THE EFFECT OF CENTRALIZATION ON THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF THE MAINLAND NOVA SCOTIA MI’KMAQ (CASE STUDIES: MILLBROOK-1916 & INDIAN BROOK-1941)

by

Anita Maria Tobin

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Faculty of Arts
Saint Mary’s University
Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada

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Anita Maria Tobin, April 1999

ABSTRACT

In the 1910s the Canadian Federal Government developed a Centralization Policy for the Mi'kmaq of Nova Scotia. By 1919, 55 members of the Halifax County Band had moved to the Millbrook Reserve. The population was listed as 124 by 1931. The political structure of the Mi'kmaq was established at this time and leadership was strong on the Millbrook Reserve under Chief Joseph Julian. The Mi’kmaq were included in the decision making process and their ideas, including procurement of additional resources, were incorporated into the program. Relocation can be viewed as only a minor disruption to the social and economic structure of those involved.

During the Great Depression, and as Canada was preparing for World War Two, the government felt the need to ease the economic burden of providing for the Mi’kmaq. Referring to the economic success of the Millbrook centralization, it was decided in 1941 that the Mi’kmaq would be centralized to the two larger reserves, Indian Brook and Eskasoni. By 1946, 816 people were living on Indian Brook where only 41 people had resided in 1931. The political structure was unorganized and representation was weak and inexperienced. The move was forced on an uninformed people under threat of enfranchisement and loss of government financial support. Without the acquisition of additional resources, the overcrowded conditions had serious consequences on the social and economic stability within the Indian Brook Reserve.
INTRODUCTION

Nova Scotia experienced many social, economic and political transitions over the first four decades of the twentieth century. Much of what was taking place in Nova Scotia at this time was far removed from the activity of the Mi’kmaq people who were preoccupied with their own daily survival and making efforts to improve their quality of life. Many Mi’kmaq still wandered from place to place, unwelcome in the towns and cities, setting up house on the outskirts hoping to somehow take advantage of markets for their wares while fishing and hunting for food in what remained of the forests. Others had resolved themselves to life on the reserves, no easier a living, relying on the government when things were at their worst. Nova Scotia, however, was moving into a new century, a time that would eventually produce a shift in traditional ideologies and, in turn, spell out the province’s place within the young country of Canada.

With respect to Halifax as the gateway to Canada, Thomas Raddall stated that:

The promised markets in Central Canada [after confederation] never materialized. However, a kind of transit freight was pouring inland over the rails from Halifax -- a multitude of European immigrants heading for the prairies. There was something wry about this spectacle to the Haligonians, watching the world go by. In 1913 when the hegira reached its peak, no less than 96,000 immigrants passed through the old Deep Water Terminal and vanished into the west.¹

This says a lot about the economic and social situation in Halifax at this time. Certainly Halifax was well established as a port city by the turn of the century. Much of Nova Scotia’s economy relied on that critical link to the sea. Additionally, the population of Halifax grew from 38,437 in

1891 to 46,619 in 1911.² There were major political implications associated with these factors as well. Ottawa was prepared to sink a lot of money into the building of piers to accommodate the role Halifax was to play in the country’s economic arena and in terms of Canada’s defense. Halifax’s geographical location had set up the port city as an integral part of the country’s military efforts very early in the century.³

The onset of World War One increased the numbers of military personnel in and around the city. With the military presence and the large numbers of immigrants moving through the city, Halifax became a mini-metropolis of sorts in terms of its diverse populace and in the degree of undesirable social activity that generally accompanies a large gathering of bored men and transient people. Public drunkenness and prostitution became common sightings in the streets of Halifax. The temperance movement, which sparked a reform movement that in turn gave women a large degree of political power, would officially make its way to Nova Scotia on Dominion Day, 1916.⁴

Prohibition laws forced the closing of every liquor establishment in the city, not that this would in any way fix the problem of lewd public behavior. Rather it created a new set of problems. Prohibition set the stage for the illegal distribution of homemade alcoholic beverages that were anything but safe to drink. Second, prohibition also pushed many a maritime fisherman into illegal activity as he applied his boating skills towards involvement in a whole new type of industry in the form of rumrunning. Maritime fishermen, stinging from the rapid decline in fish prices and the state of the industry in general, found a means to utilize their vessels for a

²Ibid, p. 246.
⁴Ibid, pp. 259-261.
substantial, albeit illegal, profit. Boatbuilders also benefited from this illegal yet profitable economic venture. Their industry took on a whole new fervor as boatbuilders exercised their craft in an effort to cash in on the quest to quench the thirst of Canadians and those people across the borders in the United States. Rum-running would continue for over fifteen years until President Roosevelt abolished Prohibition in the United States early in the 1930s.

Despite the downturn in the fishery, the overall economy in the Maritimes was booming in the 1910s, in part because of the war. Exports that yielded $19,157,170 in 1915 jumped to an amazing $147,000,000 by 1917. But while this may have brought prosperity to Nova Scotia, it also resulted in one of the most horrific disasters ever to be witnessed in Canada’s history. A French transport ship loaded down with munitions collided with the Norwegian Imo, which was exiting Halifax harbour with a load of coal. It was reported that the blast sent forth a mushroom cloud not unlike that of a nuclear bomb. The blast was heard as far away as Truro, shaking houses

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5Ibid, pp.258-261. See also, Lesley Choyce, Nova Scotia Shaped by the Sea: A Living History, (Canada: Penguin Books, 1996), pp. 225-230. For a discussion of the fishing industry in the Maritimes in the decades of 1910 to 1940, see Richard Apostle and Gene Barrett, Emptying Their Nets, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), Chapter 2. This work stated, “Industrialism came to Nova Scotia’s fishery in the 1880s, but by the 1940s the process was in a state of virtual collapse. Attempts at concentration, capitalist centralization, and the application of new industrial technology to the harvesting and processing of fish were neither widespread nor growth sustaining in this second short-swing cycle. Industrialism failed to mature.” p. 50.

6Choyce, Nova Scotia Shaped by the Sea: A Living History, pp. 227-228.


8Raddall, Halifax: Warden of the North, p. 264.
in Prince Edward Island and in Sydney, Cape Breton Island. Ships and railway cars were flung like toys into the air. Entire buildings were destroyed in the ensuing shock. When it all settled, 6,000 families were without homes, and 25,000 people were on the streets. Although it was impossible to accurately determine the numbers of casualties, it was estimated that from 1,900 to 3,000 people were killed and as many as 9,000 wounded by the blast.9

While the Halifax explosion was a horrible way to end off a decade, the 1920s would not be kind to the Maritimes either. This decade brought many changes to the provinces by the sea. The 1920s are generally known for their opulence. The Roaring Twenties were a time when women’s skirts got shorter and a new sense of personal and social freedom had overtaken the social scene. The same was not felt in the Maritime provinces of Canada. In fact, the Depression was already rearing its ugly head throughout, aided to large degree by federal control of the economy in that region.10 As stated by Raddall with respect to the struggle between Halifax and St. John to gain control of the maritime shipping industry:

In 1936 the Canadian government abolished the local harbour commissions in all national ports and set up a system of local managers under the control of a central board at Ottawa. ... in the general scramble for business by the local harbour commissions there was a cut-throat competition, which resulted in reduced rates, concealed rebates in port charges, and loss all round.11

Federal control of the maritime economy did nothing to promote the regional identity that was critical to the Maritime provinces gaining political control over their own economic resources.

9Choyce, Nova Scotia Shaped by the Sea, pp. 212-223.


Indeed the history of the Maritimes the during early 1900s can be largely defined by the internal division that long had its roots in the Maritimes prior to Confederation and prior to the promotion of John A. Macdonald’s National Policy which, spurred the rise of nationalism all across the country. In the wake of this rise of national identity, the Maritime provinces continued to compete with one another throughout the industrial era. Indeed, that competitive nature was grounded in all aspects of each province’s economic, social, and political systems. The agricultural, fishing, forestry, mining, transportation and manufacturing industries were struggling to gain as much control of markets as possible, often pitting one industrial sector against their counterpart in another district or province. Additionally, sectarian and cultural differences proved to create and strengthen a political system that was firmly based on partisan favors. 12

The Maritime provinces, so caught up in their internal social, economic and political struggles, found themselves with a weak federal government representation that was clearly out of touch with federal issues and how those issues might affect the maritime livelihood. The onset of the 1920s left the Maritime provinces meshed in a rivalry that prevented the growth of a strong regional political system and without a unified regional political and economic interest. The

12 Ernest R. Forbes, The Maritime Rights Movement, 1919-1927, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1979), pp. 1-12. Chapter 1 discusses how the Maritime provinces, before and after confederation, had been divided in their economic, social and political interests. Forbes states, “Physically, the three provinces, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island, form a natural region with well defined boundaries isolated by rugged terrain from the population centers of Central Canada and bearing an affinity to the ocean which all but surrounds it. But the identification of the people with the region as a whole was slow to materialize.” ... “At a national level Confederation promised to meet the political and economic aspirations of those ambitious for unity while preserving the existing colonial divisions in the form of separate provinces.” p. 1. The Maritimes had a long history of preserving their diversity and maintaining control of their interests through their competition with one another.
Maritimes were without a regional identity.\textsuperscript{13}

District representatives were in Ottawa arguing for economic interests within their own areas, not realizing the fact that they were damaging the overall economic strength of the Maritimes as a region. This lack of federal political control was exacerbated by the fact that the Maritimes themselves had failed to recognize the importance of building, and maintaining a strong federal political voice. Maritime people and their politicians saw the need only after the Maritimes were already in serious political and economic trouble in the federal political arena.\textsuperscript{14}

The numbers of federal political representatives for the Maritime provinces were far lower than that of the central and western provinces. The overall population of the Maritimes was less than twelve percent of Canada's entire population, which meant fewer politicians on the federal level.\textsuperscript{15} Add to this factor the Maritimes' failure to develop their own sense of regional identity and you have a federal representation lacking in both numbers and unity and therefore having an inability to affect any positive changes in the Maritimes via the federal government.

It would soon become clear that the Maritime provinces needed to come together as a region and together combat the growing control that the federal government was gaining over Maritime interests. This common goal heralded in eight years of political and legal battles with the federal government known as the Maritime Rights Movement. It ended in relative failure, fizzling out with the unspoken realization that what was to remain was a sense of regionalism that would

\textsuperscript{13}\textit{Ibid}, pp. 1-12.

\textsuperscript{14}\textit{Ibid}, p. 12.

continue to be defined by the Maritimes' lack of political clout and dependence on the federal government.\textsuperscript{16}

Over the course of those eight years a devastating depression took hold that would span more than a decade. While the 1930s are generally known as the Depression years, the Maritimes were gripped by economic hardship beginning early in the 1920s. Maritime economic development had failed to keep pace with that of the rest of Canada. With the quality of life already far behind that of Canadian standards, the Maritimes were in for the most difficult decade of their existence as part of the Dominion of Canada. Federal relief payments were slow in coming, and when they did the per capita percentages were far less than the amounts forwarded to the central and western provinces. Forbes stated that the Maritimes received only 3.3 percent of the total relief payment made to the entire country between 1930 to 1939. Individuals received less than one half that of those in other provinces.\textsuperscript{17}

People were, however, on the move during these most desperate of times. The Maritime Co-operative Movement was started in the late 1920s. As one leader of the movement stated:

\begin{quote}
Co-operation is the only means in our day through which the masses of people can again have a say in the economic processes.\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

The co-operatives eased the burden of many Nova Scotians over the course of the Great Depression.


\textsuperscript{17}Forbes, "Cutting the Pie into Smaller Pieces: Matching Grants and Relief in the Maritime Provinces during the 1930s," \textit{Acadiensis}, vol. XVII(1), p. 35.

\textsuperscript{18}Quoted in Choyce, \textit{Nova Scotia Shaped by the Sea}, p. 241.
Unions too became more commonplace over the 1930s. The coal miners had fought a long fight in the early 1900s, battling illegal tactics on the part of employers, sanctioned by the drastic measures taken against them by their own governments. The goal of the coal miners of Cape Breton in 1909 was to bring in the more powerful United Mine Workers of America to replace the Provincial Workman’s Association in order to improve the working conditions and safety of the mines. While the coal miners lost the battle in that bitter strike of 1909, they helped pave the way for the creation of unions in many industries throughout the Maritimes, including the teaching and fishing industries.

The Great Depression was followed by World War Two in the 1940s. These events were front and center in determining social, economic and political activity the world over. The start of World War Two quickly turned the maritime economy from one of destitution to one of prosperity. The maritime provinces, however, would not be afforded the opportunity to rebuild a sustainable economic base over the course of the 1940s. The strength of the maritime economy was secondary in the minds of federal politicians as they focused their attention on developing industry in Central Canada, thereby depriving the Maritimes of the chance to re-establish self-sufficiency. The handling of wartime industry is amply chronicled in Ernest Forbes’ “Consolidating Disparity”.

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In the hearts and minds of the Maritime people the fear of future economic difficulty returning to the Maritime provinces after the war was over remained. Their fears were not unfounded. Choyce stated:

Once again war was good news of sorts for Nova Scotians when it was declared in September of 1939. Halifax would be open for business in a big way and spin-offs would be felt in small towns around the province. The thirties was a time of great despair for a large chunk of the North American population, but Nova Scotians were painfully aware that, for them, things had been even worse. Confederation and the loss of traditional sea links and self-reliant avenues of living had left all of Nova Scotia in a highly vulnerable position. None of the efforts of the federal government had been able to heal the wounds of the loss. As the province climbed up out of the economic abyss, a dispassionate observer might well predict that the boom cycle of war would be only temporary. After that would anything be different? Was there any way back to a future that re-established the prosperity that had come with the sailing ships and global sea trade? 21

The answers to those questions have become acutely obvious. The Maritime provinces have not, to date, found the economic security that they had enjoyed prior to confederation. There remains no easy answer to the dilemma. The eastern provinces continue to rely heavily on federal subsidies to aid the crippled Maritime economy.

As marginalized as the Maritime provinces remain with respect to the rest of Canada, certain groups within the borders of these provinces were struggling with their own difficulties. As difficult as the first quarter of this century was for the people of the Maritimes, there were people who were far more destitute than the majority population. The Mi’kmaq were one such group. Prohibition laws meant nothing to the Mi’kmaq people. Nor did the gala affairs that accompanied


21 Choyce, Nova Scotia Shaped by the Sea, p. 243.
the return of those who had fought on behalf of the Commonwealth during the South African War have any impact on the everyday life of the Mi’kmaq.22 Neither was the extensive building of new quarters for the military, complete with a new gymnasium, nor the opening of the much celebrated golf course by the Halifax Golf Club of much interest to the Mi’kmaq people. The fact that women were flexing their political muscles with the success of the Halifax and Dartmouth Council of Women in prompting the passage of a law against spitting chewing tobacco in public places meant absolutely nothing to the Mi’kmaq.23 Women’s suffrage attained in Nova Scotia in 1918 was of no consequence to the Mi’kmaq.24 In fact, of the many indicative events taking place in Nova Scotia after the turn of the century, few, if any had anything to do with the Mi’kmaq people. Their history was very different from that which was experienced by the average maritimer.

From the initial French settlement of the Maritimes to the transfer of control of the area to the British, the Mi’kmaq became involved with, and were soon to be governed by foreign powers. The Mi’kmaq have remained for centuries bound by kinship, culture, and traditional, albeit weakened, governing systems. Their history has survived through a combination of such things as the development of an understanding of Mi’kmaq artifacts, the Mi’kmaq’s rich oral history, their traditional language, and post-European written accounts of people and events.25 The Mi’kmaq today, and perhaps Natives in general, are not so naive as to believe that a return to a traditional

22Ibid, p. 207.

23Raddall, Halifax: Warden Of The North, pp. 240-244.

24Reid, Six Crucial Decades, p. 182.

25Ruth Holmes Whitehead, The Old Man Told Us, (Halifax: Nimbus Publishing Ltd., 1991). This work is a fine collection of historical accounts of people and events as well as Mi’kmaq stories which depict the richness of the culture’s oral tradition.
social and economic society remains possible. Rather, the goal is to reaffirm their history and combine the traditional with the modern, which includes the necessity of working with the Canadian governments and maintaining the principles behind a market economy, in an effort to once again become economically stable.\textsuperscript{26}

While the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia have managed to maintain certain cultural traditions as symbols of their Native identity, their lives have indeed undergone extremely dramatic changes since their first contact with Europeans. The breaking down of traditional Mi’kmaq economic, social and political structures happened over the course of more than two centuries. The British claimed control of what is now Maritime Canada via the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. They proceeded to settle the area, bringing in immigrants from throughout Europe for settlement, and to aid in the development of a capitalist economy based on the abundant natural resources. Inevitably, the Mi’kmaq economic, social and political lives would experience great upheaval as thousands of settlers made their way to Canada, taking over the vast majority of Mi’kmaq territory. Since the Mi’kmaq were traditionally nomadic people\textsuperscript{27}, dispossession of their land base resulted in the loss of a traditional economy, leaving the them with no means by which to remain self-supporting.

Under British rule, Mi’kmaq social traditions no longer seemed applicable to survival


within the new society. With the coming of European powers came economic, political and social influences that served to fracture traditional Mi’kmaq value systems, modes of production and political and social structures. Indeed European law replaced natural law. The entire Mi’kmaq way of life was violated, leading to the conversion of the Mi’kmaq to Catholicism, depopulation from disease and war, disempowerment of Mi’kmaq leaders, the dispossession of traditional territory that was so greatly relied on for sustenance, the introduction of alcohol, and the eventual disintegration of the traditional family unit. All of this lent itself to the perpetuation of a cycle of poverty that led to reliance on welfare programs, family violence, and the destruction of Mi’kmaq identity so necessary to the health and well-being of future generations.\(^{28}\) Expansion and progress were the catchwords of the era and Indigenous peoples were pushed to the periphery and finally corralled on reserves.

The Mi’kmaq became the most socio/economically disadvantaged strata in the country. The numbers of Mi’kmaq who rely on social welfare programs continue to far exceed those of non-Native communities.\(^ {29}\) Facing racial discrimination in their efforts to secure wage labour, the Mi’kmaq were forced onto the welfare rolls.\(^ {30}\) The power of Aboriginal governments was dictated by the Indian Act, leaving very little in the way of decision-making to Band governments. Any and all decisions made by Band Councils had to be first cleared through the Department of Indian


\(^{29}\)Wien, Rebuilding the Economic Base of Indian Communities, Chapter 4.

\(^{30}\)Holmes Whitehead, The Old Man Told Us, pp. 239-241. This petition was sent to political officials in Nova Scotia from a group of ten Mi’kmaq officials and band members in 1949 for the purpose of describing the poor economic and social state of the Mi’kmaq existence and requesting assistance from the government.
Social and political deterioration lead to disorganization within Mi'kmaq communities. Their political authority diminished, their lives were totally subject to legislation and decisions made by Indian Affairs officials.

Exploitation of the natural resources of traditional Mi'kmaq territory was replaced by the European system of individual ownership of property, thus extinguishing the nomadic lifestyle of the Mi'kmaq. Various legislative decisions, starting in 1857 with the passing of the Act to Encourage the Gradual Civilization of the Indian Tribes, to the Indian Act of 1876, resulted in the breakdown of other Aboriginal traditional cultural structures as well. Seeking to absorb the Aboriginal populations of Canada into mainstream society, the Department of Indian Affairs enforced assimilationist policies incorporated into the Indian Act. Many gave up their Aboriginal status under pressure from the Canadian Government. Still others were forced to abide by Indian Affairs policies to their detriment under threat of losing their Aboriginal status and government support, as in the case of centralization in 1941.31

The Canadian Constitution of 1867 stated:

... the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next herein-after enumerated: ... 24. Indians, and Lands reserved for

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31Kathleen Jamieson, Indian Women and the Law in Canada: Citizens Minus, (Advisory Council on the Status of Women: Indian Rights for Indian Women, Minister of Supply and Services, 1978), p. 50. Deputy Minister Duncan C. Scott of the Unionist Party is quoted as stating in 1920, “Our object is to continue until there is not a single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed into the body politic, and there is no Indian question and no Indian department. That is the whole object of this Bill.” The Bill to which he referred was an amendment to the Indian Act in 1920 that was geared towards stepping up the process of assimilation that had formed the backbone of the Indian Act from the start.
the Indians.32

While this may have been the first official recognition of Aboriginal special status in Canada as a country, official recognition of Aboriginal rights goes back more than three centuries. Pepin and Robarts stated in their Task Force on Canadian Unity in 1979, with reference to the "complexity of the issues in native policy," that:

We must first recall that native people as a people have enjoyed a special legal status from the time of Confederation, and, indeed, since well before Confederation.33

While "enjoyed" may be the wrong word to use, and certainly somewhat misrepresentative of Aboriginal peoples' experiences, the fact remains that many documents confer special legal status to First Nations Canadians. The British entered into a treaty with the Abenaki in 1693, which ultimately began a series of treaties with the Eastern Indians, leading to treaty agreements between the British and the Mi’kmaq.34 The Mi’kmaq have held tightly to their special status and to the articles contained in the subsequent Treaty of 1752, knowing full well that their very existence relied on government responsibility as outlined in those documents. Unfortunately, officials most often neglected to include Mi’kmaq opinion before major policies were enforced, much to the detriment of the economic and social stability within their communities.

