Individualism and its Relationship to Well-being

by

Bradley Paul Isaak

A thesis

submitted to the faculty of graduate studies in partial

fulfilment of the requirements for the degree

of doctor of philosophy

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Abstract

The relationship between individualism/collectivism and both subjective well-being and psychological distress was investigated using a values model developed by Schwartz & Bilsky (1987, 1990; Schwartz, 1990). It was hypothesized that a mix of individualist/collectivist motivational domains (i.e., *self-direction, maturity,* and *prosocial*), theoretically identified as the "best" that individualism/collectivism have to offer toward psychological health, would be associated with greater subjective well-being and lower psychological distress than either individualism or collectivism alone. However, the study revealed that, among undergraduate psychology students, none of the motivational domains nor any particular combination of domains (i.e., mixed, individualist, collectivist) was predictive of subjective well-being or psychological distress. The simplest explanation is that the mixed motivational domains construct, or any single motivational domain, is too heterogenous to predict subjective psychological states. Post hoc analyses suggested that other variables, such as approach coping, provide an indirect link between the mixed motivational domains and psychological adjustment. Current findings and a review of the literature support the validity of the mixed motivational domain construct. However, it is argued that Schwartz's (1992) refined value survey may provide a better test of the present study's main hypotheses. A review of recent research points to the need for longitudinal studies and more heterogenous samples.

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Introduction

In the past several hundred years, the doctrine of individualism has greatly influenced the world. It has been hailed by some as the emancipator of humanity and denigrated by others as the source of societal destruction. In the 19th and 20th centuries, the debate over individualism's contribution to humanity entered the realm of the social sciences. Clouding the issue was the fact that individualism had become an integral component of Western science (Gergen, 1973a, 1973b, 1985; Pepitone, 1976; Sampson, 1978). The traditional belief that scientific theory serves to map reality in an objective, individualistic, and ahistoric manner (i.e., positivism, empiricism), stems from the rationalist and empiricist traditions linked with Descartes and other enlightenment philosophers (e.g., Boring, 1935; Burkitt, 1994; Fisher, 1995; Gergen, 1985, 1995; Leahey, 1987). According to this view, the locus of scientific rationality lies within the minds of independent persons. With the rise of postmodernist thought, some social scientists have questioned the value of the individualistic ideology underlying the social sciences and greater Western society, and have advocated a shift to a more collectivistic approach to both the scientific enterprise and societal functioning in general (Gergen, 1973b, 1985; Hogan, 1975; Sampson, 1977, 1985, 1988, 1989; Smith, 1990).

This ideological shift, closely linked to social constructionism (e.g., Gergen, 1992; Harré, 1985, 1995; Shotter, 1992, 1995), has been related to various developments in psychology including the growth of feminist, cross-cultural, and community psychology. Researchers in these fields argue that an individualistic

worldview is neither universal nor the pinnacle of humanity. Rather, they suggest that it is representative of, and propagated by, the power brokers in the Western world: typically, middle- to upper-class white males (Gergen, 1973b, 1985; Gilligan, 1982; Hofstede, 1980; Kitzinger, 1988; Lykes, 1985; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Sampson, 1988). Further, these theorists believe that individualism is detrimental to the well-being of both individuals and the societies of which they are part (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985; McKinlay, 1990; Osbeck, 1993; Prilleltensky, 1997). Although this suggestion is not new to the social sciences in general (Durkheim, 1973) or to psychology in particular (Adler, 1956), it has clearly received renewed attention in recent years. In contrast, various theorists throughout psychology's history, right up to the present, have argued that individualism is essential to social and psychological health (Perloff, 1987; Waterman, 1981, 1984).

Notwithstanding this theoretical attention, the scientific literature largely lacks empirical support for the existence of either a negative or a positive relationship between individualism and well-being. The present study was intended to assess this relationship and possible mechanisms underlying it. Similar to most other discourses on individualism, this study makes frequent reference to its counterpart, collectivism. Sometimes considered the polar opposite of individualism, at other times an orthogonal dimension, collectivism is always a closely associated theoretical construct. In the current study, individualism and collectivism are conceptualized in terms of a dynamic structure of universal values (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; 1990; Schwartz, 1990). The conventional practice in cross-cultural psychology is to utilize the terms

idiocentrism and allocentrism when referring to individualism and collectivism at the level of the individual. However, in the interest of parsimony, the terms individualism and collectivism are utilized in reference to both societal and individual levels. The level of analysis is specified if the context is unclear. Broadly speaking, individualism refers to giving priority to the goals and needs of the individual, over and above those of the group (e.g., family, community, society). In contrast, collectivism refers to the precedence of the goals and needs of the group.

Before examining the relationship between individualism/collectivism and subjective well-being, the historical and theoretical writings pertaining to individualism, both within and outside of the field of psychology will be reviewed. This summary will be followed by an examination of the constructs of individualism/collectivism, as well as their relationship to subjective well-being. The purpose and methodology of the present study will then be provided, followed by the results and discussion sections.

Definition and History of Individualism

Individualism is a word that has assumed many meanings over the past two centuries. The first time the term is known to have been used was in 1820 by the Frenchman Joseph de Maistre (Lukes, 1973). He employed it in a negative sense to signify the rejection of all authority and all that holds society together. The first time individualism appeared in English was in 1839, in a translation of Chevalier's (1966) letters, at which time it took on a more positive meaning (e.g., independence, self-reliance, freedom). Since those times it has been utilized in many different, and

sometimes contradictory, ways (Swart, 1962). Nevertheless, at a philosophical level, the essential doctrines are that the individual is the basic unit of society, the possessor of certain inalienable natural rights, foremost of which are liberty and equality, and that society exists primarily to serve the individual's interests.

Individualism's introduction into the Western world has been associated with various historical developments including classical Greek thought, Christianity, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment. As an ideology in North America, individualism has had its own unique meanings and emphases. It has permeated all aspects of life: philosophical, religious, economic, and social/political. What follows is a chronological examination of the development of individualism as an ideology in North America, particularly the United States, in which individualism has been the most pronounced and from which the vast majority of the relevant literature has originated. However, one caveat needs mention at the outset: The majority of the historical figures and historians included in this review were/are white, middle- to upper-class men. Hence, the values, principles, and understandings put forward in this section will naturally be reflective of their unique position in society.

Historical Development of Individualism

The 16th century is commonly credited with having ushered in the 'Age of Individualism'. This period in history, marked by the Reformation and the Renaissance, was a time of great change in all aspects of life, especially in its celebration of the individual. However, it is instructive to consider, as some historians have done, that this 'Age of Individualism' had important precursors dating

much farther back in time.

The Hellenists. Although the concept of the "self" is found in the earliest historical writings (Mauss, 1985), and various peoples of ancient times have been characterized as "individualistic" (Fontenay, 1969), the first manifestations of individualism to have had a clearly discernable impact on the Western world are often located in the philosophies of ancient Greece. Lindsay (1932), arguing that individualism is not novel to modern democratic societies, states that "the 5th century in Greece was marked by a great disintegration of tradition brought about, like individualism in modern times, partly by scientific discovery" (p. 675). He suggests that "the ideal of self-sufficiency ... in the Socratic character" (p. 675) exemplifies the beginnings of individualism in Greek thought.

This emphasis of the individual reached its peak during the Hellenistic period (323-30 B.C.; Long, 1974). Reale (1985) writes of this epoch that "man [sic] discovered himself as an individual" (p. 7) and later quotes Bignone (1942) as saying, "Now man [sic] seems to be everything: a unique construct with his own values and his own destiny, answering to himself alone" (pp. 7-8). The rational nature of human beings was declared necessary and sufficient for individual well-being. Reale (1985) argues that this exaltation of the individual, in concert with a de-emphasis of citizenship (i.e., belonging and submission to the State), degenerated into individualism as exemplified in the philosophy of Epicurus (341-270 B.C.).

The basic philosophy of Epicureanism is that people live to maximize pleasure and minimize pain, and that the underlying motivation for all behavior is, or should be,

self-interest. Epicurus argued that the basis for any behavior, virtuous or not, is

strictly self-interest. In the *Letter to Menoeceus*, Epicurus says that "the virtues are

naturally linked with living pleasurably" (quoted in Long, 1974, p. 69). In other

words, virtuous behavior is appropriate, but only because it is in the best interest of

the individual. Similarly, in the *Principle Doctrines*, Epicurus states that "Injustice is

a bad thing not in itself, but in respect of the fear and suspicion of not escaping the

notice of those set in authority concerning such things" (quoted in Long, 1974, p.

70). Hence, behavior is neither good nor bad, simply expedient or inexpedient for a

particular individual. Although Epicurus placed great value on friendship and the

happiness it brought, the underlying motivation was again self-interest. He argued

that human beings are not naturally communal but have developed social skills,

through an evolutionary process, as such skills proved beneficial to the individuals

involved.

The following quote from Lindsay (1932) is a suitable conclusion to this brief

review of Epicurean philosophy:

> "Thus in Epicureanism are found many of the elements which make up modern
>
> individualism: the view that society is nothing more than an aggregate of
>
> individuals; the doctrine that the state, law and justice are at best necessary
>
> evils; a scientific attitude of mind which leads to the acceptance of
>
> psychological atomism and hedonism; and a high valuation set on the voluntary
>
> association and the relation of contract." (p. 676)

A detailed examination of the entire Hellenistic period is beyond the scope of this

discussion, but, in addition to the Epicureans, it is important to briefly mention the Cynics and the Stoics. Suffice it to say that the Cynics, the most famous of whom was Diogenes (who died in 324 B.C.), were even more extreme than the Epicureans in their rejection of conventional rules. They placed great value on individual freedom and self-sufficiency (Reale, 1985). The Stoics also emphasized self-sufficiency and the importance of remaining emotionally detached from the world. Nevertheless, they felt compelled by nature to be active in the world (Dumont, 1983). But they were not to serve their neighbor out of love, for that might lead to disappointment if the service failed to help. Rather, their motivation stemmed from the basic understanding that a life of service is the "natural" life for a human being (Cressey, 1982). Stoicism was more widespread than the other Hellenistic philosophies and exerted its influence for a longer period of time (approximately 300 B.C. - 300 A.D.).

From the Hellenistic period, then, came a philosophical individualism. Whereas Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) recognized human beings as social in nature and saw the importance of a shared moral commitment and mutual accountability (Bellah et al., 1985), the Hellenists posited the ideal of the self-sufficient individual of wisdom. Many of the above philosophies would be adopted centuries later in the Western world, but not before the world was irrevocably altered by Christian religion.

Christianity. Included in the huge impact of Christianity was an essential contribution to the development of modern individualism. The teachings of Christ and the Apostles, as recorded in the Bible, place great value on the individual.

Building on the Old Testament teaching that men and women are made in the image

of God (Genesis 1:27[1]), Christian doctrine states that anyone who believes in Jesus

Christ enters into an intimate, filial, and eternal relationship with God (John 3:16,

Galatians 3:26). Such a position could potentially produce self-absorption and pride

were it not for the Christian understanding that each individual is held personally

accountable to God (and the church) to strive for a Christ-like character. Hence, the

individualistic nature of Christianity is not self-centered but God-centered, holding

obedience to God's will as centrally important (Romans 12:2). In keeping with

biblical principles, Christianity emphasizes the believer's union in the family of God

(Ephesians 4:2-6) and the mutual responsibility dictated by Christ's command to love

one another (John 13:34). This unconditional love is to extend beyond fellow

believers to anyone with whom contact is made (Matthew 22:39).

Christianity, then, as defined by the Bible, contains elements of both individualism

and collectivism. Thus, it differs substantially from Greek philosophy, particularly

that of the Hellenistic period, in which behavior was typically seen to be motivated

out of self-interest. Even the Stoics, for whom social action was important, were

different in that their motivation was not love for others or God. However, from

these idealistic beginnings, the Church often floundered in carrying out its

commission.

From the time of the conversion to Christianity of the Roman Emperor

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[1]All references to the bible based on The Thompson Chain-Reference Bible: New International Version.

Constantine in 312 A.D., to approximately 1500, the Church and State went hand in hand. Instead of being persecuted by the State, the Church received support. Membership in the Church was no longer voluntary, but automatic upon birth. In many ways, by the mid to late Middle Ages, the Church and State had become one. These changes ultimately led to the dilution of Jesus' teachings, the amplification of hierarchical structures, an increase in the mediational activity of the clergy (i.e., the institution now imparted God's grace), and the general corruption of the Church. These mutations of the original teachings of Christianity moved the Church away from both its positive individualistic aspects and the strong spirit of community (Morris, 1972). The Church, drastically altered since the 1st century, had become *the* religious, economic, and political power. Even artistic, intellectual, and philosophical pursuits were largely controlled by the Church.

It would be at best naive to summarize 1200 years in one paragraph and imply that all the factors influencing the concept of individualism had been addressed. It should be acknowledged that the Middle Ages provide many examples of noteworthy individuals, attempts at reform in the Church, and other trends of an individualistic nature (Troeltsch, 1911/1981). Morris (1972) discusses the increasing emphasis on the individual from 900 A.D. to 1200 A.D. and some of the potentiating factors. He describes changes in both Church and State: improved education that included a return to the Greek classics, the Bible, and Roman Law; the questioning of tradition and people's interpretations of Scripture; the importance placed on self-knowledge as a path to God, self-examination, sense of personal sin, and the shift in emphasis from

collective to individual salvation; changes in art and literature (e.g., the proliferation of the autobiography and the individualization of portraits); and the focus on friendship and love.

Nevertheless, none of the movements in the Middle Ages substantially altered the overriding control of the Church and State. Illiteracy was wide-spread and superstition abounded, both of which contributed to the fixation on death and the dependence on the Church for 'salvation' (Estep, 1986). Hence, the importance of the individual established by Christ and the Apostles was lost in the authoritarian Church. Not until the time of the Renaissance and the Reformation did individualism make a lasting and far-reaching resurgence.

Renaissance (14th to 16th century). Historians have disagreed as to the exact dates of the Renaissance, or even if it should be considered a separate period in history. However, the period from 1300 to the time of Luther and the Reformation in the early 1500's is the commonly accepted time frame (Estep, 1986). Jacob Burckhardt (1935, quoted in Estep, 1986) argued that the Renaissance originated in Italy where "an objective treatment and consideration of the State and of all things of this world became possible" (p. 143) and that "the subjective side at the same time asserted itself with corresponding emphasis; man [sic] became a spiritual individual, and recognized himself as such" (p. 143). For Burckhardt, this conscious individualism is what distinguished this period and the modern age from the community-defined self of the medieval period (Baumeister, 1987; Estep, 1986). The Renaissance signalled the end of the Church/State controlled society and the

beginnings of more democratic practices. Hence, the foundation was being laid for both a secular and biblically-based individualism, the latter emerging through the Reformation.

Reformation (16th century). Disillusioned by the corruption and anti-Scriptural practices of the Church, Desiderius Erasmus (1467-1536) and Martin Luther (1483-1546) were the first major advocates of reform. But it was Luther who more forcefully sought change and inaugurated the Reformation, beginning with the posting of the Ninety-Five Theses, a criticism of the Church's practice of selling indulgences as a pardon for sins. The Reformation reasserted the individualist element of Christianity and was a reaction to the authoritarian structure of the medieval Church. As Lindsay (1932) states, "the central doctrine of the Reformation was the universal priesthood of believers, a doctrine in implication individualistic and democratic" (p. 676).

Interestingly, neither Luther of the German Reformation nor Ulrich Zwingli (1484-1531) of the Swiss Reformation took their understanding of the authority of Scripture to its logical conclusion. Among other things, they both maintained a connection between Church and State. Hence, complete reformation was brought about by those who came after them (i.e., during the 16th and 17th centuries), notably the Anabaptists, the English Independents, and the Quakers (Dyck, 1981; Lindsay, 1932). It was the Anabaptists who broke completely with the authoritarianism of the medieval Church and advocated the freedom of believers and local congregations based on the New Testament model (Estep, 1986). Renewed was

the emphasis on voluntary belief, direct relationship with God, personal responsibility to God and fellow believers, and the separation of Church and State.

Although the Anabaptist and related movements were small in terms of numbers, they had a major effect on the Western world. The separation of religion and politics made it the concern of the State to establish a system of rights. In the United States in particular, this became one of the central tenets of government.

Unlike the Anabaptists, John Calvin (1509-1564) still supported a relationship between religion and politics, one in which the Church would encompass the State (Dumont, 1983). Nevertheless, Calvin's doctrine was extremely individualistic, in that every individual is either predestined by God as one of the "elect" or the "reprobate" (i.e., condemned). It is each individual elect's duty to be obedient to the Scriptures and to so demonstrate in daily behavior. Calvinism will be examined below in relation to the Protestant Work Ethic.

To summarize, the Reformation saw a return to the importance of the individual and the weakening of the authoritarianism of the Church. Due to the vast influence of the medieval Church, these changes also impacted social, political, and economic life. This rebirth of the individual in the Reformation opened new doors to a new generation of people and led to continued growth, but not always in a direction of which the reformers would have approved.

The Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment (17th to 18th century). Whereas the Reformation can be considered to have re-established a biblical individualism (with social, political, and economic ramifications), the Scientific Revolution of the

17th century and the Enlightenment of the late 17th and 18th centuries can be considered the progenitors of modern secular individualism (Hollinger, 1983; Leahey, 1987; Lindsay, 1932). These scientific and philosophic movements were dominated by the veneration of empiricism and rationalism (hence, "The Age of Reason") and the rejection of traditional religious, social, and political ideas. Although they can be considered distinct movements (Leahey, 1987), the birth of modern science and the Enlightenment are so intertwined that there is little justification for keeping the movements separate.

The Scientific Revolution, building on the atomistic and individualistic foundation that had been laid, displaced the earth as the center of the universe and reconceptualized the universe as a grand machine. Finding its beginnings in the sun-centered world system of Nicholas Copernicus[2] (1473-1543), and being formally proposed by Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) and René Descartes (1596-1650), the machine analogy became the popular view of the universe and received support from individuals such as Isaac Newton (1642-1727; Leahey, 1987). Instead of emphasizing the classical writings of ancient Greek scholars or the Bible, the scholars of the 17th century turned their attention to the study and quantification of the world around them, and to the rational application of their findings to practical human concerns.

Descartes' division of mind and body, the rational and the material, laid the

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[2]Eastwood's (1982) analysis demonstrates that Copernicus was not the first to posit a heliocentric universe but rather that such theories date back to at least the time of the Ancient Greeks.

foundation for the self-contained individual and modern psychology (Fisher, 1995).

He viewed individuals as rational/physiological systems in which mechanically

determined emotions and perceptions are governed by reason. Along with other

rationalist philosophers (e.g., Kant, Leibniz), Descartes believed in an inner being or

essence at the center of every human (Burkitt, 1994). It is the act of thinking that

defines the individual as a person and which separates humans from the other life-

forms inhabiting this planet. For Descartes, only humans are self-aware and possess

the capacity for moral responsibility (Gergen, 1995).

Based on his Mind/Body dualism, Descartes doubted that a comprehensive

"scientific" psychology could be developed (Toulmin, 1986). He believed that,

although causal attributions could be made with respect to actions of the mechanical

body, rational activities (e.g., deliberation, calculation, and judgment) do not conform

to the fundamental principles of "modern" science. In Descartes' view, rational

activities do not fall within an objective, mechanical-material, and scientifically

knowable world but, rather, within a subjective world of human consciousness known

through introspection (Leahey, 1987). Similarly, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)

believed that the material provided by the inner sense, via introspection, was resistant

to mathematization (Danziger, 1990). Thus, Kant also doubted the possibility of a

science of mental life. Danziger (1990) suggests that 19th century philosphers were

divided on the subject of introspection: some, like Kant, devalued the philosophical

significance of material gained through introspection, whereas others believed in the

possibility of developing a new empirical discipline. Danziger states that this latter

view tended to be held by philosophers who regarded the self-conscious individual "as the centerpiece around which the world had to be arranged" (p. 23) and who subscribed to a political philosophy of liberal individualism. Liberal individualism, or liberalism, is, in general, a philosophy emphasizing the freedoms, rights, and essential goodness of humankind. It is often attributed to the philosophies of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and John Locke (1632-1704).

Hobbes side-stepped the problem, raised by dualist philosophers (e.g., Descartes, Kant), of developing a scientific psychology by arguing that only matter exists and that human behavior is fully determined (Leahey, 1987). Accordingly, Hobbes believed that an objective and exact science of human nature could be developed that would permit the construction of a rationally-based political system. Underlying his political theory is the individualistic assumption that, in their natural state, humans are self-interested, independent, free, and equal units (Lindsay, 1932; Lukes, 1973). In Hobbes' view, people's equal needs *and* equal insecurity in a competitive market compels them to accept, for their own sake, "a self-perpetuating sovereign body" (MacPherson, 1962, p. 265). Thus, liberty is limited by the need for an external authority to counteract each individual's lack of restraint.

Like Hobbes, John Locke also posited an atomistic social contract theory in which each individual is free, equal, and independent. Consequently, each individual possesses certain natural rights: life, liberty, and property (Macridis, 1992). Locke believed that a person's position in society should be determined by contract (i.e., individual self-determination), not status (i.e., fixed group relations), and that one's

freedom is only to be limited by the requirements of others' freedom (MacPherson,

1962). Such individuals choose to submit themselves to another power because each

person is "constantly exposed to the invasion of others" (Locke, quoted in Sargent,

1990). Therefore, a limited government must be established to enforce laws

protecting each individual's rights. The authority of this government is given by the

independent consent of the citizenry and should be regulated by various checks and

balances. Hence, society consists of a series of voluntarily-entered relations between

free individuals.

As noted above, these theories of Hobbes and Locke represent the beginnings of

liberalism, an ideology anchored to the Epicurean proposition that humans strive to

maximize pleasure and minimize pain. Macridis (1992) suggests that liberalism

entails three "core" areas: moral, political, and economic. The moral core relates to

the inalienable rights and values attributable to human beings (e.g., freedom, dignity,

life). As can be seen, this central thread of humanistic individualism was evidenced

in the exaltation of the individual in Stoic thought, was brought to new heights by

Christianity, and was revitalized in the Renaissance and Reformation. The political

core refers to the political rights associated with a representative democracy (e.g.,

right to vote, participate, have input on policies). This aspect of liberalism also has

precursors in the ancient Greek civilization, after which it disappeared and did not

resurface until the Middle Ages ended and the modern age began. The economic core

concerns the economic and property rights associated with the "free enterprise

system" (e.g., right to produce, consume, enter into voluntary contractual relations,

possess private property). All three areas were included in the social contract theories of Hobbes and Locke, and were further developed by various Enlightenment thinkers, including Adam Smith (1723-1790), the Utilitarians, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778).

From its first release in 1776, Adam Smith's major work, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, better known now as simply *The Wealth of Nations*, has been considered the quintessential treatment of liberal economics (Macridis, 1992). In this work, Smith developed his theories of a free-market economy. Essentially, Smith argued that, if left to seek their own interests, people will not only benefit themselves through their efforts but society as a whole. Although he recognized greed as an ever-present problem and was troubled by it, Smith believed that the forces of competition within the market would safeguard society from the domination of any individual or group of individuals. He also believed in a certain compassion within human beings. Smith was a well-educated man with interests not only in economics, but in a wide variety of fields, such as law and government, astronomy, language, and ethics (Smith, 1976). In his essay, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Smith (1976) argues that "Nature" has endowed human beings with a desire to be approved of by others and, hence, to do what is morally right. Heimann (1961) suggests that Smith's belief in "sympathy" or "feeling with others" was an unconscious vestige of Christian tradition and could not be justified on a rational basis. Regardless, Smith (1976) recognized that conscience alone was often insufficient for regulating human behavior and so he advocated a system of positive

law and justice. He thought that government's role should be limited to matters of defense, internal order, and justice, as well as certain public institutions, such as education and some public assistance for the poor (Macridis, 1992). However, at no time was the government to interfere in the market.

Jeremy Bentham (1748-1831), a disciple of Adam Smith, is considered the founder of utilitarianism, a philosophy based on the principle that people try to maximize pleasure and minimize pain (Macridis, 1992). Halévy (1928) defines utilitarianism "as nothing but an attempt to apply the principles of Newton to the affairs of politics and morals" (p. 6). In other words, utilitarianism is very similar to the approach envisaged by both Hobbes and Locke: to seek out universal laws of human behavior upon which to found a political and moral science.

The *principle of utility*, for which it is named, extended utilitarianism from the theoretical to the applied realm by providing the Utilitarians with the necessary criterion with which to judge the 'goodness' of behavior. The principle of utility states that whatever is useful is considered good, whether that be a merchant's wares or an individual's conduct. Usefulness is subjective, being determined by each individual. Just as Adam Smith argued for economic activity based on people's self-interest, the Utilitarians argued that all aspects of life can and should be directed by self-interest. To regulate potentially destructive "universal egoism," Bentham posited the principle of the "greatest happiness of the greatest number" (Halévy, 1928). In this way, the principle of utility was applied both at the level of the individual and society, although Bentham did not consider the society to be a real entity, as the

following quote from Halévy (1928) demonstrates:

> "The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual persons who
>
> are considered as constituting as it were its members. The interest of the
>
> community then is, what? -- the sum of the interests of the several members
>
> who compose it." (p. 501)

Bentham proposed the principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number partly

because he believed that there were insufficient resources for everyone to be well-off

and, therefore, that absolute equality would lead to the poverty of all. He indicated

that for a society to be governed according to this happiness principle would require

an impartial legislator, or as Halévy (1928) puts it, "no respecter of persons."

Hence, Bentham recognized that not everyone in society would be satisfied but that,

through universal suffrage (i.e., the right to vote given to everyone), the majority

would be happy.

Unlike Locke, Smith, and the Utilitarians, who advocated representative

government with varying degrees of authority, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778)

argued for direct government of the people. Although he valued community and

order (Sargent, 1990), Rousseau believed that there should be no restraints on "the

general will" and that representation would only distort the people's will (Macridis,

1992). This unrestricted majority rule would be held partially liable for the atrocities

associated with the French Revolution (Arieli, 1964).

Partly in response to the tyranny of the French Revolution and partly due to the

conservative element in America, the founding of the United States was based on a

balance of liberal Enlightenment philosophy and conservative beliefs and values. The

American Revolution advanced liberal democratic ideals based largely on the theories

of Locke and, to a certain extent, the Utilitarians. Although the people were to have

their voice, it was to be through a representative government. Checks and balances

were created not only to protect the people from a totalitarian state, but to protect the

greater society from the tyranny of the majority. It was upon this foundation that, in

the 19th century, the United States would be upheld as the exemplar to the world of

individualistic ideology put into practice[3].

19th century. Various factors have been credited with the predominance of

individualism in America. These factors have included: the availability of resources

(e.g., land), which increased the likelihood of material prosperity for independent

pioneers; the agrarian-pioneer spirit; the character of the people (e.g., independent,

adventurous, industrious); the infancy of the nation and the corresponding absence of

long-standing tradition; and the individualism of the pioneers' religious beliefs

(Fehrenbacher, 1973; Pole, 1980; Tocqueville, 1900). Descriptions of American

individualism in the 19th century have come from diverse sources representing a wide

range of opinions. This section will examine a number of these descriptions, as well

as some of the factors related to the advance of individualism in America.

Besides the socio-political ideas introduced by Enlightenment thinkers, Adam

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[3]Arieli (1964) suggests that, with the American Revolution and "the triumph of
reason, liberty, and human dignity, ... the Enlightenment realized its aims and
confirmed its belief that history was the progress of humanity toward perfection" (p.
17).

Smith's (1976) laissez-faire system was well received in America. In combination

with the Industrial Revolution, economic individualism flourished, first in the northern

states and later in the south. Draper (quoted in Arieli, 1964) describes the North in

the following glowing terms:

> Magnificent cities in all directions were arising; the country was intersected
>
> with canals, railroads ... companies for banking, manufacturing, commercial
>
> purposes, were often concentrating many millions of capital. There were all
>
> kinds of associations ... churches, hospitals, schools, abounded. The foreign
>
> commerce at length rivalled that of the most powerful nations of Europe. This
>
> wonderful spectacle of social development was the result of
>
> INDIVIDUALISM, operating in an unbounded theatre of action. Everyone
>
> was seeking to do all that he could for himself. (p. 319; emphasis not added)

In the South, where the governing principle was "aristocratic feudal particularism"

(i.e., the belief held by the aristocratic landowners that they had a right to promote

their own interests without regard to the interests of the majority), laissez-faire

economics and individualism in general were disparaged (Arieli, 1964). These

philophies were an obvious threat to the aristocracy. Nevertheless, the South was

eventually incorporated into the individualistic system in the second half of the 19th

century, following the Civil War.

