

**AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS AND PROCOPIUS OF CAESAREA:
THE EASTERN CAMPAIGNS OF JULIAN AND JUSTINIAN,
4TH AND 6TH CENTURIES AD**

by

Ian Alfred Ovens Kelso

**Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts**

at

**Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia
July, 1998**

©Copyright by Ian Alfred Ovens Kelso, MCMXCVIII



**National Library
of Canada**

**Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services**

**395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada**

**Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada**

**Acquisitions et
services bibliographiques**

**395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada**

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-36478-X

“Victory is the main object in war. If this is long delayed, weapons are blunted and morale depressed. When troops attack cities, their strength will be exhausted.”

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Section II: Waging War. ca. 500 BC. (Griffith, Samuel B. tr., *Sun Tzu: The Art of War*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971. pp. 73.

“When the army engages in protracted campaigns the resources of the state will not suffice.”

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Section II: Waging War (Griffith, p. 73)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	vi
Acknowledgments	vii
Introduction	1
Chapter I: AMMIANUS AND THE EAST IN AD 363	3
1.The Historian	3
2.The Emperor	11
3.The Campaign	22
4.Interpretation	32
Chapter II: PROCOPIUS AND THE EAST 527-532 AD	35
1.The Historian	35
2.The Emperor	44
3.The Campaign	54
4.Interpretation	64
Chapter III: FINAL ANALYSIS	68
Endnotes	75
Chapter I: Ammianus and the East in AD 363	75
Chapter II: Procopius and the East AD 527-532	81
Chapter III: Final Analysis	89
Bibliography	92

ABSTRACT

Ammianus Marcellinus, a historian of the fourth century, and Procopius of Caesarea, in the sixth recorded their time in a way that left us two excellent accounts of eye witnesses. Ammianus's *Res Gestae* record the actions of many, but none as well as those of the emperor Julian(361-363 AD). Especially Julian's brief reign. More importantly his campaign against the Persians was recorded by Ammianus vividly, due to the fact that Ammianus was a staff officer in Julian's headquarters. This gave him insight into the man and his methods and the ability to write a history that was of a higher quality than most. Ammianus's classical education also assisted in his writing.

Procopius had a similar experience in his own time, but as a legal adviser on the staff of the leading general, Belisarius. Though he was not a soldier, he was well acquainted with soldiers and their ways. He was present at many of the major battles of the day, which gave him the knowledge he needed to write his works the *Bella* in 8 books(two on the Persian wars), the *De Aedificiis* and the *Anecdota*. All of these, when taken together, help to give a full picture of the people and events. He is the best historian for the emperor of the day, Justinian(527-565 AD), who had grand ideas of re-conquering the western half of the empire, but was delayed by wars against the Persians.

By using both of these historians it is hoped that the Persian campaigns of Julian and Justinian will be made clearer in the context of the emperors and their goals and flaws. The two historians will also be looked at to see what their abilities and skills were and where these skills originated. A source of their inspiration for writing their histories will be sought out as well.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like, at this point, to thank the various people who have given me much help and encouragement during this project and in times previous. First I thank Dr. Peter Kussmaul who is a Roman Historian whom I was exceptionally fortunate to have as a teacher and supervisor. In my future I shall remember his words and ideas with gladness. I thank Dr. Patrick Atherton for reading this work and for the knowledge of Virgil which he led me to. I now wish to say something of my third reader Dr. H. W. Bird, a man who is responsible for my beginnings as a historian. It is to this man and two others, Dr. Stephen Bertman and Dr. Charles Fantazzi that I owe my beginnings in Classics and the support to take flight into this field.

There are others who I wish to thank. They are extremely important to my life and learning first of all to my Grandfathers who taught me much about life and learning. Next my Grandmothers, one whom I have been fortunate to know and gain knowledge from and the other who I believe has watched down on me these last 25 years. My parents must, of course, be mentioned for they were a force that was and is constantly behind me as a bulwark. Finally, but not lastly, to Cindy Beech who has been my motivator, my buttress in my down moments, and constant and loving companion. To all I say thank you and hope that this work is worthy of all mentioned here.

The eastern campaigns of the emperors Julian and Justinian have been preserved in the writings of Ammianus Marcellinus and Procopius of Caesarea. The campaigns take place in the same area of the world, but almost two centuries apart. These historians are the last in a long line of Roman historians that begin with Livy and his *Ab Urbe Condita*. Ammianus is the last Latin historian while Procopius is the last Roman historian.

Both of the historians were in the service of their emperors: Ammianus as a Protector Domesticus on the staff of the general Ursicinus and on Julian's headquarters staff in the East in 363; Procopius was legal adviser and private secretary to Justinian's leading general Belisarius. Both historians had privileged access to information that was needed to write their histories; some information was documentation, some consisted of second or third hand accounts, but much was first-hand knowledge.

The uniqueness of their positions and talents allowed them to produce lasting and reliable records of their times which include the Persian campaigns of the two emperors mentioned. What is being sought by looking at these accounts is an indication of the type of men the emperors were and how their historians treated them. Having gained an understanding of the men it is then possible to understand why their campaigns ended as they did.

The armies of each emperor will, of course, be examined to see how their preparedness and ability affected the eastern campaigns. The amount of direct and indirect contact and cooperation between the emperors and their armies is a factor that cannot be overlooked. How advice given to the emperors by their advisers is observed or ignored must be investigated as well. All of these factors will be examined and weighed to help explain the

failures of the respective emperors and campaigns.

The first part will deal with Ammianus, his emperor Julian and the failed Persian campaign. The second deals with Procopius, Justinian and his eastern campaign. These parts will be broken down into subsections: Historian, Emperor, Campaign and Interpretation. It is hoped that by the fourth subsection the reasons for failure will become clear: that the quality of leadership in the areas of generalship and negotiations combined with the problems of a declining military, caused the defeats in the respective campaigns. A final analysis of all material looked at will be conducted in the third and final part.

CHAPTER I: AMMIANUS AND THE EAST IN AD 363

THE HISTORIAN

Ammianus Marcellinus was of a family of curial rank. His education was one that was based upon the works of the ancient authors. Because of his family status, he did not need to join the military as he did, for he could have pursued a legal or administrative career. Instead he joined the ranks of the *Protectores Domestici*(the imperial officer cadet corps) and served for a period of fourteen years. This was not a long career, but one in which he was witness to many of the key events of his time. As a young officer in 353 he was attached to Ursicinus, the *Dux Orientis*, who was a proven soldier. It was with this man that he gained the military experience which helped him to write the *Res Gestae*. He was in Gaul, with Ursicinus, to put down the Silvanus uprising of 355, and then in 359 he was with him in the East while he attempted to repulse the Persian invasion. It was during this war that Ammianus showed his ability in the area of intelligence gathering and siege warfare(as the besieged). While he was in Gaul, as a staff officer under Ursicinus, he caught a glimpse of what the future held for the empire, for it was then that Julian the Apostate, at that time still a Caesar, began his rise to fame with his Gallic victories.

The posting held by Ammianus between the forced retirement of Ursicinus and the start of Julian's campaign in the East is debated. His whereabouts are not known and he himself does not tell us of his posting. There are a few different ideas on this topic. Thompson suggests that he remained on active duty because, " . . . , soldiers do not usually leave and rejoin armies when the whim takes them."¹ He takes his cue from a letter of Libanius, a friend of Ammianus, to Apolinarius and Gemellus, which mentions the historian by name²:

friend of Ammianus, to Apolinarius and Gemellus, which mentions the historian by name²:

The letter is generally dated ca. 360. Matthews expresses some doubt about where he was and what he was doing,

“...,and it seems more likely that whatever happened to him - whether like Ursicinus he was dismissed the service, whether he was given some remote, inhospitable posting, or he was simply able to recede from view and live for a while in private life out of the public eye - the removal of Ursicinus from active life was the end too of Ammianus’ privileged view of contemporary affairs.”³

It has also been suggested that he may have resigned his commission and then rejoined for Julian’s campaign of 363 because of his admiration of the emperor. If this is true it would be because , “...of the special status in the army which Ammianus’ rank as a *curialis* had secured him...”⁴. Since he was of an upper class family(*curial*)⁵ he had entered the army at the elevated position of *Protector Domesticus* and there is a debate on how much time the *Protectores* served.⁶ Rowell says Ammianus was harmed by the forced retirement of Ursicinus due to his close relations with him:

“ As a member of Ursicinus’ staff, Ammianus, career would naturally have suffered some eclipse because of the discharge of his chief. . .What seems more likely is that Ammianus remained in the army with his rank of protector after the disbandment of Ursicinus’ staff, but was not reassigned or, if reassigned, was given some obscure or trivial form of duty in a military bureau at Antioch.”⁷

This seems to be the most plausible idea concerning his career between 359-363 and has now been dealt with in a sufficient manner. Ammianus again appears in the narrative when he joins, at Circesium, the ill-fated Persian campaign of 363. This is the point of interest for discussion in this study. His final books chronicle the empire until 378 which is the year

when the Emperor Valens was defeated by the Goths at Adrianople, but it is in book XXXI that he gives his qualifications for writing his *Res Gestae* and the time span they encompass:

“ Haec ut miles quondam et Graecus, a principatu Caesaris
Nervae exorsus ad usque Valentis interitum pro virium
explicavi mensura :...”(XXXI.16.9)

The first thirteen books, which cover a span of two hundred and fifty-seven years, and describe the history of the reigns of Nerva to Constantine and the wars between the three sons of Constantine are lost. The compression of time and material in these books must have been great, but the surviving eighteen books cover a period of 25 years, i.e. late 353 - 378. These last books discuss the career of the historian's lifetime; this is where we see the true meaning of his afore-mentioned statement. He is qualified to write this history because of his classical education --- this canon of literature would have shown him the proper style for carefully constructing his history. This gave him the ability to write in a style that his audience would appreciate. His remark about being a former soldier shows his audience that his knowledge of military matter would be handled with greater care and ability due to his time in the service. This is commented on by Austin, “But as a direct result of his career as a *protector domesticus*, he was able to gain a much wider and more detailed picture of military matters than would have been possible if he had been in any other kind of employment . . . ”⁸ Therefore his time as an officer gave him the ability to convey information on military matters, in a concise manner, to his audience. When looking at the whole of Ammianus's work, it should be viewed, “ . . . as the living product of tensions of time, place and memory.”⁹ Taking this approach one can see how his education in the classical tradition, his military service and the *Res Gestae* all fit to create a history of the

tumultuous fourth century by a man who witnessed the highest and lowest moments of the period. Ammianus's education presumably included reading other ancient historians¹⁰ than Thucydides and Tacitus, though it was the latter who inspired him to write his work. His original intent may have been to finish the recording of the empire's life which Livy and Tacitus had begun centuries before.¹¹ It is also possible that he may have been exposed to the work of Lucian, more specifically to a treatise, a letter to a friend named Philo, called *Πῶς δεῖ Ἱστορίαν συγγράφειν*. This work, as well as a reading of the classical historians, could have served as a base from which to plan and write a history. Lucian has specific criteria for what qualifications a historian should have so as to provide the reader with accurate and proper information, and he has a definite idea about what the task of the historian should be as well,

“Καί τοίνυν καὶ ἡμῖν τοιοῦτός τις ὁ μαθητὴς νῦν παραδεδόσθω--
 συνεῖναι τε καὶ εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἀγεννής, ἀλλ’ ὅξυ δειδορκῶς, οἷος καὶ
 πράγμασι χρήσασθαι ἂν εἰ ἐπιτραπείη, καὶ γνώμην στρατιωτικὴν
 ἀλλὰ μετὰ τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ ἐμπειρίαν στρατηγικὴν ἔχειν, καὶ
 νῆ Δία καὶ ἐν στρατοπέδῳ γεγονώς ποτε καὶ γυμναζομένους ἢ
 ταττομένους στρατιώτας ἑωρακώς καὶ ὄπλα εἰδώς καὶ
 μηχανήματα,...”(Lucian, *Πῶς δεῖ Ἱστορίαν συγγράφειν*, 37)

Ammianus follows the advice given by Lucian about having the mind of a soldier since he has spent time in the Roman army and lived that life. Some modern authors have linked Ammianus to Lucian and this treatise, but they have not cited this passage and the reason for this is unknown.¹² Attached to this would be the subject of being in *castra*, of knowing the drills of the troops and of their weapons; again there would be knowledge of military machines. His advice about being a good citizen would stem from his education and from doing his duty by protecting the state during his stint in the service. Most important would

be Lucian's suggestion of knowing generalship; having been attached to Ursicinus and having served as a staff officer to Julian during the campaign of 363 he would have had intimate knowledge of their skill in leadership.

According to Lucian's thinking Ammianus would make an excellent historian, but there is one other criterion that he must possess and this is the most important of all, "Τοῦ δὴ συγγραφέως ἔργον ἔν--ώς ἐπράχθη εἰπεῖν." (Lucian, Πῶς δεῖ Ἱστορίαν συγγράφειν, 39) This ultimate rule of telling the truth is one that must be followed; he complains in his work about many who write history as if it were merely a piece of literary work. Ammianus's work is seen by many scholars as being as accurate as possible considering the sources and stylistic conventions of the day. Austin observes that the history contains a " . . . wealth of eye-witness and circumstantial detail, . . ."¹³ This type of detail lends itself to an account that was as close to the truth as possible. Crump observes that " . . . his handling of rumours attests to his inherent honesty. By confessing his inability to discover the truth, he contrasts sharply with most other writers, who simply adopt the version which suits them."¹⁴ Here the point is clear that his honesty sets him apart from other writers, and it is honesty which keeps him on the path of the truth.¹⁵ Lucian says this is most important for the historian.

What must now be considered is where Ammianus found his information and how scrupulous he was at ascertaining its truth. He would have found it easy to gather information on the campaign of 363 due to the fact that he personally took part in the event. His information then would be a first hand account, but also he would have gathered information from other soldiers who participated; also any documentary evidence that was available from the period could have been brought with him to Rome. The reason for this is that Rome was

no longer the seat of government, so the documents he needed would not be there. Ammianus himself makes mention of his sources at the beginning of book XV, “Utcumque potuimus veritatem scrutari, ea quae videre licuit per aetatem, vel perplexe interrogando versatos in medio scire, narravimus ordine casuum exposito diversorum:...”(XV.1.1) Here we have the words of the man himself which relate to the gathering of material for his history. The main point here is his meticulous interrogation of witnesses and what he has experienced. Since he was part of the campaign and most likely acted as a staff officer for Julian’s headquarters, any information that came through there would be at his fingertips. Also he may have been present at strategy planning sessions which would have given him foresight into the campaign as a whole.

This position as a staff officer relates to the statement that makes mention of his personal experience of events. First-hand information of this sort cannot be replaced by documentary evidence or even second-hand accounts, because, though memory may fade with time, events of this magnitude to which he was a witness would make an impression that lasts. A comparable example from the twentieth century is that of the day that JFK was assassinated. Ask where a person was on that day and most likely he will be able to tell you because of the magnitude of the effect it had on his life and times. The same can be said about the Persian campaign of 363 in which Ammianus participated. It was an event that had not been witnessed since Diocletian and Maximian imposed their will upon the Persians in 299. On the other hand there is no comment made by Ammianus on the textual or documentary sources that he may have employed. There is speculation that he may have used the history of Zosimus, a Greek historian, and Magnus of Carrhae, an earlier historian; both of whom

wrote about Julian's Persian campaign.¹⁶ Ammianus in his narrative about the campaign, “. . . matches, almost incident for incident, the description of Zosimus and which corresponds to a lesser degree with the fragments from Magnus of Carrhae, another participant in the expedition.”¹⁷ This can be viewed in many ways, but the most likely is that of Thompson:

“It is above all in his account of Julian's expedition to Persia that Ammianus has been accused of wholesale plagiarism. Yet he himself marched with Julian's army, and so might have been expected here even more than elsewhere to give us for the most part first-hand information.”¹⁸

If it is remembered that he did in fact personally participate in the campaign and witnessed the events he described then the idea of plagiarism is unthinkable, but it does not rule out the possibility that he did look at the other accounts to compare them with what he had written. The other most likely sources of information are official documents of the times which, as has been stated before, he would have had to carry with him to Rome from Constantinople.

His background, reliability and sources have now been examined in some detail, therefore it is now necessary to look at the man whom he establishes as the centre of the Persian campaign of 363. Julian the Apostate will be treated in the next section in fuller detail, but now he will be looked at through the eyes of his chronicler.

Ammianus has a great deal of respect for Julian based on his ability as a general, his classically-based education and his temperance in day-to-day life. Ammianus was educated in the classics and was a pagan himself which would have drawn him to Julian. It has been noted that, “. . . Ammianus had immense respect for Julian's military ability, and he describes his military achievements with some gusto and at vast length.”¹⁹ In his attempt to capture these achievements he ensured that, “The reign is followed from its early hopes of

renaissance of traditional civic, religious and military ideals . . . ”²⁰ Ammianus’s descriptions of these achievements did not always illuminate positive aspects of the emperor’s character, for he sometimes found areas in which the emperor, his hero, was lacking. This idea has been noted by a few authors²¹, but here it will serve to show Averil Cameron’s thought on the matter, “Even Ammianus, one of Julian’s most ardent supporters, recognized that he sometimes suffered from flawed judgement which at times amounted to naïvety.”²² Ammianus gives a fair estimate of Julian after he has recorded his death in Persia.

His eulogy begins with all his virtues and then is balanced with his faults, “Digestis bonis, quae scire potuimus, nunc ad explicanda eius vitia veniamus, licet dicta sint carptim.”(XXV.4.16) His honesty shows forth in this one line because if he had intended to be biassed and only show the virtuous Julian this line would never have been written. Julian is given to us not as a stock figure that is great and unerring, but as one of power with human frailties. It is this ability to evaluate the emperors of his history, especially Julian, that lets the reader see who the emperor was as a man and not just as a leader. Crump sees that, “His balanced evaluations of the emperors, with but a few exceptions, produce an impression not of stereotyped and insubstantial images, but of living men possessing both strengths and weaknesses.”²³ This is the reasoning behind the belief that Ammianus’s view of Julian is not a completely biassed eulogy.

Ammianus’s education, career as a soldier, good use of sources and balanced approach when looking at emperors has helped in the creation of his work; a work which covers the tumultuous fourth century and its major players. Julian and his Persian campaign of 363 is what is to be looked at. What will become clear is the type of man Julian was in his early life

and education to his victories and his final defeat. His decision to launch the campaign against Persia and his goal will be examined, but most importantly his ability as a commander and negotiator.