One such policy was the centralization of the Mi’kmaq to several key reserves across the


34 W.E. Daugherty, Maritime Indian Treaties in Historical Perspective, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, January, 1983, pp. 68-69.
province. This policy was first initiated about 1916, with the Millbrook Reserve cited as the most logical place for the majority to reside. The project waned very early in the 1920s, only to gain momentum again in 1941 with the intention to relocate the Mi’kmaq to Indian Brook on mainland Nova Scotia, and to Eskasoni on Cape Breton Island. This work will recognize the centralization effort on Millbrook beginning about 1916, and the centralization of 1941, as two phases of the same policy as talk of centralization continued throughout most of the first half of the twentieth century. Millbrook came to be recognized as an example of the potential success that could be realized through centralization, and many Indian Affairs officials used that rationale in order to spark the second phase in 1941.

The Mi’kmaq were vulnerable to the many changes imposed over the decades and had very little opportunity to achieve economic stability. Over the first two decades of the 1900s, the Mi’kmaq were managing to survive by taking part in a variety of economic activities, each offering some support to the family economy. In order to draw comparisons between the quality of life in pre- and post-centralization Mi’kmaq communities, a brief profile of the Mi’kmaq mode of production over the 1910s and 1920s is provided. This will aid in developing some sense of what was taking place on the Indian Brook Reserve as centralization got under way in 1941.

Prior to centralization Wilson Wallis spent time on Indian Brook in 1911 and 1912. He and Ruth Wallis returned to conduct further studies again in 1950. They reported that there were 105 persons living on the reserve in 1937. Life on the reserve before centralization was described as follows:

Micmac in the valley at the old Indian Brook reserve, four miles from town, have been acquainted with large cities most of their lives; for the poor economic possibilities have forced them into casual itinerant labour
or the home manufacture and roadside or door-to-door vending of so-called “Indian wares”. ... In 1912 when one of us, with horse and buggy, drove over the four-mile road from the town of Shubenacadie to the reserve then known as Indian Brook, he found a group of 76, of whom 32 were school age children. A school, closed for some years from lack of attendance was reopened last year, but only nine of the children were registered. By 1916 the population had increased to 243, but interest in education remained low; school enrolment 17, average attendance 7. In 1930 the school was again closed. Population had decreased to 105 in 1937.\footnote{Wilson D. Wallis and Ruth Sawtell Wallis, “Culture Loss and Culture Change among the Micmac of the Canadian Maritime Provinces, 1920-1950,” in Harold Franklin McGee, The Native Peoples of Atlantic Canada: A History of Ethnic Interaction, (Toronto, Canada: McClelland and Steward Limited, 1974), pp. 127-128.}

Wilson Wallis also noted that the houses on the Indian Brook Reserve were “old shacks” and there were no outhouses. The Mi’kmaq were viewed as having an “apathetic dependence” on Indian Affairs, not caring how their homes looked, making no effort to improve the condition of their dwellings that they might adequately protect themselves from the elements. However, Wallis also stated that until 1941 these people were responsible for building their homes and that the onus was upon the owners to maintain their homes or not.\footnote{Ibid, pp. 129-130.} It was also up to the individual to furnish the interior of the home, including the purchase of a stove, a policy that did not change with the introduction of centralization in 1941.\footnote{Ibid, p. 131.} Given their poor economic situation, it would have been difficult for these people to build and maintain repairs on their homes that would meet the standards of the white communities. Monies earned would go towards the support of their families throughout the year rather than on repairs or furnishings.

The Mi’kmaq economy was very different in pre-centralization Mi’kmaq life. Borrowing
statistics from González’ work, Wien stated that the Mi’kmaq were involved in agriculture beginning in the 1800s. He stated that as many as 3,300 acres were being cultivated up to 1900. The Mi’kmaq owned livestock and farming tools and were successful in their agricultural pursuits from 1900 to 1920. Many Mi’kmaq helped in the planting and harvesting as well as other tasks on non-Indian owned farming ventures for wages as well. Many Mi’kmaq made seasonal trips to Western Canada and Maine to help harvest crops and for berry picking. Involvement in the agricultural industry on a subsistence level helped the Mi’kmaq supplement their diet, while the wages earned harvesting outside the reserve provided much needed cash for other foodstuffs and household necessities.

Wien stated that some Mi’kmaq were also involved in the manufacturing industry, processing fruits and vegetables and working in lumber mills. Many Mi’kmaq traveled to secure employment in the manufacturing industry, employment that could not be found near their homes. Some Mi’kmaq were also employed in cooperage or making axe and pick handles, snowshoes, hockey sticks, oars, buckets, and the more culturally artistic quill work and bead work. Both González and Wien note that wage labour was an important source of income to the Mi’kmaq in the early 1900s. While reliance on traditional hunting and fishing waned over this period in favor of a cash-paying job, they were still practiced as a supplement to the monetary income. The time element would have been a likely factor in the lack of significance of hunting and fishing as the

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38Wien, Rebuilding the Economic Base of Indian Communities, pp. 20-22.


40Ibid, pp. 26-27. For an extensive discussion on the Mi’kmaq economy see also Gonzalez, Changing Economic Roles for Micmac Men and Women.
work schedule would not have allowed time to do both on a full-time basis.

The Wallis’ interpretation of the economic picture on the Indian Brook Reserve echoes much of Wien’s and Gonzallez’ general description of the Mi’kmaq economy as a whole. While the Mi’kmaq existence was below the standard of mainstream society, it is clear that the Mi’kmaq busied themselves hunting, fishing and farming and working for wages in order to help support their families. The fact that attendance at the Indian Brook school was low could be attributed to the lack of culturally relevant factors within the curriculum and more importantly to the fact that, given the Mi’kmaq sources of income, children would be of more value to the family helping out at home rather than sitting in a classroom. The fall harvest could take children into the field either on the reserve or in Western Canada or Maine. As wage labour was seasonal, the more cash that could be generated in the short few weeks of the harvest, the better off the family would be over the long winter.

Wien stated that the economic situation that existed for the Mi’kmaq in the early 1900s could not be sustained as the reality of the Great Depression set in. The difficult times ahead for the people of the Maritimes would be felt hard by the Mi’kmaq as they were the last in line for any type of wage labour. Wien stated that up to this point the Mi’kmaq were not provided indiscriminatory welfare payments, Indian Affairs reserving relief payments for those who could prove an inability to work. The numbers show, however, a substantial increase in relief payments to the Mi’kmaq over the 1920s and particularly over the 1930s. Wien went on to discuss the

41Ibid, pp. 30-31.
42Ibid, p. 28.
43Ibid, p. 29.
difficulty of developing any clear picture of the employment situation of the Mi'kmaq beginning in the 1940s due to a lack of documentation. He did say that the unemployment rate was indeed high and the costs of welfare had soared. This was the leading factor that prompted centralization in 1941.

The Canadian government has made many mistakes in administering to the needs of Aboriginal peoples. The most fundamental of those mistakes was in their resistance towards fully recognizing Aboriginal peoples' special status within the Canadian political, legal and social structure, and thus their neglect in including Aboriginal voice in decisions that directly affected the success of Indigenous communities. Political instability and changes in Mi'kmaq society had served to weaken the very fabric of many Aboriginal communities. These factors are at the crux of the arguments developed in this work.

Chapter I will discuss both phases of the centralization policy, and the effect of the policy on the lives of two Mi'kmaq communities: Millbrook of phase one and Indian Brook of phase two. The effect of community stability, the amount of Mi'kmaq community involvement and the extent to which Mi'kmaq leaders exercised their political authority under the Indian Act will be highlighted as some of the most determining factors in the long term success of a centralized community.

Chapter II will be a comparative analysis of the centralization of Millbrook and that of Indian Brook. This is designed as an attempt to determine the effect of centralization on the social and political structures of Mi'kmaq communities. This will be done by drawing comparisons

\[\text{Ibid, p. 30.}\]
between the processes involved in both phases one and two of the centralization policy in order to develop an understanding of the reasons why relative successes and failures occurred.

Chapter III will discuss the changes in the social and political structures that were a result of the centralization policy. This discussion will look at both phases of the policy in an effort to determine how centralization affected both the Millbrook Reserve in 1916 and that of Indian Brook in 1941.
CHAPTER I
CENTRALIZATION POLICY IN NOVA SCOTIA

This thesis is primarily concerned with the effect of centralization on the social and political structures within Mi’kmaq communities. This chapter will provide details of the movements of the Mi’kmaq through both phases of the centralization project. This chapter will also detail the interaction between Mi’kmaq leaders and Indian Affairs officials for the same periods. By drawing on the details surrounding the two phases of the centralization policy - Millbrook in 1916 and Indian Brook in 1941 - the shift in Indian Affairs attitudes and priorities over the decades will become apparent.

Although briefly touching on Mi’kmaq history leading up to the development of the centralization policy in Nova Scotia, this chapter will not specifically detail the events. Lisa Patterson’s thesis is an excellent chronological account of the rationale behind the centralization policy, and the who’s who that saw centralization brought to fruition. More important to the development of this thesis is more specific detail on the social and political situations of the Mi’kmaq themselves. Details of the movements of groups and individuals, as well as retrospective comments from some of those Mi’kmaq individuals, will aid in an analytical discussion of this work.

Centralization was introduced in Nova Scotia by Indian Affairs in 1916 both as a strategy to encourage those Mi’kmaq residing outside official reserves, some on privately owned property, to relocate, and in an effort to cut administrative costs and relief payments. The second phase in

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45Lisa Lynne Patterson, Indian Affairs and the Nova Scotia Centralization Policy, (Halifax: Dalhousie University, 1985).
1941 was also in answer to the high unemployment rate of the Mi’kmak, exacerbated by the Great Depression, and the desire of Indian Affairs to eliminate their financial responsibility to the Mi’kmak. The poor economic condition of the Mi’kmak had been an ongoing “problem” for the government as far back as the 18th century. The desire of Indian Affairs to eliminate their responsibility in providing financial assistance to these people was uppermost in the creation of Indian Affairs policies. The financial situation of the Mi’kmak was so very poor because there was no place for the Mi’kmak in the emerging capitalist economy.

Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, the Mi’kmak became increasingly more concerned for their future as settlers from the British Isles and Germany, a large influx of Loyalists after the American Revolution, and scores of Scottish Highlanders, Irish and Germans made their way to Nova Scotia. Loss of the traditional Mi’kmak territory served to fracture the economic base of these nomadic people. The settlers, on the other hand, were very fearful that their presence might spark violent attacks from the Mi’kmak.\(^{46}\) Mi’kmak requests for land grants were answered by giving the applicants free rein to hunt and fish in certain areas, a curious concession since the Mi’kmak had already “secured” those rights via treaties.\(^{47}\) Though laws were made prohibiting settlers from moving in on Mi’kmak territory, they were rarely enforced, therefore having no affect on stopping settlers from taking over reserved land.

Recognizing what was happening in the early 1800s, Indian Affairs Commissioner Joseph Howe decided to set aside up to 1000 acres of land in each county reserved for the Mi’kmak, to a total of approximately 22,050 by 1842. Unfortunately, little practical thought was given to the

\(^{46}\)Gonzalez, Changing Economic Roles for Micmac Men and Women, pp. 49-50.

\(^{47}\)Ibid, p. 50.
location of reserved sites. Many were situated in areas far removed from the ocean thus preventing the Mi’kmaq from fishing. More were removed from the larger population, thus making it difficult for the Mi’kmaq to sell their homemade wares to the white communities. No land was reserved in the counties of Yarmouth, Hants, Colchester, Pictou or Guysborough. Neither was land reserved around Halifax and Dartmouth. As a result, many Mi’kmaq settled on private property around these prime fishing areas, much to the discontent of both owners and other settlers in the surrounding communities.

Moreover, little was done to protect the reserved sites from being taken over by settlers. Boundaries around reserved land were not clearly marked and settlers continued to encroach on Mi’kmaq property. As the reserved land provided neither access to waterways nor adequate places to hunt, loss of reserved land was also due in part to the fact that the Mi’kmaq, not used to being corralled in small areas and in need of food and fire wood, continued to practice their nomadic traditions. By the time they returned from a trip, many found their land had been confiscated by settlers.49

In an effort to settle the Mi’kmaq and encourage them towards self-sufficiency, the government arbitrarily decided that farming was to become the dominant occupation for the Mi’kmaq. Unfortunately, most of the reserved land was of very poor quality, unfit for any type of agricultural pursuit, except perhaps on a very small scale for private consumption. Moreover, officials were generally in no hurry to supply the seed and necessary tools and very often the


49Ibid.
planting season had long gone before anything was forthcoming. The Mi'kmaq, facing racial discrimination in their pursuit of wage labour, found that they could neither return to their traditional mode of production nor take advantage of alternative avenues in their efforts at regaining self-sufficiency. As a result, their dependence on government increased.

Government officials were clearly recognizing the difficulty in administering Mi'kmaq affairs due to the numbers of small groups that were spread across the province. They felt a need for the development of a specific policy of administration, but could not seem to come up with a logical, workable answer that would satisfy Indian Affairs while being acceptable to the Mi'kmaq people. After the start of World War One, funds were getting scarce and the Department was once again determining that too much money was being spent on administration of Indian Affairs. Patterson stated that higher officials in government recognized that as much money was being spent on the salaries of the nineteen part-time agents and one full-time Indian agent in Nova Scotia as was being spent on Mi'kmaq relief. This was thought an extremely inefficient and uneconomical way to spend departmental funds. Two possible solutions emerged from those talks. The first was to dismiss all the part-time agents and hire two full-time agents to administer to a given number of counties across the province. The second solution was to centralize the Mi'kmaq on to several key reserves.

The first money-saving strategy, although approved in 1919, would not be initiated until the spring of 1932, likely in answer to the economic crisis of the Great Depression. In March, 

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50 Wien, Rebuilding the Economic Base of Indian Communities, pp. 16-17.

51 Patterson, Indian Affairs and the Nova Scotia Centralization Policy. Chapter 1 discussed Indian Affairs activity prior to and after World War One.
after much discussion within the Department of Indian Affairs, all Indian agents in Nova Scotia were dismissed. On March 18th, two full-time agents were hired. Agent Maxner would be responsible for eleven counties, while Agent McNeil would administer Mi’kmaq affairs in the remaining seven counties. It took only a couple of months before the mistake of downsizing was realized. This event proved to be a mere blip in the screen of Indian Affairs policy. By July 1st, all agents were again in place throughout Nova Scotia.52

Discussions around centralization continued from the beginning of World War One. These led to the start of the first phase of the centralization policy. Patterson stated that the Mi’kmaq were becoming more settled by this time, although many were squatters who had settled on private property. Many families owned subsistence gardens and livestock. She stated that the Halifax explosion of 1917 began the first move towards centralization of the Millbrook Reserve as Mi’kmaq survivors made their way to the Truro area. Other Mi’kmaq, she maintained, were encouraged to leave their shacks situated around Halifax and Dartmouth and move to the Indian Brook Reserve. As both reserves were in close proximity, this would satisfy the desire of Indian Affairs to relocate the Mi’kmaq to the same area, if not on the same reserve. Those Mi’kmaq living around Halifax and Dartmouth refused to move to Indian Brook and the local Indian agent did not enforce the wishes of Indian Affairs.53 These factors were indeed related to the start of the centralization project. The initial spark of centralization to Millbrook, however, was ignited in

52PANS, RG 10, vol. 3220, file 536, 764-1, Red Series. Maxner was assigned Shelburne, Yarmouth, Digby, Annapolis, Queens, Lunenburg, Kings, Hants, Halifax, Colchester and Cumberland. McNeil got Guysboro, Pictou, Antigonish, Richmond, Inverness, Victoria and Cape Breton. This file contains official Indian Affairs letters which supply much of the detail surrounding the decision to oust all agents in favor of two.

53Patterson, Indian Affairs and the Nova Scotia Centralization Policy, Chapter 2.
1916, prior to the Halifax explosion, as squatters belonging to the Halifax County Band of Mi’kmaq residing in Tufts Cove and Elmsdale were being pressured to vacate that which had been deemed private property.  

The fate of these communities were under discussion as early as 1911 when Indian Superintendent A. J. Boyd wrote the Department of Indian Affairs stating that those people living at Elmsdale had “stood the test of being a permanent camping ground.” He recommended that the property be officially named the “Elmsdale Indian Reservation.” It was not to be. In July 1916, under pressure to relocate that group of Mi’kmaq, Boyd recommended the purchase of Sand Point situated east of Grand Lake, as had been previously petitioned by Chief Louis Paul and the Halifax County Band. This, Boyd maintained, would accommodate the Mi’kmaq from Tufts Cove, Sand Point, Windsor Junction and Elmsdale who were currently residing on private property. Boyd contended that the area at Sand Point, consisting of 350 acres, could be purchased for $1200.00 and was suitable for habitation. The area, he maintained, was “free from stones, and easily cultivated.” Moreover, he stated:

It is pretty well covered with a new growth of wood, some of which would be suitable for the manufacture of Indian wares. It is on the line of the I.C.R. [Railway] in the immediate vicinity of “King’s Platform” about 12 miles from Windsor Junction and far enough from any settlement of white people to leave no room for objection on the ground of proximity. A public road runs through it from


55Ibid. August 1st, 1911.

56Ibid.

“King’s Platform” westerly. I certainly regard it as an ideal place for an Indian settlement.\textsuperscript{58}

Notably, Boyd insisted that, before a final decision was made to purchase property, a meeting must be arranged with those Mi’kmaq involved so that he might confirm their interest in relocating to that area. While a meeting was supposedly set up with the owners of that piece of property, no further action appears to have been taken towards acquiring the land for an official reserve.\textsuperscript{59}

A second petition, dated March 20, 1917, still prior to the Halifax explosion in December of that year, was forwarded to J. D. McLean, the Deputy and Secretary of the Department of Indian Affairs, from a number of members of the Halifax County Band who were residing at Tufts Cove, Elmsdale and Enfield. They stated their intention to move to the Spring Brook Reservation in Shubenacadie, and were requesting that monies derived from the sale of timber from the Ship Harbour Reserve be allotted for the building of a house at Spring Brook for each family. Martin Sack of Elmsdale, future Councillor of the Shubenacadie Band, was one of the signatories (See Appendix III, Table 3.4).

Boyd, stating that he had not had an opportunity to talk with those Mi’kmaq involved, and while recognizing that there was “good soil and spare land at Spring Brook,” recommended against the move at that time. He reasoned that, in addition to the inevitable stress caused by such a move, there was an “active demand for unskilled labour with remunerative wages at Dartmouth,” situated near Tuft’s Cove, a positive factor that would be eliminated should these people move to

\textsuperscript{58}\textit{Ibid}, July 21\textsuperscript{st}, 1916.

\textsuperscript{59}\textit{Ibid}, Letter from Boyd to Ottawa, November 27\textsuperscript{th}, 1916.
By the spring of 1918, the pressure was on Ottawa to find a place for those Mi’kmaq squatting on the property near Grand Lake owned by C. Musgrave. McLean ordered Boyd to do a survey of the numbers of people living there, and to determine the extent of their stay, what timber had been cut, any improvements they had made, and what compensation, if any, these Mi’kmaq should have to pay to Musgrave. A memorandum supplying information about the Halifax County Band was included in that file. It stated that there were 235 Mi’kmaq in Halifax County at that time. It further reported that 86 Mi’kmaq were not living on either of the 7 reserves in Halifax County. Instead, they had set up residence at Bedford, Dartmouth, Windsor Junction, Enfield, King’s Siding, Elmsdale and Wellington, some of which was private property. The occupied reserves were those of Grand Lake, 1000 acres, and the recently purchased 77 acres at Sheet Harbour. The unoccupied reserves were Sambro (300 acres), Ingram River (325 acres), Beaver Lake (100 acres), Ship Harbour (500 acres), and Minister Lake, known as Cow Bay, (43.75 acres). An additional 18 Mi’kmaq people, originally from Tuft’s Cove, had moved to a “tenement house,” built by the Department after the Halifax explosion. Finally, this memo reiterated the necessity of having the Mi’kmaq squatters on Musgrave’s property removed by June 1st, only three months from the time of the report.

