

National Selective Service and the
Mobilization of Human Resources in Canada
During the Second World War

by

Michael D. Stevenson

Department of History

Submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Faculty of Graduate Studies
The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario.
July 1992

© Michael D. Stevenson 1996



National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Acquisitions et
services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-42571-1

Canada

ABSTRACT

The mobilization of human resources in Canada during the Second World War has received limited attention from historians of Canada. Although the issue of conscription dominates the historiography of Canada's war effort between 1939 and 1945, no comprehensive analysis exists of National Selective Service (NSS), the agency empowered in 1942 to oversee the enormous task of mobilizing military and civilian human resources. Moreover, cursory accounts of the extent of NSS control of mobilization assume that wartime controls were sweeping, coercive, and comprehensive in their scope and application.

An examination of NSS records in the Dominion Department of Labour archival collection reveals that NSS control of mobilization was tenuous and halting. Under the direction of Deputy Minister of Labour Arthur MacNamara, NSS mobilization efforts emphasized compromise, conciliation, and de-centralization. On paper, many mobilization regulations were complex and comprehensive, but in practice the government often did not get its way in an overheated labour market.

Instead of providing a traditional horizontal analysis of Cabinet records, this thesis employs a vertical analysis of archival records extending from the Cabinet room to local NSS employment offices. Incorporating issues of region, gender, race, and socioeconomic class, eight case studies

have been undertaken to gauge the effectiveness of NSS. These case studies examine: (1) the mobilization of Native Canadians for home defence; (2) the deferment policies affecting university students; (3) the administration of the Industrial Mobilization Survey Plan; (4) the compulsory control of the coal labour force in Nova Scotia; (5) the regulation of longshoremen in Halifax; (6) the control of women in the primary textile industry; (7) the supervision of civilian nurses; and (8) the management of employment in the meatpacking industry.

A comprehensive examination of NSS mobilization policies provides a unique perspective on the Canadian war effort. Government bureaucracies that had a limited record of constructive and comprehensive intervention in Canadian domestic society in the pre-war era were overwhelmed by the demands of total mobilization during the Second World War. The creation of NSS was the government's answer to this problem. However, weak administrative control and intense societal opposition to compulsory mobilization measures combined to ensure that the impact of NSS would be limited.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CERTIFICATE OF EXAMINATION.....	ii
ABSTRACT.....	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	v
LIST OF TABLES.....	vi
LIST OF FIGURES.....	vii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	viii
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS.....	ix
WARTIME TENURE OF KEY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.....	xi
PREFACE.....	xiii
Chapter 1 Introduction.....	1
Chapter 2 The Regulatory Framework of Mobilization.	20
Chapter 3 Native Canadian Mobilization.....	62
Chapter 4 Student Deferment.....	96
Chapter 5 The Industrial Mobilization Survey Plan..	133
Chapter 6 Coal Labour.....	172
Chapter 7 Halifax Longshoremen.....	230
Chapter 8 Female Primary Textile Labour.....	266
Chapter 9 Nurses.....	297
Chapter 10 Meatpacking Labour.....	331
Chapter 11 Conclusion.....	363
Bibliography 	376
VITA 	386

LIST OF TABLES

- Table 1 Separations and Labour Demand in Canadian Industrial Establishments, 1943-1945
- Table 2 IMSP Statistical Summary for All Plants Surveyed Once, 1943-1945
- Table 3 IMSP Statistical Summary for All Plants Surveyed Twice
- Table 4 IMSP Statistical Summary for All Plants Surveyed Three Times
- Table 5 IMSP Statistical Summary for All Plants Surveyed Four Times
- Table 6 Annual Cargo Tonnage in the Port of Halifax, 1939-1946
- Table 7 Government Payment of Longshoremen Wages Under PC 5161, 1943-1945
- Table 8 Female Manufacturing Employment, 1943-1945
- Table 9 Female Hourly Wage Rates in Cents for Selected Manufacturing Industries, 1941-1945 (rank in parentheses)
- Table 10 Domestic Production of Primary Textiles, 1941-1945 (000s of pounds or yards)
- Table 11 Results of the March 1943 Nursing Registration
- Table 12 Slaughtering in Inspected Canadian Establishments, 1940-1945
- Table 13 Slaughtering in Inspected Establishments as a Percentage of Yearly Slaughtering, 1943-1945

LIST OF FIGURES

- Figure 1 IMSP Survey Form for Individual Workmen
- Figure 2 Coal Labour Survey Employee Form
- Figure 3 Coal Labour Survey Employer Form

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APC	Army Port Company
CCL	Canadian Congress of Labour
CDA	Central Despatching Agency
CHC	Canadian Hospital Council
CLSC	Coal Labour Survey Committee
CLS	Coal Labour Survey
CNA	Canadian Nurses Association
COTC	Canadian Officers Training Corps
CTO	Compulsory Transfer Order
CVT	Canadian Vocational Training
DCC	Dominion Coal Company
DMR	Department of Mines & Resources
DMS	Department of Munitions & Supply
DND	Department of National Defence
DNWS	Department of National War Services
DPNH	Department of Pensions & National Health
DVA	Department of Veterans Affairs
ECPB	Emergency Coal Production Board
HLA	Halifax Longshoremen's Association
ICLC	Inter-departmental Committee on Labour Coordination
IDCCMP	Industrial Development Council of Canadian Meat Packers
ILPC	Inter-departmental Labour Priorities Committee
IMSC	Industrial Mobilization Survey Committee
IMSP	Industrial Mobilization Survey Plan
ISRB	Industrial Selection and Release Board
ISRC	Industrial Selection and Release Committee
ISRP	Industrial Selection and Release Plan
LSIC	Labour Supply Investigation Committee
MSC	Manpower Survey Committee
NAC	National Archives of Canada
NCCU	National Conference of Canadian Universities
NLSC	National Labour Supply Council
NRMA	National Resources Mobilization Act
NSS	National Selective Service
NWLB	National War Labour Board
PTI	Primary Textiles Institute
TLC	Trades and Labour Congress
UIC	Unemployment Insurance Commission
UMWA	United Mines Workers of America
WBTP	Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel
WPTB	Wartime Prices and Trade Board

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 21 June 1940 The National Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA) becomes law
- 12 July 1940 The Department of National War Services (DNWS) is created
- 19 July 1940 PC 2686 creates the National Labour Supply Council
- 7 August 1940 The Unemployment Insurance Act becomes law
- 27 August 1940 PC 4185, the "National War Services Regulations, 1940 (Recruits)," governs the callup of NRMA personnel
- 25 October 1940 The Inter-departmental Committee on Labour Coordination is formed
- 21 March 1942 PC 2250, the "Restricted Occupations Order," restricts men of military age from entering certain occupations
- 21 March 1942 PC 2251, the "Stabilization of Employment in Agriculture Regulations," declares all agriculturalists essential
- 23 March 1942 Elliot M. Little is appointed Director of National Selective Service (NSS)
- 26 August 1942 PC 7595, the "National Selective Service Civilian Regulations (1942)," is issued
- 4 September 1942 PC 7994 places the Unemployment Insurance Commission (UIC) under the control of NSS
- 26 September 1942 PC 8800 removes the responsibility for military mobilization from the DNWS and transfers it to the Department of Labour
- 18 November 1942 Elliot Little resigns. He is succeeded as NSS Director by Arthur MacNamara
- 1 December 1942 PC 10924, the "NSS Mobilization Regulations, 1942," is issued

17 December 1942	The Manpower Survey Committee is formed to develop the Industrial Mobilization Survey Plan (IMSP).
19 January 1943	PC 246, the "NSS Civilian Regulations, 1943," is issued and governs civilian mobilization for the remainder of the war
4 May 1943	The First Compulsory Transfer Order is issued to shepherd men of military age into essential occupations. Six more Compulsory Transfer Orders follow by November 1943
17 May 1943	PC 4092, the "Stabilization of Employment in the Coal Industry Regulations," specifies strict regulations governing the coal labour force
25 June 1943	PC 5160 and PC 5161 reorganize labour patterns on the Halifax docks
19 August 1943	The NSS administrative structure is re-organized and decentralized
1 September 1943	PC 6625 freezes men and women in essential industries in their employment
4 March 1944	PC 1355, the "NSS Mobilization Regulations, 1944," is issued
14 August 1946	Revocation of PC 1355 and all military mobilization regulations
31 March 1947	All remaining NSS civilian regulations repealed

WARTIME TENURE OF KEY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Barton, G.S.H.	Department of Agriculture, Deputy Minister, 1939-45
Brunning, E.J.	Department of Munitions & Supply (DMS), Coal Controller, 1944-45
Cousins, E.L.	DMS, Wartime Administrator of Canadian Atlantic Ports, 1941-45
Eaton, Fraudena	National Selective Service (NSS), Associate Director of the Women's Division, 1943-45
Goldenberg, H. Carl	DMS, Director of the Economics and Statistics Branch, 1940-45. NSS, Chairman of the Manpower Survey Committee, 1942-45
Gordon, Donald	Wartime Prices and Trade Board (WPTB), Chairman, 1941-45
Howe, C.D.	Minister of Munitions & Supply, 1940-45
Ilsley, J.L.	Minister of Finance, 1940-1945
LaFlèche, General L.R.	Department of National War Services (DNWS), Deputy Minister, 1940-43. DNWS Minister, 1943-45.
Little, Elliot	NSS, Director, 23 March to 18 November 1942
MacDonald, Vincent	NSS, Controller of Loading Operations for the port of Halifax, 1942. Assistant Deputy Minister of Labour, 1942-44.
Maclean, Matthew M.	Department of Labour, Director of Industrial Relations, 1942-45
Macleod, J.W.	NSS, Eastern Coal Consultant, 1943-45
MacNamara, Arthur	Department of Labour, Deputy Minister, 1943-45. Became Director of NSS after Elliot Little's resignation.

McLaren, S.H.	NSS, Associate Director of Mobilization, 1944-45
Mitchell, Allen	Unemployment Insurance Commission (UIC), Director, 1942-45
Mitchell, Humphrey	Minister of Labour, 1941-45
Raley, G.G.E.	WPTB, Representative on the Inter- departmental Labour Priorities Committee (ILPC), 1943-45
Ralston, Colonel J.L.	Minister of National Defence, 1940- 44
Riley, General H.J.	NSS, Associate Director of Mobilization, 1943-44
Ross, Sheldon	ILPC, Chairman, 1943-45
Scott, Williard	NSS, Associate Director of the Mobilization Survey Division, 1943- 45
Stewart, James McGregor	WPTB, Coal Administrator, 1939-43. DMS, Coal Controller, 1943-44.

PREFACE

This study originated in a chance discovery in the Regional Collection of the D.B. Weldon Library, University of Western Ontario, in October 1992. While conducting research for a graduate course essay, I examined an obscure set of business records contained in the papers of the London firm of C.S. Hyman Leather Company. One file contained a remarkable collection of Industrial Mobilization Survey Plan forms printed on NSS stationery. I left the room that day convinced that I had found my dissertation topic, despite the fact that I had no extensive background in Canadian history. Attempting to familiarize myself with the history of NSS, I discovered that most academic accounts of the agency were limited in scope. Moreover, most historians who mentioned the role of NSS praised the success of civilian and military mobilization policies. This puzzled me, since contemporary accounts seemed to be filled with biting criticism of NSS activities. In January 1944, for example, Progressive Conservative Opposition Leader Gordon Graydon stood in the House of Commons and denounced NSS as "Canada's greatest wartime muddle" and a "bitter and disillusioning experience for the Canadian people." Preliminary research at the National Archives of Canada revealed a substantial collection of archival sources, and this study is the end result of my fortunate involvement with this topic.

Many people and institutions have made this work possible. I am truly indebted to Peter Neary for his unwavering support as my thesis advisor during the past four years. His patience and encouragement have prevented me from faltering on many occasions. Moreover, I have learned from him the meaning and importance of professionalism in the conduct of my affairs--both academic and personal. Although they bear no responsibility for any errors and omissions, the following individuals have provided advice and support: Jack Blocker, Ben Forster, Roger Hall, Jack Hyatt, Margaret Kellow, Jean Matthews, Graeme Mount, David Slater, Jim Struthers, and Carl Wallace. Jon Parmenter and Jonathan Hawkins have provided moral support while sharing an office with me at Western, and Jen Read has provided encouragement since we entered Western's doctoral program in 1992.

This research would not have been possible without the financial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the University of Western Ontario. I am likewise grateful to staff members of the National Archives of Canada, the Canadian Nurses Association Archives, and the Canadian Hospital Council Archives for invaluable research assistance. I thank also dozens of other individuals and agencies for answers to my many queries about Canada's mobilization effort.

I dedicate this thesis to my wife, Robbie, and to my

parents, Walter and Eleanor. Robbie has endured my lengthy absences while conducting research and provided unflagging emotional support. My parents have provided a life-long support network and encouraged me to take advantage of all the academic opportunities I have been fortunate enough to enjoy.

Chapter 1 Introduction

The Canadian government established National Selective Service (NSS) as a branch of the Department of Labour on 21 March 1942 through the passage of Order-in-Council PC 2254. In his speech to the House of Commons introducing the measure, Prime Minister Mackenzie King outlined three primary objectives for NSS in relation to the mobilization of the civilian labour force: (1) estimating the number of men and women required for various war services; (2) increasing the total human resources available for war purposes; and (3) directing available men and women into the most beneficial form of wartime service.¹ King appointed Montreal industrialist Elliot Little as NSS Director to supervise civilian mobilization efforts. By the end of 1942, NSS also assumed responsibility for the complex web of regulations governing the compulsory mobilization of military personnel in Canada.

Given this sweeping mandate, it is surprising that historians have paid so little attention to the activities and programs inaugurated under the NSS regulatory umbrella. Respected scholars such as J.L. Granatstein and C.P. Stacey only refer in passing to the operations of NSS.² Moreover, the information used by these historians was culled mainly from the records of the Department of National Defence and from Orders-in-Council. The main body of information on NSS

activities, however, is to be found in the records of the Department of Labour. Granatstein's helpful survey of NSS contained in Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada, for example, is based on Cabinet War Committee minutes, the personal papers of Cabinet members such as J.L. Ilsley, and the Labour Gazette. By the same token, other works dealing with specific issues under the jurisdiction of NSS have made only limited use of the available archival material. Ruth Roach Pierson's useful discussion of the role of women in the Second World War, "They're Still Women After All": The Second World War and Canadian Womanhood,³ drew on but a small portion of the available NSS records. Similarly, Thomas Socknat based his informative treatment of conscientious objectors and alternative service workers, Witness Against War: Pacifism in Canada, 1900-1945,⁴ on selected files from the main NSS archival collections.

This paucity of scholarship examining the wartime mobilization of human resources in a comprehensive fashion is peculiar given the prominence of the conscription question in the historiography of Canada's war effort. The 1942 and 1944 conscription crises and the delicate balancing act of Mackenzie King and his Cabinet colleagues have remained a prominent feature in writing about the war since Bruce Hutchison published his biography of King in 1952.⁵ E.L.M. Burns, R. MacGregor Dawson, and C.P. Stacey all devoted significant portions of their accounts of Canada's

wartime history to King's handling of the manpower question.⁶ So too did J.L. Granatstein in his landmark monographs, Broken Promises and Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945.⁷ These two books remain the most eloquent, detailed, and forceful descriptions of the manpower and conscription debates. A more recent but much more subjective account of the same events can be found in Brian Nolan's King's War: Mackenzie King and the Politics of War, 1939-1945.⁸

In general, these writers portray Mackenzie King's handling of the manpower crisis in glowing terms. While Hutchison promises a "candid" and "controversial" portrayal of King, the prime minister emerges in his study as the "master chemist"⁹ who always finds just the right formula in relation to conscription. Granatstein, while noting the role of luck and the indefensible sacking of Colonel Ralston as Minister of Defence, clearly emphasizes King's "brilliant"¹⁰ handling of manpower issues. For his part, Nolan provides an interesting picture of King as an occasionally "mean, cruel, cold-blooded, and ruthless" tyrant, but concludes that no wartime leader could match the "heroic" qualities of King in terms of leading the nation during the Second World War.¹¹ W.A.B. Douglas and Brereton Greenhous, in Out of the Shadows: Canada in the Second World War, give King the highest praise of all. They characterize his actions as the "intervention of expert and political

management of the rarest order."¹²

This positive appraisal of King's handling of the military manpower question seems to have been transferred vicariously to evaluations of NSS efforts to mobilize human resources generally. C.P. Stacey, in his otherwise exhaustive Arms, Men, and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945, devotes only four pages to the NSS civilian mobilization policies enacted during the final thirty months of the war.¹³ Focusing on the compulsory transfer of limited numbers of civilian workers and the role of armed forces personnel in alleviating critical manpower shortages, Stacey concludes that NSS policies tilted generally in favour of those Cabinet figures such as Ralston who supported concerted and comprehensive mobilization measures. In Broken Promises, Granatstein concludes that the government "intervened massively" in the civilian labour market and regulated the Canadian workforce to an "unheard-of degree."¹⁴ The most recent compilation of contemporary and scholarly accounts dealing with the Second World War is The Good Fight: Canadians and World War II, edited by Granatstein and Peter Neary. They conclude that NSS policies in their "full elaboration" meant "regimentation on a scope and scale that Canadian workers had never known before and have never known since."¹⁵

These generalizations about the commitment of NSS to a comprehensive and coercive mobilization agenda underline the

need for a full history of wartime human resource mobilization. Perforce, this must begin with the decision taken in January 1942 to commit Canada to an expanded 'Big Army' military scheme¹⁶ and the realization in late 1941 that civilian manpower shortages were visible on the horizon.¹⁷ The intense manpower debates within Cabinet that followed during the summer and autumn of 1942, after the establishment of NSS, revealed three broad approaches. On the one hand, industrial and financial concerns represented by C.D. Howe of the Department of Munitions and Supply (DMS) and J.L. Ilesley of the Department of Finance lobbied vociferously against any comprehensive and coercive manpower scheme that would drastically re-order the Canadian industrial production scene. On the other hand, Colonel Ralston of the Department of National Defence (DND) headed a strong conscriptionist-oriented group that lobbied hard for a large active duty military machine even at the cost of draining manpower from a wide range of Canadian industries.

Caught in the middle of Howe's immovable object and Ralston's irresistible force was Minister of Labour Humphrey Mitchell. It is a telling sign of Mitchell's standing in the government that his department, which was in theory responsible for the equitable distribution of human resources between Howe and Ralston, was not included in the membership of the Cabinet War Committee. Grant Dexter's marvellous wartime memoranda and J.W. Pickersgill's superb

account of the King government during World War II amply demonstrate Mitchell's failings as an administrator. Mackenzie King welcomed Mitchell into the Cabinet in 1941 and originally held high hopes that he would buttress Liberal support among trade unionists, especially those affiliated with the Trades and Labour Congress, which he had led for many years.¹⁸ By the end of 1942, however, Mitchell had expended his political capital with King, and with national labour organizations,¹⁹ and remained an ineffectual member of Cabinet for the duration of the war.²⁰ Writing in July 1942, Dexter summed up Mitchell's wartime role as follows:

Hump has gone down a bit in my estimation. I find he is playing both ends. With Ralston and Angus [Macdonald] he is a conscriptionist-now man. With the others he is a conscriptionist-when-the-time-comes man.²¹

Mitchell's equivocation contrasted sharply with the approach of NSS Director Elliot Little in the second half of 1942. At a special Cabinet meeting of 17 July 1942, various departmental representatives estimated the potential size of the available manpower pool. NSS officials estimated that almost 640,000 men were eligible for military service, but this number included large numbers who were either medically unfit or essential to war industries. Colonel Ralston and DND representatives emphasized that the three Service branches required almost 235,000 recruits prior to 31 March 1943.²² C.D. Howe stated that 100,000 additional workers

would be required in war plants. Minister of Agriculture Jimmy Gardiner insisted that more manpower could not be obtained from the agricultural sector. Cabinet attempted to break this manpower stalemate by consolidating and streamlining the mobilization administrative structure. Responsibility for military mobilization was stripped from the Department of National War Services (DNWS) and transferred to the Department of Labour effective 1 September 1942. This change promised increased coordination of military and civilian human resources under Little's direction.

The administrative shuffling of mobilization responsibilities, however, did not alleviate manpower difficulties. On 17 September, Little shocked the Cabinet by announcing that fresh estimates of the available manpower pool showed only 427,000 men available for military service.²³ DND officials continued to berate the efficiency of the recruitment system for compulsory military service within Canada. Ralston insisted that an additional 42,000 men might be required by 1 April 1943 since his July 1942 estimate had not compensated for casualties incurred by overseas service personnel. Little insisted that the only avenue of escape from the looming manpower catastrophe was to be found in the massive re-organization of the Canadian industrial environment by curtailing non-essential industry. Cabinet instructed Little to confer with Donald Gordon,

Chairman of the Wartime Prices and Trade Board (WPTB), and formulate proposals to curtail non-essential industries and release men for military service. In August 1942, Mackenzie King had indicated publicly that he supported the curtailment or elimination of non-essential industries.²⁴ But Little quickly tested the practical limits of King's public pronouncements.

At the 23 September Cabinet meeting, Little astounded many Cabinet members by submitting a draconian proposal that would have the effect of establishing himself as a manpower czar with virtually unchecked authority. Little estimated that 27 percent of the labour force in non-essential civilian industries would have to be mobilized to meet a monthly need of 50,000 men in essential industry and the military before 31 March 1943. Little also insisted that the agricultural sector would have to provide more labour for other essential uses. He insisted that NSS be made an autonomous government department with virtually absolute powers of compulsion. Gordon submitted his own report denouncing Little's mobilization scheme. Claiming that Little's proposal would essentially destroy the diversity of Canada's economy, require a massive bureaucracy, and dislocate much of the civilian workforce, Gordon warned that Canadians would not tolerate such tough measures. He received the full support of influential cabinet members. J.L. Ilsley was shocked at the extent of Little's scheme,

while King indicated that a revamped Selective Service scheme would create "chaos in the country." Claiming that Gordon made a "first-rate and sensible" presentation, King sanctioned a path that would dominate NSS mobilization policies for the duration of the war by noting that the "only sensible course was one of gradualness."²⁵

Little's proposals were not completely rejected, but the difference between the NSS Director and the proponents of gradualism within the Cabinet, including Humphrey Mitchell, was clearly fundamental. Accordingly, after two months of inaction, Little resigned his position on 18 November 1942. He subsequently fired off a bitter letter to the Financial Post condemning the ineffectual handling of the human resource mobilization question. Little's exit did not prevent the debate concerning the curtailment of non-essential industries from continuing. WPTB and NSS officials haggled for months in an attempt to institute a modified curtailment scheme that would systematically reduce the use of non-essential human and material resources to the "minimum required for the health, efficiency, and morale of the nation."²⁶ While many ranking NSS officials felt that curtailment programs were "inevitable and imminent,"²⁷ no agreement could be reached between NSS and WPTB representatives.

One key issue separated the two agencies and highlighted the de-centralized and local orientation of NSS

policy during World War II. Many WPTB administrators were drawn from the business sector, and they tended to view curtailment programs from a national perspective.²⁸ Any moderately comprehensive WPTB curtailment plan involved centralizing industrial production in the largest and most efficient industrial enterprises located in major urban centres, the cities already experiencing acute labour shortages. This WPTB approach to industrial consolidation and curtailment of non-essential industries inevitably required large segments of the workforce in rural areas to be transferred thousands of miles to large urban centres. NSS officials, in the wake of Little's departure, refused to consider this option since it would require a national draft of human resources to conscript labour from regions deemed less efficient in the national economic structure. In December 1942, NSS representatives insisted that they desired "selective action affecting only a specific locality or even an individual firm."²⁹

This dispute continued into January 1943. At a 12 January meeting of WPTB, NSS, and DMS officials, WPTB representatives insisted that they were interested in industrial curtailment strategies "only on an overall countrywide basis." They continued to resist any NSS attempt to correlate curtailment plans with regions experiencing labour surpluses, and NSS officials formally rejected any national WPTB curtailment initiatives. NSS

officials seemed to be ignorant of the tumultuous 1942 manpower debates and continued evidence of acute civilian and military manpower shortages. Instead, they asserted that limited forms of labour direction at the local or regional level augmented by more stringent control of men in military age classes and the widespread use of women could alleviate shortages in essential war industries. As a result, NSS policy-makers embarked on a 30 month journey in January 1943 that witnessed the legislative triumph of gradualism in the mobilization of Canadian human resources during the Second World War.³⁰

Elliot Little's dismissal allowed Associate Deputy Minister of Labour Arthur MacNamara to assume the mantle of NSS Director. Well-respected by King and described by Grant Dexter as "easily the coolest-headed and most practical man" in Ottawa,³¹ MacNamara left a remarkable imprint in a 35 year civil service career. Entering the Manitoba Department of Labour as an Inspector in 1916, he rose through the ranks to become Deputy Minister of Labour and Deputy Minister of Public Works in Manitoba by 1936. His experience dealing with unemployment relief in Manitoba caught the eye of the Dominion government, and he was summoned to Ottawa in 1940 to become Chairman of the Dependent's Allowance Board within the Department of National Defence. MacNamara also served as Acting Chief Commissioner of the Unemployment Insurance Commission after the passage of the Unemployment Insurance

Act in 1940.

Arthur MacNamara proved to be the living embodiment of the concept of gradualness espoused by the King government in the autumn of 1942. Alternately termed the "Great Compromiser," the "Master Conciliator," and the "Man in the Asbestos Suit," MacNamara was an indefatigable negotiator. In 1950 the Winnipeg Free Press offered this account of his wartime career and policy outlook:

In [1942] he was named Director of NSS with virtually unlimited powers, which he contrived to use sparingly with characteristic emphasis on consultation and persuasion...Basic to the MacNamara thinking is the idea that most strikes are unnecessary, that almost anything will yield to compromise, and that labour and management should be left alone to work out agreements--with a little prodding--because it is wrong and undemocratic for government to write labour contracts. Compromise, according to the situation, may be interpreted, and is interpreted, either as wisdom or appeasement.³²

MacNamara's belief in compromise and conciliation was augmented by a strong belief in decentralization and regional authority. In the six months following Little's resignation, MacNamara guaranteed that no major initiatives would be undertaken to point NSS on the course advocated by Ralston and those NSS officials who favoured compulsory schemes. In a May 1943 article, Grant Dexter chronicled the frustration of Major-General H.J. Riley, NSS Associate Director, in the face of MacNamara's refusal to pursue mobilization goals in a more vigorous fashion. According to Dexter, Riley had been turned into a figurehead for public

relations purposes and believed that MacNamara was not equal to the task at hand.³³

MacNamara's personal philosophy came to dominate the entire NSS administrative structure. NSS bureaucrats were drawn primarily from the Unemployment Insurance Commission and the labour movement. The Unemployment Insurance Act, as James Struthers documents, was rooted in the principle of less eligibility. While the Act was a modest first step in the direction of a comprehensive insurance scheme, few UIC officials were ardent supporters of sweeping regulatory measures. Allan Mitchell, Director of the Unemployment Insurance Commission, gave a remarkable response in the summer of 1943 when pressed to allow a work permit policy to be further watered down. Mitchell did not protest that exemptions to established practice would produce chaotic results. Instead, he enthusiastically claimed that "half a loaf is better than no bread"³⁴ and authorized regulatory retreat. Similarly, many NSS officials recruited from the trade union movement were loath to endorse comprehensive schemes designed to impinge upon the freedom of workers. One of the most influential union recruits was M.M. Maclean, the Director of Industrial Relations within the Department of Labour. A former National Secretary of the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Employees and an Executive member of the Canadian Congress of Labour,³⁵ Maclean cultivated close ties with MacNamara and occupied a preferred place within

the latter's circle of advisors.

This thesis will argue that the wartime mobilization of human resources under the direction of MacNamara and NSS officials rested on the pillars of gradualism, compromise, conciliation, and de-centralization. Existing scholarly assumptions concerning the comprehensive nature of Canada's civilian and military mobilization effort must be revised when the records of NSS and other Department of Labour documents held in the National Archives are scrutinized. Historical analysis of the manpower debate has been hampered by the use of a limited number of sources at the highest levels of the political process. Rather than providing another horizontal analysis of Cabinet records and government publications, this thesis will employ a vertical analysis of records extending from the Cabinet room to the local NSS employment offices. Eight representative case studies have been chosen to provide an administrative history of human resource mobilization policies during World War II. No attempt has been made to cull a limited number of failed NSS initiatives to bolster a pre-conceived notion of wartime mobilization efforts. First, the NSS records themselves are organized on a case study basis, and each case study chosen for examination could have been replaced by others. Second, several case studies illustrate some successes of NSS mobilization initiatives. Third, an effort has been made to incorporate case studies dealing with

issues of gender, race, region, and socio-economic class.³⁶ Finally, it can be argued that the lax and uncoordinated nature of the NSS regulatory program itself created the bulk of the problems facing mobilization officials.

This thesis is organized into four general sections. First, a broad opening chapter provides a contextual overview of military and civilian mobilization policies. Second, three case studies deal specifically with the mobilization of men in specific age categories for military service. Two case studies focusing on the mobilization of Native Canadians and the deferment of military service for students deal with efforts of the Department of National War Services and NSS from 1940 to 1945 to procure men for the Armed Forces. The third case study in the military mobilization section describes the Industrial Mobilization Survey Plan, a remarkably extensive but disastrous NSS effort to comb out men from industry for military service.

The third section of the thesis contains five case studies dealing with civilian mobilization. Two case studies, in Chapters 6 and 7 deal with the only two labour sectors in Canada subject to maximum regulatory control by NSS. In the case of the coal labour force in Nova Scotia, government action failed to increase the production of bituminous coal. On the other hand, the regulation of Halifax longshoremen in a coercive fashion proved to be one of the outstanding successes of NSS policy. Chapters 8 and

9 deal with the female labour force in primary textile employment and the regulation of nurses. The primary textile case study illustrates the remarkably lax control of Canadian women during the war; the failed attempt to augment nursing staffs illustrates the willingness of NSS to allow an autonomous profession to regulate itself. Chapter 10 deals with the crisis in seasonal meatpacking employment between 1943 and 1945 and the NSS efforts to deal with a remarkable increase in livestock production during the war. The thesis conclusion outlines the place of Canadian human resource mobilization policies in the broader framework of Canadian wartime history and the Allied mobilization effort between 1939 and 1945.

A comprehensive examination of NSS and related mobilization agencies extending beyond an analysis of Mackenzie King and other Cabinet officials provides a fresh and unique perspective on the Canadian war effort. NSS was intimately involved with large segments of the Canadian population, and an investigation of its policies allows for a hybrid analysis combining military and social historical approaches. Placing the history of domestic NSS mobilization strategies within the established chronology of Canada's war struggle allows a significant new chapter of Canadian history to be written.

NOTES

1. House of Commons Debates 24 March 1942 p. 1564.
2. J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada (Toronto, 1977); C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men, and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottawa, 1970).
3. Ruth Roach Pierson, "They're Still Women After All": The Second World War and Canadian Womanhood (Toronto, 1986).
4. Thomas Socknat, Witness Against War: Pacifism in Canada, 1900-1945 (Toronto, 1987).
5. Bruce Hutchison, The Incredible Canadian: A Candid Portrait of Mackenzie King, His Works, His Times, and His Nation (Toronto, 1952).
6. E.L.M. Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945 (Toronto, 1956); R. MacGregor Dawson, The Conscription Crisis of 1944 (Toronto, 1961); and Stacey, Arms, Men, and Governments.
7. Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises; J.L. Granatstein, Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945 (Toronto, 1990).
8. Brian Nolan, King's War: Mackenzie King and the Politics of War, 1939-1945 (Toronto, 1988).
9. Hutchison, The Incredible Canadian p. 354.
10. Granatstein, Canada's War pp. 370-371.
11. Nolan, King's War p. 160.
12. W.A.B. Douglas and Brereton Greenhous, Out of the Shadows: Canada in the Second World War (Toronto, 1977) p. 238.
13. Stacey, Arms, Men, and Governments pp. 409-412.
14. Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises pp. 192-193.
15. J.L. Granatstein and Peter Neary, eds., The Good Fight: Canadians and World War II (Toronto, 1995) p. 10.
16. C.P. Stacey, Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain, and the Pacific, Volume 1 (Ottawa, 1955) pp. 95-97.
17. Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises pp. 185-188.

18. J.W. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, 1939-1945, Volume 1 (Toronto, 1960) pp. 310-311.

19. In the autumn of 1942, national labour organizations called for Mitchell's resignation. In his first speech in the House of Commons on 3 February 1943, Stanley Knowles (CCF-Winnipeg North Centre) also called on Mitchell to resign. See Canadian Unionist November 1942 (vol. 16, no. 6) pp. 135-136; Canadian Unionist December 1942 (vol. 16, no. 7) p. 164; and House of Commons Debates 3 February 1943 pp. 122-124.

20. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, Volume 1 p. 452. King contemplated sacking Mitchell in December 1942.

21. Frederick Gibson and Barbara Robertson, eds., Ottawa at War: The Grant Dexter Memoranda, 1939-1945 (Winnipeg, 1994) p. 330.

22. Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises p. 191.

23. Ibid., p. 193.

24. Toronto Globe & Mail, 20 August 1942.

25. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record p. 446.

26. Heeney to Ilsley, 29 September 1942. National Archives of Canada (NAC), RG 27, Volume 974: file 2--NSS Curtailment of Industry.

27. Ibid., 'NSS Statement of Civilian Curtailment Policy.'

28. For an excellent account of the WPTB view of the curtailment issue, see Christopher Robb Waddell, "The Wartime Prices and Trade Board: Price Control in Canada During World War II," (Unpublished York University Ph.D. Thesis, 1981) pp. 392-416.

29. Adams to Gunn, 14 December 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 974: file 2--NSS Curtailment of Industry.

30. Ibid., Minutes of the Joint Committee, 13 January 1945.

31. Gibson and Robertson, Ottawa at War p. 369.

32. Winnipeg Free Press, 8 August 1950.

33. Gibson and Robertson, Ottawa at War pp. 411-412.

34. Mitchell to MacNamara, 31 May 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1518: file R8 part 2--Labour Supply and Curtailment in the Pulp and Paper Industry.

35. Canadian Unionist March 1944 (XVII, No. 10) p. 250.

36. For a feminist analysis of Canada's wartime effort, see Pierson, 'They're Still Women After All'. Douglas Hart provides a Marxist interpretation of government supervision of Canadian industry in "State Economic Management in Wartime: A Study of the 'Regimentation' of Industry in the Canadian Industrial Mobilization, 1939-1945," (Unpublished York University Ph.D. Thesis, 1980).

CHAPTER 2
The Regulatory Framework of Mobilization

In 1935, after his country had been invaded by Italian forces, Abyssinian Emperor Haile Selasse issued this sweeping mobilization proclamation:

Everyone will now be mobilized and all boys old enough to carry a spear will be sent to Addis Ababa. Married men will take their wives to carry food and to cook. Those without wives will take any women without husbands. Women with small babies need not go. The blind and those who cannot walk or for any reason cannot carry a spear are exempt. Anyone found at home after the receipt of this order will be hanged.¹

NSS officials responsible for the mobilization of human resources during the Second World War might have appreciated the comprehensive and inclusive nature of Selasse's decree. The civilian and military mobilization measures adopted in Canada between 1940 and 1945, however, failed to meet the country's need. This was because of the indirect, ineffective, and de-centralized nature of the mobilization machinery.

An overview of the procedures adopted and the administrative structures used to realize mobilization goals in an efficient manner reveals structural flaws that virtually guaranteed only limited success in human resource management during World War II. Military mobilization was dogged by logistical and structural problems that prevented the drafting of many eligible men into the armed forces. At the same time, the officials responsible for the

mobilization of the civilian labour force did not maintain thorough and exhaustive control of men and women in domestic employment. The commonly held view that civilian regulatory measures were sweeping in their scope and application must be revised when mobilization structures are examined in detail. While many statutory regulations for both civilian and military mobilization were comprehensive in theory, key government officials failed to exercise their full powers. The result was a patchwork mobilization system and only limited success.

Military Mobilization in Canada, 1940-1946

After his sweeping election victory of 26 March 1940, Mackenzie King was soon faced with the calamitous events of May and June in France. The response of his government to the defeat of France and the sudden threat to the United Kingdom was to introduce the bill that eventually became the National Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA) into the House of Commons. This was done on 18 June 1940. In keeping with his "frequently given" promise not to conscript men for overseas service,² King claimed that the time had come to organize a home defence force. The NRMA allowed the government to conscript men to ensure "public safety, the defence of Canada, the maintenance of public order, [and] the efficient prosecution of the war." Men called up under the NRMA would be trained for 30 days. The NRMA became law

on 21 June 1940, and on 12 July the Department of National War Services (DNWS) was created to administer it under the direction of Minister of Agriculture James Gardiner. Two issues dominated the administration of conscription legislation for the duration of the war: registration and call-up procedures.

By Orders-in-Council PC 3086 and PC 3156 of 9 and 12 July 1941, DNWS officials were empowered to undertake a national registration. Under the terms of these regulations, a Registrar and an Assistant Registrar were to be appointed in each federal electoral district across Canada. All residents who had attained the age of 16 by 1 July 1940 were required to register at designated stations, by mail, or, in the case of industrial establishments of a certain size, in the workplace. Separate lists were made of all single men and childless widowers between the ages of 19 and 45 as of 15 July 1940. These lists identified 802,458 men, and it was this group that served as the prime pool of military manpower for the duration of the war. Registration questionnaires also contained occupational information so as to identify persons with specialized employment capabilities. The initial national registration was updated as the war progressed to include men who reached military age after 1940.³

Once the majority of individual registrations had been processed, action was taken to direct recruits as required.

The key regulation in this regard was PC 4185 of 27 August 1940, known as the National War Services Regulations, 1940 (Recruits). Under PC 4185, various groups were exempted from compulsory military service. Included in the exemption were all members of the active military, clergymen, judges, police officers, and penitentiary wardens. All male British subjects ordinarily resident in Canada as of 1 September 1939 and who were between the ages of 21 and 45 and were single or widowed as of 15 July 1940 were eligible for compulsory military training. PC 4185 also identified various groups who were given special consideration by the mobilization authorities. These groups included students, conscientious objectors, and Mennonites. Stiff penalties were provided for any individual found delinquent under the mobilization regulations. A series of proclamations issued following the passage of PC 4185 broadened the group of men available for NRMA service. PC 4671 of 11 September 1940 designated single men aged 21 to 24 years liable for military service. Eventually, PC 4238, authorized on 16 June 1944, extended this designation to married and single men aged 18½ to 31 years and single men aged 32 to 42.⁴

The administrative structures established by the 1940 regulations remained unchanged for the duration of the war. Thirteen Administrative Divisions were established as follows: 1) Division A--London; 2) Division B--Toronto; 3) Division C--Kingston; 4) Division D--Port Arthur;

5) Division E--Montreal; 6) Division F--Quebec City; 7) Division G--Halifax; 8) Division H--Saint John; 9) Division I--Charlottetown; 10) Division J--Winnipeg; 11) Division K--Vancouver; 12) Division M--Regina; and 13) Division N--Edmonton. In each Administrative Division, a Divisional Registrar was responsible for using the national registration information to select the men who would be called into military service based on the age groups specified in the mobilization proclamations. In each Administrative District, a National War Services Administration Board was also established. Each Board had a minimum of three members, with a Superior Court or provincial judge acting as chair. All decisions concerning postponement of military service based on occupational priority were made by the Boards. The authority of Administration Boards was truly remarkable. All Board decisions were "final and conclusive," and no member of a Board was legally liable for any decision taken since Boards were placed beyond the authority of any judicial body.⁵

In theory, the process of calling up a potential recruit was straightforward. A Divisional Registrar, taking account of an individual's age and national registration information, would issue an Order--Medical Examination to individual men. Potential recruits were directed to report to civilian physicians approved by the government for medical examination. The examining physician would grade

each recruit into one of five categories ranging from A (most fit) to E (unfit for military service). The results of the examination would then be forwarded to the Registrar. Once the Registrar had determined that a man was in a medical category suitable for military service, he could then issue an Order--Military Training to the recruit. All men seeking deferment of military service were required to have the medical examination and then submit their postponement application to the Administration Board in the appropriate Administrative Division.⁶

Eventually, the responsibility of administering the NRMA provisions was transferred from the DNWS. The establishment of NSS in March 1942 was directed at the problem of civilian manpower allocation, but during the summer of 1942 pressing military manpower shortages became evident. Key meetings of the War Cabinet and the Cabinet Manpower Committee in July 1942 revealed that "centralization of ministerial responsibility for manpower policy and administration" was desirable.⁷ As a result, through PC 8800 of 26 September 1942, the control of military mobilization was taken away from the DNWS and placed under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labour. The DNWS remained in existence and most senior DNWS officials did not transfer to the Department of Labour. On 1 December 1942, NSS assumed direct responsibility for military mobilization through PC 10924, the National

Selective Service Mobilization Regulations. The administrative structure of Divisional Registrars and Administrative Boards remained unchanged, with the Boards termed Mobilization Boards under NSS nomenclature. For the remainder of the war, efforts to secure more men for NRMA service centred on the tightening of registration provisions, the improvement of medical examination procedures, the expansion of enforcement provisions under the mobilization regulations, and the continued expansion of the eligible age and marital classes to be called out under various proclamations.

In the years following the completion of the first round of national registration efforts in late 1940, it became increasingly clear that many men who were eligible for military service had escaped medical examination. The reasons for this were varied and included change of address without notification of Registrars, errors in duplicates of national registration cards on file in Registrars' offices, and outright avoidance of compliance with orders for medical examination. NSS officials addressed this problem by ordering a re-registration as of 15 July 1940 of single men who had been born in the years 1902 to 1922 inclusive. Under PC 11240 of 11 December 1942 all men who had not previously been served with an Order-Medical Examination were required to complete a form, known as "Schedule C," and return it to the Divisional Registrar. The original expiry

date for completing Schedule C was 1 February 1943, but the deadline was subsequently extended first to March 1943 and then to January 1944. More than 146,000 men had re-registered under the Schedule C plan by 10 January 1944.⁸

In concert with Schedule C tabulations, the medical examination procedure was changed during 1943. The purpose here was to cut down on the problems inherent in allowing large numbers of civilian physicians to examine men issued military training orders and to allow for more consistent measurement of the medical condition of potential recruits. Under PC 6990 of 7 September 1943, the majority of men requiring medical examination either had to visit medical panels established in DND Army Reception Centres or submit to medical examination performed by a civilian doctor assigned to a panel of physicians for a specific region. In rural and outlying areas, however, medical examination continued to be done by a civilian physician of the recruit's choice.⁹ After a Registrars' meeting in Ottawa on 19 June 1943, steps were taken to introduce the PULHEMS system of medical examination classification to determine the "exact functional capabilities" of each recruit.¹⁰ Each letter of PULHEMS stood for a specific physical capacity: P--Physique; U--Upper Extremities; L--Lower Extremities; H--Ears and Hearing; E--Eyes and Eyesight; M--Mental Capacity; and S--Emotional Stability. Each category was graded on a scale of 1 to 5 in the manner of the old A to E system, but

the PULHEMS system allowed a detailed evaluation of the functional capacity of a potential recruit in a much wider range of physical categories than before. The changes in medical procedure and examination policy were implemented to reduce the loss of recruits through physician error and to facilitate the issuing of medical examination orders to a wider range of men.

Early in 1944 there was another important NSS initiative to identify men contravening mobilization regulations. This took the form of a requirement that employers check the status of all male employees in the age groups subject to military service. By PC 9919 of 31 December 1943, an employer had to canvass each male employee to determine if the worker possessed an official document such as a discharge certificate or postponement of military training certificate to prove his good standing under regulations. The employer had to fill out a "Schedule 9" form for each employee who did not possess official documentation explaining his presence in industry.¹¹ While the original program was designed to end on 1 May 1944, the Schedule 9 reporting was eventually extended to a continuous check-up and it was not suspended until August 1945. During the life of this program, employers forwarded more than 49,000 Schedule 9 forms to Divisional Registrars. More than 10,000 of the men thus reported on were found to be in contravention of NSS regulations, with close to 49% of the

defaulters residing in the province of Quebec.¹²

On 7 May 1945 the military call-up of eligible men was suspended and all mobilization regulations were gradually relaxed in the months that followed. Finally, on 15 August 1946, all the mobilization and registration regulations were revoked. The administrative effort involved in the mobilization of NRMA personnel was truly impressive. By March 1944 more than 1,800 men and women were involved in mobilization work. Registrars issued more than 1.2 million medical examination orders between 1940 and 1945 and close to 600,000 orders for military training. During the same period Mobilization Boards heard close to 750,000 requests for postponement of military service.¹³ Government officials also launched exhaustive investigations, including the widespread use of civilian reporting agencies,¹⁴ to prevent evasion of the mobilization regulations.

A closer examination of the mobilization structure, however, reveals that Registrars and Mobilization Board officials experienced a remarkable degree of difficulty administering the mobilization regulations. Both groups also actively stood in the way of the efficient call-up of NRMA personnel. Indeed, the remarkable authority of the Mobilization Boards proved to be the most significant barrier to a consistent, nationwide policy of military mobilization in Canada during the Second World War.

A scandal in the office of the Montreal Registrar in

1941 almost caused the collapse of the entire mobilization structure in the province of Quebec. In April 1941, it was publicly revealed that a province-wide RCMP probe had been examining cases of fraud involving the issuance of illegal deferment certificates to members of the Syrian community.¹⁵ The Syrians allegedly had paid large sums of money to secure either deferment of military training or outright exemption from it. The investigation reached into the offices of the Montreal Divisional Registrar, Pierre Décary, who was arrested along with two other principals in the case, Mike Maloley of the Syrian community, and Jean Tarte, a prominent lawyer with ties to the provincial government. Twelve Syrians were arrested as well on charges of evading military service or aiding eligible men to avoid compulsory training. The episode highlighted the sharp differences in attitude in Montreal towards the war. The Montreal Gazette trumpeted that the Décary case had "startling repercussions and implications," and painted a "ghastly picture" of the mobilization effort. By contrast, editorials and news coverage in Le Devoir tended to avoid criticism of the men involved in the dispute while condemning the coverage of the case by the Gazette. In the end, Maloley and Tarte turned King's evidence and testified against Décary in exchange for 18 month prison sentences.¹⁶ DNWS officials in Ottawa were shocked at developments in Montreal, and Major General L.R. LaFlèche, the DNWS Deputy

Minister, noted that the "most unhappy" episode in Montreal threatened the whole recruitment effort in Quebec.¹⁷

Décary's trial commenced in June 1941, with extensive statements from Maloley and Tarte. Although Tarte refused initially to give evidence by claiming that he was "the dupe of the federal police,"¹⁸ Justice Wilfrid Iazure castigated his "childish" attitude and ordered him to testify on penalty of increased jail time.¹⁹ Décary flatly denied all charges brought against him, and claimed that LaFlèche had told him to treat draft evaders with "white gloves" by not vigorously pursuing 3,000 delinquent cases in the Montreal Administrative Division. Décary chronicled the poor record keeping procedures and the lack of staff,²⁰ facts confirmed in the witness box by Acting Montreal Registrar Raymond Ranger. Chief Crown Prosecutor Gerald Fauteux noted that all deferment cases in the Registrar's office were exhaustively documented except for the cases involving the Syrians. He noted further that "Maloley, [though] not one of our race, our culture, or our education, but at the same time a human being with the same right to his honour as others, did wrong and took his medicine."²¹ Décary's attorney claimed that his client was "not the first to suffer at the hands of his friends," and that the accused's vehement denials of wrongdoing should be accepted over Tarte's testimony--testimony from "one who took an hour to make up his mind to testify."²² The jury sided with the

prosecution but recommended clemency in Décary's sentence.

While all the Syrians charged in the case pleaded guilty, Décary appealed his conviction to the Quebec Court of Appeal. Remarkably, the original conviction was quashed, with the three francophone judges siding with Décary and the two anglophone judges supporting the original conviction. One of the francophone justices noted Décary's personal integrity in the witness box and saw in this the "spontaneous cry of a quiet conscience."²³ Not surprisingly, the Gazette castigated the decision to free Décary; "even the man in the street," the paper pronounced, "is aware of the tradition that the judicial power to interfere with the ancient British right of trial by jury should be exercised with the greatest restraint."²⁴ An appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed in February 1942 on the grounds that the dissent of the two anglophone appeal justices had been based on fact and not law. Tarte eventually volunteered for active service in lieu of jail time, but the issue of draft avoidance in the Syrian community remained alive for several months.

While the criminal acts involved in the Décary incident were exceptional, serious logistical problems plagued the Registrar system for the duration of the war. In January 1943 the government released manpower statistics culled from error-riddled DNWS records. In newspaper columns across the country, Grant Dexter ridiculed the inaccuracy of these

official mobilization figures:

While the tables are well set-up, the whole is all but unintelligible. It is as though the tables were the work of a demented mathematician. No single total agrees with its fellows....The muddle with respect to the calls for military service is probably unprecedented.²⁵

In July 1943 Major General H.J. Riley, NSS Associate Director of Mobilization, complained to Arthur MacNamara that Registrars were having difficulty securing even "moderately efficient" staff due to a high turnover rate and that mistakes on registration forms were rampant.²⁶ Quebec continued to be a source of concern for the duration of the war. Riley complained that the number of postponements and deferments in Quebec was too high, but that NSS had not been given the resources to enforce the mobilization regulations in an effective manner in that province.

The biggest administrative problem the Registrars faced was that of keeping their records up to date. Unfortunately, the information concerning men who were not included in the national registration rolls or those who had enlisted in the Armed Forces was not included in a Registrar's records. Men who volunteered for active duty were obviously not subject to NRMA conscription, but the DND rarely submitted enlistment data to Registrars to streamline the call-up procedures. Early in 1943, a special effort was made to ensure that Registrars had all of the necessary information on all men in callable age classes. In the event, approximately 120,000 enlistment notices sent to Registrars

by DND officials could not be matched initially with information in their files. While 80,000 of these cases were eventually sorted out, the remaining 40,000 could not be matched with national registration information.²⁷ By the end of the war the Registrars were finally beginning to get effective control of the vast body of information that had been collected. A 1945 audit by an accounting firm, however, revealed that more than three percent of all information in Registrars' offices was incorrect, with Montreal showing the highest percentage of error at almost six percent.²⁸

The problems inherent in managing such a massive registration effort were evident in the hundreds of cases involving the sending of medical examination and military training orders to servicemen who had been killed in combat. Media support of the mobilization effort was tepid at best, and many major newspapers were sharply critical of the ability of NWS and NSS to secure manpower in an efficient fashion. In October 1942 a sailor was killed in action on the HMCS Caribou and his posthumous award for bravery was promptly forwarded to his mother. In December 1942, however, she received a military training order addressed to her son from the Charlottetown Divisional Registrar. Commentary in the Halifax Chronicle on this episode echoed sentiments that could be heard in newspapers across the country:

Call it what you will--incompetence, slackness, inefficiency, or downright stupidity--the fact remains that it is absolutely without excuse. NSS, like any other wartime agency, is designed with some regard for the public conscience. In the exercise of its functions it must ever keep before it the chastening observation that it is the servant and not the master of the people. The issue involved goes much deeper than the surface details of this particularly lamentable episode. It goes to the very heart of the manpower problem and the NSS organization. And let us remember that that body can make of our national strength a potent force in the world struggle or an abject farce. One way to insure the latter is to persist in crude incompetence of this order.²⁹

While the Department of National Defence was equally to blame in this case for not forwarding enlistment certificates to Divisional Registrars, there can be no doubt that the operations of NWS and NSS were plagued with clerical and administrative difficulties that eroded public confidence and contributed to problems in mobilizing NRMA personnel throughout the war.

Yet another flaw in the system was that a Mobilization Board could take on the personality of its Chair. The case studies in this thesis will provide ample illustration of the sticky problems created by Mobilization Boards across the country. Two men in particular tested the patience of NWS and NSS administrators in Ottawa: Justice A.M. Manson of the Vancouver Mobilization Board and Major General and Judge J.F.L. Embury of the Regina Mobilization Board. They vociferously and actively opposed many of the policies devised to mobilize NRMA personnel in an equitable manner.

In particular, Embury illustrated his disdain for

established procedure by his handling of conscientious objectors in the Regina Administrative Division. The case of Robert Makaroff is typical of the contempt Embury felt for pacifists. Makaroff, the son of Saskatoon lawyer and Doukhobor P.G. Makaroff, applied to the Regina Mobilization Board for a deferment of military service as a medical student. Embury, however, refused to consider his academic qualifications and classified him instead as a conscientious objector.³⁰ After spending time at an alternative service camp, Makaroff was sent to a rock quarry in British Columbia, where he was required to work for a private contractor in conditions so oppressive that only Asian labour could withstand them.³¹ When Embury died in late 1943, he was replaced by Justice P.M. Anderson, who immediately set about undoing the harm he had done. Anderson released Makaroff from his alternative service commitments on the grounds that he had been "singled out for discrimination and persecution." Four members of the Regina Mobilization Board resigned in protest as a result of Anderson's handling of the Makaroff case. The Canadian Legion likewise condemned Anderson for his alleged lenient handling of Makaroff; Embury had been "the honourary president of the Legion, a great soldier, a good citizen, and a kind and sympathetic man."³²

Anderson soon found himself at the centre of controversy again when he allowed former National Hockey

League scoring champion Doug Bentley to cross into the United States and play hockey for the Chicago Blackhawks, despite the fact that Bentley was rated in the highest medical category and was on an agricultural deferment. A.C. Stewart, one of the members of the Mobilization Board who had resigned over the Makaroff case, condemned Anderson's decision and pointed out that C.W. McCool, one of the new members of the Regina Board, was employed by the Chicago franchise as a scout.³³ For his part, G.R. Bickerton, another ex-Board member, claimed that the Regina operation had degenerated into "petty intrigue, tittle-tattling, and time wasting."³⁴

This was exceptional, but there is abundant evidence that the system established to ensure the efficient mobilization of NRMA personnel was susceptible to procedural and administrative difficulties. The enormous quantity of data that had to be handled and the fluid nature of wartime employment and enlistment patterns overwhelmed the agencies charged with tabulating and organizing the statistical foundation of Canada's domestic military effort. In the end, the bureaucratic structures created to administer mobilization regulations often created barriers to the efficient procurement of men for domestic military service. While previous academic studies have highlighted the intense debates in Cabinet circles about the wisdom of conscription as such, an intensive examination of specific NWS and NSS

mobilization initiatives reveals the myriad problems inherent in actually mobilizing civilians for compulsory military training.

Civilian Mobilization in Canada, 1940-1946

On first examination, it is easy to conclude that the mobilization of civilian human resources in Canada during the Second World War proceeded with few difficulties. By 1 October 1944, 37% of the Canadian population aged 14 years and older was gainfully employed in non-agricultural industry. This figure was 25% higher than the level of October 1939. Employment in essential war industries increased from only 121,000 persons in October 1939 to a wartime high of more than 1.1 million in October 1943. The number of men and women gainfully occupied in 1944 had increased by close to 600,000 persons over 1939 employment levels.³⁵ Unquestionably, these are impressive figures. Close examination of the policies adopted to mobilize the labour force, however, reveals that the remarkable outward statistical success of the domestic economy belies hidden weaknesses in the regulatory framework. In truth, the officials responsible for the direction and control of the civilian labour force often lacked the powers to respond to serious problems in a wide variety of employment sectors.

Prior to the formation of NSS in March 1942, few measures were adopted to ensure the efficient mobilization

of the civilian workforce. In the first six months of the war only a number of minor initiatives were attempted. In February 1940 a voluntary registration of skilled and semi-skilled workers was undertaken to ascertain the availability of workers for war industry, but fewer than 25,000 men and women responded.³⁶ Before 1942 two primary pieces of legislation essentially guided the civilian mobilization process. The first was the Unemployment Insurance Act of 7 August 1940. While its most important function was to devise and administer a contributory insurance scheme, the Unemployment Insurance Commission also launched a Dominion Employment Service with regional and local offices. These offices acted as clearinghouses for vacancies in and applications for employment. From September 1942, the UIC Employment Service formed the basis for NSS direction of the civilian labour force.³⁷

A second body that sought to ensure the smooth operation of civilian industry was the National Labour Supply Council (NLSC), which was established on 19 June 1940 by Order-in-Council PC 2686. The NLSC was initially composed of five representatives each from industry and labour, and its prime function was to adjudicate requests from the DMS concerning the essentiality of particular industrial enterprises. If the NLSC deemed a company essential it would communicate this information to NWS officials. NWS Administrative Boards would in turn use this

information in determining postponement of military duty requests from individual employees. After the NLSC was disbanded on 24 February 1942, the National War Labour Board (NWLB) administered NLSC functions until early 1943. Over time, more than 500 companies were identified for special consideration under the NLSC worker postponement scheme.³⁸ At the same time, the availability of small classes of technical workers and scientific personnel was safeguarded by the Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel (WBTP).³⁹

By early 1941, it had become clear that this piecemeal approach, which affected but a small percentage of the manpower pool, would not meet the pressing demand for workers. Accordingly, on 25 October 1940, the government established the Inter-departmental Committee on Labour Coordination (ICLC) to recommend measures to deal with the situation. The ICLC quickly commissioned the Labour Supply Investigation Committee (LSIC) to evaluate the mobilization effort and the latter group produced a remarkably complex and detailed report in October 1941 that exposed the extraordinary shortcomings of the existing system. Noting that "the most drastic measures" would be needed to secure large numbers of men for military service, the Committee decried the lack of effective coordination between civilian and military mobilization.⁴⁰ The LSIC called for the establishment of a priority system for industrial manpower, the increased use of women in war industry, and the end of

competition between the armed forces and industry for scarce resources.

Despite Cabinet opposition to the placing of civilian manpower requirements on the same level as military manpower needs,⁴¹ Mackenzie King responded to the LSIC report by launching National Selective Service operations. Thirteen Orders-in-Council issued during March 1942 defined the scope of the new agency within the Department of Labour. PC 2250 of 21 March 1942, the Restricted Occupations Order, prevented men between the ages of 17 and 45 from entering certain non-essential occupations without the permission of an NSS Officer. Likewise, under the Stabilization of Employment in Agriculture Regulations issued on the same date, persons employed in agriculture at 23 March 1942 could not take employment outside that field without NSS permission. Such persons were, however, permitted to move about freely from one agricultural job to another. Neither of these regulations applied to women. NSS officials were authorized to use the chain of Unemployment Insurance Commission offices across the country to administer these first civilian regulatory measures, and a nationwide registration of unemployed men between the ages of 17 and 69 was carried out in May 1942. On 17 June 1942, the Control of Employment Regulations revoked the Restricted Occupations Order, and further extended Selective Service control over civilian manpower and employment. These new regulations

mandated that every person, male or female, must seek the permission of an NSS officer to enter any employment. Once employment was obtained, an individual had to apply for the permit necessary to begin work. This could be refused by an NSS officer and the worker induced to take some other employment.⁴²

All these measures were consolidated by PC 7595 on 26 August 1942. This Order revoked the Stabilization of Employment in Agriculture Regulations and the Control of Employment Regulations. PC 7595 extended and widened NSS control by making it necessary for workers to obtain permits before seeking or entering employment, and by introducing a system of notices of separation. This system required seven days notice by either employee or employer of intended separation or dismissal. Employers were required to report all employment vacancies to UIC offices and advertising for employment or for employees was prohibited without NSS approval. Administrative difficulties that arose under PC 7595 because of the competing jurisdictions of NSS and the Unemployment Insurance Commission were quickly resolved by PC 7994 on 4 September 1942. This Order placed the UIC structure under NSS control. By February 1944, more than 5,500 NSS personnel worked in UIC offices across the country.⁴³

The most critical section of PC 7595 related to priorities in the use of labour across Canada. An embryonic

system of priority classifications according to industry had been formulated in June 1941, and the Restricted Occupations Order of March 1942, had begun to formalize the concept of classifying jobs according to essentiality. PC 7595 went much further and inaugurated the priority classification system on a nationwide basis.⁴⁴ Labelled by NSS officials as "the key...which guided manpower to its most useful employment during the war,"⁴⁵ the priority system used the Industrial Classification Manual and a continuously updated series of reports from employers to determine the wartime essentiality of a firm or an industry. Local NSS offices used the priority schedules when referring applicants to employment, with highly essential industries receiving priority over less essential industries for available labour.

Under PC 7595, a tiered priority schedule featured nine primary occupational divisions.⁴⁶ Within each of these divisions there were a number of major industry groups and within each major group there were sub-groups. The sub-groups were ranked as A, B, C, or D in priority, designations that meant, respectively, very high, high, low, or no essentiality. In the Manufacturing Division, for example, Major Group 22 was classified as Textile Mill Products. Within this industry group there were 14 sub-groups, each of which was assigned male and female priority ratings. In February 1944, Industry 2211, Cotton Yarn and

Broadwoven Goods, had a priority rating of B-A. This rating meant that employment in this sub-group was highly essential for males and very highly essential for females. Individual firms could receive a priority rating different from that of the industry as a whole. In 1942 an Inter-departmental Labour Priorities Committee (ILPC) was formed to establish and update priorities on a continuous basis. This Committee drew its membership from the Department of Labour, the WPTB, and the DMS. The ILPC remained the key NSS regulatory body for the duration of the war, as the complex and changing web of priority ratings anchored the attempt to distribute labour to essential industries in an efficient manner. Sheldon Ross became chair of the ILPC in April 1943, and established a lasting reputation as the miserly guardian of the coveted priority ratings sought by Canadian businesses.

PC 7595 remained in effect for less than five months. For the remainder of the war, Order-in-Council PC 246 of 19 January 1943 formed the regulatory blueprint that would guide NSS control of the civilian workforce. Building on the curtailment debate that had transpired in the months before its passage, this Order, termed the National Selective Service Civilian Regulations (NSSCR), epitomized the flexible and selective approach governing the civilian mobilization effort in Canada. Many of the provisions of PC 7595 were incorporated into PC 246. Seven day separation notices were still required for an employee to separate from

employment or for an employer to terminate an employee. The priority classification system remained intact as the primary lever available to Selective Service officials to direct labour to the most essential use. Strict control of advertising was not only maintained but strengthened. The system of supplementary allowances provided for in PC 7595 was likewise enhanced. This system allowed NSS officials to pay allowances for transportation and accommodation expenses to workers who were directed to or who moved voluntarily to employment deemed essential. A variety of occupation-specific regulations governing, for example, employment in agriculture and technical vocations were also included. A stringent system of labour exit permits increased the ability of Selective Service officials to restrict the movement of workers to the United States.