THE EMPEROR

Julian the Apostate(ca. 331-363), a nephew of Constantine the Great, grew up in a world that was full of suspicion and quick justice. His earliest memories would be of his father, Julius Constantius the half brother of Constantine, being killed by the order of Constantine's sons who wanted no pretenders to the purple. This left him fatherless and he had been motherless since birth, because just after he was born his mother had died. He was then alone in the world. The young Julian was spared along with his older half-brother Gallus because of their age since it seemed that they did not pose a threat to the murderous sons of Constantine. Julian and Gallus were sent to live with Julian's maternal grandmother who had an estate in Bithynia where they received a solid educational foundation. This education had a lasting effect on Julian and helped him to become the emperor he was. His first teacher was, "... Eusebius, the Arian bishop of Nicomedia, ..." ²⁴ who gave them a sound Christian education which would befit the cousins of the current Christian emperors.

The greatest influence upon the mind of young Julian was that of a Scythian eunuch in the employment of his grandmother on her estate. This eunuch, Mardonius, gave Julian the interest and love of the ancients as he, "... instructed him in the pagan classics, ..." ²⁵ In studying the ancients and their beliefs he himself began to feel that he should adhere to the ancient beliefs. Julian according to Bidez was a child who, "... prenait l'habitude d'incliner vers le sol une tête pensive et sérieuse." ²⁶ Julian began, from an early age, to ground his mind

in the serious thought of the ancients; later this same seriousness would lead him to ponder over his acclamation, by the Gallic troops, to the rank of Augustus before accepting the offer. Although he had a love of this ancient knowledge and its teachings, he could not openly profess it because of the anti-pagan sentiments of the time. Thus Julian continued to act as one believing in the Christian faith and even became a reader in the church, but hidden away was his yearning for the pagan past.²⁷ This connection came to an end when the then sole emperor, Constantius, the last surviving son of Constantine, moved his two cousins to an Imperial estate known as Macellum in Cappadocia.

Julian did not stop his quest for the knowledge of the ancients even though he had been removed from his beloved teacher Mardonius.²⁸ During the six year captivity at the estate no one was allowed in, which left little for him to do but read. He continued to read the ancients thanks to the access he had to the library of George the current Arian bishop of Cappadocia, “Georges de Cappadoce avait une belle bibliothèque, et il permit au jeune prince de venir la voir”.²⁹ Access to this grand library, well stocked with Christian and the ancient pagan authors helped to foster his love of antiquity even more.

It was while the two were at Macellum that they received their first and only visitor. Constantius stopped to check up on the two while he was en route to campaign against the Persians. This is the first time that Julian came face to face with the man he blamed for the death of his family. In 348 the exile of Macellum was over and he and his brother were sent to the new capital of Constantinople. While in his new setting he continued his education in the area of rhetoric under the tutelage of Nicocles(a pagan and rival of the pagan philosopher Libanius) and Hecebolius a Christian. After a short stay he was again moved, to the nearby

provincial city of Nicomedia. According to Libanius, Constantius feared that Julian, who was on the verge of manhood, might gain political support in the city:

“He was already on the threshold of manhood, and the princeliness of his nature was attested by many notable signs. This allowed Constantius no rest, and so, fearful that his capital, which was so influential in the formation of public opinion and in matters of government the peer of Rome, should be attracted to the young man’s excellence, with some untoward consequences for himself, he had him packed off to Nicomedia, since that city would cause him not nearly so much alarm, and there he provided facilities for his education.”(Libanius, *Orat.* 18.13)

The fear that the sons of Constantine had felt at the beginning of their reign and that had led them to massacre most of their family was still present with Constantius(the last of the sons). Instead of removing his two cousins he used them: first Gallus as Caesar and then Julian after he had executed the former for excesses in his governing. It was while he was in Nicomedia in 351 that Gallus was ordered to meet with Constantius. This meeting resulted in Gallus’s being elevated to the position of Caesar. While under the tutelage of Hecebolius, Julian was made to swear an oath to the effect that he would not attend the lectures of the Rhetorician Libanius; this he did and obeyed; however, he hired a note-taker to go to the lectures. He was, therefore, able to benefit from the teachings of Libanius and to correspond with him while he was in Gaul as Caesar.

The execution of Gallus in 355 left no central command figure in the East, since Constantius was tied up in the West fending off barbarian incursions along the Rhine and the Magnentius rebellion. After Gallus’s execution Constantius was left to deal with the Persian incursions as well. Gallus was not a competent man and his wife’s bad influence on him was

his downfall, “Le jeune César était bien servi par les généraux que lui avait donnés son cousin et beau-frère, mais personnellement, il était incapable d’avoir une bonne initiative. Sa femme, l’orgueilleuse et impitoyable Constancie, eut sur lui la plus détestable influence, et il la laissa terroriser la ville par une suite d’exécutions sommaires.”³⁰ It was while under her influence that he began to act in a way that irritated Constantius(he had heard of his doings through spies), finally the emperor had him removed from power and life.³¹

Julian was the only family member that Constantius had left, and, he pulled the bookworm into the realm of imperial politics and war. He began his career as Caesar by being presented to the troops by Constantius(Ammianus’s history at XV.8.5-12). The main proponent of Julian was Constantius’s wife, Eusebia, who saw the potential of the young man. She saved him from death in 354 when he and others(including Ursicinus) were charged with treason,

“Qui cum obiecta dilueret ostenderetque, neutrum sine iussu fecisse, nefando adsentatorum coetu perisset urgente, ni adspiratione superni numinis Eusebia suffragante regina ductus ad Comum oppidum Mediolano vicinum ibique paulisper moratus procudendi ingenii causa, ut cupidine flagravit, ad Graeciam ire permissus est.(XV.2.8)

Her continual friendship with Julian kept him safe as she persuaded her husband to trust this young man and bring him in to share the Imperial power as Caesar(XV.8.3). Once he was in power he began to show his ability during his stint on the Rhine frontier in actions against the hostile Germanic tribes. He rebuilt fortifications that had previously been sacked and made incursions into German territory, but his greatest victory was that of Argentoratum(Strasbourg) in 357. The account of this appears in XVI.12.1-70. His valour and prowess as a commander was celebrated by the troops under his command and they

would do anything for him, ordered or not.

Then, in 360, the Persians were causing their usual havoc in the East, which meant that Constantius was in need of more troops. Consequently, knowing of the victories and growing fame of Julian, he ordered that a large number of troops be transferred east to his command(XX.4.1-2) Julian's troops had no wish to go the hot climes of the East and leave their families and lands undefended. To ensure that this did not happen they forcibly proclaimed Julian emperor as Ammianus says, but it is not certain that he had no hand in this acclamation.³² He sat throughout the night in the imperial palace where he was wintering in Lutetia(Paris). When he accepted the burden of Augustus allegedly he did so to placate his troops and he promised to explain all to Constantius(XX.14.16). He made the attempt, but all he received in reply was a letter telling him to be happy with the position that he had been given. The message came with an envoy named Leonas, Constantius's *quaestor*, who was sent to deal with the situation and to give his reply to Julian(XX.9.4)

The stage was now set for a full scale civil war, but the grace of the gods was with Julian and Constantius died before he had a chance to face his opponent. In early November 361 in Cilicia, at the town of Mopsucrenae, Constantius became ill and died leaving his usurper cousin in sole command of the empire(XXI.15). All this took place as Constantius was en route to face Julian at Naissus(Nish) and he was able to do this because the fact that the Persians had withdrawn before embarking on their usual yearly invasion of Roman territory. The auspices were not favourable for Sapor(Shapur) the Persian King, so he turned his entire force about and stopped his invasion before it began, "...Eique haec disponenti, luce postera nuntiatur, regem cum omni manu quam duxerat, ad propria revertisse, auspiciis

dirimentibus.....”(XXI.13.8). Thus Constantius was free to deal with his internal problems which he felt much more confident about, because he had always come out as victor in such affairs, “ . . . solacio uno sustentabatur, quod intestinos semper superaverit motus. . . ”(XXI.13.7).³³ Consoling himself with this thought, he began his final march. Julian began his reign by continuing east as far as Constantinople where he conducted Constantius’s funeral and other state business and it was here that he became known as Julian the Apostate because he renounced Christianity for the old state religion. It is Ammianus who gives us the most admirable portrait of an emperor, soldier and man. It is his charisma, leadership and ambition which the troops follow; the magic he displayed in Gaul had not been seen in the empire for many years. Ammianus sees Julian as the proper man to lead the empire because of his love of the ancient learning and his ambition to take the empire back to its proper place in the world. He reveres his commander and sees him as an emperor of the old order. He compares him to Trajan when discussing Julian’s goals,

“Animabat autem Iulianus exercitum cum non per caritates, sed per inchoatas negotiorum magnitudines deieraret adsidue: ‘sic sub iugum mitteret Persas, ita quassatum recrearet orbem Romanorum’: ut Traianus fertur alioquotiens iurando dicta consuesse firmare ‘sic in provinciarum speciem redactum videam Daciam : sic pontibus Histrum et Euphratem superem,’ et similia plurima.”(XXIV.3.9)

Though this statement shows that Ammianus saw a link between Julian and Trajan, he did however point out, ever so subtly, his stubbornness in not accepting advice and his dismissal of auspices not interpreted the way he wanted. His lack of listening to advisers, due to his hyper-ambition, was a key element in his final defeat and death in 363. This linkage to past emperors was something that Julian wanted made public so as to help his image as a great

conqueror and to hide the fact that this was also a revival of Constantine's planned invasion of the East, "Trajan and Alexander were Julian's publicly-professed exemplars, evocative names which also served to obscure the fact that the invasion of Persia was a revival of the project of his detested uncle, Constantine."³⁴ This same bolstering of self-image with references to ancient heroic emperors and generals also led him to refuse any form of negotiated peace, "Shapur's offers to negotiate were rejected . . ."³⁵ This sentiment is not to be found in Ammianus at any point in his narrative, but is in Libanius's oration XII.76-77 and in other historians of the time.³⁶ Having rejected peace he automatically created a situation that would have to be taken care of through war. Whether or not this enforced war was good for the empire was never considered. If it had been considered, Julian would have seen that a quick negotiated peace in his favour and would still have increased his glory, though not in the way that he wanted.

In another of Libanius's orations he reports the reply sent back to the Persians, " . . . *καὶ ἀντεπέστειλέ γε μηδὲν δεῖν πρέσβειων αὐτοῦ τάχιστα ἐκεῖνον ὀψομένου.*" (Libanius, *Orat.* XVIII.164) He was stating in no uncertain terms that war was the only way to teach the Persians how to behave, as he had taught the Germanic tribes along the Rhine. His idea of peace was based upon the use of force to control the enemy, "Julian had no qualms about the use of force to carry out State policy against outsiders, . . ."³⁷ He truly felt that it was proper to crush enemies totally and then hand them peace when they asked for it, but peace on his terms.³⁸ This same conviction led him to turn his eyes towards the East and the Persians. He felt that they should be punished for their crimes against the empire,

"Inter haec expeditionem parans in Persas, quam dudum

animi robore conceperat celso, ad ultionem praeteritorum
vehementer elatus est, sciens et audiens gentem asperrimam
per sexaginta ferme annos inuississe orienti caedum et
direptionum monumenta saevissima, ad internecionem
exercitibus nostris saepe deletis.”(XXII.12.1)

The problems in the East stretch all the way back to the times of the Greeks of the fifth century BC and had been present during the early principate, but since then the Parthians(the Arsacid line) had been overthrown and the more aggressive Persian Sassanids had come to power in 227. This new line of kings traced their lineage back to Xerxes(486-465BC) and they wanted back from the Romans all the territory that he once held. Sassanid problems were something that had been inherited from the time of Severus Alexander(222-235) and Julian had, “. . . inherited the Persian problem from Constantius, as Constantius had from Constantine.”³⁹ In this inherited problem Julian saw a way to glorify himself and safeguard the empire. If he had succeeded, the Persian problem would have been quieted for a while and then the Romans could have put more effort into pushing the Germans back over the Rhine and Danubian frontiers.

Julian’s desire to conquer the East and gain the cognomen *Parthicus* may have been driving factors, “ornamenti illustrium gloriarum inserere Parthici cognomentum ardebat.”(XXII.12.2)⁴⁰ With this name attached to his he would be as his heroes were and greater glory would be his, but the campaign failed due to his errors on many fronts. He felt that he would be able to conquer the Persians and that it would be as easy as his victories in the West, but he underestimated his enemy. The Persians were better organized and equipped than the barbaric German tribes of the West and were driven to achieve a specific goal. “Julian seems to have seriously underestimated the training and logistic ability of the Persian

empire . . . ”⁴¹, and he “ . . . was an experienced commander, but his experience had been all of one kind---warfare against tribal peoples, . . . ”.⁴² Inexperience in dealing with an enemy who was cunning, wise and well-equipped took the young Augustus by surprise. This surprise could have been avoided if he had listened to the admonitions of seasoned soldiers who advised him not to embark on the campaign.

Julian was a stubborn man who saw what he wanted in omens and signs because he felt that the gods were on his side, “His successes in Germany, achieved against all expectation, and his bloodless victory over Constantius in the civil war, had encouraged his confidence that he was the special favourite of fortune and the gods.”⁴³ Ammianus, a faithful staff officer and historian, was not always uncritical of Julian and his actions, but he never openly said that any of his actions were foolish. Though he tried to give a balanced picture of the reign, it is clear that “ . . . Ammianus’ account of the actual reign of his hero is surprisingly inconclusive.”⁴⁴ The question then becomes why was it an inconclusive account? One possible reason could be that he saw the errors in Julian’s decisions as emperor and commanding general which appear in the narrative in small doses at certain points in the *Res Gestae*.

Julian was a pagan and one who ardently believed in augury, but when it came to how the signs were interpreted he only believed them if they were in his favour. During the planning of and carrying out of the campaign against the Persians he was presented with many signs that foretold failure. Even the ancient Sibylline books were consulted and they were clear on the point that it was not proper for the emperor to make war on the Persians at that time(XXIII.1.7). He disregarded this warning and continued his planned campaign, and in

doing so he ignored the prophecies of the ancients which he held up as most sacred. Just as Julian was in Circesium awaiting to cross the Tigris, he received a letter from Sallustius, Prefect of Gaul, begging him not carry out his hasty plan without proper guidance and safeguards from the gods(XXIII.5.4), but here again he ignored the plea of an old friend and ardent supporter. Book XXIII.5 is the best example of Julian's not listening to anyone; "It depicts Julian as wilfully ignoring not only divine omens but also the explicit advice of his friends; . . .".⁴⁵ One final example of his ignoring an omen when it was not in his favour until it was reinterpreted to suit him is from XXIII.5.12-14. A soldier named Jovian is struck by lightning and killed; the augurs interpret this as a bad omen and they propose that the expedition should stop and go back to Roman territory. The philosophers in Julian's retinue had a different interpretation that was part scientific and part theological which proved to be much more desirable to Julian. He did not listen to the interpreters of omens, but to his philosophical retinue which guided him in the wrong direction, "The superstitious emperor pressed on, to halt before the walls of Ctesiphon and to die in the retreat of his disintegrating army . . .".⁴⁶ Ammianus, in his list of good and bad qualities of the emperor(XXV.4), lists as one of his first bad qualities, ". . . , praesagiorum sciscitationi nimiae deditus, ut aequiperare videretur in hac parte principem Hadrianum, superstitiosus magis quam sacrorum observator, innumeras sine parsimonia pecudes mactans, . . ."(XXV.4.17). The comparison with Hadrian is interesting because Julian sees him as the best emperor and shows this in his work *συμπόσιον η κρονια* (*The Caesars*) by the actions and words⁴⁷ of Marcus,

“Τοῦ Μάρκου δὲ ἀρχομένου λέγειν, . . . ὁ δὲ ἀποβλέψας πρὸς τὸν Δία καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς, Ἄλλ’ ἔμοιγε, εἶπεν, ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ Θεοί, λόγων οὐδὲν δεῖ καὶ ἀγῶνος. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἡγνοεῖτε τὰ μᾶ, προσῆκον ἦν ἐμοὶ διδάσκειν ὑμᾶς· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἴστε καὶ λέληθεν ὑμᾶς τῶν ἀπάντων οὐδὲν, αὐτοὶ μοι τιμᾶτε τῆς ἀξίας. ἔδοξε δὴ οὖν ὁ Μάρκος τὰ τε ἄλλα θαυμάσιός εἶναι καὶ σοφὸς διαφερόντως ἅτε οἶμαι διαγινώσκων, Λέγειν θ’ ὅπου χρὴ καὶ σιγαῖν ὅπου καλόν.”(Julian, *Caes.*, 328C)

He may have wished to emulate this philosopher emperor and did so in more ways than one as it would seem.

Another problem with this campaign is that the objective that Julian had in mind that may not have actually existed. If it is true that Julian had no clear objective, then the campaign was nothing but a grab for glory.⁴⁸ Julian’s actions would then be questionable in military terms and this is shown in Ammianus’s work. It seems that Ammianus, “. . . often becomes uneasy when he is describing some of Julian’s military actions, and with considerable deliberation he ventures to find fault.”⁴⁹ This uneasiness may have come through the knowledge that there was no real objective in mind and that there need not be a campaign(this was shown by Sapor’s willingness to negotiate a peace). There may have been the desire to hand the Persians peace as it had been handed to them by Diocletian in 299. If this is the case Ammianus, “. . . fails anywhere to state explicitly what political aims Julian’s strategy was designed to achieve.”⁵⁰ Having no objective may have led him to take unsound advice from friends and advisers which led to people criticising his motives for the campaign(which would also be a criticism of him).⁵¹

The criticisms that were hurled at him came most strongly from the citizens of Antioch. Ammianus records that the detractors were envious and idle people(XXII.12.3-4), but that

they did not do anything to move Julian to change his mind. Criticisms were not only heaped upon the campaign and its purpose, but also on Julian himself because he was not like the Antiochenes. Julian was a man who did not delight in the pleasures that the citizens enjoyed, but remained as philosophical and ascetic as ever. “As a philosopher transformed in Gaul into a soldier, Julian repudiated luxury and disciplined himself beyond the capabilities of most men.”⁵² He wrote an invective against the Antiochenes’s called the *Misopogon* which listed their problems and vices. Julian was different from his cousin as ruler and it is known that, “The delicacies that Constantius thought permissible were rejected by Julian in favour of regular soldier’s fare and whatever food was offered . . . ”.⁵³ In choosing the food of the soldiers he was rejecting the luxury of the upper classes and the way of life Constantius had chosen, thereby ingratiating himself with the troops.

Julian was a man who was driven when it came to achieving a goal, but he went too far in pursuit of military glory. Due to his refusal to negotiate peace, to heed omens and friends and the need to show his troops that he was one of them he was pushed towards a campaign that was not properly guided by an end goal. All of these elements add up to a campaign with no purpose and with little incentive for the troops to accomplish anything. They could only be bolstered by speeches and promises for so long before their morale crumbled.