Boyd answered that eight families had been residing on the Musgrave property for approximately two and a half years. They had made no “improvements” and had used some of the

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61 PAC, RG 10, vol. 3160, file 363-417-1, March 5th, 1918.

62 Ibid, March 28th, 1918.
trees for fuel and for the making of axe, pick and hammer handles, and for the construction of baskets. Compensation was recommended for Musgrave at approximately $200.00.\footnote{Ibid, April 20\textsuperscript{th}, 1918.}

Some delay in moving these people by the intended date of June 1\textsuperscript{st}, 1918, had obviously occurred. Deputy Superintendent General Duncan C. Scott sent a query to Indian Agent Daniel Chisholm of Nova Scotia, wondering if the fact that those people currently squatting on Musgrave's property were to be moved to Truro on August 26\textsuperscript{th}, as he had been previously informed.\footnote{Ibid, August 26\textsuperscript{th}, 1918.} Scott had obviously been misinformed as Chisholm answered, in September, that those people had been given permission by the owner of a piece of land at Sandy Cove, A. P. King, to occupy that land in return for cutting firewood for him.\footnote{Ibid, September, 30\textsuperscript{th}, 1918.}

A number of Mi'kmaq from the Halifax County Band were accepted to the Indian Brook Reserve in January 1919. Unfortunately, neither the names of those individuals nor the number of people from that band were included in this affidavit. According to H. J. Bury, Timber Inspector, the people of the Indian Brook Reserve had subsequently offered to also accept all those Mi'kmaq from the Halifax County Band who were continuing to live on private property. Those squatters at Windsor Junction had also expressed an interest in moving to Indian Brook if the Council and the Department of Indian Affairs would give its approval. Bury, while recognizing the practicality of Boyd's policy of not forcing the Mi'kmaq to move to any location against their will, did not agree with Boyd's past recommendations to purchase additional properties with so much reserved land already unoccupied. He did, however, recommend that the Halifax County Band be given

\footnote{Ibid, April 20\textsuperscript{th}, 1918.}

\footnote{Ibid, August 26\textsuperscript{th}, 1918.}

\footnote{Ibid, September, 30\textsuperscript{th}, 1918.}
permission to move to Indian Brook as they had expressed their preference to do so. He went on to recommend that all Mi’kmaq living on privately owned land on mainland Nova Scotia be “encouraged to settle” on the Indian Brook reserve, which consisted of some 1790 acres, parts of which, according to him, were suitable for agriculture.  

In a subsequent letter, Bury made an argument that all the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia were of one band and, therefore, any funds in trust for different groups should be placed in one account for the use of any member or members of the “Mi’kmaq Band of Nova Scotia.” A staunch supporter of centralization of the Mi’kmaq, Bury was recommending that all unoccupied lands be sold and the money used for the benefit of any Mi’kmaq person or group needing assistance to relocate. Then, despite his recommendation to avoid making any further purchases of property, Bury recommended that an additional 100 acres of land be purchased from Henry Creelman, for $2500.00, to accommodate those members of the Halifax County Band who had been recently accepted to the Millbrook Reserve by Chief Joseph Julian and the Colchester Band Council. In Bury’s view, this would be a good purchase as 60 of the 100 acres, adjacent to the Millbrook Reserve, were already cleared and cultivated. Bury recommended that the reserved land at Ingram River, Sambro and Ship Harbour be sold in order to acquire funds to help in settling the Halifax County Band members into their new homes. Bury recognized the necessity of acquiring the

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67Ibid, May 1st, 1919. See also in this file, a document titled “The Indian situation in the Province of Nova Scotia as it exists at the present time.” In this, Bury gives an account of the Mi’kmaq social and economic situation in Nova Scotia, concluding with a firm recommendation to centralize the Mi’kmaq.

consent of the Halifax County Band before any action could be made on his suggestions. Consent was given by the Band for the expenditure of up to $5000.00 for land and for the construction of housing and such on the Millbrook Reserve some two weeks later, on June 18, 1919.

Those Mi’kmaq of Elmsdale, including Martin Sack, who had made a petition to move to Spring Brook on March 20, 1917, were obviously still residing on the private property at Elmsdale in 1919. It was obvious too that they still harboured the hope that they could persuade the Department of Indian Affairs to do whatever it could to secure the Elmsdale parcel of land as officially reserved for their use and settlement. Martin Sack and Jerry Lonecloud forwarded a request to the Department of Indian Affairs for an investigation into the sale to someone else of a large portion of the land on which they had settled. They asked Indian Affairs to determine whether the land was indeed reserved for their use, or whether they had squatters’ rights to the property. An answer came back in August stating that the land had never been officially reserved for the Mi’kmaq. Rather the words “Indian Reserve” were placed on a map drawn up a century earlier in 1819 because the survey team assumed it was a reserve due to the fact that a Mi’kmaq settlement was there at the time. No mention was made of whether or not they could claim squatters’ rights to the property.

Not wishing to give up on the matter, the Mi’kmaq at Elmsdale sent another petition on June 21st, 1919, this time to Bury, asking that they be given permission to purchase the land at

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70Ibid, June 18th, 1919.

Elmsdale on which they had continued to reside, in order to settle the dispute between them and "some white men," likely the purchasers of the land on which they had lived for so long. The signatures of both Martin Sack and Stephen Knockwood were included. Subsequent to this petition, a census of those at Elmsdale was supplied to Indian Affairs. It revealed that six families, consisting of a total of 27 people, were residing there at that time. This paper also revealed that 5 families, with a total number of 22 people, had moved from the Windsor Junction area in 1919 to Millbrook. Houses were erected for those people at a cost of $1664.15. Five additional houses were constructed for five of the six families from Elmsdale, who had made the latest petition of 1919. Martin Sack was not included.

As of July 7th, 1919, Bury was still working on the release of $5000.00 as consented to by the Halifax County Band on June 18th. Despite the fact that the release of this money was yet to be approved by the Department, those Mi'kmaq of the Halifax County Band who had chosen to move to Millbrook were provided with housing. A letter from Bury to the Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs revealed that the reserves at Ingram River, Ship Harbour and Sambro had been surrendered, as per his suggestion, to provide for the move to Millbrook. The proposed purchase had been examined by two Departmental officials and, according to Bury, they approved of the $2500.00 price tag. On August 18th, 1919, 15 families of the Halifax County Band, with a total of as many as 55 members, were accepted into the Colchester Band at Millbrook by Chief Julian

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72Ibid, June 21st, 1919.

73Ibid. No specific date is given beyond that of 1919.


75PANS, RG 10, vol. 3220, file 536-764-1, August 11th, 1919.
and the Band Council.76

Stephen Knockwood, whose name appeared on the Elmsdale petition of March 20th, 1917, again petitioned on April 21st, 1920, to join the Millbrook Band. He and co-petitioner Michael Tom were accepted by the Colchester Band Council on the same day.77 It was later determined that they were not members of the Halifax County Band and their acceptance was not recommended by Boyd.78 Stephen Knockwood likely ended up on the Indian Brook Reserve as his name appeared as Chief in 1945. He was subsequently elected Chief in 1948, 1953 and 1954. (See Appendix III, Table 3.4) No further mention of Michael Tom was found.

On June 21st, 1920, Peter Googoo, his wife and five children, of the Inverness Band of Mi’kmaq, were accepted onto the Millbrook Reserve.79 A letter from McLean to Boyd, July 2nd, 1920, stated that he had no objection to Googoo and his family joining the Colchester Band, provided that his identity and previous band membership be confirmed. McLean stipulated, however, that, as Googoo was a member of the Inverness Band, he was not permitted to live on the land that was purchased by the Halifax County Band from its own funds.80

Centralization of Millbrook had reached its peak by the early 1920s, though the fate of

76PAC, RG 10, vol. 3160, file 363-417-1, August 18th, 1919. The actual total varies. The document lists the numbers of family members which, when counted, adds up to 53. A later document signed by McLean, who sanctioned the move, contained in the same file and dated March 30th, 1920, made a list of family members which added up to 55 persons.

77Ibid, April 21st, 1920.

78Ibid, June 14th, 1920.


certain members of the Halifax County Band was still an outstanding issue. The first phase of the centralization project had virtually halted, and throughout the next decade Indian Affairs officials would continue to channel their efforts towards eventually centralizing all the Mi'kmaq of Nova Scotia. Bury, in January 1924, wrote to the Deputy Minister, stating that as of that date there were thirty houses on the Millbrook Reserve. He was pleased with the location as it was close to markets, had a means of transportation, and had a church and school. Bury was very impressed with the centralization project of Millbrook in general, referring to it as "a credit to the province." His concern at this point was in securing an additional piece of land to provide enough firewood to accommodate the growth in population. He stated that it was in the best interests of the Mi'kmaq and the Department alike to promote the continued success of the Millbrook Reserve. He hoped that by doing this, those Mi'kmaq still residing on private property throughout the province might be enticed to relocate to a central reserve where they too might enjoy the security of being part of a stable community with access to amenities and church and school facilities.\textsuperscript{81}

There still existed the problem of how to convince the Halifax County Mi'kmaq still residing on private property to relocate. By July 6\textsuperscript{th}, 1926, Martin Sack and five other families of Mi'kmaq were still residing at Elmsdale. The Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs wrote Boyd requesting that he take action to persuade these people to move to the Millbrook Reserve. He asked Boyd to tell these people that the Department would pay for the move, and to assure them that suitable accommodations would be provided them as had been to the members of their band already residing at Millbrook. Boyd was instructed to gain their consent even though he was

\textsuperscript{81}PANS, RG 10, vol. 3220, 536-764-1, January 3\textsuperscript{rd}, 1924.
informed that the moneys would likely not be allocated until the following year. Boyd acknowledged those orders by stating that he had indeed visited the Elmsdale settlement on August 19th but to no avail. The five families consisted of a total of 31 persons. All had absolutely refused to move to the Millbrook Reserve, rejecting any offer made by Boyd in his effort to convince them of the advantages awaiting them at Millbrook.

Talk of removing the Elmsdale Mi'kmaq to a central reserve was still ongoing in 1930. A report from Agent Maxner, Inspector of Indian Agencies, informed Ottawa that these people, now totaling 32 persons, still had no desire to relocate. Maxner related that three of the five families were on relief and recommended that they be relocated to Millbrook. Martin Sack wanted, with the help of the Department, to purchase his own piece of land that was not part of any other reserve in Halifax County. Maxner recommended that Sack, along with the family of Bert Howe, be allowed to do just that. This, according to Maxner, would promote the self-sufficiency of these two families as it had in similar instances throughout the province. A subsequent Departmental letter suggested that if Sack wanted “to become self-supporting, and if he and his family insist on living on their own land away from a reserve, then the only solution would be enfranchisement.” Apparently Sack did not wish to be enfranchised, nor did he join the Millbrook Reserve, as he later became involved in the Band Council on the Indian Brook reserve. He was listed as Councillor in 1933, 1937 and 1945. (See Appendix III, Table 3.4)

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83Ibid, November 16th, 1926.
84Ibid, July 12th, 1930.
85Ibid, July 16th, 1930.
It is not exactly clear to where the other members of that particular group had moved. Maxner stated only two months later, on September 29th, 1930, that all the residents at Elmsdale had been removed and their houses promptly razed to the ground. The letter stated that he had forwarded funds for the construction of new homes to the new reserve, but did not state where, nor for whom, those homes were built. After nearly twenty years of discussion around where the Halifax County Band of Mi’kmaq would reside, the issue was finally resolved.

Discussions around centralizing those Mi’kmaq from the smaller reserves took on more fervor over the 1930s with the start of the Great Depression. On the heels of the ill-fated downsizing of Nova Scotia Agencies in 1932, came a less-than-positive report on the situation of Mi’kmaq Reserves in Nova Scotia, forwarded to Indian Affairs on June 26th, 1933. A very frustrated and pessimistic inspector stated that both the conditions existing on the reserves and the methods of administering to the needs of the Mi’kmaq were unsatisfactory. The inspector reasoned that the part-time employment status of the rehired agents, combined with their meager wages (27.5 to 50 cents a day), might account for the administration problem. The only positive aspect, in his view, was the fact that the Mi’kmaq were getting increasingly more involved in agriculture. As for employment opportunities, given that the Great Depression was under way, there were few jobs for the larger population, which meant that the Mi’kmaq had virtually no chance of securing a paying job. The inspector stated:

White communities have been and still are facing heavy relief problems and credits are rapidly vanishing ... the case of Heatherton N.S., where, the night before my visit, the Council had met to consider ways and means of providing relief for some 35 families; ... There are cases of

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86Ibid, September 29th, 1930.
whites who are willing and anxious to work if given the chance. Unfortunately we have many Mi’kmaq who are neither willing nor anxious to do so, even in normal times. The result is that the so called and oft referred to “Depression,” has been a God send to the “Noble Red Man”, which being translated in present day terms might be made to read “Arrogant Parasites.”

He blamed the Mi’kmaq situation also on the attitude of the white community, stating that they felt the onus was upon Indian Affairs to care for the Mi’kmaq, while, in the same breath, they complained of high taxes. Racism was indeed a leading factor in preventing Aboriginal peoples across the country from realizing self-sufficiency. Although not recommending that the Department abandon the Mi’kmaq to their own fate, the inspector went on to criticize the Department’s paternalistic policies as serving to cripple the will and the ability of the Mi’kmaq to take care of themselves. He pointedly noted that the Mi’kmaq, being aware of their special status under the law, and of the existence of treaties, took full advantage of their legal position.

This inspector recommended that, since Truro served as the railway hub of the province, a full-time agent be assigned to that town, thereby affording the agent better access to reserves across Nova Scotia. He further recommended that all Mi’kmaq residing on private property be sent to an official reserve. He also determined that all unoccupied reserves should be surrendered, adding that he had already secured the surrender of the New Germany Reserve in Lunenburg County. Lastly, he suggested that all Mi’kmaq constables be let go and the responsibility of law enforcement on reserves be given to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).

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88 Ibid, June 26th, 1933.
89 Ibid, June 26th, 1933.
Bury, in 1935, discussed his previous recommendations of centralization as a solution to the “Mi’kmaq problem,” citing the success of the efforts made at Millbrook as a positive example of the legitimacy of the policy. On the same day, a memorandum was written by G. Armstrong from the Trust Fund and Relief Branch of Indian Affairs making similar recommendations:

1. That the Province of Nova Scotia be divided into three agencies.
   a. Southwestern with headquarters at Kentville or Annapolis.
   b. Central with headquarters at Truro.
   c. Northeastern with headquarters at Sydney or St. Peters.
2. The Indians of the Southwestern Agency be concentrated on the Reserves at Bear River and Windsor.
3. The Indians of the Central Agency be concentrated on the Reserves at Shubenacadie, Truro, Pictou and possibly Heatherton.
4. The Indians of the Northwestern Agency be concentrated on the Chapel Island, Eskasoni and Whycocomag Reserves with the removal of the Sydney Indians undertaken in the near future.
5. The Indians of the Yarmouth, Shelburne, Queens and Lunenburg Counties should be removed to the Bear River Reserve. If they refused to move they should be enfranchised or at least removed from relief lists.

The time had come to play hardball with the Mi’kmaq people. A general consensus was developing; the Mi’kmaq would be moved whether they liked it or not. Their only alternative was enfranchisement, thereby relieving the Department of any further responsibility for their welfare as it pertained to their special status.

Wien stated that W. S. Arneil’s report on the situation on Mi’kmaq reserves, initiated in 1941, led to the decision to again step up the centralization policy. Arneil, echoing others on the subject, recommended centralization to Indian Brook and Eskasoni. He also recommended that

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90 Ibid, November 15th, 1935.
91 Ibid, November 15th, 1935.
92 Wien, Rebuilding the Economic Base, pp. 31-33.
anyone maintaining the ability to care for themselves should not be forced to move, but be allowed to remain on their former reserve. The catch for this right was that these people should be "encouraged to assume the full duties and responsibilities of Canadian citizenship by seeking enfranchisement." Promoting enfranchisement as an alternative to centralization was putting the Mi'kmaq in the position of being forced to make life-altering decisions that would likely extinguish their special legal status, so important to their security and to their identity as First Nations people. Instilling this fear in these people could only work against Arneil's recommendation of leaving those who were self-supporting on their present reserves.

Patterson wrote that the start of World War Two triggered centralization in 1941. No doubt it would indeed be difficult to cite one specific event as the definitive factor that put phase two of the centralization policy in motion. It was more likely a culmination of events, including the poor economic situation in the Maritimes, and, more specifically, on Nova Scotia Reserves. Add to those factors the Department of Indian Affairs' century or so of inability to resolve the plight of the Mi'kmaq, and the 1941 centralization simply becomes another bad decision in a series of ill-founded decision-making practices. After decades of discussion, justification and rationalization, Indian Affairs finally decided to put an all-out effort towards centralizing Mi'kmaq communities once and for all. As previously mentioned, Bury was very pleased with the centralization of Millbrook and successfully used that view as part of the rational that sparked the second phase in 1941. The hope was that bringing more people together on the larger Reserves, the Indian Brook

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93 Ibid, p. 33, as stated in W. S. Arneil, Investigative Report on Indian Reserves and Indian Administration, Province of Nova Scotia, Indian Affairs Branch (Ottawa: Department of Mines and Resources, August, 1941), p. 4.

94 Patterson, Indian Affairs and the Nova Scotia Centralization Policy, Chapter 2.
Reserve in Shubenacadie and the Eskasoni Reserve in Cape Breton, would somehow prompt an economic turnaround that would eventually lead the Mi’kmaq to self-sufficiency.

Patterson and Wien both went on to cite specific reasons associated with World War Two that led to the decision to centralize. The first was directly related to Indian Affairs concerns over their budget and lack of efficiency. High on the list of priorities was Indian Affairs’ desire to cut the costs of administration to so many remote areas in Nova Scotia; this was not a new desire when we consider the misguided, and totally unsuccessful downsizing in 1932. Also, the poor condition of the roads and the lack of manpower, doctors and teachers and the like, due to World War Two made the job of Indian Affairs officials difficult. Additionally, the Canadian government was still grappling with high unemployment rates all over the Maritimes, and the idea of centralizing the Mi’kmaq population out of the way of the urban centers appealed to many. Key politicians agreed that the money spent on the Mi’kmaq could be better utilized in other areas.\(^9^5\)

Patterson explains well how such a poorly reasoned idea could go on to become official government policy:

How a miscalculation on the scale of centralization could have occurred is explained by the nature of the Indian Affairs Branch and the frame of reference within which it operated. While it is impossible to perfectly reconstruct the intricate web of persons, ideas, and conditions that determined the shape of centralization, it is easy to recognize the attitudes and assumptions that governed the process. Not only did Indian Affairs think centralizing Nova Scotia’s Indians on two reserves would represent an improvement over leaving them scattered throughout the province, it believed the proper role of the Canadian government was to decide exactly where and how the Indians would live. It took for granted that Indians unwilling to be enfranchised would move, or be moved, to the central

reserves and, once relocated, it expected them to work for lower-than-average wages and to accept subsistence and isolation as a way of life until they were assimilated. It apparently also assumed that houses could be built fast enough to accommodate all the relocatees, and that the agents responsible for the plan would be imbued with infinite patience. These erroneous assumptions formed the backbone of a policy that reflected the arrogance, insensitivity, paternalism, and lack of expertise present in Indian Affairs at the highest level.96

The Indian Affairs Inspector's report of June 26th, 1933, reflected such attitudes.

While Bury stated that centralization did not undermine the stability of the Millbrook Reserve, the same could not be said of Indian Brook. The 1941 centralization phase was determined by many to have been a failure, accomplishing nothing for which it was designed.97 This second phase of centralization was not orchestrated such as to yield positive results. The relocation of such large numbers cost the Department of Indian Affairs up to $1.3 million as of 1950. As many as 650 Mi'kmaq moved to Indian Brook from 1931 to 1946. (See Appendix II, Table 2.3) Centralization greatly disrupted the lives of both those who were forced to move, and those who were originally living on the larger reserves. The relocation scheme put those on both the smaller and larger reserves who had been successfully eking out a living onto the welfare role along with the numbers that were already relying on relief. This situation compounded the cost of relief payments in addition to the $1.3 million moving bill. The 1941 centralization effort hardly seemed an equitable venture.98

96 Ibid, p. 151.


98 Ibid, p. 150.
Centralization also took most of the control of Mi’kmaq affairs away from individuals and Mi’kmaq leaders and placed it on the doorstep of government departments, including replacing Band Government with a Superintendent of Indian Affairs and placing legal disciplinary responsibility in the hands of the RCMP. Wien described the process of political disempowerment as such:

Band government had been exercised by a traditional chief and, in more recent decades, by the more central family head, but they were replaced by the Superintendent of Indian Affairs and his local agent, who had the power to decide any civil or criminal matter.