In this individualistically-oriented environment, exemplified by Draper's quotation

above, the writings of John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) were immensely popular (Arieli,

1964). After Bentham's death, Mill (1859/1996) became the leading exponent of

utilitarianism. In his essay *On Liberty*, Mill states that his purpose is to:

"assert one very simple principle, ... that the sole end for which mankind are

warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action

of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which

power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community,

against his will, is to prevent harm to others" (p. 13).

Although Mill thought that the government's role should be limited, his ethical and

social views led him to argue that some interests are intrinsically more valuable than

others. Mill, like most philosophers of the Enlightenment, was a rationalist who

believed in the basic good of humanity. He put his hope in enlightened self-interest.

Mill believed that, with education and the leadership of the wiser and more mature

members of society (i.e., middle and upper classes), the purely hedonistic and

potentially destructive tendencies of self-interested individuals would be overcome,

and the collective interests of society and nation would be realized (Macridis, 1992).

Consistent with this goal, Mill became "the authority on political economy and moral

philosophy in most American colleges" (Arieli, 1964, p. 320).

Although liberal European philosophies soon permeated most aspects of American

life, individualism had origins predating the Enlightenment. The men and women

who colonized America have been characterized as adventurous individualists with a

pioneering spirit (Hollinger, 1983). The Puritans of New England, in particular,

became known for their individualistic and industrious lifestyles. In a series of letters

based on his time spent in America from 1834-1835, the Frenchmen Michael

Chevalier (1966) contrasted the people of the North, the New Englanders or "Yankees," with those of the South, the Virginians. Despite being "distrustful," "cold," and "narrow in [their] ideas," Chevalier appreciated the Yankees for their industrious, hard working, and resourceful nature; in all ways very well suited to life in the wilderness of a new frontier. According to Chevalier (1966), the Yankee "is individualism incarnate; in him the spirit of locality and division is carried to the utmost" (p. 116). Yet, Chevalier saw individualism as positive in the New Englanders because it was balanced by strong religious values.

Alexis de Tocqueville (1900), a compatriot of Chevalier's, described the inhabitants of New England in similar terms. He reported that the New Englanders combined their passion for liberty with a deep faith in God. Like Chevalier, Tocqueville credited the Puritans' faith, and consequent morality, with the balance and control of liberty. Commenting on the importance of religion in general, Chevalier (1966) stated that "all the elements of popular liberty and happiness" (p. 365) that the French and the Americans were seeking emanated from Christian principles. For this reason, Chevalier was concerned that the people, moving toward secular worldviews, were abandoning the moral foundation on which to build a successful society of free *and* equal people. In fact, in one of his last letters, Chevalier argued that politics and religion "must join hands" in achieving a successful democracy.

In 1904-5, the German sociologist and economist Max Weber (1930) suggested that a link of a different sort existed between religion and politics, or at least religion

and economics. In his now classic, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Weber argued for a close causal connection between Protestantism and capitalistic tendencies. In essence, Weber suggested that the Calvinist doctrine of "calling" made the individualistic pursuit of wealth not only a legitimate action, but a believer's duty. Thus, he posited that Protestantism, especially Calvinism, produced the spirit of capitalism. It is noteworthy that Weber drew many of his illustrations from the English Puritans who had lost some of the commitment to the social ethics that Calvin so strongly advocated and that the Puritans who founded New England still practiced (Weber, 1930).

Weber (1930) has been both severely criticized and praised for his analysis. Robertson (1933) criticizes Weber's conclusions and his methods of arriving at them. He argues that "the spirit of capitalism has arisen rather from the material conditions of civilisation than from some religious impulse" (p. xvi). That is, Robertson demonstrates a link between newly discovered lands and resources, increased commerce, and foreign trade on the one hand, and the growth of capitalism on the other. He also provides evidence of the growth of capitalism in the pre-Reformation period, in Catholicism, particularly among the Jesuits, and in secular political and economic thought. Furthermore, Robertson quotes numerous passages from Puritan writers advocating social concern over self-interest, and service to God over covetousness. In contrast, Tawney (1922/1962), while acknowledging its existence throughout history, argues that capitalism, in certain aspects of later Puritanism, became a sign of religious seriousness instead of a threat to be cautiously regarded.

Similarly, Demant (1949) states that:

> What became economic individualism had been arrived at before the
>
> Reformation, but it was not acknowledged as moral, let alone regarded as a
>
> contribution to the general good. The early Reformers were as opposed to
>
> capitalist practices as the schoolmen had been. The regions under Protestant
>
> influence capitulated first and co-operated in the transition in a way which has
>
> never been the case under catholic influence. (pp. 18-19)

In conclusion, Weber's (1930) argument cannot easily be dismissed. It may be

reasonable to accept some connection between Protestantism and capitalism, although

causal attributions are questionable and alternative hypotheses need to be considered.

What *is* certain is that the Puritans, while valuing certain individualistic

characteristics, also emphasized community (Bellah et al., 1985; Hollinger, 1983;

Robertson, 1933).

It seems advisable to briefly return to Chevalier (1966) and de Tocqueville (1900),

whose descriptions of 19th century United States are considered classics and whose

comments address almost all aspects of American life. When de Tocqueville came to

America in 1831, he hoped to somehow help his native, revolution-torn France by

learning why democracy had been so successful in America. He believed democracy

to be the endpoint of history as ordained by the divine will of God. However, de

Tocqueville also believed that individualism was the inevitable by-product of

democratic equality and that it would lead to the weakening of social bonds and a lack

of governmental accountability. He concluded that the Americans had avoided these

pitfalls because of their religious beliefs, the great importance placed on liberty (i.e.,

as stated in the U.S. Constitution and enforced by local and federal authorities), and

active participation in local government and the community.

Similarly, Chevalier (1966) noted that abuses of liberty were guarded against in

America. He illustrates his point with the account of "a conspiracy among ... persons

engaged in the transportation of goods" and the publicly approved punitive measures

taken by those in authority. Chevalier then states the following:

> In the United States, then, the general weal [i.e., well-being] is the supreme
>
> law; and it immediately raises its head and vindicates its rights, when it feels
>
> the encroachments of private interest. The system of government in this
>
> country is, therefore, not so much a system of absolute liberty and free will, as
>
> a system of equality, or rather it takes the character of a strong rule by the
>
> majority. (p. 336-7)

Hence, de Tocqueville and Chevalier believed that the potential negative consequences

of individualism were, for the most part, held at bay in the United States.

Many 19th century European intellectuals have not been as charitable as Chevalier

(1966) and de Tocqueville (1900) in their opinions of individualism. In France,

philosophers reacting to the French Revolution condemned supporters of individualism

as social anarchists and destroyers of society (Lukes, 1973). Whereas German

thinkers concurred with the French, the English were divided in their opinions of

individualism (Lukes, 1973). However, it is somewhat misleading to compare these

different views, as there are probably as many different definitions of individualism as

there are views. Nevertheless, American individualism was highly regarded domestically.

The positive view of American individualism is best exemplified in a quote found in Arieli (1964) by the unnamed author of an article entitled "The Course of Civilization" (*Democratic Review*, 1839). The following is but a sample:

> The history of humanity is the record of a grand march ... at all times tending
>
> to one point -- the ultimate perfection of man [sic]. The course of civilization
>
> is the progress of man [sic] from a state of savage individualism to that of an
>
> individualism more elevated, moral, and refined. Personal separation and
>
> independence were the beginning, as they will be the end, of the great
>
> progressive movement, with this difference -- that in its last and more
>
> perfectly developed condition, the sense of justice shall have supreme control
>
> over the individual will ... The last order of civilization, which is democratic,
>
> received its first permanent existence in this country ... The peculiar duty of
>
> this country has been to exemplify and embody a civilization in which the
>
> rights, freedom, and mental and moral growth of individual man [sic] should
>
> be made the highest end of all social restrictions and laws. (pp. 191-192)

Arieli (1964) has discussed how drastically the value content of individualism changed when it was transplanted from Europe to America. Rather than being causally linked with social anarchy and societal destruction, individualism came to represent all that was good about America: "self-determination, moral freedom, the rule of liberty, and the dignity of man" (p. 193).

Underlying this positive viewpoint was the belief that history depicted humanity's progression toward perfection. Nisbet (1986) states that "Developmentalism is without question one of the master-ideas of the whole of Western civilization" (p. 22). Developmentalism can be equated with various concepts including progress, evolution, and growth. It implies the linearity of history and the constant movement of humanity toward an ideal state of being. Nisbet argues that developmentalism was handed down from the Greeks and Romans, through the Christian Church and the belief in a Millennium on earth followed by eternity in heaven, to the modern Western world. He describes how developmentalism shifted from the religious to the secular via Enlightenment philosophy. One of the secular forms of developmentalism to appear in the 19th century was that of the social darwinists (Lukes, 1973). They advocated one of the most ruthless versions of individualism, suggesting that for humanity to flourish, humans must be guided by the 'survival of the fittest' principle dictated by evolution. This was typically tempered by the poorly supported idea that "private accumulation leads to public welfare" (Lukes, 1973, p. 30).

In harmony with the developmental perspective, sociologists such as Émile Durkheim (1973) saw individualism as a necessary, although incomplete, step towards a social order in which freedom *and* equality would reign. As indicated above, many 19th century Americans believed that their country had already attained (or at least was near) the pinnacle of human evolution. However, developments in the 20th century would lead many Americans to question individualism and lean more towards government intervention.

20th century. The 20th century witnessed a shift away from the economic

individualism of the previous century. A host of factors contributed to this change,

including the growth of industry and powerful corporations, economic decline for

farmers and factory workers, urbanization, the stock market crash of 1929, and the

Great Depression (World Book Encyclopedia, 1977). Former U.S. president Herbert

Hoover was criticized for having responded slowly to the suffering produced by the

Great Depression and for clinging to the doctrine of laissez-faire economics despite its

obvious failings. Nevertheless, although very much an individualist and a believer in

limited government interference, as evidenced in his writings, Hoover (1934) believed

that freedom had to be balanced with responsibility:

> Our American System has ever recognized that the borders between liberty and
>
> license, between free speech and slander, order and disorder, enterprise and
>
> exploitation, private interest and public interest are difficult to define. But the
>
> domain of liberty can be defined by virtue, reason, by the common will, and
>
> by law. It cannot be defined by arbitrary power. (p. 24)

To paraphrase, Hoover argues that freedom has limits that are defined by individual

morals, rational assessment, majority opinion, and government legislation.

In 1932, at Hoover's request, the U.S. Congress passed several laws aimed at

improving the economy (World Book Encyclopedia, 1977). Hoover's increased

government intervention included loans to banks and major institutions, credit to

homeowners and farmers, and support of public works and conservation programs

designed to provide jobs. Such intervention was further extended by Franklin Delano

Roosevelt's government with the implementation of the New Deal (Lippmann, 1934). What followed in the United States was increased public assistance, such as funding for education, senior's pension, unemployment insurance payments, and public health care. All of these interventions reflected the new "Keynesian" economics, named after its founder, John Maynard Keynes (Macridis, 1992). This new economic theory allowed for the maintenance of individualistic policy, but with added public interventions.

Midgley (1992) suggests that since Roosevelt established the New Deal, the U.S. has been a welfare state. He argues that, although previous presidents had tried to return to more individualistic policies, this was not accomplished until Ronald Reagan became president. Midgley outlines how, beginning at the time of the New Deal, Keynesian economics took over and seemed to produce very positive results. But in the 1970's, Keynesian economists were faced with a new and apparently insoluble problem, namely recession coupled with inflation. This opened the way to the Reagan administration of the 1980's and a partial return to radical economic individualism. However, except for wealthy Americans, their policies did not prove to be very successful either.

At the end of the 20th century, individualism is as difficult to characterize as ever. However, Swart (1962) has suggested three categories and/or manifestations of individualism that may prove useful in summarizing the modern day version. These categories are economic liberalism, political liberalism, and Romantic individualism. At a practical level, economic liberalism (i.e., laissez-faire) has been on a steady

decline throughout the past century, with governments and large corporations

controlling more and more of the economy. Nevertheless, at an ideological level,

people still highly value the idea that a person can achieve the "good life" with

enough hard work. Swart's definition of political liberalism includes both the moral

(e.g., freedom, dignity, life) and political (e.g., right to vote, participate, have input

on policies) "cores" discussed by Macridis (1992). This category of individualism is

very strong, with personal, civil, and social liberties receiving what some would

argue to be an inordinate amount of respect (Murray, 1984). At the same time,

however, there is much less civic-mindedness at the community level and

bureaucracies wield more power, thus limiting actual freedom. The third category,

Romantic individualism, was an elitist movement originating in Germany in the late

18th century with the glorification of "genius and originality" (Swart, 1962, p. 83).

In the 20th century, Romantic individualism is related to the focus on self-

actualization, individuation, self-development, and other similar concepts.

Bellah et al. (1985) employ a different categorical scheme which, although not

intended as exhaustive, is relevant to the present study's conceptualization of

individualism. They divide modern individualism into two main components, namely

expressive and utilitarian. Expressive individualism:

> holds that each person has a unique core of feeling and intuition that should
>
> unfold or be expressed if individuality is to be to be realized. This core,
>
> though unique, is not necessarily alien to other persons or to nature. Under
>
> certain conditions, the expressive individualist may find it possible through

intuitive feeling to 'merge' with other persons, with nature, or with the cosmos

as a whole. (p. 334)

This form of individualism encompasses the characteristics of modern Romantic

individualism listed above (e.g., self-actualization). On the other hand, utilitarian

individualism states that everyone has basic appetites and fears. Further, life is seen

as an effort to maximize satisfaction of one's appetites and minimize one's fears.

This form of individualism descends directly from the Utilitarian philosophers of the

Enlightenment era and is related to Swart's (1962) category of economic

individualism, in that all of life is seen in economic terms.

Bellah and colleagues (1985) suggest that, prior to the late 19th and 20th

centuries, most Americans held to biblical and/or republican traditions which, while

valuing the inherent dignity and sacredness of the individual, counterbalanced self-

interest with an equally high valuation of the community. In contrast, they argue that

utilitarian and expressive individualism have come to dominate North American

thinking in the late 19th and 20th centuries. Like the biblical and republican

traditions, utilitarian and expressive individualism proclaim the inherent dignity and

sacredness of the individual. However, unlike the biblical and republican traditions,

they hold that only the individual has a primary reality and that society is an artificial

construct, established by and for individuals.

Bellah et al. (1985) and others (Bellah, 1976; Hagedorn, 1986; Heimann, 1961;

Lindsay, 1932) suggest that this ideological shift is linked to various factors, including

the rise to dominance of modern science, Enlightenment philosophy, secularization,

industrialization, and urbanization. Many social commentators have argued that, within this new ideological context, what has emerged is an over-emphasis of individual rights and a de-emphasis of social responsibility.

Summary

The purpose of this section was to summarize some of the philosophical, religious, economic, and socio-political antecedents that have influenced modern individualism. The Ancient Greeks of the Hellenistic period were the first to significantly influence the Western world with the supreme importance placed on human beings. Next, the birth of Christianity evidenced the elevation of individual freedom and choice, in combination with an equally strong commitment to fellow believers and God. A slow decline of this biblically-based individualistic mentality was followed by renewal of individualism in both the secular and religious realms via the Renaissance and Reformation, respectively. These movements opened the way for Enlightenment thinkers. The Scientific Revolution marked the beginnings of modern science and an emphasis on empirical and rational study, exemplified in the philosophy of Descartes (Fisher, 1995; Leahey, 1987). Hobbes (Leahey, 1987; Lindsay, 1932; Lukes, 1973; MacPherson, 1962) and Locke (MacPherson, 1962; Macridis, 1992; Sargent, 1990) applied these theories and methods to human beings as atomistic units possessing inalienable, natural rights. Adam Smith (1976; Macridis, 1992), the Utilitarians (Halévy, 1928; Macridis, 1992), and others, picked up on their predecessors' theories and developed more extreme forms of individualism as applied to economic, political, and social life. All of these theories were most fully integrated in America, where

the intellectual and spiritual soil was fertile and already producing an individualistic

ideology. With both secular and religious manifestations, 19th century America saw

individualism flourish and become the nation's trademark. However, in the 20th

century, many scholars argue that the pitfalls of an unbridled individualism have been

revealed (e.g., alienation, poverty, economic depression, predatory capitalism) and

have led to increased government interventions. Individualism, no longer

significantly tempered by traditional republican and biblical values on a national scale,

manifests itself largely in its expressive and utilitarian forms.

Individualism in Psychological Theory

As noted above in the introduction and historical survey, individualism has

become deeply engrained in modern science. This section will entail a brief review

of the philosophical antecedents of individualism in psychology left by Descartes and

examples of individualism in modern psychological theory.

Cartesian Philosophy

It has been suggested that psychological theory has been constructed on an

individualistic Cartesian foundation (Boring, 1935). Leahey identifies the paradoxical

contribution of Descartes to psychology:

> In his emphases on reason as opposed to perception, on innate ideas as
>
> opposed to experience, on absolute truth as opposed to relativism, he is a
>
> rationalist. However, in his mechanical view of the world and the human
>
> body, his psychology would ultimately support empiricism and behaviorism.
>
> (p. 96)

As Leahey demonstrates, Descartes simultaneously adopted a rationalist and empiricist approach to gaining knowledge. However, Descartes believed that the observation of facts was simply an aid to finding more general truth (Leahey, 1987). Facts were of little value until ordered by the correct method of reasoning. Hence, the rational superceded the empirical. Similarly, he argued that the rational soul (i.e., mind) regulated the mechanically determined emotions and perceptions of the body (Fisher, 1995). In his elevation of mind/reason over body/emotion, Descartes prefigures the romanticist view of the self-contained, self-conscious, and autonomous individual (Burkitt, 1994). In his emphasis of introspection, the impact of the environment on mental processes (including sense of self) was, essentially, disregarded (Jong, 1997). Morever, for Descartes and, later, the romanticists, one's inner being or soul was both connected to God and rooted in nature (Gergen, 1992). Thus, "all that is good in human life, in thought, morality and creativity," (Burkitt, 1994, p. 8) stems from one's inner being. These views would later be echoed in the expressive individualism evident in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Hence, in the concept of the rational soul, Descartes laid a foundation for the self-contained individual and the metaphysical side of individualism in psychology. In the significance given to the empirical study of a mechanical/material world and human body, Descartes furthered the movement in science toward empiricism, behaviorism, and positivism. All of these latter doctrines are linked with an atomistic/individualistic view of the world.

Modern Theorists

The following review of the writings of some of the major theorists in psychology

provides evidence for the ubiquity of individualism in this field.

Freud. Sigmund Freud (Hall, 1954; Wallach & Wallach, 1983) maintained that

all behaviour originates within the person, from biological instincts for life (e.g.,

hunger, thirst, sex) and death (e.g., destructiveness, aggression). The satisfaction of

instinctual drives seated in the id is mediated by the ego. The ego must negotiate

restrictions placed on the id by society (internalized in the superego) and by the

realities of the external world. Instinctual impulses blocked by such constraints often

result in neurotic and/or moral anxiety.

Two individualistic conclusions emerge from Freud's theories. First, as all

behaviour is biologically motivated to satisfy internal needs, there is no fundamental

motivation to relate to other people or to society as a whole except in satisfying one's

own needs. Second, as blocked impulses often result in neurosis, less repression and

more direct satisfaction of internal needs would lead to greater mental health.

Sullivan. Harry Stack Sullivan (Wallach & Wallach, 1983) believed that people

will basically move forward and become healthy. This process is disrupted when

prescriptions are placed on children by parents, in particular, and society, in general.

These prescriptions appear unreasonable to the child and are impossible to carry out

consistently, resulting in anxiety when the prescriptions are transgressed. This

anxiety, the related negative ideas about self, and blocks to self-understanding result

in pathology. The implicit conclusion is that because external prescriptions often lead

to pathology, the individual would develop better without them, as people naturally develop in a positive, healthy direction.

Horney. Similar to Sullivan, Karen Horney (Wallach & Wallach, 1983) believed that people will naturally grow to be constructive, responsible, and positive. Neurosis originates when the person experiences anxiety from poor parenting. As a defense against that anxiety, neurotics form an idealized image of themselves. To attain this idealized image, neurotics impose prohibitions and restraints on themselves, of which they continually fall short. As they strive harder to fulfil these rigid dictates, they become tyrannized by this ideal self and its "shoulds." Horney suggested that people work to dispense with these inner dictates and follow their true wishes and beliefs.

Fromm. Eric Fromm (Wallach & Wallach, 1983) held that people need freedom to realize themselves and grow into their innate potential. A sign of this self-realization occurs when people love themselves. Fromm thought that only if people love themselves will they love others. Thus, maximum self-realization is for the good of all, as people will consequently love others.

Maslow. Abraham Maslow (Hjelle & Ziegler, 1981; Wallach & Wallach, 1983) postulated the existence of a hierarchical arrangement of five biological needs. Starting at the bottom of the hierarchy, there are physical, safety, love, esteem, and self-actualization needs. As the lowest need is satisfied, individuals move up to the next need on the hierarchy and become more healthy. Achievement of self-actualization, the highest need, results in a person who is autonomous and self-determined. Self-actualized individuals ultimately depend on themselves for

satisfaction and the good life, not on other people or extrinsic satisfaction.

Rogers. Carl Rogers (Hjelle & Ziegler, 1981; Wallach & Wallach, 1983)

believed that there was one fundamental motivational force in humans, namely that of

growth or actualization. Individuals know which experiences maintain or actualize

themselves and which do not, and must be free to choose their own experiences.

External values, obligations, and regulations are to be rejected since they may hinder

the self-actualization process.

Conclusion. Common to the prominent psychological theorists just surveyed is the

belief that the person is healthiest or happiest when satisfying his or her own needs.

Relationships with others, or with society as a whole, are ultimately in the service of

meeting one's own needs. Any rules, restrictions, or obligations placed on the person

by others or society are seen as harmful to the person's growth. This expressive

individualism becomes more radical with time across the theorists and is central to

many theories of individual well-being in psychology and psychotherapy.

Critiques of Individualism in Psychology

Although the individualistic ideology underlying psychology is still firmly

entrenched, the views of proponents of postmodernist theory and standpoint

epistemologies appear to be gaining ground. Social scientists have begun to question

the value of the individualistic ideology underlying the social sciences (Hogan, 1975;

Sampson, 1977, 1985, 1988, 1989; Smith, 1990). They argue that it is self-

perpetuating and destructive to both individuals and society (Cushman, 1990; Fowers

& Richardson, 1993; Gergen, 1973b, 1985; Pepitone, 1976; Spence, 1985).

The scientists above view individualism as particularly damaging to those groups in society located near the bottom of the power hierarchy. For example, in feminist psychology literature, the ideal of the individualistic, autonomous, and rational individual has been criticized as reflective of the dominant, male-oriented, scientific paradigm (Gergen, 1995; Kitzinger, 1988). This ideal, it is argued, enables those in power who control important social resources to justify and maintain their positions of dominance (Gergen, 1995; Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1990; Riger, 1992). Consistent with this criticism, research suggests that women score higher than men on measures of collectivism and lower on measures of individualism (Hofstede, 1980). Similar differences have also been reported on related constructs, such as men employing more individualistic forms of moral reasoning than women (Gilligan, 1982).

Feminist literature is not the only area of psychology to critique the ideal of the autonomous, self-actualized individual. Cross-cultural research has revealed the limited geographical scope of such an ideal, with people from eastern societies evidencing predominantly collectivistic traits, such as interdependence, submission, and loyalty (Brislin, 1993; Ho, 1985; Hofstede, 1980; Hui & Triandis, 1986; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989, 1990). Furthermore, individuals of lower socio-economic status have been found to have a more collectivistic orientation (Lykes, 1985). Given the number of segments of the world's population that appear to subscribe to a more collectivistic ideology, psychology's promulgation of the autonomous self appears to be far from universal. Rather, it may simply reflect the perspective of white, middle- to upper-class, Western males, who have dominated

North American and Western European psychology.

Fundamental to traditional individualism is the Cartesian view of the self as individualistic, rational, and autonomous (e.g., Gergen, 1995). Sampson (1977, 1985, 1988, 1989) argues that this self-contained individual of the contemporary Western world is a historically recent phenomena (relatively speaking) originating around the time of the Renaissance. Markus and Kitayama (1991) define two construals of the self, the independent and interdependent selves, which differ in terms of the how the self is perceived in relation to others. Markus and Kitayama indicate that what differentiates these construals of the self constitutes the fundamental distinctions between an individualist and a collectivist. Their definition of the independent self is consistent with Sampson's self-contained individual and the Cartesian view of the self.

In defining the independent self, Markus and Kitayama (1991) borrow from Geertz (1975), who defined it as "a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgment, and action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against a social and natural background" (p. 48). Markus and Kitayama (1991) suggest that the fundamental characteristic of this view is an understanding of the self as an autonomous, independent person. For the independent self, "others, or the social situation in general, are important, but primarily as standards of reflected appraisal, or as sources that can verify and affirm the inner core of the self" (p. 226).

On the other hand, an interdependent self involves a conception of the self as

inextricably intertwined with other human beings (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Social relationships, via what one perceives to be the thoughts, feelings, and actions of significant others, are central in determining one's behavior. For the interdependent self, the role of others in defining oneself is an ongoing, active process. Interdependence assumes a role of primary importance, whereas autonomy and self-expression are relegated to positions of secondary importance. This definition of the interdependent self is descriptive of and, indeed, derived from, people in collectivist cultures.

The postmodernists have advocated an alternative to the Cartesian view of self that is consistent with an "ensembled" (Sampson, 1988, 1989) or interdependent (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) self. The social constructionist movement of postmodernism is based on the premise that human reality is a product of conversation or discourse. The most commonly cited theorists in this field are Harré (1985), Shotter (1992), and Gergen (1985). They argue that there is no single objective reality that can be determined through scientific inquiry. Rather, the self exists in and through discourse within social and historical contexts. Mary Gergen (1995), in discussing a relational self, states:

> The single self disintegrates, one becomes plural, and selves are construed
>
> relationally -- as temporary, partial and flexible emergents created within
>
> diverse social interactions. (p. 366)

The implications of the social constructionist position for psychological research and practice is beyond the scope of this review. Suffice it to say that individualism

has been challenged not only as a healthy approach to life but as the "true"

conceptualization of reality.

Individualism/Collectivism: Operational Definitions

The preceding review of the history of individualism provides only brief glimpses

of all that has been written on this topic. The purpose of the review was to establish

an historical framework on which to build specific hypotheses. Given the diverse

meanings individualism has acquired over the years, it is not surprising that few

researchers have attempted to operationalize the construct and that those who have

made the attempt have often had divergent definitions. In the research literature,

operational definitions of individualism/collectivism have come largely from the field

of cross-cultural psychology. Harry Triandis, at the University of Illinois, is

probably the major contributor in this area. Triandis (1989, 1993) and others

(Markus & Kitayama, 1991) have provided a number of excellent reviews of the

characteristics of individualists and collectivists. These reviews differentiate

individualists and collectivists in terms of social behaviour, attitudes, values, views of

self, cognitions, relationship to in-group and out-group, and so forth. Although

researchers are beginning to recognize that individualism and collectivism are

independent dimensions and, therefore, can coexist within the same culture and

individual (e.g., Rhee, Uelman, & Lee, 1996; Triandis, 1993; Triandis, Bontempo,

Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988; Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990), most measures

of individualism and collectivism conceptualize them as polar ends of a uni-

dimensional spectrum. An exception to the uni-dimensional type of measure has

been provided by Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990; Schwartz, 1990, 1992).

Schwartz and Bilsky's measure, and another measure representative of a uni-

dimensional scale (Hui & Triandis, 1986; Hui, 1988), are discussed below.

Development of the INDCOL Scale

Hui and Triandis (1986) collaborated on a project intended to clarify what they

conceptualized as the individualism-collectivism (I-C) dimension. They developed a

70-item questionnaire based on the possible combinations of 10 target groups or

relationships (i.e., spouse, mother, sibling, relative, friend, coworker, neighbor,

acquaintance, stranger, and foreigner) and seven situations (i.e., consideration of

implications (cost/benefit) of one's own decisions and/or actions for other people;

sharing of material resources; sharing of nonmaterial resources; susceptibility to social

influence; self-presentation and facework; sharing of outcomes; and feeling of

involvement in other's lives). The seven situations were considered by Hui and

Triandis to best sample the different concerns of collectivism. The questionnaire was

then sent to a group of 81 psychologists and anthropologists around the world, each of

whom had either an interest in or experience with topics related to collectivism. Each

respondent was asked to complete the questionnaire twice, once assuming the identity

of a collectivist and once that of an individualist. The following is a sample item:

Suppose the person did something immoral (e.g., stole from someone). Would

he or she worry what the [blank] would think if found out?

1	2	3	4	5
definitely				definitely not

In the place of [blank], the respondent would substitute each of the 10 target groups

and respond accordingly, once as a collectivist and once as an individualist.

