HAYTER REED, SEVERALTY, AND THE SUBDIVISION OF INDIAN RESERVES ON THE CANADIAN PRAIRIES

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is an examination of Hayter Reed and his Indian polices during the 1887-1897 time period. It concentrates particularly on the policy of severalty that was at the forefront of Reed's initiatives. This thesis challenges the current scholarship on the issue of why severalty was implemented on the Canadian prairies. Sarah Carter (1990) has suggested that Indian lands were subdivided so that surplus reserve lands could be thrown open for settlement and that Indian reserves would eventually disappear. The movement for land surrenders came in the next Government and the concerns for sustained self-sufficiency and efforts to keep Indians from individual indebtedness motivated Reed's initiatives.

This thesis concludes that it was not the demand for Indian reserve lands that precipitated the implementation of severalty on the Canadian prairies. Rather it was the continued cutbacks in Indian Affairs budgets and therefore the need to have Indians on the Canadian prairies become self-supportive that drove the policy of severalty.

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CHAPTER 1

THE VICTORIAN UNDERPINNINGS OF SEVERALTY[1]

> The division of agencies naturally leads to the subject of the still further sub-division of reserves into separate farms. This is by every means carefully encouraged, as a means to the most desirable end of undermining the tribal system, which must necessarily be fostered by the practice of working large farms in common (ARIA 1888: 128).

The subdividing of Indian reserves on the Canadian prairies moved from the proposal stage to implementation during the late 1880s and into the 1890s. The next twenty years was the era within which the subdivision of reserves on the Canadian prairies occurred and in some cases the surveying was protested by Indian people and in other cases the surveying was done at the request of some bands. The main proponent behind the concept of the subdivision of reserves on the Canadian prairies was the Indian Affairs official, Hayter Reed (1849-1936). The central thrust of the policy was seeded in the belief that Indian people had to come to understand the 'advantages' of individual proprietorship in order for them to survive within non-Indian Canadian society.

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[1] For the purposes of this thesis severalty will mean in reference to land that is "held in a person's own right without being joined in interest with another" (Garner 1987: 499).

Sarah Carter in her book Lost Harvests: Prairie Indian Reserve Farmers and Government Policy (1990), suggested that Reed was the key Canadian government official who aided in the failure of Indian agriculture on the Canadian prairies. Carter argued that

> the motivation behind the severalty and peasant farming policies had very little to do with the encouragement of agriculture on reserves. Hayter Reed's central concern was to erode further the Indians' land base until eventually reserves were abolished altogether. Severalty was a short cut policy through which Reed hoped to accelerate the process of Indian enfranchisement, which meant the end of reserves. Severalty would confine the Indians within circumscribed boundaries, and their "surplus" land could be defined and sold (Carter 1990: 235-236).

This paper will demonstrate that Reed's motives for severalty and the peasant farming policy were somewhat different than depicted by Carter (1990). In order to come to a better understanding of what Reed's motives were it will be necessary to examine a number of issues surrounding Reed, severalty and the peasant farming policy. What were the precise interests underpinning plans for severalty for Indian reserve lands on the Canadian prairies and to what extent was this policy implemented? What was the precise role of Hayter Reed, the main proponent and how can his influence be measured and interpreted?

The purpose of this thesis will be to examine the rationale for a proposed and preliminary implemented policy of allotment on Indian reserves on the Canadian prairies. A thorough examination of Hayter Reed who appears to be the main individual behind the implementation of this policy and instrumental in developing and promoting it in Canada will be presented. This will be accomplished beginning with an examination of Hayter Reed the man, followed by an examination of the thinking of the time with regard to such a policy and conclude by drawing examples from specific lands that were allotted on reserves on the Canadian prairies. Evidence of the evaluation of this initiative will be examined and interpreted.

From preliminary examination it is clear that Hayter Reed was the most important individual promoting an American style general allotment policy on the Canadian prairies (see Carter 1990: 141-158). However, the interests behind such a policy cannot solely rest upon the shoulders of one individual. In Canadian politics it is the actions of a parliamentary government that approves policy and not individuals. It is important, however, to keep in mind the era of this policy and what prevailing thought informs the expectations of the greater Canadian society of the time. It is easy to

point fingers at one individual who appears to have been responsible for the policy, but this does not give the entire picture of the situation. It is for this reason that this investigation attempts to come to a better understanding of Hayter Reed and what motives were behind his implementing such a policy. In this examination, the thesis also assesses how representative Reed was among those in the Indian department and their political masters.

Also important to consider will be an understanding of the general mentality of the time concerning a range of impinging issues. By attempting to understand how Canadian people thought about Indian people and their lands during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a better understanding of the policies and the actions of government officials will be possible. It will also necessary to place the policy of the time towards Indian lands into the context of the greater national agenda. These actions will be assessed as to their acceptability in that day by particular spheres of power and influence. However the challenge of this thesis will be not simply to place today's values on the actions of individuals a century ago.

The thesis will conclude by drawing on specific examples of those reserve lands that were surveyed and

to be allotted to individual Indians. The question of whether or not the actual survey and or allotment resulted in successful individual farmers in these locations will be examined. By giving examples of successful Indian farmers it will be illustrated that severalty was not necessarily a total failure but rather a partial one as Carter (1990) has argued during the 1889-1897 time period. The thesis will demonstrate that for the economic conditions of the time there were some reserves that showed as much or more success compared to the non-Indian farmer of the time.

This success was accomplished even though these Indian farmers adopted severalty in its general framework. Although Indian farmers did not actually own their land, there were clear boundaries as to who had actual use of plots of land and who was to profit from the resources that came from this land. Answers to these questions simply further illuminated a neglected chapter in the history of Canadian Indian policy and its impacts. It will also be demonstrated that it was economic factors that were dictating policy not a demand for reserve lands as illustrated by Carter (1990).

It was believed by both Canadian and American government officials that the best way to break up the tribal system was to stress individualism and the

allotment of Indian reserve lands was the most fundamental means to instill this notion in the minds of the Indians (Hoxie 1984; McDonnell 1991). This program of individualism emerged from one important stream of Victorian thinking situated within a developing ideology of social evolution. The policy that Reed implemented has its seeds in Victorian attitudes towards race and class.

By examining the literature that concerns itself with the Victorian period it becomes evident that there is no tangible definition of the term 'Victorian'. The term is used to describe things, conditions and ideas both material and intellectual but in the literary contexts a definition of the term is often ambiguous. Neither a clear time frame nor specific criteria are identified. For the purposes of this paper the term 'Victorian' follows Loren Horton's definition as "a way of doing things and thinking about things that was common from the 1840s until approximately 1920" (Horton 1994: 8). It is also important to keep in mind that this way of doing things and thinking about things is very anglo-centric in its approach.

In discussing Victorian attitudes towards race an awareness that most of those commenting on race during the nineteenth century were distinctly upper and middle

class individuals prevailed. Whether the articulators were scientists, travelers, missionaries, philanthropists, or politicians, they came from 'respectable' ranks of English society (Lorimer 1978: 15). It was from this upper and middle class background that most Victorian attitudes were being shaped and the motives behind these attitudes were for the benefit of this upper and middle class group. Consequently, the policies that were adapted by policy makers such as Reed were meant to insure that that the interests of the upper and middle classes were protected. The idea was not to have Indians become like the upper and middle classes but instead fit into a lower strata of society where they could be more easily controlled. In much of the literature that discusses Victorian attitudes is the concept of 'Victorian values'. Some scholars of the Victorian era have argued that the expression 'Victorian values' has limitations (see Himmelfarb 1995). They argued that such a term was both time-bound and place-bound. However these same scholars continued to assert that such an expression was necessary in order to understand this time period. They argued that Victorians viewed these beliefs as virtues rather than values as they can be understood today (Himmelfarb 1995). 'Victorian values' were not classical (in a

upper class sense) nor were they Christian values. They were more domestic than classical values and more secular in nature than Christian values. Gertrude Himmelfarb (1995) summed up nicely how one must approach the whole concept of 'Victorian values':

> It is important for historians to try to take the measure of social behaviour as against moral principles, to estimate the degree to which particular groups and classes at particular times and places observed or transgressed those principles. But it is no less important to recognize the reality and the power of the principles themselves - the belief in family and home, respectability and character. Values remain values even if they are not always carried out in practice. They are what people aspire to, knowing that they will never be fully realized (Himmelfarb 1995: 13-14).

There is a fundamental misconception in the literature that British attitudes to race were solidified during the Victorian era (Bolt 1971 and 1984). Bolt has argued that the difference of skin colour was one of the main determinants in placing the British above the darker skinned people within the empire. However, Liggio (1976) argued that the British really solidified their attitudes towards race in their experience with the Irish. For example the comparisons between English approaches to the Irish after the sixteenth century rebellions ended in 1597 and the

treatment of Indian people in what was to become Canada were remarkably similar.

The clash between Ireland and England went beyond rivalries between two emerging European states:

> It was the clash between a people who were nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralists (Irish) and those who were settled on the land as farmers and cultivated a sedentary way of life (English). It was a fundamental conflict between two very different lifestyles, two different views of the world, two different value systems and two different sets of problems and solutions for them (Smedley 1993: 54).

The English experience in Ireland became a formative template that was mimicked in early British North America and later in regions of Canada. This traditional idea was often reduced to a conflict between nomadic and non-nomadic people who had very different lifestyles (especially on the Canadian prairies). The example of the Irish was an important experience in the evolution of British encounters with people in what was to become the British Empire. The foundation of the attitudes and approaches to Britain's colonies was implanted during the initial building of the British Empire in Ireland.

Nicholas Canny's scholarship (1976; 1987; 1988) supported this development. Canny argued that "the experience gained in Ireland throughout the trial and error period of the sixteenth century proved useful to

those who later went to British North America" (Canny 1988:17). The idea of attempting to assimilate Indians into the 'superior' Victorian society also had its beginnings in the British experience in Ireland:

> The essential consideration that underlay the thinking of English officials on Ireland was that the Irish people were removed from civil standards and were incapable of being reformed while they continued to live within what was described as a crude and barbaric environment (Canny 1988: 31).

The British in their dealings with races of darker complexion took a very ethnocentric and paternalistic approach. They believed that the values of Victorian Britain had universal application. It was argued that once native peoples became aware of these 'superior' values they would want to adopt them in order to become just like the 'civilized' British (Curtin 1964). This conviction was played out in British imperial policy through both Christian and secular components.

The secular portion of imperial thought was centered around the idea of progress. Progress was the process which would allow the native populations to rise to the highest stage of civilization, that being Victorian England. Progress as a concept in Victorian thinking,

> flourished because the Victorians were convinced of their own unique place in history, and were thus compelled to relate all other cultures and species to their own origins (Bowler 1989: 13).

Victorians evaluated the cultural systems of other societies against the image of their own. The British placed themselves in a hierarchical world where the capacity for freedom and enterprise were the measurements by which others were judged. The hierarchy of Victorian progress followed the following organization:

> ... the British at the top, followed a few rungs below by the Americans. The Latin peoples were thought to come next, though far behind. Much lower still stood the vast Oriental communities of Asia and North Africa where progress appeared unfortunately to have been crushed for centuries by military despotisms or smothered under passive religions. Lowest of all stood the 'aborigines' whom it was thought had never learned enough social discipline to pass from the family and tribe to the making of a state (Robinson and Gallagher 1978: 2-3).

Humans were seen as progressing through various regular and particular stages of development ranging from barbarism to civilization. This social philosophy became a moral as well as political concept when these Victorians added the concept of Christian duty to the picture. This duty was implemented through a combination of Christianity and the promotion of material progress through the free enterprise system. As Bowler (1989) argues,

> ... if all the advances made during the history of civilization led ultimately to stagnation and the need for renewal before a new episode of progress

> could begin, it would be obvious that something more than individual human effort was needed to initiate each upward step (Bowler 1989:9).

By 1838 Lord Gleneig identified civilization and protection as the underlying principles of Indian policy (Pettipas 1988: 94). However, by the middle of the nineteenth century a more extreme attitude was beginning to infiltrate Indian policy in British North America[2]. This new attitude was based on a social order that stressed racial supremacy. A theory of race was put forward by Victorian anthropologists in the late nineteenth century (see references below) that took into account physical as well as moral and intellectual traits. This theory allowed Victorians to view Indians in racial terms and to suggest that Indian culture was inferior due to inherited characteristics (Lorimer 1978: 148). This led to a shift in the approach to Indians, 'paternalism was no longer a trusteeship until maturity was reached, but a perpetual guardianship over ageless children" (Lorimer 1978: 148).

The above approach to non-European societies was based on the theory of Social Darwinism. When in 1859 Charles Darwin published On the Origin of the Species he provided social theorists of the day with an articulated

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[2] For a discussion of how this evolved in the United States see Billington 1980, Drinnon 1980 and White 1991.

model based on the biological evolution of man. Social theorists and anthropologists such as Lewis Henry Morgan and Edward B. Tylor (see Stocking 1987) were able to use Darwin's theory to justify European domination of non-European societies. The notion of 'survival of the fittest' was used to justify this European domination. A common belief of the Victorian period was that pre-industrial societies such as the Indians were doomed to disappear.

The principle of the 'survival of the fittest', seen to be working itself out in these regions of the world, was provided as conclusive proof that civilized and uncivilized races could not mix, and in a conflict situation the latter must perish. As the 'red' Indian was killed by the approach of civilization, to which he resisted in vain, so the black man perished by that culture to which he served as a humble instrument (Bolt 1971: 20). Significant were concepts such as developmentalism and progress that flourished during the nineteenth century because Victorians were convinced of their own unique place in history (Bowler 1989).

Where did colonial administrators acquire their ideas influenced by social evolution? Many clues were in the writings of Victorian anthropologists. Anthropologists such as Herbert Spencer and Edward B.

Tylor advocated evolutionary processes as an approach to explain the place of indigenous people in respect to British and other Western European peoples (see Stocking 1987). Some essential features of anthropological approaches utilized in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries followed issues outlined first by Aristotle (see Hanke 1959 and Pagden 1982) which were later elaborated in debates among Christian theologians (Huddleston 1967). In short, these thinkers believed that all of the world's societies could be arranged on an ascending scale of civilization and given a determined place. The stage along this scale that any given society reached could be assessed both by the character in its political structure and the quality of its citizens' conduct. In effect the scale became a formalized measurement of any given society's worth (Morgan 1966).

The higher the presumed moral standards of a population, the more readily it was believed the population recognized the truths of Christian doctrine when it happened to be exposed to them. Questions about the precise character of a society could be determined by use of what was to be termed the 'comparative method' and the ethnographic analogy. Missing information about any given population could be postulated from knowledge

about other societies judged in the same stage of development (Burrows 1966: 11).

Victorians did not only look upon indigenous peoples in this light; rather they had the same attitudes towards other Europeans. Charles A. Magrath a member of Parliament for Medicine Hat speaking in reference to immigration to Canada during the latter part of the nineteenth century at the Canadian Club of Toronto in 1912, summed up nicely the prevailing attitudes towards many non-British groups: "We believe that there are many sections in southern and eastern Europe very many years behind in the march of civilization" (Berger 1970: 148). These same attitudes also prevailed in approaches toward Oriental populations living in Canada during the nineteenth century. In 1885 Sir John A. Macdonald told the House of Commons:

> The Chinese are foreigners. If they come to this country, after three years' residence, they may, if they choose, be naturalized. But still we know that when the Chinaman comes here he intends to return to his own country; he does not bring his family with him; he is a stranger, a sojourner in a strange land, for his own purposes for awhile; he has no common interest with us and while he gives us his labour and is paid for it, and is valuable, the same as a threshing machine or any other agricultural implement which we may borrow from the United States on hire and return it to the owner on the south side of the line; a Chinaman gives us his labour and gets his money, but the money does not fructify in Canada; he does not invest it here, but takes it with him and

> returns to China; and if he cannot, his executors or his friends send his body back to the flowery land. But he has no British instincts or British feelings or aspirations, and therefore ought not to have a vote (as quoted in Ward 1990: 41).

The idea of progressivism was the key to the British legitimizing their subjugation of indigenous peoples albeit that social Darwinism was far from what Darwin was promoting in his writing (Bowler 1989: 14). The central point in this new progressivism was designed to identify one's own society as the high point of development. Those who did not measure up to the required standards had to be either pushed aside or pushed along in some program of institutional change or along the scale of civilization to make room for further progress to be made and others to take their place. Groups who did not have the proper characteristics of progress were considered as "stagnant failures, relics of earlier episodes in the history of mankind's ascent, with nothing further to contribute towards the march of progress" (Bowler 1989: 14). Those groups that were pushed along the scale were not allowed to accomplish success immediately. The progress had to occur over a generation or two. Change had to be gradual and never immediate.

