

IN SEARCH OF EASTERN BEAUTY
Creating National Parks
in Atlantic Canada
1935-1970

by

ALAN ANDREW MACEACHERN

A thesis submitted to the Department of History
in conformity with the requirements for
the Ph.D. degree

Queen's University
Kingston, Ontario, Canada
September, 1997

copyright © Alan Andrew MacEachern, 1997



National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Acquisitions et
services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-22480-5

Abstract

The following is a history of the establishment and management of the first four national parks in Atlantic Canada: Cape Breton Highlands (created in Nova Scotia in 1936); Prince Edward Island (P.E.I., 1936); Fundy, (New Brunswick, 1947); and Terra Nova (Newfoundland, 1957). Because these were the only parks created in Canada between 1930 and 1968, this thesis also documents the changing idea of what the National Parks Branch (the precursor to Parks Canada) believed parks should be.

Parks are meant to signify a culture's civility, a willingness to sacrifice resource use so that nature can be appreciated, if only within very fixed boundaries. Canada's first parks, located in the West, came to typify the national park ideal: they were huge, pristine, and mountainous. When forced by provincial and federal demands to make the park system truly national in the 1930s, the Parks Branch feared the Atlantic region did not possess the requisite characteristics: it had long been settled, had few large wild animals, and lacked sublime scenery. Attempting to make the new parks conform to the Western ideal and yet believing them necessarily poor imitations, staff developed Cape Breton Highlands and Prince Edward Island National Parks to be traditional seaside resorts that would also attract mass tourism. Both parks allowed for the spatial division of upper and middle class tourists.

But the idea of how best to integrate nature and culture was not static. Fundy National Park, established postwar, paid homage to the period's idea of recreational democracy, and the dream of society-wide affluence. Fundy was highly developed, with all amenities located in one area so that the masses could vacation together. Terra Nova National Park, in contrast, was created in the early stages of a North American back to nature movement. Seeing an opportunity to once again promote parks as places capable of defining one's cultural position, this time based on an ability to appreciate parks for their nature, staff designed Terra Nova to be a wilderness-oriented park.

The thesis concludes with two thematic chapters examining management issues common to all four parks. The first such chapter focuses on issues of use, with reference to tourism, business concessions, and resource extraction. The second focuses on issues of preservation, with reference to wildlife, fish, and vegetation. In the 1930s and during the war, the Parks Branch was relatively passive in both preservation and use. Greater funding and a more managerial ecological science led to a more interventionist approach in the late 1940s and 1950s. By 1960, with greater awareness of the damage being done to parks by intervention, the Parks Branch promised a more hands-off style for the future. However, with visitor use on the increase and the nature in parks more threatened than ever, it is not surprising that a clash over the question of intervention resonated throughout the Canadian park system in the 1960s.

Acknowledgments

Sitting in a small house on the road into Ingonish, just outside Cape Breton Highlands National Park, I listened attentively while Maurice Donovan, 89, told of being expropriated from the park in 1939. His wife, Emma, sat nearby, quiet at first but then intervening more and more to correct and clarify, speaking first to her husband and soon directly to me. Their farm had become the ninth and tenth holes of the park golf course, and by the time the Donovans left in 1939 golfers were fading their shots around the house. (Strange that Maurice would interject later in our talk, "Golf is a wonderful game.") Maurice was talking about his confrontation with the course contractor, Bill Stewart, who crossed Maurice's emotional boundary in being the only park person to drive across the farm whenever he saw fit. Maurice said,

I came up to the clubhouse one morning and they were all sitting on the patio out front and Bill Stewart saw me and I went up to him. I was polite, but said, "It's still my property. I'd like to tell you before you come tomorrow morning not to cross my line or you'll get buckshot in the arse." Stewart tore off his sweater, and I tore off my coat. "Come on. Come on."

Demonstrating, Maurice sprang up from his chair, big grin on his face, ripping off the cardigan he was wearing, his body poised, his fists ready. He subsided just as quickly: "But Cullen got between us and...." Things were smoothed over, and in time he and Stewart even got along; a respect formed. Maurice continued to talk, settling back down in his chair, but my heart was still pounding. In researching this thesis, I planned to be the all-seeing observer, the calm chronicler of all sides of

national park policymaking. I did not want 89-year-old men leaping at me, if only to tell 55-year-old stories.

Most conversations were more restrained than this one, but throughout my research I continually found strongly held beliefs in the quiet insistences of expropriated landowners, past park staff, and even Parks Canada documents. Much of the argument was of a simple park vs. non-park, us vs. them variety. But underlying the words, it seemed, was a desire to explain personal feelings about how people interact, how society works, and how people interact with nature. People's relations to the parks raised all three issues. When it came time to write the thesis, their words made it impossible for me to treat the subject in total abstraction. The four parks being studied are still in existence, the communities around them still in a love-hate relationship with Parks Canada. I want to thank those who talked to me, and made my study more than just an academic exercise.

In Nova Scotia, thanks to Wilf and Claudette Aucoin, Eva and Ernest Deveau, Angus Leblanc, Wilfred Boudreau, Wilfred Aucoin, Charlie Dan Roach, Neil MacKinnon, Fred Williams, Emma and Maurice Donovan, Gordon Doucette, and Ronald Dauphinee. Special thanks to Superintendent Tim Reynolds of Cape Breton Highlands National Park and Barry Cahill, Archivist at the Provincial Archives of Nova Scotia.

In Prince Edward Island, thanks to Ernest and Bernice Smith, Ralph Burdett, Alfred Morrison, and George and Joyce Robinson. Thanks to Barb MacDonald of the Prince Edward Island National Park for allowing me to sift through archival records on hand, and the staff of the Provincial Archives of Prince Edward Island for making sure I did not forget anything.

In New Brunswick, thanks to Audley Haslam, Bob Keirstead, Winnie Smith, Winnie and Leo Burns, Ann and Dan Keith, Roy Groves, and Larry Hughes. Thanks to Superintendent Mart Johanson, John Brownlee, and Alain Chevette at Fundy National Park.

In Newfoundland, thanks to Art Hefferin, George Squires, Mark Lane, Hector Chaulk, Don Spracklin, Ralph Ford, Dennis Chaulk, Hector and Wayne Chaulk, Mildred and Clayton King, and Judy Day. Also, thanks to Superintendent Chip Bird and Attila (Ted) Potter of Terra Nova National Park, and to Chris Dennis at the Centre for Newfoundland Studies.

Thanks also to those who asked that their names not be used.

In Ottawa, thanks to Patrick Burden, archivist at the National Archives of Canada, for leading me through the maze of RG84 and RG22.

Thanks to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the School of Graduate Studies at Queen's University, and the Department of History at Queen's University for financial support during the writing of this thesis.

Thanks to Madeline DeWolf and Robin Winks for help along the way. For their friendship and support, thanks to Jamie Allum, Richard Prinsen, Jeff Brison, Heidi and Paul Maroney, Kirsten and Doug Stewart, Ed and Sheila Lund-MacDonald, Michael and Jennifer Boudreau, and the staff of the Grad Club. A special thanks to readers Jeannie Prinsen and Colin Duncan. Thanks always to my family in Prince Edward Island and Maine.

A special thanks to my two supervisors, Ian McKay, who read every word of this several times, and George Rawlyk, who, I regret, read none.

And the specialest thanks to and for Genevieve Warner.

Table of Contents

| | |
|--|-----|
| List of Maps and Illustrations | vii |
| Chapter 1 | |
| Introduction: | |
| A Walk at Herring Cove | 1 |
| <u>Part 1: In Search of Eastern Beauty</u> | |
| Chapter 2 | |
| The National Parks Branch | 32 |
| Chapter 3 | |
| A Tartan Sublime: | |
| Establishing Cape Breton Highlands National Park, c.1936 | 72 |
| Chapter 4 | |
| The Greening of Green Gables: | |
| Establishing Prince Edward Island National Park, c.1936 | 118 |
| Chapter 5 | |
| The Most Perfect Place in the World: | |
| Establishing Fundy National Park, c.1947 | 163 |
| Chapter 6 | |
| Sawed-off, Hammered-down, Chopped-up: | |
| Establishing Terra Nova National Park, c.1957 | 215 |
| <u>Part 2: A Pious Hope</u> | |
| Chapter 7 | |
| Accommodations and Concessions: | |
| Use in Four Atlantic Canadian | |
| National Parks, 1935-1965 | 263 |
| Chapter 8 | |
| Changing Ecologies: | |
| Preservation in Four Atlantic Canadian | |
| National Parks, 1935-1965 | 325 |
| Chapter 9 | |
| Conclusion | 400 |

| | |
|--------------------|-----|
| Bibliography | 421 |
| Appendices | 447 |
| Vita | 449 |

List of Maps and Illustrations

| Figure | Between pages |
|--|---------------|
| 1. The Road to Herring Cove, 1930 and 1994 | 1-2 |
| 2. Map of Atlantic Canada National Parks, c.1967 | 4-5 |
| 3. Cartoon, 1934 | 59-60 |
| 4. Snapshot of Cape Breton Highlands National Park | 71-72 |
| 5. Map of Cape Breton Highlands National Park | 71-72 |
| 6. Snapshot of Prince Edward Island National Park | 117-118 |
| 7. Map of Prince Edward Island National Park | 117-118 |
| 8. Snapshot of Fundy National Park | 162-163 |
| 9. Map of Fundy National Park | 162-163 |
| 10. Snapshot of Terra Nova National Park..... | 214-215 |
| 11. Map of Terra Nova National Park | 214-215 |
| 12. <u>Playgrounds of Eastern Canada</u> cover | 272-273 |
| 13. Campground at Stanhope Beach | 276-277 |
| 14. Playground at Stanhope Beach | 276-277 |
| 15. Swimming Pool at Fundy | 276-277 |
| 16. Robinson's Island, 1880 | 317-318 |
| 17. Robinson's Island, 1960-1990 | 320-321 |
| 18. Warden Ben Roper with DDT Fogger | 379-380 |
| 19. Cartoon, 1973 | 415-416 |

Chapter 1

Introduction:

A Walk at Herring Cove

On a cool September day in 1994, Ann Keith and her husband Dan led me down to Herring Cove, just west of Alma, New Brunswick. Ann is a fit, lively woman; it is difficult to believe she spent two summers at cottages here sixty years ago, hoping the Bay of Fundy air would cure her whooping cough. She showed me relics from those times. Coins from Norwegian sailors. A grainy image of the stevedores' bunkhouse perched at the water's edge. A 1934 letter asking her mother to send the cat. We clambered on the treed banks like children or archaeologists, re-creating the community of cottages. Apple trees grew within and obscured the foundation of Captain Rolfe's home, there. That's the concrete base of Judge Jonah's cabin. The four-seater would have been right here. This is the old road.

The cottages are gone and the trees have taken over because a 70-square-mile area around Herring Cove became Fundy National Park in 1947. As a park, the land was expected to be natural, so the property rights of individual owners were negated through expropriation, and the land was conferred to the people of Canada. The Canadian National Parks Branch¹ allowed the area to return to nature. In the late 1960s,

¹ During the period covered in this thesis, the federal agency in charge of national parks in Canada was named the Dominion Parks Branch (1911-1921), the Canadian National Parks Branch (1921-1926), the National Parks Branch (1926-1936), the Lands, Parks and Forests Branch (1936-1947), the Lands and Development Services Branch (1947-1950), the Development Services Branch (1950), the National Parks Branch (1953-1965), the National and Historic Resources Branch (1965-1966), the National and Historic Parks Branch (1966-1973), and Parks Canada (1973 on). From 1936 on, within the Branch itself



Figure 1. The Road to Herring Cove, 1930 and 1994.
Top photo from R.W. Cautley's report on possible New Brunswick
national park sites. National Archives of Canada, PA187873.
Bottom photo from the author, 1994.

the Parks Branch began to take an interest in the cultural history present in the lands they oversaw. Park historians began to document the "human histories" of the parks.² This awkward phrase hints at the problem inherent in these official publications: in each, the park's existence seems pre-determined. All human settlement prior to park establishment seems *de facto* park property. As in the parks' geological and biological surveys, the human histories made artifacts of their subjects but ignored the cultural forces that shaped the park at establishment and during the park's life.

National parks are about both nature (which we may define simply as all that is non-human) and culture (all that is human); a history of national parks that does not address both is incomplete. To create a national park is to favour the natural over the cultural, even if only temporarily and within a fixed location. Human plans for the land are (theoretically) superseded so that the land can (theoretically) thrive unhindered. Nature's efforts to return and block out the signs of past settlement, as at Herring Cove, seem almost a validation of the park: this is indeed a natural place. But although culture, like the cottages' foundations, is difficult to see, it is nonetheless present. The markings

there was an agency involved solely with national park management. Its name was, by turns, the National Parks Bureau (1936-1947), the National and Historic Sites Division (1950-1955), and the National Park Service (1947-1950 and 1955 on). For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to the National Parks Branch throughout. This seems reasonable for three reasons: 1) most importantly, it was at the branch level that park policy was decided; 2) the park agency began its existence at the branch level, and in 1973 became Parks Canada at the branch level; and 3) this name serves to differentiate the Canadian agency from the United States' National Park Service. A list of federal ministries in charge of parks, plus senior staff, may be found in Appendix 1.

² For the parks under discussion in this thesis, the titles are Judith V. Campbell, "A Report on the Human History of Cape Breton Highlands National Park," 2 vols., no date; Fred Horne, Human History: Prince Edward Island National Park (Charlottetown: Parks Canada, 1979); Gilbert Allardyce, "The Salt and the Fir: Report on the History of the Fundy Park Area," unpublished manuscript, 1969; and Kevin Major, Terra Nova National Park: Human History Study (Ottawa: Parks Canada, 1983).

left by permanent settlers have only been replaced by those of more transient visitors: cottages are replaced by campgrounds, four-seaters by modern public facilities. And more than this, the naturalness of the park is itself a product of cultural decisions. People chose this land to be a national park for a variety of aesthetic, economic, and political reasons, and every subsequent decision also bore cultural weight. We cannot see national parks as natural without understanding that it is our culture that has made them so and declares them so.

Of course, national parks are fashioned by nature, too. In Fundy National Park, fields were allowed to grow back into forests, but the trees grew on their own. Perhaps the best way of showing that parks are natural creations is by thinking counterfactually: asking how Fundy would be different if created on Ellesmere Island, or located one hundred yards east of Alma rather than west. Historians are bound to lose their way once they begin to think this way; describing the nature in a national park and what this has meant to its history is a difficult task. But it is a hike worth taking, if only because it is this nature that the Parks Branch wished to save (and change), and this nature that is the product of what they saved (and what they changed).

In national parks, the cultural and the natural merge, as they do everywhere else. But parks are particularly interesting because they are places where humans believe they have made nature paramount. As such, parks can help us see how nature has been viewed by people. How was this land chosen as a potential park, and by whom? What vision did those who made this choice have for the new park? What human activities were permitted to interfere with nature in the park? And how

did this balance between nature and culture change during the life of the park?

What follows is a study of how the Canadian National Parks Branch struck that balance in the establishment and management of Cape Breton Highlands National Park (created in 1936), Prince Edward Island National Park (1936), Fundy National Park (1947), and Terra Nova National Park (1957). These are noteworthy national parks in that they were the first created in Atlantic Canada, and the only ones created in Canada between 1930 and 1968. For both these reasons, their histories can help fulfill two major aims of this dissertation. First, they can show how aesthetic judgments about different kinds of nature can affect the treatment of that nature. Second, they can show how the treatment of nature changes over time, in part due to changing aesthetic preferences.

In responding to the provincial demands and federal exigencies for Eastern parks in the 1930s and onwards, the National Parks Branch was forced to adapt its existing aesthetic to entirely new circumstances. Until then, the national park ideal was the sublime scenery found at Western parks such as Banff and Jasper, with canyons, waterfalls, and above all, mountains. Atlantic Canada did not possess such scenic extremes, nor did it possess in quantity or variety the large animals that visitors to the Western parks enjoyed. Moreover, most parts of Atlantic Canada had been settled for generations, and thus the region was believed not to possess a requisite sense of wildness. Though the Parks Branch tried to apply a traditional model to the Cape Breton Highlands and Prince Edward Island parks, staff's feelings about the region's natural inadequacies ensured that the new parks would be, to their minds, imperfect imitations. Thus these first two Atlantic Canadian parks were




Figure 2. Map of Atlantic Canada National Parks, c.1967.
 From David M. Baird, *Nature's Heritage: Canada's National Parks*
 (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada Ltd., 1967).

designed as resorts with some pretension to gentility, but also as destinations for mass tourism. At Prince Edward Island National Park in particular, so far from the Branch's image of what a park should be, tourism development was much more intrusive on the park landscape than would have been tolerated elsewhere.

The distinction made between "high" mountain parks and "low" coastal parks offers a fitting topographical application to a central contention of this thesis: that many of the Parks Branch's decisions were made in an attempt to maintain the parks as symbols of high culture.³ Beginning at Banff in 1885, national parks had always been resorts catering to wealthy tourists from Canada and elsewhere. Parks were sold as epitomizing fine attributes such as a taste for beauty, a love of nature, and national pride. In Pierre Bourdieu's Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, the author argues that such aesthetic consumption, whether of art or landscape, serves the same function as any other sort of consumption: it helps to legitimate social differences. People learn to enjoy those objects, entertainments, and views which they believe will reinforce their social position.⁴ In the case presented here, national parks promised to infuse their visitors with cultural capital. By their very attendance, tourists proved themselves well-cultured. As the caretaker of the parks, the Parks Branch was in the position to judge what natural and cultural features did and did not

³ A wonderful essay on the aesthetic differences between curvaceous and flat land is Jose Knighton, "Eco-porn and the Manipulation of Desire," Wild Earth (Spring 1993).

⁴ Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1984), especially chapter 1, "The Aristocracy of Culture," pp.11-96.

conform to the park aesthetic. In turn, it was in the position to be thought a high culture institution itself.

However, as Lawrence Levine explains in Highbrow/Lowbrow: The Emergence of Cultural Hierarchy in America, the boundaries between cultural groups are always shifting, so that those who wish to remain of a certain standing must continually adapt to new situations and adopt new tastes and preferences.⁵ The Parks Branch could not rely on a timeless, permanent, single model as an ideal. To maintain its system's prestige – and its own – the agency had to adapt constantly to changing times. However, it was very difficult for the Parks Branch to accomplish such aesthetic shifts, because the park mandate demanded that parks be maintained unchanged. For this very reason, studying four parks at their establishment is quite worthwhile: it was here, in the early days of the park, that many of the developmental decisions were made, defining each park as one of a certain era and setting its future in stone. Thus Fundy National Park, created in the late 1940s, was not designed as a resort like the first two Maritime parks had been only a decade earlier, but more like a suburb representing the promise of society-wide affluence. The headquarters area at Fundy with its many amenities was a response to the period's belief in recreational democracy. In the following years, the Branch noted the germination of a back to nature movement in North America. Staff again recognized the opportunity to equate parks with high culture ideals, this time by dividing visitors not directly in class terms but in more intellectual ones: by an ability or

⁵ "[B]ecause the primary categories of culture have been the products of ideologies which were always subject to modifications and transformations, the perimeters of our cultural divisions have been permeable and shifting rather than fixed and immutable." Lawrence Levine, Highbrow/Lowbrow: The Emergence of Cultural Hierarchy in America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), p.8.

inability to appreciate parks for their natural rather than their cultural features. The Terra Nova National Park, created in 1957, was therefore far less developed by the Parks Branch than Fundy had been, and was instead more of a wilderness-oriented national park.

The selection of these four parks as the dissertation's focus was determined by hopes of documenting the changing notion of what the Canadian National Parks Branch thought a park should be from 1930 to 1970. But focusing on Cape Breton Highlands, Prince Edward Island, Fundy, and Terra Nova parks serves other purposes as well. First, it fills in several historiographical gaps. Most historical work on Canadian parks focuses on their infancy, from the establishment of Banff in 1885 to the 1930 passage of the National Parks Act. Studying the first four Atlantic parks permits a view of the more recent past, and the expansion and maturity of the park system. In the same vein, the preponderance of historical research has been on Western Canadian parks. An account of the expansion to the East helps explain how making the park system truly national affected the system's policies and philosophy. Second, an examination of these parks can contribute to a better understanding of Canadian ecological science in this period. Parks were constantly referred to as "laboratories" and used for "experiments" in the latest wildlife, fish, and vegetation management policies. Finally, these were the first Canadian national parks to involve the removal of significant numbers of landowners. Studying the rationales for expropriation made by park staff helps to answer the questions of what "preservation" was meant to preserve, and why some "use" was considered unacceptable.

Practical considerations defined the limit of the project. I chose not to deal with all Atlantic Canadian national parks nor to carry

discussion of the four parks under study through to the present, in both cases due to the unavailability of archival records. The choice not to view all Canadian parks from 1930 to 1975 was more difficult, as it prevents the project from dealing comprehensively with topics such as predator control and townsite planning, which were important on the national, but not the Atlantic, scene. But to have examined parks more broadly would have eliminated the possibility of studying a few more thoroughly at the local level. This seemed a greater loss; an integral part of policy formulation and implementation in Canada is the tension between the local, provincial, and federal levels. While predator control and townsite planning are largely absent from this account, the greater issues they address – the manipulation of nature and the relationship between parks, citizens, and business – are present in other guises.

The remainder of this introductory chapter outlines the three theoretical and geographical planes on which this study simultaneously travels. At the first level, this thesis deals with the interaction of culture and nature in 20th century North America. A special concern here will be to find a language that can adequately describe nature and discuss its role in history as an independent entity entitled to consideration for its own sake. Specifically, I will examine the ability of environmental history as a discipline to do so. At the second level, this thesis is concerned with the institutional character of the Canadian National Parks Branch. The Parks Branch was forced to accommodate federal, provincial, and local interests while maintaining its own conviction of what parks were to be. Its history in seeking a balance between park preservation and park use is a real-life rendition of the theoretical struggle between nature and culture. At the third level, this thesis will

tell the stories of the Cape Breton Highlands, Prince Edward Island, Fundy, and Terra Nova National Parks themselves. This is perhaps the most important level to me, for it is here that the small ironies of our simultaneous love and exploitation of nature shine through. We need to understand small places like Herring Cove – its name a small fish and a small bay – to understand how culture and nature interact.

of nature and culture

The most important of North American national park histories, Alfred Runte's 1979 National Parks: The American Experience, is prefaced with the promise, "What follows, then, is an interpretive history; people, events, and legislation are treated only as they pertain to the *idea* of national parks."⁶ Eleven years later, Runte followed up with Yosemite: The Embattled Wilderness, a book with a method, style, and theme similar to those of his earlier work. Yet here he announces, "What follows is an environmental history. People, buildings, and traditions are treated only as they pertain to evolving philosophies of park management and use."⁷ Of interest are not the passages' clear similarities but rather their primary difference: why has an "interpretive" history become an "environmental" one? As Runte might say, what follows?

Environmental history was born out of the rise of environmentalism in North America in the 1960s and 1970s, and the

⁶ Alfred Runte, National Parks: The American Experience, 2nd ed. (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1987 [1979]), p.xix.

⁷ Runte, Yosemite: The Embattled Wilderness (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), p.2.

corresponding rise of scholarly interest in the questions raised by the movement. The few historians who began to study the relationship of humans to nature soon found themselves part of a longer historical tradition. Thus Roderick Nash could, in 1970, write a review essay entitled "The State of Environmental History," simultaneously naming a new discipline and suggesting its prior existence.⁸ Older works were incorporated into an environmental history canon: George Perkins Marsh's 1864 Man and Nature (on manmade changes to nature), Lucien Febvre's 1932 A Geographical Introduction to History (on social geography), Samuel Hays' 1959 Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency (on environmental politics), and Clarence Glacken's 1967 Traces on the Rhodian Shore (on thought about the environment) all qualified. In this context, Alfred Runte's inclination toward environmental history is understandable. His work since the 1970s on the national park idea – what might be considered intellectual or institutional history, and what he calls interpretive history – had become environmental history by 1990. One might also conclude that Runte had more incentive to be defined as an environmental historian in 1990, because by then the field was established, even trendy.

In A River Runs Through It, Norman MacLean writes that his book was rejected by one publisher with the comment, "These stories have trees in them."⁹ If environmental history is simply history with trees in it, one has to wonder what purpose it serves. We can best understand environmental history today as experiencing an adolescence much as the

⁸ Roderick Nash, "The State of Environmental History," The State of American History, ed. Herbert J. Bass (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp.249-260.

⁹ Norman MacLean, A River Runs Through It and Other Stories (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p.ix.

better-known women's history did a decade ago. Arising from a political movement of the 1960s and 1970s, women's history considered women as a worthy subject of enquiry. The new history's mandate was to return its subject to its rightful place in history. However, in time the weakness of this position became apparent. The very foundation of women's history – that women's lives have been socially and historically, rather than biologically, marginalized – suggested that women's history needed to be from that point forward forever parenthesized as "women's" history. As Joy Parr states, "'Tell me about woman' always to some degree meant 'Tell me about someone who will be recognizable to me as a woman.'"¹⁰ The result was a move away from a mainly descriptive women's history to one that sought to know how gender identities were formed. Before studying what women (and men) "did", gender historians sought to know how they came to be, pushed and pulled by the forces of race, class, ethnicity, and sexuality.

Environmental history has followed much the same path, to a point. Many of its practitioners felt that highlighting nature's place in the history of human affairs was a reasonably straightforward enterprise. In all of Runte's work, for example, the history of national parks seems to be an exercise in connecting the political and intellectual dots that led Americans from anthropocentrism to an awakening love of nature. Just as women's history envisioned filling the historical canvas by painting women in, environmental history hinted that an even more total history would be achieved once nature was part of history. The first Canadian environmental history reader, published in 1995, noted in the

¹⁰ Joy Parr, "Gender History and Historical Practice," Canadian Historical Review, vol.76 no.3 (September 1995), p.362.

introduction that "Because environmental history calls for analyses that integrate processes such as class, gender, ethnicity, and setting, this approach has the limitless ambition of an all-encompassing historical understanding."¹¹ To be sure, many environmental historians have attempted to give the field a more firm grounding. The most influential of these, Donald Worster, described the "three clusters of issues" that environmental history addresses: 1) nature itself as it has existed over time, 2) the socioeconomic realm in which nature and culture interact, and 3) the intellectual realm in which humans supply nature with meaning.¹² While Worster's model has met with disagreement, it has a simple and coherent structure familiar to other environmental historians.¹³

¹¹ Chad Gaffield and Pam Gaffield, "Introduction," Consuming Canada: Readings in Environmental History, eds. Chad Gaffield and Pam Gaffield (Toronto: Copp Clark Ltd., 1995), p.5.

¹² See Donald Worster's, "Appendix: Doing Environmental History," The Ends of the Earth: Perspectives on Modern Environmental History, ed. Donald Worster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp.289-307, and "Transformations of the Earth: Toward an Agroecological Perspective in History," in "A Round Table: Environmental History," Journal of American History, vol.76 no.4 (March 1990), pp.1087-1106.

¹³ Richard White sees within Worster's model an unconscious homage to a model of base (natural history), structure (modes of production), and superstructure (culture and ideology). White believes Worster fixates on the role capitalism plays in determining environmental change, to the degree that his model ignores other forms of environmental analysis. Richard White, "Environmental History, Ecology, and Meaning," in "A Round Table," pp.1111-1115. William Cronon accepts the tripartite model – which he simplifies as "Nature, political economy, and belief" – though he feels that environmental historians generally fail to include all three, and that most works are either materialist or idealist in character. Cronon, "Modes of Prophecy and Production: Placing Nature in History," in "A Round Table," pp.1123-1131. Barbara Leibhardt's model breaks environmental history down into ecology, human economic relations, and cognition. Leibhardt, "Interpretation and Causal Analysis: Theories in Environmental History," Environmental History Review, vol.12 no.1 (1988), p.24. Carolyn Merchant suggests that Worster needs to add a fourth issue, that of reproduction (see Merchant, "Gender and Environmental History," in "A Round Table," pp.1117-1122) but, interestingly, in another context she mimics Worster's model with a list of the three questions environmental history poses: "1) What concepts describe the world? 2) What is the process by which change occurs?" and "3) How does a society know the natural world?" (see Merchant, "The Theoretical Structure of Ecological Revolutions," Environmental Review, vol.11 no.4 (Winter 1987), pp.265-274.)

Surveying the field of environmental history in a 1994 article, Dan Flores writes approvingly, "In its brief three decades, modern environmental history has made a name for itself primarily as a field that has offered up stimulating studies of environmentalism as a socio-political movement, of intellectual ideas about nature, and specific environmental events of historical importance."¹⁴ This is fainter praise than he intends. If environmental history uses nature simply as a topic but seeks its explanations elsewhere, such as in political or intellectual history, it will necessarily be subsumed by those larger studies.¹⁵ I may, like Runte, change my business cards and become an environmental historian, but this seems an incomplete conversion if I only believe that nature is a place where history occurs and do not also believe that nature is somehow involved in how history occurs. Environmental historians have not been very successful in expressing nature's role. Perhaps we have been slow to understand the implication of the discipline's foundation: that nature is historically contingent. This should lead us to the realization that "Tell me about nature" always to some degree means "Tell me about something that will be recognizable to me as nature." Environmental historians must follow the example of women's historians and stop taking their subject for granted. They must ask what nature is and what nature does.

"Nature is," says William Cronon, "the place where we are not."¹⁶ This definition possesses the two necessary ingredients of a useful

¹⁴ Dan Flores, "Place: An Argument for Bioregional History," Environmental History Review, vol.18 no.4 (Winter 1994), p.14.

¹⁵ This is a point made by Richard White, in "American Environmental History: The Development of a New Historical Field," Pacific Historical Review, no.54 (August 1985), p.317.

¹⁶ Cronon, Nature's Metropolis (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1991), p.18. On "nature",

introduction to the idea of nature. First, it offers a simple, working notion of nature as all that is nonhuman. Second, it refutes the simplicity of this notion, by ironically intimating that we arbitrarily distance the human species from the rest of the planet. In reality, of course, the idea of nature is more complicated. We breathe in nature, stand on nature, depend on nature for our survival at every moment. And in return, we as a species change nature, in everything from providing sanctuary for bacteria to building dams that affect the earth's rotation. The idea of a culture/nature dichotomy is an imperfect, anthropocentric one – which is not surprising since we are humans (as naturalist John Livingston notes, his dogs are guilty of canimorphizing).¹⁷ We need the term "nature" if we are to begin discussion of the relationship between humans and the non-human world without constantly resorting to quotation marks.¹⁸

But even having defined nature in such a way, it is much more difficult to describe it. What language is to be used? For instance, to describe Herring Cove, should the words of park engineers, geologists,

see Raymond Williams, "Ideas of Nature," in Problems in Materialism and Culture (London: Verso, 1980), pp.67-85; and Neil Evernden, The Social Creation of Nature (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1992).

¹⁷ John A. Livingston, Rogue Primate: An Exploration of Human Domestication (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1994), p.82.

¹⁸ The two words that have been popularly used in "nature"'s stead in the last thirty years – ecology and environment – have done nothing to resolve confusion. "Ecology" can refer to a science, a movement, or a relationship between an organism and its surroundings. "Environment" has suffered much the same problem, serving as short form for a movement, as well as both a way of describing humans as part of their surroundings and describing those surroundings themselves. For these reasons, I will avoid the use of "ecology" and "environment" throughout. On ecology and environment, see Robert P. McIntosh, The Background of Ecology: Concepts and Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), especially pp.1-16; and Neil Evernden, The Natural Alien: Humankind and Environment (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985). D.W. Meinig's "Introduction" to The Interpretation of Ordinary Landscapes: Geographical Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp.3-11, offers a helpful distinction between "nature", "scenery", "landscape", and "environment."

biologists, or limnologists be preferred over those of expropriated landowners and contemporary travel writers? Should the focus be on the visible landscape, on larger environmental indicator species, or on the microbiological and climatological levels as well? The answer certainly is that there will be occasion to depend on each, selectively, and to depend on the different descriptions that result to tease out a general description of what Herring Cove is. Any description that results will be still be far from complete. As Cronon notes, "Whereas fields like women's history and African-American history have sought to recover the 'lost' voices of 'ordinary people' by letting their 'subjects speak for themselves,' we can never hope to discover quite so certain or autonomous a voice for the natural actors that participate in our own narratives."¹⁹

This might seem to stop the project before it begins. But environmental history may at this point benefit from a recent offshoot of literary theory called ecocriticism, which studies nature in literature.²⁰ Ecocritics accept that an inability to translate nature accurately to language is a fundamental reality of writing about nature. However, this should not impose paralysis, but rather modesty and accommodation. Ecocritic Lawrence Buell writes, "one has to imagine. One has to invent, to extrapolate, to fabricate. Not in order to create an alternative reality but to see what without the aid of the imagination

¹⁹ Cronon, "The Uses of Environmental History," Environmental History Review, vol.17 no.3 (Fall 1993), p.21 fn.12.

²⁰ Ecocriticism has blossomed from the pages of the Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment. As the following discussion will make clear, I have been influenced by Lawrence Buell's The Environmental Imagination: Thoreau, Nature Writing, and the Formation of American Culture (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1995), which may be called the first self-consciously ecocritical book, and by conversations on the Internet with members of the American Society for Literature and the Environment.

isn't likely to be seen at all."²¹ After all, the suggestion that descriptions of nature are social creations does not necessarily take away in the slightest from the suggestion that there is a nature with its own independent reality. The environmental historian's job is to observe the aesthetic prejudices and personal interests that tint each text, the better to understand the ways that humans represent nature; and it also, once this filter is recognized, entails seeking a closer approximation of nature. This does not mean that all environmental historians must be primarily discourse analysts, but it does mean that they show a concern for understanding how nature has been described by others and is to be described in their own work. Above all, this means accepting that each description of nature is a mediation between language and real nature. As Buell rather unartfully notes, "Should this or that literary expression of gratitude at one's return to nature be taken as responding to nature, or disguising a human interest ..., or simply as affirming the tradition of nature affirmations? The answer to such questions is always 'both.' [sic]"²²

Finding a way to describe what nature is goes a long way toward finding a way to describe what nature does. It is a truism in environmental history that nature is more than just a stage on which

²¹ Buell, p.102.

²² *Ibid.*, p.35. My enthusiasm for Buell's work does not mean that I believe ecocriticism to be "better" or even as mature a discipline as environmental history. Neither does my reliance on Buell here mean to suggest that he was the first to recognize that a description of nature involves both nature and observer. Just two recent examples of writers' discussion of this are Philip Dearden in "Philosophy, Theory, and Method in Landscape Evaluation," *The Canadian Geographer*, vol.29 no.3 (1985) and Barry Lopez in *Arctic Dreams: Imagination and Desire in a Northern Landscape* (New York: Bantam Books, 1986). Dearden describes beauty as "an interaction between landscape and observer rather than specifically residing in one or the other." (p.264) Lopez writes, for instance, "What one thinks of any region, while traveling through, is the result of at least three things: what one knows, what one imagines, and how one is disposed." (p.271)

history takes place; it is a participant. But if so, how important a participant? Some historians look longingly, I think, to the environmental determinist works of writers such as Frederick Jackson Turner and Walter Prescott Webb. To these writers, nature dominated culture: the immense presence and harsh environment of the American West stripped settlers clean of the vestiges of European culture, allowing them to grow into Americans, pursuing happiness, bearing arms, and so on.²³ More recently, historians of landscape have stood this notion on its head and argued that throughout history culture has dominated nature. In this view, nature is – in every way we look at and respond to it – a cultural construction. Moreover, it has not been a democratizing force, it has traditionally been an instrument that has served conservative, even fascist interests.²⁴ To these writers nature is so entwined with culture that nature as an entity unto itself seems to disappear. For example, Simon Schama writes in Landscape and Memory, "Landscapes are culture before they are nature...."²⁵; the word "before" strikes me as placing far too much weight on the cultural part

²³ Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1893 (Washington, D.C., 1894), pp.197-227, and Walter Prescott Webb, The Great Plains (Boston: Ginn, 1931). A more recent, implicitly environmental determinist book is William Least Heat-Moon's Prairie Earth (a deep map) (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991).

²⁴ This field has grown a rich literature in little more than a decade. See John Barrell, The Dark Side of the Landscape (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Ann Bermingham, Landscape and Ideology: The English Rustic Tradition, 1740-1860 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), Sharon Zukin, Landscapes of Power: From Detroit to Disney World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); W.J.T. Mitchell, ed., Landscape and Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Stephen Daniels, Fields of Vision: Landscape Imagery and National Identity in England and the United States (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993); and Denis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels, eds., The Iconography of Landscape: Essays on the Symbolic Representation, Design, and Use of Past Environments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

²⁵ Simon Schama, Landscape and Memory (Toronto: Random House, 1995), p.61.

of the equation. Writers like Turner and Schama have given credit to nature as shaping history, but not in ways that environmental historians should consider progress: they transform nature from a setting to a prop, and a weapon at that.

It is more helpful to see nature as an actor, but not necessarily the lead actor – an actor relating to other actors in different ways, to different degrees, at different times. For example, in saying that park staff shaped Fundy National Park in response to the natural features they found there, we really mean they acted in response to their responses to those features. There is always a dynamic involved. We should, as Lawrence Buell writes, on the one hand "acknowledge that reported contacts with particular settings are intertextually, intersocially constructed" and on the other "acknowledge that the nonbuilt environment is one of the variables that influence culture, text, and personality."²⁶ This should be a sufficient degree of environmental determinism for environmental historians. After all, if historians of class and gender can accept that neither is the sole creator of identity, surely we can say the same for humans' relationship to nature.

Having said that, this dissertation is not so much a history of four parks and their natural features as it is a history of the Canadian National Parks Branch's attitude to and treatment of those parks. In the past sixty years, a great number of geological, biological, and climatological studies have been written about these parks. I have chosen in large part not to tread the ground that Parks Canada has walked, and thus I make no attempt to consolidate these works. My

²⁶ Buell, p.13.

contribution is towards a better understanding of Parks Canada's own history, a topic the agency has been less successful in covering.

What follows, then, is an environmental history. It is so in the Runtian sense in that it takes as its main subject the human relationship to nature. But it is also environmental history in that it sees nature as a constant force in the history of Cape Breton Highlands, Prince Edward Island, Fundy, and Terra Nova National Parks. Throughout, the dissertation will call attention to how nature is described and how this reflects both nature's real and independent existence, and more centrally will examine the interests and aesthetics of those describing it. Nature will not be the foundational chapter never to be seen again, as it is in too many history books, but neither will it be the sole dominating character. It will be, as in our own lives, a constant presence, sometimes speaking, at other times quiet.

of preservation and use

The one-sentence mandate of Canada's 1930 National Parks Act is as follows:

The parks are hereby dedicated to the people of Canada for their benefit, education and enjoyment, subject to the provisions of this act and the regulations, and such parks shall be maintained and made use of so as to leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.²⁷

What begins with "benefit" is brought up short by "unimpaired". That is, the national parks are to be used by people as well as preserved from the harm that people bring. The dual nature of this mandate is entirely

²⁷ Canada, House of Commons, National Parks Act, 20-21 George V, Chapter 33, 1930.

appropriate. National parks are areas of land considered wild, free from the hand of man – that is, they are natural. Yet they are also created by and for people – that is, they are cultural. It is only logical, then, that the tug of war between preservation (the maintenance of the natural component) and use (the relinquishing of the natural to human demands) has been the constant, unresolved problem at the heart of park history.

One might think that the contest between park use and preservation would be a natural subject for Canadian academic history. It is easy to visualize it as a metaphoric battle between nature and culture, nature-loving woods walkers vs. earth-paving greedheads – or eco-fascists vs. multi-use advocates, depending on your political stripe. But this has not been the case. Robert Craig Brown's 1969 "The Doctrine of Usefulness" is still the most influential study of Canadian national park history, and the only one with which most Canadian historians are probably familiar.²⁸ Brown contends that at the birth of the national parks in 1885, there was no dispute between preservation and use, because "there is little evidence to suggest that national parks policy originated in any conviction about preserving the 'wilderness' on either aesthetic or other grounds."²⁹ Instead, John A. Macdonald's government set Banff aside to make it a tourist resort, and to exploit the trees, rivers, and mines on this reserved land. Macdonald stated at one point that "the Government thought it was of great importance that all

²⁸ Robert Craig Brown, "The Doctrine of Usefulness: Natural Resource and National Park Policy in Canada, 1887-1914," The Canadian National Parks: Today and Tomorrow, Vol. 1, eds. J.G. Nelson and R.C. Scace (Calgary: National and Provincial Parks Association of Canada and the University of Calgary, 1969), pp.94-110.

²⁹ R.C. Brown, p.107.

this section of country should be brought at once into usefulness."³⁰ Brown uses this quote to great effect, giving name to what he calls the doctrine of usefulness: the belief that parks were set aside so that the fullest use of their resources could be made by the federal government and private enterprise. Brown concludes that "the original parks policy of Canada was not a departure from but rather a continuation of the general resource policy that grew out of the National Policy of the Macdonald Government."³¹

Brown's thesis has met with no opposition in the past quarter century, perhaps especially since so much development has gone on in the parks from their beginning. Spray Lakes in Banff was dammed for hydroelectric power, coal was mined in Jasper until after the first World War, zinc and silver were taken from Yoho until after the second World War, and logging in Wood Buffalo was only recently discontinued. It would appear that Brown's catchy title even inspired American historian Alfred Runte, whose "worthless lands" thesis – that Congress only chose sites to be national parks when it was convinced the area had no natural resources of commercial value – seems a pessimistic spin on Brown's work.³²

W.F. Lothian's encyclopaedic four-volume A History of Canada's National Parks published in the mid-1970s did not respond to Brown's doctrine of usefulness, nor deal more generally with preservation and

³⁰ Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 3 May 1887, p.233, in Brown, p.98.

³¹ Brown, "Doctrine of Usefulness," p.97. See Brown, Canada's National Policy: A Study in Canadian-American Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964).

³² Runte, National Parks. See also "The National Parks: A Forum on the 'Worthless Lands' Thesis," Journal of Forest History, vol.27 (July 1983), pp.130-145. There is no evidence that Runte was aware of Brown's work. Whether the mirror thesis is coincidental or not, Runte's work perhaps tended to bolster Brown's own argument in the minds of Canadian park historians.

use.³³ Lothian's work is that most cursed of scholarly works: the commissioned history. It is avowedly partial, yet, because of the author's half-century of service with the Parks Branch, it is authoritative and comprehensive enough to steer other scholars away. As Lothian himself came to acknowledge, his masterwork is rather dry and institutional, providing little insight into the people involved in the Parks Branch and the ideal which they were attempting to enforce.³⁴

Perhaps Brown's explanation for the approach taken toward the parks in their early days could only be formulated when the wisdom of that path was in question. Preservationist impulses grew stronger within the park system and society at large in the 1960s. In 1964, park policy was established that made preservation the parks' "most fundamental and important obligation."³⁵ A revised policy statement in 1979 endorsed even stronger preservationist views, stating that retaining park land intact was the Parks Branch's prime directive. Recent historical work on Canadian parks reflects such growing preservationism, holding to Robert Craig Brown's view of park history while being more critical of its implications. Leslie Bella begins her Parks for Profit (the book's title is its abstract) with the rather ahistorical declaration, "National parks are supposed to be about preservation."³⁶ She succeeds in proving that, in

³³ W.F. Lothian, A History of Canada's National Parks, 4 vols. (Ottawa: Parks Canada, 1976). See also W.F. Lothian, A Brief History of Canada's National Parks (Ottawa: Parks Canada, 1987).

³⁴ W.F. Lothian to Gwendolyn Smart, 9 March 1984, James Smart papers, MG30 E545, National Archives of Canada [henceforth, NAC].

³⁵ Quoted in Kevin McNamee, "From Wild Places to Endangered Spaces: A History of Canada's National Parks," Parks and Protected Places in Canada: Planning and Management, eds. Philip Dearden and Rick Rollins (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.30. As will be shown in Chapter 8, I disagree with McNamee's assessment.

³⁶ Leslie Bella, Parks for Profit (Montreal: Harvest House, 1987), p.1.

fact, this has never been the case. Parks, she writes, "have not been removed from economic development, but have been the focus of that development."³⁷ One cannot help feel in reading Bella's book that parks, which she loves in theory, have been at best compromises with capitalism. Kevin McNamee's recent overview history of the park system, "From Wild Places to Endangered Spaces," accepts that economic initiatives steered the parks for much of their history, but suggests that 1960s public concern for the environment fortunately helped set parks on a higher road.³⁸ In such histories, the doctrine of usefulness is itself useful in a narrative sense: it allows the parks to begin as instruments of capitalism until redeemed by the grassroots efforts of environmentalists.

Brown's "doctrine of usefulness" thesis has been accepted rather uncritically as the perspective from which to view Canadian park history. But it is an incomplete analysis in four ways: first, its use of "usefulness" is misleading; second, it ignores preservationist impulses present at the establishment of the first park; third, it does not speak to the beliefs or policies of the park staff themselves; and fourth, it is valid as an organizing principle for only a very brief time, if at all. As a result, the constant struggle between preservation and use in the parks has gone largely unexplored. By exploring Brown's article in greater detail, it is possible to show that from the creation of Banff in 1885, there has never been only a single doctrine directing the national park system.

To begin, Brown refers to "usefulness" continually, as if it were the Macdonald government's mantra, spoken time and again in debate to indicate the plan to fully exploit the Banff area. But there is only one

³⁷ Bella, p.2.

³⁸ McNamee, pp.28-30.

reference to usefulness in the 25 pages of debate on the Banff bill,³⁹ in the passage by Macdonald cited above. Moreover, Brown ends the quote in mid-sentence:

Then it is of some importance - the Government thought it was of great importance - that all this section of the country should be brought at once into usefulness, that people should be encouraged to come there, that hotels should be built, that bath-houses should be erected for sanitary purposes, and in order to prevent squatters going in, the reservation was made.⁴⁰

Usefulness here referred specifically to making Banff a resort. All other development was secondary. It was accepted that mining and lumbering would be allowed to continue in the region because Canadians of the day accepted that nature was less important than prosperity. But to say that the Macdonald government condoned resource extraction in the park is different from saying they created the park for the sake of extraction.

Indeed, the House debates suggest that members believed parks were to be about preservation, and endorsed this goal as a good thing. The resort, after all, was to be government-run to prevent the capitalist excesses that had ruined the hot springs resort areas in Arkansas and Virginia. And whereas Brown contends that there was no interest in "preserving the 'wilderness' on either aesthetic or other grounds,"⁴¹ it

³⁹ Brown uses "usefulness" ambiguously throughout "Doctrine of Usefulness." By keeping it in quotation marks, he is both admitting that this is a principle he is arbitrarily naming, and benefiting from the reader's mistaken assumption that he is quoting its 19th century use. Note, though, on p.103 he compares the frequency of "utilization" in 1911 debates to usefulness, "the 1887 term." Also, on p.107, in a description of economic motivations, he writes, "This is what Macdonald and his colleagues had in mind when they spoke of 'usefulness.'"

⁴⁰ Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 3 May 1887, p.233.

⁴¹ Brown, "Doctrine of Usefulness," p.107.

was agreed that not just the hot springs, but the surrounding land within view as well, must be preserved. Macdonald noted in the sentence preceding his declaration on usefulness that it was considered an urgent matter, once the idea of a park was established, "that a reserve should be made at once, and that as much attention as possible should be paid to the protection of the timber in the general line of the park."⁴² This is preservation for aesthetic reasons, but it is preservation nonetheless. Macdonald knew that resource exploitation reflected poorly on a national park and, if present, must be hidden away. Opposition members understood the concept of preservation well enough to claim that national parks could not condone resource development, offering the United States' Yellowstone and Yosemite as their proof. One member vowed to side with government to keep timber licenses out of the area.⁴³ Another bluntly stated, "If you intend to keep it as a park, you must shut out trade, traffic, and mining."⁴⁴ The idea of parks for preservation was not alien to the members of the House.

If we are nonetheless to accept that the doctrine of usefulness was the dominant paradigm at the beginning of park history, we may still doubt the extent of its influence. In his article, Brown jumps from 1887 to 1911, and states that the doctrine had by then "taken on a somewhat greater degree of sophistication," meaning that it was by the later date recognized that resources should be efficiently conserved.⁴⁵ He does not refer specifically to parks at all in this period, so his thesis vis-à-vis park history is unproven beyond 1887. Also, because park records were

⁴² Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 3 May 1887, p.233.

⁴³ Ibid., p.227.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 29 April 1887, p.196.

⁴⁵ Brown, "Doctrine of Usefulness," p.103.

unavailable to Brown in 1969, his model was formulated entirely from the pages of Hansard. But since we know that even government members knew parks were to be about preservation, should we not wonder how the staff responsible for the parks after 1887 saw their job? Did they follow a doctrine of usefulness, though they were not responsible for resource extraction, or did their efforts to sustain the natural areas of the parks incline them towards a doctrine of preservation? Did they feel, for example, that they had to defend the park areas from some uses?

Ultimately, the national park system cannot be interpreted in terms of only a doctrine of usefulness or a doctrine of preservation, because the Parks Branch has been expected to fulfill the mandates of both use and preservation simultaneously. As well, use and preservation do not necessarily contradict one another: in the period covered here, preservation gained in importance even as park use rose dramatically. A more valuable indicator is the changing level of intervention that the Parks Branch permitted and itself caused in the name of both use and preservation. In the 1930s and during World War II, intervention in parks was limited, because the Branch had a shortage of funds for development and showed little interest in managing preservation. From the mid-1940s to the late-1950s, funding increased rapidly for both preservation and use, and the science of ecology which guided park preservation grew increasingly activist; as a result, the Parks Branch was much more interventionist in this period. Around 1960, the birth of a North American back to nature movement on the one hand created rapidly rising park attendance, and subsequent pressures on the park system; on the other hand, it led to calls for less direct human intrusion

on the parks' nature. Responding to demands for more intervention for park use and less intervention for park preservation, the Parks Branch in the early 1960s would have to clarify how it planned in the future to fulfill its troublesome dual mandate.

There can be no "victory" for either preservation or use: a park system demands both. Unrestrained use would make the park no different than places outside its borders, and the park as an idea would be meaningless. Likewise, unrestrained preservation would demand the exclusion of persons, a policy not only politically untenable but ecologically contrived, in that it would arbitrarily leave out one species to preserve a nature that had already been shaped by that species. Park policy demands greater latitude, so that "benefit" and "unimpaired" can continue to share space in the same sentence.

of four parks

Beyond an interest in humans' relationships to nature, and a desire to understand how national parks can and do function, a fundamental reason for writing this thesis has been to learn the stories of these four particular parks. Studying the creation of the Prince Edward Island National Park as part of a Master's thesis on tourism on P.E.I. drew me to the stories that began to emerge.⁴⁶ Stories of cows trespassing on the golf course in silent but messy protest over the expropriation of land. Stories of the Parks Branch painting the Anne of Green Gables house white with green gables to make this real house, which was said to be the model for the fictional one, more closely resemble the fictional one. In

⁴⁶ Alan MacEachern, "No Island Is An Island: A History of Tourism on Prince Edward Island, 1870-1939," Master's thesis, Queen's University, 1991.

other words, I was attracted to the ironies that were showing up. In fact, if a thesis has a defining trope, this one's is probably irony. Perhaps this is not surprising, because as Linda Hutcheon has suggested, Canadians feel comfortable with irony. It offers them the chance of addressing speakers politely but with a touch of sly confrontation.⁴⁷ And as William Cronon states, "like most modern historians," environmental historians "have a special fondness for stories that convey a sense of irony, because irony best expresses our sense of the multivalent complexity of the world."⁴⁸

Irony has been, I hope, visible in the previous two sections, in which culture/nature and use/preservation have been named as important operating principles on which to work, and then shown to be false dichotomies. The conceptual separation of human culture from nature is perhaps understandable in that we are human, but it falsely suggests that we are immune to biological processes. This, of course, is exactly the opposite of environmental history's intent. Similarly, polarizing preservation and use misses how they tend to draw on one another. Preservation has historically been an active task involving land reclamation and species re-introduction, and use for nationalistic or economic purpose has often been the reason for nature preservation. Referring to the irony in such conceptual matters seems harmless. But what of the ironies that are found in people's lives, that are present in the stories of the four parks to be studied?

⁴⁷ See Linda Hutcheon, As Canadian as ... Possible ... Under the Circumstances! (Toronto: ECW Press and York University, 1990) and Irony's Edge: The Theory and Politics of Irony (London and New York: Routledge, 1995).

⁴⁸ Cronon, "The Uses of Environmental History," p.18.

There are good reasons to have reservations about irony. It can be too easy – pointing out the peccadilloes of others with the clarity offered by hindsight. It can be too light – minimizing the importance of events with humour. In effect, it can be condescending – implicitly suggesting our own superiority by playing on the mistakes and weaknesses of the past and its people. Such condescension has been particularly dangerous in discussions about our relationship to nature. Too much environmental thought of the past few decades has disclaimed the foolishness of humans' behaviour to nature, while reverentially mouthing a preference for the company of nature over that of humans. As a result, environmentalism has been perceived as elitist and disinterested in finding solutions suitable for people as well as nature. Much of the writing has been dogmatically anti-modern (see any number of books on escaping to the wild and building your dream cabin), anti-Western civilization (such as Frederick Turner's 1983 Beyond Geography: The Western Spirit Against the Wilderness or Calvin Luther Martin's 1992 In the Spirit of the Earth), and even anti-human (especially some of Edward Abbey's later writing, and Earth First!'s manuals for ecosaboteurs). Environmental thought, in other words, has somehow become simultaneously escapist and apocalyptic. Not surprisingly, against this extremism there has been an equally extreme backlash, with the publication of recent books that seek an "ecorealist" alternative to environmentalism, promising that we can have our Western civilization and eat it, too.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ See especially Gregg Easterbrook's A Moment on the Earth: The Coming Age of Environmental Optimism (New York: Viking, 1995) on ecorealism.

And yet, irony persists; in the expropriation of farmland for a national park, the fields turned into a golf course (and the farmer becoming a golfer). In preserving a place as representative of the best of Canadian nature because it resembles the Scottish highlands. In building a causeway to permit tourists to visit an offshore island, and in doing so changing the tidal behaviour and causing the island to erode away. To use irony fairly in the writing of history, one must temper it with honest affection. The ironies that will be described in the stories of Cape Breton Highlands, Prince Edward Island, Fundy, and Terra Nova National Parks will hopefully express my affection for the people whose stories these are. I am referring not only to what might be called an easy affection for those who lost land to the national parks, but also for park staff faced with the weighty task of balancing nature and culture, and preservation and use.

The thesis is divided into two parts. Part 1, "In Search of Eastern Beauty," deals with the establishment of the first four Atlantic Canadian national parks. Chapter 2 introduces the National Parks Branch under Commissioner James Harkin, from the agency's creation in 1911 through to the mid-1930s. Chapters 3 through 6 discuss the selection, establishment, expropriation, and development of the four national parks in question. Part 2, "A Pious Hope," shifts to thematic chapters involving all four parks from 1935 to 1965, and the changing philosophy of the Parks Branch during this time. Chapter 7 studies issues of use, including tourism (with special reference to class and discrimination), business concessions, and park inviolability. Chapter 8 studies issues of preservation concerning wildlife, fish, and vegetation. Chapter 9

concludes the thesis by examining the relationship between the national parks and their surrounding communities.

Part 1 In Search of Eastern Beauty

We have advanced by leaps to the Pacific,
and left many a lesser Oregon and California
unexplored behind us.

– H.D. Thoreau,
The Maine Woods

Chapter 2

The National Parks Branch

In June of 1911 the Minister of the Interior Frank Oliver called his private secretary James Bernard ("Bunny") Harkin into his office and offered him a new job. The government was setting up a separate branch to oversee national parks, and Harkin was asked to be its commissioner. In his memoirs, Harkin would write,

Overcome by surprise I could only say that I doubted my ability since I knew nothing about the parks or what would be expected of me.

"All the better," he [Oliver] said, in his laconic way, "You won't be hampered by preconceived ideas and you can find out."¹

The park system was now in the care of a man with no experience in parks, no belief in what they should be about. Harkin would later claim that his naïveté even helped him to accept the post, "thinking that the care of a few beautiful places would be almost too cosy and delightful a task."²

This begins the Canadian National Parks Branch creation myth, the traditional story offered by park historians.³ The young bureaucrat journeyed west to visit the national parks under his control, and was transformed by what he saw there. He became a convert to

¹ James B. Harkin, The History and Meaning of the National Parks in Canada. Extracts from the Papers of the Late Jas. B. Harkin. First Commissioner of the National Parks of Canada, compiled by Mabel B. Williams (Saskatoon: H.R. Larson Publishing Co., 1987), p.5.

² Mabel Williams, Guardians of the Wild (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1936), p.3.

³ Like the biblical creation story, the Branch's also exists in a slightly different version, one in which Harkin was given the option either to head the national parks or to oversee federal water power policies. Ibid.

conservationism and soon blossomed into Canada's most influential nature lover, slowly steering the parks away from the doctrine of usefulness and towards a doctrine of preservation. He would oversee the Parks Branch for a quarter century, leading it as it grew from an Ottawa staff of seven to more than 80, and from six parks covering 4000 square miles to seventeen covering 13,000. His work was unfinished when he retired in 1936, and it would not be until decades later that the preservationist doctrine he helped formulate would gain a sort of ascendancy in the parks.

When histories of parks and conservation in Canada began to be written in the late 1960s, Harkin was an obvious candidate for founding father. In Working for Wildlife, Janet Foster writes that Harkin "articulated the most complete philosophy of wildlands preservation." He was fifty years ahead of Americans in appreciating wilderness at a time when most Canadians were fifty years behind.⁴ W.F. Lothian saw Harkin as "an ardent conservationist", J.I. Nicol called him an "idealist", and Roderick Nash noted he "had a clear conception of the aesthetic and spiritual value of wilderness."⁵ These writers forgive Harkin for also being a great booster for the economic advantages of park tourism, for filling the parks with hotels, roads, and golf courses; this, after all, is interpreted as pragmatism. To further the park agenda Harkin had to

⁴ Foster, Working for Wildlife: The Beginning of Preservation in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), p.222.

⁵ Lothian, A History, vol.2, p.16; J.I. Nicol, "The National Parks Movement in Canada," The Canadian National Parks, p.39; Roderick Nash, "Wilderness and Man in North America," ibid., p.77. Other useful in-depth studies of this period of park history include Sylvia Van Kirk, "The Development of National Park Policy in Canada's Mountain National Parks, 1885-1930," Master's thesis, University of Alberta, 1969; and Ronald Clifford Arthur Johnson, "The Effect of Contemporary Thought Upon Park Policy and Landscape Change in Canada's National Parks, 1885-1911," Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1972.

make concessions to the philistines who thought purely in economic terms.⁶ Harkin's biographers have fed off one another to the point that Gavin Henderson in a 1994 article entitled "The Father of Canadian National Parks" offers precisely no new information on the commissioner, yet goes furthest in naming him an environmentalist. Henderson writes that despite Harkin's concessions to tourism, "as we know now, he was committed to a broader perspective"⁷

In fact, we know nothing of the sort. Historians' eagerness to see Harkin's drive for dollars as a strategy rather than a philosophy tells us more about them than about him. Underlining Foster's, Lothian's, McNamee's, and Henderson's work on James Harkin is the knowledge that he was the first commissioner of the Parks Branch and he had a lengthy term at a time when the parks were relatively free of political interference, when the future policies of the parks system were being conceived. In other words, he must be important, and since the parks have done such an admirable job of preserving Canadian wilderness, he must have been a great preservationist. Therefore, Harkin becomes a hero, if only by default. That he began with no knowledge of parks makes his story all the more remarkable: national parks must truly have the power to convert people to nature.

Harkin's biographers have based their assessment of him on a very thin stack of sources. We know that he was born in Vankleek Hill, Ontario, and was educated there and at Marquette, Michigan. He

⁶ See, for example, McNamee, p.24.

⁷ Henderson, "James Bernard Harkin: The Father of Canadian National Parks," *Borealis* (Fall 1994), p.29. Henderson, it is true, is not the most neutral of biographers. He was the first executive director of the National and Provincial Parks Association of Canada (later the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society) and a winner of the society's J.B. Harkin Conservation Award.

became a newspaperman at the Ottawa Journal in 1892, leaving in 1901 to become secretary to succeeding Ministers of the Interior. He was appointed to the new Parks Branch in 1911 and was its commissioner until 1936, when he retired. He died in 1955. We know little else about Harkin's career, and the sources on him that we would expect to be illuminating are only frustrating.⁸ His archival papers do nothing to clarify his role in the formation of national parks philosophy. Rather than containing a record of his achievements in park creation and maintenance, wildlife preservation, highway construction, historic site commemoration, and so on, the papers consist almost entirely of his notes and correspondence on Vilhjalmur Stefansson's planned 1921 expedition to the Arctic. According to his longtime secretary, Harkin always considered his role as the federal government's envoy to Stefansson "The greatest thing he did for Canada."⁹ Does this mean that

⁸ The best biographical sketch is an unpublished one by W.F. Lothian to be found in Fergus Lothian Research Papers, M113 Accn.1947, folder 6, Whyte Museum of the Canadian Rockies Archives, Banff, Alberta. Thanks to Pearl Anne Reichwein for passing this on to me.

⁹ Dorothy Barbour to Mabel B. Williams, 8 June ?, Dorothy Barbour papers, in possession of Robin Winks. Barbour worked in the Parks Branch from the beginning, in 1911. Thanks to Robin Winks for sharing this material with me. There is some mystery as to why Harkin kept the Stefansson material. As Barbour wrote to Williams, "in speaking of it he always put us off saying two more have to die before the world knows - Steffansson [sic] and me." Harkin was concerned that the explorer was blackmailing the Canadians, asking for expedition money to proclaim Canadian sovereignty in the Far North, and obliquely threatening to go to the Danes or the Americans if they refused. William R. Hunt, in his Stef: A Biography of Vilhjalmur Stefansson, Canadian Arctic Explorer (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1986), p.282 fn.21, thinks this interpretation ludicrous, writing, "the Byzantine devices suggested by Harkin confound the mind." Yet in 1949 Stefansson asked Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources Hugh Keenleyside that all accounts of the proposed expedition be assembled in the National Archives and declared classified until the deaths of all involved. Harkin took this as an insinuation that he was withholding files, which he called "absurd". It is possible, then, that Harkin's archival papers consist of information that he was withholding, or conversely that their existence proves he accommodated Stefansson's demand. For more on Arctic exploration in this period, and Stefansson and Harkin's place in it, see Morris Zaslow, The Northward Expansion of Canada, 1914-1967 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1988).

he did not see his park work as particularly significant, either because it failed to interest him or because he believed that the credit for its prosperity should go to others? There is no way of knowing. In my own research on Atlantic Canadian parks, which is only a small fraction of the total park files, I came across references to Harkin being away from the office due to sickness in 1929 and 1931, and out for a slight operation in 1936.¹⁰ Was Harkin sick often enough to affect his leadership of the Branch? Or conversely did recurring medical problems help him develop the philosophy, central to park literature of the day, that nature could be medicinal? We do not know enough about Harkin, and as a result cannot know enough about the Parks Branch.

With so little biographical material available, writers have turned to Harkin's written work to flesh him out. They quote heavily from a few articles, the posthumously published extracts from a planned memoir, and his annual reports as commissioner. In doing so, his biographers have made several sizable assumptions. They have accepted uncritically that Harkin wrote all that is credited to him; that his conservationist sentiments are sincere but his economic justifications are strategic; and that what he writes is honest and unmotivated and thus corresponds exactly with how he would behave. There are valid reasons for making these decisions: they simplify the story, making Harkin more heroic, which in turn puts a face to the Branch's work. But such narrative choices have consequences. By making James Harkin the focus of all the Parks Branch's successes, writers have made him a man ahead of his time rather than a product of it. The Parks Branch becomes a

¹⁰ See February 1927, RG84 vol.2161, file U346 vol.1, NAC; January 1931, RG84 vol.483, file F2 vol.2, NAC; and 17 September 1936, RG84 vol.484, file F2 vol.3, NAC.

mere backdrop to Harkin's work, and necessarily an ineffectual organization. After all, Harkin's philosophy could only be considered progressive in relation to what would have been had he not been around.

It is easy to sympathize with historians who, in simplifying and personalizing the story, have focused on Harkin at the Parks Branch's expense; I too face the difficulty of bringing together an unruly set of facts and opinions and making them cohere. This chapter must set the scene for the establishment of parks in Atlantic Canada that are the subject of the remainder of the thesis. To do so, it must touch on the Canadian National Parks Branch philosophy, the aesthetic conventions of national parks, the rise of mass tourism to parks in the 1920s and 1930s, and the early efforts to truly nationalize the park system. The question is, how to tell the story.

This chapter begins with Harkin because I accept the premise that Harkin's tenure as parks commissioner must have been important, if for no other reason than it was the first and went on for a quarter century. In this long, stable period, many of the Branch policies were designed, tested, and corrected. But rather than search out a way to prove Harkin's personal importance, it seems more sensible to study him as representative of the Parks Branch as a whole. Arriving with no expertise about parks, he relied on his staff to help draft policy, and so served as a conduit for the philosophy germinating within the Branch. He can be seen as a personification of the organization's history – an epitome rather than an anomaly. True, this also is a storytelling form, but it is one that is not only more faithful to the information we have, but demands less of information that we do not have. For example, gaps in

our knowledge of Harkin would not be filled in with assumptions about his conservationism; rather they would be used to discuss the difficulty of uncovering Branch history. In discussing Harkin's career and writings, it may be said that they parallel the parks' history in three ways. First, though his history is understood in broad strokes, there are important gaps that have not been filled. Second, like any good Canadian he was enamoured by whatever was going on in the United States. Finally, his philosophy of parks has been oversimplified for the sake of more efficient storytelling. His writings suggest that the Parks Branch had a complex interest in both use and preservation, as well as a belief that these two were not necessarily contradictory.

the commercial and the humanitarian

Though Harkin came to the Parks Branch with an admitted lack of experience with parks, he immediately began to write knowledgeably on the financial benefits of parks and the values they promoted. This has been interpreted as a rapid conversion to wilderness advocacy, but it is much more sensible to suppose that he was relying on his staff to help draft policy. A search through the Parks Branch papers shows that often what is attributed to James Harkin was in fact first drafted by others, especially his assistant, F.H.H. Williamson, and his expert on wildlife policy, Hoyes Lloyd.¹¹ It is possible, of course, that Harkin was still very much involved, either in telling his staff what he wanted written or redrafting what was given him. But we know that the commissioner's need for advice was especially acute. What are credited as Harkin's

¹¹ I discuss this in "Rationality and Rationalization in Canadian National Parks Predator Policy," *Consuming Canada*, pp.199-200.

beliefs are more likely the beliefs of the Parks Branch as a whole than his biographers have suggested.¹²

Harkin – or, again, the Parks Branch as a whole – also relied a great deal on information obtained from the American National Park Service and American sources in general. The Canadian park system had always been close to the American one: the wording of the Rocky Mountain Park Act that officially created Banff in 1887 even mimicked the wording on the act that had created Yellowstone in 1872. A close relationship between the two park systems is understandable, given that they shared cultural histories and even shared landforms. In matters to do with nature, Great Britain's example was of far less help to Canada.¹³ The Parks Branch in the 1910s watched as the American park system more quickly grew, attracted visitors, and drew appropriations.¹⁴ James

¹² This reminds us of the difficulty in attributing anything to anyone in a large bureaucracy. In this dissertation, I have given authorial credit to the person whose signature is at the bottom of a document, unless it is specifically mentioned that someone else has drafted the document. For the sake of simplicity, in the coming pages I will cite Harkin as sole author of reports published under his name, rather than continually note that these may have been joint efforts.

¹³ One would be hard pressed to find any mention of Great Britain in any of Harkin's annual reports, or in any park correspondence for that matter. This would seem to reinforce the work of historian Richard Jarrell, who found Britain of little interest to Canadian scientists in the 19th century. See Richard A. Jarrell, "British Scientific Institutions and Canada: The Rhetoric and the Reality," Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, Series 4, vol.20 (1982), pp.533-547.

¹⁴ The Canadian and American national park systems were not much different in size in 1910, but the U.S. system began to pull away during that decade. In 1911, the U.S. had about 230,000 visitors to 12 national parks in 11 states, whereas Canada had about 75,000 visitors to six parks in two provinces. The American park system was granted \$244,000 to operate; the Canadian system, \$223,000. In 1917, the U.S. national parks had 487,000 visitors and a \$515,000 appropriation, whereas the Canadian parks had about 68,000 visitors and an appropriation of \$345,000. Canada, Department of the Interior, Annual Reports, 1911-1917. United States, Department of the Interior, Annual Reports, 1911-1920. Comparative works on Canadian-American national park policy include R.D. Turner and W.E. Rees. "A Comparative Study of Parks Policy in Canada and the United States," Nature Canada, vol.2 no.1 (1973), pp.31-36; and Marilyn Dubasek, Wilderness Preservation: A Cross-Cultural Comparison of Canada and the United States (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1990). See also Marcia B. Kline, Beyond the Land Itself: Views of Nature in Canada and the United States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,

Harkin was a firm believer that the Americans knew how things should be done, and that the Canadian park system should emulate theirs. He corresponded regularly with the National Park Service, the National Park Association, and the American Civic Association on everything from predator policy to legal aesthetic rights.¹⁵ The Branch's annual reports quoted American conservationists such as J. Horace MacFarland, Stephen Mather, Teddy Roosevelt, and Henry Thoreau with the understanding that the two countries' situations were similar. After citing MacFarland in the 1914 report, Harkin added, "His remarks, of course, referred to American parks but change the word 'American' to 'Canadian' and the concluding portion of his address crystallizes a thought of equal application to Canada."¹⁶ The commissioner's reports were especially fond of quoting John Muir, America's most prominent conservationist and founder of the Sierra Club, in speeches, articles, and reports. Henderson, Foster, and McNamee make much of this, as if restating another's philosophy is equivalent to stating one's own. But Harkin may have quoted Muir not only because he agreed with his beliefs, but also because he knew his audience was familiar with the American, and

1970); and R. Peter Gillis and Thomas R. Roach, "The American Influence on Conservation in Canada 1899-1911," Journal of Forest and Conservation History, vol.30 no.4 (October 1986), pp.160-174.

¹⁵ Harkin did also send information to the United States when asked. However, this does not seem to have occurred as often, and there was at least some opposition in Washington to helping a Canadian park system that could draw tourism away from the U.S. See Foster, p.82. In a famous letter from U.S. Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane to National Parks Service director Stephen Mather that helped shape the American park system, Lane writes, "In particular you should maintain close working relationship with the Dominion Parks Branch of the Canadian Department of the Interior, and assist in the solution of park problems of an international character." Lane, though, was from Prince Edward Island. See Lane to Mather, 13 May 1918, in America's National Park System: The Critical Documents, ed. Lary M. Dilsaver (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1993), p.51.

¹⁶ Canada, Department of the Interior, Annual Report, Report of the Commissioner of National Parks, 1915, p.8.

because to quote him was to become identified with him (which Harkin's biographers make clear is the case).

My point is not that Canadian national park philosophy was insincere, only that it was not unmotivated. The Parks Branch was trying to solidify its own meaning as an organization, and to secure funding at the same time; a discussion of its stated beliefs should recognize both realities. This is especially important in understanding Harkin's defense of both use and preservation in the parks. The usual interpretation is that the parks were first created as part of the doctrine of usefulness, a natural extension of Sir John A. Macdonald's National Policy. Under Harkin's leadership, though, use itself became a use – a tactic to bring attention and money to the parks. Years later Harkin wrote in explanation, "How could the hard-headed members of the House of Commons be persuaded to increase parks' appropriations? It is an axiom that no society will pay for something it does not value."¹⁷ The solution was to be found in tourism. Harkin wrote to American states and European countries for tourism revenue statistics and used these to convince the Canadian government that the parks were worth tens of millions each year. Often using economic multipliers multiplied by multipliers, he was able to offer exuberant statements on the economic value of scenery. Harkin calculated that wheat fields were worth only \$4.91 per acre to Canada, but scenery (presumably not wheat fields) was worth \$13.88.¹⁸ Park historians have accepted without

¹⁷ Harkin, *The History and Meaning*, p.7.

¹⁸ Harkin, Speech to Good Roads Association, Victoria B.C., 1922, cited in Bella, p.63. Defending a national parks grant increase of \$100,000 in 1920, Arthur Meighen noted that "the returns per acre being figured by the officers of the department as being more for the rocks and waste lands of our parks than even for our wheat fields." Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 8 June 1920, p.3283. On Canadian national parks and tourism, see

argument Harkin's defense, made decades after the fact, that "while we were forced in the beginning to stress the economic value of national parks we realized that there were other values far more important which would be recognized in time."¹⁹ These were results that he elsewhere calls "of a higher order -- results that serve the individual as to the welfare of his body, the activity and efficiency of his mind, and the beauty and harmony of his soul."²⁰ When Harkin speaks of such physical, spiritual, social, and national benefits of parks, he is taken at face value.²¹

But Harkin's writing suggests that the secular and the sacred justifications for park were both sincere in their time. A 1914 memo classified these as "Commercial" and "Humanitarian" reasons for parks, noting, "The commercial while very important is nevertheless subordinate to the humanitarian." He then goes on to discuss the commercial for the next 13 pages.²² The commissioner's annual reports always begin with the economic value of parks, and always in the appropriate business terms. Tourists, Harkin wrote, were "eager to spend money on trips to see outstanding natural beauty. Therefore the Canadian National Parks may be said to be in the business of selling

Bella; Michael C. Hall and John Shultis, "Railways, Tourism and Worthless Lands: The Establishment of National Parks in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States," Australian-Canadian Studies, vol.8 no.2 (1991) pp.57-74.

¹⁹ Harkin, History and Meaning, p.9.

²⁰ Harkin, "Our Need for National Parks," Canadian Alpine Journal, vol.9 (1918), p.98.

²¹ See Henderson, p.30, Nash, "Wilderness and Man," p.77, McNamee, p.24, Foster, p.79.

²² Harkin, "Memorandum re: Dominion Parks 20 March 1914," James Harkin papers, MG30 E169 vol.1, NAC. In the following pages, my use of Harkin's discussion of the commercial and the humanitarian is also meant to act as an introduction to thoughts about nature in Canadian society of the day. See also George Altmeyer, "Three Ideas of Nature in Canada, 1893-1914," Journal of Canadian Studies, vol.11 no.3 (August 1976), pp.21-26; and C. Gordon Hewitt, The Conservation of the Wildlife of Canada (New York: Scribner's, 1921).

scenery."²³ Elsewhere, it is noted that a great advantage of tourism was that "When we sell scenery, no matter how large our sales, our capital stock remains undiminished. We have the same scenery to sell over and over again."²⁴ This idea of selling scenery not only gave economic justification for the parks' existence, but also validated Canadian scenery's international stature.

Considerable space in annual reports was devoted to discussion of the humanitarian advantages of parks, particularly in the first years of Harkin's tenure. Parks made people better: physically and mentally healthier, closer to God, and more aesthetically refined. These benefits were often intertwined, and none was given preference (the boosterism is such in the commissioner's reports that at different times each benefit was declared the most important). But the space devoted to each did change. In the first years, the commissioner especially stressed the value of parks for recreation. "[T]he commercial side of National Parks is only an incident, though indeed a very important one. ... National parks are in reality national recreation grounds" Harkin wrote.²⁵ Periodically, people needed to escape the stresses of their modern lives and enjoy the benefits of the simple life. Harkin theorized that all great cultures throughout history had allowed for the exercising of the "play spirit", a rejuvenation through recreation. Though this was a physical

²³ Harkin, "Canadian National Parks and Playgrounds," The Historic Landmarks Association of Canada Annual Report, 1921, p.37.

²⁴ Harkin, Speech to Good Roads, cited in Lucy Alderson and John Marsh, "J.B. Harkin, National Parks and Roads," Park News, vol.15 no.2 (Summer 1979), p.10. Elsewhere, he proclaimed, "Each citizen of Canada is the owner of one share of stock in the National Parks. Our part is to see that the value of their holdings is kept up." Harkin, History and Meaning, p.13.

²⁵ Canada, Department of the Interior, Annual Report, Report of the Commissioner of National Parks, 1915, p.5.

rejuvenation, the park visitor did not necessarily have to exercise: just breathe fresh air, take in the sun, and regard nature. With World War I, the physical demands on Canadian bodies became more important, and so the sort of rejuvenation that the parks were offering changed. In 1916, Harkin wrote, "National Parks exist for the purpose of providing for all the people of Canada facilities for acquiring that virile and efficient manhood so noticeable in Canadian military training camps."²⁶ By the following year, with Canadians trench-deep into an exhausting war, Harkin promised the parks would "materially assist in remedying whatever the war may do to Canada's human assets."²⁷

Whereas before the war Harkin referred to rejuvenation away from the daily stresses of life, in the postwar years these stresses now seemed intolerable. "To-day" Harkin stated, "the strenuous life of civilization compels man to live under stress and tension; men by sheer will power and concentration hold themselves down for long hours to desks and machines."²⁸ Urbanism deserved special blame. Cities brought out the animal in man by removing him from his natural environment. Harkin claimed that "the data collected by scientists within the last few years has [sic] shown beyond question that life in our modern cities tends almost universally to a deterioration in type and that vitality ... under modern city conditions is constantly being dissipated."²⁹ F.H.H.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 1916, p.5.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 1917, p.9.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 1919, p.12.

²⁹ Harkin, "Our Need," p.101. Harkin here was drawing upon a cauldron of societal concerns: the rise of cities, lack of physical fitness, immigration, gender confusion, and physical degeneration. See Paul Boyer, Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, 1820-1920 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978) and Daniel Pick, Faces of Degeneration: A European Disorder, c.1848-c.1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

Williamson, Harkin's assistant, warned that unless something was done slums would take over Canada as they had "New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, Detroit, and the cities of the old world...." He noted that "a pig in its natural state is a cleanly animal but pen it up and it will wallow in the filth; a dog gets cross and vicious when shut up in a house."³⁰ But what had been done could be undone by a return to nature.³¹ A visit to a national park, for instance, would be sure to leave one restored, fortified, and inspired. How did this work? No one was sure – "What the secret of her magic elixir is our scientists have not yet discovered"³² – but Harkin knew that it was deep within our biology. As he reflected, on the subject of "man" in general, "The impulses which were stored in his physical cells through countless centuries of human existence re-awaken and he experiences a strange pleasure in reverting to the primitive." He also argued that "The older, the more basic, the more primitive the brain patterns used in our hours of relaxation, the more complete our rest and enjoyment."³³ Harkin's favourite analogy was to a wild strawberry plant. Plant it in your garden at home and it would lose "that wonderful tang which was its soul." But take it back to the wild and it would quickly recover its zest.³⁴

³⁰ Williamson to Harkin, undated, RG84 vol.103, file U36 pt.1, NAC. Harkin noted elsewhere that the results of modernity could be found "in the slums, the prisons, the asylums and hospitals of the land." Harkin, "Our Need," p.99.

³¹ The cure for neurasthenia (nervous exhaustion) was generally believed to be a return to nature, and the temporary renouncing of the modern life that had made the patient ill. A useful essay on this is W. Douglas McCombs, "Therapeutic Rusticity: Antimodernism, Health and the Wilderness Vacation, 1870-1915," New York History, October 1995, pp.409-417. See also F.G. Gosling, Before Freud: Neurasthenia and the American Medical Community, 1870-1910 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987).

³² Harkin, "Our Need," p.101.

³³ Canada, Department of the Interior, Annual Report, Report of the Commissioner of National Parks, 1919, p.12.

³⁴ Harkin, "Canadian National Parks and Playgrounds," p.37.

All this may seem like a radical critique of industrial life: if modernity was so toxic, should it not be cleaned up? But parks allowed civilization to continue as is, with the worker escaping periodically to nature to be recharged. The rejuvenated nature-goer was always meant to return and become a productive member of society. Having parks near cities, "where thousands of workers could spend the week-end camping and fishing would result in human dividends worth many times the capital invested."³⁵ Elsewhere, Harkin states, "the ideal on which National Parks are administered is the production of dividends for Canada – dividends in gold and dividends in human units."³⁶ "Human units" was a term often used, presumably to prove that the parks could be shown to have computable, statistically verifiable value. Here was a moment where humanitarian and commercial interests merged: in helping individuals, parks helped society. Harkin's biographers see him as using the commercial to justify the humanitarian; a cynic could suppose that he used the humanitarian to justify the commercial. In the absence of evidence that one outweighed the other, it is best to accept that the Parks Branch saw the bountiful parks as meeting both objectives naturally.

In reading the commissioner's annual reports, every mention of human units seems counterbalanced by a declaration of the parks' mystical properties. Harkin knew better than to try to explain or define these; it was enough to know that in nature people were elevated. People would find, it was said, "mystical agencies of healing and rejuvenescence

³⁵ Canada, Department of the Interior, Annual Report, Report of the Commissioner of National Parks, 1922, p.16.

³⁶ Ibid., 1917, p.9.

for body, mind, and soul, peculiar agencies that can be found nowhere else."³⁷ "In these silent wildernesses there are 'holy places'."³⁸ The way the reports referred to nature – or Nature – was, consciously or not, the same way others might write about God. When Harkin remarked, "Perhaps in broad terms the ultimate purpose served by national parks is to draw people towards Nature, to give them a better understanding of Nature and finally to make them realize that it is from Nature alone they can get things which they need...."³⁹ we can see how easily "God" could replace "Nature". Analogies of forests to cathedrals and mountains to temples helped reinforce the notion that God could be found in nature – and even hinted that God was nature.⁴⁰

Harkin's writing glides so easily from one justification for national parks to another – referring to them as both holy places and common stock on a single page⁴¹ – because the use and preservation of parks were understood to be related. Parks needed to be sold to Canadians, but precisely because of what they were and what they promised to be for generations. In one article, Harkin tells the story of meeting "a typical matter of fact businessman" who spoke warmly of a trip to Banff a dozen years before to recover his health. He had fallen in love with the place and spent much of his time there wandering alone. One morning

³⁷ Harkin, "Canadian National Parks and Playgrounds," p.37.

³⁸ Harkin, History and Meaning, p.13.

³⁹ Harkin, "Our Need for National Parks," p.98.

⁴⁰ For a general introduction to the topic of nature and religion, see Catharine Albanese's Nature Religion in America: From the Algonkian Indians to the New Age (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). Simon Schama's Landscape and Memory examines forests (pp.214-242) and mountains (pp.411-433) as holy places. In a different vein, John F. Sears' Sacred Places: American Tourist Attractions in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) examines the religiosity of touristic landscape.

⁴¹ Harkin, History and Meaning, p.13.

he came upon "a well-dressed, prosperous looking man", and they took to talking. On discussing the park's beauty, the other said, "Beautiful! Why, sir, I had to come to Banff to learn that there was a God."⁴² Here is a little bit of everything that the parks were to be, all in one anecdote: mystical, attractive to the tourist, healing, beautiful, and invigorating for the hardworking businessman.

the unjust distribution of beauty

But what was characteristic of national parks that made them a tonic for the sick, a reprieve for the weary, a destination for the American? The commissioner's reports rarely bothered to say, since what made the parks so distinctive was so obvious. The parks had meaning and value because they were beautiful, and they were beautiful because they were wild and natural, and they were wild and natural because they were mountainous. National parks had mountains, and the valleys, crags, and waterfalls that went with them.⁴³ Harkin's first annual report includes 20 photos of the national parks. In 18, mountains are shown, and in 15 of these they are the picture's focus. Harkin offered pages of testimonials on the benefits of mountains in his second report, but gave very little of this sort of evidence in subsequent years. It was enough to say that the parks constituted "the best scenery and the best recreational areas" in the country, and were of "a high standard of scenic beauty."⁴⁴

⁴² Harkin, "Our Need for National Parks," pp.107-108.

⁴³ On mountains, see Marjorie Hope Nicolson, Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory: The Development of the Aesthetics of the Infinite (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1959); and Barry Sadler, "Mountains as Scenery," Canadian Alpine Journal, vol.57 (1974) pp.51-53.

⁴⁴ Harkin, "Canadian National Parks and Playgrounds," p.37; and Harkin, in Canada, Department of the Interior, Annual Report, Canadian National Parks, Report of the Commissioner, 1926-1927, p.88.

That the first national parks – Banff, Yoho, Glacier, Jasper, and Waterton – were all in the mountains of Alberta and British Columbia could not help but suggest where "the best scenery" was located.

To understand this love of mountains, it is necessary to understand Romanticism, the predominant nature aesthetic in the nineteenth (and twentieth) century. Romantics privileged feeling over reason, and believed that the purest expression of feelings could be found through an intense observation of natural scenery. Through nature one could come to a greater spiritual knowledge, be energized in body and mind, and re-establish a wholeness of humanity that had been dissipated in civilization (all, notably, things which Harkin believed parks accomplished). In their quest Romantics carried as beacons two important aesthetic categories, the "picturesque" and the "sublime".⁴⁵

⁴⁵ My discussion of Romanticism, the picturesque, and the sublime is necessarily short, and ignores the contradictions of and debates about their meanings. For instance, Romanticism may be seen either as a sign of people trying to come closer to God in an increasingly secular age (see Cronon, cited below, p.73) or seeking a replacement to God in nature (as Weiskel, cited below, writes, "The Sublime revives as God withdraws...." (p.3)). Likewise, it may be said that the formalizing of strict aesthetic conventions was a rationalist betrayal of the Romantic spirit (see Jasen, p.11), yet Burke's work which helped create the Romantic project began as an attempt to find a law of aesthetics, a "theory of our passions" (cited below, p.1). On the picturesque, see Christopher Hussey, The Picturesque: Studies in a Point of View (London: Putnam, 1927). On the sublime, see Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, ed. Adam Phillips (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990 [1757]), and Immanuel Kant, Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, trans. J.C. Meredith (Oxford: Oxford Press, 1911). Other important work includes Nicolson, Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory; and Thomas Weiskel, The Romantic Sublime: Studies in the Structure and Psychology of Transcendence (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976). My understanding of how these related to North America, national parks, and tourism has been assisted by Stanford Demars, "Romanticism and American National Parks," Journal of Cultural Geography, vol.11 no.1 (Fall/winter 1990), pp.17-24; Patricia Jasen, Wild Things: Nature, Culture, and Tourism in Ontario, 1790-1914 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995) esp. pp.7-13; Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, 3rd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982 [1967]); Alfred Runte, National Parks; and William Cronon, "The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature," Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature, ed. William Cronon (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1995), pp.69-90.

The picturesque referred to distinct, irregular landscapes often bearing signs of human past, whether ruins of classical antiquity or peasant huts. North America lacked evidence of this sort of past occupation (I am ignoring, as did the Romantics, relics of past native occupation) so the picturesque never attained the influence it enjoyed in Europe. Instead, Romantics here focused their nature appreciation on the sublime. Though commonly used to describe a landscape, the sublime is more accurately a reaction to that landscape: a desired feeling, both pleasurable and terrifying, of being overcome by nature. Though the sublime as a nature aesthetic had travelled far since its introduction by Edmund Burke in 1757, it retained its original sense of an appreciation of what would, in other circumstances, be dangerous. Burke wrote, "When danger or pain press too nearly, they are incapable of giving any delight, and are simply terrible; but at certain distances, and with certain modifications, they may be, and they are delightful...."⁴⁶ By approaching large, wild nature that bespoke no human presence, the viewer could hope to glimpse a spiritual infinity through a geological one. Although any number of natural formations, from oceans to forests to waterfalls, could conceivably be sublime, it was primarily mountains that captured the Romantic imagination.

Harkin's references to the "sublime grandeur" of the parks and to the mountain parks' "primeval solitudes and sublime heights" make it easy for us to detect his appreciation of sublimity.⁴⁷ But the sublime was much more than just a handy term to use when describing parks. It

⁴⁶ Burke, p.36.

⁴⁷ Canada, Department of the Interior, Annual Report, Report of the Commissioner of National Parks, 1916, p.3; and Harkin, History and Meaning, p.12.

was the principal aesthetic used in deciding what landscape could constitute a national park.⁴⁸ Nineteenth-century North Americans found sublime nature, at places such as Niagara Falls and the Grand Canyon, proof of their continent's greatness. When Niagara in particular fell victim to crass commercialization, there were calls to preserve the sublime sites being continually discovered in the West.⁴⁹ As parks historian Stanford Demars writes in the American context, "From the beginning national parks in the United States were established more for their sublime than for their picturesque scenery. Indeed, for many years it was the monumental and the grotesque in nature that were perceived as being worthy of national park status."⁵⁰ Although the issue of cultural insecurity as a source of nature appreciation has been studied only for the United States, it seems as applicable to Canada in the study of national parks. Banff was first notable because of its mountain sublimity, and it was set aside to preserve this sublimity from unwanted – that is, uncontrolled – commercialization.⁵¹

The concept of sublimity lived on, though changed, in the early twentieth century. It had become increasingly difficult to work up to a bracing confrontation with nature, knowing that there were a hundred tourists around you doing the same thing, knowing that thousands had gone before you, and knowing above all that the efforts you had made to reach this point called into question the authenticity of your emotional

⁴⁸ City parks, on the other hand, were picturesque. This is understandable: towns are more likely to be built on relatively flat, arable land than on the side of a mountain. Still, it made for a nice "aesthetic division of labour." Thanks to Ian McKay for pointing this out.

⁴⁹ Runte, *National Parks*, pp.11-47.

⁵⁰ Demars, p.19.

⁵¹ On Banff's landscape, see Rodger Todhunter, "Banff and the Canadian National Park Idea," *Landscape*, vol.20 no.2 (1981), pp.33-39.

response. Tourism had domesticated sublimity. In the 1910s, Harkin's reports still speak of the mountain parks in the language of the Romantic sublime, but not a sublime of trembling self-belittlement in the face of Nature. It is instead an inclusive sublime that reminds man of a world outside the industrial, yet connects man to nature rather than separating him from it. Searching once more for a way to explain what parks could do, Harkin once wrote, "national parks as they are may be likened to a great power house in remote mountains which carry light, heat, and energy to far-away cities."⁵² That this emblematic park was in the mountains comes as no surprise.

But the light from the mountains did not always reach the cities. Though taxpayers helped pay for the parks of Western Canada, over three thousand miles separated the parks from the majority of Canadians. Those who did visit were those who could afford the trains, the hotels, and the time that a trip to the mountains of Western Canada demanded. During the 1910s this reality was either ignored or shrugged off, as when Harkin noted that Canadians needed to make going to nature a habit, even though "for geographical reasons all the people of Canada cannot visit the national parks."⁵³ The Parks Branch argued that parks, even when unavailable to many, still served as examples to cities, encouraging them to establish small parks within their limits and larger ones on their outskirts.⁵⁴ In 1914 Harkin himself called for parks "measured in square miles" to be established near cities, places "which

⁵² Canada, Department of Interior, Annual Report, Report of the Commissioner of National Parks, 1917, p.9.

⁵³ Ibid., 1918, p.6. See also memo, 20 March 1914, MG30 E169, vol.1, NAC.

⁵⁴ See, for example, Canada, Department of Interior, Annual Report, Report of the Commissioner of National Parks, 1914, p.10.

may not provide as spectacular scenery as the Mountain Parks of the West" but which would offer a place for city dwellers to commune with nature.⁵⁵ He did not suggest, however, that these would be national parks, presumably since they would not be large enough – and could not be sublime enough – to qualify.