The most important section of PC 246, however, was the administrative power vested in the office of the Minister of Labour. Section 210 contained two key provisions enabling the direction and control of the labour force in a comprehensive fashion. By the first of these, the Minister had full authority to direct all men in age classes callable for military service to terminate their existing employment on two weeks notice. Under the second provision, an individual so designated for compulsory transfer was required to report to a local employment office and accept the employment offered to him by NSS. An employee targeted

for transfer under Section 210 had the right to appeal to a board of referees established by the Unemployment Insurance Commission in 1940. In some industries--coal mining was the leading example--Orders-in-Council amended Section 210 to grant special considerations or privileges in securing labour. In 1943 a series of formal Compulsory Transfer Orders issued under Section 210 directed men in military age brackets from non-essential employment to more essential employment.

In law, NSS thus possessed three means for the efficient mobilization of the civilian labour force. First, and most important, was the complex web of priorities. This anchored the effort to direct male and female labour to essential military and civilian industries, although it proved incapable of addressing many pressing industrial needs in an effective manner. Second, a small number of industries such as coal mining and longshore work were targeted for special regulatory attention under Section 210 of PC 246. This aspect of the program will be detailed in several of the case studies that follow. Finally, Compulsory Transfer Orders issued in 1943 allowed young men to be transferred from occupations deemed non-essential to occupations that were crucial to the war effort. The full authority of these regulations, however, was never utilized because NSS administrators chose to follow tactics of conciliation and compromise. This was in keeping with

Arthur MacNamara's prevailing philosophy of gradualism, which left a decidedly ambiguous legacy behind it.

Other accounts of the period view the NSS compulsory transfer policy as "a clear attempt to get tough with industry and labour,"⁴⁷ but an examination of the effect of Compulsory Transfer Orders reveals the limited scope of Selective Service direction of the workforce. Although the Transfer Orders were designed to comb out men in military age classes from non-essential occupations, only a small percentage of men targeted under them was actually shifted to more essential employment. Compulsory Transfer Order #1 was issued on 4 May 1943. It ordered all callable males employed in occupations such as bartending, sales, barbering, and taxi driving to register at a local Selective Service office, and await direction to other employment. Before November 1943, six more Compulsory Transfer Orders were issued covering a wide range of service and other non-essential industries.⁴⁸ More than 104,000 men registered under these Orders, but only 17% of them were placed in more essential employment. Sixty-nine percent of these men stayed in non-essential employment while the remainder fell into other categories including enlistments in the armed forces and cases in abeyance.⁴⁹ An eighth Compulsory Transfer Order was drafted in 1944, but Sheldon Ross, Chairman of the ILPC, noted wryly that it should not be used "in view of the fact that a large proportion of those

affected by other Compulsory Orders" had not been transferred.⁵⁰ The limited results achieved under Compulsory Transfer Orders exemplifies the unwillingness of Selective Service officials to exercise their regulatory powers to the fullest extent.

Perhaps the most significant obstacle facing mobilization planners after the issuance of PC 246 was the matter of separations from employment. Despite the increased supervision of the labour force that was now possible, tens of thousands of men and women continued to leave essential employment. Between 1 September 1942 and 27 May 1943, there were 1,058,736 separation notices submitted to NSS offices by men and 375,478 by women.⁵¹ NSS officials hesitated during the first eight months of 1943 to use their full powers to direct workers. Pressure to stabilize payrolls and reduce the enormous administrative load on local employment offices, which were struggling with a tidal wave of referrals to and placements in employment, finally forced Arthur MacNamara to step up the pace of control. On 1 September 1943 Order-in-Council PC 6625 classified all firms with a labour priority rating of A or B as "designated establishments." Legally, this meant that workers in these firms, male and female, were frozen in their employment unless given permission to submit a notice of separation. PC 6625 was clearly designed to improve upon what had been happening in relation to separations under PC

7595 and PC 246.

Nonetheless, NSS officials were encouraged to administer the new regulation in a "reasonable and practical manner."⁵² In practice, separations from essential employment continued unabated for the duration of the war.⁵³ Table 1 shows the separation totals for men and women according to essentiality and the corresponding labour demand across Canada. On average, more than five percent of both men and women in the entire Canadian industrial workforce, and close to 10 percent of persons employed in essential war industry, sought a change in employment every month from mid-1943 to late-1945. Evidence from NSS files also indicates that thousands of men and women failed to obtain separation notices and permits to seek employment in other industries and were not therefore included in the official employment totals. The labour demand figures indicate that since there was a sellers market for labour, many workers separated from their existing employment to seek better paid jobs elsewhere. Nor did Selective Service officials necessarily resist the tens of thousands of separated employees streaming into their offices. Acute labour shortages plagued virtually every industry in the country, and job vacancies could be filled temporarily from the constantly revolving pool of labour. There can be no doubt, however, that certain essential industries suffered greatly because of the high separation rate. Despite a

Table 1
 Separations and Labour Demand in Canadian Industrial
 Establishments, 1943-1945⁵⁴

Month	Male A&B	Male C&D	Female A&B	Female C&D	Total Separations	Labour Demand
Aug '43	101,062	28,177	42,660	17,308	189,207	150,634
Sep '43	78,301	22,784	37,703	16,203	154,991	145,423
Oct '43	53,936	14,484	33,522	13,026	114,968	---
Nov '43	79,587	16,994	39,701	14,482	150,764	143,593
Dec '43	---	---	---	---	119,079	109,992
Jan '44	---	---	---	---	122,977	111,113
Feb '44	---	---	---	---	---	---
Mar '44	79,267	15,720	29,317	10,942	135,246	127,473
Apr '44	77,968	16,293	28,384	10,944	133,589	167,940
May '44	84,900	21,530	40,235	14,259	160,924	194,972
Jun '44	---	---	---	---	---	---
Jul '44	---	---	---	---	---	---
Aug '44	78,137	26,191	43,048	16,407	163,783	168,249
Sep '44	67,705	24,612	40,172	16,678	149,167	172,940
Oct '44	75,321	25,255	42,525	15,336	158,437	154,111
Nov '44	72,240	19,438	34,197	12,464	138,339	162,633
Dec '44	64,073	17,266	27,232	13,574	122,145	123,558
Jan '45	74,912	24,377	35,523	19,665	154,477	123,224
Feb '45	66,391	18,772	28,602	12,614	126,379	122,262
Mar '45	88,824	20,499	28,285	12,361	149,969	134,208
Apr '45	96,718	31,212	38,052	16,938	182,920	156,847
May '45	64,947	21,111	32,830	10,823	129,711	147,910
Jun '45	66,892	24,379	35,162	11,622	138,055	131,910
Jul '45	---	---	---	---	---	---
Aug '45	89,570	28,632	38,146	14,557	170,905	129,835
Sep '45	90,585	36,513	37,443	19,949	184,490	---

flurry of attempts to deal with the high turnover rate, NSS leaders ultimately proved unable to enforce the employment freeze that had been imposed by Order-in-Council.

By the beginning of 1944, therefore, the limited effectiveness of NSS operations had been clearly demonstrated. First, the outcome of the curtailment debate of late 1942 had guaranteed that no significant release of manpower from non-essential industries would take place. Second, limited and non-compulsive legislative measures had targeted only a small section of the workforce for mandatory employment in essential industry. Third, the failure to check the transiency of significant portions of the workforce, in concert with acute labour shortages across the nation, hampered efforts to supply industry with the replacements needed to meet wartime production goals. And, finally, an already de-centralized NSS structure in Ottawa was weakened further by Order-in-Council PC 6387 of 19 August 1943. Under PC 6387, nine NSS divisions were established, each of which was placed under the control of an Associate Director. Provision was also made for the appointment of Regional Advisory Boards for the Pacific, Prairie, Ontario, Quebec, and Maritime regions, an arrangement that took effect in January 1944. As a result of these developments, the only consistent NSS operation for the remainder of the war was the labour priority system. In effect, the massive Selective Service bureaucracy, with

local offices in almost every town and city across Canada, was reduced to acting as little more than a giant clearinghouse for labour.

One final attempt to institute a comprehensive management program for the Canadian workforce was launched in May and June of 1944. The initiative for this came from Sheldon Ross, the ILPC Chairman and the most consistent advocate of a re-orientation of NSS policy in the direction favoured by Elliot Little. Ross made the case that WPTB and DMS officials were failing to coordinate their activities in order to conserve precious labour resources. But Arthur MacNamara sided with WPTB and DMS administrators; the Department of Labour, he noted, "did not wish to hold down industry in Canada if it can be prevented."⁵⁵ In June 1944 Ross returned to the attack. Noting that the labour priority scheme was the "key to the whole system" of human resource control, he lamented the fact that "no-one seems to be concerned with production of less essential goods in plentiful supply." Only a vigorous curtailment policy, he concluded, could alleviate pressing shortages:

I realize that plans for curtailment were discarded at the end of 1942 but general conditions have changed considerably since that time. Priorities and the associated compulsory transfers are practically the only methods that have ever been adopted which curtail less essential activities for the direct purpose of improving available labour supply for more essential activities. Priorities can only go so far as a curtailment tool. Actually, thousands of potential workers for war production are engaged in relatively non-essential activities. A great

number of these who have never been continuously employed for the last two years have never been directed by Selective Service. These are not touched by priorities, and a very great percentage have not been moved by compulsory transfers. Compulsory transfers must be recognized as not satisfactorily effective in withdrawing men in sufficient numbers from less-essential activities.⁵⁶

No answer to Ross was forthcoming. NSS had come to the brink of national curtailment in late 1942, but had opted instead for a flexible, and in most cases ineffective, system of priorities and a limited compulsory transfer scheme that allowed only limited numbers of workers to be directed or transferred to essential industries.

Ross's observations concerning the limited scope of the mobilization effort were highlighted by a Canadian Institute for Public Opinion (CIPO) poll taken in November 1944.⁵⁷ CIPO officials asked a sample group of Canadians if they had had any contact with an NSS office and, if the answer was yes, how they felt about the service provided. Remarkably, 67 percent of respondents nationwide reported that they had never dealt with a Selective Service office. On a regional basis, the high in this regard was 73% in the Maritimes and the low 59% in British Columbia. In terms of gender, 60% of men and 74% of women reported no contact. Not surprisingly, younger respondents reported a high use of NSS offices. This was because many men in callable age categories were liable to be interviewed by NSS officers when they were rejected for military service. On a national basis, more

than 39 percent of those reporting contact with an NSS office were dissatisfied with the service they had received. Although public opinion surveys must be viewed with a certain degree of caution, this CIPO poll reveals just how much of the Canadian workforce was going about its business unaffected by the operations of NSS.

In the final months of 1944 and the first months of 1945, civilian labour controls were relaxed. Order-in-Council PC 8726, issued on 24 November 1944, allowed war workers to be released from employment in designated establishments without NSS permission and also waived the seven day waiting period before an employee could enter new employment.⁵⁸ Although the employment mobility of women had theoretically been controlled since 1942 through permit requirements, female workers had been separating from employment and entering new jobs with virtual impunity. In 1945 the government acknowledged this reality. Thus, beginning 15 May, women could seek and enter employment without having a permit; employers could interview and hire women who did not have permits; a permit could be obtained after a woman was hired; permits "would be issued automatically without regard to the labour priority rating of the work"; open permits "would be issued freely...on request"; and female job applicants and employers seeking women workers could advertise without NSS permission.⁵⁹

After the end of the war in the Pacific all NSS

controls were dismantled in several stages. On 17 August 1945 Humphrey Mitchell announced that the majority of the regulations adopted under PC 246 and succeeding Orders would be rescinded.⁶⁰ On 17 September 1945 the freezing order for men employed in essential A and B industries was lifted. Effective 3 September 1945 all men directed to essential employment were free to return to their old jobs or seek other employment. Advertising restrictions were modified the same day. Again, local NSS offices were given permission to issue permits to workers to seek out or enter into employment in the United States (such permits had been withheld since the summer of 1942). Finally, a new priority category was developed to ease the passage back to a free labour market. All establishments in the new A(E) priority were given emergency priority by local NSS offices in the assignment of workers.

NSS regulations were loosened still further towards the end of 1945. A proposal by Arthur MacNamara in March and April of 1945 to continue NSS employment controls into 1946 was poorly received within government circles⁶¹ and was rejected outright by many business groups across the country.⁶² Accordingly, on 21 December 1945, the bulk of the NSS regulations enacted between 1942 and 1945 were rescinded. At the same time a peacetime National Employment Service was established. The system of labour priorities was abandoned in February 1946,⁶³ with all remaining NSS

civilian mobilization regulations annulled by PC 1166 on 31 March 1947.

* * * *

During the Second World War government officials in Canada experienced a remarkable degree of difficulty in administering the policies designed to mobilize the human resources of the country in an efficient manner. NWS and NSS administrators allowed regional Registrars and Mobilization Boards to determine local mobilization priorities within a broad national legislative framework. Civilian mobilization policies inaugurated in 1942 under NSS jurisdiction were likewise deliberately crafted to be loose and de-centralized. In the event, these were characteristics that hindered the attempt to mobilize workers in an effective manner. The eight case studies that follow will demonstrate the halting and ineffectual nature of human resource mobilization policy between 1940 and 1945.

NOTES

1. McLaren to MacNamara, 14 September 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 3003: file A. MacNamara, Deputy Minister of Labour, 1943-1945.
2. Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada pp. 142-143.
3. 'Report on the Operations of National Registration and Military Mobilization in Canada During World War II,' pp. 9-23. NAC, RG 35(7), Volume 19: file Report on Operations of National Registration and Military Mobilization During World War II.
4. Ibid., p. 51. Men aged 38 years and over, in fact, were never called.
5. National War Service Regulations, 1940 (Recruits). NAC, RG 27, Volume 3018: file Orders-in-Council.
6. 'Report on the Operations of National Registration and Military Mobilization in Canada During World War II,' pp. 33-37.
7. Stacey, Arms, Men, and Governments p. 406.
8. 'Report on the Operation of National Registration and Military Mobilization in Canada During World War II,' pp. 101-109.
9. Circular Memorandum 897, 11 August 1943; Circular Memorandum 901, 20 August 1943; Circular Memorandum 907, 3 September 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1493: file 2-270-3 pt. 1; file 2-270 pt. 2.
10. W.R. Feasby, The Official History of the Canadian Medical Services, 1939-1945, Volume I: Organization and Campaigns (Ottawa, 1956) pp. 498-507.
11. Circular Memorandum 986, 23 February 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 2350: file 94.
12. 'Report on the Operations of National Registration and Military Mobilization in Canada During World War II,' pp. 111-119.
13. Ibid., pp. 84-85, 90.
14. The Hooper Holmes Bureau was authorized through PC 2238 of 22 March 1943 to attempt to find and report on draft evaders. Of 92,774 cases referred to all civilian reporting agencies

between 13 September 1943 and 3 June 1944, information was received on 46,022 individuals. The total number of cases reported on by police during this period was 52,066. See 'Tracing.' NAC, RG 27, Volume 1479: file 2-117-10 pt. 3--Hooper Holmes Bureau.

15. Montreal Gazette, 21 April 1941.

16. Montreal Star, 6 May 1943.

17. LaFlèche to Thorson, 25 June 1941. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1497: file 2-E-50-D-1 pt. 3.

18. Montreal Journal, 12 June 1941.

19. Montreal Star, 12 June 1941.

20. Montreal Star, 13 June 1941.

21. Montreal Gazette, 14 June 1941.

22. Montreal Gazette, 14 June 1941.

23. Montreal Star, 9 June 1941.

24. Montreal Gazette, 10 December 1941.

25. Halifax Chronicle 9 February 1943.

26. Riley to MacNamara, 5 July 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1493: file 2-270-1.

27. Unsigned, undated memo--'National Registration Activities in Relation to Mobilization.' NAC, RG 27, Volume 3003: file unlabelled.

28. Ballantyne to McLaren, 31 March 1945; MacNamara to Ranger, 23 June 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1485: file 2-146-10--NSS Examination of Mobilization Records.

29. Halifax Chronicle, 30 December 1942.

30. An excellent, brief account of Embury and his actions can be found in Stan Hanson and Don Kerr, "Pacifism, Dissent, and the University of Saskatchewan, 1938-1944," Saskatchewan History 45:2 (Fall, 1993) pp. 3-14.

31. Regina Leader-Post, 26 November 1943.

32. Regina Leader-Post, 2 December 1943.

33. Regina Leader-Post, 4 December 1943.

34. Ottawa Journal, 14 December 1943.
35. 'The Canadian Manpower Situation.' NAC, RG 27, Volume 3003: file Statistics and Reports on National Registration.
36. 'History of the National Employment Service, 1939 to December 1945.' NAC, RG 35(7), Volume 19: file National Employment Service pp. 2-3.
37. 'The Development of the National Selective Service (Civilian Organization in World War II to December 31, 1945.' NAC, RG 35(7), Volume 19: file Development of NSS During World War II pp. 3-4.
38. Circular Memorandum 826, 28 March 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1484: file 2-141 pt. 3--NWS National Labour Supply Council.
39. 'The Development of the National Selective Service (Civilian Organization in World War II to December 31, 1945.' NAC, RG 35(7), Volume 19: file Development of NSS During World War II p. 6.
40. A copy of this massive report and correspondence relating to it can be found in NAC, RG 27, Volume 897: files 8-9-74 pt. 1, 8-9-74 pt. 2, and 8-9-74 pt. 3.
41. Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada p. 188.
42. A good summary of the legislation before August, 1942, can be found in "Historical Summary of the NSS Civilian Regulations," Wartime Information Board Pamphlet, 21 March 1945. Copy located at the National Library of Canada.
43. 'Field Organization--Employment Service.' NAC, RG 27, Volume 968: file 4--NSS Field Organization and Activities of Employment Service Division.
44. An excellent and detailed analysis of the labour priority system can be found in 'Labour Priorities.' NAC, RG 35(7), Volume 19: file Labour Priority System.
45. Ross to Phelan, 16 March 1946. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1514: file 0-11--NSS Inter-Departmental Priority Committee.
46. The nine major divisions were: Division A--Agriculture; Division B-- Fishing, Forestry, and Trapping; Division C-- Mining; Division D--Manufacturing; Division E--Construction; Division F--Public Utilities Operation; Division G--Retail and Wholesale Trade; Division H--Finance, Industry, and Real Estate; and Division I--Service.

47. Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises p. 202.
48. Correspondence concerning the administration of the seven Compulsory Transfer Orders can be found in NAC, RG 27, Volume 988: files 1-11-12-1, 1-11-12-2, 1-11-12-3, 1-11-12-4, 1-11-12-5, 1-11-12-6, and 1-11-12-7.
49. 'Report on Transfer of Labour Under Compulsory Employment Orders 1-7 Inclusive to February 15, 1945.' NAC, RG 27, Volume 3003: file Statistics and Reports on National Registration.
50. Ross to Hereford, 12 September 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 988: file 1-11-12-8--NSS Compulsory Employment Order No. 8.
51. 'Statistics.' NAC, RG 27, Volume 968: file 2--NSS Statistics.
52. NSS Circular 282, 16 September 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 988: file 1-11-8.
53. While NSS officials acknowledged the severity of labour turnover, they refused to commission comprehensive studies to examine the causes of separations. See 'Labour Turnover.' NAC, RG 27, Volume 982: File 13--NSS Labour Turnover; 'The Problem of Labour Turnover from the Point of View of the War Effort.' NAC, RG 27, Volume 1514: file 0-8--NSS Labour Turnover in Canada.
54. This table has been compiled from the monthly NSS statistical reports in the following RG 27 files: Volume 984 files 12-15; Volume 985 files 1-4; Volume 1987 files 7-10; and Volume 1988 files 1-11. The labour demand figures should be viewed with caution. Women were not included in the August and September 1943 figures. Moreover, the totals for the period November 1944 to the end of the war include skilled and semi-skilled loggers, a category separated from the male labour demand totals. It is unclear if the demand statistics before this date include loggers in the male totals. Finally, and most importantly, the labour demand totals do not include those men and women referred to employment who had not secured employment. A rough calculation shows that approximately 20 percent of the labour vacancies had had potential employees referred to them. Despite these statistical issues, the number of vacancies in Canadian establishments was remarkable.
55. Minutes of the NSS Administration Board, 16 May 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 971: file 4--NSS Administration Board.
56. Ross to Hereford, 9 June 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 974: file 2--NSS Curtailment of Industry.

57. Saunders to MacNamara, 24 November 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 3005: file Miscellaneous.

58. 'History of the National Employment Service to December, 1945.' NAC, RG 35(7), Volume 19: file History of the National Employment Service to December, 1950 pp.26-27.

59. NSS Circular 379, 11 May 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 605: file 6-24-1 pt. 3--Employment of Women.

60. Department of Labour News Release, 17 August 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 988: file 1-11-12.

61. Undated, undirected memo of Arthur MacNamara. NAC, RG 27, Volume 984: file 2--NSS Manpower, General.

62. Vancouver Province, 20 March 1945. The War Industries Coordination Committee in British Columbia, a coalition of personnel directors and business executives, insisted that "the natural laws of supply and demand" would govern the labour force in the postwar era. Business groups in Montreal and Toronto also rejected any comprehensive federal control of the labour market once the war ended.

63. 'Labour Priorities.' NAC, RG 35(7), Volume 19: file Labour Priority System p. 39.

Chapter 3 Native Canadian Mobilization

The procurement of men for NRMA duty did not proceed without several glaring instances of inefficiency and failure. The recruitment of Native Canadians is a case in point. The failed attempt to adopt comprehensive measures to conscript Natives also provides the best example of the remarkably de-centralized nature of the DNWS and NSS mobilization structure. The experiences of individual Canadian Indians in the armed forces between 1939 and 1945 have been documented by Fred Gaffen, Janet Frances Davison, and Janice Summerby.¹ These accounts, however, are remarkably limited in scope and documentation and focus on the heroism and bravery of a small number of overseas volunteers among the more than 3,000 Natives, including NRMA conscripts, who served in the Canadian armed forces during the Second World War.² When a more extensive selection of documents from the files of the DNWS, NSS, and the Indian Affairs Branch of the Department of Mines and Resources (DMR) is examined, a more negative picture of the government's handling of Native mobilization emerges.

The experience of Native Canadians is also a decided contrast to the treatment of racial and ethnic minorities generally in Canada during World War II. While a consensus exists among historians of the period that Canadian minority groups were singled out for harsh, arbitrary, and vindictive

treatment,³ the basic approach of DNWS and NSS officials towards Natives was one of inconsistency, indifference and neglect compounded by prejudice, geography, and profound cultural differences. When government officials did attempt to act, they encountered stiff resistance from Native communities to compulsory mobilization. Later accounts of the swelling of patriotism among Indian communities, the flood of Native volunteers for overseas service, and the enthusiastic support for Indian recruitment from virtually all sectors of both the Native community and the Canadian government belie a harsh historical reality.

* * * *

When the war started, the Indian Affairs Branch had 98 Indian Agencies in the nine provinces and two territories. Each of these was managed by an Indian Agent who worked with local tribal groups. Under Section 3 of the 1940 National War Services regulations, compulsory registration leading potentially to military training and service was mandatory for all British subjects except for a small number of specified groups. Indians were not included among those who were given exemption. Nonetheless, their status under the NRMA remained unclear.⁴ In September 1940, Lorne McDonell, Divisional Registrar in Kingston, sought direction from Major-General L.R. LaFlèche, the DNWS Associate Deputy

Minister, as to "the liability of an Indian residing on a reserve being compelled to undergo military training."⁵

LaFlèche replied that the policy concerning Natives would be forthcoming after consultation with the Department of Justice and the Indian Affairs Branch.⁶

The government also heard from various Indian bands protesting any compulsory military service for their members. The most interesting and vitriolic material came from the Lorette Indian reserve near Quebec City, which thereafter became the centre of Native resistance to mobilization regulations for the duration of the war. On 14 October 1940, Alphonse T. Picard and Maurice Vincent of the Comité de Protection at Lorette informed DNWS Minister Jimmy Gardiner that all Natives were exempt from military service under the Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763.⁷ In response to this claim, the Indian Agent of Lorette, M.E. Bastien, was notified forthwith from Ottawa that Indians were subject to military service "in the same manner as all other subjects."⁸ The Comité de Protection, however, was undeterred, though its subsequent protests were given only routine bureaucratic replies.⁹

But this changed dramatically when the dispute came to centre on a particular individual, Jean Paul Gros-Louis. Gros-Louis was issued his military training order on 4 November 1940, whereupon his parents protested in a scathing letter to the Department of National Defence. Claiming that

their son was already assisting both his family and the country's war effort by working as a labourer at an airfield in Lorette, the parents claimed that there would be no advantage for anyone in compelling him to undergo military training.¹⁰ Picard and Vincent of the Comité de Protection also protested, arguing again that it was illegal to call up a man who was not a British subject under the 1763 proclamation. Jean Paul Gros-Louis, they wrote, "was free of [the] obligation" of military service.¹¹ DNWS officials, however, refused to budge. Henri-Paul Drouin, Divisional Registrar in Quebec City, advised LaFlèche that Gros-Louis would be ordered to report on 10 January 1941.¹² At this stage, the most colourful and flamboyant of all Native protesters during the war entered the fray. Jules Sioui, Chief Executive of the Comité de Protection, wrote a belligerent note to Drouin on 30 December 1940, announcing that his "compatriot," Gros-Louis, would not submit to the demands of the Registrar. Sioui promised to lead the defence "of my country, my race, my nation, and my people."¹³ He lived up to his word and was an irritant to mobilization officials for the duration of the war.

Another hotspot with respect to Native mobilization in late 1940 was Northwestern Ontario. In October 1940 W.A Elliot, Divisional Registrar in Port Arthur, Ontario, asked Laflèche to clarify the status of Indians who were isolated geographically.¹⁴ Resolutions had been passed by tribal

councils denouncing compulsory mobilization and demanding that Indian agents "stretch out a long arm and halt all the functions of government."¹⁵ This and other developments in Ontario and Quebec finally pushed DNWS officials to issue a definitive statement on the issue of Indian mobilization. On 17 January 1941, five treaty Indians from the Brantford, Ontario, Six Nations Reserve were arraigned before Judge John B. Hopkins charged with non-compliance of registration requirements under the NRMA. Hopkins postponed the cases against the accused pending clarification of the situation by the proper authorities in Ottawa.¹⁶ Earlier in January, a similar situation had arisen in Quebec when Superior Court Judge Alfred Savard had postponed to February 1941 all cases involving the prosecution of Native delinquents.¹⁷

On 30 January 1941, the government's policy on Natives was explained in DNWS Circular Memorandum No. 141, which was addressed to all Divisional Registrars and Chairs of National War Services Boards responsible for enforcing mobilization regulations. Before drafting the statement, DNWS officials had solicited the legal opinion of the Department of Justice. What it heard back from W. Stuart Edwards, Deputy Minister of Justice, was that "Indians, being British subjects, are subject to Section 3 of the National War Regulations, 1940 (Recruits)."¹⁸ This terse one sentence ruling was conveyed in the Circular Memorandum and remained the official position of the government for the

duration of the war. In the months immediately following this development, Ottawa held firm in the view that no Indian had any exemption privileges under existing regulations. Thus, when R.A. Irwin, Divisional Registrar in Toronto informed LaFlèche that he was "anxious to avoid entering into any controversy" with Indians residing on the Brantford Six Nations Reserve, he received an uncompromising reply.¹⁹ This was written by Captain G.R. Benoit, NWS Supervisor of Recruiting for Military Training, and forecast the cooperation of Indians in the mobilization effort:

I appreciate that you wish to avoid any friction with this group. No one has ever questioned the loyalty of Indians who served bravely in the last war and who are again represented in the fighting overseas. National Registration was a measure enacted by the Government to facilitate the prosecution of our fight for liberty and freedom. In this respect, Indians who have always enjoyed the greatest measure of liberty under Canadian institutions will undoubtedly recognize the importance of giving their whole hearted support to the war measures made necessary by the war.²⁰

But the protests would not go away. In April 1941, Manley J. Edwards, M.P. for Calgary West, wrote to Prime Minister King, Ernest Lapointe, and J.L. Ralston about a meeting he had had with representatives of the Stoney Indian Reserve.²¹ According to Edwards, Indian leaders in the area believed that Treaty Number Seven, dated 4 December 1877, relegated them to the status of government wards and that as such they were not subject to compulsory military service. LaFlèche curtly informed Edwards that Circular Memorandum No. 141 containing the Department of Justice

ruling had closed the matter.²² In a document prepared for Cabinet, W. Stuart Edwards likewise reiterated that there was "no provision in these regulations which excepts the Indians from this duty which is imposed on every male British subject ordinarily resident in Canada."²³ At a meeting of the Cabinet War Committee of 20 May, it was decided that no action would be taken to alter the ruling making Indian registration and training mandatory.²⁴

Another confirmation of government policy followed in response to continued protest from Indian groups. In July 1941, Robert George of Ravenswood, Ontario, claimed that the compulsory callup of Natives violated the Robinson Treaties of 9 June 1764. Indians, he wrote, had "been classed as the lowest of all classes of human beings in this country" as wards of the government, and they should never be forced to submit to compulsory military training.²⁵ The reply sent to George simply repeated what was in the Circular Memorandum of 30 January 1941,²⁶ but the government also heard from the Plaxton & Company law firm of Toronto that the leaders of the Shawanaga Reserve insisted that the Supreme Court rule on the legal position of Natives under the NRMA.²⁷ This demand, however, was refused by the Department of Justice on the grounds that there was "no reason for adopting the suggestion that a test case be arranged for the purpose of settling some pre-supposed doubt."²⁸ On 6 August 1941, this decision was communicated

to all Chairs of Mobilization Boards and Divisional Registrars in Circular Memorandum No. 289.²⁹

With this, the first stage in the history of Native mobilization in the Second War came to a close. DNWS officials had made their position clear in Circular Memorandum No. 141 of 30 January 1941; this position had been affirmed by Cabinet in May 1941; and the legal challenge from the Shawanaga Reserve had been dismissed. The government had built a strong case, but over the next two years it would become abundantly clear that linguistic, cultural, and geographic complications took precedence over legal nicety.

One of the most serious problems confronting Divisional Registrars in their attempt to mobilize Natives was the daunting problem of geographic isolation. Prior to the Summer of 1941, many Registrars had adopted a wait-and-see attitude regarding Indians, and several had indicated that they were not anxious to pursue the issue of Indian military training. The case of Edward Cardinal of Whitecourt, Alberta, typified the many problems Registrars faced. When a notice ordering Cardinal's medical examination prior to military training was returned by the post office, J.P. McIsaac, the Edmonton Registrar, asked the Whitecourt postmaster why the notice had not been picked up.³⁰ The postmaster replied that Cardinal frequented an area 12 miles north of Whitecourt around McLeod Lake and that he only

stopped by to pick up his mail twice during the year.³¹ McIsaac subsequently reported to LaFlèche that it was "practically impossible" to locate many Natives, and that their poor medical condition and low level of literacy would make them poor recruits.³² According to McIsaac, "the larger majority of these Indians and Halfbreeds" were "quite irresponsible," and--this approach was condemned in Ottawa--were not worth pursuing.³³

A similar situation existed in British Columbia. Thus, it was acknowledged in Ottawa that the Bella Coola Indians did not have the financial means to travel to medical examination sites which were located at considerable distances from their reserves.³⁴ By the same token, Charles Pennock, the Vancouver Divisional Registrar, wrote that the Natives of British Columbia had "a habit of treating our notices and letters with apparent indifference" on the few occasions when they could be tracked down while fishing in the summer or trapping in the fall and winter.³⁵ Both in British Columbia and elsewhere, moreover, the geographic problem was compounded by a poor knowledge of mobilization regulations among the Indians themselves, despite the best efforts of various Indian Agents to make them known. As late as December 1941, Dr. J.R. Hurtubise, the M.P. from Nippissing, informed LaFlèche that several individuals from the Nippissing reservation had contacted his office concerning their liability for military

service.³⁶

The combination of geographic isolation and varying approaches on the part of Registrars eventually created a patchwork in the military districts across the country. By February 1942, the Mobilization Board in Edmonton had stopped pursuing Native delinquents, a decision which Ottawa ultimately had no choice but to accept.³⁷ In British Columbia, a circular letter from D.M. MacKay, the provincial Indian Commissioner, allowed Indian Agents in remote areas to act in lieu of the Mobilization Board. With the consent of the Vancouver Registrar, an Agent could decide if a Native was fit for active duty before directing him to submit to a formal medical examination elsewhere. Requests for deferment would likewise be handled through the Indian Agent to avoid appearances before the distant Administrative Board.³⁸ In Winnipeg military authorities refused to enrol or enlist any Indians due to language and medical difficulties. On the other hand, they refused to issue the rejection certificates the Indians needed to be hired by local employers.³⁹ For his part, Major E.E. Crandall, District Recruiting Officer in Kenora, pointed out that Natives should be barred from the armed services because experience had shown that Indians could not "stand confinement or training."⁴⁰ In the end, Indian Affairs Branch officials finally agreed that there were "practical considerations"⁴¹ which could no longer be ignored. This

in turn led to correspondence between representatives of the DNWS and the DND and a change of direction in relation to the compulsory mobilization of Natives. The new policy was explained in Circular Memorandum No. 490 of 31 March 1942 as follows:

In future, before calling out Indians, Divisional Registrars will ascertain in advance from the Indian Agent of the Department of Mines and Resources whether or not the men subject to call speak English or French. Divisional Registrars will give advance information to Officer Commanding training centres concerned as requested by the other Department. Men who speak neither English nor French will not be called out until further instructions.⁴²

The issue of Indian mobilization continued to concern Indian Affairs Branch officials. In June, T.R.L. MacInness, Secretary of the Indian Affairs Branch, conducted an opinion survey of four key officials. They were: W.S. Arneil, Ontario Inspector of Indian Agencies; J. Thibault, Quebec Inspector of Indian Agencies; A.G. Hamilton, Manitoba, Kenora, and Fort Frances Inspector of Indian Agencies; and C.P. Schmidt, Alberta Inspector of Indian Agencies.⁴³ All four recommended that outlying districts be relieved of burdensome mobilization restrictions and that a modified policy be adopted in relation to geographically isolated cases. While Thibault wrote that military training was the best thing that could ever happen "to give the young Indians some knowledge of discipline," Schmidt offered this analysis of the Native situation:

There are a number of Northern reserves, located

at such distances from any business centre, that it will be very costly and will create a hardship for the Indians there to respond to their call. If they do respond and are found to be physically unfit for service--as will, I expect, happen in many cases--they will be stranded at the examining centre without funds to return home. Also, if called up during the Spring muskrat and beaver trapping season, or during the Winter open season for trapping fine furs, they will lose part, if not all, their season's earnings....I think it would be well to pay no attention to these if they fail to respond. If and when it becomes necessary to call up this class of Indian men for service, they could be located at time of Annuity (Treaty) Payment and given medical examinations there and then.⁴⁴

In keeping with this advice, G.R. Benoit subsequently urged Edmonton mobilization officials to use the "widest measure of discretion" when calling Indians. He also requested that, in the reporting of delinquents, Indians appear on a separate list.⁴⁵

Despite these changes, Indian protests continued to be heard during the summer of 1942. In August, Micmac leaders in Nova Scotia passed a resolution demanding exemption from compulsory military service because of the number of voluntary enlistments in both World Wars, the ambiguous status of Indians as government wards, and the exemption granted to Natives during World War I.⁴⁶ This resolution was forwarded to Minister of National Defence J.L. Ralston by Matthew MacLean, Member of Parliament for Cape Breton North-Victoria. MacLean's own understanding was that Indians were "not liable to serve unless they volunteered." This exemplified the confusion that existed on the issue

even among Members of Parliament.⁴⁷ MacLean was immediately corrected by J.T. Thorson, the Minister of National War Services, but the general difficulty remained. On 15 September Colonel Edward Mingo, the Divisional Registrar in Halifax, told G.R. Benoit that the Micmacs needed to be informed of the mandatory nature of mobilization through the proper Indian agent.⁴⁸ Two weeks later, Mingo demanded that the situation regarding Micmac mobilization be clarified in the light of a declaration by the Grand Chief, Gabriel Sylliboy, that Indians had no responsibility to follow mobilization orders.⁴⁹ Through the offices of Matthew MacLean, Sylliboy next forwarded a "direct personal appeal" to Prime Minister King:

In my humble opinion I do not believe that the existing NWS Regulations were ever intended to include Indians. I am proud and always endeavoured to be a loyal Canadian Indian under the British flag, but I am certainly not recognized as a Canadian citizen, or 'Ordinarily Resident' in Canada. I am not an immigrant, and according to the Indian Act, I am not even recognized as a 'person.' Consequently, in my humble judgment the words 'Ordinarily Resident' are not applicable to an Indian.⁵⁰

In response, LaFlèche gave Sylliboy the by now standard reply on the subject, but the situation on the Micmac reserves continued to deteriorate as Indians refused to comply in increasing numbers with mobilization orders, despite the appeals of various Indian agents.⁵¹

Other correspondence from the same period is indicative of widespread discontent among Native populations across

Canada. The case of Jules Sioui of the Lorette reserve dominated the attention of NSS officials early in 1943. On 28 January 1943, Sioui informed A. de Gaspé Taché, the NSS Mobilization Director, that it gave him great satisfaction to counsel Natives to return all military orders unopened. He was proud, he wrote, to defend "the interests, the rights, and the privileges of my nation."⁵² Taché, exhibiting none of the patience that his predecessors at the DNWS had shown toward the actions of Sioui, immediately contacted the RCMP to begin an investigation of the matter.⁵³ The result was a report which cast doubt on Sioui's credibility and influence. While it was true that Sioui counselled men to ignore their draft notices, he was "a known troublemaker" and had a reputation of being "an undesirable person." He had, in fact, served three months in jail for committing indecent acts with young boys and defaming the character of the Indian Agent in Lorette.⁵⁴ Taché's response to this report was to instruct the Quebec Registrar to order Sioui to report for registration by 30 April 1943 and to prosecute him immediately if he failed to comply: Legal endorsement of the government's position on Indian mobilization followed in the summer of 1943. Harry Smallfence of the Caughnawaga reserve in Quebec had been convicted in late 1942 for failing to appear for a compulsory medical examination. When his case reached the Court of King's Bench on 21 June 1943, Justice Wilfrid

Lazure dismissed his appeal. Noting that there were "not two or several kinds of British subjects," Lazure ruled that Indians were covered by all mobilization rules unless specifically exempted from them. This judgment, of course, validated the stand taken by the Department of Justice in early 1941.⁵⁵

Yet there was no denying that the edifice of government policy towards Native mobilization was crumbling. In a February 1943 report which typified the outlook of many military officers, Major Maris Garton, District Recruiting Officer in the Winnipeg Military District, advanced this sweeping, blunt, and racist advice:

The attitude of this office has been that while Indians are entitled to offer their services voluntarily for Active Service, extreme care should be exercised as to their acceptance. Experience has shown that very few Indians can stand confinement to camp or barracks for long periods of time and nervous demands incidental to modern warfare. Many Indians who have enlisted have had to ultimately be discharged, very frequently before their training had been completed...From our experience I would submit that it would not be sound policy to call up treaty Indians for compulsory military training.⁵⁶

Justice J.E. Adamson, Chairman of the Winnipeg Mobilization Board, protested the actions of military officials in Winnipeg to Arthur MacNamara. It would not be possible, Adamson wrote, "for this Board or Divisional Registrars to disregard a certain class without changing the regulations."⁵⁷ Acting on the advice of NSS Assistant Director of Mobilization Charles Henry, MacNamara replied

that while the idea of changing regulations did not appeal to him, he did support the idea that the Board should grant blanket agricultural postponements for Natives.⁵⁸ Adamson welcomed this suggestion but recommended that it be taken one step further: "...the best practice would be to simply assume that all these men are engaged in agriculture and should stand postponement until we get around to establishing that they are not essential in agriculture."⁵⁹ This declaration turned the usual postponement procedure on its head, and Adamson admitted that the plan would produce indefinite postponements for Natives in his district. Nonetheless, this was the "practical thing to do." The same attitude was now also taken in the Port Arthur District. As Divisional Registrar E.W. Edwards wrote, "the number of recruits obtained from the type of Indian in this area is not worth the trouble and expense to us."⁶⁰

At the same time, Indian groups were continuing their own campaign against compulsory mobilization. A reserve that showed a consistent pattern of resistance was the Walpole Island Indian Reserve near Wallaceburg, Ontario. But when A.B. Harris, Divisional Registrar in Toronto, pressed Taché as to whether the RCMP should "adopt the same policy of rigid enforcement of the regulations with respect to these people as we do in regard to others," he did not get very far.⁶¹ Thus, instead of ordering the prosecution of Native delinquents at Walpole Island, Taché asked only

that their names be forwarded to NSS officials in Ottawa for further consideration.⁶² The problems at Walpole Island, however, did inspire another NSS review of Native mobilization. In connection with this, S.H. McLaren, Assistant Director of the NSS Mobilization Section, wrote to C.W. Jackson, Secretary and Chief Executive Assistant of the DMR, pointing out that the majority of Indians failed to meet Army physical requirements and should somehow be postponed due to their perceived essentiality in agriculture.⁶³ Jackson, noting that the question of Indian mobilization had been "a vexing one for a long time," agreed with McLaren and issued a circular memorandum that called on all Indian agents to redouble their efforts to inform Indians of the possibility of applying for postponement through proper channels.⁶⁴

In August 1943, A.B. Harris repeated his demand for guidance from Ottawa concerning the problems at Walpole Island and NSS officials gave formal approval to begin the prosecution of Jules Sioui in Quebec. But there was no longer any consistency in Ottawa's application of the mobilization rules to Native Canadians. Across the country, a patchwork of policies existed. In areas of British Columbia and Alberta, Indians living in remote areas were effectively insulated from the reach of compulsory registration, medical examination, and military training provisions. In Winnipeg, Regina, and Port Arthur, a policy

of conscious neglect by Mobilization Boards and Divisional Registrars and the refusal of military authorities to enlist Indians had led to the decision to postpone Natives in the vague hope that they would be steered to essential industry and agriculture.⁶⁵ In Ontario, pleas for some direction from Ottawa had gone unanswered, while in Quebec active prosecution of Native delinquents had been common since the beginning of the war. In the Maritimes, continued Native opposition had not been countered with any effective response by the authorities. In sum, Ottawa's original policy had manifestly failed and the time was ripe for some new initiative.

This came in the form of Circular Memorandum No. 905, addressed to all Chairs of Mobilization Boards and Divisional Registrars on 31 August 1943. This Circular called for a two pronged approach: vigorous prosecution of Native delinquents; and a renewed effort to inform all Natives of their right to appeal for postponement of military service:

...It has been held by the Courts and the law officers of the Crown that Indians are liable to service under the mobilization regulations in the same manner as other people and consequently, if they fail to respond to the call-up, they render themselves liable to prosecutions and punishments. Postponements may be granted to individual Indians in the same manner as to other people. It should be borne in mind that many of these Indians...would be able to secure postponement on the grounds of essentiality in agriculture. In such cases you should advise the Indians and consult with the NSS authorities where you consider it necessary to do so....The subject is

one which should be approached with tact, discretion, and patience. It is felt that in many cases better results might be obtained by careful explanation to them of their duties and appeal to their pride, self-respect, and loyalty. If reasonable persuasion fails, however, then of course the law must take its course, and this fact should be clearly explained to the Indians where necessary.⁶⁶

The instructions to pursue prosecutions galvanized many Divisional Registrars east of Port Arthur into action for a brief period of time. Acting on the 'definite instructions' appearing in Circular Memorandum No. 905, A.B. Harris immediately issued orders to prosecute delinquency cases on the Walpole Island reserve.⁶⁷ From Halifax, Colonel Mingo reported to Charles Henry, now NSS Supervisor of Mobilization, that he was actively pursuing various delinquent Natives.⁶⁸ In Quebec, the situation was more aggravated, and Montreal lawyer Royal Werry complained to DMR officials about the increased enforcement of mobilization regulations on the Caughnawaga reserve.⁶⁹ In October 1943 there had been a riot on this reserve that "would have made Wild Bill Hickock's trigger finger itch."⁷⁰ In the course of this, eight RCMP officers had scuffled with reserve residents and three reserve Indians had been shot. In the aftermath of this disturbance, Father Brisebois, the Indian Agent in Caughnawaga, had reported that the reserve was a "haven" for more than 200 draft evaders, but band leaders passed a resolution demanding that the RCMP detachment be removed from the reserve.⁷¹ In his

letter, Werry complained that as many as twenty cases would be heard in court beginning 12 January 1944. S.H. McLaren curtly dismissed Werry's complaint and, in the event, all the Indians subject to prosecution were convicted, fined \$25.00 each, and ordered to comply with mobilization procedures.⁷²

Despite all this, the stringent policies outlined in Circular Memorandum No. 905 were quickly subverted by many NSS officials. The fourth and final phase of government activity pertaining to the mobilization of Native Canadians witnessed the dilution of any meaningful mobilization strategy and the eventual abandonment of effective enforcement measures. The first hint that active prosecution would be halted came in February 1944. Port Arthur Registrar E.W. Edwards complained that his experience showed that expending valuable resources locating and prosecuting Native delinquents was futile.⁷³ S.H. McLaren agreed with Edwards' analysis of the situation and suggested that Section 6 of the mobilization regulations, which stated in part that the "Registrar shall select the number of men" required to fill manpower quotas, could be used to filter Indian males from the mobilization procedures.⁷⁴

Meanwhile, events in Winnipeg continued on their previous course. In February 1944 Lieutenant W.J. Cummings, writing on behalf of the District Officer Commanding in Winnipeg, complained that a delinquent from the Port Arthur district

ordered by E.W. Edwards to report in Winnipeg was "a full-blooded Indian and, therefore, cannot be enrolled into the Army under present regulations."⁷⁵ Despite reminders from DND Adjutant-General H.F.G. Letson that no such formal regulation existed,⁷⁶ the Winnipeg military authorities continued to refuse most Indian enlistments for the remainder of the war.⁷⁷

RCMP authorities in the Toronto military district were also instructed to drop prosecution of Indian delinquent cases by late 1943, less than three months after Circular Memorandum No. 905 had been issued. On 18 November 1943, D.W. Morrison of the NSS Investigation Branch in Toronto wrote to the commander of the Toronto RCMP Division that the prosecution of Natives would be delayed for several months.⁷⁸ Accordingly, all RCMP detachments in the Toronto military district were advised on 22 November 1943 to close all Indian files.⁷⁹ Eventually, the issue went all the way to the Commissioner of the RCMP in Ottawa. On 15 February 1944 the Chapleau Indian Agent, F. Matters, wrote to the Indian Affairs Branch expressing his bewilderment about the refusal of the RCMP to prosecute delinquents.⁸⁰ When Matters continued to press the issue⁸¹, the Indian Affairs Branch determined that the Toronto police officials were acting on the directions of the Toronto Divisional Registrar, directions that Ottawa had not authorized.⁸²

This typified the NSS approach, which ignored gross

breaches of the regulations and encouraged Registrars to use their own discretion about calling up Indians. In effect, Registrars across the country had complete freedom to interpret NSS policy concerning Natives as they pleased. On 29 February 1944, Circular Memorandum 989 asked Registrars to exercise "great care" in selecting Natives from remote or isolated areas without saying exactly where these areas were.⁸³ The new Toronto Registrar, N.D. Davidson, made it quite clear that he considered that the discretionary powers granted to Mobilization Boards and Registrars rendered the whole issue of active prosecution on Natives irrelevant:

For the very small percentage of Indians that are acceptable to the DND, it would seem absurd to go to the additional expense of having these men brought down from those far distant places, or even from reserves that might be considered fairly close. From my own personal knowledge these men are not acceptable to the DND for medical reasons when we bring them down here...I might add that I personally know the Indians exceptionally well, and I do not think the attitude taken by this district is in any way contrary to the regulations.⁸⁴

By the summer of 1944, this was the position being taken almost everywhere in the country. NSS officials usually insisted that detailed and proper records be kept concerning the most minute facets of mobilization procedure. The disparity among various divisions with respect to Natives, however, forced the Chief Statistician of the Department of Labour, E. Bjarnason, to seek clarification of figures submitted in various weekly and monthly reports. In June 1944, F.C. Wilson, the Regina Divisional Registrar,

told Bjarnason that "nothing is to be done" regarding Natives and that all Indians would simply be placed in the category 'Not Called,'⁸⁵ a decision supported by S.H. McLaren.⁸⁶ From Winnipeg, NSS Inspector S.J. McRae continued to inform Ottawa that the Army did not desire Native enlistments.⁸⁷ Despite judicial vindication of NSS policy in the case of Jules Sioui, who was fined \$25.00 and ordered to report in September 1944,⁸⁸ a conference of Registrars held the next month favoured the continuation of the existing laxity. Winnipeg Registrar C.D. McPherson informed McLaren that, in conjunction with the Army authorities, the Mobilization Board in his division had simply granted Natives unlimited postponements or else placed them in the 'Not Called' category.⁸⁹ Port Arthur Registrar E.W. Edwards insisted that active prosecution should not be countenanced in order "to eliminate the tremendous cost and routine in which we rarely gain a single recruit."⁹⁰ After Arthur MacNamara toured the West in November 1944, he told McLaren that it did not matter to him how the Mobilization Boards dealt with the Indians as long as they found a way to "grant postponement for them all."⁹¹

The final weeks of 1944 brought new developments arising out of the decision of the King government to send NRMA conscripts overseas. On 22 December 1944, the War Cabinet again considered the issue of native conscription with the following result:

...It was agreed that (a) Indians continue to be called up under the NRMA and regulations in accordance with the decision [of the Justice Department] of 20 January 1941; and (b) that in cases which, in the opinion of the Department of Mines and Resources (Indian Affairs Branch), exemption under treaty could be claimed with justification, Indians not be posted for service overseas.⁹²

In January 1945, the Indians Affairs Branch distributed a circular letter relieving those Natives covered by treaties Three, Six, Eight, and Eleven of any requirement for overseas service.⁹³ On 6 February 1945, by Circular Memorandum 1098, NSS officials in Ottawa attempted to codify mobilization procedures in relation to Natives across the country, but in reality this document simply sanctioned the broad existing patchwork. Circular Memorandum 1098 directed Registrars: (1) not to call Indians who spoke neither English nor French; (2) not to issue orders to any Native living, in the opinion of the Registrar, in distant areas; and (3) to record any Native recruit deemed unacceptable by the Army, regardless of his physical condition, as 'Not Acceptable for Medical Reasons.'⁹⁴ The circle had finally been completed. Almost four years to the day after the Department of Justice had sternly endorsed the necessity and legality of Native mobilization, NSS had rubber-stamped the policies of neglect, indifference, and hostility that had characterized the actions of Registrars and Mobilization Boards for the previous four years.

The remaining months of the war witnessed the complete

halting of any concerted attempt to mobilize the Native population. At the same time Native leaders kept up their resistance campaign. Most dramatically, this took the form of death threats against RCMP constables by the Caughnawaga leaders.⁹⁵ On 12 February 1945, McLaren informed the Toronto Registrar to stay any prosecutions of Indians until further notice. He did so despite another curt reminder from the Justice Department that "the regulations should be enforced in the case of Indians in the same manner as in the case of other persons liable to military training."⁹⁶ Thereafter, Humphrey Mitchell and the Minister of Mines and Resources, T.A. Crerar, worked out a plan that called for the Indian Agent in each locality to work closely with Natives to persuade them to follow mobilization regulations. But this was a hollow gesture since Mobilization Boards and Army officials were refusing actively to recruit Indians for military service. On 2 May 1945, despite the fact that the mobilization regulations remained in force, Arthur MacNamara ordered NSS officials to drop active prosecution of Native delinquents and remove themselves from further involvement with Native Canadians. With the cooperation of the Justice Department, cases that were already in progress were disposed of through the granting of suspended sentences to individuals found guilty by the courts.⁹⁷

* * * *

The failed efforts to mobilize Native Canadians under NRMA provisions is perhaps the most striking illustration of the half-hearted nature of mobilization efforts in Canada between 1940 and 1945. Confronted by problems of geography, language, and health, as well as concerted Native resistance to compulsory service, DNWS and NSS officials effectively abandoned efforts to mobilize Canadian Indians in an equitable fashion. The remarkable powers given to Divisional Registrars and Mobilization Boards combined with lax Ottawa supervision to scuttle the comprehensive mobilization strategy envisioned by the framers of the NRMA. The remarkably haphazard and indecisive government response to the mobilization of Native Canadians stands in marked contrast to what happened in the United States. Franco Jere and Alison Bernstein have described the generally progressive and inclusive policies adopted by the Roosevelt Administration in the mobilization of Native Americans and the positive results, for both Natives, and non-Natives, that flowed from these policies.⁹⁸ Clearly, the record of the Canadian government in the handling of Natives deserves no such accolade. In the Canadian case, the record is more notable for what mobilization officials failed to do than for what they actually accomplished.

NOTES

1. Fred Gaffen, Forgotten Soldiers (Penticton, 1985); Janet Frances Davison, "'We Shall Remember': Canadian Indians and World War II" (Peterborough: Trent University Committee on Graduate Studies, 1992); and Janice Summerby, Native Soldiers, Foreign Battlefields (Ottawa, 1993). Gaffen, Davison, and Summerby do not utilize the records of the DNWS and NSS contained in the Department of Labour archival collections. Their use of the Indian Affairs Branch material in the Department of Mines and Resources collections is also highly selective and non-representative of the general thrust of these documents.

2. Official tabulations put the number of Native men serving in the Armed Forces during World War II at 3,090. See Report of the Department of Mines and Resources, 1946 (Ottawa, 1946) p. 195.

3. See, for example, Norman Hillmer et al., eds., On Guard For Thee: War, Ethnicity, and the Canadian State (Ottawa, 1988); William Janzen, Limits on Liberty: The Experience of Mennonite, Hutterite, and Doukhobor Communities in Canada (Toronto, 1990); and Ann Gomer Sunahara, The Politics of Racism: The Uprooting of Japanese Canadians During the Second World War (Toronto, 1991).

4. A dispute arose immediately concerning registration of Natives. On 6 August 1940, T.R.L. MacInness originally informed all Indian Agents that Natives were not required to register. This decision was reversed when it was discovered that many Indians were being denied employment because they did not carry a registration card. A circular letter addressed to all Indian Agents was distributed on 4 September 1940 asking all Agents to supervise the registration on reserves. See MacInness to Agents, 6 August 1940; MacInness to Agents, 4 September 1940. NAC, RG 10, Volume 6770: file War, 1939, Correspondence Regarding National Registration of Indians, 1941-1945, pt. 2.

5. McDonnell to LaFlèche, 30 September 1940. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1485: file 2-15-3 pt. 1.

6. Ibid., LaFlèche to McDonnell, 2 October 1940.

7. Ibid., Picard and Vincent to Gardiner, 14 October 1940.

8. Ibid., Department of Indian Affairs to Bastien, 25 October 1940. This reminder reinforced a circular letter from MacInness to all Agents that Natives were subject to NWS

regulations. See MacInness to Agents, 28 September 1940. NAC, RG 10, Volume 6768: file 452-2- pt. 4.

9. Benoit to Vincent, 20 November 1940. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1485: file 2-15-3 pt. 1.

10. Ibid., Gros Louis to DND, 4 November 1940.

11. Ibid., Picard and Vincent to DND, 12 November 1940.

12. Ibid., Drouin to LaFlèche, 7 December 1940.

13. Ibid., Sioui to Drouin, 30 December 1943.

14. Ibid., Elliot to LaFleche, October 19, 1940.

15. Devlin to MacInness, 2 October 1940. NAC, RG 10, Volume 6768: file 452-20 pt. 4. A resolution from the Six Nations band in Brantford "strongly protested the imposition of 30 days military training upon the single young men of this reservation." See *ibid.*, Randle to MacInness, 21 November 1940.

16. Montreal Daily Star, 17 January 1941.

17. Savard to Davis, 7 January 1941. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1485: file 2-15-3 pt. 1.

18. Ibid., LaFlèche to Divisional Registrars and Chairmen, 30 January 1941. This declaration points out one of several flaws in accounts written by Summerby and Gaffen. Summerby states that this decision was not officially adopted as government policy until a court decision in 1943 regarding Harry Smallfence of the Caughnawaga Reserve. In reality, government officials had been operating under the assumption that Natives were liable for compulsory service two years before the Smallfence decision. See Summerby, Native Soldiers, Foreign Battlefields p. 20.

19. Irwin to LaFlèche, 27 March 1941. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1485: file 2-15-3 pt. 1.

20. Ibid., Benoit to Irwin, 28 March 1941.

21. Ibid., Edwards to King, Lapointe, and Ralston, 26 April 1941.

22. Ibid., LaFlèche to Edwards, 6 May 1941.

23. Ibid., Edwards to Heeney, 16 May 1941.

24. Ibid., Heeney to Thorson, 25 June 1941.

25. Ibid., George to Davis, 7 July 1941.
26. Ibid., Benoit to George, 9 July 1941.
27. Ibid., Plaxton & Company to Irwin, 7 July 1941.
28. Ibid., Edwards to Benoit, 30 July 1941.
29. Ibid., LaFlèche to Registrars and Chairmen, 6 August 1941.
30. Ibid., McIsaac to Whitecourt Postmaster, 24 June 1941.
31. Ibid., Whitecourt Postmaster to McIsaac, 27 June 1941.
32. Ibid., McIsaac to LaFlèche, 8 July 1941.
33. Ibid., Benoit to McIsaac, 17 July 1941.
34. MacInness to Benoit, 20 November 1941. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1485: file 2-15-3 pt. 1.
35. Ibid., Pennock to Benoit, 25 November 1941.
36. Ibid., Hurtubise to LaFlèche, 18 December 1941. Tribal councils continued to resist compulsory mobilization measures. Reuben Bull, Chief of the Whitefish Lake Band in Vilna, Alberta, demanded that Natives, as government wards, be exempted from NRMA duty. A petition signed by hundreds of members from the Caughnawaga Band addressed to Prime Minister King cited various treaties to reinforce Caughnawaga claims and stated that "if the abuse is not stopped, we may in a little while be deprived of all the little privileges you pale face left us." See Bull to King, 29 September 1941; Caughnawaga Band to King, 29 October 1941. NAC, RG 10, Volume 6768: file 452-20 pt. 4.
37. McIsaac to Benoit, 10 February 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1485: file 2-15-3 pt. 1.
38. MacKay to MacInness, 24 April 1942. NAC, RG 10, Volume 6768: file 452-20 pt. 4.
39. MacInness to Benoit, 1 June 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1485: file 2-15-3 pt. 1.
40. Crandall to Recruiting Representatives, 20 February 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1485: file 2-15-3 pt. 1. This refusal of Winnipeg authorities to enrol many native recruits remained a source of contention. Although Indians from Manitoba clearly did serve in the Armed Forces, the enlistment ratios were lower in Manitoba than in any other province, pointing to the fact that the stated opinion of many DND officials did

manifest itself in low numbers of Manitoba Natives entering the Armed forces. A very rough calculation of the percentage of Indian recruits in the provincial Native population in 1942 (both male and female) reveals the following figures: 1)P.E.I.: 6.5%; 2)New Brunswick: 5.5%; 3)Nova Scotia: 3.4%; 4)Saskatchewan: 2.2%; 5)Ontario: 1.8%; 6)Quebec: .8%; 7)B.C.: .7%; 8)Alberta: .5%; and 9)Manitoba: .3%. Manitoba and Alberta remained on the bottom rungs of the participation ladder for the duration of the war. For Native totals in the Armed Forces see Report of the Department of Mines and Resources, 1942 (Ottawa, 1942) p. 134. For the provincial breakdown of Indian population, see Johnson to Robinson, 11 May 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 605: file 6-19-1.

41.Benoit to MacInness, 8 March 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1485: file 2-15-3 pt. 1.

42.LaFlèche to All Registrars and Chairmen, 31 March 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1485: file 2-15-3 pt. 1.

43.Ibid., MacInness to Benoit, 30 June 1942.

44.Ibid., MacInness to Benoit, 30 June 1942. This material had been part of a series of letters dealing with the issue of ignoring all Natives who lived in outlying areas. Indian Affairs Branch officials insisted that the proposal was not to exempt Indians in any way but to ensure that in the most remote areas Natives who did not respond to calls "would not be followed by prosecution or other drastic action." Although lists were submitted to MacInness for approval, the adoption of this policy within NSS circles did not occur for close to two years. See MacInness to Superintendents and Inspectors, 17 April 1942. NAC, RG 10, Volume 6768: file 452-20 pt. 4.

45.Benoit to English, 25 August 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1485: file 2-15-3 pt. 1.

46.Christman and Paul to MacLean, 24 August 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1485: file 2-15-3 pt. 2.

47.Ibid., MacLean to Ralston, 27 August 1942.

48.Ibid., Mingo to Benoit, 15 September 1942.

49.Ibid., Mingo to Bennett, 30 September 1942.

50.Ibid., Sylliboy to King, 15 October 1942.

51.Ibid., MacInness to Rice, 20 October 1942.

52.Ibid., Sioui to Taché, 28 January 1943. Sioui spread his gospel of non-compliance to reservations across Canada for the duration of the war by writing letters to all band leaders advising them that they should not allow Indians to comply with military training requirements, advice that was followed in several documented instances. See Swartman to MacInness, 24 October 1944. NAC, RG 10, Volume 6769: file 452-20-8.

53.Taché to Duncan, 8 February 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1485: file 2-15-3 pt. 2.

54.Ibid., Armitage to Taché, 1 April 1943.

55.See Regina Leader Post 15 October 1942; Calgary Albertan 22 June 1943; and the written decision of Lazure, King vs. Harris Smallfence, 21 June 1943. NAC, RG 10, Volume 6769: file 452-20-10 pt. 1.

56.Garton to Winnipeg DOC, 17 February 1943. NAC, RG 10, Volume 6769: file 452-20-4.

57.Adamson to MacNamara, 25 February 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1485: file 2-15-3 pt. 2.

58.Ibid., Henry to MacNamara, 1 March 1943; MacNamara to Adamson, 1 March 1943.

59.Ibid., Adamson to MacNamara, 4 March 1943.

60.Ibid., Edwards to Taché, 31 March 1943.

61.Ibid., Harris to Taché, 31 May 1943.

62.Ibid., Taché to Harris, 3 June 1943.

63.Ibid., McLaren to Jackson, 21 July 1943.

64.Ibid., Jackson to McLaren, 31 July 1943.