Britain's industrial power during the Victorian era gave them the physical power to have dominion over much

of the world. Their vindicating theory of progress they believed gave them the moral right to show the other people of the world the virtues of this progress. Given such a view of less industrialized societies it was only natural that anthropologists in studying less industrialized societies regarded them as being lower down the scale of development.

> This interpretation received a powerful boost when it was realized that Europe itself had once been inhabited by stone age peoples whose way of life must have been as primitive of that of the lowest modern savages (Bowler 1989: 19).

What early anthropologists began to argue was that Britain's social development also was to be seen as preserved in other cultures which were less advanced up the scale of so called 'civilization'. On this basis it was argued that those groups not far enough along on the scale had to be pushed forward for their own good. The argument was based on the idea that the British system was at the top of the social evolutionary scale; however this did not mean all the English were the same or equal in station and opportunity. Henrika Kuklick commented on this pattern when she reflected that:

> Victorians were highly self-conscious about their tendencies to explain all phenomena historically, seeing their intellectual sensibilities as themselves engendered by historical changes. It is no wonder then that Victorian anthropologists advanced a highly

> qualified form of cultural relativism - describing the beliefs and practices of primitive peoples as appropriate to their stages of development, if not rational by absolute standards - since they regarded themselves as creatures of their own particular movement (Kuklick 1991: 94).

There was no room for a branching model of social development. Victorians found it totally unacceptable that other cultures were equally valid expressions of human nature (Bowler 1989: 19); this implicitly reinforced their superiority. Although this may have been the rule, there were exceptions to this rule. Daniel Wilson, who had written about the archaeology and prehistory of Scotland before he emigrated to Canada,

> turned his attention to Indian life in the hope that parallel studies of civilizations in the New World and the Old would illuminate what was shared and universal and what was local and unique (Berger 1983: 43).

Wilson along with Canadian anthropologist Robert Grant Haliburton asserted that

> ... everywhere human nature was essentially alike. This was not of course to say that all races were identical in achievement. Wilson, who dismissed the idea that a savage state necessarily indicated inferiority and could write of one American Indian language that it had "grammatical forms as rich, regular, and consistent, as that in which Plato wrote, or Homer sung,' could still predict the ultimate disappearance of the native races of North America through absorption into the dominant European people (Berger 1983: 44).

Although Wilson believed that Indian societies were of as equal merit as emergent British society it was still evident that he perceived their demise being at hand.

What did these evolutionary writings and ideas mean therefore for Canada's Indians in the nineteenth century? Whether or not evolutionary writings provided specific guide-lines for colonial administrators and missionaries is not completely clear. What was much clearer however was that "socio-cultural thinking offered strong ideological support for the whole colonial enterprise in the latter nineteenth century" (Stocking 1987: 237). In this era when science was taking over many of the ideological, moral, and ethical functions religion had longed served, a more secular justification was needed for the displacement of Indian people from their land and culture. The argument was that 'savages' were not simply morally delinquent or spiritually inferior, but racially incapable. While racial incapability had been argued prior to evolutionary thinking, there had never before been a satisfactory explanation of its origin.

Evolutionary racialism did not merely assert the existence of a hierarchy of distinct races, it offered a secular explanation of how that hierarchy had arisen, and gave to it accumulated weight of evolutionary

processes in a greatly expanded span of time (Stocking 1987: 237). What this meant for British colonialists was that they could rationalize the worst conditions of colonial rule. In fact it was both "scientifically and morally respectable for civilized Europeans to take up the white man's burden" (Stocking 1987: 237). Therefore the colonialists did not have to worry about a guilty conscience because in the mentality of the time they were demonstrating to the 'uncivilized' Indian the way to a better life. The colonial motive became rationalized as helping the Indian along the graduating elevated ladder of civilization:

> Civilizing efforts on behalf of dark-skinned savages could, over time, eliminate savagery from the world, not by destroying savage populations, but by modifying their hereditary incapacity (Stocking 1987: 237).

The thinking of the time about evolution was the idea that human races past through a number of progressive and predictable stages. These predictable stages ranged from in increasing complexity from savagery to civilization and stressed the belief that steps could not be skipped and progress had to be gradual (Pettipas 1994: 20-22). Social theorists such as Herbert Spencer articulated ideas that became the substance of beliefs of individuals such as Reed by stressing the primitiveness of tribal groups, the stage

from which groups progressed. The perceived primitive state of tribal groups aided in the justification of allowing only gradual progress in civilized activities such as agriculture as demonstrated below.

If societies could be identified as being primitive then a justification could be found for the treatment of such societies, including Reed's approach of only allowing gradual monitored progress.

> The 'primitive' was conceptualized as the point of departure for social evolution, the meeting point of animality and humanity, with the presumed attributes of the former usually such as mendacity and lust. Spencer needed to portray primitives as immoral, irrational and aggressive in order to show how individuality, freedom and morality emerged during the process of evolution through a logic of differentiation, specialization and individuation. It enabled him to construct an evolutionary continuum and, by means of his recapitulation perspective, to substitute a number of contemporary social catagories for those at the lowest point of the continuum (Hawkins 1997: 98).

Added to the mix was the debate between polygenists and monogenists (see Stocking 1968: 42-68). Spencer's argument gave support to the idea that European civilizations and especially Victorian civilization was "the end product of an historic progress from a savage state of nature" (Stocking 1968: 75). Those who believed in the superiority of Victorian civilization such as Reed, argued

> that the development of all human social groups (composed as they were of beings of a single species with a common human nature) necessarily followed a similar gradual progressive development (Stocking 1968: 75).

It was this idea, gradual progressive development, that was key to Reed's agricultural policy.

Ramsay Cook (1985) has argued that there was a secularization of Victorian English Canada in the nineteenth century. This secularization was selective and this was especially evident in the encroachment upon the Indian people on the Canadian prairies. What resulted was the creation of the 'civil service gentleman bureaucrat' (Leighton 1983), an elite that made decisions for all in the departments such as Indian Affairs, a role which Reed played to its fullest. Victorian administrators made use of both progressivism discussed above and the Bible (in the form of Protestant theology, the work ethic, dominion over the land, etc.) in justifying their treatment of Indians on the prairies and Indian policy in the latter half of the nineteenth century (Miller 1989: 189-207).

The underlying theme in the developmental approach to Indian people on the prairies was to make them into agriculturalists. The nineteenth century Canadian political forefathers believed that agriculture was a measured accomplishment of a civilized society and

consequently the natural answer to the problems of adaptation facing previously nomadic Indians to the newly evolving social order upon the Canadian prairies. Canadians in the Victorian era assumed that the Indians in this region because they were not initially farmers, were at a stage of natural development which consequently reflected some inherent weakness of their societies. Government officials also adopted ideas of progressivism and Christian stewardship embodied in a husbandry of the land as other standards by which to evaluate Indian society and to assert its apparent weaknesses and to justify the need forcibly to change it (Carter 1990).

Indian societies were not seen as having a perceptible or recognizable order by Euro-North Americans and therefore were considered unprogressive. The fact that Indian groups on the prairies were nomadic and survived primarily by hunting, gathering and fishing added to the false belief that Indian people were not inclined to do any work to improve the land. Indian people were perceived not to be in control of their land but rather at the mercy of it. There was a perception that Indian men were reluctant to perform manual work and therefore, their time was occupied by a leisure activity, because hunting was considered to be a sport

of the upper classes(Carter 1990). The Victorians believed that hunting had a rightful place but that it was relegated to the more affluent portions of society as leisure; it was not a way or means to make a civilized economic living. Therefore, leisure could not also contribute meaningfully to the substance of labour and work (Carter 1990: 17-18).

Indians were categorized as primitive since hunting was assumed to require little skill, knowledge, or technology. Indians were considered reckless improvident, since hunting was considered as living off the fat of the land. Indians were attributed to be wanton, since not satisfied with the ordinary methods of destroying the buffalo, the Indian constructed pounds, which led to indiscriminate slaughter. Hunting, as well, promoted an unhealthy family life. Men were often characterized as the proud lords who lounged at their ease about the camps, leaving the hard labour to the women (Carter 1990: 18).

The fundamental question that then faced Victorians was how could Indians be transformed into 'civilized' members of society? It was here that it appeared government officials drew upon evolutionary thinking for answers. Agriculture was seen as a necessary step in the progress from savagism to civilization (see Hoxie

1984; Morgan 1966). Added to this was the belief that societies could not skip steps in their advancement towards civilization nor was this to be allowed to happen quickly. There was a definite progression from a nomadic lifestyle to that of an industrialized and civilized society. It was necessary for Indians to follow this so called logical development of progression. It was argued that Indian people were on their way in this respect but that they had to be shown the light, so to speak, or the precise way:

> Agriculture and private property would afford the Indians the opportunity to climb the remaining steps to civilization within the space of a few generations, greatly speeding up the process that had been so gradual in other cultures (Carter 1990:19).

Government officials, such as Hayter Reed, Edgar Dewdney and Sir John A. Macdonald, took the social evolutionary thought of the day and applied it to Indian people (in addition to other groups such as eastern Europeans and Asians) in their belief that Indians first had to become farmers before they were to be considered civilized.

It was within a 'Victorian frame of mind' that Reed approached his career with the Department of Indian Affairs and promoted his severalty policy beginning in 1888. He believed that turning Indian farmers into individual land owners was the way to help push them along the road to civilization. Therefore, as the

Indian became a self-supporting farmer he was to rely on himself, a role acceptable for integration into a Canadian social order. Added to this was the pressure that unutilized Indian reserve lands were to be opened up to settlement because it was clear to Reed and his associates that the Indians did not need all of the land that was reserved for them by treaties in the face of post reserve diminishing populations, irrespective of the causes for this (Carter 1990: 193-194). Both governments in the United States and Canada saw Indian people as a vanishing race. Assimilation, when achieved, also resulted in the end of the Indian problem and severalty contributed one important step in this direction.

Carter (1990) argues that the key determinant of economic development for prairie Indians was government policy (see Beal 1994). Although she is correct in this analysis her emphasis on it, according to a recent critique, "reduces Indian participation in development efforts to the status of protesters against government polices" (Beal 1994: 54). By examining in a more detailed manner the examples that Carter provided of severalty as well as other examples this paper will expand on her treatment of the issues. This will be accomplished by analyzing three major examples at the

local level as a way of testing the assertions that Carter made. Her analysis of the Birtle and Crooked Lakes Agency examples will be examined more fully at the local level. In addition, the example of the Blood Agency will also be examined as a way of analyzing Carter's approach to severalty and economic development.

By analyzing examples of severalty at a more local level it will be demonstrated that reactions to severalty were not always in the form of protests against government as Carter argued (Beal 1994). Reaction to severalty was based on the specific situation of the individual reserve being subdivided and surveyed. In addition, it will also be demonstrated that it was not only scientific racism that was guiding Indian policies such as severalty and peasant farming. Rather policies such as these were being guided by the economic situation of the time. The continual decline in moneys for Indian Affairs resulted in a need to have Indian farmers on the prairies become self-supporting agriculturists. It was the scientific racial thinking of the time that helped justify the approach that Hayter Reed and Indian Affairs took towards prairie Indian farmers. By attempting to create a system of peasant farmers who would be farming individual plots of land Reed was attempting to work within the financial

restraints placed on him by Indian Affairs, but at the same time his policies fit into the racial thinking of the time.

CHAPTER 2

HAYTER REED AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ALLOTMENT POLICY FOR THE CANADIAN PRAIRIES

Hayter Reed was born on May 26, 1849 in L'Original, Prescott County, Ontario. His father George Decimus Reed was a native of Surrey, England while his mother Harriet McKay was Canadian born. Reed also had a Canadian born sister Louisa. Very little is known of Reed's parents or their background. At a very young age Reed was sent to live with his father's sister's family. His aunt's husband was a successful lawyer in Toronto and eventually became Judge William Henry Draper of the Supreme Court of Canada. Reed's mother left his father to live with her family in the United States and took sister Louisa with her. Reed lost his father at the very early age of six and in a touching letter to his mother he wrote "Mama, I forgot to tell you that I seen (sic) papa after he was in the coffin. They was (sic) only two cabs at his funeral" (Reed Family Papers, n.d.). Reed complained to his mother that he never heard from her and asked that she please write. For the most part it appeared as though it was the Drapers who

raised Reed. To say that his early years were traumatic was undoubtedly an understatement.

Reed's residence with the Drapers allowed him an opportunity to obtain an education that may not have been possible if he had lived with his mother. It also put him amongst the upper and middle classes of Canadian society. While living with the Draper's, Reed attended both Upper Canada College and the Model Grammar School in Toronto. Reed chose a military career early in his life. In 1865 at the age of sixteen he joined the militia and later that year graduated from the Royal Military School with a first class certificate as a Sergeant Major. At the age of eighteen Reed was appointed drill instructor of the Kingston Rifle Battalion. In 1870 Reed was appointed Brigade Major of the 6th Brigade Division of the Provincial Battalion of Rifles. It was with this brigade that Reed came west.

In 1871 Reed was sent west with the 6th Brigade in response to the Fenian scare. In 1873 Reed was appointed Adjutant of the battalion at Fort Garry and then Garrison Adjutant to the whole force in the west. Reed remained with the force until its disbandment in 1878. He retired from the force in 1881 at the rank of major. As one can see, the first ten years of Reed's service with the Canadian government was with its

military forces. This experience had a profound impact on the way Reed approached Indian people, lands and policy.

It appears that Justice Draper had some influence on young Reed as he was called to the Manitoba Bar in 1872 although it does not appear that Reed practiced as a lawyer. However, his reading of the law, which constituted his training as a lawyer, came into play during his career with the Indian department as Reed became one of the main players in the formulation and interpretation of policy.[1] Reed's up bringing and education placed him in and among the upper and middle class portions of Anglo-Canadian society. It was his place within this social strata that was instrumental in his future approaches to Indian people. Reed's formulation of policies were situated in what was most beneficial to this strata of society in which he positioned himself; Reed's status was an achieved rather than an ascribed position. Reed was not born into this strata of Anglo-Canadian society but rather was able to gain access through Judge Draper and eventually retained

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[1]The above discussion of Reed's early life is based on National Archives of Canada (NAC) Sir Wilfrid Laurier Papers, Vol. 141, p. 42225, Reed to Laurier, 9 February 1900; McCord Museum McGill University (McCord) Reed Papers Box 1 Folder 8 and personnel correspondence with Kate Reed (Hayter Reed's granddaughter).

his position through work within Indian Affairs and his eventual marriage to Kate Armour daughter of Justice J.D. Armour. Kate Reed was a close friend of Lady Aberdeen the wife of the Governor General and this brought Reed into a circle of influential Canadians (Titley 1993). Nevertheless, his status within Canadian society helps explain why he only allowed measured levels of success.

On April 9, 1880 Reed was instructed to proceed to Winnipeg where he was to take on the position as Chief Land Guide at a salary of $100.00 per month. In his position as Chief Land Guide, Reed's responsibility was

> to make such arrangements as would permit for the distribution of immigrants and others proposing to settle in the country, from Winnipeg, as will facilitate their reaching the several agencies in the Province or Territories in the vicinity of which they propose to settle (Surveyor General, to Reed, 9 April, 1880, McCord Museum, Reed Papers).

Reed's job was to provide information to settlers on suitable sites for homesteads. In his position as Land Guide Reed made numerous recommendations to his superiors in Ottawa regarding ways to improve the system that was in operation. These included suggestions ranging from how to stop Canadians from going to the United States to ways of changing opinions of the general public towards the West (Carter 1990: 142-143).

This approach of making recommendations to his superiors became a consistent pattern during Reed's later tenure with Indian Affairs.

Reed joined the Indian Department in 1881. He was appointed Indian Agent of Battleford and his appointment took effect March 1, of that year (NAC, RG 10, vol. 3733, file 26743). Reed's military training increasingly had a profound impact on how he administrated his agency and later when he was promoted in the Department. Part of this military orientation meant a strict adherence to rules and regulations. Reed was responsible for implementing the rules and regulations of Edgar Dewdney then Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Dewdney's watchword was that Reed must be "as economical as possible", "with regard to the issuing of provisions to destitute Indians, you will have to be governed by your own good judgment bearing in mind that wherever possible work should be exacted in return" (NAC, RG 10, vol. 3733, file, 26743, Dewdney to Reed 25, February 1881).

Reed took it upon himself to enforce the work in exchange for rations policy without negotiation. No matter how destitute or how desperate the pleas, Reed would not issue rations without work being completed first. This attitude of indifference resulted in the

Indians of Battleford referring to their Agent as "Iron Heart." Reed's hard-line approach did not go without notice within the Department or by Dewdney. In 1882 Reed was appointed by Dewdney as one of the official members of the Northwest Council, a position he held until it was superseded by an elected assembly in 1888 (Thomas 1978: 111). By 1883 Reed was promoted to acting Assistant Commissioner of Indian Affairs and he took over the responsibilities as permanent Assistant Commissioner in 1884 (NAC, RG 10, vol.3626, file 5675).