The Parks Branch increasingly became aware that the lack of Eastern parks betrayed the spirit of its publicized philosophy. How could people wearied by modern life be rejuvenated if those most desperate for help could not possibly reach it? F.H.H. Williamson gave the most spirited discussion of this problem in a memo to Harkin. At present, he wrote, the parks were of benefit almost solely to "the moneyed man or the middle classes". But it was the poor who most needed fresh air and the outdoor life, because their present situation was the least tolerable. Williamson believed that

The lowest type of people undoubtedly could not obtain the highest enjoyment from the mountains and the woods such as that derived by an artist or professor of botany, but their animal nature would demand exercise and this in turn would evolve to clearer perceptions and livelier faculties, resulting after a time in love of Nature and its antithesis – abhorrence of slumdom.

The solution, of course, was that parks "should be dotted all over the country in the vicinity of centres of population...."⁵⁶ And yet even Williamson stopped short of saying they should be considered national parks.

In the 1910s and 1920s, a few new national parks were established in places outside the mountains of Alberta and British Columbia. Elk

⁵⁵ Harkin memo, 20 March 1914, MG30 E169, vol.1, NAC.

⁵⁶ Williamson to Harkin, undated, RG84 vol.103, file U36 pt.1, NAC.

Island, just east of Edmonton, was established in 1913 in a forest reserve. Ontario's Point Pelee, established in 1918, was an important site for bird migrations. St. Lawrence Islands and Georgian Bay Islands National Parks were reserved in Ontario in 1914 and 1929 respectively, for the purpose of saving some land for the public in popular tourist areas. But none of these parks was created for the express purpose of nationalizing the parks system, or because its landscape offered cities the commercial and humanitarian benefits that national parks provided. Elk Island was meant to preserve buffalo and elk, and any human visitation there was secondary. The Ontario parks were very small pieces of land, made up almost exclusively of easily transferred government property. None of these was chosen because it embodied or broadened the national park ideal; they were all exceptions rather than exceptional. This is not to suggest that these were not "real" parks, but only that they did not force the Parks Branch to re-evaluate what a national park was. The ideal was still typified in mountain parks such as Banff and Jasper.

Instead of the Parks Branch bringing parks to the cities, after World War I cars increasingly brought the cities to the park. Attendance at Canadian national parks climbed from 151,000 in 1921, to 250,000 in 1924, to 391,000 in 1926.⁵⁷ More and more of these tourists were of moderate means, able to travel cheaply by car and to accommodate themselves by camping. "The automobile," Harkin trumpeted, "has brought about a wider, and more democratic use of the parks."⁵⁸ Cars

⁵⁷ Canada, Department of Interior, Annual Report, Report of the Commissioner of National Parks, 1922, 1925, and 1927.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 1926, p.90. Harkin had commented on this the year earlier as well, ibid., 1925, p.90. On autocamping in the United States, see Warren James Belasco, Americans on the Road: From Autocamp to Motel, 1910-1945 (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1979).

also meant that a greater percentage of visitors were Canadians, there to see what the fuss was about. Recognizing that the majority of park visitors were not Europeans or Americans but Canadians, the Parks Branch redefined its goal, from servicing "recreationists" or "workers" to servicing "Canadians". Harkin's annual reports began to refer to Canadians' right to the best of their country's nature, to the parks bearing "the nation's stamp of approval."⁵⁹ Parks were now seen to make better citizens. "Already the national parks are arousing a new love and pride of country. ... Like great works of art, they are enriching the emotions and stimulating the imaginations of many and so helping to build up that finer cultural background which is necessary if Canada is to be a great nation among the nations of the world."⁶⁰

With growing respect for its clientele's Canadianness and the benefits the parks could bring Canadians, the Parks Branch for the first time showed signs of wanting to make the national park system truly national. In 1922, Harkin's report called for national parks within the reach of Canadian cities, and in 1923 the issue was given real prominence. "The great benefits accruing from the National Parks make it seem more and more desirable that these should be established more generally throughout Canada." There were wilderness areas in Ontario and Quebec that could be purchased. Harkin even noted, "It is also very desirable that areas should be set aside in the Maritime Provinces at an early date including some part of the beautiful sea coast and the original forest if any area where this remains can be secured."⁶¹ And yet, the

⁵⁹ Harkin, "Canadian National Parks and Playgrounds," p.37; and Canada, Department of Interior, Annual Report, Report of the Commissioner of National Parks, 1927, p.88.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 1929, p.111.

⁶¹ Ibid., 1923, p.112.

Parks Branch did not follow up on this bold prescription for more than a decade. The next reference to Maritime parks in the commissioner's reports would be 1936, when the Cape Breton Highlands and Prince Edward Island National Parks were being established, having been proposed, surveyed, and selected without mention. Though the Parks Branch expressed a willingness to expand the park system to the east, it did nothing in the 1920s to make this idea a reality.

The seemingly insurmountable obstacle was the lack of land that was both available and suitable. The early park system had been fortunate in that even after the Western provinces joined Confederation, the federal government held claim to the region's natural resources, so parks could be set aside quite easily. In fact, the first Rocky Mountain parks were created in the fear that the lands would soon be used, and that the opportunity of saving them for future generations would be lost. No such land was available in the East, other than the pockets of provincially-controlled Crown lands. The three small parks created in Ontario in the 1910s and 1920s came from native and admiralty lands that were transferred to Parks Branch control. As early as 1915, a few politicians and businessmen in the Maritimes began to ask the federal government for national parks, but the response was always disheartening. Harkin replied to one petitioner, "it does not appear to be possible to find enough suitable land which still remains the property of the Provincial Government."⁶² "I am afraid it is out of the question to even think of the purchase of private lands," he wrote another.⁶³ On one occasion he responded, "The moment the creation of a park depends

⁶² Harkin to Rev. C.R. Harris, 11 April 1925, RG84 vol.983, file CBH2 vol.1 pt.3, NAC.

⁶³ Harkin to W.B. McCoy, Secretary of Department of Industries and Immigration, Nova Scotia, 4 March 1925, RG84 vol.983, file CBH2 vol.1 pt.3, NAC.

upon the purchase of large areas of land, that moment we get into very deep water because it would be exceedingly difficult to get any Government to propose an expenditure of large sums of money for such purpose."⁶⁴ Creating national parks had always been difficult enough in the sparsely-populated West; reclaiming land in settled Eastern Canada seemed politically and financially untenable.

The question of suitability was more tricky. Though Harkin professed to be in favour of a Maritime national park, he wrote,

I have some doubts as to whether any of the eastern provinces have Crown lands that would be suitable. Prince Edward Island has not. I think it is almost equally true with respect to Nova Scotia. Even if New Brunswick may have some suitable areas, there is always the probability that the province would not be willing to cede such lands to the Dominion.⁶⁵

Harkin does not explain what he meant by "suitable," and the Parks Branch never expressly pointed out which landscape was and was not worthy of being a national park. However, three requirements were always sought in choosing a national park site. It must first be sufficiently large. Harkin guessed that 200 square miles was roughly the minimum requirement.⁶⁶ Second, it should be "virgin wilderness,"⁶⁷ untouched since European contact (natives apparently did not deflower wilderness). These two conditions should serve to remind us how filled

⁶⁴ Harkin to A. McCall, General Manager of Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Co., 19 October 1922, RG84 vol.983, file CBH2 pt.3 vol.1, NAC.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Harkin to James McKenna, Saint John Telegraph Journal, 31 October 1927, RG84 vol.483, file F2 vol.1, NAC. The size Harkin quoted was rather arbitrary; four months earlier, he had suggested 100 square miles was sufficient. Harkin to Charles D. Richards, Minister of Mines and Lands, New Brunswick, 6 July 1927, RG84 vol.483, file F2 vol.1, NAC.

⁶⁷ Harkin to A. McCall, General Manager of Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Co., 19 October 1922, RG84 vol.983, file CBH2 pt.3 vol.1, NAC.

with cultural meaning national parks are; how parks had to fulfill a Romantic ideal of big and unspoiled nature. Third, parks must of course be beautiful, but more than this, beautiful in the national park sense: with the sort of sublime mountain scenery not to be found east of the Rockies. It remained to be seen whether, if asked to evaluate a site for a park in the East, the Parks Branch would seek "suitable" Western-style scenery (a hopeless task, making the nationalization of the park system an impossibility) or the closest "suitable" imitation, the most mountainous and sublime land that the East had to offer.

Not surprisingly, the Parks Branch saw no reason to clarify its aesthetic philosophy. If questioned about a Nova Scotia park, it would have been bad form for Harkin to say the province's beauty was wanting. Better to question the availability of a large, unspoiled parcel of land. The most compelling evidence that the Parks Branch felt Eastern scenery did not measure up is circumstantial: when its reports trumpeted the values of parks to people, when they regretted that more Canadians could not make it to the parks, they did not take the logical next step of calling for more parks – national parks – to be created closer to the majority of Canadians.

If the Parks Branch tiptoed around the suitability of Maritime scenery for national parks, Maritimers were more likely to meet the matter head-on. The region's natural image was of hilly lands, scrubby coniferous forests, and brooding seascapes. E.W. Robinson, a Nova Scotia Member of Parliament, told the Commons during discussion of a park, "In the first place, the scenery throughout the Maritime provinces all belongs in the same category. There are not in this respect, three provinces; there is one province. We have not mighty mountains; we

have no great rivers. Everything is on a small scale."⁶⁸ And much of the land was not only populated, but taken over for agriculture, making for even less sublime landscapes. In Prince Edward Island, provincial secretary Arthur Newbery wrote a park advocate there that the idea was impossible,

the whole Province being really one immense cultivated garden rather than a Park, and no one spot seeming better than another. We lack grand mountain scenery, bold cliffs, dense forests, extensive valleys, great water falls, cascades and rapids, etc., some or most of which are essential in the formation of a National Park.⁶⁹

For both Robinson and Newbery, the very term "national park" called to mind a specific style of landscape that the Maritime provinces did not possess.

making the park system national

Even the Maritimes park booster Casey Baldwin, who would be instrumental in pushing for the creation of Cape Breton Highlands National Park, bore the Parks Branch no ill will for ignoring the region for so long. "The reason, in the past, for this apparent discrimination is perfectly fair," he said, "and we have nothing but praise and commendation for this policy." The West not only had available land, but it also had the appropriate scenery and wildlife for national parks. The comments from Baldwin came in 1934, and he felt the situation had changed in the last few years. The Depression had hit the country and

⁶⁸ E.W. Robinson, M.P. for Kings, Nova Scotia, in Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 20 April 1925, p.2237.

⁶⁹ Arthur Newbery to Donald MacKinnon, 5 May 1923, RG84 vol.1777, file PEI2 vol.1 pt.2. NAC.

Nova Scotia Should Have Its Fair Share



Figure 3. "Nova Scotia Should Have Its Fair Share"
by Donald McRitchie. From Halifax Herald, 13 October 1934.

made the nationalization of government programs essential. As well, the value of tourism was better understood, and so many Maritimers wanted more tourists. Parks, Baldwin said, were now as much about tourism as about landscape, so it was only fair that the Maritime provinces should be given national parks of their own.⁷⁰

Ironically, it was in the hopes of preventing the park system from becoming more about tourism than about landscape that, beginning in the late 1920s, the Parks Branch adjusted its philosophy to promote the idea of the system being truly national. Federal and provincial politicians had worked in concert to create Prince Albert National Park in Saskatchewan and Riding Mountain National Park in Manitoba in this period, to be the foci for recreation and tourism in their provinces. The Parks Branch had been left with little say in whether either park would be established or what sites would be selected.⁷¹ Having spent a decade preaching the economic and humanitarian benefits of parks near cities, the bureau was now finding that its very success threatened its control of the park system. It needed to define the standard for parks – a standard it would have the authority to define and maintain – in a way flexible enough to deal with the growing calls for parks throughout the Dominion. It did so by making explicit its aesthetic criteria: the land it preserved was first and foremost the best of Canadian scenery, and not only that, it was representative of the different parts of Canada. This

⁷⁰ Canada, Senate, Reports and Proceedings of the Special Committee on Tourist Traffic (1934), p.179.

⁷¹ Prince Albert National Park was a gift from Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King to the constituency of Prince Albert which he had parachuted into in 1926. As a result, Manitoban politicians pressed hard to get a park for their own province. See Bella, pp.76-77; Lothian, A Brief History, pp.68-69 and 74-75; and Bill Waiser, Saskatchewan's Playground: A History of Prince Albert National Park (Saskatoon: Fifth House Publishers, 1989).

allowed the Parks Branch graciously to concede the impracticality of having a Canadian park system with only Western parks, while maintaining its own right to decide what was deemed parkworthy.⁷² Harkin could now contend that parks were "typical of the early conditions of a province rather than for the protection of some particular outstanding physical feature...."⁷³ More than this, his letters claimed that Maritime parks had always been part of his vision:

I know that there is nothing more fascinating to the inlander than the sea. I have always felt that in years to come when Canada has an immense population there will be thousands of people each year from the interior who will want to spend some time near the sea. ... I have dreamed for many years that sooner or later we might be able to find areas in the Maritimes which would include ample sea shore and which would be incorporated in the National Parks.⁷⁴

Harkin even stated that "one of my ambitions, unrealized as yet, has been the creation of one National Park in each of our Provinces."⁷⁵ The fact is that if Harkin or anyone in the Parks Branch had wanted Maritime parks, or the system made national, they said nothing of it until faced with the threat that such policies might be thrust upon them.

Importing ideas from the United States helped bring the Maritime parks closer to reality. Maritime boosters looked to Maine's thriving tourist industry as something for the region to aspire to.⁷⁶ The state

⁷² C.J. Taylor, "Legislating Nature: The National Parks Act of 1930," To See Ourselves/To Save Ourselves: Ecology and Culture in Canada, eds. Rowland Lorimer, et al. Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Association for Canadian Studies, 31 May to 1 June 1990 (Montreal: Association for Canadian Studies, 1991), pp.132-134.

⁷³ Harkin to Richards, 6 July 1927, RG84 vol.483, file F2 vol.1, NAC.

⁷⁴ Harkin to Richards, 13 June 1927, ibid.

⁷⁵ Cited in Taylor, "Legislating Nature," p.134.

⁷⁶ For example, in an article entitled "The Tourist Industry" in the enthusiastic Maritime magazine The Busy East of Canada, it is said of Maine, "Its highways are no better than

was so popular a destination that James Harkin used it as a tourism success story in his first annual report, though noting that "Maine's Adirondacks cannot be compared to Canada's national parks."⁷⁷ Then in 1919 the U.S. National Park Service relieved the Eastern seaboard's feelings of topographical inadequacy by establishing Acadia National Park in Maine. This site, though perhaps without the grandeur of Rocky Mountain parks like Yellowstone, was as rugged and dramatic as anything on the East Coast, and it had an ocean to boot. To both the Parks Branch and Maritime park advocates, Maine served as an example that the East Coast did have parkworthy scenery.⁷⁸

At the same time, the Canadian Parks Branch borrowed from its U.S. counterpart the method by which Maritime park land could be obtained. Until the late 1920s, Harkin and his department responded to

ours and only because it offers greater and better accommodation for the tourists does it obtain more than its usual share of tourist travel." Vol. 14 no.8 (March 1924), p.4. An editorial in the 21 March 1927 Saint John Telegraph Journal illustrates how Maine stood out as a tourist destination in the eyes of Maritimers. The editor was speaking to an unnamed member of the Department of the Interior who said, "In my opinion, the greatest attraction for a natural park in the Maritimes would be a strip of seashore. That would appeal very strongly to people in the cities of Ontario. They dream of the sea. It has an especial charm for inland dwellers."

"But," the editor replied, "they seem to prefer the Maine sea coast."

"Not if you give them the accommodations," he said.

⁷⁷ Canada, Department of Interior, Annual Report, Report of the Commissioner of National Parks, 1913, p.5. Though one can take from this that Harkin did not find the East as scenic as the West, more interesting is that Maine's popularity does not seem to have suggested to him that Canada's East Coast might also have highly profitable scenery.

⁷⁸ On Maine tourism in this period, see Richard W. Judd, "Reshaping Maine's Landscape: Rural Culture Tourism and Conservation, 1890-1929," Journal of Forest and Conservation History, vol.32 no.4, October 1988, pp.180-190; and Dona Brown, Inventing New England: Regional Tourism in the Nineteenth Century (Washington: Smithsonian, 1995), particularly Chapter 6. The Parks Branch was aware more generally that the idea of park standards was undergoing change in the United States. In notes to prepare the Minister of the Interior for discussion of the 1930 National Parks Act, the Branch included an article in the American magazine Parks and Recreation entitled "National Park Standards", and highlighted the sentence "National Parks should differ as widely as possible from one another in their physical aspects, and the National Park system should represent a wide range of typical land forms of supreme quality." See "National Parks Act 1930. Explanations for Minister re Parliament," p.48, RG84 vol.1959, file U1A, NAC.

requests for new national parks around the country by saying they could not consider purchasing the necessary land. But in 1929, Harkin wrote Horace Albright, assistant to the director of the National Park Service, asking him how the land for parks such as Acadia had been obtained. Albright replied that the Park Service did not buy the land. Instead, it investigated proposed sites, and if the report was favourable it recommended the park's establishment, subject to the acquisition of the land by either the state or, as at Acadia, private interests.⁷⁹

Coincidentally, R.W. Cautley, the Chief Surveyor in the Canadian Department of Interior, wrote Harkin several months later, also outlining the American policy, and suggesting it be implemented in Canada. Not only would this new policy rid the department of the responsibility of funding land purchases, but also, "The above would seem to be an equitable arrangement which has this great advantage, namely, that it goes far to prevent any inter-State friction in regard to the expenditure of Federal money within a particular State."⁸⁰ Impressed by the simplicity and economy of the American policy, the Canadian Parks Branch decided to imitate it. From 1929 on, rather than turning requests for parks in Eastern Canada down flat, Harkin explained that although it was the Parks Branch which would evaluate whether a site was or was not suitable for a national park, it would ultimately be up to the province to make the land available. So from the example of an American national park, Maritimers began to appreciate the possibility of parks in their own region; from the American park system, the Canadian Parks Branch learned how it could make such parks a reality.

⁷⁹ Albright to Harkin, 25 February 1929, RG84 vol.483, file F2 vol.1, NAC.

⁸⁰ Cautley to Harkin, 7 June 1929, RG84 vol.1964, file U2.12.1, NAC.

In 1930, it became politically expedient for the Canadian government to announce that a park for every province was its official policy. It was seeking support for the passage of the 1930 National Parks Act, which was to replace the 1911 Dominion Forest Reserves and Parks Act. The old law, though setting up the Parks Branch, had lumped parks in with reserves, suggesting that they were, in the words of historian C.J. Taylor, "fundamentally resource reserves, allowing for the controlled exploitation of a range of resources, such as minerals, timber and water as well as scenery."⁸¹ Although amendments to the 1911 act had somewhat separated reserves from parks, the status of resources on park land was still unclear. Harkin's Branch fought for the new law to enshrine the principle of inviolability, whereby parks were declared to be maintained intact forever, free from development or encroachment.⁸² To foster national acceptance of the new act, the Liberal government proclaimed time and again during the winter of 1930 its intent truly to "nationalize" the park system.⁸³ As Minister of the Interior Charles Stewart declared during debate on the Parks Act, "It is the policy of the government to develop a national park in each province provided the province makes available for this purpose, free of charge to the Dominion and free of encumbrance, a compact area of national parks standard."⁸⁴

⁸¹ Taylor, "Legislating Nature," p.128.

⁸² *Ibid.* I will discuss inviolability further in Chapter 7.

⁸³ According to the *Toronto Mail and Empire*, "A national park maintained by the federal government in every province of the dominion, is the aim of Hon. Charles Stewart, minister of the interior, he told a meeting of the Ottawa Women's Liberal association held here to-day." 10 January 1930. The *Vancouver Daily Province* reported, "A chain of national parks from the Atlantic to the Pacific - this is the ideal toward which the parks branch at Ottawa is working, and in its work it needs the co-operation of the various provincial governments." 2 February 1930. See also 13 January 1930, *Toronto Star*.

⁸⁴ Charles Stewart, in Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 26 May 1930, p.3959.

Within the space of only a few years, the idea of making the national park system national had moved from an implausibility to a probability. The turn-around had occurred incrementally, with political motivations, fairness, American ideas, and the desire to share in park benefits all playing a part. Together, these were enough to convince politicians and at least some of the public that the East could conceivably have national parks, without damaging the integrity of the park system. Never, though, was there a sense that the way of seeing Eastern landscape had changed, or that those who were considering Eastern parks were even looking at its landscape. The Maritime landscape of 1930 was viewed much in the same way as it had been in 1920.

external pressures

There would not be a national park in the Maritimes for another few years, as events delayed the nationalization of the park system once more. The arrival of the Great Depression in 1929 meant that there was little chance of finding funds for park creation. Harkin told the Premier of Nova Scotia in 1931 that "at the present time all proposals for new parks or to enlarge our existing parks are temporarily suspended as all available funds are being utilized to meet more pressing demands" and offered the same answer when Harrington asked again in 1933.⁸⁵ As Harkin's new Minister, Thomas Murphy, stated in Parliament after being besieged with requests for new parks, "The spirit is willing but the pocket

⁸⁵ Harkin to Col. G.S. Harrington, Premier of Nova Scotia, 12 November 1931, RG84 vol.983, file CBH2 vol.1 pt.2, NAC; and Harkin to Harrington, 20 September 1933, RG84 vol.983, file CBH2 vol.1 pt.3, NAC.

book is weak."⁸⁶ There was in fact more to it than that. The Conservative government of R.B. Bennett which had been elected in 1930 was intensely anti-parks, and particularly opposed to Harkin's leadership. This was in part because Harkin had been appointed twenty years before by Clifford Sifton, and was believed to be the Liberals' man.⁸⁷ More significantly, R.B. Bennett was the Member of Parliament for Calgary West, which included the community of Banff. He had locked horns with Harkin a number of times in the past over what he saw as unconstitutional federal interference in the lives of Banff's citizens.⁸⁸ This probably reinforced Bennett's political philosophy that the state too often intruded in public life.⁸⁹ During the Conservative administration, the Department of the Interior was gutted and the Parks Branch itself lost 32 employees.⁹⁰ Bennett himself regularly phoned Harkin and asked him to resign.⁹¹ Not surprisingly, nothing was accomplished during the Bennett years towards extending the park system.

For the provinces themselves, the Depression made national parks all the more attractive. The Maritimes were increasingly dissatisfied with paying for a service for which they received no material benefit, and

⁸⁶ Murphy, in *Canada, House of Commons, Debates*, 3 July 1931, p.3376.

⁸⁷ Taylor, *Negotiating the Past*, p.110.

⁸⁸ In discussion on the provisions of the National Parks Act in 1930, for instance, Bennett complained about the Parks Branch's involvement in Banff affairs. "You cannot have a game of baseball unless Mr. Harkin says so, and he is in Ottawa three thousand miles away. Do you want to go out and do a little fishing? Oh no." *Canada, House of Commons, Debates*, 9 May 1930, p.1935. On Bennett, see James H. Gray, *R.B. Bennett: The Calgary Years* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991).

⁸⁹ See Larry A. Glassfore, *Reaction and Reform: The Politics of the Conservative Party Under R.B. Bennett, 1927-1938* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992).

⁹⁰ Lothian, *A History*, vol.2, p.17.

⁹¹ Taylor, *Negotiating the Past*, p.110, fn.12. Taylor does not explain why Bennett did not simply fire Harkin.

which the great majority of their citizens could not enjoy. On top of this, the park system was given a sizable unemployment relief project in the early 1930s, which of course primarily benefited Westerners.⁹² With little understanding and less compassion, the Minister of the Interior noted, "The east is beginning to get a little jealous of the west with its great national parks."⁹³ During the early and mid-1930s, clamouring for national parks grew nationwide⁹⁴ and politicians had little choice but to join in. For instance, J.L. Ilsley, a Nova Scotia M.P., told Parliament that he was personally opposed to a park, fearful that it would only attract picnickers who would set fire to the woods. Still, he could not refrain from adding, "Of course if there is going to be a national park I would suggest that my constituency is the most beautiful in the province...."⁹⁵ Politicians used the call for a national park as an excuse to wax romantic on the wonders of their constituency. Even if their words were completely ignored in the House, at least their local

⁹² Per capita, Maritimers received one-third of the national average in all federal relief programmes. See Ernest R. Forbes, "Cutting the Pie Into Smaller Pieces: Matching Grants and Relief in the Maritime Provinces During the 1930s," *Acadiensis*, vol.17 no.1 (Autumn 1987), pp. 34-55.

⁹³ Murphy, 18 November 1930, *Calgary Herald*.

⁹⁴ Indeed, the 1930s saw national park systems expand in a number of countries. In the United States, Shenandoah and Great Smokies National Parks were formed, transplanting communities in ways very similar to strategies later pursued in the Maritime national parks. See Runte, *National Parks*, pp.106-137; Charles L. Perdue, Jr. and Nancy J. Martin-Perdue, "To Build a Wall Around These Mountains': The Displaced People of Shenandoah," *Magazine of Albermarle, Virginia County History*, vol.49 (1991), pp.48-71; and Carolyn Reeder and Jack Reeder, *Shenandoah Heritage: The Story of the People Before the Park* (Washington: Potomac Appalachian Trail Club, 1978). In Mexico, only two national parks had been created before 1934; from 1935 to 1940, 40 more were established. Lane Simonian, *Defending the Land of the Jaguar: A History of Conservation in Mexico* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995), p.94. In German-occupied Poland, national forest reserves were created by emptying regions of people. Simon Schama, *Landscape and Memory* (Toronto: Random House, 1995), p.70.

⁹⁵ Ilsley, in Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 11 March 1935, p.1611.

paper might take note and compliment them for representing the region so well.⁹⁶

Interest in tourism was awakening at the federal level in the early 1930s. The Depression brought a sharp decline in traffic from the United States, and with that decline came the realization that a laissez-faire tourism policy was inadequate. A new hands-on strategy for tourism was spearheaded, ironically enough, by a Bennett appointee to the Senate: W.H. Dennis. The publisher of the Halifax Herald, Dennis had a wealth of experience in promoting the Maritimes. In his inaugural speech as a senator in 1934, he called for a Special Committee on Tourist Traffic. The committee that resulted was a watershed in what could be called tourist appreciation in Canada, in that it brought together experts on publicity, transportation, tourist accommodations, and national parks to study how to rationalize and make national the tourism in Canada. With Dennis as chair and Senators W.E. Foster of Saint John, New Brunswick, and Creelman MacArthur of Summerside, P.E.I., actively involved, the Maritimes were not only represented, they received an inordinate amount of attention.⁹⁷

At the forefront of the committee's interest was extending the national park system. J.B. Harkin was the first witness to be heard, on the morning of the first day, and he outlined what needed to be done to

⁹⁶ Thus we have speeches such as those of Nova Scotian M.P. William Duff, who offered a tour of northern Cape Breton: "From there I would take him along the celebrated Cabot trail over the tip of Cape North, up the side of a mountain the size of which is such that it makes even the Alps and the Rocky mountains dwindle, and on which cars go in low gear until they reach the top." Ibid., p.1612.

⁹⁷ MacEachern, "No Island Is an Island," pp.120-121. On the Tourist Committee, see William March, Red Line: The Chronicle-Herald and the Mail-Star, 1875-1954 (Halifax: Chebucto Agencies Ltd., 1986), pp.233-236, and Canada, Senate, Report and Proceedings of the Special Committee on Tourist Traffic (1934).

bring a national park to a province that did not have one. Nova Scotia businessmen Casey Baldwin and George E. Graham called for Maritime national parks, referring to Maine's success in attracting tourists. The Committee's final report noted that since the establishment of Banff, Canadians had poured over \$22 million into national parks "almost exclusively in one part of the Dominion." Therefore, it was resolved that the national park system should "be extended, as a truly national policy, to embrace all the provinces."⁹⁸ This was a Committee report that was not forgotten: its recommendation for the creation of a Canadian Travel Bureau was implemented within a month, and, as suggested, Leo Dolan became its first head. The following year, a federal-provincial conference seconded the Committee's recommendation for Eastern Canadian national parks. The worst years of the Depression had apparently made more Canadian politicians receptive to the economic benefits of national parks.

The National Parks Branch was also entering a period of improved opportunity for park creation. Following the victory of William Lyon Mackenzie King's Liberals in 1935, the Department of the Interior was merged with the Department of Mines, the Department of Immigration and Colonization, and the Department of Indian Affairs under one minister, and in the following year became a single Department of Mines and Resources. Though James Harkin would have held the same position as before, he would now have an additional level of ministry organization above him. Rather than accept what must have seemed a demotion, he chose to retire, with F.H.H. Williamson replacing him. The Parks Branch's profile, so small during the Bennett years, appeared to be

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.x.

shrinking again. But the new Minister of Mines and Resources, Thomas A. Crerar, soon demonstrated a willingness to build up the Parks Branch budget, especially for immediate work relief projects. As park historian C.J. Taylor has noted, "Unlike ministers of the Interior, Crerar regarded the whole of Canada, not just the west, as his domain, and under his administration the parks bureau began to pay attention to the east in a way that it had not done before."⁹⁹

By 1935, then, it would seem that all the stars were in alignment, and the Maritimes would have one or several national parks. Provincial governments saw federal funding, the federal government saw an extension of national interests, tourism boosters saw a larger tourist trade, and the Parks Branch saw the fairness of granting to Maritimers what it had granted to Westerners – and the power that could be achieved by doing so. But this did not change the fact that parks were expected to meet certain aesthetic criteria. Since 1885 the Canadian national park system had developed with a single idea of what was suitable national park land. Staff in the Parks Branch were indoctrinated with the belief that a park's beauty demanded virgin territory, huge parcels of land, and most of all mountains. It was only a dozen years since Harkin had mentioned in an annual report that "It is also very desirable that areas should be set aside" in the Maritimes – and his reports had not said another word about it. Did the aesthetic standard of what constituted a national park change just because it was decided that it should? R.W. Cautley, who had spent over 30 years surveying in parks in the West but who would be sent East to investigate

⁹⁹ Taylor, Negotiating the Past, p.111.

sites in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, recognized this dilemma in a 1930 report and suggested that it went beyond the Parks Branch:

It may be said that it is unfair to compare the mountains and lakes of New Brunswick with scenic features of a similar kind in other Provinces of Canada, but it must be remembered that the object of my report is to select a site for a National Park of Canada - not a Provincial Park - and that the two main objects of a National Park are:- (a) To set apart an area which shall truly represent the best of each distinctive type of Canadian scenery. (b) To attract tourists from other Provinces of Canada and from all over the world. It must also be considered that if I refrained from making these comparisons no power on earth could restrain the tourists from making them.¹⁰⁰

Cautley may very well have been right; tourists in the 1930s might not have found what became Fundy National Park as sublime as Banff, and they may not today. This is of interest, but not as much as Cautley's own feelings, since he went on to help select two of the Maritime parks ostensibly in spite of those feelings. In selecting the parks, did he and the rest of the Parks Branch staff seek a Western-style beauty in the East and accept these new parks as pale imitations; did they seek out a new aesthetic, one that corresponded to the geology and the biology of the East; or did they see their task as basically hopeless, and treat aesthetics as secondary, perhaps to tourism? Any of these decisions would not only affect what the Maritime national parks would be like, but would rebound to affect the park system as a whole.

¹⁰⁰ Cautley report on New Brunswick park sites, 1930, RG84 vol.1964, file U2.13 vol.1, NAC.



Cape Breton Highlands National Park is situated in the northern part of Cape Breton Island, Nova Scotia, and contains an area of about 390 square miles. It lies between the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of St. Lawrence and forms part of a great table-land that rises to a height of more than 1,700 feet above sea-level. In places this table-land extends to the sea in bold headlands, which rise almost sheer from the water. At other points, streams running down to the sea have carved deep gorges that widen out at their lower ends to form broad valleys or "intervales", which are characteristic of the region. ... With the exception of the plateau, which consists mainly of barren and muskeg areas, the park is covered with a typical Acadian forest. From the sea, the landscape is particularly beautiful and the combination of deep valleys, green slopes, and rounded summits broken here and there by rocky spires and outcroppings, is reminiscent of the Highlands of Scotland.

Figure 4. Snapshot of Cape Breton Highlands National Park.
Photo from National Archives of Canada, PA121449.
Text from the brochure National Parks of Canada: Maritime Provinces
(Ottawa: Northern Affairs and National Resources, 1957).




Figure 5. Map of Cape Breton Highlands National Park. This map was made prior to removal of land in the Southwest corner of the park in 1956 and around Cheticamp Lake in 1958. From the brochure National Parks of Canada: Maritime Provinces (Ottawa: Northern Affairs and National Resources, 1957).

Chapter 3

A Tartan Sublime: Establishing Cape Breton Highlands National Park, c.1936

In the fall of 1934, Chief Surveyor for the National Parks Branch R.W. Cautley travelled to Nova Scotia to scout out locations for a potential national park site. R.B. Bennett was still Prime Minister, and there were no immediate plans to create a Nova Scotia park, but the federal department bowed to the provincial government's request that a suitable future site be found. Cautley drove down from Ottawa in his own car, one specially suited to fit his 6'6" frame. Commissioner James Harkin had given him a checklist of qualities that any park would be expected to possess: accessibility, potential for development, opportunity for game preservation, and as little extractable natural resources and human settlement as possible. But Harkin wrote, "Primarily, and before all other considerations, it is desired that the site shall be the best possible example of the beauty and character of Nova Scotia scenery."¹ Harkin did not elaborate; he knew there was no need to. Cautley, a civil engineer, was like everyone else. He would know beautiful, typical Nova Scotian scenery when he saw it.

A site in Cape Breton had been talked of for years, but Cautley had repeatedly claimed sight unseen that it would not be suitable. "Now I have never seen the country," Cautley wrote in 1929, "but from such evidence as can be obtained from a study of the information,

¹ Harkin to Cautley, 4 September 1934, RG84 vol.983, file CBH2 vol.1 pt.2, NAC.

photographs and maps at our disposal, ... it does not possess those high qualities of scenic attraction that are absolutely essential to the success of a National Park."² Like Harkin with his instructions, Cautley was vague but insistent. From what he knew, northern Cape Breton was not sublime enough to be home to a national park. But at the request of the Nova Scotia government, Cautley was now visiting three locations throughout the province, including one in Cape Breton's northern peninsula. With two provincial representatives tagging along he spent five days exploring the Cabot Trail, and then spent another week crisscrossing northern Cape Breton alone.

To his own surprise, Cautley was very impressed. In his official report to Harkin that December, he recommended a national park for northern Cape Breton and wrote that "the scenic values of the site are outstanding."³ In four and one-half pages consisting of sections entitled "Advantages of Cape Breton Site" and "Accessory Scenic Advantages", he tried to explain why the area was beautiful enough to be a park. Reading these sections does not in itself make it clear why he found it attractive. Again and again Cautley returned to the stock terms: "beautiful" five times, "picturesque" five times, "scenic" and "scenery" fourteen times.

Cautley never used the word "sublime", perhaps because he saw it associated with an effeminate aestheticism. But his appreciation for the Cape Breton scenery can only be called the discovery of a coastal

² Cautley to Harkin, 7 June 1929, RG84 vol.1964, file U12.2.1, NAC.

³ Cautley report to Harkin, December 1934, p.50, RG84 vol.1964, file U2.12.2, NAC. Cautley's "Report on Examination of Sites for A National Park in the Province of Nova Scotia," as it relates to the proposed Cape Breton site, may be found in R.H. MacDonald, Transportation in Northern Cape Breton (Ottawa: 1979), Appendix A, pp.47-76. Henceforth, page references to Cautley's report are from MacDonald's book.

sublime. Travelling along the craggy coast, one looked down at the churning water from an impressive height, and thus had the opportunity to experience the terror, the spectacle of infinity, the sense of insignificance that were all associated with the sublime. In this sense, though the Cape Breton site was not truly mountainous, it permitted a comparison with the Western parks. It also opened up the possibility that other Maritime landscapes, in their contrast between land and sea, offered a type of worthwhile national park scenery. Whereas local politician Casey Baldwin⁴ and head of the Cape Breton Tourism Association, Samuel Challoner, had envisioned a park in the northern interior, leaving the coastline for the small fishing settlements that surrounded it, Cautley insisted that the coastline was essential. The interior was in itself, he wrote,

singularly devoid of scenic attraction. There are no large lakes within it and very few small ones. There are no 'mountain ranges' or 'peaks'. It is only as one approaches the coast that the original plateau has been so cut up by the erosion of many extraordinary steep mountain torrents as to become a picturesque mountain terrain, with serrated sky line and distinctive peaks. The great scenic value of the site is the rugged coast itself with its mountain background. The interior or plateau country is only valuable as a Park asset from a game preservation point of view.⁵

The coastline had the special benefit of the Cabot Trail, the recently completed road that threaded along the coast of the northern peninsula. Cautley wrote, "The point that it is desired to make quite clear at the

⁴ Throughout the late 1920s and 1930s, Baldwin was the leading booster for a Cape Breton national park. Biographical information for Baldwin may be found in John Hamilton Parkin, Bell and Baldwin: Their Development of Aerodromes and Hydromedromes at Baddeck, Nova Scotia (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964).

⁵ *Ibid.* Burke had noted that the ocean could produce sublime emotions in the viewer in a way that flat land could not (p.53).

outset is that the merits of the Cape Breton Park site rest on the coast line scenery and the Cabot Trail as a means of seeing it."⁶ As a man who built roads for a living and as a tourist to Cape Breton himself, Cautley saw the park site from the perspective of an automobile driver.⁷ He had long worked on national park roads in the Rocky Mountains, and understood the aesthetic appeal that mountainous landscape and travelling through it had for drivers. Also, he himself enjoyed the park site from behind the wheel of his car, and knew that his pleasure would not be unique. Cautley's report constantly reverts to the tone of a tourist brochure: "the tourist is faced by", "the tourist should visit", "no tourist should plan his trip", and so on.⁸ In his four and one-half page description of the park, he refers to "tourists" and "tourism" ten times. The Cabot Trail, swooping down to the sea and then rising to the highlands by grades of as much as 20 degrees, helped make the hills hillier and the sea more dramatic by permitting the tourist to enjoy both simultaneously. Cautley understood that the Trail not only made the area more accessible, it made it more beautiful. For these reasons he wrote, "the Cape Breton site is almost entirely an automobile route and must be judged accordingly."⁹

Cautley's vision for what would become Cape Breton Highlands National Park closely approximated the finished product. The process of creating the park in the mid- and late-1930s was in great part about

⁶ Cautley report on Nova Scotia sites, 1934, p.50.

⁷ Cautley's unpublished memoirs are entitled "High Lights of Memory" and can be found at E/C/C31, British Columbia Archives. Cautley makes only passing mention of leading the investigations of Riding Mountain, Cape Breton Highlands, and Fundy National Parks, and no mention of his work at Prince Edward Island National Park.

⁸ Cautley report on Nova Scotia sites, 1934, pp.54 and 55.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p.56.

developing the Trail, and about expropriating land from those people who had land and homes around the Trail. The landscape or the land itself of most of the region's interior was of little significance to the park because it was tucked away behind the highlands, cut of view for those driving on the Trail, the one way of seeing the park.

Until the opening of the Cabot Trail in 1932, the entire northern peninsula was very little known to outsiders. Few travellers ventured as far as Cheticamp, the western entrance of the park today, or Ingonish, the eastern one. The roads were poor and difficult, and there was no significant settlement to travel to, so there was little opportunity or reason to visit. The most renowned of nineteenth-century tourists to Cape Breton, American essayist Charles Dudley Warner, bypassed the region in his 1874 Baddeck and That Sort of Thing. So did most other travel writers.¹⁰ The region was even passed by in Beckles Wilson's 1912 Nova Scotia: The Province That Has Been Passed By. Those who referred to the area spoke of it in terms of its inaccessibility. An 1883 guidebook, relying on the secondhand information of a "gentleman visitor," described the land above Ingonish as "wild and grand, romantic and picturesque, though long since associated with marine disasters." Crossing the peninsula was an adventure, and the author bubbled that "To appreciate the grandeur of the scenery and enjoy its benefits it must be visited, with the companionship of one map and one or two Guides!"¹¹

¹⁰ As Margaret Warner Morley wrote in 1900, "Ingonish is the end of the tourists' explorations as a rule. Few find their way there, still fewer go north of there...." Down North and Up Along (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1900), p.253.

¹¹ Guide Book to Cape Breton, Royal Province of Nova Scotia or New Scotland, Dominion of Canada (London: Letts, Son and Co., 1883), pp.28 and 30.

Only very scattered references, such as that of travel writer C.W. Vernon, give the reader any feel for what the land was like. "To the undulating region of the seaboard," Vernon wrote, "is contrasted the wild and romantic scenery of the interior plateau, which is cut by the numerous streams on their way to the sea with innumerable deep and gloomy gorges and defiles with steep, precipitous sides, towering crags and crystal cascades."¹² And still, the description is vague. What is "wild and romantic", how deep are the gorges, how tall are the crags? And what faith can we put in the description in any case, when travel writers make nature everywhere seem remarkable and unique?

In 1925, the province began to open up the northern peninsula by constructing the Cabot Trail. As A.S. MacMillan, Minister of Highways at the time, later remembered it, the Trail was meant not only to serve those of the northern peninsula who were cut off by land for parts of the year, but also to bring tourism to the area.¹³ And indeed, when the Cabot Trail opened in 1932, northern Cape Breton became a destination for the adventurous tourist. The area's main appeal was not so much its dramatic scenery as the drama in seeing it. The Trail was steep, narrow, and treacherous. Gordon Brinley's 1936 account Away to Cape Breton is useful in demonstrating how these very factors were an attraction to

¹² C.W. Vernon, Cape Breton at the Beginning of the ... Twentieth Century (Toronto: Nation Publishing, 1903), p.315.

¹³ According to MacMillan, the realization that the Trail would bring tourism came to him in a dream, after a day spent, it would seem, walking from Pleasant Bay to Cheticamp (27 miles), driving to Baddeck (50 miles) and "retiring early." He wrote, "Some time near morning I fell asleep and dreamed about a wonderful development that I should see underway, numerous houses, cottages and tourist homes in the main bay and inlets as well as sail boats and all kinds of pleasure craft, apparently everybody enjoying themselves." A.S. MacMillan, "A Dream Come True: Story of the Development of Tourist Industry in Northern Inverness and Victoria Counties," 1952, reprinted as "Cabot Trail: A Political Story," Cape Breton's Magazine, no.62 (1993), pp.2, 66-70.

travellers. Before starting out along the Trail, Brinley read the warning in Nova Scotia's Relief Map Directory: "In our opinion, inexperienced or timid drivers should not take this drive; and under no circumstances should the drive be taken unless your brakes are working perfectly, and your car working well in low gear."¹⁴ Brinley tells of leaving Cheticamp at first light to begin the journey around "before there are many cars coming from the other direction."¹⁵ He and his wife greatly enjoyed themselves, but after completing the circuit, they came upon a less fortunate driver. The Trail had broken him, and he stumbled up to Brinley's car like a religious messenger:

"It isn't worth it! The Cabot Trail isn't worth the strain that I've suffered. I'm disappointed." Trying to cheer him, I said, "There certainly are terrible moments on the Trail, but think of the lovely hours at McKinley Mountain, Pleasant Bay, Sunrise and Big Intervale. And think of the 51 heavenly streams. Why, the Garden of Eden only had four!" But he shook his head, and as he turned away, we heard him repeating, "It isn't worth it."¹⁶

The two drivers disagreed whether the scenery that the Cabot Trail revealed made the Trail itself worthwhile. Both, though, had come more for the experience of driving the Trail than for the scenery it offered.

R.W. Cautley likewise understood that a national park consisting of just the Cabot Trail could disappoint. He therefore recommended that a parcel of land in the Bras d'Or area, forty miles to the south, be included. Travellers had long found the region to be a diamond in the rough, and even the crusty Charles Dudley Warner was moved to call it "the most beautiful salt-water lake I have ever seen, and more beautiful

¹⁴ Gordon Brinley, Away to Cape Breton (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1936), p.86.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., p147.

than we had imagined a body of salt water could be."¹⁷ Cautley himself had recommended the Bras d'Or as the most likely place for a Nova Scotia park in 1929 and 1934. And now, its genteel, more picturesque nature would nicely offset the wildness of the Cabot Trail. The difficulty was that Bras d'Or was already populated and popular, and thus land there would be expensive to buy. The Nova Scotia government had been so disinclined to take over the area that Cautley had not been asked to visit the region. Harkin had suggested it himself.¹⁸ The enthusiasm shared by Harkin and Cautley for the Bras d'Or site is indicative of their determination to make the Nova Scotia park, wherever it was, the centre for provincial tourism.

After reading Cautley's report, Harkin had serious doubts that the Cape Breton site "measures up to National Parks standards of scenic predominance." He quoted Cautley's own words that the highland interior which would constitute most of the park was singularly "devoid of scenic attraction", "a Parks liability rather than a Parks asset."¹⁹ However, Bras d'Or was another matter. In conversation, Cautley "freely admits that any reasonably-sized area in the Bras d'Or country would, in his opinion, make a better National Park than the Cape Breton site...."²⁰ The area constitutes "the most beautiful and internationally remarkable features of Nova Scotian scenery...." Most importantly, according to Harkin the Bras d'Or possessed "extraordinary facilities for recreational development"²¹ which the northern site did not.²² It is not clear

¹⁷ Warner, p.108.

¹⁸ Harkin to Cautley, 1 September 1934, RG84 vol.983, file CBH2 vol.1 pt.2, NAC.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Harkin to Gibson, 14 December 1934, RG84 vol.983, file CBH2 vol.1 pt.1, NAC.

²¹ Ibid.

whether Harkin was referring to existing manmade facilities like docks and tennis courts, or to natural features like beaches and picnic spots, but in either case his emphasis was on making the area a centre of tourist development, the fairground to the Cabot Trail's rollercoaster.

What is missing from the Parks Branch's correspondence is even a pretense of interest in a Nova Scotia park site for the preservation of its flora and fauna, or even the preservation of its scenery. There was no talk of reclaiming the interior's natural form, or even taking over the Bras d'Or to ensure a mass tourism attuned with nature, though by stretching the point we can suppose the Parks Branch may have contemplated it. It is clear that Harkin and the Parks Branch were focused not on preserving Nova Scotia's past but in developing Nova Scotians' future. The main concern was how to do so effectively, and that involved not just scenery tourism but satisfying all parts of the tourist's experiences. Harkin wrote,

I have grave fears that if we name the northern portion of Cape Breton Island a National Park and then find ourselves with nothing more to sell than a highway, even though a considerable portion of it has real scenic value, we may do more harm than good from a tourist standpoint. We cannot afford to have any visitors go away feeling that what we called a National Park was not of a quality which they had reason to expect.²³

Despite his own misgivings, Harkin knew that the park was to be created, and that if it was a failure it would sully the names of national parks nationwide.

²² Harkin referred to "the only serious deficiency of the northern area, namely, - its lack of recreational facilities...." Harkin to Gibson, 6 February 1935, RG84 vol.983, file CBH2 vol.1 pt.1, NAC.

²³ Harkin to Gibson, 14 December 1934, RG84 vol.983, file CBH2 vol.1 pt.1, NAC.

In 1935 the park plans temporarily stalled, as events beyond the control of the Parks Branch affected its ability to act. The federal election of W.L.M. King's Liberal government and its decision to merge the Department of the Interior with three other departments under one ministry slowed any park progress for a time.²⁴ Only Thomas Crerar's enthusiasm for nationalizing what had previously been the Western-centred ministry gave hope for the Parks Branch's future. But Harkin soon found that the Minister's enthusiasm had its drawbacks. In the spring of 1936, with the new federal Liberal government ready to move forward with a Nova Scotia park, Crerar and his deputy minister James Wardle met with Nova Scotia politicians to discuss the site, with neither Harkin nor any of his staff present. Though the provincial representatives agreed to ensure that a piece of Bras d'Or Lake would be turned over to national park use, Crerar on his own chose to make no mention of the Bras d'Or in his official letter to Premier Angus L. Macdonald announcing that the park could go forward.²⁵ To Harkin, this unilateral decision was a slap in the face of the Parks Branch's own planners, as well as a thoughtless and unnecessary concession. The Bras d'Or, he wrote his deputy minister, was "absolutely indispensable if the Department expects this Branch to make a success of the Nova Scotia National Park from a tourist standpoint." It was "a first-class central point for holding the touring public and gradually distributing them to the various attractive points in the island." Harkin was especially

²⁴ Harkin to J.M. Wardle, Deputy Minister of the Interior, 19 December 1935, RG84 vol.985, file CBH2-Cap Rouge vol.2 pt.3, NAC.

²⁵ See the original draft letter, Thomas Crerar to Angus L. Macdonald, 18 March 1936, RG84 vol.985, file CBH2-Cap Rouge vol.2 pt.2, NAC; and the final draft, 25 March 1936, *ibid.* Wardle told Harkin, "It was the Minister's wish, however, that for the present no mention of the Bras d'Or Lakes area be made." 27 March 1936, *ibid.*

concerned that what to his mind was an incomplete park would not only be of limited use to the province, but would also weaken the national park name. "It must be kept in mind", he wrote, "that while the name 'National Park' has a very great selling value, especially in the United States, even a National Park must deliver the goods. I feel that we cannot afford to have the name 'National Park' used in any area where the result may be to seriously damage the prestige of all our National Parks."²⁶ Harkin's arguments went unheeded, and in April 1936, Crerar sent Macdonald an agreement creating a park in the northern section of Cape Breton alone. By mid-June, Parliament was ready to pass a bill establishing Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island national parks.

James Harkin, who was 61, chose not to continue the fight for national parks. He had survived the Tory years of the early 1930s, only to be given a smaller role within the new Liberal government. Harkin chose early retirement in November of 1936, and was replaced by his longtime aide F.H.H. Williamson. But neither Williamson nor any future head of the parks agency would have the prestige and power that Harkin had enjoyed, not because of a lack of will or personality but because decisions were increasingly made over their heads, by the Branch director or by the Minister himself.

²⁶ Harkin to Wardle, 6 April 1936, RG84 vol.985, file CBH2-Cap Rouge vol.2 pt. 2, NAC.

communities

When Samuel Challoner had proposed a national park for Cape Breton in the 1920s, he had pointedly suggested that it be "exclusive of the farms and villages along the coasts."²⁷ The park was to be beneficial, not detrimental, to the people of the northern peninsula. James Harkin had instructed Cautley before his survey that "the proportion of alienated land ... will have an important bearing on the practicability of any site selected"²⁸ though his main concern was with the cost of expropriation. Having surveyed the site, Cautley felt that excluding all settlement, especially on the west coast of the proposed park, would be impossible. His vision of the park was dominated by the Cabot Trail, and for this, land along the populated coast was essential. Yet Cautley's choices of which settlements must be submerged – choices that would disrupt communities and shape the park forever – indicate his interpretation of what life in rural Nova Scotia should be like.

Beginning in the southeast at Indian Brook, 12 miles below Ingonish, Cautley suggested a number of communities should be left outside the park. Around Indian Brook, "some of the present owners have fairly well-developed farms"²⁹ so they should not be displaced, and at Ingonish, "There is a considerable population scattered throughout...."³⁰ Neils Harbour and White Point were likewise discounted, plus all of Victoria County north of the Aspy River (including Bay St. Lawrence, Cape North, and Dingwell) because of its

²⁷ Cited in Cautley report on Nova Scotia sites, 1934, p.49.

²⁸ Harkin to Cautley, 4 September 1934, RG84 vol.983, file CBH2 vol.1 pt.2, NAC.

²⁹ Cautley report on Nova Scotia sites, 1934, p.61.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.61.

"considerable population."³¹ But at Pleasant Bay and Cap Rouge on the west coast, Cautley's thinking shifted considerably. After citing Pleasant Bay's Scottish past and describing its present settlement of almost 300 people, he suggested it be incorporated into the park as is. "It is out of the question," he wrote, "to expatriate all the inhabitants of such an old established settlement." The farms of Pleasant Bay would be "really an asset to the scenic grandeur of the region, since they provide a relief for the sombre character of the scenery."³² It would be easier to control the community as a park townsite than as an independent settlement just outside the park boundary. Pleasant Bay should stay. This was an unusual suggestion for Cautley to make, since the Parks Branch understood from its experience with Western parks that townsites could be sources of constant aggravation. Also, these Western townsites were only tolerated because they supplied necessary services to park visitors, which a community like Pleasant Bay probably could not. Nonetheless, Cautley lobbied hard for the little community to be allowed to survive.

Cautley's proposal for Pleasant Bay stands in stark contrast to his stand on Cap Rouge, a small French-speaking settlement along the trail from Pleasant Bay to Cheticamp. Cautley made no mention of a community there at all, only saying that there was at most a dozen poor fishermen's "cottages" along the whole road north of Cheticamp. He referred to such homes elsewhere as "isolated fishing stations", places where fishermen eked out a scant living from the sea and from the few crops and animals they raised. This assessment, as pertaining to Cap Rouge, can only be seen as willful blindness. In reality, Cap Rouge had

³¹ *Ibid.*, p.63.

³² *Ibid.*, p.66.

some 30 families and was not much less substantial than Pleasant Bay (there were, for example, 77 Cap Rouge voters in the 1937 election, and 138 in Pleasant Bay).³³ And although, in contrast to fulltime farmers, these fishermen did not have large houses and barns, Cap Rouge had, in the words of travel writer Gordon Brinley, "good crops and well painted houses."³⁴ Cautley could not have missed Cap Rouge.

Cautley's reason for misrepresenting Cap Rouge was part practicality, part prejudice. First of all, he felt that regardless of how many houses there were, they would have to be moved. At this part of the Trail, the coast rose quickly into the uplands, and there was no room for the highway to pass around the shore settlements. Still, Cautley could have suggested the houses stay, as he had for Pleasant Bay, as a sort of spectacle for park visitors. The difference is that he neither understood nor approved of Cap Rouge's lifestyle. Unlike Pleasant Bay which showed its civilization in its big farms, Cap Rouge as a fishing community showed less material signs of permanence. It had one foot in the sea. Cautley decided that moving the shore fishermen would be to their own advantage. He wrote,

It is difficult to understand why shore fishermen have settled in some of the places where they are found.... [I]n this case, the impropriety of moving people away from the locus of their occupation does not exist, as in the case of Pleasant Bay for instance, because the thriving settlement of Cheticamp and the only good harbour for boats on the entire west coast is within a few miles and affords much better opportunities for either fishing or farming than where they now are.³⁵

³³ Halifax Herald, 30 June 1937. Cap Rouge's size is also given in Williamson to Wardle, 4 November 1936, RG84 vol.984, file CBH2 vol.3 pt.2, NAC.

³⁴ Brinley, p.94.

³⁵ Cautley report on Nova Scotia sites, 1934, pp. 59 and 68.

Without any other member of the National Parks Branch or the federal or provincial governments visiting Cape Breton, all of Cautley's recommendations for the northern peninsula became part of the federal-provincial agreement to create the park in 1936. Most notably, residents of Pleasant Bay – and Pleasant Bay alone – would be permitted to remain and lease back their land from the federal owners. Only when other park staff began to arrive did the vagaries of Cautley's recommendations become apparent. The most important new architect of the park would be James Smart, who arrived as Acting Superintendent in the summer of 1936. Smart was an ex-forester from Manitoba who had shaped Riding Mountain National Park since its inception in 1930.³⁶ After he had inspected the Branch's new territory, one of Smart's first letters to Harkin was a list of nine reasons why the planned leasehold arrangement for Pleasant Bay was wrongheaded and troublesome. Instead, "we should insist on the removal of the settlers and demolish their buildings."³⁷ Residents, Smart feared, would demand schools, hospitals, telephones, and all other possible amenities to be provided by the park. It would be necessary but almost impossible to have residents' houses conform to the park's high standards. Expatriate relatives would try to return and, most bothersome, "A great majority of the settlers, especially the younger generation, will always look to the Park for employment...." They would even "demand they be given the right to engage in businesses other than their supposed occupations, such as

³⁶ On Smart's career, see RG32 vol.237, file 1888.02.29, NAC.

³⁷ Smart to Harkin, 14 August 1936, RG84 vol.984, file CBH2 vol.3 pt.2, NAC.

fishermen or small farmers...." Park residents, Smart concluded, would be a "running sore" to the Department.³⁸

At Harkin's request, James Smart also investigated Ingonish as a substitute for the Bras d'Or as a centre of tourist development. He was especially impressed with a jutting piece of land called Middlehead owned at that time by Julia Corson, widow of an American millionaire. He wrote, "This is an area of outstanding beauty and includes one of the finest ocean beaches in Nova Scotia."³⁹ The Corson house was in rather bad repair, but it was somewhat majestic and might usefully be turned into a park hotel, on the order of the hotels at western parks like Banff and Waterton Lakes. Nearby was opportunity for the main development, a golf course, and "all other features usually included."⁴⁰

F.H.H. Williamson, Assistant Director and soon to be Harkin's replacement, visited the new park and agreed with Smart's assessments. James Smart had arrived in June, and by November, after discussion with provincial representatives and with very little fuss, he had reshaped the park. It was decided that Pleasant Bay would not be bought up and torn down, but neither would it be included in the park. The park boundary would skate around the little community; Cap Rouge would not be so lucky. The 70-square-mile tip of the park which had run all the way to the north coast on the Inverness side of the Victoria and Inverness Counties boundary was removed because it was deemed redundant, and because at the moment the park was larger than had been permitted in Nova Scotia's 1935 enabling legislation.⁴¹ In return

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Nova Scotia, General Assembly, An Act to Provide for Establishing a National Park in

for saving a considerable amount of money by these deletions,⁴² the province agreed to pay for the purchase of an additional 38 square miles around Ingonish, including Middlehead. The new national park had a headquarters.

In 1936, an Act of Canada had defined a national park in Nova Scotia, and in 1937 an amendment to that act significantly altered its boundaries. What was and what was not park was still subject to change. This suggests, I think, to what degree the new national park was not about the preservation of nature. Land was first and foremost the medium of park creation, and whatever land – by a combination of aesthetic, political, economic, and environmental factors – was finally made park land was what the Parks Branch would in the future give meaning to. Once one starts thinking about land in this abstract fashion, it is easier to understand why to the park staff the people living on the land were also abstractions, and why even as the park's shape changed in 1936 the people most directly involved were not informed. Only once the land was expropriated and the people removed could the Parks Branch begin to think of the Cape Breton site as a national park, its nature worthy of expropriation.

putting them out

Angus Leblanc of Cheticamp, formerly of Cap Rouge, told me that when mention was made of a national park for the area, no one was quite clear what it was to be: they had nothing to compare it to.

Nova Scotia, 1935, stated that the park could be no more than 256,000 acres.

⁴² Williamson later remembered this agreement as basically a land swap. Williamson to Gibson, 30 June 1938, RG84 vol.984, file CBH2 vol.4 pt.3, NAC.

"Cheticamp was as far as many had gone, you see ... some had been to Sydney to work." He paused. "—knew there would be a road through. That's all." I was about to ask him another question, when he added, "—figured there would be a fence around. Elephants, giraffes maybe for people to see."⁴³ He chuckled at himself.

Considering the new park was about to re-shape land ownership and land use in Cape Breton's northern peninsula, it is remarkable how little was known about it by those most directly affected. This, however, was a commonplace experience of Canadian expropriation of the period. Because it was provincial and federal governments that needed expropriations carried out, they fashioned laws which best served their needs while ignoring the needs and rights of landowners. In many cases, governments failed to inform landowners adequately, set compensation as they saw fit, and even set up their own boards to arbitrate dissent. Though Great Britain implemented a more progressive expropriation system in 1919, it took Canada another half-century to do the same.⁴⁴

Northern Cape Bretoners knew of the park largely through the lobbying efforts of Casey Baldwin, his speeches to Boards of Trade, his letters to editors, and the 1935 essay contest on "The Advantages of a National Park in Cape Breton" that he had sponsored. But these provided only hopeful descriptions for the park. When the official creation of the park did come about, the press knew little or nothing of it. The local Victoria-Inverness Bulletin did not announce (and almost certainly did not know) when in the spring of 1936 the Nova Scotian

⁴³ Interview with Angus Leblanc, Cheticamp, 2 August 1994.

⁴⁴ See Eric C.E. Todd, The Law of Expropriation and Compensation in Canada (Toronto: The Carewell Co. Ltd., 1976), pp.1-6. Todd calls expropriation law "the neglected Cinderella of Canadian public law." (p.1)

government authorized the expropriation of all land in what was to be the park and deeded this land to Canada. The Sydney Post-Record wrongly declared that the park was to "comprise the entire north end of Cape Breton."⁴⁵ A Canadian Press story mistakenly described the park as a disappointingly small project of 25 square miles (about 400 square miles short) and noted that those with improved property would be allowed to remain there (another error: this was to be true only for Pleasant Bay residents). Even the vigilantly anti-Liberal Halifax Herald ran this last piece without question or criticism. Considering the public interest generated when Cautley inspected potential sites, this lack of interest is surprising. The provincial government may not have wanted to draw attention to the upcoming expropriation, but one would think it would have wanted credit for making the park a reality. And while newspapers may have taken the official creation of the park as an unexciting paper transfer, one would think they would have seen its significance both to the province and to those losing land.

Landowners knew next to nothing about the new park, and the Parks Branch was wary about changing this. In an earlier memo, Cautley had warned that in creating a national park in an older, long-populated province, "there is always a danger of creating hostility and feelings of injustice if old-established rights of residence are disturbed."⁴⁶ When he wrote his 1934 report, he again suggested that involving small Cape Breton communities was bound to be troublesome: "If the land was being purchased for a park, on the understanding that the purchase involved

⁴⁵ Sydney Post-Record, 25 April 1936.

⁴⁶ Cautley to Harkin, 16 June 1933, RG84 vol.1964, file U2.12.1, NAC.

expatriation, it would probably prove to be a more difficult matter to get them to sell willingly at all."⁴⁷ Though expropriation was a provincial concern, the Parks Branch knew it must walk gingerly, that it would have forever to deal with any bad feelings created by the expropriation process. For this reason the Branch, which had originally planned to move ahead quickly with development in 1936, shifted its funds toward work that would not interfere with the original owners.⁴⁸ The Engineering Division began rebuilding the Cabot Trail to national park standards. This was a politically expedient as well as necessary job in that it demanded about 100 men to be hired from the area, and did not involve development on farmers' or fishermen's land. However, the parks staff on site were assured by their superiors that when needed they had every right to make use of all park land. To residents who believed they still owned the land, this was puzzling. In a letter to the Victoria-Inverness Bulletin, landowner Hector Moore, while stressing he was not against "the famous National Park," complained, "The Engineers and Surveyors, in fact, any employee of the Park, appear to be allowed to trespass on any private property, and take a parcel of land of said property, without even consulting the owner."⁴⁹

To the Nova Scotia government, keeping the landowners uninformed was nothing more than procrastination. They had already deeded the land to Canada, and were resigned to settling with owners sooner or later. However, it is also clear that the government felt that by

⁴⁷ Cautley report on Nova Scotia sites, 1934, p.60.

⁴⁸ Williamson to Gibson, 21 September 1937, RG84 vol.139, file CB28, NAC.

⁴⁹ Hector Moore, letter to the editor, Victoria-Inverness Bulletin, 27 November 1936. M. MacLean, M.P. for Sydney Mines, wrote Crerar that he was receiving numerous complaints of parks staff trespassing on private property. 30 August 1938. RG84 vol.984, file CBH2, vol.4 pt.2, NAC.

planning to resolve settlements with landholders slowly and piecemeal, they were doing the federal government a favour. The province's Deputy Attorney General, Fred Mathers, said as much to the Parks Branch's Chief Engineer. He explained that under the Nova Scotia Expropriation Act, the province could take possession of a property (or threaten to do so) if the landowner refused to settle. Therefore, Mathers noted, "The Dominion authorities would be far better off without the transfer being formally completed" and the difficult responsibility of eviction moved to the Parks Branch.⁵⁰ It was to the two governments' mutual advantage that the Parks Branch move forward with visible development on land that had been deeded to it, while worried, uninformed past landowners looked on and became increasingly motivated to settle with the province. It was not until 1937 that residents learned that the new park would mean the expropriation of settled land, not just the reservation of the highland plateau as Casey Baldwin had hoped. Nor would anyone learn that the park's geography had shifted to include Ingonish and omit Pleasant Bay and the northern tip of Inverness County until August of 1938, almost two years after the province and the Parks Branch had agreed to this.⁵¹

With the true state of the park so unclear in people's minds, it is not surprising that the first negotiators sent out by Nova Scotia in 1937 had no success reaching settlements.⁵² After their failure, the

⁵⁰ Fred Mathers to F.H.H. Williamson, 19 August 1934, RG84 vol.984, file CBH2 vol.4 pt.2, NAC.

⁵¹ Notice of the boundary changes was published in the Victoria-Inverness Bulletin on 5 and 12 August 1938.

⁵² The next negotiator, Wilfred Creighton, heard that his predecessors had failed because they were drunk all the time, and even tried to take a cut from settlements. This might be true, but rumours about the government negotiators' duplicity were legion. I was told, off the record, that Creighton himself earned a "commission" for striking low settlements

Department of Highways handed the responsibility for expropriation over to the Department of Land and Forests. Provincial forester Wilfred Creighton was called in to reach settlements. It was, he later wrote, a difficult task for a young man: "The work was interesting, sometimes funny, often frustrating and more often distasteful."⁵³ Creighton found that he would have to deal with about 300 properties in all, including about 70 homes mostly at Cap Rouge or around Ingonish. He also soon learned that northern Cape Bretoners expected a price of about \$6 per acre for woodland, with farmland running from \$20 to \$100 per acre.⁵⁴ Creighton would travel around making offers to everyone and hoping for a few settlements, then would leave the park area for a few weeks, go back and do it all over again.

Today, Creighton believes that the great majority of property owners got above the market norm. He tells the story of a woodland property at Pleasant Bay of 110 acres. Its owner, a young Gaelic-speaking man, accepted \$700 for it, but Creighton discovered that the deed had been signed a week after the official park expropriation. Creighton felt they should seek out the previous owner to sign a release. When they did so, the previous owner felt he should receive half the settlement. Creighton writes,

with landowners.

⁵³ Dr. Wilfred Creighton, Forestkeeping: A History of the Department of Lands and Forests in Nova Scotia, 1926-1969 (Halifax, 1988), p.58.

⁵⁴ Wilfred Creighton with Kenneth Donovan, ed., "Wilfred Creighton and the Expropriations: Clearing Land for the National Park, 1936," Cape Breton's Magazine, no.69, p.13. This price seems reasonable. Cautley had declared in 1934, "I was informed that the transfer of land between themselves is usually made at a rate of from three to four dollars an acre." Landowners probably expected more from the government than they would have another buyer. A listing of expropriation settlements may be found in Nova Scotia, Public Accounts, 1936-1945.

The young man took a dim view of this suggestion. Eventually, the old gentleman did sign, but with considerable reluctance. As we drove away, the young man kept muttering to himself in Gaelic. Finally I said, "That old man was unreasonable expecting to get half the money. You don't owe him anything, do you? You paid him for the property?"

A soft Highland voice replied, "Ach, yes, every cent, \$150."⁵⁵

The moral of Creighton's story is not only that Scots are wily, but that he had given the young man a very good price, far above the market price. Those who had only woodland did indeed profit by the expropriation. But to those who lived within the park, expropriation was another matter. For these people, it meant moving out of their homes, usually to settle at communities just outside the park border. Creighton himself remembers, "I minded seeing people put out of their homes. ... Oh, I hated ... – I was in favour of the park, the park was good. But I thought it was cruel to put them out."⁵⁶

For those who moved, the memories are vivid. Wilf Aucoin was five when his family's land in Cap Rouge was expropriated. He remembers their barn cut into pieces and hauled on oil drums down the coast to Cheticamp, and his house torn apart and salvaged. His family saw the expropriation as a blessing. They no longer had to walk ten miles to church, and they had greater opportunity for jobs. Aucoin's father Christopher became one of the first employees in the park, and stayed there for 33 years. Some people, Aucoin knows, were upset about moving, about losing their favourite hunting places, but "these are small things when you look at the whole thing."⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Creighton, *Forestkeeping*, p.60.

⁵⁶ Creighton and Donovan, p.9.

⁵⁷ Interview with Wilf Aucoin, Cheticamp Island, 1 August 1994.

Others felt differently. Maurice and Emma Donovan of Ingonish Beach will tell you that their house at Clyburn Brook was "on Number 9" – that is, on the ninth hole of the park's golf course today. They moved their house there in 1937, not knowing that the province had already decided to add the Ingonish section to the national park. The soil was beautiful, the Clyburn ran through their land, and with partridge, deer, rabbits, strawberries, fish, and their own farm goods they felt protected and self-sufficient. As Maurice Donovan tells it, the first word of the park came when a Sydney lawyer, Smith McIvor, was overseeing the settlements. He came up to them and announced, "As of today, the park owns your property." Donovan said, "I haven't sold it yet." McIvor replied, "You don't sell it, it is expropriated for public use." The Donovans asked for \$50,000 for their 30 acres cleared and 34 acres of woodland – an impossibly high price – and were offered \$1500. When negotiations stalled, Maurice Donovan got a job helping build the golf course, even as it wound around his house. In the end, the couple accepted the government offer. Interestingly, they realize that their story has certain tragic overtones to it, and recall it romantically. Donovan states,

I wish I had a camera the day we left there. Every child who was old enough to lead an animal had an animal on a rope, when we cleared off me and my wife and the babies, everyone was crying, leading the animals over the mountains. I said that evening, I wonder what the Acadians thought of their leaving the day they were expelled from Nova Scotia.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Maureen Scobie interview, "Stories from the Clyburn Valley," *Cape Breton's Magazine*, no.49 (1988), pp.1-20. Also, material from an interview with Maurice and Emma Donovan, Ingonish Beach, 5 August 1994.

Some Cap Rougians made the same connection. Angus Leblanc was fifteen when his family heard about the expropriation. His family had seventeen members. They had a real farm going, with 400 acres, a big barn, five or six acres cleared, eight cows, two horses, 45 sheep, and a few pigs. He remembers catching rides to school on the back grille or spare tire of tourists' cars. When word first came of expropriation, there were meetings at the Cap Rouge schoolhouse about resisting, but nothing came of it: a few of the older people, fearful of facing the government, settled quickly and resistance rapidly dissolved. Leblanc's family ended up selling for \$2700. His family never voted Liberal again, never forgave the government. Leblanc especially resented that the jobs they were told would come with the park never materialized.⁵⁹

Gordon Doucette of Ingonish remembers returning from the war in 1945 to find his mother surrounded by the park. His father was in a hospital in Antigonish with tuberculosis, and his mother had not wanted to move. "The method that they used," he states, "when I came back from overseas, the park had put a fence around the property, and had a gate on it, and the gate was locked, and my mother was locked into it."⁶⁰ Park staff were using a Doucette field to keep stray livestock, and the barn to store park vehicles. For years, the Doucettes stayed where they were. They did not move out until 1950, when they were "worn down" and realized that their old home would need renovating if they were to stay there.

The most recalcitrant of owners was Julia Corson, who lived at the jutting end of Middlehead in Ingonish. Whereas the parks staff felt free

⁵⁹ Interview with Angus Leblanc, Cheticamp, 2 August 1994.

⁶⁰ Interview with Gordon Doucette, Ingonish Beach, 5 August 1994.

to work on other owners' land , in Corson's case the project's engineer did not feel quite up to the task.⁶¹ Corson sought \$125,000 for her property and when the province balked she took her case to Crerar and Prime Minister King.⁶² She inundated them with letters, even sending King a poem written by her niece:

You who say you have purchased for tourists
 This bay and the mountains around
 Though all manner of eminent jurists
 Make it yours to the moles underground
 Yet we keep more than all you are claiming
 You will never find what we found
 For the pulse of the places you're naming
 Has beat in our blood for so long
 That their rhythm can never be bound
 To sell to your throng.⁶³

Like most others, though, Julia Corson tired of the fight, and in time settled for a price far below her original one.

Common to the stories of expropriation at Cape Breton Highlands National Park is a feeling of inevitability. Eva Deveau told me that her father fought the park at first, "but the government is stronger than anybody."⁶⁴ A number of people told me that people back then had a greater respect for authority, a feeling that what the government says goes. Notwithstanding, in Cheticamp there is a generally held belief that Pleasant Bay was taken out of the park because of the strength of resistance there. As Eva Deveau summarizes it, "I think the English people from Pleasant Bay, they didn't want to move and they're still there, so I think if the French people had done the same thing they

⁶¹ See T.C. Fenton to T.S. Mills, 16 September 1938, RG84 vol.984, file CBH2 vol.4 pt.1, NAC.

⁶² See letters in RG84 vol.986, file CBH16.1 vol.1 pt.2 and 3, NAC.

⁶³ Phoebe Folger Jordan poem, in RG84 vol.986, file CBH16.1 vol.1 pt.3, NAC.

⁶⁴ Interview with Eva Deveau, Cheticamp, 2 August 1994.

would have stayed."⁶⁵ For the Acadians of the area the story has become a lesson in their own lack of solidarity and will. In reality, Pleasant Bay was omitted from the park before knowledge of the boundaries was well known, so it is unlikely that any alleged resistance was ever a factor. Pleasant Bay was omitted because Cautley's plan to make it a park townsite was unwieldy from the beginning, and the Parks Branch, on the advice of James Smart, realized that it would be simpler just to move the park boundary to just outside the village. No lesson can be learned from this about how to deal with government.

The single biggest winner in the expropriation process was the biggest landholder, the Oxford Paper Company, who did not even own the property it was losing. In 1920, this Maine-based company had bought "the Big Lease", a property of over one half million acres in northern Cape Breton originally leased from the Nova Scotia government for 99 years for \$6000 per year.⁶⁶ Throughout the 1920s the company worked the property until it had cut all wood that could be retrieved economically and until the Depression made exporting any pulpwood to Maine economically unfeasible. The company held on to the Big Lease as a reserve, with the hope that in time it could cut from it again. To the Nova Scotia government, this inactivity promised opportunity: they believed the Oxford-held property would be a fine centre to the park. In his report, Cautley wrote,

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ See L. Anders Sandberg, "Forest Policy in Nova Scotia: The Big Lease, Cape Breton Island, 1899-1960," Trouble in the Woods: Forest Policy and Social Conflict in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, ed. L. Anders Sandberg (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 1992), pp.66-89. On American pulp and paper companies in the Maritimes, see Bill Parenteau and L. Anders Sandberg, "Conservation and the Gospel of Economic Nationalism: The Canadian Pulpwood Question in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick," Environmental History Review, vol.19 no.2 (Summer 1995), pp.57-83.

The greater portion of the area under discussion is included within the Oxford Paper Company's Lease, but since the Premier of Nova Scotia is fully aware of the terms under which a National Park may be established, there can be no doubt that he is prepared to dissolve the said Lease in as far as the lands which may be required for a Park are concerned.⁶⁷

When in 1936 the Member of Parliament from Colchester-Hants, Gordon Purdy, tipped off the Victoria-Inverness Bulletin that the park was going through, it was noted that the proposed site would take in "what is commonly called 'The Big Lease'. The acquiring of this property would not cost a great deal as most of it is Crown lands."⁶⁸ In all, this part of the Big Lease being considered for the park consisted of over 175,000 acres. Though Cautley had said that the highland interior was "only valuable as a Park asset from a game preservation point of view"⁶⁹ it did give the park size and ruggedness, which were considered essential.

To the government's surprise, the company had no intention of giving up its lease for a pittance. Oxford Paper made a total claim on the land for about \$2.3 million, citing its value as a pulpwood reserve and even mentioning that it had value for other purposes – including as a park. In a 1940 arbitration hearing, the company defended the land's worth while government witnesses insisted that the national park land was ugly, impassable, and useless for forestry. The interior was too wet and hillocky, its trees exposed, wind-stunted, and branchy. Dominion Forester Wilfred Creighton, having become an expert on evaluating Cape Breton land, testified that one of the Oxford Paper Company's own men,

⁶⁷ Cautley report on Nova Scotia sites, 1934, p.61.

⁶⁸ Victoria-Inverness Bulletin, 18 April 1936.

⁶⁹ Cautley report on Nova Scotia sites, 1934, p.50.

Lee Armstrong, had told him, "Mister, I have cruised a lot of country; some of it was good and some of it was bad, but of all the country that I ever saw, this is the worst."⁷⁰ Creighton agreed: "Acre for acre, it is the worst piece of land that I know, not only in Nova Scotia but anywhere in eastern Canada."⁷¹ Though both men were speaking of the area in terms of its value as forest, it is doubtful that they could find what was so economically ugly to be aesthetically beautiful. After a six-week court case, Oxford Paper won a settlement that with costs, interest, and reimbursement totalled just over \$520,000. Both sides voiced satisfaction with the judgment,⁷² but the Oxford Paper Company must have been especially content. It had made over one half million dollars on land it could not afford to use, land that may not even have been useable, land it was leasing at the time for only \$6000 per year.⁷³ The Nova Scotia government paid almost twice as much for reclaiming this one lease as it did for purchasing the 300 other properties throughout the park.

⁷⁰ Evidence of Wilfred Creighton, Oxford Paper Co. arbitration case, RG10 Series B, Vol.204 file 11, p.2384, Public Archives of Nova Scotia [henceforth, PANS].

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p.2398.

⁷² One of the men Nova Scotia hired to evaluate the land, F.T. Jenkins, wrote T.D. McDonald, Deputy Attorney General, Nova Scotia, "In my opinion the Oxford Paper Co. has received generous compensation, but I believe that, taking everything into consideration, the Nova Scotia government has not done too badly." 8 January 1941. Oxford Paper Co. arbitration case, RG10 Series B, vol.202 file 4, PANS.

⁷³ A.S. MacMillan stated that "in lieu of taxes" Oxford was paying \$6000 per year toward the maintenance of roads in Inverness and Victoria Counties. Could MacMillan mistakenly have been referring to the lease payment, which was \$6000 per year? If so, Oxford Paper was not only paying a very low lease rate, it was in effect given the chance to ensure that its money would be spent by government in a way directly of use to the company. MacMillan, "A Dream Come True."

making a park

In his 1934 instructions on examining potential Nova Scotia park sites, James Harkin reminded R.W. Cautley that he was to find a spot that would be good for wildlife: "The preservation of all game is a cardinal principle of National Parks administration." However, in the next sentence, the Parks Director noted that this alone was not enough, that "there is a great deal of country which would make a first class game preserve but which would not have any value as a National Park."⁷⁴ This was the thinking that ruled the creation of the Cape Breton Highlands National Park after the land was turned over to Canada in 1936. It was understood that the business of making a park was a two-part affair. First, the land must become a reserve, with all its wildlife and other natural resources free from harm. Second, the reserve must become a park, not only by offering nature a chance to thrive but by offering visitors the facilities needed to enjoy it. A park was not a park until it offered first-class roads, accommodations, and recreational possibilities. From 1937 to 1939, the National Parks Branch worked at this two-part process in northern Cape Breton, transforming the land into a reserve and the reserve into a park.

In Chapter 8, I will examine in detail the Parks Branch's policies for the management and preservation of wildlife, fish, and vegetation. It is sufficient to say here that the Branch's initial concern was to learn about the natural features that it had acquired, and then to ensure that local citizens understood past land and resource uses no longer applied and would not be tolerated. In his 1934 report, Cautley noted that there the

⁷⁴ Harkin to Cautley, 4 September 1934, RG84 vol983, file CBH2 vol.1 pt.2, NAC.

area was home to whitetail deer, and could be restocked with caribou and moose.⁷⁵ No other animals were mentioned. Cautley was enthusiastic about the park's fishing potential, particularly trout fishing on the Cheticamp River.⁷⁶ In regard to both fish and wildlife, the Parks Branch was concerned that locals would violate the reserve. Locals, it was said, were responsible for overfishing the Cheticamp River.⁷⁷ Cautley believed that they were also responsible for killing off most of the area's wildlife and that "It is probable that the sons of the men who exterminated game in the northern end of Cape Breton are just as keen sportsmen as their fathers were and that the protection of imported game would be both difficult and expensive."⁷⁸ It is doubtful that local landowners, killing enough for their own use, were indeed responsible for making species extinct, especially when so much of the highlands was difficult and unpopulated terrain. However, it is quite true that Cape Bretoners felt it right to take deer, partridge, and rabbit for their family's use, even out of season. When the park was formed, three of the six-man staff were game wardens, responsible as much for publicizing the park's existence as for actually enforcing regulations. The first wardens were all locals and they seem to have accepted some poaching by those who had lost land or a favourite hunting spot.⁷⁹ Around Cheticamp, warden John Roche is remembered for taking a patrol every day at the same

⁷⁵ Cautley report on Nova Scotia sites, 1934, p.58. As proof of the caribou's past numbers, and to show that northern Cape Breton was once home to many animals, Cautley cites a letter from the 1780s.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ Harkin to Gibson, 14 December 1934, RG84 vol.983, file CBH2 vol.1 no.1, NAC.

⁷⁸ Cautley to Harkin, 7 June 1929, RG84 vol.1964, file U2.12.1, NAC.

⁷⁹ This point was made to me by two interview subjects.

time. After he had walked through, hunters knew it was safe to return to the park.⁸⁰

In the protection of fish and wildlife, the new park sought to regulate and change the customs of the longtime residents of the region. The park staff were to preserve the nature they had been granted, regardless of how this nature had been used in the past. Nevertheless, for the good of the park, it was understood that the park staff themselves must shape the nature of the park. Whereas the Parks Branch demanded vigilance against traditional resource uses, it was accepted that to develop the park facilities long-term gain demanded some short-term pain. The difference was that the park's enforced changes would be one time only and would be to the ultimate benefit of park visitors.

The most important development in the new park was the improvement of the Cabot Trail. From Cautley's report, the Branch had learned that though it was to be the Park's signature attraction, it was at present just too dangerous. What was needed was to keep the present road as much as possible but shave off the steepest grades on the worst sections, especially on the western coast of the park. Cautley accepted that this would be terrifically expensive but, he wrote, "my recommendation of the Cape Breton site for a National Park must depend entirely on whether the Dominion Government is willing to construct a good road from Cheticamp to Pleasant Bay."⁸¹ The provincial government was thrilled, because the park meant they were free of completing and maintaining a very expensive highway. Nova Scotia was already in the process of a massive hard surfacing program,

⁸⁰ The interview subject who mentioned this asked not to be named. I will discuss poaching further in Chapter 9.

⁸¹ Cautley report on Nova Scotia sites, 1934, p.72.

with about 1000 miles paved between 1934 and 1939. No one could possibly be more happy about the new park than the Hon. A.S. MacMillan, Minister of Highways, chair of the provincial Tourist Commission, architect of the Cabot Trail, not to mention head of the Fundy Construction Company, hired by the federal government to do the roadwork on the trail.⁸² Symptomatic of the close ties between government and business in 1930s Nova Scotia, MacMillan's potential conflict of interest raised no eyebrows.⁸³

When the parkland was deeded to Canada in the summer of 1936, the Trail became the focus of developmental work. The Trail was the main conduit for tourist travel, and it was understood that tourists could not arrive in great numbers until the road was in good shape. Also, the Trail fulfilled the promise of giving jobs to locals. When work on it was at its peak in the summers of 1937 and 1938, there were over 100 men hired, the vast majority from communities surrounding the park, and many of these were people who had had land expropriated.⁸⁴ Road construction provided other employment, as a writer to a local newspaper claimed:

National park is the talk of the day. Our young men are anxious to get some work which will be a great help to their fathers.... Farmers should get together and get the

⁸² On MacMillan, see George Neil Joudrey, "The Public Life of A.S. MacMillan," Master's thesis, Dalhousie University, 1966.

⁸³ On the last day of the legislative sitting in 1939, opposition member G.Y. Thomas did complain, "I still say that they might as well hand over the whole government to you and let you run the whole thing. A company of yours gets contracts from the Federal government – will you deny that?" MacMillan replied, "The company that I have an interest in." *Halifax Chronicle*, 17 April 1939. MacMillan suggests he was not closely involved with Fundy Construction, but in fact wrote the Parks Branch on behalf of Fundy Construction during roadbuilding, as "Hon. A.S. MacMillan, Fundy Construction, Company, Halifax." RG84 vol.520, file CBH200 pt.1, NAC.

⁸⁴ W.H. Stuart, Acting Superintendent, to M. MacLean, M.P., 3 September 1938, RG84 vol.72, file CBH313, NAC.

supplying of eggs, produce and meat for the different camps and it would help the situation, fishermen the fish trade and all in all would be quite an item. [sic]⁸⁵

In 1937, over 6.5 miles of the Trail were built or reconstructed, and in 1938 another 10.5 miles were completed or near completion. In both years and in 1939, bridges, culverts, and guard rails were also worked on.⁸⁶

But while roadbuilding was a central reason for the province to want a park in the first place, it was not on its own considered justification for the park. Upon learning that the Parks Branch had little planned for the park in 1937 other than roadbuilding, Cape Breton Member of Parliament D.A. Cameron complained to Crerar that the park seemed to be nothing but a road, and "if the development of this park is to be along those lines – speaking for myself, and I am sure I am speaking for the residents of Nova Scotia generally – I would much rather that the park had never been undertaken."⁸⁷ What was needed was a much larger outlay of funds for the construction of accommodation and recreation facilities. The provincial authorities made much the same complaints. Calling the 1938 federal grant "not much of a showing", Highways Minister A.S. MacMillan threatened that although he was expected to move forward with expropriation, "I do not feel justified in making this expenditure in view of the small amount that your Government has expended, and are proposing to expend this year."⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Grand Etang happenings, Victoria-Inverness Bulletin, 2 April 1937.

⁸⁶ Canada, Department of Mines and Resources, Annual Report, 1938, p.88; 1939, p.98; and 1940, p.86.

⁸⁷ D.A. Cameron to Crerar, 2 April 1937, RG84 vol.984, file CBH2 vol.4 pt.3, NAC.

⁸⁸ A.S. MacMillan to J.L. Ilsley, Minister of National Revenue, 24 February 1938, RG84 vol.990, file CBH16.112 pt.1, NAC.

The National Parks Branch was uncharacteristically silent in the face of these complaints, probably because it agreed that the federal government should move development forward. Harkin himself had told Cautley early on, "It was also very important to consider what natural attractions exist or what future developments can be made with a view to attracting visitors and tourists, such as fishing, boating, swimming, motoring, golf and trail riding."⁸⁹ Cautley saw places for all of these in his dreamed-of park, and even envisioned a bathhouse, similar to that of Banff hot springs, "with a warmed salt-water plunge" which would be "an attraction to a special class of tourists suffering from arthritis and ailments benefited by salt-water bathing."⁹⁰ Originally, Bras d'Or was to be home to such development, but when Ingonish was made the centre of the park, all planned development moved there. When the Parks Branch was finally deeded control of this area in July of 1938, development plans began immediately.⁹¹

The Parks Branch had no central and considered plan for the development of Ingonish; the work was done piecemeal. First, a location for the golf course had to be selected. Golf courses were seen as absolutely essential to national parks ever since James Harkin, himself an ardent golfer,⁹² had commissioned Canadian golf architect Stanley Thompson to build courses at Jasper and Banff in the late 1920s. Banff's was a huge engineering project involving the removal of huge quantities

⁸⁹ Harkin to Cautley, 4 September 1934, RG84 vol.983, file CBH2 vol.1 pt.2, NAC.

⁹⁰ Cautley report on Nova Scotia sites, 1934, p.75.

⁹¹ Smart to T.S. Mills, Chief Engineer, Surveys and Engineering Branch, 6 July 1938, RG84 vol.984, file CBH2 vol.4 pt.2, NAC. Also, see Williamson to Wardle, 30 July 1938, RG84 vol.139, file CBH28, NAC.

⁹² Lothian, "James Bernard Harkin." See also Bob Huxley, "Golf Courses in National Parks," Park News, vol.17 no.1 (Spring 1981), p.14.

of rock and, at a cost of \$500,000, was at the time thought to be the most expensive course ever built.⁹³ The Parks Branch trusted Thompson's knowledge of golf so much that it allowed him to decide where the Cape Breton Highland course should be. He chose the land around Clyburn Brook and on the Middlehead promontory, saying, "This area provides craggy cliff land, sandy shore and wooded valley land traversed by a river. I know of no place on the whole Atlantic Sea Board where such a variety of terrain can be found in so limited an area."⁹⁴ When the Middlehead area was turned over to the Dominion in the summer of 1938, Thompson began work on the first nine holes with a crew of 50 local men,⁹⁵ draining the land, grading and topsoiling it, preparing the seed bed, and planting and fertilizing the new grass. Work progressed so steadily that in an October meeting with the executive of Mines and Resources, Thompson suggested they push forward with the next nine holes. Rather than continuing the course along the sea as had been proposed, Thompson recommended development up the Clyburn. "The Clyburn Valley," he insisted, "traversed by the river with towering hills on each side, affords gorgeous scenery and character, and would add a great deal of variety to the play, as well as shelter from the raw Ocean breeze. Its ruggedness is in keeping with the whole Park development. This route happens to be on land already deeded to the park."⁹⁶ All present agreed, and work progressed on the course. A year later all eighteen holes were complete.

⁹³ James A. Barclay, *Golf in Canada: A History* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1992), p.370. On Stanley Thompson's career, see *ibid.*, pp.365-372.

⁹⁴ Thompson to Gibson, 4 June 1938, RG84 vol.72, file CBH313, NAC.

⁹⁵ Thompson report, 1 November 1939, *ibid.*

⁹⁶ Thompson, as stated by Gibson to Williamson, 18 October 1938, RG84 vol.72, file CBH313.7, NAC.

In his meeting with the Department of Mines and Resources executive, Stanley Thompson had noted that one reason the course should move forward so quickly was that "it would be good business to spend this amount on the second nine holes and retain in employment many of these people whose properties have been taken over for the Park and who have not been settled with by the Provincial Government."⁹⁷ This may have been genuinely charitable, though it made for the awkward situation that men like Gordon Doucette and Maurice Donovan took jobs on land that they still considered their own, while awaiting a fair settlement from the province. However, it was also "good business" because it appeased people in need of appeasing. The energy with which the golf course was completed, as with the work on the Cabot Trail, encouraged local landowners to believe that the park truly would bring jobs and prosperity. But this same energy meant that all major development opportunities were used up between 1937 and 1939. Once park development was finished, the park staff's primary job was to keep the park unchanged – a mandate that demanded far less employment. But by then settlement with landowners would be complete. Not surprisingly, the most common complaint about the park I heard from interview subjects and read within the archival records was that jobs promised to locals never appeared.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ The final verse of a song by Lubie Chiasson of Cheticamp, written while working on the Cabot Trail, goes "At the end of the song/ You will be well able to understand/ That we work for the government./ At the end of two weeks/ Or at the end of the month,/ We will draw a small cheque,/ And we will go home./ The money will all go/ To the small merchants." Chiasson's song hints at local wariness about whom the new park would most benefit. Translated by Jean Doris LeBlanc, in Father Anselme Chiasson, Cheticamp: History and Acadian Tradition (Breakwater Press, 1986).

Once the Trail and golf course were built, the Parks Branch felt that its responsibility in park development was largely complete. The only remaining job was attracting investors for accommodations. Though this will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7, it is sufficient here to say that the Branch hoped that investors would come forward to set up a grand hotel at Middlehead in the national park tradition. Parks Branch Director R.A. Gibson had accepted that the golf course should move forward swiftly in part because it was the best possible inducement for "attracting to the Park people with sufficient capital who are willing to develop the type of tourist accommodation that we are trying to secure to satisfy high class tourist business...."⁹⁹ Though the Parks Branch used its own network to seek out potential investors, especially the Canadian National Railway (which already ran a number of park hotels) and local hotel companies, it was unsuccessful. There was little interest, especially when the outbreak of war in 1939 promised tourism would be sluggish for the indeterminate future. In the winter of 1940, the Nova Scotia government, fearful that another summer would see tourists cruising around the Trail without stopping, offered to set up a hotel on the old Corson property at Middlehead. They asked for the land to be deeded back to the province, and were surprised when the Parks Branch instead offered them a license to run the hotel, as if they were any other lessee. In 1941 the provincial authorities set up a bungalow camp and had spruced up the Corson house, calling it Keltic Lodge.¹⁰⁰ Though tourists liked it and it was a hit among Nova Scotians, the new hotel was a drain

⁹⁹ Gibson to Williamson, 18 October 1938, RG84 vol.72, file CBH313.7, NAC.