Forty-six complete questionnaires were returned and analyzed. Hui and Triandis

(1986) compared the social scientist's individualist and collectivist responses by

matched t-tests on all 70 (i.e., 10 target groups x 7 situations) items. They found

significant differences (p < .025) between "individualist" and "collectivist" responses

to the statements for all 10 target groups across all seven situations. Hui and Triandis

also conducted t-tests on the mean scores averaged both across target groups and

situations. This latter analysis permitted an informal comparison between the various

target groups and situations of their ability to discriminate between the concerns of an

individualist and collectivist. Hui and Triandis noted that the discriminability of the

spouse, stranger, and foreigner target groups (mean t's were 4.83, 5.20, and 3.07,

respectively) was only moderate in comparison to that of the sibling, relative, and

neighbor groups (mean t's were 7.92, 9.62, and 8.71). They took these results as

support for their conceptualization of collectivism as a target-specific construct. The

mean t scores also suggested that some of the seven situations distinguished more

between individualism and collectivism than others, although, again, all seven t scores

were statistically significant. Specifically, the consideration of implications of one's

own decisions for other people and the sharing of material resources yielded the

highest mean t scores (i.e., 8.70 and 8.36, respectively).

Subsequently, Hui (1988) created a new individualism-collectivism (INDCOL)

Scale. An initial pool of 96 items was developed based largely on the various target

groups and situations specified by Hui and Triandis (1986), as well as existing

measures of solidarity and social orientation. The items were intended to assess

collectivistic tendencies in relation to eight specific target groups (i.e., spouse,

parents, kin, neighbors, friends, co-workers, family, and acquaintance). Two

versions (English and Chinese) of the scale were created. One hundred and eight

Chinese university students in Hong Kong and 132 American university students in

Illinois responded to the 96 original items using a six-point (0-5, *strongly*

disagree/false to *strongly agree/true*) format (e.g., "Teenagers should listen to their

parents' advice on dating," "I enjoy meeting and talking to my neighbors everyday").

Item analysis using the pooled data from both samples of students resulted in the

Family and Acquaintance subscales being discarded because of low Cronbach α (.18

and .08, respectively; Hui, 1988). Items from the other subscales were excluded if to

do so raised the subscale's reliability. The final version of the INDCOL Scale

consists of 63 items constituting six subscales: Spouse, Parent, Kin, Neighbor,

Friend, and Co-worker (see Appendix A).

Hui (1988) computed split-half reliability coefficients on the pooled sample and

the Cronbach α on a different sample of 205 Chinese university students. Split-half

reliability coefficients ranged from .38 (Spouse) to .76 (Kin) on the six subscales and

the Cronbach α coefficients ranged from .41 (Spouse) to .68 (Kin).

To assess test-retest reliability, Hui (1988) administered the INDCOL Scale two

weeks later to 45 of the American students from the first session, using a five-point

response format instead of the original six-point format. Test-retest reliability

coefficients ranged from .62 to .79 on the six subscales. Although Hui suggests that, given the changes, the test-retest reliability coefficients can be considered conservative estimates, it would have been more appropriate to assess test-retest reliability using the same scale.

Hui (1988) then describes a series of studies conducted to test the INDCOL Scales' validity. Before examining these studies, however, it is important to note that individualism is poorly defined by Hui. Although he briefly summarizes Waterman's (1984) understanding of individualism, Hui (1988) fails to incorporate, or at least address, Waterman's (1981, 1984) argument that individualism promotes interdependence and concern for others. Rather, the definition of individualism is left more to default, that being the opposite of collectivism. In this regard, Hui (1988) describes collectivism as a "syndrome" that includes "actions related to interpersonal concern" (p. 19), the implication being that individualism is a syndrome that is void of such concern. Hence, any response indicative of interpersonal concern is automatically interpreted as a manifestation of a collectivist orientation, an assumption which would be challenged by many theorists, including Waterman (1981, 1984). This definitional problem has implications for all of the validity studies that Hui reports.

Study 1. In the first study, Hui (1988) asked 60 social scientists in various parts of the world with interest in, and experience with, the constructs of individualism and collectivism to complete the scale, 41 of whom responded. Those working in individualist cultures were to assume an individualist role whereas those from

collectivist cultures were to respond as collectivists. Hui did not specify how cultures were classified as individualist versus collectivist, although it appears to have been based on the judgment of the participating social scientists. The results indicated that all but 5 of the 63 items discriminated between individualists and collectivists. Furthermore, Hui reports that the scale was acceptable to researchers in different cultures and that the items did not appear biased. Again, Hui does not indicate how "acceptability" was determined.

Nevertheless, the meaningfulness of the above results are questionable for the reasons previously given in regard to the Hui and Triandis (1986) study. That is, if the "experts" were assuming an ideal role based on current theory, these findings may simply indicate that the responding researchers have all adopted a common perspective. This is made more likely by the fact that 48 of the 60 social scientists asked to participate were involved in the previous study by Hui and Triandis (1986), the results of which were used to develop the INDCOL Scale. It would seem more valuable to have had the questionnaire completed by groups of individuals from cultures commonly identified as collectivist or individualist.

Study 2. In the second validation study conducted by Hui (1988), both the INDCOL Scale and the Social Interest Scale (SIS; Crandall, 1975) were administered to 50 Hong Kong and 121 American University students to assess convergent validity. In developing the SIS, Crandall (1975) attempted to capture in a standardized measure what has been recognized as the most distinctive concept of Adler's (Ansbacher, 1968) theorizing, that being social interest. Item selection for the SIS entailed having

a panel of eight psychology faculty members and graduate students rate 90 desirable

personality trait words on a 7-point scale ranging from "no direct implications for

social feeling or behavior" to "strong implications for social feeling or behavior."

The 90 words had been selected from a list which provides mean ratings of general

desirability for each trait. Forty-eight pairs of trait words were formed on the basis

of the panel members' ratings (some words were repeated but never with the same

partner). Each pair of words was equated for general desirability (e.g., trustworthy

vs. wise) while maximizing the difference with respect to relevance to social interest.

Item analysis resulted in the selection of 15 word pairs. For each of the 24 pairs of

personality trait words, the SIS requires respondents to choose the trait word they

would most want to characterize themselves. The scale includes nine buffer items not

related to social interest. A high SIS score is interpreted to mean a high level of

social interest.

Crandall (1975) administered the SIS to three groups of adults and high school age

students (n = 176). He obtained a Spearman-Brown split-half reliability coefficient

of .77. Test-retest reliability over a five week period involving 37 university students

produced a correlation coefficient of .82. Crandall (1975) also provides evidence

from several studies attesting to the validity of the SIS.

Hui (1988) assumed that people who are high in social interest value interpersonal

virtues more than individual virtues. Hence, people with high scores on the SIS

should also have relatively high scores on the INDCOL Scale.

Hui (1988) reports that American "collectivists," as defined by a general index on

the INDCOL Scale, valued the traits of *sympathetic* and *generous* more than

individualistic on the SIS, thus lending support to his hypothesis. In addition, high

collectivism was positively associated with high social interest for the American

students. In contrast, only high collectivism as measured by the "Parent" and "Co-

worker" subscales was positively associated with high social interest for the Chinese

students. Although Hui refrains from commenting on this apparent cultural

difference, these results support the generalization that collectivist (i.e., Chinese) and

individualist (i.e., American) cultures differ in terms of what motivates interpersonal

values. That is, for Americans, interpersonal values may stem primarily from

concern for people (i.e., "social interest") whereas, for Chinese, it may originate

primarily from duty (e.g., Wei-Ming, 1985).

Study 3. In the third validation study, Hui (1988) hypothesized that need for

approval would be positively correlated with INDCOL Scale scores (i.e., collectivism)

among Chinese but negatively among Americans. Hui based this hypothesis on the

understanding that Chinese place greater value on interpersonal harmony than

Americans, who value independence much more highly, and that this difference

should be reflected in their need for approval. This hypothesis is very interesting, as

it seems to run counter to the rest of Hui's theorizing. That is, in making this

hypothesis, Hui seems to recognize that different forces may be motivating Chinese

and American interpersonal concern.

To test his hypothesis, Hui (1988) chose 30 items from a social desirability scale

to represent need for approval. The INDCOL Scale and the measure of social

desirability were administered to 108 Chinese and 132 American university students.

Hui obtained partial support, in that high collectivism was positively associated with

high social desirability among the Chinese. However, among the Americans,

collectivism did not correlate with social desirability, a finding which Hui attributes to

the pluralistic value system in the United States.

Schwartz and Bilsky's Viewpoint

Shalom Schwartz (1990; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987) has raised some insightful

concerns regarding the conceptualization of the I-C dichotomy posited by Hui and

Triandis[4] (1986; Hui, 1988) and, by association, others as well (e.g., Markus &

Kitayama, 1991; Sampson, 1988). Schwartz (1990) contends that their dichotomy,

although useful for "broad-brush analyses" at the cultural and individual levels, fails

to make important distinctions between types of individualism and types of

collectivism. He states that "the [I-C] dichotomy revolves around the presumed

conflict between personal interests and ingroup interests" (p. 140), a presumption

which, Schwartz argues, is inadequate for three reasons: (a) the I-C dichotomy fails to

account for the fact that some values serve both personal and ingroup interests (e.g.,

wisdom); (b) it overlooks values that serve goals that are collective but that are not

specifically those of the ingroup (e.g., equality for all); and (c) it implies that

"individualist and collectivist values form two coherent syndromes that are in polar

---

[4]It is important to note that in other research, Triandis and colleagues have identified
orthogonal relationships between individualism-collectivism (e.g., Triandis,
Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988; Gelfand, Triandis, & Chan, 1996).

opposition" (p. 141).

Schwartz and Bilsky (Schwartz, 1990; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; 1990) have

offered an alternate conception of individualism and collectivism. Schwartz (1990)

argues that past definitions of individualist and collectivist societies, including those of

Hui and Triandis (1986; Hui, 1988), have mixed ideological (values) and social

structural elements. Not only has this made value predictions about these societal

types partly tautological, but it has unnecessarily restricted particular values to these

types. Instead, Schwartz (1990) has defined ideal-type collectivist and individualist

societies only in terms of social structural characteristics. Hence, "collectivist ...

societies are characterized by extended primary groups (kinship, neighborhood, and

work groups) in which people have diffuse mutual obligations and expectations based

largely on their enduring ascribed statuses" (p. 152). In contrast, "individualist ...

societies are characterized by narrow primary groups (nuclear families) and by

secondary social relations in which people develop specific obligations and

expectations largely through negotiation in the process of achieving and modifying

statuses" (p. 152). Schwartz suggests that these ideal types constitute the poles of a

continuum along which societies can be classified.

Schwartz and Bilsky (1987; 1990; Schwartz, 1990) have postulated the existence

of universal human values which are related, but not rigidly fixed, to the

aforementioned social structural continuum. Schwartz (1992) defines values as (a)

concepts or beliefs, (b) that pertain to desirable end states or behaviours, (c) transcend

specific situations, (d) guide selection or evaluation of behaviour and events, and (e)

are ordered by relative importance. In addition to these five points, Schwartz and

Bilsky (1987; 1990) suggest that the primary content aspect of a value is the type of

goal that it expresses. They argue that values ultimately represent three universal

requirements of human existence: "needs of individuals as biological organisms,

requisites of coordinated social interaction, and survival and welfare needs of groups"

(Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990, p. 878). All individuals and societies must be responsive

to these needs. Through cognitive development and socialization processes, needs

come to be represented consciously as goals or values and are communicated within

cultures. For example, Schwartz and Bilsky suggest that sexual needs may be

transformed into values for intimacy or love.

Upon this theoretical foundation, Schwartz and Bilsky (Schwartz, 1990; Schwartz

& Bilsky, 1987; 1990) proposed a dynamic structure of universal value types,

differentiated at one level by the underlying interests served ("Individual",

Collective", and "Mixed") and at another level by the motivational concerns

represented. They identified seven motivational domains representative of the three

underlying interests. The motivational domains were derived from a review of

literature on needs, social motives, institutional demands, and functional requirements

of social groups (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). Each motivational domain is represented

by a list of values. The values used to represent the different motivational domains

were taken from the 36-item Rokeach Value Survey (Rokeach, 1973) because of its

wide use in the literature (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987).

Individual interests were represented by three motivational domains: *enjoyment*,

achievement, *self-direction*. The *enjoyment* domain reflects an individual's desire for pleasure or sensuous gratification. It is theorized that every organism must satisfy its physical needs and derives pleasure from doing so. The representative values are a comfortable life, pleasure, cheerful, and happiness. The *achievement* domain pertains to the basic need "to develop and use skills to obtain from the physical and social environment those resources required to thrive" (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, p. 552). Schwartz and Bilsky (1990) have defined the goal of the achievement domain as personal success through demonstrated competence. The representative values are social recognition, an exciting life, ambitious, and capable. *Self-direction* refers to independent thought and action (i.e., choosing, creating, exploring). Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) argue that humans have an intrinsic desire to explore and understand reality and to experience themselves as independent and effective. They suggest six values as representative of this domain: a sense of accomplishment, independent, imaginative, intellectual, logical, and broadminded.

Collective interests were represented by three motivational domains: *prosocial*, *restrictive conformity*, and *security*. The *prosocial* domain entails the active concern for the welfare of others, so crucial to the health of collectivities. The values representing this domain are equality, a world at peace, salvation, true friendship, forgiving, helpful, loving, and honest. *Restrictive conformity* refers to the restraint of impulses and inhibition of actions that might hurt others' interests. Such self-restriction is necessary to the smooth functioning of groups and to positive social interaction. Representative values from the Rokeach lists are obedient, clean,

politeness, and self-discipline. The *security* domain concerns the basic need of an

organism "to survive physically and to avoid threats to its integrity" (Schwartz &

Bilsky, 1987, p. 552). This domain includes concern for the safety, harmony, and

stability of society, of those with whom one identifies, and of the self. Although

Schwartz and Bilsky acknowledge that individual and group security may reflect

separate, though related, motivational domains, they created a single domain because

of the lack of discrimination provided by the Rokeach values. The representative

values are family security, national security, freedom, inner harmony, and

responsible.

The interests of both the collective and the individual (i.e., mixed) are considered

to be served by the *maturity* domain. Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) argue that "there

are some goals that people reach only through experiencing and coming to terms with

life, by learning to understand, to make peace with, and to appreciate the social and

physical reality as it is -- that is, by becoming mature" (p. 553). The mature

individual is said to have an appreciation, understanding, and acceptance of oneself,

of others, and of the surrounding world. Schwartz and Bilsky liken the values

represented in this domain to Maslow's (1970) definition of the self-actualized person.

The Rokeach values are world of beauty, wisdom, mature love, self-respect, and

courageous.

Having established the motivational domains on the above theoretical grounds,

Schwartz and Bilsky (1987; 1990; Schwartz, 1990) then had participants from various

countries rate the importance of the values as guiding principles in their lives.

Empirical support for their structural model was garnered by analyzing the Pearson

correlations between the importance ratings of the values using the Guttman-Lingoes

Smallest Space Analysis (SSA; see Guttman, 1968). The SSA is a multidimensional

scaling technique for structural analysis of similarity data. This technique represented

the values as points in two-dimensional space, such that the distances between the

points reflected the empirical relations among values as measured by correlations

between their importance ratings. In theory, the greater the conceptual similarity

between values, the more related they should be empirically and, therefore, the closer

their locations should be in the two-dimensional space. The SSA was interpreted using

a "configurational verification" (Schwartz, 1992, p. 21) approach in which the

geometric space was partitioned into wedges containing the values represented by the

seven motivational domains (see Figure 1).

As can be seen from Figure 1, the motivational domains occupy different wedges

of the field of values. Schwartz and Bilsky (1987; 1990) employed the SSA technique

with groups of participants from seven countries and obtained essentially equivalent

results in all samples, including a sample from the United States (see Figure 2). They

found that the same Rokeach values that were theorized to constitute the seven

motivational domains did, indeed, group together. Moreover, the same basic

motivational domain pattern or ordering was produced for the samples from all seven

countries. That is, the three individualist and three collectivist motivational domains

typically occupied adjacent wedges, with the common *maturity* domain occupying a

space either disecting or adjacent to the *self-direction* and/or *prosocial* domains.

Figure 1

Value Map Derived From Sample of German Students

A sample map of the value projections, generated by Smallest Space Analyses, relevant to the motivational domains facet from a sample of 331 German students (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). The geometric space has been partitioned into wedges containing the values represented by the seven motivational domains.

Figure 2 - Motivational Domain Diagrams

The diagrams that follow are graphical representations of the motivational domains of samples of people from seven different countries. Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990) generated these diagrams by Smallest Space Analyses (SSA) of the participants' ratings of the importance of the 36 Rokeach values as guiding principles in a person's life. The diagrams produced for the Israeli and German samples have labels denoting the interests served (i.e., Mixed, Collective, Individual) by the domains.

Notwithstanding the groupings of individualist and collectivist domains, the SSA

representation entails a circular order of motivational domains. Hence, in some

cases, a collectivist motivational domain may be as close or closer to an individualist

motivational domain than another collectivist domain. Schwartz has elaborated on the

theoretical conflicts and compatibilities between the various motivational domains

(Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990; Schwartz, 1992). In general, however, Schwartz and

Bilsky (1990) have offered the following rough criteria for determining the

compatibility/conflict of motivational domains: If motivational domains are separated

by more than one other domain on the SSA diagram, they are in conflict; if separated

by only one domain, the compatibility is indeterminate; and if adjacent, they are

compatible. They argue that the compatibility between two domains will determine

the extent to which their respective values will be correlated based on importance

ratings.

Citing a number of related studies and re-analyzing some of the available raw

data, Schwartz (1990) found support for the theory that the motivational domains

within a particular interest category (i.e., Individual, Collective) do not always vary

together, nor are domains in different interest categories always opposed. For

example, Schwartz utilized data provided by Rokeach (1973) on the value rankings of

American priests and gasoline service station dealers. Rokeach found that the service

station dealers gave higher priority to individualistic values than the priests. Schwartz

(1990) argues that this finding "conforms with the image of the priesthood as an

occupation that forgoes selfish concerns and of service station owners as

individualistic entrepeneurs" (p. 145). Schwartz's re-analysis, however, revealed finer distinctions between groups which are hidden by the traditional individualism-collectivism dichotomy. He noted that priests ranked the values representative of *self-direction* as more important than did service station dealers. Hence, priests considered independent thought, choice, action, and creativity more important to their lives than did service station dealers. In contrast, the service station dealers ranked *enjoyment* and *achievement* as more important than did the priests, reflecting their greater self-serving orientations. Schwartz offers these and other results as supporting the need for finer discriminations than those provided by an individualism-collectivism dichotomy.

Individualism/Collectivism and Well-being

The debate over the relationship between individualism and well-being has intensified in recent years as individualism has come under the attack of postmodernist thought and, more generally, those discontented with the perceived selfishness of late 20th century individuals. Nonetheless, there still exist strong advocates of individualism. This section entails a review of the theoretical and empirical relationships between individualism/collectivism and well-being. This will be followed by an examination of possible mediators of this relationship and other related variables.

Theoretical Relationship

Much has been said about the theoretical relationship between individualism and well-being. As already noted, social scientists are divided as to whether the

relationship is positive or negative. The following review will consider theory supporting both a negative and positive relationship between individualism and well-being. Consideration will then be given to the possible benefits of a balance between individualism and collectivism.

A negative relationship between individualism and well-being. Numerous social scientists, in addition to postmodernists, have commented on the deleterious effects of individualism in the western world (Bellah et al., 1985; Bonta, 1997; Lasch, 1978; Nagayama-Hall & Barongan, 1997; Spence, 1985, 1989; Wallach & Wallach, 1983). These effects include decreases in tradition, community, family values, interpersonal commitment, morals, and social support on the one hand; and increases in violence, aggression, and the pursuit of narrow self-interests on the other. Spence (1989) argues that:

> Freedom and autonomy ... leave us vulnerable to feelings of alienation and
>
> narcissistic self-absorption; they tempt us to pursue narrow self-interests that
>
> are destructive to the larger society in the long run and often to ourselves,
>
> even in the short run. (p. 151)

Alienation has been linked with various psychological and emotional problems, such as depression, anomie, anxiety, and stress-related difficulties. Indirect empirical evidence for such a relationship derives from the critical importance of adequate social support to people's mental health (Barlow, 1988; Cohen & Wills, 1985; Essock-Vitale & Fairbanks, 1979; Holahan & Moos, 1987; Wills, 1991).

Similarly, Heimann (1961) notes that, if freedom to choose is considered the

ultimate freedom, along with the right to strive for personal "improvement," then

commitment in relationships is fragile at best because either party may decide that it

is time to look for something more rewarding. Bellah et al. (1985) add:

> The [individualistic] therapeutic self ... is defined by its own wants and
>
> satisfactions, coordinated by cost-benefit calculation. Its social virtues are
>
> largely limited to empathic communication, truth-telling, and equitable
>
> negotiation. (p. 127)

They suggest that relational behavior is no longer guided by morals but rather by a

negotiable contract. Bellah et al. (1985) echo Heimann's views, stating that "a purely

contractual ethic leaves every commitment unstable" (p. 130). If, indeed,

commitments are unstable in North America because of the underlying individualistic

ideology, the effects could be far-reaching. For example, the instability of the family

is having devastating effects upon the psychological well-being of children of the late

20th century (Whitehead, 1993).

Baumeister (1991) has also described how the ideology of individualism, with its

emphasis on the self, produces in people a perceived need to meet extremely high

standards. That is, with the focus on independence, achievement, self-determination,

self-actualization, and so on, a sense of inadequacy is easily fostered. This burden

drives people to various forms of escape from the self, such as suicide, masochism,

alcoholism, and binge eating. Baumeister supports his argument by indicating that

many of these disorders are found most often in individualistic cultures.

In individualism's defence. In recent years, several psychologists have responded

to the growing critique of individualism with arguments in its defence. Waterman (1981) acknowledges that a purely self-centered individualism can lead to destructive ends, but he argues that critics of individualism base their arguments on faulty grounds. He outlines the typical critique of individualism by citing three allegedly negative developments, namely that individualism leads to unscrupulous competition, self-imposed isolation, and alienation from society and oneself. Waterman then argues on both philosophical and empirical grounds that individualism, as advocated by a majority of well-known 20th century psychologists, is antithetical to these developments. He holds that theorists such as Maslow, Erikson, Rotter, and Kohlberg based their views on what he refers to as the "philosophical framework of *normative (ethical) individualism*" (p. 764, italics in original). Waterman states that the defining features of normative (ethical) individualism are "eudaimonism" (i.e., attempt to 'know' yourself and live accordingly), freedom of choice, personal responsibility, and universality involving respect for the integrity of others.

Waterman (1981, 1984) provides research evidence linking certain individualistic traits (i.e., identity, self-actualization, internal locus of control, self-esteem, and principled moral reasoning) with productive social functioning. This research, he believes, provides compelling evidence in support of "the socially adaptive advantages of individualism" (p. 771). Waterman's main point is that normative individualism is not based on purely self-serving motives. Rather, he states that the "implementation of normative individualism entails the pursuit of personal goals (self-interest) through self-chosen, prosocial interdependencies reflecting a sensitivity to the needs and values

of others" (Waterman, 1981, p. 764).

Whereas Waterman (1981) argues from the position of an expressive individualist, Perloff (1987) "unapologetically" argues from a utilitarian perspective that self-interest can explain all human behavior, including that which is prosocial. He implies that self-interest often motivates helping behavior because such behavior enhances one's sense of well-being. Moreover, unintended public good often results from behavior motivated purely out of self-interest (e.g., merchants reducing prices to maintain sales). Perloff provides evidence for his claims from evolutionary biology, economics, and psychology. Although he recognizes that the self-interest model of human behavior may not be perfect, he contends that it is the best model available.

Underlying all arguments supportive of utilitarian and expressive individualism is one of two basic assumptions. The first is the strictly utilitarian argument evidenced by Perloff (1987) that self-interest ultimately leads to the good of others. The second assumption is the argument evidenced by Waterman (1981) that humanity is essentially good and that a self-actualized person will behave in socially beneficial ways. Whether or not these assumptions are entirely valid, the evidence discussed thus far supports the position that an individualism that combines prosocial concern with self-interest has, in the past, contributed to both individual and societal well-being.

Striking a "balance". Some social commentators have argued that, whereas biblical and republican traditions once tempered individualistic strivings via commitment to community values, contemporary North America has witnessed a shift

toward an unmitigated or untempered individualism (Bellah et al., 1985; Tocqueville, 1900). In response to this perceived negative trend, some psychologists have suggested that psychology is in a strong position to promote social welfare (e.g., Heller, 1989; Jason, 1991; Prilleltensky, 1990; 1997) and to fill the void left by weakened religious beliefs and republican values (Smith, 1990, 1997). In essence, these and other social commentators are saying that individualism can contribute to individual and societal well-being but only when "balanced" by collectivist values.

The relationship between individualism and collectivism, as well as related conceptual pairs, has often been described in dialectical terms. In the 20th century, this dialectic is probably best represented by Bakan's (1966) distinction between agency and communion. Agency and communion were terms developed by Bakan to characterize two fundamental modalities of human existence. Agency concerns the existence of an organism as an individual and emphasizes the forming of separations. It is exemplified by qualities such as self-protection, self-assertion, and self-expansion. Communion concerns the participation of the individual in some larger group of which the individual is a part and emphasizes the creation of unions. Communion includes group participation, cooperation, attachment and connections. Bakan (1966) states that "The moral imperative is to try to mitigate agency with communion" (p. 14). The implication is that agency, with its focus on the self and forming separations, if left unrestrained, is ultimately destructive to self and others. The "moral imperative," then, is to temper agency with the unifying force of communion.

McAdams, Hoffman, Mansfield, and Day (1996) state that the idea that "human lives are animated by two broad and contrasting tendencies," exemplified by Bakan's concepts of agency and communion, dates back at least two millennia. They refer to Empedocles' (490-430 B.C.) distinction between strife and love, which he identified as forces of separation and union accounting for all motion and change in the universe. In more recent times, others have also subscribed to a similar dichotomy. For example, Freud distinguished between the death and life instincts (Hall, 1954) and Adler (1927) between superiority and social interest. Adler argued that evolution pointed toward a world of socially interested individuals who would live lives of both freedom and commitment (Richardson & Guignon, 1988). Ansbacher (1968), based on a "logical analysis" of Adler's theory of social interest, argues that healthy people are autonomous but that they always channel their energies, independent though they may be, to the ultimate good of society. Ansbacher identifies similarities between Maslow's self-actualizing, growth-motivated individual and Adler's socially interested individual. Among other things, he suggests that both have a healthy self-image, independence of opinion of others, and a concern for humanity. Ansbacher states that the "mentally healthy person cooperates for a better future for all and in doing so gains the independence and courage to fight present evils, be they ever so widespread, rather than conforming to them" (p. 42).

Campbell (1975) argued similar views from an evolutionary standpoint. He suggested that biological evolution promotes individualism/selfishness and that social evolution promotes self-sacrificial altruism. He further commented that psychology

seems to lift up biological evolution as "right" to the neglect of the "well-winnowed wisdom" of social evolution. Nevertheless, Campbell states that "without egoism sufficient to support individual health and vigor, contributions to group welfare are impossible" (pp. 1117-1118).

Echoing many of Campbell's (1975) views nearly two decades later, Guisinger and Blatt (1994) also argue from an evolutionary standpoint that self-development and interpersonal relatedness interact in a dialectical fashion. They suggest that both are aspects of a healthy maturation process in which higher levels of self-development permit higher levels of interpersonal relatedness and vice-versa. They state that:

> An increasingly differentiated, integrated, and mature sense of self is
>
> contingent on establishing satisfying interpersonal relationships; conversely, the
>
> development of mature relationships is contingent on the development of
>
> mature self-identity. These two developmental processes evolve in an
>
> interactive, reciprocally balanced, mutually facilitating fashion from birth
>
> through senescence. (p. 108)

Guisinger and Blatt use Erikson's (1950) life stages to support their argument. They suggest that the development of individuality and relatedness are relatively independent until mid- to late-adolescence. At this point, these developmental lines become synthesized in a dialectic relationship in the formation of what Erikson has called an identity. Guisinger and Blatt argue that, even after this temporary synthesis, the dialectical tension between individuality and relatedness continues through the intimacy and generativity stages of life until they are reintegrated in mature adulthood

(i.e., ego integrity stage).

> Thus, intimacy and generativity -- the capacities to form a mutual relationship
>
> with another, to participate in society, and to be dedicated to one's own self-
>
> interest and expression -- emerge out of the integration and consolidation of
>
> individuality and relatedness in the development of a self-identity and continue
>
> through midlife and beyond. (pp. 108-109)

Guisinger and Blatt conclude that the development of healthy individuals and societies

involves the equal and complementary emphasis on individuality and relatedness.