The Northwest Rebellion of 1885 became a significant turning point for Reed and his career within the Indian Department. It was the Rebellion that opened the door for Reed, allowing him the opportunity to suggest new policy directives for Indians in the Northwest. It was then that Reed began to formulate a policy of severalty. In a memo from Reed to Dewdney in 1885 Reed identified the need to breakup of the tribal system that was eventually to become a central element of Indian policy in western Canada well into the twentieth century. On July 20, 1885 Reed sent the lengthy memo to Dewdney regarding the future management of Indians in the Northwest. This memo consisted of fifteen recommendations listing potential future policy initiatives. The main thrust of these recommendations

was to abolish the tribal system, and to gain more rigid control over the movement and activities of both rebel and non-rebel Indians (NAC, RG 10, vol. 3710, file 19550-3).

A number of these recommendations related directly to the later self-sufficiency program that Reed was to implement during his tenure. At the forefront of these recommendations was recommendation number four which stated "that the tribal system should be abolished insofar, as is compatible with the treaty" (NAC, RG 10, vol. 3710, file 19,550-3). Dewdney agreed with Reed on this point as did Sir John A. Macdonald. As Macdonald put it

> I agree with Mr. Reed's suggestion that the Tribal system should be broken up as soon as possible so that each individual Indian may be dealt with instead of through the Chiefs. This must be done carefully so that the Chiefs may not be able to rouse a hostile feeling among their Indians against the Department (NAC, RG 10, vol. 3710, file 19550-3).

The concept of breaking up the tribal system became central to Indian policy during Reed's time with Indian Affairs. The fact that Macdonald wanted to deal with individual Indians illustrates the beginnings of the self-sufficiency approach. By stressing individuality an attempt was being made to reinforce the Victorian way of thinking of holding the good of the individual over

the good of the group. Reed was careful when he introduced his severalty policy to ensure that it was explained to Indians in such a way that promoted individuality. He reinforced the benefits of individual holdings and at the same time attempted to reassure Indian populations that severalty was in their best interests (see discussion of severalty below). Reed also took great care to accept Macdonald's advice in glossing over the actual impacts that breaking up of the tribal system had upon Indian societies. Reed in the letter discussed below regarding the subdivided survey of reserves was careful to explain to his agents how to explain the process of subdivision. It was essential that Indian people did not become ill at ease about subdivision.

The next recommendation that had profound impacts when it became policy that Reed implemented during his tenure was the pass system. In recommendation number seven Reed suggested that

> No rebel Indians should be allowed off the Reserves without a pass signed by an I.D. official. The dangers of complications with white men will thus be lessened ...(NAC, RG 10, vol. 3710, file 19550-3).

Both Dewdney and Macdonald endorsed this recommendation although Macdonald took a more calculated approach and suggested that the pass system should eventually be

applied to all bands. Dewdney remarked that "this should be done and insisted upon as far as practicable. It might be thought well another year (sic) to legislate in that direction" (NAC, RG 10, vol. 3710, file 19550-3). Macdonald supported the idea of the pass system and commented

> Mr. Dewdney remarks that the pass system could be generally introduced safely. If so it is in the highest degree desirable. As to disloyal Bands this should be carried out as the consequence of their disloyalty. The system should be introduced in the loyal bands as well and the advantage of the changes pressed upon them. But no punishment for breaking bounds can be inflicted and in the case of resistance on the grounds of Treaty rights should not be insisted upon (NAC, RG 10, vol. 3710, file 19550-3).

In 1886 books containing passes were sent to the various Indian agencies. In order to leave the reserve Indians had to first obtain a letter of recommendation from their farming instructor and then apply to their agent for a pass (Carter 1990: 151). In its original implementation the pass system was put in place to reduce fears of another Indian uprising being able to occur. It was argued that Indians needed to be monitored and kept from gathering in large numbers in order to keep the peace. This degree of social control of Indian populations was necessary for the purposes of the Canadian government if Macdonald's dream of a populated west was also to be realized.

The pass system was also used to reinforce the policy of self-sufficiency to which Reed adhered during his appointment. By forcing Indians to remain on their reserves during critical times in the crop year Reed argued that overall success of the agricultural program was more likely. Success also meant a reduced need for rations and a more self-sufficient population. It also meant that Indians were to be able to have fewer contacts with undesirable portions of the larger society such as whisky traders or the Metis rebels (Carter 1990: 152-157).

An additional policy that went hand in hand with the pass system was the permit system. This system strictly supervised the selling of and purchasing of goods by Indians. In order for Indians to sell or buy goods they had to have a permit signed by their agent. As well, before a merchant was able to sell goods to Indians a special license had to be obtained from the department (Carter 1990: 157).

The permit system was based on two important factors. One was tied to Victorian thinking and the other was tied to self-sufficiency. In a typical social Darwinian approach Macdonald saw Indians as not being able to handle their own business transactions. Macdonald was concerned that Indians were vulnerable and

susceptible, falling prey to the undesirable portion of the prairie business community:

> [If] the Indians had the power of unrestricted sale, they would dispose of their products to the first trader or whisky dealer who came along, and the consequence would be that the Indians would be pensioners on the Government during the next winter (House of Commons Debates, 1884, #2: 1063).

Of even greater concern was traders requesting the payment of accumulated debts by Indians. Dewdney reported in 1892 the approach taken to credit and debt:

> During the past season, in order to further demonstrate the Department's disapproval of this system, and to prevent this system being continued, a circular letter was addressed to all Indian agents, instructing them to notify all parties who were in the habit of trading with the Indians, or with whom the latter have dealings, that the Department would be responsible for no debts incurred by Indians, whether the same were by virtue of orders from agents, chiefs, Indian councils, or otherwise (Canada Sessional Papers 1892: xvii-xviii; see also Tough 1996).

Both Macdonald and Dewdney were thinking in a purely Victorian racial sense. They were endorsing the belief that Indians due to their assumed racial inferiority could not cope in the Canadian society of the time and that the Indians understanding of debt would result in a financial burden upon the government of Canada. They had accepted the theory that Indian people were on a certain level along the scales of civilization and that

they were not yet at a level to be able to participate fully in the Canadian economy. To suggest that Indians would have not been able to obtain proper prices for their goods was without empirical support. As Ray (1974; 1980; 1990) pointed out Indians were equal participants and in many instances dictated the terms of trade during the fur trade. This general pattern lends credence to the fact that non-supervised Indian participation in the larger economy that developed during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was not necessarily the result of Indian economic dependence upon government support. As Beal (1994) has pointed out, Indians in their initial farming operations in the Battleford region in the early 1880s were competing to such a successful extent that that there were complaints to the Battleford newspaper about the success of these Indian farmers.

The permit system also gained support because of the manner in which it aided Reed's self-sufficiency policy. By limiting what Indians were allowed to sell the government was able to maintain a level of economic success that fit their criteria of self-sufficiency. This meant that Indians did not necessarily have to be selling their goods to market for a profit to be considered successful. It was a level of self-

sufficiency that Reed, Macdonald and Dewdney were striving for in their policies. The reduction of rations and the costs attached to these were the main concerns of the time. Indians producing enough goods not to require government aid was the real goal for many policies during this time period. This was illustrated by Reed in his report of 1891:

> No doubt however, the mainstay of the great majority of Indians must be farming, and it is therefore most important to teach this industry in the manner best calculated to render them self-supporting when left to their own resources, as well as at the present moment. Suppose, therefore, that an Indian confines his operation to a single acre. From this he should, in an ordinary year, raise, at a moderate computation, some eighteen bushels of wheat (where this can be successfully grown) which, after making all necessary deductions, will give him nearly, if not quite, five bags of flour.
>
> Assisted by his family there is nothing to prevent his planting a portion of a second acre, with roots and vegetables, sufficient to supplement his flour to the degree of making it last for a good portion of the year.
>
> Add to this the product of a cow or two, and the man has made a long stride toward independence (ARIA 1891: 193).

In effect what the permit system was able to do was reinforce a level of self-sufficiency rather than one of profit. By controlling the market access of Indians the government was able to dictate what items were

purchased. As government expenditures were reduced the shortfall could be made up through the permit system. Rather than allowing Indians to purchase more equipment so that they could expand their farming operations permits were instead issued for goods such as food, clothing and other necessities (Beal 1994: 189). This resulted in Indian farmers remaining at a more or less constant level of subsistence, that being self-sufficient break even farmers. Profits in effect were used to make up for shortfalls in government expenditures.

Another component of policy used to promote self-sufficiency among Indian farmers was the Birtle system. It was known as the Birtle system because it was first used in Birtle, Manitoba by Lawrence Herchner in 1886 (Carter 1990: 148). The Birtle system was a cattle on loan program which Reed fully endorsed. It was introduced to help promote individualism. Individual Indians were given a cow and at the end of a year had to either return the cow or an offspring of the cow to the department. Any offspring after the original transaction was the Indian's to keep. The main premise of the policy rested on the belief that by having a vested interest in the animal the Indian farmer was more likely to care for the animal. The Birtle system was

implemented because prior to its existence cattle were held in common and agents felt they were not cared for because no one felt responsibility for them (Carter 1990: 148).

In the end the Birtle system did not meet with much success as Carter pointed out,

> The Birtle system became the source of much confusion. Its central purpose of fostering a sense of individual ownership was largely defeated because the department would still not allow an Indian to dispose of any beast of burden without the consent of the agent, which was rarely given. At the same time the Indians were to be made to understand that the animal's progeny was theirs alone. It is not surprising that agents complained that they had difficulty in making the Indians understand that while the cattle were theirs, they had to have an agent's permission to sell, slaughter, or barter (Carter 1990: 149).

During the very critical years that followed the 1885 uprising Reed continued to be Dewdney's right hand man. From his headquarters in Regina Reed continued to advise agents as to their responsibilities and that rations were only to be issued to those willing to work for them. As Titley(1993) has pointed out Dewdney's appreciation of Reed's efforts did not go without reward. Dewdney made numerous requests to Ottawa for a salary raise for Reed and Reed received two substantial increases for the time. His salary increased from $1600

to $2000 in 1886 and again was increased another $200 in 1887 to $2200 (NAC, RG 10, vol.3626, file 5675).

In 1888 Reed was appointed Commissioner of Indian Affairs following the election of Dewdney as a member of Parliament where he took on the dual portfolios of Minister of the Interior and Superintendent General of Indian Affairs (NAC, RG 10, vol. 3802, file 50319). One of Reed's first activities as Commissioner was to travel throughout the Saskatchewan district during the fall and winter of 1888/1889. During this trip the issue that the tribal system had to be abolished was again reinforced in Reed's mind. He was convinced that the subdivision of reserves was a logical step in the direction of creating the idea of self-sufficient Indian people. Reed's report from this trip revealed his attitudes as he realized that farming on the prairies was plausible, but the present form was increasingly becoming less successful.

Reed supplied a very detailed account of the situation of Indian reserves in the Saskatchewan district during the fall of 1888. This report illustrated in detail the condition of Indian agriculture in the region and Reed's interpretation of the success or lack of success of Indian farmers. The accompanying correspondence also shed some light on the

Department's approach to Indian farming. In his report dated 27 October 1888 Reed referred to the fact that the Battleford Indians were showing signs of "individualism, and of taking up separated farms" (NAC, RG 10, vol. 3806, file 52, 332). Reed explained that from his observations at Sweet Grass and Red Pheasant's reserves the need for subdivision was necessary:

> ... I have come to the conclusion that the time has arrived where the reserves should be divided up and parceled into separate farms. The Indians would I think in the main be pleased to have this done I need hardly remind you of the advantages likely to result from such assaults upon the communist system, which is apt to prevail (NAC, RG 10, vol. 3806, file 52,332).

Reed's superiors in the Department approved of his suggestion of subdivision but took a calculated approach to the concept of separated farms. The then Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs Lawerence Vankoughnet, agreed that Indians taking up separate farms should be encouraged at all times. However, Vankoughnet in a letter to Dewdney dated 12 November 1888 making reference to Reed's report, also stressed that proper survey of Indian lands needed to take place in order for separate farms to work:

> The report of the Commissioner in respect to the Indians of Battleford District taking up farms in severalty on the various Reserves is very gratifying, and if this system is generally followed by the

> Indians it will no doubt contribute naturally and rapidly to their advancement, and the undersigned would strongly recommend that where indications are manifest of a disposition on the part of Indians to take up separate holdings on the Reserves that the latter should be at once subdivided by survey. This will prove to be the most satisfactory course for every reason, inasmuch as the Indians are allowed to take up farms without the same being defined by proper lines of survey, the matter of ultimately subdividing the Reserves will prove to be a most embarrassing one, as it has been found in the case of reserves thus irregularly partitioned off in the older Provinces (NAC, RG 10, vol.3806, file 52,332).

Reed's appointment as Commissioner allowed him the opportunity to begin to implement policy he believed was essential to break up the tribal system. In his Annual Report of 1889 Reed stated in direct terms the approach that his department had assumed. Under the heading "Sub-Division of Reserves" Reed stated, "The policy of destroying the tribal or communist system is assailed in every possible way, and every effort made to implant a spirit of individual responsibility instead" (ARIA 1889: 165).

Reed was not the first member of the Indian Department to suggest the allotment of Indian reserve lands in Canada. In fact Reed's implementation of severalty can be seen as the end product of the concept in Canadian Indian policy. This idea can be traced back to the pre-confederation era. The Commissioners of the Bagot Commission recommended a number of

improvements for the administration of Indian lands on January 22, 1844. Recommendations five, six and eight deal exclusively with the division of reserve lands.

> 5. That the several tribes be encouraged to divide their reserves among themselves, and to appropriate a portion, not exceeding 100 acres, to each family or member, surrendering to the Government the remainder in trust to be sold for their benefit.
>
> 6. That in all instances of such division, or of individual members of a tribe adopting a fixed location with the consent of the tribe, a limited title deed be granted--securing to the holder and his heirs the possession of such separate portion of the reserve, with the power of transferring or divising the same, to any member of his family or of his tribe, but not to a white man ...
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> 8. That upon a Report from an Officer of the Department that an Indian is qualified by education, knowledge of the arts and customs of civilized life and habits of industry and prudence, to protect his own interests, and to maintain himself as an independent member of the general community, the Government shall be prepared to grant him a Patent for the Land in his actual cultivation or occupation, and for as much more as he may be entitled to upon an equitable division of the reserve of his Tribe, not exceeding in any instance 200 acres. That upon issue of this Patent all further claims to share any annuity or other property of the Tribe be retained (Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Canada 1847: sec. III, Pt. III, subsec. 2).

It was with these recommendations that one of the first suggestion of subdividing Indian lands into separate individually operated farms was considered. The system was to result in lands being made available

for settlers while at the same removing responsibility for Indians from government officials to Indians. Once Indians received patent for their land holdings the government no longer was to have responsibility for these Indians or their lands. These recommendations were not implemented into successful policy. On September 8, 1856 Messrs. Froome Talfourd, Thomas Worthington and Superintendent General R. T. Pennefather were appointed to investigate the failure of Indian policy over the past decade (Miller 1978: 28). They were instructed to report back on two main issues. The first examined was "the best means of securing the future progress and civilization of the Indian Tribes in Canada", and the second examined was "the best mode of so managing the Indian property as to secure its full benefit to the Indians, without impeding the settlement of the country" (as quoted in Miller 1978: 28). The Commissioners suggested that the "communal form of ownership practiced by the Indians discouraged property improvement" (Miller 1978: 30). The Commissioners suggested ways in which this problem was to be solved. These recommendations came very close to what Reed had envisioned as the way in which Indian lands might be subdivided on the Canadian prairies.

In their report reference was made to economic development by the Commissioners:

> To aid this growing desire to exchange their lands for lasting annuities derived from the process of sales, we earnestly recommend in all cases in Western Canada (Canada West) where a final location of a band shall be determined upon that each head of a family shall be allotted a farm not exceeding 25 acres in extent, including an allowance of woodland where they may obtain fuel; that for such farm he shall receive a license giving exclusive occupation of the same to him and his heirs forever on condition of clearing a certain number of acres in a given time. These documents should be so drawn as to prevent Indians from disposing of their interest in the land, except with the consent of the government; and might be revocable in proof of habitual inheritance , or for continual neglect of the same. Further inducements might be held out to Indians by laying out on their farms a certain proportion of sums realized by the scale of the ceded territory. It is true that the present occupants have only a life interest in the land, but such an application of the proceeds cannot be fairly considered a misapplication of Trust as improvement to the property would be permanent (Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Canada 1858: Report pt. 111).

The concept of individual property holding for Indians was again addressed in the Enfranchisement Act of 22 June 1869. Clause seventeen of this legislation encouraged Indians to obtain 'location tickets' that was thought established with the intent to create a bond between the individual Indian and plot(s) of land (Miller 1978:53). When Reed began to implement the subdivision of reserves on the Canadian prairies in 1889

the Canadian government had already had some experience with administrating such a policy at places such as the Six Nations Grand River Reserve.