THE CAMPAIGN

Julian gained sole command of the empire and accomplished this act in an almost bloodless manner, but he felt the need to prove himself against an enemy who required taming. His choice was the Persian empire of the Sassanids who had been terrorizing the East since the last years of the reign of Constantine the Great. A victory over this enemy would bring glory

to him and Roman power back to the East as it had been under Trajan, Septimius Severus and Diocletian.

Julian began planning for the campaign while he was in Antioch or maybe earlier while in Constantinople. The omens that continually came forward to dissuade him from his planned war were not heeded or reinterpreted to fit his will.⁵⁴ Along with this he refused to take advice from friends and seasoned military commanders, but the last straw was the refusal to negotiate with Sapor for peace.⁵⁵ His troops were willing to follow him on his quest to punish the eastern enemy and, oddly enough, some of these troops were the ones who had refused to go east for Constantius. The state of the troops was a large factor in the failure of the campaign because they were not motivated by need or want, but by a feeling of euphoria that remained from Julian's bloodless success against Constantius. The eastern troops accepted him because of good commanders who kept them under control and rumours that Constantius had proclaimed him his heir before dying; western troops followed because of his successes in the West over the Germanic barbarians and over Constantius.

Julian set out from Antioch and marched towards Hierapolis, and then, after a brief stay, he moved on to Mesopotamia on the other side of the Euphrates. Once across the Euphrates he met with Scythian auxiliaries in Batnae a town of Osdroene; as far as this point his route would have been fairly usual for an invading Roman army(XXIII.2.6-8). His speed caught the Assyrians off guard, and allowed him freedom of movement throughout the area and to prepare to make a ninety degree turn towards Ctesiphon, but before this he arrived at Carrhae(XXIII.3.1).It took awhile for the Persians in Assyria to mount any opposition, but, when it came, Julian had problems in his rear. The sudden attack by the Persians caused him

to send a small force of 30,000 men under his cousin Procopius and Sebastianus, a *comes* and former *dux* of Egypt, to link up with Arsaces the Armenian king. Previously Arsaces had been ordered to supply a force to aid the Romans.

There has been discussion on the actual use of this force in the campaign: Austin thinks that the splitting of the force from the army illustrates what the actual objectives were in Julian's plan,⁵⁶ while Matthews states that, "This army(Procopius and Sebastianus's) was obviously a major element in Julian's strategy, being intended at least to distract Sapor and occupy him in the north . . .".⁵⁷ The idea that this was a planned manoeuvre is supported by the text of Ammianus, ". . . ilico (ut ante cogitaverat) triginta milia lectorum militum eidem commisit Procopio, iuncto ad parilem potestatem Sebastiano comite ex duce Aegypti . . ." (XXIII.3.5) It would seem that this smaller force was a planned diversionary force, as Ammianus says; other ancient authors mention this point,⁵⁸ but Ammianus who was a headquarters staff member knew of this plan first-hand and would have had a better understanding of its use. The main problem with this force was that it never linked up with Julian's main corps (which he had ordered them to do) and therefore he was not given the support that he needed to take Ctesiphon and keep the army of Sapor at bay. Had this smaller force joined up with Julian as he had ordered, ". . . apud Assyrios adhuc agenti sibi concurrerent, necessitatum articulis adfuturi" (XXIII.3.5) and accomplished its task the campaign might have ended in victory for the Romans.

Having sent this force on its way, he prepared to cross the Tigris (setting out from Carrhae), but did not do so and had supplies laid out on the route he was to take to beguile enemy intelligence (XXIII.3.6). It is at this point that the ninety degree turn took place. This route

must have had some sort of supply plan as well(XXIII.3.6, XXV.8.7) as the feigned route and on this route also he had planned for a fleet of eleven hundred ships (One thousand for supply and troop transport, fifty for use as pontoon bridges and fifty warships). His objective had now become Ctesiphon and the status that it could convey to one who sacked it. Here was his dream of the cognomen *Parthicus* and the glory of Trajan and other Roman emperors before him, but the military purpose was that the Persians would be handed a defeat and then Julian could dictate the terms of peace.

After the feigned march towards the Tigris crossing and after turning right he headed away from the regular marching route. He arrived at a *castra praesidiaria*(XXIII.3.7) at Davana which is located at the headwaters of the Belias river(a tributary of the Euphrates) and remained there briefly before moving on to the strongly walled Callinicum. It is after he left here and continued with the Euphrates on his right that he met with the fleet and received the Saracen nation's gifts of supplication.(XXIII.3.7-9) As far as this point there had been no enemy intervention or harassment and it seemed as if his planned use of the force of 30,000 combined with Arsaces's force was delaying the Persians. This force, after having misdirected the Persian main force and despoiled the territory they had been sent through, would then come and link up with Julian's main force, hoping catch the enemy in between them, "Le mouvement enveloppant combiné de la sorte pouvait assurer le succès de la campagne."⁵⁹

He crossed the Abora river at Circesium, a fortlet which is situated on a small peninsula which has the Euphrates on one side and the Abora on the other, after Julian had made the crossing, he ordered the bridge to be destroyed so no one could go anywhere but forward.

After crossing he gave the troops a speech that would be fitting for the moment and Ammianus, in his history, wrote a speech that reflected what he felt would show Julian's excellence as a leader and orator. Then the force moved forward to begin its campaign. For the most part it consisted of sieges of various fortresses and small skirmishes with the enemy. The bulk of the Persian force had been led to believe that the Romans were going to attack along the same front as always(into Armenia and Assyria) which left a small force to deal with the main body of Julian's army. Their only answer was guerilla warfare against the larger Roman force. The sieges took longer than Julian had expected, so that when he arrived at Ctesiphon he was short on time. Ammianus knows what effect long sieges can have on the desired outcome of a campaign and he lets the reader know that Julian knew this as well, ". . . Verum in omne discrimen armatis proximus princeps civitatis urgebat excidium, ne circa muros diu excubans omitteret maiora quae temptabat."(XXIV.4.18) The threat of the advances being slowed down was quite a serious problem, because the main Persian army was near and Julian's support force of 30,000 was nowhere to be seen. As time ran out for Julian he knew that he might have to turn away from Ctesiphon and leave his goal behind.

As was stated in an earlier section,⁶⁰ Julian's military experience was with barbarian Germanic tribes that were loosely organized; but the Persians were better equipped and commanded than the Germanic barbarians. Julian was not accustomed to long sieges or to the tenacity of the defenders of the fortresses. Julian was a man who, ". . . was at his very best in situations which he was firmly in control, though he fearlessly faced those in which he was not."⁶¹ This was a situation that he was not firmly in control of and he had little choice but to turn away from Ctesiphon. Julian held a war council at Ctesiphon to see what

it was necessary to do and it is here that he finally takes some advice of those who knew what would happen if the siege took place,

“Digesto itaque consilio cum primatibus super Ctesiphontis obsidio, itum est in voluntatem quorundam, facinus audax et inportunum esse noscentium id adgredi, quod et civitatis situ ipso inexpugnabilis defendebatur et cum metuenda multitudine protinus rex adfore credebatur.”(XXIV.7.1)

Though the army had reached Ctesiphon it was not able to attack and take the city; success had been with them as they took citadel after citadel in their advance towards what they saw as their final goal. This was a severe blow to their morale, “. . . although the army had experienced a series of notable successes, and had met with no actual defeat, there was clearly a feeling of defeatism in the ranks and this was being expressed even among the senior personnel.”.⁶² With the morale declining and the objective in sight an attack is what the troops wanted, but because of the slowness of the advance and not having the force of Procopius and Sebastianus to back them up, they had no choice except to turn around and leave. Julian wanted Ctesiphon, Sapor wanted Nisibis. If Ctesiphon had been taken it would have been a negotiating point: Julian would have had a sword at the Persian throat and he would have achieved peace on his terms, leaving an unmolested withdrawal as a possibility; his fame would have equalled that of Trajan, Verus and Septimius Severus, all of whom had taken Ctesiphon and withdrawn unmolested.⁶³

Julian's failure to succeed meant that he had to retire under threat of attack from the main Persian army and harassment from smaller guerilla units. His main concern was the Persian cavalry which would cause definite problems on large areas of flat ground; this was thought about during his siege of Maiozamalcha, “Cumque Maiozamalcham venisset. . . , tentoriis

fixis providit sollicite, ne castra repentino equitatus Persici turbarentur adcurso, cuius fortitudo in locis patentibus immane quantum gentibus est formidata.”(XXIV.4.2) He knew that this would be his biggest problem other than supplies, since the Persians had started a burnt earth policy(XXIV.7.7). This was the beginning of the end for the campaign and for its illustrious leader. Julian ordered that the fleet be burnt,⁶⁴ saying that he wanted the extra troops for fighting, as the army began its march back to Roman territory by way of Corduene(XXIV.7.4). One reason for withdrawing in this direction instead of towards Chiliocomum, “. . . seems to have been dictated by the hope that he(Julian) could effect the link with Procopius and Sebastianus at some point before then, and not have to move too far east.”.⁶⁵ If the link-up occurred then, this force as well as the extra twenty thousand troops that came from the fleet would be useful especially since the Persians began to step up their attacks on the withdrawing Romans. This plan was changed when it became apparent that Procopius and Sebastianus had not left Mesopotamia for the link-up(XXV.7.2).

Julian seems to have planned well for this campaign, even ensuring that he had a reserve/decoy force of thirty thousand and another force of undetermined size under Arsaces. The question is: what caused the force of Procopius and Sebastianus not to be where Julian needed them at the appropriate time? There may have been something written on this by Ammianus in XXIV.7.2; but there is a lacuna⁶⁶ of some size in the text which may have explained their whereabouts. In the text by J. C. Rolfe in a note at the bottom of a page⁶⁷ he refers to the missing information; part of which survives in the text of Socrates.⁶⁸ Austin in a study of the Roman force under Julian at Ctesiphon also mentions the lacuna, “(a) there appears to be a large lacuna at the end of 24.7.2, which probably mentioned Arsaces’

unreliability and the consequent inability of Procopius and Sebastianus to effect the link-up with the main force. . .”.⁶⁹ These two(Procopius and Sebastianus) are heard of again in XXV.8.8 during the army’s withdrawal from Persian territory under the new emperor Jovian. The withdrawing army came across provisions that were meant for use by Procopius and Sebastianus’s force, but due to their frugality not all had been used. Then the main Roman force(the remnants of it) met the force under the two afore mentioned officers. This occurred as the main force arrived back in Mesopotamia(XXV.8.16). Matthews’s view on the purpose and the effects of the failure of Procopius and Sebastianus is,

“ . . . a substantial army under Procopius and Sebastianus was deployed in the north, to secure the Tigris frontier against attack and later, if possible, to link up with Arsaces of Armenian and ravage parts of Media before joining the main army in Assyria. . . The failure of the army of Procopius to achieve the more limited of its objectives was crucial to Julian’s failure at Ctesiphon: . . .”.⁷⁰

Julian’s army was tired, hungry and disheartened at having come so far and then being forced to turn away from its objective. The army had been forced past its ability to function competently by the end of the campaign and this caused problems during the retreat. Constant harassment by Persians and lack of a suitable location for proper rest began to take its toll on the army and Julian himself. They had been well supplied during this campaign and had some victories over the ever-bellicose Persians, but the timing for the campaign had been wrong. Julian had even stripped Gaul of the *limitanei*, which left the West open to attack, “ . . . frontier garrisons . . . were pressed into service for the campaign, an all-out effort requiring the use of every available man.”.⁷¹ This campaign was obviously important to him to the point of endangering the West.

The army had performed well. It had been able to take fortress after fortress. Nevertheless, the Romans never met the Persians in a pitched battle as they had expected, but instead they had many smaller engagements that wore them down.⁷² It was by this method that the Persians were hoping to stall for time as their main army moved into the area(after having been misdirected by Julian).⁷³ There may have also been a miscalculation on Julian's part if he thought that the Persians would be no better armed than the barbarians, “. . . , Julian did not have an easy time: Roman arms were not automatically superior to those of the barbarians.”⁷⁴ This with all the other afore-mentioned problems helped to end the campaign on a disastrous note for the empire.

Terrain, supplies, slowness of advance, lack of a link-up with the secondary force and Julian's inexperience with the Persians were the causes of the failure of the campaign. After the death of Julian by an unknown spearman(XXV.3.6) the army totally lost heart because their valiant leader was gone, but this was not the only reason. The burning of the crops by the Persians had left little for scrounging, “ together with constant harassment in the districts east of the Tigris, that reduced the Roman army to extremes of starvation on its journey home, until they were met by an army bringing provisions from Roman Mesopotamia.”⁷⁵ The other army talked about here is that of Procopius and Sebastianus that was late in arriving. Rome's armies had been in crisis before and would be again, but the low level of morale was compounded by their failure to take Ctesiphon and the death of Julian.

This campaign was over and so was the reign of the man who had undertaken it for reasons that seem not to have been solid. Omens, in hindsight, predicted the failure of the campaign and many Christian writers accorded the failure to Julian's paganism, but there was a

possibility of victory if all had moved according to plan. The troops were ready to follow Julian to the ends of the earth, supplies had been laid out in preparation, a diversion had been planned for Sapor and his main force so all was there for a successful campaign. A slow advance because of drawn-out sieges caused the Romans to arrive too late to invest Ctesiphon(it was too well-fortified and would have entailed a long siege). The approach of the main Persian force, constant harassment on the retreat, inexperience and an inability to listen to advisers had caused Julian's magnificent attempt at resurrecting the glory of the Roman Empire to fail.

INTERPRETATION

The Emperor and campaign are linked to such a degree that they are one and the same. Julian lived for the campaign and it lived because of him. His goal of conquering the Persians was a goal that was grand, but could not be achieved by him and his troops. Even though he had considerable troops and supplies at his command he was not able to defeat the Persians totally the way that he wanted, because it was a task of extinguishing an empire. He may have wished to place Ormizda, the exiled son of the Persian king, on the throne, making all of Persia a vassal state. This is an idea that Constantine may also have had but never accomplished.

Julian was a man who had such great ambition for success that it far outstripped his means of achieving it. The destruction of Ctesiphon was a reasonable goal, but it too eluded him in the end, due to problems with coordinating the movements of his secondary force. His obsession with accomplishing what only Alexander the Great had done pushed him onto a narrow path. There was nothing else that he wanted more than to free the empire of the Persian threat and gain the cognomen *Parthicus*.

Allowing for slight bias on the part of Ammianus, the portrait of Julian he presents in book XXV is one that gives the reader the information needed to have an understanding of the man behind the campaign. He planned the campaign well and had the appropriate routes chosen with supplies laid out along them, but he failed to take into account the climate (especially with his western troops) and also the quality and skill of Persian troops and leaders. All moved according to the plan which may or may not have had a defined goal and he remained successful for a time, but he lingered too long on sieges. This loss of time meant that he

would not be able to invest Ctesiphon because his enemy's main force was approaching and his secondary force (the 30,000 and Arsaces's troops) did not arrive for the designated link up in Assyria. It is on account of this that he began his long withdrawal towards Roman territory. Julian's troops were willing and able to follow him, especially the western troops who had fought alongside him and acclaimed him. The troops were worn down by the climate and constant harassment from small enemy units. As the campaign drew to a dismal end the troops lost all heart; Julian was killed, there was a lack of supplies and the enemy practised hit and run tactics.

With all of the above-mentioned factors concerning Julian and the troops the end of the campaign is not at all surprising because there was too much that could and did go wrong. His goal of accomplishing what only Alexander had accomplished was neither new nor imaginative. There had been other emperors who tried to accomplish this task and had only succeeded in temporarily quieting the Persians. To subdue the Persians totally was something that could not be done by the Romans while their other borders were being hard pressed. Julian never thought about this. Had he thought about it, there would have been no campaign, but a negotiated settlement. When he removed such a large number of troops from the West to the East, Julian left the western borders in a highly precarious situation because the Roman defences would not be able to withstand any serious incursions.

The damage that was done in the East was a total reversal of the settlement by Diocletian in 299 which gave the Romans a large area across the Tigris, but after Julian's defeat the border was pushed back to a line extending from the Aboras river. It was also a loss of major fortress cities--Nisibis, Singara and Castra Maurorum-- which were great defensive losses

for the Romans on the front line with the Persians. Roman territory shrank(a loss of five provinces) and the remnants of the army crawled back home to face new problems. The succeeding emperor, Jovian, did not continue the policies of paganism that Julian had put in place, but returned the empire to Christian rule.

Julian and his campaign were intertwined; for better or worse, their fate was shared and predictable when the whole affair is examined. Ammianus may have seen this end approaching, but he does not come out and say so in his work, but hints ever so slightly at the faults in the plan and the man who conceived it. Ammianus wrote about the events years after, but still had a feeling of admiration for his former commander.

The Persian remained a constant threat to the empire and caused major problems for the emperor Justinian who, in the sixth century, attempted to rebuild the shattered empire. Here again the Persians proved to be a major stumbling block for the Romans. Conflicts with the Persians were recorded by an able historian who had been present in the East and had access to the highest levels of government--Procopius of Caesarea. An examination of this man and his emperor will consider factors similar to those above. They will be studied in a wider context of reunification.

CHAPTER II: PROCOPIUS AND THE EAST 527-532 AD

THE HISTORIAN

Procopius of Caesarea was the historian of the reign of the last Roman emperor Justinian the Great. He was born in Palestine in the late fifth century and died sometime after 558 AD. There is little known about him or his family background which was most likely aristocratic. His education was probably the accepted type for young aristocrats of his time, but he also probably took legal training. This may be indicated by the position that he attained under the top general of the day, Belisarius, as his adviser in legal matters(ξύμβουλος).¹ It is interesting that we know so little about him when we have so much by him. His acquaintance with the leading general of the day gave him a unique position for recording the events of his times and he has correctly been called the last Roman historian. He lived at the time of the final struggle for the ancient world in the sense that this was the last attempt at restoring the Roman empire. For a while, the duration of Justinian's reign, the Mediterranean became what it once was to the Romans *mare nostrum*.