65.Many Natives did help with timber and agriculture harvests on the Prairies. More than 4,000 Indians, for example, were recruited for the harvest period in the Autumn of 1944. See Morris to Greenwood, 2 December 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 605: file 6-19-1.

66.Henry to Chairmen and Divisional Registrars, 31 August 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1485: file 2-15-3 pt. 3. Much of the material for this circular came from a Department of Mines and Resources Circular sent to all Indian Agents one month earlier. See MacInness to Indian Agents, 31 July 1943. NAC, RG 10, Volume 6769: file 452-20-8.

- 67.Harris to Taché, 13 September 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1485: file 2-15-3 pt. 3.
- 68.Ibid., Mingo to Henry, 27 September 1943.
- 69.Ibid., Werry to Camsell, 7 January 1944.
- 70.Montreal Standard 27 October 1943.
- 71.Brisebois to McGill, 2 December 1943. NAC, RG 10, Volume 6769: file 452-20-10 pt. 1.
- 72.McLaren to Werry, 14 January 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1485: file 2-15-3 pt. 3.
- 73.Ibid., Edwards to McLaren, 21 February 1944.
- 74.Ibid., McLaren to Edwards, 2 February 1944.
- 75.Ibid., Cummings to Edwards, 28 February 1944.
- 76.Ibid., Letson to Winnipeg District Officer Commanding , 6 March 1944.
- 77.The Winnipeg military authorities also refused to enrol Negroes, although they, like Indians, were not on a list of racial minorities deemed unacceptable for military service. Although Arthur MacNamara informed Winnipeg Registrar C.D. McPherson, who approved of racial exclusions, that this position was "very indefensible," broad discretionary powers were given to local military commanders in this area. Winnipeg officials chose to exercise these powers. See McPherson to Henry, 6 December 1943; MacNamara to McPherson, 12 January 1944; and HQS 23F.D.3, Enlistments and Employment of Aliens and Naturalized Canadian Citizens, 30 November 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1486: file 2-162-9.
- 78.Morrison to Officer Commanding, Toronto RCMP, 18 November 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1485: file 2-15-3 pt. 4.
- 79.RCMP 'O' Division Circular, 22 November 1943. NAC, RG 10, Volume 6769: file 452-20-8.
- 80.Matters to Indian Affairs Branch, 15 February 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1485: file 2-15-3 pt. 4.
- 81.Ibid., Matters to Indian Affairs Branch, 19 April 1944.
- 82.Harold McGill, Director of the Indian Affairs Branch, was shocked at this development. He pointed out that the DMR circular of 31 July 1943 and NSS Circular Memorandum 905 urged all Indian Agents "to take all necessary measures to see that

the Indians complied with the regulations," and demanded to know why the policy had been abandoned. See McGill to Ranger, 30 May 1944. NAC, RG 10, Volume 6769: file 452-20-8.

83.Ibid., McLaren to Chairmen and Registrars, 29 February 1944.

84.Davidson to Ranger, 14 June 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1485: file 2-15-3 pt. 4.

85.Ibid., Wilson to Bjarnason, 24 June 1944.

86.Ibid., McLaren to Harris, 27 June 1944.

87.Ibid., McRae to Ranger, 15 August 1944.

88.Le Canada 29 September 1944.

89.McPherson to McLaren, 21 October 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1485: file 2-15-3 pt. 4.

90.Ibid., Edwards to McLaren, 7 November 1944.

91.Ibid., MacNamara to McLaren, 8 December 1944.

92.Heeney to Crerar, 26 December 1944. NAC, RG 10, Volume 6768: file 452-20 pt. 6.

93.Ibid., Jackson to Hoey, 2 January 1945. The following agencies were affected by the ruling: 1)Treaty 3--Fort Frances, Kenora, Port Arthur, Sioux Lookout; 2)Treaty 6--Rocky Mountain House, Saddle Lake, Battleford, Carlton, Duck Lake, Onion Lake, Edmonton, Hobbema; 3)Treaty 8--Athabaska, Fort St. John, Lesser Slave Lake; and 4)Treaty 11--Fort Norman, Fort Simpson, Fort Resolution. Three hundred and twenty four Natives from these areas had enlisted prior to the Cabinet decision.

94.McLaren to Chairmen and Registrars, 1 February 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1485: file 2-15-3 pt. 4.

95.Problems had continued on the Caughnawaga reserve throughout 1944. On 14 March 1945, Chief Dominic Two Axe informed the Governor General that he would "kill every Mountie that comes on the reservation" in pursuit of draft delinquents, a threat that NSS officials declined to prosecute after considerable discussion. See Two Axe to Governor General, 14 March 1945; Kemp to McGill, 26 May 1945. NAC, RG 10, Volume 6769: file 452-20-10 pt. 1.

96.McLaren to Lyons, 12 February 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1485: file 2-15-3 pt. 4.

97. Ibid., Mitchell to Crerar, 24 March 1945.

98. Alison Bernstein, American Indians and World War II: Toward A New Era in Indian Affairs (Norman, 1991); Franco Jere, "Bringing Them in Alive: Selective Service and Native Americans," Journal of Ethnic Studies 18(3): 1-27.

Chapter 4 Student Deferments

At the June 1944 meeting of the National Conference of Canadian Universities (NCCU), the following motion received unanimous support:

The Conference records its appreciation of the splendid relations which have existed between the universities on the one hand, and the University Advisory Board, the Director of National Selective Service, and the Minister of Labour [on the other hand], and of the fact that the government has always consulted the universities and followed their considered judgment in formulating its regulations respecting the mobilization of students.¹

The record of cooperation between the government and university officials was indeed remarkable. As such, it offers further telling insights into Ottawa's administration of the wartime mobilization effort.² In sharp contrast to the failure to mobilize Native Canadians, student deferment initiatives must be considered as one of the successes of Canada's wartime mobilization effort.

* * * *

Under the NRMA students, with the exception of some of those studying theology, were eligible for military service, but could be granted postponement of compulsory military training pending the completion of their studies. After being granted a postponement, a medically fit student of callable age was required to join his local campus

contingent of the Canadian Officers Training Corps (COTC) and to take 110 hours of military training during term and a two week military training camp in the summer. In practice, the number of students enrolled in post-secondary institutions taking campus military training courses plus the summer military camp increased from 2,138 in 1940 to a maximum of 10,422 in 1941 before declining to 7,440 in the final year of the war.³ The voice of university officials through all this was the NCCU.⁴

The military status of students was worked out following the issuance of the 1940 National War Services Regulations. Responding to calls from officials in many Administrative Divisions, L.R. LaFlèche invited all Registrars and Board Chairmen to attend a meeting with university officials in Ottawa in February 1941.⁵ Two key decisions were made at this gathering. First, all medically fit students who turned 21 between 1 July 1940 and 30 June 1941 and who had completed 110 hours of training in a campus COTC contingent could attend the two week military camp in the summer to satisfy the required 30 days of military training. Second, all students who had reached 21 prior to 1 July 1940⁶ and who had completed 110 hours of COTC training would be considered to have satisfied the 30 day training requirement. However, students in this category who wanted to attend a two week summer camp would be allowed to do so. These informal directives quickly formed the basis

of mobilization policy, first expressed in a DND directive of 5 March 1941⁷ and then in PC 1822 of 18 March 1941.⁸

A clear direction had been established, but not all mobilization authorities were satisfied with an outcome that facilitated student deferment. The two most vociferous opponents of Ottawa's approach were Justice A.M. Manson of the Vancouver Mobilization Board and, until his death in late 1943, Justice J.F.L. Embury of the Mobilization Board in Regina. In the early stages of the war, Embury repeatedly heaped scorn on the willingness of other Mobilization Boards to defer theological students. In response, LaFlèche defended the actions of other DNWS officials and criticized Embury for engaging in a "carping which must numb the finer sensibilities." He also offered this vigorous defence of the deferment of theological students:

...we are in for a very long and costly war to save our civilization or the right to live as we wish to. If we are fighting for civilization then religious faith is at the top of the list. I shall not be a party to starving the ministry of any denomination. We shall certainly need our churches after this war, when we are in the extremely difficult period of reconstruction which must follow the terrible turmoil the world is in at the present time.⁹

Embury was unimpressed and replied with this scathing denunciation of student deferments in general:

I reiterate the giving of preferential treatment in time of war indiscriminately to students at universities is unfair and wrong. I expect there will be a bit of a row one of these days. If we had less so-called higher education we would have

more courage and public spirit. However, my Board can take it. A famous historian once wrote that education is of but little value except to those natures so happily constituted that it is almost superfluous. Let's hope the Russians win the war for us. The way we are going we'd never manage our share for ourselves. Speaking as a resident of my own province, I am ashamed.¹⁰

Not surprisingly, university administrators hotly disputed this point of view. University of Manitoba President Sidney Smith attempted to counter the critics by documenting the necessity of educating skilled professionals and insisting that any student, regardless of academic discipline, would be expelled from university if he failed to meet stringent academic requirements. The regulations could not be "invoked as a refuge for any young man poor enough in spirit to desire to evade his military obligations"; any student falling short of university requirements would be directed immediately to the DNWS Mobilization Board for prompt action.¹¹ In the same spirit, University of Toronto President H.J. Cody sought to assure the public that his campus would be "no house of refuge" for delinquent students failing to see the "deadly peril" the war presented to the British Empire.¹² These sentiments were well received in Ottawa, where there was confidence that the right formula had been found vis-a-vis the universities. In January 1942, LaFlèche observed that the mobilization of students had progressed "surprisingly well," and that he was "deeply impressed" with the co-operation received from university officials.¹³

There were, however, some unresolved issues. The most prominent of these concerned compulsory COTC training for medical, engineering, and science students. In October 1941, Charles Read, a medical student at McGill University, complained to Defence Minister J.L. Ralston that the military training requirements interfered severely with a student's ability to concentrate on a course of study.¹⁴ McGill medical students had made it plain that they would join the armed forces at the conclusion of their schooling and that was all that was required. In the circumstances, the cumbersome COTC training "was in no way aiding our nation's war effort." Subsequently, the DND substituted military drill with a course in military medicine for medical students in their clinical years, but public pressure continued to mount to allow medical students to concentrate completely on their studies.¹⁵

Science and engineering students also expressed considerable opposition to the military training regime, especially the two week summer camp requirement. L.E. Westman, Executive Assistant to the Director of the Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel,¹⁶ asked LaFlèche in December 1941 to waive the two week summer training requirement for science students already enrolled in COTC training during the academic year.¹⁷ Pointing out that war industries were being canvassed to accept any and all technical students for summer employment, Westman warned of serious financial

hardships for science students if they were forced to relinquish employment opportunities to attend military camp. LaFlèche agreed with Westman that the plight of engineering and science students should receive the "sympathetic consideration" of both DNWS and DND officials.¹⁸ Westman next made the case that since science students would not be able to enter employment before the military camps opened in June, they would be deprived of five weeks of employment income.¹⁹ This evidence was compelling and led to action. On 20 January 1942, a DNWS circular memorandum was issued that allowed the two week military camp to be waived for science and engineering students provided the District Officer Commanding in a particular area approved of the waiver. This policy was extended to all medical and dental students on 12 February 1942.²⁰

Concern about the financial status of students led to further government initiatives. The issue of government assistance to deserving students had already been addressed in an agreement between Ottawa and the provinces. Under the Dominion-Provincial Youth Training Agreement, a payment of \$200.00, shared equally between the two levels of government, could be made to a student. Unfortunately, as late as the start of the 1941-42 academic year, only the four western provinces, Quebec, and Prince Edward Island participated in the scheme; the federal contribution to the scheme was a paltry \$21,850.²¹ At the urging of DNWS and

WBTP officials, a new and more comprehensive agreement was concluded in February 1942. This provided for maximum assistance to an individual student of \$300.00. With Ontario participating in the new scheme, the federal contribution doubled to \$41,000 before the 1942-43 academic year commenced.²²

At a conference with the NCCU on 11-12 May 1942, attended by university presidents and deans of engineering and science, the deferment policy for science and technical students was further defined. At a preliminary meeting on 5 May attended by representatives of the DND, the DNWS, the DMS, and NSS, LaFlèche stated that the existing system lacked consistency and proper coordination and had created an "impossible situation."²³ An alternative scheme would have to be introduced in which NSS civilian officials (at this stage military mobilization was still the responsibility of the DNWS) would have complete authority over the deferment of technical personnel. LaFlèche now also insisted that the time had come to restrict access to courses deemed not to be in the national interest.²⁴

On the morning of 12 May, LaFlèche and NSS Director Elliot Little presided over a general session of the conference. In the afternoon, the meeting split up into three groups: university presidents discussed funding for undergraduates and the student mobilization regulations in general; deans of engineering discussed engineering

requirements; and deans of science discussed science requirements with WBTP and National Research Council representatives. The result of these deliberations was that nine resolutions emanating from the 5 May preliminary meeting were adopted unanimously. Six of these concerned the transfer of authority over technical students to NSS jurisdiction, a proposal WBTP officials endorsed wholeheartedly:

The keynote throughout was the manifest desire on the part of all present to have centralized direction and co-ordination which would unite all sectional interests and make them subservient to the all important national interest in matters pertaining to the best utilization of technical manpower.²⁵

As matters developed, however, this call for sweeping reform did not meet with success. A draft Order-in-Council was prepared placing student deferment beyond the reach of the Mobilization Boards. But when LaFlèche ran into concerted opposition from Board Chairs such as Manson and Embury, he backed down. In July 1942, LaFlèche told the WBTP that any proposal to remove students seeking deferment from the direct authority of the Mobilization Boards "would be the beginning of the disintegration of compulsory mobilization in Canada."²⁶ LaFlèche also came under pressure from political quarters. During the Senate debate on a new vocational training bill in the summer of 1942, Manitoba Senator John Haig claimed that DNWS officials were "exempting the very people who ought to go--the educated

people of this country."²⁷ LaFlèche countered such sentiments with the argument that postponement entitlement was being reduced rather than expanded so as to "impose severe conditions as to scholarship and successful passing of scholastic examinations."²⁸ Nevertheless, two initiatives from the May conference moved policy in a more permissive direction. First, WBTP officials were granted the authority to issue permits to all essential technical personnel-- permits that would be considered as proof of essentiality in industry by Mobilization Boards. Second, an NSS program of scholarships, including financial aid for first year students, was introduced that gave an additional 500 technical students financial aid. By the same token, the DND agreed to put on pay and allowance all medical and dental students who were in the final year of their program, physically fit, and willing to enlist upon graduation.²⁹ The revised regulations for students were embodied in Section 17 of PC 8343 of 16 September 1942. In the view of DNWS officials, the new regulations were "far more severe" than those previously in force and would facilitate "the continuation of the flow of educated men, professional and technical, both for the immediate requirements of the war effort and for the period of reconstruction thereafter."³⁰

While this debate concerning technical and professional students was in progress, the issue of deferment for theological students and conscientious objectors was also

hotly contested. At the heart of the latter debate in this period was the question of denominational preference in exemption orders. Under Section 6(d) of the DNWS regulations, Roman Catholic seminarians were classed as clergymen and were, therefore, completely exempt from regulations. In March 1941, LaFlèche had refused a request from the Reverend George Dorey of the United Church of Canada Board of Home Missions to exempt United Church theological students who had already completed 110 hours of COTC training from the two week military camp. Dorey asked for this exemption on the grounds that the camp interfered with summer missionary activity.³¹ LaFlèche was unmoved, even though he consistently allowed Catholic seminarians, especially in the province of Quebec, to avoid the mobilization regulations entirely.³²

One of the most interesting exchanges of letters pertaining to the exemption of theological students was initiated by Amy E. Thorburn of St. Thomas, Ontario. In October 1942, she wrote to Prime Minister King insisting that her nephew, who was enrolled in the Toronto Bible College, be afforded the same privileges as Catholic seminarians.³³ Appealing to King's "personal Christian sympathy," Thorburn insisted that the "most valuable defence preparation" lay in the spiritual realm and that all potential chaplains must be afforded the same opportunity to complete their studies. In reply, Laflèche tersely directed

Thorburn to study the mobilization regulations.³⁴

Undaunted, Thorburn wrote to King a second time, pointing out the desperate need for Protestant pastors who were "sacredly set aside by God himself." She now appealed to King's "kind, Christian, personal interest" to grant the exemption she sought.³⁵ This letter elicited another brief reply from LaFlèche, whereupon Thorburn sent King an inter-denominational magazine, published in Los Angeles, that ridiculed Canada's policy of exempting Catholic seminarians.³⁶ This time the persistent Thorburn dropped the references to King's soothing nature in favour of a more direct approach: "The above injustice, if stated correctly, Mr. King, calls for rectifying at once. Please do not feel this letter needs reply but action." LaFlèche now drafted a complex four page reply to Thorburn, but W.J. Turnbull, King's principal secretary, pointed out that this failed to address the primary issue, namely, the double standard involved in exempting Catholic theological students.³⁷ Turnbull asked politely that one of LaFlèche's subordinates "draft a brief reply dealing in more simple language" with Thorburn's concerns.

The treatment of conscientious objectors attending university was yet another source of controversy. In 1942 this issue pitted Dorey of the United Church against the cantankerous Justice Embury in Regina. James McMurtry, a United Church theology student studying at St. Andrew's

College in Saskatoon, had been called for his medical examination and been placed in the lowest possible medical designation. In 1942, however, he was suddenly and arbitrarily upgraded to the medical category of B1 and ordered by Embury to report for alternative service work in Banff.³⁸ This change apparently was made after the Regina Mobilization Board had interrogated McMurtry about his attitude to the war and discovered that he was a conscientious objector. Dorey lodged "an emphatic protest against a military tribunal presuming to pass an opinion" on the beliefs of a United Church theological student.

Shortly before this, Daniel Firth, the President of Knox Theological College, University of Toronto, had added his voice to the complaints about the alleged special status of Catholic seminarians. He asked LaFlèche to provide a "straightforward answer" as to whether bona fide Presbyterian ministerial candidates were eligible for exemption from mobilization. Firth also called for the clarification of the jurisdiction of the Mobilization Boards in relation to theological students.³⁹ LaFlèche gave his usual blustering reply denying any discrimination and ignoring his own letters to Catholic officials confirming exemption privileges of Catholic seminarians. Claiming that it was "impossible for me to understand how one can say there is apparent discrimination," LaFlèche attacked Firth for questioning the "unimpeachable character" of

Mobilization Board members.⁴⁰ Eventually, the Justice Department ruled that the Mobilization Boards had sole discretion in deciding theological exemptions.⁴¹

Nevertheless, NSS officials continued to mediate the problems that arose after the NSS Mobilization Regulations were issued in December 1942. Moreover, Arthur MacNamara issued instructions to Mobilization Boards allowing for the exemption of theological students of accredited religious denominations eligible to supply chaplains to the Armed Forces.⁴²

No such compromise was reached in relation to Justice Embury's long campaign against conscientious objectors. Embury had such low regard for these men that he once proposed having the press present at hearings dealing with alternative service, but LaFlèche quashed this idea.⁴³ In December 1941, he became embroiled with a group of students at the University of Saskatchewan. Led by Harvey Moats, they claimed that Embury refused to hear their requests for deferment as students.⁴⁴ M.J. Coldwell, the Member of Parliament for Rosetown-Biggar and the CCF National President, supported Moats's assertions and reminded Mackenzie King of his statement that conscientious objectors would not be singled out for vindictive treatment.⁴⁵ Noting that Moats and his group of students had indicated that they would take alternative courses in physical fitness and ambulance work instead of COTC training, Coldwell

denounced Embury and the Regina Mobilization Board for showing "an entire disregard of British and democratic principles."⁴⁶

A bitter debate followed. Board member George Bickerton castigated Coldwell for his ignorance of the situation in the light of the recent Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor; Coldwell and others "who did not want to be disturbed in the even tenor of their lives" should step forward to "defend the principles of democracy and Christianity."⁴⁷ After visiting the United Kingdom and observing the lenient policy towards conscientious objectors in effect there, Coldwell told Bickerton that he was determined to see that "no form of incipient Hitlerism gains ground in this country."⁴⁸ Embury claimed that the whole matter could be resolved if the university dismissed Dr. Carlyle King, whom he labelled as a "subversive."⁴⁹ When Coldwell asked for a public presence at Mobilization Board meetings regarding conscientious objectors, Embury changed his earlier position and refused on the grounds that the public had "no right to know of them." He saw no problem, however, in divulging the minutes of the meetings to Canadian Legion officials anxious to target conscientious objectors for public example. Eventually, LaFlèche intervened to allow the Saskatchewan students to complete the academic year free from harassment.⁵⁰ Coldwell's last contribution to a sorry episode was to tell Embury that he

was "temperamentally unfit" to deal with the matter.⁵¹ In the end, two of the six students pursued by the Regina Board gave up their fight and joined the Canadian Firefighters Corps in the United Kingdom.⁵² But this did not deflect Embury: in December 1942 he informed NSS officials that 50 percent of the incoming 1941-1942 class of 590 students at the University of Saskatchewan had enrolled solely to avoid military service.⁵³

The first stage of the Canadian government's response to the deferment and postponement of university students ended with the NSS takeover of the mobilization machinery in December 1942. Under the supervision of LaFlèche and DNWS officials, several provisional, halting steps had been taken to formulate a policy to protect scientific and technical personnel from induction into the military. The December 1942 NSS mobilization regulations attempted to address the thorny issue of the exemption of theological students, although problems continued to be experienced in this area for the duration of the war. These initiatives were the result of close co-operation between government and university officials. In January 1943, following the takeover of the mobilization machinery by NSS, the NCCU expressed support for the "enlightened policy" of the Dominion government in relation to university education and promised its full cooperation in the national war effort.⁵⁴ At the same time, however, NCCU leaders effectively scuttled

MacNamara's preliminary proposals to curtail enrolments in university Arts courses.⁵⁵

In the spring of 1943 the promise of NCCU support was tested by the first nationwide survey of the practices of the 13 Mobilization Boards in relation to student deferments. This survey was undertaken as a result of behind the scenes pressure from the leader of the Conservative opposition in the House of Commons, R.B. Hanson. Hanson's primary concern was that undergraduates in four year degree programs were enrolling in professional programs such as law to maintain their deferment status. Claiming that such arrangements were "altogether too wide,"⁵⁶ Hanson demanded immediate action to avoid the public embarrassment of Humphrey Mitchell in the House of Commons. Hanson was especially concerned about the situation in Montreal and Toronto, where the Mobilization Boards were allegedly using their broad discretionary powers to grant extended postponements.⁵⁷

The survey form distributed by MacNamara to Divisional Registrars across the country asked 22 questions.⁵⁸ While most Registrars reported similar practices governing postponement of service and the treatment of students who failed their academic programs, their answers revealed a patchwork of policies in relation to the duration of deferments. Some Boards, it was found, only granted postponements for a single term pending clarification of

academic progress, while others granted deferments either for the academic year (eight months) or an entire calendar year.⁵⁹ Assessments of the overall effectiveness of the student deferment program also varied from place to place. While Registrars in London, Montreal, and Saint John reported that the existing system was working adequately, Registrars in Vancouver and Regina expressed dissatisfaction with the status quo. This, however, was hardly surprising given the activities of Justices Manson and Embury, the Mobilization Board Chairs in these cities.

In August 1943 the Board Chairs themselves were sent a questionnaire on student deferment.⁶⁰ Three propositions, to be submitted to an upcoming convention of the NCCU, were put to them for comment. These were that: (1) any male student who had less than matriculation standing from high school and who was of the age of 18½ years, or over, would not be permitted to enter a university or complete high school; (2) some limitation should be placed on the numbers of male students entering science courses in universities; and (3) a male student who was aged 18½ or over and who was in Medical Category A should not be allowed to enter or continue any non-science course in a university unless exempted from call-up by the appropriate Mobilization Board.

The answers received from the Board Chairs revealed the wide discrepancies in attitude across the country towards student deferment. Several respondents in provinces west of

Ontario agreed wholeheartedly with all three proposals. Justice J.E. Adamson of Winnipeg insisted that only medical students, engineers, and pure science students should be postponed.⁶¹ While no response was received from the bombastic Embury, Justice Manson was heard from in no uncertain terms. Hammering home the point that "Christian civilization" must be defended, he demanded that his Board alone should have the authority to decide on student deferments and that no new rules should interfere with this.⁶² In an addendum to his response, Manson showed to full advantage his disdain for existing NSS regulations:

We are deluged with circulars which are a nuisance. We have filed ours away to read after the war. Section 12 [of the NSS regulations dealing with students] should be deleted and an entirely new section drawn. Subsections (1) and (2) might refer to a kindergarten. The university authorities are not in half as good a position to say what courses a student should be allowed to take as are the Mobilization Boards. A course may be available at a university in Canada in the sweet bye and bye and at great expense. The same course may be available in a neighbouring American university now and at a reasonable expense. Subsection (9) should be put in the wastepaper basket. It is more or less innocuous so why keep it?⁶³

The two Mobilization Board Chairs in the province of Quebec argued in favour of the status quo. Justice H.A. Fortier of Quebec City and Judge J.C.M. Lajoie of Montreal vehemently opposed any change to the existing regulations.⁶⁴ Lajoie insisted that the experience gained in his district in the matter of student deferments should not be wasted by more regulations. In support of this view,

Montreal Registrar Raymond Ranger stressed that the need for national unity dictated that no regulation from Ottawa should impinge on Lajoie's autonomy. For his part, Fortier emphasized that Quebec's system of 36 classical colleges, which had seven year programs, could not be compared to the education system to be found in the rest of Canada.⁶⁵ The majority of classical college graduates were twenty years old before they even applied to university. Fortier also argued that no distinction should be made between technical or professional students and non-science students.

In the final analysis, MacNamara sided with the advocates of a tough approach after meeting with other mobilization officials in August 1943. Thus in his speech on 30 August 1943 to the opening of the NCCU convention he spoke admiringly of the views of Harold Dodds, the President of Princeton University. Dodds questioned the services of student whose "brains were locked up in the ivory tower" and believed that student manpower should be maximized in a period of grave military difficulties.⁶⁶ MacNamara agreed and put a plan of action, based on the survey sent of Board Chairs, to the convention. According to this, a male student aged 18½ years or older who had not achieved the standing certified by a provincial department of education for his particular age would not be allowed to enter university. This particular requirement was clearly a sop to the special circumstances of Quebec's classical colleges.

Male students in specified university programs such as medicine, science, and dentistry would be deferred as long as their marks were satisfactory. All other male university students in Arts courses would have to make individual applications for deferment. MacNamara admitted that this requirement would prevent non-science students from entering or completing their programs.

The response of the convention to MacNamara's plan was mixed. The NCCU endorsed the first two proposals but balked at the third, which held the promise of freeing the maximum number of students for military service. Instead, the convention adopted a resolution to allow any student who enrolled for the 1943-1944 academic year to complete his year regardless of the course of study. After the completion of the 1943-1944 academic year, all students in disciplines deemed non-essential would be re-evaluated and the medically fit among them would not be granted further deferments. The NCCU also recommended that a University Advisory Board (UAB) be established to advise MacNamara on future student policy. While conceding that anyone 18½ years of age or older who was not progressing at the proper pace should not be admitted to university, the NCCU sought to avoid, at least for another year, the flushing out of students in what were considered non-essential university courses.⁶⁷

Remarkably, MacNamara went along with this but he was soon being castigated by other government officials for

betraying the interests of Canada's military effort. Even ranking officials in the Department of Labour refused to support his actions. One of these, A.H. Brown, insisted that MacNamara's bargain with the NCCU violated all the principles agreed upon during the pre-conference deliberations with the War Manpower Committee of the Cabinet.⁶⁸ According to Brown, the NCCU scheme should have been vetted before the War Manpower Committee before being adopted as official NSS policy. He also maintained that the existing procedure for consulting the NCCU made a University Advisory Board redundant. Major-General H.J. Riley of the NSS Mobilization Division likewise attacked MacNamara for maintaining the privileged status of students in Canada.⁶⁹ The beleaguered Deputy Minister also heard from Air Vice-Marshal J.A. Sully, who demanded that no physically-fit student enrolled in a non-science course should be allowed to continue his studies.⁷⁰ Exhibiting a will to fight back that he lacked on many other occasions, MacNamara disputed Sully's assertion that the NCCU proposals constituted a licence for students to evade military service. The adoption of the NCCU scheme had "avoided a long drawn-out row which I think the university presidents had anticipated and which, I am sure, the government would not recommend."⁷¹

University officials, of course, were elated by their victory. Sidney Smith, President of the University of

Manitoba, applauded the "wise recommendations" endorsed by MacNamara,⁷² while K.P.R. Neville, the Registrar of the University of Western Ontario, maintained that the NCCU resolutions illustrated the "finest kind of co-operative understanding" that two groups working to win the war could have.⁷³ In practice, Mobilization Board Chairs were informed of the new NSS policy concerning student deferments in a circular letter dated 17 September 1943.⁷⁴

Through all of this, the issue of the exemption of Protestant theological students remained prominent. As early as November 1942, D.T. Owens, Professor of Philosophy at United College in Winnipeg, had complained that the regulatory change allowing exemptions for students in denominations eligible to supply chaplains still granted Mobilization Boards complete discretion with respect to the exemption of Protestant theological students.⁷⁵ A year later, Owens was back on the attack, only to have his complaint deflected by MacNamara to other NSS officials.⁷⁶ In October 1943, Owens made his case directly to Mackenzie King:

The constant depletion of the ministerial supply for Protestant churches and the intolerable inequality between Protestant and Roman Catholic novitiates create a situation which ought to be considered and rectified as soon as possible. The religious inequality created by government regulations cannot be abolished without making Section 6 (d) mandatory on Mobilization Boards. The discrimination of which I complain is one of the instances of a curious blindness which often afflicts the present government. Please do not merely pass this over to Mr. Mitchell's department

[the Department of Labour]. The adjustments, I hope, will be made. Otherwise there is nothing to do but to agitate against the regulations as they now stand and when the time comes use whatever influence one may have against parliamentary candidates whose government is responsible for an unjust, unequal, and inexplicable religious policy.⁷⁷

In his reply on King's behalf, MacNamara insisted that Mobilization Boards were comprised of "responsible citizens with full appreciation of their duties," and as such would continue to have discretion in the matter of exempting theological students. This meant that Boards in Quebec could continue to grant blanket exemption to Catholic seminarians while allowing Boards elsewhere to call or exempt theological students as they saw fit.⁷⁸

In late 1943 the NCCU finally succeeded in getting a University Advisory Board (UAB) established. The first meeting of the new group was held on 6 January 1944 to devise a student deferment policy for the 1944-1945 academic year. Five of the 12 members on the UAB were university representatives, one came from private business, and four represented NSS. The DMS and the WBTP were represented by one member each.⁷⁹ Discussion at the January 1944 meeting centred on the need to defer trained personnel, with H.W. Lea of the WBTP leading a spirited defence of the deferment of science students. Monsignor Cyrille Gagnon of Laval University, however, called for a more inclusive deferment policy that would cover all courses and allow the university to "train the future leaders of the country." The decision

reached at this meeting altered the liberal deferment policies in effect for the first four years of the war. For the first time, students enrolled in non-science courses were targeted for callup if they were medically fit. The existing practice of allowing deferment of all students enrolled in subjects deemed to be in the national interest would continue. Students in 11 specialized programs ranging from medicine to forestry to commerce qualified for special deferment status.⁸⁰ But there would now be numerical targets for students enrolled in non-essential disciplines. If medically fit, any male student enrolled in the 1943-1944 academic year who did not finish in the upper half of his class would not be allowed to continue his studies. This rule would also apply to students entering university for the first time in 1944-45 and enrolling in subjects considered non-essential. The recommendations of the UAB were duly accepted and Board Chairs were informed of the new policy early in February 1944.⁸¹

This change promised smoother administration, but problems could still arise when Mobilization Boards countered the spirit of the regulations. One of the best illustrations of this is the case of Sydney and John Halter, two brothers enrolled in science courses at the University of Manitoba. Both had completed two years of study with distinction and had accepted jobs during the summer of 1944 at the Canadian Car and Foundry plant in Fort William,

Ontario.⁸² Despite the exemption granted to them through WBTP permits, Port Arthur Divisional Registrar E.W. Edwards directed that one of the brothers enlist to allow the other to continue his studies. Queried by NSS officials about this strange decision, Edwards hinted that ethnicity was at the root of his action:

Sydney and John Halter, Polish-Jewish extraction, appear to put education ahead of service to the country. Board is of the opinion that at least one should enlist. Their family is not represented in the forces.⁸³

J.M. Dymond, the WBTP Chief Executive Officer, not only backed the right of the Halter brothers to continue their studies, but pointed out that under Section 310 of the NSS mobilization regulations, a technical student required WBTP approval to enlist. MacNamara urged Edwards to ask the Mobilization Board to withdraw the enlistment order, pointing out that no legal basis existed for it and that what had been done might jeopardise the cooperation between the NCCU and NSS.⁸⁴ Edwards refused this advice in the following terms:

The recruits are of Polish-Hebrew extraction and the Board is quite aware of what happened in Poland, and in the opinion of the Board these boys are hiding behind the privileges of education and are not interested in fighting. In the eyes of the Board they appear to be arrogant and undisciplined. The Board fully realizes the student situation as covered by the regulations, but from a patriotic view, I am convinced that one of the two will be called for service. I can truthfully say that this is an isolated case. It should not be construed as the general attitude of the Board regarding students. Public opinion is none too good in this case.⁸⁵

Despite repeated pleas from MacNamara for reconsideration, there is no evidence that the decision was reversed.

By contrast, most Mobilization Boards and university officials were quick to embrace the UAB decision of January 1944 to target specific groups of students for military call-up. University of Saskatchewan officials, for example, reported 121 Arts students in the lower half of their program during the 1943-44 academic year to the Mobilization Board.⁸⁶ Mobilization Board Chairs welcomed the precise nature of the regulations calling for the mandatory callup of medically fit men in the bottom half of their class. Two cases illustrate the approach that flowed from this. The first concerned Jean Paul Montigny, a native of Baie Comeau, Quebec, enrolled at a seven year classical college in Nova Scotia. Montigny had matriculated at the College Ste. Anne in 1938, had completed six years of his course, but was called by the Halifax Registrar, Colonel Edgar Mingo, on 17 October 1944. Montigny's father pleaded with NSS officials to allow his son to complete his program. This request was refused on the grounds that Montigny stood seventh in a class of seven in a non-science course.⁸⁷ Mingo agreed, however, to the father's request that his son be posted to a French unit.⁸⁸

Even Justice Manson seemed to welcome the new directives from Ottawa. A second interesting case of the application of the new student policy concerned the status

of high school students in Victoria who were not achieving a normal rate of progression through the secondary school program. When one such student, Frank Gower, was ordered to report for military training in November 1944, there was a heated exchange of letters between Harold Campbell, Municipal Inspector of Schools in Victoria, and Manson. Campbell implored Manson to allow Gower to complete his Grade 12, pointing out that the government now could send NRMA men overseas and that at age 19 Gower could not be accused of "retardation." After Manson declined to reopen the case, T.L. Christie, Secretary of the Board of School Trustees in Victoria, reported the dispute to Ottawa.⁸⁹ NSS officials immediately demanded an account of Manson's actions. With obvious delight, Manson countered that he was merely following the instructions issuing from the UAB meeting of January 1944. The provincial education minister had indicated that a student in the twelfth grade should not be older than 18 years. Since Gower would be 20 in April 1945, he could not be given special consideration. To do so would be to "make fish of one and flesh of another."⁹⁰ Faced with this argument, NSS officials withdrew support for Gower's claim for deferment. Before the 1944-45 academic year commenced, 3,600 medically fit students had been reported to Mobilization Boards for assignment under the terms of the January 1944 UAB agreement.⁹¹

In January 1945 UAB representatives met to consider

options with respect to students enrolled in the 1944-1945 academic session. Three proposals were forthcoming that dealt specifically with the number of students to be deferred. All callable male students who placed in the lower half of their courses would be deemed available for military service. This would effectively eliminate the preferred status of students enrolled in technical and scientific courses. Again, no callable student seeking entrance to a university in the autumn of 1945 would be admitted if his scholastic standing was lower than the average incoming grade of the students accepted in the Autumn of 1944. Finally, the number of new students accepted in 1945 would be lower than the number enrolled for the first time in 1943. This sweeping mandate for change was endorsed somewhat reluctantly by Minister of Labour Humphrey Mitchell, who estimated that it would eliminate almost one-third of all students enrolled in Canadian universities and free approximately 4,000 men for military service.⁹² Even the UAB recognized that the proposed changes would be controversial. But when a proposal to destroy the minutes of the January UAB meeting surfaced, J.S. Thomson of the University of Saskatchewan convinced the Board that "it was certain that a historical record of the part the universities played in the war would be prepared and that all available material would be of value."⁹³

In the event, the progress of the war in Europe during

the first months of 1945 allowed the UAB proposals to be placed in abeyance. Then, in May 1945, MacNamara launched a new initiative. Co-operation with university officials, he wrote, had been the key to success and any change in policy with respect to student deferment should be approved and initiated by the UAB. MacNamara's own view was that the requirement for the reporting of the lower 50% of students in non-essential courses could now be abandoned, but that mandatory military training in universities through the COTC should continue.⁹⁴ The UAB readily bought the first of these ideas but was lukewarm to the second.⁹⁵ This debate was, however, overtaken by the end of the war. At its meeting of 24 August 1945, the UAB called for the repeal of all student mobilization regulations, and this action was taken by the government soon after.⁹⁶

* * * *

The administration of the deferment of students in post-secondary institutions must be considered as one of the success stories of mobilization in Canada during the Second World War. DNWS officials adopted a flexible and increasingly lenient policy towards science, professional, and technical students in order to guarantee the graduation of skilled personnel for the civilian economy and the armed forces. NSS officials in turn built on this general

approach but sought to limit the enrolment of medically fit men in Arts courses in Canadian universities. By 1944 a scientific and measurable standard for student deferments had been established that allowed exemption for students enrolled in select disciplines while permitting strict enforcement of the rules in the case of Arts students who did not meet specific academic goals. These policies, however, were driven by NCCU leaders seeking to prevent the adoption of policies that would strip all medically fit men from Arts courses. Arthur MacNamara worked willingly within a non-governmental framework and cultivated a conciliatory relationship with the NCCU. Student deferment policies adopted between 1940 and 1945 epitomized MacNamara's ideals of compromise and cooperation. These traits must be considered as primary characteristics of the NSS direction of the mobilization effort.

NOTES

1. Fennell to MacNamara, 22 July 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1482: file 2-133-6--NSS University Advisory Board.

2. The literature on universities in Canada during World War II is scant. A.B. McKillop's Matters of Mind: The University in Ontario, 1791-1951 (Toronto, 1994) provides a solid chapter on the experience of Ontario universities between 1939 and 1945. Many university histories also deal with student and academic life on campus during wartime, including Frederick W. Gibson's To Serve and Yet Be Free: Queen's University, 1917-1961, vol. 2 (Montreal, 1983), C.M. Johnston's and John Weaver's Student Days: An Illustrated History of Student Life at McMaster University from the 1890s to the 1980s (Hamilton, 1986), and W.P. Thompson's Yesteryears at the University of Saskatchewan, 1937-1949 (Saskatoon, 1969).

3. Unsigned letter to Maingot, 17 September 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 2-133 pt. 6: University and College Students. There were 8,353 students taking campus military training in 1942, 8,957 in 1943, and 7,183 in 1944.

4. For an interesting, but limited, study of the NCCU, see Gwendoline Evans Pilkington, "A History of the National Conference of Canadian Universities, 1911-1961," (University of Toronto Ph.D. Thesis, 1974). Chapter Five of this thesis deals with the NCCU and the war effort. Her assertion that the relationship between the universities and the Dominion government was "in every sense an heroic story" is somewhat tenuous.

5. Magee to LaFlèche, 12 February 1941. National Archives of Canada (NAC), RG 27, Volume 1481: file 2-133 pt. 1--NWS University and College Students.

6. Only single men between the ages of 21 and 24 were callable under mobilization regulations at this stage of the war. It was not until March, 1942, that the age liability pool for military service was expanded.

7. Montreal Gazette 4 March 1941.

8. LaFlèche to Gardiner, 7 March 1941. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1481: file 2-133 pt. 1--NWS University and College Students.

9. Ibid., LaFlèche to Embury, 29 August 1941.

10. Ibid., Embury to LaFlèche, 23 September 1941.

11. Ibid., Smith Speech Circulated Through NWS Circular Memorandum 339, 30 September 1941.
12. Toronto Telegram 25 September 1941.
13. LaFlèche to Kay, 24 January 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1498: file 2-E-133--NWS University and College Students, Division E.
14. Read to Ralston, 2 October 1941. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1481: file 2-133 pt. 2--NWS University and College Students.
15. Ibid., Ralston to Read, 14 October 1941.
16. The WBTP had been created in February 1941 to assist in the training and placement of technical and skilled personnel in Canada.
17. Westman to LaFlèche, 16 December 1941. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1481: file 2-133 pt. 2--NWS University and College Students.
18. Ibid., LaFlèche to Westman, 17 December 1941.
19. Ibid., LaFlèche to Kay, 7 January 1942.
20. Ibid., Circular Memorandum 433--LaFlèche to All Chairmen and Registrars, 20 January 1942; Circular Memorandum 455--LaFlèche to All Chairmen and Registrars, 12 February 1942.
21. Ibid., Thompson to MacNamara, 10 September 1941.
22. Ibid., Thompson to LaFlèche, 3 February 1942. See also Pilkington, "A History of the National Conference of Canadian Universities, 1911-1961," p. 321.
23. LaFlèche to Benoît, 7 April 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1482: file 2-133-6 pt. 2--Conference of Representatives of Universities and Deans of Engineering & Science Faculties.
24. Ibid., LaFlèche to Little, 1 May 1942. Government officials attending the May 5 pre-conference meeting were: E.M. Little (NSS); H.W. Lea (WBTP); L.E. Westman (NSS); Lt. Col. George Currie (DND); Major-General G.M. Letson (DND); Brigadier K.M. Perry (DND); G.K. Sheils (DMS); H.J. Carmichael (DMS); C.J. Mackenzie (NRC); and R.F. Thompson (Labour).
25. Ibid., "WBTP Report to the Deputy Minister for the Month of May 1942."
26. Ibid., LaFlèche to Westman, 9 July 1942.
27. Toronto Star 21 July 1942.

28. LaFlèche to Palmer, 23 July 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1481: file 2-133 pt. 2--NWS University and College Students.
29. Circular Memorandum 660 LaFlèche to All Chairmen and Divisional Registrars, 12 August 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1482: file 2-133-6 pt. 2--NWS Conference of Representatives of Universities and Deans of Engineering & Science Faculties.
30. Benoit to Robertson, 20 August 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1481: file 2-133 pt. 2--NWS University and College Students.
31. Dorey to LaFlèche, 25 March 1941; LaFlèche to Dorey, 28 March 1941. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1482: file 2-134--NWS Applications for Postponement Orders.
32. Benoit to Ranger, 3 June 1941. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1498: file 2-E-133: NWS University and College Students, Division E.
33. Thorburn to King, 9 October 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1481: file 2-133 pt. 2--NWS University and College Students.
34. Ibid., LaFlèche to Thorburn, 15 October 1942.
35. Ibid., Thorburn to King, 15 October 1942.
36. Ibid., Thorburn to King, undated.
37. Ibid., Turnbull to LaFlèche, 3 November 1942.
38. Ibid., Dorey to LaFlèche, 14 November 1942.
39. Firth to LaFlèche, 29 October 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1496: file 2-B-133--NWS University and College Students, Division B.
40. Ibid., LaFlèche to Firth, 3 November 1942.
41. Taché to Edwards, 20 November 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1481: file 2-133 pt. 2--NWS University and College Students.
42. Circular Memorandum 768, 30 December 1942, MacNamara to All Chairmen and Divisional Registrars. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1481: file 2-133 pt. 3--NWS University and College Students.
43. Embury to LaFlèche, 15 April 1941; LaFlèche to Embury, 18 April 1941. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1501: file 2-M-133--NWS University and College Students, Division M.
44. Ibid., Moats to Davis, 4 December 1941.
45. Ibid., Coldwell to Thorson, 5 December 1941.

46. Ibid., Davis to LaFlèche, 9 December 1941.
47. Ibid., Bickerton to Coldwell, 13 December 1941.
48. Ibid., Coldwell to Bickerton, 23 December 1941.
49. Ibid., Embury to LaFlèche, 29 December 1941.
50. Ibid., LaFlèche to Embury, 5 January 1942.
51. Ibid., Coldwell to Embury, 20 January 1942.
52. Ibid., LaFlèche to Embury, 14 March 1942.
53. Ibid., Embury to Taché, 4 December 1942.
54. Fennell to MacNamara, 18 January 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1481: file 2-133 pt. 4--University and College Students.
55. An intense debate had been ongoing since the summer of 1942 between government and university officials. Supported by influential press organs such as the Globe and Mail, Cyril James and Queen's Principal Robert Wallace proposed that Arts programs at Canadian universities be scaled back. On 9 January 1943, MacNamara addressed a special NCCU meeting and hinted that the time had come for the universities to "ruthlessly weed out the incompetent and mediocre students." He emphasized, however, that any changes in government policy would be made "after full consultation with university authorities. A Wallace motion to force some Arts students into the Armed Forces was defeated. It is interesting to note that academics have emphasized this January 1943 meeting while ignoring the critical August 1943 NCCU convention. See Gibson, To Serve and Yet Be Free pp. 206-212; McKillop, Matters of Mind pp. 531-535; and the Globe and Mail, 24 December 1942. Pilkington also devotes 20 pages to the January 1943 NCCU meeting, one of the "most dramatic episodes in the history of Canadian universities," while the critical August 1943 meeting is summarized in a single page. See Pilkington, "A History of the National Conference of Canadian Universities, 1911-1961," pp. 322-343.
56. Hanson to MacNamara, 16 June 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1481: file 2-133 pt. 3--NWS University and College Students.
57. Ibid., Hanson to MacNamara, 22 June 1943.
58. Henry to All Divisional Registrars, 23 July 1943. Five categories were outlined in this questionnaire: 1) Postponement of Students Under Section 12 (10) of Mobilization Regulations (five questions); 2) Period of Postponement Under Section 12 (7) of Mobilization Regulations (five questions); 3) Prompt

Service of Order-Military Training on Students Failing to Pass Term or Yearly Academic Examinations Required Under Section 12 (3) (c) of Mobilization Regulations (five questions); 4) Change of Address under Section 6 (12) and Section 6 (14) (six questions); and 5) General Remarks on Administration of Section 12 (one question).

59. Ibid., Responses to 23 July 1943, Questionnaire. All Registrars' responses are contained in this file except for the Toronto Registrar.

60. Henry to All Chairmen, 12 August 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1482: file 2-133-6 pt 2(a)--NWS Conference of Representatives of Universities and Deans of Engineering & Science Faculties.

61. Ibid., Adamson to Henry, 13 August 1943.

62. Ibid., 24 August 1943.

63. Ibid., Manson to 24 August 1943.

64. Ibid., Lajoie to Henry, 17 August 1943.

65. Ibid., Fortier to Henry, 19 August 1943.

66. Ibid., MacNamara Address to the NCCU, 30 August 1943.

67. Minutes of a Conference Between Representatives of the Member Institutions of the NCCU and the Director of NSS Held in Ottawa on 30 August 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1481: file 2-133 pt. 4-- University and College Students. Representatives from the DND, DMS, and WBTP were also present at this conference.

68. Brown to MacNamara, 14 September 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1482: file 2-133-6 pt. 2(a)--NWS Conference of Representatives of Universities and Deans of Engineering & Science Faculties.

69. Ibid., Riley to MacNamara, 14 September 1943.

70. Ibid., Sully to MacNamara, 16 September 1943.

71. Ibid., MacNamara to Sully, 18 September 1943.

72. Ibid., Smith to MacNamara, 2 September 1943.

73. Ibid., Neville to MacNamara, 25 September 1943.

74. Secret Circular Memorandum No. 59 Containing Interpretive Letter No. 5, 17 September 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1481: file 2-133 pt. 4: University and College Students. Interpretive Letters were used to highlight changes in

government policy that were not formed on an official statutory basis.

75.Owens to LaFlèche, 16 November 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1481: file 2-133 pt. 2--NWS University and College Students.

76.Owens to MacNamara, 30 September 1943; MacNamara to Riley, October 5, 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1481: file 2-133 pt. 5--University and College Students.

77.Ibid., Owens to King, 18 October 1943.

78.Ibid., MacNamara to Owens, 30 October 1943.

79.Minutes of the First Meeting of the University Advisory Board, 6 January 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1482: file 2-133-6--NSS University Advisory Board. Members of the Board were: 1)Humphrey Mitchell (Minister of Labour); Arthur MacNamara (Director of NSS); Paul Goulet (NSS); S.H. McLaren (NSS); J.C. Fogo (DMS); H.W. Lea (WBTP); Sidney Smith (President, University of Manitoba); H.J. Cody (President, University of Toronto); Monsignor Cyrille Gagnon (Rector, University of Laval); J.S. Thomson (President, University of Saskatchewan); and Paul Beique (Consulting Engineer, Montreal).

80.The 11 disciplines labelled as essential were: 1)Medicine; 2)Dentistry; 3)Engineering or Applied Science; 4)Architecture; 5)Agriculture; 6)Pharmacy; 7)Forestry; 8)Education; 9)Commerce; 10)Veterinary Science; and 11)Specialized courses in Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, or Geology.

81.Secret Circular Memorandum 70 Contained Interpretive Letter No. 7, 10 February 1944, that outlined the new system. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1481: file 2-133 pt. 5--University and College Students.

82.Ibid., Dymond to McLaren, 27 June 1944.

83.Ibid., Edwards to McLaren, 26 June 1944.

84.Ibid., MacNamara to McComber, 14 July 1944.

85.Ibid., Edwards to MacNamara, 5 August 1944.

86.Thompson, The University of Saskatchewan: A Personal History p. 129.

87.Montigny to St. Laurent, 16 November 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1481: file 2-133 pt. 6--University and College Students.

88.Ibid., Mingo to McLaren, 24 November 1944.

89.Ibid., Christie to MacNamara, 11 January 1945. All correspondence between Campbell and Manson was included in this letter.

90.Ibid., Manson to Campbell, 25 January 1945.

91.Minutes of the 27 November 1944, Meeting of the University Advisory Board. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1482: file 2-133-6--NSS University Advisory Board.

92.Ibid., Minutes of the 18 January 1945 Meeting of the University Advisory Board. The other two recommendations adopted at this meeting concerned the exclusion of discharged personnel from the proposed stringent regulations concerning students and the idea that courses which had already been subject to the 50% rule for the 1943-1944 session would not be reduced further in numbers.

93.Ibid., Minutes of the 29 May 1945 Meeting of the University Advisory Board.

94.MacNamara to Ranger, 12 May 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1481: file 2-133 pt. 6--University and College Students.

95.Ibid., Responses from UAB Members to Ranger, May 1945. On 16 May 1945, Ranger had sent all three recommendations to UAB members. Most university officials did not support the third recommendation, although R.C. Wallace from Queen's University did agree that all proposals seemed "right and proper."

96.Ibid., Minutes of the 24 August 1945 Meeting of the University Advisory Board.

Chapter 5
The Industrial Mobilization Survey Plan

In 1943 NSS introduced the Industrial Mobilization Survey Plan (IMSP), a scheme for identifying surplus workers in industrial establishments who could be released for military service. A year later the NSS supervision of the IMSP was mercilessly satirized in a poem, the "Charge of the Survey Brigade," that was widely circulated among DND officials:

CHARGE OF THE SURVEY BRIGADE

Surveys to the right of them
Surveys to the left of them
Surveys all over them
Ten thousand papers

Theirs not to reason why
Theirs not to make reply
Theirs but to survey or die
And fill out ten thousand papers

Honour the effort they made
Honour the time they gave
Manpower they could not save
But they filled out ten thousand papers¹

These verses highlighted one of the biggest problems of mobilization in Canada in World War II, namely, administrative incompetence and ineptitude. The IMSP was at once the most ambitious and most disastrous effort on the part of NSS officials to find the right balance between military and industrial needs. As such, it merits special attention in this study.

* * * *

The IMSP was launched immediately after the assumption of responsibility for military mobilization procedure by NSS. On 11 December 1942, Arthur MacNamara asked Dr. H. Carl Goldenberg, Director of the DMS Economics and Statistics Branch, to chair an inter-departmental committee to establish procedures for surveying all war plants so as to facilitate the orderly withdrawal of all callable men and to prevent the hoarding of manpower.² The Manpower Survey Committee (MSC), which included representatives of NSS, the DMS, and the Department of Labour, met for the first time six days later. At the second meeting, on 21 December 1942, Allan Mitchell, Director of the Employment Service & Unemployment Insurance branch of NSS, and Willard Scott, head of the NSS Survey and Deferment Division, proposed a trial survey to be conducted by DMS and NSS officials in the Toronto area.³ Subsequently, Scott personally surveyed the John Inglis Company in Toronto and consulted with other companies in the city about the feasibility of the proposed general survey. Next, on 3 February 1943, he submitted a full scale survey plan to the MSC.⁴ This plan was endorsed by Arthur MacNamara⁵ and then tested in 110 war plants in Toronto, Montreal, and Winnipeg. In July 1943 it was approved by the MSC for general application across the country.⁶

The IMSP (Military) established an Industrial Manpower Survey Committee (IMSC) in 12 of the 13 NSS Administrative

Divisions.⁷ Each IMSC had six members, two from NSS and one each from the DND, the DMS, the Divisional Mobilization Board, and the Employment Service. One of the NSS representatives acted as chair. Firms classified by the DMS as being engaged in essential military production were visited by special Employment Service investigators. Each plant was surveyed extensively through the completion of a detailed series of plant and worker questionnaires (Figure 1) designed to establish the medical category, essentiality, and employment history of each callable male employee. After consultation with a plant manager, the IMSC prepared a comprehensive plan that: (1) identified workers who could be called immediately for military service; (2) identified workers who could be given a postponement for a period of one to five months pending the training of replacements; (3) identified workers who could be postponed for a period of six months pending the further survey of a plant; and (4) identified workers who were essential to plant operations. On completion, a survey plan was forwarded for approval to the Mobilization Board in the district where the plant in question was located.⁸ The IMSP administrative machine was quickly established but a number of issues soon arose to prevent its smooth operation. First, serious disputes developed between many IMSC Chairs and Registrars and Mobilization Boards. Second, there was a lack of cooperation by DMS officials in the day to day work of the

E. O. S. S. OFFICE
 ABOVE SPACE FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

OCCU. CODE
 FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION SURVEY
 DEPT. OF LABOUR—NATIONAL SELECTIVE SERVICE
 USE FOR MALE EMPLOYEES ONLY

REF. PREV. SURVEY: LINE NO. _____ SHEET NO. _____ SHEET NO. **80**

FIRM NAME _____ PLANT _____ DEPT. **OUTSTOCK**

ADDRESS _____ CITY _____ PROV. **Ontario**

DATE **July 27th, 1944**

SURNAME	CHRISTIAN NAMES	PRESENT ADDRESS	DATE OF BIRTH	AGE
_____	_____	_____	Sept. 15/1922	21

ADDRESS AT TIME OF 1943 REGISTRATION	E.B.	P.D.	INSURANCE BOOK NO.	REG. WITH C. O. S. S.	REG. WITH W.A.T.S.	MARITAL STATUS					DATE OF MARRIAGE
						MAR.	SING.	WID.	SEP.	DIV.	
_____	128	204	L. 61031	No	X						Sept. 15/1943

DEPENDENTS			DO YOU OWN HOME OR RENT	PRESENT JOB TITLE	TIME EMPLOYED PRESENT JOB TITLE EITHER HERE OR ELSEWHERE	TOTAL TIME EMP. THIS FORM	PRESENT RATE OF PAY	SPEL. TITL. REQ.	CAN WORKER REPLACE
CHL.	OTHERS	TOTAL							
-	-	-	Rent	Shoulder Cutter	2 Yrs.	4 1/2 yrs	.67 Hr.	yes	no

YEARS OF EXPERIENCE

A. REGULAR OCCUPATION **Shoulder Cutter** **A. 2**

B. SECONDARY OCCUPATION **Warehouse Man** **B. 2 1/2**

C. SPECIAL SKILLS OR TRAINING **None**

D. FARMING EXPERIENCE: GRAIN DAIRY FRUIT OR VEGETABLE MIXED **D. None**

PREVIOUS JOBS OR OCCUPATIONS

1. **None**

2. _____

3. _____

4. _____

5. _____

6. _____

7. _____

8. _____

9. _____

IS ABOVE EMPLOYED: PERMANENTLY: **Yes** TEMPORARILY: _____ PART-TIME: _____

IS EMPLOYEE ON POSTPONEMENT OF MILITARY TRAINING? **Yes** IF SO, EXPIRY DATE: **Sept 30, 1944**

EDUCATION	MILITARY DISCHARGE CERTIFICATES PRESENT WAR	MILITARY REJECTION CERTIFICATES PRESENT WAR	ORDER MEDICAL NUMBER
P. I. 8 Yrs. Tech. J. 3 Yrs.	None	None	A-50000

THIS SECTION FOR USE OF REGISTRAR ONLY			THIS SECTION FOR USE OF COMMITTEE ONLY				
ORDER MEDICAL NUMBER	EXPIRY DATE OF POSTPONEMENT	MEDICAL CATEGORY	C.	P.P.	R.	C.T.	V.T.
				7.3			
NO. FILE	DISCHARGE CERTIFICATES	REJECTION CERTIFICATES	_____ CHAIRMAN				
			DATE _____				

Figure 1

IMSP Survey Form for Individual Workmen

IMSCs. Third, DND officials hampered progress by insisting that the plan was not meeting its objective of securing large numbers of men from industry for the armed forces. Fourth, and perhaps most critically, replacements for workers identified as callable for military service proved difficult to find. As always with NSS, there was a great deal of bureaucratic bungling.

In the early months of the IMSP, plans submitted to the district Mobilization Boards were altered in a wholesale fashion. In August 1943, the Toronto Mobilization Board, chaired by Ontario Chief Justice J.G. Gillanders, held back approval of surveys, endorsed by the Toronto IMSC Chair, S.R. Frost, of the Fleet Aircraft and National Acme companies. In response, Allan Mitchell called on MacNamara to intervene to avoid "looking ridiculous" in the eyes of employers in other regions soon to come under survey jurisdiction. Specifically, Mitchell requested that Frost be appointed as a full member of the Toronto Mobilization Board and that all Board members not sympathetic to the plans be excluded from consideration of them. Justice Gillanders assured MacNamara that the issue could be resolved without the help of Frost, but mounting pressure from NSS officials in Ottawa and a backlog of 50 surveys eventually forced Gillanders to accept both Frost and one other new Mobilization Board member. Gillanders also agreed to streamline approvals by breaking the newly constituted

Board of nine members into three units, with each unit responsible for approving the surveys assigned to it. For the moment this solved the problem in Toronto,⁹ but the issue of conflict between mobilization officials and IMSCs would long remain alive elsewhere in the country.

The attitude of DMS officials also continued to be a problem. Since the surveys were carried out in war plants under DMS contract, DMS participation at the local level was crucial. In many districts, however, IMSCs had to operate without the help of a DMS representative. Instead, ranking DMS officials in Ottawa chose to lobby NSS officials such as MacNamara and Scott to gain more deferments in individual plants. In October 1943, Allan Mitchell reported that he had been informed by the DMS that it could not supply full-time officers to serve on IMSCs.¹⁰ At the same time, the DMS insisted that its officials have an absolute veto over each plant plan. NSS rejected this claim for "overriding authority" and called on the DMS to participate as a full and equal partner in IMSC decisions at the district level.¹¹

This cooperation was not forthcoming, but DMS officials continued to protest the implementation of the IMSP. One such complaint came from D.W. Ambridge, Director General of the DMS Naval Shipbuilding Branch, who charged that the Babcock-Wilcox and Gordie McCulloch plants in Galt had been surveyed unfairly. Scott rejected this complaint on the

grounds that of the 302 men employed in these plants, only 16 were to be called immediately. He could not see, Scott wrote, how a "more impartial and scientific approach" could be adopted than that embodied in the survey process.¹² But the DMS was not mollified by such assurances, and in late 1943 called upon the Manpower Survey Committee to grant it veto power over all decisions. In rejecting this claim, Brigadier A.E. Nash, the DND Deputy Adjutant General, again called on DMS representatives to participate fully in all IMSC decisions. This would increase the confidence of Mobilization Boards in approving plans, cut down on the time lag between initiation and implementation of surveys, allow the DMS to gather better information on plants under contract to them, and better distribute available labour between the Armed Forces and war industry.¹³

In London, Ontario, where the DMS did choose to participate on an active basis, problems cropped up that reinforced its demand for more control. In the first months of 1944, the NSS representative on the London IMSC was completely occupied with his work as the district deferment officer, leaving the DMS representative, Major William Mayall, to assume the responsibility of going before the London Mobilization Board to lobby for individual postponements.¹⁴ When Mayall and other DMS officials became completely exasperated with this arrangement, Willard Scott asked J.D. Thomas, the London IMSC Chairman, to name a

new NSS representative to the IMSC.¹⁵ Scott also asked J.G. Fogo, the DMS Associate Co-ordinator of Controls, to stop "burdening" Mayall down with constant requests for individual postponements.¹⁶ This appeal was not heeded, and Mayall continued to appear before the London Mobilization Board demanding large numbers of postponements and the alteration of all survey plans. Scott complained to MacNamara that the "arbitrary changes" being made by the Mobilization Board under pressure from the DMS were resulting in a serious loss of prestige for the IMSC among local employers. Plant owners and superintendents in London viewed the Mobilization Board, and not the IMSC, as the more important arbiter of which workers were essential in a particular workforce.¹⁷

DMS concern that too many men were being called up contrasted sharply with complaints from the DND that not enough men were being found for military service. In August 1943, Brigadier Nash of the DND told MacNamara that reports from military officers were highly critical of the way the survey plans were being handled in all three districts in which the IMSP was then in operation.¹⁸ In Toronto, 48 plans had been submitted to the Mobilization Board and not a single one had been dealt with (the Toronto Mobilization Board had not yet been reconstituted). In Kingston, there was no representative from the civilian branch of NSS on the IMSC, a circumstance that made it difficult to replace men

withdrawn from plants for military service. The Canadian General Electric Company in Kingston had been surveyed three times without a final plan being adopted. Moreover, because of DMS and company lobbying, the third draft plan appeared "to be much more lenient than the first one." This debacle had led the Kingston Mobilization Board to invite all employers to its deliberations before giving final approval to any plan, a concession that would severely limit the number of recruits for military service. In Montreal, the Divisional Registrar had failed to act promptly to fill in the medical information on survey forms. As a result, not a single recruit had been produced from nine surveys.