This administration of such a policy did not occur without problems. At the Six Nations Grand River Reserve in southern Ontario there were a number of problems with the allotment of lands in the 1850s. Similar problems like those that were encountered on the prairies (see discussion below) centered around the question of who should receive land on the reserve. David Thorburn, who served as the Six Nations' visiting Superintendent (1844-1862), wanted only Six Nations people to occupy the land and therefore receive allotments (Weaver 1994: 184-185). The chiefs however took a different view as to who were to receive allotments:

> ... but the chiefs, in fact, assigned some plots to whites and a few black families, stipulating that the blacks must remain on the lands assigned to them and not move elsewhere on the reserve. In these instances the families had developed friendships and kinship ties with the Six Nations people, and the chiefs saw no need to deny them a place in the community. The more difficult cases arose with mixed marriages, mostly of Mohawk women to white men. Here, again, the chiefs overruled Thorburn and assigned land to families in the name of the Indian wife (Weaver 1994: 185).

The allocation of lands began 1847 and by 1851 "325 nuclear families, including widows with children, had received plots" (Weaver 1994: 185-186). Families received 40 hectare plots or approximately 98.84 acres of land (Weaver 1994: 185).

Carter (1990) argued that the subdivision of reserves on the Canadian prairies was the central part of a larger plan to displace Indians from their land (202). Carter suggested that Reed was the main proponent behind this goal of displacement. Although there was some evidence to suggest this, there was also evidence to the contrary that Reed, by only allowing small subdivisions, allowed measures of success to be accomplished by Indian farmers that may not have been otherwise possible (see the examples of the Birtle and Crooked Lakes Agencies discussed below). Carter also described Reed's peasant farming policy as not allowing for the purchase of modern equipment by more than one individual at a time and that self-subsistence was the main goal. Carter further argued that through peasant farming practices and the subdivision of Indian lands Indians no longer were dependent on the Canadian government. She assigned the responsibility of formulating this policy and implementing it squarely on the shoulders of Reed (210). Did Hayter Reed have only

one single goal in mind when he implemented his policy of subdivision on the Canadian prairies; that being the eventual enfranchisement of Indians so that Indian reserve lands could be more easily obtained? Or were there more complex motives attributable to Hayter Reed and his policies on the Canadian prairies?

In order to come to a better understanding of Reed and his policy initiatives within the Department of Indian Affairs it was necessary to examine whether Reed was the man characterized by Carter (1990). Were there circumstances that further shaped how Reed approached Indian policy based upon more complete evidence than has been presented to date that more fully illustrates how Reed dealt with Indians. Three other very important additional considerations were the economic situation of the time (1889-1897), the question of whether or not Indians showed any level of success during Reed's tenure, and what measures and criterion had to be met in order to be considered successful.

One place to start in attempting to understand how Reed approached the idea of subdivision on Indian reserves pivoted upon evidence as to where Reed acquired the idea that lots be forty acres. On 19 November 1889 Reed in a letter to an Indian Agent (individual unknown) laid out the justification for the subdivision of Indian

reserves into forty acre lots. The letter in its entirety became key in understanding why Reed took the action he did:

> In order to enable you to rectify any misapprehension in the minds of the Indians regarding the object of the subdivision surveys, at present under way in some of the reserves; I have the honor to state as follows:-
> 1. The subdivision surveys of Indian Reserves, at present under progress, are intended to cover only such portions of the respective reserves as may reasonably be expected to be required for settlement within the next few years.
> 2. In the method of survey which will be adopted for the subdivision of reserves in the North West, the sections correspond to the Dominion Lands system, and section corners are marked in the same way but each section is further subdivided into sixteen lots (which, for distinction, are termed "subdivisions") of forty acres each. On the post at the north west-corner of each subdivision, is marked the subdivision number followed by the number of the section, as shown in the accompanying diagram.
> 3. The road allowance of 22 feet comes off the westernly side of subdivisions 2, 7, 10 and 15 in each section.
> 4. Whenever a portion of a reserve shall have been surveyed as above efforts should be made to induce the Indians to locate on seperate subdivisions, informing them at the same time, that pending the issue of location tickets under Section 17 of the "Indian Act", it is proposed to issue a certificate of occupancy to any individual Indian, who, in the opinion of the Indian Commissioner, upon the report of the Agent, may have made sufficient improvements on any one or more subdivisions within said surveyed portion of the reserve, or who may hereafter make such improvements. But in no case should an Indian be permitted to take up more land than the number of his family entitles him to. Care being always taken

> to fully explain that the certificate of occupancy, above referred to, is only to be considered as a preliminary title towards the more complete terms inferred by the issue of a location ticket, under the provisions of the "Indian Act", when the holder shall have proved himself entitled to it, to the satisfaction of the Superintendent General.
>
> The object in view, in subdividing into small square farms of forty acres each, is to enable an Indian to select the land most suitable for agricultural purposes, without being compelled to take into his farm - land which is inferior, or which he does not want, besides, it often happens in subdividing, that a survey line crosses existing improvements; in such cases the adjacent forty acre subdivisions can usually be selected, which will enclose them; whereas if the subdivisions were larger, they might take in land which was not reserved, or that might be occupied by another Indian. It is intended to survey a certain area of the most desirable farming lands, but lands valuable on account of hay, wood, or other natural products, will remain common property, as heretofore(NAC, RG 10, vol. 3811, file 55,152-1).

The most important thing to keep in mind, when looking at Reed's policy, was the economic restraints that Reed worked within. The expenditures on Indians during Reed's tenure available for agricultural development continually declined and Indian self-sufficiency was assumed to be the outcome and defined as essential to Indian survival. For example the total amount spent on implements, seed and livestock for Manitoba and the Northwest Territories was $30,927.27 in 1890 and by 1897 it had dropped to $10,117.99. At the

same time the entire budget for Treaty Indians in Manitoba and the Northwest Territories was also on the decline. From a total of $999,480.85 in 1890 to $776,566.52 in 1897 (ARIA 1890-1897).

The continual decline in money for Indians during the late 1880s and for most of the 1890s was tied directly to trends in the Canadian economy. Despite the availability of free land and the development of a transcontinental railway there was no wheat boom and no great influx of settlers to the Canadian prairies prior to 1896. Macdonald's dream of the Canadian prairies as the great supplier of raw materials such as wheat had not yet become a reality.

> Free homesteads entries rose briefly in the early 1880s, with the construction of the CPR, but fell off for the next decade. In some of these years, cancellation exceeded entries, and the stock of homesteads actually declined. The lands of southern Manitoba did gradually fill in and the population of that province reached 150,000 by 1891. West of this, however, settlement was thinly scattered, with vast areas still untouched by the plough one generation after the transfer (Norrie and Owram: 1996:233).

Without the revenue expected by the anticipated influx of settlers into the West the Canadian government had to make adjustments to the budgets of Indian Affairs among others. The region that was to be the revenue generator had become anything but such a source. Indian people were expected to adapt to the cutback in rations that

occurred during the 1890s and were expected to compensate this shortfall with their productivity.

> In the broadest sense, the homesteading period in the Canadian-American West was an episode of intense disposal of land by government, railroads, private land companies, speculators, and individual owners. Town merchants, for example, often managed to assemble considerable private holdings by taking over the homesteads of settler customers who went broke and were unable to pay their bills for equipment and food (Bennett and Kohl 1995: 18).

The most important issue in Reed's articulation of his policy changes was the precise origin of the idea of forty acre lots. There were a number of reasons as to why Reed may have chosen forty acre lots for the size of subdivisions. Carter argued that "reserve subdivision provided another means of facilitating surrender" (Carter 1990: 202). However, evidence suggested that Reed was not only considering surrenders when he decided on forty acre lots. His decision was centered more around economic issues than considerations linked to the surrender of land. Reed, the administrator was faced with a continually shrinking budget which meant less money for rations. This left the self-sufficiency of Indian people as the only alternative. Added to his shrinking budget was public pressure to deal with Indians whose rations had been cut back. It can be suggested that it was the pressure to have the Indian

become self-sufficient that really drove his policy initiatives (as Carter 1990 also argued).

The main thrust of this pressure to deal with rations came from different interests depending on geographic location and specific situation. The two most prominent of these interests were cattlemen and those who had been affected by the 1885 uprising. With respect to cattlemen as rations were decreased Indian people turned to other means of supporting themselves. In some cases this meant slaughtering cattle that wandered onto reserve land. This resulted in complaints from ranchers that if rations were going to be decreased that another form of subsistence would be needed to support Indian people. The Department of Indian Affairs argued that its agricultural policy stressing self-sufficiency was the cure to this problem or that the complaints about missing cattle were either untrue or exaggerated to try and gain the increase of beef contracts (NAC, Hayter Reed Papers, v. 12) (see discussion below).

For those who had experienced the 1885 uprising first hand or those who believed the rumors about another uprising the decline of rations was seen as threat to their physical well being. The reduction in rations put fears into the minds of white settlers. It

was believed that starving Indians would soon become violent Indians. It was here that the pass system became an important tool for the Macdonald administration. To guarantee law and order and to reassure prospective settlers Indians were forced to remain on their reserves (Carter 1990: 154-155).

Most likely Reed based the use of forty acre lots on the experience of farmers in Britain and of farmers in both Ontario and the eastern Canadian prairies. For example, recent scholarship by Overton (1996) demonstrated that in England farm size was very much on a scale of the kind Reed considered reasonable. By 1870 70% of the 393,569 English farms were fifty acres or less and on a more micro-level many of the districts in England had much higher percentages of farms of fifty acres or less (i.e., Yorkshire West 80%, Cheshire 76% and Norfolk 76%) (Overton 1996:175).

The situation in Ontario, where Reed grew up was very similar to the pattern as that in England. For example the average number of improved acres on farms in Ontario in 1851 was 40.8 acres. In Prescott County where Reed was born the average number of improved acres was 34.7 acres (McInnis 1992:70-71). It was apparent that Reed established forty acres as the size of

subdivisions because they were not out of scope with contemporary farm sizes in both England and Ontario.

Comparing Reed's forty acre allotments with the size of farms on the Canadian prairies the picture becomes even more clear. For example, in 1881 the average number of improved acres per farm in Manitoba was 27.5 acres; by 1891 this number had risen only slightly to 54.6 acres. The numbers for Saskatchewan and Alberta, which were reported together until 1901, reflect similar numbers. In 1881 the average number of improved acres was 28.6 acres and in 1891 the number had actually dropped to 21.3. For the prairies as a whole in 1881 there were on average 27.65 acres of improved land per farm and in 1891 the number had risen to an average of 44.2 acres (Danysk 1995: 187-188). These scales and numbers probably influenced Reed's choice of forty acre allotments that have a fit with what was being successfully farmed at the time when Reed implemented subdivision surveys on the prairies in the late 1880s.

When Reed referred to the selection of forty acre lots for agricultural purposes in the letter of 19 November 1889, he referred to the fact that there was a need for the Indian farmer to be economically self-sufficient. Purely economic and practical reasons motivated his decision for the subdivision of reserves.

Economically Reed was under pressure to make continuous cutbacks in budgets and he had no choice but to have Indians assume lots that would allow them to be self-sufficient. The practical reason was that this fell into the average size of what constituted a successful farm with respect to acres of land utilized in the late 1880s and into the 1890s. His previous experience as a Land Guide also influenced his choice of forty acre lots based on his first hand experience with both successful and unsuccessful settlers. The argument that subdivision of Indian reserves was for the sole purpose of speeding up the surrender of Indian reserves remained problematic because it did not take into account the average size of farms, the budgetary situation of Indian Affairs vis a vis other priorities of the government, nor the fact that the response to the homestead program by non-Indian farmers was anything but successful.

In addition, the government wanted to "protect" Indians from incurring debts (see Dewdney quote above). This meant that smaller plots of land made more sense in the view of the government as this would not require that Indians take on debts in order to finance their farming operation. By allowing Indians a monitored number of acres and a few head of stock Reed was also

helping reinforce the governments position on Indian debt.

The number of homestead entries for the prairie provinces for the most part showed a decline during the 1887-1897 period. Although there was some increase between 1887 and 1892 (1,680 entries to 4,741 entries), these numbers again dropped off to a low of 1,140 entries by 1897. It was not until the turn of the century that any real increases are seen in the number of homestead entries. At the same time homestead cancellations were also generally on the rise from 935 in 1887 to 1,546 in 1898 (Danysk 1995: 184-186). These numbers further illustrate that there was not a great anticipated demand for Indian reserve lands during this time period because the available homestead land was far from being exhausted. Added to this was the fact that farming on Indian reserves did not appear to be any more successful as a whole than did homesteads. Therefore reserve lands were not perceived as being superior to homestead lands.

Reed allowed Indian farmers the chance to choose lots among available lands that were best suited for agriculture. Although at first glance it appeared that Reed limited Indian farmers in their selection of land, he did so with their best interests in mind. He based

this on the experience of non-Indian farmers on the prairies. For example on the Canadian prairies in 1881 the average farm size was 267.4 acres and of that only 27.65 of those acres were improved. This meant that on average 239.75 acres were unimproved. By 1891 the situation had not changed drastically. In 1891 the average farm size was 255.8 acres and of that only 44.2 acres were improved. This meant that on average 211.6 acres were unimproved (Dansyk 1995: 188). In essence what Reed was attempting to do was ensure the success of Indian farmers on a small scale in order to allow for self-sufficiency. By allowing Indian farmers only forty acre lots Reed was attempting to raise the odds for success as he believed that this was what was being successfully cultivated by white farmers. He sought to add to this success by leaving wood and hay lands communal and therefore remove the pressure from individuals to include this in the selection of their forty acre lots.

It can also be argued that Reed was not operating in a vacuum. At the same time Reed was stressing the importance of severalty the United States government was also promoting the process although in a somewhat different form. Although there were different forms that existed in each country the underlying assumptions

in both countries were virtually identical. Janet McDonnell (1991) in her study of the allotment of Indian reserve lands in the United States demonstrated how similar the basic assumptions regarding severalty were between the American and Canadian governments:

> ... government officials developed policies rooted in two fundamental but erroneous assumptions: that the Indians should give up their tribal existence and become "civilized" and that they should become independent, productive members of society. By allotting reservation land in severalty policymakers hoped to replace tribal civilization with a white one, protect the Indians from unscrupulous whites, promote progress, and save the federal government money (McDonnell 1991: 2).

This précis completely mirrored Reed and the Canadian government's approach to Indians during the 1887-1897 time period. The breaking up of the tribal system and attempts to cut back on government expenditures on Indians were central to Reed's policies. Also underlying Reed's policies, was his belief in self-reliance and the work ethic which were to be the basis of participation by Indians in Canadian society. Those Indians that would not accept this would parish. In other words the survival of the fittest would help determine Indian success in agriculture. Those who could adapt to the new social, economic, and political order that was emerging would survive although not as they had in the past.

Similarities also existed among government officials. Reed's arguments for self-sufficiency and that the allotment of lands was the necessary starting point towards breaking up the tribal system were also echoed by his American counterparts.

> Every Commissioner of Indian Affairs who served between 1887 and 1934 endorsed the goal of self-sufficiency and maintained that allotment was the first step towards making the Indians self-supporting, industrious citizens (McDonnell 1991: 6).

Although there were a number of similarities between the assumptions underlying severalty in both Canada and the United States, the implementation of the policies were not as common. According to the stipulations of the Dawes Act (8 February 1887) the President had the power to have a reserve allotted when he believed it was time (Carlson 1981: 9). The Dawes Act stipulated

> ... that each head of a household was to receive a 160-acre tract of land, with single individuals over eighteen receiving an additional 80 acres and children under eighteen receiving allotments of 40 acres. On reservations with lands suited only for grazing, acreages were doubled. If land on a reservation was insufficient to allot each household 160 acres, allotments were prorated. Indians who were not residing on a reservation were eligible for allotments on land in the public domain. If an individual refused to choose an allotment within four years, one could be assigned to him (Carlson 1981: 10).

Lands that were allotted were kept in trust for twenty five years. During the trust period Indians were not allowed to lease, sell or will their land. Once the trust period was over individuals received fee simple title to their allotment and the alottee became a citizen of the United States. Reservation lands that were not allotted were subdivided, appraised and opened for sale. The Dawes Act was mandatory for tribes when their reservation was designated for allotment and they were not able to opt out (Carlson 1981).