The Superintendent General had always enjoyed discretionary power over Aboriginal Councils under the Indian Act. At this point he appeared to be enforcing that power via the Indian agent to its full extent. John Marr, former Chief of Indian Brook, was interviewed on his view of centralization. With respect to on-reserve policing he stated:

While Bill Duncan used to be the constable here, the Reserve was well and things were quiet and he was well respected. But after he died the people changed. People got wild and the respect for law wasn’t there anymore.

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99Ibid. For detailed account of the events surrounding the centralization project of 1941, as well as the aftermath, see chapters 4 and 5.

100Wien, Rebuilding The Economic Base, p. 34.

101Discretionary powers of the Superintendent General were designed prior to Confederation with the passing of The Act to Encourage the Gradual Civilization of the Indian Tribes of this Province and to amend the Laws respecting Indians, S.C. 1857. A second Act, The Act for the Gradual Enfranchisement of Indians, the Better management of Indian Affairs, and to extend the provisions of the Act 31st Victoria, Chapter 42, S.C., 1869, Chapter 6, also laid the cornerstone for the Indian Act with respect to Aboriginal Government.

102Treaty and Aboriginal Rights Resource Center (TARR Center), UNSI, file 92-1004-09-004. Interview with John Marr by Lillian Marshall and Tord Larson.
Michael Issac Sack, one of the few who moved from Millbrook during that period, stated that only about three families other than his own moved out of Millbrook to Indian Brook when centralization was first encouraged. Sack, also interviewed about the effects of centralization, compared law enforcement in his former community of Millbrook to that of Indian Brook as it was after the centralization project of 1941. He said,

At night you could go visit anywhere [on Millbrook], you wouldn’t meet people that were drunk or fighting and you weren’t afraid to walk down the road.\textsuperscript{103}

Indian Affairs took over on-reserve education as well, promoting the use of English and discouraging the use of Mi’kmaq, both in the schools and at home. Wien stated that the priests and nuns were in charge of education on the centralized reserves. The priest and nuns also were given the task of organizing religious services, eliminating the role previously enjoyed by Mi’kmaq elders.\textsuperscript{104}

While reports of life on Indian Brook after centralization paint an abysmal picture of the economic and social failure of the project, Wilson Wallis’s and Ruth Wallis’s visit to Indian Brook in 1950 led them to believe that the project was proving successful. While their assessment of the success of centralizing Indian Brook was premature, they were at the time impressed with the changes to the community. The article stated:

In June 1950 there was an air of bustle about the place. The sawmill was booming in the middle of the long road lined with new frame houses and in the yards were cars, bicycles, children’s wagons, store bought swings. At the top of the hill the road became a street between the buildings of Church and State: the church, itself finished in 1949, a home for the priests,

\textsuperscript{103}\textit{Ibid.} Interview with Michael Issac Sack by Lillian Marshall and Tord Larson.

\textsuperscript{104}Wien, \textit{Rebuilding the Economic Base}, p. 34.
and a convent. Agency offices, Agency store, the homes of the agent, clerk, and storekeeper. Beyond were more Indian homes, and a Band house. Up and down the street passed the cars of Mounted Police and other Agency visitors, of Indians and of tourists, and at noon, the big Agency trucks bringing the sawmill workers home for dinner. Young mothers in bright shortie coats pushing baby buggies, and an Indian constable in blue uniform, swinging his nightstick, old men, and crowds of children around. The Affairs department reported, that year, “Welfare projects and land clearing continued to be the chief source of work.”

This description paints a very pretty picture of a dynamic, unified community, economically successful and socially in high spirits. Not everyone was so enamored with this quaint little “Indian city.” While initially it indeed might have been viewed by many, both internally and externally, to be just that, a little foresight would have gone a long way in preventing the inevitable collapse of the community already in progress.

Wien stated that any employment opportunities afforded the Mi’kmaq on the centralized reserves were generated by the Department of Indian Affairs. Many had become dependant on the jobs created by the centralization project in the form of lumbering and the construction of houses. Once these jobs were no longer available, Indian affairs were forced to fund “make work projects,” as Wien described were “under the guise of Local Initiatives Programs, Canada Works Programs, or Work Opportunities Programs.” Indian Affairs also subsidized the creation of small business ventures, primarily in the service sector. The creation of more extensive Band Governments also lead to increased employment on reserves. All in all, however, the money for all these employment


106 Ibid, p. 128. “Shubenacadie,” a Micmac basket seller on the highway said to us, “that’s a real little Indian city.”
opportunities came from government funding.\textsuperscript{107}

A post-centralization petition sent to political officials in Nova Scotia from ten Mi’kmaq men in 1949 described their position well:

Our nation is like a withering leaf in a summer’s sun. ... Some people say we are lazy, still we work. If you say we must go and hunt, we tell you again that to hunt is one thing and to find meat is another. They say catch fish and we try. They say make baskets, we do but we cannot sell them. They say make farms, this is very good, but will you help us till we cut away the trees, and raise the crop? We cannot work without food. The potatoes and wheat we raised last year were killed by poisoned wind.\textsuperscript{108}

Though things looked really prosperous at the onset with the construction of new houses and the opening of a sawmill, not to mention a flood of material goods from the government, success was very short-lived. The forests were quickly depleted, therefore closing the sawmill, and layoffs were inevitable once the construction phase was completed. Many were worse off than they were before.\textsuperscript{109} Geoffrey York stated,

\begin{quote}
In the late 1940s, federal officials began to admit that agriculture and other forms of employment were nearly impossible to establish on the centralized reserves. “Just what am I going to do when I get 1,200 Indians on a reserve who are away from most industries and away from employment?” asked the new Indian agent at Eskasoni. Another official said the Micmacs must be educated for jobs outside the reserve. “If we fail there, centralization will be one of the worst steps we have ever taken,” the official said. ... There were food shortages at the designated reserves, and some of the Micmacs came close to starvation. In 1953, the people of Eskasoni pleaded for rations “to relieve our unfortunate situation.” Some tried farming but soon gave up as the land
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{107}Wien, Rebuilding the Economic Base, pp. 35-37. See also, Ellice Gonzallez, Changing Economic Roles for Micmac Men and Women.

\textsuperscript{108}Holmes Whitehead, The Old Man Told Us, pp.239-241.

\textsuperscript{109}Wien, Rebuilding the Economic Base, pp. 34-36.
was infertile. At least three quarters of the Micmacs became dependent on welfare.\textsuperscript{110}

Despite the fact that Indian Affairs ordered the destruction of property on the smaller reserves as people moved to Indian Brook or Eskasoni, Gonzalez stated that as many as half those that had centralized returned to their former reserves once the harsh reality of the situation was realized.\textsuperscript{111}

By the time phase two of the centralization policy was put into play in Nova Scotia, Indian Affairs had been discussing the strategy for several decades. Certain officials, including Bury, had spent years pushing for the relocation of all Mi’kmaq to central reserves in the province as an avenue towards saving money on administration and in helping the Mi’kmaq eventually acquire self-sufficiency, thus relieving the government of any financial responsibility. Officials, including Bury, were touting the economic and social success of the Millbrook community in the years after centralization as a means of proving the legitimacy of their faith in the policy. There were also a number of officials who were skeptical of the practicality of the move. Up to the beginning of the 1930s, these officials still believed that success might be hampered because many Mi’kmaq would have no desire to move. It was feared that the end result of complete centralization would prove to aggravate an already bad economic situation,\textsuperscript{112} concerns expressed by Bury only a couple of years earlier.


\textsuperscript{111}Ellice Gonzalez, \textit{Changing Economic Roles for Micmac Men and Women}, p. 98.

\textsuperscript{112}Lisa Lynn Patterson, \textit{Indian Affairs and the Nova Scotia Centralization Policy}. This work is a very detailed account of the proceedings that led up to the enactment of the centralization policy and the eventual conclusion. Patterson includes the attitudes of the people involved and the chronological sequence of events.
But, as the Mi'kmaq continued to rely very heavily on welfare payments, the government was completely at odds as to how to deal effectively with the chronic unemployment on the Mi'kmaq reserves. With the Great Depression creating some very precarious times for all Nova Scotians, Indian Affairs agents seemed to have lost patience with the Mi'kmaq through the 1930s, as is reflected in the report of June 26th, 1933 and again in Arneil's report of 1941. It no longer seemed important to ask the Mi'kmaq for their input before making decisions, nor to ask for their permission before enforcing those decisions directly affecting their lives. Centralization was enforced against the will and to the detriment of those Mi'kmaq involved. The relocation project proved to be an expensive mistake, costing millions to implement and millions more to support the growing numbers pushed onto the welfare role as a result.

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113 Wien, Rebuilding the Economic Base, pp. 30-31.
CHAPTER II
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS of PHASE I and PHASE II
of the CENTRALIZATION POLICY

Centralization has been referred to by authors such as Patterson and Wien as another bad
decision in the history of Indian Affairs policy that proved detrimental to the social stability on
Mi’kmaq reserves. This chapter will give a detailed examination of both phases of the
centralization policy, that of Millbrook beginning in 1916, and that of Indian Brook in 1941.

If we first look at the centralization effort of 1941 of Indian Brook in the context of
comparing it to that which took place with the Millbrook Reserve some two decades prior, it
almost seems understandable that the project would be reignited. In true Indian Affairs fashion,
officials used tunnel vision when making the comparison between the two. It is apparent that
certain individuals adamantly pushed for centralization on the Indian Brook and Eskasoni Reserves
based on the success of centralization on the Millbrook Reserve. However, starting in 1916 Indian
Affairs officials had recognized both the desire of relocatees to live on the Millbrook Reserve, and
the necessity of working with Aboriginal leaders in an effort to make adequate provisions for these
people prior to the move. What is astounding is that little consideration was given to such factors
in deciding the case of Indian Brook some twenty years later.

Chief Joseph Julian and his Council accepted a number of individuals and families into the
Band in the early part of this century. Indian Affairs officials on a number of occasions discussed
the Millbrook Reserve as one of the most successful in terms of self-sufficiency, despite the growth
in population on that reserve. They used that example as one means of convincing the Department
of Indian Affairs that such a policy for Indian Brook and Eskasoni would greatly help the Mi’kmaq
and the Department alike. They contended that such a move would stimulate the economy on the two larger reserves and eventually lead the Mi’kmaq towards economic self-sufficiency, although no one actually clarified how that goal could be accomplished. Moreover, they maintained that besides the fact that money could be saved if the Mi’kmaq could get back to work rather than continue to rely on relief payments, ministering to the Mi’kmaq would be easier and cheaper if they were all congregated in two specific areas.

These officials overlooked some very important differences between the Millbrook Reserve and both the Indian Brook and Eskasoni Reserves, with respect to both the pre-centralization stability of each community and the ability of each community to withstand a centralization project. It can be argued that the stability of the Millbrook community aided in preventing centralization from adversely affecting the economic, social and political situations within. In addition, other very critical distinctions clearly reflect why centralization would be deemed successful in one instance but considered a failure by all accounts in another. A comparison between Millbrook and the two larger reserves indicates significant differences in the political, the economic and the social structures of each group of Mi’kmaq.

The Millbrook Reserve, unlike Indian Brook, was situated close to Truro and many Mi’kmaq relied on employment opportunities in that town. Logically, the need for Departmental assistance was less than that in the more remote areas where local jobs were non-existent and transportation to and from work in another county was virtually impossible to manage. Additionally, many families on the Millbrook Reserve, as on reserves across Nova Scotia, had small family gardens and were raising animals in order to supplement their income.

Due to overexploitation, one of the most and persistent difficult problems experienced by
the Mi’kmaq was an inability to find enough firewood to keep them warm through the cold maritime winters. This was not a problem on the Millbrook Reserve as there existed an adequate supply of fuel in the surrounding area. The original purchase of 35 acres near McCullers Mill Brook was made in 1886 to accommodate the Mi’kmaq who were camping in the area. Subsequently, the Department of Indian Affairs had allowed the Truro Band to purchase several parcels of land adjacent to the reserve to be exploited for firewood, and to help in providing room for the growing numbers migrating to the Millbrook Reserve in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Truro Indian Reserves 27A, 27B and 27C were purchased between 1904 and 1907. The Department purchased a fourth property, known as the Creelman property, consisting of 100 acres, which lay between the original Reserve and the three new lots in 1919. This purchase was made for the express purpose of providing room for settlement and enough firewood and agricultural land to the 53 members of the Halifax County Band moving to the Millbrook Reserve during the first phase of centralization. An additional small piece of land adjoining the railway and the Creelman property was also transferred to the Truro Band in 1924.\footnote{TARR Center, UNSI, file 92-1004-19-032, Profile of Truro, Millbrook IR 27, 27A, 27B, 27C, p. 9.}

Indian Affairs officials fully recognized the need to proceed with due care and caution if the social and economic lives of the people involved were to be protected. Every effort was made to protect existing resources by expanding the land base of Millbrook as the population grew. H.J. Bury, an adamant supporter of centralization, stated,

\begin{quote}
This reserve has every advantage it is possible to arrange for, including proximity to a railroad and town, presence of school and church and a first class soil. Further than this it is the only reserve
\end{quote}
in Central Nova Scotia which the nomad Indians desire to settle on. There is at present only one feature that prevents a proper realization of the plans of the Department to concentrate these Indians on to a prosperous and contented community and that is, the area is too small.\(^{115}\)

Bury remained in constant communication with Chief Julian and those who were destined for the Millbrook Reserve.

The Halifax County Band unanimously consented to the purchase of the Creelman property using their Band funds. The Department, of course, had to sanction the purchase before the transaction could be completed. The road between the original property at Millbrook and the Halifax County Band was to be owned by the railway until the land was finally acquired by the Band in 1953, thereby finally providing the Truro Mi'kmaq with their own access from the Creelman Property to the rest of the Truro Reserve.\(^{116}\) Chief Julian, by all accounts a concerned, competent and pragmatic leader, was anxious to avoid any future problems associated with overexploitation of their resources. He set his sights on purchasing a piece of property that had, for many years, been used as an adequate source of firewood for the Truro Band. The Band could find their quality of life threatened should they for any reason be denied that right in the future. In 1955, Chief Julian on behalf of the Truro Band, was finally granted permission to purchase the 625.48 acre rifle range which could henceforth “for all time” continue to be utilized by the Millbrook residents for whatever purpose deemed necessary.\(^{117}\) All in all, due to the diligence of


\(^{116}\) TARR Center, UNSI, 92-1004-19-032, p. 9.

\(^{117}\) Ibid. Profile of Truro - Millbrook IR 27, 27A, 27B, 27C. Also TARR Center, file 92-1004-19-033, profile of the Millbrook Reserve. See also RG 10, vol. 3220, file 536-764-1, for Indian Affairs correspondence related to the purchase of the Creelman property. Creelman was
both the Millbrook Band Council and Indian Affairs officials, particularly Bury and Boyd, those on
the Millbrook Reserve were faring well in comparison to their counterparts on other reserves. The
care taken to not exceed the carrying capacity of the Colchester Band property turned out to be
one of the most fundamental differences between the success of centralization on the Millbrook
Reserve and the lack thereof on Indian Brook some years later.

In addition, the relative growth in population on the Millbrook Reserve in and about the
1920s was low in comparison to that of the Indian Brook Reserve in 1941. Though no
information was available on the exact number of Mi’kmaq who moved to Millbrook during
centralization, it is clear that the growth in population was relatively small. Table 2.1, Appendix II,
shows that by 1931 the population of Millbrook had increased to approximately 124 people, long
after centralization on Millbrook had ended in the early 1920s. Table 2.2, Appendix II, shows that
by 1946 the population of the Millbrook Reserve had remained the same as that of 1931. During
the centralization of Indian Brook, the population on that reserve grew rapidly. Table 2.2 shows
that in five years the population of the Indian Brook Reserve had escalated from 155 persons in
1941 to 816 by 1946. When referring to the centralization of Millbrook, officials ignored the
obvious. The large numbers that would be ushered onto the Indian Brook Reserve over a brief
period of time was something that had at no time occurred on the Millbrook Reserve.

Among the other factors separating the Millbrook centralization from that of Indian Brook
was the struggle to accommodate the large influx of families moving to Indian Brook. This led to

asking $2500.00 for the 100 acre lot. That same file contains the petition of the Halifax County
Band to the Department for permission to join the Truro Band and the acceptance of these people
into the Millbrook Reserve by the Truro Band Council, August 18, 1919.
the rapid construction of inadequate housing and thus a premature depletion of the forested area in and around the Indian Brook Reserve. This detrimentally affected the lives of all Indian Brook residents in several ways. First, the construction of new homes ground to a sudden halt as the supply of lumber ran out. Many families never had an opportunity to move into a new home as promised by Indian Affairs after being convinced to abandon their old properties. Moreover, as the new homes were built with green wood, the houses quickly warped as the drying process set in, leaving the inhabitants vulnerable to the elements.\textsuperscript{118}

Existing natural resources were severely compromised after the construction phase ended on Indian Brook. The area could no longer provide an adequate fuel supply for the large numbers of people, a very important component to the success of any community facing bitter cold winters. Additionally, it stands to reason that small game would have had to move on to other areas with the destruction of their habitat, thus severely limiting the hunting on that reserved area, putting an added strain on the ability of families to supplement their diet through the traditional Mi'kmaq mode of production.\textsuperscript{119}

The economic base, both natural and monetary, proved unable to sustain the larger population on Indian Brook after centralization for various reasons. Many Mi'kmaq were once again left unemployed as the construction phase halted and saw mills, that under conservationist exploitative processes might have had a chance of survival, were forced to close down. Moreover, there was not enough fertile land on the reserve to allow for the newcomers to begin planting


subsistence gardens like those they had left behind on the smaller reserves. Neither was there enough room to accommodate their livestock. A combination of all these unfortunate circumstances left the vast majority of Mi’kmaq on the Indian Brook Reserve, unlike their counterparts on the Millbrook Reserve, totally reliant on Indian Affairs for the most basic necessities of life, food, shelter and fuel.

In their zest to find a solution to the chronic unemployment on Nova Scotia reserves, coupled with their desire to cut administrative costs, officials of the Department of Indian Affairs made some very broad assumptions when comparing the results of centralization on the Millbrook Reserve to what was likely to occur on the Indian Brook and Eskasoni Reserves. That the Department of Indian Affairs knew what was best for the Mi’kmaq continued to be their worst assumption, much to the detriment of the Mi’kmaq people. Generally, what was best for the Department was deemed best for the Mi’kmaq. While centralization was believed to be a sound solution for both the Department and the Mi’kmaq, officials did not take the time to consider all the factors involved in phase one before initiating the start of phase two. Those persons who had ended up in Millbrook tended to do so of their own free will, albeit often because they were left with no alternative but to move elsewhere. Perhaps in some cases their inability to provide for their families where they were previously located may have prompted the move. In most cases those from the Halifax County Band moved due to the fact that they were living on property not officially reserved for their use. Once the owners of these properties launched formal complaints, these people had to make alternate arrangements. Either way, out of the necessity of making such

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120 Ibid.
a move for the betterment of their families, or because they were squatting on private property, the decision regarding their ultimate destination tended to be entirely of their own making. Furthermore, they were supported every step of the way by Indian Affairs representatives Bury and Boyd. Years passed while the details of their relocation was worked out to allow adequate provisions for their basic needs to be met. This served to help the Halifax County Band maintain its economic and social stability, while securing the long term social and economic stability of the Millbrook Reserve.

Neither were the political rights of the Mi'kmaq overlooked in the earlier centralization effort. During the centralization of Millbrook, Chief Joe Julian and the Truro Band Council had the right to accept or deny anyone wishing to become part of their Band, thus giving the Council control over the situation and the power to prevent overcrowding on their Reserve. The right to control Band membership was legislated in the Indian Act. Both the Public Archives of Nova Scotia files and those of the Public Archives of Canada show a number of petitions, and subsequent acceptance of Mi'kmaq from various Bands around Nova Scotia by the Truro Band Council, starting in 1916. The Department of Indian Affairs recognized that right for the Indian Brook Band Council during phase one of centralization as well. The Indian Brook Council exercised their political authority by accepting members of the Halifax County Band to their reserve and by offering to accommodate others, about the same time that phase one of centralization was occurring on Millbrook.