These problems led Nash and other military officials to call for representatives of the armed forces to conduct the surveys in conjunction with the civilian investigators from the Employment Service. The presence of military personnel in war plants had been vigorously opposed by NSS officials since the outset of the IMSP. P.A. Masson, Regional Deferment and Alternative Service Officer in Montreal, foresaw "a nice mess" if the military was given any role in the surveys.¹⁹ From Kingston, IMSC Chair W.J. Hyssop reported that military representatives in his district were seeking passes to enter war plants to determine the essentiality of men but were being denied access by DMS officials.²⁰ On hearing this, MacNamara sternly rebuked Nash reminding him that only IMSCs could screen information

submitted to them by the civilian investigators.²¹ DMS officials also vehemently opposed a military presence in industrial plants despite continued lobbying from Brigadier Nash.²² Military officers were subsequently allowed to visit plants in the Toronto area on condition that their visits did not coincide with those of Employment Service investigators. Then, on 15 October 1943, Major General H.F.G. Letson, the DND Adjutant General, ordered military officials to cease casting public aspersions on the survey process. He also ruled that any further Army visits to war plants would need both the authorization of the managers of the plants concerned and the approval of district IMSC Chairs.²³ This simplified matters, but behind the scenes DND officials continued to complain about IMSP procedures for the duration of the war.

A more fundamental weakness of the IMSP was how to replace men ticketed for withdrawal from industry. Since the survey administration was under the mobilization rather than the civilian wing of NSS, a co-ordinated policy of providing replacements for men deemed callable was never forthcoming. IMSP officials at the district level insisted that they could not be burdened with the job of finding replacements for the men they chose to identify as suitable for enlistment. As early as July 1943, S.R. Frost informed Willard Scott from Toronto that he wanted the IMSC to assume more of an "executive character" and be free from any duties

not directly associated with the identification of callable men.²⁴ After noting that his IMSC was "not adequately organized" to handle the replacement problem, Frost later called for a "parallel organization" to work with his IMSC to coordinate replacements.²⁵ Ontario NSS officials, however, continued to insist that it was up to individual employers to contact local NSS offices to secure replacements.

Nor could this issue be resolved further up the IMSP hierarchy. Thus, when the MSC dealt with the matter on 20 October 1943, it was agreed only that all survey plans should be adhered to except "where changes in production or other valid reasons warranted variation of the approved plan." Allan Mitchell, Director of the Employment Service, told the MSC that his organization was "not prepared to guarantee replacements."²⁶ This issue was critical, since a man deemed expendable under the IMSP could not be issued an order for military training until a replacement had been found for him. Further meetings of the MSC failed to make any headway on the replacement issue, with most members insisting that Willard Scott should continue to report to General Riley of the NSS Mobilization Branch and not to Allan Mitchell of the Employment Service. A proposal to centralize the IMSP process under the direction of either Riley or Mitchell failed to win approval in late 1943.²⁷

Accordingly, the debate on the replacement issue

dragged on into 1944, with DMS officials continuing to line up squarely behind employers engaged in war production. In February, Major Mayall informed Ottawa DMS officials that although the IMSP had originally been viewed by employers with a fair degree of support, "innumerable pleas for relief" were now flooding DMS offices. This was because promised periods of postponement to train new employees were useless as long as the Employment Service was unable to supply replacements for men scheduled to be withdrawn.²⁸ By the same token, J.G. Fogo continued to report to Allan Mitchell that if the survey process was to succeed, it would be necessary for the Employment Service to "fill gaps which might occur."²⁹ From London, J.D. Thomas, requested that a district supervisor be appointed to monitor the whole issue of replacements for firms under survey. In Thomas's view the existing process was not "sufficiently co-ordinating men with mechanical abilities to replace younger personnel." What was needed was a more compact survey procedure that allowed the Employment Service to monitor men on deferment and provide replacements.³⁰ Willard Scott, however, refused to make this change. Undaunted, Thomas asked him in April 1944 to approve the sending of a nominal roll prepared from each plant survey to the local NSS office to co-ordinate replacements.³¹ Once again Scott refused, this time with a stinging directive in which he insisted that it was the sole responsibility of the employer to contact the

Employment Service for replacements. Even so, he was now forced to admit that the replacements had "never been organized in a thoroughgoing way" and that the surveys were "squeezing industry harder" than had been intended.³²

Reinforcing these negative currents in the operation of the IMSP at the district level was the remarkably inefficient handling of the plan's administration at all branches of the NSS organization. Problems in Quebec and the Maritimes typified the organizational paralysis and inefficiency of NSS officials. As early as July 1943, officials in Montreal reported that it was virtually impossible to secure stenographic help there and that this was leading to delay in the typing of plans to submit to the Mobilization Board for approval.³³ Jurisdictional problems also arose in Montreal. Leonard Prefontaine, NSS Regional Superintendent in Quebec, supported the claim of the Regional Placement Officer in the province, H.L. Perry, that the control of the IMSC in Montreal and Quebec City rested solely with him.³⁴ In the end, Arthur MacNamara was forced to step in to bring the procedure in Quebec into line with that in all other districts. In September 1943 General Riley told the Montreal Registrar, Raymond Ranger, that Perry should be brought into line to avoid the IMSP being viewed as "too much a child of the Employment Service", a view that could only detract from the singular goal of releasing men for military service.³⁵ By February 1944

Montreal IMSC officials were being forced to spend their own money to obtain stationery for typing the nominal rolls of plants in which surveys had been undertaken.³⁶

The wide array of problems experienced in the implementation of the IMSP caused some NSS officials to question the merits of the entire process. In January 1944, G.W. Ritchie, NSS Ontario Regional Director, told Arthur MacNamara that the IMSP was "far too cumbersome and complicated" and was "almost collapsing from its own weight."³⁷ According to Ritchie, Army officials had been complaining for months that few men were being obtained from the survey process. Ritchie recommended four changes to simplify the process: (1) that the only goal of the surveys should be to identify men callable for military service and that no effort should be made to deal with replacements or the gathering of information on workers in non-callable age brackets; (2) that the number of forms being used should be reduced; (3) that the investigators devote themselves solely to surveys and not be responsible for any other NSS work; and (4) that all IMSC members should be controlled directly by MacNamara. In practice, Ritchie's proposals for streamlining the process failed to move his Ottawa superiors. Nevertheless, aware of the increasing problems associated with the survey scheme, Willard Scott dispatched Alan George, his personal assistant, to travel across the country in the first four months of 1944. George's mission

was to establish IMSCs in districts where none were currently operating--Halifax, Saint John, Regina, Edmonton, and Vancouver--and to report on the difficulties being experienced elsewhere.

George expressed initial optimism about the activities of these newly-formed IMSCs, but even they soon ran up against the old difficulties. From Saint John, T.C. Crosbie, who was named the local IMSC Chair, complained that the Mobilization Board in his district was not dealing with surveys in an expeditious manner and that the medical examinations of potential recruits from war plants were not being co-ordinated in a proper fashion by the Divisional Registrar, Colonel E.J. Mooney.³⁸ The Maritime Regional Employment Officer, T.C. McIntyre, expressed similar reservations about the ability of the Halifax Divisional Registrar, Colonel Edgar Mingo, to co-ordinate the medical information required to complete the survey forms for individual workers in his district. MacIntyre complained that 23 surveys completed prior to 23 April 1944 had been held up deliberately by Mingo while he called for military service many men scheduled for postponement.³⁹ In the same vein, George reported to Scott about the disastrous and inefficient procedures being followed in the Quebec City Administrative Division. Those who had set up the survey system there were completely unqualified and had wilfully adopted wasteful and time-consuming methods that typified "a

certain temperament" in the province. George graded the effort as only 25 per cent of what it could and should have been. The Quebec Registrar had not been dutiful in calling men promptly for their medical examinations prior to the commencement of a survey, a circumstance which had now produced long delays. The root of the problem in Quebec City lay in the diffusion of industry over a wide area combined with "some politics and the temperament of the people." If affairs were managed properly and efficiently, the number of personnel in the district was more than sufficient to meet the need.⁴⁰

Despite these and other serious administrative and jurisdictional difficulties, NSS officials chose, in May 1944, to expand the IMSP process to encompass civilian industries. The idea of surveying civilian plants had been broached as early as October 1943,⁴¹ and increased demands for military personnel in 1944 forced the issue. In addition to securing men for military service, MacNamara sought to end the "considerable hoarding" of labour in civilian industries and to provide for the transfer of skilled workers from less essential to more essential positions.⁴² A survey conducted by the Economics and Statistics Branch of the Department of Labour confirmed the wisdom of this approach. Between 1 July 1943 and 1 April 1944 the number of men and women working in war related work in 600 major firms across the country had declined by 40,920

workers, while the civilian-oriented work in these 600 firms had shown a net increase of 23,755 men and women. Female war employment in these firms had declined by almost 10,000 persons, while civilian employment had increased by a similar number. With MacNamara's blessing, Willard Scott used this data to effect the expansion of the IMSP to all plants, both civilian and military.⁴³

A conference held in Ottawa from 31 May to 2 June 1944 gathered all the major players in the survey process to discuss the implementation of the expanded scheme. Although the existing problems in the IMSP structure were again documented and discussed, the proposal to add more work received a surprising endorsement from virtually all those present. On June 8 1944, Order No. 19, authorized by Humphrey Mitchell, rendered the decisions of the conference effective. This Order stipulated that an IMSC could survey a plant of any size; that every employer was required to abide by the IMSC decisions; that any employer could be directed to appear before an IMSC; and that any male employee between the ages of 16 and 41 could be ordered to other employment on the recommendation of an IMSC.⁴⁴ Mitchell went on national radio the same day to explain the changes. Claiming that "compulsion of this sort" was only acceptable when "less strenuous measures" had been ineffective, he emphasized that the primary aim of the expanded process was to release some men for military

service and to earmark others for compulsory transfer.⁴⁵

It is difficult to gauge the success of the civilian transfer component of the IMSP since no statistics were kept on the number of transfers obtained under its auspices. The fact that the civilian transfer provisions were deleted from the IMSP within four months indicates that the transfer of men from one industry to another did not meet with great success. Close to 18,000 men had been affected by the seven NSS Compulsory Transfer Orders in 1943, and it is doubtful that the new procedure was able to alter the composition of the workforce engaged in non-essential or essential production in any significant fashion.⁴⁶ Meanwhile, the military component of the expanded IMSP continued to be plagued by the same problems evident since its earliest days.

In Halifax, problems continued to centre on Colonel Mingo and the organization of NSS in his district. In July 1944, Mingo told S.H. McLaren, NSS Associate Director of Mobilization, that he could not fill his callup quota of 12 men per day due to the generous postponements recommended by the IMSC. Mingo noted that large companies seemed to be protecting medically fit men of callable age while smaller companies were being devastated by the IMSP. At the Halifax Shipyards, for example, 235 men had received a postponement of six months and of this number 205 were callable and medically fit.⁴⁷ Mingo complained that the quality of the

Employment Service investigators and their reports were "obviously unsatisfactory" and had resulted in the "regrettable ridicule" of all NSS activities.⁴⁸ Willard Scott rejected these "childish" accusations by ridiculing Mingo. He claimed that it "would be quite impossible to find common ground" with the Halifax Registrar.⁴⁹ Local DND officials also told McLaren that residents of Amherst opposed the "disgraceful" survey of the Canada Car Foundry in which large numbers of non-essential workers had been recommended for postponement by the Halifax IMSC.⁵⁰

In August 1944, Scott dispatched Alan George to the Maritimes a second time to solve these growing administrative problems. George subsequently criticized "unqualified" survey officers for hampering the Halifax IMSC. The Halifax Mobilization Board viewed the IMSC postponement recommendations with scepticism since "personal prejudices" influenced the IMSC decisions. This resulted in extensive alterations to the plans submitted to the Board for approval. George concluded that the entire Employment Service structure in the province was inefficient. Furthermore, J.C. Nicholson, the Halifax IMSC Chair, needed to be appointed to the Mobilization Board.⁵¹ MacNamara quickly addressed George's concerns. T.C. McIntyre, the NSS Maritime Regional Employment Officer, was scapegoated for allowing unqualified investigators to survey plants, and he was fired along with four of the five Employment Service

investigators. In September 1944, Arnold Frame replaced Nicholson as the IMSC Chair in Halifax.⁵²

In Ontario, administrative problems also continued to plague the IMSP. London IMSC Chair J.D. Thomas continued to highlight the poor coordination of the surveys. Skilled men who were laid off were not being directed to replace postponed men. He called for the complete overhaul of the replacement system and noted that the number of men being released from the military on medical grounds was "approaching the extent of a racket."⁵³ In Toronto, the Mobilization Board and DND officials expressed their disdain for the IMSP. In September 1944, a meeting of the NSS Ontario Regional Advisory Board focused on the IMSP. A motion to halt all plant surveys unless a Mobilization Board authorized them was tabled. Major R.J. Clapton spoke on behalf of the Toronto Mobilization Board. He claimed that surveys were useless and that the military authorities, in concert with the Registrar and the Board, could handle all postponement matters. H.C. McDermott, the new Toronto IMSC Chair, submitted his report of this meeting to Scott:

I do not recall having listened to any such lofty appraisal of a body of men [the Toronto Mobilization Board] as Major Clapton tried to give them. They are, in his opinion, supermen and require no such assistance as surveys might give them and the Registrar was in full accord with his remarks. The feeling of the Advisory Board is obviously not in favour of the survey. For some reason or other, this attitude seems to be sponsored chiefly by Major Clapton.⁵⁴

Only McDermott and B.G. Sullivan, the NSS Ontario Regional

Superintendent, supported the IMSP. McDermott believed that Clapton's "continuous hammering" away at the IMSP had turned the ambivalent members of the Advisory Board against the surveys.

In October 1944 Arthur MacNamara finally moved to counter these criticisms of the IMSP after Justice P.M. Anderson, the Regina Mobilization Board Chair, called for the cancellation of the entire program. MacNamara canvassed the 12 Mobilization Board Chairs to determine the level of support for the IMSP. He congratulated everyone involved in the administration of the surveys, but announced that many companies had been surveyed at least twice and the number of men in these plants available for military service was minimal. Lay-offs in many war industries had lessened the demand for tight control of the civilian labour force, and the survey results did not "justify the work and effort involved." MacNamara stressed, however, that any curtailment of the IMSP must not be viewed by employers as a sign that the urgent need for military personnel was slackening.⁵⁵

Given the widespread opposition to the plan in many areas since its inception, the responses to MacNamara's call for judgment of the IMSP were remarkably diverse. A.S. Cochrane, the Deputy Chair of the Toronto Mobilization Board, agreed with the Deputy Minister's assessment of the IMSP and insisted that any deferment requests should be

handled on an individual basis without the survey.⁵⁶ Cochrane pointed to the T. Eaton firm in Toronto as an example of the failure of the IMSP. Of the 3,722 men identified on survey forms, only 26 had been listed as non-essential, with only six members of this group being over 19 years of age. Several DMS officials, despite their refusal to participate actively in the process, felt that the surveys of civilian plants were useful for information dealing with rehabilitation and post-war employment issues.⁵⁷ Mobilization Board Chairs in Winnipeg and Edmonton where the IMSP was relatively new remarked that few plants had been surveyed more than once and that the surveys should be continued for at least six months to allow second surveys to be undertaken.⁵⁸ Even DND officials commented on the general use of the surveys in the prevention of labour hoarding. They urged MacNamara, however, to streamline the IMSP in view of the fact that many firms had few employees available for military service.⁵⁹

After MacNamara considered these responses, the civilian component of the IMSP was abandoned. As well, each IMSC Chair now could determine for himself if re-surveys of a specific plant were needed to release available men into the armed forces.⁶⁰ The final alteration to the IMSP occurred with the inauguration of the War Industry Reservists Plan (WIRP). On 2 November 1944, the MSC discussed methods to identify essential skilled men with at

least two years experience employed as draughtsmen, tool and die makers, tool designers, wood or metal pattern makers, and apprentices. All employees designated as War Industry Reservists working in plants devoted primarily to military production were granted unlimited postponements. This allowed these essential workers to be exempt from further IMSP surveys. The WIRP was authorized by PC 496 of 25 January 1945. Due to the outcome of the war in Europe, however, the WIRP was terminated less than four months later and only 437 were classified as War Industry Reservists.⁶¹

Despite the implementation of the modified IMSP and the WIRP, the survey scheme continued to experience administrative difficulties in the final ten months of the war. NSS still refused to address the replacement issue. In the Maritimes, companies refused to seek replacements for callable men. As a result, the Mobilization Boards in Saint John and Halifax simply extended the postponement period of all employees deemed callable by the IMSC. In December 1944, Willard Scott castigated W.M. Roberts, the NSS Maritime Regional Employment Officer, for failing to insist that all employers seek replacements from a local Employment Office.⁶² In the same month, the Canadian Legion complained that large numbers of men were on postponement in surveyed plants in the Toronto area. Although Scott agreed with the Legion's complaint, he flatly refused a request from J.C.G. Herwig, the Canadian Legion General Secretary,

to allow Legion officials to determine the essentiality of postponed men.⁶³

One of the more interesting and acerbic critiques of the IMSP in the closing months of its operation came from Leonard O'Brien, the owner of a lumber firm in Newcastle, New Brunswick and the M.P. for Northumberland. In November 1944, O'Brien had refused to have his firm surveyed. He insisted that the IMSP "was a lot of nonsense" and that the government simply discarded the survey information once it was collected.⁶⁴ On 18 January 1945, O'Brien wrote a scathing letter to Arthur MacNamara as an employer and a member of "whatever little is left of a supposedly responsible Canadian parliament."⁶⁵ He complained that there was "absolutely no control exercised" over the manpower situation. Several of his essential employees had been called for military service while others separated from employment with impunity. O'Brien claimed that there was a "plethora of strange men running about seeking silly surveys and what not" and that a complete stranger had arrived at his office to examine company records. Since local NSS officials could not identify this individual, O'Brien caustically noted that if "a Jap arrive[d] tomorrow" he had to "give him haven and be obsequious to him." He dismissed the entire NSS mobilization effort as "a complete debacle" that prevented the efficient mobilization of manpower. While regional NSS officials attempted to settle things with

O'Brien in an amicable fashion, his outburst revealed the dissatisfaction among many manufacturers with the IMSP in particular and NSS operations in general.⁶⁶

The IMSP sputtered to a halt in the closing months of the war. Administrative problems cropped up in virtually every Administrative Division. Scott expressed particular dissatisfaction with the activities of the two survey committees in Quebec. In February 1945, 90 surveys were delayed in Quebec City after all NSS stenographers had been ordered to take their holidays before the end of the current fiscal year. This decision resulted in the complete shutdown of the IMSP.⁶⁷ Even at this late date, IMSC officials were being fired in Quebec City for incompetence.⁶⁸ Scott condemned the IMSC handling of the War Industry Reservist scheme in both Montreal and Quebec City, terming the IMSC accounting of the WIRP in those places "just plain disgraceful."⁶⁹ DMS ambivalence about the IMSP remained evident. No DMS representative ever participated in the Quebec City IMSC deliberations. The local DMS official was stationed in Levis and was not granted travelling expenses to commute the short distance across the St. Lawrence River.⁷⁰ Finally, on 30 April 1945, Willard Scott notified all IMSC Chairs that no new surveys were to be started and that any further applications for postponement were to be made directly to the Divisional Registrars. Chairs were asked to complete all surveys in

progress up to 30 June 1945. This decision ended more than two years of bureaucratic and procedural wrangling involving the IMSP.

A statistical review of the IMSP from 1943 to 1945 reveals its remarkable scope. Tables 2-5 illustrate the regional variations in survey figures for firms that had been surveyed once, twice, three times and four times. Nationally, 4,331 individual firms had been surveyed at least once under the mandate of the IMSP; these firms had a total male employment of more than 825,000. Including re-surveys, 8,123 surveys were completed with the large majority of men surveyed residing in Ontario and Quebec. Due to the severe problems that plagued the IMSP, the number of men stripped from industry is difficult to gauge. If all men who were to be called immediately or who were called after a postponement of one to five months were actually taken on strength into the military, the IMSP channelled 76,493 men out of industrial employment into NRMA units. Administrators of the IMSP readily acknowledged the fact that most men given short postponements pending the training of replacements were never called for military service. Thus a large proportion of the number of men identified as being replaceable over a one to five month period, a total of 28,917 men, were undisturbed in their employment. Those men classified as being available for immediate call were not necessarily called by Registrars and those who were

Table 2
IMSP Statistical Summary for All
Plants Surveyed Once, 1943-1945

Category	Ontario	Quebec	Maritimes	Prairies	B.C.	National
Surveys	928	1,052	676	1,057	618	4,331
Men Employed	292,964	291,708	65,083	80,035	96,543	826,333
Subject to Call	72,835	95,812	19,250	19,167	22,213	229,277
Low Medical or Discharge (% of S to C)	41,063 (57.1%)	43,218 (45.1%)	12,082 (62.8%)	11,947 (62.3%)	12,438 (60.0%)	120,748 (52.7%)
Balance	31,772	52,594	7,168	7,220	9,775	108,799
N: Available for call (% of Balance)	9,071 (28.6%)	12,871 (24.5%)	2,366 (33.0%)	2,380 (33.0%)	2,785 (28.5%)	29,473 (27.1%)
1-5 month postponement (% of Balance)	6,705 (21.1%)	8,459 (16.1%)	1,027 (14.3%)	975 (13.5%)	2,481 (25.4%)	19,647 (18.1%)
6 month postponement (% of Balance)	13,636 (42.9%)	29,714 (56.5%)	3,042 (42.4%)	1,615 (22.4%)	3,096 (31.7%)	51,103 (47.0%)
Essential or Other (% of Balance)	2,360 (7.4%)	1,550 (2.9%)	733 (10.3%)	2,250 (31.1%)	1,413 (14.4%)	8,576 (7.8%)

(Source: NAC, RG 27, Volume 986: file 4--NSS IMS History)

Table 3
IMSP Statistical Summary for All
Plants Surveyed Twice

Category	Ontario	Quebec	Maritimes	Prairies	B.C.	National
Surveys	648	718	236	528	330	2,460
Men Employed	217,509	233,147	36,199	54,970	68,414	610,239
Subject to Call	54,576	78,154	10,307	11,916	15,442	170,395
Low Medical or Discharge (% of S to C)	37,929 (69.5%)	56,622 (72.4%)	7,096 (68.8%)	8,509 (71.4%)	10,768 (69.7%)	120,924 (71.0%)
Balance	16,647	21,532	3,211	3,407	4,674	49,471
N: Available for call (% of Balance)	3,899 (23.4%)	5,748 (26.7%)	1,067 (33.2%)	692 (20.3%)	1,299 (27.8%)	12,705 (25.7%)
1-5 month postponement (% of Balance)	3,095 (18.6%)	1,909 (8.9%)	361 (11.2%)	370 (10.9%)	1,098 (23.5%)	6,833 (13.8%)
6 month postponement (% of Balance)	8,568 (51.4%)	13,223 (61.4%)	1,534 (47.8%)	1,004 (29.5%)	1,704 (36.4%)	26,033 (52.6%)
Essential or Other (% of Balance)	1,085 (6.6%)	652 (3.0%)	249 (7.8%)	981 (39.3%)	573 (12.3%)	3,900 (7.9%)

(Source: NAC, RG 27, Volume 986: file 4--NSS IMS History)

Table 4
IMSP Statistical Summary for All
Plants Surveyed Three Times

Category	Ontario	Quebec	Maritimes	Prairies	B.C.	National
Surveys	450	359	21	147	156	1,133
Men Employed	169,667	119,187	5,036	25,564	44,230	363,684
Subject to Call	39,715	40,255	1,729	3,999	9,431	95,129
Low Medical or Discharge (% of S to C)	29,895 (75.3%)	33,007 (82.0%)	1,321 (76.4%)	2,527 (63.2%)	7,070 (75.0%)	73,820 (77.6%)
Balance	9,830	7,248	408	1,472	2,361	21,319
M: Available for call (% of Balance)	2,694 (27.4%)	897 (12.4%)	97 (23.8%)	270 (18.3%)	810 (34.3%)	4,768 (22.4%)
1-5 month postponement (% of Balance)	1,040 (10.6%)	397 (5.5%)	19 (4.7%)	170 (11.5%)	525 (22.2%)	2,151 (10.1%)
6 month postponement (% of Balance)	4,996 (50.8%)	5,544 (76.5%)	228 (55.9%)	375 (25.5%)	900 (38.1%)	12,043 (56.5%)
Essential or Other (% of Balance)	1,100 (11.2%)	410 (5.6%)	64 (15.6%)	657 (44.7%)	126 (5.4%)	2,357 (11.0%)

(Source: NAC, RG 27, Volume 986: file 4--NSS IMS History)

Table 5
IMSP Statistical Summary for All
Plants Surveyed Four Times

Category	Ontario	Quebec	Maritimes	Prairies	B.C.	National
Surveys	154	29			16	199
Men Employed	51,805	4,103			5,664	61,572
Subject to Call	13,978	1,443			1,294	16,715
Low Medical or Discharge (% of S to C)	11,256 (80.5%)	1,169 (81.0%)			1,028 (79.4%)	13,453 (80.5%)
Balance	2,722	4			266	3,262
N: Available for call (% of Balance)	521 (19.1%)	17 (6.2%)			92 (34.6%)	630 (19.3%)
1-5 month postponement (% of Balance)	259 (9.5%)	12 (4.4%)			15 (5.6%)	286 (8.8%)
6 month postponement (% of Balance)	1,718 (63.1%)	232 (84.7%)			149 (56.0%)	2,099 (64.3%)
Essential or Other (% of Balance)	224 (8.3%)	13 (4.7%)			10 (3.8%)	247 (7.6%)

(Source: NAC, RG 27, Volume 986: file 4--NSS IMS History)

called could be rejected by the Army for medical or other reasons. In Manitoba, for example, 1,452 men were ordered to report for military training between 1 October 1943, and 31 March 1944 after they passed the preliminary medical examination. Remarkably, 854 of these men were denied enrolment in the armed forces for a variety of reasons, including psychiatric problems and illiteracy.⁷¹ It is doubtful, therefore, if more than 10,000 men were inducted for NRMA duty under IMSP provisions. One final observation concerning the IMSP should be emphasized. Many workplaces were disrupted through the withdrawal of male employees, but no regulations existed to force a single man recruited under the IMSP to enlist for overseas duty.

Although the number of men released from industrial employment is difficult to assess, an examination of the data in Tables 2-5 reveals interesting patterns. The percentage of callable men in the workforce remained surprisingly constant. The percentage of employees in callable age classifications ranged between 26% and 28% for companies undergoing a first, second, third, or fourth survey despite the fact that those companies surveyed a fourth time were canvassed in the final months of the war. Those men in callable age groups classified as medically unfit for military service, however, skyrocketed during the course of the war. Only 47% of the men in plants surveyed a first time were classified as medically unfit, while more

than 80% of men in callable age categories were deemed medically unsuitable for military service or had been discharged in plants surveyed a fourth time. The survey patterns in Quebec stand out from other regions. The percentage of men granted six month postponements in Quebec exceeded the ratio in the rest of the country, increasing from 56% for first surveys to close to 85% for firms surveyed four times. The national average was 47% for firms surveyed a first time and 64% for plants surveyed four times. In Montreal, not a single postponement of one or two months pending replacement was asked for between 1943 and 1945. Significant proportions of callable men in the Prairie Region were labelled as essential because men on agricultural postponements were working on a seasonal or temporary basis in industrial employment.

Despite the impressive logistical achievement of the IMSP, the inability of NSS to administer complex mobilization procedures can be illustrated further by highlighting the failure of the process succeeding the IMSP, the Industrial Selection and Release Plan (ISRP).⁷² Established in May 1945, the ISRP reversed the IMSP and an Industrial Selection and Release Committee (ISRC), comprised of the old IMSC members, was established in 11 of 13 Administrative Divisions.⁷³ Under the ISRP, employers petitioned an ISRC to release essential former employees enrolled in the Armed Forces ahead of their scheduled

discharge dates. An ISRC weighed the merits of the application, issued a ruling, and forwarded the application to the Industrial Selection and Release Board (ISRB) in Ottawa for final approval. The centralized ISRB was designed to improve on the problems of de-centralization inherent in the IMSP. Unfortunately, the ISRP proved to be such an administrative nightmare that the centralized control embodied in the ISRB was abandoned in August 1945 and replaced by a system whereby the ISRC in each district appealed directly to the District Officer Commanding for the release of essential men. The painful prolonging of the ISRP during the Autumn of 1945 also mirrored the debate concerning the cancellation of the IMSP in October 1944. Arthur MacNamara queried a variety of government officials involved in the ISRP in October 1945 about the feasibility of cancelling the entire process.⁷⁴ Despite overwhelming support for the termination of the scheme,⁷⁵ the ISRP continued for six more months before it was terminated on 31 May 1946. Almost 25,000 men were granted early release under the ISRP.⁷⁶

* * * *

A review of the IMSP, therefore, reveals the somewhat inconsistent nature of the NSS mobilization effort. The IMSP operated in a remarkably negative bureaucratic

environment between the summer of 1943 and the end of the war in Europe. Despite repeated condemnation of the IMSP from a variety of NSS, DND, and DMS sources, it survived two reviews in May and October of 1944. Indeed, the scheme was expanded in June 1944 despite overwhelming evidence that it had not achieved its goal of releasing large numbers of men for military service. Plagued by administrative and jurisdictional problems, the IMSP nevertheless emerged as the primary NSS initiative designed to supplement NRMA regulations. Unfortunately, the chronic mismanagement of the IMSP superseded the remarkable logistical accomplishment of surveying thousands of firms and hundreds of thousands of workers. The IMSP, therefore, provides the best example of the innovative wartime measures adopted to mobilize Canadian human resources. More importantly, it also reveals fundamental weaknesses inherent in the NSS administrative organization.

NOTES

1. Davidson to McLaren, 15 September 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1504: file 10-1-2 pt. 4--NSS Industrial Mobilization Surveys.
2. MacNamara to Goldenberg, 11 December 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 984: file 4--Manpower Survey Committee.
3. Ibid., Minutes of the Manpower Survey Committee, 21 December 1942.
4. Ibid., Scott to Goldenberg, 3 February 1943.
5. Ibid., MacNamara to Scott, 6 February 1943.
6. Ibid., Minutes of the Manpower Survey Committee, 20 July 1943.
7. Surveys in the Charlottetown Administrative Division were to be handled by Halifax.
8. An excellent summary of the IMSP is contained in "History of the Industrial Mobilization Survey Plan." NAC, RG 27, Volume 986: file 4--History of IMS Plans.
9. Ritchie to MacNamara, 27 September 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1504: file 10-1-2-2 pt. 2--NWS MSC Division B, Toronto.
10. Mitchell to Hereford, 18 October 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1503: file 10-1-2 pt. 2--Industrial Mobilization Survey.
11. Ibid., Hereford to Mitchell, 27 October 1943.
12. Ibid., Scott to Ambridge, 27 October 1944.
13. Ibid., Nash to MacNamara, 25 October 1943.
14. Scott to Sullivan, 28 February 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1504: file 10-1-2-1 pt. 1--NSS MSC Division A, London.
15. Ibid., Scott to Thomas, 14 March 1944.
16. Ibid., Scott to Fogo, 28 February 1944.
17. Ibid., Scott to MacNamara, 21 March 1944.
18. Nash to MacNamara, 31 August 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1503: file 10-1-2 pt. 2--Industrial Mobilization Surveys.
19. Ibid., Masson to Scott, 27 August 1943.

- 20.Ibid., Westman to MacNamara, 24 September 1943.
- 21.Ibid., MacNamara to Nash, 27 September 1943.
- 22.Ibid., Westman to MacNamara, 5 October 1943.
- 23.Ibid., Letson to All District Officers Commanding and General Officers in Charge, 15 October 1943.
- 24.Frost to Scott, 10 July 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1504: file 10-1-2-2 pt. 1--NWS MSC Division B, Toronto.
- 25.Ibid., Frost to Sullivan, 29 October 1943.
- 26.Minutes of the Manpower Survey Committee, 20 October 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 984: file 4--NSS Manpower Survey Committee.
- 27.MacNamara to Scott, 8 November 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1503: file 10-1-2 pt. 2--Industrial Mobilization Surveys. All of these problems eventually forced NSS officials to address a national radio audience on 9 January 1944 to clarify many of the confusing details of the IMSP. See Scott to Anderson, 5 January 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1503: file 10-1-2 pt. 3--Industrial Mobilization Surveys.
- 28.Mayall to Gordon, 13 February 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1504: file 10-1-2 pt. 4--NSS Industrial Mobilization Surveys.
- 29.Ibid., Fogo to Mitchell, 18 February 1944.
- 30.Thomas to Sharpe, 14 January 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1504: file 10-1-2-1 pt. 1--NSS MSC Division A, London.
- 31.Thomas to Scott, 14 April 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1504: file 10-1-2 pt. 4--NSS Industrial Mobilization Surveys.
- 32.Ibid., Scott to Thomas, 20 April 1944.
- 33.Masson to Scott, 30 July 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1505: file 10-1-2-4 pt. 1--NSS MSC Division E, Montreal.
- 34.Ibid., Prefontaine to Masson, 23 September 1943.
- 35.Ibid., Riley to Ranger, 30 September 1943.
- 36.Ibid., Scott to Prefontaine, 14 February 1944.
- 37.Ritchie to MacNamara, 31 January 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1989: file 26-5-2.

38. Crosbie to Scott, 18 March 1944; Crosbie to Scott, 29 March 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1505: file 10-1-2-7--NSS MSC Division H, Saint John.

39. Ibid., McIntyre to Roberts, 22 April 1944.

40. George to Scott, 15 April 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1989: file 26-1.

41. Rutherford to Hereford, 4 October 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1503: file 10-1-2 pt. 2--Industrial Mobilization Surveys.

42. Minutes of the 4 May 1944 Meeting of the Manpower Survey Committee. NAC, RG 27, Volume 984: file 4--NSS Manpower Survey Committee.

43. Scott to MacNamara, 15 May 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1504: file 10-1-2 pt. 4--NSS Industrial Mobilization Surveys.

44. Order No. 19, 8 June 1944; Order No. 20, 8 June 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1989: file 26-5-1.

45. Humphrey Mitchell Radio Address, 8 June 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1504: file 10-1-2 pt. 4--NSS Industrial Mobilization Surveys. Labour unions expressed few reservations about the expansion of the IMSP into many civilian plants. Canadian Congress of Labour President A.R. Mosher promised to "cooperate in every way possible and participate to the fullest extent." Trades and Labour Congress President Percy Bengough was less supportive and asked that the government demonstrate the need of the plan before seeking his cooperation. See Mosher to MacNamara, 14 July 1944; Bengough to MacNamara, 16 July 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1504: file 10-1-2 pt. 5--NSS Industrial Mobilization Surveys.

46. See "Report on Transfer of Labour Under Compulsory Employment Orders 1-7 Inclusive, Reports to 15 February 1945." NAC, RG 27, Volume 3003--file Statistics & Reports on National Registration, Manpower, & Employment. The majority of the transfers made under these seven CTOs came in 1943 and early 1944, before the decision to expand the IMSP process.

47. Mingo to McLaren, 3 July 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1505: file 10-1-2-6--NSS MSC Division G, Halifax.

48. Ibid., Mingo to MacNamara, 3 July 1944.

49. Ibid., Scott to MacNamara, 7 July 1944. NSS officials reported repeated problems in their dealings with Mingo. T.C. McIntyre, NSS Regional Employment Officer, reported to Scott on 8 May 1944 that the feeling between Mingo and Army officials was "very bitter" and McLaren reported to MacNamara

in December 1944, that NSS "would be better off without this man. See McIntyre to Scott, 8 May 1944; McLaren to MacNamara, 1 December 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 3003: file A. MacNamara, 1943-1945.

50.Saunders to Mingo, 30 June 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1505: file 10-1-2-6--NSS MSC Division G, Halifax.

51.Ibid., George to Scott, 12 August 1944.

52.Ibid., George to Scott, 23 September 1944.

53.Thomas to McFarquar, 7 August 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1504: file 10-1-2-1 pt. 1--NSS MSC Division A, London.

54.McDermott to Scott, 27 September 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1504: file 10-1-2-2 pt. 3--NWS MSC Division B, Toronto.

55.MacNamara to Anderson, 7 October 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1504: file 10-1-2 pt. 5--NSS Industrial Mobilization Surveys.

56.Ibid., Cochrane to MacNamara, 16 October 1944.

57.Ibid., Kelly to MacNamara, ? October 1944.

58.Ibid., Harvey to MacNamara, 16 October 1944.

59.Ibid., de Lalanne to MacNamara, 19 October 1944.

60.Minutes of the Manpower Survey Committee, 2 November 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 984: file 4--NSS Manpower Survey Committee.

61."History of Industrial Mobilization Survey Plans." NAC, RG 27, Volume 986: file 4--History of IMS Plans.

62.Scott to Roberts, 6 December 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1504: file 10-1-2 pt. 6--NSS Industrial Mobilization Surveys.

63.Ibid., Scott to MacNamara, 14 December 1944.

64.Crosbie to Mooney, 3 November 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1505: file 10-1-2-7--NSS MSC Division H, Saint John.

65.Ibid., O'Brien to MacNamara, 18 January 1945.

66.It is difficult to gauge the support for the IMSP within the business community. On 3 November 1944, Willard Scott told Arthur MacNamara that he was sending more than 200 letters to him from business owners concerning the IMSP. These letters, unfortunately, have been purged from NSS files. In the early months of the survey, a plant owner in the London Administrative Division complained bitterly about the IMSP.

See Westman to MacNamara, 27 October 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1503: file 10-1-2 pt. 3--Industrial Mobilization Surveys; Scott to MacNamara, 3 November 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1504: file 10-1-2 pt. 6--NSS Industrial Mobilization Surveys.

67.Scott to Masson, 12 February 1945; Masson to Scott, 16 February 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 10-1-2-4 pt. 2--NSS MSC Division E, Montreal.

68.Masson to Scott, 7 March 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1505: file 10-1-2-5 pt. 2--NSS MSC Division F, Quebec City.

69.Ibid., Scott to Masson, 24 April 1945.

70.Ibid., Masson to Scott, 25 August 1944.

71.Adamson to MacNamara, 29 April 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-2-1 vol. 2--Packing Industry.

72.A good summary of the ISRP is contained in the "Report on the Operations of the Industrial Selection and Release Plan, 24 May 1945 to 31 May 1946." NAC, RG 27, Volume 3018: file Report on the Operations of the ISRP.

73.Charlottetown was handled through Halifax and Port Arthur was handled by the Winnipeg ISRC.

74.MacNamara to Sheils, 12 October 1945; MacNamara to Scully, 12 October 1945. NAC, RG 28, Volume 105: file 2-I-11--ISRP.

75.Ibid., Sheils to MacNamara, 13 October 1945; Scully to MacNamara, 15 October 1945.

76."ISRP Statistical Report No. 2." NAC, RG 27, Volume 1984: file 10--NSS ISRP Statistical Report No. 2.

Chapter 6 Coal Labour

Early in 1946, an intense debate developed within the Department of Labour concerning the reasons for the wartime failure to increase coal production in the massive Dominion Coal Company (DCC) mines in Nova Scotia. Maritime Regional Employment Officer Peter MacAulay, a former union official in the coal industry, insisted that a shortage of producers at the coal face had created a sellers market for labour and that this had allowed many coal workers to earn a satisfactory wage with a minimum of hours worked.¹ MacAulay concluded that a closed union shop, improved management techniques, mechanization, and age limits on coal miners should have been implemented during the war and represented the only hope for increased production in the postwar period. J.W. MacLeod, a special NSS coal consultant for Nova Scotia between 1943 and 1945, disputed MacAulay's analysis of wartime coal production declines and identified union militancy and irresponsibility as the sole reason for the failure to maintain coal output. Noting that coal production tripled on a daily basis during the pre-Christmas season as miners willingly sought more money for the holidays, MacLeod advanced this alternative view:

If Mr. MacAulay will study the records of coal production for the last twenty years, the statistics of absenteeism, the tie-ups, the stoppages of work, the violations of contract, the hollow unreality of so-called grievances, and the scheming tricks of the Communists and the hot air

artists planted and working in all local unions, he will have a better idea of the real causes of the low average coal production and he will be able to make a more correct diagnosis of the coal mining problems.²

Whatever the truth of these competing claims, there can be no doubt that the inability of NSS to regulate the coal labour force in Nova Scotia so as to prevent the decline in production that occurred represents the agency's most striking failure. No industry across the nation was subject to more control than the bituminous coal operations in Nova Scotia, particularly the massive production facilities of the DCC. This regulatory effort, however, foundered on the shoals of intense union opposition, as both the leaders and rank and file members of District 26 of the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) resisted Ottawa's plans. Combined with the loss of several thousand skilled miners due to enlistment in the armed forces, union militancy rendered the efforts of NSS ineffective. In his account of the 1941 slowdown strike in the Cape Breton coal fields, Michael Earle provides a useful account of events in the early years of the war from the perspective of District 26 members.³ Unfortunately, his analysis is incomplete because it does not take account of the evidence of NSS records. Not surprisingly, these records, which form the basis of what follows, add considerably to existing knowledge and facilitate a more balanced and comprehensive understanding of developments in wartime Nova Scotia.

* * * *

Despite the critical importance of lignite and bituminous coal for both industrial and domestic use, production declined in Canada from 18,225,921 short tons in 1941 to only 16,506,713 short tons in 1945.⁴ Bituminous coal output in Nova Scotia declined by almost 30% during this period, from a wartime high of 7,387,762 short tons in 1941 to only 5,112,615 short tons in 1945. In concert with transportation difficulties, declining coal production in the Maritimes forced Ontario and Quebec to become almost wholly dependent upon American coal imports. Between 1939 and 1942, American coal imports skyrocketed from less than 14 million tons to more than 25 million tons, a level that stayed fairly constant for the remainder of the war. In Nova Scotia, the DCC accounted for close to 60% of all bituminous coal mined in the province in 1941, with 4,357,065 short tons produced in the Company's Sydney mines. Although the DCC share of coal production in Nova Scotia remained fairly constant during the war, the Company's actual production fell to less than three million short tons by 1945. Productivity likewise declined. In 1941 the average coal output per man day was 2.049 short tons; by 1945, because of production disruptions and the NSS practice of channelling inexperienced or unskilled workers to the mines as replacements for miners who had enlisted, this

figure declined to only 1.579 short tons per man day. In the final months of the war, NSS officials abandoned all efforts to increase the production of coal in Nova Scotia and admitted that three years of concerted effort in this regard had yielded no tangible result.

Prior to the establishment of NSS in March 1942, few attempts to control any facet of coal mining operations were made. In 1922 Ottawa had created the Dominion Fuel Board to report on production problems in Canada's coal fields and to advise it on policy concerning the granting of subventions to the coal industry. The creation of the Wartime Prices and Trade Board (WPTB) in September 1939 by Order-in-Council PC 2516 resulted in the creation of the post of Coal Administrator, a position to which James McGregor Stewart was appointed on 18 October 1939.⁵ As originally envisioned, the job of the Coal Administrator was to supervise coal output and distribution, but over time more duties were added. On 6 June 1941, PC 4061 made coal an essential commodity under the Defence of Canada regulations, and transferred the functions of the Dominion Fuel Board to the jurisdiction of the Coal Administrator. In October 1941, the creation of the National War Labour Board (NWLB) extended mandatory cost of living legislation to all employees in essential industries including coal mining.

Thereafter, the NWLB played a key role in the coal labour problems that arose in Nova Scotia. To begin with,

longstanding grievances of coal miners with both coal companies and conservative UMWA leaders combined with wartime wage and price controls to ignite a year of labour unrest, which hit the operations of the DCC especially hard. A federal mediation panel attempted to solve lingering wage disputes in February and March of 1941, but rank and file unionists in Cape Breton launched a series of work slowdowns in defiance of UMWA directives calling on them to keep up coal production. Despite pressure from the UMWA international office and the appointment, in July 1941, of the tough minded Silby Barrett to control District 26 militants, a significant portion of Cape Breton miners continued illegal job actions during the summer and autumn of 1941. Only with the passage of legislation in September 1941 that tightened regulations governing legal strikes and prescribed harsh penalties for illegal work stoppages was full production resumed.

The slowdown strikes cast a long shadow over NSS efforts to increase coal production. Many of the most radical miners were elected to local and district union positions in 1942, and they were strongly opposed to NSS regulatory control. Moreover, one of the key issues in the slowdown strike remained unresolved into 1942. This was that the three largest Nova Scotia operators--the DCC, the Old Sydney Collieries, and the Acadia Coal Company--all had different basic wage rates. A report issued by the NWLB in

March 1942 called for continued 'supplementary negotiations' between the companies and District 26 officials to 'level up' the wage rates in these three firms. This report also recommended that the Dominion government should be responsible for paying increased wages if the companies were unable to do so.⁶ In practice, the latter recommendation enabled UMWA officials in District 26 to lobby company and government officials for increased wages for the duration of the war.

When NSS was launched, it had no more success in solving the problems of the coal industry than had previously been the case. Since NSS possessed little control over the civilian labour force before the passage of PC 7595 in August 1942, complaints of drastic shortfalls in coal mines all across Canada could not be addressed effectively during the summer of 1942. One possibility contemplated by NSS was a more lenient postponement policy for essential coal employees who were called up. This approach was resisted by DNWS officials, who remained in charge of military mobilization procedures until September 1942.⁷

Meanwhile, WPTB officials were warning of an impending national crisis in the coal mines and insisting that the most urgent problem was "the provision of an adequate and contented staff of mine labour."⁸ Nor could this problem be addressed by simply transferring unskilled or

inexperienced men to the mines, a strategy that would result in no increase in coal output. This observation was undoubtedly correct, but it would be largely ignored by NSS officials for the duration of the war. As events unfolded, the datal workforce in the Nova Scotia coal fields, an employee class encompassing all underground workers not working directly at the coal face, continued to expand during the war while the production workers declined in number. Between 1940 and 1944, the number of coal face workers declined by almost 29%, while the number of datal underground workers increased by more than eight percent.⁹ The hard reality was that while many datal workers possessed the skills and qualifications to work at the coal face, NSS did not have the authority to compel them to do so.

While the calls of the WPTB for immediate action could be deflected by NSS officials, UMWA demands could not be ignored. In the spring of 1942, festering labour resentments led the DCC to place full page advertisements in the Sydney Post-Record urging coal workers not to support their union.¹⁰ District 26 officials countered by attempting to establish production committees to register grievances with company officials. District 26 President Freeman Jenkins blamed the "bungling and indifference" of DCC executives for the decline in coal production.¹¹ By the same token, Charles Millard, Canadian Director of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee, maintained that the

Dominion Government's "vicious labour policy" of wage control was directly responsible for the decline in coal production. This trend, union leaders argued, could only be reversed if labour was made an equal partner in coal production. But while some NSS officials in Ottawa viewed the proposed establishment of labour-management production committees as the "germ of something which may prove to be of the utmost benefit,"¹² others interpreted the UMWA proposal as nothing more than a publicity gimmick designed to counter the DCC advertisements and to regain a measure of public sympathy after the 1941 slowdown strikes. J.W. MacLeod claimed that management had every right to be wary of entering into negotiations for the establishment of production committees. The UMWA men now calling for production committees had been the leaders of the "infamous and shameful" slowdown strike that had strangled production in 1941 and caused many miners to enlist in the armed forces to escape District 26 radicalism.¹³

If the idea of production committees was a non-starter, the NWLB call for a levelling up of wages was irresistible. After company and District 26 representatives failed to agree on how this would be done, NWLB officials recommended that a conference be held in Ottawa between Department of Labour, company, and union officials.¹⁴ At this gathering, which was held on 7 and 8 October 1942, preliminary agreement was reached on a union claim for more than

\$793,000 in wage stabilization. Since the Old Sydney Collieries company was able to pay its share of the levelling up funds, a balance of approximately \$550,000 would have to be paid by the government to many employees of the DCC and the Acadia Coal Company. Silby Barrett, the ranking UMWA official present at the Ottawa meeting, returned to Nova Scotia insisting that these wage disbursements had been promised on an annual basis and that no strings had been attached concerning production figures. Detailed negotiations between the UMWA and the companies followed, but these proved difficult, whereupon Barrett threatened further job action.¹⁵

This development led Minister of Labour Humphrey Mitchell to inform the union leaders in December 1942 that the government's arrangements with the companies over wage subsidies would be designed to bring long term stability to the entire coal industry. The intention of the government, he wrote, was: (1) that the disbursements would be within the range authorized at the October meeting in Ottawa; (2) that the agreement would "result in a materially improved rate" of coal production; and (3) that wages negotiated with the companies would be fixed for the duration of the war subject to cost of living increases granted by the NWLB.¹⁶ Noting that the NWLB had already granted close to \$2,000,000 in cost of living increases to DCC employees since the start of the war, Mitchell insisted that future production levels

must be commensurate with the goodwill the government had shown. In sum, wage increases and labour stability were firmly linked.

Silby Barrett and Freeman Jenkins, however, denied that they had promised to forego further wage increases for the duration of the war and insisted that the wage increase to be granted in the levelling up scheme must be retroactive to 1 October 1942.¹⁷ While Mitchell agreed that the issue of retroactivity could be discussed, he insisted that Barrett had already agreed to a wage freeze for the duration of the war once the levelling up was completed. In these circumstances, the further negotiations between union and DCC and ACC officials that commenced on 4 January proceeded with great difficulty. Barrett claimed that he had been "fooled completely" by Mitchell while in Ottawa, and DCC officials were incensed that the levelling up negotiations were viewed by the union as the starting point for massive wage increases.¹⁸ Arthur Cross, President of the DCC's parent company, Dominion Steel and Coal, complained bitterly to federal officials that wage concessions would not reduce absenteeism among District 26 workers or increase production. On the contrary, higher wages would only increase absenteeism in DCC operations and whet the appetite of UMWA officials for further salary increases. At the end of the day, however, the union and the companies made an agreement whereby \$560,000 of Dominion government money

would be distributed to selected employees of the DCC and the ACC.¹⁹

In addition to providing wage subsidies, Ottawa also sought to address the crisis in the coal industry by modifying its military recruitment policies. In October 1942, a directive provided that, on request, any employee in the iron, steel, and coal mining industries could postpone his military training to 15 February 1943.²⁰ Plans were also developed in late 1942 to release military personnel with coal mining experience back to the mines. This scheme initially applied to the Western provinces only, but was eventually extended to encompass the Maritimes as well.²¹ Since the tangible results of the release of large numbers of men from the armed forces would not be apparent until the second half of 1943, complaints from WPTB officials continued to pour into NSS offices in the final months of 1942. The Canadian National Railways began to dip into reserve coal stocks in October 1942.²² In that same month, James McGregor Stewart noted that the increasing dependence on American coal placed Canada in a highly vulnerable position in view of the massive wave of labour unrest sweeping American coal fields. Stewart insisted that "severe curtailment" of domestic coal usage would be necessary if the requisite numbers of men were not found and placed in coal employment.²³ WPTB Chairman Donald Gordon felt that NSS should be more diligent in directing skilled

men to coal employment. NSS Director Elliot Little, however, insisted that a piecemeal approach directed at individual workers would be "only a drop in the ocean" and would have "no perceptible effect" on the coal labour situation.²⁴

Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Arthur MacNamara, after relieving Little of his duties as NSS Director, continued to proclaim publicly throughout December 1942 that NSS had "practically cured" the labour and production problems in coal mines across the country.²⁵ MacNamara admitted that Little had envisioned sweeping measures designed to coerce men to report for essential employment, but he made known that no such action would be taken in the immediate future. Newspapers across the country, however, refused to support MacNamara's rosy assessment of the coal situation. The Montreal Standard called on the public to be ready to deal with an acute manpower shortage in coal employment and to "really shiver" in the coming winter months.²⁶ Noting that 4,000 coal employees nationwide had joined the armed forces, the Standard noted that "no existing legislation" could "replace them or compel them to return." Only Little's plan for the massive consolidation of the civilian labour force could solve the problem.

Continued WPTB demands for action on the coal labour issue finally spurred serious debate within NSS in January

1943.²⁷ The immediate background to this was a survey, urged by MacGregor Stewart and agreed to by Defence Minister Ralston, of all Army men stationed in Canada to determine the availability of experienced coal miners.²⁸ Around the same time, a WPTB survey showed that 1,700 men, including 938 certified miners, were urgently needed in Nova Scotia.²⁹ In these circumstances, Arthur MacNamara succumbed to Stewart's demands for concerted action and agreed, on 14 January 1943, to appoint a special committee to deal with the coal labour situation. In doing so, however, the Deputy Minister made the remarkable assertion that the massive labour shortfalls in the coal industry could be overcome "without a great deal of difficulty."³⁰

Chaired by C.F. Needham, the Coal Labour Survey Committee (CLSC)³¹ met for the first time on 19 January and remained the primary NSS advisory panel on coal labour problems for the first six months of 1943. In February 1943, the CLSC was empowered to investigate all matters relating to the production of coal. A variety of measures were discussed though not immediately adopted. Chief among these was a stepping up of the release of miners from military service and a proposal for a nationwide publicity and morale building campaign on behalf of the industry.

On 5 March 1943, the responsibility for managing the production of coal was transferred from the WPTB to the Department of Munitions and Supply. James McGregor Stewart

now became DMS Coal Controller and the majority of WPTB employees working on the coal problem switched departments with him. The Minister of Munitions & Supply was the formidable C.D. Howe, and he quickly made his presence felt within Department of Labour circles. Howe attacked the CLSC for providing no concrete solutions to the coal labour crisis and warned that the "alarming" possibility of massive production declines must be met with vigorous action.³² He also attacked the optimistic assessment of the labour situation that had been provided to him, a document in which Humphrey Mitchell had claimed that more than 3,300 men had been placed in coal employment across the nation.³³ Howe noted that this figure did not take account of separations from coal employment and that the majority of the coal placements had been farmers in the Western provinces who would be leaving coal employment to return to their farms on 1 May 1943.³⁴ Noting that 2,748 coal miners--1,700 of them in Nova Scotia--had enlisted between 1 April 1942 and 31 March 1943,³⁵ Howe asserted that the employment outlook in the industry was actually worse in the spring of 1943 than it had been at any time during the war.

Despite Howe's condemnation of the NSS record in relation to coal labour, no comprehensive measures were planned by NSS administrators in March and April of 1943 and business continued very much as usual. Working with the National Film Board, the CLSC continued to develop plans for

the inauguration of the proposed publicity campaign. In the same spirit, the special provisions concerning the postponement of coal miners applying to Mobilization Boards were extended to the autumn of 1943. But these were limited measures, as were proposals to undertake a survey on absenteeism, to revive the production committee idea, to reduce the income tax rate for coal miners, and to issue to the public "a full and frank statement" of the difficulties facing the government in this "most difficult of all labour supply problems."³⁶ Despite the hopes of NSS bureaucrats, the policy of returning military personnel to the coal mines was not very successful. Although 500 Army men had volunteered to return to coal employment in Nova Scotia, only 59 had actually been released.³⁷ For its part, the RCAF refused to countenance the temporary release of any personnel not destined for essential agricultural employment. In the week ending 27 March 1943, only 99 placements had been made in Nova Scotia coal mines, with a net labour demand for an additional 1,471 workers.³⁸ Moreover, problems continued to be evident in the workplace. Absenteeism remained an issue, and datal men with mining certificates were refusing to move to production positions at the coal face because of the increase in wages paid to all coal employees since the start of the war.

In effect, the first phase of the NSS response to the crisis in the coal industry in Nova Scotia came to an end in

April 1943. UMWA wage demands had been addressed, at least temporarily, through the levelling up scheme agreed to in January 1943. Some preliminary attempts to address labour shortages had been made through the automatic granting of postponement to coal miners and through the release of limited numbers of Army personnel. The Coal Labour Survey Committee had been formed to gather information and to report on all aspects of the labour crisis. Preliminary plans had been made to launch a national advertising campaign to boost morale and to highlight the necessity of men volunteering for coal employment, although no campaign had been formally approved or funded. Finally, NSS officials had been put on notice that more serious measures might be needed to address the situation in Nova Scotia. At a meeting of the CLSC in April 1943, committee members agreed that some form of compulsion might be needed to secure the required numbers of workers. In the event, the second stage of the NSS response to the employment problems of the coal industry would involve the greatest single effort of the government of Canada in World War II to control a segment of the labour force.

Not surprisingly, C.D. Howe provided the spark necessary to wake NSS officials from their lethargy. In a scalding denunciation of NSS policies, Howe went directly to Cabinet in May 1943 to demand that the labour situation in the coal mines be rectified. Claiming that it was

"unthinkable" for the War Committee of the Cabinet not to take "drastic action to forestall so great a calamity," Howe insisted that all production problems could be "wholly attributed" to the failure of NSS to provide an adequate labour force in the mines.³⁹ In practice, the War Committee rejected some of Howe's demands, but his basic argument was accepted. At the 4 May meeting of the Cabinet, it was agreed that authorization was needed to prevent miners from leaving coal employment and to compel all men with coal mining experience who were working in other industries to return to the pits. After brief consultations with company and union officials, Order-in-Council PC 4092 was issued on 17 May 1943. This Order added Section 210A to PC 246, the NSS Civilian Regulations, which had been issued in January 1943. All employees in other industries had to register at a local NSS office reporting coal experience, and all employers with knowledge of former coal miners in their employ had to submit that information to NSS officials. No man with coal mining experience was allowed to remain in other employment beyond 1 June 1943 without the approval of an NSS officer. All men rejected by the armed forces on medical grounds or because of conscientious objection could be directed to coal employment under Section 202 of PC 246. No coal miner would be accepted by the armed forces for enlistment until 1 February 1944, and all miners seeking postponement from military service were not to be

issued orders for medical examination or military training.

An extensive nationwide publicity campaign accompanied the adoption of PC 4092. Department of Labour press releases insisted that only a domestic solution would satisfy Canada's hunger for coal, and that the "extraordinary measures" of PC 4092 would "open Mother Earth's storehouse still further."⁴⁰ Full page advertisements describing the government's measure and the desperate situation in the coal fields appeared in major newspapers in all coal producing provinces during June 1943. The CLSC planned and coordinated a series of National Film Board productions about the coal industry.⁴¹ Humphrey Mitchell capped the advertising offensive with a national radio address on 14 July. Claiming that he had no intention of "unduly disturbing the public mind," Mitchell exhorted men engaged in coal mining to fulfil their "patriotic duty" and avoid any dispute that would disrupt production. He emphasized that the income taxes levied by the Dominion government did not, as UMWA leaders asserted, discriminate against coal mine workers.⁴² In a remarkably inept example of scheduling, Mitchell's broadcast was immediately preceded by a CBC "Production Front" broadcast that originated from the coal mines of New Waterford and Sydney. Reporter Allan May noted that the "chief cause" of resentment among the members of District 26 was the federal income tax. After interviewing several miners, May concluded that the miners

were justified in their grievances. To say the least, his assertion was an inauspicious prelude to Mitchell's plea for labour peace and increased production.⁴³

Not surprisingly, the Dominion government's efforts to resolve the coal production crisis provoked vigorous public debate. Following the passage of PC 4092, the Glace Bay Gazette condemned compulsory regulation, claiming that "more discontent" and "more aggravation" would result from the "ostrich policy" that the government was following.⁴⁴ Only improved working conditions, salaries, and income tax concessions, the Gazette asserted, would improve production, and any forced repatriation of ex-coal miners would only add a disgruntled class of employees to an already volatile labour mix. In August 1943, the Globe and Mail joined the attack. According to Globe editorialists, the decision of the DMS to ration coal showed "the failure of NSS to function even in extreme urgencies."⁴⁵ Production statistics provided by Humphrey Mitchell in the House of Commons countered positive NSS reports on the coal labour situation; the government's action "to restore coal production [had] been done too late, although the government was warned time without number over the past 18 months by its own officials that just such a situation lay ahead."

In a bid to address one of the UMWA's primary grievances, NSS officials formulated plans during the summer of 1943 to introduce a modified system of income tax

deductions for coal miners. In August 1943, District 26 officials protested to Humphrey Mitchell that increased rates of taxation on overtime work held back production, promoted absenteeism and dissatisfaction, and denied UMWA men the chance to provide the "necessities of life."⁴⁶ In fact, discussions had already commenced among officials of the Departments of National Revenue, Finance, and Labour looking towards the possibility of introducing a flat annual taxation rate for coal miners. Under existing tax rules, the wages a worker made in an individual pay period were assumed to be indicative of the wages earned over the course of a whole year. A miner working significant amounts of overtime, therefore, jumped temporarily to a higher tax bracket and a greater proportion of his wage was deducted from his cheque. To remedy this, government officials proposed that coal employees pay a constant flat tax rate based on projected annual earnings. After consultation with UMWA representatives, a modified income tax deduction for coal miners came into effect on 31 August 1943. All coal firms employing more than 25 employees were required to fill out forms indicating the expected annual earnings of each worker. The yearly pay was then correlated with existing tax tables and a constant tax rate was applied to the pay packet of an individual worker regardless of the number of hours worked or wages earned during the course of a two week or monthly pay period.⁴⁷

Despite the government's income tax concessions and big publicity campaign, the desired results of PC 4092 were not realized. Between 1 June and 31 August, 1,105 ex-coal miners in the Maritimes registered under the provisions of PC 4092. Of these, 351 were referred to coal employment, 444 were allowed, for medical or other reasons, to remain in their existing jobs, and, as of 1 September, 310 awaited disposition.⁴⁸ According to Michael Dwyer, the NSS Maritime Regional Superintendent, the entire registration process had "completely bogged down," with men simply producing medical examination certificates claiming an inability to perform coal work that were "not worth the paper they are printed on."⁴⁹ Men deemed fit for coal employment were simply appealing their medical examinations to NSS appeal boards. In the Minto area, 16 of 19 appeals were granted by NSS officials. In the New Glasgow area, Divisional Registrar Colonel Edgar Mingo set up an Army Medical Board with only one doctor instead of the normal two. Out of 40 ex-coal miners examined, 37 were judged to be medically fit to return to coal employment, but all 37 men appealed the decisions on the grounds that two doctors were not present. When Mingo sent two new doctors to examine the men, the new Medical Board judged 30 of the 37 appellants to be medically unfit for coal employment.⁵⁰

Additional NSS measures taken during the summer of 1943 did not result in any production gains. In July, Arthur

MacNamara issued a directive that gave coal mining priority over all industries in the use of available unskilled labour. Mine operators, however, pointed out that they were swamped with unskilled help and that only an increase in the number of producers working at the coal face would increase the output in the coal mines of Nova Scotia. To enlarge already bloated staffs would be to no avail.⁵¹ The effort to release coal miners from the Army, one of the pillars of the NSS plan to augment production, might have helped but it continued to yield frustrating results. Of the 2,200 miners who had been authorized for release by September 1943, 700 had withdrawn their applications to return to the pits or been sent overseas, 100 had returned to the Army, and only 970 had gone to mines across the country, with the remainder awaiting allocation.⁵² There were several attempts to smooth the process of release, but many DND officials resisted any suggestion that military personnel should be compelled to return to coal employment.⁵³ At the same time, UMWA demands continued to grow. With all residual issues arising out of the levelling up of wages at the DCC, ACC, and OSC settled by the summer of 1943, District 26 officials lobbied hard to level up wages at three other companies in Nova Scotia.⁵⁴ Finally, in the autumn of 1943, exasperated Department of Labour officials authorized all District 26 claims for levelling up of wages in the Nova Scotia coal industry in the vain hope that this further

concession to union demands would result in a corresponding increase in coal production.