Comparing the Dawes Act to the policy that evolved in Canada under Reed some differences were readily apparent. For example the allotment size of 160 acres was much larger in the United States than it was in comparison to Canada's 40 acre allotment. In the American case there was the twenty five year trust period while in Canada it was at the discretion of the government in the form of the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs as to when an Indian was ready to receive a location ticket. Also, location tickets were much different than the fee simple that American Indians received after the twenty five year trust period. Simply put, Canadian Indians only were able to benefit indirectly from sale through surrender of lands to the government while compared to American Indians once they

received fee simple title as individuals were able to sell to anyone if they so wished; but lands with title granted in fee simple also became subject to taxation. In addition unsubdivided or unallotted lands were not open for settlement in Canada in the same manner as they were in the United States. Although Canadian and American severalty were based on similar assumptions to meet similar needs, the precise way in which each evolved and what this eventually meant for Indian people within each of these nation states were much different.

Was Reed successful at his enterprise of severalty? Carter suggested that by 1896 Indian farming on the prairies was a failure in general terms and she puts much of this blame on the shoulders of government officials such as Reed (1990: ix). Carter was quite right in her assessment of the prairies as a whole when she stated that, "measures like the permit system, severalty and peasant farming combined to undermine and atrophy agricultural development on reserves" (Carter 1990: 234). However, there were reserves that were successful in their agricultural pursuits. The records of the Department of Indian Affairs illustrated that on the micro-level there were successful Indian farmers despite the barriers they faced. To say that Indian farming was a categorical failure was misleading and

does injustice to those many successful Indian farmers that made a life of agriculture. To understand tangibly the effects of Reed's allotment policy it remained necessary to examine the reactions of Indians to allotment.

Carter argued that the motives behind Reed's severalty policy were,

> ... to erode further the land base (on Indian reserves) until eventually reserves were abolished altogether. Severalty was a short-cut policy through which Reed hoped to accelerate the process of Indian enfranchisement, which meant the end of reserves. Severalty would confine the Indians within circumscribed boundaries, and their "surplus" land could be defined and sold. The veneration of private property, self-sufficiency, and individual initiative gave severalty its veneer of humanitarianism and allowed many to believe that what was being done was in the best interests of the Indian. The convenient doctrine that the Indians must be taught to farm was once again drawn upon to justify divesting the Indians of their land. The peasant farming policy served to justify severalty. It would demonstrate that Indians could indeed subsist on small plots of land without modern methods or equipment (Carter 1990: 236).

Carter's analysis of Reed and his severalty policy was somewhat problematic in a number of areas. Most unsettling of Carter's interpretations is her conclusion that the main purpose of the severalty policy was to open up lands for white settlement. As was demonstrated above, demand for Indian reserve lands during Reed's

tenure were not at the forefront of the Canadian government's agenda. Numbers of homesteads and homestead cancellations during Reed's period of administration did not reflect successful levels of settlement as it had been envisioned by Macdonald for the Canadian prairies. This resulted in diminished demand for Indian lands during Reed's time within Indian Affairs.

Demand for Indian lands was not the concern for Reed that it was to become for his successors. It was not until the turn of the century that the surrender of Indian reserve lands emerged as a problem facing Indian people on the prairies as settlement began to show greater levels of success. During Reed's tenure the tangible issue was self-sufficiency. Declining budgets forced Reed to make decisions regarding the administration of Indian Affairs in relation to other priorities of government and it was severalty as well as peasant farming that he implemented in order to achieve the self-sufficiency of Indian people. This in turn promoted a program of efficiency. It was those who followed Reed that made use of the initial polices and legislation he already had helped put in place to coerce the surrender of Indian lands on the prairies.

Government legislation simply did not allow individual Indians to surrender their individually set aside locations. This was something which Reed certainly anticipated in respect to location tickets. A location ticket did not give individuals the right to sell their land to the government without the consent of the band. To suggest that Reed's severalty ideas first articulated by him in 1887 forecasted the demand for Indian reserve lands after 1900 was without foundation in chronological evidence.

Carter also suggested that, by not allowing Indian farmers the opportunity to expand their farms because reserves were being taken up with more allotments within their fixed reserve boundaries, they were doomed to fail as compared to neighbouring white farmers who could hold more acres (1990: 221-236). As has been illustrated below average acres cultivated between Indian and non-Indian farmers during Reed's time with Indian Affairs did not show any great differences. Carter also suggested that because Indian farmers were forced into peasant mixed style farming they were the exception to farming practices on the prairies including that of scale. Carter made reference to Vernon Fowke's conclusions (1957) that it was a wheat economy that came to dominate the Canadian prairie economy. Although this

was eventually what occurred on the Canadian prairies, when Reed was implementing severalty and his peasant farming policy, there was evidence to suggest that the wheat economy was far from being a given way of economic life on the prairies in his day. By forcing individualism rather than cooperation farming became increasingly expensive.

In fact the Edmonton Bulletin ran a regular column that discussed the advantages of mixed farming versus wheat farming during the late 1800s. It was suggested that economically mixed farming was the better choice as compared to wheat farming especially for individuals:

> The wheat farmer's capital is in his cultivated land, and in his stock and machinery for working it. His only return is from the crop produced. If the season is favorable from any cause his whole return is affected favorably and his profits are correspondingly large. But the pinch is this that unless the wheat farmer has a reserve of cash, one or two unfavorable seasons leaves him without the ability to put his farm in shape to produce another year and he is practically bankrupt (Edmonton Bulletin, 10 August 1889).

After stressing the risks of wheat farming the discussion then turned to the advantages of mixed farming. The discussion echoed the sentiments that Reed had endorsed when he recommended severalty and peasant farming:

> The settler who is favorably located and follows mixed farming, raising grain, vegetables and live stock of various kinds can scarcely ever benefit by any conjunction of circumstances to the same extent in a single season as the farmer who raises chiefly wheat. But on the other hand, there is scarcely possible a conjunction of circumstances by which he can lose as much in a single season as the wheat raiser. The season that is most unfavorable for one variety of his produce is perhaps more favorable for another, so that he can scarcely be deprived of a profit on some part of his operation each year. His business occupies him more evenly all the year around and his profits accrue the same way, therefore he is not subject to the periods of extra exertion and after idleness, of financial stringency and after abundance, which lead to bad management and wastefulness on the part of the wheat farmer (Edmonton Bulletin, 10 August 1889).

What the above discourse from the Edmonton Bulletin illustrated was that at the time Reed implemented his policy and for much of the time he played a key role in Indian Affairs the wheat economy from which Carter extrapolated her argument was really non-existent. It was only after the turn of the century that wheat came to the forefront of the prairie economy. The above discussion from the Edmonton Bulletin also demonstrated that mixed farming was believed to be the best way to insure some measures of success. Mixed farming by insuring some success fit in perfectly to Reed's concept of self-reliant Indian farmers and further supported the argument that it was economics and self-support that

were driving Reed's policies not demand for Indian reserve lands.

Reed in his policy formation was responding to both political pressures and the shifting nature of living on prairie lands in order to be a successful agriculturist. As a top ranking official in Indian Affairs Reed would have also been aware of the patterns of homestead abandonment, the economic downturn of 1893, the changing political scene in Canada (especially with the death of Macdonald), and railroad expansion was having in the development of the prairies. The graduation of children from the industrial schools also meant an increased orientation to a "progressive" disposition. The challenge was how to order such a new social formation within bands upon their reserves. Reed was far more a social planner than were his successors within the Clifford Sifton/Frank Oliver administration.

The next chapter will examine how several specific Indian bands responded to the subdivision survey of their reserves and how this affected the success or failure of their farming operations in the perspectives of the Canadian government.

CHAPTER 3

INDIAN REACTION TO ALLOTMENT OF THEIR RESERVES

Indian people's reaction to the subdivision of their reserves will be examined through a cross section of Indian agencies representative of the Canadian prairies. The Birtle Agency in Manitoba, the Crooked Lakes Agency in Saskatchewan and the Blood Agency in Alberta will be featured as each of these agencies all had portions of reserves that were subdivided into forty acre lots. The reaction to subdivision will be shown to be as varied as the geographic variation of these agencies. The responses will be demonstrated to range from protest to requested subdivision to indifference depending on the situation of particular reserves within specific agencies. Carter (1990) examines two of these examples (Birtle Agency: 224-229 and Crooked Lakes Agency: 205-209).

One of the first recorded protests to the subdivision of Indian reserves came from members of Piapot's band at the urging of O'Soup from the Cowessess Reserve of the Crooked Lakes Agency. Reed reported to the Deputy Superintendent in a letter dated 3 July 1889 that "the subdivision of Reserves into lots has had a commencement made at Piapot's Reserve" (NAC, RG 10, vol.

3811, file 55,152-1). Reed went on to explain that there was some objection to the survey of this reserve. Surveyor Nelson in a letter to Reed dated 8 July 1889 explained that Indians of Piapot's reserve who were employed in the survey of the reserve had quit. They informed the surveyor that they had quit because of low wages. Nelson met with Piapot to see if wages were the reason that that the labourers had quit work on the survey. Piapot informed Nelson that it was not wages that had stopped the survey of the reserve but rather a warning given by O'Soup of Crooked Lakes as to what the Canadian government was doing when it surveyed reserve lands into individual lots.

Piapot indicated to Nelson that O'Soup suggested the subdivision of Piapot's reserve "was very wrong" and that "to permit the surveyors to cut up his land into small squares, would be no good to the Indians" (NAC, RG 10 vol. 3811 file 55,152-1). O'Soup informed Piapot that he "would not allow the surveyors to plant any stakes in his own reserve at Crooked Lakes" (NAC, RG 10, vol. 3811, file 55,152-1). After some reassurances to Piapot surveying began again within a few days. This was not the end of this issue. O'Soup responded to what took place between Piapot and himself at Regina in July of 1889 with respect to the subdivision of reserves. O'Soup's version was much different than what Piapot described of the conversation.

O'Soup suggested that Piapot informed his people that they should "leave the reserve and go camping about or else we will sell the whole to the Government and then we will all be free and go wherever we like" (NAC, RG 10, vol. 3811, file 55,152-1). O'Soup then explained that in fact he approved of the surveying of his reserve and looked forward to the day when he would receive a location ticket:

> Piapot then asked me what I would do in case of this surveying taking place. I said for my part I was the first who went to Crooked Lake and chose out the place of our Reserve, and I called for a Surveyor to come and survey it. This was all done by me and now I have left it all in the hands of the Head Men, and the Band, and if they want their farms surveyed it will be so. I have done my part, I told them you do not know anything at all if you understood as I do you would think otherwise. Where can you go and make a living for yourself and your people. About this Surveying you seem to take it very hard as you do not understand what it means but if you understood as I do you would think nothing of it. Look at the White Man how he has his land surveyed to him. What quantity of land do you see that he receives. The Government wishes us to take example by them and wants our lands (that is the improvements) surveyed to us, and that we have to live on them for three years, and at the end of that time we get a paper to show that it is our individual property that no one else can take from us and that when the time comes for election for a member to represent us in Ottawa, we will have a right to vote the same as the white man. This is what I understand the Government is going to do (NAC, RG 10, vol. 3811, file 55,152-1).

This discussion illustrated that there was some understanding of what subdivision meant for Indian reserves. The veracity of this account of the meeting

of Piapot and O'Soup was uncertain. These two successful individuals came to farming prior to the subdivision of their reserves. O'Soup was perhaps "testing the waters" with respect to the subdivision of reserves. The subdivision of reserves into forty acre lots was not without detriment to O'Soup's farm operation which encompassed farming 43¾ acres of land in 1888 (ARIA 1888: 255). Not only did he face his total acres being reduced, but the subdivision survey had the potential consequences of land O'Soup had worked being taken from his use as the survey did not necessarily follow the pattern of existing fields. For example, O'Soup had thirty three acres of wheat, seven acres of oats, five acres of barley, one and one-half acres of peas, one acre of potatoes, one-eighth of an acre of carrots and one-eighth of an acre of garden (ARIA 1888: 255). The subdivision survey of the lands he utilized at Cowessess reserve meant that he was not going to be able to continue farming the plots of land he was already cultivating.

Piapot in comparison was farming only seven and three quarter acres of land in 1888 (ARIA 1888: 257). This suggested that Piapot did not have as much to lose if his reserve was subdivided. By planting the idea in Piapot's mind that the subdivision of reserves was potentially harmful O'Soup was trying to ascertain what consequences were possible when one attempted to avoid

having his reserve subdivided. The message was clear subdivision was proceeding whether Indian bands agreed or not. By the fall of 1890 much of the Crooked Lakes Agency reserves had been subdivided (Carter 1990: 205).

Reed was well aware however that if the subdivision survey of reserves was to succeed, Indians affected, members of the Department of Indian Affairs and the public needed to be convinced of what Reed believed to be the advantages of severalty. Reed attempted to rectify any misunderstandings that were still lingering after his above letter was issued in 1889 regarding the subdivision of reserves. In his 1889 annual report Reed wrote at length about subdivision, the issuing of location tickets, taxation, and the need for Indian Agents to have a working knowledge of how the system would work so that any misapprehensions could be rectified.

In typical Victorian fashion Reed attempted to place the blame for any resistance by the non-acceptance of subdivision upon particular Indian people. He suggested that it may be some innate shortage of intelligence that was impeding their acceptance of subdivision:

> It is greatly to be regretted that any Indians should be so lacking in intelligence as not to recognize the advantages which must occur to their people by the introduction of such a manifestly correct system among them. Yet it is a fact that the proposition to introduce it is met with strong opposition from Indians who, from the length of time they have had

> the benefit of enlightened instruction, might be expected to advocate the change instead of opposing it. It is probable that men of influence in these bands, who have acquired possession of more land than they think they would retain were a fair distribution of the land in the reserve be made, use that influence with their unsuspecting kinsmen to cause them to object to the severalty principle being applied to them (ARIA 1889: x).

Reed was making direct reference to the Piapot/O'Soup incident discussed above. Pointing to the fact that the subdivision of reserves had the negative impact of reducing the holdings of a number of individuals Reed was identifying from whom the major objections to subdivision were coming.

An examination of the documentation of Indian farmers kept by Indian Affairs illustrated that on most reserves prior to subdivision there were a number that had but a few individuals farming tracts of land in the forty acre plus range. What Reed did not appear to factor into his discussion, however, was that the produce that came from these lands did not only go to support the nuclear family of the particular farmer identified in the Indian Affairs records instead this produce helped support the entire community. For example of a total reported population of 1656 at the Birtle Agency only 123 were reported farming, at the Crooked Lakes Agency of 619 people only 68 were reported farming, and of 2169 people at the Blood Agency only 128 were reported farming in 1888 (ARIA 1888). Of those who

reported to be farming only two or three at each reserve had farms of more than forty acres. Most had nothing more than gardens. It was not as though Indian farmers were farming large tracts of lands individually.

Reed in his 1889 Annual Report then addressed the arguments that individuals such as O'Soup proposed to convince people that the subdivision of reserves was not the answer for Indian farmers:

> The following arguments against the system are usually brought to bear upon the members of a band - that the government will deprive them of the residue of their lands, should there be any after the location titles have been issued for the lots allocated to individual Indians, and that the latter will become subject to taxation, as are the lands of the white people in municipalities. It should be apparent, however, to Indians of intelligence that not one acre of land in a reserve can, under the law, be taken possession of and sold by the Government without the formal consent of a majority of the voting members of the band interested therein, ...(ARIA 1889: x).

In this statement Reed is really getting at the key point regarding severalty in Canada. Whether or not individual Indians accepted severalty or not was irrelevant. The issuing of a location ticket did not open the door for the potential sale of allotments to non-Indian farmers. Unlike the situation in the United States Indians could not convert allotments into fee simple interests (see Hoxie 1984). Therefore, the argument held by Carter (1990) and others that the subdivision of Indian reserves in Canada had but one

purpose, that being the surrender of reserve lands, may not be as straight forward as argued.

Reed then made it clear that a concerted effort had to be made to eliminate any doubts from peoples' minds regarding severalty and that this was the responsibility of the Department of Indian Affairs:

> If agents and others interested in the advancement of the Indians would explain fully to them in regard to the above or any similar objections raised by themselves or by self-interested parties to the application of the severalty principle to them, and would sedulously impress upon them the superior advantages which that system possesses over that of occupancy of lands in common, no doubt their apprehensions would be rapidly dissipated, and it would result in a more general adoption of the system. No effort to bring about the desirable consummation should be spared (ARIA 1889: x).

The subdivision at the Crooked Lakes Agency had an immediate impact on farming. O'Soup's total acres did drop to thirty three and one half acres but the overall cultivation of reserve land rose even though the number of individuals who were reported to be farming did not increase dramatically. For example, between 1888 and 1890 the number of Indian farmers rose by one from sixty eight to sixty nine but the number of acres cultivated rose from 718 acres in 1888 to 1306 acres in 1890. This meant that prior to subdivision in 1888 each farmer had averaged approximately 10.56 acres under cultivation. By 1890 after subdivision had been implemented the average numbers increased to 18.93 acres under

cultivation per farmer. The next two years saw continued increases in the number of individual farmers while the acres per average cultivated were down slightly. By 1892 there were eighty seven farmers in the Crooked Lakes Agency each having an average of 17.13 acres under cultivation (ARIA 1888-1892). When one compares these numbers to the numbers for white farmers in Saskatchewan, it is clear that Indian farmers were as successful as their white counterparts despite a lack of proper machinery (see argument by Carter 1990: 220-224). In 1891 the average non-Indian farmer in Saskatchewan had 21.13 acres under cultivation (Dansyk 1995: 187). By 1891 non-Indian and Indian farmers were very much on equal footing with respect to cultivated land in Saskatchewan.