Cross-cultural psychologists have also argued that neither individualism nor

collectivism are desirable in the extreme (e.g., Triandis, 1993). Not only have they

pointed out the dangers of the self-interest of individualism but also the potential in-

group prejudice of collectivists. They suggest that a collectivist's conceptualization of

himself or herself as interdependent with others sometimes extends only as far as the

boundaries of the ingroup. Markus and Kitayama (1991) highlight the distinction

made between the ingroup and outgroup for interdependent selves. The ingroup

consists of those individuals with whom one shares a common fate (e.g., family

members, co-workers), whereas outgroup members are not part of that membership.

Beyond ingroup members, collectivists sometimes show relative indifference to the

needs of others (Hsu, 1985; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Schwartz, 1992; Triandis,

1990; Triandis, McCusker & Hui, 1990). In contrast, individualists tend to make less

of a distinction between ingroups and outgroups in this respect (Triandis, 1990;

Triandis, McCusker & Hui, 1990).

The above views reveal that, although they may have different bases for their

claims, social scientists from diverse theoretical backgrounds seem to agree that a

balance between individual and social concern is needed for individual and societal

well-being (also see Caporael & Brewer, 1990; Dreikurs, 1991; Ho, 1985;

Kâgitçibaşi, 1990; McCreary & Korabik, 1994; Prilleltensky, 1997; Roberts &

Helson, 1997; Saragovi, Koestner, Di Dio, & Aubé, 1997; Sicher, 1991; Smith,

1990; Spence, 1985).

Empirical Relationship

As already noted, very little empirical research has been conducted on the

relationship between individualism and well-being. At the cultural level,

individualism has been found to be associated with high crime, suicide, divorce, child

abuse, emotional stress, and physical and mental illness rates (Cobb, 1976; Naroll,

1983). In contrast, Diener, Diener, and Diener (1995) have reported that subjective

well-being is positively correlated with individualism at the cultural level. They

conducted a correlational analysis utilizing data from a number of national surveys in

which the subjective well-being (SWB) of 55 nations was reported. Diener et al.

extracted a number of measures of SWB by standardizing ratings of happiness,

satisfaction with life, and so forth. The nations were rated for individualism-

collectivism using three different measures: (a) scores reported by Hofstede (1991) for

43 of the nations examined, (b) ratings provided by Harry Triandis, who is considered

a leading expert in the area of individualism and collectivism, and (c) the divorce

rate, a measure which Diener et al. (1995) believe reflects, and generates,

individualistic values. Diener et al. found individualism to be the one predictor that consistently correlated with the subjective well-being (SWB) of nations when other predictors (e.g., income, social equality) were controlled. Triandis, Leung, Villareal, and Clack (1985) are among the few researchers to have directly examined the relationship between individualism and well-being at an individual level. They proposed that the terms collectivism-individualism be used for analyses at the cultural level and allocentrism-idiocentrism for analyses at the individual level.

Triandis et al. (1985) conducted a series of studies to differentiate between allocentrism and idiocentrism. In one study, they had 159 undergraduates complete several questionnaires that included multiple measures. Of particular relevance to this discussion were the INDCOL Scale (Hui, 1988; discussed above) and measures of anomie (Srole, 1956; see below) and alienation (Middleton, 1963). They found that greater idiocentrism, as measured by the INDCOL Scale (i.e., lower scores), was positively associated with greater anomie (r = -.35, p < .001) and alienation (r = -.27, p = .01).

In a second study, 67 of the original 159 participants from the above study completed another questionnaire that included the INDCOL Scale, the Social Support Questionnaire (SSQ; Sarason, Levine, Basham, & Sarason, 1983), and a 60-item measure of loneliness (Schmidt & Sermat, 1983). It was found that greater idiocentrism, as measured by the INDCOL Scale (i.e., lower scores), was positively associated with greater loneliness (r = -.34, p < .06). Also, greater allocentrism (i.e., higher INDCOL Scale scores) was positively associated with perceived quality

of social support received ($\underline{r}$ = .38, $\underline{p}$ < .04).

Sahoo and Mohanty (1987) have empirically examined the relationship between individualism and well-being in India. They looked at the relationship between individualism-collectivism and personal discomfort. A random sampling of 100 urban-living adults, 50 men and 50 women, ranging in age from 27 to 37 years, completed a content-free measure of individualism-collectivism. Participants were asked to list five decision-making areas (e.g., "getting married") and five individuals/groups (e.g., father, literary club) considered to be "most important." This procedure generated a 5 x 5 matrix, with each of the 25 intersections representing an important decision-making area and an important individual/group. Participants were then asked to decide for each intersection if the decision-making area it represented was "linked" with the individual/group it described (i.e., whether or not the participant would include the individual/group in the decision making process). Possible responses included linked, not linked, or uncertain. The number of linkages was considered the extent to which the individual was immersed in his in-group, hence, the degree of collectivism. Conversely, the absence of linkages was considered the extent to which the individual was free from the influence of in-groups, hence, the degree of individualism. Participants also completed a 63-item Personal Discomfort Questionnaire (PDQ) that assessed self-reported state of physical, mental, and overall discomfort.

Sahoo and Mahonty (1987) found a clear gender effect. For men, higher individualism was positively associated with lower mental discomfort. For women,

higher collectivism was positively associated with lower mental discomfort. Sahoo

and Mahonty suggest that these findings reflect the consonance between masculinity

and individualism, and between femininity and collectivism. These findings must be

viewed cautiously, however, as the measure used for assessing individualism-

collectivism has not been tested for reliability or validity, and is limited in scope.

Moreover, the existence of potential cultural differences precludes generalizing the

results to North America.

Related research. Other than the above studies, investigators have not directly

examined individualism's relationship to well-being at the individual level. However,

a number of researchers have examined relationships between constructs associated

with individualism/collectivism and measures of subjective well-being and

psychological distress.

Kasser and Ryan (1993) studied the relationship between respondents' aspirations

and subjective well-being/distress. Four "life domains" were assessed: Self-

acceptance, affiliation, community feeling, and financial success. Each domain

consisted of four to six aspiration items (e.g., "You will know and accept who you

really are" -- self-acceptance; "You will be financially successful" -- financial

success). Each item was rated for personal importance (1 = "not at all" to 5 =

"very important") and for the chances of attaining them in the future (1 = "very low"

to 5 = "very high"). Scores for the aspiration domains were calculated by averaging

the item ratings on a particular dimension (i.e., importance or chances). Relevant to

the current study, Kasser and Ryan likened their self-acceptance domain with

Schwartz and Bilsky's (1987, 1990; Schwartz, 1990) domains of *self-direction* and

maturity. Similarly, community feeling was likened to Schwartz and Bilsky's

prosocial domain. In contrast, although Kasser and Ryan (1993) did not make such a

connection, the aspiration for financial success could, in theory, be linked with the

achievement/security domains.

Kasser and Ryan (1993) conducted analyses to assess the relationship between

aspirations and subjective well-being/distress. The results of the study indicated that

individuals who held financial success as a more central aspiration than self-

acceptance, affiliation, or community feeling, reported less self-actualization, less

vitality, more depression, and more anxiety.

Helgeson (1994) has recently provided an excellent review of the relationship of

well-being with agency and communion (Bakan, 1966), constructs closely related to

individualism and collectivism, respectively. Helgeson summarizes a large body of

research that supports her contention that both agency and communion are required

for optimal well-being and that, when one exists to the exclusion of the other (i.e.,

unmitigated agency or unmitigated communion), negative health outcomes occur. For

the purposes of her review, and consistent with Bakan's theorizing, Helgeson (1994)

equates agency and communion with the personality measures of masculinity and

femininity, respectively.

Helgeson's (1994) review suggests that the beneficial effects of agency and

communion on well-being are distinct. That is, agency is linked with mental health,

whereas communion is linked with relationship satisfaction. Agency has been related

to reduced depression and anxiety, enhanced self-esteem, and fewer health complaints. In contrast, the relationship between communion and psychological well-being is small (positive direction) to nonexistent. However, with respect to interpersonal relations, communion has been linked with social self-esteem, sociability-congeniality, marital satisfaction, and social support. Furthermore, communion is associated with help-seeking behaviour (a health correlate) and decreased drug and alcohol use.

Helgeson (1994) also reviews research which suggests that unmitigated agency and unmitigated communion are negatively related to well-being. She defines unmitigated agency as a focus on self to the exclusion of others and unmitigated communion as a focus on others to the exclusion of the self. Helgeson argues that the extreme of one orientation precludes the existence of the other. In the research she reviews, unmitigated agency and unmitigated communion are operationalized using items from the Extended version of the Personal Attributes Questionnaire (EPAQ; Spence, Helmreich, & Holahan, 1979), as well as through an open-ended interview assessment (Stewart & Salt, 1981). Helgeson (1994) provides evidence that unmitigated agency is associated with decreased mental health, Type A behaviour (linked with heart disease), increased drug and alcohol use, and increased aggression and delinquency. Unmitigated communion is less clearly related to well-being, but she speculates that it is associated with poorer interpersonal relationships (e.g., patterns of dependency, subjugation).

Helgeson (1994) then offers three potential mechanisms to explain the process by

which unmitigated agency and unmitigated communion affect health. First, she argues that unmitigated agency is manifest in an exaggerated need for control over achievement, whereas unmitigated communion is linked with a need for control over relationships (i.e., via the creation of dependency in others). Helgeson suggests that a second mechanism by which unmitigated agency and unmitigated communion may be related to negative consequences relates to social support. That is, unmitigated agency yields stressful interactions and unmitigated communion involves supporting others at the expense of self. A third mechanism concerns health behaviour. Helgeson reviews research that links unmitigated agency with unwillingness to seek help and failure to comply with physician's instructions. In contrast, unmitigated communion may be related to poor health care due to lack of self-focus. That is, such people may become so involved with others and their problems that they fail to notice or attend to their own symptoms.

Mediator Variables

Just as Helgeson (1994) argued for mechanisms connecting unmitigated agency and unmitigated communion with physical and mental health outcomes, there are likely mediating variables involved in the relationship between individualism/collectivism and subjective well-being. Although not part of the formal hypotheses, consideration was given in the present study to the mediational roles of social support and coping, variables commonly linked with subjective well-being in the literature.

Social support. Indirect support for a negative relationship between individualism

and well-being has been provided through studies on the impact of social support.

Low levels of social support, often considered a by-product of modern individualism

(Bellah et al., 1985), have been linked with vulnerability to mental illness (Essock-

Vitale & Fairbanks, 1979). In contrast, higher levels of social support, typically

linked with collectivism (e.g., Bakan, 1966; Helgeson, 1994; Triandis et al., 1985),

have been demonstrated to act as a buffer to stress and to be positively related to

physical and mental health (Basic Behavioral Science Task Force - NAMHC, 1996;

Cassel, 1976; Cohen & Wills, 1985; Power, 1988; Thoits, 1985; Venkatraman, 1995;

Wills, 1991). Similarly, loneliness has been associated with depressed

immunocompetence (Blatt, Cornell, & Eshkol, 1993), which refers to the body's

capacity for a normal immune response. Hence, loneliness has been associated with

increased vulnerability to sickness/disease.

Coping. Another mediator of psychological adjustment that is frequently

discussed in psychological literature is coping. Moos (1988) identifies the two main

categories that have been used to classify coping responses. One category concerns

the focus of coping, that is, problem-focused (approach) versus emotion-focused

(avoidance). The other concerns the method of coping (cognitive vs. behavioural).

With respect to psychological adjustment, the focus of coping has been of greater

import than the method.

Moos (1988) reviews a number of studies assessing the relationships between

approach and avoidance coping, as measured by his Coping Responses Inventory

(CRI), and measures of psychological distress. The results suggest that avoidance

coping is positively correlated with depression, anxiety, and physical symptoms. In contrast, approach coping is associated with better outcomes on all three indices. In general, more approach coping is associated with better psychological outcomes and more avoidance coping with poorer outcomes (Holahan & Moos, 1990, 1991; Valentiner, Holahan, & Moos, 1994).

Of further relevance to the current study, higher family and friend support is associated with greater reliance on approach coping and less reliance on avoidance coping. This latter finding alludes to the connection between coping and social support. Holahan and Moos (1987, 1990, 1991; Holahan, Moos, Holahan, & Brennan, 1997) have done substantial work on a resources model of coping in which coping functions as a mechanism through which personal and social resources relate to adjustment. They have found that people with higher levels of social support tend to rely more on approach coping, such as positive reappraisal, and less on avoidance coping, especially emotional discharge (Holahan & Moos, 1987).

O'Brien and Delongis (1996) examined the role that personality (Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness) and situational (agentic vs. communal) factors play in coping. They found that personality factors influence how people cope with agentic (work) and communal (relationship) stressors. More specifically, those high on Openness to Experience and Agreeableness tended to be more effective copers, employing approach coping strategies with both agentic and communal stressors. O'Brien and Delongis describe individuals high on Openness to Experience as imaginative, creative, flexible, and as

having a preference for variety, characteristics consistent with those high on the *self-direction* domain. Such individuals are also described as being psychologically minded and having aesthetic sensitivity, consistent with the characteristics of those high on the *maturity* domain. Similarly, their description of individuals high on Agreeableness (i.e., a proclivity to be good-natured, helpful, and trusting) is consistent with those high on the *prosocial* domain. Hence, these results add further support to the connection between this group of motivational domains and subject well-being via more effective coping strategies.

Additional Variables in the Present Study

Two other variables, right-wing authoritarianism and religiosity, were also considered in the present study.

Right-wing authoritarianism. Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) is a cluster of beliefs related to authoritarian submission (to formally sanctioned authorities and/or rules), authoritarian aggression (toward outgroups), and conventionalism (i.e., strong desire to be seen as "normal"). An excessive fear of ideas, activities, and people who are different from the dominant group is thought to underlie RWA (Altemeyer, 1988). The above characteristics are consistent with the in-group prejudice sometimes seen in collectivism (e.g., Ho, 1985; Hofstede, 1980; Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

Rokeach (1973) summarizes data which indicate that high scorers on authoritarianism rank *family security*, *polite*, and *clean* (values representative of collectivism) significantly higher than low scorers, and that they rank being *ambitious*, *independent*, and *broadminded* (values representative of individualism) significantly

lower. Similarly, Gelfand, Triandis and Chan (1996), using multidimensional scaling, found that individualism and authoritarianism formed opposite poles of a continuum. The individualism end of the continuum included a cluster of individualistic values ('pleasure', 'enjoying life', 'broadminded', 'choosing own goals', and 'detachment') connoting permissiveness, tolerance, and individual choice. The authoritarianism end of the continuum entailed values ('punishing deviates', 'respecting established authority', 'patriotism', and 'devoutness') connoting rigidity, inflexibility, and hierarchy. Interestingly, Gelfand et al. (1996) found that collectivism and individualism formed orthogonal dimensions. Moreover, collectivism and authoritarianism were largely separate concepts that overlapped with respect to 'devoutness' and 'respect for tradition.'

A small amount of research has also considered the relationship between RWA and subjective well-being. Research on this relationship appears to be mixed or nonsignificant. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford (1950) indicated that the nature of people high in RWA is, in general, to report that they are doing fine, to not be in touch with their emotions, and to be high in social desirability. Hence, such people typically report that they are doing well. However, when people who are high in RWA are under significant stress, their report of physical and mental symptomatology is no different than anyone else. Michael (1967) found that authoritarianism was not significantly related to mental health impairment or to a "psychopathological characterization" of personality structure.

A measure of RWA was included in the present study to assess its relationship

with individualism/collectivism, as well as subjective well-being.

Religiosity. A measure of religiosity was included in the present study, for the most part, out of personal interest to the experimenter. As noted in the historical review, the Christian religion has played a role in the development and containment of individualism in the western world. Moreover, altruism is part of every religious belief system. Hence, the relationship between religiosity and individualism/collectivism, as well as the other variables, was assessed.

The Relationship Between Self-reported Values and Behaviour

In the present study, Schwartz and Bilsky's (1987, 1990; Schwartz, 1990) motivational domains, constituted by values, were used to test the relationship between individualism/collectivism and subjective well-being. However, if self-reported values are not predictive of behaviour, it would bring into question the meaning of the results of the study. That is, an underlying assumption is that people's values determine their attitudes and behaviour, which ultimately determines their subjective well-being. If this assumption is not accurate, then a meaningful relationship between self-reported values and subjective well-being cannot be expected. The following section reviews relevant literature in this area.

Values versus Attitudes

In the realm of psychology, very little research has touched on value-behaviour consistency (Rokeach, 1979). In contrast, a substantive body of research exists on the related attitude-behaviour relationship (Howe & Page, 1980). However, Rokeach (1979) contends that "the attitude-behaviour relation question is a narrow one that can

be subsumed under the broader question of the relation among values, attitudes and

behavior" (p. 271). He suggests that the dearth of research on values in the social

psychology literature reflects the belief that values are not amenable to measurement[5]

and the fact that they are resistant to experimental manipulation. Nevertheless,

Rokeach notes that the study of values has not been altogether ignored by social

psychologists. The term value has been variously defined as a "general attitude," a

"broader attitude," and a "component of attitude." The problem, he argues, is that

such conceptions fail to capture the essence of the conceptual difference between

values and attitudes. Instead, he offers the following analysis:

> that humans have thousands of attitudes but only dozens of values, that
>
> attitudes are biases and values are metabiases, that humans have reason on
>
> many occasions to conceal their attitudes but less reason to conceal their

---

[5]Smith (1969) comments on the use of self-reported values in research:

> That we are tapping something "merely verbal" is no occasion for dismay: the verbal symbolism by which values are knit into the fabric of the self is a source of their importance, not a limitation. Indeed, the notion that "behavioral values" would somehow be firmer stuff than the verbal values, could we only get at them, seems to me quite mistaken. Overt behavior is never a direct index of any personological variable, being a result of components attributable to personality and the behavioral situation; for the contribution of personality in this case is further resolvable into motivation and ability, and the motivation, in turn, arises only in part from the engagement of value standards. Talk is of course behavior, too, but it is behavior from which we can infer what is relevant to know about a person's values more surely and economically than in any other way. (pp. 115-116)

values, that values are deeper as well as broader than attitudes, that values are

standards of "oughts" and "shoulds" whereas attitudes are not, that values are

determinants rather than components of attitudes, that values transcend objects

and situation, that philosophers, theologians, anthropologists, sociologists,

historians, and therapists think it more important to understand people's values

than their attitudes, that moral dilemmas involve questions of value, that

intergroup and intrapsychic conflict involve questions of value conflict rather

than attitude conflict, and that different social institutions specialize in

inculcating and transmitting different subsets of values rather than attitudes. (p.

272)

Given the above considerations, Rokeach (1979) concludes that "however central the

attitude concept may be to social psychology, the value concept must surely be even

more central" (p. 272). More to the point, "values are guides and determinants of

social attitudes and ideologies on the one hand and of social behavior on the other"

(Rokeach, 1973, p. 24).

Values and Behaviour

Rokeach (1973) offers empirical support for the relationship between values and

behaviour by identifying the value correlates of various behaviours. In one study,

Rokeach had 408 university students complete the Rokeach Value Survey. These

students were later solicited by letter to join the National Association for the

Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Rokeach found that the group of 48

students who joined the NAACP ranked the values *equality, a world at peace, a*

world of beauty, and being *honest* significantly higher in importance than the group of students who did not join. In another study, based on a national sample of over 1000 participants, *salvation* was the value that most sharply distinguished churchgoers from nonchurchgoers. That is, weekly churchgoers ranked *salvation* as of high value whereas nonchurchgoers placed little value on it.

Rokeach (1973) also examined the compatibility of college roommates. He compared the value rankings of 50 pairs of compatible (i.e., got along well) and 50 pairs of incompatible (i.e., did not get along well and stopped living together) college roommates. It was found that compatible roommates tended to share similar views concerning the relative importance of *equality*, *mature love*, and, especially, *wisdom*. The latter two values are found in Schwartz and Bilsky's (1987, 1990; Schwartz, 1990) *Maturity* domain and the former in the *Prosocial* domain. In contrast, incompatible roommates tended to share similar views about the relative importance of *social recognition* (*Achievement*). These findings offer some support to the hypothesis that the more an individual endorses values in the *Maturity* and *Prosocial* domains, the better his/her interpersonal relationships will be.

Rokeach's expectations that values would predict behaviour were based largely on "belief system theory," a theory which he and others (Ball-Rokeach, Rokeach, & Grube, 1984; Grube, Mayton, & Ball-Rokeach, 1994; Rokeach, 1973) developed.

Belief system theory. Belief system theory provides a framework for understanding how beliefs, attitudes, values, and behaviours are organized. A fundamental principle of belief system theory is that beliefs are organized along a

dimension of centrality or importance. Centrality is defined as the extent to which a belief is "functionally connected or in communication with other beliefs" (Rokeach, 1968, p. 5). The more central a particular belief, the more implications and consequences it has for other beliefs. Hence, changing a particular belief will result in changes in less central beliefs to which it is functionally or logically related.

In belief system theory, attitudes are the least central of the primary belief subsystems (Grube et al., 1994; Rokeach, 1973). In essence, attitudes are beliefs about an object or situation. The potential number of attitudes that a person can have is determined by the number of distinct objects or situations that he or she has encountered or can imagine. Thus, a person may have a vast number of attitudes.

In contrast to attitudes, values are significantly fewer in number and more central in belief system theory. The value subsystem is "a relatively stable hierarchically organized set of beliefs that certain ideal *modes of conduct* (instrumental values) are preferable to other modes of conduct and that certain ideal *end states of existence* (terminal values) are preferable to other end states of existence" (Grube et al., 1994, p. 155). Values are single beliefs which transcend objects and situations. Because values are cognitive representations of biological and social needs (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 1990), terminal and instrumental values are each limited to about two dozen. Due to the relative centrality of values, it is understood that value change will lead to widespread changes in functionally related values, attitudes, and behaviours.

Although values and the value system are relatively stable, they can and do

undergo change. In particular, because they are organized into hierarchies

(rank orders), values are continually in conflict. Attaining one value often

means blocking another. Thus, a person is routinely forced to compare among

values and make choices among them when expressing attitudes or behaviours.

As a result, a person may come to reorganize and reorder his or her values

(Grube et al., 1994, p. 156).

Finally, belief system theory states that self-conceptions are the most central

beliefs (Grube et al., 1994; Rokeach, 1973). Self-conceptions or "sentiments of self-

regard" entail "all the distinctive cognitions, negative as well as positive, and the

affective connotations of these cognitions that would be displayed if a full answer to

the question of 'who am I' were forthcoming" (Rokeach, 1973, pp. 215-216). All

other beliefs (including attitudes and values) and behaviours are thought to be

organized around self-conceptions and function to maintain and enhance positive self-

conceptions. Hence, changing a self-conception has widespread implications for the

entire belief system.

Within this hierarchically organized belief system, change and stability is believed

to be determined by a person's need to maintain and enhance positive self-conceptions

and self-presentations of morality and competence. That is, "belief system theory

proposes that individuals continually strive to act in ways that are, or at least appear

to others to be, as moral and competent as possible" (Grube et al., 1994, p. 156).

Value self-confrontation. Founded on belief system theory, researchers have

experimented with a method for systematically inducing states of self-dissatisfaction to

bring about cognitive and behavioural changes in research participants. Grube et al.

(1994) provide an example of the "value self-confrontation" (VSC) method. They

report on a study in which 143 introductory psychology students completed the

Rokeach Value Survey, both before and after half the students engaged in the VSC

treatment. The experimental group, after completing the value survey, were shown a

table of values listing the average value rankings of another group of students that had

been obtained in a previous study. Attention was drawn to the fact that the previously

surveyed students had, on average, ranked a world of beauty sixteenth and a

comfortable life tenth. In an effort to arouse self-dissatisfaction, the experimenter

then interpreted these findings as suggesting that the students in the previous survey

were more concerned with obtaining the comforts of life than with preserving the

natural environment. The experimental group was then asked to spend a few minutes

comparing their own value rankings with those in the table shown to them. Next,

they were asked to respond to the question "Do you support the environmental

movement?" by indicating one of three responses: (a) "yes, and I am personally

active;" (b) "yes, but I am not active;" or (c) "no, I do not support the environmental

movement." Participants were then shown a second table depicting the negative

relationship between support for the environmental movement and rankings of a

comfortable life and its positive relationship with rankings of a world of beauty. To

further arouse self-dissatisfaction, these results were interpreted as suggesting, in

effect, that those who are against the environmental movement put their own comfort

first. After being given a few minutes to study the table, participants completed a

series of 7-point scales indicating the extent to which they were satisfied or dissatisfied with each of their value rankings. The control group was given the same series of scales but following only a general discussion of values and attitudes. In the posttest survey, the experimenters found that the experimental group displayed a significant increase in the importance given to a world of beauty whereas the control group did not.

Grube et al. (1994) indicate that at least 27 studies have employed the VSC method to induce change in values, attitudes, or behaviours. The behavioural change studies they reviewed demonstrate that changes in values produced significant change in various behaviours, including increased eye contact with black confederates, decreased smoking behaviour, weight loss, and improved teaching performance. Rokeach (1973) reported that significant behavioural changes (e.g., enrolling in ethnic studies core courses, joining the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) were evident as long as 21 months after the VSC treatment. These studies offer further evidence in support of the belief that self-reported values are predictive of behaviour.

Present Study

In recent years, a number of social scientists have suggested the need for more empirical research examining the relationship between individualism/collectivism (e.g., Triandis, 1993) or related constructs (e.g., Helgeson, 1994; McCreary & Korabik, 1994; Prilleltensky, 1997) and psychosocial, behavioural, personality, and other measures. The purpose of the present study was to assess the relationship between individualism/collectivism, on the one hand, and subjective well-being (SWB) and psychological distress, on the other hand. As reviewed in the introduction, there is theoretical, historical, and empirical support for the hypothesis that both individualism and collectivism in the extreme (i.e., to the exclusion of the other) are detrimental to individual well-being. The literature suggests that people are inherently social beings with needs for both independence from, and interdependence with, other people (e.g., Bakan, 1966; Campbell, 1975; Guisinger & Blatt, 1994). Hence, an individual who possesses a concern both for self and others and is able to achieve both independence and interdependence is likely to experience higher levels of subjective well-being (SWB) and lower levels of psychological distress than an individual who does not. The present study was intended as a more direct assessment of such a relationship than had been provided to date. Whereas an individualism-collectivism dichotomy consisting of mutually exclusive values implies that a combination of individualist and collectivist elements is impossible (Schwartz, 1990), Schwartz and Bilsky's (1987, 1990; Schwartz, 1990, 1992), conceptualization of individualism and collectivism provided a framework to test this relationship.

As noted above, Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990; Schwartz, 1990, 1992) have conceptualized individualism and collectivism (i.e., higher-order interests) with motivational domains (e.g., prosocial, self-direction), and their constituent values (e.g., ambitious, forgiving), in a circular order on a two-dimensional plane (see Figure 2). On this plane, the smaller the distance between specific value points, the higher the positive correlation. Hence, the closer together two motivational domains are located, the more compatible are their motivational goals and the more likely they are to be concurrently valued by an individual.

Based on empirical and theoretical reasons reviewed in the introduction, it is argued that people are more likely to achieve a healthy balance of independence and interdependence if they esteem certain values more than others. It is speculated that there might be a combination of compatible motivational domains that would incorporate the "best elements" (Triandis, 1993) of both the individualist and collectivist value types (i.e., those which lead to a greater level of subjective well-being). Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990; Schwartz, 1990) found that the *prosocial, maturity,* and *self-direction* motivational domains are the representatives of the three distinct interest categories (i.e., collective, mixed, and individual, respectively) which most frequently occur together. Interestingly, these three motivational domains seem to best reflect the positive elements of both individualism and collectivism as discussed in the literature.

The values representing the *prosocial* domain refer to concern for the well-being of all people in all settings, including the welfare of close others in everyday

interaction. These values are considered to be generative of social support and relatedness. Thus, the *prosocial* domain is expected to be positively related to subjective well-being and negatively related to psychological distress through the mediator of social support.

The values representing the *maturity* domain are consistent with both prosocial tendencies of a universal type and the normative individualism described by Waterman (1981). With respect to the latter quality, Schwartz (1992) has linked *maturity* with Maslow's (1970) concept of self-actualization. Self-actualization refers to a striving for psychological growth and enhancement and should, therefore, directly relate to SWB. As already stated, prosocial values are positively related to SWB and negatively related to psychological distress through the mediator of social support. Hence, the *maturity* domain should be associated with lower distress and higher SWB via both social support and self-actualization.

