

THE FUNCTION OF SELECTION IN NAZI POLICY TOWARDS
UNIVERSITY STUDENTS 1933-1945

BÉLA BODO

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate Program in History
York University
North York, Ontario

December 1997



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0-612-27281-8

**Towards a New Genus of Students:
The Function of Selection in Nazi Policy Towards
University Students 1933-1945**

by **Béla Bodo**

a dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of York
University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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Abstract

This study analyzes the content of Nazi education policy towards university students in four hitherto neglected areas. It argues that the concept of selection as interpreted by the Nazis played a central role in Nazi attitude towards students in the Third Reich. The first chapter shows that the Nazi state failed to improve students' living standards through a generous provision of student aid and Nazi interference was limited to the introduction of racial and political criteria into the selection of students for social assistance. The second chapter examines Nazi policy towards foreign students. It argues that the selection of foreign students did not change dramatically after the Nazi takeover. After 1939, however, racial and political criteria became much more important as the basis for the admission of foreign, especially eastern European, students. The third chapter is concerned with the policy of student health services after 1933. It argues that compulsory medical examinations of students contributed little to the fulfillment of grandiose Nazi plans to create a biologically superior student population. The failure of medical examinations undermined the system of biological selection of students. The last chapter discusses the policy of racial selection as applied to Jewish and part-Jewish university students in the Third Reich. Finally, the conclusion highlights the paradoxes in Nazi policy towards university students.

Acknowledgement

I am indebted to many individuals for the completion of this dissertation. My thanks are due to the staffs of the Federal Archives Koblenz and Potsdam, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Sächsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden, Thüringisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Weimar, Staatsarchiv Würzburg, the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich, university archives of Munich, Erlangen, Dresden, Cologne, Berlin, Jena and the staffs of York University's interlibrary loan services. I am especially indebted to Dr. Ulrich Becker of the Institut für Hochschulkunde in Würzburg who sacrificed time and gave excellent advice. Furthermore, I would like to thank the members of the student fraternity Alemannia Makaria, who made me feel at home in their fraternity house during my three-weeks stay in Würzburg. Also, I would like to acknowledge the financial support that I received from the German Academic Exchange Service.

I owe special thanks to Professor Michael H. Kater, who supervised my work, for his close reading of the individual chapters and the final draft and for valuable advice. I would like to extend my gratitude to the other members of the committee such as Professor Irmgard Steinisch and Professor William D. Irvine. Finally, my gratitude goes to my late uncle, Joseph Bodo, my personal friends Szilárd Borbély, Luigi D' Alonzo, Stephen Giles, Emil Jacob, Sean Kennedy, Birgit Rohde and Bethany Walker, who encouraged me during this enterprise.

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Abbreviations

AA	Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Office)
AAD	Akademischer Austauschdienst (Academic Exchange Service)
BDM	Bund Deutscher Mädel (League of German Girls)
DAAD	Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (German Academic Exchange Service)
DAAST	Deutsche Akademische Auslandsstelle (German Academic Foreign Office)
DAF	Deutsche Arbeitsfront (German Labor Front)
DSt	Deutsche Studentenschaft (German Student Federation)
DStW	Deutsches Studentenwerk (German Student-Aid Foundation)
HJ	Hitlerjugend (Hitler Youth)
Napolas	Nationalpolitische Erziehungsanstalten (National Political Training Institutes)
NSDAP	Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist German Workers' Party)
NSDStB	Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (National Socialist Student Federation)
OKW	Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Army High Command)
PrEM	Preussisches Ministerium für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Volksbildung (Prussian Ministry of Education)
REM	Reichserziehungsministerium (Reich Education Ministry)
RKFDV	Reichskommissariat für die Festigung des Deutschen Volkstums (Reich Office for the Consolidation of German Nationhood)
RMdI	Reichsministerium des Innern (Reich Ministry of the Interior)
RSF	Reichsstudentenführung (Reich Student Leadership)
RSHA	Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Central Security Office)
RStW	Reichsstudentenwerk (Reich Student Services)
SA	Sturmabteilungen (Stormtroopers)
SD	Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service of the SS)
SS	Schutzstaffel (Elite Guard)
VDH	Verband der Deutschen Hochschulen (Association of German Institutions of Higher Learning)

Introduction

Although scholarly research into the history of the professions in Germany began in earnest only in the 1970s, today historians and the reading public in general can draw upon a considerable body of sophisticated literature on the political behavior of various social and professional groups in Nazi Germany. There are a number of excellent books on the responsibility of big business for Hitler's ascension to power and for the crimes of the regime.¹ Historians have also paid considerable attention to the role of civil servants. They argue that the readiness of civil servants to accept orders from Hitler was vital for the latter's takeover and long-term exercise of power.² The evolution of the military establishment in the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich has found its historians as well.

¹ For an excellent survey of the relevant literature see Eberhard Kolb, The Weimar Republic, London, 1988, pp. 190-194. Major works include: Henry A. Turner, German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler, New York, 1985; George W. F. Hallgarten and Joachim Ratkau, Deutsche Industrie und Politik, Reinbek, 1981; Harald James, The Great Slump: Politics and Economics 1924-1936, Oxford, 1986; David Abraham, The Collapse of the Weimar Republic: Political Economy and Crisis, New York, 1986; Hans Mommsen et al., Industrielles System und politische Entwicklung in der Weimarer Republik, Düsseldorf, 1974; Udo Wengst, "Grossindustrie und Machtergreifung," Politische Studien 34 (1983), pp. 37-47; Peter Hayes, Industry and Ideology: IG Farben in the Nazi Era, New York, 1987; Gerhard Th. Mollin, Montankonzerne und Drittes Reich: Der Gegensatz zwischen Monopolindustrie und Befehlswirtschaft in der deutschen Rüstung und Expansion 1936-1944, Göttingen, 1988; Gustav-Hermann Seebold, Ein Stahlkonzern im Dritten Reich: Der Bochumer Verein 1927-1945, Wuppertal, 1981; John R. Gillingham, Industry and Politics in the Third Reich: Ruhr Coal, Hitler and Europe, New York, 1985; Dietrich Eichholtz and Wolfgang Schumann eds., Anatomie des Krieges: Neue Dokumente über die Rolle des deutschen Monopolkapitals bei der Vorbereitung und Durchführung der Zweiten Weltkriegen, Berlin, 1961; Richard J. Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich, Oxford, 1994.