The three main works of Procopius are *Bella*, *De Aedificiis* and the *Anecdota*. The *Bella* are divided into eight books: i-ii *De Bello Persico*(BP), iii-iv *De Bello Vandalico*(BV), v-viii *De Bello Gothico*(BG). Books i-vii were written by 550 while book viii was written as an afterthought and finished by 554. *De Aedificiis* was probably written at the request of Justinian and were completed by 559/60, while the *Anecdota* were completed by 550, at the same time as the *Bella*. *De Aedificiis* is dated by a bridge, constructed over the Sangarios river in Bithynia, which is mentioned by Procopius at V.iii.9-11. The *Anecdota* are closely affiliated with the *Bella*: "There are constant cross-references in it to the Wars, especially in

the first section and as far as the end of chapter 5.”²

In this study I shall examine *De Bello Persico* and in particular book one which deals with Justinian’s first round of campaigns up to the *Eternal Peace* of 532. This first round provided the Romans with something that they had not had for a long while in the East . . . a victory over the Persians. It provided Justinian with a general who proved himself to be able, resourceful and a good tactician.³ This was Belisarius who was Justinian’s commander in the field while he remained in Constantinople. He is initially introduced to the reader in *BP* I.xii.20 where Procopius shows him and another general, Sittas, pillaging their way through Persarmenia and, as stated further down in the text, “τούτω δὲ τῷ ἀνδρὶ νεανία μὲν καὶ πρῶτον ὑπηνήτα ἦσθην, Ἰουστινιανοῦ δὲ στρατηγοῦ δορυφόρῳ, ὃς δὴ χρόνῳ ὕστερον ξὺν Ἰουστίνῳ τῷ θεῷ τὴν βασιλείαν ἔσχευε.” (*BP* I.xii.21) Belisarius was to have an illustrious career under Justinian, but there were also times when his loyalty and abilities were questioned. In 527, the year of Justinian’s succession to the throne, Belisarius was to be appointed as *Magister Militum per Orientem* and sent to Daras to deal with the Persian problem. It was also at this time that Procopius was assigned to him as his adviser, “τότε δὴ αὐτῷ σύμβουλος ἡρέθη Προκόπιος ὃς τάδε ξυνέγραψε.” (*BP* I.xii.24)

This is not the first introduction that we have to Procopius; at the beginning of his work at *BP* I.i.1-5 he states who he is, what he is writing about and why he is qualified to do so.

He states that,

“καὶ οἱ αὐτῷ ξυνηπίστατο πάντων μάλιστα δυνατὸς ὢν τάδε ξυγγράψαι κατ’ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, ὅτι δὲ αὐτῷ συμβούλῳ ἡρημένῳ Βελισαρίῳ τῷ στρατηγῷ σχεδὸν τι ἅπασι παραγενέσθαι τοῖς πεπραγμένοις ξυνέπεσε.” (*BP* I.i.3)

The idea of eye-witness is the key to his qualification to write the history which we have today. The meaning of this, for us, is that his work is full of information that may never have been put into any other written source. Cameron, in her translation, says, “It so happened that he was chosen as adviser by the general Belisarius and was present at nearly everything that happened.”⁴

As an eye-witness to many events which he describes he is able to be much more accurate about what happened at various battles, about correspondence between Belisarius and his Persian counterpart or speeches that Belisarius gave. Though first-hand knowledge of events gave him an advantage in writing his history, he was a follower of Herodotus and especially of Thucydides, stylistically.⁵ This use of a classicising style would have been expected from him in the literary circles of the time, and because of this “ . . . Procopius tried to maintain an acceptably classicising Greek, using archaising features like the optative mood and the dual, and for his time he was remarkably successful.”⁶ His classical models greatly influenced the *Anecdota*. Justinian appears in an bad light or, more appropriately, an absurd light. Such a portrait is a contrast to the one in the *Bella* and *De Aedificiis* which show him as a solid, normal human being. The story in Herodotus’s *Histories* at 2.75 about winged serpents attacked and stopped by the Ibis from entering Ægypt from Arabia is one of the first outlandish stories in ancient historiography. This tradition of the absurd was continued by Procopius in the *Anecdota*, for example, when he reports that Justinian had been seen, late at night, by others walking around without his head(*Anecdota*, xii.23).

The two portraits of Justinian, which Procopius gives, seem unreconcilable: one of a great re-unifier, protector and conqueror and the other of a megalomaniac who is the devil himself

in human guise and whose sole purpose is to destroy humanity. The former comes from the *Bella* and *De Aedificiis* while the latter is from the *Anecdota* (a scurrilous work that has had a long period of debate on its authorship). According to A. H. M. Jones this work is a, “. . . venomous pamphlet [which] does not deserve the respect which is often accorded to it,”⁷ Averil Cameron, however, talks of its definite authorship by Procopius. “But in fact there are many links both between this and Procopius’ other works . . . The preface ties the work intimately to the *Wars*.”⁸ It may be that these two ideas can be brought together to help form a fuller picture of Justinian. Procopius’s works *Bella* and the *De Aedificiis* give the impression of a ruler who has no faults and who was the re-unifier of the fragmented Roman empire. The second of the two works may have been commissioned by the emperor. This would explain why it is in such a panegyrical tone. In the latter parts of the *Bella* Procopius appears less enthusiastic. “On the other hand, the *Persian Wars* does not see the extreme disillusionment which Procopius came to feel and which is most evident in the *Gothic Wars*. Nor did Procopius have to deal here (Persian Wars) with the depressing aftermath of great conquest, as in the *Vandal Wars*, . . . ”⁹ because the wars were dragging on and the empire was collapsing.

The *Anecdota* can be seen as a blast of bile that had to be kept secret for the duration of Justinian’s reign and only became known centuries after. “The *Secret History* was not published with Procopius’ other works, and was first mentioned by Suidas in the tenth century.”¹⁰ Procopius portrays Justinian as a man only wanting property and money to bolster his efforts at war which are only meant to destroy the entire civilized world. His thirst is quenched by blood and his joy is greed. (*Anecdota*, xi.3). He is the Devil in human

guise. (*Anecdota*, xii.18-27) Although this is an interesting picture of the emperor, one none too flattering, it does have some basis of truth. He did confiscate property and monies from those who did not follow the Orthodox beliefs and also from those who were accused of conspiracy and treason by various detractors.¹¹ The money was used for the purpose of funding the wars of re-conquest and paying off the Persians for short stints of peace. This same work also tells of his wife's complicity with and power over him (*Anecdota*, x.13-14, xiii.19, xv.19-20 and xxii.28) Each work provides a different aspect of the man who was Justinian. He was a conqueror of old Roman territory, codifier of the Laws and the man who built great structures across the empire. At the same time he was also the man who persecuted those who were not Christian or not orthodox, creator of heavy taxes and drainer of the treasury. All these things caused great difficulties for the people.

Procopius's Herodotean¹² and Thucydidean¹³ influences were the stylistic basis of his history, but, as has been mentioned above, it was his being an eye-witness which allowed him to record the events in a clearer and more concise manner. Cameron states that there are certain parts of his work that lend "... themselves more readily than others - . . . - to classical imitation."¹⁴ This imitation goes beyond the two afore-mentioned authors, but may also extend to Lucian. Lucian is quite interesting because of his treatise of Πῶς δεῖ ἱστορίαν συγγράφειν, which is a kind of manual for the aspiring historian. Cameron supports the idea that Lucian may have had an influence upon his writing: "The Lucianic pamphlet on the writing of history points to prefaces and battles, especially sieges, as obvious candidates."¹⁵ If this is taken to mean that he had read the pamphlet mentioned, then it is possible that he

modelled his work on it. In this case he knew and understood the main thesis of the pamphlet – that the historian must be familiar with the routine of military camps, the military in the field, any planning for campaigns and battles.

“Τὰ δὲ πράγματα αὐτὰ οὐχ ὥς ἔτυχε συνακτέον, ἀλλὰ φιλοπόνως καὶ ταλαιπώρως πολλάκις περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνακριναντα, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν παρόντα καὶ ἐφορῶντα, εἰ δὲ μή, τοῖς ἀδεκαστότερον ἐξηγουμένοις προσέχοντα καὶ οὕς εἰκάσειεν ἂν τις ἥκιστα πρὸς χάριν ἢ ἀπέχθειαν ἀφαιρήσειν ἢ προσθήσειν τοῖς γεγονόσιν. κἀνταῦθα ἤδη καὶ στοχαστικός τις καὶ συνθετικός τοῦ πιθανωτέρου ἔστω.” (Lucian, Πῶς δεῖ Ἱστορίαν συγγράφειν, 47)

Lucian aptly puts it by saying that the historian should be an eye-witness to the events that he writes about: Procopius fits this criterion quite well. His presence at many major events gives him the needed qualification for recording the events of his time as accurately as possible.

His education would have involved the reading of the classical canon which may have included the Lucianic text mentioned above: “Thus his education will have been the standard secular education of the day, based on imitation of the classical authors and on the study of rhetoric.”¹⁶ Procopius in writing his histories proved his mastery of the classical style, but he also knew why he should write the history. Simply stated, not everyone who witnesses the great moments of his times records them. Procopius had the knowledge, but he also had the drive to write his history. Even when the witnesses were educated they did not write down the events; his understanding of what Lucian wrote illuminated the path that he should take and gave him confidence in his qualifications. The mixture of his education with his self-awareness of his own qualifications and his unique position within the imperial bureaucratic system made him, “ . . . a traditional writer and a product of his age.”¹⁷ He is, therefore, a

historian who knows his place in the continuity that is history and his duty to maintain that continuity.

His work, as stated before, was the product of his being an eye-witness. Because he could not be omnipresent he had a need for other sources of information. This means that he will have had to gain his information from sources to which he had access. These sources would have been Belisarius, other ranking officers and documents of the time. The documents would have been in Constantinople, but there may have been some that he himself had prepared for Belisarius in his capacity as ξύμβουλος. Official documents would be in the form of communiqués, orders, logistical reports,¹⁸ all of which would help to fill out the areas which he did not himself witness. For the *Bella* in particular “Most of Procopius’ information on the wars themselves comes from oral sources, when it did not spring from his own observations recorded at the time.”¹⁹ As was the custom of classical historians whom he followed he does not mention his sources²⁰, but this does not mean that we do not have some idea of his external sources. Quite possibly he made notes for subsequent use, maybe a journal, of the events that he witnessed.²¹

Without doubt Procopius had access to oral sources, two of which are suggested by Greatrex: Cabades(*BP*, I.xii.23) and Peranius(*BP*, I.xii.11-14).²² Both men would have been able to provide Procopius with information, Cabades from the Persian side and from Peranius from Iberia. Being at the imperial court would have given him access to these men and their knowledge: in fact they became Roman military commanders in areas where Procopius was also present. The information with which he was provided could then be worked into his historical works. His use of official documents has been mentioned earlier, but it is not

actually known if he did indeed use them. Procopius would have had access to such documents while in Constantinople, “ . . . ; but there is no doubt that archives were stored not only in the imperial capital but also at the headquarters of the *Comes Orientis* at Antioch.”²³ Since Procopius was in the East quite often with his general, Belisarius, he would also have had access to the archives there which may also have provided information for his works.²⁴

Procopius is the main historian of the reign of Justinian, but we must take care not to take his word over all other historians of his time. Though he is quite accurate for much of the *Bella* one must remember that, like Ammianus, he had a bias in favour of his commander. The *De Bello Persico* introduces the reader to some background history and then into the present situation in the East during the reign of Justinian. What brought Procopius's reliability into question was his scurrilous work, the *Anecdota*, which seemed to be in contradiction to what had been written in the other works. It has been noted that, “. . . we shall find that one of our difficulties in assessing the reliability of Procopius as a writer is that he consciously models himself on his great predecessors Herodotus and Thucydides.”²⁵ His stylistic choices have made it difficult to see his actual ideas through the models that he copies. However, when dealing with the *Bella* alone, we see that, “. . . within these limits he is generally admitted to be a remarkably good and trustworthy guide.”²⁶ Many scholars generally hold this view today, but again we must consider that, “It seems to have been composed as something of an official work, and therefore a good deal of it is at least outwardly biased in favour of Justinian and his efforts, though occasional criticisms rise to the surface.”²⁷ His work then would seem to be a fairly reliable source if the surface is broken

and the formal style is overcome.

Procopius can be checked with a few other sources that record the events of the campaigns in Persia between 527-532. These are not as comprehensive as those of Procopius, but do act as a check on his facts. The two most important are John Malalas, *Chronographia*, and Marcellinus Comes (and his continuator).²⁸ Malalas offers only a “. . . very circumstantial report of the campaign of 531, culminating in the battle at Callinicum, . . .”.²⁹ Malalas’s account differs from that of Procopius, but, of course it may be biased in its own way.³⁰ The latter of the other two, Marcellinus Comes, served under Justinian during the reign of Justin as *cancellarius*.³¹ His work appears to toe the party line and looks at the events from the official point of view.³²

Procopius’s position on the battlements at Daras during the battle in 530 gives him the unique position of being an eye-witness which the other two were not. As the adviser to Belisarius he may have had a hand in the correspondence (*BP*, I.xiv.1-12) between Belisarius and the Persian commander, the Mirranes³³, or at least he may have read the letters of both. The speech that Belisarius gave to his troops before the battle (*BP*, I.xiv.21-27) may not just be a classically styled pep-talk, but may actually be a close reflection of what was said since Procopius was present. This battle will be dealt within the section on the campaign. There is a divergence between Malalas and Procopius on the aftermath of the battle which makes the dissection of the event even more difficult, but it is most likely that Procopius’s version is the more correct.³⁴

Taking into account all that is known about Procopius one is able to see that his record of events is fairly well-balanced. His education gave him the ability he needed to work within

the imperial bureaucracy. He therefore was qualified to be appointed to work as the *ξύμβουλος* of Belisarius. His eye-witness position affected his content so that he can be seen as being more than just an imitator of classical style; is also an aid which helped to give his work credibility; further he made use of information from high ranking individuals who were in theatres of war at which he was not present. Comparison of his work with other historians, who recorded the same events that he wrote about, helps to give his version of the event and his ability as a historian credibility. He lived through times which were highly eventful, yet he managed to record them in a fairly even style in the *Bella*, though the *De Aedificiis* and *Anecdota* provide other problems with respect to his credibility.

THE EMPEROR

On August 1, 527, a short five months after his adoption by his uncle Justin who ruled from 518-527, Justinian came to rule the Roman empire with no co-emperor. This was to be the start of a new era for the empire which had been in slow decline over the past few centuries. This middle-aged man was to attempt what others felt to be a fanciful fantasy----the reuniting of the Western empire with the East, but the re-conquered territory was only to remain in Roman hands for a short time after his death in 565. This is the man that Procopius describes in his various works in different lights. Justinian is represented by Procopius in the *Bella*, i-viii, *De Aedificiis* and *Anecdota*. All of his must be examined to find the true character of the man and to understand the reasons behind the wars fought there during his reign.

Justinian was born in 482 in a small place known as Tauresium³⁵ in the province of Dardania, the same area from which Justin, his uncle, came. He, like his uncle, was not of an aristocratic background, but fortune had allowed Justin to gain power and thereby opened

up the way for Justinian. Justinian's main language was Latin and not Greek, the language of the eastern empire. While Justin was on the throne Justinian was able to gain an education that would not have previously been within his family's reach. Justin ensured that, because he had no children, his nephews were able to benefit from his positions as he rose in the imperial service, and as he moved up, so did his nephews, "In the course of his rise in the Imperial forces Justin saw to it that these nephews enjoyed the fruits of their uncle's success by having them educated and trained under his sponsorship."³⁶ It was during Justinian's education in Constantinople that he acquired a taste for theology and law.³⁷ In April of 527 his uncle made him his Caesar, which allowed for a smooth transition of power when Justin died five months later.

It has been said that Justinian had come to power before the traditional date given for his accession to the throne and had actually been the power behind the throne of Justin I, "Justinian himself ruled from 527 to 565, but in actual fact he had already been responsible for much of the imperial policy of his uncle Justin I (518-27)"³⁸ If this is true, then his rule would have begun in 518. This, though an intriguing idea, does not give enough credit to the rustic, but able Justin. Justinian, however, seemed early on to take an interest in ecclesiastical matters. He wrote a letter to the Pope in Rome, before attaining the rank of Caesar, on the schism between East and West, ". . . , and a very interesting hint of mildness appeared in a letter written to Pope Hormisdas in 520 by . . . Justinian, whose influence was felt from the first year of his uncle's reign."³⁹ This early interest in ecclesiastical matters would permeate his entire reign. Though he adhered to the Orthodox position, he was also an ardent protector of all Christians outside the boundaries of the Empire. This can be seen in the terms of the

treaty of 562 between Persia and the Empire.⁴⁰ His main goal was to bring the Monophysite⁴¹ east and the Orthodox back into communion with one another. This would further his vision of a politically, geographically and spiritually unified empire.

His orthodox belief was the opposite of that of his wife, Theodora, who was a supporter of the Monophysites. When Justinian ordered that the kingdom of Axum(in Æthiopia) was to be christianized, Theodora managed to get her Monophysite missionaries there first. The problem here is that the Orthodox side of this debate saw the actions of Theodora as an insult to them and the true faith. His wish to join the two sides in this theological debate together was an impossibility because neither side would budge.⁴² If his interference did anything it widened the rift between the two sides.

Justinian began his reign with a vigour that even Julius Caesar would have been proud of, and his campaigns were punctuated by quick victories that reclaimed territory that once belonged to the empire. The most important territory was that of Italy because after a period of sixty years Rome was back under the rule of its proper heirs. Africa and a small part of Spain had also returned to the imperial fold which led the young Procopius to record these events with energy and intensity at first. The strength and glory which the main players, Justinian and Belisarius, are shown to have at first, wanes as time and experience weighed upon the historian.⁴³ Thus the energy and excitement which Procopius showed at the beginning of the reign seems to drain away as the wars dragged on.

Justinian also inherited the problem that the empire had faced for centuries: the ever tenacious and present Persians. Throughout the period of his reign he was plagued by the Persians and their constant raids with only a few small lulls in the conflict.⁴⁴ The East was

an area of concern to Justinian, because it was a drain on troops he was hoping to send the West for deployment in his wars of re-conquest. Both wars were to drag on for many years, which left the East dangerously short of troops and, as had happened many times before, the Persians struck when they knew that the Romans were busy elsewhere. The Persian campaigns of 527-532 caused the empire several defeats, but also some victories that were needed to reaffirm the Roman's ability against the Persians. Under Belisarius, Justinian's rising star in the military, the Romans experienced a renewed vigour in war. His promotion to the command of the East, *Magister Militum per Orientem*⁴⁵, gave this man the freedom to react as he saw necessary to the bellicose Persians. He was the "outstanding general of the age, and one of the remarkable commanders of history."⁴⁶ This was the man responsible for the grand victory at Daras, 530, which helped to show the Persians that the Romans were still a power in the East. However, in the year following this victory he was defeated at Callinicum, but was a Pyrrhic victory for the Persians and one which paved the way for the *Eternal Peace*.⁴⁷

Justinian's policy in the East was one that many felt to be disgraceful because it looked as if the Romans were paying *tribute*, under the terms of the *Eternal Peace*, to the Persians, ". . . , Justinian agreed to pay an annual sum of 11,000 pounds of gold, which was supposedly in payment for the Caucasus defences, but which faintly smelled of tribute, however politely perfumed."⁴⁸ He had to have peace in the East so that he could continue his re-conquest of the empire from the barbarians in the West. The treaty of 532(*Eternal Peace*) was one that saw the Romans in a stronger position than they had been for years due to the successes by their generals and in particular that of Belisarius at Daras in 530. Nevertheless, this still did

not give them the upper hand at the negotiating table in 532. Belisarius went from his victory at Daras, to the quashing of the Nika insurrection and thence to the victories in Africa and Italy. The appointment of Belisarius was the best decision that Justinian had made for the military and empire because it seemed as if there was nothing that this man could not accomplish, but it was also his string of grand successes that caused Justinian to listen to the anti-Belisarian faction in Constantinople. This distrust had bad effects upon him in the later wars in Italy against Totila, "But Belisarius had changed as well as the situation in Italy. It seems that he had fallen into disgrace at court, and had been saved from punishment by the influence of his wife Antonina with the empress; . . ."⁴⁹

Justinian's plans were grand, but he neither considered problems that could arise in the East nor what would occur if the wars in the West became drawn-out. Justinian was a superb administrator and delegator which means, in short, that he rarely left Constantinople and never went on campaign. His lack of touch with his troops may have caused more than one blunder during his career. The foremost blunder was the total stoppage of pay to the *limitanei* in the East after the treaty of *Eternal Peace* had been signed with the Persians, "Under its terms (*Eternal Peace*) Justinian paid a substantial sum to the Persian king, but he offset it by suspending the pay of the garrison troops (*limitanei*) on the eastern frontier."⁵⁰ When this treaty fell apart eight years later the Persians were able to walk right over the frontier defences and sack Antioch, "The king (Persian) invaded Syria, swept aside the unpaid frontier troops, and sacked Antioch, the Syrian metropolis."⁵¹ This lack of foresight was based on a policy in the East which was ill-considered. It should have been one of constant vigilance, but instead he chose to accept a quick peace and remove troops and pay from the

limitanei. Justinian used negotiations to end the wars in the East so he could turn attention towards his main goal--the re-conquest of the West.