Finally, the *self-direction* domain, defined by the goal of independent thought and action, is consonant with the normative individualism (e.g., self-actualization, locus of control) referred to by Waterman (1981, 1984) and with the attributes of agency (e.g., self-assertion, self-expansion) suggested by Bakan (1966). Schwartz (1992) indicated that the *self-direction* domain was derived from theoretical work concerning organismic needs for control and mastery, and interactional requirements of autonomy and independence. Valentiner, Holohan, and Moos (1994) have linked these qualities with more direct coping efforts and less avoidance. The use of approach coping strategies has been connected with greater subjective well-being and less psychological

distress. A related finding is that individuals with an independent self-concept can more readily generate different solutions in creative problem-solving situations (Markus and Kitayama, 1991). Hence, *self-direction* is expected to be positively related to subjective well-being and negatively related to psychological distress through approach coping.

In contrast, the remaining individualistic and collectivistic domains are not expected to be as positively related to subjective well-being or as negatively related to psychological distress. In fact, theory and research suggest that the domains opposite to the *prosocial, maturity,* and *self-direction* motivational domains can be linked with psychological distress. Kasser and Ryan (1993) argue that the pursuit of material things as opposed to community feeling and self-acceptance, which they link with the *prosocial, maturity,* and *self-direction* domains, may distract from actualization and be associated with greater distress.

Collectivism is expected to be associated with greater subjective well-being and lower psychological distress, as has been revealed in the past (Triandis et al., 1985). However, the combined domains described above (i.e., the *prosocial, maturity,* and *self-direction* domains) are expected to better predict subjective well-being and distress due to greater specificity of collective values and the complementary mixed and individualistic values.

Kasser and Ryan (1993) suggested that "research on the structure of human values (e.g., Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 1990) could also examine correlates with well-being" (p. 421). Similarly, Triandis (1993) has sounded a call for research to determine the

"best elements" of individualism and collectivism. The present study was a response

to this need. As outlined above, the *prosocial, maturity,* and *self-direction*

motivational domains can be considered to be the "best elements" of individualism

and collectivism. For the purpose of this study, these elements were combined in a

single measure and compared with a measure of individualism/collectivism in terms of

ability to predict subjective well-being and psychological distress.

Hypotheses

1. Higher levels of a balance of individual and collective values (hereafter known as the I/C balance), as measured by the combined value ratings of the *prosocial*, *maturity*, and *self-direction* motivational domains, will be positively correlated with greater subjective well-being and negatively correlated with lower psychological distress.

2. Higher levels of the I/C balance will better predict greater subjective well-being and lower psychological distress than will higher individualism, as measured by a combination of the remaining individual motivational domain scores (*achievement* and *enjoyment*).

3. Higher levels of the I/C balance will better predict greater subjective well-being and lower psychological distress than will higher collectivism, as measured by a combination of the remaining collective motivational domain scores (*restrictive conformity* and *security*).

4. Higher collectivism will be positively correlated with greater subjective well-being and negatively correlated with lower psychological distress.

5. Higher levels of the I/C balance will better predict greater subjective well-being and lower psychological distress than higher collectivism alone.

Method

Participants

Two hundred and ninety-three undergraduates from introductory psychology

courses at the University of Manitoba participated in the study as part of their course

requirements. Undergraduates were utilized, rather than a community sample,

because of the exploratory nature of the study and because the few studies of

individualism conducted to date have found adequate ranges in scores using the

former population. Social-demographic information requested of participants included

age, sex, marital status, and socio-economic status (SES) of participant and/or family

of origin. It has been noted that these variables relate to a person's I-C orientation

(e.g., Lykes, 1985; Hofstede, 1980; Sampson, 1988).

SES was assessed using Blishen, Carroll, and Moore's (1987) socioeconomic

index for occupations in Canada. Occupational level has proven to be a good index

of SES and respondents are much more willing to provide this information than level

of income (Turner & Marino, 1994). Blishen et al.'s (1987) index provides

socioeconomic scores for 514 occupations. The socioeconomic scores are based on

measures of education and income, and a calibration of the index to the occupational

prestige metric of Pineo and Porter (1967). Blishen et al.'s index has a mean of

42.7, a standard deviation of 13.3, a minimum of 17.8, and a maximum of 101.7.

Participants were asked to indicate the occupation(s) of their parent(s) if they (a)

were living with their parents, (b) were dependent on them, in whole or in part, for

financial support, or (c) had been dependent on them within the last three years. If

they had been entirely independent of their parents for a period greater than three years and were supporting themselves, participants were asked to indicate their own occupation, if currently employed (e.g., part-time), and/or their previous (pre-student and/or summer-time) occupation, if currently unemployed. If they had been entirely independent of their parents for a period greater than three years, but were being supported in whole or in part by another individual(s), this individual's relationship to the participant (e.g., spouse, partner, relative) and occupation were requested.

Unfortunately, it proved very difficult to match each of the occupations recorded by participants with one of Blishen et al.'s (1987) 514 listings. Therefore, a decision was made to create broader occupational categories based on Blishen et al.'s metric. Specifically, 10 categories were established, constituting 10 non-overlapping ranges of SES scores. That is, SES scores falling below 20.00 received a score of 1, between 20.00 and 29.99 a score of 2, 30.00 to 39.99 a score of 3, and so on, up to scores of 100.00 or higher, which received a 10. As an example, an SES score of 63.47 was recorded as a 6. In this way, scores were approximated for occupations that could not be given a specific rating according to the 514 listings. Hence, all scores, both those which could be specified and those that were approximated, were placed in one of the 10 created intervals. This procedure yielded a normal distribution of scores.

Materials

Measures of Individualism-Collectivism and Related Constructs

INDCOL Scale. This 63-item scale (See Appendix A), as noted above, was developed by Hui (1988) as a measure of the I-C dimension. Based on previous

research (Hui & Triandis, 1986), the scale is intended to assess individualistic-collectivistic tendencies in relation to six specific target groups: spouse, parent, kin, neighbor, friend, and co-worker. Each target group is represented in a number of statements (e.g., "I practice the religion of my parents") to which a person is required to respond using a five-point (0-4, strongly disagree/false to strongly agree/true) scale. Scores can then be determined for each target group, as well as the overall total, referred to as the General Collectivism Index (GCI). The GCI score can range from 0-252. The higher the score, the more collectivistic is the person. The lower the score, the more individualistic is the person.

Hui (1988) administered the INDCOL Scale to a group of 45 Americans on two occasions, separated by a two-week time span. However, the second administration employed a slightly altered scale, with a 5-point response format and "some minor deletions and modifications" (p. 22). Given the above changes, Hui suggests that the test-retest reliability coefficients for the six subscales, which ranged from .62 (Spouse) to .79 (Friend), should be regarded as underestimations. The scale was also administered to a sample of 108 Chinese and 132 American university students (N = 202-205 due to missing data). Cronbach reliability coefficients ranged from .46 (Spouse) to .76 (Parent).

Rokeach Value Survey. The Rokeach (1973) Value Survey is a widely used survey that requires the respondent to rank-order 18 terminal (i.e., concerning end-states) and 18 instrumental (i.e., concerning modes of conduct) values in terms of personal importance. The most common way of presenting the task, Form D, is to

provide respondents with each of the 36 values on gummed labels that can be removed and rank-ordered. Rokeach administered Form D to four different samples of college students (N ranging from 36 to 216) on two occasions, separated by between three weeks and four months. Test-retest reliabilities were .76-.80 for the terminal values and .65-.72 for the instrumental values. For a sample of 204 college students tested once and then again 14 to 16 months later, he obtained reliabilities of .69 and .61 for the terminal and instrumental values, respectively.

In the present study, a slightly different procedure was employed. Participants were asked to rate each of the 36 values in terms of its importance as a guiding principle in their lives using a 0-100 scale (see Appendix B). Miethe (1985) compared the test-retest reliability (1 week interval) of this procedure with that of Form D on a sample of undergraduate university students. Miethe found the test-retest reliabilities of the two methods to be quite comparable, at .79 (n = 91) and .83 (n = 85), respectively. Two advantages of the rating procedure are that it yields an interval, as opposed to an ordinal, scale, which permits greater flexibility in statistical analysis, and it significantly reduces task completion time.

The face validity of the Value Survey is very high, particularly when definitions of the values are included. Furthermore, its extremely wide usage provides indirect testimony to its validity. More important, however, are the research findings (Rokeach, 1973) that support the validity of the survey, including the following: the results of factor analyses supporting the terminal-instrumental distinction; a semantic differential procedure providing strong evidence that the values are understood to

mean what is intended; findings consistent with theoretical and documented

distinctions, such as value differences between men and women; and an evaluation

disconfirming the presence of a social desirability response set.

Using the above value ratings, the motivational domain (e.g., *prosocial, self-direction*) measures (Schwartz, 1990; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 1990) examined in

the present study were calculated by averaging the value ratings of the representative

values (e.g., *maturity* = [a world of beauty + wisdom + mature love + self-respect

+ courageous]/5). To obtain combined scores representing collectivism (*restrictive*

conformity and *security*), individualism (*achievement* and *enjoyment*), and the I/C

balance (*prosocial, maturity*, and *self-direction*), the constituent motivational domain

scores were averaged. Hence, scores for individual values, motivational domains,

and domain combinations could range between 0 and 100. The higher the score, the

more important the value, domain, or domain combination as a guide in the

participant's life. Feather (1994) supports Schwartz and Bilsky's (1987, 1990;

Schwartz, 1990) use of sets of values to define value domains. Feather argues that

the use of value domains helps to overcome problems of unreliability that may occur

when single value items are employed.

Right-wing authoritarianism. A short version of Altemeyer's (1988) uni-

dimensional RWA Scale was administered. For the sake of brevity, only the ten

items with the highest item-scale correlations (r > .40) were included (see Appendix

C). Each item consists of a statement about a social issue to which the respondent is

asked to indicate the extent of their agreement or disagreement. Responses are based

on a nine-point scale (-4 = very strongly disagree to 4 = very strongly agree). The potential range of scores is between -40 and 40, with higher scores indicating greater right-wing authoritarianism. Five of the 10 items are reverse-scored.

Religiosity. Two measures of religiosity developed by Schludermann and Schludermann (1995) were included in the questionnaire. The first measure consists of eight items assessing religious orientation. The respondent rates the extent to which they agree with each item (e.g., "When I make an important decision, I should think about what God wants me to do") on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). Scores range from 8 (low religious orientation) to 40 (high religious orientation). Schludermann and Schludermann administered the scale to 507 introductory psychology students and obtained significant factor loadings on the first principal-axes factor from .76 to .90. An assessment of internal consistency yielded a Cronbach alpha of .88.

The second measure consists of seven items assessing religious beliefs and practices. For each item (e.g., "I believe that God exists"), the respondent indicates the extent of their belief on a five-point scale (e.g., 1 = definitely not to 5 = definitely yes). The scale has a minimum value of 7 and a maximum value of 35. The higher the score, the higher the level of religious beliefs and practices. Schludermann and Schludermann (1995) administered the scale to 507 introductory psychology students and obtained significant factor loadings on the first principal-axes factor from .56 to .86. The Cronbach alpha was .80.

Measures of Subjective Well-Being

Subjective well-being (SWB) has been defined in a number of different ways by social scientists (Evans, 1994). However, many researchers have agreed upon the importance of measuring both its positive and negative aspects (Diener, 1984; Glatzer, 1987). It seems that both perspectives provide distinct information; that is, a positive evaluation of life satisfaction does not rule out the presence of negative affect. Based on a literature review, Diener (1984) suggests that SWB is constituted by three separable components: positive affect, negative affect, and life satisfaction. He suggests that the first two components refer to the affective, emotional aspects of the construct, whereas life satisfaction refers to the cognitive-judgmental aspects. This tri-partite construal of SWB has been supported by other researchers (e.g., Chamberlain, 1988; McKennell and Andrews, 1980), some of whom conclude that the cognitive dimension is associated with stable, long-term assessments of SWB, whereas the affective dimensions are associated with relatively transitory assessments of life quality (Andrews and McKennell, 1980). The above tripartite view of SWB was employed in the present study. The self-report measures used to assess SWB were the Satisfaction With Life Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, and Griffin, 1985) and the Affect Balance Scale (Bradburn, 1969), which assesses both negative and positive affect.

Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS). Diener, Emmons, Larsen, and Griffin (1985) developed this five-item scale because they perceived the need for a multi-item measure of global life satisfaction as a cognitive-judgmental process.

Each item (e.g., "In most ways my life is close to my ideal") of the SWLS (see

Appendix D) is scored from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*), so the

possible range of scores is from 5 (low satisfaction) to 35 (high satisfaction). Diener

et al. (1985) administered the SWLS to two samples of undergraduates (N = 176 and

N = 163) along with a battery of subjective well-being measures. Correlations

between the SWLS and the other measures were .47-.75 for 10 of the 11 measures

and .32-.37 for the remaining measure. The second sample (N = 163) also

completed the Marlowe-Crowne scale of social desirability, which correlated .02 with

the SWLS, indicating that the SWLS is not evoking a social desirability response set.

Based on a sample of 76 undergraduates, a two-month test-retest correlation

coefficient of .82 and a coefficient alpha of .87 were obtained.

Affect Balance Scale (ABS). Participant affect balance was assessed using

Bradburn's (1969) 10-item Affect Balance Scale (see Appendix E), which is thought

to measure the degree to which people are feeling both positive and negative.

Separate five-item subscales assess positive (e.g., "During the past week have you

ever felt on top of the world?") and negative (e.g., "During the past week have you

ever felt bored?") affect. Respondents answer each item either no or yes depending

on whether or not they have felt that emotion "during the past few weeks." Bradburn

chose this time frame because he believed that recent events influence happiness more

than those that have occurred in the more distant past. Items are summed within each

subscale. The total ABS score equals the positive subscale score minus the negative

subscale score. The resulting difference can range between 5 and -5 and represents

either a positive or negative affect balance. This balance is interpreted as a measure

of the individual's current level of happiness (i.e., very happy to very unhappy).

Diener (1984) reviewed the literature pertaining to the ABS and concluded that,

although the ABS has deficiencies (e.g., nonaffective content in items, ceiling and

floor effects), it is one of the few available direct measures of positive and negative

affect. Bradburn (1969) reported mean correlations of .51 for men and .50 for

women among the positive affect items, and .54 for both men and women among the

negative affect items. He also reported low correlations between the subscales (.02

for men and .09 for women).

Measures of Psychological Distress

The 12-item General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-12). The GHQ is a widely used

self-report questionnaire developed for the purpose of detecting current non-psychotic

disturbances in general practice patients (Goldberg, 1972; Goldberg & Blackwell,

1970). It has been found valid when compared with more comprehensive psychiatric

interviews (Banks, 1982; Goldberg, 1972). Items assessing physical illness were

excluded in the shorter versions of the GHQ, resulting in a focus on psychological

distress symptoms and maladaptive behavior (Goldberg, 1972).

For the purpose of this research, the 12-item version of the GHQ (Appendix F)

was administered to the participants. Items (e.g., "Have you recently lost much sleep

over worry?") are focused on the current or recent presence of various symptoms and

behaviours. Each item is scored from 1 (e.g., not at all) to 4 (e.g., much more than

usual) assessing the frequency of symptoms and behaviours. Possible scores range

from 12 to 48, with higher scores representing higher levels of psychological distress.

Its alpha coefficient has been shown to be consistently high, ranging from .82 to .90

(Banks, Clegg, Jackson, Kemp, Stafford, & Wall, 1980).

Srole's Anomia Scale. Srole (1956) developed a five-item Anomia Scale intended

to measure self-to-others alienation. That is, it measures a respondent's sense of

isolation or estrangement from society. Dodder and Astle (1980) state that the scale

includes dimensions of little faith in others and in human relationships (cynicism) and

of little notion of what is really important in life other than money (valuelessness).

Each item of Srole's (1956) scale is considered to measure one aspect of anomia. For

example, the instability of immediate personal relationships is represented by the

following item: "These days a person doesn't really know whom he[/she] can count

on." In an effort to increase the reliability of the scale, Robinson (1973) attached an

additional four items to the end. These items are presented in an agree-disagree

format, with scores ranging from 0 (low anomia) to 9 (high anomia). This nine-item

version of the Anomia Scale appears to have greater reliability than the original five-

item scale (Poresky, Atilano, and Hawkins, 1981). For a sample of 58 rural women,

the five-item and nine-item scales yielded three-year test-retest correlations of .45 and

.56, respectively. Internal consistency was also higher for the nine-item measure,

with a Cronbach alpha of .64 compared to .48 for the five-item scale. Furthermore,

Dodder and Astle (1980) reported that, for a sample of 4,487 non-institutionalized

United States citizens age 18 or over, the nine-item scale consistently produced

stronger correlations with 31 variables traditionally associated with anomie (e.g.,

income, marital status). The nine-item version of Srole's Anomia scale (Appendix G) was used in the present study.

Perceived Stress Scale (PSS). The PSS is a 14-item measure of global perceptions of stress developed by Cohen, Karmarck, and Mermelstein (1983; see Appendix H). Respondents are asked to indicate how often they have felt a certain way in the past month (e.g., "In the past month, how often have you felt nervous and 'stressed'?"). Responses are based on a five-point scale (0 = never to 4 = very often) assessing frequency. Scores range from 0 to 56, with higher scores indicating higher levels of perceived stress. Normative samples included two groups of college students and a smoking cessation group (Cohen et al., 1983). Testing yielded coefficient alpha reliabilities of .84, .85, and .86 for the three samples, respectively. Cohen et al. suggest that the PSS is a measure of an individual's current state rather than of stable traits, as evidenced by test-retest reliabilities of .85 at two days and .55 at six weeks (N = 64).

Mediating Variables

It was postulated that social support and approach coping would partially mediate the positive and negative relationships between measures of individualism-collectivism and measures of psychological distress and subjective well-being. Therefore, the following measures of perceived social support and coping were included in the questionnaire.

Social Support Scale (SSS). Turner and Marino (1994) have utilized a modified and shortened version of the Provisions of Social Relations Scale (PSRS; Turner,

Frankel, & Levin, 1983) to measure perceived or experienced social support from three sources: spouse/partner, relatives, and friends (see Appendix I). The modified version was utilized in the present study and will be referred to as the Social Support Scale (SSS). Items consist of statements about perceived or experienced social support (e.g., "I feel very close to my husband/wife/partner") in each of the three areas mentioned above. Respondents are then required to indicate the extent to which the statement describes their own experience using a four-point response scale (1 = very much like my experience to 4 = Not at all like my experience). Scores can range from 6 to 24 on the spouse/partner subscale and from 8 to 32 on the friends and relatives subscales. Total score can range from 22 to 88. The lower the score, the higher the level of perceived social support.

Turner and Marino (1994) administered the modified 22-item scale to 1,394 residents, aged 18-55 years, living in Toronto. A test of internal reliability yielded Cronbach alphas of .83, .94, and .94 for the spouse/partner, friend, and relative subscales, respectively. In the present study, the spouse/partner subscale was eliminated because so few of the participants were involved in such a relationship.

Coping Responses Inventory - Adult Form (CRI). The CRI (Moos, 1988; Appendix J) is composed of eight subscales that measure different types of coping responses to stressful life circumstances. Four subscales measure approach coping: Logical Analysis, Positive Reappraisal, Seeking Support and Information, and Problem Solving. The other four subscales measure avoidance coping: Cognitive Avoidance, Acceptance or Resignation, Seeking Alternative Rewards, and Emotional

Discharge. The first two subscales in each set reflect cognitive coping strategies whereas the third and fourth subscales in each set reflect behavioural coping strategies. Each subscale is composed of six items. Respondents select a recent (focal) stressor and rate their reliance on each of the 48 coping items on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 (fairly often). The CRI also includes a set of 10 items that measure how respondents appraise the focal stressor (e.g., "Have you ever faced a problem like this before?") and its outcome (e.g., "Did anything good come out of dealing with this problem?"). These 10 items are similarly scored from 1 (definitely no) to 4 (definitely yes).

Moos (1988) reported the internal consistencies of the eight subscales obtained in two field trials that utilized over 1800 participants. Cronbach alphas, given separately for men and women, ranged from .58 (Emotional Discharge for women) to .74 (Positive Reappraisal for men) on the eight subscales.

Research has demonstrated the predictive utility of relative versus absolute coping scores (Vitaliano, Maiuro, & Russo, 1987). For example, rather than using absolute approach coping scores, it has proven more useful to employ a percentage of approach coping (i.e., [approach coping score]/[approach coping score + avoidance coping score]). Based on this research, Holahan and Moos (1990, 1991; Holahan et al., 1997; Valentiner, Holahan & Moos, 1994) examined percentage of approach coping (cognitive and behavioural), which they derived from four of the eight coping subscales. Percentage of cognitive approach coping was computed by dividing Positive Reappraisal by total cognitive coping (i.e., Positive Reappraisal divided by

the sum of Positive Reappraisal and Cognitive Avoidance). Similarly, percentage of behavioural approach coping was computed by dividing Problem Solving by total behavioural coping (i.e., Problem Solving divided by the sum of Problem Solving and Emotional Discharge). These same two coping indices were employed in the present study.

Procedure

The participants completed the questionnaire in a single sitting. The questionnaires consisted of a cover letter/consent form (Appendix K), a social-demographics section (Appendix L), and the various measures. The cover letter/consent form thanked the individuals for their participation, indicated that they were free not to complete the questionnaire, and guaranteed their anonymity. The general purpose of the study was then explained as an examination of people's values and how they relate to various aspects of life. Although this was an accurate description, it left out specific hypotheses which might have influenced responding. More details about the hypotheses were included in a debriefing letter (Appendix M) handed out upon each individual's completion of the questionnaire.

Each questionnaire utilized one of three formats for the measures section. The formats differed in the order in which the various measures were presented. The use of different orders was intended to control for the potential biasing effects of any one particular order.

Because of the nature of some of the measures (e.g., anomie and alienation scales), the debriefing letter provided participants with telephone numbers for mental

health agencies in Winnipeg. In this way, anyone interested in counselling received the necessary information.

Results

Individualism/Collectivism and Demographic Variables

The data produced by three participants was eliminated from the analyses due to a substantial number of unanswered items. Otherwise, missing data was addressed using mean replacement (i.e., for interval scales) and random assignment (i.e., for dichotomous variables) methods. The data was examined for univariate and multivariate outliers. No significant anomalies were observed. Although cultural differences are relevant to the study of individualism-collectivism, the number of individuals from culturally diverse backgrounds was insufficient for statistical analysis. Therefore, the data provided by individuals who had not lived in Canada all of their lives was not used. The above exclusionary criteria decreased the total number of participants from 293 to 249.

The sample consisted of 114 male and 135 female participants. Ages ranged from 17 to 50 years, with 90% of the sample falling between the ages of 18 and 22 years. The breakdown of participants by marital status yielded 236 single, 12 married or living as married, and 1 divorced. Due to the restricted age distribution and the limited number of non-single participants, age and marital status were eliminated from further analyses. Socio-economic status (SES) ranged from a low of 2 to a high of 10 with a mean score of 4.9 and a standard deviation of 1.4. SES was not significantly correlated with any of the variables in this study.

Preliminary Analyses

Table 1 presents means and standard deviations for the dependent and independent variables. Descriptive statistics of the study variables indicated that the distribution of scores for all variables was within acceptable limits with respect to skewness and kurtosis. A visual inspection of the scatterplots for relevant variable pairs did not reveal any non-linear relationships. Analyses of variance were conducted for all variables by questionnaire form (1- 3) to assess for order effects. No order effects were found.

Correlational analyses revealed that sex was significantly related to a number of variables included in the study. However, tests of the formal hypotheses of this study using male and female samples revealed only one statistically significant difference, which was not of theoretical significance. Therefore, for the sake of statistical power, the sample was not divided by sex. For the one analysis in which sex made a difference, a footnote is included in the text to provide relevant information.

An examination of the correlational matrix revealed that the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS) was highly correlated with the General Health Questionnaire-12 (GHQ-12) and showed the same pattern of relationships with the other variables as did the GHQ-12. In an effort to reduce the likelihood of committing a Type I error, the PSS was eliminated from further analyses and the GHQ-12 was retained, as it is a measure with greater internal consistency and past usage.

Reliability of Measures

The index of internal consistency for each measure is presented in Table 2. All

Table 1

Means and Standard Deviations for the Dependent and
Independent Variables (N = 249)

Measure	M	SD
Affect Balance Scale	1.5	2.2
Anomia	3.1	2.1
Coping Responses Inventory: Percentage of Approach Coping		
Behavioural	0.68	0.23
Cognitive	0.58	0.21
General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-12)	24.1	5.9
INDCOL (Collectivism)	140.6	17.6
Perceived Stress Scale	25.4	7.0
Right-Wing Authoritarianism	-6.4	14.4
Rokeach Value		
I/C Balance	81.5	8.4
Individualism	78.8	9.7
Collectivism	78.4	11.3
Satisfaction With Life Scale	22.1	6.6
Social Support Scale	28.4	10.7

Table 2

Internal Consistencies of Measures (N = 249)

Measure	Cronbach Alpha
Affect Balance Scale	
Subscales	
Positive Affect	.68
Negative Affect	.60
[Inter-subscale correlation was .17]	
Anomia scale	.63
Coping Responses Inventory	
Logical Analysis	.74
Positive Reappraisal	.72
Seek Guidance and Support	.67
Take Problem-Solving Action	.79
Cognitive Avoidance	.76
Acceptance or Resignation	.62
Seek Alternate Rewards	.73
Emotional Discharge	.68
INDCOL (Collectivism)	
Subscales	
Spouse	.35
Parent	.68
Kin	.65
Neighbour	.74
Friend	.60
Co-worker	.53
General Collectivism Index	.81
General Health Questionnaire - 12	.89
Perceived Stress Scale	.82

(Table 2 continued)

Measure	Cronbach Alpha
Right-Wing Authoritarianism	.83
Religiosity	
Orientation	.96
Beliefs and Practices	.93
Combined Score	.97
Satisfaction With Life Scale	.86
Schwartz's Motivational Domains (Based on Rokeach Value Survey)	
Achievement	.53
Enjoyment	.56
Self-Direction	.72
Maturity	.60
Prosocial	.70
Restrictive Conformity	.73
Security	.54
Composite Scores	
I/C Balance (I/C)	.82
Individualism (IND)	.69
Collectivism (COL)	.76
Social Support Scale	
Friend	.91
Relative	.95

alphas are comparable with previous reports, where data existed. All alphas were .60

or better, except for two subscales of the INDCOL Scale and three of Schwartz's

(1990; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 1990) motivational domains. However, the total

score alpha for the INDCOL Scale was good (.81), as were the composite

motivational domain score alphas for the I/C balance (.82), Individualism (.69), and

Collectivism (.76). There were no existing data to compare the internal consistencies

of Schwartz's motivational domains derived from the Rokeach Value Survey

(Rokeach, 1973). Preliminary analyses revealed that the internal consistency of a

number of measures could be increased by eliminating certain items. However, the

increase in alpha did not significantly alter the results of the correlational and multiple

regression analyses. Therefore, the measures were maintained in their original form

to be able to compare results with previous research.

Tests of Hypotheses

A series of multiple regression analyses (direct solution) was conducted to test the

hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1

It was hypothesized that higher levels of the I/C balance would be positively

correlated with greater subjective well-being and negatively correlated with lower

psychological distress. Each of five measures of subjective well-being and

psychological distress were regressed on the three predictor variables (Table 3). The

results reveal that higher levels of a balance of values did not predict higher

subjective well-being or lower psychological distress. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was not

supported.

Hypothesis 2

It was hypothesized that higher levels of the I/C balance would better predict greater subjective well-being and lower psychological distress than would higher individualism (i.e., *achievement* and *enjoyment*). As can be seen in Table 3, the hypothesis was not supported.

Hypothesis 3

It was hypothesized that higher levels of the I/C balance would better predict greater subjective well-being and lower psychological distress than would higher collectivism (i.e., *restrictive conformity* and *security*). As can be seen in Table 3, the hypothesis was not supported. Rather, the results show that higher collectivism best predicted greater life satisfaction (SWLS; $B = .11$, SE $B = .056$, $\beta = .19$, $p <$ .05).

Hypothesis 4

It was hypothesized that higher collectivism would be positively correlated with greater subjective well-being and negatively correlated with lower psychological distress. The results presented in Table 4 provide partial support for this hypothesis. With respect to subjective well-being, higher collectivism predicted higher positive affect[6] ($B = .014$, SE $B = .005$, $\beta = .18$, $p < .01$) and greater life satisfaction (B

---

[6]When the sample was divided by sex and the multiple regression analyses were re-run, higher levels of collectivism predicted higher levels of positive affect only for female respondents ($B = .015$, SE $B = .006$, $\beta = .21$, $p < .05$).