² See Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure, and Effects of National Socialism, New York, 1970, pp. 228-231. Major works on the role of civil servants include: Hans Mommsen, Beamtenum im Dritten Reich, Stuttgart, 1966; Martin Broszat, The Hitler State, London, 1981; Peter Diehl-Thiele, Partei und Staat im Dritten Reich, Munich, 1969; Edward N. Peterson, The Limits of Hitler's Power, Princeton, 1969; Reinhard Bollmus, Das Amt Rosenberg und seine Gegner: Studien zum Machtkampf im nationalsozialistischen Herrschaftssystem, Stuttgart, 1970; Jane Caplan, Government without Administration: State and Civil Service in Weimar and Nazi Germany, New York, .

The works of these scholars highlight the responsibility of the military establishment in the destruction of Weimar democracy, their role in rearmament and the psychological preparation of the population for the coming war, and their participation in the monstrous crimes against conquered nations during the Second World War.³ Risking prosecution and discrimination in employment, a few courageous journalists and historians have also drawn attention to German judges, who often proved to be the most zealous and merciless executioners of Hitler's will after 1933.⁴ There are excellent books on the history of other professional groups such as doctors, lawyers, engineers and teachers as well. These books argue that the aforementioned professional groups supported the Nazi movement before 1933 in the hope that Hitler's party would greatly improve their position in society. Their expectations were satisfied, however, only insofar as they were compatible with the long-term goals of the regime.⁵

The political behavior of professors has been a topic of controversy since the end of the war. Historians such as Fritz K. Ringer argue that perhaps the majority of

1988; Dieter Rebenisch, Führerstaat und Verwaltung im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Verfassungsentwicklung und Verwaltungspolitik 1939-1945, Stuttgart, 1989.

³ Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945, Oxford, 1964, pp. 468-533. Major works include: Manfred Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat: Zeit der Indoktrination, Hamburg, 1969; Martin Hirsch, Grossmachtpolitik und Militarismus im 20. Jahrhundert, Düsseldorf, 1974; Christian Streit, Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941-1945, Stuttgart, 1978; Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front 1941-45: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare, London, 1985.

⁴ See Ingo Müller, Furchtbare Juristen: Die unbewältigte Vergangenheit unserer Justiz, Munich, 1988; Hans Robinsohn, Justiz als politische Verforgung: Die Rechtsprechung in 'Rassenschandefällen' beim Landgericht Hamburg 1936-1943, Stuttgart, 1977; Gerhard Fieberg, Justiz im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland, Cologne, 1984.

⁵ Konrad H. Jarausch, The Unfree Professions: German Lawyers, Teachers, and Engineers, 1900-1950, New York and Oxford, 1990; Karl-Heinz Ludwig, Technik und Ingenieure im Dritten Reich, Düsseldorf, 1974; Gerhard Baader and Ulrich Schultz eds., Medizin und Nationalsozialismus: Tabuisierte

academics had abandoned political liberalism well before 1914.⁶ In a similar vein, Karl Dietrich Bracher contends that, already in the late nineteenth century, the propensity of German professors to deify the concept of the state and their readiness to justify successful power politics at the expense of humanist principles set them apart from their colleagues in other Western states. These same attitudes, he continues, made the critical reevaluation of Germany's responsibility for the outbreak of the First World War difficult and the acceptance of the consequences of military defeat virtually impossible. During the Weimar Republic, a small minority of the professoriate supported Socialist and democratic causes. The majority, however, claimed that they were indifferent to politics and belonged to the 'party of those without party.' This attitude was apolitical only on the surface. In reality, it amounted to nothing less than a silent admission of political impotence, resentment to democratization and a legitimization of opportunism. Although few academics entered the Nazi Party before 1933, the professoriate as a whole did its share in contributing to the

Vergangenheit - Ungebrochene Tradition? Berlin, 1980; Michael H. Kater, Doctors under Hitler, Chapel Hill and London, 1989.

⁶ Fritz K. Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community 1890-1933, Cambridge, Mass., 1969; Ulrike Hörster-Philipps and Bernward Vieten, "Die Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität beim Übergang zum Faschismus: Zum Verhältnis von Politik und Wissenschaft 1929-1935," in the University of Münster ed., 200 Jahre zwischen Dom und Schloss: Ein Lesebuch zu Vergangenheit und Gegenwart der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Münster, 1980. On general surveys of German universities see Charles E. McClelland, State, Society, and University in Germany 1700-1914, Cambridge, 1980; Thomas Ellwein, Die deutsche Universität: Vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart, Königstein, 1985. On the history of individual universities see Notker Hammerstein, Die Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main: Von der Stiftungsuniversität zur staatlichen Hochschule, Neuwied/Frankfurt, 1989; Lothar Rathmann ed., Alma mater Lipsiensis: Geschichte der Karl-Marx-Universität Leipzig, Leipzig, 1984; Wilhelm Ribhegge, Geschichte der Universität Münster: Europa in Westfalen, Münster, 1985; Geschichte der Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel 1665-1995, the University of Kiel ed., Neumünster, 1968; Geschichte der Technischen Universität Dresden in Dokumenten und Bildern, the Technical University of Dresden ed., 2 vols., Altenburg, 1994; Geschichte der Universität Jena 1548/58-1958: Festgabe zum 400 jährigen Universitätsjubiläum, the University of Jena ed., 3 vols., Jena, 1958/62; Geschichte der Universität Rostock 1419-1969: Festschrift zur 550-Jahr-Feier der Universität, the University of Rostock ed., Berlin, 1969.

