HIDDEN IN PERFECT DAY: PARANOIA AND SCHIZOPHRENIA IN THE SPECULATIVE FICTION OF PHILIP K. DICK

A Thesis Submitted to the Committee on Graduate Studies

in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the

Degree of Master of Arts

in the Faculty of Arts and Science

TRENT UNIVERSITY

Peterborough, Ontario, Canada

Methodologies for the Study of Western History and Culture M.A. Program

June 2000

ABSTRACT

Hidden In Perfect Day: Paranoia And Schizophrenia In The Speculative Fiction Of Philip K. Dick.

Lisa Howard.

This thesis discusses paranoia and schizophrenia in the speculative fiction (S.F.) of Philip K. Dick. My claim is that Dick's S.F. portrays paranoids as characters who are more than usually able to negotiate realities that are schizophrenic. Paranoids in Dick's S.F. are emblematic of internality, and of indeterminate and emotive subjectivity.

That is, Dick's paranoids generally perform a positive role and paranoia itself is assigned benevolent characteristics. Consequently, Dick's construction falls outside those current prominent literary and cultural paradigms that express both a negative view of paranoia and an ambivalence about subjectivity. Dick's idiosyncrasies in these areas may therefore point to a gap in the explanatory power of such current cultural and literary theories.

It is important, moreover, to read Dick within the context of his Gnostic and Zoroastrian motifs in order to appreciate his valuation of knowledge and interpretation as necessary and potentially positive components of human agency and in order to see Dick himself as the successful literary figure that he is, rather than as the figure of a failed poststructuralist or postmodernist.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Costas Boundas and John Fekete for their help and support with this project. I would especially like to thank John Fekete who is a better friend in his professional capacity as teacher and supervisor than many people who make a bigger deal about being my friend. I would like to thank Andy Wernick for saying things that did not register with me until several years had passed.

I would like to thank my mother for proof reading and my father for useful information about the second world war and espionage. I would like to thank Andrew Fogarasi for making fun of me, helping to keep things in perspective and for putting up with all my little foibles. I am sure that without him I would have lost all my marbles instead of just a few.

I am grateful to Chris Wilton for being a good sport. I would like to thank Nancy Legate for helping me with the photocopier and Cara Yarzab for letting me use her printer and for being a good solid friend who laughed at my jokes (I still think Martha Stewart is a troll, by the way).

I also owe a debt of gratitude to the professors at Trent in general for always doing more than their job required them to do. I would like to thank the students of Trent, especially my own students who kept me humble by asking me probing questions that I couldn't always answer. If it is possible to thank an institution, I would like to thank Trent University most of all for giving me the opportunity to do this kind of work.

Table Of Contents

Chapter Three:

Introduction

This thesis discusses paranoia and schizophrenia in the speculative fiction (S.F.) of Philip K. Dick.[1] My claim is that Dick's S.F. portrays paranoids as characters who are more than usually able to negotiate realities that are schizophrenic. Paranoids in Dick's S.F. are emblematic of internality, and of indeterminate and emotive subjectivity.

That is, Dick's paranoids generally perform a positive role and paranoia itself is assigned benevolent characteristics. Consequently, Dick's construction falls outside those current prominent literary and cultural paradigms that express both a negative view of paranoia and an ambivalence about subjectivity. Dick's idiosyncrasies in these areas may therefore point to a gap in the explanatory power of such current cultural and literary theories.

Dick is to be regarded as the "...the single writer most responsible for the acceptance of S.F. as a dominant genre of literature in the second half of the 20th century," according to Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr. (v). He is considered by many to be among the giants of the S.F. genre. In fact, Stanislaw Lem calls Dick "A Visionary Among The Charlatans" of S.F. writing (49) and Kim Stanley Robinson says that Dick's work stands among the very best of the genre (*Novels* ix).[2]

Dick is especially popular in France (Fitting 131). Pascal J. Thomas maintains that one of the principal aspects that leads to Dick's popularity in France is his particular brand of left-wing individualism. For Thomas, Dick's fiction embodies the French suspicion of institutions and depicts an anti-authoritarian stance that is especially palatable to the French.

Thomas refers to Dick's anarchic sensibility and his (Dick's) description of defiant

attitudes to government and other institutions as the common ground between Dick and his French S.F. fans (34). He suggests that Dick's interest in paranoia is a point in common between Dick and the French national character. Also among Thomas's claims is that the isolated person who has no one who can empathise with him (32) is emblematic of paranoia, but that paranoia is a sensible outlook under the circumstances Dick describes:

> The relationship between Philip K. Dick and paranoia seems to have been well mapped out; his constant uncertainty about truth, the truth of people's statements, or the truth of the universe itself, need not be documented. His characters are perpetually trying to escape the powers that be, which seem intent on mercilessly crushing the individual. For instance, the various police forces at work in Dick's books are always seen as repressive, quite at variance with what happens in the work of Robert A. Heinlein, say. Philip Dick went so far as to make the protagonist (hero?) of *Clans Of The Alphane Moon* an explicit paranoiac, and one that seems quite sensible as soon as we get into the book. (32)

According to Thomas it is Dick's particular brand of anarchism – which sees individuals as existing within the fray instead of above the fray – that appeals. He describes Dick's characters as nearly invisible in a situation: i.e., individuals hiding in crowds would be characters with particular appeal to the French.

He distinguishes this from Robert A. Heinlein's individualism which is not popular in France. On his argument, Heinlein's fiction presents certain individuals as father figures in hierarchical relationships with peers. These are individuals who are in fact 'above the fray' as Thomas sees it (33). Moreover, Thomas is not alone in suggesting that subjectivity is

important for Dick. Carlo Pagetti has also claimed that Dick is writing primarily about the subjective nature of reality within the context of the disintegration of history (19).

All the more puzzling is the argument presented by Scott Durham that Dick is staging the 'death of the subject' in his S.F. as evidenced by the example of Richard Kongrosian in *The Simulacra*. David Golumbia's explanation is that Durham is a sophisticated advocate of psychoanalytic Marxism who ties metaphysics directly into a critique of subjectivity.[3] Durham's argument was evidently inspired by *Anti-Oedipus*, a poststructuralist text by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, judging by the frame that Durham employs to discuss elements in Dick's S.F.

Much of Durham's article is devoted to showing how Dick "stages the death of the subject in terms of a radically contestatory politics of experience" (189). Since Dick mixes subjective and objective modes in his fiction, Durham claims that he, like Deleuze and Guattari, is dismantling subjectivity as a concept. Dick takes certain common subjective experiences, e.g., anxieties or thoughts, and makes them aspects of reality within the novelistic landscape.

Both paranoia and schizophrenia appear in Dick's fiction as qualities of world as well as qualities that one attributes to certain characters. This is the aspect that resembles Deleuze and Guattari's mode of thought. Durham suggests that Dick is in this way presenting examples of the poststructuralist (and postmodernist) thesis that the subject is dead.[4]

It is easy to see how Durham could connect Dick with poststructuralism. Dick writes about many of the same things as Deleuze and Guattari, including Nazis and schizophrenia/paranoia. Nevertheless, to say as Durham does that for Dick the subject is dead is premature. It is true that Dick seems to be involved in a process of externalising

internality (as Durham notes: Dick is turning subjectivities inside out); Dick's project, however, is not identical with that of Deleuze and Guattari. In Chapter One of the thesis I will distinguish between Dick's and Deleuze and Guattari's form of extro-version.

In fact, the opposite argument could equally be made (and is made in Chapter Two of the thesis), for Dick: subjectivity is at the centre of his own form of radically contestatory politics. Where Deleuze and Guattari see no difference between internality and externality (*Anti-Oedipus* 381), Dick is relying on the difference between inside and outside to create his fictional effect.

Patricia Warrick has gone as far as to claim that, in fact, Dick's best work deals, rather, with inner realities (*Mind* 118), i.e., subjectivities, and not with externalities, i.e., politics, history, or economics (which are central to the Deleuze-Guattarian view). As well, Dick does not share in the Deleuze-Guattarian sense of paranoia as 'fascist' and schizophrenia as 'revolutionary,' as will be shown in Chapters One and Two.

In spite of Dick's interest in schizophrenia and paranoia, his texts do not provide evidence to support the claim that for Dick the subject is dead. Instead, the interest in internality (subjectivity) that Warrick describes as typical of the best of Dick's work is evident throughout his work.

The anti-authoritarian subjectivity that Thomas describes is present even in *The Simulacra* to which Durham has turned for his example (i.e. Richard Kongrosian). For instance, Al Miller, who reproaches Nicole Thibodeaux for trying to turn Richard Kongrosian into a "wooden slave" (Dick, *Simulacra* 147) is typical of Dick's central characters in that he is an unassuming but 'authentic' subject.

Al Miller is an interplanetary jalopy salesman. He suggests to the representative of the

government (Nicole Thibodeaux) that she is making a mistake by forcing Richard Kongrosian (a musician) to perform at a state sponsored concert when it is clear that Richard is having a nervous breakdown. Al Miller has little to gain and something to lose by opposing Nicole. Al actually has a chance to gain a spot in the same concert. He risks losing the opportunity when he risks upsetting Nicole. By criticising her, Al could lose his only chance to better himself, and yet he does it anyway.

Some paranoids in Dick's fiction are actually sensitive to the repressed hatred of others (*Game Players* 55). George Slusser claims that paranoids in Dick's fiction are valuable responsive characters amid worlds which are constantly changing. Moreover, as Thomas has noted, paranoia in *Clans Of The Alphane Moon* is not usually subject to any stigma, much less the stigma that a Deleuze/Guattarian reading would give it (33).

In the Slusser article, which Carl Freedman calls controversial (History 152), Slusser claims that paranoia is an ability to negotiate many worlds at the same time. Slusser proposes that paranoids are the Aut-hentes: people who do (i.e. act), engage, initiate. In "History, Historicity, Story", Slusser describes paranoia as creativity from 'within', which is able to engage a situation that has no external frame of reference (206). This means that according to Slusser paranoids are most able to function as human beings (as opposed to machines or animals) when in a situation that is historically unstable. Paranoids are able to function as people without the solid external frame of reference that history provides.

On the other hand, the process of extroversion in Dick's fiction, i.e., 'making subjective things real', may be a facet (more generally) of the S.F. genre. Kim Stanley Robinson has claimed that the difference between a reality breakdown in mainstream literature such as in Thomas Pynchon's work,[5] or in J. D. Salinger's work, and a similar breakdown in 'science

fiction' or speculative fiction (S.F.), to use the contemporary critical terminology, is that in S.F. we are not free to conclude that this is a private experience (*Novels* 36).

Instead, we must consider the possibility that something has happened to the world, i.e., that it is the world that has gone mad, so to speak, and not the characters. In mainstream literature problems with reality are usually reducible to one character's madness. For instance the narrator may be having a nervous breakdown. In S.F. reality itself is askew. Madness in this way becomes a facet of the environment and is no longer reducible to an individual psychosis.[6]

Robinson also claims that in Dick's fiction the metaphor is real (*Novels* 68-69), although Merritt Abrash suggests that Robinson's discussion of the realisation of metaphor is too brief (Abrash 124) and that the examples are not credible.[7] The claim that Dick's fiction realises metaphor is also made by Warrick (*Mind* 29) though her claim is not extended to the genre as a whole. S.F. writer Samuel R. Delany meanwhile, has taken this concept the farthest, suggesting that the realisation of metaphor is a defining feature of the S.F. genre (165).[8]

Delany defines S.F. as a type of fiction which is distinct from literature (or mundane fiction as he calls it). In S.F. a sentence such as, "She gave up her heart willingly," might be read as a heart transplant and not as figurative romantic language. Accordingly, the experience of Richard Kongrosian who literally turns himself inside out over the coup d'etat in *The Simulacra* is a good example of figurative language that is literalised.

Robinson's description of the instance of reality breakdown in S.F. resembles McHale's definition of the 'dominant' in postmodernist fiction which is, on his account, ontological. In *Postmodernist Fiction*, McHale introduces his concept of 'the dominant' as a way of talking

about the emphasis on either epistemological or ontological themes that exist in particular forms or genres of literature. McHale's discussion of postmodernist fiction also bears a resemblance to Delany's view of S.F. as 'object oriented.' It is worth noting, however, that through such concepts, as employed by Robinson, Delany and McHale, an adequate account of Dick's emphasis on 'authentic' subjectivities is not provided.

More recently, in *Constructing Postmodernism* McHale says: "S.F. is openly and avowedly ontological in its orientation, i.e., like mainstream postmodernist writing it is self-consciously 'world building' fiction" (12). Fiction which is postmodernist in the way that McHale describes it is fiction in which the dominant themes centre around concerns about reality rather than subjectivities or knowledge (*Constructing* 32-33).

David Golumbia, for his part, has made the credible proposal that Dick is using S.F. to discuss a kind of metaphysical realism. Golumbia concludes, however, that Dick is employing a very unstable idea of reality -- one which is always changing. Nevertheless, Dick's search for reality was genuine, as Paul Williams points out in the biographical *Only Apparently Real*.

Williams describes Dick's search as the "passionate and often comical search for what it is, if it isn't what it seems to be." (2). On his argument, Dick did believe in an ultimate reality which he was never able to find.

In this context, Durham maintains that it would be a mistake to reduce Dick's later religious works to the status of products of new-ageism. This is a prudent judgment, especially since according to Douglas A. Mackey they are 'brilliant' works (5) comparable to works by William Blake or W.B. Yeats. Indeed, Dick's particular struggle with spiritual and religious questions began long before his Gnostic experience in 1974 and also long before he

conceived of the *Gnostic Trilogy: Valis, Divine Invasion, The Transmigration Of Timothy Archer.*[9]

In fact, the questions that Dick appears to be asking seem to come out of the same bewildered sensibility that asks if 'God' (or 'g/God' because for Dick 'God' is almost always ultimately pluralised) is good, why did he/she or it create evil? His much celebrated *The Man In The High Castle*, written in 1961, (Williams 7) is full of the kind of onto/religious speculation that occurs throughout Dick's work.

The central plot in *The Man In The High Castle* deals with the discovery of evil by someone who believes firmly in the Tao. Since, for Taoists, there is no such thing as evil, this causes the discoverer to go into crisis. Moreover Dick's early S.F. novel, *The Cosmic Puppets* (1956) (Williams 178) is also about religion, though in this case the religion is Zoroastrianism.

Galactic Pot Healer (also Zoroastrian), *The Game Players Of Titan, Our Friends From Frolix 8* (which has a Gnostic flavour), *Ubik, The Three Stigmata Of Palmer Eldritch* and *Do Androids Dream Of Electric Sheep*? are all S.F. novels coloured by mysticism or religion. As well, the existence of evil (and not just fascism) is a recurring theme in Dick's work.

Nevertheless, according to Peter Fitting,[10] it is Dick's interest in schizophrenia and not his spiritual adventures or the related interest in authenticity -- conceived, as it frequently is, as an ability to resist evil or soullessness -- (Warrick, *Mind* 117-118; Warrick, *Labyrinthian* 133) which has attracted attention.

We should, of course, not lose sight of the fact that there may be variant usages of the term schizophrenia. Dick seems to use schizophrenia to describe a disease that progresses

through several disorders: for instance, in Dick, schizophrenia often *includes* paranoia. Deleuze and Guattari, by contrast, see schizophrenia as having revolutionary social potential within a particular theoretical project. In a related vein, though differently again, for cultural theorist Jean Baudrillard schizophrenia is a way of talking about postmodernity as an era.

It is interesting to review, in the context of this theoretical and metaphorical usage of terminology, the prevailing medical definitions of paranoia and schizophrenia, in the *Diagnostic And Statistical Manual Of Mental Processes* (*DSM-IV*). *DSM-IV* Schizotypal Personalities resemble Dick's description of some of his schizophrenic characters. The manual cites the following factors as among the diagnostic criteria for Schizotypal Personality Disorder:

Schizotypal Personality Disorder is characterised in *DSM-IV* by suspiciousness, but among the other symptoms is what is referred to as magical thinking (e.g., a belief in telepathy, clairvoyance or a sixth sense) and restricted affect.

Those with schizotypal disorder exhibit thinking patterns that are described as either "overly concrete" or "overly abstract" and characterised by "vague, circumstantial, metaphorical, overelaborate, or stereotyped speech" (642).

Another personality type, that Dick frequently refers to as a form of proto-schizophrenic, is the schizoid personality type. This is described by *DSM-IV* as: "A pervasive pattern of detachment from social relationships" and includes, "emotional coldness, detachment or flattened affectivity" as major symptoms (641).[11]

Notwithstanding the many points of contact between *DSM-IV* and Dick's representations, in "The Swiss Connection," Anthony Wolk discovers that many of the ideas that Dick may have had about paranoia and schizophrenia seem not to have come from the

mainstream but from the work of the "existentialist psychologists" whose ideas were eccentric to the mainstream medical world.

Wolk lists many of the psychologists in the existentialist school. Among them are: Harry Stack Sullivan, John D. Benjamin (of the "Benjamin" Proverb test), J. S. Kasanin of the Kasanin Clinic in *We Can Build You*, Wilder Penfield of the Penfield Mood Organ in *Do Androids Dream Of Electric Sheep*? Kurt Goldstein and Ludwig Binswanger (102-103). These psychologists often appear as characters and sometimes their names will appear in the form of a product or machine name in Dick's fiction or as the name of an institute.

The Benjamin Proverb test that Dick mentions in his fiction detects a formal thinking disorder which is indicative of schizophrenia. According to Wolk, the disorder is one where the schizophrenic is unable to theorise (106). The schizophrenic Bill Lundborg in *The Transmigration Of Timothy Archer* is unable to abstract (104); Bill therefore thinks in specifics – he concretises.

A working definition that Dick might use to determine whether a character is schizophrenic would include some of the symptoms that are described in *DSM-IV* as schizoid, i.e., flattening of affect, coldness or a lack of empathy. This is on display in *We Can Build You* (*We Can* 29) and in *Do Androids Dream Of Electric Sheep*? (*Do Androids* 48). In *The Transmigration Of Timothy Archer* (*Transmigration* 102), and *We Can Build You* (*We Can* 219), schizophrenia is described as a disorder in which abstraction is literalised. Thinking is therefore overly concrete.

In *We Can Build You*, the schizophrenic Pris is described as someone who "...had an ironclad rigid schematic view, a blueprint, of mankind. An abstraction. And she lived it." Pris also has no knowledge (according to Dick) of "authentic human nature" (182). Here

Dick's definition of schizophrenia resembles the description in *DSM-IV* of Schizotypal Personality Disorder, in that her thinking is overly abstract.

Similarly, in Dick's *The Transmigration Of Timothy Archer*, a semi-biographical novel about the life of Bishop James Pike, Angel Archer is dismayed to discover the extent to which Bill Lundborg is schizophrenic. Bill is schizophrenic according to Dick's definition which, in this case, relies on the Benjamin Proverb Test. Since metaphors, proverbs, and other symbolic phrases are for schizophrenics concrete or literal, the way in which Angel discovers Bill's schizophrenia is by asking him to comment on various proverbs, that is, she asks Bill to explain them.

Instead of explaining the proverbs, Bill reiterates or concretises them. 'It never rains, but it pours', is for him a statement about rain and not about the surprising unevenness with which g/God doles out fate. However, if a schizophrenic is someone who thinks words are things (Freud qtd. in Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus* 23), what are the implications of a medicalised understanding of a genre that claims to literalise metaphor (Delany 165; Robinson, *Novels* 68-69)? Is S.F. not already schizophrenic by this definition? Is mainstream fiction not increasingly schizophrenic also? These themes will be more fully explored in Chapter One of the thesis.

Sometimes in Dick's fiction schizophrenia is characterised by a disconnection from culture and values (*Dr. Bloodmoney* 218) or it is identified with autism (*Martian* 73) which is a disorder characterised by an inability to empathise (Carlson 577). In *Martian Time-Slip* autism is presented as a lack of empathy. Dick sees a lack of empathy as the common link between it and schizophrenia.[12] In *Martian Time-Slip*, schizophrenia is identified with an overdeveloped self that is disconnected from the world (*Martian* 170).

McHale's definition of paranoia owes something to Thomas Pynchon's juxtaposition of paranoid and anti-paranoid. In Thomas Pynchon's *The Crying Of Lot 49* and *Gravity's Rainbow*, it is paranoia which appears to be a form of megalomania. Paranoia is a condition in which the self is overdeveloped to such an extent that the paranoid person interprets incidental things as relating to him or herself.

The world, then, seems to revolve around that person like a satellite, i.e., he/she has an exaggerated sense of his/her own importance and this is demonstrated by the belief that everyone is out to get him/her. The disorder is self perpetuating since paranoids make others suspicious of them. The paranoid's own suspicion and sense of self-importance leads either to an attack or to further evidence of a conspiracy (as in *The Crying Of Lot 49* where Oedipa is Oedipal).

Anti-paranoia, for its part, is paranoia's opposite. It is like Deleuze and Guattari's schizophrenia in that it implies a type of antidote to paranoia. In fact, *Gravity's Rainbow*, which develops and demonstrates the paranoia/anti-paranoia dichotomy, is schizophrenic in the sense that it is fragmented, decentered and ontologically oriented. The novel foregrounds 'world' over subjectivity or knowledge.

Both McHale and Pynchon seem to favour the anti-paranoid mode over the paranoid one.[13] Anti-paranoia is therefore described by McHale in *Constructing Postmodernism* (88) as the ability to navigate in a sea of uncertainties without reaching for the dry land of 'fact' or 'reason'.

If schizophrenia is postmodern, perhaps paranoia is not just an illness toward which we should feel sympathy or at least tolerance, but rather paranoia is emblematic of the whole modernist project with its emphasis on rationality, epistemology and subjectivity. This is the

case that McHale makes in *Constructing Postmodernism* (186). Paranoia is merely old-fashioned modernism and a failed quest for knowledge. That is, paranoia is not just paranoia, it is modernism and therefore paranoia is emblematic of a way of life which revolves around knowledge and individual power.

McHale's *Constructing Postmodernism* quotes Karl Popper on the relationship between religion and paranoia, "The conspiracy theory of society...comes from abandoning God and then asking: 'Who is in his place?" (166).

Dick's paranoia is by contrast the product of his religion and not the product of the death of God. For Gnostics, reality is "hidden" to quote the Gnostic Gospel According To Philip "in perfect day" (Wilson 62). Paranoia in Dick is often the result of an awareness of religious possibilities as well as of political possibilities.

This makes Dick sound like a modernist by McHale's standards. Perhaps by McHale's standards he is. However, it must be acknowledged that Dick presents McHale with a puzzle since the religious element of his fiction implies a 'modernist' emphasis on interpretation and subjectivity. But it would be difficult to classify Dick as a modernist because, according to McHale, S.F. is quintessentially postmodernist and Dick is an S.F. writer. As an S.F. writer Dick is also more than usually schizophrenic. Dick is modernist by one of McHale's standards and postmodernist by another. It is possible that the dilemma that Dick poses in terms of classification may point to a problem with McHale's concept of the 'dominant'.

On the other hand, one of Durham's claims about Dick is much like the claim by Baudrillard in *Simulations* that surrealism is impossible because the artistic is already part of the quotidian (Baudrillard 148). Durham intimates also that this is not the utopian result imagined by the avant garde (190). In fact, the pairing of Dick's S.F. oeuvre with

Baudrillard's *Simulations* may be a more viable match than Durham's pairing of Dick with *Anti-Oedipus*.

But if Dick is something of a modernist how can he be linked in this thesis with Baudrillard (who is a premier example of a 'postmodern')? The answer may have to do with a distinction between postmodernism as a genre of fiction and 'the postmodern' as a description of the contemporary. Baudrillard is a postmodern in a different sense from McHale.

Despite Dick's emphasis on subjectivity as it turns out he also shares common ground with Baudrillard. Baudrillard describes a world situation that is 'schizophrenic' with many of the same connotations as appear in Dick's fiction. In Chapter Three, I will consider in some detail Dick's interest in simulated realities and simulated people as they relate to the theoretical interests that Baudrillard develops in *Simulations*.

In sum, the thesis deals directly with Dick's ideas of paranoia and schizophrenia as distinguished from those of the medical profession and from those with a cultural theorist's perspective (e.g. Deleuze/Guattari and Baudrillard). The thesis seeks to situate Dick with respect to S.F. and literary theory and to link both his use of paranoia and schizophrenia and his problematisation of reality to his preoccupation with subjectivity and his interest in Gnostic or Zoroastrian themes.

The thesis will also distinguish between Dick's ontological emphasis and McHale's definitions of modernism and postmodernism. In some senses such a distinction will take shape as a test case in which McHale's theoretical concerns will be compared to examples from Dick's fiction.

Dick is much more interested in subjectivity than are any of the cultural theorists I have

cited, including Deleuze and Guattari, McHale, Delany and Baudrillard. Dick's paranoia and his schizophrenia are also different from Deleuze and Guattari's (since Dick's writing is object oriented in that it foregrounds simulated worlds and problems with reality). McHale's concept of the dominant is useful when reading Dick, as is the idea put forth by Delany and Robinson that metaphor is literalised in S.F.

However, Dick is also interested in a concept of authenticity that has to do with religion and with religious concerns. Dick's ontology is therefore often also religious. Although Dick shares Baudrillard's preoccupation with simulations, Dick's interest in religious themes is not shared by Baudrillard, nor indeed by Deleuze and Guattari.

Accordingly, I will focus in particular detail on Dick's psychological S.F. while also alluding to other texts which may be treated peripherally. In "The Swiss Connection", Anthony Wolk lists the most psychological of Dick's novels as: *We Can Build You*, *Martian Time-Slip*, *The Simulacra*, *Do Androids Dream Of Electric Sheep?* and *The Transmigration Of Timothy Archer*. Each of these novels tends to emphasise schizophrenia. All are among the texts discussed in this thesis.

As well, any critical work that looks at psychology in Dick should include a discussion of *Clans Of The Alphane Moon*, since the novel features an entire world that is an insane asylum. *Clans* also gives us an unusually clear view of the paranoid theme in Dick. A discussion of *Clans* is included here. Added to this are another dozen Dick texts related to my major topics.

Valis and *Divine Invasion* demonstrate a connection between Dick's interest in paranoia/schizophrenia and his interest in religion. *Dr. Bloodmoney*, *A Scanner Darkly*, *Eye In The Sky*, and *Time Out Of Joint* are novels about paranoia and each of these also receives

attention. *The Penultimate Truth* and *Vulcan's Hammer* receive mention because they depict an objectified cold war paranoia.

Ubik features paranoids and schizophrenics in a situation which is schizophrenic/postmodern. *The Man In The High Castle* is also a novel about paranoia in a situation which is ontologically unstable or schizophrenic. *The Three Stigmata Of Palmer Eldritch*, and *Flow My Tears The Policeman Said* are discussed, and *Galactic Pot Healer* and *Cosmic Puppets* are included as early religious texts.

Since it is among the goals of this thesis to show a relationship between Dick's metaphysics, subjectivity and paranoia/schizophrenia, occasionally some lesser known religious works such as *Galactic Pot Healer* and *Cosmic Puppets* are favoured with emphasis over a more thorough discussion of better novels such as *Martian Time-Slip* or *The Three Stigmata Of Palmer Eldritch*.

It is probably also true that Dick is in many ways an exceptional and not an exemplary writer. That is, he makes a better exception than an example. In order to make sense of Dick, it might be best to start from the examples he gives of fictional writing and to theorise from that perspective, rather than to theorise first and then try to make Dick's writing fit the theory.