¹⁰⁰ In regard to operating the Lodge at a loss, see Harold Connolly, Minister of Industry and Publicity for Nova Scotia, to R.J.C. Stead, 17 April 1942, RG84 vol.139, file CBH113.200, NAC.

on the province's finances and the government continually encouraged the Parks Branch to assume control over it. By the later years of the war, the province refused the unasked for and unwanted responsibility of keeping Keltic Lodge open.

hame noo

Making the Cape Breton park was a process of some steps. R.W. Cautley discovered a highly scenic road that could be a showpiece to some of the best landscape that Nova Scotia had to offer. The park he envisioned had only approximately defined borders, so the federal and provincial governments worked to finalize the site's exact dimensions. The past owners of lands and property within the boundaries were bought out. The Parks Branch enforced new restrictive land uses for the area, while developing some sections of it to an unprecedented degree. In all, the new park consisted of a collection of communities and a still unknown interior region that together had never been thought of as a unit. The last stage in turning this land into a park was to incorporate it with a single meaning, to make the park establishment and the park itself seem natural. This was done by promoting the park, emblematic of the best Canadian and Nova Scotian scenery, as an intrinsically Scottish place.

In his article "Tartanism Triumphant", Ian McKay¹⁰¹ describes how Nova Scotia came to see its essence as tied to Scottishness, particularly under the premiership of Angus L. Macdonald beginning in 1933. At a time when the province was coming to see tourism as a key

¹⁰¹ Ian McKay, "Tartanism Triumphant: The Construction of Scottishness in Nova Scotia, 1933-1954," *Acadiensis*, vol.21 no.2 (Spring 1992), pp.5-47.

to its economic future, Macdonald gave tourism promotion a focus by spotlighting Nova Scotia's Scottish heritage and its present-day independent, Gaelic-speaking highland stock.¹⁰² Through Macdonald's support, Nova Scotia got a Gaelic College, the Gathering of the Clans, a piper to welcome tourists at the border, and many other trappings of Scottishness. Such effort signalled that there was a Scottish presence to be preserved in Nova Scotia as well as created its own physical evidence of Scottishness: in time, it could be expected that people would forget these were evidences of Scottishness once-removed.

It would not be surprising, then, to learn that Cape Breton Highland National Park was an extension of this thinking, that Macdonald pushed for the park to show that Nova Scotia was Scottish right down to the ground. But there is no evidence that Macdonald supported this proposed park site over others, or that he had paramount influence in associating it with Scotland. Instead, the park became Scottish because many Nova Scotians – and foremost among these was Angus L. – considered this its obvious theme, and because the National Parks Branch worked actively to make it so.

Northern Cape Breton's rocky landscape had long been considered reminiscent of Scotland (and surely the Gaelic one heard there helped foster this association). In 1868, for instance, J.G. Bourinot wrote that "Those who have travelled Scotland cannot fail to notice the striking resemblance that the scenery of this part of Cape Breton bears to the Highlands."¹⁰³ But this in itself does not tell us much. The land could

¹⁰² On Macdonald, see *ibid.* and John Hawkins, *The Life and Times of Angus L.*, (Windsor: Lancelot Press, 1969).

¹⁰³ J.G. Bourinot, "Notes of a Ramble Through Cape Breton," *New Dominion Monthly* (Montreal 1868), p.91.

be interpreted in other ways. A 1935 magazine article on the proposed coming of the park described the region's landscape as "not unlike that of Sweden" and cited an American visitor who said that one view was "not excelled by the famed San Joachim Valley, California." A later writer noted that Ingonish "runs the gamut from the gloom of a Norwegian fjord to the windswept sunshine of Bermuda."¹⁰⁴ That Northern Nova Scotia was generally associated with Scotland in the 1930s does not mean this was the only way its landscape could be understood.

But even before Cautley's first visit to northern Cape Breton, at least some residents felt that the area's intrinsic Scottishness was so patently obvious that it had to be the theme of the park. Not coincidentally, they also felt that this would be both patriotically and economically profitable. At a 1934 meeting of the Baddeck Board of Trade, a woman suggested that if "the guides in the park could speak Gaelic it would be an attraction to the Tourists. The president [John M. Campbell] then assured her that when the Park was established the guides would be dressed in kilt and speak gaelic, while the caribou would be trained to play the bag-pipes if that would attract more tourists to Cape Breton."¹⁰⁵ The summer of 1934 also saw the late Dalhousie professor Donald MacIntosh donate 100 acres in Pleasant Bay to the Crown to construct "a small park" centred on a lone shieling, a mountain hut like one found on the Isle of Skye.¹⁰⁶ These instances are

¹⁰⁴ N. Milton Browne, "A Great Sanctuary in Nova Scotia," Forest and Outdoors, 1935, pp.112-116; and Arthur Walworth, Cape Breton: Isle of Romance (Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co., 1948), p.37.

¹⁰⁵ Victoria-Inverness Bulletin, 16 June 1934.

¹⁰⁶ McKay, pp.33-34. McKay overestimates the importance of this grant when he writes, "Once the Province of Nova Scotia accepted the gift, the campaign to establish a national park in Cape Breton was strengthened immeasurably." (p.34) Considering the size of the grant and its isolated location, neither the National Parks Branch nor the Nova Scotia

not evidence that the park was chosen because of its Scottishness, but suggest that once it was chosen, its Scottishness was sure to be pronounced.

When the park became a reality, the National Parks Branch worked to associate it with Scotland. The 1936 departmental report compared the area's landscape to that of Scotland. The Branch certainly knew that the Nova Scotia government wished this theme to be pressed. Describing a meeting with Angus L. in the summer of 1936, Smart noted that the Premier "was very anxious that the Scottish suggestion should be carried out, both in the name of the Park and the general theme or style in our development...."¹⁰⁷ Smart personally disapproved of this, stating "in my opinion, the characteristics of these people are not today typical of the Highland Scotch" and thus the Parks Branch should "go slowly in giving the impression that the Cape Breton Scots are representative of the historic Highlanders."¹⁰⁸ His concern for authenticity was not shared. R.A. Gibson wrote Williamson in 1938 that their minister, Thomas Crerar, mentioned "the desirability of making Cape Breton Highlands National Park a highland park, putting our park officers in kilts."¹⁰⁹ Some employees would be Gaelic-speaking, and in time heather and woolly highland cattle would be introduced to Ingonish, helping tourists imagine themselves across the Atlantic. The new provincially-run hotel was christened Keltic Lodge and the park golf course – its very existence a seeming homage to Scotland – would allow

government considered its inclusion or exclusion very relevant to the national park's existence.

¹⁰⁷ Smart to Williamson, 27 November 1936, RG84 vol.984, file CBH2 vol.3 pt.1, NAC.

¹⁰⁸ Smart to Gibson, 30 July 1938, RG84 vol.22, file PEI109, NAC.

¹⁰⁹ Gibson to Williamson, 18 July 1938, RG84 vol.139, file CBH28, NAC.

players to travel a map of Scottish associations, on holes dubbed "Tam O'Shanter", "Muckle Mouth Meg", "Hame Noo", and so forth.¹¹⁰ And in 1947, the lone shieling was unveiled, fulfilling Professor McIntosh's bequest. The Parks Branch, the sole manager of the 400 square miles that made up the Cape Breton Highlands park, provided tourists with a single, simple way of understanding the park.

Only James Smart, in charge of the park's early development, attempted to ensure that the French culture of the park region was represented in the park theme. Angus L. Macdonald sent Ottawa a list of suggestions for the park's name, most Scottish in nature. Interestingly, though, his first choice was "Isle Royale", "the old French name for the Island" which he felt gave it "the charm of antiquity" and "conveys the idea of the sea, which is, to my mind, one idea that we should keep before the minds of people in connection with advertising the park." Macdonald liked "The Highlands" as a name but thought "Highlands National Park" maybe "a little cumbersome" and that "Cape Breton Park" was unsuitable because it had "no particular historical or geographical meaning."¹¹¹ It was Smart who defended "Cape Breton Highlands National Park" expressly because it served as a reminder of both the Scottish and French pasts: "the idea being to associate the

¹¹⁰ Course designer Stanley Thompson and Loudon Hamilton, "a Scotchman, widely travelled and a student of Scotch lore," spent a winter evening coming up with the names. Stanley Thompson to James Smart, 27 October 1943, RG84 vol.141, file CBH313 pt.2, NAC. They came up with were a pastiche of Scottish, Gaelic, and Scottish-sounding names. As early as 1943, the names were losing what little original meaning they had. What Thompson remembered, for example, as "Canny Slap" because it called for "a tricky shot, one had to be canny", was now known as "Candy Slap" in reference to "a small opening or slap in a hedge or fence." See Dennis Sutherland to Superintendent J.P. MacMillan, October 1943, *ibid.*

¹¹¹ Macdonald to Crerar, 5 June 1936, RG84 vol.985, file CBH2 (Cap Rouge) vol.2 pt.1, NAC. Isle Royale was rejected immediately by the Parks Branch, because the American Park Service had established Isle Royale National Park in Michigan in 1931.

French background in the use of 'Cape Breton' and, of course, 'Highlands' would give the Scottish suggestion."¹¹² Smart pointed out that though much of the region was now Scottish, the French still congregated around Cheticamp and that Ingonish had once been French. Choosing the name Cape Breton Highlands National Park would allow the Parks Branch to focus primarily on the Scots, "without any offense to the French Canadians."¹¹³ In the same vein, James Smart tried to make the park design show signs of the park's French heritage. While buildings at the Ingonish end were to be "the Crofter style of Scottish building with rough masonry walls and thatched roof", Smart asked that those of a proposed Cheticamp-end bungalow camp "take on the style of habitant buildings similar to those in Old Quebec and, in fact, a few of the older buildings which are seen in the Acadian settlements in Cape Breton and the Gaspé country."¹¹⁴

Smart deserves credit for attempting to be inclusive, but his efforts demonstrate how strange the whole preservation of ethnic associations really was. The Parks Branch could tolerate the associations with people but not the people themselves. It did not wish to preserve the cultural remnants of the people being expropriated, but sought to introduce idealized versions of their culture for the amusement of tourists. Symbolic memory was to replace actual memory. And if the Parks Branch was not commemorating the people losing land but rather the people of the park region, why did they not give the French associations preference, since Cheticamp had 2.5 times the population of Ingonish?

¹¹² Smart to Williamson, 27 November 1936, RG84 vol.984, file CBH2 vol.3 pt.1, NAC.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Smart to T.S. Mills, Chief Engineer, 3 January 1942, RG84 vol.990, file CBH16.112 pt.1, NAC.

And why was the Ingonish end considered Scottish anyway, when the population of both Ingonish and Neils Harbour – the two communities of significance in the eastern end of the park – was overwhelmingly (almost 95%) not Scottish, not French, but English?¹¹⁵ The tide of tartanism swept such questions away, and even Smart's efforts to retain vestiges of Frenchness in the park were forgotten. By the official opening of Cape Breton Highlands National Park in 1941 (complete with kilts and bagpipes), the National Parks Branch had transformed a smattering of French-, Scottish-, and English-Canadian communities encircling a largely-unknown interior into a single unit with a single owner and a single theme. Its success in defining this piece of the most spectacular, the most typical of Nova Scotia landscapes seemed complete.

But either humans are not ever entirely satisfied with another's attempt to make sense of nature for them or, more likely, it is beyond human capability to give nature a single meaning. In 1948, the American poet Elizabeth Bishop visited the northern peninsula, and in her poem "Cape Breton" describes a quiet Sunday walk along the Cabot Trail (a part near albeit not actually within the park's final boundaries):

The road appears to have been abandoned.
 Whatever the landscape had of meaning appears to have
 been
 abandoned,
 unless the road is holding it back, in the interior,
 where we cannot see,
 where lakes are reputed to be
 and disused trails and mountains of rock
 and miles of burnt forests standing in gray scratches
 like the admirable scriptures made on stones by stones -
 and those regions now have little to say for themselves

¹¹⁵ Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census of Canada, 1931, vol.2 p.336.

except in thousands of light song-sparrow songs floating
upward¹¹⁶

Should we take this passage as pleased or elegiac? To Bishop, the trail has de-naturalized the nature near it: that which is within sight of the road, a view made available by engineers, she no longer thinks of as nature. Yet the road acts as a fence, keeping nature in. There is still a nature in the interior that humans have accidentally left largely untouched. The Parks Branch had worked diligently to shape how visitors would understand Cape Breton Highlands National Park, but it necessarily did so in a way that seemed appropriate to the time. The best example of this was that it built the park around the idea of a scenic drive -- an idea that demanded not only a society that possessed cars but one that saw driving as an entertainment in itself. In coming decades, other cultural ideas about nature and recreation would gain ascendancy; thus the idea of what this national park was, and what all national parks should be, would change.


¹¹⁶ Elizabeth Bishop, "Cape Breton," *A Cold Spring*, reprinted in *Elizabeth Bishop: The Complete Poems 1927-1979* (New York: The Noonday Press of Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1979), pp.67-68. On Bishop in Nova Scotia, see Sandra Barry, "The Art of Remembering: The Influence of Great Village, Nova Scotia, on the Life and Works of Elizabeth Bishop," *Nova Scotia Historical Review*, vol.11 no.1 (June 1991), pp.2-37.



Prince Edward Island National Park was established in 1937 and contains an area of approximately 7 square miles. It extends along the north shore of the Island Province for a distance of nearly 25 miles. Among its outstanding features are its magnificent beaches, beaten broad and smooth by the constant action of the surf from the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Adjacent to these beaches, sand dunes and sandstone cliffs rise to considerable heights, and, across the mouths of several bays, small islands and shoals give protection to the inner waters. The delights of salt-water bathing and relaxation on the sandy beaches are enhanced by the healthful climate. The temperature is ideal, the air invigorating, and the water is warmer than at many points hundreds of miles to the south along the Atlantic Coast.

Figure 6. Snapshot of Prince Edward Island National Park.
Photo from National Archives of Canada, PA187872.
Text from the brochure National Parks of Canada: Maritime Provinces (Ottawa: Northern Affairs and National Resources, 1957).

Figure 7. Map of Prince Edward Island National Park. From the brochure Prince Edward Island National Park (Ottawa: Northern Affairs and National Resources, 1962).



Chapter 4

The Greening of Green Gables: Establishing Prince Edward Island National Park, c.1936

Green Gables did not have green gables. When the National Parks Branch took over the land for what would become Prince Edward Island National Park in 1936, and with it the farmhouse that had inspired Lucy Maud Montgomery to write the children's classic Anne of Green Gables, there was no paint on the house, just whitewash, and no trim of any colour. Inspecting the recent acquisition, parks surveyor R.W. Cautley wrote his superiors that "While the exterior does not actually need painting, the present colour scheme is not altogether suitable, and it would accordingly be desirable to repaint the building at an early date in order to emphasize the gables of the house, which should, of course, be green."¹ Of course.

This story, with its easy-to-remember irony, can serve as a healthy reminder that parks are cultural constructions. But this is a sort of irony that can satisfy too easily, blinding one to ironies below the surface of the paint. For one thing, to preserve Green Gables the Parks Branch had to improve it structurally, spending as much on its renovation as

¹ R.W. Cautley to R.A. Gibson, 30 November 1936, RG84 vol.1777, file PEI2 vol2, NAC. Other evidence of this is found in a report by Smart to Mills, 30 June 1938, RG84 vol.1778, file PEI2 vol.11, NAC: "The roof should be painted and the outside walls redecorated with white paint or white-washed again. The trim of the building and around the gables should be painted green and all the windows should have green shutters - the roof painted green." See also Anita Webb, interview with Fred Horne, Prince Edward Island National Park headquarters files [henceforth, PEINP files]. This chapter is based on material from Chapter 4 of my M.A. thesis, "No Island Is an Island", pp.122-176.

had been spent to buy it, and more than what it had cost to build.² The principle of park inviolability meant that the house needed to be in prime condition, and the principle of national standards meant that it had to be very attractive; in other words, it received a treatment an ordinary Prince Edward Island home (like itself) would not be given. More than this, Green Gables' preservation was itself grossly unrepresentative. Throughout the rest of the park, the Parks Branch tore down the houses and barns of families who had worked and lived there for generations, sparing Green Gables only because of its association with a fictional story.

And the ironies run deeper still, into the land itself. After the land became a park, developments within it were shaped more by the memory of its human past than by any sense of its natural history. With an effort one can notice that Green Gables was a late nineteenth century farmhouse, in this exact location because of the advantage of a small stream's proximity in front. Today the stream seems insignificant even as scenery. Look closely and the golf course is a rough map of farmers' fields, duffers the most profitable of crops. The previous land use is often visible, if not immediately noticeable, but beneath that are even earlier landscapes no longer retrievable. The white birch, fir, and spruce that have taken over fields in the park are not the trees that were chopped down to clear the land for agriculture. Those sugar maples,

² In 1938 alone, renovations included "replacement of sills and floor joists, excavation for replacement of cement foundation under kitchen and repairs to stone foundation under main building, shingling kitchen walls and roof of main building, staining roofs, construction of one double dormer window and replacement of frames and sashes, construction and hanging of shutters, painting, erection of one partition, laying of floors, and excavation for septic tank." Canada, Department of Mines and Resources, Annual Report, National Parks Branch, 1938-9, p.107.

yellow birch, tamarack, cedar, and other species that grew here before European settlement are no longer here to supply seed.³ By letting the fields grow back, the Parks Branch is not restoring the park to an "original" condition. Look at Prince Edward Island National Park too long and the sense is that all nature is nothing but history, time masquerading as space.

That is not the sort of impression one is supposed to get from a national park. Certainly Prince Edward Island National Park is well trampled by humans both past and present. It is just a thin strip of Prince Edward Island's north shore, most of it farmers' fields expropriated in the 1930s. As one drives along the highway that runs through the centre of the strip, the park's boundaries – the Gulf of St. Lawrence on one side and fields and cottage development on the other – are always visible. At less than ten square miles it is one of Canada's smallest national parks yet it is also one of the most heavily attended. Its beaches, dune systems, and views are beautiful and not difficult for the Parks Branch to sell; more difficult is selling it as pristine and ecologically significant. As a Parks Canada staff member said after learning that Prince Edward Island National Park was one of the parks I was researching, "Well, it's not really a national park, is it?"

This chapter is born from that attitude. National parks are not found remnants of untouched, self-contained nature. They are unnaturally bordered plots of land selected by people for a variety of reasons, one being the perceived quality of their nature. Prince Edward Island National Park really is a national park, whatever that might

³ Canada, Parks Canada, Resource Inventory and Analysis. Prince Edward Island National Park (1977).

mean. Rather than denigrating its status, it is much more productive to understand how it came to be a park when in terms of size, wildness, and sublimity it was so unlike the national park ideal. This chapter will explore what properties made the park area attractive to the Parks Branch in the 1930s, and what kind of park it was expected to be. Most importantly, it will show that the park's small size, lack of sublimity, and long European settlement and use affected the Parks Branch's judgment of it, which in turn affected how it was developed. Unlike Cape Breton Highlands National Park, which with its high coastal vistas was accepted as something of a traditional Western park in miniature, Prince Edward Island National Park was always seen as something of an anachronism, not really a national park at all. Such thinking was self-fulfilling.

political plans and public aspirations

There were very few calls for a national park in Prince Edward Island before the mid 1930s. A provincial M.P., Donald MacKinnon, did write to James Harkin in 1923, concluding, "The larger freaks of nature are in the public eye to-day, but I think you can help the Province into the limelight."⁴ In testimony to the notion that Eastern Canada had more history than nature, MacKinnon was instead promised a new historic site by the federal ministry.⁵ This was both appropriate, in that the Parks Branch oversaw these parks and in that Harkin had introduced them specifically for areas of the country not likely to have national

⁴ Donald MacKinnon to Harkin, 2 April 1923, RG84 vol.1777, file PEI2 vol.1, NAC.

⁵ Stewart to R.A. Gibson, 27 June 1923, *ibid.*

park scenery.⁶ Seven years later, another park request from an M.P. and the President of the P.E.I. Publicity Association received a much more positive response. Minister of the Interior Charles Stewart wrote,

In reply I may say that it is our hope that eventually there will be a National Park in each province of the Dominion and as far as I can see there is no reason why Prince Edward Island should not be so favoured, provided the local authorities are prepared to transfer to the Dominion unencumbered land suitable for that purpose.⁷

However, the Depression cancelled any chance of establishing a park right away, and the impetus was lost. When in 1933 James Harkin listed for his superiors which provinces were looking for new parks, he noted that no overture on the subject had been made by Prince Edward Island.⁸

This would come, though, as the Depression made national parks much more attractive. The Island's economy was disastrously hit in the early 1930s. The province's gross value of production was halved between 1929 and 1932, and its two major industries, farming and fishing, especially suffered. The provincial Liberals, in opposition since a Conservative upset victory in 1931, were able to maintain that the Island's economy was being mishandled. With thousands of Islanders dependent on federal public work programs, the ability to deal effectively with the federal government was considered the greatest test of a provincial administration, and a test the Tories were said to be failing. The Liberals blamed the Conservative government for not keeping a promise that the province would not have to pay anything for

⁶ See Taylor, *Negotiating the Past*, pp.28-31.

⁷ Stewart to MacLean, 17 May 1930, *ibid.*

⁸ Harkin to Rowatt, 19 April 1933, RG84 vol.483, file F2 vol.2, NAC.

its segment of the Trans-Canada Highway. Most damning of all for the provincial Conservative government was its association with the Conservative Prime Minister R.B. Bennett, whose programs were proving totally unable to return Canada to prosperity. In the summer election of 1935, the Prince Edward Island Liberal party swept to power, carrying all 30 seats in the legislature. Without any formal opposition, and asked to lead a province in economic chaos, the new government had the strongest possible mandate for change.

Considering this opportunity, it might seem surprising that the new premier, Thane Campbell,⁹ chose to make the call for a national park one of his first acts in office. There had been no mention of a park in the election campaign, and no reason to think that Campbell had wanted one. But at his first federal-provincial conference months after being elected, he had been surprised to learn that a park was within the province's reach. "At the present time," he told the legislature when he returned, "the national park idea at Ottawa seems to be directed, to a large extent, to the promotion of the tourism industry."¹⁰ On 17 March 1936, his government passed an Order in Council asking the Canadian government to establish a national park. This was a public declaration of intent that the Nova Scotia government had not yet made, though the Cape Breton site had been inspected and basically selected two years previously. The Parks Branch had known of Campbell's interest in a

⁹ The 1935 election had been won with Walter Lea officially as leader. Lea was a sentimental choice but was ill throughout the campaign and died less than five months after assuming office. It was understood during the campaign that a vote for Lea's leadership was a vote for Campbell's.

¹⁰ Campbell, 31 March 1936, from the Charlottetown Patriot, speeches of the legislature, RG10 vol.102, Public Archives of Prince Edward Island [henceforth, PAPEI]. Please note that the date cited here, as in future citations to this source, refers to the day the quote was made, not the date that it appeared in the newspaper.

park, but his announcement tipped its hand. A day after the Island request, James Harkin wrote Nova Scotia Premier Angus L. Macdonald that the federal government had decided to move ahead with Maritime national parks.¹¹

That P.E.I. could be granted a national park does not explain why the provincial government might want one. Certainly it was hoped that a park would help the tourist industry as similar parks had in Western Canada. Prince Edward Island had slowly been developing tourism since the late 19th century, but lacked a focus which could be said to be its top attraction. Thane Campbell was no Angus L. Macdonald: he did not see tourism in visionary terms as an industry of the future, did not think that the province needed to sell itself in a single way. Campbell more traditionally believed that a good provincial government was one that provided good infrastructure – and a great one got the federal government to pay for it. So it is not surprising that the first federal contact Campbell made about a park was with the Minister of Transportation, C.D. Howe. They had talked about a park at the federal-provincial conference, and now Campbell wrote,

We also anticipate that any site which will be chosen will in all probability be some distance from the hard-surfaced highways in the province, and we therefore anticipate requesting that in connection with the national park the Dominion Government should make provision for a hard-surfaced, dust free highway leading from our present pavement to the site of the park.¹²

¹¹ Harkin to MacDonald, 18 March 1936, RG84 vol.985, file CBH-Cap Rouge vol.2 pt.3.

¹² Campbell to Howe, 8 February 1936, RG84 vol.1777, file PEI2 vol.1. The provincial Order of Council that recommended a park was careful to add the proviso "including the construction of a dust free highway or highways leading to the said National Park...." Prince Edward Island, Executive Council, Minutes, 17 March 1936, RG7 series 3, Box 12 no.2640, PAPEI.

At such an early stage Campbell could not possibly know that the park would be a distance from the main highways unless he planned to make sure that it was. Ottawa saw through Campbell's machinations but tolerated them, if in return for some roadway it would get credit for a new national park. Executive Council President B.W. LePage told the Island legislature that "we were simply told by the authorities at Ottawa, that we would get nothing for our highways in lieu of the National Park. If we wanted a Park we could have it; if we did not, it would not be forced upon us."¹³ This park's beginning was more about paving than preservation.

This is not in itself entirely unusual. Though the Nova Scotia government wished for a national park for a number of reasons, it was no doubt content in the knowledge that the federal government would maintain much of the Cabot Trail in perpetuity. British Columbia's Kootenay National Park was created in 1920 as a federal condition for helping build a highway through the province.¹⁴ But Cape Breton Highlands and Kootenay still had the scenery and wildlife necessary to maintain the national park ideal. There were no preconceptions that Prince Edward Island's national park would be in any way similar to existing ones. Premier Campbell assured his legislature that the cost of a new park would be trifling, and that only 300 to 500 acres would need to be involved.¹⁵ Crerar said much the same in Parliament as a reason

¹³ B.W. LePage, 14 April 1937, cited in Charlottetown Patriot, speeches of the legislature, RG10 vol.102, PAPEI. Leslie Bella, describing how difficult it was for the federal state to convince the provinces to turn land over for parks, remarks, "The only way to persuade a provincial government to accept a national park was the promise of road construction – roads that could be used both for tourists, and as part of the infrastructure...." Bella, p.72.

¹⁴ Bella, pp.74-75; Lothian, A Brief History, pp.59-63.

¹⁵ Campbell, 16 April 1936, cited in Charlottetown Guardian, speeches of the legislature,

why Prince Edward Island was suddenly getting a park and New Brunswick, which had been seeking one since 1930, was not: "the expenditure for a park in Prince Edward Island will not be extensive, in the very nature of things."¹⁶ Both governments seemed confident that a suitable location, agreeable to all sides, would be found.

The Campbell government already had a site it liked. Dalvay-by-the-Sea, or Dalvay House, seemed a splendid, sentimental choice for the national park. Nestled in an inlet on the Island's North Shore, this opulent Victorian summer home had been built in 1896 by Alexander MacDonald, a director of Standard Oil from Cincinnati. For fifteen years the MacDonalds occupied the house and entertained in grand style, employing many people from the nearby community of Grand Tracadie as servants. Dalvay was a fitting reminder of an era in which travel was solely for the rich. And though it could hardly be considered sublime, it was impressive enough in scale, perhaps, to meet national park standards. What could be more fitting than to preserve a millionaire's cottage as the centrepiece of a public playground, a symbol of the democratization of twentieth-century tourism? Realistically, the province could purchase the property, since having changed hands several times it was now owned by Lieutenant-Governor George DeBlois, who was willing to sell.

The government could not commit itself to Dalvay, however. It had declared its interest in a park so early that there was public debate on where the park should be. Unlike Nova Scotia, where there had been little public knowledge that a selection process was under way, in Prince

RG10 vol.102, PAPEI.

¹⁶ Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 20 June 1936, p.3994.

Edward Island it became something of an issue. Thane Campbell asked that the Parks Branch be brought in to inspect a number of sites, giving the selection process an air of scientific objectivity and relieving his government of blame for choosing one site over another. Crerar assured him that he would have inspectors travel throughout the province, but noted in confidence that it would probably be a formality, that though neither he nor anyone in the Parks Branch had seen it, "this Dalvay by the Sea premises will probably be the most acceptable." Crerar suggested that P.E.I. should begin work on buying Dalvay; when the park was established the province could turn it over in return for \$25,000.¹⁷

Prince Edward Islanders did not know this, and debated the relative beauty of their districts in the two Charlottetown papers, the Guardian and Patriot. Through the summer of 1936, letters to the editor argued whose grass was greenest, whose air was freshest, whose streams were clearest.¹⁸ Quite common were denunciations of the North Shore, which was already rumoured to be the favourite. Writers complained that the winds off the Gulf of St. Lawrence made the north side of the Island bleak, cool, and lifeless, and that the strong tides made for dangerous swimming, especially for children. It was said at a public meeting to generate interest in a park in Bonshaw, an area on the Island's south side, that the North shore had "pests such as snakes, sand fleas as large as chickens, and other annoyances." A letter in the newspaper two days later responded that to say such a thing was foolish, and besides, everyone knew Bonshaw was haunted.¹⁹

¹⁷ Crerar to Campbell, 31 March 1936, RG84 vol.1777, file PEI2 vol.1, NAC.

¹⁸ For the public reaction to the park as seen in the local press, see Horne, pp.136-158.

¹⁹ Malcolm MacNeill, Charlottetown Guardian, 7 July 1936, and "Observer", ibid., 9 July 1936.

Periodically, this style of debate would be punctuated with a more basic question: what should a Prince Edward Island national park be like? A number of writers favoured locations around Charlottetown, believing that the Island's poor in particular would be better able to make use of it. The editor of the Guardian disagreed. "What is the National Park for but to draw tourists to a province?"²⁰ He felt this was reason enough to have a park, while others felt this was reason not to have it. "Pro Bono Publico" could not believe the government would spend money "to provide a playground, or perhaps something less innocent for tourists." Rather than encouraging "careless, speed mad motorists", better to spend on schoolyard fences to protect children from them.²¹ Confusion over the reason for the park's existence even led to jokes about conspiracy, as indicated in a letter from "Inquirer", stating,

Is it a place where the area enclosed shall revert again to a state of nature...? Or is it for the benefit of the tourist and the sightseer or the seeker after health or pleasure, or for the convenience of those who would make wassail on the contents of the kegs borne shoreward by the waters of the Gulf?²²

Some still asked whether Prince Edward Island even deserved a national park. One strand of letter writers believed the province had the wrong type of beauty. "Citizen" told the Patriot, "We have no wild mountainous country that would keep tourists more than an hour to find out what it's all about. There are no places where tourists can take their packs and get lost or tramp for days."²³ Another writer added

²⁰ Ibid., 15 July 1936.

²¹ Ibid., 8 June 1936.

²² Charlottetown Patriot, 18 October 1937.

²³ Ibid., 7 July 1936.

that though the Island was beautiful, "We however have nothing more than scenic beauty and not much variety in that."²⁴ Others took the opposite tack, stating that since all of Prince Edward Island was beautiful it should all be made a park, or at least scattered districts throughout the province should benefit, rather than one site. The annual convention of the Women's Institute recommended that all the Island be considered park land, though what this would mean in practical terms was not clear.²⁵ But it was the kind of argument that appealed to unelected politicians. Conservative leader W.J.P. MacMillan proudly proclaimed, "During our time we didn't fiddle with the national park, which was not necessary because the whole Island is a national park."²⁶

At first reading, the broad range of ideas to be found in Prince Edward Island newspapers about the proposed park suggests a confusion over the meaning of national parks. But most letters writers understood the basics: parks must have the most beautiful scenery, they would be nature reserves, they would encourage tourism and recreation. Though most Islanders had likely not visited a national park, they probably knew of Banff at least. And it seems reasonable that they followed the concurrent development of the Cape Breton park (though this does not show up in the Charlottetown newspapers). What confused Islanders was how this vaguely known thing called a national park would be

²⁴ W.S. Stewart, *ibid.*, 26 October 1937.

²⁵ Charlottetown *Guardian*, 23 October 1937.

²⁶ Charlottetown *Patriot*, 13 October 1937. This was a common compliment to pay to an area, and also helped to end discussion. Thomas Crerar, for example, explained in Parliament that he would not be creating a park on Vancouver Island because "the island itself is one big park." Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 20 May 1938, p.3117. James Overton in *Making a World of Difference: Essays on Tourism, Culture, and Development in Newfoundland* (St. John's: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1996), p.2, notes persistent references made to Newfoundland as potentially one giant national park.

translated to their province. That some should see their home as "park" – scenic, pastoral, and preserved from industrialization – and others see it as "not park" – lacking the size, wildlife, and sublimity of the Rocky Mountain parks – shows a local understanding that Prince Edward Island would necessarily have a new sort of park, depending on which characteristics the Parks Branch would choose to emphasize.

a typical seaside resort

Within the Parks Branch there was as yet no plan for the Prince Edward Island park. Despite Harkin's musings about Maritime parks over a decade earlier, the promises of a park for every province in 1930, and the Senate Committee and federal-provincial conference recommendations in 1934 and 1935, there is no evidence of enthusiasm from within the Branch itself about nationalizing the system. The federal and provincial governments had agreed to a park for P.E.I. without involvement from the Branch, and even the selection of Dalvay seemed a *fait accompli*. In correspondence during the establishment and development of Prince Edward Island National Park, park staff often referred to the advantages the province would enjoy from the new park but never to any benefits that would accrue to the Parks Branch or the park system.

The first major attempt to define the proposed new park was made only days after it was announced that the Maritime parks would go ahead. F.H.H. Williamson, deputy commissioner of parks and assistant to James Harkin since the early 1910s, wrote a memo for the Ministry of the Interior evaluating the park's prospects, even though it

would be months before he would travel to the Island and see it for the first time. Williamson not only would soon be responsible for overseeing the creation of the P.E.I. park, he would upon Harkin's retirement, in less than a year, become head of the parks agency. Thus his sight-unseen analysis of the Island park reflects not only the old school Branch opinion of Maritime nature, but also the direction that would be taken with the first Maritime parks in their first years. Williamson wrote,

It will be impossible to apply the same National Park standards to the proposed park in PEI since its characteristics are almost totally different from any of the National Parks so far established in Canada. In comparison with any of the established parks it is diminutive in size; its scenic features are incomparable with the grandeur of the Rocky Mountain Parks or the extensive lakes, streams and forests of Prince Albert and Riding Mountain Parks; it is not a wilderness sanctuary for animal life; its attractions cannot include long motor drives or trail rides.²⁷

All this was beyond dispute (though in later years the Parks Branch would advertise the P.E.I. park in terms of its scenery, its rare wildlife, its "motor drive"). Williamson believed the park should rely on its strengths:

Naturally its development should centre around its principal feature - its extensive beaches with warm sea bathing. It is my opinion that we should not plan its development in terms of attracting only hundreds of tourists but many thousands a year. I see no reason why we cannot expect a quarter of a million visitors a year in a few years, like Point Pelee at present. ... I suppose for every person who wants wilderness loneliness there are a dozen who prefer to be in a crowd during their holidays.²⁸

It may seem jarring that Williamson follows his frank assessment of the park's deficiencies with a claim that it could be a real crowd pleaser.

²⁷ F.H.H. Williamson memo, 23 March 1936, RG84 vol.1777, file PEI2 vol.1, NAC.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

But he believed that the park could maintain its high cultural standards while also appealing to a more mass audience. But for that to occur, the park would have to be carefully developed. He wrote, "Under proper control I feel we can supply such desiderata, which are a healthy and altogether beneficial quality, and attract to the P.E.I. park far more visitors than by simply more or less allowing people to use what Nature has provided in the way of beach and sea and letting it go at that."²⁹ Elsewhere, Williamson told Harkin, "It seems to me the best contribution the park can make in the interests of Prince Edward Island and the country generally is to develop it as a typical seaside resort, sans the obnoxious amusements."³⁰ Here is where ideas within the Parks Branch of what constituted beauty had real consequences. Williamson believed that the beauty of the new national park's nature was insufficient to carry itself. The Branch's job, then, was to forego trying to preserve it as a traditional park and instead develop it in its most attractive incarnation, a resort. This was not a normative decision; it was an aesthetic judgment made through the filter of a quarter-century spent working within a park system which saw mountain landscapes as its ideal. Before even being established, the Prince Edward Island National Park was being treated differently because its nature did not conform to this ideal.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Williamson to Harkin, undated [1936], *ibid.* For the purposeful creation of an earlier Maritime seaside resort, see Andrew Sackett, "Inhaling the Salubrious Air: Health and Development in St. Andrew, N.B., 1880-1910," *Acadiensis*, vol.25 no.1 (Autumn 1995), pp.54-81. Sackett notes that the seaside resort was an antimodern escape from mass, urban, modern existence; ironically, the P.E.I. national park was an attempt to incorporate the masses into this ideal.

It was decided that Williamson would travel to Prince Edward Island with W.D. Cromarty, chief of the National Parks Architectural and Landscaping Service, in June of 1936 to examine potential park locations.³¹ A diary by Harry T. Holman, a well-known Island businessman from Summerside, tells of the local proponents' anticipation of the federal inspection. Holman hoped for a park at nearby Dunk River but knew he was in 'a horse race. In February he had jotted down, "DeBlois [the Lieutenant Governor and Dalvay's owner] trying to interest them in Dalvay. Province has to buy the land. Dominion stocks it and looks after it." In March he was writing to Crerar of the "utter foolishness" of a park at Dalvay, and felt by the end of the month that he had combatted that proposal. But Holman was bothered by the rumours that the North Shore site had already been chosen, despite the constant personal assurances of Premier Campbell that this was not so. Holman gave up on his Dunk River dream, standing instead with those who recommended Holman's Island, which had been home to a late 19th century resort and was also close to Summerside. He tried to stir up local support, and planned to "Blaze some paths" through the site itself in preparation. But he felt at times that his efforts were for nothing, as the rumour persisted that Dalvay had been selected. The day before he was finally to meet the two park inspectors, Holman wrote, "Will be very glad when it is over as it has entailed a lot of work and worry."³² With Premier Campbell as their guide, Williamson and Cromarty examined sites scattered throughout the province. There were

³¹ Cromarty was an architect and planner trained in England, who had joined the Parks Branch in 1921. See Taylor, *Negotiating the Past*, p.111.

³² See Harry Holman diary, especially 28 February, 21 March, 24 March, 2 April, 10 April, 9 May, 2 June, 17 June 1936. Harry T. Holman papers, Acc.4420 vol.7, PAPEI.

twenty two in all, evidence of the public interest in the proposed park. Tagging along at many of the sites were local boosters, including eleven members of the legislature, Summerside mayor Brewer Robinson, and Lieutenant Governor DeBlois.

The report that Williamson and Cromarty offered Commissioner Harkin the following month had both expected and surprising features. The inspectors agreed with the provincial government's recommendation of Dalvay and suggested that it be made a hotel in the tradition of the great park hotels at Banff, Yoho, and Waterton. But they also believed that the province should be urged to acquire a strip of coastline for the twenty five miles west of Dalvay, through Stanhope, Brackley, Rustico, and Cavendish beaches all the way to New London. They proposed the inclusion of shoreline, a strip of several hundred yards deep to build a park road and lay out developments, plus a buffer zone to discourage private tourist operators from setting up businesses too close to the park. The inspectors were especially impressed with Cavendish, stating "the area offers the greatest opportunity for Park development, since it not only possesses a beautiful and extensive beach of firm, white sand but it has the added attraction of picturesque red rocks, worn into unusual formations by the sea." Cavendish contained "an unusually wide appeal both to those who appreciate beauty and to the younger element who desire variety in their holiday environment."³³

Of particular interest to the inspectors was Cavendish's association with Anne of Green Gables. They wrote,

³³ Williamson and Cromarty report on P.E.I. sites, 28 July 1936, RG84 vol.1777, file PEI2 vol.1, NAC.

According to a large signboard erected in this district by the Prince Edward Island Travel Bureau, one of these lakes is the "Lake of Shining Waters" portrayed in the Novel "Anne of Green Gables" by Lucy Maud Montgomery and the house (Green Gables) stands in the area proposed to be included in the Park. ...These features have been preserved in their natural state and outside of the general interest of the house it is thought that the adjoining woodland and small trout stream merit inclusion in the Park area.³⁴

Williamson and Cromarty read the sign, but did not read into it; this was land very much in use. Cavendish was already on its way to being a destination for literary-minded tourists. Lucy Maud Montgomery told of seeing souvenir-mad visitors overrun Green Gables in the late 1920s.³⁵ The present owners of the house, Myrtle and Ernest Webb, were giving tours and taking in guests. More generally, beginning in the 1920s local farming families were opening their doors to travellers, building cottages, and finding more of their energies directed toward tourism.³⁶

Of course, even before tourism, the land at Cavendish and along the strip back to Dalvay had been in use by farmers for generations. By extending the proposed park far beyond Dalvay, with its single owner, the inspectors were setting the park up for confrontation with the 100 or so private owners who currently owned the land. Here was some of the best (and worst) farmland on Prince Edward Island. Except for Rustico, which had had a pair of seaside hotels in the late 19th century, the North Shore had never been a tourist destination, but thanks to Green Gables and recent cottage development the area was on its way to being

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ L.M. Montgomery, 23 September 1928, in *The Selected Journals of L.M. Montgomery, Volume 3*, eds. Mary Rubio and Elizabeth Waterston (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1987), p.378.

³⁶ See Horne, especially pp.129-130. He credits Montgomery's books with singlehandedly taking Cavendish "out of the tourism doldrums." (p.129)

the focus of the Island's tourist industry. Williamson and Cromarty, though, made no mention of present land use in their report. It was not their concern, since it was the provincial government that would appropriate the land and hand it to the Parks Branch. But before making their recommendation, they must surely have had assurances from Premier Campbell, travelling with them, that the land could be made available.

As in Cautley's report of Cape Breton, Cromarty and Williamson's description of scenery does not explain to complete satisfaction their appreciation of the proposed area. The term they fell back on time and again to describe the scenery was "picturesque". The beaches (page 3), red rocks (4), sandbars (5), red cliffs (6), scenery (6), woods (9), Winter River (10), a drive by the cliffs (13) – all were picturesque. But whereas this term usually connotes a pastoral setting with signs of past or traditional occupation, the report's authors make no references to human land use at all. Their description reads as if they stood on land and looked out to the beach and cliff scenery with the Gulf in the background. They were too close to the land that they were standing on to see it as attractive or unattractive, too close to judge it by aesthetic standards. Unlike Cautley's appreciation of Cape Breton Highlands for the contrast offered by land and sea, Cromarty and Williamson's evaluation of the Prince Edward Island site merely conveys a sense of satisfaction that the site possessed both land and sea. If anything, their references to the picturesque are to just a watered-down sublime.

In proposing a park with both Cavendish and Dalvay as centres of development, Williamson and Cromarty were hoping to accommodate two different sorts of tourists. In an earlier memo, Williamson had

suggested, "The Dalvay house will undoubtedly be the concentration point for the more or less wealthy visitors and I think we should develop this property principally for elderly people."³⁷ Dalvay had been built by wealthy tourists: its size, design and historic atmosphere (though it was but forty years old) would appeal to the tasteful and historically-aware rich. Dalvay, it was said, "Would attract best types of people and when they get to go there, will attract others."³⁸

Others were certainly expected to come. The western, Cavendish arm of the park with its beaches and Green Gables would attract middle-class families. Unlike tourists at Dalvay who would find relaxation and quiet, those who came to Cavendish would be entertained and be part of a large crowd. After returning to Ottawa, Williamson wrote Harkin a list of some of the developments he believed would be needed to popularize the area:

(Cavendish end particularly for children with "Green Gables" stream reserved for young children's fishing and the woods for children's village, picnicing etc; toy yachting on "Lake of Shining Waters", children's canoeing, paddle boating etc.) "Green Gables" might be a children's rest house with museum, aquarium etc. ... [Need for] bowling greens and buildings for same; dancing, roller skating and carnival arena, etc. Concessions may be rented for bungalow camps, hotels, boarding houses, restaurants, soft drinks and ice cream, boats, canoes, wheeled bathing houses; beach donkies and ponies; beach nigger minstrels; bands; moving picture theatres and other shows....³⁹

The important thing, of course, was that this all be tastefully and artfully done, maintaining the dignity of Canada's national parks. If so,

³⁷ Williamson memo, 23 March 1936, RG84 vol.1777, file PEI2 vol.1 pt.2, NAC.

³⁸ "Notes re PEI park" – unsigned [Harkin? to Wardle?], RG84 vol.1777, file PEI2 vol.1 pt.2, NAC.

³⁹ Williamson to Harkin, undated [1936], RG84 vol.1777, file PEI2 vol.1, NAC.

it could be an example to all Prince Edward Island in how to facilitate tourist business, "sans the obnoxious amusements." The Parks Branch's plan for Dalvay and Cavendish is a wonderful example of what Lawrence Levine calls a spatial bifurcation of culture.⁴⁰ Though visitors at the two beaches would be enjoying almost identical landscapes, they would be given different means of experiencing it, depending on their class's perceived interests. Though the Parks Branch claimed to be responding to societal wishes, it was most certainly helping to reinforce these social differences.

The inspectors' report was made public in September. It must have been a surprise to the Prince Edward Island government. The province knew it did not have the kind of scenery that the park system was used to, and sponsoring Dalvay had been based on the assumption that it was the most majestic and sublime place the Island could provide. Cromarty and Williamson's report convinced the government that it had sorely misjudged national park standards. It would seem that the Parks Branch appreciated the seaside scenery of the North Shore generally, and was willing to develop it heavily, much more than had been assumed. A week after the report was made public, Thane Campbell's government approved its recommendations "insofar as the same recommends" a new park from New London to Brackley.⁴¹ The eastern end of the park, including Dalvay, was to be omitted.

The Parks Branch's reaction illustrates the tightrope it was walking. Ottawa, caught wholly unprepared by the Charlottetown decision, responded with a flurry of telegrams. Not hiding his alarm, F.H.H.

⁴⁰ Levine, p.68.

⁴¹ Prince Edward Island, Executive Council, Minutes, 21 September 1936, RG7 series 3, Box 12 no.2640, PAPEI.

Williamson impressed upon the Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources just how critical Dalvay and its environs were. He spoke of Dalvay's wooded acres as wilderness writ small: "a sanctuary for wild life, the vegetation is unspoiled, the stream a potential paradise for fishermen and for canoeists, the woods ideal for hiking...."⁴² But these were clearly secondary considerations. More important, in a national park consisting solely of Cavendish, he warned,

Its constricted size will not permit of accommodating a large number of visitors which is the only justification for the establishment of a National park on the north shore of the Island. When thousands of visitors congregate in the area ... there will be congestion and all the evils of overcrowding. Such conditions will lower its status as a National park and react against the other National Parks which so far possess a high standard of quality which the public at present recognize and appreciate.⁴³

The threat of losing wilderness did not scare Williamson since wilderness was not the park's justification. Rather, he feared that the new Prince Edward Island national park would become so successful – and therefore, it would seem, so vulgar – that it would change how people thought of national parks in general. Dalvay was a necessary run-off, a place where tourists with finer sensibilities could cling to the illusion that the parks philosophy was unchanged. So could the Parks Branch. Cromarty was rushed to Prince Edward Island with an ultimatum for its government: no Dalvay, no park. Not surprisingly, Dalvay was reinstated immediately.

⁴² Williamson to Wardle, 5 October 1936, RG84 vol.1777, file PEI2 vol.2, NAC.

⁴³ Ibid.

a one-sided proposition

The expropriation of land for the new Prince Edward Island national park was bound to have a different dynamic than that of Cape Breton Highlands National Park. In Nova Scotia, entire properties, entire communities were taken. On P.E.I., though, the government was lopping off a strip generally a few hundred yards wide along the shore across a number of rural communities. This made expropriation both easier and more difficult for landowners, for the provincial government, and for the Parks Branch. On the one hand, many landowners did not have to move, so they were better able to abide their loss. On the other hand, many landowners did not have to move, so they would be constant presences in the future of the park.

The National Parks Branch was still new to relying on provincial governments for the purchase of planned park land. In Nova Scotia, though the expropriation process was not without problems, it at least was under the supervision of a government interested in having a park. Thane Campbell's government, in contrast, demonstrated no desire for any particular sort of park; any would do. Nowhere is this more evident than in its naming. Campbell suggested that an essay competition for Island students be organized to select a name, but when Finance Minister Dunning refused to pay for prizes, the province went no further.⁴⁴ By the spring of 1937, with the official announcement of the park's creation approaching, naming it was of some importance. Crerar wrote to ask what name Campbell preferred, but received no response. The minister's

⁴⁴ Campbell to Cromarty, 30 October 1936, and Crerar to Williamson, 22 December 1936, *ibid.*

secretary then sent a list of suggestions, from the plain "Prince Edward Island National Park" to the imaginative "Silversands National Park".⁴⁵ Again, Campbell failed to answer. After some deliberation within the Ministry of the Interior, it was decided that the best possible name was the easiest to remember: "Prince Edward Island National Park". There having been no input from the province on the matter, it was also the easiest to choose.⁴⁶

The Campbell government's policies in regard to expropriation would be a mixture of compulsion and neglect. With no opposition in the legislature, in June 1936 the Liberals passed An Act Respecting the Establishment of a National Park, which provided the machinery for expropriation. The new law allowed the government to make an offer for a property, at which time the owner could accept or appeal; if he or she appealed, the government might raise its offer or stand firm, but in either case this was the end of the transaction and the land was turned over to the province. The landowner had no recourse to the courts. When this legislation was passed there was still no park, so it drew no public notice.

Once it was clear in the late summer of 1936 what the rough boundaries of the new park were to be, the provincial government took its first step towards buying the land. In testament, though, to what it considered significant, it only moved to buy Dalvay and Green Gables.

⁴⁵ Crerar to Campbell, 19 April 1937, and W.J.F. Pratt to Campbell, 20 May 1937, "C-1937" file, Thane Campbell papers, RG25/32, PAPEI.

⁴⁶ An illegible signature on a memo of 7 August 1937 prevents us from knowing who officially christened the park. It was not the Branch's new head, F.H.H. Williamson. On 13 August 1937, Publicity Director Robert Stead defended the park's name, saying "When a manufacturer is placing a new product on the market great importance is attached to the name" and that it must be easy to spell, pronounce, and remember. Williamson wrote beside this, "I think you might add: 4. Not too long. 'PEI Natl. Pk.' and 'CBH Natl. Pk.' are rather mouthfuls." RG84 vol.1777, file PEI2 vol.3, NAC.

The Dalvay transaction was made speedily, the Lieutenant Governor handing it over for \$15,000. The federal Parks Branch, the provincial government, and the Island Travel Bureau all agreed that making it a C.N. Hotel would be the best use of it and give the park instant credibility. All agreed, in fact, except C.N. itself. The railway's president, S.J. Hungerford, felt that with only 26 bedrooms and five bathrooms, Dalvay was too small to be profitable.⁴⁷ The Parks Branch was so obviously unhappy with this response that Hungerford had his general manager visit Dalvay to come up with other ideas. After studying the site, he proposed a simple solution: demolish Dalvay and build a "wooden structure" with 75 rooms in its place.⁴⁸ The Parks Branch thought not, but had no idea what it would now do with the house. One person not surprised about Dalvay was Harry Holman, who had tried so hard to have the park located elsewhere. Hearing that Dalvay had been turned down as a hotel, he told his diary, "we always contended it was not suitable."⁴⁹

Since Green Gables was to be a centrepiece of the park, its transfer had to be made smoothly, so the Campbell government brought in the Senator for Queen's County, John Sinclair, and the Member of Parliament, Finance Minister Charles Dunning, to help deal with its owners, the Webbs. They would be given a fair price, they were assured, and Ernest Webb could stay on as park caretaker. The Webbs resigned themselves to their fate, believing (rightly) that they had little choice in the matter. They were just unclear what their new life would be like.

⁴⁷ Hungerford to C.D. Howe, 18 January 1937, RG84 vol.1777, file PEI2 vol.2, NAC.

⁴⁸ Joseph Van Wyck to Howe, 15 March 1937, RG84 vol.1777, file PEI2 vol.3, NAC.

⁴⁹ Holman diary, 8 April 1937, Harry T. Holman papers, Acc.4420 vol.7, PAPEL.

Myrtle Webb wrote an apologetic letter to Williamson, asking, "can you imagine the shock the family received when the word came out in the press the Cavendish Area had been your choice and the Green Gables property was to be included. ... Could you give us just a little idea of what we can expect in the way of changes...."⁵⁰ A price of \$6500 was agreed upon for the house and barn, a price that Premier Campbell considered somewhat steep but acceptable considering the "historic and sentimental associations" of the property.⁵¹ Green Gables – never possessing that name until the book was a best seller, never Lucy Maud Montgomery's home, and never really the home of the fictional Anne – was always more valuable for its associations than for what it was.

No other property owners received the attention that the owners of Dalvay and Green Gables did. On 24 April 1937, the park land as surveyed by R.W. Cautley was officially taken over by the province and transferred to federal ownership. The current landowners had not yet been offered a price for their property, did not even know that their land was wanted. It was Cautley who recognized the potentially incendiary nature of the land expropriation. Establishing the park boundaries in the fall of 1936 and the spring of 1937, he knew that the citizens were only vaguely aware of where the park was to be and what this would mean to their holdings. When asked by his superiors in the Parks Branch to set up permanent markers on the new park boundaries, he refused. "I am quite willing to step outside my ordinary line of duty... to serve you and my Department, but am most certainly not willing to get mixed

⁵⁰ Webb to Williamson, 11 March 1937, RG84 vol.1777, file PEI2 vol.3, NAC.

⁵¹ Campbell to Crerar, 12 November 1936, RG84 vol.1777, file PEI2 vol.2, NAC.

up with the Province's Expropriation proceedings."⁵² By the summer of 1937, Cautley warned Williamson that the province was bungling the land transfer. He recounted an incident typical of the problems he was having:

On the 8th Instant I called upon Mrs. Dr. Bonnell at her request, she being at present in residence in their cottage on the McCoubrey farm next to Green Gables. I found that she wanted to see me in connection with the grazing of their one cow, and that she was genuinely surprized when I explained as courteously as I could that we now owned their cottage.⁵³

The indifferent manner in which landowners were informed made such situations inevitable. The first public notice of the land transfer came forty days after the land had become Canadian property. Even then, the message was not directed at specific owners, instead giving a detailed, legalistic description of the land to be expropriated and concluding that "former owners of these properties are entitled to claim compensation," the claims to be sent to the Deputy Provincial Treasurer.⁵⁴

Upon pleas from the federal government, which hoped to begin development in the park that summer, the Campbell administration moved forward with settling claims. It established a commission made up of "two farmers and a businessman"⁵⁵ – E.T. Higgs, Daniel MacDonald, and Robert MacKinley – to put valuations on the expropriated properties. The Higgs Commission spent June and July travelling across the North Shore and talking to the landowners

⁵² Cautley to Williamson, 31 October 1936, RG84 vol.1777, file PEI2 vol.3, NAC.

⁵³ Cautley to Williamson, 11 June 1937, *ibid.*

⁵⁴ Public notice, 31 May 1937, *ibid.*

⁵⁵ Minister of Public Works James McIntyre referred to them as such, to demonstrate that though they represented the government, they were average people. 12 April 1938, from the Charlottetown *Patriot*, speeches of the legislature, RG10 vol.102, PAPEI.

concerned, and returned to Charlottetown with its findings. Using a scale from \$65/acre for extra good land, down to \$6/acre for sand dunes, they set prices for 84 properties.⁵⁶ The Executive Council was happy to have the evaluations made, but apparently felt that the commission had been freespending. Arbitrarily, it cut many of the recommended offers by exactly 10%, re-assessing, for example, R.B. Graham's land from \$2300 to \$2070 , and Alof Stevenson's from \$446.50 to \$401.85. Other assessments were dropped by as much as 32%. In all, only 17 of 84 recommendations were left unchanged.⁵⁷ Letters were sent out to the landowners involved, with this final, non-negotiable offer enclosed.

It was only then, four months after the land had been turned over to Canada, that there arose a groundswell of opposition to the expropriation process. It was born in the pages of the Charlottetown Guardian, the daily newspaper sympathetic to the Conservative party. In a letter to the editor, "One of the Dispossessed" explained point by point how the landowners were given unfair prices for their land, were unable to appeal the matter in court, and were unable even to convince the government to buy all their property if that was their wish. The writer concluded,

As I write this letter I can see from my kitchen window a bountiful field of waving grain on my farm, a field which next year and all the succeeding years will be barren because of the determination of the Campbell Government to establish what is now becoming known throughout the Province as "Expropriation Park".⁵⁸

⁵⁶ The full range was extra good land, \$65/acre; good land, \$40-\$50; fair land, \$25-35; light land, \$20-30; sand dunes \$6. See Provincial Secretary fonds, Prince Edward Island National Park files, RG7 Series 14, Box 30 subseries 2, file 753, PAPEI.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Charlottetown Guardian, 23 August 1937.

To an agricultural province, this was powerful imagery. For the fall of 1937, the expropriation issue was a constant topic in the editorials and letters of the Guardian and the Liberal organ, the Patriot. The Patriot's calm defenses of the government's wisdom and frugality only fed the Guardian's rage; the latter claimed that to deny the landowners the right to appeal was a violation of the Magna Carta, and it entitled editorials "What Price Democracy?" and "Our Dictators in Action".⁵⁹

Opposition in the press generated political action, in the formation of a Committee of Dispossessed Landowners. The group arrived in Charlottetown 40-strong to speak with Premier Campbell, with a petition of more than 50 names protesting "against the denial of our rights as British Subjects of access to the Courts of Law."⁶⁰

Unfortunately, the Premier was out (the committee having failed to make an appointment) and by the time he returned he faced a much-dwindled delegation. Campbell rebuffed them, promising the Executive Council would add an appeal amendment if and only if the current expropriation process ground to a halt. To maintain unity within their ranks and to broaden awareness outside their communities, the dispossessed landowners held public meetings in York, Kensington, and Corran Ban. This was a chance to reiterate their dispute with the provincial government, but it resulted in little change in political

⁵⁹ In those heady days of international politics, it was natural that landowners would refer to the Island's Liberals as fascists. Jeremiah Simpson, the most cantankerous and unyielding of dispossessed landowners, wrote to "T.A. Carar" to complain. Having stated his case, he asked the Minister to handle the matter personally, suggesting, "You need not send this to the Campbell's or [President of the Executive Council Bradford] Lepage in Charlottetown as they have been trying to imitate Musolini [sic] and Hitler." Crerar replied that this was a provincial matter, and that he had passed Simpson's letter over to Premier Campbell. 24 February 1938, RG84 vol.1777, file PEI2 vol.5, NAC.

⁶⁰ Provincial Secretary fonds, Prince Edward Island National Park files, RG7 series 14, Box 30 file 748, PAPEI.

strategy, except to amend a resolution being sent to Ottawa by omitting the phrase "arbitrary, capricious, tyrannical and oppressive."⁶¹

Widespread public opposition never blossomed, and as fall turned to winter, the national park issue lost its immediacy and disappeared from the daily newspapers.

Strangely enough, however, the Campbell government quietly did raise the settlements of 27 different landowners.⁶² It is not clear why it chose to do so, and even less clear is why it did not take credit for doing so. After all, this could have been seen as unexpected generosity, without being an admission that the expropriation process was wrong. It is reasonable to consider the claim of cantankerous landowner Jeremiah Simpson, who would later state, "It is understood that many of the Liberals received more than the government offered at first."⁶³ At the time, the Guardian editor defiantly stated, "The result has been a settlement, in some cases at least, not on the merits but on the basis of partisan pull."⁶⁴ Unfortunately, it is nearly impossible to assess this contention today, given the difficulty of knowing the landowners' politics and of evaluating the worth of the land parcels.⁶⁵ Certainly

⁶¹ Charlottetown Patriot, 30 September 1937.

⁶² This occurred piecemeal through late 1937 and all of 1938. A list of final settlements can be found in RG7 Series 3, Box 12 file 205, PAPEI. See also Prince Edward Island, Executive Council, Minutes, RG7 Series 3, Box 12 no.2640, PAPEI.

⁶³ Jeremiah Simpson to J. Walter Jones, 17 January 1944, J. Walter Jones papers, RG25/33 Box 2, PAPEI.

⁶⁴ Charlottetown Guardian, 18 February 1938.

⁶⁵ A comparison of the Committee of Dispossessed Landowners' petition with the final compensation sheet is helpful in at least calculating the value of complaining. In all, there were 86 names in the final compensation list, and 41 of these were also on the petition against the expropriation method. Of these 41, ten (24.4%) had their settlement raised. Of the 45 persons compensated who had not signed the petition, seventeen (37.8%) had their settlement raised. That is, landowners were more likely to get a higher final price for their property if they had not signed the petition, if they had not opposed expropriation. If we assume, as seems reasonable, that the petitioners were more likely to oppose the government in general terms (ie., be Conservatives) than the landowners as a

there were political considerations in building the park. In 1938 Premier Campbell wrote Crerar that Liberals from outside the park area were complaining that only locals were being hired and, worse, a known Conservative had been taken on. He recommended that Crerar get a list of acceptable candidates from the four Prince Edward Island Members of Parliament, all Liberal.⁶⁶

In the spring of 1938, the Conservative leader R.B. Bennett tried to re-open the expropriation matter in Parliament, summarizing the case and stating, "I hope we are not to undertake the management of a national park which has been brought into being by depriving citizens of their rights under the law..."⁶⁷ But Minister of Mines and Resources Crerar parried this thrust by telling Bennett that the process for obtaining park land was entirely a provincial matter, and the federal government had neither the power nor the right to step in and tell the province how this should be done. Though unsatisfied with the answer, Bennett let the matter drop.

By the time the all-Liberal legislature met in March of 1937, the government was ready with a remarkably unified defense of the new park. J. Walter Jones prophesied, "Twenty years from now we would not think of parting from the advantage which this National Park will afford. It may be our chief source of revenue."⁶⁸ These were magnanimous words, coming from a Minister of Agriculture. Jones' words must have

group were, then a partisan pull seems feasible. The final settlement list can be found at RG7 Series 3, Box 12 file 205, PAPEI, and the petition at RG7 Series 14, Box 30 file 748, PAPEI.

⁶⁶ Campbell to Crerar, 2 August 1938, Thane Campbell papers, RG25 vol.32, file "C-1938", PAPEI.

⁶⁷ Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 15 February 1938, p.487.

⁶⁸ Jones, 31 March 1938, from the Charlottetown Patriot, speeches of the legislature, RG10 vol.102, PAPEI.

struck a note, because two weeks later Edward Foley spoke almost the identical words in his reply to the speech from the throne.⁶⁹ As for the expropriation process, the Liberals formed a common front in its support. Explaining why the landowners were given no chance to appeal to the courts, Dougald MacKinnon said that the three smart men who made up the Higgs Commission would surely know more about farm values than would a judge.⁷⁰ J.P. MacIntyre said much the same: "I know if I had land to dispose of for highway purposes, I would far sooner see two farmers and a business man coming than to take it before judges of the court."⁷¹ Of course, most of the Higgs Commission's recommended settlements were changed, but this too could be justified. As Donald McKay stated, "I don't see why seven or eight men at the head of this Government are not just as fair and as honest as any judge would be in settling matters."⁷² The last word here should probably go to Premier Thane Campbell who, in defending the machinery by which expropriation was being handled, noted that there were no complaints at all until a full fifteen months after the law had been passed. This was a specious point: the law had not been applied until then. In any case, Campbell was happy to report that at this point 69 of 83 claims had been settled, "by complete accord and satisfaction and agreement."⁷³

Organized opposition to the national park expropriation process withered completely away, with only a few landowners fighting private battles with the park in the coming years. But for a short time at least

⁶⁹ Foley, 12 April 1938, ibid.

⁷⁰ MacKinnon, 8 April 1938, ibid.

⁷¹ MacIntyre, 23 March 1938, ibid.

⁷² McKay, 12 April 1938, ibid.

⁷³ Campbell, 30 March 1938, ibid.

in 1937, there had been a unity among disgruntled owners that there was not at Cape Breton Highlands, and that there would not be at Fundy and Terra Nova. This is worth examining. First of all, the Guardian played an important role in coalescing opposition to the park through its editorials, and giving ordinary citizens the chance to vent their anger. In the case of the other parks studied here, there was no paper with a readership broad enough to reach all affected and yet local enough to treat this issue with weight. Second of all, the very harshness of the expropriation method meant that landowners could respond to it in terms of universal rights, not just personal grievance, and seek support in those terms. Expropriations in the other three parks may have been severe, but they did not forbid appeal. Finally, landowner opposition was galvanized by the protests of a few particularly vocal tourist operators, particularly Katherine Wyand and Jeremiah Simpson. Perhaps because landowners saw government in this instance as a competitor for tourism dollars rather than a regulatory body, they were less willing to accept it as an immovable force than were landowners at the other parks studied.

But in the end, the forces that pulled owners toward expropriation were stronger than those that stood in its way. To be sure, many Islanders looked forward to the national park, and some property owners on the North Shore no doubt welcomed the opportunity to sell some land and hoped that their remaining land would increase in value. Those who opposed expropriation watched more and more of their neighbours receiving settlements, and felt greater pressure to sell, probably fearing that the government would offer them less the longer

they waited.⁷⁴ One owner later noted that he felt the park might as well come; as it was, tourists were coming out from Charlottetown and pulling down his fences to get to the shore.⁷⁵ And more tourists were arriving in the new park as early as 1937 and proclaiming their own brand of squatters' rights. Residents complained of tourists wandering over their property and stealing the berries they traditionally harvested. There were also logistical problems in organizing opposition. The distance between communities meant that many landowners did not have the opportunity to speak to each other or attend meetings.⁷⁶ More generally, resistance had to try to string together communities that had never had reason before to think of themselves as a unit. As Fred Horne writes, "This very likely marked the first time the whole area had a common, unique experience."⁷⁷

Most importantly, landowners never got the majority of Islanders on their side. As a writer to the Patriot suggested, "the general public will give credit to Premier Campbell for looking after the 90,000 of our province against a score or less who would like to fleece the taxpayers by securing an exorbitant price for their holdings...."⁷⁸ Many Islanders agreed, not wanting to believe that their elected officials would grab land unfairly or (worse) pay too much for it. No doubt they were happy to hear from contented owners like Oliver LePage, brother of Executive Council President B.W. LePage, who was quoted as saying, "the

⁷⁴ Landowner Sydney Ranicar accused the government of telling owners in Cavendish that those in Brackley and Tracadie had already sold, and vice versa. Charlottetown Guardian, 21 September 1937.

⁷⁵ Wendell Kelly interview with Fred Horne, 8 June 1978, PEINP files.

⁷⁶ Earl Skeffington interview with Fred Horne, PEINP files.

⁷⁷ Horne, p.148.

⁷⁸ Charlottetown Patriot, 25 August 1937.

government had been very fair, and in some cases paid too much."⁷⁹ In his own case, this may very well have been true. The money that the park was bringing to the province helped win Islanders over to it as well. Under the Canadian Unemployment and Agricultural Assistance Act of 1938, the province was granted \$40,000 in that year alone for a "Tourist Roads Programme" fulfilling Campbell's wish that the roads leading towards the park would be paved. This fund, in addition to the regular park construction budget and a special work relief grant in aid of park development, meant that in 1938 the Prince Edward Island National Park was worth over \$145,000 to the province. After crowing over this to the legislature, Campbell was careful to point out the Island was losing nothing in return. Cavendish would be prettier than ever;

All those natural beauties and amenities preserved, polished up a little, and the traditional associations of that locality which have been made so famous through the books of our beloved Island authoress Lucy Maud Montgomery will be brought into greater prominence by the beauties and amenities of the new golf course which is being established around that focal point.⁸⁰

The Conservatives tried halfheartedly to make the expropriation process an issue in the 1939 election, promising as part of their platform "Restoration to the citizens of their right of resort to the Courts of Justice...."⁸¹ But the messiness of the national park's creation had little effect at the polls. The Campbell government recaptured twenty six seats and retained a healthy majority. Even in polling districts affected by the park, the returns were practically unchanged from the 1935

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 3 September 1937.

⁸⁰ Campbell, 21 March 1939, from the Charlottetown Patriot, speeches of the legislature, RG10 vol.102, PAPEI.

⁸¹ Charlottetown Guardian, 13 May 1939.

election. For every landowner angry that his or her land was expropriated, there were undoubtedly more residents looking forward to the financial benefits of increased tourism.

The land expropriation process on Prince Edward Island's North Shore in 1936 and 1937 was bullying, inept, maybe even inequitable. But it was finished. The provincial government had survived its own handling of the issue, and landowners had received settlements for their property, whether they liked it or not. However, the expropriation would always play a part in the life of Prince Edward Island National Park. When in Parliament Crerar had rebuffed Bennett's suggestion that the Canadian government involve itself in the expropriation, a Tory member from Ontario, H.A. Stewart, broke in that the Liberals acted "as though this whole matter began and ended as between the government of Prince Edward Island on the one hand and the owners on the other. It is not quite that; it is rather a three-sided proposition, a proposition in which the government of the dominion also come in...."⁸² Though Stewart was referring to principles of justice, he might as easily have been speaking to the more practical matter of managing the park. The Parks Branch was not only taking possession of the land, it was taking possession of the difficulties that had come of transferring it. By the manoeuvre of having the province buy the park land and transfer it to Canada, the federal government avoided the responsibilities, but also the rights, of expropriation. This land shuffle tended to work faster on paper, so that when the Parks Branch was ready to develop the new park it found that many of the previous owners were still living on it. Branch staff said quite accurately that the land had been given to Canada; landowners

⁸² Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 15 February 1938, p.490.

said quite truthfully that they had not yet negotiated the sale of their land. More troublesome for the future of the park, expropriatees and local residents did not distinguish who was treating them poorly. Their land was taken so that a park could be established, and it was park staff who now wanted it; therefore the expropriation was the national park's fault. By excusing itself from the expropriation process, the federal government had traded short-term problems for long-term ones.

fencing nature in

The development of Prince Edward Island National Park seemed as if it should be a straightforward affair. Unlike at Cape Breton Highlands, where the improvement of roads was a major undertaking, and Fundy and Terra Nova, where (as we shall see) roadways and many facilities had to be built from scratch, much of the infrastructure for Prince Edward Island's national park was already in existence. The Dalway to Brackley part of the park was to be connected by new roadway, and existing roads built up and gravelled. Kitchen shelters and beach houses were to be constructed to draw more tourists to the seashore. Dalway and Green Gables were to be beautified and shaped up, and other buildings in the park torn down or moved away. But before all this, the Parks Branch built a boundary fence around its new property. That park staff gave this first priority indicates that the most difficult part of development would be undoing a century of land ownership and making the park seem a legitimate use of the land. At the time, owners could look out upon their remaining land, across the property they had lost, to the Gulf shore without seeing any real signs of difference. Especially

before the land had time to grow back from its long agricultural use, the park showed off its arbitrariness. To the people of the area, the park was less a coherent piece of preserved nature than a collection of phantom limbs.

The Parks Branch first tried to take an unyielding stance against the previous landowners. In June of 1937, while the Higgs Commission was still assessing property and several months before owners would be offered a price for their land, Commissioner Williamson chastised Cautley upon hearing he had asked permission to unload a pile of fence posts (for the boundary fence) on Oliver Bernard's property. He wrote,

It is not considered that you should have asked permission to put the fence posts on this property. This is, in effect, recognizing that Mr. Bernard has a right to the land, which, of course, he has not. Any grievances which these people may have must be against the Province for their delay in effecting a settlement for the lands which have been taken over. The point which cannot be overlooked is that the area is now a National Park and the Dominion hold clear title to the said lands.⁸³

Cautley, a 40-year veteran of the Departments of the Interior and Mines and Resources, replied frostily that he knew whose land it was, but the province was utterly failing in its responsibility to purchase it. He wrote, "I do not think we should be justified in taking action to evict former owners before they have been indemnified for the lands taken. More than that it is altogether likely, under the circumstances, that any attempt to obtain an Order to evict would not succeed." Actually, he added, he had not even been the person who had dropped off the fence posts, "although, if I had been there, it is quite likely that I might have

⁸³ Williamson to Cautley, 21 June 1937, RG84 vol.1784, file PEI16.112.1, NAC.

been guilty of such a slight civility."⁸⁴ Regardless of Williamson's rhetoric, the Parks Branch was not about to do anything aggressive that would draw the ire of local residents, the park's permanent neighbours. The Branch's only course of action was to maintain pressure on the Prince Edward Island government to make speedy settlements. After a summer of working around the dispossessed landowners, Williamson conceded to Acting Superintendent Allan McKay that inhabitants could stay the winter, as long as they moved out by 15 May of the following year.

The Parks Branch did what it could to give the park credibility as quickly as possible. To this end, the new golf course was essential. It was related to tourism and its construction was labour intensive, so it signified a commitment to local employment. And just as importantly, because the sport had high-class connotations, the course would signify that the park was to be a cultured destination.⁸⁵ In 1941, James Smart went so far as to say that "with the situation we have we cannot be satisfied with a course that is not at once considered superior to most of the courses on the Island."⁸⁶ As at Cape Breton Highlands, Stanley Thompson was brought in to design the eighteen-hole golf course, which would stretch inland from the sand dunes of Cavendish beach to encircle Green Gables. During 1938, 40 labourers were hired at \$.30 per hour on the course, more men than were working in the rest of the park combined.⁸⁷ Whether because of the Branch's eagerness to create a first-

⁸⁴ Cautley to Williamson, 25 June 1937, *ibid.*

⁸⁵ See Bourdieu on sports, pp.211-215.

⁸⁶ James Smart to R.A. Gibson, 19 July 1941, RG84 vol.150, file PEI313 vol.2, NAC.

⁸⁷ Interview with Ernest Smith, Tea Hill, 4 August 1995. See also RG84 vol.23, file PEI336, NAC.

rate facility or simply because of the inertia of development, the golf course overwhelmed all pre-existing landscape, including Green Gables itself. Though the course was meant to offer homage to Anne of Green Gables by giving holes names such as "Ann Shirley" and "Haunted Wood",⁸⁸ it was the farmhouse that became complementary to the course. A little rise was levelled off for a green almost directly in front of the house (and as a result for decades the sanctity of many a pilgrimage to Green Gables was ruined by a random golf ball).⁸⁹ Earth was pushed up around the house to give it more prominence alongside the course. Green Gables became a tea-room for visitors and golfers, and the barn was originally intended to be made a clubhouse, though it proved in too poor shape and was torn down. In the winter of 1939 the Montreal Star slammed the golf course development for destroying the beauty of Cavendish, and perhaps the Parks Branch was listening; rather than follow through with its idea to make Green Gables the golf clubhouse as well, the Branch constructed a separate building nearby.⁹⁰

Because development demonstrated the new park's usefulness to the province in terms of employment and facilities much more than preservation could, it was natural that the Parks Branch show how active

⁸⁸ Williamson to Superintendent Ernest Smith, 11 May 1940, ibid.

⁸⁹ Mercifully, the Parks Branch relocated this hole in the 1970s.

⁹⁰ In the legislature, Premier Campbell decried the Star's "unfortunate propaganda." Preservation, he said, was necessary to keep tourism from destroying "the natural amenities, woods, and the streams, and such-like...." 22 March 1939, Charlottetown Patriot, speeches from the legislature, RG10 vol.102, PAPEI. During development, only W.C. Murdie, Geodetic Survey Engineer, seems to have questioned the logic of attempting any work on Green Gables. He wrote that it was an old house and "can really never be anything else. ... Would it not be worthy of consideration to retain Green Gables as an unoccupied building and only keep it in sufficiently good repair to retain its original appearance and atmosphere to enable it to be used as a museum and a point of historical interest ...?" Murdie to Mills, 2 August 1938, Box 3, Green Gables golf course file, PEINP files. This part of Murdie's letter was ignored in response.

it was, even where relatively little development was needed. This thinking even affected the selection of the park's first superintendent in 1938. Rather than settling for just an overseer of the park's property and wildlife, the Branch hired "a capable young forester", Ernest Smith, to take charge of the park's forest development.⁹¹ Smith was to do all the normal jobs of a park superintendent, plus take time to give demonstrations to Prince Edward Islanders of modern woodlot management. He built up a nursery near Dalvay House with Norway pine, white ash, white spruce, and Norway spruce, and thinned existing stands within the park. It was hoped that such work would justify the park's existence to Islanders; not coincidentally, it would also slowly bring back "wilderness" land – in effect, woods – that had been long cleared for agriculture.

But the land of Prince Edward Island National Park could not shake the traditional associations that locals still gave it. Cavendish's road overseer, Austin Laird, ran the winter road right over the new golf course. According to Green Gables caretaker Ernest Webb, Laird stood by his action to put the road through "the way the road always went for over a hundred years. ... He went on to say that neither Smith nor Crearer could stop him."⁹² Irish moss harvesters, accustomed to travelling through fields to reach the shore, came upon the new park-built fence

⁹¹ This is a quote by Gibson to D.Roy Cameron, Chief Forester, Department of Mines and Resources, 16 June 1939, RG84 vol.23, file PEI182.3, NAC. Smith had graduated from the University of New Brunswick's Department of Forestry in 1934, and worked for the Anglo-Canadian Pulp and Paper Company in Quebec. He was the choice of J. Walter Jones, an Island politician who would soon be premier. Smith and Jones were from the same community, Pownal. Interview with Ernest Smith, Tea Hill, 4 August 1995.

⁹² Ernest Webb to Superintendent Smith, 11 January 1939, Box 1, Yankee Gale monument file, PEINP files.

and simply snipped the wires and carried on.⁹³ A farmer, William Bell, sold cranberries from what was now park land, and a flurry of telegrams flew between Ottawa and Charlottetown, discussing how to deal with such larceny. After federal-provincial consultation, it was decided that for the next harvest only, licenses would be sold to would-be cranberry pickers.⁹⁴

These were annoying skirmishes for the Parks Branch, but ones that they were sure ultimately to win. Canada had legal title to this land, and the longer that the park existed, the more accepting locals would be of its presence. One by one, dispossessed owners settled with the provincial government in 1938 and 1939. A few, embittered by the experience and seeing the Liberals retain power, voted with their feet by leaving the Island. A couple, though, stayed and voted with their plows. Jeremiah Simpson and Roy Toombs, who still had land just outside the park boundary, decided in 1939 to continue to work what was now part of the park. Simpson had from the beginning been an especially dogged opponent of the park; he had a lot to lose. As he stated, "This land has been in my family for one hundred and fifty years. I would not sell it to my best friend."⁹⁵ And he had more material reasons: in the 1920s the Simpsons had been the first property owners in Cavendish to take in tourists, and still did this as a sideline to farming. Jeremiah Simpson

⁹³ As well as disputes involving individual losing rights to the park, there were also cases in which individuals lost sole right to what had become a common property by way of the park. Farmer Mike Doyle complained to Superintendent Ernest Smith that other farmers were using "his" cove for Irish moss harvesting. Smith located the deed in the land record office, and found that Doyle did have a special right to the cove "for one peppercorn per year." Doyle admitted that he had not been paying it, so Smith told him that he had lost his right. Smith recalls, "I never heard another word about it." Interview with Ernest Smith, Tea Hill, 4 August 1995.

⁹⁴ RG84 vol.1777, file PEI2 vol.5, NAC.

⁹⁵ Simpson to Crerar, 24 February 1938, RG84 vol.1777, PEI2 vol.5, NAC.

had been involved in the Committee of Dispossessed Landowners, wrote several letters to the Guardian, and even wrote several times to Thomas Crerar. The farmer offered to meet the politician on an election platform anywhere to discuss the park, and ended his petition to the politician with apt Biblical quotes, "Thou shalt not give the inheritance of thy fathers unto strangers" and "Cursed be he that removeth his neighbour's landmark."⁹⁶ Plowing their way onto federal land was only the latest of tactics Simpson and Toombs employed. Their pleas for justice denied, they elected to deny the park's existence.

Superintendent Ernest Smith, unsure how to react, reported the matter to Ottawa and awaited instructions. Williamson wrote Premier Campbell for advice, who cheerfully told him that money had been deposited in the Court of Chancery for the two men so it was no longer a provincial concern. Smith was finally instructed to threaten the farmers with legal action, but to let them take in their crop that year. They did, and promptly seeded the land again the following year. The Superintendent admitted to the Parks Branch that he found it hard not to sympathize with Toombs and Simpson. "[I]n my opinion," he wrote, "both these parties have just cause for complaint and in view of same I do not feel that legal action should be taken before the matter has been more thoroughly investigated by the Department."⁹⁷

The matter dragged on for several years, Smith warning the farmers, the farmers promising to stop but continuing nonetheless, and the Parks Branch berating Smith for his timidity. In 1943, the new premier, J. Walter Jones, offered to mediate the dispute personally and

⁹⁶ Ibid., 24 February 1938 and 19 January 1939.

⁹⁷ Smith to Williamson, 20 June 1940, ibid.

succeeded in making a settlement with Toombs. The following spring, Smith came upon Jeremiah Simpson working his land and, after a long talk and further discussion with the Simpson family, had the farmer agree to seed the next year's crop into grass. Simpson never took the money waiting for him in the Court of Chancery, though, and Smith warned his superiors that they had probably not heard the last of Jeremiah Simpson. The farmer would honestly stop using the park for now, Smith believed, "While the present [Liberal] administration is in office, but should a change occur in four years he will make an attempt to reach a settlement with a new administration."⁹⁸

From its inception the new Prince Edward Island National Park accomplished its mission of being the tourism focus for the province. Attendance at the park skyrocketed from 2500 in 1937 to 10,000 in 1938, and over 35,000 in 1939. Five years after being established, it was the fifth most visited national park in Canada.⁹⁹ Though Prince Edward Island National Park and its sister park, Cape Breton Highlands National Park, were not thought of by the Parks Branch as traditional parks, they were considered successful for what they were. A 1938 park tourism booklet noted that obtaining land for these two Eastern parks had been a new experience for the Branch, but "The public-spirited attitudes of owners, in making their lands available for this purpose, and the co-operation between Dominion and Provincial Governments, have made

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 2 June 1944.

⁹⁹ Statistics are from Canada, *Annual Departmental Reports*, 1936-1943.

possible these valuable additions to Canada's system of national parks."¹⁰⁰

In reality, of course, it was expropriation law rather than public-spiritedness which had allowed the creation of these parks. It is a sad commentary that of the four parks studied in this thesis, involvement of locals and landowners was greatest in Prince Edward Island National Park's establishment. Only here did the very meaning of the park become a public issue; only here was there active grassroots lobbying on behalf of favoured site locations. Even the expropriation process became a matter of public debate. Yet none of these had any real effect on the final park product. Provincial and federal politicians and the staff of the National Parks Branch decided the new park's location, boundaries, and development with no place for public points of view. In the Canadian national park that shows more clearly than any other the role of humans in shaping the land, the humans who actually lived there had no role in shaping the park.

¹⁰⁰ Robert J. C. Stead, Canada's Maritime Playgrounds (Ottawa: Department of Mines and Resources, 1938).



Located between the Upper Salmon and Goose Rivers, Fundy National Park is in the southwest corner of Albert County in New Brunswick and contains an area of approximately 80 square miles. It skirts the Bay of Fundy for a distance of 8 miles and extends inland for more than 9 miles. The bold, irregular shoreline of the park is featured by numerous coves and inlets. The tides of the Bay of Fundy, known all over the world for their swiftness and height, have worn and carved the sandstone cliffs into sculptured rocky masses of rugged grandeur. ... The land rises in steps from the Bay until, at an elevation of 1,000 feet it becomes rolling tableland, richly covered with forest. Highway 14 crosses the park diagonally. It winds through this wooded countryside beside quiet lakes where the traveller may glimpse beavers at work. From the top of Hastings Hill, the visitor has a commanding view of the coastal area. ... Washed by the spray of Fundy tides, the salty tang of the air is refreshing and stimulating.

Figure 8. Snapshot of Fundy National Park.
Photo from Fundy National Park brochure, c.1965.
Text from the brochure National Parks of Canada: Maritime Provinces (Ottawa: Northern Affairs and National Resources, 1957).




Figure 9. Map of Fundy National Park.
 From the brochure National Parks of Canada: Maritime Provinces
 (Ottawa: Northern Affairs and National Resources, 1957).

Chapter 5

The Most Perfect Place in the World:
Establishing Fundy
National Park, c.1947

Drive through the village of Alma, New Brunswick, and across the bridge, and climb the short hill into Fundy National Park. The park headquarters is the cottage of local sandstone on your right at the intersection ahead, but take the road to the left, the one that runs along the coast. Pull over alongside McLaren's pond, with the natural amphitheatre behind it. There are woods off to the right, but here on the tableland, grass for acres around is lawn-cut and flowers are everywhere planted in great arrangements. Turn back to your left, to more mown grass leading to the row of trees lining the bank that falls to the long beach and the Bay of Fundy.

I thought of this particular view when reading biologist E.O. Wilson's theory of biophilia. Wilson believes that people have an innate biological affinity for nature. Following on the work of Gordon Orians, he also suggests that all of us bear a preference for the same sort of landscape. Wherever one goes, people's ideal habitat is one that is

perched atop a prominence, placed close to a lake, ocean, or other body of water, and surrounded by a parklike terrain. The trees they most want to see from their homes have spreading crowns, with numerous branches projecting from the trunk close to and horizontal with the ground, and furnished profusely with small and finely divided leaves.¹

¹ This description is actually from E.O. Wilson's memoir, *Naturalist* (Washington: Island Press, 1994), p.361. Here, Wilson is reviewing *Biophilia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984) and provides a more exact description of humans' ideal habitat.

This perfectly describes the headquarters area at Fundy. Perhaps that is why the view, looking south to the Bay of Fundy, seems so precisely perfect, a balanced blend of land and sea, slope and flat, lawn and forest.

Today, this setting is Fundy's weak point as a national park. The headquarters area with its clamshell amphitheatre, its planted flowers, its lawnscape is too artificial for many tourists. It suggests an absence of taste: a misguided belief that natural nature is insufficient, and needs to be prettied up. Even the park staff will tell you that the real park lies further removed, in the Acadian forests of the park's interior, or on the trails farther along the coast. E.O. Wilson notes that a simulacrum of our ideal landscape, but one devoid of life, would be "a department of hell." Imitation of life is never successful, he writes, and "Artifacts are incomparably poorer than the life they are designed to mimic."² Fundy National Park is not a department of hell, but its entrance area is too clearly contrived for many of today's nature-loving tourists. Depending on your own aesthetic preferences, it is either perfect or too-perfect. It is above all an artifact to the desires of the National Parks Branch, the New Brunswick government, and the landscape architects who crafted this setting (over the farms that were crafted on this land) when the park was established in 1948. Fundy was designed to suggest post-World War II cultural and economic progress for New Brunswick and for Canada. However, at the same time the national park mandate demanded natural permanency. Since then, time has made visible this irony of park creation. The natural has changed around Fundy since 1948, but

² Wilson, *Biophilia*, p.115.

the cultural has been permanently frozen, a non-living monument to the late 1940s.

a surfeit of sites

The idea of Fundy National Park was born of the same regional demands and national exigencies that had led to the establishment of Cape Breton Highlands and Prince Edward Island National Parks. In fact, New Brunswickers began to press for a park in the late 1920s, well before their neighbours in Nova Scotia or P.E.I. New Brunswick had long been a retreat for sportsmen from the United States and central Canada, so the province understood the benefit of creating what was thought at this time to be a glorified game sanctuary. The New Brunswick Fish and Game Association petitioned for a park in 1927, to protect "moose, beaver and other animals which are now threatened by extinction."³ In 1928, the Association's President Allen McAvity, a Saint John businessman and a former Liberal candidate for Saint John-Albert, helped form a National Park Committee for New Brunswick.⁴ The committee, made up of prominent men from throughout the province, naturally found itself unable to agree on a single suitable site. They narrowed their selection down to six potential sites: Mount Carleton, a hunter's paradise in north central New Brunswick; an area in Albert County, along the Fundy coast; Point Lepreau, near Saint John and also along the coast; the Canaan game reserve, near Moncton; Chiputneticook, on the American border near St. Stephen; and an area

³ Allan McAvity, New Brunswick Fish and Game Association, to Harkin, 20 January 1927, RG84 vol.483, file F2 vol.1, NAC.

⁴ Saint John Telegraph Journal, 12 September 1928.

at the head of the Miramichi River. Though the Committee was unable to choose a single favoured spot, they were ready to accept unanimously the Mount Carleton or Albert County site. In early 1929, the Committee asked the National Parks Branch to investigate their suggested locations. And soon, too: "As sleighing is good we respectfully contend this to be the best time to look over sites quickly and thoroughly."⁵

The National Parks Branch, ambivalent in the late 1920s about park proposals in the Maritimes, stalled. James Harkin told his superior that "I think that it is not desirable that the Dominion should in any way be mixed up with this delegation." Still, he felt that the Parks Branch should prepare a more definite policy.⁶ To the New Brunswick National Park Committee, Harkin wrote, "Department's attitude is that when it is notified of any specific areas which Province is prepared to transfer to Dominion for National Parks purpose it will arrange for me or some one else to inspect such lands as to their suitability for National Parks."⁷

As had happened at the creation of Prince Edward Island National Park and would happen again at Terra Nova, the province moved forward by bypassing the Parks Branch and seeking satisfaction directly from federal politicians. Members of the national park committee along with provincial Minister of Lands and Mines C.D. Richards met with federal Minister of the Interior Charles Stewart, and it was agreed that

⁵ F.M. Sclanders, Commissioner of the Saint John Board of Trade, to Harkin, 15 February 1929, RG84 vol.483, file F2 vol.1, NAC. Also, see Sclanders to Harkin, 28 February 1929, *ibid.* On published reports on progress in having a park established, see Saint John *Telegraph Journal*, 13 February and 27 September 1929, and 27 January 1930.

⁶ Harkin to Cory, 19 September 1929, RG84 vol.483, file F2 vol.1, NAC.

⁷ Harkin to Sclanders, 21 September 1929, *ibid.*

someone would investigate the sites. But there was still no common understanding of what exactly was being sought. Stewart told the Saint John Telegraph Journal that "A large tract of timberland" would be bought by the province for a park, while Saint John Board of Trade President F.M. Sclanders came away believing that a park would go through "providing some suitable site bordering on the salt water could be secured...."⁸ Nevertheless, the province had succeeded in having the federal government begin the process of park creation.

Making good on Stewart's promise, the National Parks Branch sent R.W. Cautley to investigate sites in the spring of 1930, just as he would in Cape Breton in 1934. Cautley was not very happy with the assignment. The Committee, he soon reported, was made up of members from all over the province, all advocating their own district. They were predominantly interested in the park to promote fish and game, and did not have any real knowledge of what a national park was. Perhaps worst of all, they offered no exact boundaries for the sites, so Cautley had to guess what portions of what lands should be considered available to be purchased by the provincial government.⁹

Cautley travelled throughout New Brunswick in August of 1930 and concluded that the Lepreau site was by far the most suitable, with the Albert County site the runner-up. The other four sites should not be further considered.¹⁰ It is worth noting that though Cautley did not say that he had been seeking a coastal site, he had narrowed the field down to the only two on the coast. In all four national parks studied

⁸ Saint John Telegraph Journal, 14 January 1930 and 27 March 1930.

⁹ Cautley report on New Brunswick sites, 1930, pp.1 and 2, RG84 vol.1964, file U2.13 vol.1, NAC.

¹⁰ Ibid., p.3.

here, the Parks Branch inspectors chose sites on the sea, and in Fundy and Cape Breton Highlands they did so over local preferences for inland sites. Those living in the region could look to their land for a place that was scenic enough to be a national park. But park staff took for granted that in a place called the Maritimes, the sea must be a paramount feature of any national park.