destruction of the Weimar Republic and the spread of anti-Semitic and extreme nationalist ideas.⁷

Despite ideological affinities and shared nationalist sympathies, however, tensions between Hitler's regime and university teachers persisted during the Third Reich. While a few academics, especially young scientists, welcomed the dismissal of leftist and Jewish professors, the majority opposed these measures because they feared a decline in the quality of research and teaching.⁸ Professors also resented the destruction of academic freedom and the open politicization of the curriculum and student life. Despite their

⁷ Bracher, The German Dictatorship, p. 266. See Hans Peter Bleuel, Deutschlands Bekenner: Professoren zwischen Kaiserreich und Diktatur, Munich and Vienna, 1968; Herbert Döring, Der Weimarer Kreis: Studien zum politischen Bewusstsein verfassungstreuer Hochschullehrer in der Weimarer Republik, Meisenheim, 1975.

⁸ On the troubled relations between Nazism and scientists see Alan D. Beyerchen, Scientists under Hitler: Politics and Physics Community in the Third Reich, New Haven, 1977; Ulf Rosenow, "Die Göttinger Physik unter dem Nationalsozialismus," in Heinrich Becker et al., Die Universität Göttingen unter dem Nationalsozialismus, Munich, 1987, pp. 374-409; Karl Dietrich Erdmann, Wissenschaft im Dritten Reich, Kiel, 1967; Peter Lundgreen ed., Wissenschaft im Dritten Reich, Frankfurt am Main, 1985; Jörg Tröger ed., Hochschule und Wissenschaft im Dritten Reich, Frankfurt am Main, 1984; Wolfgang F. Haug, Die hilflose Antifaschismus: Zur Kritik der Vorlesungsreihen über Wissenschaft und NS an deutschen Universitäten, Frankfurt am Main, 1967; Gernot Heiss and Siegfried Mattl, Willfähige Wissenschaft: Universität Wien 1938-45, Vienna, 1989; Alan D. Beyerchen, "Der Kampf um die Besetzung der Lehrstühle für Physik im NS-Staat," in Manfred Heinemann ed., Erziehung und Schulung im Dritten Reich, vol 2, Stuttgart, 1980, pp. 77-86; Herbert Mehrrens, "Ludwig Bieberbach and the 'Deutsche Mathematik'," in Esther P. Philipps ed., Studies in the History of Mathematics, Washington, D.C., 1987, pp. 195-241; Peter Alles, Mathematik im Dritten Reich: Technische Hochschule Darmstadt: Initiative für Abrüstung, Darmstadt, 1984; Helmut Arndt, "Niedergang von Studium und Wissenschaft 1933 bis 1945," in the University of Leipzig ed., Alma mater Lipsiensis: Geschichte der Karl-Marx-Universität Leipzig, Leipzig, 1989, pp. 261-271; Karen Schönwälder, Historiker und Politik: Geschichtswissenschaft im Nationalsozialismus, Frankfurt am Main, 1992; Volker Losemann, Nationalsozialismus und Antike: Studien zur Entwicklung des Faches Alte Geschichte 1933-1945, Hamburg, 1977; Peter Borowsky, "Geschichtswissenschaft an der Hamburger Universität 1933 bis 1945," in Eckart Krause et al., Hochschulalltag im 'Dritten Reich': Die Hamburger Universität 1933-1945, vol 2, Berlin/Hamburg, 1991, pp. 537-588; Hans-Günther Assel, Die Perversion der politischen Pädagogik im Nationalsozialismus, Munich, 1969; Ruth Carlsen, "Zum Prozess der Faschisierung und zu den Auswirkungen der faschistischen Diktatur auf die Universität Rostock 1932-1935," Ph.D. diss., University of Rostock, 1965.

dissatisfaction with their new rulers, however, only a courageous few participated in active political resistance against the regime during the last years of the war.⁹

Compared with the literature on other social and professional groups, the study of students in the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich attracted historians' attention relatively late. In the 1970s, pioneers in this field such as Jürgen Schwarz, Wolfgang Kreutzberger, Anselm Faust and Michael H. Kater explained the success of Nazism among students in the Weimar Republic as the result of a complex socio-economic and cultural crisis.¹⁰ Theoretically less sophisticated are the works of Dietrich Uwe Adam and Manfred