The type of management, options and political control afforded those involved in the centralization of Millbrook and the Band Council of Indian Brook starting in 1916 was completely denied Indian Brook leaders and relocatees over the course of the phase two relocation project.
The much care and concern over the willingness of the Mi’kmaq to relocate, and the attention towards making adequate preparation for their arrival to Millbrook, gave the first phase of centralization distinctly positive advantages over the effort of 1941. Both Boyd and Bury had made an effort to communicate both with those destined for the central reserve of Millbrook, and with Chief Joe Julian and Council. Band Councils on both the Millbrook Reserve and on the Indian Brook Reserve, at that time, exercised their right to accept or not, any new members into their communities. This gave the Millbrook Band Council and the Indian Brook Band Council control over population growth on their reserves and allowed them to consider the ability of their resources to support additional members before relocation was initiated. When it was determined that the Millbrook Reserve was in need of additional land holdings in order to accommodate the newcomers, Bury and Boyd worked as liaisons between Julian and the Department in Ottawa to make sure that the proper measures were taken.

The move of 1941 was initially legislated without any input from either those who would be forced to move from areas all around Nova Scotia, or from the Chief and Band Council of the Indian Brook Reserve. In this case, the political right under the Indian Act of the Indian Brook Band Council to control Band membership was ignored. Indian Brook residents had no alternative but to sit back and watch as events unfolded, powerless to do anything. No record exists of any correspondence between William Paul Sr., Chief of the Indian Brook Reserve from 1936 to 1939, and the Department of Indian Affairs regarding centralization. John Marr, who became Chief at Indian Brook shortly after the project started and held the position from 1942 to 1944 (See Appendix III, Table 3.4), stated:

They sent a bunch of fellows from Ottawa down here during that time,
they went to work and told us that they were going to build houses. ... There were several people from Ottawa here before anyone moved here. After they started moving then they told the people what they'd do for them. They were to build houses and finish them, which they didn't. Just gave a shell, not many were finished inside. People had to finish them themselves. There were not many people that grew gardens. They tried to have a community garden but never had any help with it. They had nothing to plant. They only received apple trees to plant.¹²¹

The decision to centralize was made in Ottawa and delegates were sent to Nova Scotia to set the project in motion, oblivious to the concerns or rights of the people involved.

We can get a glimpse into the minds of these people through some of the those who lived through the experience and were willing to share their stories. Michael Issac Sack stated:

When they [Indian Affairs] first started this centralization, they informed the people that they had to move there or else they would help them no more. This happened all over the place such as Pictou and every damn place. This is why I moved here myself. I moved from across the meadows a long time ago with my parents, I guess they lived here way before centralization. This is how we came here and a lot of other people came here like that also. People had to move or else they wouldn't help them anymore on other reserves.¹²²

Those who moved to Indian Brook were duped or browbeaten into accepting the plan and many greatly feared their fate if they decided to stay in their homes against the will of the Department of Indian Affairs. A number of Mi'kmaq were either working nearby their former reserve and/or had managed to start family gardens and raise some animals in their efforts to support themselves.

These people were familiar with the area in which they lived and they feared the loss of extended family ties and relationships with those in their communities. They had no reason to believe that

¹²¹TARR Center, UNSI, file 92-1004-09-004, Interview with John Marr, former Chief of the Indian Brook Reserve.

¹²²Ibid, p. 1. Interview with Michael Issac Sack, who moved from the Truro Reserve to Indian Brook during centralization.
their economic situation would be improved by moving to a strange place, to live with strange people, under a Mi’kmaq Council who would possibly not have their best interests at heart. Moreover, fear of being enfranchised would prompt many to move against their will.

Certainly there were those who had argued against moving in 1941, but all were denied the right to remain on their reserves except those from the previously centralized Millbrook Reserve. Indeed, how could the Department justify disrupting the lives of the residents of Millbrook when the reserve was held up as a shining example of the success of the centralization policy? Michael Sack’s family, along with several others moved from Millbrook to Indian Brook in the early stages of phase two of the project. Had they held out they also would have had the opportunity of making the decision to relocate for themselves. Chief Julian wrote the Department of Indian Affairs asking that the lives of his people not be disrupted as they were faring well enough where they were. The Department recognized Julian’s request and Millbrook was left alone.

As in the case of the economic and social life on Millbrook, neither was the political structure on Millbrook disturbed in any distinctly adverse way due to the acceptance of Mi’kmaq from other Bands into the Truro Band during the centralization effort of that time. Joe Julian held his position for many years after people from other Bands made their way to that reserve. That is not to say, however, that those coming into Millbrook were not affected politically by the changes. These people were not content to see their own representation absorbed into the political structure of Millbrook. The newcomers were obviously not aware of the rules surrounding political

\[^{123}\text{Ibid, p. 2.}\]
representation as outlined in the Indian Act. They assumed that they were entitled to elect their own representatives on the Millbrook Reserve to serve in conjunction with the existing Council.

Chief Joe Julian had difficulty in convincing these people that they were mistaken, that they were now part of the Colchester Band. Julian felt it necessary to write to the Department of Indian Affairs requesting that they clarify the matter for him.

The new residents of Millbrook apparently had some difficulty accepting Chief Julian’s interpretation of the situation, either concerned that he had no idea about official election protocol as per the Indian Act, or that he was in some way trying to deprive them of their political prerogative. Mi’kmaq traditional governing structures allowed for each band to have its own representation. Whether officially sanctioned by Indian Affairs or not, leaders tended to emerge in many Mi’kmaq communities. The signatures on the various petitions and correspondences from

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124 Indian Act, 1876. The Act to Encourage the Gradual Civilization of the Indian Tribes of this Province, and to amend the Laws respecting Indians, S.C. 1857, Chapter 26, as well as the Act for the Gradual Enfranchisement of Indians, the Better management of Indian Affairs, and to extend the provisions of the Act 31st Victoria, Chapter 42, S.C. 1869, Chapter 6, placed Indian Government under the control of the Canadian Government. The Gradual Enfranchisement Act stated that an election of one Chief and two second Chiefs for every two hundred people would be held every three years. Smaller bands of thirty or more were to have one Chief. The rules set down in these Acts found their way into the Indian Act in 1876. The election processes for Band Government changed periodically over the decades. At one point all Mi’kmaq were recognized as one band. Inspector Bury noted on May 1, 1919, (PANS RG 10, vol. 3220, file 536-764-1, May 1, 1919.) that according to Chapter 81 of the revised Statutes, 1906, the “Micmacs constitute one Band or Tribe within the meaning of the Indian Act”. At this point Joseph Julian was not a Chief with respect to the Indian Act, although he was unofficially recognized as such by Indian Affairs and continued to act on behalf of the Band in that capacity. Band government elections continue to be guided by the Amendment to the Indian Act, Chapter 29, Section 73(2), 1951, which states “The council of a band in respect of which an order has been made under subsection one shall consist of one chief, and one councillor for every one hundred members of the band, but the number of councillors shall not be less than two or more than twelve and no band shall have more than one chief”.

the newly relocated Halifax County Band showed that there was political representation. Tables 3.1 to 3.11 in Appendix III list further examples of Mi’kmaq leaders that were not officially sanctioned by Indian Affairs, but were indeed referred to in their capacity as leaders. The Halifax County Band members, by virtue of applying for and gaining acceptance into the Colchester Band, were no longer entitled to a Band Council separate from that which represented the Colchester Band.

It is unclear what happened as a result of the events surrounding the political concerns of the Halifax County Band as no further documentation of the issues could be found. It is clear, however, that something happened to alleviate their worries. Either these people accepted Julian’s word and decided to recognize him as their representative, or the Department sent the requested letter and they yielded to that explanation. There is no evidence that anyone pushed for an election on the Millbrook Reserve so that all might exercise a voice in representation. Julian himself informed Indian Affairs that elections had not been held at Millbrook for many years, but no change was initiated from the Department.

It is more difficult to determine how the 1941 centralization might have specifically affected the Indian Brook political situation, other than the clear compromise of Mi’kmaq power to control their Band membership under the Indian Act. Certain assumptions can, however, be drawn from the few existing sources of information. Table 3.4, Appendix III, shows no record of a Chief or Council on the Indian Brook Reserve for the three-year term of 1939 to 1942. John Marr was elected Chief of the Indian Brook Reserve in February 1942. Table 3.4 shows that he was deposed in June 1944, after having been in office for about two years and three months of a three-year term. The office stood empty for another nine months. Records do not state why he
was ousted, nor can this be determined from his interview of some years later. As Wien stated, the Superintendent General assumed political control of the reserve, yet there were periods whereby a Chief was recognized by the Department. At any rate, the Indian Brook Reserve had no Chief from June 1944, until the election of Stephen Knockwood in March 1945. Both time spans during which Indian Brook had no representation were critical, particularly when discussing the issues surrounding centralization of that reserve.

One has to wonder why these people had not provided themselves with a leader to represent their interests in light of such dramatic changes taking place within their community in 1941. Reasons for the political disorganization on the Indian Brook Reserve during this critical period in the reserve’s history are unclear. The election procedure was certainly well established, as indicated in Table 3.4. One period in which Indian Brook had either temporary or no representation coincides exactly to the first stages of the centralization project. If Indian Brook ever needed strong leadership to speak out for the rights of that Band it was prior to, and during the first half of the 1940s.

Indian Brook experienced other periods of political instability that left the reserve without a council. The years 1911 and 1912 saw two instances whereby the Department of Indian affairs did not recognize Indian Brook elected political leaders. Issac Sack’s term ended in 1919, but no election was recorded until 1921. William Paul’s term ended in 1924, but no election is recorded until 1933. (See Appendix III, Table 3.4) It can be stated without any doubt that the disorganized state of the political structure on Indian Brook was a result of the breakdown in political and social structures due to decades of legislation under the Indian Act and the inability of the Mi’kmaq to find their own means of economic support.
Political instability on Indian Brook in 1941 proved very opportunistic for the Department of Indian Affairs. Not having had a Chief and Council to contend with was indeed a stroke of luck with the plan to get the centralization program under way as expeditiously as possible. By once again using Wien's interpretation of the situation, it could be argued that, since the Indian agent was responsible for elections on Mi'kmaq reserves as legislated in the Indian Act, the Department of Indian Affairs could have conveniently dispensed with election procedures in order to facilitate the rapid changes that were affecting that Aboriginal community via the centralization policy.

Judging from John Marr's interview, he had some very conflicting memories about the centralization project as it was unfolding during his time as Chief of Indian Brook. He first outlined the inadequacies associated with the construction of housing, particularly the slipshod way the houses were thrown together in order to quickly accommodate the growing population on Indian Brook. He also stated that nothing was done by the Department of Indian Affairs with regard to helping migrants get gardens started that they might be able to feed themselves rather than totally rely on relief payments. Marr then stated:

Centralization did a lot for the reserve, because there were several houses on the reserve at that time. Then people started moving away and some were moving back, and some never came back. There were about 30-50 houses here. Indian Affairs built a few houses here.\(^{125}\)

Apparently, Marr concluded that even though Indian Affairs did not live up to its promises, the Indian Brook Reserve was better off as there were now more houses on the Reserve. He does not seem to have a clear grasp of the importance of that period in Mi’kmaq history, nor the impact that centralization had on those Mi’kmaq involved.

\(^{125}\)TARR Center, UNSI, file 92-1004-09-004. Interview with John Marr.
Marr went on to briefly discuss his role as Chief.

As Chief it wasn’t that bad. There wasn’t static against the Chief because he was just a Chief more than anything else. It isn’t like that today. Today the Chief has to have a good understanding and a good education. In those days the Chief didn’t need a high education and the Indian Affairs didn’t put too much pressure on you. Only a few times you were asked to do something but it never amounted to very much. People knew that the Chief had a considerable amount of power. The Chief usually helped out when they were in trouble or had any problems that he could solve.126

Again it is difficult to form any clear conclusions about Marr’s statements. He is apparently conscious of the fact that his lack of education may have hindered his ability to adequately represent his people. Marr mentioned the fact that Indian Affairs did not put too much pressure on him to perform. It seems that the people on the Indian Brook Reserve were not putting forth much pressure either. Marr seemed content to sit back and be Chief as long as there were no major problems to deal with. If the pre-centralization residents of the Indian Brook Reserve did anything to try to stop Indian Affairs from putting the project in motion, Marr gave no indication that he in any way represented their concerns to Indian Affairs agents. Nor is it apparent that Marr even shared in their viewpoint. One would assume that Marr’s lack of involvement in the affairs of the Indian Brook people, along with the periods of their having no political representation, would also have proven opportunistic for the Department of Indian Affairs. The question that requires an answer is why then was he deposed one year before the end of his term.

Although having aspirations towards political success, Marr may simply have been incapable of carrying out his responsibilities, due either to the fact that he was intimidated or

126Ibid.
indeed influenced by those from Indian Affairs, or due to his lack of experience. Since the centralization project was well under way by this time, the community was likely somewhat overwhelmed by all the activity. Records do not reveal whether the feelings of discontent and uncertainty had set in at this point. Nor is it revealed that factionalism was created by the impact of other Band members on the community. There was initially an air of growth and success on Indian Brook with employment opportunities at an all time high and the community expanding with the construction of new homes. Likely a combination of factors resulted in Marr's dismissal. William C. Borrett from the Down East newspaper had this to say about Marr after a chance meeting with him in Halifax in 1945:

Recently a fortunate visit was made to the Market Building in Halifax. There was found John Marr, a soft spoken, intelligent young Micmac Indian. John, at the age of thirty years, is the Grand Chief of the Indian Reservation at Shubenacadie. Chief Marr is an interesting talker ... he went to the ninth grade in school. His studies were carried out at the Catholic School at East Angus, Quebec. ...Today there are about 160 Indians on the reservation ... But under the plans now made for centralization he expects that upwards of 2,000 people of his race may be congregated there. He will then be Grand Chief over that number, he says. Despite his comparative youth for the responsibilities that will be his, his appearance suggests that he will be able to cope with any duties that may fall to him.127

Consider these words along with those of Marr himself, and one might conclude that Marr's grandiose notions of becoming the Grand Chief of such a large number of people clouded his view of the seriousness of the job for which he had been elected. Had he developed a more prudent attitude, and used his political position to safeguard the welfare of the Band, the events that were unfolding at the Indian Brook Reserve may not have moved along at such a rapid pace, and

127Printed in Holmes Whitehead, The Old Man Told Us, pp. 342-343.
adequate provisions might have been made for the increasing population.

There is evidence that at least one Chief was protecting his Band's long-term interests during the implementation of the Department of Indian Affairs centralization policy. As already discussed, Chief Joseph Julian certainly wasted no time in establishing the position of the Truro Band with respect to moving to Indian Brook in 1941. Certainly Julian was in a better position, however, to argue for exclusion from the project than were the Chiefs or residents of other Bands. It seemed that, in addition to Marr, certain other Chiefs were either totally influenced by or totally intimidated by the Indian Affairs Agents as they sought to convince the Mi'kmaq of the benefits awaiting them upon moving to Indian Brook. Levi Poulette, formerly of the Whycocomag Reserve, discussed the events surrounding centralization to the Eskasoni Reserve on Cape Breton Island. He stated that the Indian Affairs Agent saw to it that everything was already arranged before anyone, other than the Chief, the priest and the Indian Agent, knew anything about it. He stated,

They didn't open it up, tell anybody. They didn't ever show it to the other people. Only they worked on it. And the Chief was always signing things for them. He was the one that could read the best of the Indians. Nobody knew about this. This was already on the way before Indians heard about it. Everything was already set and done. The Chief came to the church and said they are going to put it all together. The Chief went to work on his house in Eskasoni that afternoon\(^{128}\)

Not everyone on the Whycocomag Reserve accepted the plan as a positive step forward, although it does appear that they conceded their fate and moved with little, if any, argument. It could be said also that at the time they put their faith in their leader, accepting his decision as having been

\(^{128}\)TARR Center, UNSI, file 92-1004-09-004. Interview with Levi Poulette.
made with the best interests of the band at heart. The Chief of Whycocomagh did tell them that “Castle Bay [was] an ideal place for [their] livelihood,” with an ample supply of water and wood. According to Poulette though, the Chief of this Band proceeded to tell the people of Whycocomagh that centralization was a done deal and they had no alternative but to accept it and make the best of the new situation. Poulette went on to say that the community was told that they would not receive any further assistance from Indian Affairs unless they moved to Eskasoni. He went on to say:

They were going to gather us up to take us to Eskasoni to a place called Castle Bay. Castle Bay is the place they have looked at for our future. ... Now if you don’t like it there we can always go back.¹²⁹

The Chief made it clear that if they decided to go back to their former reserve, it would be up to them to make it on their own as Indian Affairs would only help in their support if they moved to and remained on Eskasoni. Enfranchisement was the only alternative to centralizing.

Poulette, in retrospect, appeared very bitter about what he perceived as having been coerced into moving. Additionally, Poulette obviously felt that the Chief was negligent in his duties, both by taking it upon himself to make such an important decision without first discussing it with the Band, and for misleading the Band into thinking that they would be better off in Eskasoni without first confirming that the area could indeed sustain so many people. In Poulette’s view, the Chief did not stand up to Indian Affairs on behalf of his Band, and instead lead them towards further economic and social hardships. Poulette was not alone in that sentiment. Andrew Battiste, who moved from Heatherton to Eskasoni during the centralization plan, stated that he and the

¹²⁹Ibid.
other residents of Heatherton were “sold for centralization” by Chief Peter Prosper and Will Young. He believed that these men “got a lot of money out of it and once [they] got there [Eskasoni] they dropped [them].”

By the time Stephen Knockwood was elected Chief at the Indian Brook Reserve in 1945, there was no stopping the centralization program. In fact, the population was nearing its peak. By 1946 the numbers had risen to 816 persons. It can-not be said with any certainty how centralization had affected the political situation on Indian Brook. Up to this point the instability of the political structure was indeed apparent. Knockwood was hardly a newcomer to the Indian Brook Reserve at the time of his election, having moved to Indian Brook after having been refused membership at Millbrook in the 1920s. By the time the centralization program was initiated in 1941, Knockwood had lived for twenty-five years on the Indian Brook Reserve. He was elected Chief of that Band on three occasions, in 1945 and 1948 for two three-year terms, and in 1954 for a two-year term. He replaced John Bernard in March 1953, under unknown authority, after Bernard’s resignation. All in all Knockwood served a total of nine years as Chief of the Indian Brook Reserve. (See Appendix III, Table 3.4)

Although it may have appeared to Indian Affairs that the lack of political representation prior to and during the centralization on Indian Brook would work to their favor, the failure of the project reveals quite the opposite to be true. If centralization did anything to positively affect the political structure of Mi’kmaq communities in general, it was in forcing the Department of Indian Affairs to recognize the need for each group to live where they wanted and under a duly elected

\textsuperscript{130} \textit{Ibid.} Interview, Andrew Battiste.

\textsuperscript{131} Dept. Of Indian Affairs Election Files for Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq Reserves.
Band Council to act on their behalf. External needs, such as those of the white communities or those of the Agents who administered to Aboriginal peoples’ daily affairs, most often served as the catalyst for change, either positive or negative. By the 1950s the Department of Indian Affairs had conceded that the centralization project was not working and, in turn, conceded the difficulty in administering to individual Mi’kmaq communities throughout the province without the benefit of contact with elected representatives from each reserve. Moreover, the many smaller Bands across the province were expressing their desire to have their own Band Councils to handle their affairs.

Early in the 1950s the Minister of Mines and Resources, F.B. McKinnon, wrote several letters to that effect to the Department of Indian Affairs stating that no more Indians were to be brought to either Eskasoni or Shubenacadie under the centralization policy. He further stated that “it looks like smaller reserves are here to stay” and went on to suggest that separate Band Council elections should be held on the smaller reserves. He recognized that the reserves were still being run under the principle of centralization and both he and Mr. Rice, agent for the Shubenacadie Band, agreed that it would be to the advantage of the Mi’kmaq and that of the agents if officials could work with separate Band Councils elected to represent the interests of their own memberships. ¹³² This indeed did come to pass. By 1959, after the dust settled from the 1941 centralization disaster, smaller Bands were delegated and their Band Councils deemed official. (See Appendix III, Table 3.3) Unfortunately, this realization came on the backs of the people whose lives were uprooted, and who were once again struggling to find some semblance of political, economic and social stability.

¹³²PANS, RG 10 vol. 8494, file 50(3-5). See also, TARR Center, UNSI, file 92-1004-09-010.
Logic, in addition to historical documentation, clearly reflects the fact that the struggles of everyday life on Aboriginal reserves across the country - lack of employment, poverty, substance abuse and various other social problems - could only be compounded by a sudden dramatic growth in the population on Reserves. This is why it was necessary for Aboriginal leaders to exercise their political power during phase two of the centralization policy. The results of forcing the Mi’kmaq onto the two larger reserves in 1941 had an adverse effect on the delicate economic and social balance within, and serve as an example of what might happen with a sudden large growth in the population.