This is not a full length survey of Dick's work nor is it a full length survey of his novels. Instead, it is a discussion of paranoia and schizophrenia as they relate to other prominent features in Dick's work. The thesis will not attempt to make broad pronouncements about all of Dick's work, except to say that many of the specific themes addressed here recur with similar implications and emphases in Dick's texts throughout his career as a fiction writer.

An Outside Spread Without/An Outside Spread Within

Scott Durham claims that a process of turning things inside out – of objectifying the subjective – occurs in many of Dick's works of fiction (188). He also claims that this process is an example of a political and theoretical turn away from subjectivity, i.e., Dick is invoking the postmodernist or poststructural "death of the subject".

Durham's reading is indebted to Deleuze and Guattari and seems to employ a poststructuralist frame to discuss Dick's work. Durham's claim is partly valid: Dick does objectify internalities in his fiction. This chapter will discuss how this is done and will outline various examples of the process in his fiction.

In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari state that, for schizoanalysis, there is no difference between political economy and libidinal economy (381). It is among the aims of their project to include desire in their analysis of economics while including economics in their analysis of desire. Deleuze and Guattari view this as a benevolent schizophrenising process. Quoting Antonin Artaud, they proclaim: "Under the skin the body is an over-heated factory,/and outside,/the invalid shines,/glows,/from every burst pore" (3).

An interesting aspect of this project, therefore, is its attempt to treat internalities (things normally associated with subjectivities) as though they were external (that is, having to do with, in this case, economics) and vice versa. So the internal workings of the body are referred to as a factory while the factory is said to resemble a person who glows from burst pores.

Fredric Jameson has proposed in *On Philip K. Dick* that Dick's power lies in his ability to use two mutually exclusive explanatory systems. Jameson claims that Dick uses both the

subjective and objective explanatory systems even though the use of both appears to be contradictory (27). This is a tendency which on the surface does seem to recall *Anti-Oedipus* and its conflation of objective and subjective.

However, a note should be made at the outset of a key difference between Dick and the Deleuze/Guattarian project: Dick does not define schizophrenia in the same way as do Deleuze and Guattari. For Dick, schizophrenia and schizoid disorders are emblematic of coldness and a lack of humanity. The externalisation of interiority and the opposite tendency both occur with different implications from Deleuze and Guattari's work.

In *Anti-Oedipus*, "the death of the subject," occurs as an emphasis is placed on objectivity.[1] For example, in their description of Freud's Oedipus Complex, it is the father who fears his child and suspects him of things about which the child knows nothing (178). In Deleuze and Guattari's version of Oedipus, the child then absorbs his father's suspicions and paranoia. Deleuze and Guattari's approach (defined in relation to Freud) goes counter to Freud's position which emphasises psychology and prefers paranoia to schizophrenia.

In *Anti-Oedipus*, Freud's Oedipus is rendered as a microcosm of exploitation. It is a social condition that has been normalised to such an extent that it has become internal. In Deleuze and Guattari's reading of Freud's work, this feature is then 'discovered' by Freud as a fundament or essential aspect of the human psyche -- that is, a subjective factor.[2]

For Deleuze and Guattari, Oedipus is established by Freud as a new Christ/new essence which deserves a new Nietzschean 'Antichrist' (i.e., the Anti-Oedipus). In their construction, Deleuze and Guattari must therefore attack the notion of Oedipus and reveal it to be a historical or social event and not a 'natural' feature of the human mind.

Durham refers to this as the death of the "bourgeois," "autonomous" or "centered,"

subject. In *Anti-Oedipus*, this subject is replaced by a subjectivity that is "forever decentered, defined by the states through which it passes" (Durham 188). It is within this particular theoretical context that schizophrenia for Deleuze and Guattari is seen as revolutionary and paranoia is seen as authoritarian and proto-fascist. In the case of Deleuze and Guattari, fascism (either Stalinist authoritarianism or National Socialism) is a symptom of paranoia/epistemology (Benton 176).

However, where Deleuze and Guattari see schizophrenia as a political process, for Dick it is a disease with dark ethical implications. Juxtaposed with Dick's evident mixing of insides and outsides is a notion of 'enlightenment'. The path to enlightenment, however, is paradoxically a downward one, through evil, sadness and despair.[3] That is, Dick's context is not poststructural politics at all, but rather another kind of politics based on literature. Dick's affiliations are religious, literary and psychological where Deleuze and Guattari's are socio-political.[4]

In *Anti-Oedipus*, fascism takes on different connotations from the ordinary since Deleuze and Guattari employ a definition of fascism that is related to their political concerns. Fascism is not the historically specific anti-communist or anti-socialist 'fascism' of 1922-1943 as applied by Benito Mussolini. Nor is it anti-communism plus racial supremacy as applied by Adolph Hitler. The term 'fascism' is applied to psychological disorders as well as to political movements (in turn psychological conditions may be made into metaphors of political activity). For example, according to Deleuze and Guattari, "Hitler got the fascists sexually aroused. Flags, nations, armies, banks get a lot of people aroused" (293).

Subjectivity and knowledge (epistemology) are associated with modernism and both are implicated in fascism according to this reading of modernism. For Fredric Jameson as

well, modernism is a phenomenon whose byproduct is fascism (*Fables Of Aggression* 5).

Poststructuralism inherits its anti-subjective, anti-epistemological stance from Structural Marxism. Moreover, the cultural theoretical context in which the discussion of paranoia/epistemology takes place is the deconstruction of substantive rationality (Csicsery-Ronay vi) within Structural Marxism,[5] i.e., of scientific knowledge in particular, on the grounds that this knowledge is the source of the worst features of both fascism and communism (Benton 175). That is, science (especially sociology and psychology, Marxism and Freudianism) and dogma, are identified in this context.[6] In fact, all knowledge systems are called into question in this deconstruction.

Dick's fiction is by contrast much more traditional in its approach.[7] Dick's paranoia is measured on a completely different scale from Deleuze and Guattari's paranoia. For Dick, paranoia in some cases is merely an unfortunate disorder, while in others, it is allied with agency. It does not have the same fascistic connotations that it does for Deleuze and Guattari.

In Dick's universes, paranoia and schizophrenia are not polarised (they are in Deleuze and Guattari). In fact, the two conditions are often overlapping aspects of the same disease. Two extended examples drawn from *Dr. Bloodmoney* and *Clans Of The Alphane Moon* usefully illustrate the way in which Dick's paranoia and schizophrenia sometimes overlap.

The Case Of Bruno Bluthgeld

In the text of Dick's *Dr. Bloodmoney*, Bruno Bluthgeld does seem on the surface to be a good example of the way in which paranoia might be emblematic of fascism. The novel tells the story of life after a nuclear holocaust. After two nuclear disasters the survivors enter

a phase that (in many ways) is a simpler (than 'modern') communitarian way of life. Some critics have claimed that *Dr. Bloodmoney* is the most utopian (Warrick, *Mind* 83; Suvin 8; Jameson, *After* 36) of Dick's works, though this may say more about the critics than about the society in *Dr. Bloodmoney*.

Justice in this post-holocaust world is rudimentary and harsh. Suspicion frequently leads to capital punishment. Anyone with mechanical expertise is a highly valued person in this context. Survivors must eke out a meagre living from the vestiges of civilisation and are consequently almost entirely dependent on handymen whose very real character flaws are barely redeemed by their technical abilities.

The story centres around Stuart McConchie, a salesman, Hoppy Harrington, a mechanical wizard, Andrew Gill, an independent business man, and Dr. Bluthgeld, a physicist. Bluthgeld is thought to be responsible for at least one previous nuclear disaster, though his role in the event is not totally clear.

Bonny Keller, her husband George Keller, and Edie and Bill Keller, Bonny's 'siamese' twin daughter/son, also figure prominently. Edie is the product of a union between Andrew Gill and Bonny Keller which occurred in the few moments after the bombs exploded, i.e., during or immediately after the nuclear disaster. Bill is embedded in Edie's abdomen.

Since the holocaust occurs shortly after the launch of a colonising spacecraft, an astronaut named Walt Dangerfield is trapped in a makeshift satellite. He orbits the earth, living on space rations and broadcasting to the post-holocaust world. Walt, Bonny, Edie and Andrew Gill are the most likeable characters, even though Bonny and her husband engineer the trial and execution of Mr Asturias, their school teacher.

Within this context, Bruno Bluthgeld's condition at first appears unpleasant and

delusional, but probably harmless. Bluthgeld is suspicious and seems to believe that the world revolves around him. Initially, the reader imagines that this fear is somewhat unwarranted, but Bluthgeld's perception of his situation is in fact an accurate one and not part of some overall fantasy or delusion of grandeur. He perceives that people hate him as in fact they do.

Bluthgeld blames himself for the first nuclear holocaust which really was his fault, although the first holocaust seems initially to have been reflective of an error in judgement on his part. One does not get the sense that Bluthgeld wanted the first holocaust to occur. At the end of the novel, however, Bluthgeld is ultimately able to actualise his own hatred and unleash it in the form of a second nuclear Armageddon. This may imply that the first holocaust was also in fact intentional and not a matter of an error in judgement.

Mr. Asturias compares Bluthgeld to other unpleasant paranoids such as Joe MacCarthy (*Dr. Bloodmoney* 62) which rests on an assignment of traits that could be viewed as 'fascist' only in the narrowest sense of being 'anti-communist'. However, there is a fly in the ointment if one wants to imply that paranoia and fascism are uniquely connected in this novel.

In the first place, the local psychiatrist, Dr. Stockstill, diagnoses Bruno Bluthgeld's condition as *either* paranoia sensitiva *or* advanced insidious schizophrenia (*Dr. Bloodmoney* 12). According to Hal Barnes, Bluthgeld is schizophrenic at the crucial moment when he decides to annihilate the world, since he (Bluthgeld) has lost "track of their culture and its values" (*Dr. Bloodmoney* 218) as exemplified by Dangerfield's broadcasts.

Though he seems to be at the centre of each disaster, it is not clear whether (according to Dick) Bluthgeld is emblematic of paranoia or of schizophrenia. A similar confusion results in *Martian Time-Slip* when the two diseases are also described as co-extensive since

schizophrenia is defined as: "...catatonic excitement with paranoid coloring" (*Martian* 80). In *Clans Of The Alphane Moon*, the main 'pare' (paranoid) character (Gabriel Baines) is described as having paranoid schizophrenia rather than paranoia (*Clans* 131). It is possible that Dick sees a type of paranoia as an aspect of schizophrenia. In that case, Bluthgeld could be viewed as a schizophrenic.

The description of Bluthgeld's disease actually resembles the *DSM-IV* description of paranoid schizophrenia. Though his psychology (Bluthgeld's) is externalised, thereby mixing subject and object (as in *Anti-Oedipus*, where psychology is in a sense treated 'objectively' as political), *Dr. Bloodmoney* is not only not a novel that effectively demonstrates a unique relationship between paranoia and fascism, but rather a narrative that undermines any suggestion of polar opposition between paranoia and schizophrenia.

The Introverts: Angels And Paranoid Traits

By contrast, paranoia actually has positive connotations in Dick's *Clans Of The Alphane Moon*. The description of Gabriel Baines from the 'pare' (paranoid) clan is a good example of the way that Dick often portrays paranoia. The book was written in 1964 in the middle of Dick's career – nine years after his first S.F. novel *Solar Lottery* was published. Gabriel Baines serves as a kind of S.F. prototype for some of his later paranoid characters.

The *Clans* story takes place (in part) on a world which is literally insane. Insanity is therefore a quality of world, and not only a subjective condition. The entire society is founded on sub-cultures derived from psychiatric disorders. Not only are all the people on the planet insane, but the institutions are insane. The disorders are far from being closeted. People wear their insanity as a badge.

The planet was at one time an asylum for the mentally ill, but the former patients have been left unsupervised for twenty-five years. As the story opens, the former inmates of the asylum have developed an indigenous culture. Each of the mental disorders becomes a subculture. The resulting heterogeneous society bears some resemblance to a Fourierist Phalanstery in that its strength lies in its disparities (*Fourier* 137-138).

The people of the Alphane moon are psychically diverse and the society includes a broad spectrum of 'passions'. The Alphane moon is actually a better candidate for the most idyllic of Dick's works than *Dr. Bloodmoney* since there is a balance in terms of power and needs; moreover, the members of the community also seem to be doing what they want to do. A sign that this a relatively benevolent social order lies in the fact that no one is executed. The society, therefore, compares favourably with the one in *Dr. Bloodmoney* where the justice meted out is quite severe.

However, *Clans* is also undoubtedly meant as a satire of mainstream culture, and of psychiatric practices especially, since the supposedly insane people from the former asylum are more lucid than the 'sane' members of the 'normal' Earth community. The social order is much more appealing on the Alphane moon than it is on Earth. When Earth forces decide to invade the Alphane colony, the move is therefore seen as unwarranted.

In *Clans Of The Alphane Moon*, each of the subcultures is grouped into towns named after famous figures. For instance, the hebephrenics live in Gandhitown perhaps because they are wise and ascetic like Gandhi. The polys live in Hamlet Hamlet (as if there were two or more Hamlets). The manics live in an area whose name alludes to their extreme inventiveness, i.e., Da Vinci Heights. The paranoids, meanwhile, live in Adolphville (*Clans* 5). This would tend to support the idea that Dick sees the paranoids as fascist, since

Adolphville brings Adolph Hitler immediately to mind. However, Baines is yet another character who is referred to as a paranoid schizophrenic (*Clans* 131).

A leading Earth psychologist, Mary Rittersdorf, who is part of the invading forces from Earth, says that the paranoids on the moon are suffering from "...the greatest mental disfigurement possible for a human being". She also says of them that they are, "driven by hate and incapable of empathy." (*Clans* 73) She suggests that other people do not exist for paranoids except as objects. She claims also that paranoids even experience love as a variety of hate.

Dr. Rittersdorf imagines the paranoids as rulers whose ideology of hatred would bring a dominant emotional theme of hatred to the society. Since paranoia, according to Deleuze and Guattari, implies a form of fascism, this is a description that would seem to suggest, if not the Deleuze/Guattarian frame, then certainly that paranoia is a negative quality.

However, Dick evidently disagrees with his psychologist; in fact, it turns out that the psychologist is at least as disturbed and as fallible as the people she is describing. At the end of the novel, the other characters convince her to take a battery of her own psychological tests. It is ultimately revealed that she is a depressive. That is, the tests tend to imply that her judgement is too negative.

A reading of this novel through Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipal theory is awkward. In a way, Deleuze and Guattari's mode of thought would ask us to choose between 'paranoia' conceived as the psychoanalytic/psychiatric profession and the paranoid Gabriel Baines. If one is consistent in one's theoretical analysis and psychoanalysis/psychiatry is conceived of as paranoia, Dr. Rittersdorf also represents a 'fascist' authority figure. Even if one sides with Rittersdorf, one is siding with paranoia.[8]

Meanwhile, Gabriel Baines, the foremost 'pare' representative, is the only character of Alphane moon who is willing to sacrifice himself for another. Gabriel offers Annette Golding up for rescue instead of himself when they are under attack (*Clans* 153).

While it is true that he is full of suspicion and a more than slightly comical hatred, he is also the character who is in fact most capable of empathy. For instance, Gabriel is the one who realises that the effect of Earth's attack on Gandhitown would mean the potential for an attack on any or all of them. That is, he imagines himself in the Heebs' place (*Clans* 69), and the insight causes him grief.

The implication is that Gabriel is not a fascist in Dick's estimation. Instead, Gabriel is a good man and a man of some depth. Since empathy is at the centre of ideas about authenticity where Dick is concerned and since Dick often associates paranoia and empathy in his fiction, it would be a mistake to ignore these indications that Dick sees his paranoids as benevolent and that his attitude to paranoia generally is at least ambivalent and at most quite positive.[9]

Words Are Things

According to Philip Goodchild: "The most significant set of dichotomies which Deleuze and Guattari bring into question ... is that between words and things..." (82). An example of a similar process occurs in Dick's *Time Out Of Joint*. In *Time Out Of Joint* a soft drink stand disappears and is replaced by a slip of paper on which the phrase, "soft drink stand" is written.[10]

This occurs at a point in the novel where Ragle Gumm (the main character) starts to become aware that he is living in a fiction. There is a special irony here because of course

words are always things in novels, just as things are always rendered in words. This is a moment in Dick's fiction that makes the reader aware of the fact of reading a book. Obviously, novelists use words to create soft drink stands, people, cars and other elements of the landscape, but the effect works best, in the traditional sense, when the readers and characters are unaware of words on the page. In *Time Out Of Joint*, while Ragle is awakened to the fact that he is living in a fiction, the reader is also.

There are several other ways in which the subjective becomes objective in Dick's S.F.. For instance, the subjective experiences of paranoid and schizophrenic characters become objectified by the literalisation of the condition.

Paranoids are often precogs (precognitives) who are literally able to see into people's thoughts. They are actually attuned to the subconscious repressed hatreds of others; they don't just imagine that they are able to see into these thoughts. Paranoids in Dick's S.F. are literally gifted with extra-sensory talents which reveal real threats in their immediate environments.

Other aspects of paranoia are also literalised. In *Time Out Of Joint* (1959), Ragle Gumm is a successful business man with a unique talent for pattern detection. He is employed as a volunteer during a war between Earth and the Moon by the "One Happy World" government to predict when and where the next missile strike from the moon will detonate on Earth.

When we first meet Ragle Gumm he is living in the suburbs in the 1950s. He is described as harried and preoccupied. His work, "formed a circle of which he was the centre. He could not even get out; he was surrounded" (*Time* 8-9). In *Time Out Of Joint* the world literally revolves around Ragle Gumm. As it turns out, he is literally at the centre of a

conspiracy which is all about him, because the story is not set in the 1950s. It is actually set in 1998.

The explanation lies in the fact that, after a nervous breakdown, Ragle Gumm regresses to a period before 1998 where the story is set, to some time in the 1950s. The suburbs in the 1950s are therefore a kind of dream world set up by the military to support his delusional state. Since the military needs Gumm's skill to predict the next missile strike, the military builds a fake 1950s world around him to support him in his delusion.

An army of volunteers is brought in to behave as though they were neighbours and relatives. In the simulated reality, Gumm's missile predictions become a harmless newspaper contest. Therefore, while he thinks he is a repeat winner of the contest, he is actually predicting the next missile attack. His contest entries are his predictions. However, at the beginning of the novel Ragle is beginning to have doubts about the nature of his reality. He starts to recover from his mental illness.

Ragle's role in society seems peripheral at first, but is really much greater and more central than people will acknowledge. He is in fact the most important person on Earth and he really is at the centre of a conspiracy to keep him in the dark. The paranoid's gift of pattern detection is what makes Ragle so important. Things that are usually the elements of a subjective delusion are in *Time Out Of Joint* elements of a real situation.

In a similar example, *Flow My Tears The Policeman Said* (which won the John W. Campbell Memorial Award), a man is forgotten by society. Rather than forgetting his own identity as is the case with amnesia, Jason Taverner is forgotten by the world at large. A former television entertainer, he wakes up without I.D., and while *he* remembers who he is, no one else does.

In *Eye In The Sky*, meanwhile, the world is an objective version of each of the characters' subjective imaginations. After an accident with "the proton beam deflector" of a Bevatron, each of the characters takes turns creating reality. As the story progresses, there is an escalation in the fearfulness of the realities until the final reality. The effect of uncovering layer after layer of reality is to suggest that reality itself is a fiction. If it is possible for reality to be a fiction, the stability of any potential reality is undermined. Thus the eye in the sky is a matter of perspective and reality depends on that perspective.

Alternatively, when schizophrenic qualities are objectified, the 'mechanical' qualities associated with an absence of affect are translated into actual machinery. For instance, in Dick's *Do Androids Dream Of Electric Sheep?* schizophrenics are actual androids. Several of these mechanical fake-people are featured as major characters in this novel: Rachael Rosen, Pris Stratton, Roy and Irmgard Baty, Luba Luft, Max Polokov and Inspector Garland. Rick Deckard is an independent agent hired by the police. His job is to kill delinquent androids.

Since the androids are very similar to humans, a test is required to determine whether the subjects are real or fake. The test called 'Voigt-Kampff' is reminiscent of tests given to those suspected of schizophrenia or of autism in that it measures empathy. Those who fail the test are usually androids, though some schizoid humans also (significantly) fail the test (*Do Androids* 33).

Life on Earth is bleak in *Do Androids Dream Of Electric Sheep*? People take comfort in Mercerism (a religion of empathy), mood organs, and animals, which latter are rare and sought after consumer items. Electric animals including sheep are substituted when real animals are not affordable.

The subplot is dominated by a minor character named J.R. Isidore. J. R. Isidore is a veterinary mechanic (and typical Dickian anti-heroic hero) who works for Mr. Sloat and repairs defective mechanical animals. He is a 'special' which means that he is a sterile genetic accident, sometimes referred to as a 'chickenhead', caused as a side effect of radiation from a 'final' world war.

J.R. Isidore could be seen as pathetic except that the androids make him look good. It is clear that he is far better than any of the androids by virtue of the fact that he is human. For Dick, an imperfect humanity is infinitely better than a machine.

The androids of this novel are an example of the way metaphor or figurative language may be handled in S.F.. People who (in 'mundane' fiction, as Delany calls mainstream literature) merely act like machines are actual machines in Dick's S.F. That is, the hypothetical 'as if' she were a machine (which actually seems to indicate simile rather than metaphor), translates into she 'actually is' a machine in S.F.. This is what Samuel R. Delany means when he says that metaphor is literalised.

According to Delany, reality is therefore always an issue in S.F. and is constantly being foregrounded. It is often difficult to know how to take what would be (in mundane fiction) an ordinary sentence. 'What world is this?' is the overriding theme. Mundane fiction is by contrast less object oriented and more concerned with subjectivity (Delany 188).

This is similar to the distinction that McHale makes between modernist fiction and postmodernist fiction. Delany's emphasis on objectivity is a feature of S.F. only, however, whereas McHale is outlining the possibility of a postmodern 'literature' that appears to have the features of S.F.

Dick is consequently objective according to both McHale and Delany, but only in the

sense that the dominant is ontological, not in the sense that reality is absolute. This is the case with Deleuze and Guattari also. In Dick, as in other S.F. works, the instability of reality is what keeps it in the foreground. Yet, somewhere underneath the shifting surface of this conception of indefinite reality, a search for something more real or more stable is suggested in his fiction.

Dick's religious convictions do not allow him to stray too far from the possibility that there is an ultimate final reality or world that would reduce all previous worlds to the status of frauds or sham worlds. Moreover, as Jameson has noted, Dick is also deeply committed to subjective explanatory systems and this is among the reasons that his fiction is so complex and paradoxical.

Ambivalent Gods

Where Deleuze and Guattari talk about micro-fascisms and macro-desire, Dick's fiction invokes divine reasons for eternal injustices and looks for meaning in a universe that promotes indifference.[11] None of this is particularly compatible with an Anti-Oedipal reading, and yet, many of these religious elements are crucial to a thorough understanding of Dick.

By contrast with Deleuze and Guattari, Dick sees fascism as a type of evil that necessarily involves a certain grandness of scale. Fascism is not small. Micro evil is not usually evil, it is pathos. The potential for evil only comes into his stories with the introduction of divine beings or pseudo g/Gods; usually these are schizophrenics.[12] The reading that Durham gives us of Dick is therefore necessarily reductive because of the elements he must exclude. Dick externalises subjectivity, but it is within a religious or

mystical context, not within a political/economic one.

For instance, one way that Dick 'realises' aspects of psychology is to create worlds that are realised forms of the mind of the creator. If reality is the mind of g/God, then g/God may also be disturbed or even schizophrenic. We hear that g/God is good, but what we see suggests otherwise. His manifest cruelty actually indicates a pathology. Dick's novels are frequently apparent responses to the question of the goodness of g/God.

Dick asks: What if g/God is two faced? What if g/God is crazy, cruel, or amnesiac? What if g/God is retarded? In Dick's S.F. these metaphysical possibilities are often clothed in the thematics of an ancient religion: either Zoroastrianism (as in the case of *Lies Inc.* or *Galactic Pot Healer*), Gnosticism (as in *Divine Invasion*, *The Three Stigmata Of Palmer Eldritch*) or Manicheanism (Jameson, *After* 33). In *The Man In The High Castle*, Dick is dealing with Taoism as Patricia Warrick has pointed out in her article in *On Philip K. Dick* entitled "The Encounter Of Taoism And Fascism In *The Man In The High Castle*."

In Zoroastrianism, the Persian word for the force of evil (Daevas) is derived from the same Sanskrit word as our Latin word for the Christian God (deus) (Dawson 48). The Christian God, or deus, could therefore be said to represent a form of the devil in Zoroastrianism and would be identified with both deceit and cold, since Daevas (or Ahriman) is associated with these things.

Further evidence that Christianity is an inverted Zoroastrianism may be found in the fact that for Zoroastrians, sun, fire and truth are associated with Ahura Mazda -- the creator. This represents a reversal of Christian notions. For Christians, heat and fire are associated with Hell, while the comparatively chilly climes of celestial bliss characterize Heaven. That is, for Zoroastrians, Hell has already frozen over.

If Ahriman or Daevas were the world, what would that world be like? The description in *Ubik* of the forces of 'entropy' resonate with a Zoroastrian sensibility. Entropy is experienced as cold and exhausting, while Runciter who seems to be pitted against the forces of entropy is a model personality valued for his energy and vitality (*Ubik* 79). The flattened affectivity of Dick's schizophrenics takes on some interesting connotations when the criterion of Zoroastrian warmth is applied to it. It is no accident that (the Nazi) Herr Heydrich in *The Man In The High Castle* is also described as without affectivity.

Joe Chip describes the forces of entropy as they work against himself and his co-workers in *Ubik*:

> He discovered then that he had become cold, as well as exhausted. When had this happened? ... Worse than on Luna, far worse. Worse, too, than the chill that had hung over his hotel room in Zurich. Those had been harbingers" (*Ubik* 177-178).

And more overtly: "They must be wrong about Hell. Hell is cold; everything there is cold" (*Ubik* 178).

In Gnosticism, creation is g/God's founding mistake. The fall from grace is a result of God's jealous error. Moreover Eve is a heroic figure who wakes Adam from the sleep of ignorance in the garden of Eden. Not coincidentally, the heroes of Dick's Gnostic inspired novel *Divine Invasion* are also women. The Beside-Helper or Advocate takes the form of a woman. Zina, also in *Divine Invasion*, is yet another female figure whose benign countenance exemplifies wisdom.

The plots in Dick's novels are often quite elaborate and fantastic. *Divine Invasion* is no exception. It is the story of the invasion of Earth by the microform or incarnation of g/God.

Evil in this novel seems to be present as an aspect of creation and perhaps even as an aspect of creativity itself. Indeed, God admits to creating evil (Isa. 45.7), and Dick quotes this passage in *Divine Invasion* (*Divine* 63).

In this novel, the main characters: Rybys Rommey, Herb Asher, Elias Tate, Manny (Emmanuel), who is the microform of g/God, and Zina (Manny's twin) battle against the forces of evil as embodied by a devilish goat-being. Herb Asher, a mere mortal, is aided by Linda Fox, a popular singer probably modelled on Linda Ronstadt. Much of the story is a flashback to a time before Manny's birth.