In the same period, however, some NSS officials began to lobby Arthur MacNamara for more draconian measures to remedy the coal labour situation. Allan Mitchell, Director of the Unemployment Insurance Commission, noted that PC 2254 of 21 March 1942, the Order-in-Council establishing National Selective Service, empowered the NSS Director to coordinate the mobilization activities of all government departments in order to further the war effort "in all its phases." This power clearly permitted new and sterner measures to secure the release of skilled miners from the armed forces:

I do not believe that the coordination of manpower policy which is defined in the above wording has been put into effect. If this were so, we would not be carrying out the present cumbersome system of trying to secure soldier miners from the Armed Forces, but would merely through the centralized control exercised at Ottawa over manpower issues issue an Order that all soldier miners were to report at given military depots for transfer back to the mines.⁵⁵

In a remarkable response that highlighted his aversion to full scale compulsion of workers, MacNamara firmly rejected Mitchell's prescription. Noting that only Russia, Germany, and Japan would countenance such measures, MacNamara asserted that the existing NSS efforts in the coal mines of Canada were "pretty drastic" and that Mitchell's plan was neither "feasible nor practical."⁵⁶

The last major NSS initiative launched in the second half of 1943 centred on the extension of training classes to

facilitate the transfer of datal men to the coal face. Coal mining methods had changed radically since provincial mining laws were first enacted. The old 'Room and Pillar' method allowed two men to work together in one room, with these men responsible for all facets of the face operation including boring holes, blasting, cutting the coal, loading the coal, laying track, looking after ventilation, and putting up safety timbers. Because of the large area required for this method, it was difficult for foremen to provide close supervision, and producers had to be incredibly skilled in all phases of coal work. The 'Longwall' mining method in place in most Nova Scotia mines during the war, however, allowed many men to work together at the coal face under the supervision of a single foreman with no auxiliary duties such as laying track. NSS officials realized that this mining method allowed for the use of non-certified miners beside skilled coal miners with first class mining certificates.

To encourage datal men in this direction, NSS representatives attempted to inaugurate a series of training classes in the larger coal mines in Nova Scotia. But while the companies indicated a willingness to participate in the training scheme, UMWA officials refused to endorse it. Preliminary discussions between the companies and District 26 leaders in September 1943 resulted in the establishment of a small training class in Caledonia at the expense of the

DCC.⁵⁷ In the final months of 1943, however, any hope of continued UMWA cooperation evaporated in the face of the union's continuing demands for wage increases. The District 26 contract with the coal companies had expired on 1 February 1943, and a UMWA brief submitted to the NWLB had not been addressed. At the District 26 convention in October 1943, UMWA officials resolved not to support any training schemes. Wage increases of 15 to 17 million dollars annually, the union claimed, would settle all production shortfalls in the province.⁵⁸ In the same month as the convention, William Sneed, the former UMWA International Representative for Canada, advised MacNamara that all "fly-by-night" NSS training schemes should be abandoned in favour of immediate wage increases. In these circumstances, the training option was abandoned until the spring of 1944.⁵⁹

In the first five months of 1944 NSS did not attempt any new initiatives to increase the production of coal in Nova Scotia. District 26 miners were granted a one dollar per day increase in wages through an NWLB decision issued in December 1943,⁶⁰ and additional income tax concessions were granted to all coal miners in July 1944.⁶¹ The provisions of PC 4092 barring the enlistment of coal miners were likewise extended to 1 August 1944. In June 1944, a second attempt was made to start training classes at the DCC in cooperation with the union. Two classes were eventually

begun with a limited number of participants in the No. 1-B and No. 24 mines.⁶² Although company officials continued to support the training option, DCC General Manager T.L. McCall noted that the dollar per day pay increase had only resulted in higher rates of absenteeism and had further decreased the incentive for datal workers to move to producing positions at the coalface.⁶³ On the bright side, an Order-in-Council issued in March 1944 by the Nova Scotia government allowed males as young as 17 to work at the face if they were supervised by an experienced miner. More than 800 ex-coal miners were eventually returned to the Maritime coal fields under the registration provisions of PC 4092⁶⁴ and more than 2,000 soldier miners were working in coal mines across Canada by June 1943.⁶⁵ None of these measures, however, resulted in an increase in the production of bituminous coal in Nova Scotia.

Aware that more than a year of NSS activity had not improved the dismal production figures in Nova Scotia mines, coal company officials launched a concerted campaign in June 1944 to highlight existing labour problems to government officials in Ottawa. For his part, T.L. McCall detailed for E.J. Brunning, the new DMS Coal Controller,⁶⁶ the severe problem of absenteeism resulting from the increased wages being paid to District 26 employees.⁶⁷ McCall claimed that "the pick of our producers physically and as to loyalty" had enlisted in disgust after the slowdown strikes of 1941, and

that their replacements, secured through NSS, had been of poor quality. The absentee rate in DCC mines had increased from a daily average of 18.2 percent in May 1942 to 29.7 percent in May 1943. In the week in May 1944 that the DCC had paid the retroactive one dollar per day wage increase, the absentee rate among producers had reached a staggering 41.2 percent. In McCall's view, price controls gave well-paid producers an incentive to stop working once they reached an acceptable level of earnings. Datal workers also remained a problem; 625 of them in the employ of the DCC either possessed first or second class mining certificates or possessed skills that would qualify them to gain the necessary certificate to work in producing positions at the coal face. Nonetheless, they were not being transferred to where they were needed.

Brunning quickly brought this particular account of the failure of NSS efforts to the attention of Arthur MacNamara and other ranking officials in the Department of Labour. In view of production shortfalls in the United States and the possibility of increased demands on American coal after the Normandy invasion, the "serious deterioration" in the Maritime coal fields necessitated immediate action.⁶⁸ In 1939, Brunning noted, producers had composed 36.4 percent (2,274 workers) of a total workforce of 7,209. By April 1944, however, only 24.7 percent (1,554 workers) of the workforce was directly engaged in production. Comparing the

first five months of 1939 with the first five months of 1944, production had declined by 16 percent and the number of producers by 31 percent. As a result of various NSS initiatives, the mines were "flooded with non-producers"; the high rates paid to datal workers provided no incentive for them switch to production positions. Brunning called for an immediate NSS investigation into the production crisis; it was essential to induce datal men to move to the coal face and to change wage rates so as to achieve this.

In July 1944, more than two years after the idea of production committees had been rejected by NSS leaders as a publicity ploy of the UMWA, a desperate Arthur MacNamara endorsed the union's proposal. The first actual steps to get the committees going were taken at a meeting of Department of Labour officials, coal company executives, and UMWA leaders at the Isle Royale Hotel in Sydney on 12-13 July.⁶⁹ A wide variety of grievances were aired at this gathering. Company officials complained that absenteeism and deliberate union slowdowns were hampering production despite the large wage concessions that had been made to District 26 members. Union representatives countered by noting the "squalor" of the coal environment, the lack of pension and recreational opportunities for miners, and the closing of liquor stores in coal areas on Saturdays, a decision made by the Nova Scotia government on the recommendation of Humphrey Mitchell. After two days of

rancorous debate, four understandings were reached: (1) Joint Production Committees would be established and would meet twice per month; (2) pressure would be exerted on the Nova Scotia government to open liquor stores on Saturdays; (3) companies would improve recreational and community facilities in company towns; and (4) the formation of a coal commission would be sought to oversee the implementation of improvements in the industry.

Although NSS officials clearly viewed the establishment of Joint Production Committees as an alternative to more coercive measures, pressure continued to build in July and August of 1944 for more decisive action. Beginning on 30 July, workers at the Acadia Coal Company in Stellarton walked off the job for five days, an event that led ACC officials to document 40 cases of illegal work stoppages between August 1943 and August 1944. According to the company, in February 1944 14 miners employed at the ACC No. 7 mine had returned to the surface early despite being warned that they would be paid only for the hours they had actually worked. When the men received their pay packets two weeks later and discovered that their pay had indeed been docked, they and 15 other men had refused to work. Three entire shifts had subsequently failed to report for work over the next two working days and 325 tons of output had been lost.⁷⁰ Production at the ACC mines had declined by more than 10,000 tons in the first six months of 1944

compared with the same period in 1943, and absenteeism had only increased in response to the income tax concessions made in July 1944.⁷¹ To NSS Eastern Coal Consultant J.W. MacLeod the situation at Stellarton typified the "trivial causes" of the "chronic" strikes and tie-ups in the Nova Scotia coal fields.⁷² The majority of miners, MacLeod maintained, observed the rules of collective agreements, but they were "bedeviled by the noisy minority" involved in "factional union rackets."

The flood of criticism directed towards the government's handling of the coal labour force, the continued labour problems with UMWA men, and the declining coal production figures, led some NSS officials to challenge Arthur MacNamara to solve the crisis in the Nova Scotia coal fields through coercion. In August 1944, C.F. Needham called for "drastic disciplinary action" to be taken against miners and suggested, for the first time, that Compulsory Transfer Orders be used within mines to force datal men to work at the face.⁷³ Needham noted that the DCC producing class of 1,900 workers was 900 short of the required number while there was a surplus of datal men working in the DCC mines, including more than 600 certified miners. DCC officials likewise lobbied MacNamara through the DMS Coal Controller for tough action. The Company's position was that all previous NSS initiatives, including the wage increases and income tax rebates, had only exacerbated the

problem.⁷⁴ Several of MacNamara's key advisors, however, lobbied against calls for coercion of the coal workforce. M.M. Maclean, the Director of Industrial Relations, asserted that Needham was "not intimately informed" of the issues involved in the coal situation.⁷⁵ Needham was simply parroting J.W. MacLeod's viewpoint, a perspective that was "entirely out of touch" with both union and company sentiment (this ignored volumes of correspondence from company representatives endorsing Needham's views). According to Maclean, the Joint Production Committees would solve the problem. MacNamara agreed, and while admitting to Needham that he was "stymied" on the whole issue, would go no further than suggesting that the NWLB investigate the possibility of a further increase in the wage differential between datal and production workers.⁷⁶

Senior NSS officials in the Maritimes, however, supported the views of Needham and MacLeod. On 24 August, NSS Regional Superintendent Michael Dwyer told MacNamara that the records of the previous 40 years showed that every wage increase had been followed by an increase in absenteeism and a decrease in production. In Dwyer's view the time had come for the establishment of a permanent labour board with "final and supreme authority" over the coal industry.⁷⁷ The development of a new labour policy "with some teeth in it" would initially be resisted, but the majority of the workers would agree to the new rules and not

allow the "radicals to win if a strong hand [was] brought to bear in the first place." Dwyer undoubtedly made a strong case, but once again M.M. Maclean dissuaded MacNamara from acting on it. Dwyer, Maclean argued, had a "very biased" viewpoint and had swallowed the company line. The Joint Production Committees would solve the problem of absenteeism.⁷⁸

In effect, the second stage of the NSS response to the coal labour crisis ended in August 1944. While the most compulsory labour mobilization measures of the war had been instituted through PC 4092 of May 1943, coal production continued to decline steadily in the 16 months thereafter. Massive publicity efforts could not begin to address the real problem of a shortage of skilled miners. The release of coal miners from the armed forces, although the most significant source of men to augment producer staffs, proceeded with difficulty and could not fill the void created by the initial loss of skilled producers to the armed forces. Training classes were only marginally successful and were not supported by UMWA officials. Wage and income tax concessions designed to alleviate tensions within District 26 members led to greater levels of absenteeism rather than production gains. In desperation, the Department of Labour turned to Joint Production Committees as a way out but in practice these also failed to solve the problem. The result was that, having rejected

various calls for tough and concerted action, Arthur MacNamara and other NSS officials were reduced in the last months of the war to operating a tepid campaign of consultation and conciliation.

By contrast, officials of the Department of Munitions and Supply attempted to spur the government to take a more interventionist approach. In September 1944, Coal Controller E.J. Brunning lobbied C.D. Howe to wield his influence because massive government subsidies to the coal industry were not resulting in production increases. The Emergency Coal Production Board (ECPB), Brunning observed, had been formed in December 1942 to monitor Canadian coal production. To encourage output and to prevent companies from collapsing, the ECPB administered a series of production subsidies to companies. To 1 June 1944, the Dominion Coal Company and its subsidiaries had received nearly eight million dollars in ECPB subsidies, a figure that did not include any of the increased wage costs shouldered by the government. The "chief reason" for the operating losses coal companies in Nova Scotia were experiencing was the poor balance of producers within the coal labour force.⁷⁹ This being the case, Brunning called for an Industrial Mobilization Survey to be carried out in all coal mines. Medically fit datal men qualified to work at the face should be forced to do so or else face compulsory military service.

NSS immediately rejected this proposal. M.M. Maclean condemned it as a "great mistake,"⁸⁰ while H.C. Goldenberg, Chairman of the Manpower Survey Committee in Ottawa, noted that any survey designed to comb men out of coal employment would "create nothing but confusion and misunderstanding" since many men had been directed to the mines and frozen in that employment.⁸¹ For Maclean and Goldenberg the Joint Production Committees remained the only viable solution to the production problem. Brunning, however, refused to back down and insisted that a "correct proportion" of datal men to production workers be established. Dismissing the Joint Production Committees as irrelevant, he insisted that only the threat of conscription could force datal men to work at the coal face.⁸²

After C.D. Howe pressured Humphrey Mitchell to adopt Brunning's plan, a meeting of senior DMS and Department of Labour officials was convened in Ottawa on 25 September 1944. At this meeting, Arthur MacNamara admitted that the removal of the freezing provisions governing datal workers was an attractive option, but working against it was the possibility of widespread discontent among UMWA members. M.M. Maclean now finally admitted that the Joint Production Committees "would be too slow in adjusting the production problem," and that the training schemes established in March 1944 would not solve it either.⁸³ On their side, the DMS representatives present proposed that a survey of datal men

in Nova Scotia coal mines be carried out to gain an accurate and comprehensive picture of the composition and qualification of the datal workforce. Agreement was reached on this, and a Coal Labour Survey (CLS) form, modeled on the IMSP forms, was drafted within a week (Figure 2 and Figure 3). Each datal worker was required to report his qualifications for a production position and his reasons for remaining in datal employment. By the same token, employers were required to fill out a second form assessing the essentiality of each datal worker. Letters announcing the CLS were sent to all company and union officials on 2 October 1944. The first survey was undertaken at the DCC and eventually 11 Nova Scotia coal companies and 8,677 workers were canvassed.

In the face of increased official scrutiny of coal mining operations and the datal workforce, UMWA officials suddenly sought government support for a new conciliatory labour strategy. The Royal Commission on Coal had been formed in October 1944, chaired by Justice W.F. Carroll, to investigate the problems plaguing the coal industry across Canada.⁸⁴ District 26 President Freeman Jenkins informed E.J. Brunning on 5 October 1944 that the UMWA had adopted a "Summary of Proposals" calling for: (1) the union promotion of improvements in social conditions, housing, and recreation; (2) the creation of central production committees; (3) the union encouragement of "energetic"

Figure 2
Coal Labour Survey Employee Form

CHECK NO.
DATE

COAL LABOUR SURVEY
DEPT. OF LABOUR—NATIONAL SELECTIVE SERVICE

SURNAME	CHRISTIAN NAMES	PRESENT ADDRESS	DATE OF BIRTH	AGE

PLEASE PRINT ABOVE IN BLOCK LETTERS

EMPLOYED AT MINE
NAME OR NUMBER

AS SHOWN ON YOUR REGISTRATION CARD FROM NATIONAL REGISTERED MINE		DEPENDENTS				DO YOU OWN OR HOLD OR RENT	MARITAL STATUS					SITE OF MARRIAGE
ADDRESS AT TIME OF REGISTRATION	REGISTERED MINE	WIFE	CHILDREN	OTHERS	TOTAL	OWNED	WIFE	SEPARATED	DECEASED	OTHER		

PRESENT JOB TITLE _____ NO. OF MONTHS EXPERIENCE PRESENT JOB _____

DO YOU HOLD A MINE CERTIFICATE _____ IF SO, STATE IF 1ST. OR 2ND CLASS _____ DATE OF ISSUE _____

ARE YOU WILLING TO WORK AT THE MINE _____ IF NOT, STATE REASONS: _____

IF YOU HAVE NO CERTIFICATE—

HOW LONG HAVE YOU WORKED UNDERGROUND _____ IN WHAT CAPACITY _____ HOW LONG AT THE MINE WITH AN EXPERIENCED MINEER _____

ARE YOU WILLING TO TAKE EXAMINATION _____ IF NOT, STATE REASONS: _____

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN CALLED OR INTERVIEWED FOR THE ARMED SERVICES _____ IF CALLED, ORDER MEDICAL NUMBER _____

ARE YOU REGISTERED _____ IF SO, FROM WHICH SERVICE: ARMY NAVY R.C.A.F.

HAVE YOU BEEN CHARGED _____ ARE YOU OR POSTPONED _____

DO YOU OBTAIN AND COAL MINING LEAVE _____ IF SO, FROM WHICH SERVICE: ARMY NAVY R.C.A.F. RESERVATION NUMBER: _____

HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL ABILITIES _____ IF SO, STATE NATURE: _____

SIGNATURE _____

Figure 3

Coal Labour Survey Employer Form

SHEET NO. _____
 INSURANCE
 CODE NO. _____

CHECK NO. _____
 DATE _____

COAL LABOUR SURVEY
 DEPT. OF LABOUR — NATIONAL SELECTIVE SERVICE

FIRM NAME _____ MINE NAME OR NUMBER _____ DEPT. _____

ADDRESS _____ PROV. _____

SURNAME	CHRISTIAN NAME	PRESIDENT ADDRESS	DATE OF BIRTH	AGE

SEX	AGE AT TIME OF REGISTRATION	MARRIED	WIDOWED	SINGLE	SEPARATED	DIVORCED	DEPENDENTS			DATE OF MARRIAGE
							CHILDREN	OTHERS	TOTAL	

IS EMPLOYEE EVER BEEN CALLED OR QUARTERED FOR THE ARMED SERVICES? _____ ORDER MEDICAL NUMBER _____

IS EMPLOYEE OR REJECTER? _____ IF SO, FROM WHICH SERVICE? ARMY NAVY R.C.A.F. FORM NUMBER OF ANY MILITARY SERVICE CERTIFICATE PRESENT WAR _____

IS EMPLOYEE OR DISCHARGED? _____ FORM NUMBER OF ANY MILITARY DISCHARGE CERTIFICATE PRESENT WAR _____ IS EMPLOYEE OR POSTPONED? _____

IS EMPLOYEE ENLINED AND IN COAL MINING LEAVE? _____ IF SO, FROM WHICH SERVICE? ARMY NAVY R.C.A.F. RESERVATION NUMBER _____

IS EMPLOYEE ANY PHYSICAL DISABILITY? _____ IF SO, STATE NATURE _____

PRESENT JOB TITLE _____ COMPANY JOB CODE NO. OR PAYROLL _____ NO. OF MONTHS' EXPERIENCE PRESENT JOB _____

DOES EMPLOYEE HOLD MINING CERTIFICATE? _____ IF SO, STATE IF 1ST OR 2ND CLASS _____ DATE OF ISSUE _____

IS EMPLOYEE WILLING TO WORK AT THE FACE? _____ IF NOT, STATE REASON _____

IF EMPLOYEE HAS NO CERTIFICATE — DOES LONG HAS HE ORDER UNDERGROUND? _____ IS BRAT CAPACITY? _____ HOW LONG AT THE FACE WITH AN EXPERIENCED MINER? _____

RECEIVED TRAINING L.A.L. YES OR NO? _____ IS HE WILLING TO SET FOR EXAMINATION? _____ IF NOT, STATE REASON _____

DO YOU CONSIDER EMPLOYEE ESSENTIAL IN PRESENT JOB? _____

1944	TOTAL NO. DAYS WORK AVAILABLE	TOTAL DAYS EMPLOYE WORKED	DAYS EMPLOYEE LEFT DUE TO HOLIDAYS DEDUCTED ON 10TH FEB. 1944	TOTAL DAYS OFF EMPLOYE WORKED	TOTAL NO. DAYS EMPLOYE WORKED	GROSS EARNINGS	STATUTORY DEDUCTIONS	BALANCE	REMARKS
JAN.									
FEB.									
MARCH									
APRIL									
MAY									
JUNE									
JULY									
AUG.									
TOTAL									

USE REVERSE SIDE FOR REMARKS

education programs; (4) the development of company initiatives to improve management techniques; (5) the development of special machinery for union-management cooperation; (6) the formulation, with government assistance, of mechanization plans; (7) the support of government labour experts in union education plans; and (8) the granting of the union shop. Jenkins asked that the "Summary of Proposals" be accepted by DMS and the Department of Labour and that they in turn exert pressure on the coal companies to make it a joint labour-management brief to the Royal Commission.⁸⁵ Not surprisingly, some NSS officials jumped at the chance to facilitate union-company cooperation. M.M. Maclean told MacNamara that the UMWA document contained a "sound diagnosis" of the problems of the coal mining industry.⁸⁶ In late October, Maclean advised that a special conference of all interested parties should be convened to explore ways to adopt the UMWA plan.

MacNamara, however, rejected Maclean's calls for cooperation with UMWA officials. In a rare display of emotion, MacNamara informed his subordinate that he was disgusted with UMWA actions during the war and that the results of the CLS should be tabulated before any further action was contemplated.⁸⁷ In an even rarer move, MacNamara expressed his feelings about the union to C.B. Wade, the District 26 Economic Advisor, on 5 November 1944. Reiterating his belief that UMWA men were responsible for

production declines, MacNamara rejected the union proposals and insisted that the CLS would form the basis of a solution to the industry's problems.⁸⁸ Wade replied quickly; the union proposals, he wrote, should be considered an "integral part" of a larger process--including the CLS--designed to increase production and stabilize the coal labour force.⁸⁹ The Coal Labour Survey would not solve anything since the questions it contained were "mostly superfluous" and were viewed by the miners as being related to military service (a claim confirmed by several senior NSS officials).⁹⁰

Frustrated by the dismal production situation in Nova Scotia, some NSS officials sought to place the blame on other departments. Chief among them was L.E. Westman, the NSS Associate Director--War Industries, a position created in the summer of 1944. In two remarkable memoranda, one to E.J. Brunning (October 1944) and the other to Arthur MacNamara (November 1944),⁹¹ Westman admitted that virtually every NSS initiative had been a failure. The return of soldier miners to datal work rather than to production positions had been of limited value. Moreover, pay increases had bloated datal staffs, while the training schools had not been a factor of "any great consequence." Only three training classes were currently in operation at the Dominion Coal Company with a combined enrolment of less than 50 men. Westman blamed the DMS for the production declines. The real problem in Nova Scotia was not wages and

labour supply but working conditions. Until these were addressed, the "chronic problems" of the industry could not be solved.

As might be expected, DMS officials rejected Westman's analysis of the situation. Brunning's special assistant on coal matters, C.L. O'Brian, refuted Westman point by point. Although he admitted that the number of Army men working in the Nova Scotia mines was limited, O'Brian emphasized that those released from the military were the "steadiest workers in the pits."⁹² Again, while it was true that the number of men taking training classes had been "very low," there was a "greater interest" than ever in this option. As for conditions underground, the mines were in "the best of physical condition," and DCC officials were doing a "wonderful job of maintaining the facilities." In O'Brian's view, only the use of mechanical loaders in the larger mines could solve the labour problem, but these machines could only be introduced after a period of "long and careful experiment." A "mental condition" existed among Cape Breton miners that affected their outlook, and only the "utmost cooperation" between labour and management could overcome this.

NSS and DMS officials hoped that the CLS would be the preliminary step to an eventual shift of datal men to production positions, but in practice the CLS suffered from many of the same problems that plagued the Industrial

Mobilization Survey. The success of the CLS depended on two key considerations--a good response rate from the UMWA datal men and the subsequent interviewing of all men deemed qualified to work at the face. It was hoped that the majority of surveys would be returned by mail during October 1944, but the response rate during that month was "far from satisfactory."⁹³ By 7 November only 35 percent of the surveys had been completed; this forced NSS officials to issue 3,000 follow-up letters to miners urging them to fill out the CLS forms.⁹⁴ By 7 December, 75 percent of the surveys had been completed, but, with the final report scheduled for delivery on 15 December, the NSS representative supervising the survey, Peter MacAulay, asked that the plan to interview datal men be abandoned.⁹⁵ DMS officials immediately opposed this request; as C.L. O'Brian noted, the entire rationale behind the CLS was to use the biographical information on the forms to identify and interview the most promising datal workers. O'Brian agreed with UMWA officials that the CLS form contained many questions which were "not germane to the main point" of the survey.⁹⁶ In the middle of January 1945, the decision was made to interview approximately 550 Dominion Coal Company employees.

Remarkably, the interviews never occurred. In a February 1945 weekly report to MacNamara, Willard Scott, NSS Associate Director--Industrial Mobilization Survey, insisted

that personal interviews were unnecessary because CLS tabulations made it "sufficiently clear" why datal men were not going to the face.⁹⁷ More than 3,400 datal men possessed first or second class mining certificates, but close to 65 percent of the individuals in this group were over 40 years of age. Moreover, 63 percent of the 6,373 men who had completed the forms were either physically unfit for face work or had been declared essential by their employers. Although close to 800 of the men eligible for transfer had indicated that they would refuse, for a variety of reasons, to work in production positions, Scott maintained that a tighter control of the datal workforce would iron out many of the existing problems.⁹⁸ Specifically, he called for the adoption of five measures: (1) the institution of a five day week; (2) the close monitoring of extra shifts for datal workers to cut down on absenteeism and overtime; (3) the alteration of PC 4092 to allow NSS officials to compel men to positions within coal mines; (4) the return to the armed forces of soldier miners who refused to work at the face; and (5) the implementation of provincial measures to reduce the time needed to obtain a first class mining certificate. In a more subtle manner, Scott was advocating C.F. Needham's suggestion that NSS control be extended to the supervision of individual workers in coal employment, with qualified workers being forced to move to the face.

Scott's views had considerable support among NSS

officials, but Arthur MacNamara's actions ensured that nothing concrete would result from the CLS. J.W. MacLeod agreed with Scott that NSS should have power to compel certain men to work at the face but he also maintained that the 799 soldier miners working in Nova Scotia, 392 of whom were performing datal work, should be left alone.⁹⁹ Both company and NSS representatives supported the proposals for a five day work week and a clampdown on overtime shifts. MacNamara, however, failed to act and sent the the completed CLS tabulations to the Royal Commission on Coal for information purposes only.¹⁰⁰ The coal companies were not even given the opportunity to move men who had indicated on the survey forms a willingness to switch to production jobs. This was because individual responses to the CLS could not be released to management without the permission of the UMWA.¹⁰¹ As a result, many experienced men remained in datal posts in companies where no shortage of producers existed. In the mines of the Cumberland Railway & Coal Company, for example, 145 qualified datal men were willing to work at the coal face, but no production vacancies were available in that company's operations.¹⁰² At the same time, other companies in need of production workers did not have access to the information needed to identify them.

In truth, MacNamara had the support of many senior NSS officials in his de facto abandonment of regulatory control of the coal labour force. On 14 March 1945, L.E. Westman

told the Deputy Minister that "various expedients" might be tried to reduce the demand for 1,100 producers in the coal mines across Canada, but that it was "questionable whether the net result would justify the means."¹⁰³ Noting that a plan had been adopted to ensure that the soldier miners would not be interrupted in their employment, Westman succinctly summarized the position that NSS would now take for the duration of the war:

From the point of view of the present emergency, it can be said that no radical changes are likely to take place in respect to new developments of coal resources, improvements in working conditions and mechanization, labour relations, and absenteeism.

Defeatism was now also evident in Cape Breton itself. Thus, when Nathan Cohen resigned his editorship of the Glace Bay Gazette in March 1945, he denounced Cooperative Commonwealth Federation supporters in the UMWA for "creating confusion and distrust," and "sapping away" the internal strength of the union.¹⁰⁴ When the CCF dominated a union, he ventured, it would inevitably be "smothered by an atmosphere of inactivity on basic issues," and strikes were provoked by CCF members "at the expense of the war effort to serve their own purposes."

During the spring and summer of 1945, labour relations deteriorated in the Nova Scotia coalfields. On 20 February 1945, after the NWLB had rejected a union proposal for increased wages, a strike vote had been called by District 26 President Freeman Jenkins.¹⁰⁵ Despite Humphrey

Mitchell's public warning that this would not further the miner's cause and that a strike was forbidden under the provisions of the Wartime Wages Control Order, the vote carried and a series of tie-ups and work stoppages ensued. The most remarkable stoppage in production occurred in June, when UMWA miners in Glace Bay went on strike in support of a group of waitresses at the Glory Cafe who had been fired and were being denied their pay until they returned their uniforms. Local unions determined that cafe owner Lee Yen was "in league with other cafe owners in a move to smash the waitresses' union"; this made full UMWA support of the waitresses mandatory.¹⁰⁶ Two days were lost in the mines as a result of the job action. NSS officials denounced the UMWA leadership for their role in this and other disruptions. J.R. McDonald, the leader of the Glace Bay walkout, had served time in Dorchester Penitentiary for rape and assault, and J.W. MacLeod called on John Lewis, the international president of the UMWA, to suspend "this fine champion of waitresses" and any other local union leaders who participated in illegal strikes.

In other respects, however, NSS adopted a hands off approach to the problems of the industry for the remainder of the war. During this period, absenteeism continued to increase while production continued to go down. By June 1945, absenteeism had reached a daily average of 30 percent in the Nova Scotia coal industry--a rate characterized by

NSS officials as a "deliberate and calculated" attempt to produce more overtime work.¹⁰⁷ Production declined by six percent per month from January to June 1945, a situation made worse for the country by a simultaneous import cut of 10 percent in American coal.¹⁰⁸ In June, Humphrey Mitchell offered an increase of 25 cents per ton in the existing subsidy for coal, with the sum realized thereby to be divided among union members if the UMWA would agree to a contract for 12 months.¹⁰⁹ Key NSS officials, however, cautioned that decreasing production rates would be a "foregone conclusion" if datal wage rates were increased as a result of Mitchell's offer.¹¹⁰ NSS representatives welcomed the end of the war in the Pacific as an opportunity to extricate the Dominion government from the morass of the previous three years in the coal industry. With the return of thousands of men to Cape Breton and the nationwide early release of more than 600 coal miners from the armed forces under the Industrial Selection and Release Plan,¹¹¹ freezing regulations and compulsory direction of ex-coal miners were dropped in September 1945. Then, in November, despite the fact that the industry was still in a "precarious condition," PC 4092 and the emergency regulations governing the coal labour force were repealed.¹¹²

* * * *

The effort to regulate the labour force in the Nova Scotia coal fields vividly illustrates the remarkable difficulty NSS officials could experience in providing manpower for vital industry. NSS bureaucrats were given extensive regulatory authority over the coal industry but they were unable to stop the decline in coal output after 1939. To be fair, the enlistment of more than 3,000 experienced coal miners, more than half of them from the Maritimes, put the coal industry in a precarious labour situation from which it could not easily recover. Working against NSS initiatives also was the militancy of UMWA District 26. Despite the fact that, among seven major industrial groups, the increase between 1939 and 1945 in the wages of coal miners stood second only to the increase achieved in the same period by loggers, the UMWA remained militant.¹¹³ Faced with an acute labour shortage of skilled employees with specialized training and a festering labour relations environment, NSS officials were thrown on the defensive. With the issuance of PC 4092 in May 1943 and the adoption of the training scheme and publicity campaign approach, NSS became little more than a monitoring agency of the coal agency. In fact, not a single NSS initiative, apart from the failed CLS, was offered during the final 12 months of the war.

All of this allows a significant addition to be made to the historiography of the Maritimes during the Second World

War. Michael Earle's account of the 1941 slowdown strikes provides an important analysis of the coal labour force from the perspective of the UMWA District 26 militants. But his attempt to excuse illegal job action as a legitimate and valid expression of the egalitarian and democratic impulses of rank and file union members fails to take account of the pivotal role the UMWA played in frustrating measures designed to increase coal production during a period of national emergency. The history of the Dominion government's wartime efforts in relation to the Nova Scotia coal industry also calls into question certain other ideas about the treatment of the Maritimes in this period. Ian McKay and Gary Burrill have noted that the role of the federal government in Maritime economic development has been "primarily parasitical rather than productive."¹¹⁴ By the same token, Ernest Forbes has argued that Ottawa virtually abandoned Maritime economic interests during World War II apart from token gestures of financial aid.¹¹⁵ On the evidence presented here, however, the case can be made that no region of the country received such specialized wartime attention in the field of labour mobilization as did the Maritimes. To 31 March 1946, the Dominion government paid more than 18 million dollars in wartime production subsidies to Nova Scotia coal operators. This substantial expenditure, together with the remarkable degree of attention paid to labour force matters by NSS officials,

demonstrates the commitment of the Dominion government to industrial enterprises in the Maritimes between 1939 and 1945. Although the efforts made in relation to the Nova Scotia coal labour force must be viewed as a striking example of the failure of NSS to regulate the civilian workforce effectively, there can be no doubt about the commitment of the national government to Maritime industry.

NOTES

1. MacAulay to Roberts, 14 February 1946. NAC, RG 27, Volume 666: file 6-5-23-3-1 pt. 2--Coal Mining Reports, General Correspondence.
2. Ibid., MacLeod to MacNamara, 12 May 1946.
3. Michael Earle, "'Down With Hitler and Silby Barrett': The Cape Breton Miners' Slowdown Strike of 1941," Acadiensis 1988 18(1): pp. 56-90. Other useful accounts of the coal labour force after the end of the First World War are: David Frank, "The Cape Breton Coal Industry and the Rise and Fall of the British Empire Steel Corporation," Acadiensis 1977 7(1): pp. 3-34; David Frank, "Class Conflict in the Coal Industry; Cape Breton, 1922," in Greg Kealey and Peter Warrian, eds., Essays in Canadian Working Class History (Toronto, 1976); and Donald MacGillivray, "Military Aid to the Civil Power: The Cape Breton Experience in the 1920s," Acadiensis 1974 3(2): pp. 45-64.
4. All statistical material derived from the annual Coal Statistics for Canada, 1942-1946.
5. A superb summary of the government regulation of the coal industry during the Second World War can be found in the Report of the Royal Commission on Coal (Ottawa, 1946) pp. 532-563.
6. 'Report, Finding, and Direction of the NWLB in the Matter of an Application of UMWA District 26, 23 March 1942.' NAC, MG 28 I 103, Volume 33: file 7--UMWA District 26 Glace Bay, 1940-1942, pt. 1. The NWLB terms for a general contract settlement for all workers were eventually agreed to in July 1942. See Canadian Unionist July 1942 (vol. 16 no. 2) p. 43; Halifax Chronicle 15 July 1942.
7. LaFleche to Westman, 18 July 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 666: file 6-5-23-1 pt. 1--Coal Mining, General Correspondence.
8. Ibid., Report of J.R. Hill on the Coal Situation, 11 August 1942.
9. The number of producers declined from a monthly average of 3,878 in 1940 to only 2,754 in 1944, while the number of underground datal men increased from 7,004 to 7,582. The total number of coal miners, including surface workers, declined slightly from 12,949 in 1940 to 12,469 in 1944. See 'Coal Labour Survey.' NAC, RG 27, Volume 975: file NSS Submission to Royal Commission on Coal, Coal Labour Survey.

10. Sydney Post-Record 13 March 1942.

11. Minutes of UMWA Meeting to Establish Production Committees, 19 April 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 667: file 6-5-23-11 pt. 1--Coal Mine Production Problems, Nova Scotia.

12. Ibid., Unsigned Memorandum to Humphrey Mitchell, 14 May 1942.

13. Ibid., MacLeod to Robinson, 21 December 1942.

14. Ibid., Neilson to McCall, 26 September 1942.

15. Ibid., Barrett to Mitchell, 30 November 1942.

16. Ibid., Mitchell to Ling, Barrett, Scott, and Jenkins, 22 December 1942.

17. Ibid., Barrett to Mitchell, 31 December 1942.

18. Ibid., Cross to Mitchell, 5 January 1943.

19. It took almost six months before all details in the levelling up scheme were worked out. The original \$500,000 was to be split four ways: 1) \$285,000 to adjust general wage rates at DCC and ACC operations; 2) \$68,000 to adjust rates paid to machinists in the Dominion Steel & Coal Company to the rates paid in railroad shops of Dominion Steel & Coal; 3) \$70,000 to DSCC mechanics who did not receive a 10% wage increase in 1940; and 4) the balance to bring up rates of pillar work employees. In July 1943, \$470,000 of the levelling up money had been distributed, but \$34,000 of this sum had been paid to clerical workers in the employ of the Acadia Coal Company. The Department of Labour eventually paid an additional \$34,000 to be distributed to non-clerical employees. See Halifax Chronicle 2 February 1943; Canadian Unionist April 1943 (vol. 16, no. 11) p. 278.

20. Tache to All Divisional Chairmen and Registrars, 16 October 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 154: file 611-1-19-8 pt. 1--Coal Mine Labour Committee.

21. Letson to GOC Pacific and Prairie DOCs, 24 November 1942; Letson to Eastern DOCs, 13 January 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 666: file 6-5-23-2-1 pt. 1--Coal Mining, Army Men. Soldiers were allowed to be released for a three month period at the sole discretion of the commanding officer. Soldiers were not paid by the Army during this period.

22. NAC, RG 27, Volume 666: file 6-5-23-1 pt. 1--Coal Mining, General Correspondence.

23. Ibid., Stewart to Gordon, ? October 1942.
24. Ibid., Little to Gordon, 4 November 1942.
25. Vancouver Daily Province, 29 December 1942.
26. Montreal Standard, 26 December 1942.
27. Stewart to MacNamara, 13 January 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 666: file 6-5-23-1 pt. 1--Coal Mining, General Correspondence.
28. Stewart to MacNamara, 13 January 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 154: file 611-1-19-8 pt. 1--Coal Mine Labour Committee.
29. Roberts to Westman, 12 January 1943; Stewart to MacNamara, 13 January 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 666: file 6-5-23-1 pt. 1-- Coal Mining, General Correspondence.
30. Ibid., MacNamara to Needham, 14 January 1943.
31. The original name of this committee was the Coal Mine Labour Committee. The members of the CLSC were C.F. Needham, W.R. Roberts, Allan Mitchell, H.J. Riley, and C.L. O'Brian. All but O'Brian worked within the NSS structure, while O'Brian was a special assistant to the DMS Coal Controller.
32. Howe to Mitchell, 27 February 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 154: file 611-1-19-8 pt. 1--Coal Mine Labour Committee.
33. Ibid., Mitchell to Howe, 3 March 1943.
34. Ibid., Howe to Mitchell, 7 April 1943.
35. Ibid., MacNamara to Mitchell, 16 April 1943.
36. 'Industrial Morale Program in the Coal Mining Industry.' NAC, RG 27, Volume 666: file 6-5-23-1 pt. 1--Coal Mining, General Correspondence.
37. Ibid., Minutes of the Fifth CLSC Meeting, 21 April 1943.
38. Ibid., Mitchell to MacNamara, 6 April 1943.
39. Howe to Heeney, 4 May 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 154: file 611-1-19-8 pt. 1--Coal Mine Labour Committee.
40. Department of Labour Press Release, 11 June 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 666: file 6-5-23-1 pt. 2--Coal Mining, General Correspondence.

41. Ibid., Minutes of the Seventh CLSC Meeting, 7 June 1943.
42. Ibid., National CBC Radio Address of Humphrey Mitchell, 14 July 1943.
43. Ibid., 'Production Front' CBC Broadcast, 14 July 1943. May interviewed Jim Hayes, a 60 year old miner who had been working in the pits since he was 18. Hayes claimed he earned \$17.55 for five full shifts, but that he earned only an additional \$2.90 for a sixth overtime shift once he moved to a higher tax bracket.
44. Glace Bay Gazette, 18 May 1943. See also Halifax Chronicle 19 May 1943; Canadian Unionist August 1943 (vol. 17 no. 3) p. 67.
45. Toronto Globe and Mail, 24 August 1943.
46. Jenkins to Mitchell, 11 August 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 667: file 6-5-23-11 pt. 1--Coal Mine Production Problems, Nova Scotia.
47. Income Tax Commissioner to All Coal Companies, 16 August 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 155: file 611-1-19-8 pt. 3--Coal Mine Labour Committee.
48. Report on Registration of Ex-Coal Miners Under PC 4092. NAC, RG 27, Volume 155: file 611-1-19-8 pt. 4--Coal Mine Labour Committee.
49. Mitchell to MacNamara, 30 June 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 155: file 611-1-19-8 pt. 2--Coal Mine Labour Committee.
50. Report on Coal Mining Labour Supply in Eastern Canada, 9 September 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 666: file 6-5-23-3-1 pt. 1--Coal Mining Reports, General Correspondence.
51. Cross to Brunning, 30 August 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 155: file 611-1-19-8 pt. 4--Coal Mine Labour Committee.
52. Needham to Nash, 30 September 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 666: file 6-5-23-2-1 pt. 1--Coal Mining, Army Men.
53. Ibid., Macdonald to Mitchell, 21 October 1943.
54. Scott to Mitchell, 4 November 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 667: file 6-5-23-11 pt. 1--Coal Mine Production Problems, Nova Scotia. The three companies targeted were the Indiancove, Joggins, and Minto coal firms.

55. Mitchell to MacNamara, 4 October 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 155: file 611-1-19-8 pt. 5--Coal Mine Labour Committee.
56. Ibid., MacNamara to Mitchell, 8 October 1943.
57. Thompson to MacNamara, 13 September 1943; Dwyer to MacNamara, 22 September 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 155: file 611-1-19-8 pt. 4--Coal Mine Labour Committee.
58. Dwyer to MacNamara, 2 October 1943; Dwyer to MacNamara, 4 October 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 155: file 611-1-19-8 pt. 5--Coal Mine Labour Committee. In the light of continued union intransigence, Dwyer called for "a test of authority" and suggested that datal men be compelled to work at the face.
59. Ibid., Sneed to MacNamara, 28 October 1943. The UMWA finally agreed to start another training class in one mine of the DCC in December, 1943, although it took more than three months for the class to commence.
60. Report of the Royal Commission on Coal p. 550. See also Canadian Unionist April 1944 (vol. 17, no. 11) p. 268.
61. The compulsory savings portion of the income tax that was to be refunded after the war was eliminated in the budget speech of 23 June 1942. See McCall to Kelley, 10 August 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 667: file 6-5-23-10 pt. 1--Coal Mining, Coal Labour Survey. The compulsory savings tax had been levied in 1942 and the refund paid after the war included two percent interest. See David Slater, War Finance and Reconstruction: The Role of Canada's Department of Finance, 1939-1946 (forthcoming: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996) Chapter 6.
62. Needham to MacNamara, 14 June 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 666: file 6-5-23-1 pt. 3--Coal Mining, General Correspondence.
63. McCall to Brunning, 7 June 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 667: file 6-5-23-10 pt. 1--Coal Mining, Coal Labour Survey.
64. 'Registration of Ex-Coal Miners Under PC 4092.' NAC, RG 27, Volume 155: file 611-1-19-8 pt. 7--Coal Mine Labour Committee.
65. Mitchell to MacNamara, 30 June 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 6-5-23-2--Coal Mining, UIC Reports.
66. Brunning replaced Stewart as Coal Controller on 6 July 1943.

67. McCall to Brunning, 7 June 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 667: file 6-5-23-10 pt. 1--Coal Mining, Coal Labour Survey.

68. Brunning to MacNamara, 5 June 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 666: file 6-5-23-1 pt. 3--Coal Mining, General Correspondence.

69. Minutes of Joint Production Committee Meeting, 12 July 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 667: file 6-5-23-11 pt. 1--Coal Mine Production Problems, Nova Scotia.

70. Ibid., Report No. 36--Acadia Coal Company.

71. Ibid., Production Report of Acadia Coal Company, Intercolonial Coal Company, and Greenwood Coal Company.

72. Ibid., MacLeod to Needham, 3 August 1944.

73. Needham to MacNamara, 5 August 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 667: file 6-5-23-10 pt. 1--Coal Mining, Coal Labour Survey.

74. Ibid., Brunning to MacNamara, 11 August 1944.

75. Ibid., Maclean to MacNamara, 12 August 1944.

76. Ibid., MacNamara to Needham, 16 August 1944. Evidence was readily available that a significant wage differential already existed. On 2 September 1944, NWLB Chairman Justice M.B. Archibald wrote to MacNamara with the wage information for DCC workers. In June 1944, 5,097 datal workers earned an average of \$6.21 per day, while 1,600 producers earned an average of \$9.44 per day. Even Archibald noted that wage increases had only increased absentee rates, with younger datal men taking advantage of high absentee rates among older workers to remain in datal work and receive extended overtime work schedules. See *ibid.*, Archibald to MacNamara, 2 September 1945.

77. Dwyer to MacNamara, 24 August 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 667: file 6-5-23-11 pt. 1--Coal mine Production Problems, Nova Scotia.

78. Ibid., Maclean to Brown, 29 August 1944.

79. Brunning to Howe, 11 September 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 667: file 6-5-23-10 pt. 1--Coal Mining, Coal Labour Survey. Basically, the ECPB subsidy program paid operating losses plus standard profits or fifteen cents per net ton of marketable coal, whichever was less.

80. Ibid., Maclean to Brown, 15 September 1944.

- 81.Ibid., Goldenberg to Brunning, 15 September 1944.
- 82.Ibid., Brunning to Goldenberg, 16 September 1944.
- 83.Ibid., Minutes of Meeting to Deal With Coal Mining Situation in Nova Scotia, 25 September 1944.
- 84.Angus Morrison from the Calgary UMWA and Justice C.C. McLaurin from Calgary rounded out the Commission's membership.
- 85.Jenkins to Brunning, 5 October 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 667: file 6-5-23-11 pt. 2--Coal Mining Production Problems, Nova Scotia.
- 86.Ibid., Maclean to MacNamara, 23 October 1944.
- 87.Ibid., MacNamara to Maclean, 1 November 1944.
- 88.Ibid., MacNamara to Wade, 4 November 1944.
- 89.Wade to MacNamara, 7 November 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 667: file 6-5-23-10 pt. 1--Coal Mining, Coal Labour Survey.
- 90.H.R. Pettigrove admitted that NSS officials had no authority to compel workers to move from datal to producing positions. The CLS, however, might "by inference" indicate to datal men that medically fit men would be called for military service unless they volunteered to work at the face. See *ibid.*, Pettigrove to Maclean, 14 October 1944.
- 91.Westman to Brunning, 26 October 1944; Westman to MacNamara, 13 November 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 666: file 6-5-23-1 pt. 3--Coal Mining, General Correspondence.
- 92.Ibid., O'Brian to Westman, 31 October 1944.
- 93.George to Scott, 1 November 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 667: file 6-5-23-10 pt. 1--Coal Mining, Coal Labour Survey.
- 94.Ibid., George to Scott, 7 November 1944.
- 95.MacAulay to Scott, 7 December 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 667: file 6-5-23-10 pt. 2--Coal Mining, Coal Labour Survey.
- 96.Ibid., Undirected O'Brian memo, 22 December 1944.
- 97.Ibid., Reports of Associate Directors for Week Ending 3 February 1945.

98. A full report on the Coal Labour Survey is found in NAC, RG 27, Volume 975: file NSS Submission to Royal Commission on Coal, Coal Labour Survey.
99. Connolly to Scott, 28 February 1945; MacLeod to MacNamara, 6 March 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 667: file 6-5-23-10 pt. 2--Coal Mining, Coal Labour Survey.
100. Ibid., MacNamara to Brunning, 21 March 1945.
101. Ibid., Burchell to Howland, 5 October 1945.
102. Ibid., Brunning to MacNamara, 22 March 1945.
103. Westman to MacNamara, 14 March 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 666: file 6-5-23-3-1 pt. 1--Coal Mining Reports, General Correspondence.
104. Ibid., MacLeod to Westman, 17 March 1945.
105. Humphrey Mitchell Radio Address, 19 February 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 666: file 6-5-23-1 pt. 3--Coal Mining, General Correspondence.
106. MacLeod to Robinson, 30 June 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 667: file 6-5-23-11 pt. 2--Coal Mining Production Problems, Nova Scotia. A similar dispute with Glory Cafe management had erupted in 1943, with 4,000 workers staging an illegal work stoppage to support striking waitresses. See House of Commons Debates 21 June 1943 p. 3827; and Halifax Chronicle 29 June 1943.
107. Westman to MacNamara, 9 May 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 666: file 6-5-23-3-1 pt. 1--Coal Mining Reports, General Correspondence.
108. Westman to MacNamara, 18 June 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 666: file 6-5-23-1 pt. 3--Coal Mining, General Correspondence.
109. Ibid., Mitchell to Jenkins, 19 June 1945.
110. Westman to MacNamara, 9 May 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 666: file 6-5-23-3-1 pt. 1--Coal Mining Reports, General Correspondence.
111. 'Statistical Report No. 2, Industrial Selection and Release Committee.' NAC, RG 27, Volume 984: file 10--NSS ISRP.

112. Brunning to MacNamara, 13 November 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 666: file 6-5-23-1 pt. 3--Coal Mining, General Correspondence.

113. The 1945 wage rates expressed as a percentage increase over 1939 wage rates for seven major industries were as follows: 1) Logging--61 percent; 2) Coal Mining--45 percent; 3) Manufacturing--43 percent; 4) Service--36 percent; 5) Construction--31 percent; 6) Transportation and Communication--29 percent; and 7) Metal Mining--28 percent. See Report of the Royal Commission on Coal p. 304.

114. Gary Burrill and Ian McKay, eds., People, Resources, and Power: Critical Perspectives on Underdevelopment and Primary Industries in the Atlantic Region (Fredericton, 1987) p. 5.

115. Ernest Forbes, "Consolidating Disparity: The Maritimes and the Industrialization of Canada During the Second World War," Acadiensis Spring, 1986 (15:2) pp. 3-27.

Chapter 7 Halifax Longshoremen

In the summer of 1950, Captain R.F. Spring, Controller of Loading Operations in the Port of Halifax, commented as follows on a proposal that would have eliminated or altered his position as supervisor and co-ordinator of longshoremen on the Halifax docks:

My own opinion is that the present method of despatching labour to the various waterfront operations is a good one and should not be discarded or interfered with. If it is I do not see any alternative but a return to the former system of 'have a look' which was supplanted by the present one, and which has undoubtedly been a benefit to Halifax as a whole and will continue to be so if any future crises arise.¹

In thus defending his job, Spring was also standing up for a system that was one of the great wartime successes of NSS and the Department of Labour. Utilizing the sweeping powers granted to them to co-ordinate the civilian labour force, NSS officials were able to transform fundamentally patterns of longshore work that had prevailed in Halifax for decades. Moreover, this transformation endured into the postwar period--in marked contrast to many of the other changes NSS put into effect. By definition, the story of the Halifax docks in World War II constitutes an important chapter in the badly neglected history of longshoremen in Canada.² That story also exemplifies the positive side of government intervention in the labour market in wartime Canada.

* * * *

Business in the Port of Halifax quickly boomed after the declaration of war in 1939. Table 6 shows the increase in cargo tonnage handled in the port between 1939 and 1946. In keeping with these figures, the number of deep sea or ocean going vessels arriving or departing from the port

Table 6
Annual Cargo Tonnage in the Port of Halifax, 1939-1946³

Year	Inward Cargo Tonnage	Outward Cargo Tonnage	% Halifax to Canadian Total
1939	1,266,656	997,532	7.6
1940	1,727,052	1,611,537	11.1
1941	2,746,418	2,569,714	17.8
1942	2,282,758	3,103,064	24.4
1943	2,658,129	3,492,906	26.8
1944	2,587,753	3,670,537	24.8
1945	2,800,877	2,982,167	19.2
1946	1,738,442	1,647,270	12.5

increased from 3,116 in 1939 to a peak of 7,067 in 1943. Gross cargo tonnage of all ships increased from a wartime low of 2.26 million tons in 1939 to a maximum level of close to 6.3 million tons in 1944. Not surprisingly, change of this magnitude had serious implications for the hiring of longshoremen and the organization of their work. Prior to 1939, the 'have a look' or 'shape-up' hiring method

dominated longshore labour practice in Halifax. Men seeking work would arrive at a dockyard to be selected on an individual basis by a gang foreman. No central agency existed to constitute permanent gangs of skilled stevedores, and longshore work was highly irregular and casual in nature. Halifax dockworkers were unionized under the Halifax Longshoremen's Association (HLA), a branch of the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA),⁶ and the HLA kept a tight rein on membership. To assure the smooth handling of wartime cargo, therefore, Department of Labour and NSS officials had to address two key issues. First, the HLA would have to be persuaded to provide a considerable number of additional longshoremen to deal with the increased traffic. Second, the notoriously inefficient 'have a look' hiring scheme would have to be replaced with a system that could allot regular gangs of workers to ships loading or unloading cargo. In practice, these requirements were not addressed in a comprehensive fashion until late 1943.

The first meeting between Department of Labour officials and the parties concerned with longshore operations in Halifax occurred in February 1941. At this gathering, Minister of Labour Norman McLarty heard a variety of complaints from the shipping companies about the intransigence of some HLA workers and the failings of the 'have a look' system of hiring. As a result of this discussion, the HLA agreed to admit temporary members, or

cardmen, into the union for the duration of war, to increase the number of day gangs, and to begin a limited number of night shifts. As well, the HLA and the employers agreed to the appointment of an arbitrator to settle future differences between them.⁵ Subsequently, by PC 1706 of 10 March 1941, Vincent MacDonald, Dean of the Law Faculty at Dalhousie University, was named to this position. Despite these changes and HLA promises to increase union membership on a voluntary basis, problems continued through 1941. In August, McLarty met with employer representatives about the continuing failure of the HLA to supply enough workers. Only 208 cardmen had been added to union ranks, and the employer representatives maintained that only 800 of the 1,300 registered longshoremen showed up regularly for dock work. This poor turnout was causing a decline in the volume of tonnage handled. While MacDonald's appointment as arbitrator was applauded by the spokesmen for the shipping companies, they also noted that he did not have the statutory authority to require needed change.⁶

In December 1941, the HLA, led by A.M. Sullivan, and the employers reached on their own a Working Agreement designed to alleviate the problems which had arisen.⁷ This agreement guaranteed a day wage rate of 77 cents per hour and a night wage rate of 88 cents per hour (exclusive of war bonuses) but left the HLA responsible for finding "sufficient numbers" of workers to ensure the prompt

unloading and despatch of ships. The HLA now promised to use "all its powers to prevent irregularity of attendance." This was promising; but the employers were soon reporting that haphazard hiring schemes and irregularity of attendance were rendering the Working Agreement invalid, despite the accession of a more co-operative HLA President, Peter Garnier. George Huband of the British Ministry of War Transport informed C.D. Howe in January 1942 that words could not express the "extreme seriousness" of the Halifax situation.⁸ Despite the addition of 350 cardmen to the HLA, the number of longshoremen in Halifax could not handle the increasing demands of wartime traffic.

In response to all this, the Department of Labour appointed MacDonald to study the situation and submit a report that would form the basis of a complete reorganization of work in the port. MacDonald subsequently met with Colonel A.N. Jones of the Shipping Committee of the Halifax Board of Trade, Garnier and Sullivan of the HLA, and a variety of other Port officials.⁹ He submitted his report, which ran to 38 pages, on 12 February 1942. MacDonald concluded that the "haphazard hiring system" of rounding up individual men at dock gates when ships arrived and firing them the moment work ended was completely outdated. To improve conditions, the 'have a look' system of hiring individual workers would have to be replaced with a system that permitted the hiring of gangs of skilled

workers. Altogether, MacDonald made fourteen recommendations. He also advised that the changes required should be made through Order-in-Council rather than through negotiation between the employers and the union. The HLA should be required to admit enough cardmen to its permanent membership to bring this group to a strength of 1,200; by the same token, it should be required to grant an additional 800 temporary cards to bring its overall strength to 2,000. Moreover, a Controller should be appointed to wield supreme authority in all port matters, and a central despatching agency formed to deal with the problem of absenteeism and the need for properly constituted work gangs.

As a result of MacDonald's report, PC 1758 was issued on 9 March 1942. It called on the Minister of Labour to prepare a "wartime plan for the re-organization of ship loading and unloading operations in the Port of Halifax." Under this plan, the following steps would be taken: (1) a Controller of Loading Operations would be empowered to coordinate all dock activities; (2) the 'have a look' hiring scheme would be abolished and longshoremen would be called at regular times; (3) all cardmen would be admitted to the HLA with full privileges and additional temporary cardmen would be recruited to bring the longshore labour pool to 1,700 men; and (4) the daily hiring of individual workers at the job site would be abolished and all longshoremen would be hired in fixed, permanent gangs through a central

despatching agency. Men who refused to work without a valid excuse would lose their dock permits.

After Minister of Labour Humphrey Mitchell travelled to Halifax for discussions with the HLA, part of Ottawa's plan was put into effect by PC 3511 of 30 April 1942. Under this Order, the Controller was given authority over all Port matters with the exception of wage rates. The 'have a look' system was to be abolished and all existing and future cardmen were given "complete equality with permanent members" of the HLA with respect to hiring and working privileges. A Central Despatching Agency (CDA) was to be established and gangs were required to work at night when so directed. For the position of Controller the government recruited Vincent MacDonald; John J. Green of the Eastern Canada Stevedoring Company of Montreal was named Port Loading Superintendent; and Charles Train was brought from the Vancouver dockyards to organize the central despatching system.¹⁰

MacDonald wasted no time getting to work. After submitting an office budget appropriation of \$8,900 for a two month period beginning 1 April 1942, and an additional estimate of \$28,600 for 1942-1943, he demanded that the despatching of longshore workers be taken completely away from the offices of the Unemployment Insurance Commission and that he be given a "free hand" in organizing the CDA.¹¹ Although the offices of the UIC were not formally

incorporated as part of the NSS structure until September 1942, plans were already afoot to use them as employment offices under NSS regulations. Arthur MacNamara's view was that the CDA should be incorporated as a UIC office to assist in record keeping;¹² some UIC officers in the Maritimes, however, supported MacDonald's call for autonomy. For example, after meeting with MacDonald, Green, and Train in early May, H.C. Hudson, UIC Supervisor of Placement Operations in the Maritimes, wrote that the CDA "should not in any sense" be considered a part of the UIC system. In part, MacDonald opposed UIC involvement in the CDA because stevedores were not covered under the Unemployment Insurance Act. But he was also anxious to have the same degree of control over the CDA as he had over all other port functions.¹³ Ultimately, despite MacNamara's continued resistance, MacDonald got his way and the CDA functioned as an autonomous unit for the duration of the war.

MacDonald also had trouble early on with the HLA, which attempted to block the appointment of John Green as Port Loading Superintendent. On 2 May, Peter Garnier informed Humphrey Mitchell that the HLA would not accept the appointment of Green to any post in the Halifax system.¹⁴ At a meeting of the HLA on 17 June the terms of PC 3511 were rejected specifically because Mitchell had refused the union's demand that Green be replaced.¹⁵ MacDonald thought that it would be prudent to "remove this unnecessary spot of

friction,"¹⁶ but MacNamara and Mitchell refused to give way. Pressed for a justification of his rejection of Green, Garnier told Mitchell in July that the HLA had been promised that the Controller, the Port Loading Superintendent, and the Chief Despatcher would not be connected in any way either with the union or the employers.¹⁷ Green's association with the Eastern Canada Stevedoring Company in Montreal violated this guarantee. His American citizenship was another liability as there were many qualified Canadian candidates for the job.¹⁸ Eventually, Mitchell had to back down; in July it was announced that Green would be replaced as Port Loading Superintendent by Captain W.F. Spring of Vancouver.¹⁹ His appointment, however, along with that of Train, also stirred criticism. In August 1942, Halifax M.P. Gordon Isnor told Mitchell that these appointments would not lessen the "growing dissatisfaction" along the waterfront about the government's interference in longshore work.²⁰ In reply, Mitchell wrote that the primary reason for choosing Spring and Train lay in the fact that Vancouver had been operating under a central hiring hall for some time.

Throughout the autumn of 1942, HLA officials continued to resist the radical revision of existing longshore hiring methods. MacDonald's work was made more difficult, moreover, when he decided to leave the office of Controller at the end of 1942 to become Assistant Deputy Minister of Labour. In anticipation of this change, E.L. Cousins,

Wartime Administrator of Canadian Atlantic Ports (WACAP) within the DMS,²¹ was asked to assume the position, but he declined.²² Instead, he suggested that Major J.K. Wyman, Superintendent of Grain Elevators for the Montreal Harbour Commission, be offered the post. Nothing came of this, and on 26 November 1942, by PC 10323, Captain R.G. Perchard, Deputy Harbour Master of the Port of Montreal, was named to the job. MacDonald, however, remained the leading figure in pushing forward the reorganization plan.