Table 3

**Multiple Regression Analyses (Direct Entry) for Variables
Predicting Subjective Well-Being and Distress (N = 249)**

Variable[a] R^2(Adj.)[b]	B	SE B	β	
Subjective Well-Being				
Analysis 1 - ABSPOS				.048
I/C	.000	.017	.00	
IND	.018	.012	.13	
COL	.018	.012	.15	
Analysis 2 - ABSNEG				.010
I/C	.027	.019	.15	
IND	-.016	.014	-.10	
COL	-.022	.013	-.17	
Analysis 3 - SWLS				.038
I/C	.05	.083	.07	
IND	-.03	.058	-.04	
COL	.11	.056	.19*	
Psychological Distress				
Analysis 4 - GHQ				.001
I/C	.069	.076	.097	
IND	-.039	.054	-.064	
COL	.032	.052	.060	
Analysis 5 - ANOMIA				.000
I/C	-.047	.027	-.19	
IND	.016	.019	.07	
COL	.018	.018	.10	

*p < .05.

[a]I/C = Composite Score of *Prosocial, Maturity,* and *Self-Direction;* IND = Composite Score of *Achievement* and *Enjoyment;* COL = Composite Score of *Security* and *Restrictive Conformity;* ABSPOS = Affect Balance Scale: Positive Affect items; ABSNEG = Affect Balance Scale: Negative Affect items; SWLS = Satisfaction With Life Scale; GHQ = General Health Questionnaire.

[b]R^2(Adj.) = Adjusted R squared.

Table 4

Multiple Regression Analyses (Direct Entry) Comparing the Ability of the I/C Balance and Collectivism to Predict Subjective Well-Being and Psychological Distress (N = 249)

Variable[a]	B	SE B	β	R^2(Adj.)[b]
Subjective Well-Being				
Analysis 1 - ABSPOS				.063
I/C	.024	.010	.15*	
INDCOL	.014	.005	.18**	
Analysis 2 - ABSNEG				.000
I/C	-.003	.012	-.018	
INDCOL	-.007	.006	-.083	
Analysis 3 - SWLS				.104
I/C	.08	.049	.11	
INDCOL	.11	.023	.29***	
Psychological Distress				
Analysis 4 - GHQ				.008
I/C	.054	.047	.077	
INDCOL	.027	.022	.079	
Analysis 5 - ANOMIA				.054
I/C	.001	.016	.00	
INDCOL	-.030	.008	-.25***	

*p < .05.   **p < .01.   ***p < .001.

[a]I/C = Composite Score of *Prosocial, Maturity,* and *Self-Direction*; INDCOL = Collectivism Scale; ABSPOS = Affect Balance Scale: Positive Affect items; ABSNEG = Affect Balance Scale: Negative Affect items; SWLS = Satisfaction With Life Scale; GHQ = General Health Questionnaire.

[b]R^2(Adj.) = Adjusted R squared.

= .11, SE B = .023, β = .29, p < .001). However, higher collectivism did not

predict lower negative affect. With respect to psychological distress, higher

collectivism predicted lower anomia (B = -.030, SE B = .008, β = -.25, p < .001)

but did not predict lower general distress.

In contrast to the earlier findings (i.e., Hypothesis 1), higher levels of the I/C

balance also predicted higher levels of positive affect (B = .024, SE B = .01, β =

.15, p < .05), but to a lesser extent than did higher levels of collectivism

(INDCOL). Hypothesis 5

It was hypothesized that higher levels of the I/C balance would better predict

greater subjective well-being and lower psychological distress than higher collectivism

alone. As can be seen in Table 4, the hypothesis was not supported. In fact, the

opposite was true. With respect to subjective well-being, higher collectivism better

predicted higher positive affect (B = .014, SE B = .005, β = .18, p < .01) and

greater life satisfaction (B = .11, SE B = .023, β = .29, p < .001) than did a

balance of values (B = .024, SE B = .01, β = .15, p < .05; B = .08, SE B =

.049, β = .11, p > .05, respectively). Similarly, higher collectivism better

predicted lower anomia (B = -.030, SE B = .008, β = -.25, p < .001) than did a

balance of values (B = .001, SE B = .016, β = .00, p > .05).

Post-Hoc Explanatory Analyses Regarding Hypotheses

A number of possibilities were explored in an attempt to understand the lack of

relationship between the values measures (I/C, IND, COL) and subjective well-being

and psychological distress.

Multicollinearity

One possibility is that multicollinearity between the I/C, IND, and COL measures

masked a relationship between these measures and subjective well-being and

psychological distress. To assess for multicollinearity, each of the three predictor

variables were regressed on the other two. Multiple regression analyses yielded

adjusted R square values ranging from .47 to .65. Although these values are

moderately high, they are within acceptable limits.

Participant Response Bias

A threat to the validity of any study, and one which is potentially heightened

when participants are students from introductory psychology courses, is the possibility

of a response bias or careless/haphazard responding. There was informal visual

evidence of such responding on the ratings of the Rokeach values. That is, some

respondents would repeat the same rating (e.g., 100) an inordinate number of times,

suggesting that they were not carefully considering their responses. Schwartz (1992)

makes reference to this problem with the participants in his research and discusses

how he attempted to reduce such error. In his research, if a respondent rated more

than 37.5% of the values as of "supreme importance" or used any other rating more

than 62.5% of the time, the respondent was dropped. Using the same criteria, the

responses of approximately 50 participants in the present study were eliminated and

the data was re-analyzed. However, this adjustment of the data did not appreciably

alter the results and so, in the interest of power, the responses obtained from the 50

participants were retained.

Construct Validity

A third, and more significant, threat to the validity of this study concerns whether or not the motivational domains accurately differentiated between individualist and collectivist beliefs. The construct validity of the Rokeach values was assessed in two ways: Examination of the correlation of the motivational domains with collectivism, as measured by the INDCOL scale, and examination of the intercorrelations of the motivational domains as predicted by Schwartz and Bilsky (Schwartz, 1990; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; 1990).

Correlations with collectivism (INDCOL scale). Table 5 provides the correlations between collectivism and the motivational domains. With the exception of the *enjoyment* domain, the relationship between collectivism and the motivational domains is consistent with what would be expected based on the breakdown of domains by value type (i.e., Collectivist, Individualist, and Mixed). That is, other than *enjoyment* (r = .22, p < .000), the individualist domains (*achievement* and *self-direction*) do not correlate with collectivism (r = .04, p = .544 and r = -.02, p < .755, respectively). The fact that higher levels of *enjoyment* motivation predict higher collectivism may not be entirely inconsistent with Schwartz and Bilsky's (1987, 1990; Schwartz, 1990, 1992) model. That is, it is expected that at least one of the individualist domains will be located in a position adjacent to the collectivist domains. It may be that, in the current sample, the *enjoyment* domain is so situated and, therefore, is positively correlated with collectivism. Consistent with theory, greater levels of all three collectivist domains (*prosocial, restrictive conformity*, and *security*)

Table 5

Correlations Between Collectivism (INDCOL Scale) and the
Motivational Domains (N = 249)

Motivational Domains   Collectivism

Achievement   .04

Enjoyment   .22*

Self-direction   -.02

Maturity   .21*

Prosocial   .39*

Restrictive Conformity   .25*

Security   .30*

*p < .001

correlate with greater collectivism (r = .39, .25, and .30, respectively; p < .000 for

all three correlations). Similarly, greater *maturity* motivation, representative of both

individual and collective interests, is predictive of greater collectivism (r = .21, p <

.000). As would be expected, however, it was not as strongly correlated as the

collectivist domains. Hence, the overall pattern of relationships between collectivism

and the motivational domains is consistent with expectations.

Correlations between motivational domains. The construct validity of the

motivational domains was also assessed by examining their intercorrelations. The

correlations between motivational domains obtained in this study were considered in

light of Schwartz and Bilsky's model (Schwartz, 1990; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987;

1990). As described above, Schwartz and Bilsky have postulated a circular order of

motivational domains. In this structure, the three individualist and three collectivist

motivational domains occupy adjacent wedges, with the common *maturity* domain

occupying a space either disecting or adjacent to the *self-direction* and/or *prosocial*

domains (see Figure 2). Also, as noted above, Schwartz and Bilsky have offered

criteria for the compatibility/conflict of motivational domains: If motivational

domains are separated by more than one other domain on the SSA diagram, they are

in conflict; if separated by only one domain, the compatibility is indeterminate; and if

adjacent, they are compatible. Further, the compatibility between two domains

determines the extent to which their respective values and, therefore, the domains

themselves will be correlated. For example, domains that are opposite each other in

the circular structure (i.e., separated by two or three domains) can be expected to be

negatively correlated, whereas those in adjacent wedges would be expected to positively correlate.

Table 6 provides the correlation matrix for the motivational domains. Both the zero-order and first-order correlations are given. The first-order correlations were obtained by partialling out each respondent's mean value rating, a statistical procedure advocated by Schwartz (1994). Schwartz states that individuals show a response tendency to rate all values in a set of values as more or less important relative to other respondents' ratings. As a result, basic (i.e., bivariate) correlational analyses tend to produce positive correlations among most values. Hence, factors based on raw value ratings are rarely bipolar. Partial correlation is a statistical procedure which removes the influence of a particular variable(s) from the relationship between two other variables (Diekhoff, 1992). In the present case, partialling out the mean value ratings has the effect of holding the mean value rating constant for all participants. Consequently, the intercorrelations between the motivational domains are reduced, thus clarifying the bipolar relationship between motivational domains.

Consistent with Schwartz's (1994) experience, an examination of the zero-order correlations (i.e., above the diagonal) revealed that all of the motivational domains were positively correlated. However, with the mean value ratings partialled out, the intercorrelations (below the diagonal) took on a bipolar structure which is, to some extent, consistent with the relationships obtained by Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990; Schwartz, 1990). In particular, the correlations found in the present study seem to best fit the domain structure depicted for the United States sample in the centre of

Table 6

Correlation Matrix for the Motivational Domains (N = 249)

Zero-order correlations are printed above the diagonal (D.F. = 249). First-order
correlations, obtained by partialling out each respondent's mean value rating, are printed
below the diagonal (D.F. = 245).

Variable	INDIVIDUALIST			MIXED	COLLECTIVIST		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Achievement	--	.49	.64	.58	.23	.45	.41
2. Enjoyment	.03	--	.50	.45	.35	.43	.56
3. Self-direction	.25	-.02	--	.63	.31	.39	.41
4. Maturity	.03	-.27	.08	--	.53	.47	.57
5. Prosocial	-.54	-.30	-.48	-.14	--	.46	.52
6. R. Conformity	-.12	-.16	-.32	-.31	-.14	--	.55
7. Security	-.26	.07	-.36	-.13	-.07	-.03	--

Figure 2. Figure 3 presents an enlarged representation of the United States

projection.

First, the three individualist motivational domains, *achievement, enjoyment,* and

self-direction, show neutral (r = -.02, p = .749) to positive (r = .25, p < .000)

intercorrelations (Table 6, single underline). Given that these are adjacent domains in

Schwartz and Bilsky's circular order of values, positive and/or neutral values are

appropriate. Consistent with the United States' domain projection (Figure 3), *self-*

direction and *achievement* had a moderate positive correlation (r = .25, p < .000).

Second, the individualist motivational domains are negatively correlated with the

collectivist domains (Table 6, bold), with the exception of *security* and *enjoyment* (r

= .07, p = .275). Negative correlations between the individualist and collectivist

motivational domains are expected in most cases, as they are typically opposite one

another in the circular order. The findings in the present sample are, again, quite

consistent with the domain projection from the U.S. sample (Figure 3). The one

major exception is the neutral correlation between the *security* and *enjoyment*

domains. This result may be attributable to the low internal consistency of the

security domain. That is, because the values which constitute the *security* domain are

not highly correlated, *security's* intercorrelations with other domains may be

questionable.

Third, the *maturity* domain, the one mixed (i.e., both individualist and

collectivist) domain, displayed neutral or negative correlations with the individualist

and collectivist domains (Table 6, horizontal and vertical redline, respectively).

·Figure 3

**Representation of the Motivational Domain Projection for the United States
(Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990).**

These findings are, again, relatively consistent with the domain projection for the

United States. The *maturity* domain is negatively correlated with *enjoyment* (r = -

.27, p = .000), neutrally correlated with *self-direction* (r = .08, p = .225) and

achievement (r = .03, p = .638), and negatively correlated with *restrictive*

conformity (r = -.31, p = .000) and *prosocial* (r = -.14, p = .026). Although it

was expected that the *prosocial* and *maturity* domains would yield a positive

correlation (i.e., as two adjacent domains), the U.S. projection suggests they may not

be as closely related. The exception is the negative correlation between *maturity* and

security (r = -.13, p = .035). Once again, this finding may be attributable to the

low internal consistency of the *security* domain.

Less consistent with predicted outcomes, the collectivist motivational domains

displayed more negative correlations with each other than expected (Table 6, double

underline). Although the negative correlations between the collectivist domains are

not large, the domains' theoretically close proximities in the circular order was

expected to produce at least two or three positive correlations. Looking at the U.S.

domain projection (Figure 3), the neutral correlation between *security* and *restrictive*

conformity (r = -.03, p = .651) is consistent, but the correlations between the

prosocial domain and both *security* (r = -.07, p = .287) and *restrictive conformity* (r

= -.14, p = .026) are not. It is noteworthy that the *prosocial* domain displayed

neutral to negative correlations with all the other domains, the latter two correlations

being the least negative. Hence, despite the negative correlations, the *prosocial*

domain is still most closely related to *security* and *restrictive conformity*. It is not

clear why the correlations in question are all negative.

Of particular concern to the present study is the finding that neither the *self-direction* nor the *prosocial* domains evidenced significant positive correlations with *maturity*. These three domains were combined with the expectation that they represented a positively related sampling of the "best elements" (i.e., those values likely to contribute to healthy psychological adjustment) of individualism and collectivism. However, if they are not positively related, indeed, if some of these elements are quite negatively related (i.e., *self-direction* and *prosocial*), then correlations of the individualism/collectivism balance with any of the study's other variables, including measures of subjective well-being, are highly unlikely.

In general, the above findings are mixed in terms of consistency with Schwartz and Bilsky's (1987, 1990; Schwartz, 1990) model. In light of these equivocal findings, the validity of the motivational domains as measured in the present study must be viewed cautiously.

Other Post-Hoc Analyses

Motivational Domains and Subjective Well-Being/Distress

The lack of significant relationships between the I/C balance and either subjective well-being (SWB) or psychological distress raises the question of whether any of the motivational domains are predictive of SWB or distress. Multiple regression analyses were conducted to assess this possibility. Each of the five measures of subjective well-being and psychological distress were regressed on the seven motivational domains. Table 7 presents the results. Greater *security* motivation predicted greater

Table 7

Multiple Regression Analyses (Direct Entry) for Motivational Domains Predicting Subjective Well-Being and Psychological Distress (N = 249)

Variable[a]	B	SE B	β	R^2(Adj.)[b]
Subjective Well-Being				
Analysis 1 - ABSPOS				.003
Achievement	.012	.011	.10	
Enjoyment	.006	.010	.05	
Self-Direction	.005	.011	.04	
Maturity	-.012	.013	-.09	
Prosocial	-.002	.010	-.01	
R.Conformity	.004	.007	.05	
Security	.025	.012	.18*	
Analysis 2 - ABSNEG				.043
Achievement	.007	.012	.05	
Enjoyment	.001	.012	.01	
Self-direction	.007	.013	.05	
Maturity	-.015	.014	-.11	
Prosocial	-.014	.011	-.11	
R.Conformity	.010	.008	.10	
Security	.016	.014	.11	
Analysis 3 - SWLS				.027
Achievement	-.011	.051	-.02	
Enjoyment	-.036	.051	-.06	
Self-Direction	.030	.055	.05	
Maturity	.037	.062	.06	
Prosocial	-.029	.048	-.05	
R.Conformity	.059	.034	.14	
Security	.080	.060	.12	

*p < .05. **p < .01.

[a]ABSPOS = Affect Balance Scale: Positive Affect items; ABSNEG = Affect Balance Scale: Negative Affect items; SWLS = Satisfaction With Life Scale.

[b]R^2(Adj.) = Adjusted R squared.

(Table 7 continued)

Variable	B	SE B	β	R²(Adj.)[b]
Psychological Distress				
Analysis 4 - GHQ[a]				.032
Achievement	-.038	.046	-.07	
Enjoyment	.132	.045	.24**	
Self-Direction	-.055	.050	-.10	
Maturity	-.033	.055	-.06	
Prosocial	.056	.043	.11	
R.Conformity	-.013	.031	-.03	
Security	-.098	.054	-.17	
Analysis 5 - ANOMIA				.000
Achievement	.008	.017	.05	
Enjoyment	.006	.016	.03	
Self-Direction	.001	.018	.01	
Maturity	-.034	.020	-.17	
Prosocial	-.005	.016	-.03	
R.Conformity	.006	.011	.05	
Security	.006	.019	.03	

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

[a]GHQ = General Health Questionnaire.

[b]R²(Adj.) = Adjusted R squared.

positive affect ($\underline{B}$ = .025, $\underline{SE} \ \underline{B}$ = .012, β = .18, $\underline{p}$ < .05) and greater *enjoyment*

motivation predicted greater psychological distress ($\underline{B}$ = .132, $\underline{SE} \ \underline{B}$ = .045, β =

.24, $\underline{p}$ < .01).

Collectivism Subscales and Subjective Well-Being/Distress

Given that collectivism was predictive of subjective well-being and psychological

distress, these latter measures were regressed on the six collectivism subscales to

determine if any of the subscales stood out as more predictive than the others. Table

8 presents the results of the multiple regression analyses. The findings reveal that

greater parental connectedness is predictive of greater positive affect ($\underline{B}$ = .044, $\underline{SE} \ \underline{B}$

= .015, β = .21, $\underline{p}$ < .01) and satisfaction with life ($\underline{B}$ = .313, $\underline{SE} \ \underline{B}$ = .071, β =

.31, $\underline{p}$ < .01), as well as lower anomia ($\underline{B}$ = -.058, $\underline{SE} \ \underline{B}$ = .023, β = -.18, $\underline{p}$ <

.05). Furthermore, the ability of greater parental connectedness to predict lower

levels of general mental distress approached significance ($\underline{B}$ = -.132, $\underline{SE} \ \underline{B}$ = .068, β

= -.14, $\underline{p}$ < .06). Greater connectedness with friends predicted greater satisfaction

with life ($\underline{B}$ = .185, $\underline{SE} \ \underline{B}$ = .089, β = .14, $\underline{p}$ < .05) and greater connectedness

with neighbours predicted lower anomia ($\underline{B}$ = -.071, $\underline{SE} \ \underline{B}$ =.023, β = -.20, $\underline{p}$ <

.01).

Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Subjective Well-Being/Distress

The relationship between measures of right-wing authoritarianism, subjective

well-being, and psychological distress were examined to compare with previous

findings (Adorno et al., 1950; Michael, 1967). Zero-order correlations between these

variables are presented in Table 9. Consistent with the literature, higher right-wing

Table 8

Multiple Regression Analyses (Direct Entry) for Collectivism Subscales Predicting Subjective Well-Being and Psychological Distress (N = 249)

Variable[a]	B	SE B	β	R^2(Adj.)[b]
Subjective Well-Being				
Analysis 1 - ABSPOS				.065
Spouse	-.006	.025	-.01	
Parent	.044	.015	.21**	
Kin	-.038	.025	-.11	
Neighbor	.028	.015	.12	
Friend	.032	.019	.12	
Co-worker	.001	.021	.01	
Analysis 2 - ABSNEG				.000
Spouse	.015	.029	.03	
Parent	.015	.017	.07	
Kin	-.026	.028	-.07	
Neighbor	.023	.017	.09	
Friend	.011	.022	.04	
Co-worker	-.001	.024	-.01	
Analysis 3 - SWLS				.131
Spouse	-.070	.117	-.04	
Parent	.313	.071	.31**	
Kin	-.072	.114	-.04	
Neighbor	.100	.071	.09	
Friend	.185	.089	.14*	
Co-worker	-.045	.097	-.03	

*p < .05.   **p < .01.

[a]ABSPOS = Affect Balance Scale: Positive Affect items; ABSNEG = Affect Balance Scale: Negative Affect items; SWLS = Satisfaction With Life Scale.

[b]R^2(Adj.) = Adjusted R squared.

(Table 8 continued)

Variable	B	SE B	β	R²(Adj.)[b]
Psychological Distress				
Analysis 4 - GHQ[a]				.016
Spouse	-.135	.113	-.08	
Parent	-.132	.068	-.14	
Kin	.015	.110	.01	
Neighbor	-.049	.068	-.05	
Friend	.004	.086	.01	
Co-worker	.133	.093	.10	
Analysis 5 - ANOMIA				.084
Spouse	.065	.038	.11	
Parent	-.058	.023	-.18*	
Kin	-.004	.037	-.01	
Neighbor	-.071	.023	-.20**	
Friend	-.006	.029	-.01	
Co-worker	-.007	.032	-.02	

*p < .05.   **p < .01.

[a]GHQ = General Health Questionnaire.

[b]R²(Adj.) = Adjusted R squared.

Table 9

Zero-Order Correlations Between Right-Wing Authoritarianism
and Measures of Subjective Well-Being and Psychological
Distress (N = 249)

Variable	Right-Wing Authoritarianism
	r

Subjective Well-Being

Affect Balance Scale:	
Positive Affect Items	-.03
Negative Affect Items	.03
Satisfaction With Life Scale	.04

Psychological Distress

General Health Questionnaire	-.05
Anomia Scale	-.01

authoritarianism is not predictive of either lower subjective well-being or higher

psychological distress.

Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Motivational Domains, and Values

Correlational analyses were also conducted to assess the relationships between

right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and the seven motivational domains. The results

are presented in Table 10. As can be seen in the first column, higher RWA predicts

higher levels of both *prosocial* (r = .37, p < .01) and *restrictive conformity* (r =

.41, p < .01) motivation. In contrast, higher RWA predicts lower *self-direction*

motivation (r = -.14, p < .05). These findings are fairly consistent with previous

research (Adorno et al., 1950; Gelfand et al., 1996; Rokeach, 1973). Like Gelfand et

al.'s (1996) conception of a continuum with individualism and authoritarianism on

opposite poles, *self-direction* and *restrictive conformity* could be considered the

comparable polar counterparts in Schwartz and Bilsky's (1987, 1990; Schwartz, 1990)

circular order. This would also tend to fit with Rokeach's (1973) finding that high

scorers on authoritarianism rank *family security, polite,* and *clean* significantly higher

than low scorers, and they rank being *ambitious, independent,* and *broadminded*

significantly lower. Furthermore, it was expected that high *prosocial* motivation

would be related to greater RWA, given that *restrictive conformity* and *prosocial* are

adjacent domains. However, it was not expected that the correlation would be

essentially as high as the correlation between RWA and *restrictive conformity*.

Prosocial motivation contains some characteristics that are not typically used to

characterize RWA (e.g., forgiving, helpful).

Table 10

Correlations Between Right-Wing Authoritarianism and the
Motivational Domains (N = 249)

Motivational Domain	Right-Wing Authoritarianism	
	Zero-order r	First-order[a] r

Achievement	.11	.13*
Enjoyment	.01	.08
Self-Direction	-.14*	-.12
Maturity	.10	-.01
Prosocial	.37**	.05
R.Conformity	.41**	.35**
Security	.11	.04

*p < .05. **p < .01.

[a]Religiosity partialled out.

.

To provide greater clarity, a correlational analysis was conducted to assess the

relationship between RWA and each of the Rokeach values. The results are presented

in Table 11 in the first column. These correlations are largely consistent with

previous findings and suggest that people who are higher on RWA place lower value

on *equality, freedom*, and being *broadminded*. The latter two individualistic values

connote individual choice and tolerance. *Equality* contrasts with the authoritarian

aggression and in-group prejudice fundamental to RWA. The results also indicate

that people who are higher on RWA place greater value on *a world at peace, family*

and national security, salvation, and *social recognition*, as well as on being

ambitious, clean, courageous, forgiving, helpful, honest, obedient, polite, responsible,

and *self-controlled*. A number of these values are consistent with the authoritarian

submission (e.g., *obedient*), conventionalism (e.g., *polite, self-controlled, clean*), and

fear of others (e.g., *national security*) characteristic of RWA. However, the other

related values are not typically used to describe individuals high in RWA. The highly

significant correlation between RWA and *salvation* (r = .58, p < .01) provided a

clue as to a possible explanation.

Given the well recognized relationship between religiosity and RWA (Adorno et

al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1981, 1988; Hunsberger, 1995), statistically confirmed in the

present study (r = .71, p < .001), it was speculated that certain correlations between

RWA and the Rokeach values may be attributable to religiosity. To test this theory,

religiosity was partialled out of the relationship between RWA and the Rokeach

values and, conversely, RWA was partialled out of the relationship between religiosity

Table 11

Correlations Between Right-Wing Authoritarianism and the
Rokeach Values (N = 249)

Rokeach Values	Right-Wing Authoritarianism	
	Zero-order r	First-order[a] r
A Comfortable Life	.02	.19**
An Exciting Life	-.11	.03
A Sense of Accomplishment	-.02	-.02
A World at Peace	.13*	.01
A World of Beauty	.01	-.01
Equality	-.19**	-.24**
Family Security	.14*	.07
Freedom	-.16*	-.20**
Happiness	-.12	-.14*
Inner Harmony	-.04	-.11
Mature Love	-.05	-.08
National Security	.16*	.19**
Pleasure	-.04	.07
Salvation	.58**	.15*
Self-Respect	.04	-.03
Social Recognition	.16*	.14*
True Friendship	.01	-.10
Wisdom	.12	.04
Ambitious	.14*	.10
Broadminded	-.34**	-.30**
Capable	.02	.02
Cheerful	.11	.03
Clean	.15*	.16*
Courageous	.20**	.02
Forgiving	.35**	.13*
Helpful	.27**	.10
Honest	.20**	.07
Imaginative	-.05	-.07
Independent	-.09	-.06
Intellectual	-.08	-.08
Logical	.01	.01
Loving	.10	.06
Obedient	.52**	.43**
Polite	.24**	.18**
Responsible	.17**	.08
Self-Controlled	.28**	.22**

*p < .05.   **p < .01.
[a]Religiosity partialled out.

and the Rokeach values. This procedure makes it possible to assess which of the two variables accounts more for significant relationships with the Rokeach values (c.f. Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1993). The extent to which the correlation between RWA and a particular Rokeach value decreases when religiosity is partialled out will suggest how much religiosity is accountable for the relationship. Conversely, the extent to which the correlation between religiosity and a particular Rokeach value decreases when RWA is partialled out will suggest how much RWA is accountable for the relationship.

The second column in Table 10 contains the correlation coefficients between RWA and the motivational domains with religiosity partialled out. Table 12 presents both the zero-order and first-order correlation coefficients between religiosity and the motivational domains, the first-order correlations having been derived by partialling out RWA. An examination of Tables 10 and 12 reveals that religiosity appears to largely account for the apparent relationship between the *prosocial* domain and RWA, whereas RWA largely accounts for the correlation with *restrictive conformity*. These findings are consistent with the literature which demonstrates the similarity between RWA and *restrictive conformity* (Adorno et al., 1950; Gelfand et al., 1996; Rokeach, 1973).

Likewise, the second column of numbers in Table 11 contains the correlation coefficients between RWA and the Rokeach values, with religiosity partialled out. Table 13 presents both the zero-order and first-order correlation coefficients between religiosity and the Rokeach values, the first-order correlations having been derived by

Table 12

Correlations Between Religiosity and the Motivational Domains (N = 249)

Motivational Domain	Religiosity	
	Zero-order r	First-order[a] r

Achievement	.02	-.07*
Enjoyment	-.07	-.11
Self-Direction	-.08	-.03
Maturity	.16*	.12
Prosocial	.49**	.34**
R.Conformity	.25**	-.07
Security	.11	.05

*p < .05.   **p < .01.

[a]Right-wing authoritarianism partialled out.

Table 13

Correlations Between Religiosity and the Rokeach Values (N = 249)

Rokeach Values	Religiosity Zero-order r	First-order[a] r
A Comfortable Life	-.17**	-.25**
An Exciting Life	-.19**	-.15*
A Sense of Accomplishment	-.03	-.01
A World at Peace	.17**	.12
A World of Beauty	.02	.02
Equality	-.02	.16*
Family Security	.13*	.04
Freedom	-.02	.12
Happiness	-.02	.09
Inner Harmony	.02	.09
Mature Love	.02	.07
National Security	.03	-.11
Pleasure	-.11	-.13*
Salvation	.71**	.52**
Self-Respect	.07	.07
Social Recognition	.08	-.04
True Friendship	.11	.14*
Wisdom	.14*	.07
Ambitious	.08	-.02
Broadminded	-.19**	.08
Capable	.02	.01
Cheerful	.13*	.07
Clean	.04	-.08
Courageous	.24**	.16*
Forgiving	.35**	.24**
Helpful	.27**	.13*
Honest	.21**	.10
Imaginative	-.01	.05
Independent	-.07	-.01
Intellectual	-.05	.02
Logical	-.01	-.01
Loving	.08	.01
Obedient	.32**	-.07
Polite	.15*	-.02
Responsible	.17**	.07
Self-Controlled	.16*	-.04

*p < .05. **p < .01.
[a]Right-wing authoritarianism partialled out.

partialling out RWA.