During his rule apparently there were only two conspiracies against his life, one in 548 and the other in 562. This would seem to indicate that he was either highly respected or that his power was total. His interest in law moved him to order a new codification of the laws and reworking of the collected works of the great Roman jurists to be undertaken. His choice of ministers and the legal reformers were people who remained completely loyal to him, "In the years when he was the power behind the throne Justinian had gathered around him a group of men upon whom he could rely for the conduct of affairs . . . he had a surprising ability to enlist the loyalty and even the devotion of men of high ability, some of whom might have been his rivals for power."⁵² They were people who were able to get the job done, but their methods were not always acceptable to the people.⁵³ This led to Nika insurrection of 532 when the two factions of the Hippodrome, Blues and Greens, rose as a combined faction and nearly ended Justinian's reign on Sunday, January 18. If it were not for Belisarius and Narses, the emperor would have been removed and Hypatius a nephew of the emperor Anastasius I(491-518 AD) would have been put on the throne by the mob:

"The revolt assumed alarming proportions, the capitol was in flames, and a nephew of the emperor Anastasius I was acclaimed Emperor and invested with the purple in the Hippodrome . . . By secretly negotiating with the Blues, Narses split the unity of the rebels, while Belisarius fell on the Hippodrome with some loyal troops and took the malcontents by surprise. A terrible massacre, costing thousands of lives, put an end to the revolt."⁵⁴

Belisarius had been victorious in the East in one of his major engagements, he had

protected his emperor during the Nika insurrection, and he had been victorious in Africa. However, his loyalty was questioned more than once. Justinian was a man who was easily swayed on the point of the loyalty of Belisarius by the general's detractors in Constantinople. After his swift victory over the Vandals in Africa Justinian gave him a "choice" of returning to the capital or staying in Africa (*BV*, IV.viii.4). This "choice" was given after Justinian had been informed that Belisarius was plotting against him after this victory, "Before long it was whispered that Belisarius was planning to set up an independent government in Africa."⁵⁵ Procopius recorded the spread of the slander as well,

“Ὁ μὲν οὖν Βανδιλικὸς πόλεμος ἐτελεύετα ὧδε. ὁ δὲ φθόνος, οἷα ἐν μεγάλῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι, ὥδαινεν ἤδη ἐς Βελισάριον, καίπερ αὐτῷ οὐδεμίαν παρέχοντα σκῆψιν. τῶν γὰρ ἀρχόντων τινὲς διέβαλον αὐτὸν ἐς βασιλέα, τυραννίδα αὐτῷ οὐδαμόθεν προστίχουσιν ἐπικαλοῦντες.” (*BV* IV.viii.1-2)

The suspicions against Belisarius were disproved during the ceremony in Constantinople when he returned, “No less than the defeated king, Belisarius, as he performed the rite of proskynesis, made it clear that he was a suppliant of the emperor.”⁵⁶ Fear of disloyalty was reignited after Belisarius disobeyed Justinian's orders on how to end the war in Italy.⁵⁷ Instead of making peace Belisarius ensured the surrender of the Ostrogoths and the recovery of Italy for the empire, but the recovery was not to remain peaceful because the Ostrogoths rose up under a new leader. After Belisarius's initial conquest of Italy there was a rumour that the Ostrogoths had offered him the throne of the west, “They (the Goths) created a most interesting situation by offering to surrender if Belisarius would allow himself to be proclaimed emperor of the West.”⁵⁸ Belisarius returned to Constantinople to a cooler reception than he had after his victory in Africa, but his stay did not last long, because he had

to go and deal with a new Persian invasion which ended the eight-year *Eternal Peace*.

Justinian's wars were costly and drained the treasury to a critical level so he had to remove pressure from the fiscus. He stopped paying the *limitanei* of the East. This measure of economy led to the East being overrun by the Persians in 540.⁵⁹ His ambition far outweighed his foresight and the depth of his purse. Though he did receive treasure from both the African and Italian campaigns, he had to spend this to replace the troops lost so as to keep up with the continuing wars. He had renewed problems with the Persians, but also he had to contend with Bulgars and Avars who were pushing their way over the Danube, "The defensive wars of Justinian were far less successful and at times were even humiliating. These wars were carried on with Persia in the east and with the Slavs and the Huns in the north."⁶⁰

Justinian was a good diplomat when it came to getting one group of enemies to ally with the Romans and fight against another group of enemies. This was a tactic he used on the Danubian frontier to try and help make up for his lack of sufficient troops. Instead of just using force:

"... Justinian had another way of dealing with the problems in the Danube basin. In accordance with the traditional Roman tactics, he sought to divide and rule. The Lombards and the Gepids were two Germanic people who were the subjects of the emperor's duplicitous diplomacy. The capture of Sirmium by his old allies the Gepids and their subsequent hostile acts had been hard to take, and in response to this and the threat posed by Theudebert the Frank Justinian settled the Lombards, under their king Audoin, in Pannonia."⁶¹

His ability to use one group against another gave the empire a breathing space. This policy was only successful in the short term. After his death the Lombards took Italy and the Slavs began to move into the Danubian provinces. The world that he had fought so hard to conquer

was inevitably divided up because of the state in which he had left the military and the imperial coffers.

In the *De Aedificiis* Justinian is portrayed as a great builder and re-fortifier of the empire and its *limes*, but a large number of the items listed by Procopius may not have been begun by the emperor. He did order the Hagia Sophia to be built for the greater glory of God (and his own personal aggrandizement no doubt). This project was begun after the Nika insurrection which left major areas of Constantinople burnt. Therefore Justinian had an opportunity that only Nero had enjoyed previously.⁶² He constructed or, as is more likely in many cases, repaired the *limes* at Daras for example. "He (Procopius) may even have attributed work to Justinian which Anastasius actually carried out; at the least, he exalted minor repairs into full-scale building."⁶³ There is no doubt that his repair of frontier forts and city walls helped to protect the possessions of the empire to some extent, but the lack of troops and their pay in the East⁶⁴ and along the Danubian frontiers meant that there was no way for the *limes* to be properly manned, "Justinian had built a powerful system of fortifications in Europe as well as in Asia, and in the Balkan peninsula he had erected a strong inner chain of forts behind the lines of defence on the Danube. But however good the fortifications, they were useless without sufficient troops to man them."⁶⁵ A fortification is only as good as the troops who are there to defend it.

Justinian was an emperor who wanted to recover the territories of the West, because it was rightly his to rule as the heir to the power of the Caesars. His attempts at first proved to be grand successes that heralded a new life and possibilities for the empire. The world would be under the command of one emperor, as it was destined to be by God, and one religion

would rule. The political and religious breach between the East and West were to be eradicated by his hand which was guided by God(according to him). Wars that had seemingly ended quickly sprouted up anew and lasted for lengthy periods of time which drained the treasury and caused hardship for his subjects. The Persians constantly hammered the East as the Romans were busy in the West(as had been the custom from the beginning of Romano-Persian relations) and this made the position of the empire more difficult. When Germans and Slavs pressed the Danube frontier, it seemed as if all would fall apart, but through skilled diplomacy, peace treaties purchased for high prices and by excellent generals a semblance of peace was achieved.

His reign started the metamorphosis of the ancient world into the medieval, but it left an indelible mark on our own society. The *Codex Iustinianus*, the *Digest*, *Novels* and *Institutions* have given us the strength of law that structures our lives. This is the accomplishment that defined his reign. On the other hand his attempts at reconciling the East and West theologically failed and even widened the chasm between the two sides of a debate that is only now beginning to close. In his reign an ambitious imperial reunification was attempted, but after his death, November 14, 565, many of his gains began to disappear. His attempts and small victories earn him the title of *Last Roman Emperor*. The emperors after him are Byzantine, but still call themselves Roman. As Ostrogorsky aptly writes of Justinian's reign,

“ For the last time the old imperium displayed its full powers, and experienced its last great revival, both politically and culturally. . . . Justinian had meant his reign to inaugurate a new era, but it really marked the close of a great age. . . . ”⁶⁶

THE CAMPAIGN

When Justinian came to power in 527, he had great dreams of re-conquering the West, but he had to deal with the old enemies of the East.⁶⁷ Hostilities had broken out earlier due to an insult to Cabades(488-496, 498-502), the Persian king, and his successor Chosroes(502-529), by Justin and Justinian in 518. Cabades had suggested to Justin that Chosroes be adopted by him so that Chosroes's succession to the Persian throne would be made secure.⁶⁸ A similar arrangement had been made during the reign of the Persian king Isdigerdes I(399-420).⁶⁹ The emperor Arcadius(395-408) asked Isdigerdes to adopt his infant son and be his protector(the future Theodosius II(408-450))(BP, I.ii.7-10). Arcadius's arrangement served to create a long stretch of peace and good will between the two empires. Cabades's request was rejected because Proclus, an imperial counsellor, warned Justin that this adoption would prove fatal to the empire.⁷⁰ He explained that if Justin adopted Chosroes legally, then he had legal claim to become the next Roman emperor(BP, I.xi.11-18)

Whether or not this would have occurred is debatable, because Cabades was trying to ensure that the best of his sons, albeit the youngest, would take the throne after his death(BP I.xi.2-6). It was not a plot to conquer the Romans through subterfuge. Ultimately Justin decided to adopt Chosroes in a way that was appropriate for a barbarian: by force of arms(BP I.xi.22). The adoption failed due to the suggested type of adoption which offended Cabades and Chosroes. Cabades remembered this insult and he wished to go to war immediately, but was stopped by problems elsewhere(BP I.xii). Difficulties developed in the Transcaucasus region between smaller kingdoms that had leanings towards the Romans or the Persians. As with most high tension situations between these two powers no easy solution was found and

war broke out. The conflict between these two great powers was taking place in Lazica and Iberia. These areas remained a constant sore point for both for many years to come.⁷¹ Apart from these problems there was the old problem of Armenia which again led to conflicts in this area, but the main point of interest here is the campaigning that took place in the Roman provinces of Mesopotamia and Osroene.

Fighting here took place in the reign of Cabades, but it was not for the adoption insult; the issue was supposedly over the money that Justin and later Justinian had refused to give the Persians for keeping up the defences at the Caspian gates.⁷² The first battle took place just after Justinian had become emperor and Belisarius had been named *dux Mesopotamiae*.⁷³ Belisarius's first objective, as laid down by Justinian, was to build a new border fortress town at a site called Mindouos in 527. Nevertheless, the actual battle occurred in 528. No one knows the exact location of this fort⁷⁴, but Procopius places it on the border with Persia, “. . . ἐν ἀριστερᾷ ἐς Νίσιβιν ἰόντι.”(*BP*, I.xiii.2) A fort so close to the border, near the main Roman frontier defence position Daras, would have ended up encircling the main Persian defence point of Nisibis. To allow this to occur would have been disastrous for the Persians because they would have lost their control of Nisibis and its surrounding territory.

After the Persians had sent a warning to Justinian not to continue building there or else they would intervene a battle ensued because the latter ignored the warning(*BP*, I.xiii.4-5). Belisarius did not have sufficient troops to fend off a major attack; Justinian, therefore, sent another force under the command of Coutzes and Bouzes, two brothers from Thrace, who, as Procopius says, “. . . τῶν ἐν Λιβάνῳ στρατιωτῶν ἦρχον τότε”(*BP*, I.xiii.5). The battle began after both sides had been drawn up against one another and the Persians gained the upper

hand and secured a decisive victory. The loss that the Romans incurred meant not only the loss of a possible fort(a large amount of construction had been completed), but many men were captured including one of the two commanders, Coutzes, from Lebanon. The description of the battle by Procopius is meagre at best. There are a few unanswered questions and not much to go on.⁷⁵

After this defeat one would have expected that Justinian would remove Belisarius from command and sent him elsewhere in a lower position, but instead he gave him the command of all of the East(*Magister Militum per Orientem*)⁷⁶(*BP*, i.xiii.9). After being raised to this position he and his troops were sent to Daras to prepare an expedition into Persian territory, but this did not occur because the Persians came to Daras. The battle that the Romans fought here led to a much needed victory for the Romans(who had suffered a string of defeats). The successes bolstered their confidence in their ability to prevail over the Persians. Roman troop strength was approximately 25, 000 while the Persians numbered 40,000 on the first day of the engagement and 50,000 on the following day(the extra troops came from Nisibis). The Persians effectively outnumbered Belisarius two to one. Nevertheless, he still managed a stunning victory.⁷⁷ The Roman command consisted of Belisarius and his second-in-command, Hermogenes, *Magister Officiorum*, in the centre, Bouzes(mentioned previously) and Pharas the Erulian on the far left, Sunicas and Aigan who were Huns on the near left, Simmias and Ascan, also Huns, on the near right and finally on the far right John, Cyril, Marcellus, Germanus and Dorotheus. Facing them was the Persian under the command of Perozes, with the rank of Mirranes, in their centre and his two subordinates Pityaxes on his right and Baresmanas the one-eyed on his left.

One of the largest problems with studying this battle is the positioning, not of the troops, but of the Roman defensive trenches.⁷⁸ There are two theories on this question(see two attached diagrams)⁷⁹ and no consensus has been achieved so far. The problem is with the lack of detail given by Procopius in his description of the trenches (*BP*, I.xiii.13-15). The main question is whether or not the central section projected outward like a salient or inward to act as a pen for the advancing Persians. The former is followed here because it seems to be the more logical of the two. It would keep the Persians at bay and allow the Roman infantry centre to advance a little, hit the enemy with arrows and withdraw quickly without being pursued. The trench system protected the infantry from being overrun by the Persian cavalry. The trench system did have pathways across which would allow for the near left and right cavalry units to move to assist the other wing swiftly if such a need occurred.

The troops were positioned just a short distance from the southern gates of Daras with the Romans setting their cavalry on the wings and the infantry in the centre. A small hill on the Roman left was used to great tactical advantage the next day. The Romans concealed a small cavalry force hidden behind the hill under the command of Pharas. The Persian army set up directly across from them in “. . . its customary threefold formation, . . . ”⁸⁰, but only one small skirmish occurred on the first day(*BP*, I.xiii.25-28) on which they arrayed themselves against one another(plus two one-on-one combats(*BP*, I.xiii.29-39) On the next day, after the Persians had received the 10,000 troops from Nisibis, both sides arranged themselves in the same way. However, Perozes kept troops in reserve. These troops were to be a rotational unit that moved in and replaced tired troops. This would ensure that the current forward troops could move off and rest. Thus, the Romans would always fight “fresh” troops⁸¹,

“οὐχ ἅπαντας μέντοι Πέρσας ὁ Μιρράνης ἀντίους τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἡμίσεις ἔστησε, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ὀπίσθεν μένειν εἶασεν. οἱ δὲ τοὺς μαχομένους ἐκδεκόμενοι ἔμελλον ἀκμῆτες ἐπιθήσεσθαι τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ὥπως αἰεὶ ἐκ περιτροπῆς ἅπαντες μάχωνται.”(BP, I.xiv.29-30).

He also kept the Persian “special forces unit”(the *Immortals*) in reserve so that he could throw them in when the time seemed right(BP, I.xiv.30).

Before the armies took up their positions on the second day, letters were exchanged between Perozes and Belisarius that were meant to try to avoid battle, but instead they turned out to be insulting messages aimed at breaking the spirit of the other(BP, I.xiv.1-12). Procopius, as adviser, may have seen the letters that were exchanged as he would have been in Belisarius’s headquarters in Daras. On the next day, before battle, the commanders of each army gave the customary speeches to their own troops to prepare them for battle. Belisarius noted the worthlessness of the Persian infantry and that the Romans could win if they listened to their commanders and kept order(BP, I.xiv.21-27). Perozes told his troops that they would be victorious over the inferior Romans, whom they had often defeated, and the Romans demonstrated their inferiority by the way in which they hid behind a trench system(BP, I.xiv.13-19). Then both sides arrayed themselves and prepared for battle.

When the troops were arrayed this way, the battle began on the Roman far left with a lightning charge by the Persians that pushed the forces of Bouzes back. As the Persians advanced, the force of six-hundred cavalry under Sunicas and Aigan turned and hit their side, and then the force under Pharas came down the hill in a large cloud of dust that obscured his numbers and attacked their rear.⁸² Having been hit in the rear and the flank they began to turn and retreat, and as they did this, the troops that they had initially displaced turned to

attack(*BP*, I.xiv.38-43). According to Procopius the number of Persian dead was three thousand or more, but he says nothing of the Roman casualties. He does, however, state that the Romans did not pursue the Persians, but took up their positions again, as did those Persians who had successfully made it back to their own lines. It was in the next attack that most of the fighting took place, and the Persians aimed their attack at the Roman far right.⁸³ Baresmanas with his troops and the *Immortals* charged the position of John, Cyril Marcellus, Germanus and Dorotheus which broke and the Romans withdrew. As the Persian left advanced and pushed the Roman far right back, the force of six-hundred, under Simmas and Ascan, and some of Belisarius's men from the centre slammed into the Persians and cut their advancing movement in half. The larger part of this was on the right side of Simmas and Ascan's force that pinned it between them and Belisarius's men, but when the troops of the far right that had withdrawn observed this, they turned and began to attack.