In December 1942, the HLA voted to accept the new hiring system for a three month trial period, but the union refused to admit 1,500 temporary cardmen.²³ Under pressure from ILA President Joseph Ryan, who had been visited in New York by MacDonald,²⁴ Peter Garnier endorsed the three month trial period, but only to avoid an open split with the HLA's parent union. To facilitate matters, Department of Labour officials next agreed to a HLA request that three of its members be named to the new despatching agency.²⁵ Humphrey Mitchell applauded this development as a "welcome change" in the HLA position,²⁶ while MacDonald was willing to go along with it in order to avoid a repetition of the "passive non-co-operation which [had] previously delayed the scheme for months." On 8 February, in fact, HLA members had voted to reject the entire longshore reorganization plan, but pressure from the government and the ILA forced them to approve MacDonald's plan.²⁷ In practice, PC 24/1280 of 17

February 1943, allowed the Department of Labour to appoint the staff, including HLA members, of the CDA effective March 1.²⁸ It was on this latter date also that the three month trial period would begin.

The regulations MacDonald devised for the CDA had 32 sections and involved sweeping change.²⁹ They confirmed the primacy of the Controller and the use of the CDA at 59 Hollis Street as the sole clearinghouse for longshoremen. Each longshoreman would have to register with the Chief Despatcher and be cleared to work through the issuance of an identification card by the Controller. Regularly constituted work gangs would be under the control of gang foremen, who would receive instructions from the CDA to order the members of their units to report directly to jobsites. Companies seeking men for day, evening, or night work would have to submit orders at a specified time before the men were required. Men absent from a gang with a good excuse would be replaced by men from a Surplus Board under the direct control of the CDA. The Controller would determine the number of gangs needed to operate port traffic and could constitute extra gangs from the Surplus Board. In contrast to previous practice, gangs could be shifted from ship to ship once work on a particular vessel had been completed. Longshoremen could not pick their own assignments and had to accept any positions offered to them. Representatives of both the employers and the HLA would have

access to the Chief Despatcher to ensure that the regulations were being carried out. Despatching hours for men on the Surplus Board would be 8-9 a.m. for the day shift, 1-2 p.m. for the evening shift, and 7-7:30 p.m. for the night shift. Payment of workers on the Surplus Board would commence at the moment of despatch, and each man would be allotted 30 minutes to arrive at the jobsite.

Despite the comprehensive nature of this scheme, the CDA failed to meet the demand for longshoremen in Halifax because of the acute manpower shortage both in the city and the Maritimes generally. In March 1943, E.L. Cousins informed C.D. Howe that critical labour shortages were plaguing the efficient operation of the CDA.³⁰ Previous studies had shown that 807 permanent HLA members had been augmented by 794 cardmen, but only 1,350 men had registered with the new Hollis Street hiring hall and, on average, only 1,200 were working each day. On 13 March a shortage of 442 men was recorded. A conference with Halifax officials, Cousins reported, had resulted in 10 CNR boarding cars being obtained to house workers being brought to Halifax to work on the docks. This had helped matters, but 2,500 men would be needed to handle all cargo demands. Subsequently, Cousins became the driving force behind the construction, over the objections of area residents,³¹ of a bunkhouse complex to house 750 men needed to augment the HLA workforce. This complex was located on MacLean Street, and

the men living there had their way paid to Halifax by NSS. By the beginning of May 1943, 2,043 men were officially registered at the CDA, but daily turnout continued to be problematical.³² On 14 May, Colonel A.N. Jones, Chairman of the Halifax Steamship Committee, informed Humphrey Mitchell that there had been a shortage of 477 longshoremen the previous day and that by 7:00 p.m. 16 ships had been idle. This was a situation that demanded "prompt action."³³ A day later G.P. McLaren of the British Ministry of War Transport complained that 32 vessels were waiting to be loaded. Unless NSS officials provided 1,000 men and started night work, War Transport officials "would be backed up into an impossible situation" and would have to use American ports.³⁴

All of this prompted Vincent MacDonald to countenance a more direct and compulsory program of action. This eventually included the introduction of mandatory night shifts, the freezing of longshoremen in their employment, the compulsory transfer of labour to dock work, the establishment of a minimum wage, and the formation of a reserve labour battalion to keep men on the job and provide a ready surplus of workers when traffic in Halifax reached peak levels. On 17 May MacDonald met with representatives of the employers. Afterwards, he rated the operations of the hiring hall as being "reasonably satisfactory," but criticized the "constant uncontrollable drift" of

longshoremen to other industries.³⁵ The next day he met with MacNamara and other key NSS officials to consider what further steps could be taken to ameliorate the situation in Halifax. As a result of this consultation, NSS offices throughout the Maritimes were instructed to give longshore labour demands the highest priority and advertising blitzes were authorized to publicize the need for experienced dock workers. MacDonald himself was entrusted to devise plans for the guaranteed wage and the reserve labour battalion. He was likewise assigned the tasks of speeding up work on the bunkhouses and informing the HLA that the hiring hall scheme would continue once the three month trial period expired on 31 May 1943.³⁶ In the meantime, statistical evidence continued to flood into NSS headquarters about the extent of the problem in the Nova Scotia capital. From 1 May to 23 May 1943, loading operations were short an average of 325 men per day, only 10 percent of gangs worked in the evening, and there was no night work. Twelve ships were diverted to American ports during the month of May, and British Ministry of War Transport officials urged that a meeting of all interested parties be held to devise some new way to address the labour crisis.³⁷

On 31 May MacDonald wrote to MacNamara about the continued opposition of the HLA to the hiring hall procedure.³⁸ This union opposition, together with the continuing shortage of labour and the diversion of ships to

American ports, indicated the "immediate necessity" of further government action." In MacDonald's view, what was now required was a labour reserve to augment the established longshore workforce. Many HLA members viewed the CDA with "great hostility" despite the "indispensable service" offered by its three union despatchers. On 26 May 1943, the HLA had voted by 126-74 to discontinue support for the hiring hall scheme even though 2,043 stevedores were registered at the Hollis Street office. According to MacDonald, 300 additional men were needed for day work and 500 for night work to end the delays in Halifax.

Acting on this analysis, MacDonald next drafted two Orders-in-Council, modelled on British longshore legislation, which were eventually issued on 25 June as PC 5160 and PC 5161. PC 5160 required any ex-longshoreman who had been employed on the docks for an aggregate period of 12 months since 31 December 1938 and who was in an age bracket eligible for military service to separate from his existing employment and accept a longshore position in Halifax or another eastern port designated by NSS. The Order also forbade an employer from taking an ex-longshoreman into his employ. Conversely, it froze all active longshoremen in their existing jobs. Ex-longshoreman had until 21 July 1943 to comply with the terms of the order.

PC 5161, known as the Stabilization of Longshore Labour (Halifax) Order, set forth four other measures to "secure or

maintain longshore labour at its proper level." First, a group of workers would be identified to form a Reserve Pool. These workers would be housed in the bunkhouse complex under construction and would be available for work on the docks as needed. Second, a guaranteed wage of \$45.12 per week, based on a 48 hour working week, would be provided to all longshoremen. Third, deficiency pay, to top up weekly wages to this level, would be awarded to all longshoremen available for work either in the Reserve Pool or the CDA. Finally, the Controller was authorized, once the number of longshoremen reached the required level, to establish a rotation schedule to ensure that night work was carried out. Originally, the arrangements for the Reserve Pool were to take effect on 1 August 1943, but delays in the construction of the bunkhouses pushed this date back to 7 September 1943. To facilitate night shifts, the construction of a restaurant for dockworkers was now also authorized. The sum of \$21,500 was set aside for this, and the catering firm of Crawley & McCracken was contracted to provide meal service for both the restaurant and bunkhouse users.³⁹

Once the labour stabilization plan was in place, MacDonald acted to ensure that the British Ministry of War Transport would guarantee a flow of traffic that justified the expense involved in setting up the Reserve Pool and guaranteeing a minimum wage. Early in August 1943, he told Captain Eric Aikman of the Ministry that all efforts would

be wasted if an "appropriate volume of tonnage" was not forthcoming.⁴⁰ Aikman, however, insisted that MacDonald would have to "produce the goods" before War Transport authorities could route more traffic to Halifax.⁴¹ He pointed out that during July, 17 ships unaffected by repairs had loaded 76,879 tons of cargo in 165 ship days. These figures averaged out to 4,522 tons and 9.7 days per ship, a very poor record indeed. Whereas cargo should be loaded at an average rate of 1,000 tons per ship per day, a rate of only 466 tons per ship per day had been achieved in Halifax. This translated into 88 ship days lost. The "cold, conservative facts" of the case, Aikman insisted, dictated that Halifax could not be allocated additional tonnage until the port's longshoremen proved themselves ready for the challenge.

Other complaints were also heard about the terms of PC 5161. F.W. Riddell, Executive Secretary of the National Harbours Board, informed MacNamara that since entrance to the Reserve Pool was not limited to ex-longshoremen, many other classes of workers could be expected to join the Pool because of the guaranteed wage.⁴² NSS would have to be vigilant in this regard. Eric Reford, President of the Shipping Federation of Canada, likewise worried about the long-term effect of what was being done.⁴³ In his view, a minimum wage of more than \$45.00 per week was outrageous considering the fact that many of the men in the Reserve

Pool would not be skilled or experienced stevedores; these workers should be kept at \$30.00 per week maximum. Reford was also concerned about Section 13 of PC 5161, which stipulated that the government could recover some expenses of the stabilization plan by levying assessments against employers. This, he insisted, should not be done without prior consultation with the affected companies.

Despite the inauguration of the Reserve Pool in early September, slack shipping schedules hindered the effective implementation of the stabilization plan. During September, the number of gangs not working on any given day ranged from a low of seven to a high of 49, with the average being 21.⁴⁴ Given these numbers, E.L. Cousins continued to criticize NSS efforts in Halifax, claiming that the "matter of labour supply had improved but little."⁴⁵ Cousins condemned the British Ministry of War Transport for expecting that men should be "available at all times irrespective of the irregularity of vessel movement." Cousins also noted the intransigence and apparent indifference of many HLA members to the orders of the Controller.⁴⁶

Yet another continuing problem, despite the construction of the bunkhouse complex, was the housing situation facing would-be workers.⁴⁷ In July, MacDonald had asked G.K. Sheils, Deputy Minister of Munitions & Supply if some prefabricated houses built by Wartime Housing

Limited in Halifax could be allocated to longshoremen returning to the city under PC 5160. These were needed because the bunkhouses were not suitable for married men with children.⁴⁸ Sheils refused this request on the grounds that few men would be recruited under PC 5160.⁴⁹ In truth, many letters from longshoremen requesting housing in Halifax were finding their way into MacDonald's hands. Isaac Sullivan, for example, wrote that he was willing to comply with PC 5160 and return to Halifax, but only if accommodation could be found for himself, his wife, and his five children.⁵⁰ Cyril Rent, who had come to Halifax from Cape Breton, complained that he had been forced to sell all his farm livestock, acquired over a lifetime, because his wife had not been able to take care of them in his absence. In compensation, he demanded that he be given a house in Halifax so that his wife and five children could live with him.⁵¹ In response to this and other such requests. MacDonald continued to plead with DMS officials to release housing for longshoremen, but V.T. Goggin, Managing Director of Wartime Housing Ltd, was unyielding.⁵²

Nonetheless, by November 1943 the total registered strength of the dock labour force had been brought up to 2,343 men--750 regular HLA men, 530 duration cardmen, 766 temporary cardmen, and 297 Reserve Pool men. This total doubled the number available three years earlier.⁵³

Clearly, much had been accomplished, but much remained to be

done. There were still pockets of HLA resistance to the Despatching Regulations and the hiring hall, and the total number of registered longshoremen did not approximate the actual number of men working on a regular basis. The Reserve Pool, moreover, would never live up to its promise; only 200 ex-longshoremen had been secured under PC 5160 for the Halifax docks. Most significantly, the entire NSS operation of the longshore labour system continued to be attacked in the remaining months of the war by a variety of port officials, most notably by E.L. Cousins.

In his capacity as Wartime Administrator of Canadian Atlantic Ports, Cousins had a keen interest in the operation of American ports. In particular, he sought to inform himself about the Army labour battalions being used in the United States to solve longshore difficulties. In May 1943, Norman Hall, Chief of Port Security in the U.S. Coast Guard, had informed Cousins that skilled Army port battalions were stationed in many Atlantic ports and that the specially trained men in these units received regular Army pay.⁵⁴ While asserting that the military personnel were not used to replace civilian stevedores, Hall admitted that the "line of demarcation" between the two groups was not clear. Cousins had next asked John Green, the man the HLA had rejected as Port Loading Superintendent, to scout the American ports and the Army battalions on his behalf. Green reported that the use of trained, disciplined military workers seemed to

galvanize civilian longshoremen to perform better--out of a fear that all loading operations might be consigned to the Army men.⁵⁵ In July 1943, the Department of Labour had agreed to allow a 600 man Army Port Company (APC) to begin training so as to be ready in the event of labour strife on the Halifax waterfront. Thereafter, DMS and DND officials exerted increasing pressure on NSS to deploy the APC in Halifax. Arthur MacNamara, however, was firmly of the view that only an illegal work stoppage would justify this deployment.⁵⁶

In January 1944, knowing the disdain that C.D. Howe felt for many aspects of NSS operations, Cousins sought to enlist his help in wresting control of all loading operations from the Department of Labour. In a marvellous memo to the Minister of Munitions & Supply, Cousins elaborated on four key points.⁵⁷ First, he insisted that the APC be deployed immediately; 300 Army men should be allowed to compete directly with regular stevedores to settle the debate over the efficiency of military workers. Second, Cousins ridiculed the members of the HLA as being hopelessly inefficient and wholly dominated by the union leaders. It was common practice, for example, for a gang arriving at work short of men to refuse to do anything until it was brought to full strength by the Despatching Hall. Third, Cousins claimed that, despite all the efforts of NSS to secure enough men, only 1,400 men were regularly on duty.

In the circumstances, the high cost of the minimum wage and the Reserve Pool was absurd; the NSS stabilization operation should be curtailed and the guaranteed weekly wage reduced to \$25. Finally, Cousins called for a sweeping reorganization of the administration of the port. Specifically, what he had in mind here was the centralization of all functions in the hands of the individual most eminently qualified to carry them out. This, of course, was himself. To facilitate matters, he submitted for consideration a draft Order-in-Council to Howe that would give him the authority he sought.

NSS officials, however, were not about to see their authority usurped in this fashion. Claiming that "inefficiency" was "a relative term," MacDonald told Humphrey Mitchell that the longshore stabilization scheme was beginning to yield dividends and that the use of Army personnel would "inject into Halifax an element of potential friction" that might produce a retaliatory slowdown by all civilian longshoremen.⁵⁸ While admitting that the guaranteed wage was too high, MacDonald rejected Cousins's demand for more centralized control; the broad power already vested in the Controller was all that was required. MacNamara added his consistently cautious and considered view to labour matters by claiming that Cousins' recommendations should be "examined very carefully," although he conceded the latter's point about the level of

the minimum wage.⁵⁹ Armed with these opinions, Mitchell told Howe that military personnel could not be used without the approval of the HLA. He also challenged the claim that military labour would be more efficient than civilian labour. Except "under the stress of battle engagement or preparation for same," this was unlikely to be the case.⁶⁰

Although he had no jurisdiction in the matter, Howe countered that it was "inconceivable" why trained Army personnel were being denied the opportunity to work in Halifax.⁶¹ Claiming that the record of the Port of Halifax was the "worst on the Atlantic Coast," he insisted that only "properly trained" men could solve the problem. Howe challenged Mitchell to put the APC in direct competition with the HLA to determine which group was more productive. The Reserve Pool constituted a "first class scandal"; a "poor class" of men showed no desire to work while taking advantage of the minimum wage. Military labour should be brought in at once because it could "not be any worse than stevedoring labour generally working under present Halifax conditions." M.M. Maclean, Director of Industrial Relations in the Department of Labour, counterattacked by accusing Howe of having a "narrow viewpoint" and favouring a policy in relation to the APC that was both dangerous and unrealistic:

This is the usual sort of wishful thinking we find prevalent among many employer executives. In this Halifax situation what we [would] get is a riot. The difficulties we have been encountering can be

accounted for almost wholly by the policy of the shipowners down through the years. On Mr. Howe's statement that the men in the labour pool are of a poor class and have no desire to work, there is apparently no evidence to support him. If there is discovered to be any abuse of the guaranteed wage policy, it can be effectively dealt with by appropriate safeguarding regulations.⁶²

After Cabinet requested more information on the matter, MacDonald wrote a thorough report in February 1944. He highlighted the shortcomings of the Reserve Pool and the agreement of the HLA to allow Army men to be employed in Halifax and outlying ports--but only when union men could not be found.⁶³ This agreement had put the potentially explosive issue of Army labour to rest. In March 1944, over 300 Army men moved into the Maclean Street bunkhouse complex. Their presence augmented the Reserve Pool, which remained below 300 men for the duration of the war.⁶⁴ Despite continuing criticism from Cousins, NSS officials had overcome the most serious wartime challenge to the success of their longshore stabilization plan.

One final administrative shuffle in Halifax occurred in March 1944, when Port Loading Superintendent Captain R.F. Spring replaced Perchard as Controller. As the war progressed, Halifax longshoremen seemed to treat Controllers with an increasing level of respect: MacDonald was resented; Perchard was grudgingly accepted; and Spring was welcomed. His popularity among HLA officials grew in June 1944 as a result of yet another dispute with the employers. The Halifax Steamship Committee had wanted Walking Bosses

included in the deficiency pay and guaranteed wage arrangements, but MacDonald had insisted that Walking Bosses be employed directly by the companies. E.A. Saunders, Chairman of the Steamship Committee, now complained bitterly to Arthur MacNamara about the increase in the number of Walking Bosses ordered by the Controller.⁶⁵ MacNamara, however, refused to interfere, while MacDonald was furious that Saunders had gone over his head to the Deputy Minister of Labour. MacDonald told the Steamship Committee that the shipping companies had requested full control of the Walking Bosses in September 1942, and that the increase in the ranks of the Bosses had occurred only because their previous numbers had been "notoriously low."⁶⁶ He also pointed out that the shipping companies were the recipients of large sums of government money and had to play by the rules. In sum, Spring's decisions were final.

The remainder of the war saw few changes in the port of Halifax. Operations were now going well, though there were small irritations. Crawley & McCracken, for example, were disappointed with the bunkhouse scheme. They had entered into the catering agreement on the assumption that 750 men--500 longshoremen and 250 freight handlers--would be housed in the bunkhouses. In fact, the total had rarely exceeded 400, and a decline set in once the APC arrived.⁶⁷ When complaints continued to be voiced about the minimum weekly wage, pay was reduced to \$30.40 per week. This was done

through PC 3370 of 8 May 1944 and the change took effect on 17 June. Although generally satisfied with the operation of the CDA, the HLA continued to push for minor concessions, such as the elimination of night work. Spring, however, refused the HLA demands. At a meeting with Ministry of War Transport officials in January 1945, the performance of Halifax longshoremen was "not unduly criticized" by British officials.⁶⁸ As one NSS official now reported, the overall labour situation on the Halifax docks was "comfortable" despite a lack of improvement in the housing situation in the city.⁶⁹ During May and June 1945, after the end of the war in Europe, an increasing number of gangs became idle and many temporary HLA members returned to seasonal occupations. By 10 July 1945, the number of working gangs was reduced by 10.⁷⁰

During that same month, the first discussions took place concerning the dismantling of the wartime regulations. Spring insisted that the existing despatching system could "be maintained with advantage"; to return to the 'have a look' hiring system would be disastrous.⁷¹ The shift to peacetime operations should "take place gradually and in an orderly fashion"; the Reserve Pool should be phased out and negotiations should be started with the HLA to release numbers of duration and temporary cardmen. At a series of meetings in August, both the HLA and the employers advocated the continuation of the CDA and the position of Controller.

In practice, this was done through PC 5980 of 11 September 1945, which revoked PC 5161 effective 3 November 1945. The wartime system was thus brought to a "clean cut finish."⁷² Thereafter, MacNamara had little to do but monitor the last vestiges of the NSS presence on the Halifax docks. With the abandonment of the Reserve Pool, the disposition of the bunkhouses became an issue. PC 6493 of 12 October 1945 allowed the Minister of Labour to continue to operate this facility, but by 31 May 1946 only 12 longshoremen were still living in the MacLean Street complex. The other residents there comprised approximately 200 Army personnel and various other workers.⁷³ In these circumstances, the decision was made to close the bunkhouses effective 31 August 1946.⁷⁴

In May 1946, Spring reported to MacNamara that he was pleased that all disputes involving longshore labour had been settled "more or less amicably," and that the HLA, after being given control of the building in the autumn of 1945, had conducted the hiring hall in an "orderly manner."⁷⁵ At MacNamara's request, Spring next asked the HLA and the employers for their candid opinions concerning the extension of the Controllership. What was heard back showed the high esteem in which Spring was held by all concerned. The HLA spokesmen described Spring as a "distinct asset" to the Port and a "very capable man" who should be kept in his job.⁷⁶ E.A. Saunders, Secretary of the Halifax Steamship Committee, told Spring himself that he

enjoyed the unanimous support of all Committee members.⁷⁷ In late 1946 and early 1947, due mainly to the rising cost of salaries and the running of the Despatching Agency, which totalled approximately \$57,000 per year, some thought was given to divorcing the Department of Labour from the operation of the Halifax docks. This, however, was not done and the "worthwhile arrangement" that had been made during the war was allowed to continue. Finally, in 1950, the union was given complete control of its own affairs except for "periodic inspections" by Department of Labour officials. At the same time, responsibility for administering longshore affairs in Halifax was handed over to the Employment Service of Canada.⁷⁸

* * * *

In review, it is clear that the most critical government measures taken to stabilize the longshore labour force between 1940 and 1945 were the establishment of the Reserve Pool and the introduction of a guaranteed minimum weekly wage for all longshoremen. Table 7 shows the cost of the guaranteed wage system and the relationship between public and private contributions to the total wage bill. Altogether, the Department of Labour spent almost 1.275 million dollars between September 1943 and August 1945 in wage supplements for longshoremen. This sum represented

Table 7
Government Payment of Wages Under PC 5161, 1943-1945⁷⁹

Date	Total Earning & Deficiency Pay (\$)	Total Reserve Pool Pay (\$)	Total Despatch Hall Pay (\$)	% NSS/ Total Pay	% NSS/ Total RP Pay	% NSS/ Total DH Pay
Sep-Dec '43 avg	474,651.07	69,896.75	404,754.32	18.7	56.4	12.2
Jan-Mar '44 avg	404,292.73	59,971.83	344,320.90	9.1	35.1	4.6
Apr '44	381,765.05	25,396.77	356,368.28	7.9	31.7	6.2
May '44	439,717.04	29,176.97	410,540.07	4.4	17.7	3.5
Jun '44	440,652.76	34,151.64	406,501.12	45.2	51.1	44.7
Jul '44	338,583.62	16,191.50	322,392.12	15.3	22.9	14.9
Aug '44	259,779.33	13,749.21	246,300.12	33.9	52.5	32.9
Sep '44	434,836.45	23,875.70	410,960.75	12.3	34.2	11.1
Oct '44	289,169.53	23,796.04	265,373.49	24.8	35.4	23.8
Nov '44	296,180.89	28,066.86	268,114.03	28.9	43.2	27.4
Dec '44	453,040.77	48,225.02	404,815.75	9.4	17.6	8.5
Jan '45	448,030.47	56,218.80	391,811.67	1.4	6.2	0.7
Feb '45	472,525.82	47,049.47	425,476.35	1.3	9.7	0.3
Mar '45	592,170.23	53,251.88	538,918.35	2.4	16.8	1.0
Apr '45	416,862.26	28,551.40	388,310.86	3.8	13.6	3.1
May '45	311,926.80	14,262.19	297,664.61	9.3	16.0	9.0
Jun '45	373,900.25	14,747.15	359,153.10	8.7	39.1	7.4
Jul '45	295,840.88	12,308.07	283,532.81	5.2	39.5	3.7
Aug '45	292,608.89	15,288.20	277,320.69	16.4	42.1	15.0
TOTALS	9,649,073.51	943,539.36	8,705,534.15	13.2	36.0	10.8

more than 13 percent of all stevedoring wages paid while the Reserve Pool was in operation. In addition, the government paid the salaries of various port officials, and met the costs of the pier restaurant, the bunkhouses, and the Central Despatching Agency. Although the government share of the Reserve Pool wages would logically be high, the guaranteed wage system also forced Dominion officials to spend close to one million dollars during the war to stabilize the wages of the regular longshoremen registered at the hiring hall. This was almost three times the amount spent on the workers in the Reserve Pool. The sudden increase in government costs in the summer of 1944 is attributable to the fact that large numbers of ships loaded in preparation for the Normandy landings never returned to Halifax in the months following the invasion.⁸⁰ The maximum number of men enrolled in the Reserve Pool was 272 in January 1945; the minimum number was 104 in May 1945. Efforts to increase the number of men registered at the CDA were clearly successful. The maximum number of men registered was 2,343 (November 1943); the minimum number recorded (when wartime traffic was ebbing) was 1,646 (August 1945).

The history of what happened on the Halifax docks during the war is an excellent example of the imposition of central control by NSS and the Department of Labour to overcome a difficult situation. By using its powers

systematically and adroitly the government was able to maintain essential levels of employment, albeit at considerable cost to the public purse. In this case, moreover, wartime regulation facilitated postwar labour peace. The wartime reorganization of longshore hiring methods in Halifax and the centralized direction of dock employment there was such a resounding success that all the interests involved agreed voluntarily to continue government regulation into the postwar period. Nothing like this happened in the coal, textile, and meatpacking industries, all of which saw serious postwar labour disruptions. Although Ottawa waited almost four years after the commencement of the war in 1939 to adopt a labour stabilization plan for the Halifax docks, the results it obtained when it finally did act represent the pinnacle of NSS achievement in managing the wartime labour force. From this perspective, however, the failure of NSS to obtain similar results in other workplaces is readily apparent.

NOTES

- 1.Spring to Parent, 14 June 1950. NAC RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-6-3-1 part 3--Halifax Longshoremen.
- 2.The best description of the Halifax longshore situation can be found in Ian McKay, "Class Struggle and Mercantile Capitalism: Craftsmen and Labourers on the Halifax Waterfront, 1805-1902," in Rosemary Ommers and Gerald Panting, eds., Working Men Who Got Wet (Proceedings of the Fourth Conference of the Atlantic Canada Shipping Project, Memorial University, 1980) pp. 287-319. A good source for descriptions of dock labour in general is Charles Barnes, The Longshoremen (Philadelphia, 1915).
- 3.Annual Report of the National Harbours Board, 1939-1946.
- 4.An excellent account of the ILA in the 1930s can be found in Bruce Nelson, Workers on the Waterfront: Seamen, Longshoremen, and Unionism in the 1930s (Urbana, 1988).
- 5.Summary of Wartime Regulation of Longshoremen. NAC, RG 27, Volume 3001: file Shiploading Operations--Halifax, 1943-1945.
- 6.Summary of Longshore Meeting in Halifax, 3 August 1941. NAC, RG 27, Volume 141: file 611-02-46.
- 7.Working Agreement Between the Halifax Longshoremen's Association and the Steamship Companies of Halifax, 3 December 1941. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-6-3-1 part 1. The Agreement was negotiated between HLA Local 269 and the following members of the Steamship Committee: Canadian National Steamships; Cunard White Star Limited; T.A.S. De Wolf & Son; Pickard & Black Limited; Newfoundland-Canada Steamships Limited; and Scotia Stevedoring Limited.
- 8.Husband to Howe, 24 January 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 141: file 611-02-46.
- 9.Ibid., Report of Shiploading Operations in the Port of Halifax, 12 February 1942.
- 10.Ibid., Stewart to MacDonald, 18 April 1942; Stewart to MacDonald, 13 April 1942; and MacNamara to Trottier, 28 April 1942.
- 11.Ibid., MacDonald to Stewart, 6 May 1942.
- 12.Ibid., MacNamara to MacDonald, 7 May 1942.

13. Ibid., Hudson to Phelan, 9 May 1942.
14. Garnier to Mitchell, 2 May 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-6-3-4.
15. Ibid., Garnier to MacDonald, 17 June 1942.
16. Ibid., MacDonald to MacNamara, 18 June 1942.
17. Ibid., Garnier to Mitchell, 4 July 1942.
18. Green was born in Philadelphia in 1902 and graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 1924. Entering the employ of the Reading Railroad in 1917, he eventually became a Pier Superintendent before leaving for a post with the Delaware Contracting Corporation, a subsidiary of Jarka Corporation, to contract union employees for railway and coastal stevedoring. Transferred to Montreal in 1932, he became Vice-President of Jarka Corporation of Canada. See Ibid., Sheridan to Stewart, 9 June 1942.
19. MacNamara to MacDonald, 9 July 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-6-3-1 part 1.
20. Isnor to Mitchell, 25 August 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-6-3-2.
21. For a discussion of the duties of the WACAP, see Kennedy, History of the Department of Munitions and Supply, Volume II pp. 288-294.
22. Stewart to MacNamara, 9 September 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-6-3-2.
23. Halifax Chronicle 7 December 1942.
24. MacDonald to MacNamara, 9 December 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-6-3-1 part 1.
25. Ibid., MacDonald Personal Memo, January 1943.
26. Mitchell to Garnier, 4 January 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-6-3-4.
27. Halifax Chronicle 9 February 1943; Halifax Chronicle 23 February 1943.
28. The three HLA representatives in the proposed Central Despatching Agency were John Leahy, John Campbell, and John MacDonald. Leahy was paid \$250 per month as Assistant Chief Despatcher, while Leahy and Macdonald received \$200 per

month as Despatchers. See MacNamara to Mitchell, 17 February 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-6-3-2.

29. Central Despatching Agency Despatching Regulations. NAC, RG 66 Volume 5: file H-I-5 part 1.

30. Cousins to Howe, 13 March 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-6-3-1 part 1.

31. After the construction began in April 1941, intense opposition came from Halifax residents. F.B. Chilman, Secretary of the Young Avenue Citizen's Committee, expressed his "surprise and indignation" that residents of the area were not consulted. All calls for the altering of the site went unheeded by government officials. Ottawa promised, however, that the complex would be removed after the war. See Chilman to Mitchell, 24 April 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-6-3-4; Halifax Chronicle 26 April 1943.

32. Ibid., MacDonald to Perchard, 4 May 1943.

33. Ibid., Jones to MacDonald, 14 May 1943.

34. Ibid., McLaren to Aikman, 15 May 1943.

35. MacDonald to Mitchell, 17 May 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-6-3-1 part 2.

36. Ibid., Barclay to MacNamara, 19 May 1943.

37. Ibid., Aikman to MacDonald, 25 May 1943.

38. Ibid., MacDonald to MacNamara, 31 May 1943.

39. Humphrey Mitchell submitted an original appropriation for the restaurant of \$9,000, but Cousins suggested an expanded facility costing \$21,500. The catering contract for the bunkhouse with Crawley & McCracken was signed 1 September 1943, with longshoremen paying \$8.75 per week for 21 consecutive meals. See Mitchell to Council, 21 August 1943; Cousins to MacDonald, September 27, 1943; Contract Between Dominion Government and Crawley & McCracken, 1 September 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-6-3-5.

40. MacDonald to Aikman, 5 August 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-6-3-1 part 2.

41. Ibid., Aikman to MacDonald, 5 August 1943.

42. Riddell to MacNamara, 9 July 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-6-3-4.

43.Reford to Mitchell, 28 July 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 665: file 6-6-6-3-6.

44.Unsigned, undated Memo Summarizing September Port Activity. NAC, RG 27, Volume 6-5-6-3-1 part 2.

45.Cousins to MacDonald, 27 September 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-6-3-5.

46.Cousins to Howe, 30 September 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-6-3-1 part 2.

47.For a discussion of wartime housing shortages in Halifax, see Jay White, "The Homes Front: The Accomodation Crisis in Halifax, 1941-1951," Urban History Review 1992 20(3) pp. 117-127.

48.MacDonald to Sheils, 29 July 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-6-3-5.

49.Ibid., Sheils to MacDonald, 5 August 1943.

50.Ibid., Sullivan to Perchard, 3 September 1943.

51.Ibid., Rent to Perchard, 1 September 1943.

52.Ibid., Goggin to Fogo, 4 October 1943.

53.Perchard to MacDonald, 11 November 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 665: file 6-5-6-3-11.

54.Hall to Cousins, 13 May 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-6-3-1 part 1.

55.Green to Cousins, 17 May 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-6-3-1 part 1.

56.MacNamara to Currie, 22 December 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-6-3-1 part 3.

57.Cousins to Howe, 20 January 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-6-3-1 part 2.

58.Ibid., MacDonald to Mitchell, 22 January 1944.

59.Ibid., MacNamara to Mitchell, 22 January 1944.

60.Ibid., Mitchell to Howe, 24 January 1944.

61.Ibid., Howe to Mitchell, 27 January 1944.

62.Ibid., MacLean to MacNamara, 30 January 1944.

63. Halifax Chronicle 24 March 1944.
64. Spring to MacDonald, 18 March 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-6-3-5.
65. Saunders to MacNamara, 20 June 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-6-3-1 part 3.
66. Ibid., MacDonald to Saunders, 5 August 1942.
67. Vassej to MacDonald, 6 March 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-6-3-5.
68. Spring to MacNamara, 12 January 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-6-3-1 part 3.
69. Ibid., Hartley to Peebles, 13 February 1945.
70. Ibid., Spring to MacNamara, 16 July 1945.
71. Ibid., Spring to MacNamara, 21 July 1945.
72. Ibid., MacNamara to MacDonald, 5 September 1945.
73. Dwyer to MacNamara, 31 May 1946. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-6-3-5.
74. Ibid., MacLennan to MacNamara, 18 July 1946.
75. Spring to MacNamara, 17 May 1946. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-6-3-1 part 3.
76. Ibid., HLA Secretary to Mitchell, 22 May 1946.
77. Ibid., Saunders to Spring, 28 May 1946.
78. Ibid., MacNamara to Parent, 23 June 1950.
79. See various monthly reports, NAC, RG 27, Volume 665: file 6-5-6-3-6.
80. Black to MacNamara, 28 April 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 665: file 6-5-6-3-6.

Chapter 8
Female Primary Textile Labour

In November 1945, an editorial in the Canadian Textile Journal condemned in no uncertain terms the wartime record of NSS. Demanding that all labour control measures be returned to provincial jurisdiction, the author of this critique placed the responsibility for the wave of labour unrest then gripping the country squarely on the shoulders of NSS and other federal regulatory agencies:

The authoritarian character of NSS and other measures of wartime labour control and wage stabilization has been flagrantly shown to be undemocratic, bureaucratic, and unsuited to the operations of free democratic enterprise. Today, the divided authority between our Dominion and Provincial Governments over labour and wage control, the ineffectual handling of wage disputes by the Federal Authority, the economic muddling by NSS, WPTB, and the regional labour boards, and the openly apparent efforts on the part of Labour Minister Humphrey Mitchell to appropriate for himself the prerogatives of a Labour Czar completely demonstrate the futility of continuing the present system of authoritarian control into the peacetime economy.¹

This harsh comment reflected the many difficulties with government regulation that had plagued textile producers during the Second World War. These difficulties, however, had not been the result of an authoritarian or undemocratic system, but of a remarkably loose and undemanding one. There was indeed an employment crisis in the primary textile industry during the war, but this was because of the failure of NSS to exercise sufficient control over the female labour force in the industry rather than the reverse.

In truth, the record of NSS in relation to this group of workers is perhaps the most telling illustration of its general failure to achieve its regulatory objectives. There are several reasons for this. First, what happened in the textile industry reveals the underlying weakness of the labour priorities system, the mechanism that anchored the NSS effort to supply labour to essential industries. Despite its seemingly comprehensive nature, the priority classification system proved to be largely ineffective in meeting the needs of the primary textile industry for female workers. Second, the experience of the textile industry reveals the lack of coordination among the government departments responsible for the production of essential civilian goods, most notably the WPTB and NSS. Third, events in the textile industry show just how little control NSS had over the movement of women in the Canadian workforce. Since women were not obliged to remain in textile employment, large numbers of experienced female textile workers abandoned the industry for higher pay and better conditions in war industry. Similarly, many women directed to textile employment based on the essential nature of the industry either refused to work for textile firms or else soon separated from them to seek more lucrative employment opportunities elsewhere.

* * * *

As both Joy Parr and Gail Brandt have documented, textile operations in Ontario and Quebec had long been characterized by a gendered division of labour whereby skilled jobs had been, in general, the preserve of male workers.² In Quebec, poor working conditions and low wages meant that almost the whole of the industry was dominated by young single women. Not surprisingly, after World War II commenced and economic opportunities grew for women, large numbers of those trapped in the dismal and dreary working conditions of the textile mills seized the opportunity to find better jobs. In doing so, they created a problem that NSS was never able to solve. The magnitude of this problem can be seen in employment, wage, and production figures for the 1941 to 1945 period.

Table 8 highlights the marked increase in the size of the female workforce in manufacturing during the war years. While textile firms remained the single largest employers of women, they constituted one of only two manufacturing groups (the other was chemicals) to experience a decrease in employment between 1942 and 1944. Moreover, the continuous migration of women from textile employment meant that, in the latter stages of the war, many textile workers were inexperienced or part-time. In the primary textile subdivision of textile employment, the number of women on the job declined only slightly, from 48,221 in 1942 to 47,460 in 1944, but the loss of more than 8,000 male workers

Table 8
Female Manufacturing Employment, 1941-1945³

Occupation	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
Textiles	84,632	94,917	93,267	90,914	93,478
Wood and Paper	21,844	26,855	32,821	34,813	35,373
Iron and Products	20,135	45,902	73,129	69,452	42,853
Non-Ferrous Metals	14,178	21,877	30,854	32,371	25,860
Non-Metallic Minerals	2,374	3,317	4,497	4,786	4,710
Chemicals	13,727	33,529	36,520	32,035	20,766

Table 9
Female Hourly Wage Rates in Cents for Selected Manufacturing
Industries, 1941-1945 (rank in parentheses)⁴

Industry	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
Aircraft	46.0(1)	51.6(1)	65.4(2)	83.0(1)	80.8(1)
Iron & Steel	27.0(36)	51.5(2)	58.8(4)	69.7(4)	64.6(2)
Auto Supplies	38.5(3)	49.2(3)	53.9(7)	65.1(5)	58.7(5)
Machinery	31.9(15)	39.8(10)	46.4(9)	48.7(13)	50.2(11)
Electrical	33.6(12)	40.8(8)	46.2(10)	49.0(12)	55.4(6)
Sheet Metals	35.5(8)	39.0(11)	45.5(13)	45.7(17)	47.8(15)
Chemicals	34.8(11)	42.4(7)	41.9(18)	53.3(8)	51.6(8)
Wool Cloth	31.4(18)	35.1(18)	37.1(23)	38.5(23)	41.2(23)
Cotton Yarns	32.1(14)	33.3(26)	35.8(25)	38.4(26)	39.1(29)
Wool Yarn	31.0(22)	30.7(32)	33.8(32)	36.7(34)	38.8(32)
Hose & Knits	29.2(29)	32.3(29)	35.3(27)	37.0(32)	37.2(36)

Table 10
Domestic Production of Primary Textiles, 1941-1945
(000s of yards or pounds)⁵

Product	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
Cotton Yarn(lbs)	212,385	214,147	185,521	166,480	162,980
Cotton Broad-woven Fabric(yds)	365,984	369,166	317,890	295,516	277,352
Wool Yarn(lbs)	66,528	69,985	66,891	63,235	64,114
Wool Fabric(yds)	26,770	27,796	26,363	24,244	26,741
Rayon Broadwoven Fabric(yds)	83,139	79,589	80,340	79,044	80,888

in the same period was not offset by NSS efforts to find more female workers.

The wage data in Table 9 readily explains why female employment increased dramatically in war industries while it stagnated in textile employment. Unfettered by many of the wartime wage restraints placed on textile employment, wages in industrial employment such as aircraft assembly nearly doubled during the course of the war. Competition with aircraft plants in particular left many textile firms in Southern Ontario complaining to NSS officials about the problem of securing and maintaining an adequate supply of women workers. But their problem was not only with the aircraft industry; by 1944, the four major primary textile employment divisions were in the lower half of the 40 highest paying female occupations. As might be expected, the result of this was the flight of women from primary textile employment.

This in turn led to serious production shortfalls. Table 10 shows that production of primary textiles fell substantially in four key lines (the decline in rayon fabric production was marginal). Cotton production experienced the most critical setback; output of cotton yarns declined by approximately 25 percent between 1942 and 1944, while the output of cotton fabrics fell by approximately 20 percent in the same period. Taken together, Tables 6, 7, and 8 summarize the dilemma of the primary textile industry in World War II. While female employment grew rapidly in other manufacturing sectors, NSS officials waged a three year struggle to supply women to textile mills in Ontario and Quebec. In the event, NSS lost this struggle. This was because its regulatory control of women workers, who were enjoying unprecedented economic mobility, was not equal to the task at hand.

In the first 16 months of its existence, NSS found itself swamped with complaints from textile firms about absenteeism, separations from employment, and competition for scarce labour from other industries.⁶ In February 1943, A.K.A. Ziz, Manager of the Brampton Knitting Mills plant, protested that many of his employees, both male and female, were leaving his employ to work at the Victory Aircraft plant in nearby Milton, despite the fact that Brampton Knitting Mills had an A rating for female labour.⁷ Ziz castigated NSS for failing to address his employment

needs. In April, he reported that all five of his experienced male knitters had either quit or handed in their seven day separation notices. This action had created a production bottleneck that had forced the company to cancel its war order with the DMS.⁸ In the same vein, officials of Penman's Ltd. of Paris, Ontario, reported in April 1943 that their Outerwear department had been reduced from 120 to 44 employees. At the same time, the Penman's plant in Brantford had been reduced to a staff of 210 from a normal complement of 375.⁹

As the NSS consolidated its authority after the passage of PC 246 early in 1943, it recognized the problem in textile manufacturing but declined to take the drastic action advocated by lobbyists for the industry. In truth, some NSS officials welcomed the outflow of textile workers into industries thought to be more essential to the war effort.¹⁰ In July 1943, under the leadership of Fraudena Eaton, the NSS Associate Director of the Women's Division, NSS launched, in the Toronto area, the first of a series of publicity campaigns to recruit women for industry in general.¹¹ No special emphasis was placed on the needs of textile manufacturers, but in August the rising tide of complaints from the industry prompted specific action on its behalf. In the final five months of 1943 three steps were taken. First, blanket increases in priority ratings were granted to all primary textile firms. Second, an attempt

was made to get the textile firms themselves to address known problems in relation to working conditions and benefits. Finally, a massive publicity campaign was started in Ontario and Quebec to recruit new female workers for the textile industry.

The campaign for increased priority ratings for textile plants originated in August 1943 with the WPTB and its representative on the ILPC, G.G.E. Raley. Raley used the example of the Patons and Baldwins worsted spinning mill in Toronto to galvanize support for his cause. Average weekly production of cotton goods in this plant had declined from 32,705 pounds in 1941 to only 23,955 pounds per week during the first six months of 1943 and to only 20,000 pounds per week during July.¹² Raley insisted that this plant must return to a weekly cotton output of more than 30,000 pounds--an objective that would require the addition of 82 women and five men to the existing staff of 344 persons. Under intense pressure from the WPTB, the ILPC agreed on 12 August to grant a blanket priority of B-A to all fourteen primary textile industry subdivisions, ratings that were to be reviewed on 31 December 1943.¹³ Even industry 2244, Knit Outerwear, was raised to a B-A essentiality from its previous poor priority rating of C-C. Raley insisted that there was a shortage of 1,500 female workers in the primary textile industry in Ontario and Quebec and that this problem could only be solved through priority referrals from local

NSS offices. Altogether, some 400 textile firms stood to benefit from the change in priority ratings made at Raley's insistence.¹⁴

NSS went along with this but its officials were inclined to blame the manufacturers for the crisis that had arisen. During the summer of 1943, H.F. Irwin, the NSS Regional Employment Advisor for Ontario, was assigned to Ottawa to liaise with the Primary Textiles Institute (PTI), an umbrella organization consisting of members of the Canadian Woollen and Knit Goods Manufacturers' Association, the Cotton Institute of Canada, and the Silk Association of Canada.¹⁵ Irwin's first step was to meet with textile officials in Montreal and Toronto in August and place before them a comprehensive questionnaire aimed at standardizing and improving conditions in the industry.¹⁶ This questionnaire covered 21 broad topics, including personnel management, health policies, sanitation, accident prevention, employee training, wages, and labour turnover; under each topic there were questions dealing with such matters as the provision of annual medical examinations, the extent of daily rest periods, the provision of canteen facilities, and the extent of links between the textile firms and local NSS offices. While recognizing that "Utopia" could not be "achieved in a day or even a year," Irwin maintained that standardizing conditions and reforming employment practices would "give prestige to an industry

which has long been associated in the public mind with low pay and poor working conditions." For the duration of the war, Irwin worked tirelessly with the PTI, the WPTB, and NSS to improve employer-employee relations in the industry, inaugurate training programs for textile workers, and inform local NSS offices about primary textile needs.

The questionnaire was forwarded to primary textile mills in September and the results distributed in February 1944.¹⁷ A total of 166 firms with a total workforce of 45,715 persons responded. Only 59 percent of the firms had a systematic training program for employees; less than half had rest periods twice per day; only a third had rotating night shifts; only 10 percent provided medical examinations; only 21 percent employed a company doctor; less than 20 percent employed an on-duty registered nurse; and less than 30 percent provided any form of sickness insurance. Of the six industry subdivisions--Knitting, Woollen, Cotton, Rayon, Worsted, and Miscellaneous--the 38 woollen mills, employing close to 6,000 workers, reported results below the industry average in all 15 report categories. Only 34 percent of woollen mills gave rest breaks and only five percent provided a company doctor (only 8 percent of new employees were medically examined). These results proved that conditions in many textile factories were only tolerable at best and certainly inferior to conditions in many of the new war industries that were springing up. Irwin used these

results to lobby the industry to improve working conditions.¹⁸

In the publicity campaign it launched to recruit more female textile workers, NSS singled out the Hamilton/Niagara region of Ontario and Montreal. Responding to a shortage of 1,000 women workers in the Hamilton area, Fraudena Eaton and other prominent NSS officials met with textile representatives at the Royal Connaught Hotel in Hamilton on 22 October 1943.¹⁹ Although Eaton acknowledged that low wages explained women's disdain of textile work, she and others believed that effective advertising could turn the tide. The well-orchestrated publicity campaign that commenced on 3 November, featured radio and newspaper appeals, the display of promotional material in movie theatres and local businesses, exhortations by clergymen from the pulpit, and the mobilization of local women's groups. The press campaign appealed directly to the perceived role of women in domestic life; "since time immemorial" women had made clothing for "their children, their menfolk, and themselves," and the call to service in textile factories was simply an extension of this cherished legacy of care.²⁰

The enthusiastic support of community groups for the public relations campaign in Hamilton was not matched in Montreal.²¹ Several factors explain this. First, Quebec had a lower rate of female participation in the workforce

than was the case elsewhere.²² Second, vociferous opposition arose to the policy of targeting women workers. Early in 1942, the National Catholic Unions of Three Rivers had warned Prime Minister King of the "ill-fated consequences" of female participation in war employment.²³ And when NSS officials approached Monsignor Charbonneau, Archbishop of Montreal, in October 1943 to support a proposed general recruiting campaign for women workers, he took the position that each parish would have to decide about this for itself. NSS officials subsequently visited 98 Montreal area parishes, and although several priests indicated a keen interest in visiting plants to view conditions for themselves, a number condemned the recruitment of female labour as destructive of family life and "contrary to the principles of the Church."²⁴

In Hamilton, the publicity campaign resulted in 420 referrals to primary textile employment; of this group 217 women actually accepted full-time or part-time employment in these plants.²⁵ While NSS officials were generally satisfied with this result, James Turner, Manager of the Dominion Yarns firm in Welland, questioned the value of what had been achieved.²⁶ In Montreal the public relations efforts of NSS in the autumn of 1943 produced only 142 referrals and 69 hirings, an outcome that the agency itself described as "mediocre."²⁷

Despite all that was done in the second half of 1943 to

get more women workers into textile manufacturing, the employment situation in the industry continued to deteriorate. Experienced female employees continued to leave the business for better jobs elsewhere, and many women who joined the textile workforce quit their new jobs in short order. Labour turnover in two large Toronto firms typified the situation in Ontario.²⁸ In the Joseph Simpson Knitting Mills, 148 women were hired between 1 July and 30 November 1943 while 136 women separated from employment during the same period. Over the same five months, 176 women were hired by the Patons & Baldwins firm and 222 women left. In Montreal, 661 women had been referred to the massive Dominion Textile operations during 1943; 291 of these had been hired, but only 197 women had actually reported for work.²⁹

Ultimately, the increasing tide of criticism directed at NSS regulations, the failure of the publicity campaigns in Montreal and Hamilton, and the slow pace of reform in the primary textile firms themselves, convinced Sheldon Ross, despite the best efforts of Raley and the WPTB to the contrary, to abandon the blanket priority system for the industry. At the ILPC meeting of 11 November 1943, Ross asked Raley to provide the committee with a list of the primary textile firms deemed essential by the WPTB.³⁰ Remarkably, Raley submitted a list of 419 firms. Convinced that WPTB demands were completely unrealistic, Ross moved to

prune this list. Over Raley's protestations, the ILPC decided in January 1944 that only 63 firms would be given favourable essentiality ratings. Fifteen firms manufacturing woollen socks and nine firms in the knitting and spinning industry were given A-A ratings; 10 firms engaged in knit yarn manufacturing and 29 underwear plants were rated B-A. All other firms reverted to schedules B-B, C-B, or C-C.³¹ With this decision, the first phase of concerted and well-defined NSS policy ended. While WPTB officials railed against the ILPC decision, NSS officials clearly wished to set off in a new direction.

In the first five months of 1944, however, the stream of industry complaints against NSS with respect to female labour continued to flow. The ILPC continued to tinker with the female priority rating for specific firms, but PTI and WPTB officials demanded more concerted and decisive action. Leaders of the PTI insisted that the decision to grant many war plants concessions in wage and price ceilings had drawn large numbers of women away from their industry. According to Douglas Hallam, Secretary of the PTI, while some textile firms were beginning to take advantage of War Emergency Training programs, the industry as a whole remained particularly susceptible to external market forces because of its unusual mix of male and female workers. While 23 percent of non-ferrous metal workers, 17 percent of iron workers, and nine percent of non-metallic mineral workers

were female, fully 60 percent of textile workers were female as of 1 October 1943. This made the industry especially vulnerable to shifts in labour demand.³²

NSS data continued to validate PTI concerns. The Hochelaga Mill of the Dominion Textile Company reported in April 1944 that while 53 percent of its cotton yarn production was earmarked for DMS war contract orders, it needed to add more than 400 workers to its existing complement of 1,084 in order to meet its production requirements. From Valleyfield, the Montreal Cottons plant reported a shortfall of more than 500 workers, more than 15 percent of its total workforce.³³ In May 1944, H.D. Ovendon, Manager of the Welland, Ontario, NSS office, told Eaton that it was "not so very difficult to explain" why women continued to stream out of textile employment in his area. Shell plants operated by the United Steel Corporation and Atlas Steels Limited had opened locally, and there was a "great difference" between their wages and those of the textile manufacturers.³⁴

In May and June 1944, NSS again recast its policy. Convinced that another massive advertising campaign would be futile, Mary Eadie, Supervisor of the Toronto Women's Division, called for a "new approach." This would involve working with the PTI to identify specific emergency situations in a limited number of plants.³⁵ Eaton now joined Ross in criticizing WPTB officials, and Raley in

particular, for advancing so many priority rating requests.³⁶ If the WPTB could be more discriminating, perhaps a way forward could be found:

In view of the overall shortage of women workers and the difficulty of recruiting women for a comparatively low paid industry customarily maintaining long hours of work, I know the futility of promising to recruit a large number of new workers at the present time to meet all requirements. I have urged that a more careful analysis be made of the shortages as related to those departments or plants of highest priority.³⁷

Raley defended his department, but, after being condemned by Ross for his actions on the priority front,³⁸ agreed to meet with NSS officials on 6 June 1944 to devise a new strategy along the lines favoured by Eadie and Eaton.

Prior to this meeting, the WPTB and the PTI were each asked to submit a list of primary textile firms in the Toronto area identified as essential. Raley submitted the names of 17 firms on behalf of the WPTB while H.F. Irwin put forward the names of 14 firms on behalf of the PTI. A comparison of the two lists provided Ross with all the ammunition he needed to shred the credibility of the WPTB, since only a single firm was named on both lists. Ross lashed out at Raley and other WPTB representatives, insisting that the ILPC would no longer delay lowering priority ratings unless Raley admitted his duplicity in encouraging production in less-essential textile plants.³⁹ Asserting that he was "very sceptical of the value of any recommendations" put forward by the WPTB, Ross made known

that NSS would no longer rely on that agency's "unsatisfactory information."⁴⁰ Raley countered with the information about how the priority in textile employment was being handled in the United States, but his efforts were in vain.⁴¹

Having thus dealt with WPTB opposition, NSS officials proceeded to act on their own current thinking about female employment in primary textile firms. The new measures were tested by Mary Eadie on a trial basis in the Toronto area. Under this scheme, the fourteen Toronto firms Irwin identified as most essential were studied carefully to ascertain the minimum number of women required to fill essential production.⁴² Irwin reported that 146 women were needed immediately in these plants. NSS efforts to find these women were helped along by a display, sponsored by the textile firms, at the T. Eaton department store. Eadie was instructed to submit weekly reports on the employment situation in the Toronto mills, and on the progress of the training programs and an effort being made to recruit women workers in Manitoba and Nova Scotia. During the summer of 1944, the new initiative seemed to alleviate the shortage in Toronto to some degree, a fact acknowledged by all parties involved, including the WPTB. By 1 October, 89 women had taken full-time employment in the 14 designated Toronto firms. Similar initiatives in Hamilton showed a measure of success; in September 1944 almost half the workers needed by

five key Hamilton textile plants were found. Many NSS officials, however, remained sceptical. Fraudena Eaton had stated in August 1944 that NSS had "about exhausted its possibilities" in augmenting textile payrolls.⁴³ NSS bureaucrats in Hamilton believed in weathering "critical shortages" by relying on the inevitable cancellation of munitions contracts. Whenever this happened, women went "scampering to textile mills in search of permanent employment."⁴⁴

In Welland, Irwin's efforts met with much less success. In August, Empire Cottons reported a desperate need for 100 women to reverse a production trend that had seen output decline by 50 percent during the previous year.⁴⁵ Working conditions had been markedly improved at this plant, but wages and hours continued to hamstring recruitment efforts. Thus while the starting wage at Empire Cottons was 30.2 cents per hour for the day shift, the starting wage at war plants in the area was 46 cents per hour. In these circumstances, women brought in from distant areas to work in the local textile firms almost immediately left their jobs for better ones. Moreover, the standard working week at Empire Cottons was a demanding 54 hours per week: five 10 hour shifts Monday to Friday and a four hour stint on Saturday. Irwin suggested that Japanese workers should be employed by area textile firms, but this notion was "strenuously opposed" by civic officials in Welland. Even

bleaker was the situation in Montreal, where the new NSS approach made very little difference. A meeting there on 7 November 1944 between NSS, WPTB, and Canadian Vocational Training officials achieved little more than to confirm that the labour situation in the Quebec textile industry remained dire.⁴⁶ With NSS thus floundering once more by the winter of 1944-45, the WPTB, led by G.G.E. Raley, returned to the offensive.

In March 1945, bypassing the ILPC, Raley produced a remarkably detailed report that chronicled the depressed situation of the primary textile industry in general while concentrating on two of its sub-groups: Industry 2211, Cotton Yarn and Broad Woven Goods; and Industry 2231, Woollen and Worsted Woven Goods.⁴⁷ According to Raley, in Industry 2211, the number of employees had fallen from 25,817 in October 1942 to only 22,183 in January 1945; in Industry 2231 the decline over the same period had been from 10,371 to 9,904. Cotton firms based primarily in Quebec had lost close to 24 percent of their workforces in the two years before October 1944, despite the fact that 10 of the firms in question had operated under priority ratings above the industry average. By contrast, woollen firms located mainly in Ontario had lost less than 14 percent of their workers over the same two year period, even though two of 13 plants operated above the priority rating for the industry as a whole. Raley now insisted that the adverse position of

the textile industry be studied by the NSS Administration Board, the decision making body created to address issues of broad national concern.

A second WPTB report by Raley, submitted in April 1945, placed the textile labour situation in a context of severe production shortfalls that necessitated direct WPTB control.⁴⁸ In late 1943, the WPTB had launched a production directive program. Under this program, production directives required manufacturers to fill essential civilian and military requirements before devoting material to non-essential orders.⁴⁹ By 1 April 1945, Underwear, Men's and Children's Hosiery, Women's Hosiery, Children's Outerwear, and Adult's Outerwear had been placed under directive control, forcing primary textile firms to adjust their production accordingly. Raley now highlighted the fact that external sources of textile supply were becoming less reliable. He also produced payroll figures that showed a seven percent drop in expenditure in seven key primary textile groups between October 1942 and October 1944. Nor did this figure tell the full story, which would have to take account of the "greatly increased use of part-time labour, heavy turnover and absenteeism, loss of skilled workers to the armed forces, and [their] replacement with unskilled labour." While acknowledging the importance of the publicity campaigns of 1943 and the identification of key plants in 1944, Raley called for "immediate and more

strenuous efforts" by all concerned. In truth, high labour turnover continued to plague the primary textile industry; thus, in the 30 days preceding 7 April 1945, 332 women had been placed in jobs in woollen plants but 337 women had quit the same operations.⁵⁰

The renewed WPTB campaign moved NSS to try new and more comprehensive measures. The ILPC agreed to re-institute the blanket industry priority ratings abandoned 15 months earlier. In April 1945, a priority rating of A-A was granted to all establishments in four key textile industry sub-groups whose production fell entirely under WPTB directive; at the same time, an increased priority rating of B-B was granted to Knit Outerwear plants under WPTB directive. Again, the ILPC agreed to extend the A-A designation to three additional primary textile industry groups if and when they were placed under directive. Clearly, Sheldon Ross conceded much before the WPTB onslaught, though he remained unconvinced that tinkering with the priority system would "be of very much help."⁵¹

In concert with the priority revisions, various NSS officials met in March and April 1945 to re-examine the conundrum of female textile employment. One of the most ambitious proposals to emerge from these meetings targeted the textile mills in the Hamilton area for special attention. On 20 March, 13 representatives of the leading textile firms in this region met with NSS officials to

discuss the feasibility of recruiting several hundred women workers in Nova Scotia.⁵² The mill representatives offered to send recruiting agents to Sydney on condition that the women hired remain in textile employment for a minimum of six months and that NSS pay the cost of selection, transportation, and room and board. Although they had originated the proposal, NSS leaders ultimately proved wary of it on the grounds that there was "no purpose in bringing people 1,000 miles to have them unemployed in Hamilton instead of Sydney."⁵³ Local NSS officials also identified another potential problem:

These girls would be mingling at their work with other employees of foreign extraction and possibly quite a low social standing. Hamilton people being aware of some of the help these firms employed would possibly object to having them in their homes.⁵⁴

In the circumstances, NSS decided to let the whole scheme die.⁵⁵

A more constructive NSS plan was devised after Arthur MacNamara, under pressure from the WPTB and the PTI,⁵⁶ created a Special Committee on Textiles, which was chaired by Fraudena Eaton. The purpose of this committee, which met for the first time on 18 April 1945, was to work out a comprehensive, though non-legislative, response to WPTB demands for concerted action in relation to the textile industry.⁵⁷ As a result of the committee's deliberations, a big radio and newspaper publicity campaign was launched in May by NSS and the PTI. It was now also decided to extend

to the whole of Ontario a procedure that had been introduced by the Toronto NSS office. Under this procedure, which had been in effect since February 1945, all women seeking employment first spoke with a counsellor versed in textile operations before being considered for general employment. In addition, all women separating from textile employment were required to meet with this special textiles officer for an exit interview. The purpose of this interview was to determine why the woman was leaving her job and to persuade her to stay in the textile industry. Ruth Hamilton, the architect of the Toronto exit interview policy, was now given authority to travel throughout Ontario to oversee the placement of textile officers in all relevant NSS offices. In practice, this was a highly successful initiative, though it came almost two years too late. In Hamilton, 402 women were interviewed by the special textile officer between 10 May and 24 May and 178 referrals were made to textile employment. In Toronto, exit interviews persuaded close to 50 percent of women separating from employment in textile plants to return to their old jobs.⁵⁸

A third positive result of the Special Committee on Textiles was a greater emphasis on training offered by Canadian Vocational Training officials. To 1 January 1945, 127 Ontario and Quebec primary textile mills had taken advantage of the Job Instruction and Job Relations training programs designed to improve employee-employer relations

through sound management and personnel policies.⁵⁹ The Special Committee now recommended that a further push be made to train foremen and forewomen. On 4 June a meeting attended by 38 representatives of textile plants in the Toronto area was held at the Royal York Hotel.⁶⁰ Arrangements were made at this meeting to give the 10 hour course in Job Instruction Training to 26 employees beginning the week of 11 June. Another such meeting was held on 7 June for representatives of Ontario mills outside the Toronto area. CVT officials maintained that between 150 and 200 workers should receive training in Ontario textile mills. The final results of this initiative, however, revealed that only 121 employees from 15 primary textile mills had received Job Instruction Training by 31 October 1945, with Silknit Limited and W. Robinson & Sons accounting for 89 workers of this total.⁶¹

All of this, of course, occurred in a remarkably fluid general employment situation and at a time when many wartime restrictions were being lifted. In November 1944, all restrictions on women seeking permits to move from one NSS geographic jurisdiction to another were lifted.⁶² After 15 May 1945, women were no longer required to obtain permits to secure employment, although many still used NSS offices to search for work.⁶³ Advertising restrictions were likewise lifted and Labour Minister Humphrey Mitchell announced in August that the employment freeze on male workers would be

cancelled on 17 September 1945. From that date all compulsory directives regarding male employees would be abandoned.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, times remained tough for the textile industry. Ruth Hamilton's attempt to transplant procedures established in Ontario offices to Montreal failed,⁶⁵ although Dominion Textiles was able to inaugurate CVT training courses in its plants in September 1945.⁶⁶ In Ontario, 436 workers were placed in primary textile plants between 21 June and 15 August 1945, while 1,073 separations occurred in the same period. Of these, 854 were women.⁶⁷

In the final months of 1945 and the first months of 1946, NSS officials admitted that little had been accomplished during the three year effort to alleviate the shortage of female labour in primary textile mills. Harry Hereford, a member of the Special Committee on Textiles, nicely summed up the reason for this as follows:

I suppose it all boils down to the fact that as long as wages and hours are unsatisfactory in the textile industry, it will be difficult to find workers for them.⁶⁸

The Special Committee itself remained in operation until early 1946, and Eaton strongly supported Arthur MacNamara's "quite revolutionary" proposal for a minimum wage for women in the textile industry. In practice, however, this badly needed reform was not made.