Before Manny's birth, Rybys is herself living in a dome on hostile extraterrestrial 'offworld' CY30 II when she discovers that she has multiple sclerosis (which, if she can return to Earth for treatment, is not fatal). Her neighbour, who is Herb Asher, is encouraged by the fellow who delivers food to all the domes to visit Rybys because (says the food delivery man) she is sick. It is then revealed that Rybys is also pregnant with the microform of g/God and her illness is consequently exacerbated by morning sickness.

Earth, meanwhile, is governed by a coalition of the Catholic church and a form of communism called 'Scientific Legate' (*Divine* 32). Neither faction is at all prepared to welcome the incarnation of g/God on the planet. In fact the Catholic church typically does not recognise the potential event as the miracle birth, but instead claims that the child is the Antichrist.

Herb marries Rybys to provide a cover story for the pregnancy. Then Rybys, Herb and the prophet Elijah emigrate to Earth where Rybys is killed in a car accident while her child and Herb miraculously survive (though Manny has brain damage). Throughout the second half of this novel, g/God has a split personality (Emmanuel and Zina) and struggles with a

counter-god 'Belial' for control of reality.

Reality is literally a concretisation of the thoughts of the creator gods, much as in *Eye In The Sky* individual subjective realities become objectified by the 'Bevatron'. To the extent that there is a struggle for power between the gods, there is dissonance in that reality. As each of the gods wages a mental war on the other gods, 'reality', i.e., Herb's world, changes.

In the *Three Stigmata Of Palmer Eldritch*, Leo Bulero is the manufacturer of a psychedelic drug called Can-D that allows people who live on extraterrestrial colonies to pretend that they live 'normal' middle-class lives on Earth. The company employs (precognitive) Pre-Fash consultants to gauge the success of their Can-D accessories. The accessories are miniaturised household items that are sold to make the experience of translation (the drug-induced state) seem more realistic and pleasurable.

Barney Mayerson and Rondinella Fugate are two such consultants. Barney and Roni are in competition for the same job. Roni, a junior member of the firm, attempts to win Barney's trust by sleeping with him. However she is secretly trying to win Leo's favour as well so that she can take over Barney's job.

Trouble appears on the horizon when a competitor arrives in the form of Palmer Eldritch. Palmer, with the help of his daughter Zoe, intends to compete with Leo's company by selling a drug called Chew-Z, which promises eternal life. The drug claims also to offer a 'real world' rather than a fake one. However, the people who take the drug complain that among the side effects is the perceived presence of something evil in the form of Palmer Eldritch himself.

Dick is often quite ambivalent about his schizophrenic g/Gods. The inversion of ordinary Christian values makes it difficult to tell how one should judge Palmer Eldritch in

The Three Stigmata Of Palmer Eldritch. Is he a false and demonic g/God or is he good imperfect? Hazel Pierce suggests that Dick has created a character who is not "evil incarnate" but (like the creator God of Gnosticism) is good, but imperfect (Pierce, *Philip* 25). His name 'Eldritch' comes from the same root as elf and suggests a fairy world. In fact, Zina from *Divine Invasion* is also referred to as fairy. The story is reminiscent of *Divine Invasion* in that the paired godlike entities Palmer Eldritch and his daughter Zoe are not the singular or unique God of Christianity; nor is their creation an ideal world.

In Gnosticism the names of the creator g/God are Yaldabaoth, Samael, and Saclas: 'child of chaos', 'blind God', and 'foolish one' respectively. Dick tends to emphasise the blindness of g/God or his/her occlusion (*Valis* 97). The creator g/God is "fucked up" as Horselover Fat puts it in *Valis* (*Valis* 73) or as Harold Bloom calls him, a 'botcher' or an 'ignoramus' (*American* 51).

For some Gnostics, the myth of Genesis reveals that the creator g/God is irrational, jealous and accusatory. God is therefore not the perfect 'God' of mainstream Christianity. For instance, if g/God is omniscient why does he call to Adam and Eve to reveal themselves? Why does he not know where they are?

The picture in Genesis is of God looking for Adam and Eve, because he would like to punish them for the sin of knowledge (Gen. 3.9): "And the Lord God called unto Adam, and said unto him, Where art thou?" This poses the question: If g/God is good, why is he not proud of their knowledge? Why can't he find his own creations if he is all knowing and all powerful? The answer, for Gnostics, is that he is *not* all knowing and all powerful.

The Congregation Of The Dead

In Brian McHale's *Postmodernist Fiction*, as I noted earlier, McHale describes the shift from modernist to postmodernist fiction as having to do with a shift in emphasis. McHale suggests that postmodernist fiction deals with ontology (being or reality) while modernist fiction deals with epistemology (*Postmodernist* 3). Another way of putting this is to say that epistemology deals with truth, while ontology deals with reality.

McHale calls this emphasis 'the dominant'. Evidently, in postmodernist fiction, the 'dominant' is ontological.[13] An example of a genre of fiction that foregrounds epistemology would be detective fiction, since the search for information and knowledge is highlighted (*Postmodernist* 59).

In *Anti-Oedipus* a similar (to postmodernist) emphasis on ontology, 'reality' in the sense of political economy comes out of a critique of psychoanalysis. The main difference between paranoia and schizophrenia for Deleuze and Guattari is that paranoia is characterised as neurosis while schizophrenia is characterised as a psychosis (Seem xxi). This is essentially Freud's definition. However, Deleuze and Guattari derive different conclusions from this definition.

In a neurosis, the ego still exists. In schizophrenia, because it is a psychosis, the ego is gone. For Deleuze and Guattari, this means that paranoia is oppressive. Elements such as the ego and subconscious are also social forces capable of social attributions, rather than merely psychological forces that only work on the micro level. For example, in the usual definition of these terms oppression is a process that operates at the level of society, while repression usually takes place at the level of psychology,e.g., 'inappropriate' desires are normally repressed as a function of ego formation.

In general, social classes are oppressed by other classes; they are seldom repressed by them. However, in *Anti-Oedipus*, the common distinction between oppression and repression is contested. Therefore it is not the mainstream medical definition of paranoia and schizophrenia that interests Deleuze and Guattari who wish to argue that paranoid neurosis is a fascistic process while schizophrenia is a process that is liberatory. Their own version of schizoanalysis is concerned with introducing 'real reality' (objectivity) into a psychoanalysis that, from their perspective, is mired in a study of internality (Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus* 334). Real reality in this context is socio-political.

Dick also foregrounds reality in his fiction. But in Dick's fiction, we are dealing with a different kind of universe, one in which death has symbolic meaning and one in which insanity (especially schizophrenia) and death are closely allied. The mire that psychologists study is the very internality of the literature that Dick spent a lifetime writing. In Dick's universe, life and death are often the products of consciousness and understanding. Whether schizophrenia has liberatory potential within that universe is doubtful. However, Dick is also employing various literary tropes that make us think of the McHalian ontological dominant or of Deleuze and Guattari and their extroversion.

McHale cites S.F. as a genre of writing that foregrounds ontology, because of its emphasis on worlds or reality (*Postmodernist* 59). This is another way of saying that S.F. is object (or outside) oriented as opposed to subject (or inside) oriented. Dick is ontological in that he is an S.F. writer, but he also employs many of the techniques of postmodernist fiction as delineated by McHale. For instance, McHale describes the way in which objects in one world sometimes inexplicably appear in another world, creating a situation that is ontologically unstable.

In Jorge Luis Borges's "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius" (McHale, *Postmodernist* 35), Tlön is a world whose ontological status is unstable. It seems to exist only in certain encyclopedias and in the minds of certain select people. However, objects from fictional world Tlon ultimately appear in the supposed 'real world' of the story. A similar pattern of events occurs in Dick's *Ubik*. Objects and messages from 'half-life' appear in the supposed real life of the novel.

Another technique for foregrounding ontology involves the creation of epistemological problems which are irresolvable and therefore tip into ontology (McHale, *Postmodernist* 11). *Ubik* provides some good examples of this technique. According to Kim Stanley Robinson, "*Ubik* has come to be seen as the prototypical Dick novel" (*Novels* 93). He suggests that this is because it creates an epistemological puzzle (*Novels* 93). In *Ubik*, Dick presents the reader with more clues than there are 'crimes', with the result that there are more causes than effects. Finally the reader's questions about truth tip into questions about reality.

In *Ubik*, the story revolves around a prudence organisation owned by a man named Glen Runciter. The organisation employs anti-psi talents or 'inertials' as they are called (people who block the activity of telepaths and other active talents). In this world, the thinking parts of people who are virtually dead are preserved in half-life.

Half-life is a technique used to maintain the consciousness of those who are physically beyond repair so that they are able to communicate with the living and enjoy some type of existence beyond death. People in half-life are literally only half alive. Their bodies are more or less dead, but consciousness is still in existence. The experience of half-life itself is of a sort of virtual universe.

The story begins as a spy novel set in the near future with the activities of the spies

accentuated by their ability either to read minds or to block those who do. At first, the plot suggests an interpretive or epistemological quest.

Glen Runciter has many employees. Among them are Joe Chip and Pat "no last name," as Joe calls her (Dick, *Ubik* 43). Pat's unusual talent is that she can alter the present and future by altering the past. Glen, Joe, Pat and Glen's other inertials are all involved in a meeting with a potential customer, Stanton Mick, on Luna - Earth's Moon.

However, the 'thing' that calls itself Stanton Mick is suddenly revealed to be a robot-bomb, which then explodes. Glen Runciter is killed, or so it seems, for as the story progresses, the reader becomes less and less sure of who is dead and who is not dead.

After the death of Glen Runciter, time moves backwards for the other characters until they become convinced that either they are dead (and in half-life), or someone is deliberately altering their reality. More troubling are the frequent messages they receive from Glen in the form of television commercials and in product packaging. Meanwhile, each of the characters involved in the ill-fated meeting with Stanton Mick is dying. Wendy Wright is the first victim. When they find her body it is described as "...old. Completely dried-out. Like it's been here for centuries" (Dick, *Ubik* 100).

The regression in time that takes place may be caused by Pat or by Jory (a malevolent character who exists in half-life). The deaths may be the result of natural entropy as experienced in half-life or the effect may be a matter of a shift in the fabric of reality. The characters may be already dead throughout most of the novel, or perhaps only one or a few are dead. These are examples of the ways in which Dick frustrates epistemological enquiry such that an ontological dominant is foregrounded.

In *Ubik* the characters seem to die because they are alone, as though alone they cannot

sustain their own world. Meanwhile a spray can of universality, 'Ubik' (ubiquity), is the only thing keeping them alive - as if by taking them out of themselves, that is, by universalising them, Ubik (the product) allows them to transcend death. The process is reminiscent of Greek fame wherein ultra contingent heroes are made to live on eternally in the transcendant poetry of Homer. From this perspective, *Ubik*'s moratoriums serve as a kind of library of people, and relatives come to read.

In his article in *Extrapolation* entitled, "The Final Trilogy Of Philip K. Dick," F. Scott Walters describes a form of bibliophenomenology in which readers hypostatise (concretise/make real) the characters of a novel much as the g/Gods in Dick's Gnostic trilogy hypostatise human life (223). The description is a variation on the author as God topos that McHale describes in *Postmodernist Fiction* (29). Walters presents us with the possibility of worlds within worlds of readers and of characters who are hypostatised.

We are g/God in relation to the characters in *Ubik*, as we are g/God in relation to the characters in all of Dick's novels. Dick's fictions also often contain living books within them. There is a living book in *Galactic Pot Healer*, in *Lies Inc.* and Zina in *Divine Invasion* is also referred to as a book.

In many respects, the thematic is more overt in *Divine Invasion*: Dick writes a novel about g/God who hypostatises the reality of the novel including its characters such that we are the ones who realise or hypostatise the g/God who realises a world in which there are characters including other g/Gods who may create sub-worlds, et cetera. The description also bears a resemblance to Chinese box worlds (112) or mise-en-abyme (124) as described by Brian McHale in *Postmodernist Fiction*.

However, the thematic of living books is also in keeping with the ancient Jewish

cabalistic convention of living information which is passed on in the form of textual recipes. That is, it is also possible to read Dick's tropes as products of a religious rather than a strictly postmodernist literary tradition. Religious overtones often serve to distinguish between Dick's ontology and that of McHale.

The death of isolation in *Ubik*, for its part, may also have religious implications. Death is evidently not physical death, since there is some question as to whether the characters are even alive and alternatively, whether they are about to be reborn, like Mrs. Runciter. The more isolated characters exist in a state that is already schizophrenic in that it is unstable, hallucinatory and ultimately so plagued by historical paradox that it makes little mundane sense.

In some cases, death is simply not wanting or caring about the world. A lack of contact with outside reality is indicated. This is also among the primary characteristics of schizophrenia for mainstream psychiatry (*DSM-IV* 277). In *Ubik*, the characters wander away from understanding and consequently end up among the congregation of the dead.[14]

The quality of reality is itself tinged with suffering in Dick's fiction, perhaps even as a condition of its existence. For instance, Pris Frauenzimmer in *We Can Build You* represents life for Louis Rosen because she represents reality. When she leaves Louis, he wants her back even though she also creates suffering for him. He says, "With her went reality itself" and, "God knew I didn't want to suffer at Pris's hands or at anyone else's. But suffering was an indication that reality was close by" (*We Can* 150).

Hypostasis And Mechanical People

For Deleuze and Guattari schizophrenia represents creativity unfettered by the

tyrannical ego, i.e., internalised oppression (*Anti-Oedipus* 179) whereas paranoia is the embodiment of repressed desire, and therefore of modern authoritarianism and fascism. Schizophrenia as a mode is seen as a counterweight to fascist tendencies within this context.

For Dick, schizophrenia has a creative element as well. In *We Can Build You*, a story that Patricia Warrick has described as a draft version of *Do Androids Dream Of Electric Sheep?* (Warrick, *Mind* 117), the owners of the Rosen Spinet Piano & Electronic Organ Factory (which sells spinet pianos and electronic organs) decide to start building automata. The first automaton they build is a model of a historical figure from U.S. civil war history named Edward M. Stanton. Their second creation is a model of Abraham Lincoln, which they refer to as 'The Lincoln'.

In this story Louis Rosen and Maury Frauenzimmer are partners in the company that arranges for the creation of the two automata. Pris Frauenzimmer, who is Maury's schizoid daughter (and the woman whom Louis loves), designs the figures, though the technical details are created by another party named Bob Bundy (who is a hebephrenic).

Mary Shelley's famous novel *Frankenstein* is the first novel to introduce the idea of scientifically created human life. In effect, Shelley herself creates the monster. It is the first of its kind. That is, Shelley's monster is the first scientifically developed artificial human to exist (if only in the western imagination). One of the implications of the Frankenstein story is to cast doubt on the humanity of humans. The Frankenstein monster does this by being more human, better read and more alive than the human characters around him.

It may be the doubt about the humanity of humans that is the horror at the centre of simulation. Simulation casts doubt on the originality of the original. The abstraction (the fake) supplants the original (the real) as the focal point. To paraphrase Baudrillard's

Simulations, Disneyland is there to prove the reality of America, but Disneyland is real and America is fake (23). The message of the simulation is that we are all fakes. Simulation therefore makes a poor 'first impression'. It implies a critique of humanity, but this is only true until we realise that simulation was already with us. Simulation has been there all along.

As a consequence of Abraham Lincoln's artificiality in *We Can Build You*, he is not considered to be an actual subject; rather he is thought to be an object, i.e. a thing, created and therefore saleable. The fact that he is referred to as 'The Lincoln' and not Lincoln emphasises his status as an object or abstraction. As is often the case in Dick's fiction, there are intimations of slavery where androids are concerned (Robinson, *Novels* 29). The android is an 'Other' to the real people of the planet.

In *We Can Build You*, slavery is an occasion for irony since Abraham Lincoln is largely credited with ending slavery in the U.S. The Lincoln's own slavery is framed by a conversation wherein he is describing the 'relative' equality of 'the black man' to whites. Lincoln says that he (the black man) may not be equal to whites "in intellectual and moral endowments," but he is equal "in the right to eat the bread that his own hand earns" (Dick, *We Can* 106). Lincoln is progressive only in relation to a past in which slavery is taken for granted. From a contemporary perspective, the statement that 'black people' are not equal to whites in 'intellectual and moral endowments' sounds both patronising and racist.

But this is just the beginning of the irony: 'The Lincoln' is interrupted by a Mr. Barrows who wishes to buy him. Lincoln, who is identified with the end of slavery, is enslaved. They engage in an argument about what constitutes personhood, which the android (read slave) trader 'wins' by saying that he doesn't care (Dick, *We Can* 108). This is significant because 'caritas' from which the word care is derived is for Dick one of the marks of humanity. Dick

seems to imply that Barrows is actually the android where Lincoln is really the human.

Meanwhile, Abraham Lincoln, in the middle of a defense of his own personhood wherein he quotes Spinoza, claims that animals (and people) are machines since they were made by God. Therefore, he concludes, we are all machines. This is a clever argument that could go either way, since to conclude that we were all people would be an equally valid point.

The notion of 'the created' or artificial has different implications if one believes in g/God therefore. If we are all g/God's creatures we are all therefore persons, as was implied by the Abraham Lincoln doll. The prospect extends subjectivity not only to people, but to animals, plants and the planet as well (Dick, *We Can* 113). This idea is not coincidentally consistent with Gnostic notions of g/God's spark which is present in all of creation, as an aspect of itself (Bloom, *American* 52).

In fact, Dick is not turning things inside-out here, but turning outsides-in. To ask whether androids dream of electric sheep is also to inquire into the psychology of objects. To ask whether androids have empathy is like asking whether the sky feels sad when it is raining or whether fence posts bleed. "Do houses see? Do houses eat?" Dick asks, "Do androids dream of electric sheep?".

In a sense though, turning things outside-in is already the opposite. It is the same process. As the outside moves inward, the inside is turned outward. For instance, in *Do Androids Dream Of Electric Sheep*? there is a great deal of energy invested in animals both real and artificial. The idea that things may be animate in a spiritual sense (imbued with spirit i.e. anima) is translated into actual animation. On the other hand, animate things have agency and act out.

In the case of Dick's objects, often this 'acting out' is something that is directed against people. In some novels, such as *The Simulacra*, there seems to be a generalised overflow between anima, animate and animosity wherein all things have souls, act and bear evil intentions (as with the animate fly-like commercial in *The Simulacra*) or even hold grudges (as with the litigious door in *Ubik*).

Some theorists, though, have devised another way to read this phenomenon and have concluded from it that we are all in fact objects, and as objects we are all fully determined. This would mean that for Dick we are literally the wind up toys of g/God. The implication is that no real agency exists. Darko Suvin outlines this possibility in his article in *On Philip K. Dick*, entitled: "The Opus: Artifice As Refuge And World View." Suvin refers to Dick's world as "collective, non-individualist", i.e., a world where everyone is in some situation that largely determines actions (Suvin 3).

However, the theory clashes with Dick's own position which is clearly indeterminate. After all, in *Galactic Pot Healer*, Joe is offered the choice between freedom and absorption into the g/Godlike entity called the Glimmung (187). That is, he is able to choose freedom. Moreover, agency is fundamental to Dick's recurring obsession with authentic or virtuous characters. Dick's androids are awful, precisely to the extent that they are means and not ends in themselves.

To ignore this thread in Dick is to ignore the existential choice that is a crucial facet of the fiction. In *Divine Invasion* the crux of the novel hangs on a choice (by Herb Asher between the demon and the 'beside helper'); Nobusuke Tagomi's agonised choice in *Man In The High Castle* is what makes that book as compelling as it is.

Extroversion And Exegesis

Durham's claim that the subject is dead (in Dick's fiction), whether it observes the theoretical premises of Deleuze and Guattari or of Baudrillard, is problematic, not least because it tends to equate the significance of the various stagings of the death of the subject. It is interesting to note in this context that Durham merely alludes to these variant versions while claiming that his article in *S.F. Studies* is "not the place to rehearse the various ways in which the death of the subject has been staged" (188).[15]

Without this theoretical background information we are in the dark about the significance of Durham's claim that the subject is dead. For example, the implications of Baudrillard's (ecstatic) subjectivity are certainly different from the implications of Deleuze and Guattari's (schizophrenic) subjectivity. In fact a rehearsal of the premises on which Durham's claim is based might have revealed the discrepancy between Dick and this theoretical context.

One of the results of not dealing with the context directly is that in Deleuze and Guattari's poststructural context and to a certain extent in the Jamesonian versions of postmodernism (including McHale's) the connection between knowledge, modernism and paranoia (and fascism) is simply assumed. In the criticism that draws from this theoretical pool, it is also taken for granted that Dick is invoking this context when he is not. This may be why critics such as Darko Suvin assume that Dick connected paranoia and fascism (7) when in fact, there is little evidence to support this claim.

On the other hand, Durham is correct when he observes that one of the most prominent features of Dick's work is its inside-outness. In "Philip K. Dick's Political Dreams," an article by Hazel Pierce in the Greenberg and Olander collection of critical articles entitled: *Philip K.*

Dick, Pierce relates Dick's work to the poetry of William Blake. A passage which recalls Dick's metaphysical writing style alludes to Blake's "Jerusalem". The passage describes an "outside spread without" and an "outside spread within" (132).

At one point, an 'outside spread within' occurs to Pris in *We Can Build You.* Pris the schizoid artist experiences the idea of Abraham Lincoln as a reality (object) not as an idea: "The real Lincoln exists in my mind...I really have the Lincoln in my mind. And I've been working night after night to transfer him out of my mind, back into the outside world." (66). Pris describes an artistic process of extroversion whereby ideas are pushed out and made into realities.

A similar passage in Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* exemplifies the way that abstract concepts may become realities for certain people: "... your thoughts are not your experiences, they are an echo an after effect of your experiences: as when your room trembles when a carriage goes past. I however am sitting in the carriage, and often I am the carriage itself" (12). S.F. characters like Pris experience ideas in this way and live as though abstractions were realities.

In the introduction to *Anti-Oedipus*, Mark Seem claims that what Deleuze and Guattari have attempted to do was to create a hybrid between Nietzsche the madman and Marx the economist, while deconstructing Freud along the way (xviii). However their hybrid is not just a cross but also a new way of reading.

In one passage from *Anti-Oedipus*, a slave race's relationship to the means of production is described in such a way that it recalls Freud's "A Note On The Mystic Writing Pad," in which Freud describes his model for memory (Freud 230).

In "A Note On The Mystic Writing Pad" the child's toy (a particular kind of self erasing

note pad) is a metaphor for memory. The passage in *Anti-Oedipus* tells the story of a master/slave relationship between two races, the Summarians and the Akkadians. Quoting Jean Nougayrol, Deleuze and Guattari comment on the creation of language which occurs between the two peoples.

> One cannot better show how an operation of biunivocalisation organizes itself around a despotic signifier, so that a phonetic and alphabetical chain flows from it. Alphabetical writing is not for the illiterates, but by illiterates. It goes by way of illiterates, those unconscious workers. The signifier implies a language that overcodes another language, while the other language is completely coded into phonetic elements. And if the unconscious in fact includes the topical order of a double inscription, it is not structured like one language, but like two. (208)

In this instance, the outline of a historical relationship between two peoples is described in psychological terms, not merely as though each person were a psychological being with desires, etc., or even as though each group could be psychoanalysed, but as though each group of people were a psychological process.

The oppression of one people becomes the creation of the unconscious, the language used by that people is written over as though repressed. The resulting memory is a palimpsest. Indeed, oppression and repression are identified. The point here is to objectify psychology, to make it real and historical and not merely mystical. The metaphor of memory is therefore made real, i.e. related to a social relationship and detached from its subjective moorings.

The example from *Anti-Oedipus* is itself *schizophrenic* because it sees no difference between libidinal economy and political economy and so treats internalities as though they

were externalities and vice versa. This is "totally schizophrenic" logic which "deliberately confuses words and things," according to Philip Goodchild (83). That is, *Anti-Oedipus* exemplifies schizophrenic logic.

Consequently, in order to read schizophrenically one could 'psychoanalyse' the entire S.F. genre-object and say: S.F. for its part may therefore be described as diseased and in the grip of a psychological disorder, i.e., it is schizophrenic in much the same way that *Anti-Oedipus* is schizophrenic. It begs to be diagnosed. S.F. is schizophrenic because it relies on the distinction between subject and object and then subverts that distinction by literalising metaphor or by making subjective conditions objective.

Dick's fiction, on the other hand, is therefore the mise-en-abyme of the schizophrenising process in S.F.. Here, within the subplot of S.F., there is a mini world, the story within a story of Dick's fiction, that is the quintessential example of S.F., that tells S.F.'s story and the story of its disease. In Dick's hands S.F. is a nervous breakdown, a hallucinatory experience, a paranoid fantasy.

Paranoia, Schizophrenia And Dick's Gnosticism

In *Mind In Motion*, Patricia Warrick devotes a chapter to androids as mechanical mirrors of humanity (117). I have borrowed the mirror image to illustrate a series of related phenomena in Dick's fiction. The first is the way in which Dick employs androids, g/Gods and aliens in his fiction. The second is the phenomenon of paranoia as an oscillation between two selves or roles: one an inner self and the other an outer self. The third phenomenon is Dick's thematic interest in things (including religious things) related to reflection, depth or introspection.

It is tempting to see Dick as a modernist. In the literary theoretical universe where ontological/schizophrenic (objective) equals postmodernism and interpretive/paranoid (subjective) equals modernism as mapped out by Brian McHale, Philip K. Dick is an anomaly. Dick writes ontologically oriented fiction that also (and for McHale paradoxically) invites the reader to interpret.

Dick's fiction emphasises the life of the mind and then juxtaposes this with references to godlike and godly indifference. The g/Gods of Dick's repertoire are not always the kind of literary tropes that are found in *Postmodernist Fiction*, however. There is evidence to suggest that in Dick's fiction religious allusions are meant to be taken less as meta-allegories, than as complicated references to perceived uncertainties about life and death.

Interpretation, for its part, is fundamental to being human for Dick. Dick's use of religious textual strategies is not therefore always ironic (in the postmodernist sense), (McHale, *Postmodernist* 144) nor is his insistence on interpretive agents. Dick's subjects, especially his paranoid subjects, are significant in themselves, as subjects.

A sensitive reading of Dick's fiction by George Slusser claims that there is an oscillation between 'mind' (inside) and an American cultural landscape (outside) defined as a network of personalities without historical institutions (*History* 219).[1] This oscillation is crucial to an understanding of Dick's paranoids for Slusser.

Dick is actually taking sides in his fiction in favour of subjectivity. Since Dick's paranoids are able to function with compassion and integrity in realities that are schizophrenic, there is a sense in which they have not given up their ability to choose, to initiate and therefore (for Dick) to be human.

The oscillation between inside and outside, in particular between empathy and indifference, is what for Dick at least, makes his paranoid characters 'authentic'. This puts him in opposition to both McHale and Deleuze/Guattari. His view of paranoia/schizophrenia is opposite to the one we would expect from him, if he were either a postmodernist or a poststructuralist.

In any case, Slusser's account of paranoia in Dick makes it clear that a relationship may be drawn in the contemporary world between paranoia and political dissent. Quoting Freud, Slusser describes paranoids as people who have lost all sense of tradition and instead have created their own belief system.

Consequently, in a history-less society, paranoids are quite useful. When, as in America, the culture itself lacks a coherent tradition, those who can form an independent belief system are able to behave autonomously and are less subject to the trends that seem to affect everyone else. Moreover, amid the pathological hordes of Nazis in the pseudo America of *The Man In The High Castle*, there are a few paranoids such as Nobusuke Tagomi who are able to act in opposition.