In addition to this the troops under Sunicas and Aigan joined in the assault. The Romans were effectively cutting off the Persians. Persian order was thrown to the wind when, to make matters worse, Sunicas killed Baresmanas's standard bearer and then Baresmanas himself. The sight of the standard falling to the ground caused greater panic among the troops. This panic caused the total rout of the Persian force(*BP*, I.xiv.44-50). As the Roman troops tried to pursue the routed Persians they were held back by Belisarius and Hermogenes, because they did not wish them to be caught off guard if the Persians decided to turn and attack.

After this battle the Romans were left in a stronger position than they had been in for a long while, which was a shock to the Persians,

“The success of the Romans in the field was their first in the east since the war of 421-22. It was a remarkable triumph, and one which would never again be matched during Justinian’s reign. Procopius claims the Persians lost half their army in the battle, though some allowance must be made for exaggeration.”⁸⁴

This was Belisarius’s first victory and set the stage for the rest of his career that was to be positive for the most part. There was further fighting in Persarmenia to the North, but Belisarius did not again take the field until 531 at Callinicum. Before this there was an abortive attempt at negotiating for peace in 530, “After the conspicuous defeat which his army had experienced, Kobad(Cabades) was not disinclined to negotiate a peace, but at the last moment the persuasions and promises of fifty thousand Samaritans induced him to break off negotiations on a trifling pretext.”⁸⁵ Both the Romans and the Persians employed Arab tribes(Saracens) along their common border: the Romans employed the Ghassanids under Arethas(al-Harith)⁸⁶ and the Persians employed the Lakhmids under Alamoundaras(Al-Mundhir). The Persians were allied to the better of the two tribal confederations and their leader was the better of the two as well. Alamoundaras became a bane to the Roman East and the Romans never stopped him until nature did what no Roman army could.

The Persian campaign of 531 took them into Roman territory by an unexpected route that was suggest by Alamoundaras(*BP*, I.xvii.30-39). It was to be an advance into Euphratesia and Syria where the Roman defences were not in a high state of preparedness as they were in Mesopotamia and Osrhoene. “Accordingly, in the year 531 hostilities were resumed, and at the suggestion of the Saracen Alamoundaras fifteen thousand Persian cavalry under Azareth, instead of invading Mesopotamia, crossed the Euphrates at Circesium, with a view

to invading Syria.”⁸⁷ With the augmentation of the Persian army by the Lakhmids their force grew to about 20,000. An attack on Syria would yield great rewards if the Persians could reach Antioch. Alamoundaras had raided this area in 529,⁸⁸ which is why he knew about the low state of preparedness of the Roman defences. Their entire invasion force was made up of cavalry that would allow for maximum blitzkrieg ability. As time went on and Roman forces moved in, the Persian campaign began to grind to a halt(also due to problems with investing cities) so they began to retreat, “The Persians moved on Antioch and were intercepted by Belisarius in April 531 at Callinicum. The battle there went against the great general,”⁸⁹

A withdrawal of the Persian force is what Belisarius wanted, for he saw no need to attack; there was nothing to gain in open conflict at this time, but others in the high command of the East wanted a battle to exact revenge on the Persians and Alamoundaras. The battle they desired took place by the city of Callinicum on the Euphrates it ended as a Pyrrhic victory for the Persians, “They(Persians) defeated the Romans at Callinicum on the Euphrates, but suffered so heavily themselves that they fell back into their own country and the Persian commander was disgraced.”⁹⁰(*BP*, I.xviii.50-56) They joined battle on the opposite bank of the Euphrates across from the city itself.⁹¹ The date for this engagement is April 19, but the actual events that pushed Belisarius to engage with the enemy when he did not want to have never been satisfactorily understood. Procopius stated that his troops and the other commanders forced him to fight, wanting revenge on the Persians and still riding high on the victory of the previous year, so that he was forced into a situation with which he was not comfortable.⁹²

The battle itself was on unfavourable ground, open and rising slightly on the Roman right, and the Romans had a mixed force of infantry and cavalry while the Persians were all cavalry. Belisarius set his lines perpendicular to the Euphrates with the infantry, under Peter, one of Justinian's bodyguard, on the left(closest to the river), himself in the centre, Ascan next to him, a unit of Isaurians, and then Arethas and the Saracens. His best troops were in the centre; whereas, at Daras, his strongest point had been his flanks. This mistake was fatal because the Persian general Azarethes⁹³ placed Alamoundaras on his left, across from the Roman Saracens, while he took the centre and right flank. The battle opened with both sides firing volleys of arrows. At this point Procopius describes the types of archers and bows and arrows that either side used(*BP*, I.xviii.31-34). After this the Persian left, under Alamoundaras, pushed into the Roman right and caused a rout of Arethas and the Isaurians, but Ascan and his troops remained defending themselves as best they could until Ascan was killed. This caused his troops to lose heart and be overrun which meant that the high ground was in the hands of the Persians and their allies. Azarethes and his forces moved against Belisarius in the centre, Sunicas next to him and John and pushed them back towards the Euphrates. Alamoundaras continued to wheel and push the Romans back until he joined up with Azarethes and both of them had the Romans pinned with their backs to the river and some Roman troops had to swim to a small island just off the shore. Belisarius knew that he was now safe from encirclement and prepared to better defend himself his and troops as best he could(*BP*, I.xviii.44). He did order all remaining cavalry to dismount and act as infantry to be able to form close formations for better defence(*BP*, I.xviii.43).

With night coming on the Persians withdrew, not making any progress against the Romans,

and the remaining Romans either swam or crossed over on small cargo skiffs(*BP*, I.xviii.49-50). The next day the Persians despoiled the dead on the field and marched off, but their dead were numerous as well. Boats sent from Callinicum removed Belisarius and the troops on the island. This battle had not done much for either side and the campaign that had sparked it was not a great success for the Persians. Justinian investigated Belisarius's actions in this engagement and then relieved him of his command of the East. Belisarius was replaced as *Magister Militum per Orientem* with Sittas(*BP*, I.xxi.2-3). Justinian may have removed him for another reason—to go west and conquer Africa, “But when Procopius suggests that Justinian deliberately allowed Belisarius to think he had been recalled when really he was wanted for the Vandal war is going too far, especially as the Vandal war narrative implies that the African expedition had not been long in planning when it was sent out in early summer, 533, . . . ”⁹⁴ Azarethes, according to Procopius, was stripped of his rank and counted as unworthy by Cabades(*BP*, I.xviii.56).

INTERPRETATION

After the battle at Callinicum Hermogenes was sent to the Persians to ask for peace negotiations to take place, but they were rejected and Cabades sent another force into Roman territory. This time they were in the north around Martyropolis, not far from Amida. The Persians laid siege to Martyropolis, but were kept at bay, however due to the unpreparedness of the place it would not have held out for long(*BP*, I.xxi.7-8). A Roman army under Sittas advanced as far as Attachas, 100 stades from the besieged city. Procopius states that the siege was raised because of the defection of a Persian spy, who turned against the Persians, after Justinian had paid him a large sum of money(*BP*, I.xxi.13-14). The besiegers were thrown into panic when this spy told the Persian commander that an army of Huns were on their way to aid the Romans which was a false story, but it worked well. It was at this time that Cabades died, September 13, 531, and when the commander heard this news he removed the invading force from Roman territory(*BP*, I.xxi.23-28).

Chosroes gained the throne of the Persians, but according to Greatrex his position was not completely secure, so he agreed to negotiate a peace treaty with the Romans. The treaty had no time set for it, so Justinian considered it an "Eternal Peace," but it was a peace that cost the Romans dearly. It was agreed that the Romans would pay 11,000 pounds of gold to the Persians for guarding the Caspian Gates. Some saw this payment as buying peace for the empire. This did not sit well with some because it put the empire in the position of "vassal" to the Persians. Justinian accepted this "buy off" so that he could continue his aggressive advance westwards. In truth there was no real policy for the East except to keep it quiet any way possible so that the rest of the empire could be re-conquered. Justinian should have paid

more attention to the East and this would have allowed him to react to the changing situations there better and to continue his westward movements a little more unhindered.

The major mistake made by Justinian was trying to use his thinly spread army in too many places at once and not providing enough troops and supplies to his commanders. Persia began to attack the East in 540, destroying the “Eternal Peace,” and drew forces from the West who were attempting to deal with the Gothic uprising in Italy. Justinian, for all his intentions to recapture the West, did nothing for the East except to re-fortify certain areas along the Persian border.

Justinian only thought of capturing the West and restoring the Pax Romana to the world; he would rule this newly pacified world from Constantinople. If all had gone according to his plans maybe he would have returned power back to the Romans and redirected the path that the western world has taken. The East to him was an irritating distraction that needed to be taken care of in any way possible . . . buying the Persians off was the easiest way. Had he used a more conservative approach he might have taken the West and defended the East, but he moved too fast for his resources. As Justinian looked back to the past glory of the empire for direction and he allowed his enemies to take advantage of him. Another problem area was the Balkans, which he also tried to defend by building fortifications, but again, --a fortification is useless without troops to man it.

Procopius saw the world in which he lived go from the high point of re-conquest to the low of prolonged warfare. At first it seemed to him, as is portrayed in his work, that the empire would be rebuilt as the emperor wanted. His attachment to Belisarius gave him a point of view that is enviable and was necessary for understanding the events that occurred. He had

access to the top soldiers and decision makers of his day. These acquaintances aided him in presenting the most accurate picture of the reign of Justinian. The East was the place where he received his first taste of Roman victory. This experience set the tone of his *De Bello Persico*. This book was an encomium of his hero Belisarius in book one, but book two, which covers 540-549, shows a more sceptical image of Belisarius and Justinian.

As the main historian for this reign he recorded Justinian's attempts at restoration and their failure. In the *De Aedificiis* Justinian is praised for his grand building schemes and re-fortification projects, but this is counter-balanced by the bitter vituperations that flows from the very soul of Procopius in the *Anecdota*. When we take his works as a whole, they seem to form a continuous pattern in which one is able to see the characteristics of Justinian, Theodora, Belisarius and the many other figures. The two books he writes on the Persian campaigns set the tone for the rest of the *Bella* and the *De Aedificiis*.

Belisarius, had more pressure on him than any other then because of his position. He was the commander in the field. However, he had answer to a man who knew nothing of the field and how to run an army or a campaign. The victories of Belisarius were proof that his skill in warfare was excellent, but his successes gained him the disapprobation of the emperor. His detractors in Constantinople spoke to the emperor of the secret ambitions and plans that his general had in mind, but in actuality Belisarius was as loyal as Agrippa was to Octavian. When Belisarius was given the proper resources, he was able to win amazing victories such as his first at Daras, but due to Justinian's doubts and over-extension of his forces Belisarius did not always have what he needed.

If we take part of Procopius's observations about Belisarius's character to be true, namely

that he could be swayed easily, it is understandable why he was persuaded to engage the Persians at Callinicum. Had he been able to sway the troops and keep a stronger grip of his officers he may have avoided the battle and defeat. This having been accomplished the Romans would have been in a better position during negotiations. Supposedly his removal from office was not a punishment, but it was rather meant to enable him to command the force that was to recapture Africa from the Vandals.

In looking at what was accomplished in the first round of campaigning in the East it can be said that Justinian got exactly what he wanted, or so he thought, by gaining peace . . . even a bought one. This allowed him to carry out his plans in the West, but in doing this he did not actually end as the victor because he did not remain vigilant in the East and therefore conflict arose again. This can be seen in the light of centuries of Romano-Persian relations: when one side is busy elsewhere the other strikes. Justinian's early successes in the West were later overturned and only won back at a high cost. The lack of resources on the eastern frontier was part of that cost. His legacy was to haunt the next few emperors who had to deal with these unsolved problems.

CHAPTER III: FINAL ANALYSIS

Both of the previous chapters have laid out the historians, emperors, campaigns and an interpretation of the material. This chapter will bring all of that together to compare and contrast the figures and campaigns and their success or failure. What is intended to be shown is that these figures have more in common than not. Though there are more than two hundred years separating the people and places, there is a similarity between the historians and their works. In their works the actions of the main players of the times are recorded and from those actions our world unfolded.

Ammianus and Procopius have written about the actions of the major people and happenings of their times. What makes them unique is that they interacted with the key figures and participated in the events.¹ They were affected by similar continuities in history. Both men were from the East and received an education that included the Greek model of historiography.² This one fact is not special nor exceptional except that it had a particular effect on both men.

As was discussed in the sections on Ammianus and Procopius, there may have been a link with a small work by Lucian, (*Πῶς δὲ Ἱστορίαν συγγράφειν*),³ which may have been the catalyst for their respective histories. His simple work outlines what it takes to write a good history . . . not just rhetorically, but how to view events correctly and how to order them in a way which brings the past to life. The qualifications that should be possessed by a historian, spelled out in Lucian's work, seems to have sparked an awareness in these two men. The positions of Ammianus and Procopius gave them qualifications required by Lucian for prospective historians.

Ammianus and Procopius were inspired by their acquaintance with the most important figures of the day. Ammianus saw the figure of Julian who wanted to save the pagan faith and the old Roman ways, and knew that he was a man who was made for greatness. Julian was as flawed as every other man, but his ability to defeat his enemy swiftly and harshly meant that he was feared by the barbarians of the West, which helped to keep them under control. The legions knew that this was a man who was worthy to be followed, even in the midst of the worst battle, and who lived as they did.⁴ If the campaign of 363 had succeeded the Persians would have respected and feared him like the western barbarians did.

Procopius knew that the man to whom he had been attached was to command respect and bring victories to the empire. From his first victory at Daras to his campaigns in Italy Procopius was with him, observing the great skill of this man.⁵ In writing about Justinian he recorded the life of a man who was an excellent administrator and organizer. Men chosen by Justinian were of great skill and ability. In a world where high office was held only in short stints, Justinian's appointees remained in office, for the most part, for the duration of his reign.⁶ The ambition of both Justinian and Belisarius fuelled the push for the West and the re-conquest of the empire . . . Justinian for the empire and his own glory and Belisarius for his emperor.

These two historians held similar ideals of empire which meant that the Romans were to be the supreme power in the world with all other nations bowing before them. Their respective emperors were attempting to restore the honour and power the empire had formerly possessed. Julian had tamed the western barbarians⁷ and then planned to do the same to the Persians after he had dealt with Constantius. By hitting the barbarians and the

Persians hard he hoped to show that Rome was again in the ascendant position. Had his campaign in 363 been successful the power of Rome would have been secure. Justinian was attempting to restore what had been once Roman territory so that the Romans could once again be the world superpower orchestrating the *Pax Romana*. His attempts were valiant and at first successful, but the initial easy successes were replaced by long campaigns of re-conquest in the already “re-conquered” territories.⁸ The East was an area of secondary consideration for Justinian, but it turned out to be a third front that consumed large amounts of men and supplies needed in the West. The Danubian frontier also caused great difficulties for Justinian in the same way, which meant that he had a four front war in actuality.⁹

The Persians and the campaigns against them constitute a large portion of historians works.¹⁰ Persian armies would have been a familiar spectre that loomed over both their worlds since both were from the East; Antioch and Caesarea respectively. Their participation in the eastern campaigns gave them the material to record, but their roots, which were in the East, gave them the understanding of the East: socially and politically. Growing up with the threat of Persian invasions led them to learn about their enemy and this knowledge was, later on, incorporated in their works. Their knowledge of the Persians is not perfect, but it is considerable.

Being with the soldiers and in the *castra* gave them a substantial source of information.¹¹ Understanding the military from the ground up allows for better insights into campaigning. Ammianus would have had a closer relationship with the junior ranks because he was a soldier in the *castra*. Procopius had a closer relationship with the upper echelons, but he would still have had some contact with the common soldier. He saw battles first-hand which

allowed him to understand the confusion that occurs.¹² Ammianus had first hand experience in battles which would have given him a better knowledge along with long lasting nightmares that haunted his memory and made his battle narratives vivid.¹³

These two men also saw the flaws in their leaders that appeared in their works, or in the case of Procopius in a separate work.¹⁴ Ammianus saw the possibilities that were stored within Julian if he heeded the warnings of his senior military advisers, but he did not heed them and this flaw is pointed out as one travels through Ammianus's work. He also shows that Julian did not always have ideas fully formed before he implemented them. The best example of this is the Persian campaign.¹⁵ Julian did not stop to think if it was the right thing to do at that time, but only felt that it must be done because he deemed it to be right. Procopius sees the people around him in a very different light in most of his works. In the works of Procopius Justinian and Belisarius are generally shown in a favourable light. It is left to the reader to discover their shortcomings from the facts presented. The *Anecdota*, where Justinian is shown as a demon rather than a man, belongs more to the genre of invective than that of history.¹⁶

The campaigns that were recorded by these two men represent similar problems in the East, but different ways of dealing with them. Julian and his campaign show the old Roman way of dealing with an enemy. The Romans attempt either to defeat the enemy in open battle or to present a show of force that frightens the enemy into submission.¹⁷ Justinian, on the other hand, preferred negotiations when he was able to because the West was of greater interest to him. Negotiating was an art form that Justinian saw as a most useful tool in dealing with the Persians because it appeared less costly in men and money.¹⁸ Julian and Justinian were

men who were similarly ambitious and both wanted the empire to regain the glory and honour they thought it deserved. However, Julian was a man of action who led his troops into battle and lived with them.

The overambitious plans of both the emperors caused their difficulties and, in Julian's case, his death.¹⁹ These problems were then passed on to their successors. Julian had stripped the West of many troops to ensure that he would be victorious, but while the troops were away the barbarians began to reach out and test the waters once again. Justinian left Justin II (565-578) an empire severely weakened and open to attack on all fronts, and the financial state made matters worse.²⁰ If both of these emperors had thought about the implications of their plans, they might have taken a more cautious approach to their campaigns. Justinian should not have left the East relatively open after the "Eternal Peace"²¹ of 532 was signed and Julian should not have moved such a large number of the troops to the East for an uncertain campaign, leaving the West vulnerable.

Ammianus and Procopius were men who lived in transitional periods which had had an effect on the world until this day. Julian was a pagan of the strongest type, but with him died the last opportunity for paganism to challenge Christianity. This last moment of paganism served to temper Christianity as a blacksmith tempers iron. The new religion took centre stage in the religious life of the empire which meant that the old Roman ways were officially replaced. By the time of Justinian Christianity was no longer battling pagans, but was turning upon itself attacking heretical sects.²² Justinian's support of the Orthodox stream of Christianity did not sit well with the eastern Monophysite church. It did endear him to the Pope in Rome, but did nothing except cause him problems in Syria and Egypt.