In Cautley's opinion, Lepreau was particularly beautiful and "truly representative of the best of New Brunswick's coastal scenery."¹¹ Best of all it had a long, scenic beach. However, behind the coast were four or five miles of ugly barrens that would add nothing to the park. The Albert County site roughly surrounding Alma (and the general location of what would become Fundy National Park) was in Cautley's estimation nearly as attractive. Like Lepreau, "It contains a number of scenic features which are all situated on the coast." Unfortunately, as at Lepreau the scenery a mile or so back from the coast was of very little interest – just "an unrelieved density of timber on a high, rolling surface."¹² Cautley could imagine a scenic drive leading to the several waterfalls in the interior, but otherwise considered this hinterland useful only as a game preserve. He supposed that it would be wonderful game country, so good that the area might become overstocked.

Cautley made only cursory reference to the community of Alma, mentioning its single church and its 250 to 350 residents (actually, it had two churches and a slightly larger population).¹³ Rather than

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.4.

¹² *Ibid.*, p.12.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p.13. Nancy Colpitts, "Alma, New Brunswick and the Twentieth Century Crisis of Readjustment: Sawmilling Community to National Park," Master's thesis, Dalhousie University, 1983, p.184.

speak to members of the community, he deduced that "From the number of boats on the shore it is probable that the population includes a good many fishermen."¹⁴ There was fishing at Alma, but the region's economy was centred on the timber trade. Most men in the community cut lumber and sold it to the local mills, supplementing this income with farming or fishing. Therefore, though Cautley's suggestion that Alma be excluded from the park ("at least for the present") was intended to allow the community to carry on its traditional existence, the removal of much of the area's timberland for a park would necessarily make this difficult.¹⁵ Cautley was quite taken with the coastline landscape west of Alma, which was to become part of Fundy Park. For example, he spoke of the "lovely, open valley" leading down to Herring Cove, and imagined that on the "very pretty valley" between Alma and Point Wolfe a beautiful golf course could be laid out.¹⁶ Left unsaid was that this land was attractive as well as accessible to Cautley because it had been opened up for farmland. In this area, within a mile of the coastline in such tiny communities as Herring Cove, Hastings, and Alma West, lived about 45 families whose properties would have to be expropriated. In all, Cautley was reasonably satisfied with the Albert County site, but his report in no way matches the enthusiasm he would feel for the Cape Breton Highlands when he inspected it four years later.

On the other sites, nothing was of particular interest. Mount Carleton, which was being most heavily promoted as the park site by prominent New Brunswickers including provincial historian W.F.

¹⁴ Cautley report on New Brunswick sites, 1930, p.13.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.17.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.12-13.

Ganong,¹⁷ was in Cautley's eyes thoroughly unacceptable. Cautley took special care to explain in detail why this site, already a centre for hunting and fishing tourism from the United States and central Canada, could not be a national park. "I did not see," he wrote, "one single feature of which it could be advertised, 'This mountain - (lake or stream, as the case might be) - is one of the finest and most beautiful of its kind in Canada'...."¹⁸ The Mount Carleton region was also inaccessible, it offered no spectacular views, much of it had been burned in a major fire in 1923, its remaining forests were too valuable to not be used by the province, and much of it was under long-term lease to lumber companies. The other sites at Chiputneticook, Canaan River, and the Miramichi River were even less suitable.

This left Cautley with the Lepreau and Albert sites. To make his evaluation as scientific as possible, he proceeded to rate them out of 100 in eight categories: scenic advantage, accessibility, recreational facilities, fish, game, geographical position, cost of development, and "alienation and practicability". Lepreau scored 665 points, and Albert County only 530. Albert received low marks for scenic advantages, accessibility, fish, and alienation and practicability. Lepreau was the clear winner.¹⁹

¹⁷ Ganong had written that Mount Carleton "has the wildest and most distinctively differentiate scenery; it has charming rivers readily navigable for canoes, and many lakes, including the most beautiful in the Province...." There would be no problem in regard to the part of the area now under timber lease: "All that would be necessary would be to arrange that the lumbering be so done as not to damage attractive natural features." Ganong to W.H. Davidson, Secretary of the Newcastle Branch of the New Brunswick Fish and Game Association, 2 January 1929, RG84 vol.483, file F2 vol.1, NAC.

¹⁸ Cautley report on New Brunswick sites, 1930, p.27. On Mount Carleton, see Marilyn Shaw, Mount Carleton Wilderness (Fredericton: Fiddlehead Poetry Books and Goose Lane Editions Ltd., 1987).

¹⁹ Cautley report on New Brunswick sites, 1930, p.17. Albert County was given a 60 for scenery "because of inferior character of coastal scenery, absence of lakes and rather monotonous type of interior." Cautley granted a 50 for accessibility, 70 for recreational possibilities, 50 for fish, 80 for game, 90 for geographical position and 80 for cost of

Harkin accepted Cautley's report and passed the recommendation of the Lepreau site on to his superiors in December of 1930. By then, however, the Conservatives were in power federally, and had little interest in park creation. New Brunswick waited for word from the Canadian government until 1933, when the province was finally told that nothing could be done until it officially proposed a location itself.²⁰ New Brunswick straightaway offered the Lepreau site for a national park, "subject to the willingness of the Dominion Government to spend a large amount of relief work and to reimburse the Provincial Government the cost value of roads, bridges etc. within the site."²¹ However, there was another obstacle: the Conservative Prime Minister, R.B. Bennett, was a son of Albert County, and it seemed natural that if there was to be any national park in New Brunswick, it would be there.²² There is no evidence that the Parks Branch faced any direct pressure to establish a park around Alma. But on his way back to Ottawa after surveying the Cape Breton Highlands in 1934, R.W. Cautley dropped in to Albert County to re-examine its scenery and to estimate what expropriation would be needed. Notably, he did so at the request not of Harkin, but of Assistant Deputy Minister R.A. Gibson.²³

development. He admitted that he did not know how expensive it would be to redeem land alienated from the Crown, so the 50 for alienation and practicability "must be regarded as an arbitrary figure."

²⁰ New Brunswick's patience can be seen in the correspondence of RG84 vol.484, file F2 vol.2, NAC.

²¹ Cited in Cautley to Harkin, 22 December 1934, RG84 vol.484, file F2 vol.3, NAC.

²² It is not clear whether Bennett himself got involved with bringing the park to Albert County, or whether his supporters wished to put it there as a memorial (just as William Lyon Mackenzie King helped bring Prince Albert National Park to Saskatchewan).

²³ Cautley to Gibson, 22 November 1934, RG84 vol.484, file F2 vol.3, NAC.

Hopes for the acceptance of a "Bennett national park"²⁴ were dashed when the federal Liberals defeated the Tories in 1935. Just as importantly, the 1935 New Brunswick election brought to power a Liberal administration eager for a national park at Mount Carleton. The new Minister of Lands and Mines, F.W. Pirie, wrote Ottawa offering the Mount Carleton site, asking that it be considered, "provided of course that your Government undertakes to proceed with its development at a satisfactory rate, to be agreed upon. I would also respectfully suggest, that at least two to three hundred thousand dollars be included in your estimates for developing work during the year 1936."²⁵ The provincial government's enthusiasm for the site was based on a number of factors. The site was largely Crown land, it was relatively free of settlement, it had Ganong and provincial sportsmen as its supporters, and it would soon be accessible thanks to a highway being built from Plaster Rock to Renous which served to bisect the province. Liberal Premier A.A. Dysart predicted in the 1936 Throne Speech that his government would soon announce that a national park was to be established.

A week later Dysart backed down, saying, "the Federal Government might not embark on that project as soon as hoped for...."²⁶ The National Parks Branch still saw the Mount Carleton site as unacceptable. Cautley called it "foredoomed to failure,"²⁷ a huge black forest in the middle of nowhere. Not only was the proposed area

²⁴ This was a name given to the Albert County plans, as mentioned by R.B. Hanson, M.P. for York-Sunbury, in Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 26 May 1939, p.4649.

²⁵ Minister of Lands and Mines Pirie to Crerar, 28 January 1936, cited by Fred Squires, in New Brunswick, Legislature, Synoptic Report, 1937, p.21.

²⁶ Cited by Squires, ibid., pp.20-21.

²⁷ Cautley to Harkin, 6 March 1936, RG84 vol.484, file F2 vol.3, NAC.

commercially valuable for timber, at 765 square miles it was larger than Kootenay, Yoho, or Glacier National Parks – too big for a such a small province.²⁸ The provincial opposition members jeered the government's determination to promote a site the Parks Branch had already condemned, saying, "The present Government administration did not care where the park was established provided it was established at Mount Carleton...."²⁹

Of course the only thing to be done was to have all possible sites re-investigated; Cautley was sent once more. There was supposed to be a "new" Albert County site for him to inspect, but it turned out to be practically the same site as in 1930 but with less interior woodland involved. Though Cautley agreed that valuable forests should not be permanently incorporated into a park, he noted that this only served to highlight the area's tragic flaw: aside from its coastline "there is so little Parks value in the interior of Albert County...."³⁰ Cautley once more listed why Mount Carleton was totally unsuitable, due to everything from its inaccessibility to the fact that "It is a bad fly country."³¹ Cautley also visited a new site, Mount Champlain along the boundary of Kings and Queens County, and fell in love with it. He proclaimed it the best of all sites he had seen in 1930 or 1936. It was extremely scenic, he reported, and with the best view in all of New Brunswick. He envisioned it as an Eastern equivalent of a Western park, with the benefit that "it will not only be possible but easy to construct a driveway almost to the

²⁸ Cautley to Harkin, 24 June 1936, *ibid.*

²⁹ Squires, *Synoptic Report*, 1937, pp.21 and 22.

³⁰ Cautley report on New Brunswick sites, 1936, pp.14-15, RG84 vol.1964, file U2.13 vol.1.

³¹ *ibid.*, p.3.

very summit. Thus it will be accessible to all kinds of tourists, including invalids, whereas the trouble with most of the splendid mountains in our Parks is that they are only accessible to the small proportion of tourists who are athletic and vigorous."³² To the engineer Cautley, Champlain Mountain's potential even made the fact that the site was not on the coast forgivable. It was close to the Saint John River, and he had explained to his New Brunswick hosts "that the site could not be considered at all unless it included a solid block of river frontage."³³ Cautley's 1936 report concluded that accessible Mount Champlain was the best possible location for a New Brunswick park, followed by Lepreau and Albert County.

To all involved, Cautley's findings were quite frustrating. Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island were getting their parks and yet New Brunswick, the first Maritime province to ask for one, seemed to be getting no closer.³⁴ To the provincial government, Cautley's preferences for sites in the more populous south of the province ensured that a park would be expensive and difficult to expropriate. As Minister of Lands and Mines Pirie wrote, "there would be a great deal of ill-feeling if some of the old established settlers had to be removed by expropriation proceedings." Pirie glumly stated that there was already general feeling

³² *Ibid.*, pp.9-10.

³³ *Ibid.*, p.5.

³⁴ When asked why Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia had parks and New Brunswick did not, Crerar tried to put the best face on matters: "There is some difference of opinion as to the best location for a park in that province. I would point out something that I think is obvious to everyone acquainted with the situation. A park located in Nova Scotia or in Prince Edward Island is bound to be of some benefit to New Brunswick because of the fact that tourists could reach a park in Nova Scotia only by travelling through New Brunswick." This response did not, of course, satisfy New Brunswickers. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 13 May 1936, pp.2789 and 2791.

in the province "that everything goes to the south."³⁵ The government publicized its predicament by tabling in the legislature the mass of park-related correspondence that had been growing since 1928. At the same time, federal politicians were growing increasingly impatient with provincial indecision and threatened to take over the process themselves. When T.A. Crerar was asked in the House of Commons about New Brunswick's progress towards a park, the following exchange ensued:

Crerar: "I may say that if the province is not in a position to do so within the next few weeks, I think I shall probably bring in legislation that the site may be determined by proclamation."

R.B. Bennett: "Not by order in council, surely."

Crerar: "Oh, yes: under the exceptional circumstances of the case, in order to give this park to the province of New Brunswick, and to meet the wishes of my right honourable friend, I am quite willing to recommend that the site may be selected by order in council."³⁶

Crerar did not end up taking this step: the park was not to be forced on the province. But even R.W. Cautley was tired of the responsibility of selecting the park's location. Before heading to New Brunswick for his

³⁵ Cited by Gibson to Williamson, 13 April 1937, RG84 vol.484, file F2 vol.3, NAC. The competition between sites appears to have led to accusations of impropriety, though I found no reference to this in either the Synoptic Reports or the Saint John Telegraph Journal at the time. But the 15 April 1936 Island Farmer, in an editorial on the proposed Prince Edward Island park, noted, "There are 2 things that can ruin the park project from the very start. The first of these is the least suspicion of racketeering, which has come up in our sister province of New Brunswick in connection with their National Park; the other is the choosing of an unsuitable location." Nine years later, at the end of the war, Ian Sclanders wrote a piece for the Telegraph Journal entitled "Get Ready for Tourists!" in which he spoke of the "bitter controversy about the proper location for the project" in 1936. It had been "political dynamite," and a "case of sectionalism and lack of co-operation...." 18 December 1945. My own research found a relative lack of references to the New Brunswick national park in political and editorial discourse in 1936 – surprising especially since New Brunswickers saw Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia successfully obtaining parks.

³⁶ Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1 March 1937, p.1384.

1936 inspection, he had written Harkin that "... I should be glad to be relieved of sole responsibility, since the investigation and report on proposed new Park sites is a matter of the first importance, involving, as it does, the future of the Branch, the ultimate expenditure of enormous sums of public money and the fulfillment of the best purposes of the Govt.'s Parks policy."³⁷

The New Brunswick government agreed. Surprised that in 1936 it was Cautley who had been sent to investigate the same sites he had investigated in 1930, the province asked specifically for someone else to be sent in 1937.³⁸ The task was given to James Smart, Chief Inspector in the National Parks Branch. Smart conducted an aerial survey of the sites, and came to much the same conclusions as Cautley had. Champlain was the best site, Smart believed, and would only demand thirty square miles or so. The Lepreau barrens were just too much of a drawback in his eyes, and though Smart found Albert "much more scenic", its woods back of the coastline were unuseable. Interestingly, Smart began his dismissal of the Mount Carleton site by noting that it "is typical of the original unexploited forest country of New Brunswick."³⁹ In this case, this was presumably a bad thing. Mount Carleton was just too stony a location for a golf course, too inaccessible,

³⁷ Cautley to Harkin, 6 March 1936, RG84 vol.484, file F2 vol.3, NAC.

³⁸ Pirie clearly blamed Cautley for not recognizing Mount Carleton's beauty when he saw it. In 1938, he recalled that after the first inspection in 1930, "...I was advised by several of my friends in the counties of Victoria and Carleton that Mr. Cautley, the inspector, had not given the Mount Carleton and the proposed site in Carleton county a proper inspection...." In 1936 he asked the Department to send another inspector, only to find that Cautley was sent again. "However," he wrote, "it was shown in his report in 1936 that he missed certain sites.... ...I asked a further inspection by some one familiar with inspecting national park sites." New Brunswick, Legislature, Synoptic Report, 1938, pp.31-32.

³⁹ Smart report on New Brunswick sites, 1937, p.10, RG84 vol.1023, file F2 pt.1, NAC.

and without sand beaches. Upon reading Smart's report, T.A. Crerar officially asked the Dysart administration if it would purchase the Champlain site for a park.⁴⁰

After due consideration, the New Brunswick government chose to postpone its decision. Before the House in the spring of 1938, Pirie spoke candidly of his feelings in the matter. "...I am going to be a good loser," he announced, "and simply say, we will forget about a National Park in the Mount Carleton area as far as my recommendation is concerned."⁴¹ However, for the moment no other site would be selected. He was dissuaded, he said, by Nova Scotia's experience in park building. Pirie stated, "I think it cost the province of Nova Scotia something between \$2,000,000 and \$3,000,000 merely to acquire the park site. They figured at the start that the cost would be around half a million dollars." More study was needed before a New Brunswick park could be considered. "I do not propose to submit to this Government a recommendation to purchase any particular area or locate a park site in any particular area if the procuring is out of the question or unreasonable."⁴² Pirie's concern may well have been genuine, but it was also timely. Peppered with proposals from all regions of New Brunswick, and discouraged by the Parks Branch from creating a park where it wished, the government chose to postpone resolving this tricky matter. In Parliament, Thomas Crerar spoke sympathetically of the province's decision, or rather indecision:

⁴⁰ Crerar to Pirie, 16 July 1937, RG84 vol.1023, file F2 vol.4 pt.2, NAC.

⁴¹ Pirie, Synoptic Report, 1938, p.32.

⁴² Pirie, Synoptic Report, 1938, p.32. I found nothing in the Cape Breton Highlands National Park files to suggest the Nova Scotia government considered it would only cost \$.5 million to establish the park, nor that the costs incurred gave the government second thoughts about park creation.

... I am bound to say that I recognize the difficulties which the provincial government had to overcome in getting an area. If they were starting de novo in an area where there was no settlement it would be a comparatively easy matter. That was the situation not only in connection with the Cape Breton Highlands park site in Nova Scotia, but very largely in Prince Edward Island.⁴³

The repeated failure to select a single park site for New Brunswick between 1928 and 1938 tells us something of how the politics of park creation worked. Above all, it shows that during this time the three main parties involved – the federal government, the provincial government, and the National Parks Branch – all had to be in favour of both the park in theory and its location for it to become a reality. In 1930, Ottawa and Fredericton politicians could unite to compel the Parks Branch to investigate sites, but it was understood throughout the decade that they needed Branch approval for a site to be accepted. Also in 1930, Harkin could endorse the Lepreau site (presumably an acceptable site to the province), but this meant nothing if the federal government did not act on it. And in 1937, the Parks Branch and Ottawa could agree to support Mount Champlain, but it was up to New Brunswick to decide whether to purchase the land. The national park did not become a reality in this period, not because of an intractable position taken by any of the three parties, but because of a lack of will on all sides. For the politicians, the desire for a park in New Brunswick

⁴³ Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 26 May 1939, p.4649. Whether Crerar knew it or not, the Parks Branch had quietly inspected another potential park location in March of 1939 at the request of the New Brunswick government. James Smart surveyed St. Martins, just down the Bay of Fundy from Alma. Though he found it potentially adequate (and cheaper and easier to develop than the Albert County site), Williamson decided Smart was being too generous, and that "there is no question that the area falls far below the ordinary standards for National Parks." Williamson to Gibson, 8 March 1939, RG84 vol.1023, file F2 vol.4 pt.2, NAC.

was never calculated to be greater than the ill feelings it might create in other parts of the province. And for the National Parks Branch, a New Brunswick park was of uncertain value: around 1930, the Branch was ambivalent about Eastern national parks in general, and by 1936, no one location had evoked a coherent vision of what a New Brunswick park could be, as had happened in Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island. Not until the late 1940s would politicians and public servants unite with a common goal: the creation of Fundy National Park.

intermission

Just over a year after the New Brunswick government had decided to postpone selecting a park, war broke out in Europe; there would be no inkling of interest in park building for the next six years. Parks, as unessential government expenditures, were meant to contribute heavily to the war effort. In the West, besides housing Japanese internment and alternative service camps, parks opened themselves up to war-related resource extraction.⁴⁴ In the Maritimes, Cape Breton Highlands and Prince Edward Island National Parks tried to maintain services that had just been developed, despite a deep cut in the budgets of all parks. The Parks Branch saw its yearly grant drop lower and lower from 1938 to

⁴⁴ On parks during the war, see Bill Waiser, *Park Prisoners*, and Bella, pp.94-103. It was accepted during the war that parks were peacetime luxuries. Member of Parliament Rev. Alexander Nicholson stated, for example, in discussion of increasing Banff's Lake Minnewanka hydro development, "in time of war those who prize these natural beauty spots must be prepared to see them sacrificed if power is necessary." R.B. Hanson, of York-Sunbury, noted, "If this will have the effect of changing the economy of that part of Alberta, then I think we are justified in voting for this measure, even though we may be violating some other tenets which we hold with regard to national parks." Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 4 June 1941, pp.3484 and 3491.

1943, falling below \$1 million for the first time since the 1920s.⁴⁵ No one in the Parks Branch, much less in the rest of the country, considered this the time to expand the park system. New Brunswick Member of Parliament A.J. Brooks periodically asked Minister of Mines and Resources Crerar if there was any word for a new park from the provincial front, but he was quick to add, "I would not be absurd enough to ask for it during the war...."⁴⁶ Crerar's response to Brooks' queries was unequivocal:

I think it is quite impossible during this time of war to proceed with the establishment of any new parks. I would have great difficulty in convincing my colleague the Minister of Finance that it is desirable to spend money in developing new parks during the war. I have no doubt, however, and I express my own view in the matter quite frankly, that New Brunswick should have a national park, and that when the troubles we are now experiencing have passed away, that province will have a national park.⁴⁷

That was good enough for everyone for the time being.

The very month that the war began, September 1939, there began a four-year silence in the Parks Canada files on the creation of Fundy National Park. Not until August 1943 would the park be brought up again in correspondence. At this later date, Crerar confidentially wrote his provincial counterpart, asking him to think about reconstruction, and stating that a national park was a natural project for New

⁴⁵ The amounts were: 1938, \$1.41 million; 1939, \$1.29 million; 1940, \$1.17 million; 1941, \$1.19 million; 1942, \$1.00 million; 1943, \$.87 million. Canada, Department of Mines and Resources, Annual Report, 1938-1943.

⁴⁶ Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 30 July 1942, p.5033.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 20 March 1941, p.1740.

Brunswick.⁴⁸ The province took the hint and hurriedly added plans for a national park to its own report on reconstruction being written.⁴⁹

Once the war was over, politicians returned to the park issue as if they had never left it. Members in the New Brunswick legislature once again praised locations within their respective ridings. In 1946, Conservative Fred Squires recycled verbatim his 1937 speech against the Liberal handling of the park issue, as if reading the minutes of a ten-year-old argument.⁵⁰ And in the spring of 1947, James Smart was sent twice to New Brunswick. This time he did not inspect any park sites; he simply talked with Premier John McNair and Minister of Lands and Mines R.J. Gill about the Champlain, Albert County, and Lepreau proposals. Though the politicians temporized, it was clear to Smart by the end of their first conversation that they favoured the Albert site. Mount Champlain, which had been Cautley's and Smart's first choice, had the advantages of being inland, not subject to fogs, away from the Bay of Fundy's tides, and already served by good highways and hydropower. Unspoken, though, was the reality that it was in a riding that stubbornly continued to vote Conservative.⁵¹ The Lepreau site was considered too close to the United States border, and thus would not lead tourists through much of the province. Albert County, in a good

⁴⁸ Crerar to Pirie, 10 August 1943, RG84 vol.1023, file F2 vol.4 pt.2, NAC.

⁴⁹ The report stated, "New Brunswick is the only province which has no National Park. It is urgent that such a park be created, and it is recommended that the Provincial Government select one or more National Park sites now." (Actually, Quebec did not have a national park either.) New Brunswick, Legislature, Report of the New Brunswick Committee on Reconstruction (1944) p.35. See also Colpitts, "Alma, New Brunswick," p.195; and R.A. Young, "'and the people will sink into despair': Reconstruction in New Brunswick, 1942-1952," Canadian Historical Review, vol.69 no.2 (1988), pp.127-166.

⁵⁰ New Brunswick, Legislature, Synoptic Report, 1946, p.253, and 1937, p.21.

⁵¹ Colpitts, "Alma, New Brunswick," p.196. Kings County voted Conservative candidates into the provincial legislature in every election from 1908 through the 1970s, except for 1935.

location in the province and capable of being an excellent wildlife reserve, was also Liberal country.⁵² Though Smart was concerned that the Albert site was "too valuable land from a forestry standpoint to tie up for all time as a National Park," he refused to brook suggestions that it therefore be pared in size. If this was the province's choice, they would have to transfer it as is; the province accepted.⁵³ On 25 July 1947 the transfer of 79.5 square miles in the south of New Brunswick, surrounding the shoreside community of Alma, was made public.⁵⁴ The Albert County site had never been the National Parks Branch's first choice, but it would be home to New Brunswick's first national park.

After the years of squabbling about the park's location, this speedy backroom resolution seems decidedly anticlimactic. Rather than praise or condemn the new park's location, New Brunswick politicians and newspaper editors spoke of the park as merely a stepping stone to their next project: a Fundy Trail. Modelled on Cape Breton's Cabot Trail, it would attract tourists to a drive along the southern coast of the province.⁵⁵ And it seemed that now was the time to ask the federal government for help in such endeavours. Having spent the past six years managing all strands of the national economy, the Canadian

⁵² Albert County elected Liberal members in every provincial election from 1930 until 1952. Notably, in that election – the first since completion of Fundy National Park – the riding went Conservative, and continued to do so through the 1970s.

⁵³ Smart memos, 26 April 1947 and 21 June 1947, RG84 vol.1023, file F2 vol.4 pt.1, NAC.

⁵⁴ Saint John Telegraph Journal, 28 July 1947, pp.1 and 4. The official announcements of park creation were made in the Canadian Order in Council #3211 and the New Brunswick Order in Council #47-538.

⁵⁵ See Saint John Telegraph Journal, 4 August 1947; New Brunswick, Legislature, Synoptic Report, 1948, pp.77-78; and Synoptic Report, 1949. As early as 7 October 1949, the Telegraph Journal would report, "No matter how much is spent on the park, it will not achieve its full purpose until the 'Fundy Trail' is a reality." On 26 January 1950, it would announce, "In fact, it is doubtful whether Fundy National Park can be regarded as adequately planned and exploited until the seaside trail is run through." Fifty years later, there are still hopes for a proposed Fundy Trail.

government now had the financial resources and political will to pump money into peacetime national development projects at an unprecedented rate. The Ministry of Mines and Resources, working on just \$15.1 million in 1945, was granted \$25.7 million by 1947, and \$47.5 million the following year. The National Parks Branch was just one of many agencies pared during wartime that now saw great opportunity for expansion in these freespending days. In 1946, the Branch was budgeted over \$2 million for the first time. The next year over \$2.5 million was expended, and in 1948 this was more than tripled to \$7.7 million, more than had been granted during the war years combined.⁵⁶ In such an atmosphere, that New Brunswick get a new national park was more important than where and what it would be. Though the Parks Branch had spent considerable energy in the 1930s defining what a New Brunswick national park should be, and communicating this to the politicians involved, the park was nonetheless being established because of a short-term political and economic reality. This reality, more than a pre-existing vision, would shape the development of the park as well.

a wasteland

What little has been written about the Fundy National Park region's history has commonly shown it to have been centred on the timber industry throughout the nineteenth century and then caught in the industry's spiralling decline for the first half of this century. The park's establishment then redeemed the area: salvation for the land, deliverance for the community. Historian Gilbert Allardyce writes that

⁵⁶ Canada, Department of Mines and Resources, Annual Report, 1943-1949.

creating the park was "completing a process that had begun long before. For Alma Parish was already a region of exhausted resources, shrunken population, and encroaching forests, an area that had been returning to wilderness since the closing decades of the last century."⁵⁷ Elsewhere, Allardyce writes that when the 19th century timber and shipping boom was over in the area, "the settlements had nothing left to sell except their scenery. The history of the Fundy Park is therefore an easy one to summarize."⁵⁸ In much the same fashion, Mary Majka in Fundy National Park explains, "The devastated land had to recover from the exploitation of early history to become once again an area sought after, but for a different reason." There had been a "tragic decline", and she ponders that "No doubt the fact that by this time the area had become impoverished was also a factor" in selecting it for a park site.⁵⁹ Leslie Bella writes Fundy off in a sentence, stating, "This wasteland was sufficiently useless to be acquired cheaply for a national park."⁶⁰ Only Nancy Colpitts, in a Master's thesis on Alma forestry and in an article that followed, questions this singleminded narrative.⁶¹ Colpitts points out that sawmill production from 1920 to 1947 was relatively stable in the region, and there was no sign of resource exhaustion. Her work,

⁵⁷ Gilbert Allardyce, "The Vexed Question of Sawdust: River Pollution in Nineteenth-Century New Brunswick," Consuming Canada, p.120. This article is reprinted from Dalhousie Review, no.52 (1972). It is not clear to me how in an area with a rich forestry past "encroaching forests" can be seen as a sign of economic stagnation, and why this does not negate the idea of "exhausted resources."

⁵⁸ Allardyce, "The Salt and the Fir."

⁵⁹ Mary Majka, Fundy National Park (Fredericton: Brunswick Press, 1977), pp.30-31.

⁶⁰ Bella, p.129.

⁶¹ Colpitts, "Alma, New Brunswick," especially Chapter 4, "The National Park: Sawmilling Community to Government Support System," pp.168-221. Also, Colpitts, "Sawmills to National Park: Alma, New Brunswick, 1921-1947," Trouble in the Woods, pp.90-109. In "Sawmills to National Park", Colpitts seeks to disprove the notion held by historians A.R.M. Lower and S.A. Saunders that the New Brunswick sawmilling industry in general was in decline in the first half of this century.

however, centres on the relationships between government, absentee corporate landlords, sawmill owners, and private contractors in fashioning a lumber industry in the area. She is not directly interested in the state of the area when Fundy Park was created.

This state is worth examining, however. Without knowing the condition of the region's forests at the creation of the park, we cannot understand the motivations of the National Parks Branch and the two levels of government for establishing a park there, nor can we evaluate what the park has done for (or to) the Alma region. If the woods were seen as exhausted, perhaps the Parks Branch saw an opportunity to help heal a land and a community, making land that had been discarded by foresters useful. Or perhaps the opposite was the case: the Fundy region was seen as seemingly pristine, the woods only lightly and not visibly harvested, and the park staff planned either to keep it from further cutting or to manage closely what cutting there was. My research suggests that, though far from pristine, the woods of what would become Fundy National Park were plentiful and productive, and the National Parks Branch and both governments accepted the park with this in mind. From the point of view of locals, there was general acquiescence about the park not because the woods were exhausted but because they provided only a small and uncertain income. When a new industry – tourism – presented itself, the loyalty to forestry was not strong.

Since 1922, when the American firm of Hollingsworth and Whitney bought the lease to much of the timber land in the vicinity of Alma, the town had had little control of its own destiny. Locals hoped the Americans would build a pulp and paper mill, but instead they chose (as the Oxford Paper Company did in Cape Breton) to hold the land as a

timber reserve. Through the 1920s, although there were local lumbermen ready and willing to work in the woods, there was little investment able to pay the stumpage fees that Hollingsworth and Whitney demanded. The population of Alma parish dropped 30% in the 1920s to about 500, and the mills and dams that had been the lifeblood of the town fell into disuse. Such conditions were common throughout New Brunswick, and in the 1930s the Crown encouraged Hollingsworth and Whitney and companies elsewhere to permit more cutting, in return for the loosening of forestry regulations and the lowering of stumpage fees being paid back to the Crown. The freeing up of more forest land permitted two sets of backers to set up stationary mills near Alma. Judson Cleveland and Hartford Keirstead opened a mill at the mouth of the Upper Salmon River that ran down to Alma, and Jack Strayhorne, Fred Hickey, and a new backer, Fred Colpitts, re-opened operations at Point Wolfe.

In terms of production, the years leading up to the park's creation were hardly, as Majka puts it, a period of "tragic decline". The annual cut at Alma jumped from 2.5 million board feet in the early 1930s to as much as 16 million in 1940, levelling off at 8 million in the 1940s. More telling, Alma's production as a percentage of the provincial cut climbed from under 1% in the mid-1920s to as high as 5% in 1937, levelling off at around 2.3% in the 1940s.⁶² The population of Alma stabilized, climbing almost one-third in the 1930s, to 650. The lumber industry was working at full gear, and most of the Alma region was directly or indirectly prospering from it.

⁶² Colpitts, "Sawmills to National Park," p.109.

Still, it is possible that to those involved in forestry, the industry seemed to be in decline. The community of Point Wolfe had dried up in the 1920s and was not restored when the Colpitts mill opened in the 1930s. More centrally, the private contractors were in an insecure position due to forces beyond their control. They were dependent on the patronage and prices of the sawmill operators, who were in turn dependent on the government's interventions to ensure the good graces of Hollingsworth and Whitney. Just as on the streams that ran to the rivers and the rivers that ran to the Bay of Fundy, there could be logjams at any point along the route. For these reasons, it is possible to see lumbering in the Fundy Park region in the 1930s and 1940s as both profitable and precarious.

Perhaps the period before park creation is remembered as a time of timber exhaustion because there was a perception that traditional conservationist practices were being abandoned. A number of people spoke to me of their parents' and grandparents' practice of selective cutting, sparing all trees of less than a 14 inch diameter. Winnie Smith of Alma remembers proudly that her father was an "early environmentalist."⁶³ People believe that the government permitted Hollingsworth and Whitney to relax this restriction; as a result, overcutting occurred. County councillor Sam McKinley, the first Alma resident to advocate the park's creation, later remembered that "the trees were so thin it was a sin to cut them."⁶⁴ On the other hand, Leo Burns of Alma recalls that the traditional practices were followed under

⁶³ Interview with Winnie Smith, Riverside-Albert, 31 August 1994.

⁶⁴ Cited in Laurie Cooper and Douglas Clay, "An Historical Review of Logging and River Driving in Fundy National Park: Rough Draft," p.5, internal document, Fundy National Park files.

Hollingsworth and Whitney.⁶⁵ It is hard to know what to make of this meager evidence on its own. It is possible that lumbermen feared the industry was on the wane, and felt they should use up the finite wood resources before their competitors did. In this case, increased production in the 1930s and 1940s may be seen as a sign of overcutting and coming exhaustion – just as decreased production would also be seen as a sign of exhaustion.

The Parks Branch's records can at least offer an outside opinion of the state of Alma's forests, and as a result demonstrate what the Branch believed it was accomplishing in turning this area into park land. In his 1930 report, R.W. Cautley noted that the site was "densely forested" and that "A mile, or less, back from the shore all the area of this site is covered with an unrelieved density of timber on a high, rolling surface."⁶⁶ He made no other direct reference to the health of the forests around Alma, just as he made no reference to what the creation of a park might do to residents dependent on forestry. Six years later, Cautley was surprised to find that what he had been told was a new site suggestion was in fact roughly the same site with different rear boundaries: "It was stated that the lands in the rear of Alma contained a great deal of commercially valuable timber, a fact which is admittedly true, and that, consequently, the area to be considered as suitable for a National Park in that district should be reduced to a minimum."⁶⁷ Cautley then added, "The Forestry officials informed me that the Albert

⁶⁵ Interview with Leo Burns, Alma, 1 September 1994.

⁶⁶ Cautley report on New Brunswick sites, 1930, pp.14 and 12, RG84 vol.1964, file U2.13 vol.1, NAC.

⁶⁷ Cautley report on New Brunswick sites, 1936, p.14, RG84 vol.1964, file U2.13 vol.1, NAC.

County coast is the most valuable area in the Province from a tree-reproduction or pulp point of view, and that the timber reproduces itself more quickly than anywhere else."⁶⁸ For these reasons he did not approve of any Albert County site which included much woodland, but he continued to believe that in any case a park should exclude Alma itself. In other words, he was concerned that timber would be alienated from use, but not that timber cutters would be alienated from their livelihood.

James Smart, who was a forester trained at the University of New Brunswick, reiterated in his report of the following year that the forests north of Alma were "extremely valuable" and that "From a park standpoint the back area has no attraction except as a contiguous timber area for use as a game preserve."⁶⁹ At Point Wolfe, he saw what he estimated to be 10 million board feet ready for sawing. He was especially impressed with how resilient the timber was, reaching merchantable size in only 25 to 30 years. Interestingly, whereas in the Cape Breton Highlands Cautley had suggested that Pleasant Bay be incorporated into the park and Smart recommended it be excluded, here at Fundy he overturned Cautley's suggestion that the park not include Alma. Smart wrote, "...I believe that this would be a disadvantage to Park administration and would also deprive this community of their main source of livelihood, the timber."⁷⁰ The thriving timber industry worked efficiently in conjunction with small

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p.15.

⁶⁹ Smart report on New Brunswick sites, 1937, p.5, RG84 vol.1023, file F2 pt.1, NAC.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p.6.

scale agriculture and fishing, and "the combination of all the industries accounts for the prosperous appearance of the community."⁷¹

There is no evidence that Smart saw a different, exhausted forest when he returned to Alma ten years later, when as Controller of the National Parks Branch he oversaw the creation of Fundy National Park. In fact, the woods he saw were evidently so productive that they would need supervision, and he worked with the provincial government to carry this out. He informed his superior,

I have pointed out to you that the New Brunswick area is a different situation from our other parks and in my opinion certain silvicultural systems of improvement cutting should be carried on from year to year to keep the growth in hand. The growth is very prolific and if no thinning operations are carried on the whole area will become a jungle, interfering with its general use for recreational purposes and also crowd out some forms of wildlife. Furthermore, I think in time it will be considered that sections of the area should be used for forestry experimental purposes as demonstration plots of silvicultural systems and for study.⁷²

Smart even discussed with the provincial government the possibility of allowing this selective cutting to be done by and for local foresters. The Parks Branch did not make a firm decision on the matter, but the provincial Department of Lands and Mines was so confident it had won this concession that it announced in its 1949 Annual Report, "Since the area is highly productive from a forestry standpoint it will be developed as a demonstration of good forestry practices as well as a wild life refuge and for recreational purposes."⁷³

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Smart to Gibson, 14 January 1948, RG84 vol.1039, file F200 vol.1, NAC.

⁷³ New Brunswick, Department of Lands and Mines, Annual Report, 1949, p.24. The Deputy Minister of Lands and Mines, G.H. Prince, sent Smart his notes on an early discussion they had and states, "It was intimated that the Dominion would give consideration to developing a well managed forest in the area with the likelihood that good

When the park was announced in the fall of 1947, production at both the Upper Salmon River and Point Wolfe mills immediately plummeted. The Point Wolfe mill prepared to close down, while Judson Cleveland at the Upper Salmon River mill tried to figure out how he could continue, with the timber land he had used having been alienated.⁷⁴ The new park would give jobs to the area but it was not filling an empty niche: it moved people out of an industry many of them had known all their lives. W.P. Keirstead of Alma wrote Smart that he had returned from a stint in the R.C.A.F. hoping to take up his father's business as a merchant and lumber operator. "The Park project has disturbed all this," he wrote, "cutting off local lumber resources, thus depleting lumber camp provision sales, dispersing families, many far removed from our sphere of business, so that our outlook today is altogether different than in the spring of 1945."⁷⁵

The creation of Fundy National Park meant the permanent protection of a pocket of New Brunswick's forest, and a guaranteed tourist industry of some scale for the people who lived nearby. These may rightly be considered good things in themselves. It misrepresents the history of both the park land and its people to suggest that at establishment the land was denuded and the people were without jobs or futures. When Fundy National Park was established, forestry was still alive and well in Alma.

forest management would be adopted." See Prince to Smart, 6 October 1947, RG84 vol.1023, file F2 vol.4 pt.1, NAC.

⁷⁴ Colpitts, "Alma, New Brunswick," p.197.

⁷⁵ W.P. Keirstead to Smart, 4 November 1949, RG84 vol.1025, file F16.112.1 vol.1 pt.2 (1949-1952), NAC.

a happy, happy time

Winnie Smith of Alma was working in Moncton in the summer of 1947, helping her sister take care of her newborn baby. She walked into Staples' Drugstore in Moncton one day and saw the park announcement on a newspaper headline. "I was jumping up and down," she recalls. "It was a happy, happy time. Joyous."⁷⁶ She thought the park would bring prosperity to the area through tourism, and she was proud that her home had been considered beautiful enough to become New Brunswick's first national park. Not everyone to be expropriated was so happy, but there was in the establishment of Fundy a greater acceptance among locals than at either Cape Breton Highlands or Prince Edward Island National Parks. Those forced to relocate were in many ways more prepared than those in the two earlier parks had been. They were much more likely to know what the new national park was all about, having heard about or visited the two existing Maritime parks. They knew that the Alma region had been discussed as a possible park site since 1930. As well, there existed in Alma a community that would take in all those moving out of the park area. Beyond all this, there was a willingness to give up the lifestyle that had kept Alma, in the words of one resident I spoke with, a "dogpatch".

The New Brunswick government also gave residents less reason or opportunity for protest or complaint than had occurred in Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island. The government settled with landowners quickly, and relatively generously. Unlike in Prince Edward Island, expropriated landowners were able to appeal their settlements. Unlike

⁷⁶ Interview with Winnie Smith, Riverside-Albert, 31 August 1994.

in Nova Scotia, landowners were dealt with all at once, with a firm date for their removal. There is no evidence, however, that the state's action was a result of having learned from the experiences at the first two Maritime parks. It more likely demonstrates a changing Canadian sense of how expropriation should be handled, as well as the provincial government's awareness that the park issue was so public that land acquisition had to be done straightforwardly. In any case, the expropriation proceedings to create Fundy National Park lacked the messes and controversies that surrounded the proceedings at Cape Breton Highlands and Prince Edward Island National Parks.⁷⁷

The park location was made public in late July 1947, and federal and provincial orders in council cemented the transfer that fall. The New Brunswick government worked quickly, promising the Canadian government that all occupants would be removed by 31 October 1948. Surveys were made, valuations determined, and the owners offered a price for their property. If this was refused, the government would invariably make a higher, final offer. If the owner still refused, the case would go to arbitration (only two cases did).⁷⁸ Meanwhile, the Parks Branch began work in the spring of 1948 to develop the park.

Nearly half of the new park area was Crown land under timber license to Hollingsworth and Whitney, and the remainder was privately owned in about 130 properties – the largest which was also Hollingsworth and Whitney's.⁷⁹ Not surprisingly, the New Brunswick

⁷⁷ That is not to say that the New Brunswick government was in any way reacting to the expropriations at the first two parks. In fact, there is no mention of Cape Breton Highlands or Prince Edward Island parks during establishment of Fundy.

⁷⁸ The arbitration proceedings are explained by Gill in New Brunswick, Legislature, Synoptic Report, 1949, Appendix p.16.

⁷⁹ New Brunswick, Department of Lands and Mines, Annual Report, 1947, p.121 and 1949,

government's first order of business was achieving a rapid settlement with the forestry company.⁸⁰ Unlike Oxford Paper Company in Cape Breton, Hollingsworth and Whitney quickly and amicably accepted \$325,000 for about 21,000 acres of land it owned and another almost forty square miles it held in lease. In the eyes of the Saint John Telegraph Journal, this was a major concession by the company. The paper noted that this was "one of the best lumber areas in New Brunswick," where "seven or eight million feet" of lumber and a lot of pulp were cut the previous year.⁸¹ But Hollingsworth and Whitney was probably quite satisfied with the price. It knew that the New Brunswick government was beginning to promote the pulp industry and would in the future favour companies that had mills within the province. Also, it had owned the land for 25 years and never put it to much use anyway. The New Brunswick government even offered to buy the company's small parcels of land outside the park boundary, which would be of little use to the company once the park was made.⁸²

Once Hollingsworth and Whitney had settled, there was little chance that the rest of the property owners would not follow. There was now nowhere in the region for them to get timber enough to keep the private lumbermen cutting, and the mills supplied. The overnight loss of the region's major wood supply underscored how tenuous the industry had always been, how residents had never had control of their

p.21.

⁸⁰ In January of 1948, Smart mentioned in a memo that 70 of the 79.5 square miles of the park had already been settled. This means that settlement with Hollingsworth and Whitney had already been made, even though no other owners had even been contacted yet. Smart to Gibson, 24 January 1948, RG84 vol.1024, file F2 vol.5.

⁸¹ Saint John Telegraph Journal, 28 August 1947.

⁸² See Colpitts, "Alma, New Brunswick," pp.204-205.

own livelihood. And as Nancy Colpitts writes, "Even if objections from Colpitts and Cleveland had blocked the park, Hollingsworth and Whitney was still free to retaliate by denying the two entrepreneurs access to the land."⁸³

On top of this, the two sawmill owners, Judson Cleveland and Fred Colpitts, had their own reasons for agreeing to close the mills without a fight. Cleveland was over 80 years old and seems to have accepted that the park would mean the end of his career as a lumber operator. Fred Colpitts had been the Liberal M.L.A. for Albert County from 1930 to 1939 and was, though not a vocal proponent of the park, a loyal member of the government that was establishing one. The two men's different situations resulted in different settlements. K.B. Brown of the New Brunswick Department of Lands and Mines, in charge of surveying and assessing the lands to be expropriated, went out of his way to ensure a good settlement for Colpitts. He had originally assessed Colpitts' property at \$5000, but Colpitts sought \$7900 plus \$2000 for the loss of the use of his mill. Brown went back and found ways in which a more favourable valuation "might be justified," and conceded the mill compensation "might be justified with some difficulty." He ended up with a new offer of \$9652, "as an illustration of an attempt to meet Mr. Colpitts' claim and to justify the amount on a basis of facts."⁸⁴ At some point not noted in the files, the assessment was raised again and Colpitts ended up receiving \$16,000 for his property. Judson Cleveland, a Conservative, was less fortunate. His mill was just outside

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p.205.

⁸⁴ K.B. Brown, in Fred Colpitts file, Fundy National Park Land Assembly Records, Department of Natural Resources, RG10 RS145, Provincial Archives of New Brunswick [henceforth, PANB].

the park boundary at Alma, so the province had no obligation to compensate him for it. He received almost \$6000 for his 170 acres within the park, but was rebuffed when he sought \$6000 more for the loss of his business. Though he complained to the province, "The park has taken my job – made my mill worthless. ...People say I was struck harder than anyone else,"⁸⁵ he was awarded no additional money.

The remainder of the property owners had little choice but to accept expropriation. Most of the community had relied on Hollingsworth and Whitney's leased or owned woods and on Cleveland's and Colpitts' mills to make a living; with those gone, their interest in contesting the new park waned. Aware of this advantage,⁸⁶ the province sought to satisfy the landowners speedily – in particular those 45 or so families who would have to relocate. Most homeowners received between \$4000 and \$10,000 for their property, depending more on the size and quality of their land than on the value of their house and barns. Cottagers received about \$2000 for their holdings. For most residents this was enough to rebuild in Alma or nearby. Not surprisingly, there is still a wide variance of opinion as to the fairness of the prices offered by the provincial government. Bob Keirstead told me that he and his brother obtained quite different settlements on the two 30-acre properties of timberland they owned. The government offered his brother \$600, then flew over Keirstead's land and set a price of \$97, later raising this to \$200. "It must have been a foggy day," Keirstead

⁸⁵ Cleveland, in Judson Cleveland file, *ibid.*

⁸⁶ For example, in answering Fred Colpitts' complaints, K.B. Brown suggested that residents were lucky to be dealing with the government: "If Hollingsworth and Whitney had decided to convert all wood to pulpwood, as they had told us they planned to do, would you have had a claim against them?" See Colpitts file, Fundy National Park Land Assembly Records, Department of Natural Resources, RG10 RS145, PANB. Colpitts, "Alma, New Brunswick," p.201.

said dryly.⁸⁷ Generally, though – and in contrast to the expropriations at Cape Breton Highlands and Prince Edward Island National Parks – it is believed that the residents received a fair market or above fair market price for their property.

However, the provincial government accepted no responsibility for those who did not live on the parkland but who depended on it for their living. Residents of Alma who worked in Hollingsworth and Whitney's woods received nothing, and those who owned small woodlots that they selectively cut from received a sum for the land, not for its value to them (as park residents did for their home and farmland). Thus while Mary Jonah of Sussex received \$2022 for a lot and cottage, Wilfred McKinley of Alma received only \$760 for 87 forested acres. Fred Colpitts, past M.L.A. for Albert, was the only property owner to receive extra money for the loss of future income.⁸⁸ While it is certainly understandable why the province sought to avoid what would have been a debated and expensive procedure of compensating for loss of livelihood, the incident demonstrates why establishment of a national park means more than just the preservation of a block of land. It shapes the land use and economy not only of the park itself but also of

⁸⁷ Here is a good example of how difficult it is today to judge settlement offers. In the expropriation records, Bob Keirstead's property is stated to be 24 acres, not 30, and his brother is said to have been given \$539, not \$600, for 38 acres, not 30. Are these the final settlements in each case? Are the surveyed sizes accurate? Is Keirstead's memory of the properties wrong? How credible is his knowledge of the value of the property? See Fundy National Park Land Assembly Records, Department of Natural Resources, RG10 RS145, PANB.

⁸⁸ The assessor, Brown, felt that granting Colpitts this concession could spark trouble. He stated, "This seems to me to be comparable to the woman who wanted \$2500 for the loss of her business in keeping chickens and foxes and that of the man who claimed he could clear \$1000 a year raising pigs. Many such claims would no doubt develop if this were recognized." See Colpitts, "Alma, New Brunswick," p.203.

the surrounding area. An expropriation process which does not speak to this is delusional.

For a time, the National Parks Branch considered allowing some occupants of the area to stay, not in recognition of their right to the land but because of their potential benefit to the park. Prior to the park's establishment, Claude Bishop kept a fishing business and small house at Herring Cove and asked that he might be allowed to stay and fish there. James Smart considered the matter and decided that this would be in keeping with the new park. He told K.B. Brown, "we would be prepared to let him continue his fishing operation at Herring Cove and give him a permit of occupation I told Mr. Bishop that I thought it would be a great advantage to the park development to have an operation as his in the park when it is established"⁸⁹ Smart was also interested in letting the half-dozen cottagers at Herring Cove including Bishop stay on, in government-issue cottages. Smart had spent part of his career at Riding Mountain and Prince Albert National Parks, and was familiar with the shack tents that summer-long visitors to the park were allowed to put up there. He wrote, "On National Parks like Riding Mountain and Prince Albert and such as Fundy, on which only Summer occupation would be permitted, those people are the best boosters for the Department in its efforts in promotion of National Parks."⁹⁰ Presumably, they would become fixtures of the park, giving it a small permanent clientele as well as acting as overseers of a park they would be inclined to protect. The cottagers at Herring Cove were allowed to summer there for \$10 each year until 1952, while the Parks

⁸⁹ Smart to Brown, 29 May 1948, RG84 vol.1024, file F2 vol.5, NAC.

⁹⁰ Smart to Gibson, 10 December 1952, RG22 vol.239, file 33.6.1 pt.3, NAC.

Branch considered whether to build a subdivision of identical new cottages. Of course, Smart was accepting of Bishop and the cottagers because their stay would be seasonal and because they would not detract from the park's image. That is, they would be either recreationists or quaint fishers – farmers, loggers, or businessmen were not invited. The Parks Branch ultimately decided to forbid all residence in Fundy, recognizing it might be politically inexpedient to expropriate some people while letting others stay and fearful of creating a permanent administrative concern. Neither the cottagers nor Bishop were invited back in 1953, and their buildings were demolished.⁹¹

Perhaps the most interesting case was Judson Cleveland's intervention to help the Baizley family who lived in Alma West and whose daughter ran the post office there. Cleveland had allowed the family to live on his property for twenty years, and he now asked K.B. Brown to add \$1500 to his evaluation so that he could continue to manage their interests. Cleveland's generosity is impressive, but his belief that the Baizleys would prefer to be kept rather than to be reimbursed themselves for the loss of a home indicates the paternalistic nature of the forest industry. Awkward about this arrangement, the New Brunswick government chose to grant \$2000 to the municipality of Albert for the Baizleys' care. It is not clear whether the money ever went to the family: in 1951, the daughter, Mrs. J. Boyd Baizley, wrote the province asking why her family was never given anything when the park came in.⁹²

⁹¹ See RG84 vol.1024, file F16.1, NAC.

⁹² Baizley file, Fundy National Park Land Assembly Records, Department of Natural Resources, RG10 RS145, PANB.

The great majority of the families who were expropriated off the park land moved to Alma and built homes there. For those living on the tableland of Alma West, where the park headquarters are today, it was a move of only a few hundred yards to the east. Some of the dispossessed landowners brought bad feelings about the new park with them. Pearl Sinclair recalls that one family never set foot in the park again, though they would drive through it on the way to Sussex.⁹³ Murice Martin accepted the sale of his family's farm and went on to become the park staff's main authority on local history, while his brother Norval never accepted the park takeover. A 1948 article for the Saint John Telegraph Journal by Ian Sclanders shows the myopia that people not directly affected by the park creation could exhibit. Sclanders, who had been an advocate of a New Brunswick park since the early 1930s, reported that the golf course designer Stanley Thompson expected great things of Fundy's course,

but he probably wishes that the residents of Alma West, so soon to be evacuated to other parts, were a bit more understanding. The green for the second hole is right in Mrs. Jim Armstrong's backyard, where her garden used to be, and she frequently reminds him that, thanks to him, she won't have any vegetables to can this year.⁹⁴

Armstrong complained that "We'll have to live in a little tarpaper shanty"⁹⁵ while rebuilding in Alma. Leo Burns believes that this was the hardest and most unforeseen part of the expropriation business: everyone who could possibly help you build a house in Alma was already working in the park in 1948.⁹⁶

⁹³ Interview with Pearl Sinclair, Alma, 2 September 1994.

⁹⁴ Ian Sclanders, "New Brunswick Parade," Saint John Telegraph Journal, 26 July 1948.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Interview with Leo Burns, Alma, 1 September 1994.

What most bothered residents, and what has stuck in many of their memories, were the efforts of the incoming park developers to completely eradicate evidence of past human presence. Homes, barns, and outbuildings were not removed or torn down, they were simply vacated, bulldozed over, and the remains burned. The Parks Branch did not keep a single pre-existing structure for the park's use. Even a local petition to have the two community churches left standing was unsuccessful.⁹⁷ Winnie Smith, who found it a "happy, happy time" when the park announcement was made, is saddened that her family farm is now the cesspool for the park's Chignecto Campground. She notes, "They could have left signs saying, 'This was where there was a house.' It's sickening. I just feel awful about that."⁹⁸ Perhaps the most symbolic change involved Point Wolfe. The point had been named for British General James Wolfe, and there had been a little community there from about the 1830s to the 1920s, when the timber industry slumped. The Parks Branch knew its name, and referred to it correctly during the years of park acquisition and development. But the official booklet that went with Fundy National Park's opening in 1950 refers throughout to "Point Wolf", and the name stuck for a number of years in park publications.⁹⁹ It is unclear whether this was an accident, or an attempt by the Parks Branch to associate the park with natural history rather than human history.

⁹⁷ Allardyce, "The Salt and the Fir," p.5.

⁹⁸ Interview with Winnie Smith, Riverside-Albert, 31 August 1994.

⁹⁹ Canada, Department of Resources and Development, Fundy National Park, opening ceremonies booklet. In 1956, in a newspaper article telling of an expatriate returning to the Fundy Park region for a visit, Jean Smetzer writes, "It seems to me a great pity that the park literature has dropped the -e- from Wolfe thus losing its historical significance." Smetzer, 19 July 1956. From clipping collection of Greta Geldart Elliott.

the face-lift

As in Prince Edward Island and Cape Breton Highlands National Parks, in Fundy National Park the Parks Branch did not in fact replace the previous human presence with wild nature, but with its own vision of what a national park should be. That vision had evolved since the 1930s. The first two Atlantic Canadian parks had been chosen to resemble classic turn-of-the-century resort settings. The two parks had seaside features, rich summer homes turned into hotels, picturesque drives along the water, and attractions for both wealthy and middle class tourists. Fundy had none of these. Most of it was densely wooded, it had only one noteworthy "view" (from the tableland, looking down on the Bay of Fundy), and whatever cultural heritage it had had was bulldozed away. But to the Parks Branch, none of this was of concern. Approaching the mid-century, it was time for a new national park, one that symbolized the present and the future rather than holding firmly to the past.

Cape Breton Highlands and Prince Edward Island National Parks had become successful parts of the park system since their establishment in the late 1930s. From their 1937 attendance of 20,000 and 2500 respectively, attendance had grown and, after a wartime lull, was rising regularly postwar. By 1948, Prince Edward Island National Park's attendance was the fifth highest in the Canadian parks system at over 84,000, up from 48,000 in 1945. Cape Breton Highland's attendance was almost 26,000, thirteenth in the system, and up from 19,000 in 1945.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ Canada, Department of Mines and Resources, Annual Reports, 1937-1948. See Appendix 2.

The Eastern parks' locations, much nearer the population core of Canada and the United States than were the Western parks, had proven useful in attracting tourists. And they had in no way weakened the parks system's reputation or image; in fact, they helped make the national parks more truly national. However, while Eastern parks were more readily accepted by the Parks Branch, their scenery was still considered unremarkable by Branch standards. They were attractive, and would attract tourists to the Maritimes, and this was sufficient. Now that Eastern national parks were not as suspect as they had been 15 years earlier, the main question was not whether to have them but rather how to market them most effectively.

This was increasingly important in the postwar tourism boom. Attendance to parks had doubled between 1945 and 1947, and would jump another 50 percent by 1949.¹⁰¹ To satisfy the growing class of affluent, mobile middle-class consumers, parks which had survived on little upkeep and development for most of the decade would now have to spend to improve facilities. As mentioned earlier, this began in earnest in 1948, the very year that most of Fundy was developed. In that year, the budget for Canadian national parks was over \$7.7 million, three times what it had been even in 1947. The loosening of the purse strings permitted the Parks Branch to conceive of Fundy in larger terms than had been possible for Cape Breton Highlands or Prince Edward Island. In the first two Atlantic parks, limited funds demanded that the Parks Branch accept the restrictions imposed by nature and culture. The parks were built on top of existing roadways, elaborated on existing tourist views, and recycled existing cultural allusions. Cape Breton

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 1945-1950.

Highlands and Prince Edward Island National Parks came to resemble beachside resort settings because that is already what they were trying to resemble, and the Parks Branch could do little more than improve the resemblance. But at Fundy, this limitation did not exist. Alma West and region had never attempted to be a tourist centre, and more importantly the Parks Branch could afford for the first time to start development from scratch. At Cape Breton Highlands only \$1.1 million of federal money had been spent in the first four years of development, but at Fundy over \$2.2 million was spent in the three first years of development, 1948 to 1950.¹⁰²

Unfortunately, in the archival record no member of the Parks Branch expressly describes what the Fundy Park development was to be, or what the hopes for the new park were.¹⁰³ This may in itself be telling. There is no sign that there was disagreement either within the Parks Branch or between levels of government about the park plan before development, nor any indication that there was significant unhappiness about how development progressed. Once the site was selected and the properties expropriated, development went ahead straightforwardly. There is thus no better way to begin describing the

¹⁰² In 1948, \$540,000 was spent; in 1949, \$870,000; in 1950, \$835,000. Note that in the same period \$2.6 million was spent by the department in rebuilding sections of Cape Breton Highland's Cabot Trail. RG22 vol.474, file 33.9.1 pt.4, NAC.

¹⁰³ The nearest approximation is a letter from New Brunswick Deputy Minister of Lands and Mines G.H. Prince to James Smart during park negotiation, in which he re-caps what was agreed between them in a previous meeting. Prince had hoped that Alma West could be excluded from the park but was told, he remembers, that this "was considered impossible as this location was selected for the main gateway to the park and for development as a town site for store, restaurants, gasoline station, hotel, bungalow sites, swimming pools, etc. ... An extensive road construction program will be undertaken and water and storage system installed in the town site. Golf course and skii runs and other types of construction will be undertaken." Of course, Prince may have been remembering what he wanted to remember (ski runs were never in the Parks Branch plans), but Smart did not contradict him. Prince to Smart, 6 October 1947, RG22 vol.366, file 304.73 pt.1, NAC.

plan for the park than to show it as it existed shortly after opening. Lilian Maxwell writes of visiting the new park in her 1951 boosterish travel book 'Round New Brunswick. She offers a rather perfunctory description of Fundy's natural scenery, but this is only fitting. The natural scenery was of secondary interest to the obviously new, obviously precisely-maintained built environment. Maxwell writes,

Near the Administration plateau are facilities for people who want to have a good time. There is a 100-foot-long swimming tank full of warmed sea-water, bathing-houses which contain bathing-suits, 1000s of them of every description, a natural arena where band concerts or church services are held, and near at hand some 40 cottages of the Swiss chalet type, each containing all the modern conveniences even to propane gas for cooking. We took the road going to Point Wolfe several miles west, and on the way passed the golf course of nine links, tennis court, and a ball field, then the club-house. The club-house is a magnificent building, fitted for the enjoyment of all the sports including bowling. There are, besides the lockers, a snack bar, sports shop, a handicraft shop, etc. The main room of the club-house is 50 feet by 30 feet in extent and there is a fireplace 13 feet wide.¹⁰⁴

Fundy National Park was designed to provide all possible amenities for the travelling family that was expected to dominate tourism post-war. The swimming pool and golf course would fulfill sporting needs; an amphitheatre and handicraft school would fulfill cultural needs; cottages, hotels, and campgrounds would fulfill accommodation needs; and a "townsite" of gift shops and restaurants would fulfill consumer needs.

While most of these amenities were present at other national parks, what makes Fundy unique is that the developments were

¹⁰⁴ Lilian Maxwell, 'Round New Brunswick Roads (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1951), pp.104-105.

designed to be the focus of the visitor's experience. At Cape Breton Highlands and Prince Edward Island, for example, development was meant to spread tourists around and help them see more of the park's natural area. Because the Parks staff saw Fundy as having only one marketable view, development here would need to have a different purpose. It would have to keep tourists busy in this one spot, to ensure they spent any amount of time in the park at all. The Parks Branch had the funding, the opportunity (once the people of Alma West were expropriated), and the motivation to develop this national park to a degree to which a new park had never been developed before. The editor of the Saint John Telegraph Journal complimented the park designers for their innovation: "And New Brunswick's site - from the description of its numerous features - promises to be distinctive among Canada's national parks. Not just an attraction to be looked at for a few minutes, like a curiosity of Nature, Fundy National Park will be a place for visitors to stay in and spend as long as they wish."¹⁰⁵

The development of the park headquarters was at the expense of both the area's cultural past and its environmental present. Once the residents of Alma West and vicinity had been moved and their houses and farms bulldozed, a preliminary landscaping was needed. The Parks Branch contracted this and much of the construction work to Caldwell and Ross of Campbellton, New Brunswick. The new Fundy National Park, populated for almost 150 years, was too wild to be presently acceptable. Roads needed to be straightened, hillocks flattened, ugly and misshapen trees cut down, stones removed, grass planted. It was a big project that

¹⁰⁵ Editorial, Saint John Telegraph Journal, 5 January 1950.

involved the use of over 15,000 cubic metres of topsoil, enough to cover a 12 acre field a foot deep.¹⁰⁶

In a number of newspaper articles of the time, the provincial media reported on the tidying operation. Again and again they returned to metaphors that suggested beautification. "It requires men and machines to put the finishing touches" on the landscape, one writer suggested, and it would be a long-term job: "It will take years to completely landscape and trim the Albert county countryside."¹⁰⁷ This was to be a "tremendous face-lifting operation", "an improving facial", "an estimated \$3,000,000 face-lifting" wrote others.¹⁰⁸ It was "the effect which may be obtained by polishing an already gem-like setting. Improvement touches have been largely in the nature of removing man-made blotches in a beauty-blessed area."¹⁰⁹ No reporter saw this landscaping as out of the ordinary, and one writer even congratulated the Parks Branch for retaining existing scenery: "the camping ground is taking shape in what was once a jungle of cut-over trees, stumps, and stones. Here, too, the accent on natural setting is evident. As many trees are being retained as possible without interfering with camping ground plans. ... Rustic picnic tables and benches, hewn from trees removed in the park make-over job, abound...."¹¹⁰

The Parks Branch was fully behind this scale of landscaping. Ian Sclanders noted that the person in charge of overseeing park creation,

¹⁰⁶ Lothian, *A Brief History*, p.111.

¹⁰⁷ *Moncton Times*, undated. From clipping collection of Greta Geldart Elliott.

¹⁰⁸ From clipping collection of Greta Geldart Elliott. It is possible that these writers were relying on the same Parks Branch press release.

¹⁰⁹ R.W. Murphy. From clipping collection of Greta Geldart Elliott.

¹¹⁰ From clipping collection of Greta Geldart Elliott.

Superintendent Ernest Saunders, was relaxed about the work, "as though moving scenery around were mere routine. 'We're cutting the top of that hill off,' he said, 'and we'll use it to fill in that bog down there. We did a little job on that stream yesterday - shifted its course a couple of hundred yards with a bulldozer.'" It was all part of "turning rough wilderness into a gigantic playground."¹¹¹ James Smart was a little more apologetic about the changes being made, but he too saw them as necessary and the damage as temporary. In a 1950 Christmas card to New Brunswick historian Esther Clark Wright, he wrote,

At the present time our development area looks a little raw in spots due to construction work.... To some people it may appear that we are not keeping the area inviolate as is our general aim in connection with the administration of National Parks but it has been my experience that nature is a great healer and a lot of the rough spots will be cured and in a few years the whole layout will again take on a more natural appearance.¹¹²

Nor was Smart above helping the great healer along. After a landslide in the administration area, he had park wardens plant trees along the scar – in irregular clumps, to better imitate nature.¹¹³

On top of the new topsoil, Fundy National Park was built. Stanley Thompson's company was brought in to design and set up a nine-hole golf course along the road on the way towards Point Wolfe, just as Cautley had suggested 18 years earlier. Golf was still considered *de rigueur* for national parks, and \$100,000 was spent on the new course.¹¹⁴ A swimming pool was built almost right on the beach at

¹¹¹ Ian Sclanders, "New Brunswick Parade," Saint John Telegraph Journal, 26 July 1948.

¹¹² Smart to Esther Clark Wright, 20 December 1950, RG84 vol.46, file F109, NAC.

¹¹³ Gordon L. Scott to J.R.B. Coleman, Chief, National Parks Branch, 31 April 1951, RG84 vol.140, file F28.1, NAC.

¹¹⁴ There were, however, the first rumblings of discontent. Unaware that campgrounds

Alma West. It was an engineering showcase, with water directed from Spring Brook Hill through a pipe system overhead on the road to Point Wolfe down to the beach where it was warmed. The pool was meant to ensure swimming regardless of the weather, but soon after its opening a large dividing wall had to be built to keep the cold winds of the Bay out; it, of course, also eliminated the view of the Bay.

Potentially the most innovative development was the opening of the New Brunswick School of Arts and Crafts in buildings in the headquarters area. Headed by Dr. Ivan Crowell, director of handicrafts for the province, the new school would teach single-day to eight-week classes in weaving, woodturning, candle making, and the like. "Courses in weaving," it was noted, "are taught in English, French, Estonian, Norwegian, and Swedish."¹¹⁵ James Smart hoped it would give the new park a cultural cachet, and stated, "we would like to see this activity established on a scale similar to the Banff School of Fine Arts in Banff Park..."¹¹⁶ This is interesting, because it once more shows Smart – who had toyed with the idea of keeping the Herring Cove cottages as a townsite – trying to create community within Fundy Park in the image of a Western park with which he was familiar. Smart also established in Fundy what he usually called a "business subdivision" but what he also over-optimistically called a "townsite": seven building lots in which a

were in the works, H.S. Robinson, Assistant Chief of the Historical and Information Section of the Department of Mines and Resources, wryly noted, "As something less than 4% of park visitors make use of park golfing facilities, we believe that it would create better relations with about 96% of the public if we were able to publicize the availability of extensive up-to-date campground facilities." Robinson to Gibson, 8 December 1949, RG84 vol.484, file F36 pt.1, NAC.

¹¹⁵ Jessie I. Lawson and Jean MacCallum Sweet, *This is New Brunswick* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1951), pp.121-123.

¹¹⁶ Smart to Moore, 24 February 1949, RG84 vol.142, file F317, NAC.

service station, restaurants, and gift shops were planned to serve the national park's needs.

There was no longer a belief that tourists would segregate by class, as there had been at Prince Edward Island National Park a decade earlier. Fundy would keep all types of tourists in its headquarters area. As a result all park components had to be first-class. Campgrounds were developed for tents and trailers, but there were also 29 cottages built on a row overlooking the golf course. These were fully furnished two-room chalets with gas stoves and refrigerators, amenities as modern as any that could be found outside the park. The Parks Branch fully expected that the new park would encourage local initiative into tourist-related businesses. They offered business lots and long-term leases to potential investors. But the Branch was disappointed to find no local interest. The park's own development work made investment in the park unlikely. People in Alma simply could not afford to invest to the high standards that the Parks Branch had set, particularly in what was considered a risky and unfamiliar venture. At a time when some in the village still did not have refrigerators, it was difficult to imagine setting up seasonal accommodations with refrigerators in every unit. Yet Alma citizens were also wary about developing at their own expense in town; they felt they would not be able to compete with the prime facilities and landscape of the park headquarters area.¹¹⁷

Also, the residents of Alma, like the New Brunswick government, were quite happy to have the federal government foot the entire bill for park development. The short-term employment the park brought

¹¹⁷ James Hutchison to Smart, 20 February 1953, RG22 vol.239, file 33.6.1 pt.3. The Branch's handling of accommodation matters will be discussed further in Chapter 7.

overshadowed thoughts about long-term economic effects. While the park was being established from 1948 to 1950 in particular, everyone in Alma seemed to be involved, from construction workers to old lumber cooks to groundskeepers. It was steady pay for labourers, at \$.60 per hour if hired by the park, \$.65 if hired by the contractors. Even winter projects kept over 100 men hired. Smart could announce proudly early in the 1950s that "Almost every able bodied person in Alma available for work has at some time or other during the past three years been employed on the park work."¹¹⁸ And to the delight of the New Brunswick government, it was entirely a federal expense. This had been an issue whenever the national park had been discussed. As Russell Colpitts bluntly told the legislature in 1946, "It has been said that each county should have its own Provincial park. I have no fault to find with this, but one thing we must keep in mind is that these small parks would have to be developed by monies from the Provincial Treasury, whereas all the expenditures in connection with the development of a national park are paid by the Federal Government."¹¹⁹ This was still the thinking. Though the province spent over \$850,000 for expropriation of the park land, it could demonstrate its economic savvy by pointing out that it had convinced the Canadian government to spend several times that in development.¹²⁰

Only in one memorable case did the Branch's willingness to spend money (and everyone's knowledge of that fact) result in embarrassment to the park system. The Superintendent's residence was traditionally an

¹¹⁸ Smart to Gibson, 17 April 1952, *ibid.*

¹¹⁹ New Brunswick, Legislature, *Synoptic Report*, 1946, p.221.

¹²⁰ See New Brunswick, Department of Lands and Mines, *Annual Report*, 1950, p.18.

important building in the parks service: evidence of permanent watchfulness over the park, and one of very few perks for men who took the job.¹²¹ At Prince Edward Island and Cape Breton Highlands, existing homes were fixed up to accommodate Superintendents. But at Fundy a new home was to be built and on the most prominent location imaginable, on the bluff at Alma West. It actually cut off some of the view of the Bay. The first designs from Saint John architect H.S. Brenan for what was authorized to be a \$12,000 house were, according to Smart, "absolutely unacceptable.... an old-fashioned style which one would see on almost any street in Saint John."¹²² Just as the Parks Branch wanted Eastern national parks to be somehow reminiscent of Western scenery, it expected the buildings in the Eastern parks to be Western-style stone structures. The Branch gave Brenan examples of existing designs from Canadian and American parks to work from, but he instead slavishly followed them and the cost jumped to \$24,000. In charge of the house's construction on the ground was Superintendent Saunders, who would benefit from whatever was built. The Treasury Board took notice of the cost overruns, demanding to know why there had been so much winter work, why an intricate cobweb brickwork design was needed, why the kitchen had so many cabinets. And still another \$4700 was granted in 1949 to complete the project. It was an embarrassment to the whole Parks Branch, and the story was distributed

¹²¹ And as Hugh Keenleyside, Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources, later said when defending cost overruns on the house, "the construction of appropriate departmental headquarters promptly is a token of the intention of the Administration to undertake worthwhile development of the Park." Keenleyside to R.B. Bryce, Treasury Board, 16 June 1949, RG84 vol.141, file 56.1, NAC.

¹²² Smart to Gibson, 4 May 1949, ibid.

throughout the system as a moral lesson.¹²³ Assistant Controller J.A. Wood visited the park in the summer of 1949 and reported, "When I arrived I found a number of men laying a flagstone driveway. When I asked Saunders where the money was coming from to pay for this work he told me it was being charged to landscaping. I stopped the work immediately."¹²⁴ By the time the house was completed it cost \$30,000, enough for three or four farms in Alma West in 1948. The Superintendent's house stood, like a brown white elephant, front and centre of Fundy National Park development.

Perhaps the overruns were worth it: fifty years later, the Superintendent's residence looks to be in fine shape. Other park developments have not fared so well. The handicraft school is gone, the business subdivision never worked out, the golf course is now seen by most parks staff as anachronistic, and in general all development on Alma West seems today to be an unnatural legacy.¹²⁵ Yet residents and expropriatees all remember Ernest Saunders, who oversaw development, as the superintendent who did the most for the area. He didn't let the politicians or anyone else push him around, they said; he was autocratic but fair (that also translated into "He wouldn't last five minutes today, the unions would crucify him."¹²⁶) Of course, he also gave people jobs, making locals' hopes for the new park as a place of employment a reality for a time. As Leo Burns told me, "He accomplished more in four or five

¹²³ R.A Gibson told the Assistant Controller J.A. Wood, "Surely everyone associated with the National Park Service has realized that the reported cost of this structure has been criticized by Treasury Board and we had to make a special explanation." Gibson to Wood, 12 July 1949, *ibid.*

¹²⁴ Wood to Gibson, 13 July 1949, *ibid.*

¹²⁵ I will discuss staff unhappiness with the overdevelopment of Fundy in Chapter 8.

¹²⁶ Interview with Bob Keirstead, Alma, 29 August 1994.

years than the rest put together."¹²⁷ This makes the relative extravagance of the Superintendent's residence seem somehow fitting. To the people of Alma, the Park Superintendent stepped into the shoes left by Colpitts and Cleveland, as a patron who could distribute or refuse community employment. From Alma, the view of the Superintendent's residence perched on the bluff above suggested how the park would oversee the future of the community. From the road to Point Wolfe, the Superintendent's residence blocked the view of the Bay of Fundy, development getting in the way of nature.

¹²⁷ Interview with Leo Burns, Alma, 1 September 1994.



Terra Nova National Park, 153 square miles in area, is a superb example of Newfoundland's eastern coastal region, with its rocky points, deeply indented shoreline and rolling, forested landscape. It is situated on Bonavista Bay, about 48 miles southeast of Gander, and is the most easterly of Canada's national parks. ... [G]lacial sand and gravel created the tidal flats at the heads of Newman and Clode Sounds, while Terra Nova's many lakes and bogs were formed in depressions gouged out of the rock surface by the glaciers. Perhaps the park's most distinctive features are the many fjords or "sounds", which reach inland like long arms of the sea and are also the result of glacial movement. ... Terra Nova's rolling terrain is thickly covered with a boreal or northern forest dominated by black spruce and balsam fir.

Figure 10. Snapshot of Terra Nova National Park.
Photo and text from the brochure Terra Nova National Park (Ottawa: Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1970).




Figure 11. Map of Terra Nova National Park.
 From Heritage Foundation's Terra Nova National Park map, n.d. [1990s].

Chapter 6 Sawed-off, Hammered-down, Chopped-up: Establishing Terra Nova National Park, c.1957

Created in 1957, just ten years after Fundy National Park was established, a new park in a new province seemed to signal a rapidly changing National Parks Branch. Terra Nova National Park, 150 square miles of fir and spruce forests and rainswept bedrock on Bonavista Bay, Newfoundland, was of a different sort than the first three Maritime parks. Park documents show it was chosen more purely for its typical Newfoundlandscape than in honour of any more formal aesthetic standard. Its blending of land and sea was considered fine in itself, and its bogs, its inaccessible islands and shorelines, and its sometimes dismal views never threatened its creation. There were also plans for improved relations with citizens living near the park, and more accommodation with those who had lived on or depended on park land. And the new park was not to be heavily developed: there were to be no tennis court, no heated pool, and breaking even more with tradition, probably not even a golf course. Terra Nova National Park was established without the cultural associations of Cape Breton Highlands, the obvious scenic attractions of Prince Edward Island, or the sheer developmental promotion of Fundy.

Cabin design is as sure a sign of changing park philosophy as anything. The cabins at the headquarters area at Newman Sound are strikingly different from cabins at the other parks studied here. They are

not on flat ground and they are not in a regimented, suburb-like configuration at all, turned inward to each other as if to find community in nature. Instead, the cottages at Terra Nova are at odd angles, built into a hill and almost hidden from one another amid the trees. Each offers a view of Newman Sound and the Bread Cove Hills in the distance. Above all, they relate to their natural surroundings, not to each other. From the front window, there is no view of recreation, progress, or development, only nature.

In Chapter 8, I will examine Terra Nova National Park as symbolic of a burgeoning modern environmentalism and an increasingly "nature-minded" national park system. But this is only half of its story. When the park was established, the federal and provincial governments agreed, and the National Parks Branch accepted, that the new park would be used to supply lumber if Newfoundland was able to attract investors for a third pulp-and-paper mill for the province. The yearly growth in the park, estimated at 12,000 - 15,000 cords, would be available for cutting. This promise hung over the new Terra Nova National Park like a chainsaw of Damocles. The history of Terra Nova's establishment and design should be seen as evidence of the Parks Branch increasingly defining its work in terms of nature preservation, while experiencing decreasing autonomy from political interference and ministerial control. This separation of interests foreshadowed the showdown over the park system that would occur between the proponents of use and preservation in the 1960s. For now, the Parks Branch was able to bend, to accommodate awkwardly both interests; in the next decade, a firm declaration of the Branch's position would be needed.

sawed-off

There was talk of Newfoundland having a national park even before it was part of the nation. The colony's Department of Mines and Resources hired American sportsman Lee Wulff throughout the 1940s to help develop sport tourism on the island, and Wulff encouraged the creation of what he called a national park.¹ When the Newfoundland National Convention met in 1946 to discuss the possibility of entry into Canada, its Transportation and Communications Committee also heard recommendations for a park from their publicity consultant (they were advised to talk to Robert Moses of the New York State Park Commission for assistance).² At the time, though, such planning seemed the most wishful of thinking. Tourism was practically non-existent on the island. There were very few accommodations throughout Newfoundland and only short, bad stretches of roadway, none of which crossed the colony. The Tourist Board resigned in protest in 1946, saying it could not work without government assistance. When the Board re-formed in the 1950s, it took the rather extraordinary (and self-abnegating) step of advising tourists away from Newfoundland, saying that the new province was just not ready for them.³

Newfoundland's entrance into Confederation made the creation of a national park much more feasible. Canada already had a strong national park system and a Parks Branch to find, develop, and maintain

¹ Lee Wulff, in Newfoundland Tourism Board, Annual Report, 1942, Reid Company papers, W. Angus Reid files, MG17 part 3, box 3, Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador [henceforth, PANL]. On tourism in Newfoundland, see Overton.

² J.K. Hiller and M.F. Harrington, eds., The Newfoundland National Convention 1946-1948, Vol.2 (St. John's: Memorial University of Newfoundland and McGill-Queen's Press, 1995), p.148.

³ See editorials, St. John's Evening Telegram, 1 June 1957, and 21 May 1959.

a park site. The federal government also had money to fund the project. When the Newfoundland delegation visited Ottawa in 1947 to discuss the terms of union, they included among their questions, "Would Newfoundland become entitled to a national park? Does the Department of Mines and Resources establish as well as maintain National Parks?" and perhaps most importantly "Approximately how much does the federal government spend in setting up a national park?"⁴ Happy with the answers, the delegation asked for a "definite statement"⁵ in regard to a park in the report on the working basis for union. Apparently, this agreement was not formally made, but the federal government assured Newfoundland that after Confederation a national park would be forthcoming.

Talks between St. John's and Ottawa continued after Newfoundland joined Canada in 1949. In December of that year, the province's Minister of Natural Resources Edward Russell asked that a number of potential sites be inspected.⁶ Though the province would be happy to discuss a number of sites, it was particularly favourable to a 35-square-mile section in the Serpentine Lake area near Cornerbrook on the west coast. It was already a well-known salmon fishing area with beautiful scenery, and it was hoped that as a national park it would attract more hunters and fishermen to the province (whether it was

⁴ Newfoundland, Report on Meetings Between Delegates from the National Convention of Newfoundland and Representatives of the Government of Canada, summary of proceedings and appendices, 25 June - 29 September 1947, pp.20 and 122.

⁵ Cited in J.R. Baldwin, Canadian Privy Council Office, to Keenleyside, 4 September 1947, RG84 vol.1942, file TN2 vol.1, NAC.

⁶ E. Russell, Minister of Natural Resources, Newfoundland, to Hon. Colin Gibson, Minister of Mines and Resources, Canada, 24 December 1949, RG22 vol.177, file 33.11.1, NAC.

understood that there would be no hunting in the park itself was not clear).

It may be seen as evidence both of the perceived importance of satisfying Newfoundland post-Confederation and of the National Parks Branch's unfamiliarity with the newest province that James Smart, the Branch Controller, himself chose to inspect the proposed sites. After a visit to the province in May 1950, he reported on his findings. First of all, he outlined the factors he had considered, primarily following the realtors' mantra of location, location, location. Any Newfoundland park should be accessible to Newfoundlanders themselves who would presumably be its most frequent visitors, it should be accessible to off-province tourists visiting by air or travelling along the Trans-Canada Highway which was in the process of being built, and it should disturb as little settlement as possible. As for its appearance, Smart simply stated, "it should be an area typical of the province, embracing sea-coast country, the habitat of indigenous wildlife, forest and fisheries, and with scenic values."⁷

Most of the sites investigated were unacceptable to Smart for one reason or another. The Salmonier area on the Avalon peninsula was not on the coast, the Placentia area also on the Avalon was too settled and lacking in wildlife. The Upper Burin peninsula was too remote. Serpentine Lake, the government's first choice, was not on the sea, was too small to sustain wildlife, and had too much privately-owned land. Only the suggested site on Bonavista Bay, 250 square miles enclosing all

⁷ Smart report, 1950, pp.2-3, RG84 vol.1942, file TN2 vol.1, NAC. In 1947, Smart had believed that a Newfoundland park should be 500-1000 square miles, but by 1949 he was to state, "we would not expect a very big area to be set aside...." See Smart to Gibson, 31 May 1947, *ibid.*, and Smart to Gibson, 11 January 1949, *ibid.*

of Newman Sound and running back beyond the Terra Nova River to the west, seemed acceptable. Though portions of it had been burned by fire in 1950, most of it was wooded and healthy. It was dotted with lakes and rivers and would be good moose and caribou habitat, if they were re-introduced to the area. The park site was on the proposed Trans-Canada route and its distance from St. John's was neither too great (which would make the park inaccessible to tourists) nor too small (which would restrict the focus of Newfoundland tourism to too small an area). The head of Newman Sound would make a fine headquarters area, being well-wooded, close to water, and sheltered. And as for the scenery:

The scenery from the point of view of spectacular and rugged terrain is not so pronounced as other areas, but the combination of land and sheltered waters and many islands shoreward is most attractive and what one would consider typical of Newfoundland. Probably there are more small boats in use in this section of the coast than in any other part of Newfoundland.⁸

Interestingly, Smart here chose to see the prominence of boats as evidence of the area's Newfoundlandness, rather than evidence that local inhabitants used and depended on the land. While this may suggest a disregard for those who would be dislocated by a park, Smart in fact offered a number of "special conditions" in their regard. Fishermen should be allowed to maintain camps on the park seashore, he suggested. Timber and wood permits for locals should be available. The Terra Nova River should remain open to log runs that began outside the park area, and the river should be considered for possible hydroelectric development to serve both park and community. These are much

⁸ Smart report, 1950, p.9, *ibid.*

greater concessions to past land use than any Smart had been willing to concede at Fundy National Park, and it is not clear what made the Newfoundland case different. Smart likely knew that all Newfoundlanders traditionally enjoyed liberal access rights to land, such as the right to shore up anywhere and take wood if needed for themselves or their boats, and that anyone could cut wood up to three miles in from the shore on Crown lands. Or perhaps he felt that the compensation paid to landowners at Fundy had not been sufficient to make amends for losing their land. In any case, Smart concluded his report by writing, "The above conditions would not be a detriment to the National Park but in most cases a benefit to Park administration through the cultivation of friendly and appreciative co-operation of the neighbouring settlements."⁹

Smart had noted that the park should be set aside even "If it is felt that the time is not opportune due to the international situation to allot funds for the initial development...."¹⁰ Just as Fundy National Park had been delayed by the Second World War, the Newfoundland park was delayed in the early 1950s by the Korean War and the arms build-up of the Cold War. As more and more money was poured into defense – in 1952, it made up 40% of the federal budget¹¹ – appropriations for other departments suffered. The Parks Branch, which was granted \$9 million in 1950, was allotted only about \$6.5 million each year until 1955. With increasing pressure on the park system due to an almost doubling of

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.17-18.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ See Canada, Department of Finance, Annual Report, 1953.

visitation during the same years, there were only enough funds to maintain existing parks and no opportunity for expansion.¹²

Nor was Newfoundland pressing for a park in this period.¹³ Premier Joey Smallwood, in his tenure as premier from 1949 to 1972, was entranced with the idea of Newfoundland's economic development, primarily by attracting foreign manufacturers and developers with provincial investment. His administration foolishly sank money time and again into foreign companies, only to have them go under or never even open in Newfoundland. Smallwood's memoirs, I Chose Canada, includes an entire chapter of failed business ventures (23 in all – 1 for each year in office) and concludes with a proud declaration of ineptitude: "But these 23 aren't even 10% of the total; they are only the most serious ones."¹⁴ Smallwood was too mesmerized by the thought of developing every bit of the province's hydro potential and forest resources to be in favour of a national park which would lock up a portion of the woods and water forever.

¹² For attendance figures, see Appendix 2. For expenditures, see Canada, Department of Resources and Development, Annual Reports, 1951-1954, and Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, Annual Reports, 1955-1957. As late as 1954, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent would state that though the Parks Branch should work in establishing the Newfoundland park, "It is not our intention to develop the park fully until such time as there is some diminution in the many demands now made on the Federal Treasury for defense purposes." St. Laurent to Smallwood, 3 February 1954, RG22 vol.177, file 33.11.1, NAC.

¹³ In late 1953, Premier Joey Smallwood wrote, "I agree that the time must come for us to have a National Park in Newfoundland, but my feeling is that the time is not yet. I see no particular rush, and feel that it would be better from every standpoint to wait for as long as perhaps two or three years before we ask the Government of Canada to proceed with the actual preparation of the park." Smallwood to St. Laurent, 24 December 1953, ibid.

¹⁴ Hon. Joseph R. "Joey" Smallwood, I Chose Canada (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1973), p.359. On Smallwood, also read Richard Gwyn, Smallwood: The Unlikely Revolutionary, 2nd ed. (Toronto and Montreal: McClelland and Stewart, 1972 [1968]) and Frederick W. Rowe, The Smallwood Era (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1985).

Yet two factors pulled park interests closer to Smallwood's developmental interests. First, the federal Department of Mines and Resources, renamed the Department of Resources and Development in 1950, was retooled again in late 1953 to become the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources. This second shuffle by Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent prefigured an increased developmental ethic within the ministry under the new leadership team of Minister Jean Lesage and Deputy Minister Gordon Robertson. Since the National Parks Branch was part of this department, it could expect to be caught up in the development drive. Second, the election of Jack Pickersgill as the M.P. for Bonaville-Twillingate in the summer of 1953 gave Newfoundland politics a bridge to the world of federal bureaucracy. Pickersgill had been the most influential civil servant in the country in the King and St. Laurent Prime Minister's Offices and later as Clerk of the Privy Council, and he had even entered Cabinet as Secretary of State in 1953. To the Conservative opposition this last move was the greatest proof imaginable that the supposedly non-partisan civil service was a Liberal stronghold, and Pickersgill's integrity was attacked in Parliament. When Smallwood came to Pickersgill to ask him to become "the Newfoundland minister in Ottawa", the son of Manitoba farmers jumped at the challenge. Since the proposed park was not only in the district in which Pickersgill was elected, but also part of Smallwood's provincial district, chances of its establishment improved considerably.¹⁵

¹⁵ On Pickersgill's place in the politics of the day, see J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1933-1957 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982), especially pp.207-225. Pickersgill describes the Ministry of Northern Affairs and National Resources shuffle in My Years With Louis St. Laurent: A Political Memoir (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), p.207, and his courtship by Smallwood beginning on p.181. Peter Neary notes that besides giving Newfoundland a stronger place

Though Joey Smallwood was wary of anything that stood in the way of development, he knew that with a national park came federal money. The Trans-Canada Highway was being constructed at the time, paid for on a 50-50 federal-provincial basis. As Pickersgill pointed out to the Premier,¹⁶ if the highway were to go through a national park, it would become a completely federal responsibility, and save the province twenty to thirty miles of highway costs. Smallwood asked St. Laurent if the Canadian government would agree to build the road before the park itself was established, and after some debate this was agreed to in principle, though roadbuilding would not begin until the park location was certain.¹⁷ Smallwood was so happy that the cost of this part of the highway would be taken off his hands that in a rush of good feeling he offered to extend the proposed park to the west and the north, making it

in the federal cabinet, Pickersgill (being from away) helped Smallwood both in that he was not a competitor for provincial leadership and relied on Smallwood for patronage. See Neary, "Party Politics in Newfoundland, 1949-1971: A Survey and Analysis," Newfoundland in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: Essays in Interpretation, eds. James Hiller and Peter Neary (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), p.218.

¹⁶ There is some question as to the order of events here. In his memoirs, Pickersgill states that in the summer of 1954, three local Liberals – his good friend Max Burry of Glovertown, Edgar Baird of Gander, and Willis Briffett of Glovertown – urged him to see that a park was established. He was reticent at first, but "What changed my mind was the realization that highways in a national park were a federal responsibility. I confess I saw the creation of a national park as a means of completing the highway across Newfoundland...." He recalls bringing Smallwood on board with this argument. See Pickersgill, pp.229-230. As my text shows, though, Smallwood already had this in mind in the winter of 1953; Pickersgill mis-remembers either the year or his own influence in the matter.

¹⁷ Smallwood to St. Laurent, 24 December 1953, RG22 vol.177, file 33.11.1, NAC. Assistant Deputy Minister C.W. Jackson noted that "The Trans-Canada Highway Act only authorizes the Minister to spend money on those portions of the Trans-Canada Act in National Parks." Jackson to Robertson, 11 January 1954, *ibid.* His superior Deputy Minister Gordon Robertson disagreed, saying, "I think we can distinguish between the establishment of the park in a legal sense and its establishment in the sense of carrying out the works that are normally done to provide facilities in a park." In other words, Robertson believed the ministry could defend spending money to develop land that was going to become a park, even if it was not yet one. Robertson to Lesage, 11 January 1954, *ibid.*

425 square miles in all. The Parks Branch declined the offer, thinking this extension unhelpful.¹⁸

It would seem that the provincial government was now ready to donate land for a national park, but the idea of losing valuable timber land still made it hold back. Smallwood's greatest dream was of a "third mill", a pulp and paper mill to make use of more of the province's forest resources and to bring in more tax revenue. The two existing mills owned by Bowaters and the Anglo-Newfoundland Development Company were privileged with the most agreeable long-term leases imaginable: they paid no income tax from logging, and paid only about \$.05 stumpage per cord, as compared to the rate of \$3.50 - \$4.25 in other Eastern provinces.¹⁹ Smallwood vowed that he would ensure better terms for Newfoundland in an agreement on a third mill, and he travelled the globe to find a company to start up the mill. The problem was that no company was willing – which would have led a less driven premier to suspect that businessmen thought it could not be profitable. But as Smallwood later recalled, "I must confess that as the years passed, my determination to build a third and a fourth mill increased as one concern after another failed to come through with a firm commitment to build."²⁰ The Premier's obsession meant that every tree in the province was seen as a potential offering to the third mill, and every tree preserved in a national park threatened to impoverish the province.