In order to develop an understanding of the impact of centralization on Mi’kmaq reserves, this chapter has provided a comparison between the centralization project of 1941 and that of Millbrook in 1916. The social and political stability that existed on Millbrook prior to centralization helped secure the social and economic structures of Millbrook during and after relocation. Millbrook had access to employment opportunities in nearby Truro. Residents had access to a supply of wood for fuel. Many had subsistence gardens and hunted to subsidize their diet. After having been Chief for decades, Joseph Julian enjoyed the respect and confidence of those he served. After some initial concerns over political representation, the newcomers apparently came to accept Joseph Julian as their Chief. He was not intimidated by Indian Affairs and he possessed the ability to recognize the probable consequences of doubling the population on the Millbrook Reserve. Indian Affairs, through their representatives Boyd and Bury, recognized the need to consult with Julian and the Halifax County Band on issues surrounding the centralization of the Millbrook Reserve. All Mi’kmaq involved in phase one, both the Millbrook Council and the relocatees, were party to discussions before any final decision was made.
Provisions were made to protect everyone involved, from the construction of adequate housing for those who moved, to securing additional land to provide resources for housing, fuel and farming so as to not over-exploit the existing properties. This served to avoid compromising the quality of life enjoyed by established Millbrook residents, while helping the newcomers settle into their new lives with little hardship.

The political and social structures of Indian Brook as centralization got under way in 1941 were not as stable as those of Millbrook in 1916. While employment opportunities were not readily available, the over 1700 acres on Indian Brook did secure a fuel supply and allow for subsistence farming and for hunting as a supplement to the diet of the pre-centralization reserve population. The political structure had experienced periods of instability prior to 1941 and was particularly unstable as phase two of centralization was implemented. Neither Indian Affairs officials nor the Indian Brook residents made any effort to ensure that their interests would be looked after by holding an election on that reserve before centralization had begun. The Indian Brook Reserve had no Chief or Council from 1939 to 1942 when John Marr was elected Chief. Marr appears not to have had a grasp of the significance of the changes taking effect within his community, making no effort to become politically involved in the relocation project. Neither Chief Marr nor anyone in Indian Affairs appeared to exercise any foresight during the centralization of Indian Brook. As the population grew to six times the initial number of 155 persons in 1941, all existing resources were strained beyond their capacity. No one thought to acquire additional resources to accommodate for the rapid population growth. The results proved catastrophic to residents old and new residing on the reserve. All would face one of the worst periods in their recent history.
CHAPTER III
DISCUSSION of the SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SITUATIONS on POST-CENTRALIZATION MI’KMAQ RESERVES

This chapter will take a closer look at the effect of centralization on the social and political lives of the Indian Brook Reserve residents. It is important to first understand that the economic, social, and political cultures of the Mi’kmaq people as they existed prior to centralization had already undergone dramatic changes since European settlement. This work has stated that legislation geared towards the growth of settlement and the development of a capitalist economy imposed by British rule, and then the Canadian Government, served to undermine Mi’kmaq cultural traditions, thereby disrupting the economic, social and political stability of Mi’kmaq communities. The Mi’kmaq were left without a substantial land base, the approximately 22,000 acres of reserved land hardly able to sustain a hunting and gathering type of existence. Neither were the Mi’kmaq afforded the opportunity to find a new source of economic activity that would allow them to merge into the capitalist economy that governed the new order.

Left with the responsibility of helping these people regain some sort of stability in their lives, the Department of Indian Affairs very often made the same major mistake, failing to include the Mi’kmaq in the decision-making process. This factor led to the failure of many programs geared towards fixing the “Indian problem.” Centralization in 1941 was one such project. The centralization effort in 1916 was a different matter, however. Even though the economic situation in the Maritimes was stable over the course of the 1910s, the Department of Indian Affairs was seeking to develop ways to cut the costs of administering to the small groups of Mi’kmaq that were spread across the province. The idea of centralizing the Mi’kmaq was created both by that
desire and as a result of complaints of individual property owners who wanted Mi'kmaq squatters removed from their properties. Even with the costs associated with World War One creating a fiscal shortage, Indian Affairs did not force the centralization issue in the early stages of the policy. At no time over the course of the approximately eight years of trying to find a place of permanent settlement for Mi'kmaq squatters was anyone forced into moving somewhere that didn’t appeal to them. The Department of Indian Affairs was extremely patient with the Mi’kmaq starting with the first petition of 1911, up to 1919 when the first 22 people moved to Millbrook. After the first of 22 of the group migrated, they were followed later in the same year by 5 more families, and finally the last 55 members of the Halifax County Band made their way to Millbrook in 1919.

In comparing the pre-centralization situation on the Millbrook Reserve to that of Indian Brook in Chapter II, it is apparent that some Mi’kmaq groups had been better able than others to carve out a more stable existence within the new order and had found a way to come to terms with the rules under which they existed. Additionally, the Millbrook Council had maintained its political authority to the maximum degree allowed by Indian Affairs. Others were not so fortunate. Life within Mi’kmaq communities was wrought with problems unique to on-reserve living, problems that were further aggravated by external social and economic changes. In the case of centralization in 1941, the Great Depression had been a leading factor in the implementation of phase two of the policy. Unfortunately, by 1941 the Indian Brook Reserve had not found the social or political stability that Millbrook had achieved in 1916. As discussed in the first two chapters, phase two of the centralization policy had thrown life on the Indian Brook Reserve into a state of chaos and had brought the community beyond the brink of disaster.

People generally identify themselves first as part of a family group and secondly through
their place or role within their community. In the case of phase one of centralization, the Halifax County Band, though being forced out of their original area, had decided that their destination would be the Millbrook Reserve. Their leaders discussed with the Band any and all aspects of the move, from the decision to relocate to Millbrook to how monies were to be spent to allow for an easier transition. They conferred with the Department of Indian Affairs and Chief Julian on the specific details associated with the move and were not forced to relocate without the appropriate preparation. Julian maintained a strong voice throughout the whole process. When the Halifax County Band finally moved to Millbrook, they did so as a group. They, in essence, moved their community from one location to another, secure in the fact that they would remain together and rebuild their lives on their newly purchased property. They had enough land to initiate agricultural pursuits, both private and commercial, and the resources were there to allow them to continue the tradition of making axe and pick handles and the like that they might sell outside their reserve. They were close in proximity to Truro, affording them opportunities for wage labour and a market for their homemade wares and agricultural products. After voicing some concern over their political prerogative as a band separate from the Colchester Band, the Halifax County Band accepted their place and recognized Chief Julian as their leader. Politically the Halifax County Band was absorbed into the Colchester Band, but it appears that the entire community came together as one with no major social or political problems.

Over the years Chief Julian, still working with the full support of Indian Affairs, continued to make purchases of property that helped maintain the security of the community. They purchased the access road between the original Millbrook Reserve and the Halifax County Band property in 1953, and more importantly they finally got permission in 1955 to purchase the rifle
range which had been exploited for many years by the band as their source of firewood.

Additionally, McLean, in 1920, specifically stated that Chief Julian had full right to accept Peter Googoo and his family into the Colchester Band. However, as Googoo had previously been a member of the Inverness Band, he and his family were not allowed to build on the newly purchased Halifax County Band property as the land had been purchased from that Band’s own funds. Julian apparently found a place for Googoo on the older part of the Millbrook Reserve. The due care and caution exercised over the years helped the Millbrook Reserve remain stable.

During the course of phase two of the centralization policy in 1941, Mi’kmaq people from all over the province made their way to the Indian Brook Reserve. It mattered not who had been using the land prior to centralization. The reserve became a virtual melting pot for Mi’kmaq who had formerly belonged to a number of different Bands. These emigrants could no longer feel secure in the knowledge that they belonged to a unified community to which they could turn when in need. Nor were they secure in their political position within the larger reserve. They could no longer look to their own leaders to protect their welfare and fight for their rights. The loss of community adversely affected these new members of Indian Brook as they struggled to integrate into everyday life on their new reserve. Many of these people were getting by economically prior to moving to Indian Brook. However, that security was also destroyed as they left behind their family gardens and whatever monetary opportunities they may have generated through wage labour or the sale of homemade wares.

The large and rapid influx of people also affected the sense of community for the established Mi’kmaq on that reserve. That small group was suddenly outnumbered six-fold and these people had to come to terms with hundreds of strangers descending on their once small
settlement as houses sprang up all over the reservation. The number of white people on the reserve increased as Indian Affairs had taken over administration. Politically, as well as socially, they were outnumbered. Their land base was rapidly diminishing, and within a very short time it became apparent that the carrying capacity of the Indian Brook Reserve had been greatly exceeded. Not only was the entire population of Indian Brook left without enough firewood, but the pre-centralization economy was destroyed due to the overexploitation of the forested area. Milling was no longer an option. The monetary family income that was earned from the sale of homemade wooden wares was eliminated as the Mi’kmaq were no longer able to create goods for marketing. Agricultural ventures on a personal scale were difficult, on a commercial scale impossible. There proved also to be not enough land to accommodate the growth in numbers of livestock that came with the new members. Everyone suffered the effects of overcrowding.

It seems that members old and new residing on the Indian Brook Reserve vented their frustrations on each other. Their economic stability destroyed, many ended up on welfare. So too was the social stability within the reserve severely compromised. The fact that centralization increased the dependence of the Mi’kmaq on Indian Affairs, not only economically but socially, can be placed on the doorstep of Indian Affairs itself. As part of centralization, Indian Affairs took over many of the responsibilities formerly accorded the Band, including education, religious organization and law enforcement. The Mi’kmaq language was not acceptable to those put in charge of educating Mi’kmaq children. Their religious celebrations were no longer organized by the elders of the community. The Mi’kmaq did not respect the imposed law enforcement agencies as they had their own people. Many complained about the increase in crime on the larger reserve, lamenting on the loss of freedom to wander their reserve without fear of being accosted by
someone else. Public and household disturbances associated with substance abuse became a common occurrence as well, undermining the family unit and threatening community stability.

Officials, several whom had been involved in the centralization of Millbrook, were determined to see that all the Mi’kmaq of the province would be resettled in either Indian Brook or Eskasoni in 1941. The fact that certain officials were concerned over the willingness of the Mi’kmaq to relocate was ignored. Even though the Millbrook project had proven relatively successful, these officials were acutely aware that this was due in part to the cooperation between all those people involved, Indian Affairs, the Halifax County Band and the Colchester Band. Those who wanted centralization in 1941 were determined that they knew what was best for the Mi’kmaq and for mainstream society, and despite the efforts of others to slow the project down, the centralization project was reignited without any consideration of Mi’kmaq concerns. That inconsideration proved to cause the Mi’kmaq much hardship.

In 1941 Indian Affairs went so far as to threaten the Mi’kmaq with abandonment and enfranchisement should they chose not to move. This proved to be a very effective means of persuading the Mi’kmaq to bend to their will. Though total enfranchisement of all Aboriginal peoples did indeed form the backbone of the Indian Act, threats of such measures were not imposed on the Halifax County Band over the course of discussion around phase one of centralization. The only mention of enfranchisement came when Martin Sack and Bert Howe expressed their desire to live on their own piece of property outside and official reserve in the province. In 1941, Inspector Arneil recommended that Indian Agents not force those Mi’kmaq from the smaller reserves to relocate if they were maintaining some sort of income and contributing to the support of their families. However, he went on to state that should these people chose to
remain on their reserves, then they must enfranchise. The Department of Indian Affairs put enormous pressure on the leaders of the smaller Mi’kmaq communities to move their people to either Indian Brook or Eskasoni under threat of being abandoned to their fate and forced to enfranchise should they chose to remain in their homes. This was hardly a positive note on which to undertake such a large project. The newcomers were joining the larger reserves under a cloud of suspicion and resentment, many angry at their own leaders for throwing aside the democratic nature of their government by giving in to Indian Affairs without the consent of the electorate. They were fearful of what was in store for them, both economically and politically, under the new Band government.

The proximity of Millbrook to Truro was considered a positive factor that would contribute to the economic success of Millbrook. Indeed Boyd recommended against the purchase of Spring Brook for the Mi’kmaq of Elmsdale in 1917 based on the fact that the property was far removed from the economic opportunities afforded the group through their close proximity to Dartmouth. Conversely, the Department of Indian Affairs was anxious to move the Mi’kmaq away from the urban centers in 1941. Neither officials nor the general public wanted the Mi’kmaq competing for jobs in the towns and cities. How they thought the Mi’kmaq could possibly become self-sufficient by isolating them in a specific area without first providing enough land to accommodate the growing population is astoundingly contradictory to their rational behind centralization. Their desire to rid themselves of any financial obligation to the welfare of the Mi’kmaq by centralizing them was totally undermined as a result of their own policy.

Political stability on the Millbrook Reserve during phase one was a very positive factor which contributed greatly to the success of the project. Moreover, Indian Affairs recognized the
right of Band leaders to control the membership of their band. The fact that Indian Affairs respected the political authority of Julian and continued to work side by side with him over the years helped instill confidence in the Halifax County members’ decision to move to Millbrook and aided greatly in their acceptance of Julian as a powerful and competent leader.

In 1941, the Department of Indian Affairs took full advantage of the political instability that existed on the Indian Brook Reserve. While the reasons for that instability are uncertain, it can perhaps be attributed to the many changes imposed on the group over the years. It is clear that at this time Indian Affairs had no desire to promote the political rights of the Band as they existed under the Indian Act. The residents of Indian Brook were never consulted about Indian Affairs intention to change the face of their community forever. Their right under the Indian Act to control Band membership was denied them, as was their right to political representation. Since the reserve had no official leadership at the time, Indian Affairs officials were free to move in and set the project in motion without interference from a Chief or Band Council. After John Marr was elected chief in 1942, Indian Affairs made no effort to consult with him about any concerns he might have had on behalf of his people. In all fairness, neither did Marr put forth any resistance to the project, choosing instead to sit back and watch as the events unfolded, oblivious to the damage that centralization would ultimately cause to the community.

With the election of Steven Knockwood in March 1945 came the beginning of some sense of the political stability that Indian Brook had been sorely lacking. The newcomers were likely disillusioned with their own leaders, many feeling betrayed after their Chiefs neglected to take into account their wishes in favor of those of Indian Affairs. Some viewed the whole affair as a sell-out on the part of their leaders to the detriment of their people. The same might be said of those who
had resided on the Indian Brook Reserve prior to centralization. Certainly Marr was ousted from office for some unknown reason, thereby leaving the position vacant for approximately ten months. Given the fact that people from the many different Bands in Nova Scotia were now residing on Indian Brook, it is safe to assume that it would have been difficult to find a leader who would instill confidence in both the old and new residents. It seems that Knockwood was a good choice. Under majority vote he went on to serve six consecutive years as Chief of the Indian Brook Reserve. He would later be chosen to replace John Bernard after his resignation in March 1948 and he was subsequently elected Chief for the following two-year term. Knockwood ultimately served nine years as Chief of the Indian Brook Reserve. Given his history, he could indeed have possibly been one of the most unbiased and empathetic people on the reserve. He too had undergone some very difficult times in his efforts to find an acceptable place to which to move his family during the crisis faced by the Mi'kmaq of Elmsdale years earlier. He had been refused membership to the Millbrook Reserve in the 1920s, but some time later he had made his way to Indian Brook. His experiences during his own relocation, coupled with the twenty-five years he had resided at Indian Brook, surely would have provided Knockwood an understanding of the concerns of all residents on the reserve. However, there was nothing that Knockwood could have done to change the events that were already in progress on the reserve. People were still moving into Indian Brook while others were getting fed up with the whole affair and choosing to take their chances back on their former reserves.

Table 3.4 Appendix III shows that from the time of Knockwood's election in March 1945, the Indian Brook Reserve henceforth kept with the election process as outlined in the Indian Act. They were represented by a Chief and the appropriate number of councillors to suit the rise in the
population after centralization. Additionally, officials were beginning to realize that administering
to the Mi’kmaq would be easier if each group had their own leaders. By 1950, McKinnon had
conceded that running the reserves under the principal of centralization was not working and both
he and Agent Rice recognized the need for all groups to hold elections on their own reserves. The
need for strong, pragmatic leadership that would serve to protect the social stability on reserves
had become evident. As long as Band Councils have control over the population on reserves, and
provisions are made to accommodate any dramatic changes, a repeat of the results of the
centralization of 1941 could likely be avoided.

In summary, social and political factors profoundly affected the outcome of centralization.
Earlier centralization efforts proved more successful. The Millbrook Reserve in 1916 seemed to
be faring well economically. They had enjoyed strong political representation under Chief Joseph
Julian, who requested and received additional resources to meet the requirements of centralization
and the resulting population increase. Local Indian Affairs officials often requested the input of
concerned parties and considered their recommendations throughout the entire phase one of the
centralization policy.

Phase two of the centralization project is largely viewed as a failure. The social and
political organization of Indian Brook in 1941 was not stable enough to withstand a rapid
expansion of the community. The Indian Brook Reserve was experiencing another in a series of
periods whereby leadership was weak or non-existent on that reserve. The Department of Indian
Affairs neglected to consult with the Mi’kmaq prior to or during implementation of the 1941
centralization. Therefore, phase two of centralization was forced on an uninformed and unwilling
population. More importantly, centralization resulted in a complete collapse of the local economy.
with the associated demise of the existing social structure. The forests were depleted, leaving the Mi’kmaq without economic resources and without firewood. Indian Affairs made no effort to secure additional resources for the six-fold increase in population which occurred over a short period. The isolation of Indian Brook made procurement of outside employment nearly impossible. The vast majority of Mi’kmaq on Indian Brook ended up on welfare. Social problems related to substance abuse were a constant complaint of Indian Brook residents. The imposed law enforcement agency was ineffective in keeping order and many lamented the loss of their personal security and freedom.

The success of the Millbrook centralization effort and the failure of the centralization project of 1941 on the Indian Brook Reserve were predetermined by the combination of social and political factors which existed there at the time. It becomes obvious that not only did centralization affect the existing social and political structures of the Mi’kmaq but in many ways those same social and political factors in turn determined the success or failure of the centralization policy.
APPENDIX I

TOTAL MI’KMAQ POPULATION from 1920 to 1946

Table 1.1: Mi’kmaq population and numbers of occupied reserves in Nova Scotia for given years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL POPULATION</th>
<th>TOTAL RESERVES</th>
<th>OCCUPIED RESERVES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>2,031</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>2,040 (1,500 persons lived permanently on reserves while 640 were squatters)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>1,827</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1,966</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>2,063</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>2,363</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Existing census recordings for the Mi’kmaq people of Nova Scotia are sketchy, leaving many gaps over the decades. Prior to the 1930s, what did get recorded tended to be the total population of all Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia as opposed to listing the numbers of persons living on any given reserve at any given time. The Supervisor of Indian Timber Lands, H.J. Bury, reported that as of February 27th, 1920 the total Mi’kmaq population for Nova Scotia was 2,031 persons. Without giving any specific detail, Bury stated that of forty-five Mi’kmaq reserves in Nova Scotia, twenty-five were occupied at that time.133

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In 1924, Bury reported the total population of Mi'kmaq as 2,040. He stated that 1,500 persons were living permanently on twenty-six reserves. Bury recorded the total number of Reserves as forty-three, two less than in 1920. He also stated that 640 Mi'kmaq were living in shacks that skirted the major centers around Nova Scotia including Sydney, Halifax, New Glasgow, Yarmouth and Inverness. Three years later, in 1927, the total population of Mi'kmaq was recorded as 1,827 with twenty of forty-three reserves occupied. In 1931 the total population was calculated at 1,966, with twenty-one of forty reserves occupied. The census of 1941 recorded 2,063 Mi'kmaq in Nova Scotia. In 1946 the total population of Mi'kmaq in Nova Scotia was recorded in the Royal Commission Report of that year as 2,363. The report gave more specific information on individual reserves as outlined in Table 2.3 in Appendix II.

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134Ibid. Letter from H.J. Bury to the Department of Indian Affairs., December 20, 1924.

135Ibid. Memorandum: Honorable Charles Stewart from Deputy Superintendent General, March 5, 1927.

136Ibid. Letter to the Deputy Minister from the Supervisor of Indian Timber Lands, December 15, 1931.