Comparing the above statistics with agencies where subdivision did not occur an interesting pattern emerges. Neither the File Hills nor the Touchwood agencies had reserves that were surveyed for subdivision (Carter 1990: 205). For the years 1888 to 1891 the File Hills Agency reported that the Indians were farming in common (ARIA 1888 - 1891). In fact in several cases communal farming was occurring over reserve boundaries in the circumstances of adjacent reserves. For example the Okanees Band was farming in cooperation with the Peepeekeeses Band on the Peepeekeeses reserve. In 1888 even though it was reported that the Indians at File

Hills were farming communally, the numbers for individuals were still reported. These numbers indicated that there were thirty-eight Indian farmers who on average had an average of five acres under cultivation in 1888. Individual numbers for farmers were not reported again until 1892 and in that year there were thirty-two Indian farmers on File Hills who had an average of 8.56 acres under cultivation (ARIA 1892). By 1895 there were thirty-one farmers each cultivating an average of 5.31 acres (ARIA 1892).

The Touchwood Agency also made for an interesting comparison because it did not appear as though they farmed to the same extent communally. However, they did not meet with the same successes as did Indian farmers at Crooked Lakes and the Birtle agencies (see discussion below). In 1888 it was reported that sixty-three Indian farmers had on average 7.92 acres under cultivation. By 1892 there were fifty seven farmers cultivating on average 12.55 acres but by 1895 sixty-three farmers were cultivating on average 7.52 acres (ARIA 1888-1895). These statistics implied that severalty was a potential indicator of levels of success in farming pursuits. In general terms those reserves that were subdivided showed greater measures of success than did those reserves that were not. Before a full discussion could be attempted it was necessary to look at other agencies where subdivision survey was implemented.

This above mentioned position of equal standing however did not last long. By 1895 (the last year of available detailed published records) the number of Indians at Crooked Lakes who were identified as farmers was seventy eight and the total acres under cultivation was 686 acres. This meant that the average number of acres per farmer under cultivation had dropped considerably to 8.79 acres. The subdivision survey of reserves in the Crooked Lakes Agency had the initial impact of increasing the number of acres per farmer cultivated, however, additional policies such as the pass and permit system (see Carter 1990 and discussion above) also contributed to lowering the number of acres cultivated per farmer in this Agency[1].

The above example of the Crooked Lakes Agency was not the only response or result of the subdivision survey of Indian reserves. For example a number of reserves in the Birtle Agency in Manitoba adapted immediately to subdivision and showed great success in their farming enterprises. In fact subdivision survey was requested by Indians on the Oak Lake Reserve as early as 1896 (NAC, RG 10, vol. 3561, file #82, pt. 2) as well as by the Fort Alexander Band (not part of Birtle) in 1893 (ARIA 1893: xvi). Both the Birdtail and

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[1] Please note that these numbers are averages only and that there were non-Indian farmers who did have acres under cultivation that exceeded what the averages depict.

Oak River reserves were subdivided in 1889 and 1891 respectively (ARIA 1893: 146 and Elias 1988: 84). Similar to the situation at Crooked Lakes the subdivision survey had an immediate impact on farming at the Birtle Agency. In 1888 each farmer had on average 7.35 acres under cultivation within the Birtle Agency. By 1892 after the subdivision survey of some of the reserves had taken place the number had risen to 18.97 acres cultivated per Indian farmer. In comparison to non-Indian farmers living in Manitoba the farmers at the Birtle Agency were still somewhat behind. In Manitoba in 1891 the average number of acres under cultivation per farmer was 54.58 acres (Dansyk 1995: 187). Moreover the farming at the Birdtail Agency had only been a reality for five or six years by 1892 (Elias 1988: 71-82) compared to non-Indian farmers who had been cultivating the land for twenty five years or more. Also if viewing this at a more micro level an examination of both the Bird Tail and Oak River reserves (those which were subdivided) revealed a much different picture of its formations. On the Bird Tail reserve the average acres of cultivated land per farmer was 27.42 acres as well on the Oak River reserve it was 24.40 acres (ARIA 1892: 352).

Although the above mentioned average numbers were potentially measures for examining farming in general terms, on a more micro level there were a number of very

successful Indian farmers at Birtle Agency who adopted the subdivision system. This adoption of subdivision was tied to the awareness by a number of those at the Birtle Agency of the model of individual farming that occurred among the Sioux in Minnesota as a result of missionary influence prior to 1862 (Elias 1988: 15-16) Although Reed had hoped to keep Indian farmers on forty acre plots with the possible opportunity to expand to eighty acres some farmers were able to go over this set limit. By examining the numbers for individual farmers at the Birtle Agency it became apparent that there were a small number of Indian farmers who farmed more than the forty acre allotment and a few who pushed their total acres over the eighty acre limit.

At the Bird Tail reserve there were five individuals who were farming more than their forty acre allotment and of these five one was farming more than the maximum eighty acres: Alex Ben was farming 40.31 acres, Jason Ben 42.44 acres, Charlie Hauska 45.06 acres, Sunka Ho Hahon 68.31 and Moses Bun 80.13 acres (ARIA 1892: 352). Similarly at the Oak River reserve there were six individuals farming more than the forty acre allotment and two who had exceeded the eighty acre limit: Eli Aicage was farming 40.50 acres, Kinyan Wakan 50.50 acres, Charlie Dowan 56 acres, Tuyomhena 60 acres, Mah'piya Ska 80.50 acres and Pah'doka Sui 93 acres (ARIA 1892: 352-352).

The situation at the Birtle Agency did not go without notice. In the annual reports of both 1893 and 1895 Indian Affairs spoke glowingly of the success that was being met. In reference to the Bird Tail reserve Indian Affairs reported that:

> These Indians have conformed to the subdivision of their reserve, each man knows his own lines and land marks and keeps within them, the road allowances are observed, and used instead of the old trails; this gives a symmetrical appearance to the landscape, which is very pleasing to the eye, and has done away with the boundary disputes (ARIA 1893: 143).

By 1895 Indian Affairs was still talking of the success of subdivision at Bird Tail:

> The reserve was subdivided a few years ago. Each family is now in occupation of an 80 acre lot and, with the exception of a few individuals, they have straightened their fields close up to [the] divisional lines and a few have placed large stones on the corners, on which I have inscribed their names and the number of the lots (ARIA 1895: 142).

Successes were also reported at the Oak River reserve:

> Last year the reserve was subdivided; since then, under the direction of the farmer, each Indian is straightening out the lines of his claim, and working to his boundary. There was a good deal of difficulty at first in keeping them from plowing the road allowances and confining their operations within the proper limits; but now they appear to understand the matter, and do their work according to the farmer's instructions (ARIA 1893: 146)

> The Oak River Sioux Reserve No. 58, was also subdivided a few years ago, and each year since the Indians have been straightening their individual

> fields to the divisional lines of their lots, and as new houses or stables are erected they are placing them on their own lots - if before they were not so (ARIA 1895: 142).

One reason as to why success in subdivision may have been more readily implemented at the Birtle Agency was tied to the fact that the Sioux living there were not treaty Indians. Since they were not treaty Indians, treaty regulations regarding agricultural equipment would not have to be followed as rigidly as they were for treaty Indians. For Reed the Dakota reserves were a perfect testing ground for subdivision as he would not have been restricted by treaty obligations.

On the surface appearance subdivision and the resultant style of farming were operating without any major problems according to the discourse in the Annual Reports. This, however, was not the case. In 1893 the Oak River Band began to protest the management of their reserve especially the implementation of the permit system. Their protest which included letters to Ottawa and the Virden Chronicle resulted in an investigation into alleged problems. The residents of Oak River divided into two factions. Reed held up the example of the non-protesters as an example of how well the permit system worked. In the end the protesters were able to have their voices heard, but this did not result in any changes being made to the implemented system (Carter 1990: 226-229). However references made to the

subdivision survey provided insights about how the allotment of reserve lands to individual farmers precisely functioned. The meeting held on 19 December 1894 illustrated that there was some confusion as to whom was to be assigned an allotment and how an assignment was obtained.

According to the proceedings the first person to speak was Harry Hotanin. He alluded immediately to the subdivision survey of the reserve.

> Since Scott (the farming instructor who was being complained about) came here we are getting poorer every day . . . if we have money we have to go to the village to pay our debts, if we have grain we take it to the market, we only see it weighed, we never see if we get anything for it or not, for that reason these people don't care if they raise a big crop or not, and these Indians don't know which is their own land: a good many are good workers, a good many young fellows would like to have a section of land but Scott says "you have no wife yet, you don't want land": if they have no wife they have no one to make a living for, then it is of no use having a wife at all (NAC, RG 10, vol. 3908, file 107,243).

Farming Instructor Scott did not refute that he had limited the selection of lots in this described manner and suggested that it was official policy that dictated his actions:

> Heads of families have been allotted 80 acres of land, boys refused as no promise made that each male soul was to get 80 acres of land and unfair to heads of families who have not yet made selections of land to lock up the choicest lots to boys Signed R.W. Scott Farmer(NAC, RG 10, vol.3908, file 107,243).

This statement raised an interesting point. It was the head of families that were to be given preference to receive subdivided portions of land. This meant that unmarried males were not considered able to obtain a subdivided plot of land. This concentrated the availabilty of farm land on reserves to older males also reinforcing their authority. Later in the proceedings while an individual by the name of George Kinyan-Wakan was speaking Hotanin rose again to take the floor and again addressed the issue of subdivision.

> Lots of old people and young people who have no homes should get 80 acres, we asked the Deputy that a young fellow 15 or 17 or 18 years old should hold a farm, we asked that these young fellows should claim cattle (NAC, RG 10, vol. 3908, file 107,243).

Indian Agent Markle replied that:

> [He] informed Indians that families (5) were entitled to 80 acre lots, [he] refused to look up select lots in the names of boys which is what some of the Indians wished [him] to do, and in some instances before heads of families had made a selection of land (NAC, RG 10, vol. 3908, file 107,243).

This exchange between Hotanin, Indian Agent Markle and Farming Instructor Scott illustrated some of the confusion and frustration that accompanied the process used in the subdivision of Indian reserves. Even when bands readily accepted subdivision, government policy affected the success of the venture. By limiting the selection of allotments to heads of family the government was undermining its own policy directives.

If it was the goal of the Canadian government to turn prairie Indians into farmers, why did they limit who could obtain a subdivided lot to heads of families only? Little documentation was directly available to this question. However, there were some clues as to why Indian Affairs took the position it did under Reed with respect to the selection of subdivided lots.

One issue to be taken into account was the Victorian approach to Indians which informed the construction of Indian policy that was discussed earlier. The main thrust of policy as implemented on the prairies was to assimilate Indian people into the greater Canadian society and as part of this incorporating process Reed believed the Government was compelled to break up the tribal system substituting individualism. The process was to subdivide reserves which fostered families and individuals to become individuated units of production. In typical Victorian fashion it was males especially heads of families who were seen as the most important members of society. It was the nuclear family unit that was expected to replace the communal oriented traditional societies that existed on the Canadian prairies prior to Euro-Canadian western expansion. The evidence demonstrated that through allowing only declared heads of families to select subdivisions the idea of the nuclear family was being instilled in the minds of Indians. In practice, if a young Indian man

wanted to select his own subdivision, he was expected to be married so that he was able to demonstrate his commitment to the Agent in that he had fulfilled the requirement of heading a nuclear family and explicitly demonstrating his disposition to reject the 'primitive' communal system.

The Government and Department were attempting to insure that men were holding the good of their nuclear families over the good of the whole community. Government officials such as Reed saw single male farmers regardless of age as a threat to the closed system they were attempting to implement. Single farmers without families and, therefore, without a domestic labour force in the form of parents and children were potentially viewed as a threat because they were most likely to depend on each other for labour, machinery, and seed. Rather than destroying the tribal system singles males had a reinforcing effect upon the practice of communal farming. In fact, the Oak River, Oak Lake and Birdtail bands eventually were able to train young males to fill the roles of agricultural labourers and managers.

> In Manitoba, the Oak River, Oak Lake and Birdtail bands developed their agricultural pursuits to the point that virtually all labour, capital and resources were dedicated to that form of production. Once that was accomplished, the young men were integrated as agricultural labour and ultimately as

> management on the reserve, and trained in that capacity (Elias 1988: 154).

This application of policy was used to explain why older people were also excluded from the selection of land. Older people were not considered to be independent from the help of others. The policy implied that older people could not successfully operate as farmers. This implied that individuals or nuclear families were not able to be farming except for the labour available from extended family or community-based farms. Pertaining to young men this meant associating with some extended family and constituted ironically a more communal than an individual approach to farming.

The almost paradoxical contradiction has caused Indian people who lived on reserves that had been surveyed and subdivided to become even more strategic in their orientations to Government's representatives. Many Indians who wished to have the opportunity to adhere to government policy and take up farming were denied the opportunity to do so. It must have been hard to grasp the idea that the government wanted Indians on the prairies to become farmers while at the same time the government restricted this option to a select group.

Despite the above problems with subdivision there were still bands who made the request that their reserves be subdivided. However the motives for these requests appeared to parallel the examples discussed

above. Both the exclusion of younger populations from access to subdivided lands and the relative successes of farming at reserves that had been subdivided were key in the requests for subdivision by some bands. One of the first of these requests came from the Fort Alexander Band of Manitoba in 1893. In this particular case the younger members of the band requested that their reserve be subdivided and wanted location tickets issued. However the younger members of the band were opposed by the older generation and the Chief. The opinions of the older generation were that subdivision equaled the expected result of a loss of available farm land. Those older successful farmers feared that they were not going to be able to continue to farm the acres they had been farming or that perhaps expansion was not even possible. Even though it was against the policy of the time to allow younger unmarried individuals to choose allotments, Indian Affairs still viewed the situation at Fort Alexander as a positive one. It became apparent to Reed that the concept of subdivision was becoming instilled in the minds of the younger generations living on reserves (ARIA 1893: xvi).

By not allowing unmarried males to take up allotments this policy in effect was laying the foundation for the permanent establishment of individual tenant farmers. Younger individuals soon realized that the plots they were to receive were not necessarily the

best quality land (as the older generation had already chosen the best lands). On those reserves that had not been surveyed and subdivided the fear was greater that no lands were available for younger farmers. This led Reed to believe that it was important to consider the younger generations that were eventually to adapt to the subdivision survey of reserves and eventually the issuing of location tickets:

> . . . although it may not be possible to carry out the subdivision of the reserve and the location of Indians at once, the next generation will doubtless see it accomplished (ARIA 1893: xvi).

This was not the only reserve to request the subdivision survey of their reserve. Beginning as early as 1896 individuals at the Oak Lake Reserve had been requesting the subdivision of their reserve (NAC, RG 10, vol. 3561, file 82, part 2). Their request to have their reserve subdivided surveyed was for reasons unknown, not met with the immediate surveying of their reserve. Correspondence continued until 1901 when their reserve was finally surveyed and subdivided. There were a number of questions that surrounded the requesting of the Oak Lake band that their reserve be surveyed. First, why did this band request that their reserve be surveyed? Second, why was Indian Affairs slow to move on subdividing their reserve after their request? The answer to the first question was the apparent success of farming at reserves within the larger Birtle Agency.

Both the Birdtail Sioux and Oak River Bands whose reserves where subdivided, were showing measurable success in their farming operations while the situation at Oak Lake was not as promising.

The Annual Reports of Indian Affairs illustrated the contrast in farming successes from reserve to reserve in the Birtle Agency. For example, in 1895 on the Oak Lake reserve had a population of approximately forty individuals and of these there were eight individuals farming an average of 8.84 acres (ARIA 1895: 374,415). In comparison the numbers for the same year at the Birdtail reserve indicated that there was a population of eighty one and of these twenty-one were farmers farming an average of 17.28 acres (ARIA 1895: 374,412). At the Oak River reserve there was a population of two hundred and eighty one of which forty eight were farmers farming an average of 12.94 acres (ARIA 1895: 374, 413-414).

What the above numbers indicated was that those reserves in the Birtle Agency that had been subdivided and surveyed were having some measures of success. More individuals were farming more acres of land on average than at Oak Lake. This possibly explained why individuals at Oak Lake began to ask for the subdivision survey of the land by 1896. After the early allusions to subdivision in 1896 on the Oak Lake reserve Indian Agent Markle, after two years of having no success in

having the reserve surveyed and subdivided, again inquired about the possibility in June of 1898. Markle was informed that "the Surveyor had in all probability all the work that they would likely accomplish this season" (NAC, RG 10, vol. 3561, file 82, part 2). No further correspondence dealing with this issue appeared in the record again until February of 1901.