¹⁸ Lesage to St. Laurent, 26 January 1954, *ibid.*

¹⁹ Howard Kennedy, D. Roy Cameron, Roland C. Goodyear, Report of the Royal Commission on Forestry, 1955, (St. John's: Government of Newfoundland, 1955), p.47.

²⁰ In I Chose Canada, p.438, Smallwood lists a dozen international companies – some with no experience in pulp and paper – that he pursued.

As if to remind himself why Newfoundland would ever want a national park, in the fall of 1954 the province's Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources, P.J. Murray, wrote his federal counterpart, Gordon Robertson, asking him to re-cap the tentative park negotiations of the past five years. Why, again, was the Newman Sound site chosen? And what would become of park resources? Murray stated flatly that the Terra Nova River would have to be left available for hydro power, and if not it would have to be excluded from the park. He also asked whether "a forest management policy for the park woodlands based on the maximum sustained yield principle" could not be practiced in a park, to "lessen to some degree the disadvantages which we would suffer in passing over this particular area as a national park."²¹ In other words, could the park not permit forestry which would harvest mature timber at the same rate as natural regeneration? Robertson asked Director of the Parks Branch J.A. Hutchison's advice on these matters. Using the National Parks Act as his guide, Hutchison responded that hydro development could not be permitted in a national park, and if this meant the exclusion of the Terra Nova River, so be it; perhaps the province could be convinced to offer an alternative river system in the area. As for forestry, it "cannot be considered" in a national park.²²

Robertson had not asked just the Parks Director to comment on Murray's letter. He had also solicited the advice of Jack Pickersgill (who, not surprisingly, favoured development in Newfoundland over park inviolability) and that of the Canadian Forestry Service. This latter move especially demonstrates that the Parks Branch's theoretically

²¹ P.J. Murray to Robertson, 1 October 1954, RG22 vol.177, file 33.11.1, NAC.

²² Hutchison to Robertson, 15 October 1954, *ibid.*

autonomous management of parks was not in fact practiced. Because Northern Affairs and National Resources contained both the parks and the forestry agency, the ministry could rely on the advice of both and then come to its own policy decisions. Forestry Director D.A. Macdonald, understandably, saw the Newfoundland matter as a forestry rather than park issue, and thus felt that national park policies did not necessarily preclude sustained yield if it could be shown that cutting over-mature timber was to the good of the forest and the park in general.²³

Robertson's reply to Murray's letter offered a precedent-setting redefinition of national park management. "Under the [National Park] Act and Regulations," he wrote, "it would be possible to carry out a fairly extensive program of cutting in the interest of good forest management and protection." While Robertson clarified that this would depend on the forest conditions, that the trees would have to be selected and marked by park staff, and that cutting would be closely controlled to maintain the forest in a "substantially natural state," this nevertheless was a major concession.²⁴ It blithely offered a re-definition of park policy that could conceivably result in extensive forestry within a park, and did so in a way that suggested that such forestry would be a benefit to some parks. As well, the way this decision had been reached signalled a willingness to remove park policymaking from the Parks Branch and make it the responsibility of all branches of the Ministry, with the Minister and the Deputy Minister the ultimate arbiters.

Despite this concession, the province still balked at approving a national park. The government waited for word from the Royal

²³ D.A. Macdonald to Jackson, 21 October 1954, *ibid.*

²⁴ Robertson to Murray, 26 October 1954, *ibid.*

Commission on Forestry headed by Howard Kennedy, which had been called to explore the feasibility of a third mill. The Kennedy Report was released in the spring of 1955, recommending that a third mill (preferably one co-owned by the two present millowners, Bowater's and the Anglo-Newfoundland Development Corporation) be built on the eastern end of Newfoundland. The Report stressed that practically all of Newfoundland's forests would have to be available to supply such a mill. In the concluding paragraph of its Report, the Commission affirmed that in principle it was agreeable to a national park, but reminded the government that alienation of any land from forest or even hydro use could affect the third mill's chances.²⁵

What this meant to the national park plans was unclear. To Pickersgill, it was irrelevant, since the government had already agreed to allow timber cutting. The Western Star reported,

"I am anxious to stick the treasury here for the cost of that road all the way through the park," Honourable J.W. Pickersgill told the Western Star, "so naturally I am impatient at the delay." ... More recently the Newfoundland government has balked on the question of timber. There is no sound reason for the delay on the latter point, Mr. Pickersgill said, since the timber within the park would be open to commercial use, and would be managed by the Federal government at least as ably as the Provincial government could expect to manage it for itself.²⁶

²⁵ Kennedy, Cameron, Goodyear, p.186.

²⁶ Corner Brook Western Star, 21 March 1955. Pickersgill failed to mention that the planned agreement did not allow Newfoundland lumbermen to cut in the parks. Having read a number of such misleading press reports, Jean Lesage felt obliged to send Pickersgill a copy of Robertson's 1954 promise to Murray, underlining the important passages: "I should point out that any cutting under such a plan would have to be in accordance with the best forestry practices and would be done under the immediate control of the officers of the Park. It would be a cutting of trees selected and marked by Park officers." Enclosed in Lesage to Pickersgill, 8 September 1955, RG22 vol.177, file 33.11.1, NAC.

But the Newfoundland government understood that this was not quite what Canada had offered: no one had promised that commercial lumbermen could do their own cutting. When asked at a provincial tourism conference (by Pickersgill's friend in Gander, Edgar Baird) why the provincial government had not yet accepted Ottawa's offer of selective cutting in the park, provincial Minister of Mines and Resources Frederick Rowe stated that they were concerned that the Parks Branch might find this selective cutting expensive and pass on the high cost to the mill, making the park forests in practice unavailable.²⁷ The Kennedy Report validated the provincial government's belief that a national park would be a danger to development. Fearful of losing use of the Terra Nova River and its surrounding forests, the province announced it was excluding this drainage basin from any further discussion on the park.²⁸

Having failed to negotiate effectively at long distance, the federal government sent Gordon Scott, Chief Engineer of the Parks Branch, to St. John's to keep talks going. Scott's involvement at this point was invaluable from the Parks Branch perspective. Until now, it had been frozen, forced to respond to concessions and compromises made at the departmental level. Scott could ensure that the Branch remained a primary force in park decision-making. And he could turn the focus of the discussion away from deal-making and toward explaining to the Newfoundland government why, when it came to resource preservation, the parks had to be unyielding.

²⁷ "Report of Proceedings of Provincial Tourism Conference, 28 February - 1 March, 1955," p.12, Reid Company papers, W. Angus Reid files, MG17 part 3 box 3, file "Tourism 1953-1955," PANL.

²⁸ Hutchison to the Chief, 2 May 1955, RG84 vol.1942, file TN2 vol.2, NAC.

In a letter back to Ottawa and in a report that followed, Scott told of the "confusing and involved" factors that were slowing down talks: the fact that the proposed park was in both Pickersgill's and Smallwood's constituencies, plus the competing interests in hydropower, a third mill, the Trans-Canada Highway. Above all, Scott explained that when Smallwood and company thought of the Newman Sound area, they thought of the estimated 330,000 cords of merchantable timber. Scott wrote, "If I heard the phrase 'the economic development program' spoken once I have heard it a dozen times since coming here. They want the National Park, please don't misunderstand me, but the conclusions of the Kennedy report & the idea of a 3rd mill is the magic words to these people - much more so than a National Park."²⁹ To the province, there was no reason why a park and forestry could not co-exist. Scott disagreed. He told the Newfoundland government that though the federal ministry had promised some form of experimental forestry, the Parks Branch would not condone an out-and-out pulp operation. Scott was "most emphatic we would not tolerate any idea of controlled tree-cutting for pulp purposes in any Park. The Director of Forestry thought this was a dog-in-the-manger attitude" but Scott rejoined that they "want their cake and eat it too."³⁰ It is obvious in the correspondence that discussion between Scott and Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources P.J. Murray, a fierce opponent of the park, was especially unfriendly. Scott's report concludes, in fact, with the statement that

²⁹ Scott to Hutchison and Coleman, 14 May 1955, RG22 vol.177, file 33.11.1, NAC.

³⁰ Ibid.

Murray's attitude "seriously jeopardized" the chance that a park would be created.³¹

Scott, however, did his best to make something of their discussions. Against his superiors' wishes, he chose to scout out other sites and even drew up an alternative proposal that traded the head of Newman Sound and the Terra Nova River watershed for the Northwest River watershed to the west and south of the original boundaries. This extension, stretching down twenty miles to the woods behind Clarenville, would give the park salmon streams and caribou habitat missing from the area presently under discussion.³² Scott also tried to convince the Smallwood government that "I was not trying to be a salesman for the National Parks Service but I was simply pointing out what appeared to be erroneous thinking that any old area would do for a park."³³ He pleaded with Ottawa not to accept an "emasculated", second rate park: "If we were ever foolish or short-sighted enough to do so then the recrimination which would definitely be directed at us by both the Province and the public at large, would certainly be justified."³⁴

Chief Engineer Scott's report served to buttress the Parks Branch's opposition to politically-directed planning. Parks Director J.A. Hutchison, quiet throughout early negotiations, wrote his Deputy Minister with full support for Scott's findings and warning that "unattractive, indeed unacceptable, features are present either in the actual lands offered or in the reservation that the Province wishes to

³¹ Scott report to Coleman, p.15, *ibid.*

³² As Scott noted, "the caribou is the Provincial emblem and it would be somewhat ridiculous if we did not have a herd of these animals in the Park." *ibid.*, p.5.

³³ *ibid.*, p.9.

³⁴ Scott to Hutchison and Coleman, 14 May 1955, *ibid.*, and Scott report to Coleman, p.16, 21 May 1955, *ibid.*

couple with the offer."³⁵ But if the Branch position was now clear, it was also clearly antagonistic to provincial wishes. This left it little opportunity to negotiate further, and it allowed the federal ministry to behave as a mediator between its stubbornly idealistic Parks Branch and a development-minded provincial government.

The Trans-Canada Highway kept the Newfoundland government interested in the national park when nothing else did. By the fall of 1955, all of Newfoundland from Port aux Basques in the west to St. John's in the east had been connected by roadway, except for a 22-mile stretch from Alexander Bay to Bunyan's Cove – the proposed national park area. The province had purposely left this, waiting for it to become a federal responsibility once it was made a park. Smallwood did not want to wait any longer. He wrote St. Laurent, going over the many points of contention that were slowing the park establishment and asking that in the meantime Canada reimburse the province for a highway to be built in what would in the near future be parkland.³⁶ Saint Laurent agreed, on two conditions: one, that the Parks Branch be allowed to ensure the road fit its requirements; and, two, that the park be agreed to within the year. Smallwood accepted these conditions, but recognized the agreement was a gamble for him. On the one hand, it would save the province a considerable amount of money during a very trying time in the provincial economy.³⁷ On the other hand, the road committed him

³⁵ Hutchison to Robertson, 2 June 1955, *ibid.*

³⁶ Smallwood to St. Laurent, 31 August 1955, cited in RG84 vol.1954, file TN200 vol.4, NAC.

³⁷ As the Premier told the legislature, "the Government of Canada will reimburse us every cent we will have spent on that road and then proceed to pave it, then they will provide the maintenance at their own expense for ever, if it should be designated a National Park." Smallwood, in Newfoundland, House of Assembly, *Proceedings*, 1956, pp.1080.

to the park, and Smallwood – relying on the findings of the Kennedy Report – believed that the park would jeopardize the mill. As he told the legislature, "we regard the third paper mill as incomparably more important than a National Park."³⁸

Smallwood felt certain of this when the Jenkins Report, an assessment of the forestry potential of the park area paid for jointly by Bowater, Anglo-Newfoundland, and the provincial government, was presented in late 1955. Forester F.T. Jenkins had found that 60% of the proposed park was forested, containing about 384,000 cords of pulpwood. Though locals had cut from it extensively for decades, Jenkins concluded, "There does not appear to be any insuperable difficulties to logging this area if cutting is postponed for 25 to 30 years..."³⁹ This clinched it for Smallwood: the wood would be there, the wait did not bother him, and therefore the Newman Sound area could not be a park. The Premier wrote Pickersgill, "These facts certainly appear to rule out the possibility of our turning over this area for the purpose of the National Park, unless something can be done to assure the timber to the third paper mill. ... I think that any other course would be criminal." He left the problem for Pickersgill's "fertile brain."⁴⁰ Smallwood's reaction to the Jenkins Report is notable, because it demonstrates a longsightedness about the park land that the Parks Branch itself rarely exhibited. Whereas the Parks Branch saw its job as maintenance of the existing nature of a park, one day at a time,

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ F.T. Jenkins, Report on Forest Survey of the Proposed National Park Area, Bonavista Bay, Newfoundland (St. John's: Government of Newfoundland, 1955).

⁴⁰ Smallwood to Pickersgill, 28 December 1955, RG22 vol.474, file 33.11.1 pt.2, NAC. It is worth noting that this letter is in the park files: Pickersgill was sharing with the Parks Branch information and strategy being sent him by Smallwood.

Smallwood envisioned the area as it would exist 25 years down the road and planned accordingly. Of course, Smallwood's vision demanded that the area be preserved today, held in trust until its usefulness would be made manifest after a period of natural restoration.

For much of 1956, the federal and provincial governments did not discuss park establishment with each other, and it took Jack Pickersgill's fertile brain to keep the park idea alive. The Ottawan-turned-Newfoundlander acted as a go-between to accommodate the park mandate while satisfying the province's needs. He first suggested that the new park be conceived of as a sort of experimental forestry station.⁴¹ The Forest Service was brought in to consider this, but felt that though this might be possible it was unwanted. Its staff was already having difficulty maintaining a forest management program in Riding Mountain National Park which did not violate park regulations, and cutting in a park which was expecting strong visitation would be far more complex.⁴² What finally made the Terra Nova National Park a reality was a suggestion Pickersgill made to Deputy Minister Gordon Robertson after bumping into him in an office hallway in Ottawa. Pickersgill said that he was sure Newfoundland would accept the park if Canada confirmed Robertson's concession of 1954 to cut in the park, and extended this to say that if a third mill was built it could buy mature and over-mature

⁴¹ Cited in Robertson to Côté, 4 January 1956, *ibid.*

⁴² D.A. MacDonald to Côté, 7 February 1956, *ibid.* On timber extraction from Riding Mountain National Park, see Lothian, *A Brief History*, p.78 and Bella, p.37. Coincidentally, announcing in the House of Commons in 1954 the planned creation of a Newfoundland national park, Jean Lesage was asked about timber permits. R.R. Knight of Saskatoon recalled the parks recently getting into trouble for permitting a lumber company to cut extensively in Riding Mountain. "That's all over," Lesage replied. *Ottawa Citizen*, 28 January 1954.

timber up to the yearly growth of the park's forests.⁴³ Robertson took this suggestion to his Minister, Jean Lesage, who after some discussion accepted it, writing, "I think it would be possible to do something along these lines."⁴⁴ On 13 November 1956, Smallwood approved the federal offer and the park was all but created.⁴⁵

What made the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources agree to such heavy cutting in the park, which even Lesage said would "go further than anything we have done anywhere else"?⁴⁶ The most critical fact was that the ministry wanted the deal made, wanted the national park in Newfoundland as promised since before it joined Canada, and this seemed the only way to satisfy Smallwood's government. But as well, the agreement reflected dissatisfaction with present forestry policy in national parks. In a memo to his assistant, Robertson wrote,

As you know, there have been some growing doubts in the Minister's mind, as well as in our own, as to whether our present policy with respect to forest management in the parks is entirely satisfactory. There have been allegations that the spruce budworm is getting an increased hold in Cape Breton Highlands Park and there have also been suggestions of disease in Yoho Park. While the objective may be to retain the parks in their natural state, I do not think this means that we have to refrain from taking measures that will maintain the forests in as healthy a condition as possible. There is no question but that we will be severely

⁴³ Robertson to Jackson, 3 October 1956, RG22 vol.474, file 33.11.1 pt.2, NAC; and Lesage to Pickersgill, 17 October 1956, *ibid.* This was not Pickersgill's own equation: Smallwood mentioned it as early as 28 December 1955 in a letter to Pickersgill, *ibid.*

⁴⁴ Lesage to Pickersgill, 17 October 1956, *ibid.*

⁴⁵ Pickersgill to Smallwood, 22 October 1956, 3.25.00, J.R. Smallwood Collection, Centre for Newfoundland Studies Archives. Smallwood to Lesage, 13 November 1956, RG22 vol.474, file 33.11.1 pt.2, NAC.

⁴⁶ Robertson to Jackson, 3 October 1956, *ibid.*

blamed if the "natural state" in Cape Breton Highlands, say, after a few years, is one of dead forests.⁴⁷

This is to some degree a rationalization: there is no indication that forest policy for Terra Nova would have been any different than at other parks if Newfoundland had not demanded it. Nevertheless, it suggests that the department had qualms about a belief in preservation that called for a completely hands-off approach.⁴⁸

The Parks Branch had no opportunity to defend its policy, or to voice its reaction to the policy being thrust upon it. In fact, it was not even the first group consulted on it. The Forest Service's D.J. Learmouth was called in to estimate the proposed park area's annual growth and decide how it could be cut in a way that would not detract from the scenery – in fact, so that tourists would not be aware of it. Learmouth found that the yearly growth was about 12,000 to 15,000 cords; thus it would be impossible to limit forestry operations to segments of the park. Nevertheless, he was optimistic that one could maintain a timber operation that was "beautiful in the truest aesthetic sense." He wanted the department to understand, though, that

A project which frankly attempts to reconcile large scale commercial exploitation with the preservation of the forest and other values in a condition suitable for a National Park has not, to my knowledge, been attempted on an area of this size before; certainly not in North America. This experiment - and experiment it will be - will certainly attract the attention of Park authorities, foresters, and others concerned with National Parks and the management of forest lands on a world-wide basis. Its success or failure could have considerable influence on future development policies of National Parks both in Canada and in other countries. This

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Park policy on vegetation will be discussed more fully in Chapter 8.

in itself is no reason for not proceeding with such a project....⁴⁹

Learmouth's claims to science are somewhat disingenuous. This project was experimental only in the sense that it was untried. It did not arise from a carefully and independently made decision to test whether this degree of forestry should be tried in all parks. Learmouth and the department ignored Forestry Director D.A. MacDonald's report of earlier in the year which both rejected the idea of mixing parks and forestry and stated that Terra Nova's small stands and shallow roots would demand clearcutting if forestry did go on.⁵⁰

What is clear in the correspondence is that no one knew what intensive forestry in this proposed national park would mean. Would it cost the park millions of dollars each year to operate a cutting operation, hurt tourism, weaken the image of parks nationwide, and harm the ecological integrity of the parkland? Or would it prove a precedent-setting merger of parks and forestry, help the Parks Branch deal with overmature trees, beautify the park, and open up a source of revenue to all Canadian parks? No one knew, and the department rationalized its gamble by stating that the problem might be moot: there might still turn out to be so much wood in Newfoundland that the park forests would not be needed, or conversely not enough wood in Newfoundland to justify a third mill being built.⁵¹ But the department was absolutely unwilling to make this forest policy a precedent. When Newfoundland deputy minister Murray asked for a formal agreement on

⁴⁹ D.J. Learmouth, Forestry Engineer, Department of Northern Affairs and Natural Resources, to Coleman, 28 December 1956, RG22 vol.474, file 33.11.1 pt.2, NAC.

⁵⁰ MacDonald to Côté, 7 February 1956, *ibid.* MacDonald felt that selective cutting on shallow soil would only result in windfall.

⁵¹ See, for example, *ibid.*

the matter, he was told there was "no question whatsoever of any contractual relationship in this matter."⁵² When Murray pressed, Lesage responded, "I do not think we could cover the forest policy question in any more precise fashion without risking the whole future not only of the Newfoundland Park but of all the forested National Parks across Canada."⁵³ This is hardly a vote of confidence in the policy.

What is striking is the utter lack of participation by the Parks Branch at this vital stage of park creation as the federal and provincial ministries, with Pickersgill greasing the wheels, worked out a deal. Though Smart helped locate the park site in 1950 and Scott ensured that worries about the proposed park were expressed in 1955, the Parks Branch had neither the opportunity nor the arena to voice its opinion of the conditions that were being placed on this park establishment. The only firm stand the Branch could and did make was to forbid any clearcutting in a national park it was overseeing: selective cutting, even if it was more expensive, was the only method the Parks Act and Regulations would permit. This declaration was directed at Lesage as much as to the Forest Service or the Newfoundland government, in that it served to remind the Minister that the agreement he had made would potentially involve the Parks Branch (and thus his ministry) in a heavy annual expense.⁵⁴

One might think that Newfoundland would be generous following Canada's accommodation to the third mill. After all, Smallwood more than anyone had needed the park to go through quickly: the federal

⁵² C.R. Granger, Private Secretary and Executive Assistant of Pickersgill, to Murray, 22 January 1957, *ibid.*

⁵³ Lesage to Pickersgill, 28 January 1957, *ibid.*

⁵⁴ See F.A.G. Carter memo, 4 February 1957, *ibid.*

payment for the section of Trans-Canada Highway was contingent on his ability to establish the park within the year. Columnist Harry Horwood wrote in the St. John's Evening Telegram that Pickersgill was the province's man of the year for "bailing the Newfoundland Government out of an extremely embarrassing financial situation (The local boys had built a strip of highway in the park area; the contractors were hammering on their door for payment, and there wasn't a solitary quid left in the treasury to pay them. Now this road, and all others in the park, will be financed by Ottawa)." ⁵⁵ But although the Smallwood government may have breathed a sigh of relief, it did not become a more giving negotiator. In drafting the land transfer, the province chose to present the land in two parcels, with the provision that the smaller one, "Schedule B", be withdrawn by the federal government if the province later needed it for hydro development; the federal government accepted this. ⁵⁶ As well, P.J. Murray announced that the North West Brook watershed, proposed by G.L. Scott as a replacement for the Terra Nova watershed, was itself needed for waterpower. After some argument, Lesage relented and excluded the watershed from the proposed park, saying only that if in the future Newfoundland realized it did not need it, "the area could always be added to the Park at any time the provincial government asked that this be done." ⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Harold Horwood column, St. John's Evening Telegram, 27 December 1956, p.4. Pickersgill was also feted for getting unemployment insurance extended to fishermen.

⁵⁶ See Lesage memo, 5 April 1957, RG84 vol.1942, file TN2 vol.3, NAC; and Lothian, A Brief History, p.118. This interference with the notion of park inviolability will be discussed further in Chapter 7.

⁵⁷ Lesage to the new Newfoundland Minister of Mines and Resources W.J. Keough, 28 January 1957, RG22 vol.474, file 33.11.1 pt.2, NAC. On whether to include the North West Brook watershed, see Murray to Hutchison, 17 December 1956, RG84 vol.1942, file TN2 vol.2, NAC; and Robertson to Murray, 4 January 1957, ibid.

Should one read this as naïve or sarcastic? Throughout the establishment proceedings, the Newfoundland government made it clear that their ideal national park was one which contained no marketable natural resources whatsoever. From Smart's initial estimate of a necessary 500-to-1000 square-mile site, the province whittled the 250 square-mile area he proposed down to a final 150 square miles. The federal government had even conceded to a provincial request to swing the Trans-Canada close to the coast (to accommodate communities like Charlottetown), in violation of the Trans-Canada Highways Act which demanded that roads go in as straight a line as possible between well-populated areas. In return, Newfoundland moved the park's western boundary closer to the coast, knowing that the park would still enclose the highway.⁵⁸ The new park designed to be typical of Newfoundland scenery contained no noteworthy salmon streams, river systems, or caribou country.

Though the federal government for a variety of reasons chose to capitulate to provincial wishes on so many fronts, an especially important factor was the countdown to a federal election in the spring of 1957. The Liberals in Ottawa and the Liberals in St. John's wanted what they had discussed for several years and considered for a decade to bear fruit. As the election call got closer, Ottawa became more conciliatory, and Smallwood's hedging became an even better strategy for getting what he wanted.⁵⁹ In his memoirs, Pickersgill remembers the 12 April 1957

⁵⁸ Pickersgill went to federal Minister of Highways Robert Winters in 1955 and had him permit the longer route. Scott to Hutchison, 8 November 1955, *ibid.*

⁵⁹ Scott, for example, wrote a note to Hutchison that began, "Since time is obviously a factor in proclaiming a park area...." Scott to Hutchison, RG22 vol.474, file 33.11.1 pt.2, NAC. The House of Commons *Debates* in which the park agreement is announced hints at the importance of the coming election. Lesage notes, "the boundaries have now been

proclamation of Terra Nova National Park because it was "the last day in the life of that Parliament. I was pleased. I was even more pleased after 10 June 1957, because I doubted if the new Conservative government would have established a national park in my constituency."⁶⁰

To the different players in the park creation, the new Terra Nova National Park⁶¹ represented different things. To the Smallwood government, the park was 384,000 cords of merchantable timber held in trust. To Pickersgill, it was security that his new riding would remain faithful to him for elections to come. To the federal dealmakers, it was proof of the success of federalism, a national project to help a beleaguered provincial economy. To the Evening Telegram, it was "A Disappointment" according to their headline the day after proclamation. The editor wrote,

The Newfoundland national park, according to latest Canada Press reports, has been cut in area from the original 400 or more square miles to 150 miles on either side of the proposed transinsular highway. The effect of the reduction in area will be to destroy a great deal of the park's value as a wildlife refuge, a place for scientific study and for holiday recreation. We can only guess what motives are behind the move. We know it springs from the Provincial, not the Federal Government; and it is most likely connected with the old "third mill" dream that our current crop of dreamers refuses to allow to die. It is a pity that out of Newfoundland's 160,000 square miles a mere 400 or 500 could not be found somewhere for conversion into a national park without putting our whole industrial future in jeopardy. ... Their attitude has been that they'd be delighted to set aside an area for a national park provided the Federal

defined, and I expect that a formal agreement will be signed between this government and the government of Newfoundland within the next 10 or 15 days." An opposition member asked, "Before the election?" and Lesage retorted, "We work on this side, we don't lose time trying to play tricks." Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 8 April 1957, p.3234.

⁶⁰ Pickersgill, p.230.

⁶¹ The Newfoundland government named the park the day it was proclaimed. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 12 April 1957, p.3467.

Government would allow them to build a pulp mill right in the middle of it, or open a mine, or start several saw mills, or build dams and canals for a hydro-electric development.⁶²

To the National Parks Branch, the new park was of uncertain value, smaller than originally planned, with a timber policy that might soon make the park a clearcut with picnic tables. But the Parks Branch had no chance to voice displeasure: as part of the national parks system, Terra Nova was to be idealized to the same extent as any other park. In official literature, the new park was of different but equal value to Banff, Prince Edward Island, or Cape Breton Highlands. Years later, when longtime Branch staffer W.F. Lothian wrote of Terra Nova's establishment in the commissioned A Brief History of Canada's National Parks, he did so in his usual crisp, non-judgmental fashion, neither defending nor protesting how this park creation was brought about. However, he ended his piece with what would be the longest quotation of a primary source in his book: he reprinted the Evening Telegram editorial referred to above, letting the editor make his criticism for him.⁶³ The National Parks Branch may have been concerned about its latest member, but it had to put on a brave public face and proceed with park development.

hammered-down

Expropriation was an even more straightforward exercise in Terra Nova park than it had been in the first three Maritimes parks. Almost all of the park land either was owned by the Crown or was part of the Reid Newfoundland Company holdings, given at the turn of the century

⁶² St. John's Evening Telegram, 12 April 1957.

⁶³ Lothian, A Brief History, p.118.

to the company as part payment for building the colony's railroad. Even before the park was proclaimed, the Smallwood government was able to convince Reid's to trade park land for equivalent land elsewhere on the island. Other than this, there was very little Terra Nova land actually owned by locals and apparently none that was inhabited.⁶⁴

That is not to say that there was no human presence. A number of local communities depended a great deal on the land in the new park for their livelihood, though no one lived there. As was noted earlier, Newfoundlanders enjoyed a traditional right to cut from Crown land up to three miles from shore, which would include just about every square inch of what was to become park land. Much of the park area had been extensively lumbered for up to three quarters of a century.⁶⁵ In fact, in the 30 years before park establishment, many people in the area switched from fishing to lumbering because it offered a higher standard of living.⁶⁶ Wood along the Terra Nova River had been cut for pitprop and shipped to England since early in the century. Commercial operations along the head of Newman Sound began in the same period, with lumber shipments headed to St. John's. The King family of Eastport used Minchin's Cove as a base for operations throughout the northern part of Newman Sound; from Bread Cove on Clode Sound, the

⁶⁴ The Newfoundland government did not give a breakdown of park expropriation costs in its yearly public accounts, as Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island had done to varying degrees. In the 1958 Annual Report of the Department of Mines and Resources, there is reference to \$4338.42 spent on national park land assembly (p.175), in 1959 another \$200 spent on the same item (p.162), and in 1960 \$22,000 on expropriation (p.98). This final figure is for expropriation in the entire province, and it is unclear how much, if any, concerns the park.

⁶⁵ See Major, pp.49-61.

⁶⁶ W.C. Wilton and H.S. Lewis, "Forestry Problems of the Bonavista Peninsula Newfoundland," Forest Research Division of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Development, Technical Note #26, 1956, RG84 vol.1942, file TN2 vol.2, NAC.

Spracklins of Charlottetown worked north to meet them. Bread Cove, in fact, had about two dozen year-round residences until the 1940s. And the community of Terra Nova itself, inland and seven miles beyond the new park, was the eastern point in the Anglo-Newfoundland Development Corporation's supply route, hauling wood from the vicinity to the company's pulp and paper mill at Grand Falls. At park establishment, the Newfoundland government estimated that there were 15 sawmills relying on the forests of the park land, producing about \$60,000 of total output and employing 40-50 men.⁶⁷ Ten years later, it was concluded that at establishment there had in fact been 17 sawmills, and nearly 120 men dependent on forestry.⁶⁸ The government's low original estimate may be attributed to the fact that these small-scale seasonal operations were tucked in out-of-the-way places and easy to overlook, and perhaps also to a government unwillingness to make park usage an issue. The park was also used by families in communities from Port Blandford in the south to Eastport in the north to obtain their firewood and other wood needs.

So even if no one lived in what was to be Terra Nova National Park year-round, many still worked there, and for many it was a second home. Small sawmilling operations like the Kings' hired a half dozen men or so to go to the woods in the winter, and kept a couple on over the summer.⁶⁹ Clayton King remembers most of his family moving to

⁶⁷ Murray to Robertson, 2 October 1957, RG22 vol.474, file 33.11.1 pt.3, NAC.

⁶⁸ ? to Flanagan, 9 November 1967, RG84 vol.1954, file TN200 vol.3, NAC. Don Spracklin, who operated a sawmill in Bread Cove, told me that at park establishment there were 53 men on his payroll alone. He estimated there were 14 operations working out of Charlottetown alone (though many of these would be getting their wood from outside the park area). Interview with Don Spracklin, Charlottetown, 18 August 1994.

⁶⁹ An excellent social history of Newfoundland logging is Dufferin Sutherland, "The Men Went to Work by the Stars and Returned by Them": The Experience of Work in the

Minchin's Cove to cut and saw timber from November to May while he stayed in school in Eastport. He would only see his parents at Christmas and Easter, when he travelled up to the Cove to visit. His future wife Mildred spent one summer up Newman Sound herself, babysitting her sister's child.⁷⁰ The winter homes at Clode and Newman Sound were spartan affairs, made warm with a single wood stove and sawdust insulation. It was understood that the little communities were temporary, and no one took the trouble of keeping a school or church going. But for at least part of the year the park area was inhabited; Mark Lane guesses that at times there seemed to be as many living up in Newman Sound as back home in Eastport.⁷¹

When the park came in, the lumbering economy was in something of a decline, a victim of its own success. With more sawmills working around Newman and Clode Sound, there was more competition for the same wood and, to some, not enough wood to make lumbering worthwhile. The King mill at Minchin's Cove ceased operation around 1950, as did the mills at Bread Cove. Clarence King told me that his father stopped sawing because the area they traditionally used was worn out and all the woods nearby was spoken for. He planned to wait eight or ten years for some natural regrowth, and begin work again.⁷² However, other businesses found there was still wood if one was willing to work at getting it. The Lane mill at Big Brook continued cutting, while the Squires began sawing at Piss-a-Mare Brook (at the present-day park

Newfoundland Woods During the 1930s," Newfoundland Studies, vol.7 no.2 (1991), pp.144-172; as well as his "We Are Only Loggers": Loggers and the Struggle for Development in Newfoundland, 1929-1959," Ph.D. thesis, Simon Fraser University, 1995.

⁷⁰ Interview with Clayton and Mildred King, Sandy Cove, 19 August 1994.

⁷¹ Interview with Mark Lane, Eastport, 17 August 1994.

⁷² Interview with Clayton King, Sandy Cove, 19 August 1994.

wharf on Newman Sound), as did Don Spracklin at Bread Cove. There is nothing to suggest that either forestry or the forests would not return just as strong.

Though the staff of the Parks Branch were well aware of the area's past forest use, upon park establishment they referred to Terra Nova as if it were virgin territory. There is never a sense in the park files either that the Branch felt it was getting damaged goods, or conversely that it was saving a forest from exploitation. In his 1950 report, James Smart made no mention of the forests except to say that fire had denuded some sections, yet the photographs that accompany his report plainly show lumber stacked on the shore. In his 1955 trip to the proposed site, engineer G.L. Scott was told by his guide, a woods foreman with 40 years experience, that "the proposed park area had been logged over by the local people for the past 75 years and he could not understand how anyone could possibly conduct an economic pulp or saw lumber operation in the park area."⁷³ This did not suggest, though, to either Scott or his superiors, that one could not conduct a park there. When Forestry Director J.D.B. Harrison inspected the park after it was created, he found that only 10% was mature growth and 90% was either young or very young growth. This was a young forest, most of the mature and

⁷³ Scott to Hutchison, 8 November 1955, RG84 vol.1942, file TN2 vol.2, NAC. The Parks Branch also was aware that the Jenkins report had found that "Practically all parts of the proposed Park area have been logged for saw-timber, and sometimes for poles or pit-props. Those sections close to settlements have been heavily cut to small diameter for firewood." There are handwritten stars on the Parks Branch copy of the Wilton and Lewis report where it is written, "Devastating forest fires in the past and reckless exploitation by man had caused a decrease in the area on which merchantable timber could be expected to develop even under intensive silvicultural care. The productive forest lands remaining have been subjected to such intensive cutting for sawlogs, fuelwood, and other forest products that most stands are in deplorable condition." (p.3) – although it should be noted that this refers to the eastern end of the Bonavista peninsula, not the western end of which the park area could be said to be a part.

overmature timber having already been cut down or burned by fire.⁷⁴ The Parks Branch was well aware that it was adopting an area that could not possibly be considered wilderness, that was in fact the product of its long interaction with humans. But the prominent natural effects of human industry could be ignored because there was no sign of permanent occupation and very little evidence of any human presence. Thus when the park was just coming in, Parks Director Hutchison could confidently write that the first work crew would be "starting from scratch in a completely undeveloped area..."⁷⁵

The Parks Branch was in fact pleasantly surprised with its new ward's appearance. Parks Director J.R.B. Coleman wrote that he found Terra Nova National Park "a much more attractive area than I had imagined..." and Deputy Minister Robertson – who had been instrumental in shaping the park but who had never laid eyes on it – wrote that he was "very agreeably surprised by the area and the possibilities in the national park. For some reason I had expected that it would have a good deal less attractiveness and less possibility for development than it seems to me to have."⁷⁶ (Would he have gone about negotiations differently if he had known?) Chief Engineer Gordon Scott stated, "It is really beautiful and with careful planning it is our opinion it will be the best National Park in the east."⁷⁷ What each man found beautiful and felt should be the basis of development was what he

⁷⁴ J.D.B. Harrison, Director, Forestry Branch, to Deputy Minister, 29 November 1957, RG22 vol.474, file 33.11.1 pt.3, NAC. "Mature" is defined as over 80 years of age, "young growth" as 41-80 years.

⁷⁵ Hutchison to Robertson, 12 April 1957, RG84 vol.1944, file TN28 pt.1, NAC.

⁷⁶ Coleman report, 7 August 1957, RG22 vol.474, file 33.11.1 pt.3, NAC; and Robertson to Coleman, 7 October 1960, RG22 vol.1097, file 311.1 pt.1, NAC.

⁷⁷ Scott to Hutchison, 28 May 1957, RG84 vol.1944, file TN28 pt.1, NAC.

each independently called its "Maritime theme", presumably the look of its forested hills tapering down to calm, dark inlets. Branch staff were so content with the new park that they wished there were more of it: what complaints there were concerned its relatively small size, whittled down through political interference.⁷⁸

More so than at the other parks studied, the Parks Branch was concerned that development would change what was presently pleasing. Robertson wrote, "As I know you are well aware, administrative problems, forestry problems and aesthetic problems will all have to be taken into consideration in choosing sites for buildings, in determining road locations, and so on."⁷⁹ This was an obvious caution, but one that it was now felt needed to be voiced. The great concern was overdevelopment. The Parks Branch was much more involved in overseeing park development at Terra Nova than it had been in the first Eastern parks, a reaction to what had gone on in the building of Fundy, as I will document in Chapter 8.

There was purposefully less intrusion on the natural landscape at Terra Nova and simpler construction using less expensive materials. The Parks Branch staff did not simply put contractors to work at Terra Nova, they ensured that it was done without ensuing destruction. As early as August 1957, Scott was already cautioning the contractor about over-

⁷⁸ As Coleman wrote, "The 150 sq. mile area now comprising Terra Nova National Park is not large enough to properly represent a typical section of Newfoundland. It contains no salmon stream nor does it contain tundra areas for the support of wildlife native to the Province such as caribou. I agree with Mr. Scott that we should have the balance of the area between the west Park boundary and the CNR railway which contains the Terra Nova River and probably an additional area of about 150 sq. miles in the vicinity of Maccles Lake west of the CNR." Coleman report, 7 August 1957, RG22 vol.474, file 33.11.1 pt.3, NAC.

⁷⁹ Robertson to Hutchison, 17 April 1957, *ibid.*

zealous tree-cutting.⁸⁰ A year later, Coleman had a similar criticism and demanded that the contractor improve the look of an area which had been roughly bulldozed.⁸¹ Park developments were also to be simpler. As mentioned earlier, the clearest demonstration of this was that the tourist cabins were built not only to be part of their natural surroundings but also to be of unelaborate design. The Parks Branch even chose not to build all of them right away, since tourists were not really expected in great numbers until at least the early 1960s.⁸² As well as being a philosophical and aesthetic choice, simplicity was determined by economics. In the late 1950s, visitation to national parks across Canada was beginning to rise rapidly and park finances were straining to catch up. It made sense to spend cautiously on new developments.⁸³

Most significantly, at Terra Nova the Parks Branch refrained from setting up the recreational facilities that had traditionally been the heart of new national parks. It was decided that there would be no immediate development of a golf course, and that a heated pool was unnecessary with the sea so close by. Newfoundlanders familiar with the amenities found at other parks were, not surprisingly, upset. The St. John's Evening Telegram lobbied for a heated pool and letters to the

⁸⁰ Cited in Scott to Hutchison, 28 May 1957, RG84 vol.1944, file TN28 pt.1, NAC.

⁸¹ Coleman to G.B. Williams, Chief Engineer, Development and Engineering Branch, Department of Public Works, Canada, RG84 vol.1944, file TN28 pt.2, NAC.

⁸² Coleman to Robertson, 24 December 1957 and 11 February 1958, RG84 vol.1943, file TN16.112, NAC.

⁸³ Robertson wrote to Charles Granger, Deputy Minister of Highways for Newfoundland that there was very little money to fund winter work at Terra Nova in 1957 because there had been high traffic through the parks system that summer. 17 September 1957, RG22 vol.474, file 33.11.1 pt.3, NAC. That same winter, Newfoundland sent the Parks Branch a bill for \$15,797.47 for fire protection at Terra Nova, as they had agreed. The Branch responded seeking a few clarifications, but an internal memo notes, "This letter is really a polite stall. ... there was no money provided for this work - we were depending on a surplus developing and none has! We can't pay till the new fiscal year starts." F.A.G. Carter to ?, 12 March 1958, RG22 vol.1097, file 311.1 pt.1, NAC.

editor cried for pools, ski runs, stadiums, and so on.⁸⁴ The Gander Parks and Playgrounds Association along with the town's Chamber of Commerce petitioned for a golf course for the park, saying, "'there is absolutely nothing to do there."⁸⁵ Even some within the Parks Branch and ministry quietly agreed. Recommending that the Parks Branch reconsider its rejection of the horseshoe pitch and shuffleboard that the cabins' concessionaire had offered, Deputy Minister Robertson argued, "there is a serious need for some recreational amusement amenities of a modest kind and of an outdoor character in the park."⁸⁶

Superintendent Atkinson suggested that "At the moment we are like the artist who concentrated too much on the frame for the picture, and did nothing about the picture" and called on "every device known to our planners" to make Terra Nova extraordinary.⁸⁷ But the Parks Branch resisted such demands, explaining that they had a real opportunity to plan this park and wanted development there to proceed slowly. Park staff were beginning to view recreational development as detrimental: it meant a sizeable initial investment and a perpetual draw on park funds from then on, and it detracted from the park's preservationist aims.

While there was some dissatisfaction with the lack of permanent recreational development, the scale of work at Terra Nova in the first years of the park quieted most complaint. As early as April 1957, the

⁸⁴ See editorial, *St. John's Evening Telegram*, 8 July 1960, and "Resident of Glovertown," 7 February 1962. "Resident" wrote, "These developments would attract the summer tourists and give some enjoyment, much more enjoyment than just lying around in a cabin or tent with nothing to do."

⁸⁵ E.P. Henley, President, Gander Chamber of Commerce, to Dinsdale, 23 January 1962, RG84 vol.1097, file 311.1 pt.1, NAC.

⁸⁶ Robertson to Coleman, 7 October 1960, *ibid.*

⁸⁷ Interim Annual Report, Atkinson to Chief, 21 January 1960, RG84 vol.1952, file TN112 Year Vol.1, NAC.

Parks Branch was preparing to hire for park development. The Parks Branch was proud of its employment record in the following years, for keeping as many as 250 men at work in the summer months. Even in winter, park projects that were little more than relief work were organized to maintain a year-round federal presence, though they were known to be inefficient.⁸⁸

To local communities, however, it was not only a matter of how many were hired, but from where. This was a concern at all four parks studied here, particularly Cape Breton Highlands, Prince Edward Island, and Terra Nova, where a number of communities bordered the park. To the people of Traytown, Charlottetown, Port Blandford, and the other little communities that surrounded Terra Nova, who had depended on the park forests for their livelihood, it was sufficient sacrifice just accepting the park's existence. They saw the new park jobs as their right, and saw anyone hired from elsewhere as taking a job from a local boy. The Parks Branch, the federal ministry, and the provincial government all wanted locals to be hired: it was simplest, it fostered good relations, and it acknowledged what all groups saw to be an obligation.⁸⁹ The difficulty was that according to federal employment regulations, skilled

⁸⁸ A report to Scott noted that 25 carpenters were employed to build houses for park staff in the winter. "They have avoided laying off men during the winter but it has meant employing them uneconomically. Where we are trying to work closely to building estimates we cannot afford to keep men on when there is no work for them and either we lay them off or we take into account the additional cost when the project is finished. ... There is very little work to be found outside of the Park and it is very understandable that people should not be too willing to adopt labour-saving procedures, or that the men should work their hardest to finish a job when they know they will be laid off at the end of that job. This I think explains to a great extent the amount of time taken on each of the jobs." J.E. Wilkins to Scott, 19 June 1958, RG84 vol.1944, file TN28 pt.1, NAC.

⁸⁹ Pickersgill told the House of Commons in 1961 that hiring locally had been agreed to by all parties at establishment. "The provincial government asked for this assurance because they felt they were more or less taking away the livelihood of these people in establishing the park. They wanted to be sure that no hardship was effected." Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 10 May 1961, p.4627.

men had to have at least a high school education, and many of those who had gone to the woods at an early age did not. Though skilled work was available now to locals, the more permanent jobs would not necessarily be given or even made available to them. As well, politicians did not share Newfoundlanders' own definition of the term "local". The editor of the St. John's Evening Telegram zeroed in on the problem when he wrote, "Many of those hired during the present building phase are from outside Newfoundland, and recently local men were passed up in favour of a group from Bonavista, which is so far away from the park that the people there regard it as being in a different world."⁹⁰

Even among the communities surrounding the park there was fierce competition for jobs. Charlottetown was most affected by the park – the park completely surrounded the town, and cut it off from traditional sources of wood – and its citizens expected jobs as compensation (indeed, that was what many believed the park was for). Jack Pickersgill and Joey Smallwood assured the people of Charlottetown, probably during the 1957 election campaign, that they would be the first to be offered park jobs. Parks Director Coleman understood the special obligation owed Charlottetown, and suggested that the park favour the little village in recruiting seasonal labour.⁹¹ Yet this plan was not fulfilled. Though workers were hired from communities all around the park, the central hiring area became Glovertown and Traytown, just north of the park. Pickersgill had a house in Traytown, and he relied on his friend Max Burry of Glovertown to find suitable (Liberal) employees. When the Liberals lost federally, the Conservatives chose their own man,

⁹⁰ St. John's Evening Telegram, 16 December 1957.

⁹¹ Coleman report, 7 August 1957, RG22 vol.474, file 33.11.1 pt.3, NAC.

Carson Stroud of Glovertown, to advise on hiring. Stroud, without a federal seat to protect, was even less likely than Burry to hire from outside his region, and so most jobs went to people in and around Glovertown. Pickersgill complained in the House of Commons that Stroud was a newcomer to the area, and suggested that the clergy be sought for employment advice instead.⁹² When the Liberals were returned to power in 1963, Pickersgill forgot his own advice; on the advice of Park Superintendent Doak, he submitted a list of names, organized according to village and hiring preference, to the National Employment Office in St. John's.⁹³

In coming years, relations between park staff and local residents would be strained by the promises made by politicians in this period that the park would provide jobs for all, for life. At all four parks studied here, expropriatees and local residents spoke of such assurances. Often these reminiscences are hazy, and sometimes seem to have been heard secondhand. But at Terra Nova there is more evidence that such promises were given. A number of residents recall Smallwood and Pickersgill flying in by helicopter to deliver a speech, and promising jobs. There is also reference in the park files to the Branch having to renege on

⁹² Pickersgill stated, "I was sorry to hear, as most of my constituents who live in that area were, that the minister felt it necessary to seek the advice of a gentleman who came to live in that community after the national park was established as to the qualifications of people who had lived there all their lives." Alvin Hamilton defended Stroud as "a leading citizen in the area ... highly regarded" adding that "The only previous advisor of whom the department is aware was Captain M. Berry [sic] who is, I believe, a personal friend of the hon. member for Bonavista-Twillingate, and any additional information will have to come from him in that regard." Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 2 July 1958, p.1825; 14 August 1958, pp.3536 and 3558; 18 February 1959, p.1149. On his friendship with Max Burry, see Pickersgill, pp.202 and 226.

⁹³ Doak to Coleman, 9 September 1963, RG84 vol.1954, file TN200 vol.3, NAC. To his credit, when Pickersgill was given a list of "our key men that we would like to keep," he told Doak that "some of them were opponents of his, but regardless they should not be laid off or replaced."

promises made "by individuals, not at present responsible in the Dominion Government, but who were responsible for the formation of the area as a National Park."⁹⁴ The Parks Branch in Ottawa became so accustomed to deflecting locals' complaints about employment that they wrote a new superintendent,

The problem you are having with men coming to your Park stating that their livelihood has been taken away has been faced by Mr. Atkinson since he took over. For your information I am attaching two copies of letters which are the only commitments that were ever given from this Department to the Government of Newfoundland.⁹⁵

Perhaps local residents should have been more savvy, and understood that the core of development would take place in the first few years and necessarily decrease thereafter. But the Parks Branch did little better in thinking of the park's long-term effects on local employment. In 1957, Robertson felt free to say that thanks to the new park, employment was up in the area; as early as 1960, with most development completed and locals still clamouring for jobs, Superintendent Atkinson thought that it should be explained – to the people of Charlottetown in particular – that most of the necessary work was done: "Conditions at this time are very much better than they ever will be, and yet we receive many complaints."⁹⁶

As in the cases of the earlier Atlantic parks, this new national park offered the people of the area the hope of work, albeit impermanent. Just as many of the men had long travelled to the woods in search of a sawmiller, they now travelled to the park. On the eve of the first winter

⁹⁴ ? to ?, 31 August 1959, RG84 vol.1944, file TN28 pt.2, NAC.

⁹⁵ Strong to Doak, 9 March 1960, *ibid.*

⁹⁶ Interim Annual Report, Atkinson to B.I.M. Strong, 21 January 1960, RG84 vol.1952, file TN112 Year Vol.1, NAC.

of park development, 30 to 40 men showed up from as far as 150 miles away, looking for work. The engineer in charge could do nothing for them but take their names and send them home.⁹⁷ Hundreds, according to Pickersgill, sought him out about work, and though the Branch tried to keep on as many people as possible, they were expressly told by their Department not to let Terra Nova become a relief project.⁹⁸ Complaints spilled into the newspapers, as in one letter whose writer maintained, "If there is no work this coming year, I fear the United Nations will have another problem to cope with and they might even have to send an emergency force to clear it up."⁹⁹ It never came to that. The park was hiring people, and complaints like these were one way of encouraging it to hire more. Even the Conservative-leaning Evening Telegram's Harry Horwood was willing to admit that Terra Nova National Park was looking to be "one of the best 'new industries' started in Newfoundland since Confederation."¹⁰⁰ (This, a cynic might say, was a competition with few entries.) In fact, it proved "how valuable even a sawed-off, hammered-down, chopped-up national park can be to a province."¹⁰¹

But to many people of the region, this park that had promised so much growth now seemed to be a great deal of unused land and a few hired labourers. Sitting talking with me at his home in Eastport, Clayton King spoke quietly, "A lot of people thought it was going to be a major

⁹⁷ Carter to Robertson, 4 December 1957, RG84 vol.1944, file TN28 pt.1, NAC.

⁹⁸ Coleman [?] to J.D.B. Harrison, 2 December 1959, RG84 vol.1949, file TN60 vol.1, NAC.

⁹⁹ Selby Moss, Allied Aviation Ltd., letter to the editor, St. John's Evening Telegram, 18 December 1957.

¹⁰⁰ Harry Horwood editorial, St. John's Evening Telegram, 28 December 1957.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

industry, but" and trailed off. I waited, and finally asked, "Tourism, you mean?" "No no no," he said. "Employment in the park. But that didn't materialize."¹⁰²

chopped-up?

Superintendent at Terra Nova J.H. Atkinson reported to Ottawa in early 1960 that he had had visitors. He wrote,

I was approached by 25 men from Charlottetown with a request for work immediately. When we were unable to give them work they asked for timber permits. Since all the men concerned were on Unemployment Insurance, we did not consider it necessary to issue them permits, and so stated. The men then stated that they would enter our timber lands on the following Thursday in a body to cut timber with or without a permit.

Atkinson relented somewhat, giving permits to those who used to work on this land, and who were now cutting for personal use. He decided to advertise for permit applications from Charlottetown residents. "The response to this call was very startling, since we did not receive even one application. The whole point is that the timber angle is used to get work, and very few if any, are really interested in timber permits."¹⁰³ This incident nicely reflects the different ways that local residents and the Parks Branch regarded timber cutting at Terra Nova. To the people of the area, the woods were a way of supplementing income, obtaining their family's wood needs, and keeping busy. It seemed logical that if the park was not prepared to offer employment in its place, men should be free to use the woods in the traditional manner. Atkinson, however,

¹⁰² Interview with Clayton King, Sandy Cove, 19 August 1994.

¹⁰³ Interim Annual Report, Atkinson to B.I.M. Strong, 21 January 1960, RG84 vol.1952, file TN112 Year Vol.1, NAC.

thought that to local residents timber was just an "angle", a way to gain leverage with the park. He could not accept that unemployment insurance benefits did not adequately replace traditional forest use, nor could he comprehend that locals might simply find the forest of government bureaucracy something to avoid. Atkinson's reaction above all signals the Branch's larger paranoia about threats to the Terra Nova forest. From 1957 on, the Parks Branch worked to fulfill the needs of locals who had lost their traditional use of the woods, while waiting nervously for word from the Newfoundland government that a third mill was on the way, and that logging should begin in the park.

More so than at either Fundy or Cape Breton Highlands, the Parks Branch was prepared to allow cutting by dispossessed locals at Terra Nova. This may seem somewhat ironic, considering that in this case those who had lost access to the woods had not even owned them, but perhaps this was in one way considered grounds for more largesse: most of the men who had worked on parkland had not been compensated for it. More likely, the Parks Branch was coming to understand not only that past landowners had a right to satisfactory compensation, but that happy locals made for a smooth-running park. James Smart had directed the establishment of Fundy National Park and saw firsthand how non-owners dependent on park land were left out of remuneration. By 1950, in his first evaluation of Terra Nova, Smart insisted that local residents should be permitted to continue to cut for their own use.

Though there was no discussion of locals' cutting rights during park planning, when the park was first established the Parks Branch allowed local lumbermen to continue their work, under supervision.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁴ After consultation with the Parks Branch, Deputy Minister Robertson informed the

During development, sawmillers were allowed free salvage from any clearing being done, and for additional supply they were given permits for wood in out-of-the-way areas.¹⁰⁵ Special preference was given to those who had made their living lumbering in the park prior to establishment. Wardens were even told to look the other way when it was discovered that a mill in Minchin's Cove was still in operation.¹⁰⁶ No further action was taken while the Parks Branch waited for the Forestry Service to set up a management plan that would decide which mature, out-of-the-way timber should be taken.

The park staff's concern about the amount of wood local residents would demand turned out to be groundless. In 1959, only 16 permits were sought and granted, for about 40,000 fbm (board feet) and 17 cords fuelwood. In 1960, this dipped to only five permits for 3550 fbm and 10 cords, and by 1961 only three Charlottetown families were applying for timber permits, totalling 36,000 fbm. In the years to follow there were never more than 10 timber permits sought.¹⁰⁷ By 1967, a report on logging in Terra Nova National Park stated that "the situation is well under control and there is no harm done to the park."¹⁰⁸

Newfoundland government, "I would not think that the volume of cutting would be such that these interim arrangements could cause any real harm to the long-range program, even if the cutting pattern in the interim period does not happen to follow the final plans as worked out." Robertson to Granger, 17 September 1957, RG22 vol.474, file 33.11.1 pt.3, NAC.

¹⁰⁵ Robertson to Murray, 28 October 1957, *ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ Warden H.T. Cooper to Lothian, 11 October 1957, RG84 vol.1954, file TN200 vol.1, NAC.

¹⁰⁷ For 1959, Annual Report, Atkinson to Strong, 1 June 1959, RG84 vol.1952, file TN112 Year vol.1, NAC. For 1960, Interim Annual Report, Doak to Strong, 23 January 1961, *ibid.* For 1961, Annual Report, Doak to Strong, 14 April 1961, *ibid.* The later estimation is given in ? to Flanagan [?], 9 November 1967, RG84 vol.1954, file TN200, vol.3, NAC. One thousand fbm scaled by the International 1/4" Log Rule of logs cut from 8" trees form a pile of stacked wood measuring three to five cords. Therefore, the most wood cut from the park was somewhere between 120 and 200 cords, in 1957.

¹⁰⁸ *ibid.*

Superintendent Atkinson's claim that locals had no real interest in lumbering was not accurate. A variety of factors made sawing in the region, and particularly within the park, less and less practical. In the late 1950s, it became increasingly difficult to find a market for lumber, and stockpiles began to grow. Labour difficulties also affected the provincial industry in this period.¹⁰⁹ But closer to home, the park regulations on timber permits hampered local woodsmen and convinced many of them to give up on the woods. Permit holders were expected to pay a price of \$6 per 1000 board feet, and though the Parks Branch apparently did lower this,¹¹⁰ it was still a new charge for lumbermen. By the early 1960s, the park had forbidden any cutting along the coast – where it could presumably be visible to touring boaters – and set aside a timber block off the road on the way to the town of Terra Nova. This site offered space for 400,000 fbm of saw logs to be clearcut, but it was far from the usual cutting zones, required loggers to dispose of slash, and worst of all was unreachable by water. As the Parks Branch well understood, lumbermen who traditionally floated their logs along rivers were now forced to sell timber along the road or have it trucked to the mill.¹¹¹ If this discouraged loggers and sawmill operators, so be it. In some of the Parks Branch's discussion, it is clearly believed that the park would be of great benefit if for no other reason that it would force the local citizenry to reject their outmoded lifestyles and to join the 20th century.¹¹² As Parks Director Coleman noted,

¹⁰⁹ See Sutherland, "We Are Only Loggers."

¹¹⁰ This was discussed in Robertson to Murray, 28 October 1957, RG22 vol.474, file 33.11.1 pt.3, NAC.

¹¹¹ Coleman to Robertson, 2 January 1963, RG84 vol.1954, file TN200 vol.3, NAC.

¹¹² There is a large literature on underdevelopment and modernization theory in Atlantic

Generally speaking the sawmill industry in this area is made up of a large number of very small, out of date sawmills which produce very low quality lumber. Financially, their operations are marginal at the very best. They are, in fact, prime examples of the uneconomic and wasteful timber-using practices the Government of Newfoundland is quietly attempting to discourage in the province.¹¹³

In 1963, four lumbermen were caught defying park regulations and cutting on their own along the coast of Clode Sound near Charlottetown. Having initially ignored cutting in the new park, the Parks Branch now felt confident enough to press charges. The men were convicted, and a strong statement had been made to defend the park from traditional cutting practices.¹¹⁴

Don Spracklin, who had been the main sawmill operator in Charlottetown at Terra Nova's establishment, and his son Larry spoke to me about the problems the park had created for the family business. Don remembers having 53 on the payroll at park creation, but he could not find people to hire let alone wood to cut, once the park came in. Don knows irony when he sees it. He wryly points to Spracklin Pond on a map of the park, named for his family but now a place he cannot fish without a permit. He feels that the guarantees of jobs and concessions that came with park establishment were never fulfilled. Smallwood, he remembers, flew in to Charlottetown and ensured its people that "the

Canada. See Gary Burrill and Ian McKay, eds. People, Resources, and Power: Critical Perspectives on Underdevelopment and Primary Industries in the Atlantic Region (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press for the Gorsebrook Research Institute, 1987); and Robert J. Brym and James Sacouman, eds. Underdevelopment and Social Movements in Atlantic Canada (Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1979).

¹¹³ Coleman to Robertson, 30 April 1963, *ibid.*

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

timber's in the bank," still available to people of the area. Now, Don Spracklin just laughs, "Well, they lost the combination."¹¹⁵

What Spracklin and the people of the park area never realized was that Smallwood's plan for the park never included their cutting of it. If timber was in the bank, it was sitting there gaining interest for the third mill. At a provincial forestry conference in early 1964, an audience member asked Smallwood why cutting was so much more limited in the park than outside it. Smallwood evinced surprise that any cutting was going on at all. According to Superintendent Doak, sitting in the audience,

Mr. Smallwood replied that Terra Nova National Park is the only National Park in Canada where any cutting will be permitted at all. Through negotiations, permission was obtained for the Government of Newfoundland to cut the annual increment in the Park to be used only for a third paper mill. This is the only wood allowed to be cut under the Laws of Canada. Park authorities have not the right to issue permits to cut. ... The Premier also stated "I realize that the Park was cutting and thinning in order to beautify the Park", but he did not know that they were issuing permits to cut timber and that he would investigate the matter.¹¹⁶

Later, Doak talked to Keough, Minister of Mines, Agriculture, and Resources for Newfoundland, who concurred that "We do not want those people in there hacking away at the Park."¹¹⁷ The Parks Branch was surprised by this broadside; it had not considered that the province

¹¹⁵ Interview with Don Spracklin, Charlottetown, 18 August 1994.

¹¹⁶ Doak to W.W. Mair, Chief, National Parks Branch, 18 January 1964, RG84 vol.1952, file TN132, NAC.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.* This continued to be the Newfoundland position up to 1967 at least, according to ? to Flanagan [?], 9 November 1967, RG84 vol.1954, file TN200 vol.3, NAC, which states, "the Newfoundland Minister of Mines & Resources has stated he wishes to keep logging and sawmilling by small enterprise out of the Park and considers the timber as a growing asset for the third pulp mill. The Premier of Newfoundland has stated in public that the timber reserves in the Park are available to the Province for this purpose."

might see the park timber agreement as superseding National Park Regulations on timber permits. And it had never expected that the Newfoundland government would want to take cutting privileges away from its own people. The Parks Branch chose to quietly continue to grant timber permits to those locals who met park regulations, particularly those who had worked in the park previous to park establishment. And why not? The locals' needs were small, and their claim to a small part of the large park seemed reasonable. It was the shadow of the third mill that hung over the future of Terra Nova's forests.

Part 2

A Pious Hope

The men are unspoilt by comfort yet they are free
of the necessity of having to exploit nature.
They enter nature rather as a swimmer,
who has no needs to cross it, enters a river.
They play in the current: In it and yet not of it.
What prevents them being swept away are time-honoured rules
to which they adhere without question. ...
the rules always establish calm, as locks do in a river.
Such men feel like gods because they have the impression
of imposing an aesthetic order upon nature
merely by the timing and style of their formal interventions.

– John Berger

G

Chapter 7 Accommodations and Concessions: Use in Four Atlantic Canadian National Parks, 1935-1965

When the proposed National Park Act was under discussion in the House of Commons in 1930, Conservative member George Gibson Coote complained that the bill's wording was unnecessarily grand. Why was the old clause that the parks "shall be maintained and made use of ... for the benefit, advantage and enjoyment of the people of Canada" replaced with the "high sounding" statement, "The parks are hereby dedicated to the people of Canada for their benefit, education, and enjoyment"? And more than this, Coote said, "... I do not think it is possible for us to control the actions of future generations. Just how we are going to administer and take care of these parks and leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations, it is rather difficult to see." Minister of the Interior Charles Stewart rose in reply: "Does my honourable friend think there is any very great difference between the old section and the new? In both it is a pious hope. I would not care very much if you wiped both of them out. I do not think either section will do much harm or much good to the national parks."¹

This was a fitting christening for the National Park Act. For its entire history, the Parks Branch has depended on a public acceptance that it, more than any other governmental body, has a philosophy which transcends short-lived administrations.² The parks are always to

¹ Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 9 May 1930, p.1943.

² There has never been need, for example, of a well-defined and publicly-accepted

be parks, and to be unchanged. Thus in 1930 the Branch hoped that a carefully-worded statement of purpose, tightly balancing preservation and use, would ensure its own success at keeping parks unimpaired, while providing for the benefit, education, and enjoyment of Canadians. But the Minister of the Interior, ultimately responsible for implementing the Act, understood that a rigid philosophy would necessarily bend to changing situational concerns and philosophical perceptions. Stewart was right to call the Parks Branch's plans to marry perfectly preservation and use "a pious hope", just as it was necessary that the Branch try to marry them.

To this point, my thesis has focused on the acquisition and early development of Atlantic Canada's first four national parks. Each park has been viewed as the Parks Branch saw it at the time: as pure potential, ready to be transformed into whatever vision of a national park the Branch thought appropriate at the time. The following two chapters will examine the policies designed and implemented day-to-day between 1935 and 1965, after this initial period of detached abstraction. This chapter will focus on use, understood as any human demand on the parks, and will focus particularly on tourism (with special reference to its relationship to class and discrimination), business concessions, and resource extraction. It will describe the complicated ways in which questions of use could compromise principles of preservation (defined as any action designed to maintain a given park in as natural a state as possible), leaving to the next chapter a detailed consideration of the formulation of policies on wildlife, fish, and vegetation.

Though "preservation and use" is a handy phrase to express the two-sided mandate of the national parks, this should not be taken to imply a dichotomy. After all, the two were never meant to be mutually exclusive; both were to be fully realized. Nor were they necessarily in contradiction; as goals, they may complement or not even affect one another. For example, a reintroduction of a species to a park area might be seen as an act of preservation which need not reflect on park use. Expansion of a park hotel would affect use, but might not in itself change the park's ability to preserve nature. That "use" seemingly had greater importance in a given period of Canadian park history does not in itself allow us to conclude anything about the weight attached to "preservation" nor about general attitudes toward nature.

Here, rather than relying on a stark "use/preservation" dichotomy, I will trace a more complicated story, of a Parks Branch that was more likely at some points in its history to emphasize one goal or the other, yet which sought to pursue both goals simultaneously. As the next two chapters will make clear, in the mid-1930s to the mid-1940s the Parks Branch took a relatively "hands-off" position, with little interest in actively managing park preservation and little money to develop park use. After the war, the Parks Branch became much more active in both preservation and use. The ecological science of the time encouraged the government's experts to become more managerial, and a more interventionist state offered them unprecedented funds to do so. Likewise, greater funding for public works and a North American culture which promoted recreational democracy meant increasing development for tourist use. By 1960, however, the public was growing concerned about human destruction of the environment – including that found in

parks – and the Branch had begun to question the logic of its own past interferences. As a result, the Parks Branch pledged a more passive management style for the future. However, with visitor use climbing precipitously and the nature in national parks under greater threat than ever, it is not surprising that a clash over the question of intervention resonated through the Canadian park system in the 1960s. The Parks Branch in the 1960s would have to decide not only which style better managed preservation and use compatibly, but which better represented the agency's philosophy to the public.

Cape Breton Highlands, Prince Edward Island, Fundy, and Terra Nova serve as excellent cases studies of Canadian national park policies on preservation and use in this period. These parks maintained the same regulations, depended on the same scientific and planning experts, and adopted the same practices as the rest of the park system. But more than this, as new parks they were not fettered by the management decisions of past decades: they were given the most up-to-date ideas to adopt. This in turn resulted in constant discussion between Ottawa and its people in the field over how best to interpret and implement these changes in philosophy. The following two chapters cannot claim to be an exhaustive examination of preservation and use in the Canadian national park system from the 1930s to the 1960s, because they do not cover all the parks. Nevertheless, they can be said to offer reasonable conclusions on the directions taken by the Parks Branch to make these seemingly incompatible responsibilities compatible.

parks for profit

Park historian Leslie Bella begins her discussion of Atlantic Canada national parks with the statement, "Every one ... was a park for profit."³ Each was created to first draw in federal development dollars and over the long term give focus to its province's tourism industry. Having defined the parks in this way, Bella gives the first four Atlantic Canada parks only a single page in her history of the park system. In the process, she misses a significant part of their story. She fails to mention, for example, that these parks were to be preserved from normal resource use; surely if they were only parks for profit this would not have been the case. Above all, Bella misses the point that national parks were always meant to be used. Flora and fauna benefited from the mandate of preservation, but the mandate of use ensured that the human species did not miss out. And because so much of our society's activity is regulated by capitalism, it is not surprising that these parks, and all others, would be parks for profit.

This chapter examines the ways that human use affected the management of the first four Atlantic Canadian parks. Use, like preservation, was a part of every moment of the parks' existence, making a day-to-day record of it impossible to chart. Instead, I will focus on issues that in particular reflect on the meaning of the parks, and the ability of the Parks Branch to translate that meaning. The chapter begins with a broad discussion of tourism, the most evident park use. Of special interest here is how the Parks Branch changed the ways it sought to promote the parks, depending on its understanding of society's wants

³ Bella, p.128.

and the parks' ability to satisfy them. This is followed by a short section on how, having sold the parks as cultured destinations, staff dealt with cases of discrimination. The next two sections deal more specifically with the parks' relationship to the economy. The first discusses the arrangements made to entice concessionaires to do business within the parks. The second discusses another sort of concession: the Parks Branch's inability to protect the parks from private enterprise and provincial governments' infringements on inviolability. The chapter concludes with the collision of use and preservation in the mid 1950s as the result of overcrowding and overdevelopment in the Canadian parks.

Canadian national parks have at various times and places been used as timberland, mine sites, laboratories, and work relief camps. But they were not primarily created with these functions in mind; parks were first and foremost to be used as tourist attractions. It was hoped that visitors would come to parks to admire the splendour of nature, and take in the spiritual, educational, and health-giving properties it possessed. In doing so, visitors would also stimulate the Canadian and local economy. This had been the case ever since Banff Hot Springs had been reserved, and Sir John A. Macdonald had suggested the spa would help "recuperate the patients and recoup the Treasury."⁴ But in understanding parks, it is essential to recognize that tourism had more than just an economic value: it did not just financially justify parks, it psychologically justified them. Preservation was a gift Canadians gave themselves, proof they were civilized enough to leave a parcel of nature free from resource extraction, even though so much of their society was founded on seeing nature's value solely in economic terms. But for the

⁴ Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 3 May 1887, p.233.

country to take credit for this benevolence, visitors had to see the parks. Without the promise of people travelling to the parks to see scenery and wildlife, there would have been insufficient human use of them to justify a national park system.⁵

Canadians' fixation on American tourists is a wonderful example of how the desire for tourism transcended economic matters. True, there were solid, financial reasons for seeking American tourists. The United States provided a huge market that Canadian tourism promoters had yet fully to exploit. The dollars brought by American visitors were injected directly into the Canadian economy, whereas inter-Canadian tourism just saw money change hands. Thus Cape Breton Highlands and Prince Edward Island parks were justified in terms of drawing not just tourists, but American tourists, and Fundy's site was chosen in part because it was far enough from the U.S. border that American visitors would have to travel across much of New Brunswick to reach it. But financial considerations are insufficient to explain the Parks Branch's special eagerness to attract and please Americans. For example, the license plates occasionally depicted in Parks Branch publicity photos were usually American. One magazine article on Fundy National Park even commented explicitly on this emphasis on Americans: "As indicated by the licence plate on their car the campers are from somewhere in Ohio, USA." as if readers of the Canada-West Indies Magazine would be impressed.⁶ The Saint John Telegraph Journal,

⁵ Of all the parks created before the 1960s, only Wood Buffalo National Park on the border of Alberta and the Northwest Territories could be said to have no real potential for attracting tourists.

⁶ "Fundy National Park: Canada's Newest National Playground," Canada-West Indies Magazine, vol.91 no.6 (June 1951), no pagination.

reporting on Fundy's grand opening, carried a photo of an average New York family under the headline "Good Neighbours Visit."⁷ The inconsistent calculation of attendance figures⁸ makes it difficult to know how important American tourists really were to these parks, but it seems clear they were never more than a significant minority. Early Prince Edward Island park statistics show that 20% of those who signed at Dalvay and Green Gables in 1940 were American, though this dropped down to 3% later in wartime.⁹ As Fundy became better known to tourists, it reported a rise in Americans from about 10% to 25% of total attendance in the 1950s. Still, it is unlikely that the Telegraph Journal was accurate two years later when it reported that Fundy's visitors were "mostly from the US."¹⁰ Such enthusiasm for Americans is perhaps the one strand that ran through the tourism history of the four parks discussed here. As late as 1961, Terra Nova Superintendent Doak would

⁷ Saint John Telegraph Journal, 31 July 1950.

⁸ It was well-known within the Parks Branch that attendance figures were crude and calculated in different ways throughout the system. In 1955, Director Hutchison noted, "At Fundy Park, vehicles are stopped at the Lakeview and Alma entrances to the Park and recorded together with the number of passengers. ... At Cape Breton Highlands National Park, vehicles are recorded at the Ingonish and Cheticamp entrances and the number of passengers estimated at 3 persons per car. ... At Prince Edward Island National Park, attendance figures are compiled from registrations at Dalvay House and Green Gables plus the estimated number of visitors to the Cavendish, Brackley, and Stanhope sections of the Park." Hutchison to Jackson, 28 October 1955, RG22 vol.470, file 33.2.43 pt.1. Branch staff felt that statistics for Prince Edward Island National Park in particular were grossly inflated, because it had so much day-use by Island beachgoers. This was no doubt true, and in the 1960s helped make P.E.I.'s park the second most visited in the park system. From the Branch's point of view this was not "real" tourism since it brought so little money into the economy. However, local visitors put just as much strain on the park's natural features as anyone else. They would be less likely to have an impact on cultural artifacts such as hotels and campgrounds.

⁹ Annual Reports, PEINP files. Record of the number of arrivals through the park gates was also kept, and Americans made up only 7% of these in 1940. This suggests the importance of day-use by Prince Edward Islanders, who would not visit Dalvay or Green Gables, and instead head straight for the beach or the golf course.

¹⁰ Saint John Telegraph Journal, 6 December 1961. For Fundy tourism statistics, see RG84 vol.1036, file F121.13 vol.2, NAC.

deem it noteworthy to report that the new campsites were being used "but to the best of our knowledge no Americans were staying there."¹¹

By studying the Parks Branch's approach to tourism through time, then, one learns more than just the economics of tourism: one can better understand the agency's sense of itself and the parks under its care. Though theoretically everyone was a potential visitor, Branch staff sought to attract tourists whom they imagined would enjoy the parks. They also chose sites and buildings they hoped tourists would consider appropriate. But such a judgment was necessarily rooted in the tourism of the time, and tourist preferences tend to be fickle. By tying park policy to something as intangible and changeable as public taste, the Parks Branch was guaranteeing that the parks would become dated. When that happened, staff would have to decide to what extent revamping the park facilities to attract tourists was justified, considering that the parks were supposed to be preserved unchanged.

As has been discussed earlier, Cape Breton Highlands and Prince Edward Island National Parks were designed in the 1930s to have crossover appeal. They would have the trappings of a seaside resort — development centred on their beaches, a large Victorian hotel — so that well-off tourists would be enticed to come. Wooing the wealthy was how national parks had always been sold. But because these parks would be so much closer to the Eastern seaboard population base, because the automobile was expanding the tourism base for parks, and because nature in these parks was in itself considered insufficient to attract the discriminating tourist, developments were also planned to entice the less well-off. Prince Edward Island's Dalvay was selected, as has been noted,

¹¹ Doak to Strong, 5 October 1960, RG84 vol.1944, file TN36, NAC.

since it "Would attract best types of people and when they get to go there, will attract others."¹² Cavendish would prosper when mass followed class, as was certainly expected to occur. Although the Parks Branch toyed with the idea of building entertainments suited to the middle class, staff chose to rely on traditional, more upper-class park facilities. The most important of these were golf courses, which were considered compulsory for national parks in this period because golf was the most enjoyed outdoor sport of white, male, middle-age, middle-to-upper class Canadians – including, notably, James Harkin, Thomas Crerar, and James Smart.¹³ The first Maritime parks were also given bowling greens and tennis courts, because they too spoke of outdoor, upper-class entertainments. Conversely, the Parks Branch forbade "Coney Island" recreations that spoke too openly of lower-class culture. The only part of the park seen specifically as a middle-class attraction was the beach itself, but it was acceptable because it was natural.

The decision to attract less wealthy tourists changed the way the parks were envisioned. During the war and up to about 1950, Canadian national parks in both the East and West were commonly referred to in publicity as "playgrounds". In Canada's Maritime Playgrounds, the Parks Branch's publicist Robert J.C. Stead introduced this concept by explaining that "national parks are playgrounds on a gigantic scale; they are areas in which forest, lake and landscape are preserved in their natural beauty; where wild bird and animal life is protected from the

¹² "Notes re PEI park" – unsigned [Harkin? to Wardle?], RG84 vol.1777, file PEI2 vol.1 pt.2, NAC.

¹³ For Harkin and Smart's love of golf, see Lothian, "James Bernard Harkin," p.10, and Lothian, A History, vol.4, p.20, respectively. In the 1950s, Crerar's correspondence with ex-Nova Scotia Premier Angus L. Macdonald consisted almost entirely of golf. See Thomas Crerar papers, Acc.2117, Series 3, Box 122, 1945-1950 file, Queen's University Archives.




Figure 12. Playgrounds of Eastern Canada cover.
Photo of Fundy National Park headquarters. From Playgrounds of Eastern Canada (Ottawa: Resources and Development, c.1950).

'arch-predator', Man; and where the peace and quiet of hill and valley are conserved against the noise and confusion of this clamorous age."¹⁴ How these qualities made parks like playgrounds is unclear,¹⁵ but the underlying intent is not: this was a move to bring the parks down to a scale familiar to urban, presumably middle-class visitors. By highlighting what made the parks familiar rather than distinct, the Parks Branch signalled a willingness to become accepted by a mainstream audience.

This is attributable to the continent-wide rise of what might be called recreational democracy, a belief that recreation time, including a yearly vacation, was a right that everyone needed and deserved. In the postwar years, recreational democracy became reality for middle class North Americans, born out of economics and technology. A strong economy and a quickly rising standard of living gave North Americans unprecedented wealth and opportunity for leisure time. Automobiles were within family budgets, and the public road system was being greatly expanded and improved in the 1950s, with work under way on the Trans-Canada Highway and the U.S. interstate system. The technologies of tourism – everything from ice coolers to recreational vehicles – were both improved and less expensive. Besides greater opportunity for recreation travel, there were simply more potential travellers: the baby

¹⁴ Stead, no pagination.

¹⁵ In Parliament, Conservative M.P. Douglas Hazen chastised the use of the term: "The minister says that these parks are created as playgrounds; surely they are created for more than that. Are they not created as a place where game can be preserved and conserved? Are they not, in some instances, provided as protections for watersheds? Are there not a number of other reasons for their establishments? To say that they are created merely for purposes of playgrounds is surely limiting their use to an extent to which it was never intended they should be limited." Hazen, in Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1941, p.2015.

boom meant larger families were taking vacations. Tourism grew by about 10% per year across North America during the 1950s.¹⁶

The National Parks Branch saw itself as ready to meet this demand. The park system, in fact, was understood to have been a pioneer of the notion of recreational democracy, and to be an intrinsic part of its success. In Playgrounds of Eastern Canada, a booklet published in the early 1950s, it is said,

the National Parks fulfil a fourfold purpose. They are conserving the primitive beauty of the landscape, maintaining the native wildlife of the country under natural conditions, preserving sites memorable in the nation's history, and serving as recreational areas. Their value in the last category becomes more apparent each year, for they provide in ideal surroundings, unequalled opportunities for outdoor life.¹⁷

It made sense that the author would draw special attention to recreation. It was the great social equalizer, not demanding an aesthetic sense, compassion towards animals, or a knowledge of history. And it was becoming increasingly important to the park idea. Even by the time Fundy was created in the late 1940s, it was no longer considered necessary to develop the park with luxuries expressly favouring the wealthy. It did not need the sort of cultural associations the earlier Maritime parks had provided, nor a scenic drive or a resort-style hotel. Instead, Fundy was designed around a single recreation development area. The Parks Branch did not conceive this as a lowering of standards,

¹⁶ This is a quite well-documented period in the history of North American tourism. See, for example, Alexander Wilson, The Culture of Nature: North American Landscape from Disney to the Exxon Valdez (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1991), esp. pp.28-33. See also Shirley Maye Tillotson, "Gender, Recreation, and the Welfare State in Ontario, 1945-1961," Ph.D. thesis, Queen's University, 1991. Tillotson shows that recreation was an unheralded but important part of the new state in the 1950s.

¹⁷ Canada, Department of Resources and Development, Playgrounds of Eastern Canada, no date.

but rather as a simple realization that far more people could now achieve those standards. The Branch's dream, harkening back to James Harkin, that the public at large would enjoy the parks was in the process of being realized.

As historian Lary M. Dilsaver says of the American case, "Incessant promotion of parks as valued destinations and places almost holy in America's splendid landscape convinced the public."¹⁸ Evidence suggests his words apply equally well to Canada. Attendance at the Canadian parks which had hovered around one million in the mid-1930s and dipped as low as 415,000 during the war, rose rapidly. By 1950, there were almost 1.8 million visitors and by 1955, 3.3 million. In terms of their ranking within the park system, the first Maritime parks stayed quite consistent, but like other parks, their actual visitation statistics were way up (see Appendix 2). The Parks Branch had succeeded in making parks especially attractive because they provided the best of natural scenery alongside affordable, modern amenities. That is, they were still considered high culture destinations accessible to the masses. To meet increasing tourist demand in the 1950s, the Parks Branch worked to expand facilities and make them more accessible to more people. In other words, it continued to implement the sort of policies which had made parks so popular in the first place.

Recreational democracy seemed to be such a unifying concept, and such a success in society, that parks staff, not surprisingly, believed that once tourists arrived they would enjoy spending time together. Fundy

¹⁸ Lary M. Dilsaver, "Stemming the Flow: The Evolution of Controls on Visitor Numbers and Impact in National Parks," The American Environment: Interpretations of Past Geographies, eds. Lary M. Dilsaver and Craig E. Colten (Maryland: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 1992), p.251.

headquarters was given an assembly hall, which in coming years mostly saw use as home to the New Brunswick School of Arts and Crafts. Recreation halls were also built at Cape Breton Highlands and Prince Edward Island National Parks; the first, called a "casino hall" in planning documents, was put up by the Keltic Lodge management, while the latter was used for a park recreation program. Publicity stills of the parks in the 1950s likewise indicate a belief that parks were very much social places. Whereas earlier photographs of the first Maritime parks were predominantly landscape shots, with perhaps a golfer or a fisherman in middle distance, more of the newer photos were at a closer distance and cluttered with people. Families at park campgrounds and bungalow camps were not usually pictured alone, but with another family close by, separated by only a bit of grass. The playground at Prince Edward Island's Stanhope Beach shows 25 children and adults crowded around the slide and sandbox. An often-used photograph of Fundy has several hundred people standing fully dressed around the park's saltwater swimming pool, while the shores of the Bay of Fundy 100 yards away appear deserted.¹⁹ The existence of such a photograph of the park in actual use, and the Parks Branch's use of the photo for publicity purposes, suggests staff thought it representative as well as attractive to tourists. Tourism was understood by the bureau to be a social activity, and the close-knit accommodations and mass recreation developments of the 1950s were meant to respond to this.

The Parks Branch, in equating increased park attendance with visitors' presumed love of crowds, was responding only to one element of its audience, and implicitly overlooking the initial appeal of parks as

¹⁹ Playgrounds of Eastern Canada, p.15.




Figure 13. Campground at Stanhope Beach.
From Playgrounds of Eastern Canada (Ottawa: Resources and
Development, c.1950).



Figure 14. Playground at Stanhope Beach.
From Playgrounds of Eastern Canada (Ottawa: Resources and
Development, c.1950).



Figure 15. Swimming Pool at Fundy.
From Playgrounds of Eastern Canada (Ottawa: Resources and
Development, c.1950).

natural antidotes to civilization. In postwar North America, attitudes to parks and to nature in general were more complicated than the Branch seemed to acknowledge. The period saw more people living in cities, with less direct, physical involvement in obtaining their food, their heat, their water. Alexander Wilson writes that "Nature was newly out of reach of most North Americans."²⁰ And yet, technology was serving to fill this gap. Nature shows on television re-introduced people to the world around them, if only one hour at a time. Automobiles brought people back to nature, if only for a weekend at a time. Of course, these were different kinds of experiences from those past; in Alexander Wilson's words, they emphasized the experience of nature rather than its use.²¹ National parks played a significant role in this new understanding of nature. Parks were popular places for family recreation, but this was grounded in the fact that they were places where families could expect to view nature. Thomas Dunlap credits the U.S. National Park Service with having the greatest impact in the popular understanding of wildlife conservation in that country, and Alfred Runte states, "No institution is more symbolic of the conservation movement in the United States than the national parks."²² The same could be said of the Canadian national parks.

This is what we might call the optimistic side of the fermenting ecology movement, as it would later be called. But there was also a pessimistic side. The 1950s saw North Americans develop a sense that the nature they were enjoying was in danger, and that humans were to

²⁰ Wilson, p.131.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² See Dunlap, *Saving America's Wildlife*, pp.79-82; Runte, *National Parks*, p.xix.

blame. On the planetary scale, the prominence of nuclear fallout in the air, the presence of strontium-90 in milk, plus the ever-looming potential of nuclear war created anxiety for the future safety of both nature and humanity.²³ These threats were not visible to people, but on a level that people were more likely to experience firsthand, national parks were starting to show signs of crowding. From the Parks Branch's perspective, a rise in visitation from 600,000 in 1945 to 3.3 million in 1955 meant many logistical headaches, but it was nonetheless a sign of accomplishment, an embarrassment of riches. For a visitor to a park, such an increased attendance simply meant that where there had been one tourist like themselves, there was now a family. This was easily understood evidence that humans could pose a threat to nature. And, not surprisingly, those who wanted parks to be natural experiences felt that those who did not appreciate the parks in the same way were the greatest threat.

Just as the Parks Branch's appropriations to meet the presumed needs of its expanding clientele started to spiral upwards – from \$2 million in 1946 to \$9 million in 1950, and on to \$22 million by the end of that decade – a significant minority of park visitors began to rebel against the development-intensive sort of park experience. The greatest evidence of this was that camping, which since the Depression had been associated more with Okies than tourists, experienced a great

²³ See Dunlap, *Saving America's Wildlife*, pp.99-102; Worster, *Nature's Economy*, p.342-353. National parks were not just seen as a figurative escape from nuclear war. In 1957, Member of Parliament Lloyd Crouse of Queens-Lunenburg lobbied for a second Nova Scotia national park on the grounds that "In the event of a nuclear war, these national parks would be invaluable. People in thickly settled areas could be evacuated to these camp sites where water and sewage facilities are provided. Because of their location these facilities would not likely be contaminated by fall-out so I would urge the government to give some thought to this proposal." Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 13 November 1957, p.1078.

resurgence.²⁴ There were only 22,000 campers in the whole park system in 1952, but ten times that just five years later. The Maritime parks experienced the fastest growth, which indicated just how different this new tourist was: prior to the 1950s, the region's weather had been considered too cold and wet to permit camping. There were only 243 campers in Prince Edward Island National Park in 1952, and 183 in Cape Breton Highlands; in ten years, they would welcome 39,000 and 30,000 campers respectively.²⁵ The Parks Branch was caught off-guard by this phenomenon, and did not have enough campsites ready. More than this, the campgrounds the parks did have were not what the public wanted. They were, as publicity shots promised, mini-communities set in tight, symmetrical formation. This became the most common complaint in the parks studied here. A visitor to Fundy wrote, "Frankly, when I go camping I do so because I want to get out in the woods, and more or less on my own."²⁶ Another noted that this was not just a Canadian park problem: "You are making the same mistake USA has done in their national parks – campsites are too close together and there is no privacy. Camping area looks like a gypsy congregation – not

²⁴ On camping's North American renaissance in the 1950s, see Geoffrey Wall and R. Wallis, "Camping for Fun: A Brief History of Camping in North America," Recreational Land Use: Perspectives on Its Evolution in Canada, eds. Geoffrey Wall and John Marsh (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1982), pp.341-353. In 1946, a Parks Branch staffer noted that the public had gotten away from camping, and now preferred more elaborate facilities. ? to Smart, 9 January 1946, RG84 vol.103, file U36 vol.2, NAC. Runte, National Parks, p.157, notes that autocamping, or "sagebrushing," was popular in the 1920s as a reaction to the extravagances of park resort tourism of the day. It suggests something about class consciousness and our appreciation of nature that vacationers turned to camping in the 1920s and 1950s as a consumer choice, and turned away from it in times when it was a necessity for some.

²⁵ See RG84 vol.103, file U36 vol.3; and Canada, Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, Annual Reports, 1953-1964.

²⁶ J.B. McKee Arthur, New Jersey, to Alan Field, Director, Canadian Government Travel Bureau, 16 December 1958, RG84 vol.1036, file F121 vol.3, NAC.

people enjoying nature!"²⁷ It took some years for the Parks Branch to recognize the significance of such complaints, and still more to act on them. By the end of the 1950s, the system would be under even greater stress from skyrocketing attendance and the Branch's own attempt to match demand with development. Staff would have to re-evaluate just what kind of tourism the parks were intended to supply.

The Atlantic Canadian parks received more than their fair share of attention, because they recorded such phenomenal gains in visitation – significantly above the park system's national average. Fundy's attendance jumped 360% during the 1950s to 227,000; Prince Edward Island's jumped 470% to 412,000; and Cape Breton Highlands' jumped 1120% to 323,000. The reasons for these parks' particular popularity are easy to see. They were within driving distance of the core population of North America's Eastern seaboard, an essential factor in an automobile-inspired tourism. They had only recently been developed, and with middle-class family tourism in mind. Related to this, their picturesque rather than spectacular landscapes, once deemed liabilities, now made them "safe" and accessible to a public that saw camping as the ultimate nature experience. The Maritime national parks came into their own in the very years that the Parks Branch would begin to consider ways of discouraging such mass attendance.

²⁷ R.G. Talpey, no date, *ibid.*

restricted clientele

The Parks Branch had the unusual task of creating exclusive places that were not to exclude anyone. Parks were to be for the use and enjoyment of all Canadians, and there is every evidence that staff took that mandate seriously; there is no evidence, on the other hand, of any policy designed to discriminate. Having said that, the Parks Branch most certainly created parks that were sure to be of less interest to some people than others. Golf and tennis were accepted park recreations because they were sports of the relatively well-off; if tourists did not possess the wealth and social standing to play them regularly in their daily lives, they were less likely to enjoy them on vacation. And if they were Jews or Blacks routinely barred from places to play such games, they were even less likely to. Park brochures, filled with the smiling white faces of nuclear families and heterosexual couples, likewise did not tell anyone to stay away, but they did signal to readers who would most likely be found there and thus who would be most comfortable. It is impossible to know how tourists responded to such symbols, or whether such symbols kept the poor and minorities from visiting in the first place. Similarly, it is impossible to know whether overzealous staff took the idea of park standards to mean certain people should be excluded, regardless of the park system's mandate.

Since visitors were not categorized at the park entrance by class or ethnicity, the characteristics of the visitors to the parks are unknown. American studies in the 1960s and 1970s found that a disproportionate number of park visitors were white, well-educated, middle- to upper-

class.²⁸ The same was likely true in the Canadian parks,²⁹ and probably even more evident in earlier decades. Writing in the early 1970s, sociologist Joseph Meeker notes, "Attempts by the National Park Service to attract minorities to the parks assume that these groups will find them pleasant and meaningful in the same way that white middle-class visitors do, but that assumption is most likely false." He concluded, "Poor people, black people, and ethnic minorities generally show little enthusiasm for the park idea."³⁰ One might add that many Canadians and Americans who retained a direct link to the land through economic use may have felt no need to "experience nature" once again while on vacation.

If some visitors excluded themselves by reasons of their cultural preferences, others were excluded in more overt ways. In certain flagrant cases, an image of exclusion emerges from the paper trail generated by complaints and controversies. I should mention that in studying four parks' histories of up to 40 years, the cases that follow are the only such cases found. They are not meant to be representative, but to highlight how the Parks Branch's responses indicate a quiet awareness of subtle

²⁸ Joseph Meeker, "Red, White, and Black in the National Parks," [1973] in On Interpretation: Sociology for Interpreters of Natural and Cultural History, eds. Gary E. Machlis and Donald R. Field (Corvallis, Oregon: Oregon State University Press, 1992), pp.196-205; and Joseph Sax, Mountains Without Handrails: Reflections on the National Parks (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980).

²⁹ A 1975 study of Point Pelee National Park found that 74% of adult visitors had at least some university training, and about half had a university degree. J.L. Grant and G. Wall, "Visitors to Point Pelee National Park: Characteristics, Behaviour, and Perceptions," Recreational Land Use, pp.117-126.