137PANS, RG10, vol. 3161, file 365-009-4, Dominion census of 1941.
APPENDIX II

MI'KMAQ POPULATION BY RESERVE from 1900 to 1969

Table 2.1: List of Counties and respective population of Mi'kmaq people in 1931.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTY</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANnapolis</td>
<td>94 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigonish &amp; Guysboro</td>
<td>184 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Breton ( Eskasoni Reserve)</td>
<td>158 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Breton ( Sydney Reserve)</td>
<td>125 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colchester</td>
<td>124 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumberland</td>
<td>98 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Digby</td>
<td>88 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halifax</td>
<td>157 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hants (Indian Brook)</td>
<td>41 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hants (Windsor)</td>
<td>15 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inverness</td>
<td>224 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kings</td>
<td>72 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunenburg</td>
<td>11 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pictou</td>
<td>158 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queens</td>
<td>37 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richmond</td>
<td>180 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelburne</td>
<td>40 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>111 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yarmouth</td>
<td>49 people</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1930, the Department of Indian Affairs was in the process of downsizing, reducing the
number of agents for Nova Scotia from 19 to 2. This arrangement lasted only a couple of months during the spring of 1932.\textsuperscript{138} However, the Department found it necessary to make an account of the numbers of Mi’kmaq people living in various areas in order to divide the province in what would seem a fair and manageable number of counties for each of the two new agents. Table 2.1 lists the numbers of people living in the 19 counties in Nova Scotia.\textsuperscript{139}

In a general report to Indian Affairs, Bury, in the summer of 1935, recorded that Cambridge Reserve had 12 families, Bear River Reserve had 13 families, and Millbrook Reserve had 27 families. Bury also mentioned Richard Nivens and his 5 children of Tufts Cove, Dartmouth. He stated also that 12 families from the Windsor Junction area had previously moved to the Millbrook Reserve making the total number of families 39. At the same time Ship Harbour, Kejimkujik and Ingram River Reserves were surrendered, New Germany Reserve was deeded to white settlers, and Pennal Reserve was leased. The document did not specify to where the people of these reserves moved, assuming there were indeed people residing there at all during that time frame.\textsuperscript{140}

Unfortunately, this information spoke little about either the settlement patterns of the Mi’kmaq, or their movements prior to the centralization of 1941. However, an Investigative

\textsuperscript{138}PANS, RG10, vol. 3220, file 536-764-1. Two agents were hired to administer to Mi’kmaq affairs in Nova Scotia. W. Maxner was assigned eleven counties, Cumberland, Colchester, Halifax, Hants, Kings, Lunenburg, Annapolis, Queens, Digby, Yarmouth and Shelburne at an annual salary of $2,040. C.J. McNeil was assigned the seven counties of Pictou, Guysburo, Antigonish, Richmond, Inverness, Victoria and Cape Breton at an annual salary of $1,920.

\textsuperscript{139}\textit{Ibid.} List compiled by Indian Affairs, 1931.

\textsuperscript{140}\textit{Ibid.} Department of Indian Affairs memo, general report from H.J. Bury to Dr. McGill, June 18, 1935.
Report on Indian Reserves completed in 1941 by W. S. Arneil did mention that the population of the Indian Brook Reserve as of that year was 155 persons.\textsuperscript{141} That number is important to this thesis, allowing a comparison with some future listings of the population on the Indian Brook Reserve and other reserves on mainland Nova Scotia. It also provides a clearer picture of the numbers that moved during the enforcement of the centralization policy.

A recurring problem with the primary sources, particularly letters written by Indian Affairs officials, was the inconsistency of information. For example, in October 1946, as Indian Affairs agents tried to clarify who and how many were living where, confusion ensued in answer to questions from the Royal Commission on Indian Affairs. Mr. Rice, agent for the Shubenacadie Agency, suggested that 5 families were living on the Bear River Reserve at that time. It was later stated by Agent Morris that 6 families lived there at that time while 7 other families had moved to Shubenacadie. He went on to suggest that if the commissioner wanted any population statistics for Shubenacadie or Eskasoni he could find them in Agent Arneil’s report. The commissioner wanted to read this report because he was of the impression that at least 100 people were living on the Bear River Reserve and 32 children were attending the school there. Morris did not think there was a school on the Bear River Reserve, and if such a school existed, then he did not understand why Indian Affairs should be operating a school for such a small number of students. In Morris’ view, Rice knew some of the Mi’kmaq people by their first names, and he implied that Rice was showing favoritism to these people.\textsuperscript{142} Apparently Rice went ahead and did a count on the Bear Reserve.

\textsuperscript{141}W. S. Arneil, \textit{Investigative Report on Indian Reserves and Indian Administration, Province of Nova Scotia, Indian Affairs Branch}.

\textsuperscript{142}PAC, RG 14 D4, Records of Parliament, Royal Commission on Indian Affairs, October, 1946.
River Reserve and included the findings in a letter to Morris dated November 4th, 1946. Rice found that 7 families were living on the Bear River Reserve while 6 others had moved to Shubenacadie. These were the families of Mathew Pictou, James Harlow, John Pictou, Ben Brooks, John L. Lewis and Mrs. Mary Bradford.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.} Letter from H.C. Rice to J.E. Morris, November 4, 1946.}

The Royal Commission also listed population numbers for two other reserves though the numbers contradicted each other, perhaps once again due to the conflicting testimony of various Indian Agents. There was first reported 4 families residing at Cambridge, then the document later listed 5 families. It also stated that 6 or 8 families had already moved to the Indian Brook Reserve, Shubenacadie. Kings Clear Reserve was listed as having 11 families at that time.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.} Royal Commission on Indian Affairs, October, 1946.}

A more complete list of the population of Mi'kmaq living on Nova Scotia Mi'kmaq reserves as of 1946 was included in a letter from Rice to the Department of Indian Affairs in 1949.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{AREA} & \textbf{POPULATION} \\
\hline
GUYSBOROUGH COUNTY: COOK'S COVE & 22 people \\
& & DORTS COVE \\
\hline
ANTIGONISH COUNTY: HEATHERTON, AFTON, & 121 people \\
SUMMERSIDE & SOUTH RIVER \\
\hline
PICTOU COUNTY: PICTOU LANDING RESERVE & 74 people \\
(another place is listed in this grouping but is illegible) \\
\hline
COLCHESTER COUNTY: MILLBROOK & 124 people \\
\hline
CUMBERLAND COUNTY: HALFWAY 7 SQUATTERS & 39 people \\
\hline
HALIFAX COUNTY: SHEET HARBOUR & SQUATTERS & 56 people \\
\hline
LUNENBOURG COUNTY: GOLD RIVER & 16 people \\
& & & SQUATTERS \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Population of Mi'kmaq Reserves in 1946.}
\end{table}
In 1949, Rice forwarded a letter to the Department of Indian Affairs whereby he stated that 700 people were currently living in the "area of Micmac."\textsuperscript{145} It is not clear exactly what Rice meant here. The Indian Brook Reserve was, and is, sometimes referred to as Micmac. The agent had already recorded the population of Indian Brook as 816 in 1946. He may indeed have been estimating the population of the Indian Brook Reserve some three years later, in 1949. It is quite likely that people had already begun filtering out of Indian Brook and back to their former reserves or to other reserves around Nova Scotia, not satisfied with the conditions on Indian Brook after it became clear that the centralization project was not going to work out.

Table 3.2, Appendix III, will list the membership of 6 Bands on mainland Nova Scotia for 1958. These numbers are significant when trying to establish the numbers of people who moved during the centralization scheme, and the numbers who moved back to their former reserves after it became clear that it had been a mistake to uproot their lives. Table 2.3 compared the population data for the years 1931 (Table 2.1), 1946 (Table 2.2) and 1958 (Table 3.2). Although it is not safe

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
QUEENS COUNTY: WILDCAT RESERVE & SQUATTER & 45 people  
\hline
SHELBOURNE COUNTY: SQUATTERS & 32 people 
\hline
YARMOUTH COUNTY: YARMOUTH RESERVE & SQUATTERS & 30 people 
\hline
DIGBY COUNTY: BEAR RIVER & 76 people 
\hline
ANNAPOlis COUNTY: LEQUILLE RESERVE & SQUATTERS & 69 people 
\hline
KINGS COUNTY; CAMBRIDGE RESERVE & SQUATTERS & 112 people 
\hline
HANTS COUNTY: INDIAN BROOK & 816 people 
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{145}TARR Center, Department of Mines and Resources, Indian Affairs Branch, file 51-29-1, Letter from H.C. Rice to Indian Affairs, March 23, 1949.
to assume that the numbers are completely accurate, particularly considering the fact that each listing may not include all the same areas as do the other listing, the established pattern does reveal something of the movement of the Mi'kmaq between 1931 and 1958. It became very clear that in virtually every case, the population of each county was significantly lower in 1946 than that of 1931. The population of the Indian Brook Reserve, however, rose dramatically, particularly between 1941 and 1946. In 1931, the population of Indian Brook was a mere 41 persons. As mentioned earlier, the count in 1941 on that reserve was 155 persons. By 1946 the population of Indian Brook had escalated to 816 people.

An examination of the statistics for 1958, with relation to the previous years, revealed that as many as 210 Mi'kmaq had already filtered back to their former reserves by that year, or at the very least they had made their way to someplace other than the Indian Brook Reserve. The population on the Indian Brook Reserve had dropped to 606 people by 1958 while the population of each county listed showed a significant increase in population after 1946 and by 1958.

Table 2.3: Comparative populations of Mi'kmaq people for mainland Nova Scotia Counties for 1931, 1946 and 1958.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTY</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1946</th>
<th>1958</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANnapolis</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigonish &amp; Guysborough</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pictou</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colchester</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumberland</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halifax</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunenbourg</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

146 W. S. Arneil, *Investigative Report on Indian Reserves and Indian Administration.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>37</th>
<th>45</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>QUEENS</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHELBOURNE</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YARMOUTH</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KINGS</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>112</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIGBY</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HANTS (INDIAN BROOK)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>606</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX III

MI'KMAQ POLITICAL FIGURES from 1900 to 1969

This section contains information on Mi'kmaq political figures on mainland Nova Scotia Mi'kmaq Reserves dating from 1900 to 1969. Tables 3.1 through 3.12 are a compilation of available data on Mi'kmaq Chiefs and Councils, along with election dates and other pertinent information surrounding terms of office. The bulk of information listed in these tables was found through two specific sources. The first was a list of Chiefs of Mi'kmaq Reserves in Nova Scotia, including the date of each election and the terms of office, starting as early as 1856, which was published in the Micmac News, September 1972. The second source was the Department of Indian Affairs files list of Mi'kmaq Chiefs and Councils for Mi'kmaq reserves dating back to 1856.

The Micmac News data reflected that which was contained in the Department of Indian Affairs election files with respect to Chiefs for the Shubenacadie Band except in the following instances. The Department of Indian Affairs had no record of Newell McDonald being elected Chief on July 26th, 1911. The Department list read that Chief John Noel was elected on July 1st, 1897 and died on May 20th, 1911. Although it inferred such, it did not clarify whether or not John Noel did indeed keep that position until his death. In 1884, an Act for conferring certain privileges on the more advanced Bands of Indians\textsuperscript{147} ruled that an election had to be held once a year. However, the election of John Noel in 1897 was the only election on Departmental record for the Shubenacadie Band until Simon Bass (spelled Bastt in the Micmac News) was elected Chief on

\textsuperscript{147}An Act for conferring certain privileges on the more advanced Bands of the Indians of Canada, with a view of training them for the exercise of municipal powers, April 19, 1884.
July 28th, 1913. (See Table 3.4) Table 3.1 lists further discrepancies between the Micmac News and the Department of Indian Affairs files with respect to election dates for the Shubenacadie Band. These dates varied by a matter of anywhere from only a couple of days to a couple of weeks. One explanation may be that there was much going on in Canada at the time. Given the fact that these elections were held prior to 1950, during the Great Depression of the 1930s and then World War Two throughout the 1940s, it would not be surprising to find that the transfer of information from Indian Affairs officials in Nova Scotia to the Department in Ottawa might have taken some time. Indeed, given the conditions in Canada over the course of this period in our history, this information surely would not have been very high on the list of priorities. It is likely either that the Department of Indian Affairs dates were the official effective dates as every action having to do with Aboriginal affairs had to first be cleared through the Department.

Table 3.1: Discrepancies between the Micmac News and Department of Indian Affairs files with respect to election dates for the Shubenacadie Band of Mi'kmaq.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHIEF</th>
<th>MICMAC NEWS DATE ELECTED</th>
<th>DEPT. OF INDIAN AFFAIRS DATE ELECTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WILLIAM PAUL</td>
<td>JUNE 21, 1921</td>
<td>JULY 6, 1921.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOHN MALONEY</td>
<td>AUG. 28, 1933</td>
<td>AUG. 31, 1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILLIAM PAUL SR.</td>
<td>DEC. 28, 1936</td>
<td>JAN. 22, 1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOHN MARR</td>
<td>FEB. 9, 1942</td>
<td>MARCH 13, 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEPHEN KNOCKWOOD</td>
<td>MAR. 28, 1945</td>
<td>APRIL 4, 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEPHEN KNOCKWOOD</td>
<td>MAR. 30, 1948</td>
<td>APRIL 10, 1948</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similar to that which is contained in Table 2.1, the Micmac News reported the election of 1965 for the Truro Band to have been held on March 25th, while the Departmental files listed it as having been on December 3rd of that year.
Both sets of records for the Bear River Band also had a slight discrepancy. According to the Department of Indian Affairs election files, Richard James McEwan was elected Chief on November 4th, 1963 and again on November 4th, 1965. The file then stated that James Richard McEwan was elected on November 14, 1967. According to the 1951 Amendment to the Indian Act, elections on reserves would thereafter be held every two years. The Departmental files, however, did not record the election of 1969. The election of November 17th, 1971, again listed Richard McEwan as elected Chief. The Micmac News, on the other hand, listed a James R. McEwan as elected Chief starting with the election of 1963, up to and including the election of 1971, and also including the election of 1969. According to the Micmac News, James R. McEwan held office from 1963 to 1971. It is therefore safe to conclude that Richard James McEwan and James Richard McEwan were one and the same person. This work accepts his years in office as those listed in the Micmac News. (See Table 3.7)

Although the Department of Indian Affairs, in two separate instances, did not recognize the appointment or the election of certain Mi'kmaq Chiefs for this period, these Chiefs remain, nevertheless, as part of the history of the Mi'kmaq political structure. As in the case of the Mi'kmaq recognition of McEwan as Chief for eight consecutive years (see Table 3.7), government legislated policy for Aboriginal peoples was very often not in keeping with the beliefs or the reality of these people's everyday lives. According to the Micmac News, September 1972, Joseph Jeremie was temporarily appointed Chief at Elmsdale on August 28th, 1911. The Department of Indian Affairs did not recognize this appointment because the Mi'kmaq residing at Elmsdale were not living on an official reserve at the time. (See Table 3.4) No further mention of Joseph Jeremie could be found prior to nor after this election.
Conversely, Peter Paul's election of July 26th, 1912, as Chief for the Counties of Halifax, Hants, Kings, Lunenburg, Colchester and Cumberland was not recognized by the Department because four of the six counties were recognized as separate Bands and each Band had traditionally elected its own Chief. (See Table 3.4) Like Joseph Jeremie, there was no mention of Peter Paul's involvement in Band Councils in Nova Scotia prior to nor after July 26th, 1912.

Although many sources were mined in the hope of providing a complete list of mainland Nova Scotia Mi'kmaq Band Councils for these six decades, 1900s to the 1960s, there remain many gaps in the time line for the 1910s up to and including most of the 1950s. The process of constructing complete tables for each reserve was an impossible one due to the lack of available information surrounding political leaders and political activity on Mi'kmaq reserves for the decades prior to the 1960s. The Department of Indian Affairs files provided a more complete list from 1959 up to the present. The reason for this is clear since prior to 1959, the Department of Indian Affairs did not recognize all the Mi'kmaq Bands across Nova Scotia as they exist today.

Recognition of Indian nations had eventually gotten lost after the introduction of the Indian Act as all Aboriginal groups in Canada subsequently got lumped together as one tribe and each tribe got demoted to the status of Band. Up to 1959, the Mi'kmaq were officially considered one Band only. It will later become apparent that Indian Affairs was inconsistent with regard to administration of the Indian Act as it pertained to Aboriginal politics, tending to recognize certain Chiefs and Bands in official correspondence, if not in compliance with legislation.

After centralization had halted, H.M. Jones, Director of Indian Affairs, in 1958, drew up a proposal stating that, as per Section 17 of the Indian Act, smaller reserves should be allotted and Bands officially created across mainland Nova Scotia. He included also the total population of
each grouping. (See Table 3.2)

Table 3.2: Proposed structure of smaller Reserves system on mainland Nova Scotia. 1958.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BAND</th>
<th>RESERVES</th>
<th>MEMBERSHIP TO DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFTON</td>
<td>POMQUET, AFTON and FRANKLIN MANOR 48% 1000 ACRES</td>
<td>185 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PICTOU LANDING</td>
<td>FISHERS GRANT, MERIGOMISH and FRANKLIN MANOR 52% 1000 ACRES</td>
<td>198 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRURO</td>
<td>TRURO (MILLBROOK), BEAVER LAKE, SHEET HARBOUR and COLE HARBOUR</td>
<td>232 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHUBENACADIE</td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE, GRAND LAKE, NEW ROSS and PENNAL</td>
<td>606 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANNAPOLIS VALLEY</td>
<td>CAMBRIDGE, HORTON and ST. CROIX</td>
<td>129 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEAR RIVER</td>
<td>BEAR RIVER and WOOD LOT</td>
<td>94 people</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This proposal was sent on to the Deputy Minister who recommended the new system to the Minister. On October 22nd, 1958, the Minister too agreed with Jones’ proposal and gave the project the go ahead.148 By May 1959, the Minister forwarded orders to proceed with the plan. The reserves were allotted as per Jones’ recommendations and the Minister deemed that Band Councils for those reserves would henceforth be determined by an election and the term of office would be two years as per the Indian Act. (See Table 3.3)

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148 TARR Center, UNSI, file 92-1004-19-007, Proposal by H.M. Jones, Director of Indian Affairs, for the creation of Bands and the allotment of smaller reserves on mainland Nova Scotia, October 9th, 1958.
Table 3.3: Minister of Indian Affairs' order that Band Councils be determined by election.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BAND</th>
<th>DATE ORDER MADE</th>
<th>EFFECTIVE DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFTON</td>
<td>MAY 29, 1959</td>
<td>JUNE 1, 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANNAPOLIS VALLEY</td>
<td>SEPT. 4, 1959</td>
<td>SEPT. 8, 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEAR RIVER</td>
<td>SEPT. 4, 1959</td>
<td>SEPT. 8, 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PICTOU LANDING</td>
<td>MAY 29, 1959</td>
<td>JUNE 4, 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRURO BAND</td>
<td>MAY 29, 1959</td>
<td>JUNE 1, 1959</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A general list of Mi'kmaq who did not officially belong to any Band or reserve was created and included with Jones' proposal. This list contained the total of 254 persons. Additionally, five reserved areas were not included in the proposal and it was suggested that these could either be allotted at some future point or used as exchange for other lands that might prove more beneficial to the needs of the Mi'kmaq. These included Gold River, Wildcat, Ponhook Lake, Medway River and Yarmouth. These lots were not subsequently disposed.