Hazel Pierce suggests that Peter Fitting and Stanislaw Lem fail to ask the crucial questions with respect to Dick's spiritual search. They fail to ask, as Dick does: "What is death? Are there successive states of consciousness? Is reality only a mind created illusion?" (Pierce, *Philip* 30) She does not ask *whose* mind created illusion it would be. As has been shown, reality in Dick's fiction is often a battleground, with various minds competing over it. Often reality is a feature not of one mind, but of many. Pierce does not include "What is g/God?" or "What is authentic?" to her list of questions in this section, but she alludes to these elsewhere. On the other hand, her questions are a good beginning.

The Gospel According To Philip K. Dick

What is g/God for Dick? In Dick's fiction, g/God is often the ambivalent creator of Gnosticism. Sometimes God is also schizophrenia personified. Often g/God is an impostor. Gnosticism is the quintessential paranoid religion. It is also the religion of anti-authoritarianism. It is based on hidden knowledge of a conspiracy which exists at the highest level, i.e., at the level of cosmology.

For Gnostics, the truth about creation is "hidden in perfect day" as an aspect of the material world. On the anti-authoritarian side of things, Gnosticism acts as a mirror of Christianity and reveals things about Christian worship that are not seen ordinarily. Among them, that g/God is too strict, that h/He is fallible and that we need not trust h/His judgement. Dick's interest in split personalities, the focus on paranoia and information and his schizophrenic landscapes have different connotations if they are imagined as part of a Gnostic cosmology.[2]

For Gnostics the creator g/God Yahweh, the supposedly omnipotent ruler of all things,

is really a fraud. Creation is an ambiguous event instigated by a demiurge. The demiurge manufactures a contingent world against the wishes of the true 'God' who is only present as a ghost or spirit. As a creation story this accounts in part for the paranoia in some of Dick's fiction. Awareness of a complex cosmology may be paranoia-inducing. Or, alternatively, doubt may be at the root of the paranoid's belief that the creator g/God is imperfect.

Since the creator g/God is not our real 'father,' we are inclined to be suspicious of him. The Gospel According To Philip gives us a counter-reading of the Bible from a Gnostic perspective: "And the Lord would not have said: 'My father who is in Heaven' unless he had had another father..." (Wilson 31).

According to Harold Bloom, "In the Gnostic view, the God of organised Western faiths is an impostor, no matter what name he assumes." (*Omens* 246) Since the quality of g/God characterises the quality of world, paranoia is built in at the time of creation. The alien or stranger g/God who is exiled from this world haunts the Gnostic world.

In *Divine Invasion*, Emmanuel's ambivalence is realised as a split personality. Initially the dichotomy between Zina and Emmanuel implies the dichotomy between good and evil. In fact the test that the two gods devise is quite similar to the test of Job. However, Zina is a much more positive character in this version than this allusion allows. In fact, both Emmanuel and Zina are good, but imperfect.

Zina as evil's impostor is representative of a kind of creativity. Zina, who is also referred to as divine wisdom, Hagia Sophia (*Divine* 214), fairy (*Divine* 138), Diana (*Divine*, 138) and The Torah (*Divine* 212) is the manufacturer of fictions. Emmanuel is, by contrast, a little dull.

Dick's Gnostic stories make Christianity seem ironic. For instance, the term "devil's

advocate" implies a tautology. The devil is already his own advocate in Dick's fiction. According to Harold Bloom, in Greek, diabolos means blocking agent – one who is an authorised representative of g/God, i.e., a kind of angelic lawyer representing g/God in the judgement of humans (*Omens* 67).

Dick's fiction assumes this in *Divine Invasion* when Zina/Sophia as Linda Fox plays the role of defense lawyer, i.e., she plays opposite the diabolos as a mirror image would do, advocating on behalf of humanity; whereas the role of ultimate judgement (the role Christians reserve for God) is played by a third deity, a goat-being who represents a kind of evil. The choice is therefore between relative goods one and two or between presumed evil and evil, i.e., not between absolute 'Good' and 'Evil'. Here we have a situation where a potentially infinite number of goods and evils, i.e., n goods or n evils, could manifest themselves. Moreover, the devil is in a sense on g/God's side in an adversarial system. A genealogy of the word 'devil,' therefore, reveals that his evil is relative.

Twin gods are a recurring image of multiple origins in Dick's fiction. In passages from Dick's Gnostic exegesis (as quoted in *Valis*), he refers to the beginning as the creation of two twin forms (each a mirror image of the other): one which developed while the other languished (*Valis* 266). The second twin becomes the origin of non-being, irrationality and evil.

> The One was and was-not, combined, and desired to separate the was-not from the was. So it generated a diploid sac which contained, like an eggshell, a pair of twins, each an androgyny, spinning in opposite directions (the Yin and Yang of Taoism, with the One as the Tao). (*Valis* 266)

This implies a connection between Dick's ideas about the Tao and his Gnosticism.

However, according to the Tao, there is no evil, while in Dick's Gnosticism evil is an aspect of creation. It may be that the duality of the Tao plus evil comes close to Dick's Gnosticism.

In *Valis*, paranoia (as an epistemological quest) and Gnosticism coincide. The novel is about a man who is trying to come to terms with the suicide of 'Gloria,' his friend. Gloria kills herself by jumping from a building that houses a detox. centre where she goes to get help for her drug problem. The main character, Horselover Fat, blames himself for not saving her. He attempts suicide himself, but is unsuccessful.

After some time spent in a psychiatric ward, Fat decides to dote on a woman who has terminal cancer. It is as though Fat is unable to get used to the fact that people die and is affected by the deaths of strangers as much as those of his closest friends. His life becomes a string of funerals. Each death is just as upsetting as the last. This makes the book sound morbid, but it is actually quite funny. The subplot of the novel, which eventually dwarfs the initial plot, is the story of Horselover Fat's religious experience. He believes that he is receiving information from a benevolent deity called Valis (vast active living intelligence system).

Fat is in therapy with a psychologist named Maurice, who is so baffled by his biblical interpretations that he assumes that Fat has not read the bible. Maurice tells Fat to go home and to read Genesis twice. One passage summarizes Fat's impression of the frustration Maurice undoubtedly feels: "He hadn't iced Syrian assassins by regarding the cosmos as a sentient entelechy with psyche and soma, a macrocosmic mirror to man the microcosm" (*Valis* 98).

The passage also reveals something about the structure of the novel. Since Fat believes that the form of the universe is dualistic, with Form II as the original non-being, his initial

crisis, in which his friend Gloria seems determined to kill herself, is expressed in the following way: "Gloria's mind had become an eraser in the service of non-being." Gloria's fate is reflected in the macrocosmic mirror of the universe.

Some formal elements of the novel underline the main character's split personality. For instance, the story is told from the perspective of Philip K. Dick, who writes an account of Fat's activities as though reporting on another person. He refers to himself in the third person in order to "gain much-needed objectivity" (*Valis* 11). This seems to be indicative of an oscillation between internality and externality that is present throughout the novel and is typical of paranoia. An otherwise subjective account of personal experiences alternates with intermittent reportage from an objective viewpoint.

The name of Dick's alter ego translates into Philip Dick. Horselover Fat is a translation of his first name into Greek and his second name into German. The first part Philip is from the word 'philos' which means lover plus 'ippos' which means horse. The word for fat, in German, is dick.

Ultimately, one version of Philip K. Dick claims that the other is overseas living another life. Evidently, a complete split has occurred and two people exist rather than two alternate personalities. The split mind develops two bodies. Or else one or the other or both is crazy. This is difficult but not impossible to explain. *Valis* therefore suggests a McHalian epistemological dominant, because it does not quite tip into ontology. It is still possible to explain away weirder events as features of a deranged mind.

However, the fact of the split self also recalls the split self of Gnosticism. In Gnosticism the self actually has two names: the psyche (which is the soul) and the pneuma (spirit). The spirit or pneuma is the superior self which is in fact a part of the true God.

Paranoia also has Gnostic connotations in some of Dick's less obviously Gnostic work. The title of *A Scanner Darkly*, the novel in which Robert Arctor is a narcotics agent whose job it is to spy on his own abode, is taken from the phrase 'a glass darkly,' in 1 Corinthians.[3] Arctor is originally charged with the task of spying on the entire household and on his friends: Charles Freck, Donna Hawthorne, Jerry Fabin, Jim Barris and Ernie Luckman.

Arctor's discomfort and paranoia become acute during his assignment when his superiors decide to focus their investigation on him and install holo-scanners in his house to monitor his activities. This means that Arctor is forced to focus his reports on himself. He must, therefore, in his role as narcotics officer, suspect himself. In Arctor's paranoid condition his personality is split and observes itself. "How many Bob Arctors are there. A weird fucked up thought. Two that I can think of, he thought" (*Scanner* 79).

He observes himself through a holographic scanner as though looking through a mirror at himself. "For now we see through a glass darkly" (1 Cor. 13.12). That is, now we see ourselves in a mirror but poorly. Arctor in his capacity as Fred, takes a dim view of his own life.

Though Arctor watches himself, the reflective surface of the analogical mirror makes him see himself backwards: "...but then face to face: now I know in part;" At one point in the passage from 1 Corinthians there is a tense change here to "...but then shall I know even as also I am known" (1 Cor. 13.12). "Even as also I am known" suggests that he will see himself "then" the right way around as others see him. Arctor/Fred says to his fellow narcotics agents during psychological testing, "Maybe it's you fuckers who're seeing the universe backward like in a mirror" (*Scanner* 171). "Then" suggests some other time perhaps at the end of time, or as in *A Scanner Darkly*, once Fred/Arctor has been pulled through infinity as an effect of

long-term drug use (*Scanner* 170).

The fact that Bob/Fred ultimately 'chooses' to stay on one side of the mirror (on 'God's side', outside) indicates a 'choice' in favour of psychosis. This choice is marked by the fact that he does not remember his own name, and is therefore renamed Bruce. Bob/Fred sins (in the sense of makes an error) and, though alive in body, is essentially dead in spirit (mors ontologica) (*Scanner* 195, 204).

The death that is referred to in *A Scanner Darkly* may be the death of that part of the self which is related to the true God (i.e., the pneuma). In any event, the image that is used to symbolise the death is the image of someone looking out from inside a corpse. The situation in *A Scanner Darkly* is similar to the one in *Ubik* where people cease to exist as conscious entities because of pathological isolation. However, in Bob/Fred/Bruce's case it is his body that is alive while his mind is dead.

In both novels the lines of communication between people break down. Those who die lose the ability to control what they see. Paradoxically, a loss of contact with the outside world in *A Scanner Darkly* results in a loss of agency. Arctor actually has to be told what to do. The loss of community that each character feels in *Ubik* results in a loss of singularity as well.

Dick's fiction employs both paradox and allegory. From a McHalian perspective, texts such as *Divine Invasion*, for instance, suggest a polarity between good and evil and then destroy that expectation. *Divine Invasion* is therefore consistent with the schizophrenic tendencies of postmodernist fiction as McHale defines them. Postmodernist allegorical writing (*Postmodernist* 144) lures the reader to interpret and then subsequently undermines that interpretation.

From another perspective though, Dick is writing Gnostic fiction. Dick depicts Gnostics in contexts that are schizophrenic because Gnostics believe that there is something wrong with the creator. Much of Dick's fiction is actually schizophrenic or ontological in its orientation. That much is clear. But the fiction is also consistent with Dick's religious conviction that the world is ultimately a bad or paradoxical place that was poorly designed and therefore impossible to explain completely. In this reading, he is part of a trend in literature that lies outside postmodernism.

The mirror image is often used by Dick to demonstrate our relationship to g/God (*Valis* 98). This is because the mirror is symbolic of a reflection on the problem of evil. The world is an image of the g/Gods who created it. Evil exists in the world because it exists in the g/Gods.

Gnosticism, for its part, sees all of Christianity as if it were a looking glass world. A sort of divine inversion results. In a sense then, Gnosticism needs no extra irony. It is already ironic. But this is old-fashioned irony, the effect of which is the creation of depth.

Man's Insanity Is Heaven's Sense

It is easy to see how one could make a connection between Dick and a poststructuralism that sees paranoia as fascist. Dick writes about paranoia, schizophrenia and fascism. These are all relevant topics with specific meanings in a poststructuralist universe. His insides are often outside and vice versa. But Dick writes without making the obvious connection between paranoia and fascism that one would expect from reading *Anti-Oedipus*. Dick's fiction actually makes a clearer connection between fascism and schizophrenia. For example, the descriptions of the Nazis in *The Man In The High Castle* usually indicate that

the Nazis are emblematic of schizophrenia and not of paranoia.

The Man In The High Castle is the Hugo Award winning novel about a world in which the Nazis have won the second world war and, allied with the Japanese, have control of most of North America as well as Europe. In this story, Nobusuke Tagomi is a businessman who conducts a series of meetings with a foreign guest who is revealed to be a spy. The guest, Mr. Baynes, whose name is actually Wegener (*Man* 187), has information about a secret Nazi plan to bomb Japanese territory (*Man* 188). Tagomi's act of heroism occurs when he saves the life of Mr. Baynes.

Several other characters and stories are featured in this alternate universe. Robert Childan is a shopkeeper who sells (fake) authentic American folk art. The folk art is in demand because the U.S.A. is no longer in existence. A crisis occurs for Childan when he discovers that many of his 'authentic' historical items are in fact fakes.

Frank Frink (whose name used to be Fink) is Jewish. Frink, who is always at risk in this society because he is Jewish, loses his job and decides to go into business for himself. He makes jewellery that he attempts to sell to Childan. Juliana Frink is Frank's former wife. She is having an affair with a man who is revealed to be a Nazi spy.

There is a story within this story in this novel as well. A man named Hawthorne Abendsen writes a novel called *The Grasshopper Lies Heavy*[4] about a world in which the Nazis lose the war. The world in *The Grasshopper Lies Heavy* is similar but not identical to our own world. The book is banned. Juliana has a moment of heroism when she kills her Nazi lover because she knows that he intends to murder Hawthorne Abendsen. This is actually a kind of mise-en-abyme in McHale's sense. It is like an Escher painting of a fish whose scales also resemble fishes -- an image McHale uses to illustrate the concept of mise-

en-abyme (*Postmodernist* 124). *The Grasshopper Lies Heavy* is the fish scale that resembles *The Man In The High Castle.*

Fascism in *The Man In The High Castle* is schizophrenic. In the novel, several allusions to Nazis are made. Instead of the expected association of paranoia with fascism, or the "Germanic-paranoia-turning-fascist" theme that Darko Suvin refers to (7), there is an association between *schizophrenia* and fascism.[5]

For instance, Tagomi refers to the Nazi Herr R. Heydrich as a realist who is also a pathological schizophrenic (*Man* 94). On a grander scale, Tagomi also describes the Nazi political world as "a monstrous schizophrenic morass of... internecine intrigue" (*Man* 191). However, if one looks hard at Baynes's description of fascist psychology, one could (arguably) make a connection with a passage from the paranoid and Gnostic Gospel According To Philip.

In the Gospel According To Philip: "God created men. Men created God. That is the way it is in the world - men make gods and worship their creation. It would be fitting for the gods to worship men" (Wilson 48).

The passage has to do with the fact that the one whom the Christians call g/God is really the demiurge or the angel of Gnosticism. Since humanity is seen as more akin to the creator of the demiurge and not to the demiurge himself (even though he created the 'artifact' i.e. the material and contingent aspects of the world) the claim is that the god or angel should worship us, because he/she/it is unqualified to be our God.

One of the defining characteristics of the Nazis that Baynes describes in *The Man In The High Castle* is (coincidentally) the belief that g/God should eat man (as one would eat g/God in the sense of eucharist). Dick is suggesting that Nazis would like g/God to worship

them rather than the other way around:

> Their egos have expanded psychotically so that they cannot tell where they begin and the godhead leaves off. It is not hubris, not pride; it is inflation of the ego to its ultimate - confusion between him who worships and that which is worshipped. Man has not eaten God; God has eaten man. (*Man* 42)

There is a similarity here between Gnosticism (the paranoid religion) and fascism (as embodied by Dick's Nazis). However, the similarity between this description and the image in the Gospel According To Philip is superficial. The description of the Nazis also resembles Dick's definition of schizophrenia/autism in *Martian Time-Slip*. In that novel a parallel is made between the selfishness of plumbers' union leader Arnie Kott (a very important man for a planet with little water) and the autistic Manfred Steiner.

Jack Bohlen, a schizoid mechanic on Mars, is recruited as the supervisor of a project designed to form a bridge of communication between Manfred (the autistic child) and the rest of the world. This is so that Arnie Kott can predict the next step in a land speculation scheme.

Unfortunately, Leo Bohlen (Jack's father) stands to profit from the situation as well. That is, Leo stands to profit as long as Arnie is kept in the dark. In order to serve Arnie, Jack Bohlen must betray his father.

Jack, in *Martian Time-Slip*, defines the ultimate stage of the schizophrenic process as "A coagulated self, fixed and immense, which effaces everything else and occupies the entire field" (Dick, *Martian* 170). It is also described as "apathy towards public endeavor" (Dick, *Martian* 74). The ultimate in autism (which Dick identifies with schizophrenia) is, in effect, represented by Arnie Kott who is singularly apathetic towards public 'endeavors.' Arnie

Kott's ego "has expanded psychotically" much as Manfred Steiner's has.

The passage from The Gospel According To Philip, for its part, outlines a relationship to an authority that one does not recognize. It doesn't suggest that Gnostics start by claiming the position of absolute knowledge and power. That is, it is less a matter of claiming g/God's role than of questioning the quality and authority of an entity that claims to be g/God and who is not doing a very good job. From this perspective, the Gnostics are anti-authoritarian while the Nazis are uber-authoritarian. The Nazis bear a greater resemblance to the demiurge than to the Gnostics of The Gospel According To Philip since the demiurge is a schizophrenic tyrant.

On another level, divine law (in Dick's texts), especially those of a false g/God and not capital 'G' God, do not apply to us. If the gods act in a certain way this is not to say that people should behave in the same way, and if the Nazis see themselves as gods it is because they are mad, not because they are Gnostics. Man's insanity is therefore Heaven's sense.

Baynes says in *The Man In The High Castle* that the abstract for the Nazis is real. By this he means that the Nazis literalise abstractions. "Their view; it is cosmic. Not of a man here, a child there, but an abstraction: race, land. Volk, Land. Blut. Ehre. Not of honourable men but of Ehre itself, honour; the abstract is real, the actual is invisible to them." and "They see through the here, the now, into the vast black deep beyond, the unchanging" (*Man* 41).[6] This is a line of thought that Dick frequently uses in connection with schizophrenia.

The Japanese in *The Man In The High Castle* are by contrast highly metaphorical. The I-Ching, an oracle that helps the Japanese to make decisions, is a series of metaphors that one may apply to everyday life. Significantly, the Japanese employ metaphor in their cyphers because they know that metaphorical language is a code that will not be cracked (Dick, *Man*

21). The Nazis can crack any literal code because they are literalists. This means that the inability to desymbolise (Dick, *Transmigration* 102) is such a strong feature of Nazi culture that the Japanese are able to rely on it for intelligence purposes.

For instance, in order to warn Tagomi that Baynes is a spy, the code refers to "skim milk in his diet" (*Man* 21). The phrase is from a Gilbert and Sullivan musical: "things are not as they seem, skim milk masquerades as cream." The code implies that he is masquerading as something that he is not. The hidden meaning is detectable to paranoids such as Tagomi, but is not detectable to the Nazis. Literature is consequently anti-fascist to the extent that it works on more than one level.[7]

The Nazis also favour idealist art[8] and eschew the abstract cubists. At one point, in order to goad one Nazi, Baynes says that he is nostalgic for cubism and abstractionist art. He complains that he likes a picture to mean something. His comment is a parody of the usual American art-boob refrain that representational art means something while contemporary abstract art is incomprehensible.

A similar relationship to abstraction is discussed in *The Transmigration Of Timothy Archer*. In this novel Angel Archer narrates the story of Bishop Timothy Archer, who was modelled on James Pike, a colleague and friend to Martin Luther King. The main characters are Angel, Jeff Archer (Angel's husband and Tim's son), Timothy Archer, Kirsten Lundborg and Bill Lundborg (Kirsten's schizophrenic son).

Timothy has an illicit affair with Angel's friend Kirsten Lundborg. Jeff also becomes infatuated with Kirsten and commits suicide. Subsequently, Timothy and Kirsten claim to be receiving communication from Jeff, who is in the 'after-life'. Then, Kirsten and Timothy die. First Kirsten overdoses on tranquillisers. Then, some time later, Timothy decides to take a

religious pilgrimage and dies of thirst in the desert. Finally, Bill claims to have been the recipient of Tim's transmigrated soul.

Bill's schizophrenia is contrasted with Tim's abstract bookishness throughout the novel. Bill is apparently unable to abstract, which is why he literalises the metaphors and proverbs that Angel uses to test him for schizophrenia. The combination of the two personalities (that of Tim and of Bill) would seem to resolve the imbalance that is present in both of their personalities.

However, Anthony Wolk has claimed that Dick is inconsistent in his description of schizophrenia. Wolk suggests that sometimes Dick describes it as a condition which is overly concrete and sometimes he describes it as a condition which is overly abstract (Wolk 108). There is a sense in which the description in *The Man In The High Castle* of the relationship between abstraction and reality for the Nazis does however resemble Bill Lundborg's condition in *The Transmigration Of Timothy Archer*. For the Nazis the 'abstract is real' (*Man* 41). For Bill, the abstract is also real in that figurative language is always concrete for him.

The implication is that the thinking disorder that Dick often mentions as related to schizophrenia is not so much an inability to abstract but rather it is a type of thinking that is either too concrete or too abstract (these are qualities that are actually typical of mainstream schizotypal personality disorder) (*DSM-IV* 645). That is, Dick sees a confusion of the concrete and the abstract as both a sign of schizophrenia and a feature of fascism.

Indeed, the confusion of the abstract and the real is a quality that Dick characterises as android also. That is, "a peculiar and malign abstractness" pervades the "mental processes" of the androids as well (*Do Androids* 137) in *Do Androids Dream Of Electric Sheep*? "We're all

schizophrenic," says Pris, "with defective emotional lives - flattening of affect, it's called" (*Do Androids* 141). This is an important theme in a textual universe, i.e. Dick's fiction, which seems to want to identify schizophrenic/androids (fake people) with Nazis and to identify authentic characters (i.e. the antidote to fascism) with neurosis and paranoia.

Instead of hailing the death of the subject, Dick may be making a point here about the overzealous application of theory to real life. On the one hand, the fascists can't see the trees for the forest.[9] Put another way, they can't see the people for the concept Volk. On the other hand, anything that has polyvalence, such as metaphor or allegory, is reduced to the most primitive reading.

Dick is far from choosing ontology over epistemology. In fact, in *The Man In The High Castle*, the only thing standing in the way of fascism is a humanity and epistemology (interpretation)[10] as embodied by Tagomi. As a Gnostic, Dick lives in a world that is opposed to the anti-epistemological position that underlies McHale's theoretical concerns. Where McHale is in a sense agnostic, Dick is clearly not. Nor is Dick's fascism derived from paranoia that is defined as any meaning system, as is the case for McHale. Instead, Dick's fascism is derived from a form of misinterpretation that is guided by literalism.[11] In the words of the New Testament: "The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life" (2 Cor. 3.6).

Through A Glass Darkly

In *Constructing Postmodernism*, Brian McHale claims that anti-paranoia is the ability to negotiate uncertainties without the "irritable reaching after fact and reason" (*Constructing* 88). Paranoids, according to Pynchon, keep putting themselves (fucking idiots) into paranoid situations (*Gravity* 340). For Pynchon, paranoids are their own worst enemies. The main

reason for this is that paranoia is a *self*-fulfilling prophecy. The view of paranoia that both McHale and Pynchon have outlined is consequently a negative one.

George Slusser's description addresses itself to a similarly negative view of paranoia as equivalent to the fall from grace in the garden of Eden which is precipitated by eating of the tree of knowledge. According to Slusser, Horkheimer and Adorno equate paranoia with both science and the sin of knowledge (*History* 218). Other products of this poisoned tree are totalitarian systems such as "The Enlightenment" and "Antisemitism".

As Slusser points out, however, Dick's paranoids are often portrayed sympathetically. Moreover, Dick's texts do not lend themselves easily to a frame of reference where paranoia equals knowledge which is sin, because it is Christian. Dick's Gnostic inspired heroes (at least), tend to see 'enlightenment' (if not The Enlightenment) as a good thing. Characters such as Zina who enlighten are heroic, not sinful. The attitude of Gnostics resembles the attitude of literary criticism in that both are engaged in interpretation or hermeneutics.[12]

Dick's shifting realities have a different significance in Slusser's reading than they would for Pynchon or McHale. In Slusser's view, Dick's landscapes are unstable not because he is a postmodernist, but because he is an American. As an American, Dick is used to a sense of history that is unfixed and therefore volatile (*History* 219).

Paranoids are actually the most significant group of characters in Dick's fiction. Dick's 'heroes' appear to be mostly paranoid figures. While they sometimes have trouble making up their minds, their decisions are often characterised by unusually good instincts.

Perhaps the key to paranoid better instincts may be found in Freud's definition of paranoia as quoted by Slusser. The quotation implies a connection between good instincts and imagination. A paranoid is a person in whom "the function of conscience, that which

attaches the individual mind to collective tradition, is usurped by its mirror opposite: introspection" (*History* 217). Instead of common knowledge (con and science: to know with) the paranoid looks inward. From this perspective, if morality is a common code of values that is social, the paranoid is amoral, but not unethical.

Disobedient characters occur throughout Dick's fiction. Marsha is a good example in *Eye In The Sky*. The story of *Eye In The Sky* is about an accident that causes each character's personal reality (subjectivity) to be objectivised into a world. In this novel, we are able to witness the most paranoid of subjectivities realised.

Paranoia as quality of world may be an unpleasant experience. In *Eye In The Sky*, each reality is unveiled to reveal a reality underneath which is much worse than the last. Considering that the first reality involves a particular character's (Arthur Sylvester's) obsession with a minor religion and also realises his own bigotry and small mindedness, this is no small feat. The 'worst' world here is clearly a paranoid one. However, the tendency to realise such worlds appears to be a schizoid trait. As with Pris Stratton in *We Can Build You*, the ability to realise a world is usually associated with Dick's schizoid characters.

Charley McFeyffe's world is the world of communist paranoia, which incidentally bears more than a passing resemblance to anti-communist paranoia. In fact, Charley embodies them both in true paranoid fashion. This is a fearful place wherein the most banal and prosaic sorts of behaviour are treated with great significance.

Marsha Hamilton's fairly innocuous actions are treated with great anxiety, for example. In McFeyffe's world, Marsha is therefore subjected to the violence that such anxiety often induces. However, Charley is also mirroring Marsha's world. At first, even her husband believes that he is inhabiting the world as created by Marsha. However, Marsha is actually a

threat to communism as McFeyffe sees it, because she is inconsistent, whereas he is, in fact, a dogmatist. She is a threat because she won't obey.