⁹ On the political behavior of university teachers see Michael H. Kater, "Professoren und Studenten im Dritten Reich," Archiv für Kulturgeschichte 67 (1985), pp. 465-487; Ulrich Schneider, "Widerstand und Verfolgung an der Marburger Universität 1933-1945," in Dieter Kramer and Christina Vanja eds., Universität und demokratische Bewegung: Ein Lesebuch zur 450-Jahrfeier der Philipps-Universität Marburg, Marburg, 1977, pp. 219-256; Arno Weckberger, "Gleichschaltung der Universität? Nationalsozialistische Verfolgung Heidelberger Hochschullehrer aus rassistischen und politischen Gründen," in Karin Buselmeier et al., Auch eine Geschichte der Universität Heidelberg, Mannheim, 1985, pp. 273-292; Jeremy Noakes, "The Ivory Tower Under Siege: German Universities in the Third Reich," Journal of European Studies 23 (1993), pp. 371-407; Richard Zneider, "The Nazis and the Professors: Social Origin, Professional Mobility, and Political Involvement of the Frankfurt University Faculty, 1933-1939," Journal of Social History 12 (1978), pp. 147-158; Michael H. Kater, "Medizinische Fakultäten und Medizinstudenten: Eine Skizze," in Fridolf Kudlien ed., Ärzte im Nationalsozialismus, Cologne, 1985, pp. 82-104; Volker Losemann, "Zur Konzeption der NS-Dozentenlager," in Manfred Heinemann ed., Erziehung und Schulung im Dritten Reich, Stuttgart, 1980, pp. 81-109; Michael H. Kater, "Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung an den deutschen Hochschulen: Zum politischen Verhalten akademischer Lehrer bis 1939," in Hans Jochen Vogel et al., Die Freiheit des Anderen: Festschrift für Martin Hirsch, Baden-Baden, 1981, pp. 49-75; Reece C. Kelly, "National Socialism and German University Teachers: The NSDAP's Effort to Create a National Socialist Professoriate and Scholarship." Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, 1973; Helmut Heiber, Universität untern Hakenkreuz, Part 1: Der Professor im Dritten Reich: Bilder aus der akademischen Provinz, Munich, 1991; Birgit Vézina, Die "Gleichschaltung" der Universität Heidelberg im Zuge der nationalsozialistischen Machtergreifung, Heidelberg, 1982; Gudrun Mieke, "Zur Rolle der Universität Rostock in der Zeit des Faschismus in den Jahren 1935-1945," Ph.D. diss., Rostock, 1968.

¹⁰ See Jürgen Schwarz, Studenten in der Weimarer Republik: Die deutsche Studentenschaft in der Zeit von 1918 bis 1923 und ihre Stellung zur Politik, Berlin, 1971; Wolfgang Kreutzberger, Studenten und Politik, 1918-1933: Der Fall Freiburg im Breisgau, Göttingen, 1972; Anselm Faust, Der Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund: Studenten und Nationalsozialismus in der Weimarer Republik, 2 vols. Düsseldorf, 1973; Michael H. Kater, Studentenschaft und Rechtsradikalismus in Deutschland 1918-1933: eine sozialgeschichtliche Studie zur Bildungskrise in der Weimarer Republik, Hamburg, 1975. Additional studies include: Peter Spitznagel, "Studentenschaft und Nationalsozialismus in Würzburg 1927-1933," Ph.D. diss., University of Würzburg, 1974; Hans Peter Bleuel and Ernst

Franze, who wrote the first local studies on the history of students in the Third Reich.¹¹ Adam's well-researched book on the University of Tübingen devotes only one lengthy chapter to students under Nazi rule and even it is confined to the recounting of major events. On the other hand, Franze's work deals with the organizational history of the National Socialist German Students' League (Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund or NSDStB) in detail but unfortunately it neglects other agencies and measures the Nazis used to indoctrinate and control students. This weakness was probably the result of a lack of sources (a problem which I have also encountered during my research in the Tübingen university archive). The first attempt to deal with other such organizations was made by Geoffrey J. Giles, who explored the rich deposit of files of the University of Hamburg to reconstruct the institutional history of the NSDStB in the Third Reich and to highlight changes in students' political behavior during Hitler's reign.¹² While Giles' work distinguishes itself with its masterly handling of the history of the local NSDStB, it pays much less attention to the social aspects of student life. Since the publication of Giles' book, similar studies have been published by Udo Jordan and Peter

Klindert, Deutsche Studenten auf dem Weg ins Dritte Reich: Ideologien, Programme, Aktionen, 1918-1935, Gütersloh, 1967; Rainer Pöppingshege, Absage an die Republik: Das politische Verhalten der Studentenschaft der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität Münster 1918-1935, Münster, 1994; Ulrich Linse, "Hochschulrevolution: Zur Ideologie und Praxis sozialistischer Studentengruppen während der deutschen Revolutionszeit 1918/19," Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 14 (1974), pp. 1-114; Michael Wortman, "Der Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund an der Universität Köln (1927-1933)," Geschichte in Köln 8 (October 1980), pp. 101-118; Ralf Fieberg, "Die Durchsetzung des Nationalsozialismus in der Giessener Studentenschaft vor 1933," in Hans-Jürgen Böhles ed., Frontabschnitt Hochschule: Die Giessener Universität im Nationalsozialismus, Giessen, 1982, pp. 38-67 and Wolfgang Zorn, "Student Politics in the Weimar Republic," Journal of Contemporary History 5 (1970), pp. 128-143.

¹¹ Uwe Dietrich Adam, Hochschule und Nationalsozialismus: Die Universität Tübingen im Dritten Reich, Tübingen, 1977; Manfred Franze, Die Erlanger Studentenschaft 1918-1945, Würzburg, 1972.

¹² Geoffrey J. Giles, Students and National Socialism in Germany, Princeton, 1985.

Chroust on Giessen and Gerda Stuchlik on Frankfurt am Main and Norbert Giovannini on Heidelberg.¹³ On the positive side, these local studies concern themselves equally with political and social history. However, with the exception of Chroust's work, which integrates local events nicely into a wider national framework, these studies often confine themselves to local events.