Justinian also heralded the end of the antique and the start of the medieval world.²³ This closing of the past ensured that the West would begin to grow in new ways that would lead to the recreation of civilization in a new direction, while still taking needed sustenance from Rome. Justinian's legal project, which was swiftly completed by John, a former *quaestor*²⁴, Tribonian and others forms the basis of the Western world's legal system. The *Codex Iustinianus*, the *Digest*, the *Novels* and *Institutions* formed the greatest gift that Justinian gave to the world and is the reason why he is known as "the Great". After Justinian's death in 565 the West was slowly regained by the barbarians. Parts of Italy, his most prized reconquest, were lost to the Lombards²⁵ who began the metamorphosis of Italy from the ancient to the medieval and finally the modern state. His successors, with his Arab allies, eventually crushed the Persians, but this opened the way for those same Arabs, converted to Islam, to conquer the East. All of these changes began the transformation of civilization into the world in which we now live.

The historian must not only be able to record events, which anyone can do, but must also understand the events and the reasons why they need to be recorded. Both Ammianus Marcellinus and Procopius of Caesarea were men who possessed this ability. History was made by the men under whom they served and it is extremely fortunate for us, in the last years of the twentieth century, to have the works of these two men. Their lives were influenced by the events around them, but they were able to withdraw themselves from the events of their times so that they could record what they had witnessed.

Though they are not completely free of bias, it must be remembered that they were men who were swayed by the rhetoric of the day as many of us are. They managed to record their

times in a manner that enables us to understand not only events, but also the individual players in those events. In accomplishing this they also gave us a glimpse of who they were which in turn allows us to understand their works. W. B. Yeats in his poem *Fallen Majesty*,²⁶ captures the idea of what happened to the Roman empire in late antiquity. The poet sees what the empire had been and what it had become as time passed. This is similar to how both historians saw the empire, as it was and as it had become. They provide insight into the life of a declining empire from a personal point of view brought about by their participation in the events.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER I: AMMIANUS AND THE EAST IN AD 363

1. E. A. Thompson, *The Historical work of Ammianus Marcellinus*, Groningen, Bouma's Boekhuis, 1969, p.10.
2. Libanius, *Epistles* 234.
3. John Matthews, *The Roman Empire of Ammianus*, London, Gerald Duckworth & Company Ltd., 1989, p.47.
4. G. A. Crump, *Ammianus Marcellinus as a Military Historian*, Wiesbaden, Einzelschriften, 1975, p.1.
5. A *Curialis* is a member of the *Curia*, a town council, which was the intermediary between the people and the imperial government. For a good introduction to this topic see the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*.
6. A *Protector Domesticus* was part of a *schola* of officers that were used for various positions(e.g. as Ammianus was or in the Imperial bodyguard). The length of service that a man of this rank served is questionable as is how some of the appointees got their postings. For a discussion on the *Protectores* see A. H. M. Jones, *The Later Roman Empire*, pp.636-640, John Matthews, *The Roman Empire of Ammianus*, pp.74-80, G. A. Crump, *Ammianus Marcellinus as a Military Historian*, pp.6-9 and N. J. E. Austin, *Ammianus on Warfare*, pp.7-9.
7. R. T. Rowell, "Ammianus Marcellinus, Soldier Historian of the Late Roman Empire", Princeton, *Seiple Lectures, First Series, 1961-1965*, p.284.
8. N. J. E. Austin, *Ammianus on Warfare*, Brussels, Coll. Latomus, 1979, p.19.
9. Matthews, p.7.
10. Sallust(86-35BC) may have also been on the reading list for the young Ammianus, which would give him a taste of a soldier's history, in the sense that Sallust had been on campaign with Julius Caesar(49BC) and fought in Africa in 46BC. The influence of Thucydides on him would have been quite noticeable to Ammianus as it is to us today. What Ammianus was to become was influenced not only by the great Greek historians, but the Latin authors as well.

11. "The most important historian of the fourth century is Ammianus Marcellinus, a broadminded pagan, whose *Res gestae*, written in Latin, was conceived as a continuation of Tacitus(only books 14-31 for the period 353-378 have survived).", John Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State*, tr. Joan Hussey, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1956, p.22.
12. Lucian's work *Πῶς δεῖ Ἱστορίαν συγγράφειν* is mentioned by Matthews, Naudé, Austin and Sabbah, but they miss a passage which seems to fit the historian quite well. This is section 39 which appears in my text. It lays out the qualifications needed by a historian, which Ammianus seems to have acquired over his lifetime. Either this is an oversight on their part or the passage is overly obvious to all but me.
13. Austin, p.17.
14. Crump, pp.29-30.
15. It is important to note that when a historian claims to be totally honest and truthful it may not be the case. Two main examples of this would be The *Historia Augusta* which is from the 4th century AD. It is a work of notorious dishonesty, but that does not stop it from providing much truth. Another example is closer to home within the confines of this work: the *Anecdota* of Procopius of Caesarea. This tabloidesque work is enjoyable on its own, but not to be trusted. When it is joined with the rest of Procopius's works it can be used as a counterbalance.
16. Magnus of Carrhae was a participant on the campaign of 363, but not much is known about him or his position. He may have been the tribune who is mentioned in a summary by the historian Malalas. Matthews has a discussion on this topic(*The Roman Empire of Ammianus*)pp.163-164. Zosimus wrote the *Historia Nova*, late 5th century, which covers the period from Augustus to ca.410, but it is a work that is heavily based on previous writers. He uses Eunapius to a great extent, another historian with links to Julian, and follows the opinions of the historians he uses. An excellent version of this author's text is by Francois Paschoud(Budé, 1971-89) in 5 Vols.
17. Crump, p.27.
18. Thompson, p.28.
19. *Ibid*, p.79.
20. Matthews, p.19.

21. See Robert Browning, *The Emperor Julian*(1976)p.225, G. W. Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate*(1978)p.6, Matthews, *The Roman Empire of Ammianus*(1989)pp.112-114, p.469.
22. Averil Cameron, *The Later Roman Empire*, London, Fontana Press, 1993, p.91.
23. Crump, p.32.
24. G. W. Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate*, London, Gerald Duckworth & Company Ltd, 1978, p.23.
25. *Ibid*, p.24.
26. J. Bidez, *La Vie de l'Empereur Julien*, Paris, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", 1965, p.18.
27. Julian was stopped from revealing his pagan leaning by the Christians in government and more importantly by his cousin, the emperor Constantius. To have come out of the religious closet would have been instant death for Julian. Bowersock deals with this topic in the sixth chapter of his book, *Julian the Apostate*. This is a good cursory look at the problems that Julian faced before Constantius's death and the repercussions for admitting his paganism.
28. In the work by Polymnia Athanassiadi-Fowden, *Julian and Hellenism: An Intellectual Biography*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981, there is a good discussion on the tutor Mardonius(pp.16ff.) and the continued education of Julian after he is parted from him(p.24). It is also in this text that the formation of Julian's ideas on Christians is laid out clearly(pp.24-27).See also Bidez, *La Vie de l'Empereur Julien*, 1965, pp.82-89 on Julian's apostasy.
29. Bidez, p.25.
30. *Ibid*, p.97. Ammianus notes this interesting "fact" at XIV.1.2 and 8. The description of Constantia has a similar feel to it as Procopius's description of Theodora(*Anecdota*.xii.14, xv.1-4, iii.6ff, xvi.14-17) and Antonina(*Anecdota*.i.26,36,38,39).
31. For a short discussion on this see Matthews text pages 33-36 with corresponding notes on pages 483-484. This clarifies the idea of what was going on with spies at the time and why Constantius was suspicious of Gallus.

32. See pp.49-51 in Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate*, (1978) on the possibility of Julian's hand in his acclamation. Also see, Matthews, pp.98-100.
33. See also Victor, *De Caesaribus*, 42.20, *Epit.*, 42.18, Eutropius, *Brev.*, 10.15. These also state the same idea as Ammianus and add support to his words.
34. R.C. Blockley, *East Roman Foreign Policy*, London, Francis Cairns Ltd, 1992, p.25.
35. *Ibid*, p.25.
36. Julian's rejection of negotiations with the Persians is not recorded in Ammianus, but it does appear in Libanius's Oration 12.76-77, 17.19, 18.164-165 and also in the *Ecclesiastical History* of Socrates at 3.19 and 21. This is an indication that Ammianus either did not know about the refusal to negotiate or neglected to put it into his history because of the negative light it threw on Julian. It would seem that the latter of the two explanations is the most probable because the refusal was sent out Antioch while Julian was preparing for the campaign. As Ammianus was on the headquarters staff he probably heard about the refusal from others on the staff or from Julian himself.
37. Robert Browning, *The Emperor Julian*, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1976, p.88.
38. This was a policy that had been followed for centuries. The Romans negotiated only when they were tied up with problems in the West and could not move troops to deal with the Persians quickly enough.
39. Matthews, p.136.
40. See Browning *op. cit.*, p.190 for his reasoning for wanting to take Persia and become another Alexander or Trajan.
41. Browning, p.192.
42. *Ibid*, p.191.
43. Matthews, p.136.
44. *Ibid*, p.111.
45. Cameron, p.98.

46. Blockley, p.26.

47. “. . . and he was not unlike Marcus Aurelius, whom he even took pains to emulate.” H.W. Bird tr. ed., *The Breviarium: Ab Urbe Condita of Eutropius*, Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 1993, p.69. See also Julian’s own work, *Caesars*, 334A, 335C-D and Bidez, p.83

48. See Eutropius, *Breviarium*, 10.16.

49. Thompson, p.79.

50. Matthews, p.139.

51. See Eutropius, *Breviarium*, 10.16.

52. Bowersock, p.14.

53. Matthews, p.88.

54. See pp.20-21 above.

55. See p.17 and p.22 above.

56. Austin discusses this on page 95 of his text. If the use of this force was indeed planned, the plan it is an indication of the tactical ability that Julian possessed. If he had survived this campaign he might have been able to use this ability to help shore up the defences of the empire and stop the barbarians for a while longer.

57. Matthews, p. 138.

58. Zosimus also contains information about the planned usage of this diversionary force, at IV.4.2, “Καὶ τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως ἐξορμήσαντος συμβέβηκεν ἡ κατὰ Προκόπιον ἐπανάστασις· Τούτῳ γὰρ Ἰουλιανὸς ὥς γένει συναπτομένῳ μέρος τι τῆς δυνάμεως ἐμπιστεύσας, ἐκέλευσεν ἅμα Σεβαστιανῷ διὰ τῆς Ἀδιαβηνῆς χωροῦντι ἀπαντῆσαι οἱ δὲ ἑτέρας ὁδοῦ κατὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἰῶντι, δούς αὐτῷ καὶ βασιλικὴν στολὴν ἔχειν δι’ αἰτίαν πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἡγνυμένην”. Also see Magnus of Carrhae as preserved by Malalas on the purpose of the use of this secondary force. Matthews, *The Roman Empire of Ammianus*, p.163.

59. Bidez, p.319.

60. See p.19 above.

61. Browning, p.47.

62. Austin, p.99.
63. Matthews, p.139.
64. Julian did save twelve ships from the fire that he had ordered to be ignited. Bowersock discusses this(*Julian the Apostate*, 1978, pp.114-115) event and the reasoning behind it. There is also a theory that Persian agents tricked Julian into this act because of a promise to lead the army on an overland shortcut to the force under Procopius and Sebastianus.(Ammianus, 24.7.5, Festus, *Breviarium*.28, Zosimus, *Historia Nova* 3.26 and 28).
65. N. J. E. Austin, "Julian at Ctesiphon: A Fresh Look at Ammianus' Account", *Athenaeum* 50, 1972, p.305.
66. The lacuna which is supposed to begin at XXIV.7.2 is of an unknown length and may have included information that may have clarified what happened to the force under Procopius and Sebastianus. This one piece of information would help to complete the picture of Julian's failure at Ctesiphon.
67. Rolfe in his translation in the Loeb series volume 2, has a note at the bottom of page 467 discussing the lacuna and where it may survive.
68. Socrates III.19 may contain some of what is missing from Ammianus's text, but it does not hold the answer to what happened to the diversionary force and III.20, where it might logically be expected to be, is also a disappointment. So we do not know why this force did not link up with Julian at Ctesiphon.
69. Austin, "Julian at Ctesiphon...", p.301.
70. Matthews, pp.138-139.
71. G. A. Crump, "Ammianus and The Late Roman Army", *Historia* 22, 1973, p.100.
72. During the campaigns against Russia in 1812 Napoleon had to retreat due to lack of supplies and manpower. As he retreated the Russians, knowing of his lack of food due to their scorched earth policy, began to close but the winter did the most damage. What was most frustrating to Napoleon was that he never had the great battle that he wanted. His *Grande Armée* was never able to be used to it fullest. This event is not dissimilar to what Julian and his troops experienced during the campaign of 363.
73. See p.24 above.

74.Cameron, p.134.

75.Matthews, pp.282-283. Ammianus XXV.8.7

CHAPTER II: PROCOPIUS AND THE EAST 527-532 AD

1. A ξύμβουλος is a private secretary/legal advisor. In 527, Procopius was appointed to this position on the staff of Belisarius. The duties that go along with this office are not clear, so it is not possible to know exactly what Procopius did. We do know that he was used as a spy at the start of the Vandalic war(533)(*BV*, III.xiv.3, 4, 7-13) and as a procurement officer during the Gothic war(*BG*, VI.iv.1ff.). These two missions were probably not in the job description of a ξύμβουλος, but Procopius was assigned to carry out these tasks. In his capacity of secretary he may have written the letters sent to the Persian general and the speech given to the troops by Belisarius before the battle at Daras in 530(*BP*, I.xiv.1-4, 7-10(letters), 21-27(speech)).
2. Averil Cameron, *Procopius and the Sixth Century*, London, Routledge, 1996, p.50 and G. A. Williamson tr. and Philip Ziegler Introduction, *Procopius: The Secret History*, London, The Folio Society, 1990, pp.xv-xvi.
3. J. W. Barker, *Justinian and the Late Roman Empire*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1966, p.75.
4. Averil Cameron tr., *Procopius: History of the Wars, Secret History, and Buildings*, New York, Washington Square Press, 1967, p.3.
5. Procopius stayed on the classical path, "In style and presentation Procopius frequently followed the classical historians, especially Herodotus and Thucydides."A.A. Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire: 324-1453*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1952, p.180. Also see Cameron, *Sixth Century*, p.39.
6. Cameron, *Sixth Century*, p.43.
7. A.H.M. Jones, *The Later Roman Empire: 284-602*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1964, Vol. I, p.266.
8. Cameron, *Sixth Century*, p.50.
9. *Ibid*, p.169.

10. H.B. Dewing tr., *Anecdota*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, Loeb Classical Library, 1993, p.viii.
11. *Anecdota* xi.3-11, see Cameron, *Sixth Century*, p.6 and p.22, Bury, *Later Roman Empire*, Vol. I, p.1ff.
12. J. B. Bury, *A History of the Later Roman Empire(395 A.D. TO 800A.D.)*, Amsterdam, Adolf M. Hakkert, 1966, Vol. II, p.178.
13. Cameron, *Sixth Century*, p.135.
14. *Ibid*, p.40.
15. *Ibid*, p.40.
16. *Ibid*, p.7.
17. *Ibid*, p.3.
18. Geoffrey Greatrex, *Rome and Persia at War, 502-532*, London, Francis Cairns Ltd, 1998, p.63.
19. Cameron, *Sixth Century*, P.136.
20. Greatrex, p.63.
21. Bury, *Later Roman Empire*, Vol. I, p.355, Vol. II, pp. 178-179; also see Cameron *Sixth Century*, 6 p.136 n. 1.
22. See Greatrex, p. 63 for both Cabades and Peranius.
23. Greatrex, pp.63-64.
24. "Whether such archives were employed by Procopius must remain in doubt, since he nowhere quotes any official documents verbatim. But given that it was at Constantinople that he worked on his *Wars*, it is *prima facie* likely that he took advantage of the records stored there: a good example of material which he may have acquired from such archives (if not from persons involved) is his excursus on southern Arabia(I.19-20)" Greatrex, p.64.
25. P. N. Ure, *Justinian and His Age*, London, Penguin Books, 1951, p.19.
26. *Ibid*.

27. Barker, p.77.
28. John Malalas(ca.480-570 AD) is the author of a work known as *Chronographia*, which covers history from the creation of the world until 563. He was mentioned briefly in chapter one because of his association with Magnus of Carrhae. The text of Magnus is extant only within Malalas's pages, but he also writes on the reign of Justinian. This allows us to use his work to compare his account with Procopius's. On Magnus see the Oxford Classical Dictionary: Third Edition, pp.914-915.
 "Marcellinus Comes(and his continuator) Marcellinus' Chronicle was initially published in 518, but was later extended by the author up to 534; a continuation to 548 by another writer survives. Marcellinus served as the *cancellarius* of the future Emperor Justinian during the reign of Justin, and it has long been observed that his account reflects an official perspective. Although his chronology is not always accurate -- . . . --he can on occasion help to compensate for the failure of other sources to date events explicitly."
 Greatrex, pp.67.
29. Greatrex, p.66-67.
30. *Ibid.*
31. "The *cancellarii* were attendants performing services in connection with the exercise of judicial functions by the higher magistrates in whose service they stood" Arthur E.R. Boak, *The Master of the Offices in the Later Roman and Byzantine Empires*, New York, Macmillan Company, 1919, p.37
32. See p.43, n.28 above.
33. Mirranes(Mihran) was the rank given to the Persian commander, Perozes, at Daras in 530 by Procopius, but this may have been a mistake, "He(Perozes) was a member of the Mihran house, which traditionally had control of the army. Indeed, so often had the Romans come across Persian generals of that name that they had inferred that the 'Mirhan' was actually the name of an office," Greatrex, p.176. What is meant by a "house" is that there were a certain number of ruling families in the Persian empire. At the top were the Sassanids(the royal family) and the rest came after this and controlled certain areas of the Persian government.
34. "In the Battle of Callinicum which followed(the battle of Daras), Belisarius' part may have been less than glorious; Malalas says that he fled by boat, leaving Sunicas and Simmias to carry on the fighting as long as they could," Cameron, *Sixth Century*, p.158.