By this time there was a new Agent at the Birtle Agency by the name of G.H. Wheatly. Wheatly reported that:

> the Oak Lake Sioux Indians at a meeting on January 24, 1901, held at the Mission House, John Thunder in Charge, who acted as Interpreter. There were fifteen Indians present over 21 years of age, and all expressed a wish that the Reserve be subdivided, and requested me to ask the consent of the Department to have this subdividing of the Reserve, done as soon as possible (NAC, RG 10, vol. 3561, file 82, part 2).

Wheatly sent the request along to Indian Affairs for approval with an added suggestion. Wheatly informed the Department that rather than subdividing their reserve the "members of the Band should be induced to remove to the Birdtail Sioux Reserve, it would be a good deal to their advantage" (NAC, RG 10, vol. 3561, file 82, part 2).

Indian Affairs on the advice of Indian Agent Markle, who had already gone on to become the agent at the Blackfoot Indian Agency, decided that the Oak Lake reserve was to be subdivided but that amalgamation was

not an option. Although there was no documentation that stated that Indian Affairs wanted the Oak Lake reserve for settlement purposes, there were some allusions to such an arrangement. This was illustrated by both the request of Wheatly in 1901 to have the band members move to Birdtail and by a correspondence from Wheatly to David Laird, then Indian Commissioner, in 1904 (NAC, RG 10, vol. 3561, file 82, part 2).

In the 1904 correspondence on the order of Laird Agent Wheatly inquired about the surrender of a strip of land on the Oak Lake reserve. The members of the reserve informed the Department that they were not interested in surrendering any of their reserve (NAC, RG 10, vol. 3561, file 82, part 2). This correspondence regarding the proposed almagamation of Oak Lake and Birdtail and the request for the surrender of part of the reserve helped explain why the Department did not act immediately to subdivide the reserve. It was the underlying theme that centered around wanting the land for purposes other than for Indians that delayed the surveying of the land. In the eyes of individuals such as Wheatly the acquisition of reserve land was expected to be easier if it was to be taken all at once from the band rather than having to deal with individuals in a piece meal fashion.

Not all reserves that were surveyed and subdivided met with success in the eyes of Indian Affairs or

individuals such as Reed. In some cases reserves were subdivided but this did not always meet with any real reaction from reserve residents. The failure of subdivision on some reserves was not necessarily the result of Indian protest or revolt to the survey. In some cases Indians simply continued to operate as though their reserve had never been subdivided. The success or lack of success of course was often tied to the enforcement of the policy by the local agent. An example of an apathetic approach to a reserve's subdivision survey was at the Blood reserve in Alberta.

The Blood reserve was subdivided/surveyed in 1892. Hana Samek (1987), in her comparative policy study, suggested that "the reports are unclear as to how many Bloods availed themselves" (118-119) of taking up the offer to farm an 80 acre plot. The Annual Reports of the reserve however gave some indication as to the success or lack of success of subdivision on the Blood reserve. For example in 1891 prior to the subdivision of the Blood reserve 179 individuals reported cultivating only 281 acres of land. Of these the largest was seven acres and the smallest was 1/8 of an acre. The average farmer on the Blood reserve was cultivating only 1.57 acres (ARIA 1891) By 1895 after three years of subdivision survey being a reality there were fewer individuals farming, 134, and only twenty-three more acres under cultivation at 304 acres.

However the average acres under cultivation did rise to 2.27 acres per farmer. As well the largest farmer then had under cultivation thirty-one acres while the smallest holding was still 1/8 of an acre (ARIA 1895).

Why the Blood did not turn to farming for their means of survival as did other groups on the prairies does not go without explanation. Part of the answer can be found in the fact that their interests were in livestock rather than cultivation as this was the path that residents on the Blood reserve took for their means of survival after the buffalo had disappeared. For example, in 1891 prior to the subdivision of their reserve the Blood owned 1552 head of horses, more then any other group on the prairies (ARIA 1891). However the Annual Report for 1891 showed that the Blood did not sell any of their horses. The only earnings that appeared for the Blood was the sale of wood and hay and money earned through labour and freighting. The totals for earnings for the Blood reserve in 1891 totaled only $1,123.73 (ARIA 1891: 217). The population for the Blood reserve in 1891 was 1696 which meant earnings of Indians only allowed for approximately $0.66 per individual. With the return on their operations being so meager it was necessary for many individuals on the Blood reserve to depend on government rations for their survival.

Government rations, however, were being reduced by this time as part of Reed's policy of cutting back rations and forcing Indians to take up farming. The reduction of rations and the subdivision survey of the Blood reserve went hand in hand. The survey of the Blood reserve had the appearance of being tied directly to complaints about the killing of cattle on neighboring ranches by the Blood.

M. H. Cochrane one of Alberta's most influential ranchers of the time, wrote to Minister of Interior Daly in December of 1892 regarding the alleged slaughter of six head of his cattle by unnamed Blood Indians. In Cochrane's letter he did not place blame on the Blood for taking his cattle but rather placed blame on Reed and the government for allowing Indian people to drop to a level of starvation that forced them to take his cattle to survive:

> It is well known that the action of the government in cutting down the rations to almost [the] starvation point is the cause of the Indians helping themselves, for, when they do not get enough to sustain them in their quarters on the reservation they leave in small bands and camp where they can hide and steal our cattle (NAC, Hayter Reed Papers, v.12).

Cochrane then wrote on continuing to place blame on the shoulders of Reed for the situation that had developed. It was common sense economic realities that Cochrane indicated in his letter further illustrating

that Reed was under financial restraints in his dealing with Indians on the prairies.

> It may be very pleasing to Mr. Hayter Reed to show at the end of the year how cheaply he has fed the Indians but I do not think the country or parliament will sanction a policy which compels the Indians to help themselves, as they can hardly be expected to refrain from doing, when cattle are in sight and they are insufficiently provided for by the government (NAC, Hayter Reed Papers, v.12).

This response illustrated that financial restraints were publicly perceived as a consideration for Reed in the implementing of policy. As was discussed above Reed's budgets for rations were continually decreasing, which led to particular policies being developed such as subdivision survey. Cochrane made reference to the price of beef and the amount the government paid for it. Cochrane reported that beef rations were "nearly one half less than three years ago"(1889) and that the "the price the government pays is three cents per lb. less" (NAC, Hayter Reed Papers, v.12). This demonstrated that in fact Reed's available moneys for rations had been decreased considerably over the three-year time frame alluded to by Cochrane.

Although no exact evidence has survived to prove conclusively that subdivision on the Blood reserve was a direct result of the above complaints it did seem to coincide with when the Blood reserve was subdivided into 80 acre lots in the same year, 1892. By inference Reed

probably realized that something had to be done at the Blood reserve and that subdivision was his answer. The problem, however was neither that the Blood people were open to farming nor was the geography ideal for farming. Both the people and the environmental geography of the land were better suited to ranching.

The complaints by Cochrane on Reed did not go without response. Reed suggested that if Cochrane made use of more men to watch and control his cattle, perhaps he would not have the problems he had. In addition Reed claimed that during his visit to the Blood reserve in September of 1892 he was informed by the Blood and that they were happy with the rations they had received. Reed asserted that the complaint made by Cochrane was made in part to lobby for an increase to his operation's share of supplying beef to the government for rations (NAC, MG 29, Hayter Reed Papers, v.12). Whether or not Cochrane had a motive other than wanting to stop his cattle from being taken by Indians was not clear in the exchange.

The answer to Indians taking ranchers' cattle was not to supply them with more rations. Budgets nor policy simply did not allow the increase of rations. Available dollars for rations were on a continual decline within Indian Affairs budgets. In the mind of Reed farming was the way to make up for the shortfall in rations. Indeed the Blood reserve was surveyed and

subdivided turning Blood reserve residents into farmers in the eyes of Indian Affairs. The success of the government in its attempts to turn the Blood into farmers was however very limited. As Samek (1987) and the select passages from the Annual Reports of Indian Affairs illustrated, the Blood did not rigidly subscribe to the lots laid out for them and concentrated their efforts on the raising of livestock rather than the tilling of the soil. This was illustrated by the fact that the largest farmer on the Blood reserve had only thirty-one acres under cultivation. In addition there was a total of only 304 acres under cultivation in 1895. However, in the same year the Blood reserve had 2047 head of livestock and 134 individuals who reported to be agriculturists. This meant that on average each farmer was responsible for approximately fifteen head of livestock (ARIA 1895). These numbers illustrated that livestock raising rather than cultivation was the preferred occupation on the Blood reserve. Therefore, this subdivision survey of the Blood reserve had no real relevance to the imposition of agricultural operations for the Blood. This appeared to be why there was no evidence to suggest that the Blood adapted to the subdivision survey of their reserve in any concrete way.

This discussion has illustrated that there was no one reaction to the subdivision and the survey of Indian reserves on the Canadian prairies. By drawing on

specific examples from across the prairies it was evident that those reserves that adopted agriculture showed more success than did those that were not subdivided. This was especially evident when the agricultural statistics for the Crooked Lakes and Birtle Agencies were compared to the File Hills and Touchwood Hills agencies. These numbers illustrated that both the Crooked Lakes and Birtle Agencies which contained reserves that were surveyed and subdivided, had better levels of success than did the File Hills and Touchwood Hills agencies which were not surveyed and subdivided. It was also illustrated that the survey and subdivision of a reserve did not necessarily mean success at agriculture. The example of the Blood reserve demonstrated that an unsuitable geography and or environment also affected the way individual Indians reacted to the survey and subdivision of their reserve. The actual survey of a reserve did not mean that subdivision was to be successful. The environmental geography as well as available technologies and methods of farming had an impact on what specific Indian bands adopted as their new way of living. As the Blood example illustrated the raising of livestock and not agricultural pursuits was what the Blood's reserve was finally to be allowed as an economic means of subsistence.

CHAPTER 4

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Hayter Reed, the main architect and significant influence on Indian policy on the Canadian prairies from 1883 -1897, was also one of the most stringent administrators within Indian Affairs in Canadian history. His policies ranging from the pass and permit system to the subdivision survey of Indian reserves had lasting effects on the lives of both Indian and non-Indian populations living on the Canadian prairies.

In his positions as Indian Commissioner of Indian Affairs from 1888-1893 and Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs from 1893-1897 Reed was able to have nearly ten years of direct influence upon Indian policy on the Canadian prairies. With the election of Laurier's Liberal government and the appointment of Clifford Sifton as Minister of Interior and Superintendent of Indian Affairs in November 1896 Hayter Reed's days as Deputy Superintendent became numbered.

On 25 February 1897 Reed was given the choice of accepting a lower position within the Department or superannuation. Reed chose the latter and after sixteen years of service Reed was unemployed. Reed's time in government service did not go completely without reward.

Reed soon found employment through his friendship with William Van Horne, head of the Canadian Pacific Railway. Reed became manager of the Chateau Frontenac Hotel in Quebec City. By 1905 he had become the manager of the CP hotels division. After retirement in 1914, Reed and his wife Kate divided their time between St. Andrew's New Brunswick and Montreal. Mrs. Reed died in October 1928 and Reed survived her, living until 21 December 1936. He was 89 years old when he passed away (Titley 1993: 137-138).

The subdivision survey of Indian reserves that was promoted so vigorously by Reed was depicted in Canadian history by Carter (1990) as a way to remove and alienate individual Indian people from their reserves. What this thesis has demonstrated that there was more to subdivision than the taking of Indian reserve lands for settlement in subsequent surrenders. The available statistics did not support the expropriation of reserve lands for settlement purposes. During Reed's time with Indian Affairs the demand for reserve lands by settlers was not an issue. Non-Indian farmers who had taken up homesteads were only partially successful and there were many homestead abandonments. A demand for reserve lands during Reed's tenure did not exist. It was not until after 1901 during a second wave of immigration to the region that there was a move to promote surrenders of

Indian reserves. When Reed introduced severalty in 1888 he knew nothing about the trend to surrender Indian reserves which was to become a contentious issue twenty to thirty years later.

Reed witnessed first hand that homesteading was not meeting with the success that was envisioned. He was also aware that Indian people would have to be made part of Canadian society. The diminishing of Indian Affairs budgets meant that Indian people in Reed's mind were going to have become self-reliant agriculturists on the prairies. It was this need to have Indians become self-supporting that drove his policies of severalty and peasant farming. In order to have settlers become successful in their homesteads it was also essential that they did not face unnecessary competition from Indian farmers. This was one of the main reasons why it was self-sufficiency that Reed stressed in his policy. Indians were to only have measured levels of success. By keeping Indians on 40 acre allotments some success would be possible but to only a level that would allow for self-support. By using the pass and permit systems Indian Affairs could allow for some interaction in the larger western Canadian market by Indian farmers but the Department could control how much interaction would be allowed.

Some of the reasons behind the lack of demand for Indian reserve lands during Reed's tenure were found in the different approaches of the Macdonald and Laurier administrations to the settlement of the Canadian prairies. After 1897, with the appointments of first Clifford Sifton and then Frank Oliver as Ministers of the Interior and Indian Affairs departments, a new approach to immigration was implemented. For example, Sifton simplified homestead procedures, forced railways to select and patent their grants, increased the number of immigration agents, increased publicity through pamphlets and a presence at exhibitions in the United States and Europe, and actively pursued potential homesteaders rather than waiting for them to make inquiries (Friesen 1987: 249). This resulted in a large influx of settlers, between 1891 and 1901 326,000 people immigrated to Canada. By the next decade (1901-1911) 1,782,000 people had immigrated to Canada (Friesen 1987: 248). It was with this new influx of settlers that the demand for lands for settlement and specifically Indian reserve lands, became an issue. This explained why Reed did not have the same pressures to obtain reserve lands for homesteads as did those who followed him. The lack of demand for reserve lands for homestead purposes also supported the argument that the decision to subdivide and survey Indian reserve lands was not driven by

surrenders during Reed's tenure but by a economic need to have Indians become self-sufficient.

This thesis has suggested that there were economic reasons being influenced by Victorian thinking that constituted the main influence behind the subdivision survey of Indian reserves on the Canadian prairies. Reed's decision to implement the subdivision survey of Indian reserves on the Canadian prairies was partially determined by the circumstances of the general cut backs in the budget of Indian Affairs during the 1880s and 1890s. Reed's objectives in wanting severalty went beyond purely economic reasons to Victorian thinking and attitudes towards race which were also key to his approach. Reed did not necessarily have the best interests of his Indian charges in mind when he formulated policy. At the same time Reed was also limited in what he was able to attempt through administering budgetary restraints.

It was underlying themes of race and progress that dictated Reed's approach to Indian policy. This was well documented in a written speech of Reed's titled 'Dealings with Indians' in which Reed outlines the relations that the Canadian government had had with Indian people. What was key about this document was that it gave insights into Reed's beliefs in the theories of race and progress that dominated the

Victorian period. Although, the exact date that this speech was prepared was not indicated on the original copy, from appearances it was written either at the end of Reed's career with the Department or shortly after his departure as he reflected on a number of the policies that he introduced.

In his speech Reed reinforced again and again the ideas of progress and self-sufficiency. Underlying his speech was a condescending tone which reflected his Victorian background. One of the key issues that was discussed by Reed was the issuing of rations to Indians and how this affected the success and failure of Indian people to adapt to Canadian society of the time:

> . . . where Indians have been brought to a certain stage of advancement, it (the Government) should be relieved of at least a portion of the burden of their maintenance.
> This means in other words that where an industrious Indian has out supplied his less industrious neighbour the assistance given to him should cease. So far the theory is excellent, but the difficulty in practice which presents itself is, that the reward for industry appears to compel him to maintain himself while his less industrious brother is with comparatively little exertion helped out by the government (McCord Museum, Reed Family Papers, Box 1, Folder 12, n.d.).

Reed went on to rhetorically ask the question "How is this difficulty overcome?" In answering his own question Reed turned to ideas of progress and scales of civilization to formulate his answer. Reed argued that

once the Indian had "made a long stride to the point at which a spirit of pride, self-respect, and independence could be awakened" (McCord Museum, Reed Family Papers, Box 1, Folder 12, n.d.) he would no longer require assistance. Reed also went on to suggest that the more industrious Indians were expected to look down upon the non-industrious Indians and that the non-industrious Indian would then want eventually to become shamed into being just like the industrious Indian.

Reed's discussion of industrious and non-industrious Indians illustrated his acceptance of social evolutionary thinking and his belief that Indians needed to and could progress to a stage of civilization that would bring them closer to a Victorian way of life. Reed's speech makes it very apparent that he had a tangible concept of the ideas of progress and social evolution that dominated the Victorian period. He was well aware of the theory that in order for the Indian eventually to attain a higher level of civilization, certain stages were to be passed and that the progress would have to be a slow one. As Reed stated, "it is not hopeful to merge the Indians of the present generation with the white population" (McCord Museum, Reed Family Papers, Box 1, Folder 12, n.d.).