In "The Exit Door Leads In," Dick's main character is judged on his ability to disobey authority. In a test of his strength of character, Bob Bibleman is told to do something. He is told to keep a secret. Then he learns that it would benefit humanity if the secret were revealed. However, when Bob obeys and does not disclose, he discovers that he was being tested and that he has failed, because his obedience demonstrated that he cannot think for himself (Dick, *I hope* 125). Loyalty to someone who treated Bob badly, and who ordered him to refrain from doing something beneficial to humanity, is not rewarded.

It is doubtful, therefore, whether Dick saw schizoid characters as subjects. Anti-authoritarianism is crucial to Dick's notion of authenticity. Those who are not able to disobey, those who allow themselves to be used as a means, are not real people. They are machines who are in fact determined by their circumstances. But blind disobedience is just as stupid. Dick is not advocating constant rebellion, as we see with Tagomi. Instead, because Tagomi questions, and is able to pick and choose on an ethical level, it is possible to see him as human. An element of judgement is involved. Sometimes Tagomi obeys, sometimes he doesn't. Tagomi is, therefore, himself emblematic of interpretation.

If John Isidore is the mirror of Rick Deckard in *Do Androids Dream Of Electric Sheep*? as Warrick suggests – Warrick claims that they are opposites who move towards each other and towards a common point – it seems likely that Childan mirrors Tagomi as well in *The Man In The High Castle*. Tagomi's behaviour contrasts sharply with that of Robert Childan. Both are businessmen, both connect with the Nazis, and each has a role to play in the life of Frank Frink. Childan, however, is often hypocritical and sycophantic

towards his Japanese superiors, where Tagomi is in a sense 'genuine'. Genuine, however, does not mean transparent or even self-identical.

Robert Childan's actions which lead to Frink's arrest are countered by Tagomi's in *The Man In The High Castle*. Childan signs the paper indicting Frink (Dick, *Man* 117). More importantly, he excuses himself by telling himself a lie which is ironically that he cannot tell a lie. He says: "...I'm simply not capable of deceit..."(Dick, *Man* 117). This is not true, since he is obviously hypocritical in his feelings for his Japanese superiors.

Childan's only moment of integrity occurs when he chooses to decline an offer to mass produce Frank Frink's unique pin. However, this event only seems to involve integrity. Childan's reaction to Paul's offer to mass produce the Frink pin is really quite ironic in this context, since he is also the one who condemns the maker of the pin to death.

The object's authenticity is more important to Childan than the authenticity of the maker of the object. People are less important than pins. This seems like a bad decision. The artists themselves seem like a "minor" problem to Childan (*Man* 181).

Tagomi, for his part, refuses to sign the paper that would doom Frink; in fact, he writes 'release' (*Man* 238) and then signs, overturning the significance that his signature would have had. Childan thinks of his Japanese hosts as monkeys, even as he flatters and obeys them (*Man* 114). Tagomi's wish to ingratiate himself to Baynes is in comparison a genuine wish to be considerate and thoughtful. However, when Tagomi is asked to attend a conference held to discuss who is to be the next Nazi leader, he finds that the company of Nazis makes him physically ill. That is, Tagomi is nauseated by authoritarianism.

Dr. Smile Meets The Man Of Sorrows

"In the midst of the personified impersonal, a personality stands there," (Melville 476) says Ahab in *Moby Dick*. In Melville's case the personified impersonal is nature. The personality is Ahab. In Dick, the personified impersonal is everywhere in everything from talking doors to autofacs and psychologising briefcases. In each of Dick's novels an authentic personality also stands there.

In many of Dick's novels, heroism is closely tied to a notion of authenticity. But what is authenticity in Dick? In Hazel Pierce's account of *The Man In The High Castle*, four characters stand out as the foci of Dick's story: Nobusuke Tagomi, Robert Childan, Frank and Juliana Frink.

Each contributes something and is authentic in his or her own way, according to Pierce. In Eric S. Rabkin's reading of the same novel, Childan's rejection of his boss's offer to mass produce the Frink pin is the most heroic moment (184).

However, as has been shown, it is possible to see Childan as a less appealing character than Pierce and Rabkin make him out to be (Pierce, *Philip* 18). Pierce describes him in terms of inner strength, i.e., as a character who speaks up on behalf of the American people. In any case, of the three characters mentioned by Pierce, Tagomi is the most significant, according to George Slusser's notion of authenticity.

For Slusser, paranoids in Dick's S.F. are authentic in the sense that they are actors; the word authentic comes from "authentes" which means doer of a deed (*History* 206). This is good because, according to Dick, the fascists are also actors (*Man* 162), though as actors they tend to be anti-intellectual (*Man* 161), over-ambitious and very consistent. Unlike his

fascists, Dick's paranoids stumble unheroically into heroism, overanalyse everything, and make mistakes.

Where McHale and Pynchon see the ability to negotiate uncertainties as an anti-paranoid trait, quite the opposite is true for Slusser, who sees Dick's paranoids as the most capable of making intelligent and compassionate decisions in environments that are ontologically unstable.

If we apply Slusser's theory to an example from *A Scanner Darkly*, we find that Jerry Fabin is a good example of an authentic character. Charles Freck describes the way that Jerry Fabin is able to arrive first from a dead sleep (after days of sleeplessness from obsessive and buggy paranoia) at the scene of a potential accident: "Jerry ran past the car to the back and knocked with his bare pale shoulder that never saw the light of day, the boy entirely away from the car" (Dick, *Scanner* 17). In effect, Jerry chooses the boy over the car. Any other choice might have resulted in the death of the boy. Charles Freck is amazed that Jerry knew exactly what to do.

Charles himself had done the wrong thing and had tried to enter the car to put on the brake. The other characters were used to thinking of Jerry as a near invalid and a shut in. Jerry's pale shoulder is pale because he spends most of his time indoors taking drugs and pulling imaginary bugs from his hair. It is a surprise to everyone that he could act so swiftly.

'Fellow feeling' is among the qualifiers of 'rightness' in this scene with Fabin. Paranoids like Jerry and Tagomi worry. Their pasts are unreliable (Slusser, *History* 218), and this makes them worry more.

As Jeff Wagner noted, Dick places a high value on both kindness and empathy.[13] Wagner cites empathy as an example of the way in which Dick moved from a position which

was external to one which was internal (80). Quoting *The Three Stigmata Of Palmer Eldritch* he highlights a particularly Dickian view of empathy:

> Always, in his middle level of the human, a man risked the sinking. And yet the possibility of ascent lay before him; any aspect or sequence of reality could become either, at any instant. Hell and heaven, not after death but now! Depression, all mental illness, was the sinking. And the other.. how was it achieved? Through empathy. Grasping another, not from the outside but from the inner. (Dick, *Three* 83)

The passage describes an experience that occurs when Richard Hnatt is undergoing E-therapy (evolutionary therapy). During E-therapy Richard discovers that the empathy he feels for his wife Emily is among the higher experiences possible in humans. This is the capacity to imagine oneself in the place of the other that is absent in Dick's schizophrenic characters. Ironically, empathy is also a way out of paralytic solipsism. Escape from the prison of the self is also achieved through inner knowledge of another. The process of empathy seems to be at the center of an oscillation between outer and inner.

In mainstream psychiatry, a lack of empathy is also considered to be an indicator of autism. In a test designed to detect autism as outlined in *Physiology Of Behavior* by Neil R. Carlson, (577) a child is shown a series of pictures in which a ball is left in a basket by one child, but when the child is not looking, another child moves the ball, hiding it in a box.

When asked where the first child would look for the ball a normal child responds, "In the basket," while an autistic child would respond with, "In the box". This is because autistic people are unable to form a 'theory of mind' (Carlson 576). That is, the autistic child is unable to stand in the first child's shoes. He or she does not realise that for the first child, the ball is

still in the basket and therefore this is where the child will look first.

The autistic child takes a godlike perspective, assuming that the other child knows what he or she knows and that this is the only view. The text also quotes one autistic person who complains that "other people seem to have a special sense by which they can read other people's thoughts" (Carlson 576). From an autistic point of view, everyone else is a Dickian 'teep' (telepath) or 'precog' (precognitive).[14]

However, what are we to make of Juliana Frink, who is also in *The Man In The High Castle* and who, in many ways, embodies the characteristics of an actor, without being particularly paranoid, according to Slusser? Juliana seems to be a little unfocussed at first, but surprises us by killing her lover when she discovers that he is a Nazi assassin. Juliana acts much as Nobusuke acts.[15] This would tend to suggest that some actors are not paranoid, and that the grouping of paranoids and actors is merely coincidental.

According to Slusser, while Juliana is not paranoid, she is actually an example of another kind of actor, one who attempts to fix history in an old-fashioned or 'European' way. Slusser suggests that Juliana is a 'nemesis' in the service of history (*History* 208).

That is, she is not paranoid in Slusser's reading of Dick because she is not emblematic of, as Slusser puts it, "the capacity of mind, as Emersonian power and form, to engage things in a field of decommitted phenomena" (*History* 218). That is, Juliana would like the phenomena to be committed or fixed. She would like an external frame of reference in the form of an absolute history. Juliana would like Hawthorne Abendsen to declare the truth of his novel absolutely. Put simply, Juliana is not autonomous enough to be paranoid.

Another test of Slusser's theory comes when we look at Jack Bohlen in *Martian Time-Slip*. It appears here that paranoids are not the only actors in Dick's fiction. Jack Bohlen, the

schizoid (by Dick's definition) mechanic in *Martian Time-Slip*, also seems to be an actor. Unlike many of Dick's schizoid characters, Jack is evidently capable of empathy, since he is the one who brings water to the Bleekmen, the indigenous people of Mars who are dying of thirst in the desert. At least, he seems capable of empathy as long as he resists his schizoid tendencies. However, he does have difficulty dealing with situations that are ontologically unstable and this differentiates him from Tagomi.

Jack Bohlen is actually uncomfortable in a 'field of decommitted phenomena'. For instance, the children in *Martian Time-Slip* are taught by machines instead of people. The machines are reproductions of literary figures such as Immanuel Kant and Mark Twain, and are programmed to weed out schizophrenics. According to Bohlen, they create an environment that is fake even by Earth standards. The machines teach the children "...to expect an environment that doesn't even exist for them. It doesn't even exist back on Earth..." (Dick, *Martian* 85).

Jack is sent by his boss, Mr. Yee, to repair the teaching machines in his area and the prospect fills him with dread. His fear of the machines seems to come out of his fear of simulation. Jack is not sure whether the machines are alive or dead, since they are animate, but without biological life. He finds it difficult to deal with this uncertainty (Dick, *Martian* 69). Jack is afraid that the teaching machines will induce a psychotic episode and, as a result, he is very reluctant to repair them (Dick, *Martian* 69).

Jack's schizophrenic tendencies make him especially vulnerable to the effects of simulated environments. Since his ability to act depends, for him, on a stable environment, Jack is not a good example of Slusser's authentic person either, since the 'authentes' apparently need no frame of reference in order to act, be it history or sanity.

There must be more to Jerry Fabin's authenticity in *A Scanner Darkly* than charity, because Charles Freck also felt charitable but did not know what to do. If one felt empathy for everyone and everything, even for the Nazi assassins, how would one act? As we have seen already an inquiry into the psychology of objects could also be read as schizophrenic.

Obviously, in order to act with integrity, having the will to do so is not enough. A way must also be found. One must know how to act. Both Fabin and Tagomi embody this 'way'. For instance, whereas Charles Freck does not know what to do, Jerry Fabin's accurate appraisal of the situation in *A Scanner Darkly* has life- saving potential. From Slusser's perspective, the way is the ability to manufacture some kind of localised knowledge system (or story) – a world of one's own (*History* 202).

An apt description of the relationship between judgment and knowledge is outlined in Plato's *The Theaitetos*. One of the Socratic models of memory as discussed by Plato in *The Theaitetos* is of an impression made on a wax tablet (Plato 129). An impression is also a copy, which implies that memory is itself a simulation. Ironically, impressions are also inverted images of the thing that makes them. The relationship between thing and image seems to imply that even our image of the past is reversed: Perhaps its significance is also opposite to the lesson we would like to learn from it? Knowledge is therefore a process of selection.

In that case, memory is not just a mirage but a mirror of actual existence. Our memories are a cover story. What we repress and deny is the very information we need to make accurate decisions. For Socrates, memory is one aspect of knowledge. The other aspect is the criterion of judgement (Plato 123).

In *The Man In The High Castle*, Tagomi pretends that he is in the wild west. He

imagines himself as a gun fighter. As a result, he is able to engage the situation and kill the Nazi assassins. Tagomi represents skill tempered by play and compassion. Tagomi is a good shot, but he is also a dreamer who fakes his way into heroism. This is different from Childan who pretends that he cannot tell a lie and essentially shirks his responsibilities.

Sin is by contrast "missing the mark" as Timothy Archer says in *The Transmigration Of Timothy Archer* (Dick, *Transmigration* 48). It is representative of a lack of 'righteousness' which in this context is a matter of skill. It would appear that sometimes missing the mark is the result of being too truthful and sometimes it is the result of being too kind.

Empathy is a capacity which Manfred Steiner from *Martian Time-Slip* and Emmanuel of *Divine Invasion* (both of whom are nicknamed Manny) lack because they experience time differently from other people. Dr. Glaub refers to this as a "derangement in the interior time-sense" (Dick, *Martian* 107). Internality and time are related in that linear time appears to be a subject function. Apparently, for Dick at least, judgement requires an emotional investment that is impossible for schizophrenics to fulfil because of this derangement. Ironically, empathy is itself a skill that schizophrenics do not possess.

From a Biblical perspective, "Then shall I know even as also I am known" suggests accuracy (external or objective knowledge) which is combined with an empathic knowledge, i.e., a knowledge from the inside, internality. Perhaps that which exists in time should not be judged by the standards of eternity. This may be why Dick quotes the Bible, which tells us: "And now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity" (1 Cor. 13.13).

The invitation to interpret Dick's fiction is not, as it is in McHale's postmodernist fiction, a ruse designed to trap closet paranoids. From McHale's perspective, then, Dick must

be a modernist; but in this case it is a modernism that has an ontological dominant, despite its significant references to subjectivity and interpretation; or, alternatively, Dick is a postmodernist, but one who favours paranoia. In either case, there is a problem vis-à-vis McHale's theory.

The ontological orientation of Dick's fiction is overdetermined. In Slusser's view, the roots of Dick's concerns are in America and in America's relationship to history. Consequently, and from a different kind of postmodernist perspective (from a Baudrillardian perspective), Dick is still a postmodernist, or rather he is postmodern.

Simulations

Jean Baudrillard's *Simulations* may be a better theoretical tool to use when approaching examples of fakeness in Dick's speculative fiction (S.F.) than is Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus*. This is the case for a number of reasons, one of them being that even though some texts by Deleuze and/or Deleuze and Guattari do address 'simulations,' *Anti-Oedipus* does not.[1] This would not in itself be a significant reason to ignore other texts authored by Deleuze and Guattari. In fact, however, Baudrillard's concept of simulation is closer to Dick's than Dick's is to Deleuze's, although this may not be particularly evident from reading *Anti-Oedipus*.

Both Baudrillard and Dick seem preoccupied by a fake world that is identified with America. The two also share an outlook vis-à-vis simulation that situates paranoia and schizophrenia in a similar way (though possibly for different reasons). For instance, Baudrillard does not see an association between paranoia and fascism whereas Deleuze and Guattari do. For Baudrillard, as with Dick, paranoia is an aspect of schizophrenia, whereas for Deleuze and Guattari the categories "paranoia" and "schizophrenia" appear to be mutually exclusive.

Baudrillard, like Dick, does not attempt to characterise paranoia as a kind of proto-fascist condition, nor does he seem to see schizophrenia as the basis of a new and creative theoretical starting point, at least not in the Deleuze/Guattarian sense. Since, as was illustrated earlier, Dick's texts connect certain phases of schizophrenia with an absence of affect, and in many of his novels he also identifies schizophrenic tendencies with fascism, Baudrillard is closer to Dick than to Deleuze and Guattari in this respect, although Baudrillard does not go as far as to identify schizophrenia and fascism. Where Baudrillard is

sociological in his approach, Dick tends to be both religious and historical.

For Jean Baudrillard, confusions between object and subject and between reality and abstraction (e.g. maps and territories) (*Simulations* 2)[2] or between fact and model (*Simulations* 32) are a part of a contemporary existence that is overrun by simulation (*Simulations* 55). That is, contemporary societies suffer from a proliferation of certain kinds of abstraction (*Simulations* 2; *Ecstasy* 17). This prevalence of abstraction results in an implosion at the level of signification; thus a confusion between referee and referent, or between signifier and signified, enters into the picture (*Simulations* 4).[3]

For both Dick and Baudrillard, there are two types of simulated humans. Both types are simulated to the extent that they are similar to humans without actually being human. This construction differs markedly from Deleuze's definition of simulation as that which is without similarity to the original.[4]

In *Simulations*, Baudrillard describes the 'hyperreal' as a societal situation in which the real is confused with the model (53). His *Simulations* is a descriptive rather than a normative text. He therefore discusses contemporary societal issues and everyday events in his theoretical text as examples of the 'hyperreal'.

In one case, Baudrillard illustrates his point with the example of a family (the Loud family) whose everyday life is at the mercy of television. The Louds agree to have all aspects of their personal lives broadcast on television. As a result, they cease to have any kind of 'real life' from that point onward. The Louds become a kind of abstraction even to themselves. The film crew therefore introduces a kind of reflexivity (identity or confusion between subject and object) which destabilizes the Louds's life and brings paradox into their sense of reality.

In Dick's short story "The Electric Ant," a similar situation arises when a man discovers that he is actually an android. When Garson Poole realises that he is in fact a machine, he starts playing with his own 'reality tape'. Both the Louds and Dick's 'electric ant' experience real life as an abstraction. The Louds are not sure if their own emotions are genuine or if they are faking it for the cameras. T.V. as an abstraction and everyday life (reality) merge. The reality tape or the camera's film become a substitute that is interchangeable with real life.

A closer parallel to the Loud family may be found in Dick's *A Scanner Darkly*. Instead of a film crew, Robert Arctor has holo-scanners installed in his home. Arctor is like the Louds in that he is self-conscious of his identity on film as something separate from his inner world as an undercover police officer. In watching himself on screen he becomes estranged from his actual life which is being abstracted.

There is also a parallel between the imagery used by Baudrillard and that used by Dick vis-à-vis simulations. In terms of the imagery in Dick's fiction, android 'clones' are to schizophrenia what twinning is to paranoia. Where twins are mirror images, clones are the same person 'n' times.

However, from a philosophical perspective, the interchange of the real and the abstract presupposes a distinction between the two. In this, Baudrillard seems to contradict himself, since he says on the one hand that the hyperrealist sociality is where "the real is confused with the model" (*Simulations* 53). On the other hand, the hyperreal is also a situation where there is no distinction between the model (the abstract) and the actual (*Simulations* 53).

But if there were in fact no distinction, we would not be able to confuse the two. Since there is also some similarity between Baudrillard and Dick in terms of their emphasis on

fakeness, this leads us to suspect that both authors are working with an assumption of reality in spite of the fact that Baudrillard is proclaiming the death of the real (*Simulations* 10). Otherwise one is forced to ask of Baudrillard: simulated in relation to what (Nietzsche, *Will* 306)?

For Deleuze it must be acknowledged that the whole situation begins differently.[5] The simulacrum has no model unless it is "another model, a model of the Other," according to Deleuze (Deleuze, *Logic Of Sense* 258). The simulacrum is built on "disparity, on difference." The simulacrum is a threat to the extent that it is a poor copy without resemblance (Deleuze, *Logic* 257).

Baudrillard starts from the sociological premise that abstraction (a separate quantity) has become reality for certain people. Baudrillard says that North Americans are moving towards a life of totalising formal abstraction. From his perspective, North America is already science fiction (*Ecstasy* 17).

Meanwhile, since Dick sees literalism as a feature of fascism, North America is already 'fascist' to the extent that it literalises metaphor. It is a place where the abstract is confused with the real. That is, it is not colonialism or racism by itself that makes contemporary America fascist, as Cassie Carter seems to indicate (Carter 340), but rather, it is literalism that makes America fascist.

If there is a 'reality' for Dick, it seems likely that it would not be entirely abstract. In some of his novels, lived reality is described as the hypostatised mind of g/God – a realised abstraction of g/God's thoughts.

This, however, is not 'genuine reality'; 'genuine reality' is symbolised for Dick by the image of the 'Palm Tree Garden' (a recurring Gnostic image). For example, in *Divine*

Invasion, one of his Gnostic texts, lived reality is a world created by children, but the characters are allowed glimpses of a better world underneath. Here, action is the basis on which new 'more real' (in a spiritual sense) worlds may result.

F. Scott Walters illustrates a like minded point with an example from *The Transmigration Of Timothy Archer*.[6] For Walters, Angel Archer reaches authenticity only when she decides to *act* on Bill Lundborg's behalf.

On the other hand, from the concretised aspect of abstraction to the crisis at the level of signification to the hallucinatory aspect of hyperreality itself, many of the elements described in Baudrillard's *Simulations* are also developed and explored in Dick's fiction. It is these elements of hyperreality which bear reiteration because of their similarity to Dick's own description of schizophrenia and schizophrenic worlds.[7]

Twice Upon A Time

In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari refer to the fourth thesis of schizoanalysis as the distinction of two poles: "...the paranoiac, reactionary, and fascisizing pole and the schizoid revolutionary pole." (*Anti-Oedipus* 366) If the conditions of paranoia and schizophrenia were mutually exclusive as they appear to be in *Anti-Oedipus*, then the kind of overlap which occurs in Dick's fiction and in *Simulations* between paranoia and schizophrenia would likely be impossible.

Dick and Baudrillard both define schizophrenia as co-extensive with paranoia. For Dick, paranoia and schizophrenia are allied phenomena whose roots are in the characters' dissonant relationships with time. For Baudrillard, paranoid instances of simulation overlap with schizophrenic ones.

Since there is evidently a time before the beginning, we must admit that we are the product of multiple origins rather than a single one. We might therefore begin our story not with 'once upon a time' but with 'twice upon a time' to paraphrase Victor Borge's comedy sketch on inflationary language.

The paradoxes of time and memory recur in Dick's fiction as the source of some of his preoccupations with simulation and identity. Dick explores a variety of crises related to time. Where paranoids are concerned, a hyperintuitiveness leads to complications with respect to identity and agency. Schizophrenia, on the other hand, seems to stem from a process of 'acting into' history as Hannah Arendt terms it (Arendt 62), such that all aspects of existence are altered including the actant.

Carlo Pagetti notes that:

> ...the process of dissolution of the technological in the apocalyptic, of futuristic convention in existential anguish, took shape in Dick's novels of the '50s (among which it is necessary to mention at least *Time Out Of Joint*). It finds full expression in *The Man In The High Castle* where the expedient of imagining the United States dominated by the forces of the Axis is not a pretext for a 'false' reconstruction of history, but the sign of an arbitrariness that has contaminated history... (20)

According to Slusser, a similar description of American history as 'historicity' is the environment in which paranoids flourish. In *Time Out Of Joint* and *A Scanner Darkly*, the effect of this historical arbitrariness is paranoid. In novels such as *The Man In The High Castle*, *Divine Invasion*, or in *The Three Stigmata Of Palmer Eldritch*, *Martian Time-Slip* and *Ubik*, the results are schizophrenic. Dick's schizophrenia is comparable to Baudrillard's

description of the contemporary as 'schizophrenic.' In fact, Dick and Baudrillard share a disposition to define paranoia and schizophrenia as expressions of an era.

In a paranoid novel such as *A Scanner Darkly*, the plot centres on complications resulting from a double role. *A Scanner Darkly* is the story of a narcotics officer who spies on his drug-taking friends.

In order to remain anonymous, Bob Arctor wears a 'scramble suit' when he reports to police headquarters. He also refers to himself by his code name 'Fred'. The suit conceals his identity by showing him as a vague blur, rather than as himself. His complex perception of history plays havoc with his personality. This leads Arctor to the following conclusions in *A Scanner Darkly*: "You put on a bishop's robe and miter, he pondered and walk around in that, and people genuflect and like that, and try to kiss your ring if not your ass, and pretty soon you're a bishop" (25).

Even the etymology of the word 'paranoia' reveals a split personality. The prefix 'para' means beside, while 'noia' is from 'nous' meaning mind. The paranoid is literally beside himself. He or she has two pasts and therefore two presents and two futures. A problem then arises. If s/he can't be original, how can s/he be fake?

In the paranoid *Time Out Of Joint*, the main character also has double history. The phrase, "the time is out of joint," captured in Dick's title is taken from Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, and is used there to describe Hamlet's own disorientation at the sight of the ghost of his dead father.

If Hamlet is paranoia's poster child, one may therefore suppose that history has a hand in making him so. For example, when Hamlet is away, his past is irrevocably altered such that he becomes fatherless, or rather he gains an unwanted father (his uncle who marries his

recently widowed mother). The uncle, not surprisingly, wants Hamlet to forget his real father (even though murder is suspected) and adopt the uncle as parent. Hamlet is mired in indecision about whether he should accept this alternate history or whether he should instead revenge his father by killing his uncle.

Ironically, Hamlet's extended moment of indecision could also be read as a moment of choice magnified. That is, it could be read not as a moment of indecision, but as deciding. Or as is the case with Gabriel Baines' from *Clans Of The Alphane Moon*, paranoia is exemplified by "...the one possibility plucked from the many" (Dick, *Clans* 138).

Paranoia may in fact be an allegory for the way we live in contemporary society. One of the commonplace experiences of our day to day existence is the lack of consensus surrounding what constitutes history and therefore a lack of consensus on what constitutes reality. From a certain perspective, the belief in money is a common delusion (in fact this is the subject of a paranoid fantasy in Dick's *I Hope I Shall Arrive Soon*). No one is more aware of this element of 'belief' in reality than Dick appears to be.

It may be, because of the lack of fixity, because of a radical fluidity in the basic elements of existence, that the ability to assess things accurately is compromised. However, this 'arbitrariness' may also be an opening or invitation to imagine things as other than they are.

Gabriel Baines's impulse to imagine things as other than they are leads him to see himself in someone else's shoes and is an example of paranoia's connection with empathy. Moreover, it is within this context of radical fluidity that paranoids such as Ragle Gumm, Gabriel Baines and Joe Chip (for instance) are able to function more successfully as full human beings than are most of Dick's other more 'normal' characters. This is almost certainly

among the reasons that Dick draws attention to these characters.

Alternatively, the ability that divine beings and autists have to change the past in Dick's fiction has a postmodern flavour since it poses ontological problems. That is, schizophrenics in Dick's fiction are in the habit of creating impossible loops with respect to their own history similar to the ones that inspired the term 'grandfather paradox.' An example from Dick's *Ubik* seems to illustrate the process. The experience is of a reality shift: "We haven't gone anywhere," says Joe Chip, "We're where we've always been. But for some reason - for one of several possible reasons - reality has receded." (153). Time in *Ubik* is not only *out of joint*, it is slowly unravelling.

Paranoia and schizophrenia exist on a continuum, then, vis-à-vis time,[8] much as modernism bleeds into postmodernism: i.e. epistemological problems overflow into ontological ones (McHale, *Postmodernist* 11). However, rather than choosing one of several courses in the present or future (as in paranoia), the choice for schizophrenics seems to involve altering the past in order to alter the present and the future. This is one way that we may 'act into' history in Arendt's sense. Schizophrenics such as Pat in *Ubik*, Manfred Steiner in *Martian Time-Slip*, or Emmanuel and Zina in *Divine Invasion* create/destroy reality by altering the past.