In addition, Jacques R. Pauwels and Irmgard Weyrather have filled an important gap in our understanding of Nazi anti-feminist ideas and political practice by examining the impact of their policies on female students.¹⁴ Despite the skillfulness that characterizes these works, both suffer from an important weakness: they fail to relate their narrow subjects to the larger body of literature on other aspects of Nazi educational policy. There are also a number of studies on the history of student fraternities, although the quality of these works varies greatly according to the qualifications and political agenda of their

¹³ Udo Jordan, "Studenten des Führers: Studentenschaft nach 1933," in Hans-Jürgen Böhles et al., Frontabschnitt Hochschule: Die Giessener Universität im Nationalsozialismus, Giessen, 1982, pp. 68-99; Gerda Stuchlik, Goethe im Braunhemd: Universität Frankfurt 1933-1945, Frankfurt am Main, 1984; Norbert Giovannini, Zwischen Republik und Faschismus: Heidelberger Studentinnen und Studenten 1918-1945, Weinheim, 1990; Peter Chroust, Giessener Universität und Faschismus: Studenten und Hochschullehrer 1918-1945, 2 vols., Münster, 1994. See also Christoph Dorner and Lemhöfer Lutz, Die Braune Machtergreifung: Universität Frankfurt 1930-1945, Frankfurt am Main, 1989; Eckhard John and Martin Bernd eds., Die Freiburger Universität in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus, Freiburg and Würzburg, 1991; Wolfgang Schumann, "Die Universität Jena in der Zeit des deutschen Faschismus (1933-1945)," in the University of Jena ed., Geschichte der Universität Jena: Festgabe zum vierhundertjährigen Universitätsjubiläum, Jena, 1958, pp. 615-620; Thomas Pester, Geschichte der Universitäten und Hochschulen im deutschsprachigen Raum von den Anfängen bis 1945: Auswahlbibliographie der Literatur der Jahre 1945-1986, Jena, 1990.

¹⁴ Jacques R. Pauwels, Women, Nazis, and Universities: Female University Students in the Third Reich, 1933-1945, Westport, Conn., 1984; Irmgard Weyrather, "Numerus Clausus für Frauen - Studentinnen im Nationalsozialismus," in Frauengruppe Faschismusforschung, Mutterkreuz und Arbeitsbuch: Zur Geschichte der Frauen in der Weimarer Republik und im Nationalsozialismus, Frankfurt am Main, 1981, pp. 131-162. For a general survey see Lothar Mertens, Vernachlässigte Töchter der Alma Mater: Ein sozialhistorischer und bildungssoziologischer Beitrag zur strukturellen Entwicklung des Frauenstudiums in Deutschland seit der Jahrhundertwende, Berlin, 1991.

respective authors.¹⁵ Finally, during the research and writing of this dissertation Michael Grüttner published the first comprehensive study of the social and political history of students in the Third Reich.¹⁶ The areas which he deals with in his survey include: the history of the NSDStB; the role of students in the Nazi takeover of universities; changes in the social structure of the student body; female students and lastly the Nazification of the curriculum and student life during the war.

Grüttner bases his conclusions both on a close reading of the secondary literature and his own research. His synthesis represents an important stage in the research of students' history in the Third Reich. However, even his, otherwise excellent, work suffers from two weaknesses. First, Grüttner often fails to test his partial conclusions against the larger body of literature in other fields of Nazi social and political history. Even more importantly, he tends to interpret Nazi rhetoric not as the declaration of intentions and long-term goals but disguises for personal ambitions and organizational interests. By

¹⁵ See Friedhelm Golücke ed., Korporationen und Nationalsozialismus, Schernfeld, 1989; Michael S. Steinberg, Sabers and Brown Shirts: The German Students' Path to National Socialism 1918-1935, Chicago, 1977; Peter Stitz, Der CV 1919-1938: Der hochschulpolitische Weg des Cartellverbandes der katholischen deutschen Studentenverbindungen (CV) vom Ende des ersten Weltkrieges bis zur Vernichtung durch den Nationalsozialismus, Munich, 1970; Erich Bauer, "Die Kameradschaften im Bereiche des Kösener SC in den Jahren 1937-1945," Einst und Jetzt: Jahrbuch des Vereins für corpsstudentische Geschichtsforschung 1 (1956), pp. 5-40; Rolf-Joachim Baum et al., 1582-1982: Studentenschaft und Korporationswesen an der Universität Würzburg, Würzburg, 1982; Horst Bernhardt, "Die Göttinger Burschenschaft 1933 bis 1945: Ein Beitrag zur studentischen Geschichte in der nationalsozialistischen Zeit," in Paul Wentzcke ed., Darstellungen und Quellen zur Geschichte der deutschen Einheitsbewegung im neunzehnten und zwanzigsten Jahrhundert, vol. 1, Heidelberg, 1957, pp. 205-248; Hans König, Burschen, Knoten und Philister: Erlanger Studentenleben von 1743 bis 1983, Nürnberg, 1983; Manfred Studier, Der Corpsstudent als Idealbild der Wilhelmischen Ära: Untersuchungen zum Zeitgeist 1888 bis 1914, Schernfeld, 1990; Peter Krause, "O alte Burschenherrlichkeit:" Die Studenten und ihr Brauchtum, Graz, 1979; Emil Popp, Zur Geschichte des Königsberger Studententums 1900-1945, Würzburg, 1955. On Austrian fraternities see Dieter A. Binder, Politischer Katholizismus und Katholisches Verbandswesen: Am Beispiel des Kartellverbandes der katholischen nichtfarbentragenden Studentenverbindungen Österreichs (OKV), Schernfeld, 1989.