Reed justified the non-merging of the populations not to poor government policy but rather to the weakness

of Indian people in their abilities to interact with less favourable portions of Canadian society:

> At best they will doubtless have to be kept by themselves on the Reserves, for to able them to cope with the temptations and assaults which they would be exposed to, if left to their own resources among white men [would be disastrous](McCord Museum, Reed Family Papers, Box 1, Folder 12, n.d.).

In effect, Reed was drawing on Victorian approaches to race. He argued that Indian racial and social inferiority was an order that also had the potential to make them victims of Canadian society and that they had to be protected on their reserves and over generations taught how to survive in Canadian society. Reed had accepted the Victorian belief that Indian people were inferior and needed to be protected much like children. In other words he suggested that the Canadian government had taken up the whiteman's burden.

This idea of protection was a point of contention for Reed. Reed realized that protection was necessary, but he also realized that this protection in the form of Canadian government legislation (i.e. the fact that Indians were considered wards) was also slowing the progress of the Indian. As Reed stated:

> For the Indians protection against imposture on the past of unscrupulous white men, he (the Indian) requires special legislation, to be guarded as a ward and the very existence of such legislation, while it is necessary to his preservation in the meantime, strongly retards his progress toward the goal of

individualism and independence (McCord Museum, Reed Family Papers, Box 1, Folder 12, n.d.).

The fact that Reed attempted to have allotments that reflected the prevailing levels of successful farm size and also reflected the practice in Britain, Ontario and on the prairies however indicated that he did not always necessarily have the worst of intentions in mind. Reed sought to insure that Indian people were successful in their farming endeavors and the size of allotments reflected his reasoning in this approach. Reed faced constant pressures from above to remain within the budgets set for Indian Affairs. The best way to do this, Reed believed, was by turning prairie Indians into farmers through the promotion of self-sufficiency. However, when farmers complained that Indians were too effective in production and in the market place, the peasant policy was invented (Carter 1990: 209-213). The problem was that Reed was very much a product of his time. Although Reed perceived measures of success for Indian farmers these were always well within a set of Victorian assumptions about race.

Reed's assumptions about race included his belief that Indian farmers had to be turned into individual land owners in order to help push them along the road of civilization. Once Indians saw the benefits of British/Canadian farming they would want to adopt this lifestyle. Additionally there was the assumption that

races could be placed on a pyramidal hierarchy of civilizations. The British saw themselves at that apex of this pyramid with Indian people among so many others in their empire being at the bottom (see discussion above). This assumption about the place of certain civilizations helped to justify the actions of individuals such as Reed in their actions, such as severalty. It was the white man's burden that individuals such as Reed believed they were taking on.

These assumptions about race were key to understanding Reed's approach. The idea of progress was central to Reed's policy. The subdivision survey of reserves was seen by Reed as a step along the social Darwinian stages of progress. It was through the subdivision of reserves and the adoption of farming that Reed believed he was to push Indians along the levels of progress. It was this same approach to race that allowed Reed also to hinder the fundamental progress of Indian farming. If Indian farmers were not progressing at a rate acceptable to the Department, then Indians were the ones accused of being unprogressive and they were potentially denied seed, machinery and or rations until they proved up to the tasks that reflected that they had progressed to a certain level.

The subdivision survey of reserves was used as the vehicle for a next measure of success. Those who took

up their subdivision plots were considered to be taking the next steps along the stages of civilization versus those who did not and were seen as unprogressive.

By drawing examples from across the prairies this thesis was able to provide a more definitive description of what the immediate results of subdivision survey meant for Indian people on the prairies. Generalizations regarding the way Indian people reacted to the subdivision of the reserves and the farming policy that accompanied such an endeavor were not always clear cut. Some groups such as those in the Birtle Agency were quick to adapt to the new situation that developed as a result of subdivision. A number of individuals on the Birdtail and Oak River reserves had very successful operations that grew bigger than the original forty acre allotment. Other bands such as those at the Crooked Lakes Agency originally questioned and protested the subdivision survey of their reserves but eventually adapted their farming operations to fit the survey. As at the Birtle Agency there were a number of individuals at Crooked Lakes who approached or exceeded the forty acre allotment. In contrast on the Blood reserve even though the reserve was surveyed, allotments were not taken up as the reserve economy centered around livestock rather than the tillage of the soil.

By examining the three agencies identified in this thesis at a more local case level a number of conclusions can be drawn regarding the subdivision survey of Indian reserves on the Canadian prairies. First, generalizations cannot be made about why certain reserves were selected or not selected to be subdivided because there were numerous factors that effected which reserves were selected for subdivision. For example, the case of the Blood reserve illustrated that outside pressures resulted in the decision to survey any particular reserve. In other cases as at the Oak Lake reserve even the request to have their reserve subdivided did not mean an immediate response.

Second, the reactions to subdivision survey were not uniform from agency to agency or from reserve to reserve, varying situations at different reserves resulted in different reactions. For example the idea of subdivision met with some protest at Piapot, was requested at Oak Lake, viewed with caution at Cowessess, found acceptance at Birdtail and Oak River, and was met with indifference at the Blood Reserve.

Third, the reason for and choice of forty acre allotments was somewhat more complex than the literature has demonstrated. The evidence suggested that the decision to subdivide reserves and have Indians on the prairies adapt to farming was very much influenced by

the shrinking budgets of Indian Affairs during the 1880s and 1890s. The evidence also suggested that the choice of forty acre lots was not entirely a reflection of the belief that Indians did not have the ability to farm more than this allotment. Instead the evidence suggested that Reed's choice of forty acre allotments was tied to what was being successfully farmed in Britain, Ontario, and on the prairies. Large numbers of acres under cultivation by individuals was not the norm during the 1880s and 1890s on the prairies. For the most part farms on the prairies during these two decades were under 100 acres.

Fourth, Agencies such as File Hills and Touchwood Hills where subdivision did not take place and farming was done in a communal form illustrated that subdivision often meant greater rates of success. A comparison of these agencies with the Birtle and Crooked Lake Agencies demonstrated that those two agencies which were surveyed and subdivided had larger average acres under cultivation.

The fifth conclusion that can be drawn was that Reed was not acting alone. Support for the subdivision survey came not only from Reed. The idea of subdivision predated Reed by more than fifty years in Canada and was being implemented concurrently in the United States. In addition individuals such as Edgar Dewdney and Sir John

A. Macdonald saw the subdivision survey of reserves as a way to eliminate the burden the government had in their responsibilities for Indians. Self-sufficient Indian farmers living on individual plots of land would mean less pressure on government budgets. The problem was that individuals such as Reed, Dewdney, and Macdonald often times had a vision that they believed was in the best interests of Indian people but because of their lack of understanding of Indian societies their policies were often were doomed to failure. This lack of understanding was tied directly to the Victorian thinking of the time regarding race and progress. Indian people were not regarded as equals but rather as children who needed to be 'shown the light' of a proper Victorian lifestyle. This meant that much of the policy directed towards Indian people was operational in the minds of the policy makers motivated by an intention to help Indians along the scales of progress. But in effect it was a tool to destroy not only former Indian ways of life but also to turn Indians into Victorian Canadians. As a result the good intentions of policies such as subdivision eventually became methods to displace Indians from their lands which became apparent at the turn of the century when influxes of settlers put pressure on unutilized or under utilized reserve lands.

This whole approach to Indian policy was tied to Mcdonald's National Policy, which required Indians to be settled on reserves in order to open up lands for settlers who would supply raw materials to eastern Canadian manufacturers and provide a market for these manufactured goods. It was the financial investments of eastern Canadian manufactures that precipitated the need to obtain western Canadian lands.

A sixth conclusion was tied to Reed's presence within the Indian Department. This conclusion reflected as much what was known as what was not known. It was clear that Reed was more loyal to Department policies than he was to Department employees. Agents and farming instructors who complained about the peasant farming system, i.e. limiting rations, restricting the use of machinery, stressing self-sufficiency, etc., were detested by Reed. As Carter (1990: 222-224) has pointed out, Reed was not the slightest bit sympathetic to objections. Reed saw those who complained as being lazy or too sympathetic to the plight of Indians. Those who did not comply with Reed's polices soon found themselves without a job as Agent Finlayson at Touchwood Hills soon found out (Carter 1990: 223).

It was this no nonsense approach that allowed Reed to move up the ranks within the Indian Department. Reed's relationships with ministers he served under were

not documented in the available sources. However, the fact that there was no such record seems to suggest that Reed's loyalty to the Department and its policies during Macdonald's tenure as Prime Minister made him a valuable asset. It took a change of Government to have Reed removed from his post.

The original idea of subdivision survey was to aid in the process of turning Indian people into farmers. The 1876 Indian Act (and subsequent amendments) stated that surrenders of reserve lands needed the consent of a majority of male members (Miller 1978: 64). Individual Indian farmers even with certificates of possession were not able to surrender or sell their individual allotments. Simply to argue that subdivision survey of reserve land was created to obtain reserve lands for settlement was very problematic. Not only was there no demand for Indian reserve land in 1888 when the policy was first brought forward but Indian Act legislation did not allow for surrenders of land without band consent (Miller 1978: 64). It was only after settlement had progressed nearly thirty years later on the Canadian prairies that surrenders of Indian reserves became an issue. It was the unsubdivided portions within reserves that were desired as it was argued that they were not being used to their fullest potential. To conclude that Hayter Reed was a visionary who realized that his policy

of 1888 was to be used as a way to obtain reserve lands from Indians nearly thirty years later was not substantiated in the data for this study.

Carter (1990) argued that "Hayter Reed's central concern was to erode further the Indians' land base until eventually reserves were abolished altogether" (235). What this study has demonstrated is that Reed's central concern was the need to have Indian farmers become self-reliant self-supportive members of Canadian society. It was the use of severalty and the peasant farming policy that Reed used to allow for incremental degrees of success and it was these same policies that Reed used to insure that limited success was not to a level that Indian farmers competed in any tangible way with homesteaders in the market economy of the Canadian west, even though the cash economy was emergent in the region incorporating Indians as well as everyone else. In effect, it was not the demand for surplus Indian reserve land that motivated Reed's policies but rather the need to have Indian farmers become self-supportive members of Canadian society that drove Reed and his policies.

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Crooked Lake Agency-Relating to Surveys, Surrenders and Sales of Reservation Land. (Indian Commissioner for Manitoba and Northwest Territories): 1899-1908 Part #4 Reel#C-10099 vol#3561 File#82.

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Appointment of Hayter Reed as Indian Agent at Battleford and James Anderson as Indian Agent at Edmonton. Also a few Clippings regarding the Death and Background of Hayter Reed: 1881-1936 Reel# C-10128 vol#3733 File#26743.

Assistant Commissioner Hayter Reed's Report on the Question of the Buildings Proposed to be Erected in the Macleod, Peigan and Blood Agencies: 1887 Reel# C-10138 vol#3787 File#42748.

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Blackfoot Agency-Expenditure for Repairs to the Clerk's House causing Disagreement between Commissioner Hayter Reed and Superintendent Duncan Campbell Scott: 1892 Reel#C-10154 vol#3870 File#88557.

Carlton Agency-Commissioner Hayter Reed Requesting Advice Concerning Islands in the South Saskatchewan Opposite John Smith's and Cha-kas-tay-pay-sin Reserves: 1884 Reel#C-10119 vol#3677 File#11466.

Caughnawaga Agency-Correspondence Regarding a Visit by Thomas Mayne Daly, Superintendent General, and Hayter Reed, Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs to the Caughnawaga Resreve: 1894-1895 Reel#C-11279 vol#2792 File#156,843.

Commissioner Hayter Reed Recommends that Indian Scouts be Used wit the Police Force: 1891-1892 Reel# C-10152 vol#3865 File#84815.

Commissioner Hayter Reed Reports his Visit to the Sarcee and Blackfoot Agencies and St.Joseph's Industrial School. Supplies and Accounts for the Erection of a Carpentry and Shoemaker's Shop at St.Joseph's: 1891-1892 Reel#C-10152 vol#3865 File#84813.

Correspondence Instructing Indian Commissioner, Hayter Reed to Inform Permanent Officials in the Northwest Territories that their Salaries will in Future be Paid from Headquarters; also Instructing him that Vouchers should be

sent to Ottawa for Payment and that Diaries should Accompany Accounts for Traveling Expenses: 1888-1889 Reel#C-10141 vol#3808 File#53419.

General Correspondence Regarding Matters in Carlton, Battleford and Fort Pitt Districts, Including and Extensive Report by Hayter Reed: 1883-1884 Reel#C-10117 vol#3668 File#10644.

Hayter Reed Informing the Department on What Action has been taken towards the Construction of Buildings in the Nortwest Territories for the Fiscal Year. Included are Copies of Plans and Specifications for the Clerk's House at the Crooked Lake Agency: 1889 Reel#C-10143 vol#3819 File#59253.

Hayter Reed Inquiring Whether or Not Half-Breeds are Entitled to Arrears at the Time of their Withdrawal from Treaty: 1886 Reel#c-10133 vol#3754 File#30880.

Hayter Reed Recommending that an Additional Expenditure of $75.00 be Authorized in Order to Complete a House for a Clerk at the Crooked Lake Agency: 1888-1889 Reel#C-10141 vol#3808 File#53426.

Hayter Reed to the Superintendent General Informing him that Agent Samuel Lucas Requires $308.00 Towards Erection of a Stable, Ration-House, Implement-Shed and Interpreter's house at the Peace Hills Agency: 1889 Reel#C-10144 vol#3824 File#60265.

Hayter Reed, Commissioner for the Northwest Territories, Expressing his Intention to Visit Duck Lake and Carlton Agencies: 1891 Reel#C-10149 vol#3960 File#142119.

Hayter Reed, Commissioner for the Northwest Territories was Appointed Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs: 1893-1895 Reel#C-10167 vol#3960 File#142119.

Headquarters-Ottawa-Circular Issued by Hayter Reed, Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs to all Agents, Requesting a List of all Timber Licenses Issued, Also Replies from Agents: 1896-1903 Reel#C-11291 vol#2883 File#179,980.

Hobbema Agency-The Indian Commissioner Hayter Reed, Recommends that the Name of the Peace Hills Agency be changed to the Name of Hobbema Agency: 1893 Reel#C-10157 vol#3896 File#98074.

Indian Commissioner Hayter Reed's Report on the Following Indian Industrial Schools in Canada and the United States: Mount Elgin or Mohawk, The Muncey and the Carlisle: 1889 Reel#C-10143 vol#3818 File#57799.

Manitoba ad Northwest Territories-Hayter Reed (Commissioner) Reporting on his Tour of the Northern Agencies: 1890-1891 Reel#C-10148 vol#3844 File#73083.

Manitoba ad Northwest Territories-The Indian Commissioner, Hayter Reed, is Submitting the Returns of the Sale of Lands. (The Returns are not Included): 1893 Reel#C-10158 vol#3903 File#102615.

Northwest Territories-Assistant Commissioner Hayter Reed's Report of his Trip West: 1888 Reel#C-10139 vol#3796 File#47249.

Northwest Territories-Commissioner Hayter Reed's Report on his Visit to Reserves in Treaty 7: 1892 Reel#C-10155 vol#3879 File#92338.

Northwest Territories-Hayter Reed's Reports on his Visit to the Agencies and Reserves in the Saskatchewan District: 1888-1889 Reel#C-10141 vol#3806 File#52332.

Northwest Territories-Indian Commissioner Hayter Reed Questioning the Department on their Policy Regarding Children Attending Denominational Schools: 1891-1897 Reel#C-10151 vol#3792 File#81812.

Northwest Territories-Treaty 7-Commissioner Hayter Reed Reporting on his Recent Visit: 1892 Reel#C-10154 vol#3871 File#89302.

Personnel File on Hayter Reed, Assistant Commissioner for Manitoba and the Northwest Territories: 1883-1888 Reel#C-10190 vol#3626 File#5675.

Policy Adopted by Indian Agent Hayter Reed in Supplying Food to the Indians with in the Battleford Agency: 1881 Reel#C-10133 vol#3755 File#30961.

Report from Assistant Commissioner Hayter Reed on Indian matters for the Battleford and Prince Albert Districts: 1887 Reel#C-10136 vol#3773 File#36060.

Report on Hayter Reed's (The Indian Commissioner) Visit to Sarcee, Blackfoot and Peace Hills Agencies: 1891 Reel#C-10150 vol#3853 File#78526.

William Donovan of Prince Albert Complaining of Immorality on the Part of Assistant Commissioner Hayter Reed: 1886-1887 Reel#C-10136 vol#3772 File#34938.

IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3)













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