The description of Pat's ability to alter time, therefore, resembles the "... one possibility plucked from the many..." (Dick 138) that comprises Gabriel's paranoid vision in *Clans Of The Alphane Moon*. However, Pat's ability is really the paranoid's ability exponentially amplified. In *Ubik*: "Pat controls the future; that one luminous possibility is luminous because she's gone into the past and changed it; by changing it, she can change the present which includes the pre-cog" (Dick, 28).

Zina describes a similar ability in *Divine Invasion*: "It branched off at crucial points, due to our interference in the past. Call it magic if you want, or call it technology; in any case we can enter retrotime and overrule mistakes in history" (Dick 47).

In fact, this is also the 'technology' that allows Emmanuel (the incarnated g/God) to anticipate Elias in *Divine Invasion*. In *Martian Time-Slip*, as well, it is discovered that Manny can travel through time. The plot of *Martian Time-Slip* is rendered more complicated by the fact that Manny's ability allows others to travel through time as well and also allows these others to change things in the past. The result is an experience of reality that is destabilised and 'surreal'.

Brian McHale is not the first to point out that: "Of course, causes are always the effects of other causes." (*Constructing* 8). However, this insight has a seminal relationship with a schizophrenic sense of time. Certainly the lack of a sense of causality signals the beginning of schizophrenia in the more mainstream realm of medicine. In *Divine Invasion* this relationship is borne out. Emmanuel (Manny) is able to alter the course of history because of his manipulation of causality: "Just thinking, he said aloud. Elias came into the room saying as he came: 'What are you doing Manny?' Causality had been reversed; he had done what Zina could do: make time run backward" (*Divine* 68-69).

Manny's ability to subvert causality is a realised form of schizophrenia wherein a delusion (the ability to alter cause and effect) is objectified into a reality. Manny does not merely believe he can alter time; he really is able to alter time.

Divine Invasion illustrates another element of schizophrenia that was addressed in chapter one, in that certain concepts of time are literalised. In *Divine Invasion*, a process of extroversion is related to the schizophrenic experience of time. The process resembles the

way in which creative characters in Dick's novels frequently objectify their own thoughts.

In the most advanced cases of schizophrenia, time's status as a fourth dimension is expanded upon. The concept becomes realised for some of the characters as though it were to be taken literally. In *Valis*, Elijah propounds the theory of time as a form of space when he says, "You see, my son, here time changes into space. First you change it into space and then you walk through it." (Dick 126)

Similarly, in *Divine Invasion*, the g/God Emmanuel objectifies his own brain processes:

> He sat still for a while, although a while no longer signified anything. Then by degrees the transform took place. He saw outside him the pattern, the print of his own brain; he was within a world made up of his brain with living information carried here and there like little rivers of shining red cells that were alive.
>
> He could reach out and touch his own thoughts. (Dick 66)

The relationship between Pat's or Zina's ability to break in and alter the course of history and Manny's sense of time as space is a matter of degree. Pat and Zina tinker with the past while Manny has become time. In a display of this ability, Emmanuel rearranges the furniture during an eternal moment that eventually becomes contingent and linear:

> Across from him the ratty blue couch that Elias prized began to warp away from plumb; its line changed. He had taken away the causality that had guided it and it stopped being a ratty blue couch with Kaff stains on it and became instead a Hepplewhite cabinet, with fine bone china plates... Then he restored a measure of time - and saw Elias Tate come and go about the room, enter and leave; he saw accretional layers laminated together in sequence along the linear time axis

(Dick 67)

This is clearly an exemplification of the autistic state. There is a similar passage in *Ubik* where a "retail home-art service enterprise" fluctuates between a contemporary incarnation and a past incarnation as a "tiny anachronistic drugstore with rococo ornamentation" (Dick 161). This latter example from *Ubik* may also have been caused by Pat's intervention in the past which subsequently creates an unstable reality. However, in *Ubik* the effects are devastating for everyone, including Pat herself.

Of course, the effects of the rearrangements in *Divine Invasion* are felt by mortals such as Herb Asher. Herb Asher's reality keeps shifting and his past is a jumble. He is not entirely sure whether he is living in a dream world and in a coma or if he is still on an offworld, or whether he is really and finally on Earth.

The passage resembles the 'timelessness' of the total instanteneity of things that Baudrillard defines as postmodern (*Ecstasy* 27). The Dickian schizophrenic experience of time is an experience of everything happening at once, which is why it is imagined as a lack of causality.[9]

In both *Cosmic Puppets* and *Divine Invasion*, people are dolls (golems) and puppets of the divine. In the *Game Players Of Titan*, godlike aliens have the entire population playing a rigged game wherein the stakes are human population and birth rates. In *Cosmic Puppets*, children play war games with the fates of real people. These 'children' who are the g/Gods of Zoroastrianism are in fact playing with existence itself.

The sense of time as space is heightened in Dick's Gnostic and Zoroastrian novels suggesting that Dick often relates this temporal phenomenon to a religious idea of g/Gods as largely amoral, supramoral or insensible to small scale suffering. For Baudrillard reality

shifts are underwritten by capitalism, while for Dick these are underwritten by g/Gods.

The Orders Of Simulacra

In *The Novels Of Philip K. Dick*, Kim Stanley Robinson has claimed that in the 'Golden Age' of science fiction stories by authors such as Asimov and Simak contained the message, "the robot is just like us," but Dick subverts this image by suggesting that, "we are just like the robot" (29).

Kim Stanley Robinson's description serves as a fine introduction to a discussion of Baudrillard's orders of simulacra as they relate to Dick's fiction. In Dick's S.F., android clones such as Pris Stratton and Rachael Rosen in *Do Androids Dream Of Electric Sheep*? are what Baudrillard would call second order simulacra. Clones are "...the series, and even the possibility of two or of n identical objects" (*Simulations* 97). First order simulacra, on the other hand, are represented in *Simulations* by the automaton. The automaton's charm lies in the fact that it may be distinguished from the 'original'. It is interesting to the extent that it is different. The second type (second order simulation) evokes identity and calls the original into question on several levels.

There are also examples of 'first order' simulacra throughout Dick's S.F.[10] In Dick's novel, *The Simulacra*, the people are ruled by a genuine 'puppet government' in that each presidential candidate is a carefully built political automaton. As well, the puppet in *The Simulacra* and 'The Lincoln' or 'The Stanton' from *We Can Build You* are not infinitely repeatable. These therefore resemble Baudrillard's 'first order' simulacra.

In fact, much of the plot in *We Can Build You* revolves around the resistance by the designers of the automata to a plan by investors to make of 'the Lincoln' prototype a whole

series of replaceable androids for the colonies based on the abstract concept of average neighbours. It turns out that 'The Lincoln' would have to be radically simplified in order to turn him into a suitable model for this enterprise (Dick, *We Can* 110).

In Dick's *The Simulacra*, the society is ruled by an actual puppet government in a one-party state. The puppet, called a 'der Alte' is created by the company Sohnen Werke. 'Der Alte' like 'The Lincoln,' is an example of an actual political figure who is turned into a doll and therefore made into an abstraction. 'Der Alte', which means the old man, also has Konrad Adenauer as a historical connotation.

In 'real life', Konrad Adenauer is the first German Chancellor to be elected after the second world war. He is called old man because he was old when he first came to power. Both Lincoln and Adenauer are commonly regarded as benign and relatively autonomous figures. The fact that they are made into automata in Dick is bizarre especially since it is unlikely that Dick is suggesting that these historical figures were actually subject to puppet masters. However, their fictional counterparts are in fact at the mercy of various forces, though Lincoln fares better and is more autonomous than the totally automatic 'der Alte'.

In both *The Simulacra* and *We Can Build You*, history literally comes to life, but it is a weird kind of life. From a Baudrillardian perspective, the use of real historical figures as abstractions is much like real countries being made into fake worlds by the Walt Disney Corporation. It is a case of history being exploited for purposes other than edification.

In fact, Lincoln and Adenauer cannot really serve as a history, because they are there in the universe of the novelistic present as actual figures. More importantly, Lincoln and Adenauer are real figures who are placed in a fictional environment, jumping levels from historical figure to storytime figure. This underlines the fictional element of history and, at

the same time, undermines the historical reality of the figures themselves.

In a similar example, Europe in the Disneyland of America cannot really be fake, because it is actually present as a reality that is more real than the 'real' Europe. From Slusser's perspective, this is a very American phenomenon because Americans are not great believers in 'history'. It is historicity that they like, because historicity is a kind of fictionalised past.

The plot in *The Simulacra* consists of a plan to change the manufacturer of the simulated leader to a company owned by a man named Maury Frauenzimmer. Before an election a new puppet is made and the people vote. The voters do not find it strange that the same woman is always married to the new leader and that she never ages. Nicole Thibodeaux is the first lady to the puppet regardless of who he happens to be.

Amazingly, no one notices that the leader of the U.S.E.A. (United States Of Europe And America) is a puppet until it is revealed to the public. The revelation suggests that Nicole has been in charge all along, but this is also a charade since Nicole is only an actress who has been hired to play the role of first lady. Finally, a group of bureaucrats are discovered who are ultimately pulling the strings of the various puppets. The discovery becomes an opportunity for a coup d'etat and the real leaders are killed.

The plot of *The Simulacra* ultimately breaks down as an example of second order simulation in Baudrillard's sense, if by second order we mean that the simulacrum conceals the fact that there is no truth (*Simulations* 1). In order to be an example of Baudrillardian second order simulation, it would have to appear as a series of unveilings with no end, but instead each revelation uncovers a layer of truth until we discover that there has actually been a conspiracy to deceive the society as a whole. That is, simulation is in fact the result of

deliberate deception on the part of an actual group of people. There is a genuine conspiracy.[11]

On the other hand, *The Simulacra* ends with the rescue of the woman who played the first lady. That is, her public continue to believe in her power as though simulation is the first choice of the people in a democratic society. One of the subplots of this novel involves a time machine and the possible rescue of Nazi figures from the past.

Another subplot involves the nervous breakdown of a musician and celebrity named Richard Kongrosian. As was noted earlier, at the end of the novel Kongrosian is literally turning himself inside out. Ultimately, the time machine, and Richard Kongrosian among other things, open up the novel and make it difficult to summarise from an epistemological perspective. There is truth in Dick's fiction; it's just not a very satisfying kind of truth. The truth is that things don't add up.

The nature of the simulacra in *Do Androids Dream Of Electric Sheep* is quite different. Rachael Rosen is identical to Pris and the potential for an infinite series of androids is clear. As Rick Deckard says: "There is no Pris, only Rachael Rosen over and over again" (Dick, *Do Androids* 197).

In *Do Androids Dream Of Electric Sheep?* Dick creates a world which is barely inhabitable. Therefore, most of humanity has emigrated to colonies on other planets. To keep them company on the colonies, androids are created. We could read these as analogous to humans, especially human slaves (Robinson 29). But these fake people are lacking in essential human qualities and this makes them potentially pathological. Rick Deckard and assassins like him are therefore hired to kill the androids when they try to escape.

So, on one hand, what we are dealing with is a world in which it is okay to kill a

psychopath (android) because s/he is unable to show empathy – a disturbing prospect to say the least. On the other hand, as a second order simulation, the android is no longer a human analog, i.e., not a form of humanity at all. In fact, quite the reverse is true. A human is a form of pathetic android, and in fact a lesser android because flawed.

Everything therefore refers back to the model in Dick, i.e., to the abstraction and not the generic human being. Reality is therefore eccentric to simulation, i.e, a satellite of abstraction (Baudrillard, *Simulations* 64) and this, for Baudrillard, is itself a societal pathology.

Simulation's Subversive Potential

Dick and Baudrillard both situate paranoia and schizophrenia as overlapping conditions, but their overall world views are different. Baudrillard has suggested that simulations have subversive potential (*Simulations* 41). It may also be true that simulations are not *necessarily* subversive. For instance, according to Baudrillard, simulated wars which actually kill people are just as heinous as actual wars, but they tend to be less genuinely adversarial (*Simulations* 70). That is, simulated wars are tactical wars that are empty at the level of meaning.

In the case of the cold war, the actuality of war does not even exist. Strategy becomes inflated to such an extent that it engulfs all else. The end result is a perfect abstraction of war with no war in practice. Baudrillard's claim is that 'war' is 'peace', since a permanent state of readiness is the 'price' of peace. But this readiness is itself an internalised war. To buy the bomb and join the nuclear arms race is to be condemned to deterrence.

In Dick's *The Penultimate Truth*, deterrence takes the form of a conspiracy against the

vast majority of people. Most people live in bomb shelters, but the war is already over. The secret of the end of the war is being held back from the people by a landowning class called Yance-men. The hero of the novel decides to ascend to the surface to find an "artiforg pancreas" for his boss who has pancreatic cancer.

Once at the surface, he discovers that the war is in fact a lie. The penultimate truth, therefore, is that people have been lied to. The ultimate truth is not known. However, one other character has already discovered the lie without going to the surface. Carol, who also lives in the underground "ant tank," has noticed that there are inconsistencies in the newscasts. It is her meticulous reading or detective work that allows her to suspect that the "ants" are not being told the truth.

Deterrence is also of interest in Dick's *Vulcan's Hammer* (first published in 1960) which illustrates the potential for a fake war waged as a state of permanent military escalation, i.e., a permanent state of readiness and paranoia. In *Vulcan's Hammer* the rate and type of military escalation is calculated by a giant computer which (who?) determines the potential risk level of all activities conducted by all people. The computer is so sophisticated that it anticipates its enemy's every move. The situation is also quintessentially paranoid as well as being a good example of a particular kind of Baudrillardian simulation, i.e., cold war.

Finally, however, the computer in *Vulcan's Hammer* is overwhelmed by its own paranoia and must be destroyed. The escalation of its defensive actions leads to the much feared and even somewhat comical result that it must be attacked regardless of the fact that it has anticipated this result and that is why it has become so defensive.

In this instance, paranoia has also become objectified, i.e., it has become a lifestyle. As

in *Anti-Oedipus*, psychology appears to have sociological implications. Since the computer enforces its own paranoia on the rest of the world, it has become an objective fact. Paranoia also leads to the birth of a sort of subjectivity within the computer's circuitry because the computer ultimately chooses to protect itself above and beyond everyone else. However, this is not a Dickian human subjectivity because the computer fails to exhibit anything resembling empathy.

Since the situation is essentially a paranoid one, are we to conclude that simulation is also inherently paranoid? Perhaps, but it would be safer to conclude with Dick that simulation is both paranoid and schizophrenic or that it is paranoid as an aspect of a type of schizophrenia. Certainly, if a condition involving literalised abstraction is, according to some (Goodchild 83), schizophrenic, and a self fulfilling prophecy is according to some (Pynchon, *Gravity* 340) paranoid, then this particular instance of simulation is paranoid, but simulation is itself schizophrenic.

Baudrillard sees the particular 'reason' for simulated war as not really significant or meaningful; similarly, for Deleuze and Guattari, 'microfascisms' of all types, including war, are based on the creation of meaning and authority. This is precisely the meaningfulness which makes paranoia fascist and yet leaves schizophrenia immune to fascism. For Deleuze, "Even the most insane fascism speaks the language of goals, of law, order and reason..." (*Anti-Oedipus* 367).

In *Anti-Oedipus*, paranoia and significance are therefore associated by a chain of signifiers which leads back to the singular object of desire, i.e., the phallus. This is the basis of fascism which is escaped by the schizophrenic. The schizophrenic is beyond significance because he or she is beyond ego, beyond saying 'I':

> The ego, however, is like daddy-mommy: the schizo has long since ceased to believe in it...There are those who will maintain that the schizo is incapable of uttering the word I, and that we must restore his ability to pronounce this hallowed word. All of which the schizo sums up by saying: they're fucking me over again. "I won't say I anymore, I'll never utter the word again; it's just too damn stupid. Every time I hear it I'll use the third person instead, if I happen to remember to." (23)

In *Anti-Oedipus*, fascism is derived from authority itself. The central element of fascism is subjectivity.[12] Without subjectivity or authority, there would be no fascism. In order to prevent it, therefore, it would be expedient to get rid of authority by ridding ourselves of significance. However, it is impossible and no doubt undesirable to abolish significance totally.

Conversely, in Dick's novel, *The Man In The High Castle*, anti-fascism is described as awakening: "...if you know you are insane, you are not insane. Or you are becoming sane finally. Waking up" (41). Dick's anti-fascism resembles the Gnostic image of enlightenment. Lotze the Nazi does not know he is insane (*Man* 40). The *lack* of knowledge is here equated with fascism (*Man* 41). In order to know there must be an 'I' who knows. However, the Nazis are described in this novel as 'unconscious,' (*Man* 41) which implies that they may be lacking a self at least in the sense of an ordinary ego consciousness.

For Baudrillard, differently again, the paranoia attendant to cold war (for instance) is the substance of the simulation or fraud. Meanwhile, the aims of war are identical with the aims of capital, i.e., the aim is to annihilate stakes altogether. The gesture that Deleuze and Guattari would like to see performed, the liquidation of meaning and authority, is in fact

being accomplished by capitalism. However, Deleuze and Guattari also see that capitalism reterritorialises even as it liquidates meaning (Aronowitz 22), whereas in Baudrillard fascism is a kind of backlash against hyperreality, i.e., a nostalgia for power (*Simulations* 46)

Simulated humans of the second order have subversive potential for Baudrillard to the extent that they bring into question the authenticity of the thing imitated and cancel out the differences on which meaning is based. For Baudrillard, "Parody makes obedience and transgression equivalent..." (*Simulations* 40). This process is subversive for Baudrillard to the extent that it undermines established order.

However, the theory does not always play itself out in the novels of Philip K. Dick. For instance, in *Do Androids Dream Of Electric Sheep*? the fact that Deckard can't tell the difference between Rachael and Pris makes it difficult for him to kill Pris once he has become Rachael's lover. In this case, simulation coupled with intense feeling does subvert authority, but not enough to subvert the established order in any way. Rachael and Pris are indistinguishable from some humans, it is true. Nevertheless Deckard is finally able to kill Pris.

The fact that in second order simulations everything refers back to an abstraction also seems to form part of a critique of schizophrenic processes for Baudrillard. If everything begins with the abstraction, i.e., either with the D.N.A. molecule or with computer code, then it ends with a situation which is a kind of perpetual generalised fiction.

The question that begs to be asked is: how different is this societal obsession with D.N.A. that Baudrillard describes as hyperreal from the thinking processes of Dick's Nazis in *Man In The High Castle* who cannot think of honour or people without thinking of it in the abstract, as 'Ehre und Volk'?

Baudrillard's description of the schizophrenic hyperreal is comparable to Dick's fictional examples of societies which are made up of the schizoid/android. Baudrillard's suggestion that simulation is schizophrenic and therefore a psychosis does not have the laudatory ring that Deleuze and Guattari attribute to their own schizophrenia (*Ecstasy* 27).

He says, "Schizophrenic vertigo of these serial signs, for which no counterfeit, no sublimation is possible, immanent in their repetition - who could say what the reality is that these signs simulate" (*Simulations* 152)? He calls simulation a 'Hades' in which it is no longer a place of torture but of radically relativised meaning (*Simulations* 34). Here relativisation bears the echo of 'torture'.

Further, Baudrillard claims that "They [these signs] no longer repress anything (which is why, if you will, simulation pushes us close to the sphere of psychosis)" (*Simulations* 152). These are not the words of someone who is pleased with the postmodern, conceived as it is here as a description of the contemporary. Nevertheless, Baudrillard does not wish to return to a hierarchical world ruled by an aristocracy where authority is absolute and comes from God. Baudrillard is in fact inclined to promote an acceleration of the hyperreal process in the hopes that this will lead to some kind of breakthrough.[13]

Marxism And Metaphysics

One occasionally gets the sense that Baudrillard is protesting too much and that by implication some sort of 'real world' must exist for him. This is certainly the case with Dick. There is a real world for Dick. It just so happens, however, that in his fiction we are almost never living in it. We are always at one remove from some ultimate and finally better and truer reality, despite the fact that frequently each new world reveals a worse world

underneath.

Contemporary war for Baudrillard is always simulated, but this raises a question about *Simulations* which may be hard to answer. If war is fake for us, is it fake for capital, i.e., big business? Does the Gulf war or Vietnam count as a fake war if it is a real strategy for some people? Does it make sense to talk about the bourgeoisie and capital as realities in this context (as Baudrillard does)? Reality is therefore simulated by a real agent, i.e., capitalism.

Much could be made of the Marxist themes as symbolised by the ants and the Yance-men in Dick's *The Penultimate Truth*. In this story, the proletarian 'ants' support the lifestyle of the sterile Yances by working in underground colonies while the Yances occupy much of the Earth, happily enjoying the luxury of land ownership.

The Yances own leadies (robots) and wage wars against each other. They also spend a great deal of time rationalising their situation. In *The Penultimate Truth*, the Yance-men lie to the ants by hiding the end of the nuclear war from them. This could certainly be read as a Marxist false consciousness. At the end of the novel, one worker's attitude to the conspiracy is contrasted with that of a particular Yance-man. The Yance-man seems to want to continue the fiction while the worker swears that he will not let the Yance-men lie to the workers again.

Eric S. Rabkin claims that Dick's "Electric Ant" (and androids generally) are symbolic of workers because "ants are also workers" (181). However, Dick is more unpredictable than Rabkin would have him be.

For instance, in a short story called "The Defenders," on which *The Penultimate Truth* was undoubtedly based, the robots (called leadies) are actually in the place of the 'bourgeoisie.' That is, androids are, ideologically at least, the Marxist middle class in the

short story instead of being workers. Moreover, in the short story the leadies are genuinely protecting the 'workers' from themselves. If the leadies did not protect them, these people who really are 'war mad' would devastate the Earth.

In any case, Dick's Yance-men are closer to Medieval Kings (suggesting Feudalism) (124), or privileged soviet communist party members in *The Penultimate Truth*, because the means of production are centralised (e.g. all the leadies are the property of Wes-Dem) (126). Yance-men acquire their status through land ownership rather than by industry or capitalism. This is typical of Dick's ability to undermine any predictable translation of his fiction.

Rabkin, for one, seems quite frustrated by what he sees as Dick's inability to acknowledge the economic basis of his own (Dick's) realities. He believes that Dick is blind to the economic forces that "strongly – albeit perhaps not completely – determine consciousness" (180). Rabkin's implication is that Dick is ignoring these factors and that he (Dick) is therefore not Marxist enough in his fiction. This misses the point. Dick is not just un-Marxist; he is in many ways anti-Marxist in his fiction.[14]

Baudrillard claims that simulation is so successful that it has begun to work against capital (*Simulations* 43). Capital in fact risks "vanishing in the play of signs". In Dick's novels, by contrast with Baudrillard, capitalism appears to thrive in virtual environments. The more virtual, the better.

In Dick's *The Simulacra* the situation was such that ultimately when all was revealed someone was benefitting from the charade, i.e, there was, in fact, a conspiracy. Similarly, in Baudrillard's case if the 'cause' (war) generates the desired 'effect' for capital, does it count as a second order simulation?

Baudrillard seems to have anticipated the question to a certain extent. In his discussion

of the Nixon scandal he describes the way that certain revelations may act to confirm our faith in the 'realness' of the rest of reality, when in fact what remains is also fake.

The scandal of a fake war can serve the purpose of bolstering the 'reality' of future wars; or, to use another example, Nixon may have been a liar and a crook (just as the President is a puppet in Dick's *The Simulacra* i.e. a literal fake), but so were all of the other politicians before him. Baudrillard describes scandals such as Watergate as an attempt to prove the real by the imaginary (*Simulations* 36).

Does this attitude betray a lack of sophistication on Baudrillard's part? Must the world be either a complete fraud or an ultimate reality, and are not all worlds made up of fictions at least in part? Is Baudrillard's cynicism not a kind of disappointed idealism? Paradoxically, the truth that there is no 'truth,' is still a 'truth' even a capital 'T' Truth.

In these situations, i.e., in political situations especially, it is not a matter of real or fake, but a matter of degree and to what ends. This is not at all to imply that ends justify means, but rather to suggest that simulation is not inherently bad, just as it is not inherently subversive.

Dick's fiction, especially his later fiction, seems less preoccupied than Baudrillard with capitalism. In fact, he is almost entirely metaphysical in his approach. One gets the impression that simulated humans are a way for Dick to talk about soullessness and g/God: his simulated universes are also coloured by spiritual implications. His fiction, therefore, has specific religious connotations that have no analogue in either Baudrillard or Deleuze and Guattari.

One must be cautious when attributing sociological or Marxist theoretical implications to Dick's fiction. In fact, Dick would probably be dissatisfied with subjectivity as Deleuze or

Deleuze and Guattari have outlined it. For Dick, subject is not a feature of object, nor even a fold in object (Boundas, *Gilles* 100). Though inside is outside in many of his novels, this seems to be an aspect of a psychosis or even a metaphysical theme, rather than a matter of (Marxist?) weighting in favour of object rather than subject. Moreover, Dick's subjects are in fact agents who affect objects in a way that is not accounted for in the Deleuze/Guattarian frame.

Obviously, Dick is not like anyone else, nor is he even like himself much of the time. However, certain aspects of his fiction recur as characteristics or features of his thought overall. For instance, especially in his Gnostic mode, Dick is an esoteric thinker (as well as being in a sense an exoteric one), who does not tend to provide the kind of detail that would support the economically based arguments on which to an extent Baudrillard's *Simulations* and Deleuze/Guattari's schizoanalysis are grounded.

The theorists tend to employ economic histories to contextualise slavery, subjection, and subject formation – in the case of Deleuze and Guattari the Sumarian/Akkadians (*Anti-Oedipus* 208) or as an 'originary' moment in the liquidation of meaning in Baudrillard (*Simulations* 43). In *Anti-Oedipus*, desire seems to take the place of the Marxist base, i.e., everything moves by means of desiring production, as though desire as unconscious and therefore oppressed/repressed were a kind of proletariat and not an aspect of a proletariat.

By contrast, without rendering the economy irrelevant, Dick seems more interested in subjectivity than either Deleuze and Guattari or Baudrillard. In the end, his work is less an instantiation, and more an example of resistance to the kinds of categorisations associated with Deleuze and Guattari or the Baudrillardian theoretical approaches.

Conclusion

A reading of Dick through cultural and literary theorists is, in a way, a reading of these theorists through Dick. That is, a reading of Dick's texts through Baudrillard, McHale and Deleuze and Guattari reveals as much about the postmodern (as iterated by Baudrillard), postmodernism (as delineated by McHale) and poststructuralism (as expressed by Deleuze and Guattari) as it reveals about Dick. It is also a reading of each theorist through the other theorists (For instance, from McHale's perspective Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy could be viewed as S.F. because of its schizophrenic ontological orientation).

According to Lance Olsen in his article "Cyberpunk And The Crisis Of Postmodernity" the "antipremises -- (themselves a kind of premise)," on which postmodernism is based are also themselves continually threatened by antipremises -- a process he suggests might reflect bad reasoning or bad faith (146). Another way of putting this is to say that the schizophrenia of postmodernism may become a kind of orthodoxy which (since it is intrinsically unsystematic) could threaten to undermine itself.

There is also some overlap between the postmodernist and poststructuralist fields in terms of the way these theories colour various features of the theoretical landscape. McHale alludes to this connection when he refers to John Barth's description of postmodernism. He cites John Barth as saying that postmodernism is: "one foot always in the narrative past... and one foot in, one might say, the Parisian structuralist present" (*Constructing* 27).