¹⁶ Michael Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, Paderborn, 1995.

arguing that changes under Nazi rule were the result of improvisations, unintended outcomes of bureaucratic struggles and the consequences of socio-economic transformations that were beyond Nazi control, Grüttner reinforces a strong tendency of earlier works.¹⁷ Thus, Grüttner' argument bears close resemblance that of Franze, who contends that Nazi plans did not go beyond the negation of the bourgeois values of Weimar universities.¹⁸ He also seems to agree with the conclusion of Aharon F. Kleinberger and Reece C. Kelly, who assert that apart from the inability of the regime to clearly demarcate areas of responsibility, it was the lack of an overall conception and the dilettantism of Nazi leaders that were mainly responsible for the regime's failure to create a new science and university system.¹⁹

This underestimation of the importance of ideological concerns is not limited to the above authors. It reflects a general tendency detectable in the works of 'functionalist' historians. In contrast to the 'intentionalists', who tend to perceive major events as the results of the intentions of actors in general and those of Hitler in particular, Tim Mason argues, 'functionalists' place more emphasis on impersonal forces such as the symbolic role of Hitler, the machinery of government and bureaucratic infighting. They contend that the leaders of the Nazi Party and state bureaucracies shared no common goals, except for their vague idea to make government and society more national socialist. Engaged in a

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 473-474.

¹⁸ Franze, *Die Erlanger Studentenschaft*, p. 377.

¹⁹ Aharon F. Kleinberger, "Gab es eine nationalsozialistische Hochschulpolitik?", in Manfred Heinemann ed., *Erziehung und Schulung im Dritten Reich*, vol. 2, Stuttgart, 1980, pp. 9-30; Reece C. Kelly, "Die gescheiterte nationalsozialistische Personalpolitik und die misslungene Entwicklung der nationalsozialistischen Hochschulen," in Heinemann ed., *Erziehung und Schulung im Dritten Reich*, vol. 2, pp. 61-76.

Social Darwinian struggle for power, these leaders sought the easiest route to success; they selected negative goals, such as the persecution of defenseless minorities, and pursued these goals with unprecedented radicalism in order to defend their position in the Nazi bureaucracy on the one hand, and to prove their zeal on the other. This radicalism led to permanent mobilization of the Nazi movement and state, which, taken as an end in itself, brought Germany and Europe into war and genocide.²⁰

This 'functionalist' approach has helped historians to shed light both on the process of policy-formulation and bureaucratic intrigues that either furthered or hindered the realization of Nazi plans. It has encouraged historians to look at what separated various state and Party organizations from one another. However, this approach has been less successful in explaining what united competing state and Party organizations. In the field of Nazi policy towards students, for example, one may ask the question of whether the numerus clausus imposed by the Reich Ministry of the Interior on the admission of non-'Aryans' in April 1933 had anything to do with expulsion of politically unreliable students from the universities after the Nazi takeover. Were the administrators in this ministry motivated by the same goals as the Nazi students in the DSt and NSDStB, who never gave up their plan to herd all male students into Kameradschaft houses and into Party organizations during the Third Reich? Why did the arguments used by the DSt to justify the introduction of compulsory Labor Service bear so close resemblance to those of the German Student-Aid Foundation, which advocated the regular and compulsory

²⁰ See Tim Mason, "Intentions and Explanation: A Current Controversy about the Interpretation of National Socialism," in Gergard Hirschfeld and Lothar Kettenacker eds., Der 'Führerstaat'; Mythos und

medical examination of students? Why did the more conservative administrators in the REM resort to the same kind of rhetoric to excuse the expulsion of presumably indolent students during the last years of the war as their political opponents in the Reich Student Leadership, who wanted to make the admission of students dependent on membership in the Nazi Party?

In this work, I argue that every state and Party organization involved in setting the goals of Nazi policy towards university students subscribed to the same goal: they all wanted to transform German universities along ideological lines. They all accepted that the purpose of their activities should be nothing less than “the creation of a new genus of student, the creation of a new genus of university teacher, and the development of a new concept of scholarship.”²¹ Although the opinions of Nazi educators and politicians differed on the question of how to achieve these goals (the disagreement was especially obvious in regards to immediate priorities and the pace of change), they all agreed that students should be selected on the basis of racial and political criteria.

Indeed, it was this general agreement about the importance of racial and political criteria in the selection process which gave Nazi education policy its character and separated it from its counterparts in Imperial Germany and the Weimar Republic. By selection, Nazi educators and politicians understood two diametrically opposed, yet logically connected, sets of political practices. They described the negative aspect of selection as elimination (Ausmerze). The Nazis used this term to justify repressive

Realität, Stuttgart, 1981, pp. 23-40.

²¹ Bracher, The German Dictatorship, p. 268.

measures against people whose existence they perceived to be pernicious to the healthy development of the 'national community': the hereditary ill, those whom the Nazis referred to as asocials, homosexuals, members of other races, especially Jews. On the other hand, the positive aspect of selection, usually mentioned in the documents as support (Förderung), referred to policies and measures that aimed at improving the chances of the full members of the 'national community' to realize their abilities. Finally, the term selection referred to training procedures and political practices that aimed at choosing the members of the future Nazi elite. Although proof of 'Aryan' ancestry became a prerequisite for future membership in the Nazi elite, it alone (like social status and professional qualification) did not guarantee automatic entry into the most politically privileged groups. Instead, the Nazis emphasized the importance of the principles of loyalty (Treue) and willingness to serve (Dienstwilligkeit) as the basis for the selection of future leaders. These principles implied the internalization of the Nazi variety of racism and the eagerness to carry out the commands of the Nazi leaders even if they went against basic rules of morality.²²

The application of racial and political criteria in the admission and treatment of students marked a new stage in the politicization of German universities after 1933. It signaled, at least at the level of intention, a radical departure from the two principles upon which the admission of high-school students were based both in Imperial Germany and the Weimar Republic: the high social status of students' parents (the high cost associated with secondary education represented a serious financial burden for lower-middle-class families

²² Harald Scholtz, Erziehung und Unterricht unterm Hakenkreuz, Göttingen, 1985, pp. 145-159.

and virtually barred working-class children from ever obtaining jobs that required more than a primary-school education) and respectable achievement by the candidates themselves at secondary schools.²³ While Nazi leaders, including Hitler, continued to give lip service to the merit principle after 1933, they also considered, at least in theory, demonstrated talent in the chosen fields of study less important than political reliability and racial purity. Had they applied political and racial criteria consistently to the selection of students, the result would have been disastrous: it would have probably led to an even greater decline in the quality of students in the Third Reich than actually occurred. Indeed, in the long run, the politicization of admission criteria would have worked towards the exclusion of an ever increasing number of candidates. This tendency, which had been already manifest in the imposition of restrictions on the admission of Jews, the politically unreliable, the asocial and the allegedly unhealthy, would have led to the creation of even more elitist institutions, perhaps not dissimilar to universities in the Communist states of Eastern Europe, where, after a short revolutionary period, the introduction of political criteria progressively narrowed the number of groups from which the regime recruited the student population.