³⁰ Meeker, pp.203 and 200. In a 1995 interview, black actress Halle Berry said, "Recently, there was a role of a park ranger that I really wanted. We kept pushing and pushing until finally the studio called my agent and said, 'We don't know if a park ranger would be black.'" Cited in New York Times, 12 March 1995.

and not-so-subtle forms of discrimination both within the park system and the society at large.

In 1942, Parks Controller James Smart wrote P.E.I. Superintendent Ernest Smith concerning problems noted by a visitor recently returned from Dalvay. The problems included an absence of rugs on the floor and an abundance of overly active children. Number seven on Smart's list was "Jews are being allowed into the hotel."³¹ Smith confirmed that this was true:

Under the terms of the lease the hotel is a public hotel.... It might be added that during the course of the season approximately one dozen people of Hebrew extraction were guests and they were very fine people and well behaved. The question of their admission is one for the Department to decide in the light of the policy of other National Parks hotels. ... I believe the management of Dalvay would not accept them if they could avoid it. Personally I see no objection as long as they are of a suitable class.³²

The matter was considered minor enough that Smart did not even respond. The question of allowing Jews in Prince Edward Island National Park arose again in 1948. It came to the attention of parks publicity man H.S. Robinson that Dalvay's brochure advertised "Restricted Clientele" – that is, a visitor could trust that no Jews would be permitted. Robinson called the brochure "objectionable and dangerous" to the Parks Branch, but Assistant Controller Spero was not so sure. He felt that since a concessionaire, not the Parks Branch, ran the hotel it did not reflect poorly on the department. Spero stated, "Other concessions operated in the National Parks have fairly strict rules concerning the admission of certain races and while these are not advertised they are

³¹ Smart to Superintendent Smith, 25 August 1942, RG84 vol.1781, file PEI16.2 vol.3, NAC.

³² Smith to Smart, 4 September 1942, ibid.

strictly observed. In any event, the operator of a hotel can always refuse admission to a guest under the pretext of lack of accommodation...."³³ Deputy Minister Keenleyside vehemently disagreed, believing that such advertising did sully the park's name, particularly since it was for a national park building.³⁴ The concessionaire was told to remove this phrase. The following year, though, it was found that nothing had been done: the concessionaire had thousands of the offending brochures and wanted to use them up. The Parks Branch received complaints in 1949 from the Canadian Jewish Congress and from the Quebec head of Women's Voluntary Services, who wrote, "I'm afraid I was not merely puzzled that this sort of thing should be associated with a National Park, but rather horrified as well. The recent war does not seem to have taught people much of a lesson if this sort of attitude persists."³⁵ Ottawa ordered the brochures destroyed. The Parks Branch's conduct in this incident suggests it was concerned with discrimination, but primarily in terms of how it affected public relations. Staff recognized racial bias to be antithetical to the park system's aims, and took action to snuff it out. Yet Spero clearly knew about a well-developed system of discrimination within the parks concessions. Neither he nor those with whom he corresponded did anything to change it. Once the brochures were destroyed, the Branch saw its problem as solved; the offense was only offensive if it was public.

³³ Spero, Assistant Controller, to H.S. Robinson, Supervisor, Parks and Resources Information, 4 May 1948, RG84 vol.1781, file PEI16.1 vol.4, NAC.

³⁴ Gibson to Nason, 12 May 1948, *ibid.*

³⁵ Elsie M. Kieran, Women's Voluntary Services, Quebec, to Robinson, 15 June 1949, *ibid.* Saul Hayes, National Executive Director of Canadian Jewish Congress, to Keenleyside, Deputy Minister, 12 September 1949, RG22 vol.242, file 33.21.1 pt.2, NAC.

The Parks Branch similarly reacted to another incident of racial discrimination in the summer of 1960. A professor of theology at Boston University, Harold DeWolf, wrote the owner of the Fundy Park Chalets to confirm a reservation for himself and his wife. There was also, he added, a young couple he wished to invite to come with them:

Canada's history being what it is, we feel confident that you would treat them well, but we want to make sure, to avoid any possibility of embarrassment. The friends of whom I speak are a fine Negro minister and his wife. They might want to take also their young children, but would more likely leave them with relatives. The young man is university-trained, with four degrees, an author and in every sense a cultivated gentleman. His wife is also a cultured person of superior character.³⁶

DeWolf waited for a response throughout May, throughout June, and finally received it just before leaving for New Brunswick at the beginning of July. Robert Friars, who had bought the bungalow court from the Parks Branch in 1957 and now operated it, confirmed the DeWolfs' reservation, but noted,

With regard to your friends whom you mentioned ... I feel that I cannot accept the possibility of embarrassment which may arise from this situation. Each day we have over one hundred guests at our site of which a great many are from the New England States, as well as those farther South. For this reason we feel that it would be better not to accommodate your friends.³⁷

So the DeWolfs travelled to Canada alone, without their young black friends, Dr. and Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr.³⁸

³⁶ Harold DeWolf to Robert Friars, 1 May 1960, RG84 vol.1025, file F16.112.1 vol.3, NAC.

³⁷ Friars to DeWolf, 24 June 1960, *ibid.*

³⁸ The following pages are based on my "Why Martin Luther King Didn't Spend His Summer Vacation in Canada," The Globe and Mail, 14 January 1995.

Harold DeWolf was King's professor and mentor at the Boston University school of theology, and they had stayed friends after King received his Ph.D. there in 1955.³⁹ It would seem that King periodically relied on DeWolf to help him get away from the rigours of the civil rights movement. Biographer Stephen Oates recounts that in 1956, King was feeling run down from a long speaking tour and talked to DeWolf "about arranging a retreat for him in Boston, a sanctuary where he could be alone for 'spiritual renewal and writing.'"⁴⁰ In 1960, DeWolf (who eight years later would be the only white person to speak at King's memorial service) again tried to help relieve his old friend of the stresses that came with being Martin Luther King. It was a very hectic spring for the young preacher. He was the inspirational leader of student sit-ins in the South against lunch-counter segregation. He had been arrested on trumped-up charges of income tax fraud in February and acquitted by an all-white jury in late May. In June, he met privately with presidential-hopeful John F. Kennedy.

King never learned why the planned summer vacation to the Maritimes fell through. Harold and Madeline DeWolf travelled alone to Fundy, and while there tried to meet with Robert Friars and Superintendent J.D.B. MacFarlane, but without success. Upon his return to the U.S., DeWolf wrote the Parks Branch in Ottawa and told of the offending correspondence, concluding, "... Mr. Friars' letter, when it

³⁹ DeWolf's role as advisor on King's Ph.D. has been closely scrutinized since the 1990 discovery that much of the dissertation had been plagiarized, not least from a doctoral thesis that DeWolf had supervised only three years earlier. See "Becoming Martin Luther King, Jr. — Plagiarism and Originality: A Round Table," Journal of American History, vol.78 no.1 (June 1991), pp.11-123.

⁴⁰ Stephen B. Oates, Let the Trumpets Sound: The Life of Martin Luther King, Jr. (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1982), p.101.

came, while putting the blame on possible guests who might object – as is customary in discrimination practices – quite flatly declined to accept our friends at the Chalets."⁴¹

To its credit, the Parks Branch responded quickly and unequivocally. Chief B.I.M. Strong wrote Superintendent MacFarlane,

The action of Mr. Friars in refusing accommodation on the basis of colour is certainly something we cannot condone. ... I want you to make it clear to Mr. Friars that his arbitrary decision ... was certainly not in keeping with the democracy and freedom of which Canada is so justly proud. He should also be informed that if another incident of this nature comes to our attention corrective attention will be taken by the Department.⁴²

The Superintendent, perhaps feeling that this episode reflected poorly on him, defended Friars by noting that his rejection, though poorly worded, had only been intended to avoid embarrassment. As to Fundy Park Chalets not permitting blacks, MacFarlane stated, "In fact it was just about this time that a Mr. and Mrs. Brown from Philadelphia (negroes) stayed at Mr. Friars' for several days."⁴³

MacFarlane's superiors were more than happy to have this incident interpreted for them as a misunderstanding. An unsigned note from within the Parks Branch on MacFarlane's letter reads, "This is much 'ado' about nothing. Prepare the usual 'will not happen' reply and thank the Supt. for this."⁴⁴ In a mollifying note to DeWolf that both apologized for and rationalized Friars' letter, Strong wrote,

⁴¹ DeWolf to National Parks Branch, 21 July 1960, RG84 vol.1025 file F16.112.1 vol.3, NAC.

⁴² Strong to MacFarlane, 29 July 1960, *ibid.*

⁴³ MacFarlane to Strong, 3 August 1960, *ibid.*

⁴⁴ Strong [?] to a Mr. Kelly, 5 August 1960, *ibid.*

Admittedly, Mr. Friars' statement ... was in bad taste but it was not by any means intended as a direct refusal to make accommodation available. ... His action can only be attributed to overzealousness on his part to avoid possible embarrassment being precipitated by other patrons of his establishment. I am satisfied this will not happen again.⁴⁵

Whether DeWolf accepted this explanation or not, he chose to pursue the matter no further.

Can we judge Friars's intentions with complete certainty? Most likely, Friars did tolerate the presence of blacks, but was quite willing to refuse entrance to an individual who sought permission beforehand. His slippery response to DeWolf was worded to let himself off the hook: I don't discriminate, but others might. Less slippery is his conclusion: "it would be better not to accommodate your friends." As for the National Parks staff, they were quick to choose an interpretation of the episode that was easiest to smooth over. What was important was to alienate no one, to make Fundy a park that everyone could enjoy, black and racist alike. For this reason it was not considered necessary to draft a directive to all park staff explicitly stating the Canadian National Parks' racial policy. The unpleasantness at Fundy was interpreted as an isolated incident.

There is no way of knowing how isolated it really was. It would be helpful to know if the exclusivity of the national parks often permitted or even fostered such acts of exclusion. What might be said is that the park staff's response to these episodes of discrimination is analogous to Canada's experience as a whole. As historians Robin Winks and James Walker point out, Canadians have traditionally felt a certain moral superiority to Americans on the basis of an allegedly more progressive

⁴⁵ Strong to DeWolf, 12 August 1960, *Ibid.*

stand on race relations.⁴⁶ A major reason for this, however, was that discrimination was always less visible, more anecdotal, since blacks here did not attain the population concentration that they did in the United States. The National Parks Branch could only prove its antipathy to prejudice if it acted more decisively in the instances of discrimination it faced.

the hotel business

Indecisiveness on questions of exclusion was of a piece with the overall stance of the Parks Branch towards tourist accommodation. Once the Parks Branch had completed the tasks of park selection, expropriation, and development, its official position was that it wanted little to do with the new tourist operations that had made the proposed park attractive in the first place. The feeding and accommodating of visitors would be left up to concessionaires who would invest in the right to participate in Branch-approved facilities. As staff were quick to tell provincial politicians and local entrepreneurs, they had created the park; it was now up to local industry to make it a worthwhile investment. The Parks Branch's thinking on this was quite understandable. It was a federal agency, and was not in the business of conducting business. The parks had been established to encourage the local tourism industry, not compete with it.

⁴⁶ See Robin W. Winks, The Blacks in Canada: A History (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 1981), pp.464-465, and James W. St.G. Walker, Racial Discrimination in Canada: The Black Experience (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association Historical Booklet #41, 1985), pp.16-24.

And yet, the Parks Branch's claims were somewhat disingenuous. It was the Parks Branch which made sure that each of the first Maritime parks had some impressive form of tourist accommodation within its borders, though in each case there were nearby communities that could have been expected to fulfill visitor needs. In fact, an important reason Cape Breton Highlands and Prince Edward Island parks were chosen was specifically because staff envisioned the houses at Middlehead and Dalway to be reminiscent of grand hotels like those at Banff, Jasper, and Waterton. The Parks Branch believed that national parks must have accommodations within their borders, and ones worthy of the park name.

As a result, in the four parks studied here a similar pattern emerged. The Parks Branch offered land for development of accommodations within its parks. Staff expected investors to provide facilities of the highest aesthetic standards. Investors, though, felt such qualifications impossible to reach, particularly since they could only make money on their investment a few months each year. Besides, local operators wondered why the federal government did not supply the facilities themselves. Unable to attract any interest when tenders were called, the Parks Branch responded by doing everything possible to accommodate what interest there was. The lucky concessionaire was offered concessions to ensure his continued satisfaction. Staff blamed the situation on a lack of local initiative while, increasingly through time, other local tourist operators blamed the federal bureau for creating a subsidized business against which they could not hope to compete.

From the first days of the first two Maritime parks, the Parks Branch understood that accommodating tourists would be a problem.

In his 1934 report on the proposed Nova Scotia park, R.W. Cautley noted, "it will probably be found necessary for the Parks Branch to finance the construction of suitable tourist accommodations, and either to put people in charge or rent them to carefully selected contractors...."⁴⁷ There simply were no hotel facilities in the Cape Breton Highlands area. Indeed, the head of the Cape Breton Tourist Association admitted that visitors thought the situation ghastly: "as modern accommodations go, Cape Breton is at zero."⁴⁸ James Smart worked diligently to find investors. He contacted Fay Becker, a Banff leaseholder, guaranteeing that a bungalow camp near the new park was bound to be a great success, since there was really no quality competition.⁴⁹ Failing to win Becker over, Smart offered a location in the park's development headquarters at Middlehead to a group of Sydney businessmen. The Parks Branch's plan for the accommodations may be seen in Smart's suggestion that the investors should "really cater to high-class business and therefore should not stint on providing facilities in the way of comfortable and well furnished cabins and, above all, a first-class central building." Another set of cabins would be built near the golf course for "those with more moderate means."⁵⁰ Concerned by the scale of the project, the Sydney group backed out. Knowing that the federal government was having no luck finding sponsors, the Nova Scotia government asked what was to become a common question: since this was a federal project, why did the federal government not supply

⁴⁷ Cautley report on Nova Scotia sites, 1934, p.74.

⁴⁸ N. Milton Browne, Cape Breton Tourist Association, to Smart, 30 March 1939, RG84 vol.990, file CBH16.112 vol.1 pt.3 (1937-1949), NAC.

⁴⁹ Smart to Becker, 1 October 1937, *ibid.*

⁵⁰ Smart to Browne, 2 May 1939, *ibid.*

suitable lodgings? Smart replied, "You seem to believe that in other parks this accommodation has been provided by the Government. Such is not the case. Hotels, bungalow courts, and other tourist accommodation is [sic] provided by private enterprise."⁵¹ The provincial government finally agreed to tackle the problem itself, building Keltic Lodge in 1940 and immediately regretting its decision. Though it tried to convince the Parks Branch to take over control of the lodge, the federal agency demurred, saying it was not in the hotel business.⁵²

The Parks Branch always stated a willingness to work with would-be concessionaires, but federal wishes tended to surpass local capabilities. Katherine Wyand had opened Avonlea Cottages at Cavendish Beach to tourists in the 1920s, and when word came that her land would be expropriated for Prince Edward Island National Park, she asked to stay. The Parks Branch was interested in having the services of an experienced tourist operator, and tentatively agreed that she could have a cottage concession. But Cautley reported from P.E.I., "The Wyand cottages are an eyesore. Badly built in every variety of slipshod construction. Located without the slightest sense of order. Painted different colours. ... I recommend that the Provincial Government be required to buy her out lock stock & barrel – NOW."⁵³ The Parks Branch agreed, and rescinded its invitation. The following summer, the Wyands

⁵¹ Smart to AS MacMillan, Minister of Highways, NS, 21 March 1938, RG84 vol.990, file CBH16.112 pt.1, NAC.

⁵² J.D. MacKenzie, Minister of Highways, Nova Scotia, to Crerar, 19 September 1941, RG84 vol.986, file CBH16.1 vol.2 pt.2, NAC

⁵³ Cautley to Cromarty, 22 December 1936, RG84 vol.1784, file PEI16.112.1, NAC. Cautley was also concerned about reports that Wyand would be a difficult person to work with.

were hard at work on their cottages, refusing to move. Cautley recommended they be told "there is no question involved of their being given preference as possible concessionaires. On their own showing, they have not sufficient means to build first-class bungalow cottages, and what they have built show bad judgment in construction, location and style."⁵⁴ Wyand, though, said that thanks to the park, local land prices had jumped so much she could not afford to relocate. She became a vocal opponent of the park, writing letters to the editor detailing the bureaucratic run-around she had faced, as she travelled from Parks "Controller" to "foreman" to "Director" to "Commissioner" to "Inspector" in hopes of keeping her business.⁵⁵

Surprisingly, then, in 1938 the Parks Branch offered Wyand the cottage concession. No one else had put in a tender for it, and it was felt that the new national park badly needed accommodations. The main stipulation was that she fix the cottages up (with the Branch's help) and let them be moved off the beach to a less central location. Wyand happily agreed. The cottages were tidied up in appearance and painted white with green trim. A parks staffer reported, "While they do not come up to the standard required in other parks they are clean presentable buildings."⁵⁶ After visiting the park in 1940, James Smart was less satisfied: "I doubt whether we can expect to ever have this camp present the appearance desired. The buildings are all of such design as to preclude any pleasing or harmonizing finish. The best we can expect is

⁵⁴ Cautley to Williamson, 16 June 1937, *ibid.*

⁵⁵ Katherine Wyand, "Open Letter to Members of the Legislature," *Charlottetown Guardian*, 1 April 1938.

⁵⁶ Blake Sinclair, Dalvay House, to Williamson, 4 October 1939, RG84 vol.1784, file PEI16.112.1, NAC.

neatness. The final outcome of this camp will be its abandonment and complete removal through lack of patronage."⁵⁷ The Parks Branch had every right, of course, to retain only park buildings that matched its standards. But Cautley and Smart's disgust over Wyand's cottages suggests how deep was the divide between the two sides' aesthetics. Wyand needed only simple and serviceable cottages that would be used a few months a year. Families would not need to worry about dressing formally or tracking in sand in her summer cabins. The Parks Branch wanted the cottages to have the order and symmetry that suggested they were the finest that Canada had to offer. Local tourist operators probably did not possess the funds, never mind the sensibility, to fulfill such demands.

By the end of World War II, the Parks Branch's thinking had changed in a number of ways. Staff noticed a dropping interest in the park system's resort-style hotels but a concurrent drop in campers as well. Instead, visitors were turning to the parks' bungalow camps for reasonably priced yet comfortable accommodation. Park clientele was increasingly understood to be the expanding North American middle class, seeking middle-class facilities. This suited the Parks Branch fine. Projects like Keltic Lodge and Dalvay, which had been thought only a decade earlier as necessary totems of park status, were losing considerable money. The Parks Branch called Dalvay a "white elephant" and thought that if more accommodations at Prince Edward Island were built, they would be ones for "people of moderate means."⁵⁸ This was the general plan for all park facility development at the time. "The

⁵⁷ Smart to Williamson, 4 June 1940, *ibid.*

⁵⁸ Gibson to Smart, 19 January 1948, RG22 vol.242, file 33.21.1 pt.2, NAC.

whole trouble," according to one staffer, "is that the present rates are too high for the average family man...."⁵⁹

One might think, on this evidence, that cottages like those Wyand offered would have found their niche. But the Parks Branch still wanted park buildings to possess the same high standards as always. Therefore, when the new Fundy National Park was being designed in the late 1940s, though it was given a bungalow camp rather than a hotel, the camp was of the Parks Branch's own construction and design.⁶⁰ Twenty-nine cottages were built along a single line overlooking a bluff near the golf course. All were identical, 20 feet by 20 feet, with a high French-style roof and fetching wooden shutters with hearts carved in them. All came with the most modern of conveniences, including a refrigerator, gas stove, and bathroom. A New Brunswick newspaper article of the time suggested that such accommodations were "almost sure to have a family-man appeal. ... [I]t would seem that a low-budget visitor could enjoy a peak holiday at bargain basement figures."⁶¹ The Parks Branch justified such development as necessary to provide Fundy with accommodation as soon as it opened. But more importantly, staff

⁵⁹ ? to Smart, 9 January 1946, RG84 vol.103, file U36 vol.2, NAC. See also Smart to all Superintendents, 17 October 1945, *ibid.* Cape Breton Highlands was targeted by the Parks Branch, the Canada Youth Commission, and the Nova Scotia Department of Health as the potential home of "family camps" for local communities. It was thought "such a project would have more prospects of success if the idea were to originate from amongst the people most likely to benefit e.g. the mining communities of Nova Scotia." Robinson to Smart, 2 December 1946, *ibid.*

⁶⁰ A park hotel was not ruled out, however. Smart stated, "I am, of course, hoping that some person with good financial backing and experience in operating accommodations for tourists will become interested in establishing on this park and put up a type of accommodation that is more suitable for the most exacting tourists: in other words, more elaborate and de luxe accommodation than we will be providing for in the bungalow camp we intend to build this summer." Smart to W.A. Moore, Deputy Minister of Industry and Reconstruction, New Brunswick, 24 February 1949, RG84 vol.1025, file F16.112, NAC.

⁶¹ From clipping collection of Greta Geldart Elliot.

meant to set "a standard for the type of layout we would like to see undertaken by private enterprise."⁶² The Parks Branch built similar bungalow camps at Cape Breton Highlands and Prince Edward Island parks in 1949 and 1950. Again, it was made clear that such developments only provided a "model establishment which might encourage others to invest capital in a similar scheme. It was never intended, however, that the National Park Service should embark in the hotel or bungalow camp business on a wide scale."⁶³

The Parks Branch put out a call for tenders on the three new cabin developments, but received only a few expressions of interest for each. In one sense this seemed to justify the building of the cottages in the first place, since local people obviously did not want to invest in tourism. But there were reasons for locals to act cautiously. Tourism was still a rather new enterprise in areas surrounding the parks (particularly at Fundy and Cape Breton Highlands), and people did not trust that they could make money on it in just a few months a year. If new to the industry, they may have doubted their ability to run the first-class facilities set up in the parks. On top of this, many people simply did not understand that a place had been made in the park for local investment; others who did know this felt that, considering how long Western parks had received federal funding, the government owed it to these new parks to invest the money itself.⁶⁴

⁶² Smart to Hugh Young, Deputy Minister, 24 February 1953, RG22 vol.239, file 33.6.1 pt.3, NAC.

⁶³ Lesage to MacEachen, 28 January 1954, RG22 vol.473, file 33.9.1 pt.4, NAC.

⁶⁴ For expressions of these attitudes, see, for example, Charlottetown Patriot and Charlottetown Guardian, 25 September 1947.

Out of small lists of applicants, the Parks Branch chose Robert Friars to lease its bungalow camp at Fundy, R.S. Humphrey at P.E.I., and Charles Fownes at Cape Breton Highlands. Each would be charged 20% of the gross rental revenue for the year, a sum that suggested a reasonable return for the government without being onerous to the concessionaire.⁶⁵ In retrospect, it is little wonder that these bungalow camps became successes, booked solid for the entire year by the beginning of each season, and quite profitable for the leaseholders. The cottages were attractive, maintained by the Parks Branch, well advertised in park publications, and possessing a monopoly of this sort of accommodation within the park. And the cottages were priced affordably, because the Parks Branch wanted to attract middle-class visitors. In doing so the government acknowledged that it limited the concessionaire's potential profit, so it was satisfied with a small rent.

The Parks Branch did not find the developments so profitable, though, having built the fine structures and leased them cheaply. Staff calculated by the 1950s that each Maritime bungalow camp was losing the government over \$2000 each year. When the concessionaires expressed interest in purchasing the bungalow camps, the agency took them up on it. After evaluating the P.E.I. camp at about \$67,000, the New Brunswick camp at \$73,000, and the Nova Scotia camp at \$60,000, the Parks Branch accepted offers of \$55,000, \$55,000, and \$52,000 for them respectively.⁶⁶ The government had created virtual monopolies at

⁶⁵ Hutchison to Young, 23 October 1952, RG84 vol.1025, file F16.112.1 vol.1 pt.1 (1952-1955), NAC.

⁶⁶ See Jackson to Lesage, 24 October 1956, RG84 vol.1025, file F16.112.1 vol.2, NAC, and Coleman to Robertson, 3 February 1960, RG22 vol.898, file 307.1, NAC. The Parks Branch had intended to sell the cabins themselves, and had in fact done so, when it was discovered that doing so would also mean selling the land under them. The "sales" became "leases." See Lothian to Coleman, 6 April 1964, RG84 vol.1943, file TN16.112.1 vol.3, NAC.

considerable cost to itself, and at the expense of other potential local investment in tourism accommodation.

From Ottawa's point of view, the entire episode was seen as having a single cause: a lack of local initiative. Minister Jean Lesage defended to a P.E.I. politician the decision to sell the tourist cabins without public offering by stating, "These courts were built by the department at a time when it was quite impossible to interest private persons in such construction."⁶⁷ The same was said of conditions at the other Maritime parks. James Smart wrote, for example, that the community of Alma just outside Fundy "has not yet come to the idea that they are overlooking the opportunity passing by their doors of bettering conditions in their town and developing it as one of the most attractive tourist towns in the Maritimes."⁶⁸ But the situation was not as simple as park staff might pretend. As Fundy Superintendent Saunders noted, no one in Alma had the money to invest in tourism on any scale, and if they did, Fundy's facilities were hardly ones they could aspire to. Locals felt that the Parks Branch itself should provide facilities, since it had the location offered by the park itself and obviously had the funds to do the job right.⁶⁹ In this way, the facilities which were to act as "models" for local investment more likely acted as discouragement.

⁶⁷ Lesage to Neil Matheson, M.P. for Queen's, 22 August 1956, RG84 vol.1785, file PEI16.112.2 vol.3, NAC. This was occasionally voiced by Maritimers themselves. W.W. Reid, Supervisor of the P.E.I. Travel Bureau, told Smart, "It would appear to me that our people down here are a bit too conservative [in that] they are quite keen to make something once the Government backs the project, and at the same time they do not appear to be too anxious to share any profit with the Government." 8 May 1948, RG84 vol.1797, file PEI56.2 vol.2, NAC.

⁶⁸ Smart to Gibson, 10 December 1952, RG22 vol.239, file 33.6.1 pt.3, NAC.

⁶⁹ Hutchison to Smart, 20 February 1953, *ibid.*

Considering the money the government had lost in the bungalow camps of the first Maritime parks, it is surprising that exactly the same method was followed in the development of Terra Nova National Park. Nineteen cabins, of notably simpler design than those in previous parks, were built at Newman Sound by the department, and tenders were called to manage them. Only two submissions were received, and the Parks Branch chose St. John's businessman Norval Blair to take the concession. The cabins were an immediate hit, especially with vacationing Newfoundlanders. Blair soon asked if he could provide some services himself, and the Branch permitted or refused on the basis of applicability to park taste: a laundry room (yes), a playground (yes), a passenger boat service (yes), a hot-dog stand (no), a shuffleboard court and horse-shoe pitch (no, no), and a miniature roller coaster (no).⁷⁰ Blair also asked that the Branch itself inject more funds in the site by building tennis courts, a swimming pool, more cabins. Meanwhile, Superintendent Doak was receiving complaints from locals who "did not know what the Government was doing in the accommodation business and taking trade away from them."⁷¹ The best course of action, the department decided, would be for Blair to buy the cabins, as the concessionaires at the other Maritime parks had. After all, noted the superintendent, "we should not be in the 'hotel business'."⁷² Blair expressed tentative interest in the idea but, thinking like a good

⁷⁰ Coleman was concerned that even the playground might "give a shoddy appearance." Robertson generally disagreed with Coleman: "there is a serious need for some recreational amenities of a modest kind and of an outdoor character in the park." Coleman to Robertson, 11 May 1960, RG84 vol.1943, file TN16.112.1 vol.1, NAC; and Robertson to Coleman, 7 October 1960, RG22 vol.1097, file 311.1 pt.1, NAC.

⁷¹ Doak to Strong, 5 June 1961, RG84 vol.1943, file TN16.112.1 vol.1, NAC.

⁷² Doak to Coleman, 20 March 1964, RG84 vol.1943, file TN16.112.1 vol.3, NAC.

businessman, said he would prefer to wait until the government had built the 20 or 30 more cabins he was asking for.⁷³

No clear lessons emerged from the Parks Branch's foray into the business end of tourism. Perhaps it was worth it to have accommodations in parks, even those with communities nearby, because they improved the visitor's experience of the park. Perhaps the accommodations built within the Maritime parks really did serve as models for local tourism operators and thus ultimately helped local industry become stronger. The answers to these questions are impossible to determine. More interesting, though, is the manner in which the Parks Branch justified its actions by claiming a lack of local initiative, while ignoring both its own motivations for park development and the knotty reasons that locals found investing so difficult to imagine. And then, after investing considerably in park accommodations, the Parks Branch felt obliged to show its uninvolvedness in capitalism by selling them at a loss to a single concessionaire who would enjoy a valuable monopoly. The Parks Branch was in the hotel business, and it would have cost taxpayers and local business less if it had admitted so.

inviolability

Throughout the national park system's history, parks were created because the benefits they provided their provinces and Canada – nationalistic pride in the place's beauty, an influx of federal development money, and, above all, tourism – were thought more valuable for that specific land than the small-scale economies that they

⁷³ Memo, 15 September 1961, RG84 vol.1943, file TN16.112.1 vol.1, NAC.

replaced. But these benefits were not believed to measure up against those of large-scale economic investment. If alternative uses for park land were discovered to hold out the prospect of more money for a province, provincial politicians lobbied for them. In many instances, the national parks were threatened by provincial governments and private interests which thought of parks as little more than land held in trust, ready to be reclaimed when needed. Coal was taken from Jasper and Banff; lead, silver, and zinc from Yoho; and timber from a number of parks, including Banff, Riding Mountain, and Wood Buffalo.⁷⁴

For the first decades of the park system, staff seem to have shared with the rest of Canadians the belief that preservation should not be allowed to interfere with economic development. But in the 1920s, the Parks Branch began to declare in its annual reports that what made national parks unique was the principle of inviolability, the notion that parks should be forever safe from the incursions of either private development or other government departments. National parks were distinct because they were timeless, representing not only a distant past without human interference in nature but a refuge from any future meddling as well. Canadian park historian C.J. Taylor sees the first great test of inviolability to be the Calgary Power Corporation's 1923 proposal to dam Banff's Spray Lakes for hydroelectric purposes. Commissioner James Harkin argued vehemently to prevent the damming on the basis that parks had no intrinsic meaning if they were not free from the economic concerns that affected other land. When it became clear that development at Spray Lakes would go through,

⁷⁴ Chapter two of Bella, "Mining the Parks," provides a useful listing of national parks' resource extraction.

Harkin's Parks Branch asked that this and other areas with obvious resource value be removed from the park system. Taylor writes of Harkin, "Principle rather than size had now become his priority."⁷⁵ Though Spray Lakes was taken from the park, the incident was in one sense a victory for inviolability, demonstrating that when threatened by economic exploitation the Parks Branch would chop off its hand rather than have its whole arm infected. Inviolability has been an intrinsic part of the national park ideal ever since.

However, the Spray Lakes case demonstrates inviolability's intrinsic weaknesses. First, it is ultimately unenforceable, since any statute that attempts to fetter the power of future executives completely is not legally binding. Harkin could speak of parks' distinct status, but there was no way for him to turn it into law; nothing could keep future governments from expanding, contracting, or indeed terminating the parks as they saw fit.⁷⁶ Second, the Parks Branch's own place within the federal system made maintaining inviolability very difficult. At various times during the years under study, parks were part of the Ministries of Interior, Mines and Resources, Resources and Development, and Northern Affairs and National Resources, all of which were primarily concerned with land use and resource extraction. As in the Spray Lakes case, the

⁷⁵ Taylor, "Legislating Nature," p.132. The Spray Lakes episode is very similar to the more famous U.S. case in which Yosemite National Park's Hetch Hetchy Valley was dammed in the 1910s. The great difference is that a widespread opposition arose to the Hetch Hetchy case, resulting in public support for the national park idea; no such support arose in Canada to save Spray Lakes.

⁷⁶ See N.D. Bankes, "Constitutional Problems Related to the Creation and Administration of Canada's National Parks," Managing Natural Resources in Federal State, ed. Owen J. Saunders, essays from the 2nd Banff Conference on Natural Resources Law (Toronto: Carswell Press, 1986), pp.212-234. H. Ian Rounthwaite suggests that parks might be able to win the right to permanent protection through common law public trust, though this has not been attempted in the courts. "The National Parks of Canada: An Endangered Species?" Saskatchewan Law Review, vol.46 no.1 (1981-1982), pp.43-71.

ministry was as likely to side with the proponents of economic development as with its own Parks Branch. Finally, inviolability could always be sidestepped as it had been at Spray Lakes, by removing the contested land from the parks system and thus from the restraint of inviolability. National parks were inviolable until they were needed.

When Maritime provinces began to express interest in having their own national parks, the Parks Branch firmly and clearly explained that the right to all timber, minerals, and other resources would transfer to Canada with park establishment. It would seem that the provinces understood this well enough. In 1929, Nova Scotia Premier Harrington chose not to push further for a park at that time because "it would be improper for me to recommend to my colleagues that the people of Nova Scotia abandoned [sic] all interest in the possible mineral deposits in the northern part of Cape Breton."⁷⁷ Seven years later, the next Nova Scotia government made a different decision, and agreed to the Cape Breton Highlands park. Again, the federal government impressed on its provincial counterpart that this would mean a loss of resources. Federal Minister of Mines and Resources T.A. Crerar, answering a provincial question about mineral rights, was careful to suggest that "If any portion more valuable for mineral development than for National Park purposes such portions should be eliminated now."⁷⁸ Yet inviolability was such a

⁷⁷ Premier G.F. Harrington, cited in Cautley to Harkin, 7 June 1929, RG84 vol.1964, file U2.12.1, NAC. Perhaps the greatest proof that the Parks Branch's message was understood was the manner in which the provinces tried to sidestep inviolability at park establishment. New Brunswick tried to include a clause in the agreement that created Fundy National Park which stated, "It is noted, however, that this grant reserves to the Province all coals and also all gold and silver and other mines and minerals." The Parks Branch explained why this would not do, and the province conceded the point. J. Allison Glen, Minister of Mines and Resources, Canada, to R.J. Gill, Minister of Lands and Mines, New Brunswick, 21 February 1948, and Gill to Glen, 4 March 1948, RG84 vol.1024, file F2 vol.5, NAC.

⁷⁸ Crerar to J.H. MacQuarrie, Minister of Lands and Forests, Nova Scotia, 9 June 1936,

new concept that even with such blunt declarations, the federal department fretted that the principle might still be somehow undermined. When Nova Scotia Premier Angus L. Macdonald agreed "that the Dominion Government will exercise full control of the park area in accordance with the authority vested in it by the National Parks Act and Regulations thereunder" Deputy Minister Wardle's handwritten response was: "Not enough."⁷⁹ The department wanted a more specific declaration of jurisdiction. Federal Deputy Minister of Justice W. Stuart Edwards assured the department, though, that a general statement was far superior: an attempt to define all that Canada owned within the park would have been bound to have left something out.⁸⁰ The Nova Scotia act ultimately transferred to Canada all "estate, right, title and interest in the land so purchased or acquired or leased" for the new park.⁸¹

Almost immediately, Cape Breton Highland's inviolability was tested. A prospector from Toronto, F.M. Connell, asked the Parks Branch if he could re-open a gold mine at Clyburn Brook, near the centre of park development at Middlehead. He had tried mining in the area when gold was at \$20 per ounce, but found it unprofitable; now that it was \$35 per ounce, it might be worthwhile.⁸² Both the provincial and federal governments were troubled by this. As Parks Director Gibson noted, "The

cited in Lesage to George Prudham, Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys, Canada, 4 May 1954, RG84 vol.516, file CBH31 pt.1, NAC.

⁷⁹ Premier Angus L. Macdonald to Crerar, 31 March 1936, RG84 vol.985, file CBH2 Cap Rouge, vol.2 pt.2, NAC.

⁸⁰ Wardle to W. Stuart Edwards, Deputy Minister of Justice, 4 April 1936, and Edwards to Wardle, 11 April 1936, RG84 vol.985, file CBH2 Cap Rouge, vol.2 pt.2, NAC.

⁸¹ Cited in Harkin to Daly, Departmental Solicitor, Department of the Interior, 17 June 1936, RG84 vol.985, file CBH2 Cap Rouge, vol.2 pt.1, NAC.

⁸² Cited by Gibson to Camsell, 29 November 1938, RG84 vol.516, file CBH31 pt.1, NAC.

point of the whole thing is that this Middle Head area is the most desirable feature in the Park. We have known this from the beginning."⁸³ More than this, there was concern that allowing mining in an Eastern park would set "a very dangerous precedent." Yet neither government wanted to turn Connell down. Both thought it difficult to turn down investment in Cape Breton, particularly for an industry so central to the island's existence. After considerable soul-searching, the federal ministry of Mines and Resources refused Connell's request.⁸⁴ The Parks Branch periodically received similar petitions to prospect in Cape Breton Highlands Park during the Second World War, but turned each one down.⁸⁵

The Connell incident was a minor one, but it demonstrates how the supposedly uncompromising concept of park inviolability could be shaken by the prosaic needs of a capitalist system. The park system also had to deal with governments' claims on park land. The Parks Branch was generally receptive, so that it could help the local economy and prove itself a good neighbour. After creating Fundy National Park, the Parks Branch was asked by the New Brunswick government if the provincial Potato Research Station could be allowed to continue operation within the parks border. It took up, after all, just 14 acres, was tucked out of the way of all planned development, and would only be needed for a decade. The Parks Branch felt that this would do no harm, and even gave the Station a three-acre extension and some recently

⁸³ Gibson to Williamson, 1 December 1938, *ibid.*

⁸⁴ Camsell [?] to Gibson, 30 November 1938, *ibid.*

⁸⁵ For example, Henry M. Evans wrote that there were "considerable war minerals" to be retrieved in the western section of the park. Evans to National Parks Branch, 14 May 1941, *ibid.*

expropriated farm buildings. But this guest became a nuisance. In 1951, the Potato Station asked for eight more acres (and the right to cut the small trees growing on them), and in 1954 park staff discovered that it had absorbed 11 more again. Though the Parks Branch bristled at letting the research station stay longer, it succumbed to provincial and federal pressure to do so, and even ended up letting it have another eight acres for crop rotation.⁸⁶ There was no way the Parks Branch could openly complain about this infringement on the park, because to do so was to admit that it did not have the control on park land that the idea of inviolability suggested. Besides, both the provincial and federal governments – who did not owe the idea of inviolability any allegiance – were happy to see the land in use. In his authorized history of the Canadian national parks, W.F. Lothian calls Fundy's Potato Research Station just "an unusual feature", condoned because its research provided a service to Canadians and was relevant to New Brunswick agriculture. In noting that the site was finally moved out of Fundy in 1974, he does not mention that the Parks Branch had been trying to accomplish that objective on and off for the previous 20 years.⁸⁷

The Parks Branch had a difficult time defending the principle of inviolability when either private business or government contested it. When the two acted together, the Branch's situation was nearly impossible. In 1953, staff at Cape Breton Highlands National Park were surprised to learn that survey parties were at work throughout the park. Toronto's Mineral Exploration Company soon reported finding high

⁸⁶ This episode is taken from the correspondence of RG22 vol.366, file 304.73 pt.1, NAC.

⁸⁷ Lothian, A Brief History, p.114.

grade metals in the area, including within the park itself.⁸⁸ With Cape Breton's coal industry in decline in this period, the Nova Scotia government did not even bother debating the province's right to the park minerals and simply claimed them as its own. The provincial Minister of Mines bluntly told his federal counterpart,

The mineral right within the National Park belong to the Province and if any mineral occurrence of apparent economic value is found within its boundaries the province would definitely like to have arrangements made for the surface necessary to carry out its development and exploitation to give employment to persons displaced by the coal industry.⁸⁹

Northern Affairs and National Resources disagreed with this interpretation, of course, pointing out that the province had lost right to any minerals when it handed over the park land.⁹⁰ But the department was not actually opposed to park mineral extraction, since development would assist the provincial economy and show the federal government to be a gracious partner. The Canadian government allowed a Nova Scotia crew to survey throughout the park, the only conditions being that the work go unpublicized and that the superintendent be kept informed;⁹¹

⁸⁸ Victoria-Inverness Bulletin, 24 March 1954.

⁸⁹ M.A. Patterson, Minister of Mines, Nova Scotia, to Hon. George Prudham, Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys, Canada, 22 April 1954, RG84 vol.516, file CBH31 pt.1, NAC.

⁹⁰ The Parks Branch may very well have been wrong. Bankes states that an 1899 ruling makes clear that in a general land transfer from province to Canada, mineral rights are not transferred from provincial authority unless stated explicitly. And since Eastern parks like Cape Breton Highlands and Terra Nova were created by a simple land conveyance, "Without more, one must conclude in each case that the precious metals have remained vested in the provincial Crown." Bankes, p.227. In the case presented here, the Nova Scotia government that transferred the park land in 1936 certainly believed it had given up mineral rights. My point in introducing Bankes' opinion is not to prove what the national parks did or did not own, but only to show that inviolability does not have a firm legal foundation.

⁹¹ Robertson to Boyer, Deputy Minister of Mines, Nova Scotia, 25 May 1954, *ibid.* In spite of federal wishes, the surveying made the papers. See Halifax Chronicle-Herald, 19 and 20 May 1954.

the Parks Branch had to appear to be in complete control of park land. However, the survey results for the southwest corner of the Cape Breton Highlands park showed promise of diamonds and other minerals, making even the pretense of inviolability unsustainable. Nova Scotia's minister of mines stated,

Although the mineral rights belong to the Crown in the Right of the Province of Nova Scotia, yet we realize that National Park regulations prohibit the prospecting or development of minerals within its boundary. ... [W]e feel that it would be a reasonable request to change the Park boundary to the position indicated....⁹²

and with a red pencil, cropped a small section off a map of the park. In discussion of this proposal within its ministry, the Parks Branch offered surprisingly tame resistance. The southern part of the Highlands was too secluded to have any real value for park aesthetics or development, so it was deemed relatively expendable. The federal government agreed in the spring of 1956 to remove 13.3 square miles from the Cape Breton Highlands park. This was the same sort of compromise as had occurred at Spray Lakes in the 1920s: the province got the land it wanted for development, the federal ministry got to display beneficence towards its provincial counterparts,⁹³ and the Parks Branch could say that its principle of keeping parks free from resource extraction had held firm. And yet Cape Breton Highlands National Park, created less than 20 years earlier to be maintained forever, had been chipped away as a result of the first significant interest in its resources' traditional uses.

⁹² W.T. Dauphinee, Minister of Mines, Nova Scotia, to Prudham, 2 August 1955, RG84 vol.516, file CBH31 pt.1, NAC.

⁹³ This was worth some political capital. The Chronicle-Herald, 28 April 1956, spoke highly of the federal decision to omit the section from the park.

Having accepted one infringement on its Nova Scotia park, the Parks Branch almost immediately faced another. In October of 1956, representatives of the Nova Scotia Power Commission asked permission to land a seaplane on Cheticamp Lake in the southeastern part of the park's interior, and set up camp on its shore. This puzzled park staff, since the company would have to be working some distance outside the park.⁹⁴ Only then did the Parks Branch learn that the Power Commission had for months been considering a major hydroelectric project at Wreck Cove, a few miles outside the park's southern boundary. The provincial government of Liberal Premier Henry Hicks had set aside \$30 million for the utility (chaired by Hicks himself) to increase generating capacity and improve services.⁹⁵ The Power Commission now hoped to divert the Cheticamp River headwaters drainage basin centred at Cheticamp Lake away from its traditional course down the western side of the island, and instead send it off to the east to supply a hydro plant at Wreck Cove. In asking by telegram permission to survey the area, the Power Commission explained that it considered "Wreck Cove of deep significance to industrial future Cape Breton."⁹⁶

Park staff were unanimous in their opposition. The proposed project would largely dry up the Cheticamp River, lessening the aesthetic and recreational attraction of the western side of the park which was coincidentally undergoing extensive tourism development.⁹⁷ It would,

⁹⁴ G.D. Mader, Nova Scotia Power Commission, to Superintendent Doak, 22 October 1956, and Coleman to Doak, 2 November 1956, RG84 vol.998, file CBH68 vol.1, NAC.

⁹⁵ See Nova Scotia Power Commission, minutes of meetings, in H.D. Hicks papers, MG2 vol.1240, files 1 and 3, PANS.

⁹⁶ Morley Taylor, Nova Scotia Power Commission, to Côté, 2 November 1956, RG84 vol.998, file CBH68 vol.1, NAC.

⁹⁷ Scott to Hutchison, 22 November 1956, *ibid.*

according to the Canadian Wildlife Service, most certainly ruin the fishing that the park was trying to encourage, and draw the ire of the federal Department of Fisheries.⁹⁸ It would unfairly target a national park which had already sustained loss of land that very year, and it would more generally weaken the park system's claim to inviolability. Parks Chief Coleman made a direct parallel to the hydro project at Banff's Spray Lake, citing both the original damage it had caused the park system and subsequent damage caused by further hydro development there in the early and late 1940s.⁹⁹ For all these reasons, the Parks Branch pleaded with its ministry to allow it to turn down the province's request. Director James Hutchison told his deputy minister,

The Cape Breton Highlands National Park is one of the outstanding parks in the system. We are all aware of the favourable comment from visitors and of the pride that the people of Nova Scotia have taken in the park. If the park is eventually to fulfill its proper purpose the area now enclosed within the boundaries should be defended to the uttermost and the natural features of streams, lakes, mountains, forest cover, should not be sacrificed for the need of immediate commercial requirements.¹⁰⁰

Impressed, the department supported the Parks Branch's position. In early November, the assistant deputy minister wrote the Power Commission that its request to survey the Cheticamp Lake area and ultimately to divert the Cheticamp watershed had been refused.¹⁰¹

Within two weeks the federal position was reversed. The Power Commission could have its survey, though there was still no promise of

⁹⁸ W.W. Mair, Chief, Canadian Wildlife Service, 7 November 1956, RG22 vol.366, file 307.16.2 pt.1, NAC.

⁹⁹ Coleman to Hutchison, 7 November 1956, *ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ Hutchison to Robertson, 7 November 1956, *ibid.*

¹⁰¹ Côté to Taylor, 8 November 1956, *ibid.*

development.¹⁰² The turnaround was the result of heavy lobbying by the provincial government, in particular by Premier Hicks himself.¹⁰³ The only power that the Parks Branch could exercise in the matter was to act as if it was in complete control of the situation. It was agreed that the survey by Power Commission staff would be paid for by the Parks Branch and supposedly on its behalf, so it could "study" what a hydroelectric diversion would mean to the Cheticamp River salmon population. This may have been an effort to keep the survey from seeming a precedent for development, but it also prevented the Branch from voicing further opposition. When the Cheticamp Board of Trade heard about the survey for the proposed Wreck Cove diversion project, it told the federal ministry that it would "enter a strong protest on the grounds that it would be detrimental to the tourist industry, which has a great bearing on the economy of this area."¹⁰⁴ Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources Alvin Hamilton replied that there was apparently some misunderstanding: his own department was handling the survey, and "They are engaged only in determining the quantity of water flowing in the river and are not reporting in any manner upon the possibility of diversion from Cheticamp Lake."¹⁰⁵ By maintaining a pretense of complete control over what happened to the national park,

¹⁰² Coleman to Superintendent, 23 November 1956, RG84 vol.998, file CBH68 vol.1, NAC. See also Lesage to Governor General in Council, 29 November 1956, RG22 vol.366, file 307.16.2 pt.1, NAC.

¹⁰³ The 13 November minutes of the Nova Scotia Power Commission states, "Considerable discussion ensued in connection with the Wreck Cove development and the attitude of the National Park authorities in refusing the Commission access to the park for the purpose of surveys in the Cheticamp area." Chairman Hicks noted he had been talking to Robert Winters, the federal minister from Nova Scotia, about this, and thought it would be settled soon. H.D. Hicks papers, MG2 vol.1240, file 3, PANS.

¹⁰⁴ Simon P. Boudreau, Secretary, Cheticamp Board of Trade, to Hamilton, 25 September 1957, RG84 vol.998, file CBH68 vol.1, NAC.

¹⁰⁵ Hamilton to Boudreau, 8 October 1957, *ibid.*

the Parks Branch's opportunity to exercise real control was further limited.

The survey reported its findings in the fall of 1957, and the Nova Scotia Power Commission interpreted them to mean the Cheticamp watershed would be valuable to the Wreck Cove project. Of course, it then asked for the watershed. Parks Director J.R.B. Coleman was incensed: "I wish to go on record as being absolutely opposed to either the diversion of water from the Cheticamp River or any further reduction of the Park area."¹⁰⁶ Coleman was especially angered by the Power Commission's refusal to say whether the diversion was necessary for the project's success. Deputy Minister Robertson felt the same, noting, "It is not at all apparent to me, however, that the advantages of the Wreck Cove project with the diversion (as distinct from Wreck Cove without the diversion) are so outstanding as to justify an encroachment on one of our best national parks."¹⁰⁷

Though the federal ministry probably would have permitted the removal of park land for the hydro project anyway, the Parks Branch was mollified somewhat when the newly-elected Nova Scotia Premier Robert Stanfield offered to replace the Cheticamp Lake watershed with other land. His original suggestion was the northern tip of Inverness county (the northwest corner of Cape Breton Island) which had been originally intended as part of the park anyway. Upon consideration, though, the Parks Branch decided that the area consisted of barrens not conducive to tourism and not sufficiently attractive. Stanfield then offered five acres

¹⁰⁶ Coleman to Robertson, 16 October 1957, RG22 vol.366 file 307.16.2 pt.1, NAC.

¹⁰⁷ Robertson to Dinsdale, 21 October 1957, ibid.

of provincial land bordering Canada's historic site at Port Royal. This was land the Parks Branch was quite happy to get.¹⁰⁸

Having been promised land in return and assured that a token flow of water would continue down the Cheticamp River, the Branch no longer contested the Power Commission's threat to park inviolability. In early 1958, about ten square miles were removed from Cape Breton Highlands National Park's Cheticamp Lake area. The Canadian government held onto the land, waiting for word from Nova Scotia that it wanted the parcel transferred; that word did not come. The Power Commission decided that the Wreck Cove development was not viable after all, for the time being at least.

Fifteen years later, the Power Commission felt ready to move forward. Its plans were largely unchanged: build about 20 dams and dikes to control the water of over 80 square miles of the Cape Breton Highlands, directing this water to an underground powerhouse at Wreck Cove. Environmentalism had grown considerably in the interim, however, and the Commission faced considerable opposition from those who felt the plant would destroy fish habitat, flood some of the best moose range in the province, and taint some of the last remaining Nova Scotia wilderness.¹⁰⁹ Though the project was sure to affect Cape Breton Highlands National Park, the Parks Branch was largely silent during this period; it had fought and lost that battle in the 1950s. Wreck Cove,

¹⁰⁸ In the federal correspondence, handwritten beside the first suggestion of obtaining Port Royal land is the word "Wonderful!" See Robertson to Coleman, 6 November 1957, *ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ On the Wreck Cove debate in the 1970s, see "Wreck Cove Hydro-Electric Investigation," *Cape Breton's Magazine*, no.9 (October 1974), pp.4-11; and the Halifax newspaper *4th Estate*, 28 November 1974, 7 May 1975, 16 June and 1 December 1976, and 17 February 1977.

when completed in 1978, became an integral part of the Nova Scotia's energy system, immediately doubling the power produced in the province.¹¹⁰ The Cheticamp River is a shadow of its former self, most of its water diverted to the other side of Cape Breton. When visiting the park in the summer of 1994, I noticed that the large stones which once held the current as it flowed down out of the Highlands now merely hid the trickle as it ran underneath.

In the history of the parks studied here, there is no indication that the Parks Branch ever found improved ways to ensure that inviolability would be practised. It faced much the same difficulties in keeping park resources sacred in the 1950s as it had in the 1920s. At the time of the establishment of Terra Nova National Park, the Newfoundland government fought even more aggressively for its pro-development position than had provincial governments in the past, demanding and winning the right to pre-empt inviolability by leaving room in the land transfer for the future removal of timber. Newfoundland even forced Canada to take the park in two lots so that, as the agreement reads,

If at any future date the Province should require any of the lands described in Schedule "B" for the purpose of hydro-electric, or other commercial development, Canada will introduce into the Parliament of Canada such legislation as may be necessary to exclude from the Park all or any portion of the said lands described in Schedule "B".¹¹¹

Bankes calls this "a remarkable provision from a legal perspective" because it both tries to tell a future parliament how to act – which is not legally binding – and then only forces it to "introduce" legislation, not

¹¹⁰ Edward T. Bush, *A History of Hydro-Electric Development in Canada* (Ottawa: Historic Sites and Monuments Board, 1986), p.114.

¹¹¹ Federal-provincial agreement, 12 March 1957, cited in Bankes, p.225. See also Lothian, *A Brief History*, p.118.

demanding that such legislation ever be passed.¹¹² Just as the Parks Branch had difficulty codifying inviolability, Newfoundland had difficulty codifying violability.

The concessions that the Parks Branch made to public and private economic interests both willingly and unwillingly in the first Atlantic Canadian parks demonstrate how tenuous its hold on the park system really was. Parks existed because of the value they gave their land; if a greater value was found, the park's existence was in doubt. The dogma of park inviolability was perhaps needed to convince Canadians of the special sort of value that parks provided, but it was ultimately untruthful. The Parks Branch could no more honestly claim that it was protecting this plot of land forever than it could claim that this land, expropriated within the previous half century, was pristine wilderness. Just as a statute cannot bind future legislators to a certain act, a concept cannot bind future Canadians to an appreciation for parks. Inviolability could not be achieved through the shortcut of declaring it a timeless park principle; it demanded that park staff work at it every day and in every park under their jurisdiction.

erosion

Throughout its history, the Parks Branch's primary concern was in fulfilling what Minister of Interior Charles Stewart in 1930 had called "a pious hope": the perfect marriage of use and preservation. Parks staff had faith that a balance between the two could always be found, that they could, even as they sought to increase public patronage, also keep

¹¹² Bankes, p.225.

the park system intact and inviolate for future generations. But in the late 1950s, the Parks Branch for the first time began to doubt its ability to achieve this balance. As discussed in the beginning of the chapter, the parks were becoming very popular, perhaps too popular.

The park system's initial response was its traditional one, to build facilities that would satisfy tourists. Between 1953 and 1959, the Parks Branch's government appropriation quadrupled to \$24 million as the federal cabinet approved a major highway construction throughout the parks, and the construction of better accommodations, particularly campgrounds.¹¹³ The Canadian program mirrored the United States' Mission 66 program, initiated in 1956 to bring the Parks Service up to present needs.¹¹⁴ But the Parks Branch discovered, as did its American cousin, that this time development did not resolve the problem of overuse. Swift increases in park visitation meant that the new facilities were insufficient as soon as they were completed. Moreover, as Alfred Runte writes of the American case, "By enabling more tourists to visit the parks, they inevitably came."¹¹⁵ Better facilities for the masses led to more masses. The Parks Branch's 1959 annual report spoke of the Branch's need to know "how many can use the area without gradual

¹¹³ Canada, Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, Annual Reports, 1954-1960; and Lothian, A History, vol.4, p.21. The parks also benefited from Prime Minister Diefenbaker's federal-provincial winter works program, designed to foster employment during the recession of the late 1950s. Gerald Killan, Protected Places: A History of Ontario's Provincial Parks System (Toronto: Dundurn Press with the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 1993), p.107.

¹¹⁴ Runte, National Parks, p.107. The Mission 66 program resulted in the construction of 2800 miles of new and rebuilt roads, 936 miles of trail, 575 campgrounds, and much more. R. Gerald Wright, Wildlife Research and Management in the National Parks (Urbana and Chicago, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1992), p.23.

¹¹⁵ Runte, National Parks, p.107.

deterioration,"¹¹⁶ suggesting for the first time a niggling doubt about how well preservation and use could be balanced in the future.

Symbolic of the Branch's coming to terms with park use in the 1950s was the case of Robinson's Island in Prince Edward Island National Park. Robinson's Island – or Rustico Island, as it would come to be called by the Parks Branch¹¹⁷ – was a three-mile-long green-bean shaped island in the middle of the park, between the Cavendish-Rustico section to the west and the Brackley-Dalvay section to the east. Its west end was little more than sand, though in the late 19th century this was home to the Seaside Hotel and a number of fishing stages. The hotel burned down at the turn of the century, and the island was little used in the years to follow. When Williamson and Cromarty examined the proposed park land in 1936, they do not even seem to have noticed the island's existence. The Higgs commission in charge of calculating prices for the park expropriation recommended Robinson's Island be excluded since it would be expensive to buy, but it became part of the park nevertheless.¹¹⁸ No immediate use was found for it, so for 15 years it

¹¹⁶ Canada, Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, Annual Report, 1959, p.41.

¹¹⁷ Robinsons had bought the island since 1838, and owned all or part of it for the next century. It was known by a number of names over the years, but atlases of the late 19th and early 20th centuries call it Robinson's Island, and it even went by that name during park expropriation. In fact, many Prince Edward Islanders continue to call it Robinson's Island. Though it is not known whether the island had ever been previously known as Rustico Island, it is clear that the Parks Branch preferred the new designation because it did not suggest past ownership, and in 1960 they had the name change made official. I will refer to it as Robinson's Island so as not to confuse the reader with Rustico, on the mainland.

¹¹⁸ Though the Higgs commissioners recommended excluding the island, they also suggested prices of \$2900 for Cleve Robinson and \$3200 for Percy MacAusland, the two owners. Robinson negotiated a \$5000 settlement. MacAusland, though, refused to settle, and only accepted \$5000 in 1942 with a promise from Premier Thane Campbell that this would not keep him from seeking more. Thane Campbell papers, RG7 series 14, box 30, subseries 1 file 749, and subseries 2 file 753, PAPEI. MacAusland would fight to regain his land or get a better price for it for the next 30 years. See, for example, "Asks Queen's




Figure 16. Robinson's Island, 1880.
 From Meacham's Atlas, 1880, reprinted in The Island Magazine, no.33
 (Spring/Summer 1993), p.12.

was allowed to be the most wild and inaccessible part of Prince Edward Island National Park.

Following the war, the Parks Branch considered how to best use all parts of the P.E.I. park. The park's prime feature was obviously its shoreline, so improvements of the roads along the shore were given top priority. Grading, gravelling, and hard-surfacing the road from Rustico to Cavendish was begun, as was similar work along the eastern end of the park. With this work under way, staff began to toy with a more ambitious project: linking the two ends of Robinson's Island with the mainland to the west and east. This would fulfill a number of worthwhile objectives. First, it would make the park a single coherent unit; at present, visitors travelling from one end of the park to another had to exit the park, drive a dozen miles, and re-enter.¹¹⁹ Second, it would create a single scenic drive, showing the park to best advantage. Third, it would open up Robinson's Island to development. Prince Edward Island supported the project for all these reasons – plus, of course, it would bring federal funds and construction jobs to the province.¹²⁰

There was another reason, a curious one, why linking Robinson's Island seemed a good idea. The harbour between the island and the

Help for Hearing," Eastern Graphic, 2 June 1976.

¹¹⁹ This was not just of interest to the Parks Branch: the provincial tourism industry wanted the park to be more easily accessed. In 1957, the P.E.I. Innkeepers Association wrote that "our National Park remains divided up into three or four isolated areas without any direct connection between them, and consequently Islanders anxious to motor through and show off our Park are completely frustrated in the attempt and have been now since the inception of this Park 20 years ago. We feel certain that that same frustration is experienced daily each summer by countless thousands of our visiting Tourists to this Province." P.E.I. Innkeepers Association to Lesage, 30 May 1957, RG22 vol.476, file 33.21.6 pt.1, NAC.

¹²⁰ Charlottetown Patriot, 14 February 1949. See also Charlottetown Patriot, 30 July, 16 and 17 August 1951.

community of Rustico just outside the park to the west – Big Harbour, as it was called – constantly silted up. The resultant shallowness was a danger to fishermen working out of Rustico. Engineers deduced that if a causeway was built between the island and the eastern mainland – that is, across Little Harbour – then the increasing volume through Big Harbour would help scour it much more efficiently. Local fishermen would have a deeper, safer harbour.¹²¹ That was the theory, but no one knew for sure. Fishermen were less optimistic, reckoning that more tidal movement at Big Harbour could just as easily mean more silting.¹²² Work began on the Little Harbour causeway in 1953 regardless, while staff continued to study what was going to happen. Two years later, with it nearing completion, Parks Director Hutchison would still describe it as work "which I understand is of an experimental nature...."¹²³

The Little Harbour causeway was completed in 1955. Sand soon accumulated along its length, and Robinson's Island became, in essence, a peninsula. The same year, Parliament approved a major highway program for Canadian National Parks to better serve the rising wave of tourists. As part of this program Prince Edward Island National Park

¹²¹ Dr. S.S. Masur, "Rustico Estuary Investigation, 1952-1953" report, cited in W.S. Veale, District Director, Department of Public Works, to Regional Director, Department of Public Works, 14 May 1971, Box 5, PEINP files.

¹²² Fishermen were divided on the issue. The province's Fisheries Development Committee endorsed a causeway to Rustico, in the hopes of improving the harbour. This is mentioned in Deputy Minister Young to Winters, 29 April 1953, RG22 vol.476, file 33.21.6 pt.1, NAC. However, the Parks Branch received warnings from Rustico fishermen that a causeway would ruin the harbour. This is documented in W.S. Veale, "The Fisherman's Case," Veale to Regional Director, Department of Public Works, 14 May 1971, Box 5, PEINP files. The fishermen's opinions probably did not carry much weight either way: ultimately, there were too many attractive reasons for the construction of a road across Robinsons Island for it not to go through. One Rustico fisherman put this more bluntly: "No use talking to engineers, might as well talk to a gull." Beecher Court interview with Fred Horne, S2.290, PEINP files.

¹²³ Hutchison to Jackson, 21 March 1955, RG22 vol.476, file 33.21.6 pt.1, NAC.

received funds for a Gulf Shore Parkway, a reconstruction of existing shore roads to Trans-Canada Highway conditions. The \$2.8 million project was to be capped off with a \$500,000 high trestle bridge across Big Harbour to Robinson's Island. This would be in addition to previously planned developments in the park, such as the completion of the new Cavendish campground, improvements to Brackley Beach's, and the eventual construction of facilities on Robinson's Island. Despite the speed and scope of these planned changes, the Branch showed no sign of trepidation. After a visit to the park, Deputy Minister Robertson even justified the development by saying,

While it is only a long, thin strip of land, the area that is available for actual use by people is, I think, as great as we have in almost any other park. In the case of Cape Breton Highlands Park, it is really only the coast portions of the Cabot Trail that are available for "enjoyment" by the people of Canada. In the case of Fundy Park, it is only the headquarters area, Bennett Lake, and for scenic purposes the twelve-miles of road. Prince Edward Island Park has, I should think, more enjoyable and useful space than either of them.¹²⁴

But in the late 1950s, park staff received an omen that their dreams for seemingly unlimited use might be unattainable. With the causeway at Little Harbour having closed off the east end of Robinson's Island, stronger tide movement began to eat away at the sandy west end of the island. Noticeable chunks of the island eroded away. As a result, Public Works engineers admitted that more study would be needed before a bridge to Rustico could be considered.¹²⁵ The Gulf Shore Highway and other developments proceeded regardless, which both accommodated and encouraged the mounting volume of visitations,

¹²⁴ Robertson report to Hutchison, 10 August 1955, RG22 vol.317, file 33.21.1 pt.3, NAC.

¹²⁵ See Hutchison to Robertson, 27 June 1957, RG22 vol.476, file 33.21.6 pt.1, NAC.




Figure 17. Robinson's [Rustico] Island, 1960-1990.
 From Todd L. Keith, The Cumulative Effects of Development and Land Use at Prince Edward Island National Park, Parks Canada Technical Reports in Ecosystem Science no.0002 (Halifax: Parks Canada, Atlantic Region, 1996), p.24.

which doubled at Prince Edward Island National Park between 1957 and 1960.

W.F. Lothian writes in the authorized history of the Canadian parks system, "During the years following 1955, operations of the National Parks Branch had expanded to an extent that the existing organization was experiencing difficulty in carrying out its functions and responsibilities at a level of efficiency expected by the Department."¹²⁶ It was felt, among other things, that too many decisions were being made on a short-sighted, day-to-day basis. A Planning Section was created to look at park policies in long-range terms. The chief of this section, Lloyd Brooks, visited Prince Edward Island park in 1960, and was appalled by what he saw there. "Unfortunately," he wrote, "this Trans Canada type highway is now nearly completed in a manner and to a standard which is unrelated to the whole concept of national park use."¹²⁷ He listed its faults: it disregarded natural topography, it encouraged speeding, it permitted shoulder parking, and worst of all it forced a major development straight through the middle of the entire park. As for Robinson's Island, development there had resulted "in the destruction of the single geographic feature which had a chance of surviving in a relatively natural state in spite of continued heavy use in the rest of the park."¹²⁸ He hoped that rather than choosing to go ahead with plans to connect it with Rustico, the Parks Branch would help fund a road

¹²⁶ Lothian, A History, vol.4, p.21.

¹²⁷ Lloyd Brooks, "Planning Considerations, Prince Edward Island National Park," January 1960, Box 17, PEINP files.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

around Rustico Bay, outside the park. This would be "more consistent with park ideals and much less costly."¹²⁹

But the federal ministry could not so easily admit failure. After a 1960 trip to the park, Deputy Minister Robertson explained that the Parks Branch faced other factors, when he reported on a 1960 trip to the park:

The change in the Park since 1957 – and especially since 1955 – is quite remarkable. We have made very great progress indeed in improving the facilities, but the increased use is so tremendous that it is doubtful whether we have really gained much ground. ... Mr. Brooks has expressed the view that it was an error to build the road onto Rustico Island and thus eliminate the chance of preserving it. In principle, this may be right, but I think in fact it is and would be quite impossible. The pressure of use is too great to allow that relatively large area to be untouched.¹³⁰

At a time when facility expansion plans set for 1962 were already proving insufficient for tourist needs in 1960, the Parks Branch could not possibly limit development, Robertson concluded. However, having seen the destruction of the west end of Robinson's Island, he acknowledged that it was probably hopeless to build a bridge there. The deputy minister instead suggested a bridge heading southwest off the island, cutting down the amount of travel outside the park. This was preferable to stopping the road on Robinson's Island altogether because, "It would make the construction of the road (at least at its high standard) along Rustico Island largely a waste. It would also, I am sure, bring sharp

¹²⁹ *Ibid.* The longterm environmental effects of the Gulf Shore Parkway are discussed in Todd L. Keith, The Cumulative Effects of Development and Land Use at Prince Edward Island National Park, Parks Canada Technical Reports in Ecosystem Science no.0002 (Halifax: Parks Canada, Atlantic Region, 1996), pp.22-25.

¹³⁰ Robertson report to Coleman, 6 August 1960, RG22 vol.899, file 316.1 vol.1, NAC.

criticism from the people of the province."¹³¹ After reading Deputy Minister Robertson's report, the superintendent of Prince Edward Island National Park put it more bluntly : "he feels it will emphasize a 'boob' on the Department's part."¹³²

This was one time when not even a deputy minister's will was sufficient. Because of the causeway built on the eastern end of Robinson's Island, the western end continued to erode away and the harbour entrance at Rustico silted up more than ever. Attempts to reinforce the island's western wall proved useless, as did repeated dredging of the harbour. In 1954, the park had stopped construction of roadway 1400 yards from the western end of Rustico Island. By 1968, the tide had taken so much of the island that its new tip was now only about 600 yards away. After continuing, constant erosion – including the loss of 100 yards of land in a single October night in 1975 – the widened Big Harbour reached within 125 yards of the Gulf Shore Highway.¹³³ By that time, the Parks Branch had officially announced that the plan to link the island with Rustico was abandoned.¹³⁴

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² Superintendent Kipping to Strong, 25 August 1960, Box 17, PEINP files.

¹³³ These figures are from assorted letters, maps, and photos, *ibid.* For reports on the erosion, see Charlottetown *Guardian*, "Robinson's Island Loses Another Section of Causeway," 30 March 1976, and "Fishermen Lay Blame on Man," 17 April 1976.

¹³⁴ Charlottetown *Patriot*, 23 December 1971; *Journal-Pioneer*, 24 and 27 December 1971. The department had been pressured to make a decision for years. Member of Parliament Heath Macquarrie had complained in Parliament in 1970, "So while we find in Prince Edward Island that we are not able to get a crossing from our island to the mainland, we also discover it is apparently impossible to bridge the mouth of a very small fishing harbour. It is hard to explain why the feasibility studies on the bridge were not done before the expensive, so-called connecting highway was laid. How difficult it is to explain to the people of Canada, the people of P.E.I., that while the U.S. can get a man on the moon, and the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. can place equipment on or around Mars and Venus with great precision, all the forces of the government of Canada cannot cross Rustico Harbour." Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 14 February 1970, p.4048.

The erosion of Robinson's Island was admittedly an unusual case: the strain of rapidly increased use which began in the late 1950s more often caused a metaphorical rather than literal wearing away of the national parks. But the lesson to the Parks Branch was the same. Visitor interest and visitor demands on parks were proving so great that the department could not hope to keep up, and to do so would mean the destruction of the very elements of what it was mandated to preserve. In the 1960s the Parks Branch would decide that preserving parks for future generations meant limiting to a degree even those uses for which the parks had been created. The alternative, like the Gulf Shore Highway that trailed off the end of Robinson's Island, was a road to nowhere.

Chapter 8 Changing Ecologies: Preservation in Four Atlantic Canadian National Parks, 1935-1965

The period 1935 to 1965 is an interesting one for studying the day-to-day management of preservation issues in parks, precisely because it is a time when the park system is believed to have been unchanging. There is traditionally a pause in Canadian national park histories between the 1930 Parks Act and the rise of environmental interest in parks in the 1960s. Kevin McNamee's 25-page "From Wild Places to Endangered Spaces: A History of Canada's National Parks," for example, gives this 30-year period two small paragraphs.¹ A central reason for this neglect is that the system did not grow much in these decades: there were only four new parks, and they were all relatively small. There was a sense within the Parks Branch that the system was now complete, demanding only eternal vigilance to maintain.² Much the same attitude was present in the United States national park system, which saw the creation of only five new natural areas between 1940 and 1959. An American park historian has aptly titled this period the "we think we've done it all" era – and, also aptly, she then spends little time discussing it.³

¹ McNamee, p.28.

² In 1938, Commissioner F.H.H. Williamson noted, "In Canadian Parks possibly the development has reached a point where we should call a halt on new work and confine ourselves simply to the improvement, completion, and maintenance of existing works." Williamson to Gibson, 4 January 1938, RG84 vol.2101, file U172 (6), NAC.

³ Susan Power Bratton, "National Park Management and Values," Environmental Ethics,

The general neglect of this period by historians is surprising, however, when one considers that in both Canada and the United States the 1960s is seen as one of the most important decades in park history. In that decade in both countries, the size of the park system mushroomed, there came to be greater public respect for the parks' preservationist philosophy, and massively increased park visitation led to debate on how to curb development. The North American-wide environmental movement is seen as so central to all of this that the park system's own histories are presumed to be irrelevant; the 1960s were born fully-grown. In this chapter, I will argue that in fact the decades leading up to the 1960s were instrumental to the shaping of park preservationist policies. In its treatment of fish, wildlife, and vegetation, the Canadian National Parks Branch took an increasingly hands-on approach during the 1940s and 1950s, until – recognizing the ecological, philosophical, and political failures of its actions – it sought to become less interventionist in the 1960s. At both stages, it justified its approach by invoking the name of science.⁴

vol.7 (Summer 1985), pp.119, 126-7.

⁴ I acknowledge a danger in extending my argument into the United States, and even – as will be discussed in the following paragraph – locating my own work in relation to two historians writing on American parks. It is true that I am using the American case to learn more about Canada, and using the Canadian case to suggest something about the American one. However, I think this can be defended. As this chapter will make clear, my research indicates many confluences between the American and Canadian situations in everything from predator policy to post-World War II budget growth. On a related point, Canadian biologists in this period were generally trained in the States, and the Canadian Parks Branch depended on its American sister agency for advice in establishing and implementing policies. For secondary material, I was forced to depend on American sources because so little was available on Canadian national parks, wildlife, or ecological science from the 1930s to the 1960s. This thesis was written too late for me to incorporate Stephen Bocking's comparative history of environmental science in Britain, Canada, and the United States, (to be published in 1997); and prior to Thomas Dunlap's history of environmental policy in Canada, the U.S., New Zealand and Australia; and Sandy Burnett's history of the Canadian Wildlife Service (both to be published in 1998). For more on the relation between American and Canadian science in national parks, see my "Rationality and Rationalization."

This chapter is a response to the interpretations on the role of science in parks offered by American historians Thomas Dunlap⁵ and Richard West Sellars,⁶ both writing on the interwar years. Dunlap, looking at the American and the Canadian park systems, sees park biologists as essential in transmitting to the public a rational justification for valuing wildlife and wilderness. Biologists were able to defend successfully such ideas as predator protection and biodiversity because they possessed the badge of authority granted by science. Their work encouraged the slow growth of a public environmental sensibility which fully blossomed in the 1960s. Sellars, in contrast, sees the park biologists' influence in the 1930s to be ephemeral, even within the park administration. As early as the end of that decade, foresters, developers, and landscape architects were gaining control of the parks, and they would enjoy that control unopposed until the 1960s. The environmental movement that then developed, Sellars notes, was not the result of the continuing influence of park scientists. In fact, it was sharply critical of current park management practices.

My research suggests a middle road between these two arguments. As Dunlap contends, science gave preservation issues prominence from the 1930s on, and was always essential in formulating what park policies would be. However, this does not mean that science advocated a "leave nature alone" policy that we now would consider more

⁵ Thomas Dunlap, "Wildlife, Science, and the National Parks, 1920-1940," Pacific Historical Review, (May 1990), pp.187-202, and "Ecology, Nature and Canadian National Parks Policy: Wolves, Elk, and Bison as a Case Study," To See Ourselves/To Save Ourselves, pp.139-147.

⁶ Richard West Sellars, "The Rise and Decline of Ecological Attitudes in National Park Management, 1929-1940," The George Wright Forum, vol.10 no.1 (1993), pp.55-77; vol.10 no.2 (1993), pp.79-108; vol.10 no.3 (1993), pp.38-54.

environmentalist. As Sellars contends, the spirit of the times called for intervention; in the late 1940s and 1950s in particular, preservation was an active process. Science was used to justify all manner of intervention, from the stocking of park lakes to the killing of "surplus" wildlife.

Whereas Sellars and Dunlap see scientists as antithetical to the landscape architects, planners, and foresters that prospered in the American park system post-war, I see them in the Canadian case as all sharing a managerial ethos. The perceived rationality of science rationalized humanity's attempt to improve on nature.

wildlife

It may seem surprising that a thesis on national parks could travel so far with virtually no mention of wildlife. But this reflects the Parks Branch's general lack of interest in the wildlife that the new Maritime parks contained. This is evident in the reports on the planned parks in the 1930s. In passing, Cautley expressed satisfaction with Cape Breton Highlands' wildlife potential solely because deer were present, and because moose and caribou, though absent, could be restocked.⁷ No other wildlife was mentioned. After inspecting the proposed Prince Edward Island National Park, Williamson and Cromarty stated only that "the same yardstick" could not apply to this park as others, because "It is not essentially a wilderness sanctuary for animal life...." To compensate for this, they recommended that the North Shore waters be set off as a fish reserve, "in the same way as the Western National Parks

⁷ Cautley report on Nova Scotia sites, 1934, pp.57, 58, and 76.

act as reservoirs for game."⁸ Of the first three parks, the future Fundy had the most wildlife to its credit. In 1930, Cautley called the Albert County site "first class moose and deer country" and gave it a rating of 80 out of 100.⁹ Still, in his reports on Fundy in 1930 and 1936, and in Smart's in 1937, deer and moose were the only two animals referred to. If Fundy had any other living creatures, they did not merit mention.

Why was there so little interest in the wildlife of Maritime parks? The most direct reason was the Branch's belief that no place in the region had wildlife that satisfied the national park ideal. To an agency used to relying on bear, moose, elk, deer, buffalo, and even large predators like wolves and mountain lions to attract tourists and to prove that it hosted real nature, the animals in the Atlantic provinces hardly compared. Small animals such as foxes, skunks, and porcupines (not to mention insects, birds, and amphibians) might be abundant in these parks, but they would hardly draw tourists. There were just not enough different kinds of big mammals, and too few of the kinds that were there.¹⁰

⁸ Williamson and Cromarty report on P.E.I. sites, 28 July 1936, RG84 vol.1777, file PEI2 vol.1 pt.2, NAC.

⁹ Cautley report on New Brunswick sites, 1930, pp.15 and 17.

¹⁰ There is a large literature on human perceptions of animals. A standard text, though defined more by its subtitle than its title, is Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800 (Middlesex: Penguin, 1983). See also John Berger's essay "Why Look at Animals?" from his About Looking (New York: Pantheon, 1979); on conservation, John A. Livingston, The Fallacy of Wildlife Conservation (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1981); on animal rights, Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethic for Our Treatment of Animals (New York: Avon, 1977); and on the history of environmental ethics Lisa Mighetto, Wild Animals and American Environmental Ethics (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1991). A good introduction to 20th century North American attitudes is Stephen R. Kellert, "Historical Trends in Perceptions and Uses of Animals in Twentieth Century America," Environmental History Review, vol.9 no.1 (Spring 1985) pp.19-33.

Wildlife played a minor role in the creation of the first Maritime parks for other reasons. For one thing, wildlife management had a secondary place in the Branch's organization. The Dominion Wildlife Division had been established in 1918 as a small agency within the Parks Branch, but its staff was very small and preoccupied with enforcement of the Migratory Bird Regulations Act; indeed, staff had been hired for their expertise in ornithology.¹¹ Although the Wildlife Division could and did communicate the latest scientific information to the Parks Branch, it was administrators within the Branch itself who ultimately made policy. An example of this on the national level was the Parks Branch's management of predators such as wolves and mountain lions in the 1930s. Reading animal population studies from the United States, the Wildlife Division's Supervisor of Wildlife Protection Hoyes Lloyd¹² grew convinced that predators offered a natural and necessary check on prey populations. He sought to convince Commissioner Harkin that the practice of killing predators in Canadian parks should be discontinued, and wrote lengthy reports to that effect in the early 1930s. Harkin used Lloyd's reports to fight proponents of increased kills (though he did not take the advice to stop killing predators altogether).¹³ And yet, since the Division existed, there was no need to hire biologists or other natural scientists within the Branch itself. The result was that the Parks Branch

¹¹ For the Wildlife Division and the origin of wildlife research in Canada, see Lothian, A History, vol.4, p.55-59; D.H. Pimlott, C.J. Kerswill, and J.R. Bider, Scientific Activities in Fisheries and Wildlife Resources, Special study #15 (Ottawa: Science Council of Canada, 1971), p.112; Ian McTaggart Cowan, "A Naturalist-Scientist's Attitudes Towards National Parks," Canadian Audubon, vol.26, May 1964. 93-96; and Gail Lotenborg, "Wildlife Management Trends in the Canadian and U.S. Federal Governments, 1870-1995," unpublished report for Parks Canada, 1995, no pagination.

¹² Lloyd's formal training was as a chemist, but he came to the Wildlife Division because of his interest in ornithology. On Lloyd, see Foster, pp.159-161.

¹³ MacEachern, "Rationality and Rationalization," pp.204-205.

was staffed with foresters, engineers, and bureaucrats who lacked training with wildlife. It is worth noting that among those who inspected Maritime parks and initially assessed the variety and range of wildlife there were the engineers Cautley and Cromarty, the forester Smart, and the career bureaucrat Williamson.

The Wildlife Division itself leaned toward non-intervention in the 1930s, as a result of simultaneously following the most traditional and the most innovative strands of biology. Following the centuries-old tradition of natural history, the Division saw its primary goals to be classifying all park species, and obtaining information about them. Following the latest practices in ecology – the twentieth century science that studies relationships between organisms – the wildlife officers believed that all species act together in concert, and that actions affecting one population might seriously affect others.¹⁴ This was why, for example, Hoyes Lloyd opposed predator extermination policies: the results of intervention were unforeseen and thus by their nature unwanted.¹⁵ Lloyd won a friend on this issue with the promotion of F.H.H. Williamson as Harkin's replacement in 1936. More so than Harkin, Williamson was aware of and responsive to the latest findings in

¹⁴ For ecology in this period, see Donald Worster, Nature's Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994 [1977]). On ecology in the national parks, see Sellars, "The Rise and Decline," and Dunlap, "Wildlife."

¹⁵ North American biologists were greatly affected by the lessons learned in the Kaibab National Forest in Arizona. U.S. Biological Survey staff had cleansed this game preserve of all predators by 1920, and in subsequent years the deer population exploded. All foliage was soon picked clean, and by 1925 starvation wiped out much of the herd. In Discordant Harmonies: A New Ecology for the Twenty-First Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), Daniel Botkin offers a valuable critique of the simplistic lessons learned from the Kaibab. Essentially, he points out that deer and predator populations do not simply move up and down in relation to one another. This ignores all other variables in their environment, and factors their "value" strictly by their absence or presence in the system. See also Thomas Dunlap, "That Kaibab Myth," Journal of Forest History, vol.32 (1988), pp.60-68.

ecological research, and used cases of predator eradication leading to prey irruptions as cautionary tales against tinkering with nature. This is not to say that the park system under Williamson practiced complete non-intervention: some predators were still killed, animals were collected for museums and zoos, and parks were stocked with "useful" wildlife. But it may be said that when the Cape Breton Highlands and Prince Edward Island National Parks were established, North American ecologists were wary of human attempts to regulate wildlife numbers, and had convinced the Canadian Wildlife Division and the National Parks Branch itself to think likewise.¹⁶

At the same time that scientists were re-evaluating the management of park wildlife, administrators were changing their idea of wildlife's role in the parks. In the first decades of the century, Canadian national parks had often been justified on the basis that they were sanctuaries, where game species would have the freedom to grow and prosper and then wander off to be killed by hunters.¹⁷ Fish and game organizations largely came to accept the argument that sanctuaries of all sorts ultimately helped to maintain healthy wildlife breeding stock.¹⁸

¹⁶ More research is needed on the effect that the Depression had on Canadian wildlife preservation policies. In the United States, it has been said of Franklin Roosevelt's 1930s that "No other decade or administration did so much to save wildlife." Donald Worster, An Unsettled Country, p.77. See also Theodore W. Cart, "'New Deal' for Wildlife: A Perspective on Federal Conservation Policy, 1933-40," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, vol.62 (July 1972), pp.113-120.

¹⁷ Parks Commissioner James Harkin was seen as Canada's greatest advocate of sanctuaries, in national parks as well as in provincial and public reserves. For Harkin's interest in sanctuaries, see Foster, especially pp.88, 198, and 206, as well as his own "Wildlife Sanctuaries," Rod and Gun in Canada, October 1919. On sanctuaries in general, see Ira N. Gabrielson, Wildlife Refuges (New York: MacMillan, 1943), and Worster, Nature's Economy, pp.259-60 and An Unsettled Country, pp.76-77.

¹⁸ Some hunters mistakenly believed that parks were sanctuaries for hunting rather than sanctuaries from them. In 1942, Superintendent of Prince Edward Island National Park Ernest Smith thought this belief prevalent enough that he asked his superiors if he could advertise in local papers that hunting was forbidden in the park. RG84 vol.23, file

In the 1920s and 1930s, fish and game groups in New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and even Prince Edward Island were instrumental in pushing for parks in their provinces.

However, in the same period parks were proving their worth increasingly in terms of tourism, and the Parks Branch was finding less need to promote them as sanctuaries. If sportsmen wanted a reserve, they should ask their province to set one up. The presumed absence of wildlife in the proposed Maritime parks, while unfortunate, was thus not catastrophic. A park had to have remarkable scenery; it could, if necessary, import wildlife.¹⁹ Of course, the Branch was not likely to tell fish and game organizations doing much of the local legwork in promoting parks that the park-as-sanctuary idea did not hold the importance it once had. Instead, staff complained to Ottawa that the locals did not understand what national parks were all about. For instance, when visiting New Brunswick in 1930, Cautley discovered that the National Park Committee was composed almost exclusively of men from fish and game associations, and that the provincial government supported the Committee's recommendation of the Mt. Carleton site on the grounds that it was already a hunting locale. On the first page of his report, Cautley noted, "These gentlemen do not seem to have had sufficient information as to the general requirements for the success of a

PEI300, NAC. When Fundy was established, Egbert Elliott of Alma wrote the National Parks Branch asking if he could set up a tourist business that would cater to hunters. RG84 vol.1024, file F16, NAC.

¹⁹ In his instructions to Cautley prior to the engineer's inspection of Cape Breton in 1934, Harkin wrote, "The preservation of all game is a cardinal principle of National Parks administration. At the same time it must be remembered that a National Park is something far greater than a mere game preserve and that there is a great deal of country which would make a first class game preserve but which would not have any value as a National Park." 4 September 1934, RG84 vol.983, file CBH2 vol.1 pt.2, NAC.

National Park."²⁰ As each of the first three Maritime parks was established, local fish and game clubs reacted identically: first with delight that their work had borne fruit, then with surprise that the Branch was acting so slowly to increase game populations, and finally with anger when it was clear that the park was uninterested in improving hunting outside its boundary.

In sum, scientific, administrative, political, and aesthetic positions might reasonably have been expected to have kept the Parks Branch from an interventionist wildlife policy in Cape Breton Highlands and Prince Edward Island National Parks in the years following their creation. However, the point is largely moot. The arrival of the Second World War in 1939 allowed little thought or opportunity of wildlife management for most of the next decade. Since wildlife in the first two Maritime parks was deemed relatively insignificant and not even threatened by large predators, for the time being setting up a park boundary and hiring wardens was considered management enough.

Ottawa did receive monthly wildlife reports from the superintendents of the two parks during the war. Having no training in animal biology either before or after taking their jobs, superintendents did little more than list creatures they saw during hikes. Not surprisingly, the reports make reference only to large, "significant" animals. The November 1939 report from Cape Breton Highlands, for example, refers only to 70 deer, 104 grouse, 127 rabbits, 6 red foxes, 17 bald eagles, 2 blue herons, 4 muskrats, and 7 Canada geese.²¹ Staff were happy to see that wildlife populations were generally on the rise, thanks

²⁰ Cautley report on New Brunswick sites, 1930, p.1.

²¹ Ibid.

to the sanctuary offered by the new parks.²² In 1941, in keeping with the spirit of Cape Breton Highlands, its superintendent sent Ottawa a complete list of park animal, bird, and fish species in both English and Gaelic.²³

The only interventionist policy practiced in these parks during the war was the attempted reintroduction of moose and beaver to Cape Breton Highlands. At the Park Branch's request, two colonies of beaver were captured, crated, moved, and released by the Nova Scotia Department of Lands and Forests in 1938. One of the colonies survived the move, though the other one, like a group of moose transferred the same year, was not so fortunate.²⁴ The justification for these reintroductions was that these animals had been native to the park area, but had been extirpated by the humans there in the past century. They should be returned, then, to restore the park to its pristine condition.

This might seem to be an endorsement by the Parks Branch of what was still a radical idea in park wildlife management. In the United States, biologist Joseph Grinnell in the 1920s and the authors of the 1933 Fauna of the National Parks of the United States had met resistance for proposing that parks be returned to their original state, with native species reintroduced and exotic ones removed.²⁵ But the Cape Breton

²² Following traditional notions about "good" and "bad" animals, special notice was made of predators in the parks. From Cape Breton Highlands, the August 1939 report states, "The predatory animals are bound to increase with the increase in game. Foxes and black bears seem to be increasing. There does not seem to be any necessity for controlling predators as long as wildlife is on the increase." *Ibid.* Much the same was said in following months, but no predator eradication policies were introduced (or even suggested by the superintendent).

²³ Superintendent J.P. MacMillan to Smart, 27 October 1941, *ibid.*

²⁴ See RG84 vol.140, file CBH272, NAC for the beaver reintroduction. Mention of the moose transfer is made in Williamson to Sarty, RG84 vol.1002, file CBH300 vol.1 pt.3.

²⁵ Sellars, "The Rise and Decline," vol.10 no.1, pp.62-65.

Highlands case was not revolutionary. Though it was true that beaver and moose were native but absent, they were ultimately chosen for reintroduction because they were attractive to tourists and to the Branch's idea of what wildlife a park should have.²⁶ Bringing them back certainly intruded on existing biological conditions, but this was more of a blip in the wildlife policy of the time than a sign of change. These were one-time-only interventions, and once released the new park residents were left on their own. It was taken for granted that nature would help its own, after this initial push from park staff.

Biologist C.H.D. Clarke's arrival at Cape Breton Highlands in 1942 to report on its wildlife is the Branch's first sign of sustained interest in the animals of the Maritime parks. Yet his report also shows the conservative nature of wildlife research at the time. Clarke, hired as the Wildlife Division's mammalogist in 1938 (and its first staffer not trained in birds), offered an essentially hands-off plan in keeping with the time. He wrote that the population fluctuations resulting from the creation of the new park were of great scientific interest but they should only be monitored and not directed. "They are absolutely natural phenomena and we have no concern in trying to interfere with them."²⁷ Instead, the Branch's management of wildlife should be limited to protecting all species (predators included), obtaining all possible information on their populations, and restoring vanished species – though only moose and caribou were mentioned. Clarke was careful to note that only the native variety of woodland caribou still present in Gaspé, not the Newfoundland caribou, should be considered for introduction: "For one

²⁶ Also, reintroduction of species killed off by locals in the past was a way of defending the park's legitimate takeover of the land and its resources.

²⁷ C.H.D. Clarke report, 23 March 1942, p.5, RG84 vol.1002, file CBH300 pt.3, NAC.

thing, survival would be doubtful; for another, it is not desirable to introduce exotic species into the parks."²⁸

The Parks Branch showed a desire to protect native species even in the most prosaic management decisions of this period. From Prince Edward Island National Park, Superintendent Smith complained in 1942 that skunks were rooting up lawns and might soon move to the golf course. The Branch's new Controller, James Smart, refused to let them be killed "[a]s a National Park should contain normal populations of all species of wildlife native to the region," even the lowly skunk.²⁹ Smart sought C.H.D. Clarke out for confirmation of his views, and was able to write the Superintendent in a follow-up note that "It should be borne in mind that the excavations made by skunks in golf courses are actually in search of insects which are themselves quite destructive to turf."³⁰ The Parks Branch felt sufficiently sure of its position on this issue that it stood firm when the provincial government complained that the park was becoming a breeding ground for skunks. Smart wrote, "The claim that the park is harbouring the skunks and actually is a breeding ground for an overflow into the surrounding country I think is rather a far-

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.7. In another case of rejecting exotic but otherwise desirable species during this period, the Parks Branch declined the offers of Pheasants Unlimited on Prince Edward Island and the provincial fish and game association of Nova Scotia to let pheasants loose in the respective parks because they were not native birds. Harrison Lewis of the Wildlife Division even suggested that if pheasants began to arrive from outside the parks and adversely affected native wildlife, they should be controlled. Lewis to Spero, 3 May 1946, RG84 vol.182, file PEI301, NAC. Smart to Frank Nolan, President, Fish and Game Protective Association, 3 December 1948, RG84 vol.139, file CBH301, NAC.

²⁹ Smart to Superintendent Smith, 16 September 1942, RG84 vol.1802, file PEI282, NAC.

³⁰ Smart to Smith, 16 November 1942, *ibid.* Smart did, however, indicate that killing skunks might be justified in the future if they destroyed park property or were a serious nuisance.

fetched contention."³¹ This is an interesting assertion, since the Parks Branch had long maintained that the parks' game animals did just that.