The description suggests that like poststructuralism, postmodernism is a contested or amended structuralism. Both postmodernism and poststructuralism also enjoy a similar repertoire of concerns having to do with notions of subjectivity (Easterbrook 31; McHale,

Constructing 247) and in their negative view of paranoia/modernism. However, there are differences in the way that this connection between poststructuralism and postmodernism expresses itself. For instance, McHale is himself an inheritor of structuralism's negative view of paranoia and epistemology, while Baudrillard maintains a negative view of schizophrenia.

I have tried to show that Dick's descriptions of his schizoid Nazis make a union between his fiction and Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipal theory an awkward, imperfect and misleading one. A reading of Dick that draws on this poststructuralism, such as the one made by Scott Durham, tends to gloss over the connection that Dick makes between fascism and a societal inability to desymbolise. The reading also implies that Dick's fiction is less subject-oriented than it is.[1]

Beyond the link between fascism and schizophrenia that Dick makes, there are other features of Dick's fiction that are irreconcilable with Deleuze and Guattari. The conclusion that Angel Archer comes to about Bill, i.e., that his ratiocination is limited to the concrete, is not a very meaningful one for Deleuze and Guattari, especially since it relies on a notion of medicalised pathology and a notion of psychology as science.

From a certain perspective, Dick is an empiricist.[2] To say this is to say that Dick assumes the two categories (real/abstract) as they exist experientially or 'scientifically' before demonstrating that they are to be exchanged. However, in Dick's defense, it is also possible that Dick actually sees these categories as arbitrary or as fictions, but that as fictions he assumes that they are necessary.[3] On the other hand, since he was a Gnostic he probably believed that the material world was a sham. This would not be considered a particularly empirical view.[4]

There are moments when Dick and the poststructuralists seem to agree. For instance,

literalised paranoia, that is, paranoia as object or quality of world, is schizophrenia for Dick. Here, Dick and Deleuze and Guattari seem to meet because each sees objectified paranoia as fascist. For Deleuze and Guattari, it is because paranoia is fascist; for Dick, it is because schizophrenia is fascist. For instance, in Dick's view, McFeyffe's communist paranoia in Eye In The Sky might be seen as fascist to the extent that it is realised paranoia. The Nazis' desire to literalise Volk and Ehre in The Man In The High Castle is also obviously fascist.

If the inability to desymbolise is both an indicator of schizophrenia/fascism and a characteristic of contemporary America, then America, it could be argued (and is argued in Chapter Three), is schizophrenic. Since Dick saw the impulse to concretise as fascist, on this level America is fascist also. The Man In The High Castle is therefore about fascism in America where the quality as embodied by the Nazis is schizophrenic, and anti-fascism as embodied by the Japanese is paranoid.

From a Baudrillardian perspective, America has been fictionalised (or virtualised) and this feature undermines the distinction between real worlds and fake ones for Americans. Baudrillard describes the contemporary as surreal in a way that destroys surrealism as a movement. Similarly, Dick's fictions feature schizophrenia as an epidemic. In We Can Build You "millions of Americans" have it (209).

Another postmodern view is McHale's. From McHale's point of view, postmodernist fiction is a genre that in some cases derogates paranoia in its literary form. The postmodernist attitude therefore clashes with Dick's own view of paranoia.

A postmodernist reading of Dick may also gloss over Dick's emphasis on subjectivity. In addition, it implies that Dick is ontological in a way that precludes knowledge. However, Dick's religious interests (which began in the early fifties and later developed into the

Gnosticism that is seen in the Valis trilogy) tends to refute the conclusion that he is anti-knowledge.

On McHale's reading, the interpretive or scholarly critical mode is itself paranoid. However, in a way this is self-defeating. If interpretation is paranoid, then McHale's books are also paranoid. McHale's thesis begs the question: what is the point of writing a very good scholarly guide to postmodernism which undermines itself by saying that interpretation (which is necessary for scholarship) is paranoid and should be avoided? Surely one could only write such a book once. Afterwards, one would have to write books that exemplified (rather than explained) the fact that interpretation was moot.

Dick is not a postmodernist in this sense, because he does not advance the cause of postmodernism. There is an element of pathology in the 'postmodern' for Dick as there is with Baudrillard (though it is probably a different element).[5] This is why, of the three theoretical sets of interests, Baudrillard's is the closest to Dick's. From Dick's perspective though, both schools of cultural criticism, i.e., as exemplified by Baudrillard's Simulations and by Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus, are deterministic. Baudrillard is deterministic because of his Marxism;[6] Deleuze and Guattari are deterministic because of the influence of Spinoza on their work.

This is also one of the chief criticisms that may be advanced against Marxist S.F. critics. The Marxist readings of Dick tend to be reductive. Eric S. Rabkin, for instance, wonders why Dick doesn't see how poverty has informed his own fiction and why he does not admit that, as Marx says, it is social existence that determines consciousness (Rabkin 179). Thomas M. Disch, for his part, ignores Dick's anti-Marxist tendencies and refers to Dick's work as mostly of a "Marxist bent" (Disch 23).

Some of the theoretical interpretations of Dick tend to obscure aspects of his fiction rather than elucidate them. For instance, Peter Fitting sees culture as a form of ideology (*Ubik* 45; *Reality* 108) and measures Dick's fiction in terms of its status as an example of that ideology. For Jameson, Dick's fiction is a function of his (the author's) class (Jakaitis 169). All of these Marxist S.F. critiques are variations on the same old Marxist saw that consciousness (our thoughts and inner life) is determined unidirectionally by the social (or real) world. This was a theme that Dick actively resisted.

Jake Jakaitis notes that Dick was labelled a Marxist despite his protestations. Dick was not so much Marxist as he was opposed to totalitarianism in all its forms (Jakaitis 172). For Jakaitis however, a Marxist interpretation of Dick's work is not necessarily inappropriate (169). Ultimately, however, Jakaitis ends by dismissing Dick as merely a guilty white liberal (192).

An exception to this trend in Dick criticism is George Slusser, whose view of Dick's subjects is better for our purposes than either the Deleuze/Guattarian, Baudrillardian or even the McHalian way of theorizing subjectivity because Slusser's view is closer to the way human subjects are actually depicted in Dick's fiction. His view also has the beneficial side effect that it explains why Dick presents us with so many generous views of paranoids and so many unkind portraits of schizo, schizoid and schizophrenic characters. Since many of Dick's more benevolent characters are paranoids it seems unlikely that he saw them the way that McHale, Deleuze and Guattari or Pynchon see them.

Slusser quotes Emerson who echoes Dick's way of thinking about subjectivity: "Illusion, Temperament, Succession, Surface, Surprise, Reality, Subjectiveness...I dare not assume to give them their order, but I name them as I find them in my way" (Slusser, *History*

219). Within the shifting context of Dick's schizophrenic S.F., paranoids stand out as sensible characters capable of making good choices and also capable of empathy. According to Slusser, paranoia is a 'vector if not of "love," at least of potential responsiveness' within contexts which are "actively devouring" (218).

In his article "Dianoia/Paranoia", Neil Easterbrook outlines the potential for a connection between Dick's notions of subjectivity and his notion of authenticity (Easterbrook 29). Citing Walt Whitman, Easterbrook also notes the connection between subjectivity and authenticity through empathy. Whitman says: "I do not ask how the wounded person feels, I myself become the wounded person."

In Dick's fiction there is a thought experiment concerning what type of people function best in worlds that fall apart. It turns out that paranoids are the answer. Paranoids are what Warrick refers to as anti-heroic heroes. Tagomi who is at the centre of a conspiracy, Joe Chip the 'precog,' Gabriel Baines the 'pare,' and Ragle Gumm, the repeat contest winner, are systematic, pattern detecting interpreters who live in worlds that are unusually volatile.

Despite the volatility of their respective worlds, they manage to perform small feats that go unrecognised and are usually undermined by the indifferent gods. In many cases, the resulting story is a kind of dark comedy. To contest fate, to subvert the inevitable, or to flout tradition is what it means to be human for Dick. Blind obedience, fascism, and various other kinds of fatalism and spiritual death fall under the category of the inhuman. Humanity, not anti-fascism, is the goal. Anti-fascism is merely a side effect.

On the other hand, not all of Dick's paranoids are benevolent. The supercomputer in Vulcan's Hammer, Robert Childan in The Man In The High Castle and Dr. Bluthgeld in Dr. Bloodmoney are not particularly good, notwithstanding their paranoid tendencies. To the

extent that Dr. Bluthgeld is paranoid, he is symbolic of the hateful qualities that may be attributed to paranoia. Robert Childan is a sycophant and the 'super' computer is self-defeating.

Since Dick frequently mixes paranoid and schizophrenic traits, it would be difficult to claim that Dick is totally positive about paranoia. Instead, he seems to see paranoia and schizophrenia as if they were two sides of a coin. The paranoid side is usually empathic and the schizoid side of these characters is usually creative. Gabriel Baines in Clans Of The Alphane Moon, Dr. Bruno Bluthgeld in Dr. Bloodmoney and Pris Frauenzimmer in We Can Build You are all described as both paranoid and schizophrenic.

Nevertheless, Dick frequently stresses paranoid subjectivity in his descriptions of authenticity: "The measure of a man is not his intelligence. It is not how high he rises in the freak establishment. The measure of a man is this: how swiftly can he react to another person's need? And how much of himself can he give" (*Our Friends* 41)? As was discussed in Chapters One and Two, the best examples of people who give of themselves are paranoids such as Nobusuke Tagomi, Jerry Fabin and Gabriel Baines.

On other occasions, authenticity is measured in terms of wilfulness, as in this description of Stuart in Dr. Bloodmoney: "This man has somehow managed to preserve his viewpoint, his enthusiasm, through all that has happened - he is still planning cogitating, bullshitting... nothing can or will stop him" (201). The quality of authenticity is almost never associated with schizophrenia unless the point is to demonstrate the inhumanity of the human characters in relation to automated ones, e.g., the automated Abraham Lincoln in We Can Build You and Konrad Adenauer in The Simulacra.

Within the context of Dick's overdetermined schizoid landscapes, literalised

schizophrenia is translated, among other things, into cybernetics. That is, Dick's androids and his schizoids share significant features. In novel after novel Dick literalises schizophrenic qualities to underline the inhumanity that is present in them. This is because Dick pities his androids, although he does not like them. It is unlikely that he thought of them as ideal.

There are two prominent exceptions, however, to Dick's negative portrayals of androids. The two first order (in Baudrillard's sense) simulacra, i.e., automata Abraham Lincoln and Konrad Adenauer (Der Alte), are more human than many of the characters around them. In both The Simulacra and We Can Build You androids are a model humanity (so to speak) compared to the schizoid people in their vicinity. In Konrad Adenauer's case it is not much more than an intimation of humanity though, since he is only a puppet. However, Adenauer does lend his puppet a whisper of integrity, if only by association. In both novels, the androids make the humans look bad by implying that the humans lack humanity. It is as if Dick is saying here that even an android is more human than these humans. However, the measuring stick is still humanity itself.

Dick's first novel in order of composition is The Cosmic Puppets which features a Zoroastrian theme (Mackey 14). In a sense, then, Dick featured religious issues in his S.F., from his first novel to The Transmigration Of Timothy Archer (Mackey 124), his last.

Sam Umland, unlike Darko Suvin (2), Peter Fitting (*Phil* 131) and Scott Durham (198), sees religion and philosophy as central to Dick's work. Umland's article on Dick's religious interests concludes with some hopes concerning the future of Dick criticism:

> I hope that this chapter will prompt a literary criticism of Dick's entire corpus that more fully accounts for his philosophical and religious obsessions, one that

> assumes that these obsessions are not late developments of his life (which they are not), or marginal in any definition of his fiction (they are not), but utterly essential to an understanding of it. (Umland 94)

Umland's is among the points being argued in this thesis. To understand Dick, it is essential to understand his religious and philosophical concerns. Long before the Gnostic trilogy, there were Galactic Pot Healer, Lies Inc., The Game Players Of Titan, and The Cosmic Puppets.

In Man In The High Castle, the religion is Taoism, but it is a Taoism which is already inflected with a Gnostic expression of evil. In Do Androids Dream Of Electric Sheep?, the religion is Mercerism, and a great deal is made of the potential for empathy or charity in this religion. In fact the two themes that recur throughout Dick's fiction, i.e., empathy and the problem of the origin of evil in the world, are not well served by a totally secular reading of his fiction.

For instance, Dick's Gnosticism is quite compatible with paranoia. Knowing is evidently a crucial element in both Dick's fictional and his religious repertoire. An understanding of some of the basic elements of Gnosticism makes it clear that Dick is not anti-paranoid or anti-knowledge. There is sin inherent in creation. From a Gnostic perspective, 'the fall' is creation, not eating of the tree of knowledge. The original sin is committed by g/God.

Coldness, both as a feature of the environment and as a feature of the personality is associated with evil. This is a Zoroastrian theme. Hell for Zoroastrians is cold. The prospect that reality may be hidden in perfect day is a familiar one for Gnostics. Both Zoroastrianism and Gnosticism make us suspicious of Christianity. These are some

examples of the aspects of Dick's fiction that may have had their origins in Dick's religious quests.

Dick's inside-outness may also be an aspect of Dick's mysticism. Since Dick's g/Gods are schizophrenic, the outside is literally the inside of the Gnostic g/God's thoughts. The implied mirror in A Scanner Darkly, which in psychology is used to separate inside and outside, invites us to read Dick's fiction in a religious way. Meanwhile, the inverted quality of Dick's fiction also suggests Zoroastrianism.

There is schizophrenia inherent in writing fiction, just as there is paranoia inherent in interpreting it. The process of S.F. writing is especially schizophrenic because it involves making abstract ideas (things that do not exist) into realities in the fictional world of the novel. This should not be confused with Dick's view of fascism.

Where Dick's fascists take abstract concepts and make real people live up to them, the novelist takes abstract concepts and tests them on fictional characters. The novelist introduces new ideas into a fake real world with fake people in it. Though the novelist sometimes tortures and kills his characters like some of the cruel gods in Dick's fiction do, s/he does not torture and kill them in real life.

The point seems obvious, but people often react to words as though they were deeds. This is because in a way they are. Words, especially words in fiction, however, are not deeds in the sense that they may be taken literally. A novel is play. It is a kind of joke. Dick was evidently aware of this. The devil in Dick's Divine Invasion does not play (258). The fascists and the schizoids do not joke.

Dick's fiction invites discussions of virtuality and schizophrenia, life and death, desire and agency that are particularly appropriate for contemporary scholars. In view of the fact

that many of the new technologies such as cloning and organ replacement may extend life beyond the current normal life expectancy, life and death may take on new meanings. Half-life or life in a coma may be the solution to the cabin fever that could certainly result from years aboard a space craft; or it may be a solution to the problem of physical or bodily death (which Dick differentiates from death of the mind or spirit).

Dick's fiction addresses itself to a number of contemporary problems. What is human in the age of artificial intelligence? What is virtual in the age of cyberspace? What is identity in the age of cloning? Who am I if I can be in two places at once? What does it mean to be good or evil in a virtual world? These seem to be particularly pressing questions for humanity today.

Notes To Introduction

[1] Dick was a prolific S.F. writer, who also wrote mainstream fiction. He was born in 1928 in Chicago Illinois. He grew up in Berkeley, California and spent most of his life in California. He died in 1982 of a stroke at the age of fifty three. Dick was married five times and wrote more than sixty books. For more biographical information about Dick, please see Williams 3-11.

[2] As is evident in these citations, and in others throughout the thesis, the commentary on Dick's work is phrased as simultaneously, or even primarily a commentary on the author himself, i.e., textual criticism merges with, or emerges as, biography and psychoanalysis. This peculiarity may one day merit study on its own.

[3] David Golumbia cites Durham's as an important critical view (83-102).

[4] Durham's is not the only critical view that suggests an association between Dick and poststructuralism. Neil Easterbrook and Emmanuel Jouanne are also among those who make this association. For more on the proposed association between Dick and poststructuralist thought, see Easterbrook 20 and Jouanne 234. Philip K. Dick is also cited in McHale's *Postmodernist Fiction* as an S.F. writer whose themes echo postmodernist fiction. For more on McHale's view of S.F. and postmodernist fiction, see McHale, *Postmodernist* 64. On the other hand, to say that poststructuralists and postmodernists have concerns about subjectivity is not to say that those with concerns about subjectivity are either poststructuralists or postmodernists. Dick could as easily or, in fact, more easily be categorised as a Jungian or Freudian psychologist. It is not clear from Durham's article whether he means to make a stronger association with postmodernism or with poststructuralism. He mentions

postmodernism, but his comments about Dick are more in keeping with a poststructuralist frame, i.e., with the externalisation of subjectivity. For a more detailed view of his position, see Durham 189.

[5] Brian McHale, however, cites some of Pynchon's work, such as *Gravity's Rainbow*, as postmodernist, i.e., ontological in orientation. This means that Pynchon may be a poor example of the mainstream fiction that Robinson is discussing, since a reality breakdown in some of Pynchon's fiction may also be an expression of a quality of world. For more on McHale's view of Pynchon, see *Postmodernist* 25.

[6] Robinson's thesis also has some points of contact with Deleuze and Guattari's object orientedness in which aspects of libidinal economy are revealed to be aspects of political economy. Things that are usually elements of psychology become aspects of world in Dick. For more on this thesis, see Robinson 15-16. Robinson's description of Dick's narrative strategy of a 'third person limited point of view' resembles Deleuze's description of indirect discourse. For Deleuze, however, all language is indirect discourse and "the translative movement proper to language is indirect discourse." For more on Deleuze's 'indirect discourse,' see *One Thousand Plateaus* 77.

[7] Kim Stanley Robinson's book *The Novels Of Philip K. Dick*, which does admittedly have some flaws, as Merritt Abrash has pointed out, also has some very insightful moments. Abrash outlines four areas where Robinson's book exhibits poor scholarship. One: factual errors. Two: Robinson's claim that Dick's short stories are pencil studies to his novelistic oil paintings is a poor reason to exclude the short stories from his book on Dick. Three: Robinson's book, which claims to be a full length survey of all of Dick's novels, is uneven in its treatment and gives short shrift to some of Dick's more important works. Four: there is a shortage of references to other Dick scholarship in Robinson's book.

Though Abrash is critical of Robinson, he also maintains that Robinson is an original and engaging writer. For a more detailed view of Abrash's comments, see "Failure" 123 and "In Response" 129. For a rebuttal of these criticisms, see also Slusser, "Scholars" 127 and Robinson, "Whose" 125.

[8] Surprisingly, Delany's definition of S.F. excludes 'pseudo-gothic' literature with its 'psychological/subject-oriented' connotations such as Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein*, and also excludes what Delany calls 'miraculous voyages' to magical lands. This is a surprise because such texts are often included by others as examples of early S.F.. For instance, Brian Aldiss includes *Frankenstein* in his definition of what constitutes early S.F. (*Trillion* 29). For more on the realisation of metaphor in S.F., see Delany 165.

[9] Few people ever mention *Radio Free Albemuth* as a part of this group of texts. *Radio Free Albemuth* features many of the elements that are seen in *Valis* and could be a draft version of that novel, though it is not identical to it. *Radio* is more clearly an S.F. novel as opposed to biography.

[10] In a review of a Dick conference held in the Chateau de Morigny in France, in late June 1986, Peter Fitting describes Dick's popularity in France as related to the schizophrenic element of his fiction in the late '60s and his political themes of the late '50s. For more on this conference, see Fitting, "Phil" 131.

[11] The manual cites the following factors as among the diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia: Two or more of the following, each present for a significant portion of time during a 1-month period (or less if successfully treated): (1) delusions, (2) hallucinations, (3) disorganised speech (e.g. frequent derailment or incoherence), (4) grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior, (5) negative symptoms, i.e., affective flattening, alogia, or avolition (285). Also according to this standard medical textbook for psychological disorders,

schizophrenia is characterised by social/occupational dysfunction (that is, a disturbance in work or interpersonal relationships), as well as a low standard of self-care. Paranoid Schizophrenia is defined as a type of schizophrenia in which "preoccupation with one or more delusions or frequent auditory hallucinations," occurs but "disorganized speech, disorganized or catatonic behavior, or flat or inappropriate affect" do not occur (287). In "Paranoid Personality Disorder," there is a "pervasive distrust and suspicion of others such that their motives are interpreted as malevolent, beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts." Four or more features may be found in a paranoid personality, he or she "suspects without sufficient basis, that others are exploiting, harming or deceiving him or her," the paranoid "is preoccupied with unjustified doubts about the loyalty or trustworthiness of friends or associates"; the paranoid "is reluctant to confide in others because of unwarranted fear that the information will be used maliciously against him or her"; and the paranoid may read "hidden demeaning or threatening meanings into benign remarks or events" (637-638). The key words here seem to be *unjustified* doubts, *unwarranted* fear and suspects *without sufficient basis.*

[12] It is interesting to note in this context where a comparison is being made between Deleuze and Guattari's attitudes to paranoia/schizophrenia and those of Philip K. Dick, that Deleuze and Guattari are quite critical of Freud and Freud's characterisation of schizophrenia as akin to autism (23). Dick, like Freud, and like the mainstream medical profession, also makes the association between flattened affectivity in autism and in schizophrenia an explicit part of his fiction. In fact, he returns to this association frequently as a key point in his definition of schizoid and schizophrenic behaviour.

[13] For a more traditional view of paranoia within the context of a predictive

Notes To Chapter One

[1] Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus* is objective, i.e., sociological (as Hayles notes in *How We Became Posthuman*. Criticism that is grounded in Marxism (or psychoanalytic Marxism such as Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus*) is quite dismissive of 'psychological' (this includes most mainstream literary) interpretations of Dick's fiction (165).

[2] Defined in relation to each other, Freud is a subjectivist and Deleuze and Guattari are objectivists. Deleuze and Guattari are objectivists in the sense that they view the psychological as a feature of the social, i.e., political and libidinal economy are identified and fantasy is always group fantasy. For more on Deleuze and Guattari's view of fantasy, see *Anti-Oedipus* 30. On the other hand, this simplifies. For both Freud and Deleuze and Guattari there is an element of psychology in the social and vice versa. Deleuze and Guattari in particular see no difference between subjectivity and objectivity.

[3] Dick's fiction sometimes recalls classic texts such as Dante's *The Inferno* and Homer's *Odyssey*, especially Chapter XI of the *Odyssey* (The Book Of The Dead). In Dante's *Inferno*, the descent into Hell is a preliminary to a positive end. Dante first descends into Hell, then rises through the levels of purgatory and limbo and eventually to paradise.

[4] It is possible to read Dick against the grain. That is, it is possible to read Dick and dismiss his evident commitment to indeterminacy, to ignore his unlikeable schizophrenics and to say that the point of Dick novels is in undermining the psychological aspects of literature. However, to do so is to risk appearing dogmatic. Dick (the author) does not have to agree with the theoretical texts being applied to him, but the fiction itself should at least

provide some firm examples that the theory has more than passing relevance to it.

[5] Ted Benton acknowledges that Gilles Deleuze sought to distance himself from the "New Philosophy", the movement that Benton describes as an anti-systematic, Marxist-derived theoretical movement (a sort of non-system system) that opposed power and order in the wake of the spontaneous strikes of May 1968. Benton lists B.H. Levy, G. Lardreau, C. Jambet, A. Gluckmann, J.M. Benoist and J. P. Dolle as among the group of 'New Philosophers'. However, Jacques Derrida (the deconstructionist) and Deleuze and Guattari are listed as philosophers who anticipated the break with institutionalised epistemology made by the 'New Philosophy'. Michel Foucault (a fellow poststructuralist and author of *Madness And Civilisation*) is also described by Benton as a richer more complex antecedent of 'New Philosophy' who is ambivalent towards Marxism. Deleuze and Guattari's anti-systematic Marxism in *The Anti-Oedipus* has many of the features that are problematic in the 'New Philosophy'. For more on Structural Marxism and its deconstruction of epistemology, see Benton 176-177.

[6] This is not a universally accepted premise. Many people continue to believe that science, in fact, *undermines* dogma. However, "Althusser, despite his familiarity with modern non-Marxist work in the philosophy of science, seems finally unable to break from the idea that scientific work is incompatible with the co-existence of diverse theoretical perspectives and the openness to revision of established theories." For more on the relationship between dogma and science, see Benton 233. What is at stake in this debate is all forms of knowledge (including non-scientific knowledge). The goal is the end of

totalitarianism in all its forms (Benton 188). The grounds on which knowledge is undermined are that discourse is not representational. That is, words do not have any logical relationship to the things they describe. Objects are therefore at least partially constituted by language. However, as Benton sees it, this is a spurious argument which does not prove that reality is dependent on language (190). In any case, to speak of fascism, liberation and paranoia and schizophrenia in a meaningful and coherent way and to underline this constellation with an argument about the way in which language may help to constitute thought, also has its epistemological side, if by epistemology we mean that this sets up truths and is susceptible to dogmatic renderings.

[7] Dick was interested in existential psychology as Anthony Wolk has suggested. Dick's heroes make better examples of existential humanists than of Marxist derived poststructural subjectivities because they are explicit agents. The language paradigm which decentres subjectivity (because agents do not create language) is far from Dick's way of thinking. It is unlikely that Dick would have been persuaded by Levi-Strauss's (Structural) notion of a universal depth-grammar of the mind because it is too deterministic. Moreover, Dick's view of schizophrenia is akin to Freud's in that both identified schizophrenia with autism, while Dick's schizophrenic, schizoid and schizotypal characters share with mainstream psychology the qualities of affective flattening, and confusion of abstraction with reality. For more information on the language paradigm, see Benton 11-12.

[8] Patricia Warrick's claim that Dick's doctors are repetitions tends to imply that all of Dick's doctors are the same, but if we compare Dr. Smile, the talking briefcase from *The*

Three Stigmata Of Palmer Eldritch, with Dr. Bloodmoney, they are not similar. Dick was neither totally positive, nor totally negative in his depictions of doctors. Dr. Stockstill is relatively benevolent, and Dr. Stone is a kind of saint in *Valis*. For more on Dick's repetitions, see Warrick, *Mind* 20.

[9] *Clans* is not the only novel that shows paranoids behaving heroically. *The Man In The High Castle*, *A Scanner Darkly*, *Ubik* and *The Three Stigmata Of Palmer Eldritch* also feature some strong paranoid characters. Nobusuke Tagomi is the most noted paranoid hero (in *The Man In The High Castle*), but Joe Chip in *Ubik* and Jerry Fabin in *A Scanner* are also heroic and Leo Bulero attempts to rescue Barney Mayerson in *The Three Stigmata*. Ironically, the most obvious example of an authoritarian or 'fascist' paranoid figure is Robert Childan in *The Man In The High Castle*, who is seen by many critics as heroic. Dick is not always positive in his depictions of paranoids. However, there is a definite association between paranoia and heroism in his fiction.

[10] Umberto Rossi notes this peculiar relationship in Dick's *Time Out Of Joint* between words and things, but comes to different conclusions about it (207).

[11] David Wingrove refers to the world in *Ubik* as one in which "even the deserving are...cruelly punished," (27).

[12] In *The Man In The High Castle* Baynes says that the fascists are fascist because they "identify with God's power" (41).