35. See John Moorhead, *Justinian*, London, Longman, 1994, p.17.
36. Barker, p65.
37. *Ibid.*
38. John Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State*, Tr. Joan Hussey, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1956, p.64.
39. Vasiliev, pp.130-131.
40. Justinian was an ardent supporter of Orthodox Christianity, but when he made peace with the Persians in 562 he protected the Nestorians who had moved to the Persian empire to get away from religious persecution.(see Ure, *op.cit.*, p.99.) His policy on religion was quite interesting: protect all Christians outside the empire's sphere of influence from persecution, but ensure that Orthodox Christianity was the only path followed(all others were to be persecuted). "In Antioch at the end of the fourth century originated the teaching that there was no complete union in the two natures in Christ. In its further developments this teaching attempted to prove the absolute independence of Christ's human nature both before and after its union with the divine nature. . . . But with the passing of the patriarchal throne of Constantinople to the Antiochene presbyter Nestorius, an ardent supporter of this new teaching, . . . Nestorius' name for the Virgin Mary was not the "Mother of God" but the "Mother of Christ," the "Mother of Man,"" Vasiliev, p.98.Hence this version of Christian doctrine took the name of its most ardent supporter.
41. The Monophysites, "while they believed in the preponderance of the divine nature over the human Jesus Christ, arrived at the conclusion that the human was completely absorbed by the divine substance; hence Jesus Christ possessed but one--divine--nature. This new teaching was called Monophysitism, or the Monophysitic doctrine, and its followers are known as Monophysites(from the Greek *μόνος*, "one," and *φύσις*, "nature"),"Vasiliev, p.99.
42. His need for Christianity to be the only religion, especially Orthodox Christianity, was so strong that in 529 after nearly a thousand years Plato's Academy was shut down because of its pagan teachings, "It was Justinian . . . who finally closed the ancient university at Athens, the one remaining centre of purely pagan learning." This followed along with his anti-pagan policy, but it also initiated the end of the ancient world which began to change into the medieval. Ure, p.116.

43. See p.38 above.
44. The West had fallen into the hands of the Germanic barbarians in 476, under Romulus Augustulus, the last western emperor. Odovacar the Visigoth had taken Italy and set up a new kingdom and captured parts of Illyricum.
45. This is discussed in General L.M. Chassin's book, *Bélisaire: Généralissime Byzantium(504-565)*, on p.30.
46. Barker, p.75.
47. The "Eternal" or "Perpetual" Peace of 532 was something that was designed to get the Persians off the Empire's back so that the West could be re-conquered. There was no time limit set for it to end. Hence the name given to it by Justinian of Eternal Peace(ἀπέραντος εἰρήνη). The Romans were to pay the Persians a sum of 11,000lbs. of gold, move the command of Mesopotamia from Daras to Constantina(farther back behind Daras's location), and two fortresses in Persarmenia, which the Romans had captured were to be returned. The gold was for the defence of the Caspian gates, the fortresses given back were Bolum and Pharangium. Fortresses in Lazica were also restored to the Romans and Dagaris a prisoner of the Persians was set free(*BP*, I.xxii.1-19).
48. Barker, p.118.
49. Bury, Vol. I, p.406.
50. Warren Treadgold, *Byzantium and Its Army: 284-1081*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995, p.15.
51. *Ibid*, p.16.
52. Robert Browning, *Justinian and Theodora*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971, p.71. For a full discussion see chapter two(pp.71-85) of Browning's text.

53. The Nika Rebellion took place in Constantinople on January 1, 532. The Circus factions(racing teams as well as proto-political parties) came together as one, instead of fighting one another, and rioted against Justinian's civil administrators. The citizens, in their respective factions: Blue and Green, were tired of the corruption of John the Cappadocian who was Praetorian Prefect and Tribonianus who was *Quaestor*. To placate the people Justinian removed these two men and placed Phocas in the former job and Basilides in the latter, but the people still rioted even though both of these men were touted as just men(*BP*, I.xxiv.18) The revolt lasted until Belisarius and Mundus ended it with a military assault on the citizens who were at the hippodrome declaring emperor Hypatius, a nephew of a previous emperor, Anastasius(*BP*, I.xxiv.1-58).
54. Ostrogorsky, p.67.
55. John Moorhead, *Justinian*, London, Longman, 1994, pp.69-70.
56. *Ibid*, p.70.
57. This was yet another victory for Belisarius which made Justinian nervous. His top general was victorious across the empire and was also very popular, but when Belisarius disobeyed Justinian he gave him more reason to believe that Belisarius was planning to usurp the throne. This suspicion grew as enemies of Belisarius poisoned the ears of the emperor against him.
58. Ure, p.44. Also see *BG*, VI.xxix.17-18 and Bury, *Later Roman Empire*, Vol. I, p.396.
59. See Treadgold, p.15 and Greatrex, p.219 for a discussion on Justinian's stoppage of pay to the *limitanei* on the Romano-Persian border.
60. Vasiliev, p.138.
61. Moorhead, p.155.
62. Nero had the opportunity to remodel Rome as the city of his dreams after the fire in AD 64. Due to the Nika riot of AD 532 Justinian had the same chance because large areas of Constantinople were destroyed by the mobs(Moorhead, *Justinian*, p.52). This rebuilding led to the construction of his most notable edifice--the Hagia Sophia(dedicated 27 December, 537)(Moorhead, p.55.).
63. Cameron, *Sixth Century*, p.107 and p. 221.

64. See above p.49 and p.51.
65. Ostrogorsky, p.66.
66. *Ibid*, p.72.
67. See Moorhead, *Justinian*, pp.89-95 and Barker, *Justinian and the Later Roman Empire*, pp.112-119 for a discussion of the continuing Persian problem which diverted Justinian's attention from the re-conquest of the West.
68. On the idea of Justin I(518-527) adopting Chosroes, the youngest son of Cabades, see *BP*, I.xi.7-9, Ure, p.61 and Greatrex, p.135.
69. See Ure on the adoption of Theodosius II by the Persian king Isdigerdes p.61, Greatrex, p.13 and *BP*, I.ii.1ff.
70. See Ure, p.63 for the positive side to the adoption.
71. Greatrex has the most up-to-date study and discussion of the Lazic problem, pp.139-148.
72. Barker has a sound general overview of the "Caspian gate situation" which was good for the Romans since they did not have to man the defences there, but it led to disputes over financial support that the Persians wanted for manning the defences. Also see Holmes, *The Age of Justinian and Theodora*, p.403.
73. "Operations against the Persians were opened inconsequentially in 527. By the following year command there(Mesopotamia) had been given to Belisarius, who now emerges as the leading general in the conflict. An attempt to extend the fortifications(Mindouos) . . . in 528 brought a Persian attack." Barker, p.117.
74. "While the campaign can confidently be dated to 528, the site of Belisarius' defeat is still disputed. Malalas merely refers generally to Mesopotamia, but Zachariah, specifies that the battle was fought in the vicinity of Thannuris; the operation follows a reference to possible Persian fortification work there. Procopius, . . . , locates the battle site at Minduos, apparently to the north of Nisibis. Since Thannuris lies some 80 km south of Nisibis, there seems to be a significant discrepancy between our two most detailed sources. Several solutions have been proposed. Although none are entirely satisfactory, some at least can be rejected as implausible." Greatrex, p.157.
75. For a quick synopsis of the battle see Bury, *Later Roman Empire*, pp.372-373.

76. See Bury, *Later Roman Empire*, p.373 on this matter.
77. "But he defended the city of Daras against a much superior Persian force, by a combination of skilful field engineering and rapid choice of the right place and time to attack." Browning, p.74.
78. For a short description of the Roman trench system and troop layout see W.G. Holmes, *The Age of Justinian and Theodora: A History of the Sixth Century A.D.*, Vol.II, pp.397-398.
79. Both Bury and Greatrex have diagrams showing the layout of the trench system. For the diagrams of Greatrex see p.172, *Rome and Persia*, for a view of ditch and city and p.179 for the immediate battlefield. Bury, *Later Roman Empire*, has a different layout: see Vol. I, p. 375.



80. Greatrex, p.180. This formation is three men deep and would have been stretched out along the length of the Roman defensive line.
81. A short description of this exists in Holmes p.398. How this was easily accomplished if at all is not clear. I am not sure that it could have been done without the Persian front breaking as the troops moved in and out of close combat.

82. “. . . several thousands of the Persians bore down on the left wing of the Romans and threw it into disorder. Already the flight had commenced, when the six hundred Huns held in reserve on that side charged the left flank of the enemy; and simultaneously the three hundred Herules, rushing down the slope of the hill from their ambush, fell upon them from behind. Terrified by these unforeseen attacks the Persians turned and fled, . . .” Holmes, Vol. II, p.401.
83. See the Holmes, Vol. II, pp.401-402 for a vivid description of this battle.
84. Greatrex, p.184. Also see Ure, p.66.
85. Bury, Vol. I, p.377.
86. See Moorhead’s discussion on how and why Arethas was given the rank of Phylarch of the Roman Saracens, p.94.
87. Bury, Vol. I, p.377. Also see BP I.xviii.1 and Greatrex, p.195.
88. See Greatrex’s discussion on this, p.152.
89. Barker, p.118.
90. Ure, p.67.
91. Bury, Vol. I, p.378.
92. Greatrex, p.200.
93. “According to Procopius, the Persian commander was called Azarethes, although this is probably a misunderstanding of the title *hazarafi*; . . .” *Ibid*, p.196.
94. Cameron, *Sixth Century*, p.158. Also see Moorhead, *Justinian*, p.23 and Procopius, *BP*, I.21.2 and *BV*, III.9.25.

CHAPTER III: FINAL ANALYSIS

1. Ammianus, p. 8, p.9, n.18, Procopius, p. 35 above.
2. Ammianus, p.3 and p.6, Procopius, p.40 above.
3. Ammianus, pp.6-7, Procopius, pp.39-40 above.
4. Ammianus, XIV .12.38-40, XVI.5.9, XXV.3.1-5, XXV.4.4.

5. *BP*, I. xvi.34-35 and *BV*, III.xii.3 and *BG*, VI.iv.1ff.; VI.iv.19
6. See pp.49, n.52 above.
7. Ammianus, XVI.12, XVII.1, XVIII.2.
8. See pp.47 above.
9. See pp.50-51 above.
10. Ammianus Bks. XXIII-XXV (on Julian's campaign), Procopius Bks. I-II *BP*.
11. Ammianus, p.3, Procopius, p.36 above.
12. *BP*, I.xiii.9-39 (as *ξύμβουλος*)
13. XIX.2.3-12; XIX.7.5; XIX.8.1-5.
14. Ammianus, XXV.4, Procopius, *Anecdota*.
15. See p.10, p.17 above.
16. See pp.38-39 above.
17. See pp.17-18 above.
18. Negotiated settlements had become the favourable way of dealing with the Persians. Treaties usually had the Romans paying for peace which was a way of life during Justinian's reign, "These payments proved, however, to be a feeble substitute, since the underlying commitment to long-term stability had given way to short-term advantage, as is shown by the history of Roman-Persian relations under Justinian and his successors." Blockley, *East Roman Foreign Policy*, p.162.
19. Ammianus; XXV.3.6-23.
20. See Moorhead, *Justinian*, p.181.
21. See p.47, n 47.

22. "Among all the targets of Justinian's persecutions, it was those classified as heretics who suffered the most. . . No one who was not an orthodox Christian should properly enjoy the blessings of the world. Proven heretics were at the very least subject to loss of all civil and property rights. . . Some dissenters, such as dualistic Manicheans and relapsed heretics in general, were subject to capital punishment, often of the most gruesome sort."Barker, p.100.

23. See pp.53-54 above.

24. See Moorhead, *Justinian*, pp.33-34.

25. See Barker, pp.215-216. The Lombards who attacked Italy were the same group who assisted the general Narses in quieting the Ostrogoths down in the second Italian campaign(541-563 AD).

26. "Although crowds gathered once if
 she but showed her face,
 And even old men's eyes grew dim,
 this hand alone,
 Like some last courtier at a gypsy
 camping place,
 Babbling of fallen majesty, records
 what's gone.

The lineaments, a heart that laughter
 has made sweet,
 These, these remain, but I record
 what's gone. A crowd
 Will gather, and not know it walks
 the very street

Whereon a thing once walked that
 Seemed a burning cloud."Christopher Moore ed., *W.B. Yeats: Selected Poems*, New York, Gramercy Books, 1992, p.215.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Ammiani Marcellini: Rerum Gestarum Libri Qui Supersunt, 2 Vols., Victor Gardthausen ed., B.G. Teubner, Stuttgart, 1967.

Ammianus Marcellinus: Rerum Gestarum Libri Qui Supersunt with translation, 3 Vols., J. C. Rolfe ed and tr., Heinemann LTD, London, 1982-1986.

Eutropius: Breviarium, Franciscus Ruehl ed., B. G. Teubner, Stuttgart, 1975.

The Breviarium: Ab Urbe Condita of Eutropius, H. W. Bird ed. and tr., Liverpool University Press, Liverpool, 1993.

The Breviarium of Festus: A Critical Edition with Historical Commentary, J. W. Eadie ed., The Athlone Press, London, 1967.

Herodoti: Historiae Libri I-IV, Carolus Hude ed., Oxford Classical Text, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1940.

The History: Herodotus, David Grene tr., Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1987.

The Works of The Emperor Julian, 3 Vols., W. C. Wright ed. and tr., Heinemann LTD, London, 1969.

Libanius: Opera VOL. X Epistulae 1-839, R. Forester ed., B.G. Teubner, Stuttgart, 1963.

Luciani Opera: TOMUS III Libelli 44-68, M. D. Macleod ed., Oxford Classical Text, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980.

Lucian: vol. VI, L. Kilburn ed. and tr., Hienemann LTD, London, 1968.

The Chronicle of John Malalas: A Translation, Elizabeth Jeffreys, Michael Jeffreys and Roger Scott trs., Australian Association for Byzantine Studies, Melbourne, 1986.

Procopius: Bella, 2 Vols., Jakob Haury ed., B. G. Teubner, Stuttgart, 1963.

Procopius: History of the Wars, text of J. Haury 1905-1913, 5 Vols., H. B. Dewing tr., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1990-1996.

Procopius: Secret History, 1 Vol., H. B. Dewing ed. and tr., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1996.

Procopius: Buildings, 1 Vol., H. B. Dewing ed. and tr., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1996.

Procopius: History of the Wars, Secret History, and Buildings, Averil Cameron tr., Washington Square Press Inc., New York, 1967.

Procopius: The Secret History, G. A. Williamson tr., Philip Ziegler Introduction, The Folio Society, London, 1990.

Socrates Scholasticus: *The Ecclesiastical History*, Bohn's Ecclesiastical Library, Henry G. Bohn, London, 1853.

P. Vergili Maronis Opera, R. A. B. Mynors ed., Oxford Classical Texts, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1969.

Zosime: Histoire Nouvelle, 5 Tomes, François Paschoud ed. and tr., Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris 1971-1989.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Athanassiadi-Fowden, Polymnia, *Julian and Hellenism: An Intellectual Biography*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981.

Austin, N. J. E., *Ammianus on Warfare*, Coll. Latomus 165, Brussels, 1979.

Austin, N. J. E., "Julian At Ctesiphon: A Fresh Look At Ammianus' Account", *Athenaeum* 50, 1972, pp.301-309.

Austin, N. J. E., "In Support of Ammianus' Veracity", *Historia* 22, 1973, pp.331-335.

Barker, J. W., *Justinian and The Later Roman Empire*, University of Wisconsin Press, Milwaukee, 1966.

Bidez, J., *La Vie de l'Empereur Julien*, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1965.

Blockley, R. C., *East Roman Foreign Policy*, Francis Cairns Ltd, Great Britain, 1992.

Blockley, R. C., "Ammianus Marcellinus and his Classical Background — Changing Perspectives", *International Journal of the Classical Tradition*, Vol. 2, No. 4 Spring 1996, pp.455-466.

Boak, A. E. R., *The Master of The Offices In The Later Roman and Byzantine Empires*, MacMillan Company, 1919.

Bowersock, G. W., *Julian the Apostate*, Gerald Duckworth & Company Limited, London, 1978.

Browning, Robert, *Justinian and Theodora*, Wiedenfield and Nicolson, 1971.

Browning, Robert, *The Emperor Julian*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1976.

Bury, J. B., *A History of the Later Roman Empire (395 A.D. TO 800 A.D.)*, 2 Vols., Adolf M. Hakkert, Amsterdam, 1966.

Cameron, Averil, *Procopius and the Sixth Century*, Routledge, London, 1996.

Cameron, Averil, *The Later Roman Empire*, Fontana Press, London, 1993.

Camus, P. M., *Ammien Marcellin: Témoin Des Courants Culturels Et Religieux A La Fin Du Iv^e Siècle*, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1967.

Chalmers, W. R., "Eunapius, Ammianus Marcellinus, and Zosimus on Julian's Persian Expedition", *Classical Quarterly* Vol. X, 1960, pp.152-160.

Chassin, L. M., *Bélisaire: Généralissime Byzantin (504-565)*, Payot, Paris, 1957.

Crump, G. A., *Ammianus Marcellinus as a Military Historian*, *Historia*, Einzelschriften 27, Wiesbaden, 1975.

Crump, G. A., "Ammianus and the Late Roman Army", *Historia* 22, 1973, pp.91-103.

Gray, E. W., "The Roman Eastern *Limes* From Constantine to Justinian — Perspectives and Problems", *Proceedings of the African Classical Association* 12, 1973, pp.24-40.

Greatrex, Geoffrey, *Rome and Persia at War, 502-532*, Francis Cairns Ltd, London, 1998.

Holmes, W. G., *The Age of Justinian and Theodora: A History of the Sixth Century A.D.*, second edition, 2 Vols., G. Bell and Sons LTD., 1912.

Hornblower, Simon and Anthony Spawforth eds., *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, Third Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996.

Jones, A. H. M., *The Later Roman Empire: 284-602*, 3 Vols., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1964.

MacKail, J. W., "Ammianus Marcellinus", *JRS* Vol. 10, 1920, pp.103-118.

Matthews, John, *The Roman Empire of Ammianus*, Gerald Duckworth & Company Limited, London, 1989.

Moore, Christopher ed., *W. B. Yeats: Selected Poems*, Gramercy Books, New York, 1992.

Moorhead, John, *Justinian*, Longman, London, 1994.

Naudé, C. P. T., "Battles and Sieges in Ammianus Marcellinus", *Acta Classica* Vol.1, 1968, pp.92-105.

Ostrogorsky, John, *History of The Byzantine State*, Tr. Joan Hussey, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1956.

Ridley, R. T., "Notes on Julian's Persian Expedition(363)", *Historia* 22, 1973, pp.317-326.

Rowell, H. T., "Ammianus Marcellinus, Soldier-Historian of the Late Roman Empire", *Seiple Lectures, First Series, 1961-1965*, Princeton, 1967, pp.265-313.

Sabbah, Guy, *La Méthode D'Ammien Marcellin*, Société, d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1978.






Thompson, E. A., *The Historical Work of Ammianus Marcellinus*, Bouma's Boekhuis, Groningen, 1969.

Treadgold, Warren, *Byzantium and Its Army: 284-1081*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1995.

Ure, P. N., *Justinian and His Age*, Penguin Books Ltd, London, 1951.

Vasiliev, A. A., *History of The Byzantine Empire: 324-1453*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1952.

IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3)



APPLIED IMAGE, Inc.
1653 East Main Street
Rochester, NY 14609 USA
Phone: 716/482-0300
Fax: 716/288-5989

© 1993, Applied Image, Inc., All Rights Reserved