Beginning in the late 1940s, the National Parks Branch began to take a much more activist role in preservation issues regarding wildlife. Post-war prosperity allowed for an exponential increase in funds for wildlife management, just as it did for federal projects of all kinds. The budget for wildlife matters jumped from \$200,000 in 1948 to \$400,000 in 1954, to \$700,000 by 1960, and to \$3.9 million by 1969.³² To handle this increased funding, the Canadian Wildlife Division was replaced in 1947 by a new Dominion Wildlife Service, renamed the Canadian Wildlife Service in 1950. By becoming a separate agency, the Wildlife Service was meant to mimic the autonomous U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. The advantage of this is that it would have greater independence and a more objective, credible role in managing wildlife. Thanks to enlarged responsibilities and loosened pursestrings, the Wildlife Service grew from a professional staff of seven in 1947 to 90 in 1969. In turn, the availability of scientists and funds encouraged more proactive projects in wildlife management.³³

The Canadian Wildlife Service did not take over the management of park wildlife. Parks Controller James Smart wrote all the superintendents early in 1948, "You are aware that during the recent

³¹ Smart to Gibson, 23 September 1949, RG84 vol.23, file PEI300, NAC.

³² Canada, Departments of Resources and Development, Northern Affairs and National Resources, and Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Annual Reports, 1948-1969. Since there was a departmental reorganization in 1947, and more items were targeted by this expenditure from then on, it is difficult to know exactly how much of an increase this was.

³³ Frank Benjamin Golley's A History of the Ecosystem Concept in Ecology: More Than the Sum of its Parts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993) is helpful in demonstrating how the size and budgets of scientific studies can shape the direction that their work takes.

reorganization of the Department and this Branch a Wildlife Service was set up which will act as our technical division to advise us on wildlife management. This does not mean that we give up any responsibility for looking after wildlife in parks...."³⁴ But it did mean that the Parks Branch would be drawing on more and better funded scientists for future policies.

The creation of the Canadian Wildlife Service signalled not only a new scale for wildlife science in Canada, but a new direction as well. Hoyes Lloyd, Harrison Lewis, and others who were the backbone of the old Division retired around the time that the Service was created. One official account, Scientific Activities in Fisheries and Wildlife Resources, hints at the perceived difference between the old breed of wildlife scientists and their successors. The former "were a group of keen, hard-working individuals who contributed a great deal to our knowledge of the occurrence and distribution of the wildlife of Canada. After their retirement, the Wildlife Service replaced them with men who were trained along more formal lines."³⁵ Put another way, the old men were counters, the new men were scientists. The Wildlife Service was now staffed with young men schooled in the United States in the latest precepts of biological science, particularly ecology. Because ecology theoretically studied all of a system at once rather than a single species, it was believed to be a science of unlimited promise. Thus Hugh Keenleyside, Deputy Minister of the Department of Mines and Resources, proudly announced plans in 1949 for a system-wide inventory of national park wildlife: "It will be no mere cataloguing of plants and

³⁴ Smart to Superintendents, 6 January 1948, RG84 vol.2102, file U172 vol.7, NAC.

³⁵ Pimlott, Kerswill, and Bider, p.112.

animals, a great deal of which has already been done, but will be concerned with the community of living things and with the manner in which the various forms of life affect one another. This will be what scientists term an ecological survey."³⁶

Ecology was not a value-free science, though – or rather, like any science, it was not practiced in a value-free way. It accommodated intervention in nature. The most obvious example of this is in the application of its most well-known discovery of the 1920s: the value of predators to habitat health. Knowing that deer and wolf populations were dependent on each other could teach ecologists that both species had to be left alone – and, indeed, some ecologists did take this lesson. Others, though, interpreted it to mean that to manage deer effectively, both wolf and deer populations had to be actively managed. Ecology in North America in the 1940s and 1950s rationalized interventionism (just as the same science could have rationalized non-interventionism in another period). As Canadian parks historian Gail Lotenburg writes of the period, "most federal wildlife administrators in Canada interpreted ecological concepts as a means towards securing traditional management goals."³⁷ I want to stress that this was not, as Lotenburg's statement may imply, a misreading of contemporary ecological theory. Ecology in the 1930s and 1940s was moving away from an organic model to a mechanistic one, from a study of individuals and their places in a

³⁶ Press release, Deputy Minister Hugh Keenleyside, 11 June 1949, RG22 vol.153, file 5.0.1.35 vol.6, NAC. The following year, the first meeting of the Ecological Survey of National Parks met in Ottawa.

³⁷ Gail Lotenburg, "Wildlife Management Trends in the Canadian and U.S. Federal Governments, 1870-1995," unpublished report for Parks Canada, 1995, no pagination. Discussing the Canadian situation generally, Stephen Bocking writes that "most Canadian ecological research has been tied more or less closely to immediate resource management concerns." Bocking, "A Vision of Nature and Society: A History of the Ecosystem Concept," *Alternatives*, vol.20 no.3 (1993), pp.12-18.

community, to movements of physico-chemical properties within a system. Not surprisingly, this change in metaphor distanced biologists further than ever from the subject of their enquiry.³⁸

The direction taken by ecology would have great impact on preservationist policies of the Canadian national park system. The Parks Branch relied on the Canadian Wildlife Service to explain ecology and to recommend how it should be applied within the parks (though decisions on parks were ultimately made within the Parks Branch).³⁹ As a result, wildlife policies in the national parks would become considerably more interventionist in the 1950s. Rather than merely fencing off an area and letting wildlife thrive, staff now considered it their responsibility to manage wildlife numbers. As early as 1949, the new Parks Branch wildlife philosophy – outlined, notably, by the head of the Canadian Wildlife Service, Harrison Lewis – was as follows:

It should, perhaps, be emphasized that it is not the established policy to administer the wildlife of the National Parks by simply letting it alone, letting nature take its course, and trusting in the idea that is commonly referred to as the "balance of nature". That would not be practicable, because the park areas are already more or less disturbed by human activities and they are surrounded by areas that are even more altered by man.⁴⁰

³⁸ See Worster, *Nature's Economy*, chapter 14, and Bocking.

³⁹ Lothian, *A History*, vol.4, p.59. Because the Parks Branch was responsible for day-to-day management decisions, it is "credited" for the policies discussed in the remainder of this chapter. Of course, I acknowledge that the Canadian Wildlife Service was often critical in this decisionmaking – just as the Forest Service was in matters pertaining to park forestry, and politicians were to any matter in which they had an interest.

⁴⁰ H.F. Lewis to George J. Keltie, President, Western Canada-Yukon Fish and Game Council, 31 March 1949, RG84 vol.39, file U300 vol.16, NAC. See also Lewis to Smart, 4 March 1949, *ibid.*

By the mid-1950s, this philosophy had been elaborated on still further. Animal populations were bound to erupt in the unnaturally natural conditions of a national park. As suggested in a 1957 policy statement,

This brings in its wake such evils as starvation, disease, range destruction, damage to forest regeneration, displacement of desirable plants and soil erosion. Unless these surpluses migrate naturally out of the Parks, they must be removed without hesitation either by careful killing or live-trapping. ... All of the National Parks of Canada are potential danger areas for the development of excessive populations of game, predators and fur-bearers.⁴¹

To leave wildlife alone would in itself be a form of management, and an immoral one. Having created the environment in which animals could overpopulate, the Parks Branch would be wrong to let them do so. There was a sense of supreme confidence, perhaps even arrogance and opportunism, involved in taking this stand. Animals were living and dying because of past human choices, so humans must take the responsibility of continuing to make choices to ensure their general survival. This may have reflected the Parks Branch's opinion not only of animals, but of the rest of human culture as well. Just as in past decades the agency had proven it was more progressive than the general public by not interfering in animals' lives, it would now prove its intelligence by interfering efficiently.

The swing toward interventionism may be seen in the wildlife policies chosen for the new Fundy National Park in the early 1950s. Unlike at Cape Breton Highlands and Prince Edward Island, Fundy's wildlife received attention immediately upon establishment. By 1951, there were already four reports discussing Fundy's animal population.

⁴¹ "A Policy Statement Respecting Wildlife in the National Parks of Canada," Coleman to Hutchison, 21 January 1957, RG84 vol.2140, file U300 pt.18, NAC.

The early consensus was that the area's potential for wildlife was excellent. Wildlife Service staffer John Kelsall reported that in places where lumbering had been practiced, there was unlimited young growth for moose and deer to feed on. He did warn, though, that moose were dying in winter, probably from a combination of moose ticks and difficult travelling in deep snow.⁴² Three years later, Wildlife Service Chief Mammalogist A.W.F. Banfield reiterated the hopes that moose, which presently numbered about 120, would increase naturally to the area's "carrying capacity." (This was a wildlife management term referring to the maximum population of a species that a given area can sustain. Perhaps inevitably, the idea of carrying capacity came to suggest that the right number of all species in all places could be determined by ecology, and then made real.⁴³) And yet Banfield noted that "Without a moose reduction programme, we can expect continuing heavy moose tick infestations and winter mortality."⁴⁴ In other words, Banfield wrote that the moose population was below its natural maximum, and yet still might need pruning. This is not really surprising, since winter deaths bothered parks staff. Although such mortality in the animal world is as natural as death by predation or old age, to modern North Americans it has always seemed needless and

⁴² John P Kelsall report, "Mammal and Bird Survey, New Brunswick National Park, June 4 to July 4, 1948," to Smart, 29 October 1948, RG84 vol.141, file F300, NAC.

⁴³ R.Y. Edwards and C. David Fowle's "The Concept of Carrying Capacity," Transactions of the 20th North American Wildlife Conference (Washington, DC: Wildlife Management Institute, 1955), pp.589-602, discusses how a supposedly scientific term as this can lose precise meaning due to its popularity and apparent universal applicability. They write, "We find that most definitions of carrying capacity are vague and that some are almost meaningless." (p.589)

⁴⁴ A.W.F. Banfield, "Fundy National Park Wildlife Investigations, March 12-17, 1951," RG84 vol.1002, file CBH300 vol.1 pt.2, NAC. Banfield did not yet recommend moose reduction.

avoidable.⁴⁵ It was not difficult for wildlife officers at Fundy to convince themselves that the ungulate population needed their help.

By 1953, there were reports of "serious overbrowsing."⁴⁶ Apparently, the park's character as a sanctuary in less than four years of park existence had permitted moose numbers to balloon. At wildlife officer J.S. Tener's recommendation, the Wildlife Service approved the killing of 20 moose "for the purpose of game management."⁴⁷ It is not clear from the files whether this reduction actually took place; before it could, Superintendent Saunders warned his superiors that the province felt it owned the moose by virtue of the New Brunswick Game Act. With the advice of the Attorney General's office, the Parks Branch explained that the federal Parks Act overrode the provincial act, thanks to the clause that gave Canada the right to "all profits, commodities, hereditaments and appurtenances whatsoever thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining" to the park – including moose.⁴⁸ In 1955, with the park moose population around 150 and the carrying capacity now estimated to be only 80, another culling program was set in motion.⁴⁹ This moose reduction demonstrates just how dubious the Branch's claims to science really were. Though the reduction was supposedly intended to lower an overextended and unhealthy population, it was done in such a way as to make any important results impossible. Old bull moose, the least likely animals in the herd to affect long-term

⁴⁵ Wright, p.69.

⁴⁶ J.S. Tener report, passed on by W.D. Taylor to Coleman, 20 August 1953, RG84 vol.1039, file F300 vol.1, NAC.

⁴⁷ J.A. Hutchison to Nason, Legal Advisor, 22 October 1953, RG84 vol.1024, file F2 vol.5, NAC.

⁴⁸ See RG84 vol.486, file F216 pt.1, NAC.

⁴⁹ It was now estimated that each moose needed a square mile of good range.

population, were targeted. The nine that were killed were found to be "in good condition" and almost all had fat on their quarters, though they had been killed because they were supposedly running out of food.⁵⁰

The same sort of managerial sentiment made itself heard in Cape Breton Highlands National Park. Deer populations there were reported to be manageable and increasing naturally during the 1940s. But in the early 1950s, it was believed that deer numbers were climbing fast, almost tripling from 1951 to 1952, with sightings up from 140 to 360.⁵¹ Seeking to make the most of this, the Nova Scotia Fish and Game Association began to call for an open season on deer in the park.⁵² Wildlife officer Tener found that "The degree of overbrowsing throughout the Park, with the exception of the deer yarding areas, has not yet reached serious proportions, but can readily do so if the deer population increases further or if unusually severe winter forces the animals to restrict their range more than at present."⁵³ If so, reduction would be called for. The Parks Branch, with the help of the Wildlife Service, followed the Nova Scotia case closely. In late 1954, Banfield noted that there were only a few areas of heavy browsing, and the deer generally still had plenty to eat. Nonetheless, he decided that deer were "on the verge of requiring control" and therefore that a small control program targeted at perhaps 25 deer should be implemented. "This project," Banfield wrote, "will provide the Park Service with slaughter experience in case a larger

⁵⁰ "Moose reduction program, Fundy National Park, January 1955," *ibid.*

⁵¹ A.W.F. Banfield to Coleman, 28 May 1954, RG84 vol.520, file CBH217 pt.1, NAC.

⁵² See R.A. Morrison, Secretary, Cape Breton Fish and Game Association, to ?, 8 May 1954, *ibid.*, and *Sydney Post-Record*, 26 January 1955.

⁵³ Tener to Lewis, 4 March 1952, RG84 vol.1002, file CBH300 pt.2 (1942-1952), NAC.

reduction programme is required in the future."⁵⁴ That is, control was needed solely as practice for control that might be needed later. It is difficult, when reading the notes of the 1955 deer slaughter, to see it as anything but a strange form of scientifically-ordained ritual animal sacrifice, a way for Parks Branch staff and Wildlife Service officers to allow themselves the pleasure of killing animals while denying that pleasure to others. Superintendent Doak reported that "hunting conditions were ideal" when the group went out. Twenty-five deer were killed. All were found to have been in very good condition, and during the entire shoot not a single carcass was found to suggest starvation.⁵⁵ The Superintendent wrote Ottawa suggesting more kills, but the Parks Branch elected to wait and see.

The reductions implemented in Cape Breton Highlands and Fundy were both too much and too little: purposeful moves away from hands-off preservation as a result of questionable scientific reasoning, yet entailing such insignificant numbers that they were unlikely to have any real impact on the stated desire to regulate a population. In fact, Fundy would experience a moose overpopulation and crash within five years of its 1955 reduction program. Other choices could have been made. "Excess" animals could have been removed to other place in the provinces that would be glad to have them (although, it is true, they might then have been killed by hunters). Strips of forest could have been opened up for browse (which, admittedly, would have meant killing

⁵⁴ Banfield report, 2 November 1954, RG84 vol.520, file CBH217 pt.1, NAC.

⁵⁵ Doak to Coleman, 28 January 1955, *ibid.*

plants). The other option was to do nothing, and see if the anticipated effects actually occurred.⁵⁶

Though the Parks Branch tried to maintain a fixed philosophy on park wildlife, its policy decisions were often shaped by the political and pragmatic needs of the moment, and by the perceived value of the wildlife in question. Such was the case with the hunting of wildfowl in Prince Edward Island National Park. Hunting has traditionally been the most forbidden activity in parks. Whereas parks throughout their history accepted the removal of trees, minerals, and fish from their borders, the removal of animals was always taboo. When the P.E.I. National Park was established, local politicians complained on behalf of duck hunters in the area over the loss of a favourite shooting spot.⁵⁷ But by the mid-1940s, hunters grew resigned to the park's existence and lobbied instead that the park do everything to build bird populations so that the birds would spill outside the park to be shot. However, the discovery of a mistake in R.W. Cautley's original survey of the park forced the Parks Branch to re-evaluate how it dealt with local hunters. Cautley had mistakenly set a park boundary at Stanhope to "the line of mean high tide" on swampland not influenced by tide; as a result, the park did not have title to two pieces of land that hunters coveted. For a time, the park chose to condone hunting in the contested areas, and even an Acting Superintendent hunted there.⁵⁸ The Parks Branch sought to rectify this situation permanently in 1957 by arranging a land

⁵⁶ Research in the U.S. has questioned wildlife managers' ability to judge browse quantity in the first place; what might appear to be overbrowsing might be quite natural for an area. Wright, p.80.

⁵⁷ There was discussion of this in the 1939 Transactions of the Provincial-Dominion Wildlife Conference, RG22 vol.4, file 13, NAC.

⁵⁸ F.A.G. Carter to Robertson, 23 September 1957, RG22 vol.476, file 33.21.1 pt.4, NAC.

swap with Gordon Shaw, owner of the local Shaw's Hotel. The park received a parcel it had long thought it owned, and Shaw received a piece of land that he could offer his visitors as a private shooting ground. Provincial hunters, however, felt they had lost out on the deal and again had their politicians complain. On top of this, locals discovered Cautley had defined part of the park's shore boundary as the "high water mark of the Gulf of St. Lawrence"; hunters could presumably set up blinds on the beach. As Superintendent Browning put it, some of the Prince Edward Island National Park beaches did not belong to the park, though "Perhaps we could claim squatters rights."⁵⁹ Ultimately, the Parks Branch figured out that its position was stronger than this, but to avoid disagreements with locals, staff were told by Ottawa to let duck hunting continue in the disputed areas.⁶⁰ In this case, the prime directive of national park wildlife policy was as flexible as the park's boundary.

The Parks Branch was not above advocating the killing of wildlife perceived to be becoming pests. The most prolonged example of this in the first Atlantic Canadian parks was the Branch's battle against insects, which will be discussed later in this chapter. But in a number of other incidents larger pests were also targeted. Porcupines were causing damage at Fundy headquarters, so staff requisitioned "Good-Rite ZIP," a chemical deer repellent, and were later given a more direct deterrent, a

⁵⁹ Superintendent F.C. Browning to Strong, 7 May 1958, RG84 vol.1778, file PEI2 vol.8, NAC.

⁶⁰ It should be noted that many locals may very well have disliked this concession. In 1960, Superintendent Kipping wrote that "indeed there was local derision directed at the Park staff because of their inability to cope with the hunting." Cited by Coleman to Côté, 4 August 1964, RG84 vol.1778, file PEI2 vol.10, NAC.

shotgun.⁶¹ Five hundred muskrat were authorized to be killed in P.E.I. National Park since they had reached "nuisance-value proportions"; nonetheless, only 64 could be found to be killed.⁶² Reductions were not always even aimed at any perceived need, but simply so the Parks Branch could demonstrate it was being a good neighbour. In 1950, Wildlife Service biologist John Kelsall discussed killing foxes at Prince Edward Island Park: "The shooting would not be done with a view to eliminating or controlling the fox population but rather to assure any possible sources of complaint that the Park authorities are cognizant of the high fox population and are doing something about it."⁶³ The Parks Branch decided not to recommend a reduction program in this case, not because it violated park philosophy, but because it was decided there were not enough complaints to take this step. Probably the most perverse manifestation of this zeal for control arose when the staff of Prince Edward Island National Park's 1959 dealt with a very large deceased pest: a beached whale. They blew it up. This may have been the best decision under the circumstances, but Superintendent Kipping's description of the event suggested a certain unseemly enjoyment of the spectacle. He corresponded with C.B.C. entertainers "Gentleman and Olga" who had reported on the incident, telling them that staff had to blow the whale "to heaven with 600 pounds of dynamite."⁶⁴ And when Ottawa asked Kipping for details, he sent pictures of what he called "the

⁶¹ Smart to Superintendent, 9 May 1951, RG84 vol.141, file F300; and Strong to Superintendent, 15 December 1959, RG84 vol.487, file F281 pt.2, NAC.

⁶² C.O. Bartlett, Wildlife Biologist, Canadian Wildlife Service, cited by Superintendent Kipping to Strong, 16 January 1963, RG84 vol.1802, file PEI279, NAC.

⁶³ John P. Kelsall to Harrison Lewis, 9 October 1950, RG84 vol.1802, file PEI275, NAC.

⁶⁴ Superintendent Kipping to "Gentleman and Olga" of C.B.C. "Long Shot", 2 September 1959, Box 17, whales and seals file, PEINP files.

explosion which transported the whale out of the realm of our jurisdiction."⁶⁵

That was exactly the sort of image the Parks Branch wanted to avoid. Generally, when it felt obliged to kill and remove some park wildlife, it sought to do so with discretion and decorum. On the subject of controlling porcupines at Fundy, for example, Ottawa ordered that "Any control activity should, of course, be carried out as inconspicuously as possible in the interest of good public relations"⁶⁶ and "These operations must be carried on with discretion, in order to avoid offense to the public."⁶⁷ Keeping the reduction programs quiet became such a standard policy that staff even convinced themselves such discretion had a managerial purpose. The minister in charge of national parks in 1962, Walter Dinsdale, told the President of the New Brunswick Fish and Game Association that park hunting was not permitted because "the game species involved would become much more retiring, thus reducing the opportunity of worth-while recreation for a large segment of the public." For the same reason, he said, when staff had to kill certain animals they were careful not to harass or frighten others.⁶⁸

In reality, it was the human animals that the Parks Branch did not want to disturb. The Branch knew that the public was unlikely to understand why different rules applied for park staff than for park users. Why was hunting forbidden in the park, yet proper game management might demand the shooting of some animals? If management was needed, why were locals not allowed to have a limited hunt? Why, for

⁶⁵ Kipping to Strong, 13 November 1962, *ibid.*

⁶⁶ Strong to Superintendent, 15 December 1959, RG84 vol.487, file F281 pt.2, NAC.

⁶⁷ Smart to Superintendent, 9 May 1951, RG84 vol.141, file F300, NAC.

⁶⁸ Dinsdale to Ralph H. Olive, 8 June 1962, RG22 vol.1083, file 300.52, NAC.

that matter, were farmers' cattle impounded if they strayed into Cape Breton Highlands, while highland cattle were kept by Keltic Lodge into at least the 1950s?⁶⁹ Such awkward questions, perhaps typical of those prompted by park development throughout the world, were raised repeatedly about these four parks in this period. And there were some relatively valid answers to some of these contradictions. National parks are intended to be places free of human effect; however, the parks need humans to help enforce this ideal (as well as to make the visitor's communion with the park as pleasurable, yet as passive, as possible). Moreover, the Parks Branch argued that nature had been affected by humans before the park's existence. Humans were therefore needed to re-establish the natural state of the park, which demanded management. All this is sensible if we accept the original idea that parks have an inherent logic, and if we accept that staff's decisions for the park are free of human interest.

fish

Writing of the American case, Richard West Sellars states, "In its management of fish, more than any other natural resource, the Park Service grossly violated known ecological principles."⁷⁰ The same could be said of the Canadian National Parks Branch. As with wildlife, fish in Canadian national parks were deemed deserving of preservation, and as with wildlife, some fish deserved more preservation than others. But it was accepted that tinkering with the population and distribution of fish

⁶⁹ See RG84 vol.986, file CBH16.1 vol.2 pt.1, NAC. James Smart opposed keeping these cattle in public parts of Cape Breton Highlands, not because they were an exotic species but because of the threat they posed to tourists' footwear.

⁷⁰ Sellars, "The Rise and Decline," vol.10 no.2, p.97. See also Runte, *Yosemite*, pp.65-66.

species could be tolerated to a degree that would not be tolerated for air breathers. Of course, the ultimate tinkering was that fishing, unlike hunting, was not merely tolerated but encouraged. National parks were promoted as having some of the best sport fishing lakes and rivers in Canada. That Parks Branch personnel evidently never tried to justify or sugarcoat fishing suggests how ingrained the logic of fishing in parks had become. As with wildlife, the amount of intervention by park staff on fishing matters increased during the 1950s, before showing some abatement in the 1960s.

In the first national parks of Eastern Canada, fishing was to have an especially important role for a number of reasons. First, the Parks Branch believed the very name "Maritimes" promised tourists opportunities for fishing (that it might also suggest salt water fishing rather than parks' traditional freshwater fishing was not considered an insurmountable problem). Second, it was hoped that an abundance of fish in Eastern parks would compensate for their perceived absence of wildlife. Finally, in the Maritimes, inland fisheries was still under federal control, having been delegated to the provinces elsewhere. The Parks Branch therefore could expect particularly close affiliation with the federal Department of Fisheries in managing park fish populations.⁷¹

Nova Scotia was renowned for its fishing, and when discussion of a national park for the province began in the 1930s, fish had a high priority. Cape Breton's Margaree River was already famous among North American anglers, and the Parks Branch hoped that it could likewise put the Cheticamp River in the Cape Breton Highlands on the map. Even

⁷¹ See Kenneth Johnstone, The Aquatic Explorers: A History of the Fisheries Research Board of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977).

before Cautley's inspection in 1934, Commissioner James Harkin stated that one of his conditions for a northern Cape Breton park would be "to co-operate with the Dominion Government in doing away with all net fishing of salmon off the mouth of Cheticamp River. I am informed that at the present time the salmon fishing in both Margaree and Cheticamp rivers has been practically ruined by the mouths of both rivers being netted by shore fishermen."⁷² Harkin was not concerned about depletion of the fishing stock per se, but felt that net fishing was fundamentally unsportsmanlike and kept anglers from catching the same fish. Cautley's 1936 report came to the same conclusion, and suggested that if the park was to go through there, fish ladders could be installed to make access up the Cheticamp easier for salmon. He even hoped that, if legally practicable, the Parks Branch could restrict net fishing outside the park boundary.⁷³

Fish were also important in the planning of Prince Edward Island National Park. Williamson and Cromarty recommended that the water off the North shore of P.E.I. be made a fish preserve, "in the same way as the Western National Parks act as reservoirs for game."⁷⁴ However attractive this idea, and however seemingly responsive to contemporary concerns for the viability of lobster stocks, it actually had more to do with creating a credible park than with preserving an endangered species. The water was of interest as a reserve because of its location off a possible park site, not because it was believed to be a central location

⁷² Harkin to Gibson, 14 December 1934, RG84 vol.983, file CBH2 vol.1 no.1, NAC.

⁷³ Cautley report on Nova Scotia sites, 1934, p.58, and Cautley to Harkin, 16 June 1936, RG84 vol.520, file CBH296 pt.1, NAC.

⁷⁴ Cromarty and Williamson report on P.E.I. sites, 1936, pp.11-12, RG84 vol.1777, file PEI2 vol.1 pt.1, NAC. They suggested this reserve would not include Rustico fishing grounds.

for fish. And it was only to be a fish sanctuary "except for taking of fish by hook and line as under Park regulations."⁷⁵ When the Department of Fisheries concluded that the fish preserve would serve no purpose, and Island politicians complained about how it would affect North Shore fishing, the idea was scrapped.⁷⁶

Once the two parks were established, the Parks Branch investigated the fish stock they had and tried to determine how they could generate more. The findings were not encouraging. Prince Edward Island National Park lakes did not contain trout, as was hoped, but "a serious enemy", white perch.⁷⁷ As well, other lakes outside the park supplied much better angling. Cape Breton Highlands was nuisanced with both white perch in its lakes and netters outside its main river, the Cheticamp. The natural solution was to stock the park rivers and lakes with fish. The Cheticamp had been stocked with salmon from the Department of Fisheries' Margaree River hatchery since 1916; the Parks Branch simply dumped in more fish. Cape Breton Highlands was stocked with 170,000 fingerlings in the first year of its existence, 180,000 in 1938, up to 250,000 by 1941. After a late wartime lull, by the late 1940s the park was again being "planted" at rates up to 100,000 per year.⁷⁸ Around the same time, Prince Edward Island National Park also began to be stocked with

⁷⁵ Wardle to William A. Found, Deputy Minister of Fisheries, 6 November 1936, RG84 vol.1802, file PEI296 vol.1, NAC.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ Dr. A.H. Leim, Director, Atlantic Biological Station, 30 August 1939, RG84 vol.1802, file PEI296 vol.1, NAC.

⁷⁸ Canada, Departments of Mines and Resources, and Resources and Development, Annual Reports, 1939-1954. Salmon was the main fish stocked in early years, with Eastern brook trout increasingly stocked by the late 1940s. Though none of the Eastern parks had their own hatcheries, a useful article on the Branch's thinking about stocking is V.E.F. Solman, J.P. Guerrier, and W.C.Cable's "Why Have Fish Hatcheries in Canada's National Parks," Transactions of the 17th North American Wildlife Conference, 1952, pp.226-233.

trout, even though its lakes were not considered likely to provide good fishing.⁷⁹

The continuing popularity of stocking is surprising, since limnologists in this period – and biologists in general – were moving away from population control and showing greater interest in habitat improvement. In other words, biologists were coming to understand the complexity of natural systems, and realize that a wildlife program that focused on one or two species was insufficient.⁸⁰ When Parks Branch limnologist V.E.F. Solman reported on Cape Breton Highlands in 1948, he noted that four million fish were dumped in the Cheticamp since 1916, and still there were few fish. Yet Solman did not blame the netting at the river's mouth, as Harkin had and locals still did. He believed that salmon were still able to get by the nets in sufficient numbers. More troublesome to fish populations were habitat factors such as water temperature and competition from other species.⁸¹

The Parks Branch relied on stocking because it was straightforward and seemed sensible. Staff needed to be doing something, since the

⁷⁹ Canada, Departments of Resources and Development, and Northern Affairs and National Resources, Annual Reports, 1953-1954.

⁸⁰ The move in this direction can be seen in Transactions of the North American Wildlife Conference in the late 1940s. In the 1946 conference summary, Rudolf Bennett noted the number of warnings against "indiscriminate restocking – this was so different ten years ago." 11th Conference, p.513. Two years later, Canadian J. Dewey Soper made much the same point in regard to both fish and game species in "Canada Looks at Waterfowl," 13th Conference, pp.52-57. The same year, J.V. Skiff in "Is There a Place for Stocking in Game Management?" spoke of the evolution of conservation from game protection, to game breeding and stocking, to game management, to wildlife management within a larger sphere of conservation of land and water coupled with good agricultural and forestry practices. Ibid., p.215. In contrast to the American case as described by Skiff, which argues that American managers had reached this final stage by the 1940s, in Canada it appears that government agents had in the same period only attained the stage of game management, in which they believed they could effectively manage all wildlife.

⁸¹ Solman, "Limnological Investigations in Cape Breton Highlands National Park, Nova Scotia, 1947," RG84 vol.140, file CBH296.12, NAC.

Maritime parks' appeal to tourists depended so much on fishing.⁸² Even though the early reports on a New Brunswick park had little to say about fishing potential (Cautley gave the Albert County site a 50 out of 100, and wrote "There are practically no lakes"⁸³), the 1950 opening ceremonies brochure for Fundy National Park showed two photos of fishermen hard at play. James Smart asked limnologist Solman to sell American fishermen on Prince Edward Island's perch by using the more impressive name, "silver bass."⁸⁴ The Parks Branch then paid C.H.P. Rodman of the American magazine Hunting and Fishing to vacation in the Prince Edward Island park; he did not catch a single silver bass, but he wrote a nice article anyway.⁸⁵ Cape Breton Highlands aggressively advertised its offshore swordfishing, though in 1948 Solman reported, "In spite of all this publicity not one tourist has arrived and demanded to be shown such fishing."⁸⁶

The first Eastern national parks did not become fishing meccas for tourists, but many local fishermen enjoyed them. This hardly consoled the Parks Branch. In 1939, Commissioner F.H.H. Williamson said bluntly that fishing regulations did not "necessarily correspond with the Provincial dates as the parks policy is to cater more to the tourist trade than for the benefit of the local residents."⁸⁷ Locals spent much less

⁸² In the 1950 film Father of the Bride, Elizabeth Taylor's character breaks off her engagement because her fiancé wants a Nova Scotia honeymoon, complete with fishing. This alludes to Nova Scotia's fame and popularity with sport fishermen, while suggesting that the province would need to re-market itself to attract postwar American families.

⁸³ Cautley report on New Brunswick sites, 1930.

⁸⁴ Solman to Lewis, 4 February 1948, RG84 vol.1802, file PEI296 vol.1, NAC.

⁸⁵ Ibid. Also, see Hunting and Fishing, November 1952.

⁸⁶ Solman to Lewis, 11 February 1948, RG84 vol.140, file CBH296.12, NAC.

⁸⁷ Williamson to MacKay, 28 March 1938, RG84 vol.1802, file PEI296 vol.1, NAC. The foreman MacKay was similarly concerned that improvements in the park would result in possible overfishing by locals. MacKay to Williamson, 10 June 1938, ibid.

money than did other park visitors, and beyond that they caught the fish meant for tourists. The Parks Branch therefore adjusted the parks' fishing seasons to approximate the tourist season more closely. For example, the opening of the salmon season at Cape Breton Highlands was moved from the province-wide 1 June to 15 June, since "practically all of the salmon have been caught by local residents before many of the tourists start arriving in the Park, which is usually from early June on."⁸⁸ This more than anything else demonstrates that the Parks Branch saw tourists and locals as fundamentally different park resource users. Though ostensibly for the benefit, advantage, and enjoyment of all Canadians, parks were meant to be especially for tourists, Canadian or otherwise.

As with wildlife, fish management in the national parks became decidedly more interventionist in the early 1950s. This seems to have been due to a number of factors: the creation of the Canadian Wildlife Service with a resultant increase in scientific personnel, a move within ecology towards more extensive management projects, increased funding for such projects, and the Parks Branch's own dissatisfaction with fish stocking.⁸⁹ The most fundamental change may have been technical: the discovery and application of rotenone. When Prince Edward Island National Park had been established, foreman A.L. MacKay had noted that another option to stocking the park's lakes was contaminating it, killing

⁸⁸ Superintendent MacFarlane to Smart, 12 June 1952, RG84 vol200, file CBH3.1.1, NAC. In this case, the decision backfired. A group of Americans arrived early the following summer, and were very upset that the fishing season was two weeks away. In the parks studied here, the fishing seasons changed periodically as the Parks Branch tried to find a period which would attract the most tourists and yet correspond closely to the provincial season.

⁸⁹ See Lothian, *A History*, vol.4, pp.60,66-67; and Pimlott, Kerswill, and Bider, p.62, for administrative changes at this time. See Bocking for changes in ecology.

all its fish, and re-stocking. However, he supposed that such a task would likely leave the lakes "tainted for an indefinite period."⁹⁰ He was right for his time, but he did not know that the Fisheries Research Board of Canada was currently testing the purification of lakes using rotenone, a natural poison derived from the powdered root of a number of plants (most commonly, derris). In 1936 the fisheries staff succeeded in killing all fish along 25 miles of stream and in a six-acre lake near the Cobequid Hatchery in Nova Scotia. Rotenone was found to wipe out all insect and fish life within half an hour, allowing for the introduction of preferred species, and there was no long-term effect to the water.⁹¹ Rotenone poisoning became relatively commonplace in North American fish management in the 1940s, but it was not until the 1950s that the Canadian national parks began to use it.

The Parks Branch was quite proud of its new fish management tool, and publicized its ability to improve on what nature provided. One press release stated,

Eels have a place - but not on the lines of anglers who visit a National Park looking for good trout fishing. So when they multiplied to the point where they played havoc with the trout in Freshwater Lake, in Cape Breton Highlands National Park, Nova Scotia, Canadian biologists of the Wildlife Service took drastic action. With the help of the Park Engineer they dumped a lethal dose of 4,500 pounds of rotenone into the lake to clean out the waters and rid them permanently of these and other hungry predators. The operation has been successful, and a specially-designed barrier built at the outlet of the lake to prevent the eels from re-entering the waters, as elvers in spring or adults in the autumn. Re-stocking with trout has been postponed until next year to

⁹⁰ MacKay to Williamson, 15 March 1938, RG84 vol.1802, file PEI296 vol.1, NAC.

⁹¹ See Louis A. Krumholz, "The Use of Rotenone in Fisheries Research," Journal of Wildlife Management, vol.12 no.3 (July 1948), pp.305-317.

allow for the re-establishment of the swarms of water insects that form the main diet of lake trout.⁹²

Eels were in fact a secondary consideration, and only a follow-up press release admitted that white perch were the main target. A speech two years later by the minister in charge of national parks, Jean Lesage, referred to the killing of fish matter-of-factly, as if this sort of interventionism was becoming more normal. Lesage stated,

Many people think that fish are where you find them. That was true once, but nowadays, with fishing becoming one of the most popular outdoor sports, it might be more correct to say that fish are where somebody makes sure that you find them. In the National Parks, that "somebody" is the National Parks Service, acting on the advice of the limnologists of the Canadian Wildlife Service.⁹³

Prince Edward Island National Park's little lakes got the same "drastic measures"⁹⁴ as had those of Cape Breton Highlands, since planted Eastern brook trout had not been hardy enough to depose perch. In fact, once the lakes were poisoned, rainbow trout were introduced precisely because they were not local fish – few Island lakes had them. It was felt that bringing in this exotic species would make the park's lakes interesting and different.⁹⁵

Rotenone was a great success in park lakes. The Branch's chief limnologist in 1960, Jean-Paul Cuerrier, noted that at Cape Breton

⁹² Press release 25 November 1954, RG22 vol.156, file 5.0.1.35 vol.14, NAC.

⁹³ Jean Lesage, "Canadian Wildlife Service," speech to the Canadian Institute of Surveying and Photogrammetry, Ottawa, 2 February 1956, RG22 vol.159, file 5.0.1.39, NAC.

⁹⁴ This was the same phrase used in 1953 by J.C. Ward, Biologist, and Jean-Paul Cuerrier, Parks Branch Assistant Limnologist, and in 1956 by Parks Branch Director James Hutchison to describe the proposed use of rotenone in P.E.I. National Park lakes; both, however, favoured the poisoning. See Ward report, 1953, RG84 vol.1802, file PEI296.1, NAC; and Hutchison to Pritchard, Director, Department of Fisheries, 24 January 1956, *ibid.*

⁹⁵ Ward report, 1953, *ibid.*

Highlands, "The absence of competition has favoured the survival of hatchery trout which have provided satisfactory angling returns to Park visitors."⁹⁶ Nonetheless, there began to be rumblings of discontent about the drastic measure of poisoning lakes. After an inspection of Fundy in 1956, Secretary to the Minister F.A.G. Carter questioned why the Wildlife Service planned to drop rotenone in the unfortunately-named Lake View Lake. He wrote,

Apparently by the locals here, there is reasonable fishing (speckled trout) and no one understands why poisoning is necessary. It may be necessary; I do not know. I do know, however, that it would be most helpful if the Wildlife Service could explain the "whys" to the wardens, etc., and to all concerned within the park – to try to win them over. This may have been tried and may be impossible. There is a considerable feeling throughout the Park that the Wildlife people are long haired experimenters. I have no doubt this is grossly unfair....⁹⁷

This nicely shows that to "locals" – a designation, it is worth noting, that apparently united people of the community with ground-level park staff – the methods and plans of biologists were a mystery. Carter, a federal bureaucrat, clearly felt the same way. It would be a mistake, however, to infer from this that the Canadian Wildlife Service tended to push the Parks Branch in managerial directions it did not wish to go. Two years later, it was the Superintendent of Fundy who asked his superiors whether Wolfe Lake could be poisoned; his superiors considered the request, but opted for stocking it with fingerlings instead.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Cuerrier to Strong, 4 August 1960, RG84 vol.520, file CBH296 pt.2, NAC.

⁹⁷ Carter report, 1 August 1956, RG22 vol.472, file 33.6.1 pt.4, NAC. According to the Wildlife Service, poisoning had not been considered. Coleman, 23 August 1956, *ibid.*

⁹⁸ MacFarlane to Strong, 5 June 1958; and Strong to MacFarlane, 17 June 1958, RG84 vol.487, file F296 pt.1, NAC.

The use of rotenone peaked and then disappeared in the mid-1950s; it would appear from available archival records that no Atlantic Canada national park lake or river was again poisoned pure. Perhaps this was due to complaints from tourists and locals or from staff within the Parks Branch over this ultimate form of intervention. Perhaps this was part of a general move away from active park resource management around 1960, which will be described later in this chapter. Or perhaps, though less likely, the lakes continued to be poisoned for some time, only without the fanfare and press releases. But the Parks Branch did continue to manage the fish populations under its domain, to a degree that would have been considered unacceptable for any other living things in the parks. Populations were introduced or killed off, with little attention to whether they were native or exotic. Staff knew and admitted this. As Parks Chief B.I.M. Strong explained to a Superintendent in 1959, "As you know, fishing seasons in the National Parks are set not too much according to biological consideration of the game fish involved but rather according to the aims and objectives of the National Parks."⁹⁹

vegetation

Neither fish nor wildlife preservation was ever completely practiced within the national parks; it was always which fish, how much wildlife. But the underlying philosophy, that national parks were places where living creatures should exist unbothered by humans, continued to hold even when the resulting policies changed. The theory of preservation was more directly challenged by vegetation. It was obvious that

⁹⁹ Strong to Superintendent, 5 June 1959, RG84 vol.1802, file PEI296 vol.2, NAC.

untouched vegetation was not necessarily "better" for itself or for the park; if left alone, it could choke out desired species, increase fire hazard, block views, attract disease, and be aesthetically unattractive. As well, thick forests, if cut, could be financially attractive, and not cutting them would be wasteful. Finally, humans did not have the sort of relationship with vegetation that they had with animals. There was not, to the same extent, a feeling that plants had a natural right to existence.¹⁰⁰ For all these reasons, the National Parks Branch forever questioned the validity of a hands-off policy with regard to vegetation, particularly forests. In the four parks studied here, the same trend is visible in forest management as in fish and wildlife – increased interventionism in the 1940s and 1950s, followed by a reversal in the 1960s – but more interesting is the volume of discussion about the underlying meaning of preservation.

The Parks Branch depended on the Canadian Forestry Service for expertise on forestry matters, just as it depended on the Canadian Wildlife Service for fish and wildlife matters, but its own knowledge of this resource was greater. Foresters were trusted with positions of general responsibility in the Parks Branch to a degree that wildlife biologists would never have been. James Smart, Parks Branch Controller from 1941-1950 and Director from 1950-1953, began his career with the Forest Service after earning his forestry degree at the University of New

¹⁰⁰ Roderick Nash's The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989) discusses the evolution of rights over time. Though animal rights are quite well established, the idea of rights for other living things is in its infancy. An important theoretical work on this is Christopher D. Stone's "Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects," Southern California Law Review, no.45 (Spring 1972), pp.450-501, republished as a book of the same name in 1974.

Brunswick.¹⁰¹ As mentioned earlier, Prince Edward Island National Park's first superintendent, Ernest Smith, was chosen expressly because of his forestry experience. Fundy National Park's first superintendent, Ernest Saunders, had been in charge of the Acadia Forest Experimental Station since 1937, and was paid extra in his new job because it was understood that he would have extensive silviculture work to perform.¹⁰²

Forestry preservation was an issue from the very establishment of Cape Breton Highlands National Park. The Parks Branch had to decide whether people living near the park should be allowed to continue their traditional use of its forests. James Smart, respecting foresters and their needs, pushed for small woodlots to be set up at out-of-the-way spots throughout the park. Controller F.H.H. Williamson was less enthusiastic:

Settlers adjacent to a Park boundary, who have been dependent on timber in the Park area, form a problem, since satisfying their demands is usually opposed to Park regulations. The man who draws out such a plan as Mr. Smart proposes should be sufficiently experienced in National Parks' operations as to know what cuttings would constitute improvement from a Park standpoint, the only legitimate excuse we have for allowing timber to be taken out for settlers' needs.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ Smart was transferred in 1930. In bringing him to the Parks Branch, Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources W.W. Cory wrote, "with the growing needs and responsibilities for the protection of the Parks' forests and development of silviculture methods involved in the growth of the Parks system, it becomes a necessity to have a fully qualified Forester appointed to this Branch." Cory to William Foran, Secretary, Civil Service Commission, 10 April 1930, RG32 file 237, file 1888.02.29, NAC.

¹⁰² Smart to Gibson, 14 January 1948, RG84 vol.1039, file F200 vol.1, NAC.

¹⁰³ Williamson also warned that "there shall be no repetition in Cape Breton Highlands National Park of the timber disposal complications experienced at Riding Mountain Park" in Manitoba. Williamson to Gibson, 4 December 1939, RG84 vol.520, file CBH200 pt.1, NAC. When Riding Mountain was created in 1930, it was decided that traditional use of park forests would be honoured, so that even sawmills were allowed to continue operation in the park. James Smart was the park's superintendent in this period. Lothian, *A Brief History*, p.78.

In other words, the Parks Branch needed an excuse to show that helping fulfill local wood needs would be for the good of the park forests. Smart found one by having the proposed woodlots made "demonstration plots" to be cut on a sustained yield basis, with park staff choosing the trees to be targeted.¹⁰⁴ The Forestry Branch approved this idea, so the project went forward.

Allowing ex-residents to cut wood in the park was a noble idea, and a far cry from the usual treatment of their traditional rights once the parks were created. But it caused difficulties when put in practice, while reinforcing the Parks Branch staff's (and particularly James Smart's) tendency to see park resources as objects to be used. Staff found sustained yield difficult to manage, so they moved to exhausting one stand of trees and moving on – hardly an innovative forestry practice.¹⁰⁵ The Parks Branch and locals also disagreed about the types of trees to be cut. For building small boats, fishermen needed pine, which the Parks Branch specifically wished to preserve since, in Smart's words, "this is a desirable species from a scenic point of view and there is very little of this species in the Park."¹⁰⁶ More generally, locals sought hardwoods which burned longer in woodstoves, while the Parks Branch wanted to preserve its hardwoods. Staff even specifically used softwoods when they needed to build guard rails, cabins, and so on. As Smart told the Cape Breton Highlands Superintendent,

it is the opinion of the Bureau and also of our foresters that the main species of wood to encourage on these areas are the hardwoods and any softwoods should be cut if they come

¹⁰⁴ Smart to Williamson, 30 January 1940, RG84 vol.520, file CBH200 pt.1, NAC.

¹⁰⁵ W. Robinson to Smart, 15 October 1941, *ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ Smart to Superintendent, 19 February 1941, *ibid.*

within the size specified – in fact, it might be necessary to treat such as balsam as one which should be eliminated entirely from an area, as it is a very poor type of wood for any purpose and, being a very prolific seeder, it is inclined to take over the area at the expense of the hardwood species.¹⁰⁷

This is so interesting because it is so meaningless. The small sections of forest that the woodlots demanded would have had no appreciable effect on species composition. More importantly, there should have been no reason to discuss a tree's purpose, because it did not need one in the park, other than existence. And if Smart was referring to this softwood's lack of scenic value, he was perhaps admitting to a regional prejudice against the scrubby, coniferous look of Maritime forests; in any case, he was responding to a blatantly unnatural aesthetic the park could not possibly hope to satisfy. His comment on succession – that softwoods tend to block out hardwoods – was just plain wrong. The opposite is in fact the case, and for a forester to think otherwise shows an irrational aversion to softwoods.¹⁰⁸ I would argue that Smart's quote above all demonstrates his uncertainty about how to manage the contradictory task of safeguarding and stabilizing a vulnerable and ever-changing resource. In trying to find a consistent position, the Parks Branch would

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.* The same advice is given by D. Roy Cameron, Dominion Forester, to J.C. Venness, Dominion Forestry Service, 4 February 1941, *ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ It would appear that forest succession was poorly understood at the time. Superintendent MacMillan wrote Smart, "No doubt you have observed that softwoods are usually found on the edges of settlements and on the lower levels while on the sides of mountains and over the mountain tops hardwood predominates. ... This would indicate that the hardwoods eventually supplant the softwoods, possibly due to a greater longevity of life." MacMillan was accurate in his impression, but mistaken in thinking that longevity was the cause. Smart did not correct him. Superintendent MacMillan to Smart, 25 February 1941, *ibid.* On foresters' knowledge of succession earlier in this century in the Western U.S., see Nancy Langston, *Forest Dreams, Forest Nightmares: The Paradox of Old Growth in the Inland West* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995), pp.122-134.

fall back on questionable science, vague aesthetics, and the familiar values of capitalism.

This became still more evident upon the creation of Fundy National Park in the late 1940s. James Smart, Parks Controller by this point, saw the park's future beauty in doubt specifically because of the forest's fecundity. "The growth is very prolific," he wrote, "and if no thinning operations are carried on the whole area will become a jungle, interfering with its general use for recreational purposes and also crowd out some forms of wildlife."¹⁰⁹ Underlying this comment is a recognition that in terms of park forests, time worked at cross purposes with preservation. A park is chosen because of its scenery as it exists at the park's establishment; it might be justifiable, then, for the park to be preserved, not in its natural state, but in a way that maintains that scenery as it had been at establishment. Smart did not tackle this paradox head-on, but resorted to a scientific justification for intervention: for "forestry experimental purposes as demonstration plots of silvicultural systems and for study" a perennial program of "improvement cutting" should be implemented.¹¹⁰ He called in the Forestry Service to develop a forest inventory for the harvesting of Fundy timber.

It is perhaps not surprising that it would be someone from outside the Parks Branch, H.L. Holman of the Forestry Branch, who would make the most intelligent critique of park preservation philosophy in this period. He visited Fundy in the fall of 1949 and reported that he was very impressed with it. Of course, "no small part of the natural beauty

¹⁰⁹ Smart to Gibson, 14 January 1948, RG84 vol.1039, file F200 vol.1, NAC.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

of this park, in common with most others, is derived from the forest and that, without the forest, it would become a commonplace bit of country with little or nothing to recommend it...."¹¹¹ Holman was amazed at the forest's rate of grow-back, calling it the fastest he had ever seen. He agreed with Smart that this was a management concern: "An impenetrable jungle or thicket growth, of small spruce and balsam fir is not, in my opinion, a desirable feature of a much-frequented recreational area. At close range such stands are ugly and, in addition, constitute a fire and insect hazard of no mean proportions."¹¹² Therefore, Fundy's forest demanded supervision. Openings and viewpoints should be kept clear, deciduous trees should be planted in public areas, conifers should be thinned. Holman recognized that this degree of management flew in the face of traditional park policy. He wrote,

It might be argued that such a program would not be in accordance with accepted Park policy inasmuch as it contemplates disturbing the natural condition of the forest in such a way as to give it the groomed appearance of a city park. If it is true that that has been the accepted policy of the National Parks, then I think it is time that it was modified to some extent at least. Where people congregate in large numbers, they are not usually the sort of people who are likely to appreciate the unspoiled beauty, if indeed it is such, of the undisturbed natural forest and are more likely to be the sort of people who will thoughtlessly toss a cigarette into the brush on a hot, windy day.¹¹³

And not only did Holman doubt the park visitors' desire to see real nature, he challenged the park's ability to provide it. The undisturbed, primeval Fundy forest had disappeared in the last two centuries, he wrote, the victim of lumbering as well as insect depredation. "In short,

¹¹¹ H.L. Holman to Smart, 1 December 1949, RG84 vol.1802, file PEI181 vol.1, NAC.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

the present forest is anything but natural and is, rather, the direct result of man's mismanagement in the past."¹¹⁴ The park therefore had license to preserve what it wished. Smart wholeheartedly agreed with Holman's report and moved to adopt its recommendations.¹¹⁵ To the observer, this episode is a welcome dose of reality for a park system that so often treated the nature it oversaw as its personal discovery. But by accepting the park as a product of history, the Parks Branch once again permitted itself a more active role in shaping the park's future. And underlying its actions was the belief that land touched by mankind was somehow profane, and did not deserve the hands-off sort of preservation that virginal land did.

Holman and Smart were not backing away from the aesthetic of a seemingly-pristine forest, they were championing it. They just felt that such a landscape could be created. This can be seen in Holman's 1949 inspection of Prince Edward Island National Park. Whereas Ernest Smith had been hired as its first superintendent specifically to show Islanders what a managed forest looked like, Holman saw this project as hopelessly misdirected. Rather than making the newly planted forests appear natural, he noted,

Whole fields have been planted with nice, orderly rows of trees as though the sole object were to grow timber for commercial purposes. There are no gaps or openings to serve as picnic places out of the wind and glare of the beach, no mixture of species to relieve the monotony of pure spruce, or pine, planted four feet apart each way and no lanes left unplanted for accessibility. Further, none of the planting has been done on that part of the area that is most

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ Smart to Gibson, 3 December 1949, *ibid.*

in need of it – the open windswept fields and the dunes near Cavendish.¹¹⁶

In other words, the Parks Branch had not hidden the artificiality of either past or present occupation. Smart echoed Holman's concerns, and in a letter to his superior demonstrated that a policy of intervention could exist in harmony with the appearance of non-intervention. Smart recommended that at Prince Edward Island National Park "we should not rigidly keep to the regular plantation methods but that the planting should be done with a view to keeping to a more natural condition" and in the same letter stated his hope that the park thinning operations would permit the Parks Branch to open a Christmas tree trade.¹¹⁷

The 1950s was a decade in which the Parks Branch would continually find need for active forest management in the parks, and each time find justification. At Prince Edward Island National Park, staff took to thinning and cropping trees that were obstructing tourist lodges' views of the North Shore. This was done to pacify park neighbours, but was not believed to contradict park policy since, in the words of Deputy Minister R.G. Robertson, "trees are developing in a very overcrowded and unpleasant fashion. Keeping hands off these areas do not preserve them in their natural state because they are all second growth areas in any event."¹¹⁸ At Fundy National Park, a sawmill was maintained to meet the wood needs of the Maritime parks, but out of visitors' eyesight and

¹¹⁶ H.L. Holman to Smart, 1 December 1949, RG84 vol.1802, file PEI181 vol.1, NAC

¹¹⁷ Smart to Gibson, 3 December 1949, *ibid.* As a result of Holman's inspection and Smart's reply to it, the P.E.I. nursery was abandoned. The Christmas tree business never materialized. J.C. Goodison, Acting Superintendent, to Coleman, 26 September 1955, *ibid.*

¹¹⁸ Robertson to Coleman, 20 August 1957, RG84 vol.1786, file PEI28 vol.1, NAC. Complaints about park trees may be seen in North Shore Tourist Resort Operators to Department of Northern Affairs and Natural Resources, 8 October 1955, RG22 vol.317, file 33.21.1 pt.3, NAC; and Acting Superintendent H.A. Veber to Coleman, 30 June 1954 RG84 vol.1786, file PEI28 vol.1, NAC.

knowledge. The mill on the Upper Salmon River owned by Judson Cleveland before expropriation was used by the park until it burned down in 1952. The Parks Branch considered implementing an intensive cutting plan for the entire park,¹¹⁹ but in the end decided just to set up another small mill at Bennett Brook. Throughout the mid-1950s, staff yearly logged between 60,000 - 100,000 board feet¹²⁰ – about 1/100th the amount taken before the park's establishment. When asked by a New Brunswick government member about the park system's timber policy, Assistant Deputy Minister E.A. Côté noted, "I indicated to him that I thought our policy was in the state of evolution and that I could not give him an immediate answer."¹²¹

What more than anything cemented the belief that hands-off preservation was dangerous to the forests being preserved was the rise of spruce budworm infestation in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia (and, to a lesser extent, Prince Edward Island) in the early 1950s. This was a quite natural event, as budworm populations buildup every 25 to 70 years.¹²² Cape Breton Highlands reported some budworm in 1951, and by 1955 it

¹¹⁹ Gibson to Timm, Dominion Forest Service, 17 May 1948, RG84 vol.1039, file F200 vol.1, NAC; and Smart to Superintendent Saunders, 27 June 1952, *ibid.*

¹²⁰ Superintendent MacFarlane to Coleman, 25 May 1956, *ibid.*; and cited by C.E. Mullen, "Literature Review, Fundy National Park," Parks Canada, p.71. Those in charge of implementing the cut squeezed scientific benefit from even the most prosaic of forestry tasks. For example, at Bennett Brook "It is proposed to lop and scatter the brush on part of the area and pile and burn on the remainder to provide cost data and esthetic comparisons between the two brush disposal methods." D.J. Learmouth, Forestry Engineer, to Coleman, 20 October 1955, RG84 vol.1039, file F200 vol.1, NAC. In the early 1960s, a mill at Kinnie Brook was used to saw large spruce logs bound for the new historic park at Louisbourg. Michael Burzynski, "Man and Fundy: Story Component Plan," Parks Canada, 1987, p.43, internal document, Fundy National Park files.

¹²¹ Côté to Jackson, 11 September 1956, RG84 vol.472, file 33.6.1 pt.4, NAC.

¹²² On spruce budworm in the Maritimes, see Kari Lie, "The Spruce Budworm Controversy in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia," *Alternatives*, vol.9 no.2 (Spring 1980), pp.5-13; Charles Restino, "The Cape Breton Island Spruce Budworm Infestation: A Retrospective Analysis," *Alternatives*, vol.19 no.4 (1993), pp.29-36; Elizabeth May, *Budworm Battles* (Halifax: Four East, 1982). On the 1950s infestation, see Lie, p.7.

had spread widely, most noticeably around the park headquarters.¹²³ The insects feasted on balsam fir and spruce, and with the aid of the balsam woolly aphid left most of the park softwood forests, especially in the interior, dead or dying. The result was a park which, in the words of forest engineer D.J. Learmouth, had "a very ragged appearance. ... Fortunately, much of the Park stands are mixed-wood stands and ... serve to camouflage much of the dead and deformed softwoods and maintain the aesthetic appearance of many of the fine views along the Cabot Trail."¹²⁴ But in the interior, "its present monetary, aesthetic or recreational value is practically nil."¹²⁵ The infestation affected so many trees that any sort of clean-up was out of the question. Fundy was similarly threatened, though the budworm that moved throughout New Brunswick in this period had not yet moved to the park. To the Parks Branch's dismay, nothing in its prior theory and practice of park management prepared it for the outbreak. For this reason, Deputy Minister Robertson argued that forest preservation in national parks needed to be redefined:

All this leads up to the question whether we should not give serious consideration to the establishment of a more positive forest policy in connection with administration of the forests in the parks.

I want to say immediately that by "positive" I do not mean a policy of exploitation. We are all firmly convinced of the rightness of the Park philosophy against exploitation. The question is how best to conserve. It could be argued that maintenance of the Parks "so as to leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations" means that the

¹²³ C.C. Smith report, December 1957, RG84 vol.520, file CBH181.1 pt.3, NAC.

¹²⁴ Learmouth report to Coleman, 24 October 1955, RG84 vol.520, file CBH180.3 pt.1, NAC.

¹²⁵ Learmouth report "A Fire Access Trail Program for Cape Breton Highlands National Park," 1956, RG84 vol.8, file CBH62, NAC.

forests must be left in an utter state of nature, and with nature left to do with them just what she will – destroy them by disease, by fire, or anything else. We do not take that position as to destruction by fire, and rightly so. Equally, I think we cannot take that position where a risk of destruction by disease occurs. In other words, we do not hold to the view that the right course is "hands off". What we should aim at, it seems to me, in the case of fire, disease and all other aspects of forest concern, is an intelligent and scientific policy of management and protection, the object of which is to see, insofar as we can, that the areas now covered by healthy forest remain covered by healthy forest, year in year out, in perpetuity.¹²⁶

Robertson's argument hinges on his implicit definition of a healthy forest: one in which there are mostly living, growing trees, so that overall the forest has more growth than death. But a forest cannot expand infinitely over time, so constant growth is necessarily unsustainable. Sooner or later, the forest will stagnate and suffocate on its own growth. Insect depredation – and fire¹²⁷ – kills off part of the forest, but in doing so opens it up for new vegetation and wildlife. This was well understood by scientists of the time and by the Parks Branch, too, but

¹²⁶ Robertson to Hutchison, 28 December 1956, RG22 vol.474, file 33.9.1 pt.5, NAC.

¹²⁷ Fire was (and is) another troublesome forest management concern in national parks. By the time Robertson was writing, Cape Breton Highlands, with its large, inaccessible interior prone to lightning strikes, had reported fires of varying sizes in 1939, 1943, 1945, 1947, 1949, and 1950. The 1947 fires burned 4330 acres, cost \$21,000 to suppress, led to the evacuation of Pleasant Bay and destroyed 20 homes there. And yet, by the 1950s plant biologists understood that the constant suppression of fires allowed forest litter and small brush to build up, making the next fire more likely to be a major one. Also, fires opened up areas for wildlife and for young trees – by 1955, 6-foot high spruce, fir, poplar, birch and maples were taking over the Pleasant Bay burn area. The Wildlife Service explained all this to the Parks Branch in the hopes of showing how park forest management was interfering with wildlife management, but policy did not change. The Parks Branch had to show its commitment to the protection of local communities, and could not wait for fires to burn themselves out. But more than this, staff did not want to let fires burn: fires were seen as destroying forest beauty and utility, and had to be stopped. Harrison Lewis to Smart, 1 March 1952, RG84 vol.2102, file U172 vol.8, NAC; and Smart to Hutchison, 13 March 1952, *ibid.* See Canadian Parks Service, Keepers of the Flame: Fire Management in the Canadian Parks Service (Ottawa: Canadian Parks Service, 1989), and R.W. Wein, Historical and Prehistorical Role of Fire in the Maritime National Parks (Fredericton: University of New Brunswick Press, 1978).

staff could not help but see dead trees as aesthetically unappealing and – reverting to a logic that only applied outside the parks – as economically wasteful. Common sense told them that letting insects kill trees was bad forestry management.¹²⁸

The obvious solution was insecticide. Spraying insect pests was an accepted part of Canadian national park management. There was absolutely no consideration that insects deserved any of the protection provided to other living things in the parks; they were simply killed. For example, from the very first years of Prince Edward Island National Park, its stagnant ponds were annually sprayed with hundreds of gallons of furnace oil – the recipe for killing mosquito larvae.¹²⁹ And with the availability of war-surplus planes and the massive expansion of the pesticide industry in postwar North America, aerial spraying grew much more accepted and much more common.¹³⁰ It was in this climate that New Brunswick began a full-scale attack from the air on spruce budworm in the 1950s, in a program that would continue for decades. In a rare act of restraint, though, the Parks Branch opted not to attack the Maritime parks' spruce budworm with aerial sprayers. The Branch was likely wary about what such a massive interventionist move would mean to its public preservationist image, especially since the Nova Scotia government had chosen not to spray, despite considerable pressure to do

¹²⁸ This was a struggle faced by foresters across North America. See Langston, esp. pp.114–156.

¹²⁹ Scribbler re Dalvay House information, PEINP files. For insect abatement in U.S. national parks, see Runte, *Yosemite*, pp.176–178.

¹³⁰ For pesticide use in postwar America, see Thomas R. Dunlap, *DDT: Scientists, Citizens, and Public Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981). On the relationship between war and pesticide, see Edmund P. Russell III "Speaking of Annihilation": Mobilizing for War Against Human and Insect Enemies, 1914–1945," *Journal of American History* (March 1996), pp.1505–1529.

so. By the time the Parks Branch even considered spraying, it was advised by federal foresters that the infestation was too far developed to bother.¹³¹

There was another reason to avoid aerial spraying: in the words of Chief J.R.B. Coleman, "In a National Park, the effect of wide-spread spraying with DDT on the fish and wildlife populations must also be considered and may be reason enough to avoid such procedures on Park lands until more information on this aspect of insect control is available."¹³² The chemical DDT – dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane – had been discovered by the American military during the Second World War to be a wonderful agent for insect control: it was inexpensive, very toxic, persistent, useful as either a contact or stomach poison, and yet of low acute toxicity to mammals, including humans.¹³³ When it was made available for civilian use in 1945, it was heavily marketed as a sort of super chemical that could cleanse the planet of pests.¹³⁴ Biologists were more cautious, and the Canadian Parks Branch took note of their concerns. In 1946, James Smart distributed to superintendents in all the Canadian national parks a U.S. Fish and Wildlife circular, "DDT: Its effects on Fish and Wildlife," which discussed 12 studies showing the dangers of DDT.¹³⁵ It was already proven that DDT tended to kill non-

¹³¹ Learmouth to Coleman, 17 October 1956, RG22 vol.474, file 33.9.1 pt.5, NAC.

¹³² Coleman to Hutchison, 8 December 1955, RG22 vol.473, file 33.9.1 pt.4, NAC.

¹³³ Dunlap, *DDT*, p.37.

¹³⁴ Russell, p.1525. A leading biologist of the time began an article on DDT with the pronouncement, "No chemical substance has excited greater general interest than DDT." Tracy I. Storer, "DDT and Wildlife," *Journal of Wildlife Management*, vol.10 no.3 (July 1946), pp.181-182. This issue of the journal was devoted to DDT and wildlife management.

¹³⁵ Clarence Cottam and Elmer Higgins, "DDT: Its Effects on Fish and Wildlife," (Washington: US Fish and Wildlife, Department of Interior, 1946). See Smart to Superintendent, 30 October 1946, RG84 vol.1002, file CBH300 pt.2 (1942-1952), NAC; also, RG84 vol.23 file PEI300, NAC. Even prior to the civilian release of the chemical, the

targeted populations such as birds and fish, though some of this seemed to be due to overspraying. Smart demonstrated both the national park experience with using DDT and awareness of its dangers when he wrote in 1948, "In using any chemicals we have, of course, to take into consideration the effect on our wildlife population and in particular on the fish as we have found the latter are very susceptible to DDT even in comparatively small quantities."¹³⁶ Insect control was nonetheless periodically carried out in Maritime national parks in the late 1940s and 1950s – including in the first year of Fundy's existence – but it is not clear whether DDT was the pesticide of choice.¹³⁷

When spruce budworm erupted in the 1950s, the park system knew enough about DDT to be distrustful of aerially spraying it. And yet, action seemed necessary. Cape Breton Highlands' Superintendent Doak, who happened to be a great advocate of DDT, informed Ottawa that the public was constantly criticizing the park about its trees, and he pushed for a spray program.¹³⁸ More importantly, senior politicians became involved in the matter. The Assistant Deputy Minister of Northern

Canadian Provincial-Dominion Wildlife Conference passed a resolution stating, "Therefore, be it resolved, that this conference recommends a programme of scientific investigation of the complicated problems relating to DDT and wildlife before any large quantities of DDT are used for any large-scale commercial purpose, and also recommends that the use of DDT be kept under strict governmental control." February 1945, RG22 vol.4 file 13, NAC.

¹³⁶ Smart to Harold Furst, Manager, Seignory Club, Montebello, Quebec, 8 November 1948, RG84 vol.39, file U300 vol.16, NAC. Smart wrote to find out how the Seignory Club kept insects away.

¹³⁷ L.W. Ford to Coleman, 23 February 1955, RG84 vol.1786, file PEI28 vol.1, NAC; and Canada, Department of Mines and Resources, Annual Report, 1949, p.22

¹³⁸ Doak told Coleman, "If you should decide to carry out an aerial spray probably the Province of Nova Scotia would co-operate and have the entire Island sprayed." 30 July 1956, RG84 vol.520, file CBH181.1 pt.3, NAC. In this letter, he advocated the use of DDT, even though he had just received a letter from a New Brunswick forestry engineer expressly recommending the use of another spray, if any. C.C. Smith, Forest Biology Lab, Fredericton, to Doak, 20 July 1956, ibid.

Affairs and National Resources, C.W. Jackson, told Director of the Parks Branch James Hutchison that the ministry was under pressure – presumably from the provincial government or federal Nova Scotia politicians – to act. Though the Forest Branch had suggested that the infestation would have to run its course, this was now deemed unacceptable. As Hutchison relayed to Chief Coleman, "I can tell you now the Minister is not prepared to accept such a stand unless it is a matter of last resort." A more activist response was needed.¹³⁹

The Parks Branch decided that a localized DDT spraying program would take place around public parts of the Cape Breton Highlands Park. Vegetation along roadsides, campground and picnic areas, and park headquarters would be targeted. Of course, by only spraying public sites, the Parks Branch was just hiding its budworm problem. Moreover, it was giving the impression that trees close to tourists were of greater value to the park than distant ones, and that their appearance was worth an increased risk to local fish, wildlife, and humans.¹⁴⁰ Learmouth, a forester, assured the Parks Branch that he had discussed this "informally with mammalogists, ornithologists, and limnologists of the Canadian Wildlife Service" who did not think this would be a hazard, since it would only be a light spray on a small area.¹⁴¹

¹³⁹ Jackson to Hutchison, 1 August 1956, *ibid.*; and Hutchison to Coleman, 8 August 1956, *ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ There was as of yet no firm evidence that DDT posed a threat to humans. However, it was certainly suspected. Dunlap, *DDT*, pp.88-89. There was constant discussion of the risks and benefits of DDT in the North American Wildlife Conferences of the 1950s. In a defense of the chemical in 1952, David G. Hall of the U.S. Bureau of Entomology stated, "DDT is not the human killer many people think it is." Hall, "Our Food Supply, Wildlife Conservation, and Agricultural Chemicals," Transactions of the 17th North American Wildlife Conference, 1952, p.30.

¹⁴¹ Lothian, Assistant Chief, to Hutchison, 3 December 1956, RG22 vol.474, file 33.9.1 pt.5, NAC.

The spraying of spruce budworm at Cape Breton Highlands took place in the summer of 1957. It was a largely pointless exercise, since the bulk of infestation had already swept through the area in past years and was gone. Three thousand gallons of 25% DDT emulsion was mixed on site with 12,000 gallons of water to form 15,000 gallons of 5% DDT, which was then distributed through a chemical sprayer. Superintendent Doak, though warned that people tended to overdose DDT, complained to Ottawa that the small spray coming out of the machine could not possibly be doing the job.¹⁴² The following spring, it was reported that the control program had preserved the appearance and limited the mortality of the sprayed trees, but not to the degree expected. This was not considered a failure, though, since the exercise was constantly referred to as having "limited control objectives" and as being "somewhat experimental in nature."¹⁴³

The simplest lesson to be learned from this episode is that, regardless of references to an unchanging philosophy of preservation, the Parks Branch still had to answer to political pressures. As a result, its policies were not always ones it would have chosen. Another lesson is that once policy moved in a certain direction, it gained its own momentum. In the years that followed the spraying at Cape Breton Highlands, the Parks Branch organized increasingly extensive insect control programs without any apparent pressure to do so. Perhaps this was because staff found the experiments with DDT so encouraging, or because they simply enjoyed the concept of cleansing nature in such a modern and scientific way. Or perhaps in justifying an unwanted

¹⁴² Doak to Strong, 1 August 1957, RG84 vol.520, file CBH181.1 pt.3, NAC.

¹⁴³ See, for example, *ibid.*

decision, staff convinced themselves of the rightness of their actions. In any case, insect control picked up in the late 1950s. At Cape Breton Highlands, DDT was used in 1958 against spruce budworm, and the following year against the birch case bearer. As staff had known would happen, spruce mites filled the vacant budworm niche and subsequently had to be killed with Ovotran acaricide: spraying resulted in spraying.¹⁴⁴ Fundy staff used 150 "Skeeter Bombs" (which the superintendent vaguely believed contained DDT) on the pond near headquarters, 2-4-D on weeds, and Black Leaf Forty for insects on ornamental shrubs.¹⁴⁵ Prince Edward Island National Park controlled its "ugly nest caterpillar" with either Malathion or what its park naturalist called the "well-known 5% DDT spray."¹⁴⁶

Insect control soon became normalized. What had originally been used for epidemic infestation became the weapon against everyday black fly and mosquito populations. Ex-staff told me of walking around the campgrounds a half-hour before spraying, warning campers to cover their food. They then hooked up the DDT fogger to a 45 gallon drum filled with a diesel oil and DDT mix and tied it in the back of a truck. Staff worked without masks, and when they drove around, the fogging operation drew crowds of children who would run along behind. In the words of one staff member, the spray would "kill all the birds and squirrels, there'd be nothing left."¹⁴⁷ By the early 1960s, the Parks

¹⁴⁴ Superintendent Browning to Strong, 23 July 1959, *ibid.* That staff had been expecting a mite outbreak can be seen in CC Smith, Forest Biology Lab, Fredericton, to Superintendent Doak, 20 July 1956, *ibid.*

¹⁴⁵ Superintendent MacFarlane to Strong, 19 October 1961, RG84 vol.1036, file F150.5 vol.2, NAC.

¹⁴⁶ R.D. Muir, cited in Strong to Superintendent, 30 July 1962, RG84 vol.1802, file PEI181.1. vol.2, NAC.

¹⁴⁷ Interview with Neil MacKinnon, Pleasant Bay, 4 August 1994. Three ex-staffers from

Branch's proactive insect control program was a point of pride. In a St. John's Evening Telegram story on the new Terra Nova National Park, the community of tourist cabins was portrayed as offering Newfoundlanders unprecedented freedom from insects:

Among the appealing features of this little snug town nestled in deep woods is that there are no flies to bother the inhabitants. They'd be there in hordes but for the 'treatment' given the area three times weekly by Ben Roper. Warden Roper sprays the region with DDT. Dense clouds of it bellow from a compressed air gun and floats [sic] over the cabin area eliminating any flies which might be found.¹⁴⁸

The park was sufficiently proud of its new machine that Warden Roper posed for a picture of the fogger in action.

However, in the same period, pesticide use in general and DDT use in particular were beginning to draw widespread opposition. Wildlife biologists were finding evidence that chemicals of low toxicity may become concentrated and cause indirect poisoning further up the food chain; whether this also occurred in humans was unknown. This became a matter of public debate in 1962 with the publication of a series of articles in The New Yorker by Rachel Carson, and the release the following year of her book Silent Spring. Carson's message was that today's pesticidal contamination of the environment might be having permanent, irreparable effects on the health of the planet and its residents. Carson even specifically discussed how the aerial spraying of DDT to combat spruce budworm had killed salmon stock on New Brunswick's Miramichi River.¹⁴⁹ Just as Carson's work was becoming a public issue, the Parks Branch received its first written complaint about

Maritime parks discussed DDT with me, but asked not to be quoted.

¹⁴⁸ Don Morris, "Park Paradise Beckons," St. John's Evening Telegram, 6 August 1960.

¹⁴⁹ Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962), pp.134-138.



Ben Roper, chief game warden at Terra Nova National Park, is a man most welcomed around the park's cabin area. For he brings with him his powerful compressed air machine which emits great bellows of DDT which roll throughout the countryside eliminating flies. Here Ben stands by the machine as it pours forth its insect killer.

Figure 18. Warden Ben Roper with DDT Fogger.
From St. John's Evening Telegraph, 6 August 1960.

its spraying program. An American chemist who had visited Cape Breton Highlands wrote,

There was the indiscriminate fogging of the areas around the camp ground with a DDT-oil fog. We were informed by the park warden doing the fogging that a stronger fog was used last year and resulted in the death of many of the birds in the area. Even though he was using a fog reduced in strength by some 37.5% this year I feel the practice is both foolish and dangerous. It is foolish because the fog had only momentary effect on the black flies which were causing all of the campers much discomfort. The inexpensive insect repellents now on the market proved to be more effective, and without any cost to the National Park. It is dangerous for reasons which I am sure you are familiar. ... As a chemist and as a citizen I condemn the widespread and indiscriminate use of any insecticide and urge that your department discontinue the practice we witnessed on Cape Breton.¹⁵⁰

The superintendent disagreed with this assessment, saying that staff did not feel there was significant bird mortality – especially now that they had reduced the DDT formula to the recommended 5% level.¹⁵¹ But more complaints poured in, and the Parks Branch began to experiment with different types of chemicals. As a narrator of a 1965 C.B.C. television show on P.E.I. Park explained, the program to spray mosquitoes was ultimately discontinued, when people noticed that "the song birds disappeared with the mosquitoes. ... Now mosquitoes feed on people, and the songbirds feed on mosquitoes: Nature's perfect balance restored."¹⁵² A happy ending.

¹⁵⁰ Joseph G. Strauch Jr., Corvallis, Oregon, to David Munro, Canadian Wildlife Service, 12 September 1962, RG84 vol.1002, file CBH301 pt.2, NAC.

¹⁵¹ Superintendent McCarron to Strong, 22 November 1962, *ibid.*

¹⁵² Narrator on "Diary of a Warden," CBC program 20/20, 1965. Thanks to Barb MacDonald of Prince Edward Island National Park for making this available to me.

But nearly a decade of insect spraying in the parks made it easier to permit spraying again. New Brunswick, rather than letting the spruce budworm outbreak rise and subside in the early 1950s, had chosen yearly aerial spraying and been rewarded with 15 years of semi-outbreak levels. Frustrated, the province took to blaming Fundy for hosting the budworm, and urged the Parks Branch to spray. In 1968 the Branch relented and Fundy was involved in spruce budworm spraying until 1975. Nonetheless, spruce budworm destroyed much of the park's firs and spruce between 1974 and 1978.¹⁵³

Just as the Parks Branch had, for a variety of reasons, originally chosen one location for a national park over others that would probably have been equally suitable, it chose some parts of the parks' constituent living things over others in managing them. Effect followed effect, often beyond the Branch's understanding. The preference for attractive forests filled with healthy trees led park staff to cut the forests in a way reminiscent of traditional use. It also led to the killing of insects, and secondarily to the killing of birds, small mammals, and fish. Even the most innocent gestures produced unforeseen results. When staff selectively cut down trees killed by spruce budworm and removed them, they felt they were doing the forest a favour; instead, they were removing homes of insects that were budworm predators. As the next section of this chapter will show, park staff slowly grew aware of the changes they were inadvertently and advertently bringing to the parks, and from about 1960 on were more assiduous in at least thinking about the possible consequences of their actions. But the Canadian National Parks Branch as an agency has never really acknowledged the extent to which

¹⁵³ Burzynski, *Man and Fundy*, p.50.

it was responsible for decades of rampant intervention. Today, a sign at Fundy National Park about its peregrine falcon population reads, "Toward the 1950s peregrine numbers declined drastically. The widespread use of DDT, an insecticide which accumulated in the food chain, was responsible for the decrease." Also, "A pair of peregrines nested on a seaside cliff a few kilometres east of Point Wolfe in 1948, the year that Fundy National Park was established. They were not seen again and decades would pass before others of their species would replace them."¹⁵⁴ The sign never quite mentions that at one time pesticide use was so widespread in North America, and thought so safe, that it was used abundantly in this very national park.

a new ecology

The Parks Branch's interventionist policies on preservation matters in the 1940s and 1950s owed much to the science of ecology, even though administrators rarely used the word. If asked, staff could explain management decisions in terms of carrying capacity, climax communities, population cycles, and other ecological concepts. But explanation was rarely needed. During this period of its history, the Parks Branch's presumed right to manage the nature within its border and its ability to do so competently were largely taken for granted by the public. Thus staff could distribute press releases describing in detail the poisoning of lakes or the spraying of campgrounds without feeling a need for discretion. Science maintained sufficient cultural authority in these

¹⁵⁴ Sign at Point Wolfe Beach, Fundy National Park. The population collapse of the peregrine falcon across North America was one of the most important reasons why the U.S. decided to ban DDT in 1972. See Dunlap, *DDT*, pp.130-132.

decades that the Parks Branch, an agency presumably grounded in science, had freedom to make decisions regarding the parks' natural environment as it saw fit.¹⁵⁵

But in the late 1950s, the meaning of ecology began to be re-interpreted by North Americans. As discussed in the previous chapter, this was a period when people were developing a newfound attachment to nature, combined with a growing anxiety about its fate under human "management". Though the public deferred to ecology for its ability to help explain the natural world, many people began to learn different lessons from this science. Just as ecology could teach that nature was but a complicated machine in need of tinkering, it could also teach that one should be respectful of nature's complexity and therefore fiddle with its processes as little as possible. This may seem to have been an opportunistic reading of the science, advocating a non-interventionism that people wanted in any case, but it was no less valid than that made by game managers who had favoured interventionism. Nor was such an interpretation new: it had been in gestation for decades, including among some ecologists themselves.¹⁵⁶ The 1960s saw ecology the science – reductive, abstract, with a mechanistic view of nature – adapted by North American society as ecology the movement – holistic, value-laden, with an organic view of nature.

¹⁵⁵ On science's cultural authority, see Dunlap's work, especially "Wildlife, Science, and the National Parks."

¹⁵⁶ No one better exemplifies ecology's transformation than the American ecologist Aldo Leopold. His 1933 book Game Management taught a generation of administrators how to manage nature, but as early as the mid-1930s he had lost faith in humans' ability to do so. Until his death in 1948, Leopold sought to create a less-intrusive relationship with nature. His final book, A Sand County Almanac, is a critical text in the creation of the ecology movement.

The National Parks Branch, as perhaps the foremost Canadian agency dealing with humans' relationship to nature, served as the harbinger of this new thinking. Within the space of just a few years in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, the national park system underwent a swift ideological conversion. From actively promoting recreational facilities for the masses, the Parks Branch turned to advocating a far less interventionist philosophy. In doing so, however, it did not give up the science of ecology for the ecology movement; it continued to defend its policies in scientific terms. But it could now also use ecology to justify its decisions ethically. The scientific authority it had once derived from ecology was now supplemented by a no less potent cultural authority, that of ruling on the "natural values" which it was mandated to preserve, if need be by curtailing the recreational activities of the masses.

There is perhaps no better evidence of this ideological shift than the Branch's changing opinion of Fundy National Park, which it had just recently established. With over 100 acres of manicured lawn, the most modern recreation facilities, a business subdivision, and a community hall, Fundy offered the most ostentatious display of manmade intervention to be seen in the entire park system. Though the superintendent's residence was subject to internal criticism for its opulence even while it was being built, Branch staff gave no evidence in the park's early years of development of being dissatisfied with the general results. It had been developed as it had been designed. Yet when Terra Nova, the next national park to be established, was underway in the late 1950s, staff used Fundy as a model for how not to design the new park. Parks Director Coleman specifically stated that the new park's

cabins should not be as elaborate as those at Fundy.¹⁵⁷ More generally, facilities should not overshadow nature: the buildings should fit into the landscape, and development should be on a much smaller scale. When work at Terra Nova was complete, Deputy Minister Robertson commended the builders, noting that the "headquarters seems to have been well laid out – an infinite improvement on the last park we established at Fundy!"¹⁵⁸

In the coming years, criticism of Fundy would only grow. A staff member stated in 1960 that the New Brunswick park had had to rely on recreation development because it comprised such average nature. Even still, the park was not properly representative of its location: "The beauty of the Saint John Valley, the Atlantic Salmon streams and the great tidal bore are all outstanding attractions of this region not found in the park."¹⁵⁹ Director Coleman agreed that Fundy was not as attractive as it could be, but shrugged off any blame on the Parks Branch's part by claiming "...Fundy was not the Department's first choice for a national park area at the time the matter was being considered."¹⁶⁰ He ignored the fact that though Cautley and Smart had never ranked the Albert county site first in preference, the Parks Branch

¹⁵⁷ Cited in Carter to Robertson, 4 December 1957, RG84 vol.1944, file TN28 pt.1, NAC.

¹⁵⁸ Robertson to Coleman, 7 October 1960, RG22 vol.1097, file 311.1 pt.1, NAC.

¹⁵⁹ Harold Eidsvik, Planning Officer, "Fundy National Park - Planning Considerations," February 1960, p.1, FNP files. For these reasons, there was some departmental interest in New Brunswickers' hopes for a winding Fundy Trail along the coastline. In 1956, Assistant Deputy Minister C.W. Jackson stated, "At the present time, while the park is named for the Bay of Fundy, there are very few points within the park from which a view of the Bay can be obtained." Jackson to Minister Lesage, 14 September 1956, RG22 vol.472, file 33.6.1 pt.4, NAC.

¹⁶⁰ Coleman "Addenda" to "Fundy National Park - Planning Considerations", February 1960, p.1, FNP files. He also said, "At one time it was considered good policy to make expenditures in the park readily apparent to the public; hence the prominent siting of the Superintendents' residences in some parks."

certainly had not opposed it. Fundy increasingly became the target of open condemnation from staff. Deputy Minister Robertson felt that the subdivision was a travesty, writing,

I was even more struck than previously with the lamentable planning that had led to the location of the park compound where it is. ... Even worse than the location of the compound is the complete outrage in having the Imperial Oil service station where it is. Whoever permitted this should have been shot, but I suppose it is too late to take action now.¹⁶¹

The most scathing and most searching reaction to Fundy came from Parks Naturalist R.D. Muir in 1964. He had visited all the parks the previous summer, and though he had concerns over the scale of development in some, he saw Fundy's problem as much more serious. The park facilities did not seem to be in harmony with their natural surrounding. Reflecting on a previous visit, Muir wrote,

From last year's Fundy experience came a slowly developing uneasiness, a poorly defined feeling that something had gone wrong in this park. Because of the nebulous and psychic aspect of this reaction, it was not included in last year's report. It was easy enough to see that moose had gone wrong [there had been a population explosion and crash], but there was more than that, something very basic had happened, and the basic concept of a National park had foundered. ∴ The crux of the matter was that the natural features for which the park was set up were being destroyed, obscured, covered up and cheapened.¹⁶²

Muir's re-reading of Fundy occurred within 15 years of the park's creation. Nothing had physically changed: the park had preserved intact the landscape it had created. Nonetheless, what had seemed in 1950 to epitomize a modern, enlightened relationship with nature was by 1963 proof of humans' inability to leave nature alone.

¹⁶¹ Robertson to Coleman, 19 October 1960, RG22 vol.897, file 304.1 vol.1.

¹⁶² Muir to Stirrett, 20 January 1964, "Report on Field Trips, 1963," p.84.

What makes this transition especially remarkable is that it occurred in a period of the Canadian park system's history in which intervention of the sort that Muir found so distasteful was practised by the Parks Branch to a greater degree than ever before. For the sake of park use, a system gorged with tourists was receiving unprecedented levels of funding. For the sake of preservation, the Parks Branch was implementing some of its most egregiously interventionist policies on wildlife, fish, and vegetation.

This seeming contradiction can be explained, at least to a degree, as a reaction against the physical results of this "hands-on" approach. As discussed in the previous chapter, attendance in the parks mushroomed during the 1950s, from about 1.8 million at the beginning of the decade to 4.9 million at the end. The Parks Branch tried to match this increased visitation with increased facilities. It became clear almost immediately to staff that the park system could not keep up to such growth, and that trying to do so might compromise the park nature. Discussion of parks took on an apocalyptic tone. The Branch's annual report in 1959 for the first time had voiced a concern about the possible deterioration of the parks system by way of development. By 1964, this concern was much more obvious, so that the report would begin, "A race against time has developed in the management of the National Park...."¹⁶³ The ideological shift, then, can be understood as a response to the manmade change caused by rapidly increasing use of the parks. There was an important new ingredient in this way of seeing: the Parks Branch was for the first time including itself in consideration of manmade change. The park system had always looked at the effects of

¹⁶³ Canada, Northern Affairs and National Resources, Annual Reports, 1964, p.17.

tourists, past residents, and locals as potentially harmful to the park's wilderness and thus sought to minimize these impacts. But when staff began to see themselves as part of the parks' history, they became aware of the degree to which they themselves were manipulating nature in the parks.

There is certainly truth in this explanation for the ideological move away from interventionism, but it is not entirely satisfactory. Because of the continuing need to accommodate the public, the parks continued to be increasingly developed in the 1960s, casting doubt on the direct relationship between ideology and action. Nor is there an intrinsic reason to believe that one event, intervention, should produce an opposite reaction, a move away from intervention. Moreover, one could say that the coming decades actually proved staff's fears wrong: a park system supposedly overburdened with almost 6 million visitors in 1960 would prove capable of handling, without collapse, almost 17 million in 1970. It may have been reasonable for the Parks Branch to develop a less interventionist philosophy in the 1960s, but there is nothing that made this decision obvious, necessary, or fated.

I would speculate that the Branch's change in philosophy was related to its conception of itself as a purveyor of high culture. National parks had been championed throughout their history as safeguarding such ideals as beauty, love of nature, and patriotism. As custodian of the parks, the parks agency was also presumed to possess such qualities. But in postwar North America, it was more difficult for the Parks Branch to make such claims: the expansion and increasing wealth of the middle class made parks much more accessible, and the apparent wiping away of class difference made the promotion of elitist ideas less tolerable. The

Parks Branch felt obliged to re-conceptualize itself as an agency serving a single, mass clientele. The Atlantic parks themselves bore eloquent testimony to this changing social vocation of the Branch. Earlier development at Prince Edward Island and Cape Breton Highlands had explicitly been premised on the assumption that the park had to serve two distinct classes of tourists. Later development at Fundy was centred on one location to serve the recreational needs of one class. This also signalled staff's belief that visitor use was largely distinct from nature, and that for the enjoyment of users and to meet the goals of preservation, they should be kept separate.

But in the 1950s, the Parks Branch discovered that even in an age of recreational democracy, not all tourists were alike. A significant number of park visitors were shunning the facilities so elaborately and expensively prepared for them, preferring instead to get back to nature as much as possible. Staff were surprised to find that many people did not like the open, community-style campgrounds being developed. Similarly, in the late 1950s, the parks system experimented with a naturalist program, including trail walks and interpretive lectures, and staff were amazed at its great success. For example, 800 visitors to Fundy sat in on a single campfire talk in 1962, and field trips along the Bay of Fundy attracted 200 to 300 people.¹⁶⁴ Considering that Parks Branch staff were part of the culture, and as caretakers of the park presumably in tune with the public's feelings about them, what was remarkable was not that the Branch changed its operating philosophy, but that it was in many respects so slow to do so. It took years for the Parks Branch staff to

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 1963, p.22. In a nicely symbolic move, park recreation directors were retrained as naturalists in the early 1960s.

recognize that people were coming to parks primarily to experience nature, and not to experience recreation in close proximity to other people.

The Parks Branch's discovery of this constituency allowed it to once again speak of two classes of visitors, but this time the division between the classes was an intellectual and cultural one. Visitors were divided between those who understood and appreciated appropriate park recreations and those who did not. One could divide the visitors between those who sincerely loved nature and those who were more interested in mass recreation – epitomized, in the 1950s, by the drive-in, whose potential inclusion in the national park system created fierce controversy in this decade.¹⁶⁵ This was not a manufactured distinction; staff were honestly concerned about stress on the parks system, and it seemed sensible that visitors who loved parks for their nature had the greatest right to their enjoyment. But, not coincidentally, this gave the Parks Branch a renewed opportunity to position parks as cultured places that bestowed on visitors – the right sort of visitors, experiencing the park in the right way – cultural capital.¹⁶⁶ It also let the Parks Branch claim to be the best situated organization to judge what was cultured in

¹⁶⁵ Concessionaires at Banff tried throughout the mid-1950s to win the right to build drive-in theatres within the townsite, but Parks Branch staff were adamant in their opposition. Drive-ins were a far cry from golf courses and swimming pools which, as Deputy Minister Robertson reasoned, "are enjoyments that can be achieved only in large, open areas; they are the kind of physical and outdoor activities that (among others) the Parks are to provide...." This is reasonable (though one could argue that drive-ins also encourage physical, outdoor activity). But Robertson added that in creating developments such as golf courses, "where well-handled, the impairment is not serious – in fact the clearing and opening of certain areas often increases the beauty and adds to the possibility of visual enjoyment." In the 1950s, a golf course could still infuse a park's nature with aesthetic value, whereas a drive-in could not. In years to come, not even golf courses would be safely ensconced in high culture. Robertson to Lesage, 5 June 1956, RG22 vol.469, file 33.2.2 pt.4, NAC.

¹⁶⁶ See Bourdieu, pp.12-14.

parks, and therefore obviously well-cultured itself. In sum, the Parks Branch's ideological shift away from interventionism allowed it to reconceptualize a park elitism that had given it authority for most of its history, but which had disappeared postwar. Naturalist R.D. Muir provided this new elitism with what could have been its motto: "It is only the enlightened who see the order and pattern in Nature."¹⁶⁷

Regardless of the motivations for advocating a less interventionist philosophy, the Parks Branch's move did have repercussions in how parks were actually managed. Though some of the new patterns evident at Terra Nova National Park involved style as much as substance, the "new naturalism" was clearly at work in the new Atlantic park. Terra Nova was welcomed as a new sort of park for Eastern Canada and a return to the wilderness ideal. The only real development in the park was its cabins, and even these were relatively spartan. When time came to name them, the Branch blanched at the concessionaire's suggested "Terra Nova Tourist Cabins" because it was trying to disassociate itself from tourism. As H.S. Robinson, the Chief of the Education and Information Section, explained, "we have deleted phraseology such as 'Canada's National-Playgrounds,' 'Tourist Accommodations,' 'Tourist Resort,' 'Tourist Attractions,' from all our publications and releases."¹⁶⁸ The more neutral "Terra Nova Park Bungalows" was chosen. But the park cabins were not even to be the centrepiece of park accommodations; the 417-unit Newman Sound Campground was where it was said that "the real park experience is available...." Within a few years of initial development, staff would also carve out 70 "primitive" sites six miles

¹⁶⁷ Muir to Stirrett, 20 January 1964, "Report on Field Trips, 1963," p.3.