The results of these statistical procedures seem to support the idea that religiosity is largely accountable for the apparent relationship between RWA and the values *a world at peace*, *salvation*, *courageous*, and *forgiving*. Both variables appear to equally account for the relationship between RWA and the values *family security*, *helpful*, *honest*, and *responsible*. Hence, higher RWA seems to most clearly predict lower valuing of *equality*, *freedom*, and being *broadminded* and higher valuing of *national security*, *social recognition*, and being *ambitious*, *clean*, *obedient*, *polite*, and *self-controlled*. Other than *ambitious*, which was only weakly correlated with RWA, these latter 10 values appear to be representative of those values most often cited in the literature as characteristic of RWA (Adorno et al., 1950; Gelfand et al., 1996; Rokeach, 1973).

Structural Equation Model of Study's Main Variables

The main purpose of this study was to test the hypothesis that the I/C balance (i.e., *self-direction*, *maturity*, and *prosocial*), theoretically identified as the "best" that individualism/collectivism have to offer toward psychological health, would be associated with greater subjective well-being and lower psychological distress than either individualism or collectivism alone. However, out of interest, a number of additional variables were included in the questionnaire completed by the study's participants. Based on the literature, some of these variables (i.e., coping and social support) were expected to function as mediators in the relationship between the aforementioned motivational domains and measures of subjective well-being and

psychological distress. It is statistically difficult, however, to test models with multiple, intercorrelated variables which serve as both dependent and independent measures. Structural equation modelling (SEM) is a statistical technique designed to test complex models such as these. Hence, while not required by this study's hypotheses, SEM was used in an exploratory manner in an attempt to better understand the relationships between the variables under consideration. Before examining the proposed model, a brief overview of SEM will be given, as it is a sophisticated and, for many, poorly understood statistical technique.

Structural equation modelling. Structural equation modelling (SEM) is a statistical technique which combines confirmatory factor analysis and path analysis. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) involves specifying the relationship between observed and latent variables. A latent variable is the unobserved construct presumed to predict measured variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). For example, the underlying construct of approach coping is presumed to influence the scores on the measures of cognitive and behavioural approach coping (see Figure 4). In SEM, circles represent latent constructs and rectangles represent measured variables. CFA is also referred to as the measurement model. An advantage of using a measurement model is the ability to estimate the parameters while correcting for the biasing effects of random measurement error. Measurement error can be estimated and explicitly removed from the model by specifying a measurement error term set to (1 - reliability). This is explained further below in the analysis section. The removal of error variance is not possible with multiple regression. In SEM, path analysis, or the

Figure 4
Initial Model

structural model, specifies the predicted relationships between latent constructs.

SEM allows for the simultaneous testing of both the measurement and structural model. This testing provides estimates of the relationships specified in the model. These estimates are then used to reconstruct the correlation (or covariance) matrix which is then compared to the actual matrix. This comparison gives an indication of the extent to which the model fits the simple data. This fit is assessed in a variety of ways, as discussed below.

The theoretical model. The theoretical model for the SEM will be described by systematically proceeding through the graphical representation presented in Figure 4. Many of the relationships to be tested by SEM have already been discussed above and used to generate the main hypotheses for this study. Hence, this section will only summarize the relevant supporting information. For an expanded discussion, please refer back to the theoretical model described under Present Study.

Referring to Figure 4, then, higher levels of the latent construct social support was expected to predict higher levels of approach coping. This expectation is based on the resources model of coping (Holahan & Moos, 1987, 1990, 1991; Holahan, Moos, Holahan, & Brennan, 1997) which has linked social support with psychological adjustment through coping. Holahan and Moos (1987) have found that people with higher levels of social support tend to rely more on approach coping, such as positive reappraisal, and less on avoidance coping, especially emotional discharge.

Higher levels of the mixed motivational domains were expected to predict (a) higher levels of social support, (b) higher levels of approach coping, and (c) higher

levels of positive psychological adjustment. Each of these relationships is depicted in Figure 4 and discussed in greater detail above.

Greater collectivism, as discussed above, was assumed to be linked with a greater sense of connectedness and was, therefore, expected to predict greater levels of social support. It was also theorized that higher levels of collectivism would, as a result of the positive mindset (e.g., meaning in life; see Crandall, 1975) produced by a sense of relatedness, predict higher levels of approach coping (via positive reappraisal) and positive psychological adjustment.

Collectivism and the mixed motivational domains were connected with a bi-directional arrow to indicate an unanalyzed relationship. The arrow signifies covariance between the two variables but with no predicted direction of effect.

Finally, greater approach coping was expected to predict greater positive psychological adjustment as has been demonstrated in previous research (Holahan & Moos, 1990, 1991; Moos, 1988; Valentiner, Holahan, & Moos, 1994). These researchers have found that more approach coping is associated with better psychological outcomes and more avoidance coping with poorer outcomes.

Analyses. The model, as shown in Figure 4, was tested using structural equation modelling (LISREL8; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993). For those latent constructs for which there was only one observed variable (i.e., mixed motivational domains, social support, and collectivism), the indicator loading for each latent construct was set to 1 in the unstandardized solution. For approach coping and positive psychological adjustment, both the Percentage Cognitive Approach Coping and General Health

Questionnaire were also set to 1. The path for at least one indicator must be set to 1 to establish the scale of the latent construct. This is required for parameter estimation to proceed.

In this study, random measurement error was corrected using an approach proposed by Bollen (1989), whereby the error term for each observed variable is set to (1 - reliability) x (variance) of the construct. Because a correlation matrix was used in the analysis (i.e., variance = 1), the measurement error was set to (one minus the reliability). Internal consistency measures were used as reliability terms. Zero-order correlations, means, and standard deviations for the study variables are presented in Table 14.

The LISREL analysis used in this study allows the path model to be evaluated in several ways: t-tests of specific path coefficients, goodness of fit indices, and modification indices (MI). LISREL uses a maximum likelihood procedure when estimating the paths specified by the researcher. In LISREL, t-tests are used to determine the strength of a path and to see if each hypothesized path is essential to the model. A t statistic is considered statistically significant at $p < .05$ if it is greater than 1.96 and at $p < .01$ if it is greater than 2.56 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). The sign of the t-value is interpreted in the same way as a correlation coefficient.

Four goodness of fit measures were used to assess model fit: (a) χ^2; (b) goodness of fit index (GFI); (c) adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI); and (d) the root mean squared residual (RMR). A small, nonsignificant ($p > .05$) χ^2 value indicates that a model is consistent with the data. With large samples, however, even small

Table 14

Zero-Order Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations for the SEM Variables (N = 249)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	$\bar{x}$	SD
1. Collectivism (INDCOL)	--	.28	-.22	.32	.20	-.10	-.02	.11	203.64	17.62
2. I/C Balance		--	-.04	.18	.15	-.10	.06	.16	81.49	8.36
3. Social Support			--	-.13	-.18	.08	-.06	-.13	28.43	10.66
4. Satisfaction With Life				--	.53	-.51	.18	.31	22.09	6.56
5. Affect Balance Scale					--	-.64	.20	.24	6.52	2.19
6. General Health Questionnaire						--	-.32	-.36	24.15	5.92
7. Behavioral Approach Coping							--	.36	.68	.23
8. Cognitive Approach Coping								--	.58	.21

differences between the sample and estimated population are significant (Tabachnick

& Fidell, 1996). As a result, other methods of assessing the fit of a model are also

used. The GFI ranges from 0 to 1, and indicates both the amount of variance and

covariance in the data set accounted for by the model. Values greater than .90

indicate a reasonable model fit (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). The AGFI is a

modification of the GFI and takes into account the number of cases, as well as the

number of observed variables in relation to the number of latent constructs in the

model. The AGFI also ranges between 0 and 1. As with the GFI, values greater

than .90 indicate a reasonable model fit. The RMR assesses the variance and

covariance not accounted for in the model (i.e., residual). The RMR ranges from 0

to 1; values less than .05 are desired (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).

Another way in which the LISREL program permits evaluation of a model is by

providing modification indices (MI). Indices are computed for every possible path

between variables in the model. Modification indices provide information to the

researcher as to the improvement in model fit that would result by freeing (i.e.,

adding) additional paths. A MI of greater than 5.00 indicates that freeing that path

would decrease the χ^2 for the model by at least 5.00, thus enhancing the model's fit

(Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1986).

Results. The LISREL analysis of the model yielded a good fit with the data.

Although it produced an overall χ^2 value of 35.9 with 14 degrees of freedom (p =

.001), the GFI was .96, the RMR was .04, and the AGFI was .91.

The results are displayed in Figure 5. The numbers next to the paths are the path

Figure 5
Final Model

coefficients. The numbers next to the dashed arrows are error terms.

The path between collectivism and social support was significant (p < .01), supporting the view that greater collectivism is predictive of greater social support. Similarly, greater collectivism was also predictive of more positive psychological adjustment (p < .01). This supports the view that collectivism leads to a sense of meaning and relatedness conducive to positive psychological adjustment. However, greater collectivism was not directly related to approach coping. The path between social support and approach coping was very nearly significant (p < .052). Nonetheless, this borderline finding was obviously lower than expected based on existing research (Holahan & Moos, 1987, 1990, 1991; Holahan, Moos, Holahan, & Brennan, 1997). Social support and the mixed motivational domains were positively correlated as expected.

The path between the mixed motivational domains and approach coping was also significant. Hence, although the mixed motivational domains were not directly predictive of positive psychological adjustment, they appear to be indirectly related to greater positive psychological adjustment via greater approach coping. This finding supports the theory that *maturity* and *self-direction* are predictive of higher levels of approach coping and lower levels of avoidance. The mixed motivational domains were not predictive of higher social support. Greater approach coping was highly predictive of more positive psychological adjustment, consistent with previous research (Holahan & Moos, 1987, 1990, 1991; Holahan, Moos, Holahan, & Brennan, 1997).

The MI's indicated that additional paths would not significantly improve the fit of the model. It should be noted that, although the structural equation model fits the data quite well, the goodness of fit only indicates how the model fits the data, not the extent to which the variables are related. In other words, given the variables tested, this model depicts their relationships well. However, as is evident from Figure 5, many of these relationships are not substantive.

Discussion

The main purpose of this study was to test the theory that a mix of individualist/collectivist motivational domains (i.e., *self-direction*, *maturity*, and *prosocial*), theoretically identified as the "best" that individualism/collectivism have to offer toward psychological health, would be associated with greater subjective well-being and lower psychological distress than either individualism or collectivism alone. What the study revealed was that none of the motivational domains nor any particular combination of domains (i.e., mixeo, individualist, collectivist) was predictive of subjective well-being or psychological distress.

Why Weren't the Hypotheses Supported?

There are a number of possible explanations for the lack of relationship between the motivational domains, or any combination of them, and measures of subjective well-being and psychological distress.

Motivational Domains as Predictors of Well-Being/Distress

The simplest explanation is that the mixed motivational domains construct, or any single motivational domain, is too heterogenous to predict subjective psychological

states. The lack of research in this area makes comparison with other such studies impossible. However, research in the field of value-behaviour consistency can be brought to bear on this subject, as behaviour can be considered a precursor to subjective psychological states. Some researchers have maintained that values, in general, have little predictive utility with respect to people's actual behaviour (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; Wicker, 1969). However, this view does not seem warranted given the research findings to the contrary (e.g., Ball-Rokeach, Rokeach, & Grube, 1984; Grube, Mayton, & Ball-Rokeach, 1994; Rokeach, 1973, 1979).

In recent years, research has focussed on variables hypothesized to influence value-behaviour consistency (e.g., Maio & Olson, 1994; Wojciszke, 1987; Zanna, Higgins, & Herman, 1982). Feather (1995) has argued that values have "long-term effects on a person's behavior, functioning to influence both the short-term and long-term goals that become salient for a person and the selection of plans and actions that relate to these goals" (p. 1136). Consistent with the aforementioned researchers, who have postulated intervening variables, Feather suggests that one important way in which values exert their effects on behavior is by influencing which objects and events within a person's psychological environment have a positive and negative valence (i.e., perceived attractiveness) in a given situation.

> Thus, values affect the way a person construes or defines a situation so that some objects, activities, and potential outcomes are seen as attractive, or positively valent, whereas others are seen as aversive, or negatively valent. (p. 1136)

Feather (1995) found evidence that value-induced valences served as mediators

between people's self-reported values on the Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz, 1992)

and their choice of value-related scenarios (e.g., a student choosing to study alone or

with others in an exam scenario). Although both valences (i.e., perceived

attractiveness of a scenario alternative) and, to a lesser extent, self-reported values

were related to respondents' choices, the results of multiple regression analyses

indicated that the effects of values on choice were mediated by the valences.

This proposed mechanism by which values impact behavior might help to explain

the current study's results. In the final model generated by structural equation

modelling (SEM; see Figure 5), although the mixed motivational domains (*prosocial*,

maturity, and *self-direction*) were not predictive of social support, they were

positively related to higher collectivism (INDCOL scale; Hui & Triandis, 1986; Hui,

1988) which, in turn, was predictive of higher social support. The INDCOL scale, as

discussed in the introduction, requires respondents to indicate the extent of their

agreement with a variety of situation- and target-specific situations (e.g., "I like to

live close to my good friends") considered to be reflective of collectivist concerns.

Borrowing from Feather's (1995) reasoning, collectivism, as measured by the

INDCOL scale, might be considered to represent the valences which mediate between

a respondent's values (e.g., mixed motivational domains) and behavior (e.g., social

support). Although these latter variables are not truly mediated by collectivism in a

statistical sense (i.e., given that the mixed motivational domains and social support

were not significantly correlated), collectivism could be seen as indirectly linking the

mixed motivational domains and social support.

Indirect linkages, such as those listed above, may help to clarify the apparent lack of relationship between motivational domains and subjective well-being/distress. As noted above, Kasser and Ryan (1993) found that individuals who held financial success as a more central aspiration than self-acceptance (i.e., *self-direction* and *maturity*), affiliation, or community feeling (*prosocial*), reported less self-actualization, less vitality, more depression, and more anxiety. Kasser and Ryan theorized that individuals aspiring for wealth may ignore or be distracted from investing in the psychologically beneficial pursuits of social interaction, self-examination, or investment in social concerns. Regardless, Kasser and Ryan's study revealed that aspirations (e.g., "You will help people in need") were predictive of subjective well-being and psychological distress. To a large extent, Kasser and Ryan extrapolated these aspirations from Schwartz and Bilsky's (1987, 1990; Schwartz, 1990) motivational domains. Hence, these findings support the role of aspirations as an indirect link between values and subjective well-being/distress.

Similarly, in the present study, approach coping served as an indirect link between the mixed motivational domains and positive adjustment. As noted above, the *self-direction* domain was derived from theoretical work concerning organismic needs for control and mastery, and interactional requirements of autonomy and independence (Schwartz, 1992). Valentiner, Holohan, and Moos (1994) have linked these qualities with more direct coping efforts and less avoidance. The use of approach coping strategies has been connected with greater subjective well-being and

less psychological distress (Holahan & Moos, 1990, 1991; Valentiner, Holahan, & Moos, 1994).

Although the mixed motivational domains were not predictive of subjective well-being and psychological distress, it would seem premature to discount their impact on psychological health. Rather, it may be beneficial to study the relationship between motivational domains and psychological health in connection with linking variables.

Validity of the Motivational Domains

A second possible explanation for the lack of relationship between the mixed motivational domains and measures of subjective well-being and psychological distress is that the Rokeach values did not accurately assess the individualist and collectivist value domains. As discussed in the results section, the motivational domains did not always correlate with each other or collectivism in the expected manner.

In recent years, Schwartz (1992, 1994; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995) has developed a more refined version of the values model which includes several modifications of the earlier version. First, he has included three new universal motivational domains (power, stimulation, tradition) yielding a more comprehensive assessment of values. Second, on conceptual and empirical grounds, he has modified the definitions and contents of four of the earlier motivational domains (enjoyment, maturity, prosocial, and security). With respect to the enjoyment domain, all but one of its constituent values (Pleasure) used in the early model were dropped and Enjoying Life was added. Schwartz (1992) indicated that the value Happiness was deleted, as it was found to relate closely to all domains. Schwartz

stated that these changes to the *enjoyment* domain yielded a more sharply defined motivational goal that was more clearly derived from organismic needs. The name of the domain was changed from *enjoyment* to *hedonism*. These changes are particularly relevant to the current study because *enjoyment* appeared to be the domain most often out of line with predicted outcomes. Also of significance to the current study, in Schwartz's new model the universal subset of the *prosocial* values (i.e., a world at peace, equality) became part of the *maturity* domain. See Figure 6 for a graphic representation of the 10 universal motivational domains.

To adequately sample the 10 universal motivational value types, Schwartz (1992) employed a 56-item value survey. Twenty-one of the values are identical to those in the Rokeach Value Survey (Rokeach, 1973). It is a more complete list, permitting what Schwartz (1992) believes to be a fairly comprehensive assessment of universal values.

Another improvement upon the current study is the rating method (Schwartz, 1992). Schwartz and Bilsky (1990) found distinct regions within the projection of values occupied almost exclusively by terminal or by instrumental values. Schwartz and Bilsky acknowledged that this finding could support the meaningfulness of the instrumental-terminal distinction and method of organizing people's values. However, that this same distinction appeared in studies that utilized only values in terminal form or in Chinese, a language which precludes discrimination between instrumental and terminal values, they postulated that the distinction might be an artifact of the serial order in which the values were rated. Schwartz and Bilsky (1990) did not offer an

Figure 6

Circular Order of Ten Motivational
Domains (Schwartz 1992).

Self-Transcendence

UNIVERSALISM | BENEVOLENCE

SELF-DIRECTION

TRADITION

CONFORMITY

Openness
to Change

Conser-
vation

STIMULATION

SECURITY

HEDONISM

ACHIEVEMENT | POWER

Self-Enhancement

explanation for how an order effect might produce a distinction between instrumental

and terminal values. Schwartz (1992) has speculated that "as respondents go through

the questionnaire, they may shift their subjective scale of importance as they

encounter values of greater or lesser importance than those encountered previously"

(p. 16). In an effort to minimize such shifts in a respondent's scale of importance,

Schwartz (1992) implemented an anchoring technique. Participants pre-read the value

lists and anchor ratings by rating the highest and lowest values first. This procedure

reduces spurious rating differences between instrumental and terminal values.

Furthermore, Schwartz (1992) employs a nine-point rating scale rather than a

ranking procedure, which may be less intimidating for participants and permit them to

provide better relative ratings of a value's importance.

The reason Schwartz's (1992) value scale was not employed in the current study

was because of problems obtaining the 1992 article and this experimenter's belief, at

the time, that the Rokeach Value Survey was a better documented measure.

However, given the substantial changes that Schwartz made to his model, and its wide

use in the past several years, it would be worthwhile to retest Hypothesis 1 using the

self-direction, *universalism*, and *benevolence* domains from the newer model. These

domains correspond to the *self-direction*, *maturity*, and *prosocial* domains in the

earlier model.

Moreover, the inclusion of the *power* domain adds an element to Schwartz's

(1992) model which would be interesting to examine in relation to

individualism/collectivism. Power motivation has been linked with negative health

correlates such as drinking, using drugs, gambling, and aggression (Winter, 1988).

Similarly, Emmons (1991) found that personal strivings for power (i.e., desires to

control, impress, or manipulate others) were associated with more negative affect and

more distress. In Schwartz's (1992) revised circular order of motivational domains

(see Figure 6), the *power* domain is situated opposite to and, therefore, in conflict

with, the *self-direction*, *universalism*, and *benevolence* domains. It would be

interesting to contrast the ability of the mixed domains (i.e., *self-direction*,

universalism, and *benevolence*) with that of the *power* domain to predict subjective

well-being and psychological distress. Such a study might provide greater

discrimination between the positive and negative aspects of individualism and

collectivism.

Collectivism as a Predictor of Well-Being/Distress

A third possible explanation for the lack of relationship between the mixed

motivational domains and measures of subjective well-being and psychological distress

may be that collectivism, alone, is the best predictor of subjective well-being/distress.

Although all the motivational domains fared poorly in predicting subjective well-

being/distress, higher levels of the collectivistic domains were predictive of greater

satisfaction with life. Similarly, higher collectivism (as measured by the INDCOL

scale) was predictive of greater positive affect and satisfaction with life, and lower

levels of anomia. These findings are consistent with previous research results which

have shown collectivism to be positively related to better psychological health (Naroll,

1983; Triandis et al., 1985; Davidson & Cotter, 1991). The direct relationship of

collectivism to psychological adjustment, as evidenced in the results from the

structural equation model, can be interpreted as support for the conclusions of

theorists such as Frankl (1967) and Adler (1959). These theorists have suggested that

self-transcendence (i.e., the motivation to transcend selfish concerns and promote the

welfare of others and nature) is beneficial in finding meaning in life.

Support for the Mixed Motivational Domain Construct

It is interesting to note the correspondence between the mixed motivational

domains and other theoretical constructions. Schwartz (1992) has postulated higher

order value types in his current circular order of values (see Figure 6). Figure 6

depicts the grouping of the motivational domains into four higher order value types

(separated by bolded lines) and the two bipolar dimensions along which they are

organized. One dimension places the higher order value of self-transcendence (i.e.,

universalism and *benevolence*) in opposition to self-enhancement (i.e., *power*,

achievement, and *hedonism*). This dimension "arrays values in terms of the extent to

which they motivate people to enhance their own personal interests (even at the

expense of others) versus the extent to which they motivate people to transcend selfish

concerns and promote the welfare of others, close and distant, and of nature"

(Schwartz, 1992, pp. 43-44). The second dimension places openness to change (i.e.,

self-direction and *stimulation*) in opposition to conservation (*security*, *conformity*, and

tradition). This dimension "arrays values in terms of the extent to which they

motivate people to follow their own intellectual and emotional interests in

unpredictable and uncertain directions versus to preserve the status quo and the

certainty it provides in relationships with close others, institutions, and traditions" (p. 43). As can be seen, *hedonism* is bordered by dashed lines, indicating that it shares some elements with both the openness to change and self-enhancement higher order value types.

Schwartz (1994) has pointed out the similarity between some of his higher-order value types and independently derived polar dimensions. For example, Schwartz (1994) has commented on the similarity between Eysenck's (1954) tough/tendermindedness dimension and his own self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence dimension. He has also compared Fromm's (1949) humanistic vs. authoritarian conscience typology with the opposition of the adjacent *universalism* and *self-direction* domains to the adjacent *power*, *security*, and *conformity* domains. In the current study, it can be argued that the mixed motivational domains represented part of the openness to change and the self-transcendence higher order value types. Using Eysenck's and Fromm's constructions, the mixed motivational domains represent tendermindedness and humanism.

Similarly, it has already been noted that O'Brien and Delongis (1996) have identified that the personality factors Openness to Experience and Agreeableness tend to be positively related to more effective coping. As indicated above, these personality factors would appear to correspond to the mixed motivation domains examined in the present study. In support of this conceptual link, the current study found that higher levels of the mixed motivational domains was associated with higher levels of approach coping.

Much more recently, Prilleltensky (1997) has argued for the benefits of a mix of particular value types. He has proposed an "emancipatory communitarian approach" for psychology that would both promote caring for disadvantaged people and seek to change the social and political conditions that perpetuate suffering. As part of this approach, he advocates a "balance" among five different values or value groupings: 1) self-determination, 2) caring and compassion, 3) collaboration and democratic participation, 4) human diversity, and 5) distributive justice. These categories fit well with the mixed motivational domains advocated in the current study. In essence, the *self-direction* domain coincides with self-determination, *prosocial* with caring and compassion, and *maturity* with the latter three value categories. Prilleltensky mentions that these values need to "operate in concert." He also suggests that the values that should be emphasized at any one time will depend on the context in which a person presently exists. To clarify, Prilleltensky states the following:

> The particular configuration of values to be promoted depends on the time,
> place, and interests of those involved. Whereas economically advantaged
> people suffering from chronic illness may need caring and compassion more
> than other values, poor single mothers may have a more pressing need for
> money than for signs of compassion. (p. 521)

Although Prilleltensky is here Referring primarily to the benefits received by the recipients of value-driven behaviours, the beneficial effects of a 'concert of values' may also apply to the agents of such action. Prilleltensky's concert of values may have particular relevance for the current study. Although the mixed motivational

domains may indeed promote the greatest well-being over the long term, a one-time 'snapshot' as obtained in this study may be misleading. That is, each participant came to the study from unique life circumstances and may have been in need of, or gaining well-being from, the emphasis of a particular configuration of values. Such considerations invite a more formal critique of the present study in light of postmodernist theory and standpoint epistemology.

A Non-Positivist Critique

One of the principles of standpoint epistemology and the postmodernist movement is that the life context in which an individual exists is not "error" that needs to be partialled out of research but critical information that needs to be accounted for in arriving at meaningful conclusions (Osbeck, 1993). The one-time cross-sectional approach employed in the current study is more consistent with the logical positivism of the traditional scientific enterprise, a paradigm which assumes the existence of universal, ahistorical truths. Postmodernism, which challenges the idea of a single meaning of reality and a single truth (e.g., K. Gergen, 1988; Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1990), and standpoint epistemologies argue that such cross-sectional analyses strip the behaviour under investigation of the social context, thus ruling out consideration of sociocultural and historical factors (Fine & Gordon, 1989; Rappaport, 1990; Riger, 1992, 1993). As a result, traditional scientific research, with its focus on intrapsychic explanations, attributes personality traits to "natural dispositions" rather than contextually determined behaviours (Fine, 1985; M. Gergen, 1988; Riger, 1997). Hence, it could be argued that a "snapshot" study is inadequate

when it comes to assessing the complex relationships between values representative of individualism/collectivism and measures of subjective well-being and distress. Riger (1997) contrasts "snapshot-type research" as was used in the present study with a "videotape epistemology." Such "videotape" methods include considering people's behaviour over time and within various contexts, multiple levels of focus (i.e., microlevel and macrolevel factors), and the views of multiple participants.

As Prilleltensky (1997) suggests, the beneficial effects of emphasizing a particular value at any one point in life depends on one's social context. Riger (1993) offers a poignant example of the conditional benefits of holding particular values when she contrasts the experiences of two rape victims. Migael, is a white middle-class woman who was raped by a stranger in a laundromat. She was empowered over time by her use of the resources available to her through medical, social, and criminal justice services. Ultimately, Migael successfully prosecuted the rapist. In contrast, Altavese is "a poor black mother of three, gang-raped while drinking with some women friends in a poor, high-crime neighborhood" (p. 287). She refused to prosecute the rapists out of concern for the rest of her family who may have ended up suffering due to retaliation. Whereas Migael took the route of defending her individual rights (individualism) safeguarded by her middle-class circumstances, Altavese opted to protect her family (i.e., social connectedness), who would not have had the same protection as Migael's family.

Roberts and Helson (1997) accounted for socio-historical context when they examined the influence of individualism in a longitudinal study of women. Seventy-

seven women were tracked between 1958 and 1989 and assessed with various self-report instruments, including measures of mental and physical health, and individualism. They found that the women who increased in individualism at appropriate times in life (i.e., not when young mothers or later in life when acting as "generative pillars of society" but when societal changes required more self-sufficiency and participation in the labour force) were the healthiest and best adjusted. These women also maintained strong social networks, suggesting that increased individualism did not come at the expense of interpersonal intimacy. Their conclusion echoes that of so many others, namely that it is desirable to integrate individuality and social relatedness. Although Roberts and Helson's (1997) study does not employ the qualitative methods often associated with postmodernist research (e.g., interview, discussion group; see Marecek, Fine, & Kidder, 1997), it obtains significant results by taking into account some elements of the participants' socio-historical context.

The above findings and conclusions support the idea of a healthy balance of individualistic and collectivistic values. However, these studies also indicate the complexity of the relationships between individualism/collectivism and well-being/distress and the importance of accounting for one's social context.

<div align="center">Other Findings</div>

Approach Coping

As can be seen in Figure 5, approach coping was highly correlated with psychological adjustment, supporting previous findings (Holahan et al., 1997; Valentiner et al., 1994). Although the relationship between social support and

approach coping was only significant at p < .052, it supports the existence of an indirect link between social support and psychological adjustment. Valentiner et al. (1994) obtained an even stronger relationship between social support and approach coping using a measure of parental social support with a sample of undergraduate university students. This latter finding suggests that, in an undergraduate university population in which many of the students still live at home, parental support likely has a more significant impact on coping than other forms of social support. A related finding in the current study was that higher parental collectivism was more predictive of greater subjective well-being and lower psychological distress than any of the other collectivism subscales. Similarly, Lay, Fairlie, Jackson, Ricci, Eisenberg, Sato, Teeaar, and Melamud (1998) have found that family connectedness acted as a buffer between daily hassles and depression.