The Micmac News in September 1972 determined that the Acadia Band, which comprised all five of these reserves was constituted a Band on June 8th, 1965, thereby granting them the right to elect their own Band Council. However, there was no official record of an election within the Acadia Band prior to July 13th, 1971. On this date, Charles Labrador was elected Chief for an indefinite term of office. The Departmental files stated that "spokesmen" represented the Band's interests prior to the official election of 1971. (See Table 3.11)

149 Ibid.
150 Micmac News, September 1972, and the Department of Indian Affairs election files for Nova Scotia Mi'kmaq reserves.
The time line and the names of Chiefs and Councilors for the Shubenacadie Reserve as recorded in the Micmac News, September 1972, and the Department of Indian Affairs files are listed in Table 3.4. The Micmac News list for the Shubenacadie Band coincided, except for the aforementioned discrepancies, with one from the Department of Indian Affairs. Shubenacadie Band included New Ross No. 20, Pennal No. 19 and Shubenacadie Nos. 13 and 14. Shubenacadie had by far the most complete list of Chiefs and Councils for mainland Nova Scotia dating back to 1856. However, there were several gaps in the time line of interest in this work. The Micmac News stated that there is no record of any election being held at Shubenacadie between the years 1919 and 1921. As Table 3.4 shows, William Paul was then elected on June 29th, 1921. The Micmac News then stated that there is no record of an election between 1921 and 1923. These numbers were inconsistent with the text and may have been a mistake or a misprint. In keeping with the Department of Indian Affairs files, the article should likely have read that there is no record of an election between 1921 and 1933. William Paul's term ended on June 29th, 1924. As each term consisted of three years for this period, the time line consumes three terms of office for which there is no record. The Micmac News stated, however, that William Paul is mentioned in a letter as Chief in 1932. This term would have consumed the years 1930 to 1933. If this is factual then there remains two terms of office for which there is no record, 1924-1927 and 1927-1930. John Maloney was elected on August 28th, 1933. (See Table 3.4)
Table 3.4: Chiefs and Councillors for the Shubenacadie Band of Mi'kmaq, including New Ross No. 20, Pennal No. 19 and Shubenacadie Nos. 13 and 14 Reserves, from 1900 to 1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHIEF</th>
<th>COUNCILLORS</th>
<th>EFFECTIVE</th>
<th>TERM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NEWELL McDONNALLD</td>
<td></td>
<td>JULY 26, 1911</td>
<td>1yr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOSEPH JEREMIE</td>
<td></td>
<td>AUG. 28, 1911</td>
<td>Temporarily appointed for Elmsdale but not recognized by the Dept. of I.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETER PAUL</td>
<td></td>
<td>JULY 26, 1912</td>
<td>Not recognized by the Dept. of I.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIMON BASTT</td>
<td></td>
<td>JULY 28, 1913</td>
<td>3yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISSAC SACK</td>
<td></td>
<td>SEPT. 29, 1916</td>
<td>3yrs. Term ended on Sept. 29, 1919. No election shown until June 29, 1921.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILLIAM PAUL</td>
<td></td>
<td>JUNE 29, 1921</td>
<td>3yrs. There is no further record of an election until 1933.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOHN MALONEY</td>
<td>-MARTIN SACK</td>
<td>AUG. 28, 1933</td>
<td>3yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-ISSAC MARR</td>
<td>[I.A. date Aug. 31, 1933]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILLIAM PAUL SR.</td>
<td>-MARTIN SACK</td>
<td>DEC. 28, 1936</td>
<td>3yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-MICHAEL PARRY</td>
<td>[I.A. date Jan. 22, 1937]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-STEPHEN MALONEY</td>
<td>[I.A. date Mar. 13, 1942]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEPHEN KNOCKWOOD</td>
<td>-MARTIN SACK</td>
<td>MAR. 28, 1945</td>
<td>3yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-WILLIAM PAUL</td>
<td>[I.A. date April 4, 1945]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Members</td>
<td>Start Date</td>
<td>Duration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-HENRY SACK</td>
<td>I.A. date April 10, 1948</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-JOHN FRANCIS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-CHARLES W. FRANCIS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-SIMON NEVIN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-WILLIAM PAUL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-HENRY SACK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEPHEN KNOCKWOOD</td>
<td>-MRS. REBECCA PICTOU</td>
<td>APRIL 7, 1954</td>
<td>2 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-JOHN BERNARD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-FRANK WIGHTLY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-IVAN KNOCKWOOD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOHN A. BERNARD</td>
<td>-ERNEST HOWE</td>
<td>APRIL 23, 1956</td>
<td>2 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-LAWRENCE PAUL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-MICHAEL PAUL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-FRANK MARTIN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVAN KNOCKWOOD</td>
<td>-FRANK MARTIN</td>
<td>APRIL 21, 1958</td>
<td>2 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-WILLIAM PAUL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-MRS. JOHN LEWIS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-CHARLES W. FRANCIS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-EDWARD PAUL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-TOM SILLIBOY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-CHARLES W. FRANCIS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOHN S. KNOCKWOOD</td>
<td>-JOSEPH SILLIBOY</td>
<td>APRIL 23, 1962</td>
<td>2 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-RAYMOND BROOKE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-EDWARD PAUL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-MAXIMUS BASQUE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[The latter two positions were declared vacant by Dept. Order on Mar. 19, 1963.]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-JOHN LEWIS and SIMON NEVIN</td>
<td>---elected on MARCH 24, 1963</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although the Department of Indian Affairs election files excluded the election of 1968, the Micmac News stated that Simon Nevin remained in the office of Chief until April 26th, 1970. One John Knockwood was then voted Chief. Although likely the case, it is not clear whether or not the Council remained the same for 1968 to 1970 as neither source supplied that piece of information.

The following are lists of Chiefs and Councils for the other areas on mainland Nova Scotia, Tables 3.5 through 3.9, as printed in the Micmac News, September 1972, and the Department of Indian Affairs election files. Certain names gleaned from other sources are included and cited accordingly.
Table 3.5: Chiefs and Councillors for the Afton Band of Mi'kmaq, including Franklin Manor, Pomquet and Afton Reserves, from 1900 to 1969.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHIEF</th>
<th>COUNCILLORS</th>
<th>EFFECTIVE</th>
<th>TERM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FRANK PROSPER(^{151})</td>
<td></td>
<td>1919-Signature as Chief.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANK SIMON</td>
<td>-JAMES MARSHALL</td>
<td>JUNE 25, 1959</td>
<td>2yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-FRANK MOSEY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILFRED J. PROSPER</td>
<td>-STEPHEN LEWIS</td>
<td>JULY 20, 1961</td>
<td>2yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-ANNE CHRISTINE SIMON</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILFRED J. PROSPER</td>
<td>-CHARLES LEWIS</td>
<td>NOV. 20, 1963</td>
<td>2yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-MRS. CHARLES LEWIS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILFRED J. PROSPER</td>
<td>-CHARLES LEWIS</td>
<td>NOV. 15, 1965</td>
<td>2yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-BENJAMIN PAUL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOEL LAFFORD</td>
<td>-CHARLES LEWIS</td>
<td>NOV. 27, 1967</td>
<td>2yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-BEN PAUL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETER PERRO</td>
<td>-CHARLES LEWIS</td>
<td>NOV. 27, 1969</td>
<td>2yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-MRS. ETHEL LEWIS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.6: Chiefs and Councillors for the Annapolis Valley Band of Mi'kmaq, including Cambridge, Horton and St. Croix Reserves, from 1900 to 1969.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHIEF</th>
<th>COUNCILLORS</th>
<th>EFFECTIVE</th>
<th>TERM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MICHAEL FRANCIS</td>
<td>-MARSHALL SMITH</td>
<td>OCT. 8, 1959</td>
<td>2yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-AGNES GORMAN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHARLES PHILLIPS</td>
<td>-AGNES GORMAN</td>
<td>OCT. 25, 1961</td>
<td>2yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-JOHN CHARLES SMITH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHARLES PHILLIPS</td>
<td>-JOHN TONEY</td>
<td>NOV. 26, 1963</td>
<td>2yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-JOHN SMITH SR.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOHN A. SMITH</td>
<td>-JOHN COPAGE</td>
<td>NOV. 30, 1965</td>
<td>2yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-EILEEN TONEY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{151}\)TARR Center, UNSI, file 92-1004-19-013, Transfer of deed to a lot at Summerside, Antigonish, to John A. Chisholm, October 1, 1919.
Table 3.7: Chiefs and Councillors for the Bear River Band of Mi'kmaq, including Bear River No. 6 and Bear River No. 6A Reserves, from 1900 to 1969.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHIEF</th>
<th>COUNCILLORS</th>
<th>EFFECTIVE</th>
<th>TERM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L. PETER(^{152})</td>
<td></td>
<td>Referenced as Chief in Commission Report, 1946</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOUIS PETERS</td>
<td>-JOSEPH PAUL</td>
<td>OCT. 7, 1959</td>
<td>2yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-LOUIS HARLOW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOUIS PETERS</td>
<td>-JOSEPH PAUL</td>
<td>OCT. 13, 1961</td>
<td>2yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-JAMES R. McEWAN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAMES R. McEWAN</td>
<td>-LOUIS PICTOU</td>
<td>NOV. 4, 1963</td>
<td>2yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-FREDRICK HARLOW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAMES R. McEWAN</td>
<td>-FREDRICK HARLOW</td>
<td>NOV. 4, 1965</td>
<td>2yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-LOUIS PICTOU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAMES R. McEWAN</td>
<td>-FRANK MEUSE</td>
<td>NOV. 14, 1967</td>
<td>2yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-LOUIS PICTOU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAMES R. McEWAN</td>
<td></td>
<td>NOV. 14, 1969</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{152}\)PAC, RG 14 D4, Records of Parliament, House of Commons, Commission on Indian Affairs, 1946.
Table 3.8: Chiefs and Councillors for the Pictou Landing Band of Mi'kmaq, including Boat Harbour West No. 37, Fishers Grant No. 24G, Franklin Manor No. 22, and Merigomish Harbour No. 13 Reserves, from 1900 to 1969.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHIEF</th>
<th>COUNCILLORS</th>
<th>EFFECTIVE</th>
<th>TERM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALECK MOOSE(^{153})</td>
<td></td>
<td>1916 (Pictou Landing)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOUIS SAPIER(^{154})</td>
<td></td>
<td>1946 (Fishers Grant)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOUIS J. FRANCIS</td>
<td>-ALBERT DENNY</td>
<td>JUNE 24, 1959</td>
<td>2yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-MARTIN SAPIER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOUIS J. FRANCIS</td>
<td>-JOHN PROSPER</td>
<td>JULY 19, 1961</td>
<td>2yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-MARTIN SAPIER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOUIS J. FRANCIS</td>
<td>-JOHN PROSPER</td>
<td>NOV. 8, 1963</td>
<td>2yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-MARTIN SAPIER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOUIS J. FRANCIS</td>
<td>-MAURICE FRANCIS</td>
<td>NOV. 24, 1965</td>
<td>2yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-MARTIN SAPIER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAYMOND FRANCIS</td>
<td>-NOEL MARTIN</td>
<td>NOV. 30, 1967</td>
<td>2yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-MARTIN SAPIER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAYMOND FRANCIS</td>
<td>-JOHN PROSPER</td>
<td>NOV. 30, 1969</td>
<td>2yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-MRS. JOHN FRANCIS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{154}\) RG 14 D4, Records of Parliament, House of Commons Commission on Indian Affairs, 1946.
Table 3.9: Chiefs and Councillors for the Truro Band of Mikmaq, including Beaver Lake No. 17, Cole Harbour No. 30, Millbrook No. 27, Sheet Harbour No. 36 and Truro Nos. 27A, 27B and 27C Reserves, from 1900 to 1969.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHIEF</th>
<th>COUNCILLORS</th>
<th>EFFECTIVE</th>
<th>TERM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JOSEPH JULIAN</td>
<td>CAPTAIN TOM GLOADE (1916)</td>
<td>1916-1918</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOSEPH JULIAN</td>
<td>-W.J. GLOADE</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-W.J. STEPHENS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-FRANK GOULD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOSEPH JULIAN</td>
<td>-WILLIAM STEPHENS</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-FRANK GOULD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-LEWIS PAUL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOSEPH JULIAN</td>
<td>-MICHAEL MARTIN</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOSEPH JULIAN</td>
<td>-MICHAEL MARTIN</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-JOHN BROOKE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GERALD GLOADE</td>
<td>-ALEXANDER JULIAN</td>
<td>JUNE 23, 1959</td>
<td>2yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-ANDREW PAUL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GERALD GLOADE</td>
<td>-ALEXANDER JULIAN</td>
<td>JULY 28, 1961</td>
<td>2yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-DENNIS GLOADE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

155TARR Center, UNSI, 92-1004-19-033. Joseph Julian is mentioned as Chief of the Millbrook Band for many years, including 1916-1918.

156Holmes Whitehead, The Old Man Told Us, p. 302. Letter from Jerry Lonecloud to Chiefs.

157PANS, RG 10, vol 3220, File 536-764-1 Red Series, Department of Indian Affairs, Document signed by Joseph Julian and Council accepting members of the Halifax County Band into the Millbrook Band, August 18, 1919.

158Ibid. Document signed by Joseph Julian and Council accepting members of the Halifax County Band, including Stephen J. Knockwood, into the Millbrook Band, April 21, 1920.

159PAC, RG 14, D4, Records of Parliament, House of Commons, Commission on Indian Affairs, 1946.

The Department of Indian Affairs files and the Micmac News both showed the Millbrook Reserve political history of Chiefs and Councillors as having started with the election of Gerald Gloade as Chief on June 23rd, 1959, for the Truro Band which at this time included Beaver Lake No. 17, Cole Harbour No. 30, Millbrook No. 27, Sheet Harbour No. 36 and Truro No. 27A, 27B and 27C reserves. (See Table 3.9) However, correspondence between a number of Mi'kmaq and various Indian Affairs officials mentioned the Millbrook Reserve Chiefs and Councils. Joseph Julian was recognized as the Chief of Millbrook in a letter dated May 30th, 1919.161 Chief Joseph Julian and Councillors W.J. Gloade, W.J. Stephens and Frank J. Gould signed the aforementioned letter welcoming members of the Halifax County Band, including Louis Paul and John D. Paul, into the Millbrook Band on August 18th, 1919.162 Records of Parliament provided a list of Chiefs and Bands for 1946. This list included Joseph Julian as Chief of the Millbrook Band.163 Joseph

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162 Ibid. August 18, 1919.

163 PAC, RG 14, D4, Records of Parliament, House of Commons, Commission on Indian Affairs, 1946.
Julian also wrote a letter in 1949 to the Indian Commission in his capacity as Chief of the Millbrook Band, along with Councillors Michael Martin and John J. Brook, which is contained in the Records of Parliament.\footnote{Ibid. Letter to the Commission from Chief Joseph Julian and Council, 1949.} According to a historical profile of the Millbrook Reserve contained in the Union of Nova Scotia Indians files, Joseph Julian held the longest term of office for a Mi'kmaq Chief over the course of the 1900s. He held the position from 1916 up to approximately two weeks before his death in 1957.\footnote{TARR Center, UNSI, file 92-1004-19-033.} (See Table 3.9)

According to the Micmac News, the Kedgemakooge Band, also listed as Fairy Lake Band, included Kedgemakooge Reserves No. 7 and 9. Chief Sylvie Pictou signed a document in 1908 surrendering the Kedgemakooge Reserve for lease. He signed another surrender for the timber on that reserve in 1917. Kedgemakooge was surrendered for sale in 1918 by Chief Benjamine Pictou. Up to 1972 all properties associated with the Kedgemakooge Reserve had been sold except for Lots 2, 4 and 5. The terms of office of Sylvie Pictou and Benjamine Pictou were the only mention of Chiefs or Councils on that reserve. (See Table 3.10)

Table 3.10: Chiefs (no Councillors listed) for the Kedgemakooge Band of Mi'kmaq, including Kedgemakooge Reserves Nos. 7 and 9, from 1900 to 1970. The Kedgemakooge Band is also known as the Fairy Lake Band.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHIEF</th>
<th>EFFECTIVE</th>
<th>TERM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SYLVIE PICTOU</td>
<td>1908 - signature as Chief.</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYLVIE PICTOU</td>
<td>1917 - signature as Chief.</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BENJAMINE PICTOU</td>
<td>1918 - signature as Chief.</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A letter from Indian Superintendent A.J. Boyd of River Bourgeois, N.S., to the
Department of Indian Affairs on July 21st, 1916, mentioned Chief Louis Paul of Halifax County.\textsuperscript{166} The same file contained a subsequent letter from Boyd to Indian Affairs dated April 20\textsuperscript{th}, 1918, which mentioned Chief John D. Paul and Louis Paul of the Grand Lake Reserve. A statement of consent for the release of funds was signed by a number of Mi'kmaq of Halifax County on June 18\textsuperscript{th}, 1919. Included in those names were John D. Paul and Lewis Paul. Although John D. Paul used an X to represent his signature, Lewis Paul signed his own name as Lewis, not Louis.\textsuperscript{167} Both Lewis Paul and John D. Paul and their families were accepted into the Millbrook Band by Chief Joseph Julian and Council on August 18\textsuperscript{th}, 1919.\textsuperscript{168} Lewis Paul signed a petition as Councillor accepting a new member from Inverness into the Millbrook Band on June 21\textsuperscript{st}, 1920.\textsuperscript{169} (See Table 3.11) Table 3.11 also records that the Acadia Band was constituted an official Band on June 8\textsuperscript{th}, 1965.\textsuperscript{170}

\textbf{Table 3.11: Available information on Halifax County, Grand Lake and Acadia Band Mi'kmaq Chiefs.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHIEFS and COUNCILLORS</th>
<th>BAND</th>
<th>DATE ELECTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHIEF LEWIS (LOUIS) PAUL</td>
<td>HALIFAX COUNTY</td>
<td>Mentioned as Chief in an official Departmental letter on JULY 21, 1916.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHIEF JOHN D. PAUL</td>
<td>GRAND LAKE RESERVE</td>
<td>Mentioned as Chief in an official Departmental letter on APRIL 20, 1918.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{166}PAC, RG 10, vol. 3160, File 363-417-1, July 1916.

\textsuperscript{167}\textit{Ibid.} June 18, 1919.

\textsuperscript{168}\textit{Ibid.} Petition from members of the Halifax County Band to join the Millbrook Band and official acceptance of those members by Chief Joseph Julian and Council, August 18, 1919.

\textsuperscript{169}\textit{Ibid.} June 21, 1920.

\textsuperscript{170}Micmac News, September, 1972.
While many Mi'kmaq political figures held either the office of Chief or Councillor on the same reserve for more than one term, still others held both offices at some point during their political careers. Still others served as political representative for more than one Band on separate occasions. The information in Table 3.12 is designed to simplify the data in Tables 3.4 through 3.11 with respect to those individuals who served one or more electorates, and those who served in both the capacity of Chief and that of Councillor on a given reserve.

Table 3.12: Political figures who served one or more electorates, and those who served as both Chief and Councillor on a given reserve.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>BAND</th>
<th>OFFICE HELD</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LEWIS (LOUIS) PAUL</td>
<td>HALIFAX COUNTY BAND</td>
<td>CHIEF</td>
<td>JULY 21, 1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TRURO BAND</td>
<td>COUNCILLOR</td>
<td>1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILLIAM PAUL</td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>CHIEF</td>
<td>JUNE 29, 1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>CHIEF</td>
<td>DEC. 28, 1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>COUNCILLOR</td>
<td>MAR. 28, 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>COUNCILLOR</td>
<td>MAR. 27, 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>COUNCILLOR</td>
<td>APR. 21, 1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOHN MALONEY</td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>CHIEF</td>
<td>AUG. 28, 1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>COUNCILLOR</td>
<td>MAR. 27, 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOHN MARR</td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>CHIEF</td>
<td>FEB. 9, 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>COUNCILLOR</td>
<td>APR. 25, 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Band 1</td>
<td>Band 2</td>
<td>Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIMON NEVIN</td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>COUNCILLOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>COUNCILLOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>CHIEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>CHIEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOHN BERNARD</td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>CHIEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>COUNCILLOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>CHIEF</td>
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<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>COUNCILLOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVAN KNOCKWOOD</td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>COUNCILLOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>CHIEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>CHIEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAWRENCE PAUL</td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>TRURO BAND (not certain if both are the same person)</td>
<td>COUNCILLOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TRURO BAND</td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>COUNCILLOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(not certain if both are the same person)</td>
<td>(not certain if both are the same person)</td>
<td>CHIEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOHN BROOKE</td>
<td>TRURO BAND (Spelled BROOKS in this instance)</td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td>COUNCILLOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(not certain if both are the same person)</td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Spelled BROOKS in this instance)</td>
<td>SHUBENACADIE BAND</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARSHALL SMITH</td>
<td>ANnapolis BAND</td>
<td>ANnapolis BAND</td>
<td>COUNCILLOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANnapolis BAND</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAMES R. McEWAN</td>
<td>BEAR RIVER BAND</td>
<td>BEAR RIVER BAND</td>
<td>COUNCILLOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BEAR RIVER BAND</td>
<td>BEAR RIVER BAND</td>
<td>CHIEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BEAR RIVER BAND</td>
<td>BEAR RIVER BAND</td>
<td>CHIEF</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BEAR RIVER BAND</td>
<td>BEAR RIVER BAND</td>
<td>CHIEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BEAR RIVER BAND</td>
<td>BEAR RIVER BAND</td>
<td>CHIEF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It cannot be certain whether Lawrence Paul is the same person who acted as Councillor for the Shubenacadie Band in 1956 and for the Truro Band in 1969 as no record could be found of his transfer from one Band to the other. The same holds true for John Brooke for 1949 and 1960. It is not always safe to make the assumption that both people of the same name are the same person as people of the same name appear frequently throughout documented material. For example, Table 3.4 listed one Simon Nevin as elected Chief in 1966 and holding the office until
1970. Another Simon Nevin was elected Chief of the Truro Band in 1969. Also, Table 2.6 lists John A. Smith as having been elected Chief of the Annapolis Valley Band for consecutive terms in 1965 and in 1967. It also states that John Charles Smith was elected Councillor in 1961. The John Smith Sr. elected Councillor in 1963 could be either of these two persons or indeed someone else entirely.
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PANS


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-------- UNSI, file 92-1004-09-010
-------- UNSI, file 92-1004-19-007.
-------- UNSI, file 92-1004-19-032.
-------- UNSI, file 92-1004-19-033.
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