* * * *

An examination of NSS policy with respect to women workers in the primary textile industry highlights the failure of the regulatory machinery established to direct the wartime activities of Canadian women in general. NSS officials could prioritize textile industries according to essentiality, publicize the desperate job situation in primary textile mills, and attempt to persuade women to enter textile employment, but they lacked the authority to actually order women to work in the mills. Given a choice between textile employment and the more remunerative jobs available in war industries, thousands of Canadian women opted for the latter. The war thus drastically altered the pattern of female employment in the country. After the war, however, there was a return to the older habits of work. In the case of the textile industry, that meant for many women a return to wages and working conditions they hoped they had left behind forever. The weak and ineffective wartime policies of NSS had contributed in no small measure to this outcome.

NOTES

1. Canadian Textile Journal November 16, 1945 (vol. 62, no. 23) p. 17.
2. Joy Parr, The Gender of Breadwinners (Toronto, 1991); Gail Cuthbert Brandt, "'Weaving it Together': Life Cycle and the Industrial Experience of Female Cotton Workers in Quebec, 1910-1950," Labour/Le Travail 7 (1981) pp. 29-61.
3. The Manufacturing Industries of Canada, 1941-1945, Summary Reports (Ottawa, 1943 (pp.24-25), 1945 (pp. 18-19), 1946 (pp. 18-19), 1947 (pp. 20-21), 1948 (pp. 20-21)).
4. The Manufacturing Industries of Canada, 1941-1945, Summary Reports (Ottawa, 1943 (p. 56), 1945 (p. 47), 1946 (p. 50), 1947 (p. 53), 1948 (p. 59)).
5. 1946 Supplement: Statistical Report on the Primary Textile Industry in Canada (Ottawa, 1947) pp. 1, 8, 14, 19, 26.
6. In November 1942, WPTB officials had concluded that the labour force in the primary textile industry had been strained to its limit and that men or women could not be spared for other industries. See 'Proposals for Standardizing Production and Releasing Manpower in the Textile Industry, November 1942.' NAC, RG 27, Volume 1524: file Proposal for Standardizing Production and Releasing Manpower in the Textile Industry.
7. Ziz to Goldenberg, 25 February 1943. NAC, RG 27, Box 1518: file R3 pt. 1.
8. Ibid., Daly to Rutherford, 8 April 1943.
9. Ibid., Raley to Ross, 29 April 1943.
10. Ibid., Ross to Robinson, 17 April 1943.
11. 'Report on Recruitment of Part-Time Workers in Toronto,' 28 July 1943. NAC, RG 27, Box 605: file 6-24-1 pt. 1. This two week campaign resulted in 1518 women accepting employment in essential industry, 875 of them in full time posts, despite the fact that the campaign targeted part-time workers only.
12. Raley to Ross, 4 August 1943. NAC, RG 27, Box 1518: file R3 pt. 2.
13. ILPC Minutes, 12 August 1943. NAC, RG 27, Box 1514: file O-11-1 pt. 2.

14. Ross to Raley, 16 October 1943. NAC, RG 27, Box 1518: file R3 pt. 2.
15. Lawson to Gordon, 21 June 1943. NAC, RG 27, Box 1518: file R3 pt. 3.
16. Irwin Memo, 19 August 1943. NAC, RG 27, Box 1518: file R3 pt. 2. Irwin believed strongly that only internal reforms and improved training procedures would alleviate shortfalls in primary textile employment. See Hereford to MacNamara, 26 August 1943. NAC, RG 27, Box 666: file 6-5-21-1 pt. 1.
17. Undated Memo. NAC, RG 27, Box 1518: file R3 pt. 3.
18. Irwin worked tirelessly with Ontario textile firms in the final months of 1943 attempting to improve relations between local NSS offices and primary textile mills and emphasizing training options. See unsigned, undated memo. NAC, RG 27, Box 666: file 6-5-21-1 pt. 1.
19. Eaton to MacNamara, 25 October 1943. NAC, RG 27, Box 1518: file R3 pt. 2.
20. Ibid., Unsigned Memo, 28 October 1943.
21. Leonard Prefontaine Memo, 26 October 1943. NAC, RG 27, Box 605: file 6-24-1 pt. 2. The original campaign in Montreal had sought women for all industries but was quickly replaced by a campaign that focused specifically on textile employment.
22. A report prepared in February 1943, showed that the proportion of unplaced applicants to unfilled vacancies was 49 percent in Quebec, 138 percent in Ontario, 257 percent on the Prairies, 497 percent in B.C., and 583 percent in the Maritimes. Allan Mitchell, Director of the Unemployment Insurance Commission, stressed that measures needed to be adopted to increase the female labour pool in Quebec. See Eaton to Mitchell, 20 February 1943. NAC, RG 27, Box 605: file 6-24-1 pt. 1.
23. Ibid., Three Rivers NCU to Mackenzie King, 31 March 1942.
24. Florence Martel Memo, 14 October 1943. NAC, RG 27, Box 605: file 6-24-1 pt. 2.
25. Eaton to Martel, 19 November 1943. NAC, RG 27, Box 1518: file R3 pt. 2.
26. Ibid., Turner to Ovendon, 23 November 1943.
27. Ibid., Martel to Eaton, 22 November 1943.

28. Ibid., Sauriol to Eadie, 30 November 1943.
29. Ibid., Dominion Textile Company to Prefontaine, 3 December 1943.
30. ILPC Minutes, 11 November 1943. NAC, RG 27, Box 1514: file O-11-1 pt. 2.
31. ILPC Minutes, 25 January 1944. NAC, RG 64, Box 1463: file unmarked. Ross reported that 68 firms were given elevated priorities, but a check of the minutes reveals only 63.
32. Hallam to Ross, 18 February 1944. NAC, RG 27, Box 1518: file R3 pt. 3.
33. Ibid., Raley to Ross, 4 May 1944.
34. Ibid., Ovendon to Eaton, 8 May 1944.
35. Ibid., Eadie to Hudson, 9 May 1944.
36. Ibid., Eaton to MacNamara, 10 May 1944.
37. Eaton to MacNamara, 6 June 1944. NAC, RG 27, Box 666: file 6-5-21-1 pt. 1.
38. Ross to Raley, 30 May 1944. NAC, RG 27, Box 1518: file R3 pt. 3.
39. Ibid., Ross to Hereford, 29 June 1944.
40. Ibid., Ross to Eaton, 19 July 1944.
41. The feud between Raley and Ross caused many NSS officials unfamiliar with the debate to inquire about the source of Raley's animosity towards the ILPC. See *ibid.*, Wood to Hereford, 18 July 1944.
42. Eaton to MacNamara, 14 August 1944. NAC, RG 27, Box 1518: file R3 pt. 4.
43. Ibid., Eaton to Irwin, 22 August 1944; Eaton to Irwin, 6 September 1944.
44. Ibid., Unsigned, undated report on Hamilton situation in September 1944.
45. Ibid., Irwin to Rutherford, 17 August 1944.
46. Ibid., Eaton to MacNamara, 8 November 1944.
47. Ibid., Raley to Wood, 6 March 1945.

48. 'Summary Report on the Textile Supply Situation in Canada and Requirements for Labour,' 3 April 1945. NAC, RG 27, Box 1518: file R3 pt. 5.

49. 'History of the Knitted Goods Administration.' NAC, RG 64, Box 24: file 'Chronological History of the Knitted Goods Administration.'

50. Eaton to MacNamara, 12 April 1945. NAC, RG 27, Box 1518: file R3 pt. 5.

51. Ibid., Ross to MacNamara, 27 April 1945.

52. Rutherford to Roberts, 23 March 1945. NAC, RG 27, Box 1518: file R3 pt. 4.

53. Ibid., Rutherford to Dunham, 15 March 1945.

54. Minutes of 29 March meeting with Hamilton textile firms. NAC, RG 27, Box 666: file 6-5-21-1 pt. 1. NSS officials calculated that a gross wage of \$15.75 would be reduced to only \$3.32 per week after all deductions, transportation, and room and board were calculated. See *ibid.*, Hallawell to Anderson, 29 March 1945.

55. Eaton to MacNamara, 14 April 1945. NAC, RG 27, Box 1518: file R3 pt. 5.

56. An emergency meeting between the NSS Administration Board and PTI officials had been arranged on 17 April "through pressure from the WPTB" to allow textile officials to emphasize the scope of the problem. See Hallam to MacNamara, 12 April 1945. NAC, RG 27, Box 666: file 6-5-21-1 pt. 1.

57. Eaton to MacNamara, 26 April 1945. NAC, RG 27, Box 1518: file R3 pt. 5.

58. Ibid., Eaton to MacNamara, 29 May 1945.

59. Brook to Raley, 26 December 1944. NAC, RG 64, Box 380: file 6-25. Topics covered in these 10 hour courses included material on how to start a new employee properly, how to prevent accidents, how to correct workers, how to prevent grievances, and how to handle grievances. See Hallam to all Ontario Textile Firms, 20 September 1943. NAC, RG 27, Box 666: file 6-5-21-1 pt. 1.

60. Brook to Mackenzie, ? June 1945. NAC, RG 64, Box 380: file 6-25.

61. Ibid., Brook to Mackenzie, 31 October 1945.

62. Maclean to Collings, 1 December 1944. NAC, RG 27, Box 605: file 6-24-1 pt. 3.

63. Ibid., MacNamara to all NSS Regional Superintendents, 3 May 1945.

64. Canadian Textile Journal August 24, 1945 (vol. 62, no. 17) p. 19.

65. The exit interview plan, however, was extended to other industries in Ontario in September 1945. See Hereford to MacNamara, 21 August 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1518: file R6--NSS Exit Interview Plan.

66. In the Montreal Cottons plant in Valleyfield, for example, 295 women had separated from employment between 1 March and 30 June 1945. Only 112 women had been placed in employment during the same period. See Hamilton to Eaton, 20 August 1945. NAC, RG 27, Box 666: file 6-5-21-1 pt. 2.

67. Unsigned, undated memo, August 1945. NAC, RG 27, Box 1518: file R3 pt. 5.

68. Hereford to MacNamara, 15 February 1946. NAC, RG 27, Box 666: file 6-5-21-1 pt. 2.

Chapter 9
Nurses

In a keynote article in the October 1942 edition of the Canadian Nurse, Marion Lindeburgh, Executive Secretary of the Canadian Nurses Association (CNA), exhorted the members of her profession to rise to the challenge of a serious domestic wartime shortage of nurses. In the course of her appeal, she quoted from Wordsworth as follows:

O Duty!
Who art a light to guide, a rod
To check the erring and reprove;
Thou, who art victory and law
When empty terror overawe
From vain temptations dost set free
And calm'st the weary state of frail humanity.¹

In practice, these eloquent lines fell on deaf ears and the crisis in nursing continued. Neither NSS nor the CNA was ever able to find a way to meet the demand for hospital nurses. This was because of strident CNA insistence on professional autonomy and an obliging NSS response which emphasized voluntarism and loose government regulation.

The relationship between NSS and the CNA resembles that between NSS and the universities. Arthur MacNamara willingly allowed the CNA, an autonomous professional organization, to direct the scope of mobilization efforts affecting its membership. By failing to be more interventionist, however, he tolerated a situation in which hospitals across the country faced severe nursing shortages. The cornerstone of NSS policy was a 1942 decision to exempt

nurses from all mobilization provisions affecting women. This was the exact opposite of what was being done in the United Kingdom.² In a remarkable concession to private interests, the CNA was left to regulate itself through local nursing registries, provincial nursing associations, and its own administrative structure.³ In consequence, the national interest--an adequate supply of nurses--fell by the wayside.

* * * *

At the heart of the CNA desire to guard its autonomy lay the issue of safeguarding the recognition of nursing as a profession. In the decades before World War II, the CNA had waged a battle to ensure that the provision of nursing care would not be balkanized among a disparate group of qualified and unqualified practitioners. In the 1920s, Ontario nurses had fought for licensing and the recognition of professional qualifications. During the Great Depression, however, there had been a setback in this regard, as many untrained nursing practitioners found work in hospitals.⁴ CNA officials clearly viewed the onset of war in 1939 as an opportunity both to improve the economic status of nurses and to elevate their professional status. To these ends, the organization launched an aggressive campaign soon after the war started.

First and foremost, CNA leaders steadfastly opposed any government regulation of nurses. Instead, the government was asked to provide financial support to encourage the enrolment of more student nurses; to publicize the need for married nurses and nurses not employed in hospital settings to take institutional work; and to augment the teaching staffs of nursing schools. This strategy received the formal endorsement of the CNA in late 1941,⁵ and representatives of the organization thereafter submitted a request to the Dominion government for a sum of \$125,000. The Department of Pensions and National Health eventually allotted \$115,000 for the 1942-1943 fiscal year to the CNA for student recruitment, publicity, and augmentation of teaching staffs.⁶ In 1943-44, this grant was increased to \$250,000 per annum for the duration of the war.⁷ The effect of this grant was positive but scarcely dramatic. Pupil nurse numbers rose from 8,500 in 1939-40 academic year to 11,163 in 1941-1942, but in 1942-43 only a small increase in registrants, which brought the total to 1,266, was recorded. Enrolments in 1943-44 and 1944-45 were 11,359 and 12,254, respectively.⁸ On the other hand, 7,216 nurses left the civilian nursing force during the war. Thus, whereas there was a 19 percent increase in hospital admissions in the last three years of the war, the number of practising nurses increased by only eight percent.⁹ Hence, there was a continuing crisis of care.

As might be expected, the CNA also lobbied hard to increase the salaries and improve the working conditions of nurses. In this regard, the efforts of the organization were directed at the Canadian Hospital Council (CHC), the national umbrella organization of provincial hospital bodies. The case put forward by the CNA was simple and direct. Spiralling hospital admissions and the depletion of hospital sub-staffs were placing an enormous strain on nurses in Canadian hospitals, who were now being forced to add non-nursing responsibilities such as domestic duties to their normal responsibilities. A National Health Survey conducted in 1943 revealed that 15 percent of all general duty nurses in hospitals worked an average of more than 121 hours per fortnight.¹⁰ On top of this, the salaries of nurses were notoriously unstable and inconsistent. The average monthly nursing wage in 1942 in large hospitals with more than 200 beds was only \$59.35 plus maintenance. By contrast, in medium-sized hospitals with 51-100 beds nurses received an average of \$73.75 per month plus maintenance.¹¹ Because of poor pay and difficult working conditions, the CNA refused to accept any measure of blame for the wartime nursing shortages. At the same time, the CHC demanded that the problem be solved by strictly regulating the economic and occupational freedom of nurses. Caught in the middle was NSS.

During the first eight months of 1942, the dimensions

of the problem became apparent to all concerned. A steady stream of nurses was entering the Armed Forces,¹² and many other nurses and essential hospital employees were leaving their jobs to take advantage of more lucrative opportunities in industry. To monitor this situation, early in 1942 the CNA appointed Kathleen W. Ellis as Emergency Nursing Advisor. She was to travel across the country to gauge the extent of the difficulties which had arisen and to recommend remedial measures.¹³ Ellis proved to be a formidable and energetic advocate of CNA autonomy. Educated at Johns Hopkins and Columbia Universities, she had been Director of Nursing at the Vancouver General Hospital and a nursing professor at the University of Saskatchewan.¹⁴ In the first seven months after her appointment, Ellis spent 157 days in various provinces tirelessly promoting the advantages of a nursing career to students, directing provincial advertising campaigns, and fiercely asserting the need for nurses to have professional autonomy and be free of government regulation.¹⁵

Not surprisingly, her efforts encountered stiff resistance from the CHC. Through its Secretary, Dr. Harvey Agnew, the CHC called on the government to limit the migration of both nurses and other skilled hospital employees from health care employment. In particular, the CHC insisted that hospital work be given a higher labour priority rating by the ILPC so as to guarantee the supply of

hospital sub-staff workers. This, in turn, would avoid further demands being placed on already overworked nursing personnel. If immediate legislation or regulation was not possible, Agnew wanted large sums of money spent on advertising to persuade hospital workers to remain in their employment.¹⁶

Others advocated more radical solutions. Chief among them was Dr. E. Stanley Ryerson, a member of both the Medicine Faculty, University of Toronto, and the Ontario Nursing Council. Ryerson believed that the two outstanding features of nursing in Canada were the strenuous nature of training and the poor financial remuneration.¹⁷ Noting that the traditional "impulses of charity and mercy" could no longer persuade women to enter civilian hospitals to ease the nursing shortage, Ryerson proposed four measures: (1) the institution of the eight hour shift; (2) the introduction of a rotation system in residences which would allow each student nurse to live outside for four months of every year in training; (3) the enlistment into the Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps, with pay and at the rank of private, of all student nurses entering their third year; and (4) the reduction of the formal training period from three years to two, with the license to be granted upon the completion of the third year working in a hospital. Other medical officials lashed out at the weakness and arbitrariness of NSS regulations as the source of the

nursing shortage. For example, Margaret Jamieson, Superintendent of the Restigouche and Bay Chaleur Memorial Hospital in New Brunswick, complained bitterly about NSS restrictions on advertising; these made a bad situation "infinitely worse." Jamieson felt betrayed, and claimed that she had been foolish to believe that the introduction of civilian mobilization measures would help the hospitals in any meaningful fashion.¹⁸

Finally, NSS Associate Director Fraudena Eaton called a conference of NSS, CNA, and CHC representatives in Ottawa for 22 October 1942 to discuss hospital conditions. Prior to this meeting, K.W. Ellis set the limits of discussion: only cooperation with, and not the coercion of, the CNA would be considered; and debate must centre on the establishment of "minimum requirements" of living, salary, and working conditions.¹⁹ Ellis asked all provincial nursing groups to bring forward their ideas at the conference, but in fact little that was new was discussed there.²⁰ The CNA delegation reiterated that only better wages and working conditions for nurses could begin to alleviate the crisis and that voluntary workers or hospital aides could not substitute for trained nursing professionals. The only CNA concession was an expression of willingness to endorse a professional permit system which would document the availability of nurses. This procedure would be directed by the Wartime Bureau of Technical

Personnel.²¹ The CHC brief to the conference called for the freezing of all hospital staff members in their existing employment; the placing of all hospital personnel at the highest level of essentiality; and the granting of primacy to hospital employment in the allocation of workers by NSS officers.²² Both the CHC and the CNA called for a massive publicity campaign, to be funded by the government, to highlight the benefits and essentiality of hospital employment.

Beyond this, the October conference failed to produce any plan of action. The proposal for the registration of nurses quickly died, and a litany of complaints about nursing shortages continued to be heard at NSS headquarters in Ottawa. The unanimous opinion of key officials there was that further surveys of the nursing situation should be undertaken to give the CNA--this was revealing--"a much better idea of how they can recommend solving their own problems."²³ The CHC continued to press for more regulation of hospital employees but the CNA continued to lobby for the unrestricted management of its own affairs.

The first serious attempt to address the shortage of nurses occurred in British Columbia when Percy Ward, Inspector of Hospitals for the province, proposed that his office begin acting in an advisory capacity to assist hospitals in personnel matters involving nurses. The idea would be to mediate any disputes which might cause hospital

employees to separate from their jobs and to establish voluntary guidelines concerning wages, working conditions, and hours of work.²⁶ Ward stressed that he would act only to supplement the efforts of NSS officers and as a "channel through which otherwise apparently unsolvable problems might be routed."²⁵ In January 1943, it was decided to raise the labour priority rating of a lengthy list of male hospital sub-staff operatives from D to B.²⁶ This concession to CHC pressure resulted in further demands by Agnew regarding the restrictions placed by PC 246 (the NSS Civilian Regulations) on part-time workers. Agnew now claimed that many women would be willing to work part-time in support positions such as domestics and ward aides for five or six days per week. They would only come forward, however, if NSS waived the requirement that anyone working more than three days per week have a permit. Castigating those women who were "doing very little to hasten victory," Agnew argued that all restrictions should be lifted for persons willing to do essential work.²⁷ Responding to this case, NSS decreed in March 1943 that the regulations regarding part-time work would not apply to anyone who went to work in a hospital for less than 24 hours per week.²⁸

Although plans to register nurses through the WBTP were abandoned in late 1942, the idea of a registration drive to determine the number of nurses in Canada, regardless of current occupation, gained momentum early in 1943.²⁹ On 12

February, it was decided to have a three day registration in late March, and a proclamation to this effect was issued on 15 February. While the majority of nurses were required to register at hospitals or local Employment Offices, arrangements were made for nurses living more than five miles from an NSS office to register through the post office. Large advertisements about the registration were placed in every daily newspaper in Canada on 15 March, and information was also circulated to every hospital and post office across the country. The registration was compulsory for all nurses under 65 years of age who were not enlisted in the armed forces, regardless of marital status or existing employment.

The final tally of the national registration drive occurred in June 1943, although the returns were not widely circulated for four more months because of CNA objections. The registration proved that there was a large number of nurses who were not practising. Table 11 summarizes the results of the registration by region and employment status. The nationwide ratio of practising nurses to total population was 1:520; Ontario had the most favourable ratio (1:381) and Saskatchewan the most unfavourable (1:897). The registration clearly revealed that most nurses who were not practising their profession were married housewives, although it also showed that 50 percent of all practising nurses were not employed in general duty in hospital wards.

Table 11
Results of the March 1943, Nursing Registration³⁰

Occupation	Maritimes	Quebec	Ontario	Prairies	B.C.	Canada
Private Duty	717	1,126	3,397	703	384	6,327
General Duty	899	2,002	4,342	2,030	1,432	10,705
Industrial Nursing	28	425	658	180	65	1,356
Other Nursing	268	922	1,542	662	386	3,780
Housewives	2,922	2,424	11,457	5,306	3,173	25,282
Industry, Business	71	121	487	94	166	939
Other Non-Nursing	80	94	511	95	50	830
Totals	4,985	7,114	22,394	9,070	5,656	49,219

More than 1,000 individuals indicated a willingness to resume nursing on a full-time basis, although 484 of these insisted on remaining in their own locality.

With the registration results in hand, Eaton and other NSS officials launched a series of consultations across the country. In Montreal, meetings were held with local hospital and nursing officials on 28-29 June. The business discussed included the feasibility of grants from the Dominion government to local hospitals; the granting to hospitals of further exemption from NSS regulations; and the sponsorship by the Dominion government of more recruitment drives for nurses.³¹ Eaton recognized that the decision to allow the CNA to regulate the flow of nurses through local nursing registries simply had not worked.³² The Manitoba

registration system, for example, had failed to produce nurses for rural areas or tuberculosis sanatoria. Moreover, despite threats from Manitoba nursing officials to deny them private duty referrals, members of the Winnipeg registry had refused even to attend meetings to discuss the situation and to vote on possible improvements in the registry system.³³

Yet, while she recognized the increasing shortage of professional help in Canadian hospitals, Eaton steadfastly resisted direct NSS control of the placement of nurses. In a July 1943 letter to the CNA, she summed up her position as follows:

I have not yet lost faith in my original belief that the CNA and the individuals of the nursing profession will find ways and means to arrive at a solution through self-regulation when the situation is placed fairly before them.³⁴

Eaton assured Marion Lindeburgh that NSS plans centred on the CNA and provincial nursing associations assuming "more responsibility for the adjustment of their situation"; cooperation, not compulsion, would continue to guide government policy.³⁵ On their side, CNA officials remained adamant in the view that they were not to blame for the shortage of nurses and that the root of the problem lay in the parsimonious salaries and poor working conditions defended by the CHC.³⁶

Nevertheless, CNA and various provincial nursing representatives did attempt to find solutions within the established framework of practise. One of the most

ambitious efforts in this regard was made in Manitoba. At a conference in August 1943, the Manitoba Association of Registered Nurses passed two helpful resolutions. These were: (1) that a committee be struck to interview all members of the provincial nursing directory in order to direct nurses where they were most needed; and (2) that this committee make a special effort to mobilize physically fit women with no dependents to work in hard pressed rural areas,³⁷ especially in the tuberculosis sanatorium at Ninette and the various psychiatric hospitals scattered about the province. In the event, the committee contacted 300 nurses but with decidedly mixed results. Of the 95 single nurses interviewed in person, 43 refused assignment in tuberculosis or psychiatric wards while 33 nurses said that health problems or domestic duties made work in rural areas impossible for them. Of the 66 married nurses interviewed, 46 refused to consider posts in psychiatric or tuberculosis institutions. Of 153 nurses reporting by telephone, only 53 were able to serve even in a limited capacity to alleviate the nursing shortage in the province.³⁸

A second important CNA initiative was launched in June 1943 at a meeting of the executive of the Association. At this meeting, a Joint Committee on Nursing was formed to meet with representatives of the CHC. Nine prominent CNA officials, including K.W. Ellis, were named to the

committee, which was to consider all problems relating to the supply and distribution of qualified nurses in Canada. While the CNA proclaimed proudly that it would handle the professional aspects of the shortage of nurses, its officials also made plain that they could not "assume the responsibility for rectifying or improving the economic factors involved in this problem."³⁹ The CHC agreed to participate in the work of the Joint Committee and appointed a four member group to represent its interests.⁴⁰ At a meeting of the fully constituted Joint Committee on 31 August 1943, the CNA members endorsed the following: (1) a minimum payment to general duty nurses of \$100 per month plus maintenance; (2) an eight hour day and a six day week for this same group; (3) a salary of four dollars per day plus maintenance for general duty work of more than one week but less than one month; (4) the payment of the prevailing private duty nursing rate for all general nursing work of less than a week; (5) the elimination of non-nursing duties from the workload of general duty nurses; (6) the limiting of private duty nursing to necessary cases only; (7) the increased use of subsidiary nursing groups; and (8) no freezing of nurses in their existing employment through government regulation.⁴¹ In response, the CHC members present invited the CNA to raise these concerns at the CHC annual meeting to be held on 8 September.

At this gathering both the CNA and NSS were officially

represented. A variety of topics were discussed, including the need for more money to be found for student nurses. NSS officials suggested that the CNA approach the Department of Labour about the availability of scholarship money under the Canadian Vocational Training Act. This money could be used to supplement the block grant the CNA received.⁴² An NSS proposal that the CHC employ interned Japanese women in hospital work was quickly squelched; CHC representatives from British Columbia pronounced that the "rest of the country could do as they liked" but that B.C. hospitals had no interest in these women "except to have them removed as far as possible" from the province.⁴³ The Joint Committee list of remedies for the nursing crisis received an indifferent response from the CHC executive. The CNA demands were placed far down on the agenda of the meeting on the grounds that the CHC had not met specifically to discuss the recommendations. Subsequently, the CHC endorsed in general terms a submission put forward by the Joint Committee in January 1944. The recommendations in this submission, however, were simply passed along to the provincial hospital councils for study without any firm guidelines for action to improve the wages and working conditions of women attached.⁴⁴ In a 1946 document, the CNA summarized the tepid response of the CHC to the wartime proposals of the Joint Committee as follows:

The recommendations of the CNA, formulated in 1943, although generally agreed to in principle by

the provincial hospital associations, actually were not strongly supported by the latter or generally implemented. Very little, in fact, was done during the war years to hold nurses in the hospital field.⁴⁵

By the beginning of 1944, therefore, the pattern of interest group response to the problem of meeting the demand for nurses was well established. Central to this was the refusal of NSS to tell nurses where and when to work. Eaton had welcomed the establishment of the Joint Committee in the hope that it would "overcome the need for directive control of nurses."⁴⁶ Even officials who were known to be strong advocates of government intervention were reluctant to venture into the nursing marketplace. Chief Alternative Service Officer L.E. Westman expressed the prevailing view well when he wrote that "control as a thing in itself" must not take precedence over established CNA practice.⁴⁷ The CNA itself remained adamantly opposed to NSS interference and continued to seek a solution to the problem by increasing the supply of nurses through recruitment and training. At every opportunity, the CNA pressed the case that the root cause of all that had gone wrong was to be found in the realm of salaries and working conditions. The CHC, of course, rejected this analysis and looked to legislative remedies to solve the crisis.

In January 1944, nursing officials in Manitoba again sought a way forward. At a conference between NSS, nursing, and hospital officials, it was decided to address a shortage

of 60 pupil nurses in three mental hospitals in the province by a public relations campaign and by lowering the age of entry into nursing programs from 18 to 17. The NSS publicity campaign emphasized uniforms, the promise of postwar employment, three weeks of paid vacation, and other benefits of nursing life.⁴⁸ This campaign, however, achieved only partial success due to vociferous opposition from many nurses and other Manitoba residents condemning the recruitment of teenagers for this purpose. Although at least 11 students were signed up during the campaign,⁴⁹ many dissenting views were expressed in the Manitoba press. A letter which appeared in the Winnipeg Free Press and which was signed by 'A Voice of Protest' captured the essence of the protest:

I suggest that we appoint Dr. Pincock [the provincial Health Minister], Mrs. [E.W.] Gerry [the coordinator of women's employment in the Winnipeg NSS office] , and a body of adults with no political buns to butter to volunteer to serve one week. If they can survive the ordeal and can conscientiously pledge to mothers of seventeneers their word of honour that, having tested and tried, they do declare it to be a suitable, non-injurious occupation for children, then I will cheerfully and humbly swallow this protest...Make nursing of these unfortunates a well-paid peacetime occupation for suitable returned men and women who, as seasoned warriors, have become immune to sorry sights. At best, it is a task for the mature and a crying shame to foist so grievous a burden on to the slender shoulders and highly emotional, sensitive nervous systems of young girls.⁵⁰

Soon after these events, K.W. Ellis told Eaton that an NSS proposal to provide local employment offices and

provincial nursing registries with the lists from the March 1943 registration was opposed by the CNA. In keeping with her previous conciliatory approach, Eaton answered that the registration results would only be distributed "during any emergency which might arise" and that NSS would not act without the approval of the CNA and the provincial nursing agencies.⁵¹ In April, NSS and CNA officials held face to face meetings again. Remarkably, the only measures adopted had already been tried: there would be another publicity campaign; Arthur MacNamara and Eaton would write to all non-practising nurses in the country; and there would be another national survey of hospital requirements. CNA leaders resolutely maintained that the situation "did not warrant the placing of controls over the employment of nurses," and Eaton wholeheartedly supported their request for another national publicity campaign.⁵² This campaign featured newspaper and radio advertisements and a National Film Board short film, which was released in theatres on 25 May. It showed women leaving secretarial duties to resume nursing training, housewives with training leaving their aprons behind to rush to the nearest NSS office to register for hospital work, and an "old gent with gout playing cribbage with a pretty nurse."⁵³ The personal letter issued by MacNamara and Eaton in June 1944 urged all trained nurses to examine the relative importance of the work they were performing and emphasized that nurses had not been subject

to any form of regulation. Nurses were asked to register at a local employment office or put their names on the local nursing registry to express their willingness to fill hospital nursing vacancies.⁵⁴

NSS officials in Ottawa received scores of letters from nurses explaining why they could not respond to MacNamara's and Eaton's appeal. While the majority of the letter writers cited health and home concerns,⁵⁵ a vocal minority targeted bureaucratic regulations within both government and the nursing profession itself. Poor wages and working conditions in hospitals were also singled out for complaint. H.R.M. McDougall of Toronto berated hospital officials for paying nurses lower wages than they paid to charwomen. She challenged MacNamara to send a circular letter to hospital administrators asking them to improve voluntarily the working conditions of nurses. Given the historical pattern of low wages, a patriotic appeal to nurses would not solve the problem; this would be like trying to solve the military manpower problem by shaming "the zombies into active service."⁵⁶ Muriel Locke of Toronto castigated MacNamara for "threatening" nurses into cooperating in order to avoid regulation; a better approach would be to provide government funds to augment nursing incomes.⁵⁷ An acerbic unsigned letter detailed the severe handicaps facing professional women and bitterly attacked the negligent attitude of government officials:

...it makes you do a little thinking. And the conclusion you come to would not be very flattering to some of these high-salaried chairwarmers who sit among the seats of the mighty in Ottawa. They dream in comfort, we work amongst realities, and our memories are long.⁵⁸

The results of the national hospital survey were published in June 1944. A total of 694 hospitals were surveyed; these employed 8,655 full-time and 805 part-time nurses. The survey showed that 2,135 nurses were needed immediately by these institutions. It also highlighted the remarkable fact that more than 10 percent of all nurses employed in hospitals had separated from employment in at least one hospital during the month of April 1944.⁵⁹ The average monthly wage in most areas of the country fell between \$70 and \$90 per month; the lowest wage was \$50 per month at the Hotel Dieu Hospital in Bathurst and the highest wage was \$115 per month at the Belcher Hospital in Calgary. Above all, the survey showed that nurses were expressing their discontent over salaries and working conditions by voting with their feet. High wage hospitals across the country usually had full staff complements while low wage hospitals were short of nurses. In Ontario, for example, the Nicholl's Hospital in Peterborough paid salaries of \$110 per month and reported no nursing shortages; by contrast, St. Joseph's Hospital in the same city paid only \$70 per month and had a 25 percent staff shortage. In Calgary, the Belcher Hospital reported no shortage, while the Calgary General Hospital needed 13 nurses to supplement the work of

the 35 nurses on staff who were being paid \$83 per month.⁶⁰

The results of the hospital survey reinforced a rising tide of criticism directed at both nursing and government officials during the summer of 1944. Harvey Agnew of the CHC was quick to point out that tuberculosis sanatoria and psychiatric hospitals were not the only institutions suffering acute staff shortages. Agnew complained that war industries with unlimited budgets were hoarding nurses whose chief concern was to "inquire about headaches and bandage cut fingers" while patients "hovering near death" were being denied proper nursing care.⁶¹ Horace Atkin, Superintendent of the Metropolitan Hospital in Windsor, Ontario, complained that the lack of regulation of nurses enabled many of them to "enjoy a tourist excursion across Canada." Not surprisingly, he wanted strict controls put on the profession to alleviate shortages.⁶² In Welland, Ontario, thanks to a grant of \$165,000 from wartime construction funds, the County Hospital had been able to add a 50 bed wing to the original 100 bed facility. A shortage of 26 nurses, however, meant that only 50 of the 150 beds were in use.⁶³

The situation in Quebec was especially serious. Following the hospital survey, an emergency meeting was held in Montreal in July that brought together an array of municipal, provincial, federal, and nursing officials. This meeting heard that there were shortages in sub-staff in the

Province's hospitals, and that 400 nurses were desperately needed to augment the 1,400 who were currently on the job. The survey showed that more than 10 percent of Quebec nurses had separated from employment during the month of April. Nevertheless, NSS officials recommended only that two more committees be struck. These would deal, respectively, with nursing and sub-staff shortages in the Montreal area and would emphasize cooperation rather than compulsion.⁶⁴ The CNA perspective on these events was that the difficulties in Montreal could be resolved if those involved "were altogether exempted from NSS regulations." At the same time, "some effort" should be made to retain graduating student nurses in hospitals, and other nurses should be "encouraged" to accept two month stints on general duty.⁶⁵

Ultimately, the continuing shortages and a poor response to the advertising campaign forced NSS and CNA representatives to meet again to discuss a more comprehensive response to the nursing crisis. At this meeting, which was held in Ottawa in August, the two parties agreed to the following: (1) that financial inducements in the form of supplementary allowances under NSS jurisdiction should be extended to nurses; (2) that a plan to bar any nurse who had graduated since 1942 from accepting private duty work should be devised; (3) that hospitals should be encouraged to make better use of auxiliary medical organizations such as the Red Cross Society and the St.

John's Ambulance Society; (4) that local community resources should be more fully utilized by hospitals; (5) that student nurses should be eligible for a \$200 grant from the Student Aid Schedule of the War Emergency Training Plan; and (6) that concessions on NSS advertising and recruiting rules should be made to allow hospitals greater freedom in obtaining hospital sub-staff.⁶⁶ These were comprehensive recommendations indeed, but no concrete action was forthcoming from the meeting. The cooperative efforts of the CHC and the CNA earlier in the war to increase the number of nursing aides had been partially successful,⁶⁷ but the proposal to use autonomous auxiliary hospital organizations fell flat.⁶⁸ Clearly, the granting of government subsidies and the restriction of private duty nursing had the greatest potential to ease the shortage of nurses. Neither measure, however, was administered with any degree of conviction.

Section 213 of PC 246 authorized NSS officials to pay transportation costs and separation allowances to workers who transferred to essential jobs away from their current employment. On 11 August 1944, NSS officials issued Circular 356 allowing local NSS officers to pay separation allowances to all trained nurses not currently employed in their profession who were willing to accept general duty hospital positions for a minimum period of six months. But this approach proved to be highly ineffective. Almost three

months after they were introduced, Eaton announced that the allowances were "not proving to be of value" and that only a single nurse in Canada had received a separation allowance to 2 November 1944.⁶⁹ The debate next shifted to the clause in Circular 356 stating that only nurses not currently employed in their profession were eligible for separation allowances. Eaton took the position that this clause should be interpreted to mean any nurse not employed in a hospital, since NSS officials had turned down applications for the allowance from several private duty nurses seeking full-time positions in hospitals. The CNA, however, immediately condemned any offer of funds to private duty nurses that was not also available to general duty nurses. This could only have the effect of creating friction among hospital nurses.⁷⁰ In December, Eaton issued a second circular reducing the minimum employment period from six months to two months for any nurse seeking to claim the allowance. Despite this measure, however, she was eventually forced to concede that the worth of the entire supplementary allowance scheme had been "extremely limited." This was because it had not been possible to target a large number of nurses.⁷¹

The August 1944 proposal to regulate private duty nurses also failed. CNA officials demanded that the need for such a restrictive regime be "thoroughly demonstrated" before regulations were put into effect.⁷² A draft of the

rules proposed called for the amendment of Section 207 of PC 246 in six key respects. The changes to be made would affect all nurses who had completed their training since 31 August 1942. Henceforth, the following requirements would apply to them: (1) no nurse could engage in private duty nursing without a permit; (2) no one could employ a nurse in a private duty position without seeing the permit; (3) an NSS officer could set conditions regarding the place and duration of private duty employment; (4) an NSS officer could cancel or extend the permit of a nurse at any time; (5) no person could employ a private duty nurse after the expiration of the permit; and (6) no private duty nurse could continue private duty nursing once the permit expired. These were stiff rules, but, faced with the usual pressure from the CNA, NSS did not enact them. In March 1945, Eaton had admitted that NSS had a failed record with respect to the strict regulation of nurses. Arthur MacNamara offered this remarkable response to her request to reconsider imposing the restrictions on private duty nursing:

I think we should try to avoid justification for criticism [of the proposed private duty restrictions] on the ground that we knew of the shortage and knew that it was going to get worse yet we did nothing about it.⁷³

For the remainder of the war, the actions of both NSS and the CNA remained true to form. In February 1945, the CNA called again for government subsidization of salaries and for yet another publicity campaign.⁷⁴ By the same

token, NSS continued its foot-dragging--even in relation to the 11 military hospitals under the jurisdiction of the Department of Veterans Affairs. Committees consisting of representatives of the Civil Service Commission, provincial nursing associations, and NSS were variously established to deal with the nursing needs of these particular hospitals.⁷⁵ Ottawa, however, refused to centralize the recruitment of nurses and mandated that each district committee should be completely responsible for its own affairs. Remarkably, the committees empowered to recruit nurses in Ontario and Quebec were not even functioning more than four months after this whole approach had been adopted.⁷⁶ Similarly, Eaton visited Saskatchewan in January 1945 to monitor embryonic plans for a new provincial placement service, a collaborative effort of NSS and the Saskatchewan Registered Nurses Association. This was certainly a promising scheme, but it was not put into effect until more than five months later. This delay typified the handling of the nursing crisis by NSS.⁷⁷

In the closing months of the war, Eaton still refused to budge. While admitting that the nursing situation still had the "emergency quality which is disappearing from other employment situations affecting women,"⁷⁸ she claimed in July 1945 that her office had done a "good deal" to improve matters. The government should "get out of the picture fairly soon" and leave all re-adjustment problems to the

CNA.⁷⁹ This position belied the evidence flooding into NSS offices of a continuing crisis.⁸⁰ Towards the end of the war, moreover, a new problem arose when many married nurses left hospital employment in anticipation of the discharge of their spouses from the armed forces. In a November 1945 comment on this particular situation, Eaton offered this ironic epitaph for the involvement of NSS with the nursing profession during the war:

NSS has assisted greatly in settling the demand for nurses during a great emergency but believes that in ordinary times the problem is not their particular responsibility. Therefore, no analysis of the future requirement for nurses has been made.⁸¹

* * * *

A review of the wartime history of Canadian nurses reveals a startling pattern of bureaucratic paralysis and institutional autonomy that seriously threatened the functioning of hospitals. All the major participants in the debate must share responsibility for the failure to staff hospital wards between 1942 and 1945. Although the issue of regulating nurses was complicated by the lax wartime controls placed on Canadian women generally, NSS had an opportunity to make its presence felt in no uncertain terms. Instead, NSS officials chose to allow the CNA to regulate its own affairs during the war. The CNA, however, failed to expand the nursing workforce. Despite the fact that large

sums of public money were poured into the coffers of nursing organizations across Canada, the CNA effort was marked by tepid and ineffective action. Although the enlistment of nurses in the armed forces was the main reason for the problem that arose, the CNA did not help matters by giving such high priority to its own autonomy. For its part the CHC failed lamentably to address the problem of wages and working conditions that deterred many women from seeking hospital employment. The effect of the interaction of NSS, the CNA, and the CHC in wartime Canada was an unfortunate stalemate. For this NSS must bear the primary responsibility.

NOTES

1. Canadian Nurse October 1942 (Vol. 38, no. 10) p. 759.

2. Controls over nursing employment in Britain tightened during the course of the war to the point where all nurses had to serve in a hospital for a minimum period of one year upon graduation. All nurses in certain age classes had to register with an employment office before seeking nursing employment and could be directed to essential hospital services. See H.M.D Parker, Manpower: A Study of Wartime Policy and Administration (London, 1957) pp. 291-292, 415.

3. NSS Associate Director Fraudena Eaton stated that the presence of the nursing registry system was one of the prime reasons why NSS stayed out of the way in 1942 and allowed the CNA complete autonomy. See Eaton to Agnew, 20 July 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1522: file X1-2-12 pt. 3.

4. For discussions of the professionalization of the nursing profession see E. Friedson, Professional Powers: A Study in the Institutionalization of Formal Knowledge (Chicago, 1986); L. McIntyre, "Towards a Redefinition of Status: Professionalism in Canadian Nursing, 1938-1945," (Unpublished Master's Thesis: University of Western Ontario, 1984); and M. Moloney, Professionalization of Nursing (Philadelphia, 1987).

5. Canadian Hospital October 1944 (vol. 21. no. 10) p. 37.

6. 'Minutes--Meeting of the CNA Committee Appointed to Approach the Government Regarding Grant, 25 July 1942.' CNA Committee Papers, Box ARC WY1 CE Gov. G.: file Government Grant Committee Minutes, 1942-1945. Order-in-Council PC 72/6073 of 14 July 1942, authorized the first grant.

7. The \$250,000 for 1944-1945 was divided four ways: (1) \$20,000 for administration; (2) \$75,000 for bursaries for supervisor and teacher preparation; (3) \$125,000 for recruitment of student nurses; and (4) \$30,000 to support university and hospital nursing programs. See 'Minutes--Meeting of the CNA Committee Appointed to Approach the Government Regarding Grant, 25 July 1942.' CNA Committee Papers, Box ARC WY1 CE Gov. G.: file Government Grant Committee Minutes, 1942-1945. The 1945-1946 grant was conditional. Five-twelfths of the \$250,000 total was granted in the Summer of 1945 pending further review after the results of the 1945 election. The remaining seven-twelfths was not distributed after a government decision in late 1945.

8. CNA Brief to the CHC Annual Meeting, 28 January 1946. CNA Committee Papers, Box ARC WY1 CA1 CJL 1944-1976: file Joint Committee on Nursing--Reports and Background, 1941-1950.

9. Canadian Hospital October 1944 (vol. 21, no. 10) pp. 38-39.

10. Canadian Hospital June 1943 (vol. 20, no. 6) p. 16.

11. Canadian Hospital October 1942 (vol. 19, no. 10) pp. 44-50, November 1942 (vol. 19, no. 11) pp. 34-38.

12. A total of 4,439 women served as Nursing Sisters in all three branches of the Armed Forces during World War II. The constant withdrawal of civilian nursing personnel from Canadian hospitals to the military sector remained perhaps the prime reason for shortages developing and persisting for the duration of the war. See Pierson, "They're Still Women After All" p. 263.

13. 'Memorandum of Meeting, 18 January 1942.' CNA Committee Papers, Box ARC WY1 CA1 CE ENA: file Advisory Committee to the Emergency Nursing Advisor of the CNA, Minutes, 1941-1943.

14. 'Appointment of Miss Kathleen Ellis.' CNA Committee Papers, Box ARC WY1 CA1 CE ENA: file Advisory Committee to the Emergency Nursing Advisor of the CNA, Press Releases, 1942-1943.

15. Canadian Nurse September 1942 (vol. 38, no. 9) pp. 640-645; Canadian Nurse January 1943 (vol. 39, no. 1) p. 25.

16. 'Notes on Labour Situation in Hospitals and Similar Welfare Institutions, 8 May 1943'; Agnew to Little, 1 September 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1521: file X1-2-12 pt. 1.

17. Ibid., Ryerson to Westman, 7 July 1942.

18. Ibid., Jamieson to Eaton, 12 October 1942.

19. Ibid., Ellis to Eaton, 30 September 1942.

20. Ibid., 'Personnel Needs of Hospitals' (unsigned, undated memo). In addition to NSS, CHC, and CNA representatives, other representatives came from the Canadian Tuberculosis Association, the Catholic Hospital Council of Canada, the Toronto Hospital Council, the Montreal Hospital Council, the Victorian Order of Nurses, the Department of Pensions and National Health, and the Royal Canadian Army Medical Services Nursing Division.

21. Ibid., CNA Brief to the 22 October Conference.

22. Ibid., CHC Brief to the 22 October Conference.
23. Mitchell to Eaton, 15 December 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1522: file X1-2-12 pt. 2.
24. Ibid., MacNamara to Eaton, 4 December 1942.
25. Ibid., Ward to Eaton 21 December 1942.
26. 'Minutes of the Interdepartmental Committee on Labour Priorities, 27 January 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1515: file O-11-1 pt. 3. The list of 15 male hospital sub-staff positions raised to a B rating included: orderlies, engineers, carpenters, painters, electricians, plumbers, wall washers, chefs, laundrymen, receivers, gardeners, morgue attendants, printers, business officers, and night watchmen. Agnew felt that "few women could be found" to perform cook duties while few women were trained in the "art" of business management. See Agnew to Deutsch, 18 December 1942. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1521: file X1-2-12 pt. 1.
27. Agnew to Eaton, 10 March 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1521: file X1-2-12 pt. 1.
28. Ibid., Mitchell to All Employment Offices, 2 April 1943.
29. Ibid., Hereford to Eaton, 3 February 1943.
30. All numbers taken from the summary of the registration drive found in NAC, RG 27, Volume 1522: file X1-2-12-2 pt. 2.
31. Martel to Eaton, 7 July 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1522: file X1-2-12 pt. 3.
32. Ibid., Eaton to Agnew, 20 July 1943.
33. Ibid., Gerry to Eaton, 20 July 1943.
34. Ibid., Eaton to Hall, 26 July 1943.
35. Ibid., Eaton to Lindeburgh, 13 August 1943.
36. Ibid., Wilson to Eaton, 28 July 1943.
37. Ibid., Botsford to Eaton, 16 August 1943.
38. Ibid., Botsford to Eaton, 2 October 1943.
39. 'Report of the Committee Appointed to Confer with the CHC.' CNA Committee Papers, Box ARC WY1 CA1 CJL: file Joint Committee on Nursing, Reports and Background Documentation, 1941-1950. The CNA delegation consisted of Marion Lindeburgh,

F. Munroe, K.W. Ellis, Gertrude Hall, M. Baker, E. Flanagan, E. Beith, Mother Allaire, and Sister Allard.

40. The four CHC delegates were Dr. J.C. Mackenzie, R. Lapointe, Dr. George Stephens, and Dr. A.F. Anderson. See Canadian Hospital September 1943 (vol. 20, no. 9) p. 42.

41. 'Report of the Committee Appointed to Confer with the CHC.' CNA Committee Papers, Box ARC WY1 CA1 CJL: file Joint Committee on Nursing, Reports and Background Documentation, 1941-1950.

42. A total of 344 student nurses eventually took advantage of a special \$100 bursary offered under the provisions of the 1942 CVT Act. See Canadian Vocational Training, Annual Report, 1944-1945 (Ottawa, 1945) p. 10.

43. Eaton to Pammett, 27 September 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1522: file X1-2-12 pt. 3.

44. Canadian Hospital January 1944 (vol. 21, no. 1) p. 24.

45. CNA Submission to the CHC Conference in Toronto, 28 January 1946. CNA Committee Papers, BOX ARC WY1 CA1 CJL: file Joint Committee on Nursing, Reports and Background Documentation, 1941-1950.

46. Wilson to CNA Executive Committee, 14 September 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1522: file X1-2-12 pt. 3.

47. Westman to MacNamara, 7 January 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1522: file X1-2-12 pt. 4.

48. Ibid., Gerry to Griggs, 17 January 1944.

49. Ibid., Gerry to Eaton, 31 January 1944.

50. Winnipeg Free Press 29 January 1944.

51. Eaton to Ellis, 14 February 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1522: file X1-2-12 pt. 4.

52. Eaton to Agnew, 10 May 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1522: file X1-2-12 pt. 5.

53. Ibid., NFB Script.

54. Ibid., Eaton to MacNamara, 9 May 1944.

55. A total of 97 individual replies remain in NSS records with 55 respondents citing health or domestic reasons for refusing

nursing employment. See the summary of responses, 1 September 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1522: file X1-2-12-2 pt. 3.

56. McDougall to MacNamara, 27 June 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1522: file X1-2-12-2 pt. 2.

57. Ibid., Locke to MacNamara, 8 July 1944.

58. Ibid., unsigned, undated letter to MacNamara.

59. Summary of Questionnaires Received From Employment and Selective Service Offices re Nursing Personnel in Hospitals as of 31 July 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1521: file X1-2-5.

60. The results for each hospital in Canada can be found in NAC, RG 27, Volume 1521: files X1-2-2-1, X1-2-2-2, X1-2-2-3, X1-2-2-4, and X1-2-2-5.

61. Agnew to Eaton, 1 June 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1522: file X1-2-12 pt. 6.

62. Ibid., Atkin to Agnew, 21 April 1944.

63. Ibid., Dunham to Sullivan, June 1944.

64. Ibid., unsigned memo of Montreal conference, 20 July 1944.

65. Ibid., Memorandum on Montreal Proceedings, 20 July 1944.

66. Eaton to Greene, 25 August 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1522: file X1-2-12 pt. 7.

67. At a March 1942 meeting, representatives of the CHC, CNA, Red Cross Society, and St. John's Ambulance Corps had agreed on a training proposal for ward aides that would see instruction times reduced from 240 hours to 80 hours. See Canadian Hospital April 1942 (vol. 19, no. 4) p. 19.

68. Meetings held throughout the final months of 1944 indicated a general unwillingness of hospital, nursing, and auxiliary medical officials to adopt the scheme wholeheartedly. The Red Cross worried about the effect increased salary and workloads would have on the voluntary nature of the organization. See Eaton to MacNamara, 27 November 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1522: file X1-2-12-1A. The issue dragged on into 1945. In March Agnew indicated that consultations "cast some doubt on the desirability of putting too much effort on this proposed development." See Eaton to MacNamara, 15 March 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1522: file X1-2-12 pt. 9.

69. Eaton to MacNamara, 2 November 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1521: file X1-2-5.

- 70.Ibid., Hall to Eaton, 13 November 1944.
- 71.Ibid., Eaton to Agnew, 16 February 1945.
- 72.Eaton to Greene, 25 August 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1522: file X1-2-12 pt. 7.
- 73.MacNamara to Eaton, 26 March 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1522: file X1-2-12 pt. 9.
- 74.Ibid., Minutes of the CNA Liaison Committee, 22 February 1945.
- 75.Ibid., McLaren to NSS Regional Superintendents, 14 April 1945.
- 76.Perry to Eaton, 10 July 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1522: file X1-2-12 pt. 10.
- 77.Ibid., Amas to Eaton, 18 May 1945.
- 78.Ibid., Eaton to MacNamara, 20 June 1945.
- 79.Ibid., Eaton to MacNamara, 23 July 1945.
- 80.The Mountain Sanatorium in Hamilton, for example, reported in July that a regular staff complement of 101 full-time nurses had been reduced to only 27 full-time positions and 58 part-time positions. See *ibid.*, Bartholomew to Eaton, 16 July 1945.
- 81.Eaton to Chisholm, 14 November 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1522: file X1-2-12 pt. 11.

Chapter 10 Meatpacking Labour

In the Summer of 1944, NSS Director Arthur MacNamara became increasingly frustrated with efforts to supply labour to meatpacking plants across Canada. Confronted with incessant demands for more workers from a variety of packing plants and cold storage facilities, MacNamara targeted the Manager of the Manitoba Cold Storage Company in Winnipeg, L.S. Pearce, as one of many industry officials who had refused to cooperate with NSS in meeting the need for more labour:

This man gives me a severe pain. The difficulty at this plant is mainly with the management. A few weeks ago they would not employ Indians because they drank whisky. The Indians worked very successfully in one of the other Winnipeg plants. Later the question of the rate structure was a bother. Now he will not take men who can be borrowed from the Swift Canadian Company and Canada Packers. I do not wish anyone hard luck but I hope Mr. Pearce gets caught in one of his freezers and can't get the door unlocked.'

The source of MacNamara's frustration is not hard to find. During the war there was a remarkable increase in livestock production, whereas in the meatpacking industry the number of workers decreased. Not surprisingly, the industry looked to NSS to find it more workers, but in this case, as in many others, Ottawa responded in an ad hoc and inconsistent fashion. Instead of developing and carrying out a comprehensive plan, NSS resorted to a patchwork of temporary, albeit successful, measures. Principally, these

involved the employment of seasonal agricultural workers and military personnel and a reliance on the labour priority classification system to favour the meat packers.

* * * *

The remarkable pressure on meatpacking plants to process Canadian livestock shipments between 1939 and 1945 is evident from the slaughtering information contained in Table 12. The problem of labour shortages first became an issue in 1943. In that

Table 12
Slaughterings in Inspected Canadian
Establishments, 1940-1945²

Year	Cattle	Calves	Hogs	Sheep & Lambs
1939	873,600	679,117	3,623,645	783,828
1940	890,919	703,918	5,457,083	765,165
1941	1,003,691	727,829	6,280,345	826,603
1942	970,415	666,672	6,196,850	825,368
1943	1,021,054	594,087	7,168,525	889,317
1944	1,354,121	661,245	8,766,417	959,169
1945	1,819,024	787,626	5,681,629	1,185,161

year, the total dressed weight of meat in the four major livestock categories was 1,894,139,000 pounds. This was a 14 percent increase over the figure recorded in 1942 and a 67 percent increase over the figure recorded in 1939. In 1944 the total jumped by another 22 percent and in 1945 the

dressed weight of slaughterings remained above 2 billion pounds. The United Kingdom consumed most of the Canadian livestock production. Exports of pork, bacon, and ham increased from 1,869,983 caratweight in 1939 to 7,026,854 caratweight in 1944; in the same period beef exports to Great Britain increased from 8,693 caratweight to 980,800 caratweight. By late 1944, 65 percent of all pork and bacon products consumed in Great Britain came from Canada.³

The pressure on labour supply in meatpacking plants that manifested itself in 1943 was heightened by the seasonal nature of employment in the industry. Table 13 shows slaughterings of cattle, hogs, and sheep by four month period as a percentage of annual slaughterings in inspected abattoirs between 1943 and 1945. Generally, the rush on packing plant operations began in the

Table 13
Slaughterings in Inspected Establishments as a Percentage
of Yearly Slaughterings, 1943-1945⁴

Time Period	Cattle	Hogs	Sheep
January to April, 1943	27.6%	30.0%	20.4%
May to August, 1943	32.3%	28.4%	22.2%
September to December, 1943	40.1%	41.6%	57.4%
January to April, 1944	28.0%	41.0%	28.0%
May to August, 1944	29.8%	28.8%	23.8%
September to December, 1944	42.2%	30.2%	48.2%
January to April, 1945	29.0%	43.2%	16.9%
May to August, 1945	25.1%	26.1%	21.8%
September to December, 1945	45.9%	30.7%	61.3%

autumn of each year. November, December, and January were the peak months for slaughtering. In December 1943, for example, close to 14% of the annual hog slaughter occurred. Meatpacking, moreover, had many of the same negative features of work as did the primary textile industry. Poor conditions and low wages deterred many men from pursuing packing employment voluntarily. Slaughterhouse and packing employment stood twenty-seventh on the scale of remuneration in 1943 but slipped to twenty-ninth in 1944. Over the same two years wage rates declined from 71 to 68 cents per hour.⁵ The combination of low wages, unattractive working conditions, and seasonal fluctuations in demand meant that the industry was poorly placed in the wartime competition for workers.

In May and June 1943, Winnipeg packing plants had difficulty securing the postponement from the callup of skilled employees, despite the fact that the number of postponements sought in relation to the total packing workforce in the city was low.⁶ NSS officials initially resisted calls for increased protection for the packing labour force, but other government departments questioned this approach. In June, Deputy Minister of Agriculture G.S.H. Barton told Arthur MacNamara that more than 1,000 men out of a national packing labour force of slightly more than 13,000 had left their jobs. The majority of those who had quit were farmers who worked in abattoirs and

slaughterhouses during the winter months. While NSS had funnelled a significant number of unskilled men and women to packing employment, skilled labour was "impossible to find." As a result of the shortage of experienced workers, hogs were now being shipped from Alberta to Winnipeg.⁷ With many male employees moving to more lucrative employment, the time had come, Barton insisted, to order all skilled packinghouse workers to stay in their jobs.

Despite confirmation from his own officials that the industry was now short some 1,589 male and female workers,⁸ MacNamara resisted this advice. While admitting that wages and working conditions were not attractive in the industry, MacNamara maintained that tough regulations would only result in greater resentment than already existed among workers and therefore do more harm than good.⁹ For the moment, NSS relied on Industrial Mobilization Surveys and the postponement of skilled packing workers from the callup to satisfy the employment needs of the industry. This strategy encountered stiff resistance from the companies. In August, for example, J.S. McLean, the President of Canada Packers in Toronto, reported that he was "extremely nervous" and "genuinely alarmed" by the Department of Agriculture livestock delivery forecasts. These indicated a volume of work that had never been known in the history of the company.¹⁰ Against this backdrop, and following joint submissions from the Wartime Prices and Trade Board and the

Department of Agriculture and meetings between Barton and MacNamara, NSS took further action. This came on 19 August in the form of a recommendation from the ILPC that 36 meatpacking plants across Canada be granted an A priority rating, to be reviewed by 1 December, for men and women.¹¹

From the perspective of the meatpacking companies, however, this was not enough. In September, Joseph Harris, the Plant Manager for Canada Packers at St. Boniface, Manitoba, told J.S. McLean that something more would have to be done quickly to "avoid the worst mess the industry" had ever known. Claiming that a "national tragedy" loomed, Harris forecast that NSS officials would do nothing until stockyards across the country were cluttered with livestock that could not be slaughtered.¹² MacNamara's routine response to such criticism was that "every industry [had] the same idea," namely, the guarantee of a stable labour force. No such guarantee could be given. Moreover, the packing companies were notoriously slow in giving local NSS offices advance notice of livestock shipments that would necessitate the hiring of more workers.¹³ Nevertheless, he now did agree to two further changes to help the industry. First, by PC 6625 of 1 September, employees in all establishments with an A or B labour priority rating were restricted from leaving their jobs.¹⁴ Second, on 23 September 1943, instructions were issued that employees in seven critical industries, including meatpacking, were to be

given "special consideration" when postponement requests came before Mobilization Boards. Noting that 21 percent of the men who normally worked in meatpacking were now in the Armed Forces, MacNamara told his officials that packing staffs needed to be significantly increased to handle increased livestock flows.¹⁵

These were promising measures, but tensions continued to be evident between packing plant officials and local NSS offices. From Regina, S.L. Hinchliffe, the manager of the city's NSS office, wrote on the day the new instructions were issued to Mobilization Boards that the Burns plant had laid off three men and that he could no longer accommodate requests for dozens of men on 12 hours notice.¹⁶ Company officials immediately countered that each of the three men in question had either left voluntarily or been fired for negligence. Hinchliffe's report was designed only to "cover up the shortcomings of Selective Service" and his "baseless statements" posed a grave danger to efficient packing operations.¹⁷ In the same spirit, S.E. Todd, the Managing Director of the Industrial and Development Council of Canadian Meat Packers (IDCCMP), also disputed an NSS report from the Maritimes that the Swift's plant in Moncton employed 45 travelling salesmen. According to Todd, Swift's employed only 17 salesmen. Todd was also quick to point out that the industry had adopted many labour saving methods ordered by the WPTB. Cellophane wrapping had been

discontinued on 7 of 10 base products; the number of salesmen had been reduced by 35 percent; the number of rope strands on hide bales had been reduced from three to two; the number of products packaged in tin had been reduced from 42 to 17; and the number of products sold in less than carcass quantities had been reduced, thereby cutting back on the labour needed for processing, handling, shipping, and ordering.¹⁸

Todd was also active in investigating the possibility of using Army labour to help the packing industry. In October, the IDCCMP drew up a preliminary list of 88 Ontario men with experience who were in the armed forces. After consultation with military officials, packing representatives learned that only four men on the list of 88 would be available for release. Armed with this survey result, Todd lobbied for the placing of meatpacking on the same priority as coal mining in terms of securing the release of skilled employees.¹⁹ NSS officials agreed to consider this request, and the IDCCMP subsequently submitted a 42 page list of former packing employees dating back to 1939.²⁰ National Defence officials, however, refused to consider the wholesale release of packing workers, though small numbers of skilled butchers were released in December 1943.