Right-Wing Authoritarianism

Consistent with the literature (Adorno et al., 1950; Michael, 1967), in the present study higher right-wing authoritarianism did not predict either lower subjective well-being or higher psychological distress. However, higher right-wing authoritarianism predicted higher *restrictive conformity* and lower *self-direction* motivation. These findings are also consistent with previous research (Adorno et al., 1950; Gelfand et al., 1996; Rokeach, 1973) and offer support for the validity of the motivational domain measures.

That higher right-wing authoritarianism predicted higher *restrictive conformity* and lower *self-direction* motivation is also consistent with Triandis and Gelfand's (1998)

findings. Triandis and Gelfand (1998) have defined and empirically supported a distinction between horizontal (emphasizing equality) and vertical (emphasizing hierarchy) individualism and collectivism. In horizontal individualism (HI), people want to be unique and distinct from groups, and are highly self-reliant; in vertical individualism (VI), people want to become distinguished and acquire status, and are in competition with others; in horizontal collectivism (HC), people emphasize equality, common goals, interdependence, and sociability, but they do not submit easily to authority; and in vertical collectivism (VC), people sacrifice personal goals for the sake of the ingroup and submit to ingroup authorities. Using this categorical structure, Triandis and Gelfand found that people high on right-wing authoritarianism were higher on vertical collectivism, consistent with the values which constitute *restrictive conformity*. Gelfand et al.'s (1996) conclusion that authoritarianism was the polar opposite of individualism is also consistent with the present study's finding that higher right-wing authoritarianism is associated with lower *self-direction* motivation. Although Triandis and Gelfand (1998) do not report on this finding, it would follow that people high on HI, consistent with *self-direction*, would be low on authoritarianism. Future research is needed to assess this relationship.

General Limitations and Future Directions

The current study attempted to demonstrate the beneficial effects of an integration between theoretically positive aspects of individualism and collectivism. The results failed to support this thesis. As discussed above, the adequacy of the motivational domain measures utilized in this study is questionable. It would be valuable to test

the same hypothesis utilizing Schwartz's (1992) 56-item value survey and the newer version of his values model (Figure 6). This would also permit testing of the power domain and its relationship to subjective well-being and psychological distress. Relatedly, it would be informative to see if other measures of well-being/distress (e.g., social adjustment, self-actualization), as well as other mediator variables (e.g., control) would yield stronger relationships with the motivational domain measures. Moreover, this study relied on self-report measures. Future research should include other types of measures, such as peer assessments, which have sometimes been shown to contradict self-report measures (e.g., Saragovi et al., 1997).

An examination of the relationship between values and subjective well-being using a more heterogenous sample is also indicated. Roberts and Helson's (1997) findings suggest the need to consider multiple variables (e.g., age) when studying individualism's impact on subjective well-being. Schwartz (1992) has also found the location of certain values in the two-dimensional space to differ depending on variables such as age and sex. For example, undergraduate students and teachers attributed different meaning to the value self-respect. Students tended to group it in the *self-direction* domain, whereas it tended to emerge in the *achievement* domain for teachers. Kristiansen (1990) found that health was related to the *security* domain among men and to *hedonism* among women. Future research should examine the impact of variables such as sex, age, life stage, and personality characteristics on the relationship between individualism and subjective well-being.

Another direction to move in future research would be into other methodologies.

A limitation of this study is that the data are correlational in nature and were gathered at one time, so conclusions cannot be made regarding causal explanations between variables. Longitudinal studies examining the social context of participants would be valuable. To this end, the use of qualitative approaches such as in-depth interviews, life-stories, and narratives would add rich information.

Conclusions

The current study failed to support the hypothesis that a balance of individualist and collectivist values results in the most well adjusted people. Clearly, there is no simple relationship between individualism/collectivism and subjective well-being or psychological distress. Future studies using improved measures, additional mediator variables, and qualitative methodologies is indicated.

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APPENDIX A

INDCOL Scale: Listed by Subscales

SPOUSE

S1.   If a husband is a sports fan, a wife should also cultivate an interest in sports.
If the husband is a stock broker, the wife should also be aware of the current
market situation.

S2.   A marriage becomes a model for us when the husband loves what the wife
loves, and hates what the wife hates.

S3.   Married people should have some time to be alone from each other everyday,
undisturbed by their spouse.

S4.   If one is interested in a job about which the spouse is not very enthusiastic,
one should apply for it anyway.

S5.   Even if my spouse were of a different religion, there would not be any
interpersonal conflict between us.

S6.   It is better for a husband and wife to have their own bank accounts rather than
to have a joint account.

S7.   The decision of where one is to work should be jointly made with one's
spouse, if one is married.

S8.   It is desirable that a husband and a wife have their own sets of friends, instead
of having only a common set of friends.

PARENT

P1.   My musical interests are extremely different from my parents.

P2.   In these days parents are too stringent with their kids, stunting the
development of initiative.

P3.   When making important decisions, I seldom consider the positive and negative
effects my decisions have on my father.

P4.   Teenagers should listen to their parents' advice on dating.

P5.   Even if the child won the Nobel prize, the parents should not feel honored in
any way.

P6.   It is reasonable for a son to continue his father's business.

P7.   I would not share my ideas and newly acquired knowledge with my parents.

P8.   I practice the religion of my parents.

P9.   I would not let my needy mother use the money that I have saved by living a
less than luxurious life.

P10. I would not let my parents use my car (if I have one), whether they are good
drivers or not.

P11. Children should not feel honored even if the father were highly praised and
given an award by a government official for his contribution and service to the
community.

P12. Success and failure in my academic work and career are closely tied to the

nurture provided by my parents.

P13. Young people should take into consideration their parents' advice when making education/career plans.

P14. The bigger a family, the more family problems there are.

P15. I have never told my parents the number of sons I want to have.

P16. The number of sons my parents would like me to have differs by [0 / 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 or more / I don't know] from the number I personally would like to have.

KIN

K1. I would help, within my means, if a relative told me that he/she is in financial difficulty.

K2. If I met a person whose last name was the same as mine, I would start wondering whether we were, at least remotely, related by blood.

K3. Whether one spends an income extravagantly or stingily is of no concern to one's relatives (cousins, uncles).

K4. I would not let my cousin use my car (if I have one).

K5. When deciding what kind of work to do, I would definitely pay attention to the views of relatives of my generation.

K6. When deciding what kind of education to have, I would pay absolutely no attention to my uncles' advice.

K7. Each family has its own problems unique to itself. It does not help to tell relatives about one's problems.

K8. I can count on my relatives for help if I find myself in any kind of trouble.

NEIGHBOR

N1. I have never chatted with my neighbors about the political future of this province.

N2. I am often influenced by the moods of my neighbors.

N3. My neighbors always tell me interesting stories that have happened around them.

N4. I am not interested in knowing what my neighbors are really like.

N5. One need not worry about what the neighbors say about whom one should marry.

N6. I enjoy meeting and talking to my neighbors everyday.

N7. In the past, my neighbors have never borrowed anything from me or my family.

N8. One needs to be cautious in talking with neighbors, otherwise others might think you are nosy.

N9. I don't really know how to befriend my neighbors.

N10. I feel uneasy when my neighbors do not greet me when we come across each other.

FRIEND

F1. I would rather struggle through a personal problem by myself than discuss it with my friends.

F2. If possible, I would like co-owning a car with my close friends, so that it wouldn't be necessary for them to spend much money to buy their own cars.

F3. I like to live close to my good friends.

F4. My good friends and I agree on the best places to shop.

F5. I would pay absolutely no attention to my close friends' views when deciding what kind of work to do.

F6. To go on a trip with friends makes one less free and mobile. As a result, there is less fun.

F7. It is a personal matter whether I worship money or not. Therefore it is not necessary for my friends to give any counsel.

F8. The motto "sharing in both blessing and calamity" is still applicable even if one's friend is clumsy, dumb, and causes a lot of trouble.

F9. There are approximately [0 / 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / more than 4] of my friends who know how much my family as a whole earns each month.

F10. On the average, my friends' ideal number of children differs from my own ideal by [0 / 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 or more / I don't know my friends' ideal].

CO-WORKER

C1. It is inappropriate for a supervisor to ask subordinates about their personal life (such as where one plans to go for the next vacation).

C2. When I am among my colleagues/classmates, I do my own thing without minding about them.

C3. One needs to return a favor if a colleague lends a helping hand.

C4. I have never loaned my camera/coat to any colleagues/classmates.

C5. We ought to develop the character of independence among students, so that they do not rely upon other students' help in their schoolwork.

C6. A group of people at their workplace was discussing where to eat. A popular choice was a restaurant which had recently opened. However, someone in the group had discovered that the food there was unpalatable. Yet the group disregarded this person's objection, and insisted on trying it out. There were only two alternatives for the person who objected: either to go or not to go with the others. In this situation, *not going* with the others is a better choice.

C7. There is everything to gain and nothing to lose for classmates to group themselves for study and discussion.

C8. Classmates' assistance is indispensable to getting a good grade at school.

C9. I would help if a colleague at work told me that he/she needed money to pay utility bills.

C10. In most cases, to cooperate with someone whose ability is lower than one's own is not as desirable as doing the thing alone.

C11. Do you agree with the proverb "Too many cooks spoil the broth"?

APPENDIX B

Rokeach (1973) Value Survey

The forms that were distributed to participants appeared as seen below, with the exception that the values were doublespaced to enhance visual clarity.

****

Here is an alphabetical list of values many people feel are important to strive for in their lives. On a scale from 0 (not important) to 100 (very important), please rate each value according to its importance to you, as a guiding principle in your life. Write down a number-rating next to each value.

```
0            25           50           75           100
|------------|------------|------------|------------|
not at all   somewhat     moderately   quite        extremely
important     important    important    important    important
```

Rating   Value

_____   A comfortable life (a prosperous life)
_____   An exciting life (a stimulating, active life)
_____   A sense of accomplishment (lasting contribution)
_____   A world at peace (free of war and conflict)
_____   A world of beauty (beauty of nature and the arts)
_____   Equality (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all)
_____   Family security (taking care of loved ones)
_____   Freedom (independence, free choice)
_____   Happiness (contentedness)
_____   Inner harmony (freedom from inner conflict)
_____   Mature love (sexual and spiritual intimacy)
_____   National security (protection from attack)
_____   Pleasure (an enjoyable, leisurely life)
_____   Salvation (saved, eternal life)
_____   Self-respect (self-esteem)
_____   Social recognition (respect, admiration)
_____   True friendship (close companionship)
_____   Wisdom (a mature understanding of life)

Here are 18 more values listed in alphabetical order. Please follow the same directions as you did with the first list.

```
      0           25          50          75         100
      |------------|------------|------------|------------|
  not at all    somewhat   moderately   quite      extremely
  important     important   important   important   important
```

__Rating__   __Values__

_____   Ambitious (hard-working, aspiring)
_____   Broadminded (open-minded)
_____   Capable (competent, effective)
_____   Cheerful (lighthearted, joyful)
_____   Clean (neat, tidy)
_____   Courageous (standing up for your beliefs)
_____   Forgiving (willing to pardon others)
_____   Helpful (working for the welfare of others)
_____   Honest (sincere, truthful)
_____   Imaginative (daring, creative)
_____   Independent (self-reliant, self-sufficient)
_____   Intellectual (intelligent, reflective)
_____   Logical (consistent, rational)
_____   Loving (affectionate, tender)
_____   Obedient (dutiful, respectful)
_____   Polite (courteous, well-mannered)
_____   Responsible (dependable, reliable)
_____   Self-Controlled (restrained, self-disciplined)

APPENDIX C

Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) Scale

We would like to know your opinions concerning a variety of social issues. You will probably find that you agree with some of the statements, and disagree with others, to varying extents. Please indicate your reaction to each of the statements, using the following scale:

-4   if you very strongly disagree with the statement
-3   if you strongly disagree with the statement
-2   if you moderately disagree with the statement
-1   if you slightly disagree with the statement

0   if you feel exactly and precisely neutral about a statement

+1   if you slightly agree with the statement
+2   if you moderately agree with the statement
+3   if you strongly agree with the statement
+4   if you very strongly agree with the statement

You may find that you sometimes have different reactions to different parts of a statement. When this happens, please combine your reactions, and tell us how you feel on balance.

1. It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people's minds.

2. People should pay less attention to the Bible and other old traditional forms of religious guidance and instead develop their own personal standards of what is moral and immoral.

3. There is nothing immoral or sick in somebody's being a homosexual.

4. Obedience and respect of authority are the most important virtues children should learn.

5. Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly.

6. Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down.

7. A lot of our rules regarding modesty and sexual behaviour are just customs which are not necessarily any better or holier than those which other people follow.

8. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps.

9. The real keys to the "good life" are obedience, discipline, and sticking to the straight and narrow.

10. The biggest threat to our freedom comes from the Communists and their kind, who are out to destroy religion, ridicule patriotism, corrupt the youth, and in general undermine our whole way of life.

APPENDIX D

Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS)

Below are five statements about your life in general. Using the description below, **indicate the degree of your agreement or disagreement** with each item by **circling the appropriate letters** to the right.

SD = Strongly Disagree	N = Neither agree nor disagree	MA = Mildly Agree
D = Disagree		A = Agree
MD = Mildly Disagree		SA = Strongly Agree

1.	In most ways my life is close to my ideal.	SD	D	MD	N	MA	A	SA
2.	The conditions of my life are excellent.	SD	D	MD	N	MA	A	SA
3.	I am satisfied with my life.	SD	D	MD	N	MA	A	SA
4.	So far I have acquired the important things that I want in life.	SD	D	MD	N	MA	A	SA
5.	If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing.	SD	D	MD	N	MA	A	SA

APPENDIX E

Affect Balance Scale (ABS)

During the past few weeks have you ever felt:

CIRCLE ONE

Particularly excited or interested in something?	YES	NO
Proud because someone complimented you on something you have done?	YES	NO
Pleased about having accomplished something?	YES	NO
On top of the world?	YES	NO
That things were going your way?	YES	NO
So restless that you couldn't sit long in a chair?	YES	NO
Very lonely or remote from other people?	YES	NO
Bored?	YES	NO
Depressed or very unhappy?	YES	NO
Upset because someone criticized you?	YES	NO

APPENDIX F

The 12-Item General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-12)

We would like to know how your health has been in general, over the past few weeks. Please answer all questions below by circling the answer which you think most nearly applies to you. Remember we want to know about present or recent complaints not those you had in the past. It is important you try and answer all the questions.

HAVE YOU RECENTLY:		1	2	3	4
1.	been able to concentrate on whatever you're doing	Better than usual	Same as usual	Less than usual	Much less than usual
2.	lost much sleep over worry?	Not at all	No more than usual	Rather more than usual	Much more than usual
3.	felt that you are playing a useful part in things?	More so than usual	Same as usual	Less useful than usual	Much less useful
4.	felt capable of making decisions about things?	More so than usual	Same as usual	Less so than usual	Much less capable
5.	felt constantly under strain?	Not at all	No more than usual	Rather more than usual	Much more than usual
6.	felt that you couldn't overcome your difficulties	Not at all	No more than usual	Rather more than usual	Much more than usual
7.	been able to enjoy your normal day-to-day activities	More so than usual	Same as usual	Less so than usual	Much less than usual
8.	been able to face up to your problems?	More so than usual	Same as usual	Less able than usual	Much less able
9.	been feeling unhappy and depressed?	Not at all	No more than usual	Rather more than usual	Much more than usual
10.	been losing confidence in yourself?	Not at all	No more than usual	Rather more than usual	Much more than usual
11.	been thinking of yourself as a worthless person?	Not at all	No more than usual	Rather more than usual	Much more than usual
12.	been feeling reasonably happy, all things considered?	More so than usual	About the same as usual	Less so than usual	Much less than usual

APPENDIX G

Srole's Nine-Item Anomia Scale

1. There's little use writing to public officials because they often aren't really interested in the problems of the average man.

               Agree   Disagree

2. Nowadays a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself.

3. In spite of what some people say, the lot of the average man is getting worse, not better.

4. It's hardly fair to bring children into the world with the way things look for the future.

5. These days a person doesn't really know whom he can count on.

Four new items in the enlarged anomia scale are:

6. Most people really don't care what happens to the next fellow.

7. Next to health, money is the most important thing in life.

8. You sometimes can't help wondering whether anything is worthwhile.

9. To make money there are no right and wrong ways anymore, only easy and hard ways.

APPENDIX H

Perceived Stress Scale (PSS)

The questions in this scale ask you about your feelings and thoughts during the last month. in each case, you will be asked to indicate *how often* you felt or thought a certain way. Although some of the questions are similar, there are differences between them and you should treat each one as a separate question. The best approach is to answer each question fairly quickly. That is, don't try to count up the number of times you felt a particular way, but rather indicate the alternative that seems like a reasonable estimate.

For each question choose from the following alternatives:

        0.   never
        1.   almost never
        2.   sometimes
        3.   fairly often
        4.   very often

1.   In the last month, how often have you been upset because of something that happened unexpectedly?

2.   In the last month, how often have you felt that you were unable to control the important things in your life?

3.   In the last month, how often have you felt nervous and "stressed"?

4.*   In the last month, how often have you dealt successfully with irritating life hassles?

5.*   In the last month, how often have you felt that you were effectively coping with important changes that were occurring in your life?

6.*   In the last month, how often have you felt confident about your ability to handle your personal problems?

7.*   In the last month, how often have you felt that things were going your way?

8.   In the last month, how often have you found that you could not cope with all the things that you had to do?

9.*   In the last month, how often have you been able to control irritations in your life?

10.*   In the last month, how often have you felt that you were on top of things?

11.   In the last month, how often have you been angered because of things that happened that were outside your control?

12.   In the last month, how often have you found yourself thinking about things that you have to accomplish?

13.*   In the last month, how often have you been able to control the way you spend your time?

14.   In the last month, how often have you felt difficulties were piling up so high that you could not overcome them?

*   Scored in the reverse direction

APPENDIX I

Social Support Scale

A. *Spouse/Partner Support*
  1. I feel very close to my husband/wife/partner.
  2. I have a husband/wife/partner who would always take the time to talk over my problems, should I want to.
  3. My husband/wife/partner often lets me know that he/she thinks I'm a worthwhile person.
  4. When I am with my husband/wife/partner I feel completely able to relax and be myself.
  5. No matter what happens I know that my husband/wife/partner will always be there for me should I need him/her.
  6. I know that my husband/wife/partner has confidence in me.

B. *Friends Support*
  1. I feel very close to my friends.
  2. I have friends who would always take the time to talk over my problems, should I want to.
  3. My friends often let me know that they think I'm a worthwhile person.
  4. When I am with my friends I feel completely able to relax and be myself.
  5. No matter what happens I know that my friends will always be there for me should I need them.
  6. I know that my friends have confidence in me.
  7. I feel that my friends really care about me.
  8. I often feel really appreciated by my friends.

C. *Relatives Support*
  1. I feel very close to my relatives.
  2. I have relatives who would always take the time to talk over my problems, should I want to.
  3. My relatives often let me know that they think I'm a worthwhile person.
  4. When I am with my relatives I feel completely able to relax and be myself.
  5. No matter what happens I know that my relatives will always be there for me should I need them.
  6. I know that my relatives have confidence in me.
  7. I feel that my relatives really care about me.
  8. I often feel really appreciated by my relatives.

Response Scale for All Three Measures:

  1) Very much like my experience
  2) Much like my experience
  3) Somewhat like my experience
  4) Not at all like my experience

APPENDIX J

Coping Responses Inventory - Adult Form

Please think about the most important problem or stressful situation you experienced **during the last 12 months** (for example, having troubles with a relative or friend, experiencing the illness or death of a relative or friend, having an accident or illness, having financial or work problems). Describe the problem in the space provided below. If you have not experienced a major problem, then list a minor problem that you have had to deal with.

Describe the problem or situation in some detail:

_____

_____

_____

_____

Approximately how long did the problem last? _____   _____

                                                     Days   Months

How upsetting did you find the problem or situation? **Circle the appropriate number.**

Not at all upsetting			Moderately upsetting			Extremely upsetting
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

PART I

Using the following scale, please answer the following questions about the problem you have just described. **Please circle your answer.**

                    1 = Definitely No
                    2 = Mainly No
                    3 = Mainly Yes
                    4 = Definitely Yes

1. Have you ever faced a problem like this before? 1   2   3   4

2. Did you know this problem was going to occur? 1   2   3   4

3. Did you have enough time to get ready to handle this problem? . . . 1   2   3   4

4. When this problem occurred, did you think of it as a threat? 1   2   3   4

5. When this problem occurred, did you think of it as a challenge? .. 1   2   3   4

6. Was this problem caused by something you did? 1   2   3   4

7. Was this problem caused by something someone else did? 1   2   3   4

8. Did anything good come out of dealing with this problem? 1   2   3   4

9. Has this problem or situation been resolved? 1   2   3   4

10. If the problem has been worked out, did it turn out all right
for you? 1   2   3   4

Please think again about the problem you described. **By using the following scale, please indicate which of the following you did in connection with that situation by circling the appropriate number.**

1 = No
2 = Yes, once or twice
3 = Yes, sometimes
4 = Yes, fairly often

Did you:

1. think of different ways to deal with the problem? 1   2   3   4

2. tell yourself things to make yourself feel better? 1   2   3   4

3. talk with a relative or spouse about the problem? 1   2   3   4

4. make a plan of action and follow it? 1   2   3   4

5. try to forget the whole thing? 1   2   3   4

6. feel that time would make a difference -- the only thing to do
was wait? 1   2   3   4

7. try to help others deal with a similar problem? 1   2   3   4

8. take it out on other people when you felt angry or depressed? 1   2   3   4

9. try to step back from the situation and be more objective? 1   2   3   4

10. remind yourself how much worse things could be? 1   2   3   4

11. talk with a friend about the problem? 1   2   3   4

12. know what had to be done and try hard to make things work? 1 2 3 4

13. try not to think about the problem? 1 2 3 4

14. realize that you had no control over the problem? 1 2 3 4

15. get involved in new activities? 1 2 3 4

16. take a chance and do something risky? 1 2 3 4

17. go over in your mind what you would say or do? 1 2 3 4

18. try to see the good side of the situation? 1 2 3 4

19. talk with a professional person (e.g., doctor, lawyer, clergy)? 1 2 3 4

20. decide what you wanted and try hard to get it? 1 2 3 4

21. daydream or imagine a better time or place than the one you were in? 1 2 3 4

22. think that the outcome would be decided by fate? 1 2 3 4

23. try to make new friends? 1 2 3 4

24. keep away from people in general? 1 2 3 4

25. try to anticipate how things would turn out? 1 2 3 4

26. think about how you were much better off than other people with similar problems? 1 2 3 4

27. seek help from persons or groups with the same type of problem? 1 2 3 4

28. try at least two different ways to solve the problem? 1 2 3 4

29. try to put off thinking about the situation, even though you knew you would have to at some point? 1 2 3 4

30. accept it; nothing could be done?....................... 1 2 3 4

31. read more often as a source of enjoyment?. 1 2 3 4

32. yell or shout to let off steam? 1 2 3 4

33.   try to find some personal meaning in the situation? 1   2   3   4

34.   try to tell yourself that things would get better? 1   2   3   4

35.   try to find out more about the situation? 1   2   3   4

36.   try to learn to do more things on your own? 1   2   3   4

37.   wish the problem would go away or somehow be over with? 1   2   3   4

38.   expect the worst possible outcome? 1   2   3   4

39.   spend more time in recreational activities? 1   2   3   4

40.   cry to let your feelings out? 1   2   3   4

41.   try to anticipate the new demands that would be placed on you? . . . 1   2   3   4

42.   think about how this event could change your life in a
positive way? 1   2   3   4

43.   pray for guidance and/or strength? 1   2   3   4

44.   take things a day at a time, one step at a time? 1   2   3   4

45.   try to deny how serious the problem really is? 1   2   3   4

46.   lose hope that things would ever be the same? 1   2   3   4

47.   turn to work or other activities to help you manage things? 1   2   3   4

48.   do something that you didn't think would work, but at least
you were doing something? 1   2   3   4

APPENDIX K

Cover Letter/Consent Form

Please read the following information very carefully.

1. This questionnaire is designed to gather information about people's beliefs, values, and general well-being.

2. You can be assured that:
   a) We are interested only in group results in this study. Although we may ask for personal information, such as, age, nationality, and health status, the names and data of individual people will not be published.
   b) All data collected from the study will be kept strictly confidential with the use of code numbers in place of participants' names and student I.D.'s.
   c) Any materials containing identifying information will be stored in a locked area.
   d) Access to the above materials will only be permitted to the experimenter, Brad Isaak, and his supervisor, Dr. Bruce Tefft.

3. Participants are free to drop out of the study AT ANY TIME and WITHOUT PENALTY.

If you are willing to participate, please complete the following AFTER having read the above information.

I, _____, understand the information
          (Print your name)
given above and do hereby consent to take part in the aforementioned research.

Date: _____ Signature: _____

Student I.D. #: _____

INTRODUCTION TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE

On the pages that follow are a variety of questions. Please answer each of the questions frankly and honestly. As noted above, confidentiality will be maintained. Although your participation is voluntary, it is important that you try to answer all of the questions as best as you can. Please begin with the following page and complete each page in order.

APPENDIX L

Social-Demographics

The information obtained from the following section will be used only for comparative purposes.

1. Gender (circle):   M / F   2.   Age: _____

3. Marital Status (circle):
   Single / Married or living as married / Divorced / Separated

4. Are you a Canadian citizen (circle)? . . . . Yes / No

5. If you are NOT a Canadian citizen, of what country are you a citizen?

_____

6. In what country were you born? _____

7. How long have you lived in Canada?
   a.   All my life
   b.   If not (a), then please indicate number of years: _____

8. Do you live in . . . (circle)
   a.   Your parent's home
   b.   Residence
   c.   Other _____

9. Do you share your living accommodations with
   anyone (circle)? . . . . Yes / No

10.   If you share accommodations, with whom do you share (circle)?
       a.   Spouse/partner
       b.   Relative
       c.   Roommate
       d.   Other

11.   If at any time during the past three years you have lived with your parents or been
       dependent on them, in whole or in part, for financial support, please provide a title
       and brief description of their usual occupations.

       Mother - Title of Occupation: _____
               Description: _____

               _____

Father - Title of Occupation: _____

    Description: _____

_____

If you have been entirely independent of your parents for a period greater than three years, and are supporting yourself, please provide a title and brief description of your usual occupation.

    Title of Occupation: _____

    Description: _____

_____

If you have been entirely independent of your parents for a period greater than three years, but are being supported in whole or in part by another individual(s), please indicate their relationship to you (e.g., spouse, partner, relative) and provide a title and brief description of their occupation.

    Relationship: _____

        Title of Occupation: _____

        Description: _____

_____

    Relationship: _____

        Title of Occupation: _____

        Description: _____

_____

12. How would you rate your general health at present compared with other people your own age (circle)?
    a. Much better than others my own age
    b. Better than others my own age
    c. The same as others my own age
    d. Poorer than others my own age
    e. Much poorer than others my own age

13. On average, how often do you exercise (circle)?
    a. Every day
    b. Four to six times a week
    c. Three times a week
    d. Twice a week
    e. Once a week
    f. Occasionally
    g. Never

APPENDIX M

Debriefing Letter

Dear Participant,

Thank you for helping with this project. The aim of this study is to assess how people's beliefs and values relate to subjective well-being. In particular, we are interested in determining how the ideologies of individualism and collectivism relate to well-being. Very little research has been done to assess this relationship. We hypothesize that people who value a mix of individualistic and collectivistic characteristics will report greater well-being than people who value either extreme alone. Once the data from the questionnaires have been analyzed, collective results will be available for anyone interested.

Sometimes, after completing this sort of questionnaire, people realize that they would like to talk to someone about problems or issues that are bothering them. Often, it helps to talk to friends or family members about your problems. Other times, however, you may feel the need to talk to a professional. The following places provide free or relatively inexpensive counselling services:

University of Manitoba	Psychological Service Centre
Student Counselling Service	161 Dafoe Building
University Centre 474-8592	474-9222

Klinic Community Health	Interfaith Marriage and
Centre	Family Institute
870 Portage Ave 784-4090	University of Winnipeg
(call Friday mornings)	786-9251
24-Hr Crisis Line: 786-8686	

If you have any complaints or concerns regarding the questionnaire, please contact my advisor, Dr. Bruce Tefft (474-8259).

Once again, thank you for your participation!

Sincerely,

Brad Isaak, M.A.