Since the Nazi ideal of selection aimed at measuring and evaluating the whole personality of candidates, the stakes in the outcome of the Nazified selection procedures were correspondingly high: membership in the academic community on the one hand, and

²³ However, reality did not completely conform to the state's ideal. While there was a considerable influx of lower middle-class students in the last decades of the nineteenth century, the low standards of students, who remained preoccupied with the pleasures of student life and cared little about their studies, remained a constant complaint of educators throughout the Second Empire. See Konrad H. Jarausch, Students,

destruction of individual careers and the possibility of exclusion from the racially based 'national community' on the other. Whether or not the selection procedures were successful, and hence whether or not the Nazi regime realized its ideological goals, is the subject of this dissertation. Secondly, it examines those elements of the selection procedures which were not directly related to the utopian goal of creating a new genus of student. More specifically, this work is concerned with the impact of the selection procedures on the behavior of the enforcers and students. Thus, it focuses on the seductive side of Nazi rule as it manifested itself in the co-option of academic administrators, doctors, and apolitical students who, by accepting power from the Nazi state to enforce its laws, became the local representatives of the Nazi regime. Moreover, the selection procedures served to instill fear into the student population; they aimed at intimidating students by demonstrating to them the theoretically unlimited power of the Nazi state. Finally, the Nazis used the same procedures to nurture an artificial sense of pride in Gentile and healthy students at the expense of their non-'Aryan' and allegedly sick counterparts. Thus, the selection procedures encouraged the acceptance of Nazi ideology and inculcated political conformity among German students. Whether or not the Nazis realized these additional goals constitutes the secondary theme of this dissertation.

The goal of this work is to explore new fields in student history and to explain development in these fields on the basis of unexplored sources. Thus, Chapter One and Chapter Three drew primarily upon on the rich and hitherto largely neglected sources of

the German Student-Aid Foundation. Chapter Two relies mainly on the relevant, and again hitherto inadequately explored, files of the Reich Ministry of Education and the Reich Student Leadership. The final chapter is based on the third set of neglected primary sources, which include the hundreds of applications by non-‘Aryan’ students addressed to the rectors of individual universities, the Reich Ministry of Education, the Ministry of the Interior, the state ministries, the Party Chancellery and district Party offices. My approach to these sources was greatly influenced by the methodology worked out by Detlev Peukert and other social historians belonging to the Alltagsgeschichte (history of everyday-life) school.²⁴ Thus, this work focuses not on the bureaucratic struggles that led to the creation of certain orders and procedures but on the impact of the same procedures on a social group (in this case, students). Instead of drawing attention to the problem of policy formulation, this work examines the difficulties that the Nazi authorities faced in enforcing their policies. Finally, this dissertation sheds light on the qualitative changes that Nazi selection procedures induced in the attitudes, mentalities and value systems of students.

Finally, I shall put forward a disclaimer and say a few words about the organization of the dissertation. This dissertation is not intended to provide an synthesis on student life in the Third Reich. Thus, it does not seek to address issues that have been adequately discussed in other works. Instead, it concentrates on four, hitherto neglected, or insufficiently researched, areas in the following order: Chapter One examines what the terms of elimination and support entailed in Nazi student aid policy. It focuses on the

²⁴ On the methodology of this school see See Detlev Peukert, Inside Nazi Germany: Conformity and Opposition in Everyday Life, London, 1987, pp. 21-25.

question of how the Nazi principle of selection was applied in the apportioning of student aid and whether the Third Reich provided sufficient support not only for Nazi activists but also for average students. Chapter Two looks at Nazi attitudes towards foreign students in the context of Nazi foreign policy. It examines how the concept of selection was applied to various ethnic groups, especially during the Second World War. The third chapter deals with the policy of student health services, which was propagated by the German Student-Aid Foundation as the main instrument of selection based on physical characteristics and health. It focuses on the fate of both compulsory medical examination and on the enforcement of racial laws aimed at the expulsion of allegedly unhealthy students. Chapter Four deals with the origins and implementation of Nazi policy towards Jewish and part-Jewish students. It sheds light on the process of radicalization, which led to the barring of Jews from German universities in 1938. Second, it examines the confusion and uncertainty that characterized Nazi policy towards part-Jews, many of whom continued to attend universities until the end of 1944. Finally, the conclusion draws a balance sheet of Nazi successes and failures and explains the sources of contradictions in Nazi policy towards university students.