By the same token, NSS officials questioned whether the packing industry really needed all the workers it constantly

sought.²¹ In March 1944, MacNamara diplomatically asked G.S.H. Barton to provide a more exact accounting of future livestock movements in order that NSS "might feel justified" in devoting so much attention to the needs of meatpackers.²² In New Brunswick, NSS officials continued to question the employment practices in the Swift's plant in Moncton, especially the refusal of plant managers to hire men over 45 and their decision to limit daily operating hours. Swift's managers vehemently rejected this criticism. According to J.A. Ford, the manager of the Moncton plant, men were leaving packing employment all the time with the full consent of local NSS officers. The optimistic employment forecasts of Moncton NSS officials were misleading because Swift's had been forced to accept many women and young men who were "entirely unsuited" for packing work.²³

In effect, the first stage of the NSS response to the crisis in meatpacking employment ended in March 1944. In concert with the recruitment of 2,851 agricultural workers to work in packinghouses, the agency was able, through its various regulatory initiatives, to meet the increase in livestock shipments in late 1943 and early 1944. The nationwide freezing of employees in essential firms reduced the rates of separation from packing employment. Moreover, to March 1944, more than 1,000 key men in the packing industry were granted deferment of military service.²⁴

Finally, increased labour priority ratings allowed unskilled labour to be channelled into packing employment. Comparing the first eight weeks of 1944 with the first eight weeks of 1943, cattle and calf slaughterings increased by 36 percent, hog slaughterings by 77 percent, and sheep and lamb slaughterings by 34 percent.²⁵ With these results, NSS officials were confident that the crisis in the industry had passed. Accordingly, at an ILPC meeting in late January 1944, the labour priority rating for meatpacking workers was reduced from A to B.²⁶ This decision proved shortsighted, for in the spring of 1944 packinghouse plants faced a new round of labour shortages.

The main reason for this was the return of agricultural workers and farmers to their normal occupations. Under NSS regulations, all agricultural men working temporarily in other employment had to return to farms before 1 April 1944. During the first week of March, Department of Agriculture and IDCCMP representatives succeeded in having the issue of meatpacking labour placed on the agenda of a meeting of the NSS Administration Board scheduled for 14 March. Remarkably, it was decided at this meeting that agreements with the provinces concerning the disposition of farm labour could not be violated, and that the problems of the packing industry would have to be solved by other means. Two possibilities in this latter regard were the import of workers from Newfoundland and the continuation of the policy

of postponing the military callup of key meatpacking workers. In effect, Administration Board members took the position that the root cause of the trouble in the meatpacking business was not a faulty regulatory framework but poor wages and working conditions.²⁷ Nonetheless, the priority ratings for packing workers were raised to A at the ILPC meeting of 16 March 1944.²⁸ NSS officials also extended the postponement of essential packing employees.²⁹

The tepid NSS response evoked a concerted industry attack on NSS policy. On 29 March Todd complained to Barton that a "rapidly deteriorating" employment situation left managers with a "very pessimistic" opinion of the government's ability to handle the situation which had arisen with increased livestock shipments.³⁰ The Swift's plant in Edmonton, for example, was scheduled to lose 50 percent of its workforce through the departure of agriculturalists. Claiming that he had avoided making "alarmist representations" in the past, Todd now asserted that labour shortages would be "crippling." In forwarding Todd's analysis to Arthur MacNamara, Barton noted that plants had been able to process livestock runs during March by the "narrowest of margins."³¹ Accordingly, he called on NSS to deal with the issue "much more vigorously and effectively" than it had in the past.

In response, NSS officials secured the temporary services of some agricultural employees during April 1944 in

Alberta and Ontario. For his part, MacNamara now decided that the long-term answer for the Alberta plants was to use interned Japanese men in them. On 15 April, MacNamara approached C.H. Millard, the National Director of the Packinghouse Workers of America, concerning the use of 400 Japanese workers in the province.³² This plan, however, was badly received by both union and management. Owners and managers feared sabotage, union strife, and conflict with American soldiers stationed in Alberta. Municipal officials in Calgary and Edmonton were likewise "unalterably opposed,"³³ though the Calgary Albertan observed that it was "surely better to have a hundred Japs in town for a few weeks than to risk a breakdown of one of our chief industries."³⁴ Opposition voices were also heard from St. Boniface and Prince Albert.³⁵ As a result of all this, MacNamara abandoned his proposal only three days after he had put it forward.³⁶

Meanwhile, the industry campaign against government policy continued full blast. In a letter dated 13 April, E.S. Manning, Secretary of the IDCCMP, claimed that provincial agriculture departments had done more for the meatpacking business than had NSS. The removal of hundreds of agricultural workers from the packing workforce, the continued increase in livestock slaughterings, and a new federal regulation that required the export of beef carcasses with the bone removed, had produced an "extremely

critical" situation in the packing plants.³⁷ This was a situation, moreover, which the government had so far failed almost entirely to address. Despite the statutory provisions governing separations from employment, the turnover rate in packing plants was "very disconcerting." What was needed from Ottawa was a coordinated policy rather than the piecemeal response of the past:

The packing industry is charged with the responsibility of processing the livestock which the government has asked and encouraged producers to raise. The onus for providing manpower rests with the government as the industry can only carry out the policies which have been laid down for them by the Dominion Department of Agriculture, the Meat Board, and the WPTB.³⁸

To date, Manning charged, the attitude of NSS officials had been "none too encouraging."

The criticism of NSS from the meatpacking industry crested in late April, when several companies across the country were placing embargoes on the shipment of livestock.³⁹ On 22 April, representatives from provincial farm labour committees in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta met in Regina to discuss the problems of the meatpackers, but no concrete solutions were forthcoming.⁴⁰ Earlier in April, a survey of agricultural labourers in these provinces had failed to identify significant numbers of men willing to remain in packing jobs, and NSS, of course, possessed no power to make them do so. R.M. Putnam, Director of the Alberta Agricultural Extension Service, noted that only 15 Indians were available for packing

employment; that "no further developments" with respect to the use of Army labour could be expected; and that workers displayed a "distinct apathy" towards the industry because of its poor wages and working conditions.⁴¹ At the same time, mobilization officials were challenging the efficiency of NSS civilian operations. Justice J.E. Adamson, Chairman of the Winnipeg Mobilization Board, noted that 841 men had been rejected for military service in his division between 1 October 1943 and 31 March 1944, but that NSS officials had allowed the vast majority of these rejects to "get away into work of their own choosing."⁴² At a secret meeting held in Edmonton on 26 April that brought together farm, packing, Chamber of Commerce, union, and NSS officials, it was agreed that 400 workers were needed immediately in Alberta to avoid a production disaster.⁴³

Faced with this threat, MacNamara intervened personally. On 1 May 1944, he decreed that finding the workers required for meatpacking would be placed "before all other essential civilian manpower needs."⁴⁴ An intensive recruiting campaign was immediately started among farm labourers who were engaged in seeding. As part of this campaign, a farm worker was guaranteed payment of all transportation costs if he stayed in packing employment for two months before returning to agriculture. In the same spirit, CVT schemes were launched in the Prairie provinces to train meatpacking workers.⁴⁵ A big publicity campaign

was also started to advertise the urgent needs of the meatpacking industry. Finally, all available unskilled labour, including rejects from Army depots, was funnelled to Prairie packing operations.

Arthur MacNamara targeted workers in British Columbia as the prime source of labour to meet the needs of the Alberta packinghouses. Accordingly, he ordered NSS Pacific Regional Superintendent William McKinstry to send 400 workers to the neighbouring province.⁴⁶ McKinstry initially refused to do this, but MacNamara threatened to remove him from his job if he did not desist.⁴⁷ On the other hand, McKinstry could not control what the workers shipped from B.C. to Alberta actually did when they got there. A.O. MacLachlin, the Acting Manager of the NSS office in Edmonton, chronicled the activities of 140 men who arrived from British Columbia and were issued permits to work in the city's packing plants. Within two weeks of their arrival, only 55 of these men remained in packing employment. The remainder had either left without notifying NSS officials or secured separation permits. MacLachlin complained that many of the men had arrived by train in Edmonton at NSS expense, taken the cash advance offered by NSS or company officials, and then returned immediately to B.C.⁴⁸ NSS Chief Enforcement Officer T.R. Walsh confirmed MacLachlin's observations concerning separations; he noted that a background check was rarely done in the case of a

separation request because of the administrative difficulty this involved.⁴⁹ After only 125 men were secured from British Columbia, MacNamara cancelled the plan on May 23.⁵⁰

The appeal to farm workers thus remained the most successful NSS stratagem in relation to the problems of meatpackers. On the other hand, agricultural officials in the Prairie provinces were now expressing concern that scarce farm labour was being drained from essential employment on the land. The Alberta Federation of Agriculture expressed regret that "the only plan advanced by the authorities" for the meatpacking industry was to drain a supply of farm labour that was "already sorely reduced."⁵¹ Agricultural officials in Manitoba, who had found 100 men on farms to help in the Winnipeg plants, cautioned that NSS officials must be prepared to solve pressing employment shortfalls in August and September when few men could be spared from harvest activities.⁵² Moreover, military officials continued to rebuff attempts to secure six month releases for skilled butchers, on the grounds that the drain in packing employment had been "caused as much or more" by workers leaving the industry as by their being recruited from it.⁵³ On the bright side for NSS, however, was the fact that industry spokespersons were now praising its efforts in relation to labour supply. In May 1944, IDCCMP Managing Director Todd expressed his satisfaction that the former NSS policy of providing only temporary relief had

been abandoned, and that experience had taught the government the necessity of providing a stable workforce for the meat plants.⁵⁴

The meatpacking employment picture on 1 June 1944 revealed the relative success of the NSS efforts during the previous month. Employment had increased from 16,551 workers on 30 April to 17,037, while unfilled vacancies had decreased over the same period from 1,570 to 1,226. Unfilled vacancies in Prairie plants had declined by almost 50 percent, but the labour turnover rate continued to be a problem; 1,774 men and women had left packing employment during the month of May.⁵⁵ Presented with this evidence of an improving work situation in the industry, ILPC Chairman Sheldon Ross sought to reduce the labour priority rating for packing labour from A to B. This was actually done for 36 meatpacking plants at an ILPC meeting on 8 June.⁵⁶ Department of Agriculture officials were shocked by the ILPC decision. G.S.H. Barton complained that the change would "probably reproduce in more acute form" the shortages of the previous year.⁵⁷ After Ross refused to reconsider, he was overruled by MacNamara. Although he was "sorry to take this rather definite position," the Deputy Minister emphasized his "constant personal attention" to the situation in meatpacking and the "extreme lengths" of NSS involvement to alleviate the labour shortage facing the industry.⁵⁸ As a result of his intervention, the priority rating for

packinghouse labour was indefinitely restored to A on 22 June 1944.⁵⁹

Prior to 1 August 1944, NSS officials remained reasonably optimistic about the future of labour supply to the meatpackers. Between 1 January and 1 August 1944, the number of men and women employed in the industry had grown from 15,957 to 17,409. In those same seven months, however, there were more than 9,500 separations from employment.⁶⁰ J.H. Stewart, the Regional Employment Officer in Montreal, argued that NSS efforts were "rather nullified" in view of the high separation rate, and that regulations should be "rigidly enforced to kill this annoying situation."⁶¹ A spot survey of packing plants showed that while the bulk of separations were granted to men returning to agriculture, many were granted for unconfirmed medical reasons or for no reason whatsoever. NSS officials realized that this "excessive turnover" was inexcusable and that "vigorous enforcement of the regulations" would have to be countenanced in order to maintain the required complement of workers.⁶²

Another phase of NSS policy began in August 1944 with the realization that employment requirements would be higher in the coming autumn than they had been in the autumn of 1943. In Quebec, 40 percent more hogs and 40 percent more cattle were expected, while in Ontario abattoirs were preparing for 15 percent more hogs and 20 percent more

cattle. Moreover, Western abattoirs had made plans to send overflow livestock runs to Ontario slaughterhouses. IDCCMP officials estimated that a minimum of 1,000 additional men would be needed to handle packing requirements in Quebec and Ontario alone.⁶³ Meanwhile, the employment trend in the industry was the exact opposite. Thus, between 29 July 1944 and 1 September 1944 the number of men and women on the job fell from 17,409 to 16,270. Separations in this period numbered 2,512, and net labour demand at the end of the period was almost 1,700.⁶⁴ Clearly, NSS was faced with another big crisis in the making.

The agency responded by again looking to NRMA personnel for help. NRMA recruits with packing experience were encouraged to apply to their commanding officers for industrial leaves, and NSS lobbied military officials to comply with all requests. On 25 September 1944, DND officials agreed to participate in the release of skilled packing workers from NRMA commitments,⁶⁵ and, on 4 October, military personnel on active duty were also granted permission to return to essential industries.⁶⁶ Active recruitment of farm labour and other seasonal workers was also commenced, and a nationwide advertising campaign was started in the press and on the radio. In Ontario, workers were recruited north of Toronto as far as Manitoulin Island. In the same spirit, farm labour committees across the country sent personal letters to agricultural workers

encouraging them to take employment in meatpacking.⁶⁷ Despite all these efforts, however, the number of workers employed in the industry continued to decline during September, when there were 1,743 separations. On 1 October 1944, the workforce numbered 16,018 persons.⁶⁸

In these strained circumstances, relations between industry and government officials, at least in certain parts of the country, continued to fester. In October 1944, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture pressed the view that NSS was obligated to provide labour to accommodate increased livestock movements to abattoirs nationwide. While farmers had a "magnificent" record in meeting the wartime demand for greater production, their achievement was being tarnished by labour troubles and shortages elsewhere in the economy.⁶⁹ As ever, NSS countered such criticism with the claim that, because of their refusal to improve working conditions, the packing companies bore much of the responsibility for the difficulties they now faced. At a July meeting in Montreal with national representatives of Swift's, Canada Packers, and Wilsils, NSS officials had complained that existing working conditions would not "induce men and women to voluntarily apply" for packing work; hence the continuous referral of "drifter types" to meatpacking firms.⁷⁰ Within NSS, the Swift's plant in Moncton was regarded as the worst example of the evils that beset the industry. This particular plant was said to be congested from

slaughterhouse to storage sheds, and to have wet and unsanitary floors that were covered with "particles of refuse."⁷¹

Despite everything that was wrong, NSS managed, through the recruitment of agricultural workers and the release of hundreds of men from the military, to meet the needs of the packing plants in the last months of 1944. An emergency appeal to staff the Swift's plant in Moncton resulted in the addition of 68 men to the payroll by 1 November. In Manitoba, more than 300 agriculturalists moved to Winnipeg packing plants, and in November about 200 Saskatchewan labourers and conscientious objectors joined them.⁷² The Ontario Farm Labour Committee recruited close to 700 men for packinghouse employment in southern Ontario.⁷³ Nevertheless, Department of Agriculture officials continued to lobby MacNamara to the effect that packing plants should be "absolutely saturated" and that "fine calculations" should not be considered when assigning labour to them.⁷⁴ By 1 December, however, it was clear to all that the employment situation in the industry had changed materially. During October and November 2,500 persons took meatpacking jobs and by 1 December the workforce reached 18,777. Although more than 3,000 separations occurred during this same period, close to 6,000 hirings were reported across the country. At the end of November, net labour demand was only 471. Moreover, only 25 percent of the jobs waiting to be

filled were for skilled workers.⁷⁵ In December 1944, many packing plants cancelled all orders with NSS for further help.⁷⁶

During the first months of 1945, livestock runs began to decline significantly in Canada. In November 1944, just over 153,000 cattle were slaughtered; by contrast the March 1945 figure was approximately 126,000. For the same months hog slaughterings numbered 828,409 and 599,822 respectively. Indeed, in the first three months of 1945 about 32 percent fewer hogs were slaughtered than in the same period in 1944.⁷⁷ As a result of these changes, packing plants began to lay off large numbers of both men and women. At the Canada Packers plant in Winnipeg, for example, 480 men and 265 women were let go in the two months prior to 6 February 1945.⁷⁸ Although NSS officials insisted that it was "almost impossible to make any reliable prediction" about the future size of livestock runs,⁷⁹ they began discussing measures for the return of large numbers of men to agricultural employment in the spring of 1945.

A meeting of the IDCCMP and Prairie NSS representatives in Winnipeg on 24-25 January revealed just how much the meatpacking industry had come to rely on seasonal workers. On 1 February 1945, 723 Alberta, 460 Saskatchewan, and 447 Manitoba farmers were employed in packing plants. In total they represented close to 16 percent of all meatpacking workers in the Prairie provinces.⁸⁰ Plant representatives

identified 750 of these farmers as being essential to the successful working of their operations. As NSS braced for the exodus of the agriculturalists from the industry, its sole initiative was to maintain the A-A labour priority rating for the majority of the plants. This was done over the opposition of Sheldon Ross, who argued that the time had come to downgrade the packinghouses to B-B.⁸¹

By 14 April 1945, only 167 farmers remained in packinghouses in the Prairie provinces. Likewise, in Ontario the numbers of farmers working in slaughterhouses declined from 675 on 3 February to only 11 in the second week of April. By 28 April 1945, only 14,044 men and women were working in the meatpacking sector, and net labour demand was again above 1,000.⁸² Department of Agriculture officials warned MacNamara that the liberation of Europe might lead to a big new export demand for Canadian meat.⁸³ Uncertainty was also evident in the course of events in Ontario. There, a renewed labour shortage had led to seven packing plants being given the coveted A(E) priority category for male labour in March 1945. This, however, had not met the need. During the first week of June 228 experienced men were needed by the Swift plant in Toronto alone and another 300 men were urgently needed by other Toronto plants and in Kitchener.⁸⁴

During the summer months of 1945, the general labour situation in meatpacking employment remained relatively

unstable. Eventually, eleven firms in Quebec, Manitoba, and Alberta were added to the list of Ontario firms possessing the A(E) priority rating.⁸⁵ NSS also continued to struggle with the old problem of separations from meatpacking employment. During June, 393 placements were made in Ontario meatpacking firms, but there were 280 separations.⁸⁶ This led Ontario NSS Regional Superintendent B.G. Sullivan to lament that "employees are leaving by the back door almost as fast as we put them in the front door. In response, Sullivan ordered exit interviews of packing workers seeking separation notices.⁸⁷ Beyond this, NSS did not attempt any new solutions, although it was realized in the agency that the labour problem in meatpacking was once more "quite serious."⁸⁸ On 31 August 1945, at the end of a week in which there were 433 separations from packing employment, net labour demand in the industry reached 1,466 men and women.⁸⁹

In the autumn of 1945 Army men were again brought in to help. Four plants received priority in the use of military personnel: the Canada Packers plants in Toronto, St. Boniface, and Winnipeg, and the Swift Canadian plant in Toronto. Altogether more than 500 Army labourers were employed in these plants,⁹⁰ and meatpacking detail ranked second only to construction work in terms of employment priority for Army workers.⁹¹ Another important source of labour for packing operations in this period was found

through the Industrial Selection and Release Plan. Employers were encouraged to petition Selection and Release Committees for the early discharge of essential workers and to ask former employees to petition their commanding officers for quick demobilization. Eventually, more than 450 skilled butchers became available for work through the ISRP scheme.⁹²

As the country adjusted to peacetime conditions, labour relations as well as labour supply soon became an issue for Ottawa in relation to the meatpacking industry. When strike action was threatened at Burns', Swift's, and Canada Packers, the federal government, in the autumn of 1945, took control of the packing plants by naming a Controller for each company. These officials were given full authority to arbitrate labour disputes. Claiming that the disruption of meat shipments to Europe "would be considered by Canadians as little less than criminal," Humphrey Mitchell called on both company and union officials to negotiate in good faith to reach a mutually satisfactory contract arrangement,⁹³ a call that eventually was heeded by packing and union negotiators.⁹⁴ There was good news for the government also in the growing availability of workers for the industry. At the end of September, only 845 vacancies in packing employment were reported, and by the end of November the workforce had jumped to 18,000 men and women.⁹⁵ The next month, NSS instructed local offices to no longer submit

monthly reports on employment in the meatpacking industry since "the emergency [had] been met."⁹⁶

* * * *

The attempt to increase the number of workers in the meatpacking industry reveals several important features of NSS control of the civilian mobilization process. NSS policy was remarkably susceptible to external pressure. Part of the government's agricultural strategy was to maximize production of meat products, but no account was taken in this of the effect that ever increasing livestock shipments would have on the demand for meatpacking workers. To meet the labour crisis in the industry, NSS was forced to rely primarily on seasonal agricultural workers and military personnel. This case study complements the account given in Chapter 8 of NSS actions in relation to women in the primary textile industry. In both cases, separations from employment were a consistent feature of the wartime labour force, and the labour priority rating system--the administrative anchor of NSS mobilization policy--was largely ineffective. Although the measures adopted by NSS did allow livestock shipments to be processed in Canadian packing plants, the halting and haphazard nature of these initiatives typified the record of the agency.

NOTES

1. MacNamara to Barton, August 23, 1944. National Archives of Canada (NAC), RG 17, Volume 3129: file 66-5 pt. 4.
2. All statistics in Table 12 derived from Livestock and Animal Products Statistics, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1942-1947).
3. Pickersgill to MacNamara, January 3, 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1517: file R1.1 pt. 4--Labour Situation, Meat Products.
4. All Statistics in Table 13 taken from Livestock and Animal Products Statistics, 1946 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1948) pp. 13, 37, 54.
5. Weekly Earnings and Hours of Work of Male and Female Wage Earners: Employment in the Manufacturing Industries of Canada, 1943-1944 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1945-1946) p. 10 (1943), p. 10 (1944).
6. Blair to Scott, July 6, 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1517: file R1.1-10--Postponement of Military Training for Essential Personnel in Meatpacking Industry.
7. Barton to MacNamara, June 11, 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1517: file R1.1 pt. 1--Labour Situation, Meat Products.
8. Ibid., Needham to MacNamara, June 28, 1943.
9. Ibid., MacNamara to Barton, July 12, 1943.
10. McLean to Barton, August 17, 1943. NAC, RG 17, Volume 3129: file 66-5 pt. 2.
11. Minutes of the Inter-departmental Labour Priorities Committee, August 19, 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1515: file O-11-1 pt. 2--NSS Weekly Meetings Re: Labour Priorities.
12. Harris to McLean, August 19, 1943. NAC, RG 17, Volume 3129: file 66-5 pt. 2.
13. MacNamara to Rutherford, September 24, 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-2-1 volume 1--Packing Industry.
14. See Chapter 1 for an outline of the freezing regulations.
15. Circular Memorandum 922 to all Mobilization Board Chairmen and Registrars, September 23, 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1517: file R1.1-10--Postponement of Military Training for Essential Personnel in Meatpacking Industry.

- 16.Hinchliffe to Armstrong, September 23, 1943. NAC, RG 17, Volume 3129: file 66-5 pt. 3.
- 17.Ibid., Burns to Maynard, October 1, 1943; Maynard to Pearsall, October 2, 1943.
- 18.Todd to Foster, October 7, 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1517: file R1.1 pt. 1--Labour Situation, Meat Products.
- 19.Todd to Barton, November 18, 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 3129: file 66-5 pt. 4.
- 20.Foster to Todd, November 22, 1943. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1517: file R1.1 pt. 1--Labour Situation, Meat Products.
- 21.Ibid., David to Manning, April 3, 1944.
- 22.MacNamara to Barton, March 30, 1944. NAC, RG 17, Volume 3129: file 66-5 pt. 4.
- 23.Ford to Barton, April 18, 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1517: file R1.1 pt. 1--Labour Situation, Meat Products.
- 24.Ibid., Foster to MacNamara, March 10, 1944.
- 25.Memorandum Re Estimate of Livestock Slaughtering, March to May, 1944. NAC, RG 17, Volume 3129: file 66-5 pt. 4.
- 26.Minutes of the Inter-departmental Labour Priorities Committee, January 25, 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1515: file 0-11-1 pt. 3: NSS Weekly Meetings Re Labour Priorities.
- 27.Minutes of the Administration Board Meeting, March 14, 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 971: file 4--NSS Minutes of Administration Board.
- 28.Minutes of the Inter-departmental Committee of Labour Priorities, March 16, 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1515: file 0-11-1 pt. 3--NSS Weekly Meetings Re Labour Priorities.
- 29.David to MacNamara, April 12, 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1517: file R1.1 pt. 2--Labour Situation, Meat Products.
- 30.Todd to Barton, March 29, 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-2-1 volume 1--Packing Industry.
- 31.Barton to MacNamara, March 30, 1944. NAC, RG 17, Volume 3129: file 66-5 pt. 4.
- 32.MacNamara to Millard, April 15, 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-2-1 pt. 1--Packing Industry.

33. Ibid., Harrison to MacNamara, April 17, 1944.
34. Calgary Albertan, April 19, 1944.
35. White to MacNamara, April 20, 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-2-1 pt. 2--Packing Industry.
36. MacNamara to Carnill, April 18, 1944. RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-2-1 part 1--Packing Industry.
37. Manning to David, April 13, 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1517: file R1.1 pt. 2--Labour Situation, Meat Products.
38. Ibid., Manning to Raley, April 20, 1944.
39. Ibid., Pickersgill to Putnam, April 15, 1944.
40. Ibid., Griggs to White, April 26, 1944.
41. Ibid., Putnam to Pickersgill, April 18, 1944.
42. Adamson to MacNamara, April 29, 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-2-1 pt. 2--Packing Industry.
43. Carnill to MacNamara, April 26, 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1517: file R1.1 pt. 2--Labour Situation, Meat Products.
44. MacNamara to Campbell, May 1, 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-2-1 pt. 2--Packing Industry.
45. Putnam to All Prairie Agriculturalists, May 4, 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1517: file R1.1 pt. 2--Labour Situation, Meat Products.
46. Ibid., MacNamara to McKinstry, April 28, 1944.
47. MacNamara to Rutherford, May 3, 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-2-1 pt. 2--Packing Industry.
48. MacLachlin to MacNamara, May 27, 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-2-1 pt. 3--Packing Industry.
49. Ibid., Walsh to MacNamara, June 2, 1944.
50. MacNamara to Carnill, May 23, 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-2-1 pt. 2--Packing Industry. MacNamara blandly described the plan as an "expensive operation" that should not be continued. MacNamara also attempted to funnel Chinese men in military age classes to Alberta. While the federal government refused to allow Chinese men to enlist in the Armed Forces, they apparently had no qualms about uprooting them and

directing them in a compulsory fashion to other employment. See Ibid., MacNamara to Adamson, May 6, 1944.

51. Alberta Federation of Agriculture Press Release, May 2, 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-2-1 pt. 2--Packing Industry.

52. Ibid., May 12, 1944.

53. Ralston to Gardiner, May 22, 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1517: file R1.1 pt. 2--Labour Situation, Meat Products.

54. Ibid., Todd to David, May 15, 1944.

55. Ibid., Meatpacking Employment Report, May, 1944.

56. Minutes of the Inter-departmental Labour Priorities Committee Meeting, June 8, 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-2-1 pt. 3--Packing Industry

57. Ibid., Barton to MacNamara, June 12, 1944.

58. Ibid., MacNamara to Hereford, June 21, 1944.

59. Minutes of the Inter-departmental Labour Priorities Committee Meeting, June 22, 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1515: file 0-11-1 pt. 4--NSS Weekly Meetings Re Labour Priorities.

60. NSS Report Prepared by H.F. Caloren to be Given to the NSS Advisory Board, June 14, 1944; Meatpacking Employment Report, July, 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1517: file R1.1 pt. 3--Labour Situation, Meat Products.

61. Ibid., Stewart to Rutherford, July 5, 1944.

62. Rutherford to Perry, July 17, 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-3-1 pt. 3--Packing Industry.

63. Rutherford to Raley, 15 August 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1517: file R1.1 pt. 3--Labour Situation, Meat Products.

64. Ibid., Meatpacking Employment Report, August 1944.

65. Letson to All DOCs and GOCs, September 25, 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1517: file 0-5--9--NSS Army Labour, Cold Storage.

66. Order-in-Council PC 7429 of October 4, 1944 allowed active duty men to be detailed to industrial duty. Only personnel not above the grade of private or trained soldiers could be detailed for industrial leave.

67. Haythorne to Wood, September 23, 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1517: file R1.1 pt. 3: Labour Situation, Meat Products.
68. Ibid., Meatpacking Employment Report, September, 1944.
69. Canadian Federation of Agriculture President to MacNamara, October 5, 1944. NAC, RG 17, Volume 3129: file 66-5 pt. 4.
70. Stewart to Rutherford, July 5, 1944. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1517: file R1.1 pt. 3--Labour Situation, Meat Products.
71. Ibid., Roberts to Rutherford, October 24, 1944.
72. Ibid., Rutherford to MacNamara, October 28, 1944; Griggs to MacNamara, November 1, 1944.
73. Ibid., Minutes of the Ontario Dominion-Provincial Farm Labour Committee Meeting, November 3, 1944.
74. Ibid., Barton to MacNamara, November 6, 1944.
75. Ibid., Meatpacking Employment Report, October, 1944; Meatpacking Employment Report, November, 1944.
76. Crabb to MacNamara, January 15, 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-2-1 pt. 3--Packing Industry.
77. Livestock and Animal Products Statistics, 1946 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1948) pp. 13, 37.
78. Duncan to MacNamara, February 12, 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-2-1 pt. 3--Packing Industry.
79. Hereford to MacNamara, January 18, 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1517: file R1.1 pt. 4--Labour Situation, Meat Products.
80. Ibid., Crabb to MacNamara, January 29, 1945.
81. Minutes of the Inter-departmental Labour Priorities Committee Meeting, February 28, 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 971: file 1--NSS Minutes of the ILPC.
82. Meatpacking Employment Report, February 3, 1945, to April 14, 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1517: file R1.1 pt. 4--Labour Situation, Meat Products.
83. Wood to MacNamara, May 14, 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-2-1 pt. 3--Packing Industry.
84. Ibid., Rutherford to MacNamara, June 9, 1945.

85. Minutes of the Inter-departmental Labour Priorities Committee, August 15, 1945; Minutes of the Inter-departmental Labour Priorities Committee, July 18, 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 971: file 1--NSS Minutes of the ILPC.
86. Wells to MacNamara, July 11, 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-2-1 pt. 3--Packing Industry.
87. Ibid., Sullivan to MacNamara, July 11, 1945.
88. Ibid., Hereford to MacNamara, August 16, 1945.
89. Ibid., MacNamara to Ross, September 7, 1945.
90. Letson to All DOCs and GOCs, August 29, 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 1517: file 0-5-2 pt. 2--NSS Army Labour, General.
91. MacNamara to Ross, September 7, 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-2-1 pt. 3--Packing Industry.
92. Industrial Selection and Release Committee, Statistical Report No. 2. NAC, RG 27, Volume 984: file 10--NSS ISRP.
93. Department of Labour Press Release, October 12, 1945. NAC, MG 28 I 103, Volume 37: file 5--United Packinghouse Workers of America, General, 1944-1947, pt. III.
94. Canadian Unionist February 1946 (vol. 20, no. 2) p. 37.
95. Hereford to MacNamara, November 9, 1945. NAC, RG 27, Volume 664: file 6-5-2-1 pt. 3--Packing Industry.
96. Ibid., Rutherford to MacNamara, December 27, 1945.

Conclusion

In a polemical Saturday Night article published in 1995, noted historian Michael Bliss argues that the administration of Canada's war effort between 1939 and 1945 was riddled with inefficiency and incompetence. Disdainfully dismissing "those who confidently celebrate our jim-dandy war achievement," Bliss offers this alternative view:

The war had been an organizer's delight--the assertion of human authority to solve horrendous problems. It was the triumph of visible hands and voices, commanding, controlling, directing, planning. Our leadership elites got the job done, but only barely. The war policies of Canada did not work very well. We tried hard, we were long on enthusiasm and courage and grit, but we came close to botching our military and industrial efforts. The fact that our senior partners in the struggle had many similar problems--nobody's generals and planners had real control of events--underlines how desperately hard it was to organize for total war.¹

Bliss's thesis helps make sense of the history of NSS, which exemplified both "visible hands and voices" and botched "military and industrial efforts." Certainly, both trends are well evident in the case studies presented in this thesis.

The hallmark of the mobilization of human resources in Canada between 1939 and 1945 was the relative lack of coordination among departments with an interest in the efficient prosecution of the war. In fact, NSS proved to be a convenient, and often justified, target for other

departments and agencies with more clout in Cabinet circles. C.D. Howe was the driving force behind the attempts to stabilize the labour situation in the coal mines of Nova Scotia. The pressure of E.L. Cousins, DMS Wartime Administrator of Atlantic Ports, added impetus to the efforts to re-organize dock labour in Halifax. Department of Agriculture administrators, deprived of any representation on NSS policy-making bodies, could only lobby Arthur MacNamara on behalf of meatpacking establishments across Canada. Department of National Defence officials harshly criticized the majority of NSS initiatives. In the example of Native Canadians, certain DND officials played an important role in circumventing original attempts to mobilize Indians and pushing NSS in the direction of the abandonment of compulsory mobilization of Natives. Military representatives also played a key role in muddying the waters of the Industrial Mobilization Survey Plan and the attempts to rationalize university student deferment policies.

NSS and the WPTB were the agencies primarily responsible for Canada's domestic war effort. Donald Gordon and other WPTB officials within the Department of Finance clearly towered over NSS administrators in terms of legislative authority. Gordon led the charge in the autumn of 1942 against Elliot Little's plan for a comprehensive mobilization strategy. WPTB opposition to the limited

curtailment options proposed by NSS officials effectively crippled NSS civilian labour force policies. Little coordination existed between the two agencies responsible, in theory, for the maintenance of essential civilian production and the provision of labour to the same vital industries. The only effective link between them was through the Inter-departmental Labour Priorities Committee, but this link was not very strong. As the case study of primary textile employment indicates, G.G.E. Raley's attempt to guarantee a constant supply of women to textile industries was remarkably ineffective because of the determined opposition he faced from ILPC Chairman Sheldon Ross.

Strong regional control of the mobilization process also characterized NSS supervision of the war effort. By January 1944, much of the civilian mobilization effort was statutorily devolved to Regional Advisory Boards; this complemented the dominance of Registrars and Mobilization Boards within the NRMA conscription scheme, which remains the most compelling example of the de-centralized nature of mobilization policy in Canada. Registrars and Mobilization Board Chairmen were responsible for the patchwork of policies affecting the call-up of Natives. Justice A.M. Manson's stalwart opposition to virtually every NSS initiative designed to maintain viable university enrolment totals or to staff essential industries provides the best

example of the unimpeachable authority of regional mobilization officials. Manson and his colleagues on Mobilization Boards across the country destroyed any goodwill existing between NSS and industrial officials involved with the Industrial Mobilization Survey Plan and played a key role in the IMSP debacle. Repeated government studies illustrated that Divisional Registrars were not capable of handling the enormous logistical task involved in processing men for NRMA service.

A lax regulatory approach is yet another striking feature of the history of NSS. The withdrawal of hundreds of thousands of men and women from the workforce for military service created acute labour supply shortages across the country. Since NSS officials were either unable or unwilling to curtail non-essential industry, chaos existed in many critical sectors of the Canadian economy. In the case of meatpacking, no concerted or forward-looking plans were formulated to deal with pressing labour demands. Instead, a series of frantic and often failed initiatives was augmented with a dependence on seasonal agricultural workers and military personnel to meet critical labour shortages. The problem of separations bedeviled NSS attempts to bring a semblance of order to the civilian labour force. Although Arthur MacNamara and other leading NSS administrators recognized this problem, few measures were enacted to enforce existing NSS regulations and combat

labour turnover. Even when NSS statutory authority was strong, as in the case of coal miners and longshoremen, day to day administration tended to be half-hearted. Because NSS control did not extend to the distribution of men within each coal company, its recruitment effort did not increase bituminous coal production. Only the provision of a paid reserve pool of labour and the relatively limited size of the longshore labour force allowed NSS officials to be successful in increasing the cargo capacity of Halifax.

A fourth characteristic of NSS supervision of human resource mobilization centres on the willingness of Arthur MacNamara to work within existing non-government structures to achieve limited mobilization goals. The National Conference of Canadian Universities and the Canadian Nurses Association provided autonomous administrative structures that MacNamara could use as quasi-mobilization agencies despite the fact that both the NCCU and the CNA hindered the effective mobilization of students and nursing staffs. Armed with sanctioned government demands, MacNamara went to the critical NCCU conference in August 1943 and promptly capitulated to NCCU proposals sharply different from the original NSS proposal for a comprehensive re-structuring of student deferment schemes. Similarly, MacNamara acquiesced to the CNA demands for professional autonomy and allowed nursing representatives to dictate the pace of domestic nursing mobilization. NSS was reduced to an advertising and

survey body trying to cajole women with nursing credentials to alleviate pressing shortfalls in Canadian hospital staffs.

At the same time, NSS had a remarkable capacity for gathering information. One is struck in examining the NSS archival collection by the enormous effort expended to study a sweeping range of mobilization problems. By the same token, strenuous efforts to consult a wide range of government and non-government agencies and organizations were undertaken. Unfortunately, these extraordinary and revealing statistical compilations and comprehensive consultation efforts were rarely incorporated into any strategies designed to mobilize the Canadian population in an effective manner. The Industrial Mobilization Survey Plan is the most striking illustration of NSS failure to follow through on an ambitious logistical scheme. NSS officials completely ignored six months of effort expended tabulating the Coal Labour Survey. Statistical surveys of the nursing profession were not followed by comprehensive measures designed to mobilize inactive nurses qualified to alleviate general duty nursing shortages.

Moreover, it must be noted that there was remarkable opposition to even limited mobilization from many sectors of the Canadian population. A nationwide surge of unselfish patriotism among all sectors affected by NSS operations did not manifest itself, a fact that partly explains the limited

achievements of the agency. Sectors of the Native community drew on centuries of resentment to non-Native authority and actively opposed the compulsory mobilization of Canadian Indians. Although the NCCU established an amicable relationship with government authorities, five years of the war had expired before comprehensive measures to limit enrolment in non-essential academic disciplines were proposed. Strident union opposition to labour controls was evident in the coal and longshore labour sectors. Thousands of women took advantage of lucrative employment options in non-traditional employment sectors to separate from textile employment, a movement that involved NSS administrators in a three year unsuccessful struggle to augment payrolls in the primary textile field. The nursing profession waged a strong campaign against government interference in the professional autonomy of the CNA. Industry officials jealously guarded their payroll complements and fought to limit the impact of the IMSP designed to withdraw medically fit men from the civilian workforce and conscript them for military service.

* * * *

The study of NSS and human resource mobilization policy offers a new perspective on Canada's role in World War II. It challenges the dominant view that extols the virtues of

Mackenzie King's handling of the manpower question. Indeed, once the focus of research is shifted away from the Cabinet level, conventional viewpoints must be reconsidered. Historians of the 1944 manpower crisis have pointed to external shocks such as wastage rates and replacement shortfalls as the factors behind the derailment of an otherwise comprehensive and well-orchestrated mobilization programme. The 1944 manpower muddle and King's ultimate reversal on conscription, however, were the direct results of domestic mobilization policies that were rooted in the concepts of gradualism and voluntarism. This study, therefore, complements a growing body of scholarship that highlights a decidedly mediocre record of military and civilian endeavours during World War II.²

Furthermore, the appraisal of NSS mobilization policy offered here complements micro-studies of Canada's war effort that focus on the sensitive issues of race, gender, and ethnicity. In particular, it allows further light to be shed on the wartime experience of women. It is a telling sign of the embryonic nature of Canadian social history that Ruth Roach Pierson's pioneering study, published in 1986, remains the principal account of the role of women in society between 1939 and 1945. Only Diane Forestell has stepped forward to question some of Pierson's conclusions.³ The case studies dealing with primary textile workers and nurses are significant additions to Pierson's narrative

since she devotes only marginal portions of her work to these topics. Similarly, the range of case studies presented here broadens our understanding of the interaction of the government with the Canadian population. While NSS interaction with minorities, workers, and women was not always positive, an inclusive analysis of NSS regulatory efforts provides an important perspective on Canada's war effort.

Finally, this study of NSS allows Canada's human resource mobilization programme to be compared with the mobilization efforts of the primary non-Soviet Allied nations--the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States. It is difficult to compare the compulsory military mobilization schemes of these countries. No other nation adopted a politically motivated conscription scheme like Canada's NRMA policy, but the military mobilization structures in all four countries were generally similar. Due to geographic factors, Australia and the United States shared many of the regional features of Canada's conscription design. Local or regional mobilization officials operated with a wide degree of latitude in the interpretation of national mobilization regulations. All regulatory structures in the Allied countries contained deferment procedures for men deemed to be employed in essential occupations in industry or agriculture. Moreover, military officials everywhere tried to sway mobilization

efforts in favour of the fighting forces as opposed to essential civilian employment.

The civilian mobilization policies devised in Great Britain were more comprehensive than those adopted in any other Allied nation.⁴ A fully-functioning mobilization structure was established by the Spring of 1941. Registration provisions and industrial concentration measures were comprehensive. Under the authority of a Director-General of Manpower, close to 1.1 million men and women were directed to essential employment during the war. Between June 1939 and June 1943, employment in non-essential industries declined by more than 32 percent, while employment in essential industries increased by 39 percent. Strict measures governing coal and dock labour were instituted, and the NSS efforts to stabilize the workforce in the Nova Scotia coal fields and the port of Halifax--the only two employment sectors in Canada subject to compulsion--were based on British initiatives. The compulsion of British women, including the registration and direction of nurses aged 18 to 40, stands in stark contrast to the voluntarist approach adopted by NSS.

By contrast, Australia's mobilization policies were decidedly lax.⁵ National registration measures and a schedule of reserved occupations were adopted before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, but Australia was woefully unprepared for total war before 1942. On 31 January 1942, a

Manpower Directorate was formed to attempt to implement controls over labour mobility and to adopt measures of limited compulsion for certain classes of men and women. A remarkably aggressive campaign waged by military officials, however, destroyed any attempt to distribute human resources between military and civilian uses. Not until the autumn of 1943 were measures proposed to stabilize employment, but deliberate sabotage of these plans by military and certain industrial officials rendered mobilization efforts futile. In fact, the number of men and women employed in essential industries declined by 11 percent between June 1943 and June 1944.

The American civilian mobilization process fell between the British and Australian extremes and mirrored the NSS approach.⁶ On 18 April 1942, after several years of inaction, President Roosevelt created the War Manpower Commission (WMC). WMC Director Paul McNutt subscribed to the same tenets of localism and voluntarism as Arthur MacNamara. As a result, McNutt attempted to direct mobilization schemes through 12 regional manpower directors and the 1,500 offices of the United States Employment Service (USES). Local USES offices possessed few legislative levers to compel workers to enter essential employment and the WMC eventually adopted modified versions of the NSS Industrial Mobilization Survey Plan. Although the percentage of women in the American workforce increased

from 24 percent in 1940 to 33 percent in 1944, no compulsive controls were placed on women. Military officials proved to be constant irritants to McNutt. While McNutt had gained complete control of both military and civilian mobilization by 1942, Congressional opposition to McNutt's manpower programme and concerted opposition from powerful Cabinet officials such as General George Marshall scuttled plans to coordinate manpower policy under a single agency. NSS officials, therefore, were not alone in their inability to institute comprehensive mobilization measures.

Obviously, there is much that is questionable in previous assumptions about mobilization policy in Canada during the Second World War. But Michael Bliss's assertion that the war effort was "a riot of irrationality and mismanagement"⁷ is also incorrect. Doug Owsram offers a more balanced analysis when he notes that government bureaucrats like Arthur MacNamara "may have been good managers, but they were not magicians and their theories were not the key to the promised land."⁸ In the end, MacNamara's fundamental belief in conciliation, voluntarism, and compromise allowed opponents of a radical and coercive mobilization agenda to carry the day in wartime Canada.

NOTES

1. Michael Bliss, "Canada's Swell War," Saturday Night May, 1995 (18:4) pp. 40-41.
2. See J.L. Granatstein, The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War (Toronto, 1993); Terry Copp and Bill McAndrew, Battle Exhaustion: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945 (Kingston, 1990); and David Zimmerman, The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa: How Admirals, Scientists, and Politicians Impeded the Development of High Technology in Canada's Wartime Navy (Toronto, 1989).
3. See Diane Forestell, "The Necessity of Sacrifice for a Nation at War: Women's Labour Force Participation, 1939-1946," Histoire Sociale/Social History 1989 22(4): pp. 333-347.
4. See H.M.D. Parker, Manpower: A Study of Wartime Policy and Administration (London, 1957).
5. See S.J. Butlin, War Economy, 1939-1942 (Canberra, 1955), and S.J. Butlin and C.B. Schevchin, War Economy, 1942-1945 (Canberra, 1977).
6. See George Q. Flynn, The Mess in Washington: Manpower Mobilization in World War II (Westport, 1979).
7. Bliss, "Canada's Swell War," p. 42.
8. Doug Owsam, The Government Generation: Canadian Intellectuals and the State, 1900-1945 (Toronto, 1986) p. 334.

Bibliography

PRIMARY SOURCES

National Archives of Canada

RG 27 Records of the Department of Labour
RG 2 Records of the Cabinet
RG 10 Records of the Department of Mines and
 Resources
RG 17 Records of the Department of Agriculture
RG 28 Records of the Department of Munitions &
 Supply
RG 35 Series 7 Inter-departmental Committees--Public Records
 Committee
RG 64 Records of the Wartime Prices and Trade Board
RG 66 Records of the National Harbours Board
MG 28 I 103 Records of the Canadian Labour Congress

Canadian Nurses Association Archives

CNA Committee Papers

University of Western Ontario Regional Room

Records of the C.S. Hyman Leather Company

Government Publications

Annual Report of the National Harbours Board, 1939. Ottawa,
1940.
Annual Report of the National Harbours Board, 1944. Ottawa,
1945.
Annual Report of the National Harbours Board, 1945. Ottawa,
1947.
Annual Report of the National Harbours Board, 1946. Ottawa,
1947.
Canadian Vocational Training Annual Report, 1944-1945.
Ottawa, 1945.
Coal Statistics for Canada, 1942. Ottawa, 1944.
Coal Statistics for Canada, 1943. Ottawa, 1946.
Coal Statistics for Canada, 1944. Ottawa, 1946.
Coal Statistics for Canada, 1945. Ottawa, 1947.
Coal Statistics for Canada, 1946. Ottawa, 1948.
Livestock and Animal Product Statistics, 1939. Ottawa,
1941.
Livestock and Animal Product Statistics, 1940. Ottawa,
1941.

- Livestock and Animal Product Statistics, 1941. Ottawa, 1942.
- Livestock and Animal Product Statistics, 1942. Ottawa, 1944.
- Livestock and Animal Product Statistics, 1943. Ottawa, 1945.
- Livestock and Animal Product Statistics, 1944. Ottawa, 1946.
- Livestock and Animal Product Statistics, 1945. Ottawa, 1947.
- Livestock and Animal Product Statistics, 1946. Ottawa, 1948.
- Industrial Classification Manual: For Use of Employment and Selective Service Offices. Ottawa, 1943.
- The Manufacturing Industries of Canada, Summary Reports. Ottawa, 1943.
- The Manufacturing Industries of Canada, Summary Reports. Ottawa, 1945.
- The Manufacturing Industries of Canada, Summary Reports. Ottawa, 1946.
- The Manufacturing Industries of Canada, Summary Reports. Ottawa, 1947.
- The Manufacturing Industries of Canada, Summary Reports. Ottawa, 1948.
- Report of the Department of Mines and Resources, 1942. Ottawa, 1942.
- Report of the Department of Mines and Resources, 1946. Ottawa, 1946.
- Report of the Royal Commission on Coal. Ottawa, 1947.
- Slaughtering & Meat Packing and Sausage & Sausage Casings in Canada, 1942. Ottawa, 1943.
- Slaughtering & Meat Packing and Sausage & Sausage Casings in Canada, 1943. Ottawa, 1944.
- Slaughtering & Meat Packing and Sausage & Sausage Casings in Canada, 1945. Ottawa, 1947.
- Slaughtering & Meat Packing and Sausage & Sausage Casings in Canada, 1946. Ottawa, 1948.
- Weekly Earnings and Hours of Work of Male and Female Wage Earners: Employment in the Manufacturing Industries of Canada, 1943. Ottawa, 1945.
- Weekly Earnings and Hours of Work of Male and Female Wage Earners: Employment in the Manufacturing Industries of Canada, 1944. Ottawa, 1946.
- 1946 Supplement: Statistical Report on the Primary Textile Industry in Canada. Ottawa, 1947.

Newspapers and Journals

Calgary Albertan
Canadian Hospital
Canadian Nurse

Canadian Textile Journal
Canadian Unionist
Financial Post
Glace Bay Gazette
Halifax Chronicle
Montreal Daily Star
Montreal Gazette
Montreal Journal
Montreal Standard
New York Times
Regina Leader-Post
Sydney Post-Record
Toronto Globe and Mail
Toronto Star
Toronto Evening Telegram
Vancouver Daily Province
Winnipeg Free Press

SECONDARY SOURCES

Books and Articles

- Abella, Irving. On Strike: Six Key Labour Struggles in Canada, 1919-1949. Toronto, 1974.
- Aronsen, Lawrence. "Planning Canada's Economic Mobilization for War: The Origins and Operation of the Industrial Defence Board, 1945-1951," American Review of Canadian Studies 1985 15(1): 38-58.
- Aronsen, Lawrence. "From World War to Limited War: Canadian-American Industrialization for Defence," Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire 1982 (54): 208-245.
- Atkinson, Michael, and Coleman, William. The State, Business, and Industrial Change in Canada. Toronto, 1989.
- Baetz, Mark, and Thain, Donald, eds. Canadian Cases in Government-Business Relations. Toronto, 1985.
- Balcome, Randall. Supreme Court of Canada Decision Making: The Benchmarks of Rand, Kerwin, and Martland. Toronto, 1990.
- Barnes, Charles. The Longshoremen. Philadelphia, 1915.
- Bernstein, Alison. American Indians and World War II: Toward a New Era in Indian Affairs. Norman, 1991.
- Bliss, Michael. Northern Enterprise: Five Centuries of

- Canadian Business. Toronto, 1987.
- _____. "Canada's Swell War," Saturday Night 1995
18(4): 40-41.
- Borins, Sandford. "World War II Crown Corporations: Their
Wartime Role and Peacetime Privatization," Canadian
Public Administration 1982 25(3): 380-404.
- Bothwell, Robert, Drummond, Ian, and English, John. Canada,
1900-1945. Toronto, 1987.
- Boyce, Gordon. "Continuity and Transition in Corporate
Capability: Incentives, Management, and Innovation at
Dofasco, Inc.," Business and Economic History 1990
(19): 223-233.
- Brandt, Gail C. "'Weaving it Together': Life Cycle and the
Industrial Experience of Female Cotton Workers in
Quebec, 1910-1950," Labour/Le Travail 1981 (7): 29-61.
- Burns, E.L.M. Manpower in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945.
Toronto, 1956.
- Burrill, Gary, and McKay, Ian, eds. People, Resources, and
Power: Critical Perspectives on Underdevelopment and
Primary Industries in the Atlantic Region. Fredericton,
1987.
- Butlin, S.J. War Economy, 1939-1942. Canberra, 1955.
- Butlin, S.J., and Shevdim, C.B. War Economy, 1942-1945.
Canberra, 1977.
- Copp, Terry, and McAndrew, Bill. Battle Exhaustion:
Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Canadian Army, 1939-
1945. Kingston, 1990.
- Dawson, Peter. "Canadian Military Mobilization," Armed
Forces & Society 1989 16(1): 37-57.
- Dawson, R. MacGregor. The Conscription Crisis of 1944.
Toronto, 1961.
- Douglas, W.A.B., and Greenhous, Brereton. Out of the
Shadows: Canada in the Second World War. Toronto,
1977.
- Dreizsinger, N.F., ed. Mobilization for Total War: The
Canadian, American, and British Experience, 1914-1918,
1939-1945. Waterloo, 1981.

- Earle, Michael. "'Down With Hitler and Silby Barrett': The Cape Breton Miners' Slowdown Strike of 1941," Acadiensis 1988 18(1): 56-90.
- Feasby, W.R. The Official History of the Canadian Medical Services, 1939-1945, Volume I: Organization and Campaigns. Ottawa, 1956.
- Flynn, George. The Mess in Washington: Manpower Mobilization in World War II. Westport, 1979.
- Forbes, Ernest. "Consolidating Disparity: The Maritimes and the Industrialization of Canada During the Second World War," Acadiensis 1986 15(2): 3-27.
- Forestell, Diane. "The Necessity of Sacrifice for the Nation at War: Women's Labour Force Participation, 1939-1946," Social History (Canada) 1989 22(4): 333-347.
- Frank, David. "The Cape Breton Coal Industry and the Rise and Fall of the British Empire Steel Corporation," Acadiensis 1977 7(1): 3-34.
- _____. "Class Conflict in the Coal Industry, Cape Breton, 1922," in MacDowell, Laurel Sefton, and Radforth, Ian, eds., Canadian Working Class History, Selected Readings. Toronto, 1992. 459-480.
- Friedson, E. Professional Powers: A Study of the Institutionalization of Formal Knowledge. Chicago, 1986.
- Gaffen, Fred. Forgotten Soldiers. Penticton, 1985.
- Gibson, Frederick. To Serve and Yet Be Free: Queen's University, 1917-1961, Volume II. Montreal, 1983.
- Gibson, Frederick, and Robertson, Barbara, eds. Ottawa at War: The Grant Dexter Memoranda, 1939-1945. Winnipeg, 1994.
- Gordon, Josie. "Administration of Veterans' Preference in Canadian Civil Service," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 1945 11(4): 601-603.
- Gordon, Walter. A Political Memoir. Toronto, 1977.
- Granatstein, J.L. Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945. Toronto, 1990.
- _____. The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior

- Commanders in the Second World War. Toronto, 1993.
- _____. Conscription in the Second World War: A Study in Political Management. Toronto, 1969.
- Granatstein, J.L., and Hitsman, J.M. Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada. Toronto, 1977.
- Granatstein, J.L., and Morton, Desmond. A Nation Forged in Fire: Canada and the Second World War, 1939-1945. Toronto, 1989.
- Granatstein, J.L., and Neary, Peter, eds. The Good Fight: Canadians and World War II. Toronto, 1995.
- Griezic, Foster. "Considering Government and Business in the Canadian Political Economy," Social History 1986 19(3): 451-460.
- Hanson, Stan, and Kerr, Don. "Pacifism, Dissent, and the University of Saskatchewan, 1938-1944," Saskatchewan History 1993 45(2): 3-14.
- Harbour, Frances. "Conscription and Socialization: Four Canadian Ministers," Armed Forces & Society 1989 15(2): 227-247.
- Higgins, Benjamin. Canada's Financial System in War. New York, 1944.
- Hillmer, Norman, Kordan, Bohdan, and Luciuk, Lubomyr, eds. On Guard For Thee: War, Ethnicity, and the Canadian State, 1939-1945. Ottawa, 1988.
- Hutchison, Bruce. The Incredible Canadian: A Candid Portrait of Mackenzie King, His Works, His Times, and His Nation. Toronto, 1952.
- Jamieson, Stuart. Times of Trouble: Labour Unrest and Industrial Unrest in Canada, 1900-1966. Ottawa, 1968.
- Janzen, William. Limits on Liberty: The Experience of Mennonite, Hutterite, and Doukhobor Communities in Canada. Toronto, 1990.
- Jere, Franco. "Bringing Them in Alive: Selective Service and Native Americans," Journal of Ethnic Studies 18(3): 1-27.
- Johnston, William. "Canadian Defence Industrial Policy and Practice: A History," Canadian Defence Quarterly 1989 18(6): 21-28.

- Johnston, C.M., and Weaver, John. Student Days: An Illustrated History of Student Life at McMaster University from the 1890s to the 1980s. Hamilton, 1986.
- Kennedy, J. de N. History of the Department of Munitions and Supply. Ottawa, 1950.
- Keyserlingk, Robert. "The Canadian Government's Attitude Toward Germans and German Canadians in World War II," Canadian Ethnic Studies 1984 16(1): 16-28.
- Keyserlingk, Robert. "'Agents Within the Gates': The Search for Nazi Subversives in Canada During World War II," Canadian Historical Review 1985 66(2): 211-238.
- MacDowell, Laurel Sefton. "The 1943 Steel Strike Against the Wartime Wage Controls," Labour 1982 10(3): 65-85.
- _____. "The Formation of the Canadian Industrial Relations System During World War II," in MacDowell, Laurel Sefton, and Radforth, Ian, eds., Canadian Working Class History, Selected Readings. Toronto, 1992. 575-594.
- MacGillivray, Donald. "Military Aid to the Civil Power: The Cape Breton Experience in the 1920s," Acadiensis 1973 3(2): 45-64.
- McKay, Ian. "Class Struggle and Mercantile Capitalism: Craftsmen and Labourers on the Halifax Waterfront, 1805-1902," in Ommer, Rosemary, and Panting, Gerald, eds., Working Men Who Got Wet. Saint John's, 1980.
- McKillop, A.B. Matters of Mind: The University in Ontario, 1791-1951. Toronto, 1994.
- Milkman, Ruth. Gender at Work: The Dynamics of Job Segregation by Sex During World War II. Urbana, 1987.
- Milner, Mark. "Reflections on the State of Army History in the Two World Wars," Acadiensis 1989 18(2): 135-150.
- Moloney, M. Professionalization of Nursing. Philadelphia, 1987.
- Morton, Desmond. Canada and War. Toronto, 1981.
- Neary, Peter. "Canada and the Newfoundland Labour Market, 1939-1949," Canadian Historical Review 1981 62(4): 470-495.

- Nelson, Bruce. Workers on the Waterfront: Seamen, Longshoremen, and Unionism in the 1930s. Urbana, 1988.
- Nolan, Brian. King's War: Mackenzie King and the Politics of War, 1939-1945. Toronto, 1988.
- Owram, Doug. The Government Generation: Canadian Intellectuals and the State, 1900-1945. Toronto, 1986.
- Parker, H.M.D. Manpower: A Study of Wartime Policy and Administration. London, 1957.
- Parr, Joy. The Gender of Breadwinners: Women, Men, and Change in Two Industrial Towns, 1880-1950. Toronto, 1990.
- Pickersgill, J.W. The Mackenzie King Record, 1939-1945. Toronto, 1960.
- Pierson, Ruth Roach. 'They're Still Women After All': The Second World War and Canadian Womanhood. Toronto, 1986.
- Pilkington, Gwendoline. Speaking With One Voice: Universities in Dialogue With Government. Montreal, 1983.
- Polenberg, Richard. War and Society: The United States, 1941-1945. New York, 1972.
- Prymak, Thomas. Maple Leaf and Trident: The Ukrainian Canadians During the Second World War. Toronto, 1988.
- Reddig, Ken. "Judge Adamson versus the Mennonites of Manitoba During World War II," Journal of Mennonite Studies 1989 (7): 51-70.
- Roy, Patricia, Granatstein, J., Iino, Masaka, and Takamura, Hiroko. Mutual Hostages: Canadian and Japanese During the Second World War. Toronto, 1990.
- Sandberg, Anders. "Dependent Development, Labour, and the Trenton Steel Works, Nova Scotia, 1900-1943," Labour 1991 (27): 127-162.
- Schull, Joseph. The Great Scot: A Biography of Donald Gordon. Montreal, 1979.
- Schultz, J.H. "Shell Game: The Politics of Defence Production, 1939-1942," American Review of Canadian Studies 1986 16(1): 41-57.

- Slater, David. War Finance and Reconstruction: The Role of Canada's Department of Finance, 1939-1945. Forthcoming, McGill Queen's University Press, 1996.
- Socknat, Thomas. Witness Against War: Pacifism in Canada, 1900-1945. Toronto, 1987.
- Stacey, C.P. Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain, and the Pacific. Ottawa, 1955.
- _____. Arms, Men, and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945. Ottawa, 1970.
- _____. "Canadian Leaders During World War II," Canadian Historical Review 1985 66(1): 64-72.
- Summerby, Janice. Native Soldiers, Foreign Battlefields. Ottawa, 1993.
- Sunahara, Ann Gomer. The Politics of Racism: The Uprooting of Japanese Canadians During the Second World War. Toronto, 1991.
- Thompson, W.P. Yesteryears at the University of Saskatchewan, 1937-1949. Saskatoon, 1969.
- _____. The University of Saskatchewan: A Personal History. Toronto, 1970.
- Ward, Norman, and Smith, David. Jimmy Gardiner: Relentless Liberal. Toronto, 1990.
- Webber, Jeremy. "The Malaise of Compulsory Conciliation: Strike Prevention in Canada During World War II," Labour 1985 15(2): 57-88.
- White, Jay. "Pulling Teeth: Striking for the Checkoff in the Halifax Shipyards, 1944," Acadiensis 1989 19(1): 115-141.
- _____. "'Sleepless and Veiled Am I': An East Coast Canadian Port Revisited," Nova Scotia Historical Review 1985 5(1): 15-29.
- _____. "The Homes Front: The Accommodation Crisis in Halifax, 1941-1951," Urban History Review 1992 20(3): 117-127.
- Wolfe, David. "The Canadian State in Comparative Perspective," Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 1989 26(1): 95-126.

Woods, Walter. Rehabilitation (A Combined Operation).
Ottawa, 1953.

Young, Robert. "'And the People Will Sink Into Despair':
Reconstruction in New Brunswick, 1942-1952," Canadian
Historical Review 1988 69(2): 127-166.

Zimmerman, David. "Radar and Research Enterprises Limited:
A Study of Wartime Industrial Failure," Ontario History
1988 80(2): 121-142.

_____. The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa: How Admirals,
Scientists, and Politicians Impeded the Development of
High Technology in Canada's Wartime Navy. Toronto,
1989.

_____. "The Royal Canadian Navy and the National
Research Council, 1939-1945," Canadian Historical
Review 1988 69(2): 203-221.

Unpublished Theses

Davis, Janet Frances. "'We Shall Remember': Canadian
Indians and World War II." Trent University M.A.
Thesis, 1992.

Hart, Douglas. "State Economic Management in Wartime: A
Study of the 'Regimentation' of Industry in the
Canadian Industrial Mobilization, 1939-1945." York
University Ph.D. Thesis, 1980.

McIntyre, L. "Towards a Redefinition of Status:
Professionalism in Canadian Nursing, 1938-1945."
University of Western Ontario M.A. Thesis, 1984.

Pilkington, Gwendoline. "A History of the National
Conference of Canadian Universities." University of
Toronto Ph.D. Thesis, 1974.

Rankin, Diana. "The Mobilization and Demobilization of
Canadian Women in the Workforce During the Second World
War." University of Western Ontario M.A. Thesis, 1986.