¹⁶⁸ H.S. Robinson, Chief, Education and Information Section, to Coleman, 15 February 1962, RG84 vol.1943, file TN16.112.1 vol.1, NAC.

away from headquarters, along the Bonavista coast, "for those anxious to really rough it."¹⁶⁹

Since the Parks Branch staff hoped Terra Nova would become the first Eastern wilderness park, it was all the more disappointing that when creating it, they lost its wood supply to potential timber purposes and the Terra Nova River watershed to hydroelectric purposes. Without the watershed, the park had no good salmon streams and no place to reintroduce caribou. On top of this, once the park was established it was found to have a disappointing quantity and variety of wildlife. Though it was said that moose numbers were booming across Newfoundland, the wardens at Terra Nova reported seeing only a few, plus some foxes, rabbits, and other small mammals.¹⁷⁰ Superintendent Atkinson reported, "Quite candidly I miss the animals found in the Western Parks, as without them it is like being in an uninhabited piece of country...."¹⁷¹ On and off for the next decade, Ottawa asked Newfoundland for "a section of typical caribou country and some typical salmon fishing streams"¹⁷² but without success. By 1963, wildlife sightings would be on the rise, but the Parks Branch still sought to expand the park. For a time, the government of Newfoundland expressed interest in donating Pitts Pond outside the southwest corner of the park, but continually fretted about losing potential economic benefit from it.

¹⁶⁹ Superintendent J.B. Heppes, "Terra Nova National Park," Newfoundland Journal of Commerce, vol.35 no.7 (July 1968), p.17.

¹⁷⁰ Superintendent J.H. Atkinson to Strong, 1 June 1959, RG84 vol.1952, file TN112 Year vol.1, NAC. See also Atkinson to Strong, 21 January 1960, *ibid.*, and Strong to Atkinson, 25 November 1959, RG84 vol.1954, file TN216, NAC.

¹⁷¹ Atkinson to Strong, 21 January 1960, RG84 vol.1952, file TN112 Year vol.1, NAC

¹⁷² Lesage to W.J. Keough, 28 January 1957, RG22 vol.474, file 33.11.1 pt.2, NAC.

Parks staff pulled out all stops in trying to convince the province. Chief Park Naturalist George Stirrett noted

the presence of a stand of pine, *Pinus resinosa*, which is present at the south end of Pitts Pond near Terra Nova National Park. Red pine occurs in only three locations in Newfoundland and the stand at Pitts Pond is the most easterly part of the range of the species in Canada. This red pine stand should be a talking point in our proposals to have the area of Pitts Pond included in TNNP.¹⁷³

Certainly this reference to the most easterly pines in Canada was a gimmick, but it nevertheless shows the lengths to which staff would seek justification for expanding a park to what was thought to be its necessary natural size. And more than that, it showed appreciation for the distinctiveness and inherent value of an Atlantic Canadian species -- and a plant species at that. Such appreciation had not been observed in three decades of national parks in the region.

Of all Canada's national parks, probably none was affected more by both the strain of park use and the subsequent defense of preservation than Prince Edward Island National Park. The smallest park, at just seven square miles, it was also one of the busiest: by 1961, almost one million visitors were recorded as visitors to the park. Throughout the 1950s, the Parks Branch worked continually to meet demand in the park, building a bungalow camp, a recreation hall, campgrounds, and the Gulf Shore Parkway which stretched along almost the entire park's length, broken only at Robinson's Island. When park ideology moved away from development in the early 1960s, it was as if staff had awakened from a dream, amazed at the decisions that had

¹⁷³ Chief Park Naturalist George M. Stirrett to Brooks, 24 January 1964, RG84 vol.1942, file TN2 vol.5, NAC.

been made just a few years earlier. As they had at Fundy, staff disassociated themselves from the park's problems, by criticizing its very establishment and placing blame on decisions of early years. Superintendent E.J. Kipping, for example, spoke freely at a public meeting of "mistakes of many years ago" now "coming home to roost."¹⁷⁴ Even Green Gables Golf Course, long the pride of the park, was now seen as an anachronism. The minister in charge of parks, Arthur Laing, refused a request by the P.E.I. government for a second golf course by saying, "In the early days of National Parks' development a number of policies and practices were followed which seemed appropriate under the conditions then existing but which in the light of present day experience appear questionable and rather short-sighted. I do not think there is any doubt that golf courses fall into this category."¹⁷⁵ The park system would keep the golf courses it had, but it would not be designing more. Generally, Branch staff spoke of the Island's national park as a failure. Parks engineer R.P. Malis believed that no matter what happened, it "will never be accepted by the people as a true National Park in the strict sense of the word" and agreed with a recommendation being floated to reclassify the park as a national seashore, like those in the U.S.¹⁷⁶ Though this did not happen, the fact that the Parks Branch was seriously contemplating the demotion of the second most visited member of the system shows how greatly the ecology

¹⁷⁴ Superintendent E.J. Kipping speech to Resource Development Council, Prince Edward Island., 6 February 1962, RG84 vol.1786, file PEI28 vol.2 pt.3, NAC.

¹⁷⁵ Laing to Leo Rossiter, Minister of Industry and Natural Resources, Prince Edward Island, 3 February 1964, RG84 vol.1779, file PEI2A pt.4, NAC.

¹⁷⁶ R.P. Malis, Regional Engineer, to Coleman, 27 May 1964, RG84 vol.1786, file PEI28 vol.2 pt.1, NAC.

movement was changing the conception of what a national park should be.

The Branch's ideological shift meant more to Prince Edward Island National Park, however, than just a denigration of its past and a pessimistic reading of its future. Staff worked to make the park a more natural experience. The greatest environmental and aesthetic threat was seen to be "ribbon development," private tourism development just outside the park's boundary. The park's border forests were relied on to block this out, and the Parks Branch even considered a tree planting program to screen out the real world – a far cry from park practice less than a decade earlier to trim trees so that private tourist operations would have a better view of the gulf.¹⁷⁷ Superintendent Kipping believed there was nothing to be done but buy up bordering land as it became available, and he even took to sending Ottawa word about parcels that he learned were for sale. The Parks Branch initially expressed no interest, feeling that such a piecemeal expansion would accomplish nothing. Besides, there was no precedent for the federal government purchasing land for a park.¹⁷⁸ But when Ottawa realized it could ask the Prince Edward Island government to cover the bill, the idea was reconsidered. Lobbying for support among Island politicians, Arthur Laing wrote, "It is now apparent that the land area originally set aside was inadequate and the best we can hope to do is to try and acquire land to round out the park at several key points."¹⁷⁹ The provincial

¹⁷⁷ See Coleman to "Dr. Fischer," 14 December 1964, RG84 vol.1802, file PEI181 vol.2, NAC.

¹⁷⁸ Strong to Kipping, 1 December 1961, RG84 vol.1779, file PEI2A pt.3. See also Coleman to Robertson, 30 January 1962, *ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ Laing to J. Watson MacNaught, 12 September 1963, RG22 vol.1103, file 330.3 pt.1, NAC.

government offered a site in Stanhope, outside the eastern wing of the park, on the condition that the Parks Branch build a golf course there; otherwise, the province had no interest in buying expensive property if the park planned to let it lie fallow.¹⁸⁰ The Parks Branch declined the offer. But the notion of buying buffer land was now firmly entrenched, and the Branch increasingly lobbied its own government to buy land directly. Though it took several years of convincing, in 1968 the Canadian government initiated a land acquisitions program for the park. Between 1969 and 1977 approximately 2400 acres of adjacent land were incorporated into the park.¹⁸¹

As the experience of Prince Edward Island National Park in the 1960s shows, the Parks Branch's move towards less interventionism affected how the agency thought about and actually managed the park. But that is not to say that development was completely curtailed. Throughout the decade, the Branch continued to satisfy the park's roughly one million yearly visitors without limiting access by setting visitor capacities or even implementing entrance fees. Even in this era of less intervention, the Branch built a campground and day-use area on Robinson's Island, made accessible to the public only a few years earlier. No fewer than 16 parking lots, including one at Dalvay for over 1200 cars, could be found at the little park by the end of the decade. The idea of preservation may have gained an ascendancy in the 1960s, but this clearly had not relieved the Parks Branch of its responsibility to accommodate tourists.

¹⁸⁰ See RG84 vol.1779, file PEI2A pt.4, NAC for negotiations on this. Also, *Charlottetown Guardian*, 3 February 1964.

¹⁸¹ Canada, Parks Canada, Prince Edward Island National Park Preliminary Master Plan (1977), no pagination.

The culminating moment for the Canadian parks system in the 1960s was Arthur Laing's address on park policy to the House of Commons in September of 1964. Park historians have called it "a very significant milestone"¹⁸² and one that "established the preservation of significant natural features in national parks as its 'most fundamental and important obligation'."¹⁸³ The ingredients for drama were there. A quiet revolution was already under way within the parks system, as both staff and the public sought nature-friendly policies. The Parks Branch laboured for six years on a declaration explaining how it was attempting to reconcile preservation and use. Now, the agency felt pressure to make this statement public: businessmen at Banff and Jasper were pressing their right to develop wherever they wanted in the townsites;¹⁸⁴ a National and Provincial Parks Association of Canada had recently formed to protect the parks from development;¹⁸⁵ and in 1963 Macleans magazine published a scathing article, "Beauty and the Buck," that painted the parks system as being on the verge of collapse.¹⁸⁶ Author Fred Bodsworth pulled no punches: "We are losing them because a lax and indecisive parks policy, particularly toward business and political pressures, has allowed many national parks to deteriorate into commercialized, honky-tonk resorts where the major aim is no longer

¹⁸² Nicol, p.47.

¹⁸³ McNamee, p.30. It is not clear who McNamee is quoting, since this phrase does not appear in Laing's policy statement.

¹⁸⁴ Bella, pp.113-116. On the parks system in the early 1960s, see McNamee, pp.29-30.

¹⁸⁵ On the formation of the parks association (now the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society), see Dubasek, pp.72-78.

¹⁸⁶ Fred Bodsworth, "Beauty and the Buck: A Holiday Through Our Magnificent National Parks," Macleans, 23 March 1963, pp.25 and 41-46. The Bodsworth article received a deal of great discussion within the publicly-minded Parks Branch. For example, RG84 vol.2103, file U172 vol.12, NAC contains considerable correspondence on it.

park preservation but rather separating tourists from their money."¹⁸⁷ It was hoped that Laing's speech would answer such criticisms by showing that the Parks Branch was already correcting past mistakes, and also would discourage developers from planning further incursions in the parks. More broadly, it would replace the unwritten policies that had been in effect since 1930, dependent always on precedent and on-the-spot decisionmaking, with a single, firm park policy.

Ironically enough, given its present reputation, Laing's speech does not seem very decisive to a contemporary reader. The closest Laing comes to a pointed declaration of park priorities is to say:

National park policy cannot contribute to a solution of the crisis if it is based on one of the two extremes, maximum preservation on one hand, or maximum public use and development on the other. One would deprive the public of the benefits they receive from national parks; the other would destroy the special enjoyment and pleasure the public receives from lands kept in a near natural state. The objective of national park policy must be to help Canadians gain the greatest long term recreational benefits from their national parks and at the same time provide safeguards against excessive or unsuitable types of development and use.¹⁸⁸

It helped, of course, for this position to be clarified for the Canadian public, and for Parks Branch staff to have such a ministerial statement from which to refer.¹⁸⁹ But rather than providing a solution, Laing's address simply restated the problem: that parks were always under a dual mandate of preservation and use. This was entirely appropriate.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p.25.

¹⁸⁸ Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 18 September 1964, p.8192.

¹⁸⁹ Staff often quoted or referred to Laing's speech in correspondence. For example, Coleman to Superintendent McAuley, 21 May 1965, RG84 vol.1802, file PEI181 vol.2, NAC; and letter for Laing to Louis Robichaud, Premier, New Brunswick, 8 October 1964, RG84 vol.1039, file F200 vol.4, NAC.

Though this was a period when park staff and the public leaned towards less interventionist policies – and, indeed, Laing's speech was interpreted as a victory for these beliefs – a balance between preservation and use would never be entirely achieved.

Chapter 9

Conclusion

While staff did the day-to-day work of maintaining Cape Breton Highlands, Prince Edward Island, Fundy, and Terra Nova National Parks for the benefit of all Canadians, one group of Canadians paid special attention. Local residents, and in particular those who had land expropriated, were the national parks' most observant critics. They knew that the parks were not in fact pristine wilderness, and they perceptively drew out the inconsistencies of parks policy. Of course, what made local residents so astute was also what made them less than objective. Many locals felt that the park belonged to them, either because they personally had lost land at the park's creation or because their community had given the park territory and thus deserved special consideration in return.

Locals' feelings revolved around issues of both preservation and use, and in both cases worsened when the parks system grew less interventionist in the 1960s. Many were upset that park resources were no longer available to them. Trees could no longer be cut, deer no longer hunted, trout no longer fished without permit. This was considered especially onerous at Terra Nova and Cape Breton Highlands, where so much of the local land had been free for all to use. It was all the more galling when parks staff committed the same acts in the name of management. Why were staff at Cape Breton Highlands allowed to shoot moose during periods of overpopulation, while locals were not? Why did the Parks Branch operate a sawmill in Fundy, when locals were not allowed to cut? How, for that matter, could the Parks Branch preach the

sanctity of park nature when its own roadbuilding and development of facilities tore up the land?¹ Such inconsistencies were made worse by the fact that through time the Parks Branch tended to grow less and less accommodating of locals' needs. One reason for this was that staff did not feel the same sense of obligation to nearby residents as park establishment receded further into the past. For example, through the years the Parks Branch stopped giving timber permits to those who had once cut on Terra Nova. As a result, not only did locals feel they had lost an important resource right promised them at park creation, but they interpreted the Branch's actions as a deliberate, piecemeal process.² Staff also grew less accommodating because of the system-wide move away from natural resource use in the parks in the 1960s. Neil MacKinnon, who worked at Cape Breton Highlands for 30 years, remembers cutting trees for the flagpoles at warden stations; in later years, the wood had to be brought in from outside.³ Don Spracklin told of getting in trouble with the staff at Terra Nova for pumping 1000 gallons of water out of Udells Cove Pond, for use in the Christmas Seal boat that went around the Newfoundland outports each year giving chest x-rays.⁴ Others told me stories about the run-ins people had had with staff over the attempted removal of sand, stones, and ice. These incidents are sometimes remembered with amusement, sometimes with

¹ "At present it seems rather ironic that the main aim of preservation is to be achieved through an elimination of park residence while, at the same time development is encouraged through the addition of urban type facilities and services." Mary-Lou Roder, "Resident Populations and National Parks: A Review and Case Study - Gros Morne National Park," BA Thesis, Department of Geography, University of Western Ontario, 1977, p.54, quoted in Richard MacFarlane, "Parks Canada: The Failure of National Park Planning Procedures," *Park News*, vol.14 no.3 (Fall 1978), p.38.

² Interview with Ralph Ford and Dennis Chaulk, Charlottetown (Nfld.), 19 August 1994.

³ Interview with Neil MacKinnon, Pleasant Bay, 4 August 1994.

⁴ Interview with Don Spracklin, Charlottetown (Nfld.), 18 August 1994.

disgust. In either case, such stories are offered to demonstrate the Parks Branch's tenuous connection with real life, its willingness to put ideology before actual human needs.

Local residents also felt that the parks were not the economic salvation that politicians and parks staff had promised they would be. The most consistent complaint I heard at all four parks was that, after the initial burst of park development had subsided, not enough people were ever hired. Those whose land had been expropriated felt especially deceived, in that many claimed they and their families had been promised jobs for life. A typical sentiment was that of Winnie Smith, who said, "You were moved out of the park, and now you can't be hired back in."⁵ It was also felt that too many of the jobs that were created went to people from more distant communities, or, worse still, other provinces. These complaints may have been justified at some places at some times: it seems clear at Terra Nova, for example, that the Smallwood government did promise jobs to locals, and then took to hiring more from some communities than others. However, the parks and their staff should not be blamed for this, nor for the quite reasonable fact that most development took place within the first few years of park creation. Aware of the importance of park jobs to the local economy (and the importance of local harmony to the smooth running of the park), and recognizing that greater appropriations meant fulfilling more park projects, it would appear that the Parks Branch did in fact do its utmost to keep employment high⁶ and to spread hiring throughout

⁵ Interview with Winnie Smith, Riverside-Albert, 31 August 1994.

⁶ For example, the ministry in the late 1950s agreed to introduce "work rotation" at Cape Breton Highlands National Park, whereby local labourers were hired and then replaced when they had worked enough to qualify for unemployment insurance. Hamilton to Robert

local communities.⁷ Because Terra Nova National Park was created on the cusp of the parks system's turn from interventionism in the 1960s, it was developed even less than the other parks, and thus received even more complaints from local residents. When would Terra Nova get a swimming pool, a golf course, and other such amenities seen at other national parks?⁸ Premier Joey Smallwood promised that if a second park were built on Newfoundland's western shore, as was being discussed in the late 1960s, the province would demand much more development:

Just taking so many hundred square miles of all the wilderness we have, putting a boundary around it and calling it a Park, well that's ridiculous! That's not what they have across Canada.... They have National Parks that are National Parks in which untold millions of dollars of Canadian money was spent to provide the people of the other provinces with these magnificent National Parks. But [to] settle for another wilderness park, such as we already have at the Terra Nova ... would be intolerable for us to accept....⁹

Muir, M.P. for Cape Breton North and Victoria County, 30 January 1958, RG22 vol.898, file 307.1, NAC.

⁷ Local politicians would not have allowed otherwise. Cape Breton Highlands National Park, for example, was part of both Inverness and Victoria Counties. In the mid 1960s, Member of Parliament Robert Muir periodically asked in Parliament how many were hired for the park from each county. In 1963, the answer was 48 from Victoria, 45 from Inverness. In 1967, there was even greater parity: 49 from Victoria, 50 from Inverness. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 2 December 1963, p.5318, and 6 February 1967, p.12670.

⁸ Following a number of letters and articles on the subject in the St. John's Evening Telegram, a columnist in 1968 insightfully commented that present park policy "was designed to clamp down on artificial development, which was already extensive in a number of Canada's national parks, which have been existing for quite a few years. In other words, the idea is to tolerate artificial development which started before the legislative changes came into force but prevent it from getting underway in new parks. This is where the issue arises in the development of Terra Nova." Bob Moss, Evening Telegram, 12 July 1968. See also ibid., 30 April 1965.

⁹ Joey Smallwood, radio interview, 8 April 1970, Terra Nova National Park file, Newfoundland Collection, St. John's Public Library. In similar fashion, an Evening Telegram editorial of 9 May 1968 entitled "Those Obstinate Federal Chaps" suggested, "let's do some horse trading next time and be sure we get the best we can out of the federal branch."

The parks system's ideology was moving in the opposite direction, however. Parks in the future would be even less likely to satisfy local communities' requests for development.¹⁰

Because local residents had different interests than the Parks Branch when it came to issues of preservation and use, and more fundamentally because the park had been imposed on them and their community, many considered themselves adversaries of park staff. The parks themselves seemed set up to foster this opinion. The majority of staff were hired from the park vicinity, but most of these locals were in lower-rung jobs. Those in the most senior position, the superintendents, were almost always brought in from elsewhere. This was done not only in early years, when locals might not be expected to have the required knowledge of or experience in parks, but also later, when the Parks Branch feared local staff might have conflicts of interest when making hiring and management decisions. Superintendents were transferred from park to park every few years, ostensibly to improve their training; the policy nonetheless could not help but suggest that they were not to form a close affiliation with any one park or its people. An ex-staff member even told me that when a park was facing a difficult time with local citizens, the Parks Branch would send out "an enforcer" with no links at all to the region.¹¹

It is to some degree understandable if park staff slipped into an "us-versus-them" mindset. Local residents demanded more from the

¹⁰ In discussion on a proposed second national park for Prince Edward Island in the mid-1960s, Premier Walter Shaw noted, "I am further surprised at the criteria imposing standards of a very high quality on sites for National Parks. The standards have been apparently raised from those in effect when the main National Park on Prince Edward Island was considered." Walter Shaw to Arthur Laing, 22 February 1966, Proposed Second Prince Edward Island National Park files, Acc. 2617/3, PAPEI.

¹¹ Interview with an ex-staffer who requested anonymity.

park than anyone and were the most likely to violate preservationist policies.¹² But for staff to give in to such thinking was counterproductive. Their experience with poaching is a good example of this. There is some evidence of illegal hunting in all four parks' histories; perhaps the greater surprise is that there is not more.¹³ I expected that some people would tell me they poached for political reasons, to make a statement against the park, but every person who spoke of poaching insisted this was not the case. People, it was said, hunted in the park because they needed the food or liked the sport, but not because they thought of it as a political act.¹⁴ Consequently, the most respected staff were those who made allowances for human need and tolerated occasional indiscretions.¹⁵ On the other hand, people spoke poorly of

¹² In correspondence, Ottawa staff show a constant wariness when dealing with local residents, which occasionally surfaced as distrust. In 1955, when Superintendent Doak asked to be transferred after unstated problems dealing with locals, Deputy Minister Robertson wrote that Cape Breton Highlanders were "inclined to ride over anyone who is at all lenient, and they regard any concessions or favours as a sign of weakness." Though he thought Doak should stay, if he were to go he was to be replaced "with a strong and decisive personality, who will not be intimidated or upset by the efforts that the local people will undoubtedly make to recapture the upper hand that they apparently had at one stage." Robertson to Hutchison, 10 August 1955, RG22 vol.473, file 33.9.1 pt.4, NAC. See H. Duane Hampton, "Opposition to National Parks," *Journal of Forest History*, vol.25, no.1 (1981), pp.36-45.

¹³ Discussion of poaching is sprinkled throughout park archival correspondence. See especially any of the parks' wildlife files, labelled "300", such as RG84 vol.1002, file CBH300 pt.2 and 3, NAC. The correspondence suggests that none of the four parks studied here experienced any epidemic of poaching activity at any time in its history. Cape Breton Highlands Superintendent Tim Reynolds believes that today there is only a normal amount for a rural area, and ex-Prince Edward Island Superintendent Ernest Smith thinks it was never much of a problem. Personal communication with Tim Reynolds, 3 August 1994. Interview with Ernest Smith, Tea Hill, 4 August 1995.

¹⁴ Interviews, for example, with Don Spracklin, Charlottetown (Nfld.), 18 August 1994; Wilf Aucoin, Cheticamp, 1 August 1994; and an individual at Cape Breton Highlands who requested anonymity.

¹⁵ Ernest Smith, the first superintendent at Prince Edward Island National Park, told of catching a man that he knew hunting in the park. Smith made him swear that he would not do it again, and let him go. Interview with Smith, Tea Hill, 4 August 1995. There is no way of knowing whether some staff themselves poached fish and wildlife in the parks, but this was not uncommon in the Western Canadian parks. Wardens were originally hired in

staff who treated all locals as potential poachers, such as the warden at Terra Nova who would walk along the streets in the nearby village of Charlottetown and touch car engine bonnets, figuring out who had just been out.¹⁶ That this incident would be so clearly remembered shows just how precarious relations between staff and residents were. Sitting in a group around a kitchen in Cheticamp on the border of Cape Breton Highlands National Park, one man – forgetting I was there – started to talk about doing a little hunting in the park. Everyone laughed, and he turned to me, sputtering, "But that's my people's land back there!" But it wasn't. His family had been expropriated from Cap Rouge, close to 10 miles away. This was his people's land only if one thought of the park as a single unit, and the people on its border as another. In this sense, the park had created a community of residents who considered all of the park theirs.

The popularity of national parks in the 1960s ensured the creation of more parks and more relationships between locals and staff. The thought of having a tourism attraction which might attract a million visitors per year and which would be administered by the Canadian government encouraged provincial governments to lobby for parks to a degree unseen since the 1930s.¹⁷ The Liberal federal government also approved of more parks, because they were popular signs of the national state and good investments for tourism creation; it also seemed urgent to create more soon, before the best of Canadian recreation land was

part because of their knowledge of park land, which for some of them probably came by hunting. I discuss this issue in "Rationality and Rationalization," pp.207-208. My favourite poaching story from the parks studied here was told secondhand about a staff member from the Prince Edward Island park. At the end of every day working at the park nursery, he would go home with a tiny sapling nestled in his lunchbox.

¹⁶ Interview with Don Spracklin, Charlottetown (Nfld.), 18 August 1994.

¹⁷ Bella, p.129.

snapped up by developers, particularly American ones.¹⁸ The Parks Branch also liked the idea. The pressure of popularity made staff seek park expansion and creation as means of reducing stresses on existing parks. As well, the primacy of the environmental justification for parks convinced staff of the need to preserve many more types of Canadian nature.

However, expropriation of land for parks promised to be a different matter than it had been even a decade earlier. The building of public works projects such as highways and airports in postwar Canada had highlighted countless difficulties with existing federal and provincial expropriation laws.¹⁹ There were many procedural problems, resulting in arbitrary and inadequate notification, owners unaware of their rights, and owners even losing their land without being compensated.²⁰ And what compensations did occur were insufficient. Canadian law was premised on the outdated notion that expropriation was a standard sale from one party to another that just happened to be compulsory; thus settlements were awarded on a "value to the owner" basis that did not accurately reflect why the state had initially wanted the property. Also, no additional rights or privileges were granted the previous owner. In the 1960s, courts and legislatures modified the laws to make them more uniform, and to change the basis of compensation to "market value," which was more likely to compensate the owner fairly.²¹ This legal

¹⁸ Hon. Jean Chretien, "Our Evolving National Parks System," Nelson and Scace, pp.7-14.

¹⁹ Douglas Dacre, "Expropriation: The Fear and the Facts," *Maclean's*, 8 November 1958, pp.22-23, 81-82, 84-86. Dacre notes that in 1947, 1000 properties were expropriated by the Ontario Department of Highways. Ten years later, there were 6000.

²⁰ Kenneth J. Boyd, *Expropriation in Canada: A Practitioner's Guide* (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book Inc., 1988), p.2.

²¹ Todd, p.2. The new Federal Compensation Act, 1970, set compensation to be the higher of market value or the cost of establishing a similar property elsewhere.

change reflected – and reinforced – changing Canadian cultural attitudes towards the state's responsibility to the public. Many Canadians no longer saw government as an immovable force whose will must be obeyed.

It might seem that these changes would make the Parks Branch wary about parks system expansion, but the opposite seems to be true. As a part of the culture, the agency understood it could not run roughshod over citizens' concerns, and welcomed the chance to forge new and clean relationships with citizens at new parks. This was pragmatic thinking, but it also reflected a better ecological understanding that park lands had their own cultural history which had shaped their nature, and staff could not erase this just by wiping away reference to past inhabitation. In fact, staff in the Atlantic parks began to grow interested in showcasing this cultural history. A regional director in 1965 discussing the extension of Cape Breton Highlands into the northern tip of the island thought that though "planned communities should replace the scattered developments," there was nothing intrinsically wrong with having residents within the parks. He wrote,

Large numbers of the travelling public are interested in seeing typical fishing villages. Planning these communities will to some extent change their character but it is doubtful that they would lose their visitor appeal. If properly done, this planning will actually guarantee preservation of certain aspects of their character appeal, e.g. Peggy's Cove outside Halifax. ... It is not a serious nor complete disadvantage to have these communities dependent to a degree on the park. They provide an essential labour supply and other services which, if properly controlled and planned, could provide a sound social and economic unit.²²

²² H.A. Johnson, Regional Director of Atlantic Region, to Director, 17 September 1965, re "Cape Breton Highlands National Park, Boundary Revisions and Interior Development, A Preliminary Report , Report #40, April 1965," RG84 vol.991 file, CBH28 vol.4, NAC. Cape

In sum, there were legal, humanitarian, ecological, bureaucratic, and even aesthetic reasons to imagine that future parks should be characterized by more interaction between parks and local citizens.

In the late 1960s the Parks Branch began expanding the park system in earnest. Kejimikujik, in the Nova Scotia interior; Kouchibouguac, on the eastern shore of New Brunswick; and Gros Morne, on the west coast of Newfoundland were established between 1968 and 1970, along with parks in British Columbia and two in Quebec.²³ Three parks were also being discussed for the Canadian North, as well as a third Nova Scotia park, and another for little Prince Edward Island. In the same period, the Parks Branch began releasing provisional master plans which documented how policy in each of the national parks, old and new, was to proceed. As proof of its commitment to good relations with the public, the Parks Branch announced in 1969 that it would host public meetings to discuss each of the master plans.²⁴

Of the four parks studied here, only Cape Breton Highlands and Fundy were discussed in such public hearings. Given the format of the proceedings, they should have been restrained events. The Parks Branch held the role as moderator, with the responsibility of weighing the meaning and import of briefs of everyone from the National and Provincial Parks Association of Canada to the New Brunswick Dance

Breton Highlands staff had noticed since the park had opened that Acadian fishermen appealed to tourists. In 1938, Superintendent J.P. Macmillan lobbied successfully to have the fishing shacks at Cap Rouge remain standing. He wrote, "I am of the opinion that these shacks serve as an added attraction to the Park from a tourist standpoint." Macmillan to Smart, 23 February 1942, RG84 vol.520, file CBH296 pt.1, NAC. Over Superintendent Doak's protestations, the Parks Branch opted to tear the shacks down in the 1950s because they were deemed unattractive. Doak to Chief, 11 May 1955, RG84 vol.984, file CBH2 vol.6, NAC.

²³ See Lothian, *A Brief History*, pp.122-129, for the Atlantic Canadian parks.

²⁴ Lothian, *A History*, vol.4, p.26.

Teachers Association. The sheer number of briefs – Fundy had 60 written ones and 33 oral ones²⁵ – ensured a deadening of polemical opinions. The Parks Branch even solicited briefs from groups likely to share its views.²⁶ Finally, the Branch shaped the proceedings by setting the hearings' time and location. This was especially significant for the Cape Breton Highlands hearing, held on a Wednesday in Sydney, almost 100 miles from the park itself.²⁷ But although these factors could conceivably have made the public hearings sedate, they were in fact quite spirited affairs. The transcripts of the Cape Breton Highlands and Fundy hearings suggest that citizens near the parks welcomed the chance to have their say about park policy. Just as importantly, the hearings were a harbinger of what the Parks Branch could expect of public opinion when creating new Atlantic Canadian parks in the 1970s.

There were many interests represented at the hearings, and even those with similar views often had quite different motivations. At both hearings, the closest to a bifurcation of opinion was between those who wanted more development, including park expansion, and those who wanted less development, and certainly no expansion. Representatives from distant communities, business clubs, and tourist associations, who imagined some small fallout from federal dollars and the resulting tourism but were far enough removed that they were not directly

²⁵ Some of the oral briefs were based on written ones. See Canada, National and Historic Parks Branch, Transcript of Proceedings Fundy National Park Public Hearing, October 24, 1970, 1970.

²⁶ The Sierra Club's brief, written at the Branch's request for the Fundy hearing, shows little sign of knowing anything about Fundy.

²⁷ In analysis of the establishment of Gros Morne National Park, James Overton notes that in such matters, "'participation' is predominantly defined by the new administrative power system. They attempt to control the time, place and form of participation and also the issues that the public will be invited to express opinions on." (p.186)

affected by park policy, spoke up for more development.²⁸ Citizens and representatives of communities closer to the parks also made specific requests for more park facilities. These speakers also reiterated the demand that residents be given greater consideration for hiring, as had been promised at park creation. The mayor of Alma, just outside Fundy, explained,

Local residents were led to believe by the politicians of the day that, lumbering having ended, they would supply the labour force for the development of the park. This was the case for many years; however, the passage of time has brought many changes, and at the present time there seems to be little concern for the local residents by those in positions of control.²⁹

A common complaint was that too much of the parks were not in use, either for tourism development or resource use. A Cape Breton M.L.A. said that only one percent of the park was developed and that 99% was, unacceptably, "absolutely nothing."³⁰ In the New Brunswick hearing, there were calls to let Fundy's forests be lumbered, and economic, ecological, and aesthetic justifications were offered.³¹ Some repeated the longstanding Atlantic Canadian claim that the region was owed more funding from the Parks Branch since it deserved what one speaker called

²⁸ Canada, National and Historic Parks Branch, Transcript of Proceedings Cape Breton Highlands National Park Public Hearing, June 24, 1970, 1970, pp.25, 91, and 93; Transcript of Proceedings Fundy, pp.47, 50, 52, and 86.

²⁹ Audley Haslam in Transcript of Proceedings Fundy, p.116. The chair of the proceedings, Director of the National Parks Branch John Nicol, disputed Haslam's contention. He said that at present, only 13 of the 125 working at Fundy were from outside New Brunswick. Better than 65% of fulltimers and 75% of seasonals were from Albert County (p.164).

³⁰ Fisher Hudson, M.L.A. for Victoria County, in Transcript of Proceedings Cape Breton Highlands, p.91.

³¹ Transcript of Proceedings Fundy, pp.25, 55-58, and 96. Edward Swinamer, representing Riverview Heights, Albert County, made the innovative suggestion that tourists could replant trees themselves (p.91).

"deferred credit" for the 50 years that only Western Canada had had national parks.³²

Both Cape Breton Highlands and Fundy were considering expansion in this period, and many at both hearings were enthusiastic about it. Cape Breton Highlands' provisional master plan talked of taking in the northwestern section of Cape Breton, leaving fishing communities intact.³³ Likewise, there was interest in expanding westward along the shore at Fundy National Park, creating a scenic Fundy Drive and making an easier approach to the park for tourists from Maine. Those who sought development at the parks usually approved the idea of park expansion – as long as it did not interfere with them.³⁴

There was also a school of speakers who opposed development, expansion, or in some cases anything else the Parks Branch would suggest. Naturalist groups wanted the parks largely left alone, but like pro-development business groups would not be directly affected by any policies created.³⁵ Some local residents shared the naturalists' opinions,

³² John Hirtle, Voluntary Planning Board, Bridgewater, in Transcript of Proceedings Cape Breton Highlands, p.25.

³³ A Miss Mary Barker asked the Chair of the Cape Breton Highlands public hearing, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister J.H. Gordon, a simple question: what species, what nature in Cape Breton's north was considered so precious that the park had to be expanded? Gordon fumbled, explaining that an inventory of flora and fauna had not yet been written up. But he then answered in the most basic aesthetic terms. "As you go gradually north," he said, "the scenery tends generally to become more and more spectacular, more and more rugged." Land that had been omitted from park plans in the 1930s and refused by the park (as a trade for the loss of Cheticamp Lake) in the 1950s because it was considered ugly, was now, because the aesthetic had changed, spectacular enough to demand park expansion. Transcript of Proceedings Cape Breton Highlands, p.25.

³⁴ See ibid., p.5, and Transcript of Proceedings Fundy, pp.47, 50, and 52. Charles Polley of the Moncton Fish and Game Association said of a westward Fundy expansion, "It would interfere with a few woods operations, but we are not too sympathetic in this line – right or wrong, we are not. The woods operations denude the land, so on and so on." Ibid., p.44.

³⁵ Transcript of Proceedings Cape Breton Highlands, pp.20, 39, and 99; Transcript of Proceedings Fundy, pp.18, 93, and 131.

particularly in their adamant opposition to the chemical spraying under way at Fundy.³⁶ Other speakers decried any thought of increased park development because they already considered the park a detriment to local business. At Cape Breton Highlands, Maynard MacAskill, president of a citizens' group entitled the North Victoria Landowners' Protective Association stated, "Presently you build subsidized campgrounds with our tax dollars and then you force us to compete with you. The national park is stifling private enterprise and it is unfair for the individual in our society to have to compete against his own tax dollar."³⁷ As could be expected, MacAskill also opposed park expansion: "We lived the National Park for 34 years. Our stomachs are full of it. We will tolerate it, but we want no more of it."³⁸ Though talk at Fundy of expansion was muted because it was still so hypothetical, those residents at Cape Breton Highlands who were potentially affected by the park's plans made the most of the hearings to voice their emphatic opposition. A 700-name petition was presented, as were the results of three public meetings held in northern Cape Breton: ten of twelve communities voted with large majorities (and some 100%) against expansion, and the other two communities endorsed expansion only if no one would have to move.³⁹ This stand was unanimous among those who spoke at the Sydney hearing. The most vitriolic attack was voiced by W. Gwinn, an older resident of the threatened region. He told of the park's establishment, "They sent this Mr. Smart down there and he told more

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.27, 72, and 138.

³⁷ Maynard MacAskill, President of the North Victoria Landowners' Protective Association, in Transcript of Proceedings Cape Breton Highlands, p.57.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p.82.

lies and falsehoods than you would find in the thousand tales of the Arabian Nights. All kinds of promises. As soon as they got things in their possession these promises were completely forgotten."⁴⁰ After comparing the expropriation to the clearances of the Scottish Highlands, Gwinn's speech rose to a crescendo:

I think if you went down there and asked the majority of the people what their dearest wish would be, they'd answer you something like this: 'We wish this cursed tiger was chained in the bottomless pit. We wish the National Park would destroy every vestige they have created down there. We wish they would burn every building they have ever erected. If they do that that will be the most glorious day that ever dawned in north Cape Breton.' ... I'll tell you what would happen. The people would be out on the hills and the fields singing and rejoicing, 'Glory, glory, hallelujah, the curse is lifted, the bloody tiger is chained in the bottomless pit, the Iron Curtain is torn down. Thank God we have freedom and liberty again.' That's what you would hear. Thank you.⁴¹

The chair, introducing the next speaker, called Gwinn a tough act to follow.

It is difficult to know how the Parks Branch assessed these hearings. It released documents responding to public concerns and further explaining its policies, but whether the hearings actually shaped policy is unclear.⁴² Even given the great diversity of opinion, the Parks Branch could have been expected to learn two lessons from the proceedings: first, that though parks were for all Canadians, they most directly affected those who lived next door to them; second, that expropriation for parks

⁴⁰ W. Gwinn, member of the North Victoria Landowners' Protective Association, Transcript of Proceedings Cape Breton Highlands, p.66.

⁴¹ Ibid., p.67.

⁴² Ottawa, National and Historic Parks Branch, Decisions Resulting from the Public Hearing on the Provisional Master Plan for Fundy National Park, 1971; and Ottawa, National and Historic Parks Branch, Decisions Resulting from the Public Hearings on the Provisional Master Plan for Cape Breton Highlands National Park, 1971.

would bring passionate and unified opposition, and more so in the 1970s than in previous decades. Since even if a park was established expropriatees were likely to take residence nearby, the Parks Branch seemed destined for a future of difficult local relations.

Yet no matter how fair it promised to be in land acquisition, the park system still needed land if it was to make new parks. With the assistance of provincial governments, the Branch moved forward with parks at Kouchibouguac in New Brunswick and Gros Morne in Newfoundland, and announced its intent to create a park at Ship Harbour in Nova Scotia. In all three cases, it was met with a hailstorm of opposition. The Ship Harbour park was cancelled after a sustained protest spearheaded by a citizens group, the Association for the Preservation of the Eastern Shore.⁴³ Though Kouchibouguac was established, its story was hardly one of success.⁴⁴ Beginning in 1970, the family of Jackie Vautour, one of about 225 families to be dispossessed, mounted a decade-long protest against the park. They returned the cheque the province had offered and stayed on their land until forcibly removed in 1976 and their home destroyed. Vautour moved his family back into the park in a tent, and subsequently built a more permanent shelter there. Following the loss of a Supreme Court challenge in 1980, he and his supporters organized two violent protests at the park

⁴³ See Robin Reilly, "Planning for New National Parks in Atlantic Canada: The Experience with Ship Harbour, Nova Scotia (1965-1973)," *Park News*, vol.17 no.1 (Spring 1981), pp.5-10.

⁴⁴ See G.V. LaForest and M.K. Roy, *The Kouchibouguac Affair: The Report of the Special Inquiry on Kouchibouguac National Park*, Fredericton: n.p., 1981; Paul Thomas, "The Kouchibouguac National Park Controversy: Over a Decade Strong," *Park News*, vol.17 no.1 (Spring 1981), pp.11-13; On park expropriation in general, see Rick Maclean, "Leaving Behind a Bitter Legacy: Expropriated Land for National Parks" *Atlantic Insight*, vol.10 no.1 (January 1988), p.38.



Figure 19. "How can we do things for people if people keep getting in our way!?" by Robert Chambers.
From Halifax Chronicle-Herald, 12 May 1973.

headquarters. They promised the park would never be left in peace.⁴⁵ Kouchibouguac was a watershed in Canadian national park history. The Parks Branch recognized that it could no longer pretend to be uninvolved in the process of park creation simply because the provincial governments were responsible for acquiring land; just as importantly, provincial governments recognized that expropriation for parks was politically inexpedient. The Newfoundland government conceived a new approach to park creation in the making of Gros Morne. Though originally 175 families were to be moved, it was decided in the face of public opposition that the park would be established around them.⁴⁶ By 1979, the Parks Branch officially adopted this method. In the future, more public input and support would be involved before a park would even be considered, and no land would be expropriated – it would only be acquired if the owner was willing to sell. Though the process of national park creation was bound to take longer, it might at least be smoother.⁴⁷

The protests at the newer Atlantic Canadian national parks did not much affect the first four parks of the region.⁴⁸ Nor did citizens groups at the newer parks refer back to the expropriation experiences of

⁴⁵ Edward Gaunce, co-ordinator of the Kouchibouguac Committee for Justice for the Expropriates, said, "Let me say it in plain words. We either get the land back or we destroy it completely. Fire in the woods, oil to pollute the rivers." Vautour himself stated, "If they want the land back, they'll have to carry bodies out of here." Cited in Thomas, p.12.

⁴⁶ See Chapter 8 of Overton, "National Parks and Tourism in Underdeveloped Areas: The Establishment of Gros Morne Park," pp.171-190.

⁴⁷ McNamee, p.33.

⁴⁸ The nearest approximation was the burning of five toll booths at Prince Edward Island National Park over Christmas in 1975. This was in apparent protest over the implementation of entrance fees in Atlantic Canadian parks (Western parks had had fees for the previous forty years). See Charlottetown Guardian, 27 and 29 December 1975. Earlier that year, the Guardian had organized a petition to Prime Minister Trudeau opposing the fees, arguing that tourists already paid a ferry rate to visit the Island, and

the earlier parks: the submissiveness of landowners at Cape Breton Highlands, Prince Edward Island, Fundy, and Terra Nova was not the sort of reaction they wished to emulate. Today, the four parks are still in existence, of course. Cape Breton Highlands National Park did not expand to the north, and thanks to a Consultative Committee with members from ten communities surrounding the park, there now exists a better relationship between staff and locals. Prince Edward Island National Park is still one of the most attended parks, and the threats of erosion from the sea on one side and development on the other are as great as ever. There are more concessions to preservation, though, and in 1995 the park actually closed off part of the Gulf Shore Highway to permit dune migration across the road. Fundy National Park still has many of its 1950s trappings, but its long-ignored nature is now central to visitors' enjoyment of the park. Terra Nova National Park, which was celebrated as a wilderness park at the time of its creation, has been overshadowed somewhat by the rugged, more mountainous beauty of Gros Morne National Park in western Newfoundland. Parks in the east have always had that problem.

During the development of Terra Nova in the late 1950s, the Parks Branch's new Planning Section believed that the new park was missing something. To the authors of the planning report, this was only a park of typical Newfoundland hills, bogs, and inlets. In sum, "It is soon

should not have to pay again upon entering the park. The newspaper received 4000 names within four days. Letters of support were published, such as one that read, "We are happy to add our names to your telegram, and feel most strongly that such a levy should not be charged. The point that we are only one of two provinces where a fee must be paid to arrive and depart is an excellent one Yours truly, Mr. and Mrs. Gordon MacEachern, Mr. and Mrs. Arnold MacEachern." My grandparents and parents.

apparent that the park has no truly outstanding point of interest."⁴⁹ Something was needed to capture the visitor's attention. The authors suggested portals at the park entrances: "These must be massive, rock masonry portals with the name of the park outlined with relief letters of black steel. The purpose of these portals would be psychological as well as informative. They should 'set the stage' for the visitor and place him in a receptive and appreciative mood for what is to come."⁵⁰ This would impress tourists and remind local citizens that they were entering land where they were no longer free to hunt, fish, and cut timber. The planners believed that on approaching the portals, visitors would have "no doubt that they are entering a special area which has been set aside for a distinctive purpose."⁵¹

The portals were never built, but the Planning Section's call for them was astute. National parks always depended on such signs, though not usually such literal ones. The forbidding of conduct such as hunting, cutting wood, or owning land were themselves signs that parks were different. Publicity photos and promotional brochures were likewise designed to reinforce the message that nature did not have the same sort of meaning in parks that it had elsewhere. Natural objects in parks were to possess neither economic nor moral values one way or another, they just were. As the national park system gained its own history, it was even hoped that facilities like resort hotels and golf courses, because they were associated with the parks, would themselves somehow signal a preference for the natural over the cultural here.

⁴⁹ Planning Section report "Terra Nova National Park, Portals and Information Centres," (1959) RG84 vol.1944, file TN28 pt.2, NAC.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

But portals suggest that there are limited points of access, and here the metaphor breaks down. The park and the outside world are not so different, and not only because they have the same sort of climate and geology, flora and fauna, but also because they share many of the very same objects. Seeds float or are carried across borders, deer wander back and forth, and air and rain pass over the land equally. In growing recognition of this, much scientific research of national parks in recent years has studied them in terms of their relationship with the land outside. Of particular importance has been the application of concepts from island biogeography. Parks are seen as "islands", distinct in some ways from the land around them, yet with only a limited capability of maintaining species health on their own. Therefore, species need corridors to other islands if the parks are to fulfill their mandate of preservation.⁵²

The cultural side of national parks needs to be studied in the same way. Humans create a park to be an island for nature, and in doing so prove the difficulty we have incorporating nature into our everyday world. But even when a park is created, humans travel as effortlessly into and out of it as any species, carrying with us, in both directions, ideas about nature and people's place in nature. The histories of Cape Breton Highlands, Prince Edward Island, Fundy, and Terra Nova National Parks are thus not histories of just those places. In each case, the park that was selected, established, expropriated, and developed stands as an inviolable monument to the time when these events took place. Parks are very helpful, then, in serving to document how we have felt about

⁵² For an introduction to island biogeography and patch dynamics in parks, see John B. Theberge, "Ecology, Conservation and Protected Areas in Canada," Parks and Protected Places in Canada, pp.137-153.

and behaved towards nature in the past. However, as I hope this thesis has shown, those attitudes and actions are never about nature alone, but also involve our own messy human aspirations for social, spiritual, and financial betterment. As such, parks also serve to document how we have felt about and behaved towards one another.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Manuscript

National Archives of Canada (Ottawa).

Records of the Canadian Park Service. RG84.

Records of the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs. RG22.

Records of the Public Service Commission. RG32.

James Bernard Harkin papers. MG30 E169.

James Smart papers. MG30 E545.

Robert J.C. Stead papers. MG30 D74.

Public Archives of Nova Scotia (Halifax).

H.D. Hicks papers. MG2 vol.1240.

Oxford Paper Co. arbitration case papers. RG10 Series B, Vol. 200-206.

Cape Breton Highlands National Park (Ingonish).

Campbell, Judith V. "A Report on the Human History of Cape Breton Highlands National Park." 2 volumes. No date.

Cape Breton Highlands National Park files.

Public Archives of Prince Edward Island (Charlottetown).

Prince Edward Island. Executive Council. Minutes. RG7 series 3, Box 12 no.2640.

———.Provincial Secretary. Prince Edward Island National Park files. RG7 series 14, Box 30.

———. Speeches of the Legislature, 1936-1960. Legislative Library Material. RG10 vol.102-104a.

Prince Edward Island National Park files. RG7 Series 14, Box 30.

Proposed 2nd Prince Edward Island National Park files. Acc. 2617/3.

Thane Campbell papers. RG25 vol.32.

Harry T. Holman papers. Acc. 4420 vol.7.

J. Walter Jones papers. RG25 vol.33.

Prince Edward Island National Park (Dalway).

"Diary of a Warden." C.B.C. program 20/20.

Prince Edward Island National Park files.

Provincial Archives of New Brunswick (Fredericton).

New Brunswick. Department of Natural Resources. Fundy National Park Land Assembly Records. RG10 RS145.

Fundy National Park (Fundy headquarters).

Allardyce, Gilbert. "The Salt and the Fir: Report on the History of the Fundy Park Area." Internal document. 1969.

Burzynski, Michael. "Man and Fundy: Story Component Plan." Internal document. 1987.

Cooper, Laurie and Douglas Clay. "An Historical Review of Logging and River Driving in Fundy National Park: Rough Draft." Internal document. No date.

Eidsvik, H.K. "Fundy National Park - Planning Considerations." Internal document. 1960.

Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador (St. John's).

Reid Company papers, W. Angus Reid files. MG17 Part 3.

Newfoundland Collection, St. John's Public Library (St. John's).

Terra Nova National Park files.

Centre for Newfoundland Studies Archives (St. John's).

J.R. Smallwood collection. Acc. 3.25.00.

Queen's University Archives (Kingston).

Thomas A. Crerar papers. Acc.2117.

Whyte Museum of the Canadian Rockies Archives (Banff).

Fergus Lothian research papers. M113 Acc.1947.

British Columbia Archives (Victoria).

R.W. Cautley papers. E/C/C31.

Private Collections

Dorothy Barbour papers. In the possession of Robin Winks, New Haven, Connecticut.

Fundy National Park clipping collection of Greta Geldart Elliott. In the possession of Larry Hughes, Riverview, New Brunswick.

PRIMARY SOURCES

Printed

Government Sources

Canada. Annual Departmental Reports. 1914-1975.

- . Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. National and Historic Parks Branch. Decisions Resulting from the Public Hearings on the Provisional Master Plan for Cape Breton Highlands National Park. 1971.
- . Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. National and Historic Parks Branch. Decisions Resulting from the Public Hearing on the Provisional Master Plan for Fundy National Park. 1971.
- . Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. National and Historic Parks Branch. Fundy Master Plan. 1966.
- . Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. National and Historic Parks Branch. Transcript of Proceedings Cape Breton Highlands National Park Public Hearing, June 24, 1970. 1970.
- . Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. National and Historic Parks Branch. Transcript of Proceedings Fundy National Park Public Hearing, October 24, 1970. 1970.
- . Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. Parks Canada. Prince Edward Island National Park Preliminary Master Plan. 1977.
- . Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. Parks Canada. Resource Inventory and Analysis, Prince Edward Island National Park. 1977.
- . Department of Resources and Development. National Parks Branch. Fundy National Park. Opening ceremonies brochure. 1951.
- . Department of Resources and Development. National Parks Branch. Playgrounds of Eastern Canada. no date.
- . Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Census of Canada. 1931.

- . House of Commons. Debates. 1887-1975.
- . Parliament of Canada. National Parks Act. 20-21 George V. Chapter 33. 1930.
- . Senate. Reports and Proceedings of the Special Committee on Tourist Traffic. 1934.
- New Brunswick. Department of Lands and Mines. Annual Report. 1945-1952.
- . Legislative Assembly. Report of the Committee on Reconstruction. 1944.
- . Legislative Assembly. Synoptic Report. 1927-1952.
- Newfoundland. Department of Mines and Resources. Annual Report. 1955-1960.
- . House of Assembly. Proceedings. 1955-1958.
- . Report on Meetings Between Delegates from the National Convention of Newfoundland and Representatives of the Government of Canada. Summary of proceedings and appendices, 25 June - 29 September 1947.
- Nova Scotia. General Assembly. Acts. 1935.
- . General Assembly. Public Accounts. 1936-1945.
- United States. Department of the Interior. Annual Reports. 1911-1920.

Newspapers and Magazines

Bulletin (Victoria-Inverness). 1934-1939.

Chronicle (Halifax). 1934-1939.

Chronicle-Herald (Halifax). Scattered dates, 1954-1956.

Citizen (Ottawa). 28 January 1954.

Daily Province (Vancouver). 2 February 1930.

Eastern Graphic (Montague, P.E.I.). 2 June 1976.

Evening Telegram (St. John's). 1955-1962.

4th Estate (Halifax). 28 November 1974, 7 May 1975, 16 June and 1 December 1976, and 17 February 1977.

Guardian (Charlottetown), 1933-1939, scattered dates 1961-1976.

Herald (Calgary). 18 November 1930.

Herald (Halifax). 1934-1939.

Hunting and Fishing. November 1952.

Island Farmer (Charlottetown). 15 April 1936.

Journal (Ottawa). 11 June 1923.

Journal-Pioneer (Summerside, P.E.I.). 24 and 27 December 1971.

Mail and Empire (Toronto). 10 January 1930.

Patriot (Charlottetown). 1934-1939, scattered dates 1961-1976.

Post-Record (Sydney). 1936-1938, and 26 January 1955.

Star (Toronto). 13 January 1930.

The Busy East of Canada (Sackville, N.B.). 1919-1935

Telegraph Journal (Saint John). 1929-1931, 1935-1937, 1947-1950.

Times (New York), 12 March 1995.

Western Star (Corner Brook). 21 March 1955.

Other Primary Sources

Berger, John. G. New York: Vintage Books, 1972.

Bishop, Elizabeth. "Cape Breton." A Cold Spring. Reprinted in Elizabeth Bishop: The Complete Poems 1927-1979. New York: The Noonday Press of Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1979, pp.67-68.

Bodsworth, Fred. "Beauty and the Buck: A Holiday Through Our Magnificent National Parks." Maclean's. 23 March 1963, pp.25 and 41-46.

Bourinot, J.G. "Notes of a Ramble Through Cape Breton." New Dominion Monthly. Montreal, 1868.

Brinley, Gordon. Away to Cape Breton. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1936.

Browne, N. Milton. "A Great Sanctuary in Nova Scotia." Forest and Outdoors, 1935, pp.804-808.

Carson, Rachel. Silent Spring. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962.

Cautley, R.W. "Report on Examination of Sites for a National Park in the Province of Nova Scotia." In R.H. MacDonald. Transportation in Northern Cape Breton. Appendix A. Ottawa, 1979, pp.49-76.

Chretien, Hon. Jean. "Our Evolving National Parks System." The Canadian National Parks: Today and Tomorrow, Vol. 1. Eds. J.G. Nelson and R.C. Scace. Calgary: National and Provincial Parks Association of Canada and the University of Calgary, 1969, pp.7-14.

Clarke, C.H.D. "Fluctuations in Populations." Journal of Mammalogy. Vol.30 no.1, February 1949, pp.21-25.

Cottam, Clarence, and Elmer Higgins. "DDT: Its Effects on Fish and Wildlife." Washington: U.S. Fish and Wildlife, Department of Interior, 1946.

- Cowan, Ian McTaggart. "A Naturalist-Scientist's Attitudes Towards National Parks." Canadian Audobon. Vol.26, May 1964. 93-96.
- Dacre, Douglas. "Expropriation: The Fear and the Facts," Maclean's, 8 November 1958, pp.22-23, 81-82, 84-86.
- "Fundy National Park: Canada's Newest National Playground." Canada-West Indies Magazine. Vol.91 no.6, June 1951, no pagination.
- Guide Book to Cape Breton, Royal Province of Nova Scotia or New Scotland, Dominion of Canada. London: Letts, Son and Co., 1883.
- Harkin, James B. "Canadian National Parks and Playgrounds." Annual Report. The Historic Landmarks Association of Canada. 1921, pp.36-39.
- . The History and Meaning of the National Parks in Canada, Extracts from the Papers of the Late Jas. B. Harkin, First Commissioner of the National Parks of Canada. Compiled by Mabel B. Williams. Saskatoon: H.R. Larson Publishing Co., 1987.
- . "Our Need for National Parks." Canadian Alpine Journal. Vol.9, 1918, pp.98-106.
- . "Wildlife Sanctuaries." Rod and Gun in Canada. October 1919.
- Heppes, J.B. "Terra Nova National Park," Newfoundland Journal of Commerce, Vol.35 no.7, July 1968, pp.16-22.
- Hewitt, C. Gordon. The Conservation of the Wildlife of Canada. New York: Scribner's, 1921.
- Hiller, J.K., and M.F. Harrington, eds. The Newfoundland National Convention 1946-1948, Vol.2, St. John's: Memorial University of Newfoundland and McGill-Queen's Press, 1995.
- Jenkins, F.T. Report on Forest Survey of the Proposed National Park Area, Bonavista Bay, Newfoundland. St. John's: Government of Newfoundland, 1955.
- Keith, Todd L. The Cumulative Effects of Development and Land Use at Prince Edward Island National Park. Parks Canada Technical Reports in Ecosystem Science no.0002. Halifax: Parks Canada, Atlantic Region, 1996.

- Kennedy, Howard; D. Roy Cameron; and Roland C. Goodyear. Report of the Royal Commission on Forestry. St. John's: Government of Newfoundland, 1955.
- Krumholz, Louis A. "The Use of Rotenone in Fisheries Research." Journal of Wildlife Management. Vol.12 no.3, July 1948, pp.305-317.
- LaForest, G.V. and M.K. Roy. The Kouchibouguac Affair: The Report of the Special Inquiry on Kouchibouguac National Park. Fredericton: n.p., 1981.
- Lawson, Jessie, and Jean MacCallum Sweet. This is New Brunswick. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1951.
- MacLean, Norman. A River Runs Through It and Other Stories. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976.
- MacMillan, A.S. "A Dream Come True: Story of the Development of Tourist Industry in Northern Inverness and Victoria Counties." 1952. Reprinted as "Cabot Trail: A Political Story." Cape Breton's Magazine. No.62 (1993), pp.2, 66-70.
- Maxwell, Lilian. 'Round New Brunswick Roads. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1951.
- Mullen, C.E. Literature Review, Fundy National Park. Halifax: Parks Canada, 1974.
- Odum, Eugene. Ecology: The Link Between the Natural and Social Sciences. 2nd edition. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Watson, 1975 [1963].
- Pimlott, D. H., C.J. Kerswill, and J.R. Bider. Scientific Activities in Fisheries and Wildlife Resources. Special study #15. Ottawa: Science Council of Canada, 1971.
- Rubio, Mary and Elizabeth Waterston, eds. The Selected Journals of L.M. Montgomery. Volumes 1-3. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1985, 1987, 1992.
- Scobie, Maureen. "Stories from the Clyburn Valley." Cape Breton's Magazine. No.49, 1988, pp.1-20.
- Stead, Robert J. C. Canada's Maritime Playgrounds. Ottawa: Department of Mines and Resources, 1938.

- Storer, Tracy I. "DDT and Wildlife." Journal of Wildlife Management. Vol.10 no.3, July 1946, pp.181-183.
- Transactions of the North American Wildlife Conference. Washington, D.C: Wildlife Management Institute, 1938-1960.
- Vernon, C.W. Cape Breton at the Beginning of the ... Twentieth Century. Toronto: Nation Publishing, 1903.
- Walworth, Arthur. Cape Breton: Isle of Romance. Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co., 1948.
- Warner Morley, Margaret. Down North and Up Along. New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1900.
- Webb, Walter Prescott. The Great Plains. Boston: Ginn, 1931.
- Williams, Mabel. Guardians of the Wild. London, Ont.: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1936.
- "Wreck Cove Hydro-Electric Investigation." Cape Breton's Magazine. No.9, October 1974, pp.4-11.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Published

"A Round Table: Environmental History." Journal of American History. Vol.76 no.4, March 1990, pp.1087-1106.

Albanese, Catharine L. Nature Religion in America: From the Algonkian Indians to the New Age. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990.

Alderson, Lucy and John Marsh. "J.B. Harkin, National Parks and Roads." Park News. Vol.15 no.2, Summer 1979, pp.9-16.

Allardyce, Gilbert. "'The Vexed Question of Sawdust': River Pollution in Nineteenth-Century New Brunswick." Dalhousie Review. Vol.52, 1952-1953, pp.177-189. Reprinted in Consuming Canada: Readings in Environmental History. Eds. Chad Gaffield and Pam Gaffield. Toronto: Copp Clark Ltd., 1995, pp.119-130.

Altmeyer, George. "Three Ideas of Nature in Canada, 1893-1914." Journal of Canadian Studies. Vol.11 no.3 August 1976, pp.21-26.

Bankes, N.D. "Constitutional Problems Related to the Creation and Administration of Canada's National Parks." Ed. J. Owen Saunders. Managing Natural Resources in a Federal State. Essays from the 2nd Banff Conference on Natural Resources Law. Toronto: Carswell Press, 1986, pp.212-234.

Barclay, James A. Golf in Canada: A History. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1992.

Barrell, John. The Dark Side of the Landscape. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

Barry, Sandra. "The Art of Remembering: The Influence of Great Village, Nova Scotia, on the Life and Works of Elizabeth Bishop." Nova Scotia Historical Review. Vol.11 no.1, June 1991, pp.2-37.

"Becoming Martin Luther King, Jr. – Plagiarism and Originality: A Round Table." Journal of American History. Vol.78 no.1, June 1991, pp.11-123.

Belasco, Warren James. Americans on the Road: From Autocamp to Motel, 1910-1945. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1979.

Bella, Leslie. Parks for Profit. Montreal: Harvest House, 1986.

- Berger, John. About Looking. New York: Pantheon, 1979.
- Bermingham, Ann. Landscape and Ideology: The English Rustic Tradition, 1740-1860. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.
- Blodgett, Peter. "Striking a Balance: Managing Concessions in the National Parks, 1916-1933." Journal of Forest and Conservation History. Vol.34 no.2, April 1990, pp.60-68.
- Bocking, Stephen. "A Vision of Nature and Society: A History of the Ecosystem Concept." Alternatives. Vol.20 no.3, 1993, pp.12-18.
- Botkin, Daniel. Discordant Harmonies: A New Ecology for the Twenty-First Century. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste. Trans. Richard Nice. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1984.
- Boyd, Kenneth J. Expropriation in Canada: A Practitioner's Guide. Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book Inc., 1988.
- Boyer, Paul. Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, 1820-1920. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978.
- Brown, Dona. Inventing New England: Regional Tourism in the Nineteenth Century. Washington: Smithsonian, 1995.
- Brown, Robert Craig. "The Doctrine of Usefulness: Natural Resources and National Park Policy in Canada, 1887-1914." The Canadian National Parks: Today and Tomorrow, Vol. 1. Eds. J.G. Nelson and R.C. Scace. Calgary: National and Provincial Parks Association of Canada and the University of Calgary, 1969, pp.94-110.
- Brym, Robert J. and James Sacouman, eds. Underdevelopment and Social Movements in Atlantic Canada. Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1979.
- Buell, Lawrence. The Environmental Imagination: Thoreau, Nature Writing, and the Formation of American Culture. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1995.
- Burrill, Gary and Ian McKay, eds. People, Resources, and Power: Critical Perspectives on Underdevelopment and Primary Industries in the Atlantic Region. Fredericton: Acadiensis Press for the Gorsebrook Research Institute, 1987.

- Burke, Edmund. A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful. Ed. Adam Phillips. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990 [1757].
- Burzynski, Michael. A Guide to Fundy National Park. Vancouver and Toronto: Douglas and McIntyre, in co-operation with Parks Canada, 1985.
- Bush, Edward T. A History of Hydro-Electric Development in Canada. Ottawa: Historic Sites and Monuments Board, 1986.
- Cart, Theodore W. "A 'New Deal' for Wildlife: A Perspective on Federal Conservation Policy, 1933-1940." Pacific Northwest Quarterly. Vol.62 July 1972, pp.113-120.
- Chiasson, Father Anselme. Cheticamp: History and Acadian Tradition. Trans. Jean Doris LeBlanc. St. John's: Breakwater Press, 1986.
- Colpitts, Nancy. "Sawmills to National Park: Alma, New Brunswick, 1921-1947." Trouble in the Woods: Forest Policy and Social Conflict in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Ed. L. Anders Sandberg. Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 1992, pp.90-109.
- Cook, Ramsay. "Landscape Painting and National Sentiment in Canada." Historical Reflections. Vol.1 no.2, 1974, pp.263-283.
- Cosgrove, Denis, and Stephen Daniels, eds. The Iconography of Landscape: Essays on the Symbolic Representation, Design, and Use of Past Environments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Creighton, Wilfred. Forestkeeping: A History of the Department of Lands and Forests in Nova Scotia, 1926-1969. Halifax: Nova Scotia, Department of Lands and Forests, 1988.
- Creighton, Wilfred, with Kenneth Donovan, ed. "Wilfred Creighton and the Expropriations: Clearing Land for the National Park, 1936." Cape Breton's Magazine. No.69, pp.1-19.
- Cronon, William. Nature's Metropolis. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1991.
- . "The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature." Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature. Ed. William Cronon. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1995, pp.69-90.

- . "The Uses of Environmental History." Environmental History Review. Vol.17 no.3 (Fall 1993), pp.1-22.
- Daniels, Stephen. Fields of Vision: Landscape Imagery and National Identity in England and the United States. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993.
- Davis, Donald F. "Dependent Motorization: Canada and the Automobile to the 1930s." Journal of Canadian Studies. Vol.21 no.3, Autumn 1986, pp.106-132.
- Dearden, Philip. "Philosophy, Theory, and Method of Landscape Evaluation." The Canadian Geographer. Vol.29 no.3, 1985, pp.263-265.
- Dearden, Philip and Rick Rollins, eds. Parks and Protected Areas in Canada. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1993.
- Demars, Stanford. "Romanticism and American National Parks." Journal of Cultural Geography. Vol.11 no.1, Fall/Winter 1990, pp.17-24.
- Dilsaver, Lary M., ed. America's National Park System: The Critical Documents. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1993.
- . "Stemming the Flow: The Evolution of Controls on Visitor Numbers and Impact in National Parks." The American Environment: Interpretations of Past Geographies. Eds. Lary M. Dilsaver and Craig E. Colten. Maryland: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 1992, pp.235-255.
- Dubasek, Marilyn. Wilderness Preservation: A Cross-Cultural Comparison of Canada and the United States. New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1990.
- Dunlap, Thomas R. DDT: Scientists, Citizens, and Public Policy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981.
- . "Ecology, Nature, and Canadian National Park Policy: Wolves, Elk, and Bison as a Case Study." To See Ourselves/To Save Ourselves: Ecology and Culture in Canada. Rowland Lorimer et al., eds. Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Association for Canadian Studies, 31 May - 1 June 1990. Montreal: Association for Canadian Studies, 1991, pp.139-147.
- . Saving America's Wildlife. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.

- . "That Kaibab Myth." Journal of Forest History. Vol.32, 1988, pp.60-68.
- . "Wildlife, Science, and the National Parks, 1920-1940." Pacific Historical Review, May 1990, pp.187-202.
- Easterbrook, Gregg. A Moment on the Earth: The Coming Age of Environmental Optimism. New York: Viking, 1995.
- Evernden, Neil. The Natural Alien: Humankind and Environment. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985.
- . The Social Creation of Nature. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1992.
- Flores, Dan. "Place: An Argument for Bioregional History." Environmental History Review. Vol.18 no.4, Winter 1994, p.1-18.
- Forbes, Ernest R. "Cutting the Pie Into Smaller Pieces: Matching Grants and Relief in the Maritime Provinces During the 1930s." Acadiensis. Vol.17 no.1, Autumn 1987, pp.34-55.
- Foster, Janet. Working for Wildlife: The Beginning of Preservation in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978.
- Gabrielson, Ira N. Wildlife Refuges, New York: MacMillan, 1943.
- Gaffield, Chad, and Pam Gaffield. "Introduction." Consuming Canada: Readings in Environmental History. Eds. Chad Gaffield and Pam Gaffield. Toronto: Copp Clark Ltd., 1995, pp.1-7.
- Gillis, R. Peter and Thomas R. Roach. "The American Influence on Conservation in Canada 1899-1911." Journal of Forest and Conservation History. Vol.30 no.4, October 1986, pp.160-174.
- Glassfore, Larry A. Reaction and Reform: The Politics of the Conservative Party Under R.B. Bennett, 1927-1938. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992.
- Golley, Frank B. A History of the Ecosystem Concept in Ecology: More Than a Sum of the Parts. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993.
- Gosling, F.G. Before Freud: Neurasthenia and the American Medical Community, 1870-1910. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987.

- Granatstein, J.L. The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1933-1957. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982.
- Grant, J.L. and G. Wall. "Visitors to Point Pelee National Park: Characteristics, Behaviour, and Perceptions." Recreational Land Use: Perspectives on Its Evolution in Canada. Eds. Geoffrey Wall and John Marsh. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1982, pp.117-126.
- Gray, James H. R.B. Bennett: The Calgary Years. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991.
- Gwyn, Richard. Smallwood: The Unlikely Revolutionary. 2nd ed. Toronto and Montreal: McClelland and Stewart, 1972 [1968].
- Hall, C. Michael and John Shultis. "Railways, Tourism and Worthless Lands: The Establishment of National Parks in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States." Australian-Canadian Studies. Vol.8 no.2, 1991, pp.57-74.
- Hampton, H. Duane. "Opposition to National Parks." Journal of Forest History. Vol.25, no.1, 1981, pp.36-45.
- Hawkins, John. The Life and Times of Angus L. Windsor. Windsor: Lancelot Press, 1969.
- Hays, Samuel P. Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement 1890-1920. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959.
- . "From Conservation to Environment: Environmental Politics in the US Since WWII." Environmental Review Vol.6, Fall 1982, pp.14-41.
- Hays, Samuel P. in collaboration with Barbara Hays. Beauty, Health and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955-1985. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Henderson, Gavin. "James Bernard Harkin: The Father of Canadian National Parks." Borealis. Fall 1994, pp.28-33.
- Horne, Fred. Human History: Prince Edward Island National Park. Charlottetown: Parks Canada, 1979.
- Hummel, Don. Stealing the National Parks: The Destruction of Concessions and Park Access. Bellevue, Wash.: Free Enterprise Press, 1987.

- Hunt, William R. Stef: A Biography of Vilhjalmur Stefansson, Canadian Arctic Explorer. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1986.
- Hussey, Christopher. The Picturesque: Studies in a Point of View. London: Putnam, 1927.
- Hutcheon, Linda. As Canadian as ... Possible ... Under the Circumstances! Toronto: E.C.W. Press and York University, 1990.
- . Irony's Edge: The Theory and Politics of Irony. London and New York: Routledge, 1995.
- Huxley, Bob. "Golf Courses in National Parks." Park News. Vol.17 no.1, Spring 1981, pp.14-16.
- Jarrell, Richard A. "British Scientific Institutions and Canada: The Rhetoric and the Reality." Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada. Series 4. Vol.20, 1982, pp.524-547.
- Jasen, Patricia. Wild Things: Nature, Culture, and Tourism in Ontario, 1790-1914. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995.
- Jenkins, John Hamilton. Bell and Baldwin: Their Development of Aerodromes and Hydrodromes at Baddeck, Nova Scotia. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964.
- Johnstone, Kenneth. The Aquatic Explorers: A History of the Fisheries Research Board of Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977.
- Judd, Richard W. "Reshaping Maine's Landscape: Rural Culture Tourism and Conservation, 1890-1929." Journal of Forest and Conservation History. Vol.32 no.4, October 1988, pp.180-190.
- Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Aesthetic Judgement. Trans. J.C. Meredith. Oxford: Oxford Press, 1911.
- Kellert, Stephen R. "Historical Trends in Perceptions and Uses of Animals in Twentieth Century America." Environmental History Review. Vol.9 no.1, Spring 1985, pp.19-33.
- Killan, Gerald. Protected Places: A History of Ontario's Provincial Parks System. Toronto: Dundurn Press with the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 1993.

- Kline, Marcia B. Beyond the Land Itself: Views of Nature in Canada and the United States. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970.
- Knighton, Jose. "Eco-porn and the Manipulation of Desire." Wild Earth. Spring 1993.
- Langston, Nancy. Forest Dreams, Forest Nightmares: The Paradox of Old Growth in the Inland West. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995.
- Least Heat-Moon, William. PrairieErth (a deep map). Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991.
- Leibhardt, Barbara. "Interpretation and Causal Analysis: Theories in Environmental History." Environmental History Review. Vol.12, no.3 (Spring 1988), pp.23-36.
- Levine, Lawrence. Highbrow/Lowbrow: The Emergence of Cultural Hierarchy in America. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988.
- Lie, Kari. "The Spruce Budworm Controversy in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia." Alternatives. Vol.9 no.2, Spring 1980, pp.5-13.
- Livingston, John A. Rogue Primate: An Exploration of Human Domestication. Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1994.
- . The Fallacy of Wildlife Conservation. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1981.
- Loewen, Candace. "Terra Nova: New Province, New Park." The Archivist. Vol.16 no.2, March-April 1989, pp.10-11.
- Lopez, Barry. Arctic Dreams: Imagination and Desire in a Northern Landscape. New York: Bantam Books, 1986.
- Lothian, W.F. A Brief History of Canada's National Parks. Ottawa: Parks Canada, 1987.
- . A History of Canada's National Parks. 4 volumes. Ottawa: Parks Canada, 1977-1981.

- MacEachern, Alan. "Rationality and Rationalization in Canadian National Parks Predator Policy." Consuming Canada: Readings in Environmental History. Ed. Chad Gaffield and Pam Gaffield. Toronto: Copp Clark Ltd., 1995, pp.197-212.
- . "Why Martin Luther King Didn't Spend His Summer Vacation in Canada." The Globe and Mail. 14 January 1995.
- MacFarlane, Richard. "Parks Canada: The Failure of National Parks Planning Procedures." Park News. Vol.14 no.3, Fall 1978, pp.37-42.
- MacLean, Rick. "Leaving Behind a Bitter Legacy: Expropriated Land for National Parks" Atlantic Insight. Vol.10 no.1, January 1988, p.38.
- Majka, Mary. Fundy National Park. Fredericton: Brunswick Press, 1977.
- Major, Kevin. Terra Nova National Park: Human History Study. Ottawa: Parks Canada, Environment Canada, 1983.
- March, William. Red Line: The Chronicle-Herald and the Mail-Star, 1875-1954. Halifax: Chebucto Agencies Ltd., 1986.
- Marsh, John. "Postcard Landscapes: An Exploration in Method." The Canadian Geographer. Vol.39 no.3, 1985, pp.265-267.
- May, Elizabeth. Budworm Battles. Halifax: Four East, 1982.
- McCombs, W. Douglas. "Therapeutic Rusticity: Antimodernism, Health and the Wilderness Vacation, 1870-1915." New York History. October 1995, pp.409-428.
- McIntosh, Robert P. The Background of Ecology: Concepts and Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- McKay, Ian. "Tartanism Triumphant: The Construction of Scottishness in Nova Scotia, 1933-1954." Acadiensis. Vol.21 no.2, Spring 1992, pp.5-47.
- McNamee, Kevin. "From Wild Places to Endangered Spaces: A History of Canada's National Parks." Eds. Dearden, Philip and Rick Rollins. Parks and Protected Areas in Canada: Planning and Management. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp.17-44.

- Meeker, Joseph. "Red, White, and Black in the National Parks." 1973. On Interpretation: Sociology for Interpreters of Natural and Cultural History, Eds. Gary E. Machlis and Donald R. Field. Corvallis, Oregon: Oregon State University Press, 1992, pp.196-205.
- Meinig, D.W., ed. The Interpretation of Ordinary Landscapes: Geographical Essays. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.
- Merchant, Carolyn. "The Theoretical Structure of Ecological Revolutions," Environmental Review. Vol.11 no.4, Winter 1987, pp.265-274.
- Mighetto, Lisa. Wild Animals and American Environmental Ethics. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1991.
- Mitchell, W.J.T., ed. Landscape and Power. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.
- Nash, Roderick. "The American Invention of National Parks." American Quarterly. Vol.22, Fall 1970, pp.726-735.
- . The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989.
- . "The State of Environmental History." The State of American History. Herbert J. Bass, ed. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970, pp.249-260.
- . Wilderness and the American Mind. 3rd ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982 [1967].
- "The National Parks: A Forum on the 'Worthless Lands' Thesis, a Roundtable." Journal of Forest History. Vol.27, July 1983, pp.130-145.
- Neary, Peter. "Party Politics in Newfoundland, 1949-1971: A Survey and Analysis." Newfoundland in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: Essays in Interpretation. Eds. James Hiller and Peter Neary. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980, pp.205-245.
- Nelson, J.G. and R.C. Scace, eds. The Canadian National Parks: Today and Tomorrow. Proceedings of a Conference organized by the National and Provincial Parks Association of Canada and the University of Calgary, October 9-15, 1968. 2 volumes (Calgary: University of Calgary, 1969).

- Nicolson, Marjorie Hope. Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory: The Development of the Aesthetics of the Infinite. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1959.
- Oates, Stephen B. Let the Trumpets Sound: The Life of Martin Luther King, Jr. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1982.
- Overton, James. Making a World of Difference: Essays on Tourism, Culture, and Development in Newfoundland. St. John's: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1996.
- Parenteau, Bill, and L. Anders Sandberg. "Conservation and the Gospel of Economic Nationalism: The Canadian Pulpwood Question in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick." Environmental History Review. Vol.19 no.2 Summer 1995, pp.57-83.
- Parkin, John Hamilton. Bell and Baldwin: Their Development of Aerodromes and Hydromedones at Baddeck, Nova Scotia. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1964.
- Parr, Joy. "Gender History and Historical Practice." Canadian Historical Review. Vol.76 no.3, September 1995, pp.354-376.
- Perdue, Jr., Charles L. and Nancy J. Martin-Perdue. "'To Build a Wall Around These Mountains': The Displaced People of Shenandoah." Magazine of Albermarle, Virginia County History. Vol.49, 1991, pp.48-71.
- Pick, Daniel. Faces of Degeneration: A European Disorder, c.1848-c.1918. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Pickersgill, J.W. My Years With Louis St. Laurent: A Political Memoir. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975.
- Power Bratton, Susan. "National Park Management and Values." Environmental Ethics. Vol.7, Summer 1985, pp.117-133.
- Reeder, Carolyn, and Jack Reeder. Shenandoah Heritage: The Story of the People Before the Park. Washington: Potomac Appalachian Trail Club, 1978.
- Reilly, Robin. "Planning for New National Parks in Atlantic Canada: The Experience With Ship Harbour, Nova Scotia (1965-1973)." Park News. Vol.17 no.1, Spring 1981, pp.5-10.

- Restino, Charles. "The Cape Breton Island Spruce Budworm Infestation: A Retrospective Analysis." Alternatives. Vol.19 no.4, 1993, pp.29-36.
- Rounthwaite, H. Ian. "The National Parks of Canada: An Endangered Species?" Saskatchewan Law Review. Vol.46 no.1, 1981-1982, pp.43-71.
- Rowe, Frederick W. The Smallwood Era. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1985.
- Runte, Alfred. National Parks: The American Experience. 2nd edition. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987 [1979].
- . Yosemite: The Embattled Wilderness. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990.
- Russell, Edmund P., III. "'Speaking of Annihilation': Mobilizing for War Against Human and Insect Enemies, 1914-1945." Journal of American History. March 1996, pp.1505-1529.
- Sackett, Andrew. "Inhaling the Salubrious Air: Health and Development in St. Andrew, N.B., 1880-1910." Acadiensis. Vol.25 no.1, Autumn 1995, pp.54-81.
- Sadler, Barry. "Mountains as Scenery." Canadian Alpine Journal. Vol.57, 1974, pp.51-53.
- Sandberg, L. Anders. "Forest Policy in Nova Scotia: The Big Lease, Cape Breton Island, 1899-1960." Trouble in the Woods: Forest Policy and Social Conflict in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Ed. L. Anders Sandberg. Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 1992, pp.66-89.
- Sax, Joseph. Mountains Without Handrails: Reflections on the National Parks. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980.
- Schama, Simon. Landscape and Memory. Toronto: Random House, 1995.
- Sears, John F. Sacred Places: American Tourist Attractions in the Nineteenth Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Sellars, Richard West. "The Rise and Decline of Ecological Attitudes in National Park Management, 1929-1940." 3 parts. The George Wright Forum. Vol.10 no.1 (1993), pp.55-77; Vol.10 no.2 (1993), pp.79-108; Vol.10 no.3 (1993), pp.38-54.

- Shaw, Marilyn. Mount Carleton Wilderness. Fredericton: Fiddlehead Poetry Books and Goose Lane Editions Ltd., 1987.
- Simonian, Lane. Defending the Land of the Jaguar: A History of Conservation in Mexico. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995.
- Singer, Peter. Animal Liberation: A New Ethic for Our Treatment of Animals. New York: Avon, 1977.
- Smallwood, Hon. Joseph R. "Joey." I Chose Canada. Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1973.
- Stone, Christopher D. "Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects." Southern California Law Review. No.45, Spring 1972, pp.450-501.
- Sumner, Lowell. "Biological Research and Management in the National Park Service: A History." The George Wright Forum. Autumn 1983. 3-27.
- Sutherland, Dufferin. "'The Men Went to Work by the Stars and Returned by Them': The Experience of Work in the Newfoundland Woods During the 1930s." Newfoundland Studies. Vol.7 no.2, 1991, pp.143-172.
- Taylor, C.J. "Legislating Nature: The National Parks Act of 1930." To See Ourselves/To Save Ourselves: Ecology and Culture in Canada. Rowland Lorimer, et al., eds. Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Association for Canadian Studies, 31 May - 1 June 1990. Montreal: Association for Canadian Studies, 1991, pp.125-137.
- Negotiating the Past: The Making of Canada's National Historic Parks and Sites. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990.
- Theberge, John B. "Ecology, Conservation, and Protected Areas in Canada." Eds. Dearden, Philip and Rick Rollins. Parks and Protected Areas in Canada: Planning and Management. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp.137-153.
- Thomas, Keith. Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800. London: Penguin Books, 1983.
- Thomas, Paul. "The Kouchibouguac National Park Controversy: Over a Decade Strong." Park News. Vol.17 no.1, Spring 1981, pp.11-13.

- Todhunter, Rodger. "Banff and the Canadian National Park Idea." Landscape. Vol.25 no.2, 1981, pp.33-39.
- Todd, Eric C.E. The Law of Expropriation and Compensation in Canada. Toronto: The Carewell Co. Ltd., 1976.
- Turner, Frederick Jackson. "The Significance of the Frontier in American History." Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1893. Washington, D.C., 1894, pp.197-227.
- Turner, R.D. and W.E. Rees. "A Comparative Study of Parks Policy in Canada and the United States." Nature Canada. Vol.2 no.1, 1973, pp.31-36.
- Waiser, Bill. Park Prisoners: The Untold Story of Western Canada's National Parks: 1915-1946. Saskatoon: Fifth House, 1995.
- . Saskatchewan's Playground: A History of Prince Albert National Park. Saskatoon: Fifth House, 1989.
- Walker, James W. St.G. Racial Discrimination in Canada: The Black Experience. Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association Historical Booklet #41, 1985.
- Wall, Geoffrey, and R. Wallis. "Camping for Fun: A Brief History of Camping in North America." Recreational Land Use: Perspectives on Its Evolution in Canada. Eds. Geoffrey Wall and John Marsh. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1982, pp.341-353.
- Weiskel, Thomas. The Romantic Sublime: Studies in the Structure and Psychology of Transcendence. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976.
- White, Richard. "American Environmental History: The Development of a New Historical Field." Pacific Historical Review. Vol.54, August 1985, pp.297-335.
- Williams, Raymond. "Ideas of Nature." Problems in Materialism and Culture. London and New York: Verso, 1980, pp.67-85.
- Wilson, Alexander. The Culture of Nature: North American Landscape from Disney to the Exxon Valdez. Toronto: Between the Lines, 1991.
- Wilson, E.O. Biophilia. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984.
- . Naturalist. Washington: Island Press, 1994.

- Winks, Robin W. The Blacks in Canada: A History. Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 1981.
- Worster, Donald. An Unsettled Country: Changing Landscapes of the American West. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1994.
- . "Appendix: Doing Environmental History." The Ends of the Earth: Perspectives on Modern Environmental History. Ed. Donald Worster. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp.289-307.
- . Nature's Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas. 2nd edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985 [1977].
- Wright, R. Gerald. Wildlife Research and Management in the National Parks. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992.
- Young, R.A. "'and the people will sink into despair': Reconstruction in New Brunswick, 1942-1952." Canadian Historical Review. Vol.69 no.2, 1988, pp.127-166.
- Zaslow, Morris. The Northward Expansion of Canada, 1914-1967. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1988.
- Zukin, Sharon. Landscapes of Power: From Detroit to Disney World. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.

SECONDARY SOURCESUnpublished

- Colpitts, Nancy. "Alma, New Brunswick and the Twentieth Century Crisis of Readjustment: Sawmilling Community to National Park." Master's thesis, Dalhousie University, 1983.
- Johnson, Ronald Clifford Arthur. "The Effect of Contemporary Thought Upon Park Policy and Landscape Change in Canada's National Parks, 1885-1911." Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1972.
- Joudrey, George Neil. "The Public Life of A.S. MacMillan." Master's thesis, Dalhousie University, 1966.
- Lotenburg, Gail. "Wildlife Management Trends in the Canadian and U.S. Federal Governments, 1870-1995." Unpublished report for Parks Canada, 1995.
- MacEachern, Alan. "No Island Is an Island: A History of Tourism on Prince Edward Island, 1870-1939." Master's thesis, Queen's University, 1991.
- Roder, Mary Lou. "Resident Populations and National Parks: A Review and Case Study - Gros Morne National Park." B.A. Thesis, University of Western Ontario, 1977.
- Sutherland, Dufferin. "'We Are Only Loggers': Loggers and the Struggle for Development in Newfoundland, 1929-1959," Ph.D. thesis, Simon Fraser University, 1995.
- Van Kirk, Sylvia. "The Development of National Park Policy in Canada's Mountain National Parks, 1885-1930." Master's thesis, University of Alberta, 1969.

Appendix 1

Departments in charge of national parks, and senior park officials. 1930-1965

Departments

Interior, 1911-Nov. 1936

Mines and Resources, Dec.1936-Jan.1950

Resources and Development, Jan.1950-Dec.1953

Northern Affairs and National Resources, Dec.1953-1966

Ministers

Charles Stewart, 1926-Aug.1930

Thomas Murphy, Aug.1930-Oct.1935

Thomas A. Crerar, Oct.1935-April 1945

James Glen, April 1945-June 1948

James MacKinnon, June 1948-March 1949

Colin Gibson, April 1949-Jan.1950

Robert Winters, Jan.1950-Sept.1953

Jean Lesage, Sept.1953-June 1957

Douglas Harkness, June 1957-Aug.1957

Alvin Hamilton, Aug.1957-Oct.1960

Walter Dinsdale, Oct.1960-April 1963

Arthur Laing, April 1963-1968

Deputy Ministers

W.W. Cory, 1905-March 1931

H.H. Rowatt, April 1931-April 1934

James Wardle, Aug.1935-Nov.1936

Charles Camsell, Dec.1936-Dec.1945

Hugh Keenleyside, Jan.1947-Sept.1950

Hugh Young, Oct.1950-Nov.1953

R. Gordon Robertson, Nov.1953-June 1963

Ernest Côté, July 1963-1968

Senior Parks Branch Officers

James Harkin (Commissioner), 1911-Nov.1936

R.A. Gibson (Director), Dec.1936-Nov.1950

James Smart (Director), Dec.1950-Feb.1953

James Hutchison (Director), March 1953-July 1957

J.R.B. Coleman (Director), Aug.1957-1968

Parks Division Heads (after 1936)

F.H.H. Williamson (Controller), 1936-1941

James Smart (Controller), 1941-Nov.1950

J.R.B. Coleman (Chief), Dec.1950-July 1957

B.I.M. Strong (Chief), Oct.1957-Nov.1963

W.W. Mair (Chief), Dec.1963-1966

Appendix 2

Attendance
(Ranking among all parks is in brackets)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Cape Breton Highlands</u> | <u>Prince Edward Island</u> | <u>Fundy</u> | <u>Terra Nova</u> | <u>All national parks</u> |
|-------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1936 | | | | | 908,161 |
| 1937 | 20,000 (9) | 2500 (17) | | | 1,008,690 |
| 1938 | 20,500 (10) | 10,000 (15) | | | 954,120 |
| 1939 | 22,035 (11) | 35,488 (8) | | | 995,270 |
| <u>1940</u> | <u>20,151 (11)</u> | <u>35,665 (9)</u> | | | <u>1,170,653</u> |
| 1941 | 23,694 (11) | 40,470 (5) | | | 1,000,563 |
| 1942 | 10,189 (12) | 24,826 (6) | | | 466,245 |
| 1943 | 17,612 (6) | 25,963 (5) | | | 415,351 |
| 1944 | 11,940 (12) | 33,365 (5) | | | 457,392 |
| <u>1945</u> | <u>18,863 (7)</u> | <u>48,068 (4)</u> | | | <u>602,409</u> |
| 1946 | 23,896 (10) | 50,281 (6) | | | 914,902 |
| 1947 | 27,507 (11) | 67,508 (7) | | | 1,154,699 |
| 1948 | 25,769 (13) | 84,333 (5) | | | 1,261,910 |
| 1949 | 31,508 (14) | 95,623 (6) | | | 1,688,367 |
| <u>1950</u> | <u>29,060 (14)</u> | <u>87,851 (6)</u> | <u>62,844 (10)</u> | | <u>1,795,138</u> |
| 1951 | 31,903 (14) | 107,961 (7) | 81,064 (10) | | 2,016,797 |
| 1952 | 35,372 (15) | 122,290 (7) | 101,139 (10) | | 2,409,661 |
| 1953 | 33,610 (14) | 146,827 (7) | 107,793 (10) | | 2,857,268 |
| 1954 | 123,731 (8) | 158,954 (6) | 99,346 (12) | | 3,035,001 |
| <u>1955</u> | <u>75,310 (12)</u> | <u>172,884 (6)</u> | <u>105,487 (11)</u> | | <u>3,305,149</u> |
| 1956 | 116,556 (11) | 181,692 (8) | 120,666 (10) | | 3,529,976 |
| 1957 | 128,397 (11) | 200,748 (8) | 143,662 (10) | | 3,940,711 |
| 1958 | 162,938 (11) | 206,245 (9) | 179,277 (10) | | 4,287,343 |
| 1959 | 193,684 (10) | 224,781 (7) | 199,777 (8) | | 4,600,434 |
| <u>1960</u> | <u>323,392 (8)</u> | <u>412,463 (5)</u> | <u>227,262 (9)</u> | <u>20,000 (30)</u> | <u>4,930,648</u> |
| 1961 | 371,686 (7) | 775,583 (2) | 280,006 (9) | 29,710 (28) | 5,491,663 |
| 1962 | 451,911 (6) | 1,009,021 (2) | 302,340 (12) | 29,915 (31) | 7,426,403 |
| 1963 | 615,133 (8) | 1,019,104 (2) | 494,157 (10) | 55,926 (24) | 9,426,857 |
| 1964 | 624,942 (8) | 1,112,536 (2) | 566,443 (10) | 66,180 (23) | 9,179,028 |
| <u>1965</u> | <u>729,443 (5)</u> | <u>967,372 (2)</u> | <u>679,406 (9)</u> | <u>108,738 (20)</u> | <u>9,845,283</u> |
| 1966 | 851,653 (6) | 1,130,773 (2) | 753,310 (9) | 179,647 (17) | 11,367,912 |

Rankings include National Historic Parks,
but total attendance is for National Parks alone.
All data are from the following year's departmental Annual Report.