[13] Ted Benton describes the shift in argument in structural Marxism from an

epistemological justification for ideology to an ontological one as illustrated by Louis Althusser in the statement: "Ideology is not illusory for the reason we've given before; it's not illusion, it's not falsity, because how can something which has effects be false? It may derive from forms of the imaginary but it is not false." Althusser adds that "it would be like saying a black pudding is false, or a steam roller is false" (Benton, 186). Benton's response is that "one might usefully reflect that ideologies, though real and having effects, cannot be eaten nor driven" (187).

[14] The "congregation of the dead," is a phrase borrowed from Melville to designate insanity. The descent into madness is a spiritual death that occurs even while the subject is still living. It is a falling away from understanding. For more on insanity and spiritual death, see Melville 405.

[15] Emmanuel Jouanne also compares Dick to Deleuze and Guattari: "This process of confusion [between fiction and non-fiction in Dick] which Dick pushes so far as to question the structures of his existence, corresponds perfectly to the 'deterritorialisations' described by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in their *Kafka, Pour Une Litterature Mineure* (1975)". Interestingly, Jouanne also excuses himself from elaborating on his claim saying: "This is not the place for an extended study of narrative economy in the divine trilogy" (Jouanne 234).

Notes To Chapter Two

[1] George Slusser describes this as a process of "undulation" between "center and circumference" (*History* 219).

[2] Dick's fiction is Gnostic on two levels if we consider Robert Galbreath's proposition that fantastic literature is already Gnostic (330).

[3] There are several paradoxes that have to do with Dick's use of Gnosticism as a recurring allegory. For instance, though Gnosticism does use the Christian Bible as a text, parts of that text, especially the Pauline sections, were probably meant as an explicit rebuke directed mainly at Gnostics (*Omens* 67). According to Harold Bloom, Paul, a former Gnostic, bore an animosity towards angels in Gnostic texts as well (*Omens* 56). Indeed, 'knowing in part' from 1 Cor. would suggest a lack of gnosis if we read it with a Christian anti-Gnostic inflection, whereas "...then shall I know even as also I am known," suggests that g/God is outside not inside as it is in Gnosticism. The allusion is to a future time in which we may see ourselves as others see us, i.e., from the outside, which is also presumably a description of g/God's knowledge of us. That is, g/God's spark which is at the centre of Gnosticism is challenged as is knowledge of that spark. However, Dick nevertheless uses these passages with special emphasis. Actually, it is not impossible to see these passages in context as part of a Gnostic perspective. In *A Scanner Darkly*, it is evident that Robert Arctor's personality is extinguished. This is precipitated by a schizophrenic explosion of the self brought on by drugs and overexposure (the police install holo-scanners in his house). 'Knowing as also I am known', i.e., absolute objectivity, is marked by a description of spiritual death (death of the inner self).

[4] The "grasshopper lies heavy," is a phrase taken from Ecclesiastes. In the King James Version of the Bible, the passage is "...also when they shall be afraid of that which is high, and fears shall be in the way, and the almond tree shall flourish, and the grasshopper shall be a burden, and desire shall fail: because man goeth to his long home, and the mourners go about the streets" (Eccles. 12.5). Solomon, who is said to have written Ecclesiastes, makes an association between sadness (or emotional lows) and wisdom. Solomon says: "all is vanity," but we must not despair. Herman Melville, quoting this passage, includes the proviso: "there is a wisdom that is woe; but there is a woe that is madness" (405).

[5] Fascism, conceived broadly as including Stalinism, (i.e. conceived in the way that Poststructuralism conceives it) is also associated with schizophrenia in *The Captive Mind*, Czeslaw Milosz's book on living in Poland under communism (22).

[6] The description of Dick's fascists also bears some resemblance to ultra Stalinist communists (as they are described by Czeslaw Milosz): "Only he, the observer, will see into the future like a god, and know it to be hard, necessarily hard, for such are the laws of History." This is the attitude of newly indoctrinated writers in Communist Poland (21).

[7] Under communism in Poland allegory and satire are expressly forbidden because satire and "allegory, by nature manifold in meaning, would trespass beyond the prescriptions of socialist realism" (Milosz 42).

[8] The poet under Stalinism in Poland writes from the perspective of the ideal citizen (Milosz 56).

[9] The expression "he can't see the forest for the trees," is usually used to describe people who can't see the big picture. The fascists have the opposite problem. They can *only* see the big picture. They can see the forest, but not the trees.

[10] Epistemology is also a word used to describe a branch of philosophy. However, I am using interpretation and epistemology loosely here as synonyms to indicate meaning systems because this is how McHale uses the term 'epistemology'. It does not mean objective knowledge in this context.

[11] One of the peculiarities of McHale's construction of paranoia as epistemology is that this construction does not differentiate between knowledge and pseudo-knowledge. All specific claims to truth as well as all systems of knowing are treated as though equal (equally suspect). So while paranoia is usually viewed as a disease wherein someone has the false belief that others are out to get them, in McHale's construction Baynes's belief that the Nazis are out to get him (where there is specific evidence to support it) and Childan's belief that the Japanese or the Jews are out to get him (where there is no evidence to support it) are equated. For a sample of Childan's paranoia about Jews see Dick, *Man* 117. Paranoia is normally contingent on a false belief, but in the anti-epistemological (or anti-paranoid) view, there ceases to be any distinction between true and false even in the sense of specific truths.

[12] Ted Benton uses the term agnostic to describe the work of both Structural Marxism and Post-Structuralism. The "pressure towards epistemological relativism or agnosticism is present in Althusser's work itself," (Benton 180).

[13] "Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels," says Paul in 1 Corinthians,

"and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal" (1 Cor. 13.1). Charity in this context is fellow feeling, agape as distinguished from eros, which is erotic love (1 Cor., notes 13.1). Charity is love or concern for one's neighbour. Empathy not pity, as Christopher Palmer suggests in *On Philip K. Dick*, is what seems to be at the centre of Dick's charitable acts (Palmer 268). Empathy is an intellectual or imaginative apprehension of another's condition or state of mind. Or as Baynes says of Tagomi: "He [Tagomi] fired on my behalf." Tagomi puts himself in Baynes's shoes (Dick, *Man* 200).

[14] This has some interesting implications if the whole of society is autistic/schizophrenic. If all of America is schizophrenic (as Baudrillard claims in *Simulations*), then relatively sane people with passable judgement are paranoids who have special mind reading abilities. In Dick's fiction, paranoids bank on their own version of human nature in a situation where that nature is not supposed to exist.

[15] However, according to some, Juliana is "almost casual" about killing Joe, whereas Nobusuke is filled with remorse (Campbell 196).

Notes To Chapter Three

[1] While it is true that Dick shares with Deleuze/Guattari a tendency to turn psychology inside-out, as was suggested also by Scott Durham, the tendency in Dick to emphasise certain types of simulation is really more evocative of Baudrillard's theoretical matrices.

[2] This comparison of the real with the abstract could be considered a bit unusual, since 'real' is usually contrasted with 'unreal' and 'abstract' with 'concrete'. In Baudrillard's texts (like in Dick's texts) the real can usually be read as concrete and the abstract frequently means the fake or simulated.

[3] Scott Durham has noted that in Dick the aesthetic merges with the everyday (Durham 190). It is one of the features of Dick's simulated worlds that they appear surreal, cartoonish and hallucinatory. This is similar to a description of the hyperreal in Jean Baudrillard's *Simulations*, in that the hyperreal is a condition in which the everyday and the aesthetic are already merged. But according to Baudrillard's definition, it is no longer possible to have a surrealist movement per se, because so much of existence is surreal already. In Baudrillard's description of the contemporary, the everyday world already incorporates simulation as an aspect of itself and therefore the playful exchange between the quotidian and the 'artistic' on which the Surrealists themselves depended is lost (*Simulations* 147).

[4] For Deleuze, the situation is nearly reversed: The simulacrum is precisely that which is without resemblance to the original, as opposed to the copy which does not bear a resemblance. For instance, with respect to our difference from God, our sin makes us into simulacra of Him not copies of Him (*Logic* 257).

[5] Deleuze does not juxtapose real and abstract. Rather than juxtaposing the real and the abstract, Deleuze juxtaposes the virtual with the actual. The virtual is "real without being actual, ideal without being abstract; and symbolic without being fictional." The virtual is structure, the actual is the expression of the virtual as differenciation (which is local). Deleuze's construction differs so markedly here in terms of terminology from both Dick and Baudrillard that he makes it difficult to compare his virtual/actual with Dick and Baudrillard's discussion of real/abstract (*Difference* 208).

[6] 'Salvation' [read entrance into the Palm Tree Garden], according to F. Scott Walters, is contingent on choice (Walters 231, 233).

[7] Paranoia as a paranormal ability or as heightened agency has no parallel in *Simulations*. By contrast, as is noted by Slusser (199-222) Dick sees heightened agency as paranoia's saving grace.

[8] In his discussion of binary (the code which exemplifies for Baudrillard being/not-being), the end of industrialisation and the beginning of digitality, Baudrillard illustrates the transition from an industrial society to a hyperreal society in the following way: "After the metaphysic of being and appearance, after that of energy and determination, comes that of indeterminacy and the code." The hyperreal is characterised by indeterminacy which is where it derives its potential for freedom. One/zero, that is the question, becomes the first step towards ascii art and Windows TM *(Simulations* 103).

[9] Emmanuel's eternal moment betrays, at one and the same time, a lack of instanteneity and a total instanteneity. Dick's demonstration of divine time also resembles the Deleuzian

description of 'Aion' from *The Logic Of Sense* which is experienced as a series of vast and profound presents or as Dick puts it, accretional layers (*Logic* 164).

[10] Counterfeit humans also occur in Dick's *We Can Build You, The Simulacra* and *Counter-Clock World.* Stanton Mick is a fake human in *Ubik.* Some of the short stories also feature robots or fake humans, e.g. "The Impostor" or "Second Variety".

[11] A better example of an second order simulation of the Baudrillardian variety, however, does occur in *Ubik.* The truth in *Ubik,* finally, is that there is none.

[12] Michael Orth makes an association between subjectivity, fascism, and libertarianism, which is convincing only if you accept the idea that authoritarian individualism is 'libertarian' in the first place. This is very loosely defined 'libertarianism', i.e., it is libertarianism which is essentially already authoritarian and this makes it easy to equate it with fascism (Orth 297, 309).

[13] By contrast, the liberatory function of schizoanalysis is to disturb. The goal, for Deleuze and Guattari is anti-fascism rather than the overthrow of the government in the name of the revolution (revolution can also be implicated in fascism). This is not to say that Baudrillard is advocating revolution either, but disturbance and pathology play different roles in Deleuze and Guattari's construction.

[14] Dick was no Marxist. In fact, ants/robots are associated with socialism in some of Dick's fiction (Dick, *Robots* 55). So, in a way, suggesting that he was unaware of the economic forces that may have determined aspects of his life and his fiction is a bit like

telling a Jewish friend that he should make himself more aware of Christ. For a similar discussion of Jameson's Marxist interpretation of Wyndham Lewis, please see Foshay 18-19.

Notes To Conclusion

[1] Most postmodernist and poststructuralist criticism is anti-subjective. Most views of the postmodern also include a description of the 'deconstruction' of subjectivity. A possible exception to this is Viviane Casimir whose view of contemporary culture is one in which subjectivity is making a return (333-42).

[2] The Althusserian critique of empiricism seems to be based in part on a dislike for subjective explanations of history and for subjectivity in general (Benton 27). The structural critique of subjectivity is based on the assumption that human beings are not in control of language which precedes them and to a certain extent determines their thoughts and their reality (Benton 11). However, language is only partially determinative of thought, and does not determine reality (Benton 190). The reason Althusser's conception of science does not seek to falsify itself with empirical evidence also has to do with its reliance on Gaston Bachelard's philosophy of science (Benton 24). Scientific theory is not seen as an attempt to account for data, but the technical realisation of scientific concepts. According to Althusser, there are no such things as raw data. All data are the product of conceptualisation (Benton 37). Ironically, the critique of empiricism comes as part of an effort on part of Louis Althusser to establish Marxism as a science (as epistemology). This is ironic, because empirical evidence is a fundamental prerequisite for most science.

[3] If Dick's only flaw is that he is an empiricist, this seems like a relatively harmless flaw to have as a novelist, i.e., for a writer of 'fiction'. One could argue that the category 'fiction' must in fact assume a 'reality'. In that sense, it would not be possible to write fiction

at all, if the writer were not in some sense empirical in his thinking.

[4] For more on Gnosticism and the material world, see Galbreath 331.

[5] For Dick the lack of empathy is the most pathological aspect of postmodern America, for Baudrillard, the lack of 'reality' is the most pathological. For Dick, however, a lack of empathy is related to a confusion of the abstract with the real.

[6] I am confining my remarks about Baudrillard and Marxism to Baudrillard's early texts. In later texts such as *The Transparency Of Evil* his work loses its Marxist inflection and takes on a religious one.

Works Cited

Abrash, Merritt. "In Response To George Slusser." Mullen et al. 129-30.

—. "A Failure Of Scholarship." Mullen et al. 123-25.

Alighieri, Dante. *La Divine Comedie*. Trad. Alexandre Cioranescu. Editions Rencontre: Lausanne, 1968.

American Psychiatric Association. *Diagnostic And Statistical Manual Of Mental Disorders*. 4th ed. Washington: American Psychiatric Association, 1994.

Aldiss, Brian "Philip K. Dick: A Whole New Can Of Worms." *Foundation* 26 (1982): 11-14.

—. *Trillion Year Spree: The History Of Science Fiction*. 1986. London: Paladin, 1988.

Arendt, Hannah. *Between Past And Future: Six Exercises In Political Thought*. New York: Viking Press, 1961.

Aronowitz, Stanley. "Anti-Oedipus & Molecular Politics." *New Political Science* 1 (1980): 19-24.

Baudrillard, Jean. *The Ecstasy Of Communication (L'autre Par Lui-Meme)*. Trans. Bernard Schutze and Caroline Schutze. New York: Semiotext(e), 1987

—. *Simulations*. Trans. Paul Foss et al. New York: Semiotext(e), 1983.

—. *The Transparency Of Evil*. Trans. James Benedict. London: Verso, 1993.

Benton, Ted. *The Rise And Fall Of Structural Marxism: Althusser And His Influence*. London: MacMillan, 1984.

Bloom, Harold. *The American Religion: The Emergence of the Post-Christian Nation*. New York: Touchstone, 1992.

—. *Omens Of The Millennium: The Gnosis Of Angels, Dreams And Resurrection*. New

York: Riverhead, 1996.

Borges, Jorge Luis. *Labyrinths: Selected Stories & Other Writings*. Eds. Donald A. Yates and James E. Irby. New York: New Directions, 1962, 1964.

Boundas, Constantin and Dorothea Olkowski eds. *Gilles Deleuze And The Theatre Of Philosophy*. New York: Routledge, 1994.

Burden, Brian. "Philip K. Dick And The Metaphysics Of American Politics." *Foundation* 26 (1982): 41-46.

Campbell, Laura E. "Dickian Time In *The Man In The High Castle*." *Extrapolation* 33 (1992): 190-201.

Carlson, Neil R.. *Physiology Of Behavior*. 5th ed. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1994.

Carter, Cassie. "The Metacolonisation Of Dick's *Man In the High Castle*: Mimicry, Parasitism, And Americanism in the PSA." *Science Fiction Studies*. 22 (1995): 333-42.

Casimir, Viviane. "Data And Dick's Deckard: Cyborg as Problematic Signifier." *Extrapolation* 38 (1997): 278-91.

Csicsery-Ronay, Istvan Jr. Introduction. "Pilgrims In Pandemonium: Philip K. Dick And The Critics." Mullen et al. v-xviii.

Dawson, Miles Menander. *The Ethical Religion Of Zoroaster*. New York: AMS Press, 1931.

Delany, Samuel R.. *Starboard Wine: More Notes On The Language Of Science Fiction*. New York: Dragon Press, 1984.

Deleuze, Gilles. *Difference And Repetition*. Trans. Paul Patton. New York: Columbia University, 1994.

—. *The Logic Of Sense*. Trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale. Ed. Constantin V.

Boundas. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.

—. *One Thousand Plateaus.* Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 1987.

Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism And Schizophrenia.* Trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane. Introd. Mark Seem. Preface by Michel Foucault. Mineapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 1977.

Dick, Philip K. *Blade Runner: (Do Androids Dream Of Electric Sheep).* 1st Ballantine Books ed. New York: Ballantine Books, 1982.

—. *Clans of the Alphane Moon.* Boston: Gregg Press, 1979.

—. *Confessions Of A Crap Artist--Jack Isidore (Of Seville Calif.): A Chronicle Of Verified Scientific Fact.* Glen Ellen, Ca.: Entwhistle Books, 1975.

—. *The Cosmic Puppets.* London: Severn House, 1986.

—. *Counter Clock World.* New York: Berkley Pub. Corp., 1967.

—. *The Divine Invasion.* London: HarperCollins, 1996.

—. *Dr. Bloodmoney: Or, How We Got Along After The Bomb.* New York: Dell, 1980.

—. *Eye In The Sky.* New York: Ace Books, 1957.

—. *Flow My Tears, The Policeman Said.* Scarborough: New American Library of Canada, 1975.

—. *Galactic Pot Healer.* London: V. Gollancz, 1971.

—. *The Game Players Of Titan.* New York: Ace Books, 1963.

—. *I Hope I Shall Arrive Soon.* 1st ed. New York: Doubleday, 1985.

—. *In Milton Lumky Territory.* 1st ed. New York: Dragon Press, 1985.

—. *Lies Inc.* London: Gollancz, 1984.

—. *The Man In The High Castle.* 1962. New York: Vintage Books, 1992.

—. *Martian Time Slip*. London: New English Library, 1976.

—. *Mary And The Giant*. New York: Arbor House, 1987.

—. *A Maze Of Death*. 1970. Vintage Books, 1994.

—. *Now Wait For Last Year*. London: Harper Collins, 1996.

—. *Our Friends From Frolix 8*. New York: Ace Books, 1970.

—. *The Preserving Machine And Other Stories*. London: Golancz., 1971.

—. *The Penultimate Truth*. London: Voyager, 1998.

—. *Radio Free Albemuth*. New York: Arbor House, 1985.

—. *Robots Androids And Other Mechanical Oddities: The Science Fiction Of Philip K. Dick*. Ed. Patricia Warrick and Martin H. Greenberg. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984.

—. *The Simulacrum*, London: Eyre Methuen, 1977.

—. *Solar Lottery*. Boston: Gregg Press, 1976.

—. *A Scanner Darkly*, 1977. New York, Daw Books: 1984.

—. *The Shifting Realities Of Philip K. Dick: Selected Literary And Philosophical Writings*. Ed. and introd. Lawrence Sutin. New York: Pantheon, 1985.

—. *The Three Stigmata Of Palmer Eldritch*. New York: Doubleday, 1965.

—. *Time Out Of Joint*. New York: Belmont Books, 1965.

—. *The Transmigration Of Timothy Archer*. New York: Timescape Books: Distributed by Simon and Shuster, 1982.

—. *Ubik*. London: Rapp and Whiting, 1970.

—. *Valis*. London: Grafton, 1992.

—. *Vulcan's Hammer*. Boston: Gregg Press, 1979.

—. *We Can Build You.* 1972. New York: Vintage, 1994.

—. & Roger Zelazny. *Deus Irae.* Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1976. Disch, Thomas M. "Toward The Transcendent: An Introduction To Solar Lottery And Other Works." Greenberg And Olander 13-26.

Duchesne-Guillemin, Jacques. *Symbols And Values In Zoroastrianism: Their Survival And Renewal.* New York: Harper & Row, 1966.

Durham, Scott. "From The Death Of The Subject To A Theology Of Late Capitalism." Mullen et al. 188-99.

Easterbrook, Neil. "Dianoia/Paranoia: Dick's Double 'Impostor'" Umland 19-41.

Fitting, Peter. "Philip K. Dick In France." Mullen et al. 131-32.

—. "Reality As Ideological Construct." Mullen et al. 92-110

—. "*Ubik*: The Deconstruction Of Bourgeois SF." Mullen et al. 41-49.

Foshay, Toby Avard. *Wyndham Lewis And The Avant Garde: The Politics Of The Intellect.* Montreal: McGill-Queen's, 1992.

Foucault, Michel. *Madness And Civilisation: A History Of Insanity In The Age Of Reason.* Trans. Richard Howard. 1965. New York: Vintage Books, 1988.

Fourier, Charles. *Design For Utopia: Selected Writings Of Charles Fourier.* Trans. Julia Franklin. New York: Schocken Books, 1971.

Freud, Sigmund. *The Standard Edition Of The Complete Psychological Works Of Sigmund Freud.* (Vol. 19). Trans. James Strachey. London: Hogarth, 1961.

Galbreath, Robert. "Fantastic Literature As Gnosis." *Extrapolation* 29 (1988): 330-337.

Gillespie, Bruce, ed. *Philip K. Dick: Electric Shepherd.* Melbourne: Norstralia Press, 1975.

Golumbia, David. "Resisting 'The World': Philip K. Dick, Cultural Studies, And

Metaphysical Realism." *Science Fiction Studies* 23 (1996): 83-102.

Goodchild, Philip. *Deleuze And Guattari: An Introduction To The Politics Of Desire.* London: Sage, 1996.

Greenberg, Martin Harry and Joseph D. Olander, eds. *Philip K. Dick.* New York: Taplinger, 1983.

Greenland, Colin. "Reviews: *The Transmigration Of Timothy Archer* By Philip K. Dick." *Foundation.* 26 (1982): 83-84.

Hayles, N. Katherine. *How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies In Cybernetics, Literature, And Informatics.* Chicago: University Of Chicago, 1999.

Homer. *The Odyssey.* Trans. E. V. Rieu. New York: Penguin, 1946.

Jakaitis, Jake. "Two Cases Of Conscience: Loyalty And Race In *The Crack In Space* And *Counter Clock World*." Umland 169-95.

Jameson, Fredric. "After Armageddon: Character Systems In *Dr. Bloodmoney.*" Mullen et al. 26-36.

—. *Fables Of Aggression: Wyndham Lewis, The Modernist As Fascist.* Berkeley: University Of California Press, 1979.

Jouanne, Emmanuel. "How "Dickian" Is The New French Science Fiction?" Mullen et al. 232-36.

Lem, Stanislaw. "A Visionary Among The Charlatans." Mullen et al. 49-62.

Lewis, C. S.. *The Four Loves.* New York Harcourt: Brace, 1960.

McHale, Brian. *Constructing Postmodernism.* London: Routledge, 1992.

—. *Postmodernist Fiction.* New York and London: Methuen, 1987.

Mackey, Doublas A.. *Philip K. Dick.* Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988.

Melville, Herman. *Moby Dick*. Toronto: Penguin, 1994.

Milosz, Czeslaw. *The Captive Mind*. Trans. Jane Zielonko. New York: Vintage-Random House, 1953.

Mullen, R. D., et al., eds. *On Philip K. Dick: 40 Articles From Science-Fiction Studies*. Introd. Istvan Csicsery-Ronay Jr. Terre Haute & Greencastle: SF-TH Inc., 1992.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Beyond Good And Evil: Prelude To A Philosophy Of The Future*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. 1966. New York: Vintage, 1989.

—. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Translated and introd. by R. J. Hollingdale. Baltimore: Penguin, 1969.

—. *The Will To Power*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. Ed. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage-Random

Olsen, Lance. "Cyberpunk And The Crisis Of Postmodernity." Slusser and Shippey 142-52.

Orth, Michael. "Reefs On The Right: Fascist Politics in Contemporary American Libertarian Utopias." *Extrapolation* 31 (1990): 293-316.

Pagetti, Carlo. "Dick And Meta-SF." Mullen et al. 18-25.

Palmer, Christopher. "Critique And Fantasy In Two Novels By Philip K. Dick." *Extrapolation* 32 (1991): 222-34

Pierce, Hazel. *Philip K. Dick*. Mercer Island, WA: Starmont House, 1982.

—. "Philip K. Dick's Political Dreams" Greenberg and Olander 105-36

Plato. *Parmenides Theaitetos Sophist Statesman*. Trans. John Warrington. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1961.

Pynchon, Thomas. *The Crying Of Lot 49*. New York: Harper & Row, 1986.

—. *Gravity's Rainbow*. New York: Bantam, 1980.

Rabkin, Eric S. "Irrational Expectations: Or, How Economics And The Post-Industrial World Failed Philip K. Dick." Mullen et al. 178-87.

Robinson, Kim Stanley. *The Novels Of Philip K. Dick.* Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1981.

—. "Whose Failure Of Scholarship." Mullen et al. 125-27.

Rossi, Umberto. "Just A Bunch Of Words: The Image Of The Secluded Family And The Problem Of Logos In P. K. Dick's *Time Out Of Joint*." *Extrapolation* 37 (1996): 195-211.

The Ryrie Study Bible: King James Version. Charles Caldwell Ryrie introd. Chicago: Moody Press, 1978.

Seem, Mark. Introduction. Deleuze and Guattari xv-xxiv.

Shakespeare, William. *Hamlet.* Ed. Edward Hubler. Markham: Penguin, 1987.

Schneider, Daniel J. *Symbolism: The Manichean Vision.* Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967.

Slusser, George. "History, Historicity, Story." Mullen et al. 199-222.

—. "Scholars And Pedants." Mullen et al. 127-29.

Slusser, George and Tom Shippey, eds. *Fiction 2000: Cyberpunk And The Future Of Narrative.* Athens, GA: University Of Georgia Press, 1992.

Strick, Philip. "Philip K. Dick And The Movies." *Foundation* 26 (1982): 15-21.

Suvin, Darko. "The Opus: Artifice As Refuge And World View (Introductory Reflections)" Mullen et al. 2-15.

Thomas, Pascal J. "French SF And The Legacy Of Philip K. Dick." *Foundation* 34 (1985): 22-35.

Umland, Samuel J., ed. *Philip K. Dick: Contemporary Critical Interpretations.* Westport, Con.: Greenwood, 1995.

—. "To Flee From Dionysus: Enthousiasmos From 'Upon The Dull Earth' To *Valis*" Umland 81-99.

Wagner, Jeff. "In The World He Was Writing About: The Life Of Philip K. Dick." *Foundation* 34 (1985): 69-96.

Walters, F. Scott. "The Final Trilogy Of Philip K. Dick." *Extrapolation* 38 (1997): 223-235.

Warrick, Patricia S.. *The Cybernetic Imagination In Science Fiction.* Cambridge: MIT Press, 1980.

—. "The Encounter Of Taoism And Fascism In *The Man In The High Castle.*" Mullen et al. 74-90.

—. "The Labyrinthian Process Of The Artificial: Dick's Androids And Mechanical Constructs." *Extrapolation* 20 (1979): 133-153.

—. *Mind In Motion: The Fiction Of Philip K. Dick.* Carbondale: Southern Illinois U., 1987.

Williams, Paul. *Only Apparently Real: The World Of Philip K. Dick.* New York: Arbor House, 1986.

Wilson, R. McL., ed. and trans. *The Gospel Of Philip.* London: A.R. Mowbray & Co., 1962.

Wingrove, David. "Understanding The Grasshopper: Leitmotifs And The Moral Dilemma In The Novels Of Philip K. Dick" *Foundation* 26 (1982): 21-40.

Wolk, Anthony. "The Swiss Connection: Psychological Systems In The Novels Of Philip K. Dick" Umland 101-26.