Chapter One: Nazi Student-Aid Policy

Until very recently, the social history of German university students in the Third Reich has been a neglected field of study. Only in the last decade have historians paid some attention to the social aspects of university life in Hitler's Germany. The pioneering works by Titze, Jaraus, Kleinberger, Giles and Chroust have put the changes in students' numbers, faculties and social backgrounds in a historical perspective.¹ They conclude that the social measures of the Nazi government such as the restriction of admission to various faculties, quotas on the enrollment of female students, the purging of Jews and politically unreliable elements from the universities, the introduction of labor and military service and Nazi anti-intellectualism hastened but did not cause the decline in student numbers. This in fact had begun a few years before the Nazis came to power in 1933. The sudden drop in student enrollment should rather be attributed to demographic shifts, the pauperization of the middle classes during the Great Depression and bad prospects for employment after graduation. Similarly, the rise in student numbers after 1939 was the result of an increased number of high-school graduates and an improved outlook for future employment. Pauwels and Stephenson demonstrated that the misogyny

¹ Hartmut Titze, "Die zyklische Überproduktion von Akademikern im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert," Geschichte und Gesellschaft 10 (1984), pp. 92-121; Morris Beatus, "Akademic Proletariat: The Problem of Overcrowding in the Learned Professions and Universities during the Weimar Republic 1918-1933," Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1975; Konrad H. Jaraus, Deutsche Studenten, 1800-1970, Frankfurt am Main, 1984, pp. 176-186; Aharon F. Kleinberger, "Gab es eine nationalsozialistische Hochschulpolitik?" in Manfred Heinemann ed., Erziehung und Schulung im Dritten Reich, vol. 2, Stuttgart, 1980, pp. 9-30; for local studies see Geoffrey J. Giles, Students and National Socialism, pp. 240-242; Peter Chroust, "Social Situation and Political Orientation-Students and Professors

of Nazi leaders, conservative teachers and students had only a temporary and limited impact on the university attendance and future employment of female students in the Third Reich.² There are also excellent studies on the development of individual faculties during this period. Kater's book on the medical profession ties the unprecedented popularity of the medical faculty among students to excellent opportunities for employment after 1938, the more obvious ideological infiltration of other faculties such as law, and the preferential treatment of medical students during the war.³ Jarausch argues that the financial position, if not the status, of future lawyers, engineers and teachers slightly improved under the Third Reich.⁴ At the other end of the spectrum, the Protestant and Catholic theology faculties suffered serious losses in prestige and student enrollment under Nazi rule. There is also a consensus among historians on the impact of Nazi social policy on students. In contradiction to the professed goals and propaganda of the Nazi state, universities remained virtually closed to the working classes. In fact, the educated middle classes regained some of their former dominance, at least until the outbreak of the war. Although the lack of information does not allow us to fully reconstruct the social background of students during the second half of the war, it seems certain that no major change took

at Giessen University, 1918-1945," Historical Social Research — Historische Sozialforschung 38 (April 1986), pp. 41-96.

² Jacques R. Pauwels, Women, Nazis, and Universities: Female University Students in the Third Reich, 1933-1945, Westport, Conn., 1984; Jill Stephenson, The Nazi Organization of Women, London, 1981; for the Weimar period see Michael H. Kater, "Krisis des Frauenstudiums in der Weimarer Republik," Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial-und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 59 (1972), pp. 207-255.

³ The chapter also deals with the social background and political affiliations of medical students, see Michael H. Kater, Doctors Under Hitler, pp. 150-169; for the impact of politics upon the choice of other faculties such as law and humanities see Herald Scholtz, Erziehung und Unterricht unterm Hakenkreuz, Göttingen, 1985, p. 184; also Gerda Stuchlik, Goethe im Braunhemd, p. 121; Hartmut Titze, Der Akademikerzyklus: Historische Untersuchung über die Wiederkehr von Überfüllung und Mangel in akademischen Karrieren, Göttingen, 1990, pp. 70-85; Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, pp. 126-125.

place in this period that would alter our view of the social composition of the student population.⁵ The social history of students shows a remarkable continuity with the Weimar period and parallels the general development of European and American societies in the first half of the twentieth century.⁶

This chapter examines the changes in social support for students in the Third Reich. More specifically, it is concerned with the attempt of the Nazi state to use student aid to realize its idea of selection in respect to university students. As has been alluded to in the introduction, the Nazi idea of selection had two aspects: elimination of the unwanted and support for the full members and future leaders of the Nazi 'national community'. This chapter will show that these aspects were interrelated: support presupposed membership in the 'national community' and fostered both conformity and acceptance of the Nazi regime. Whether the Nazi regime came closer to the realization of this 'national community' at the university level and whether students who were not directly affected by the eliminationist aspect of selection felt more tied to Hitler's state because of its generous student-aid policy are the subjects of this chapter.

This section first looks at the changes in state subsidies to the German Student-Aid Foundation, the influence of the Nazi takeover of other sources of student income and expenditure like part-time work, family support, university fees and monthly costs of maintenance and studying. Then, it discusses the attempt of the German Student-Aid

⁴ Jaraus, The Unfree Professions, pp. 158-167, 180-189, 196-210.

⁵ Jaraus, Deutsche Studenten, pp. 181-187; Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, pp. 136-140; Giles, Students and National Socialism, p. 242; David Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution: Class and Status in Nazi Germany 1933-1939, New York, 1967, p. 264.

Foundation to centralize scholarships in order to facilitate a more equitable distribution of aid. Finally, it examines the politicization of various branches of student aid and explains the reactions of students and academics to the Nazification of social services.

The Weimar Republic had witnessed an unprecedented involvement of the state in student aid. The main social organization of students, the German Student-Aid Foundation, received a considerable amount of starting capital from the Interior Ministry in 1922 and continued to draw the larger part of its budget from state sources during the Weimar Republic. After 1918, the state became involved in the remission of university fees and the distribution of loans and grants as well. It helped to create the first central loan bank, which provided thousands of students with the funds to complete their studies. The first truly national scholarship, the Study Foundation of the German People (Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes) was established and maintained with state support. Central and state governments provided large amounts of money for the building and maintenance of student eateries, houses and dormitories. Finally, the state gave unparalleled amounts of money to finance compulsory medical examinations and covered at least part of the cost that students suffering from tuberculosis incurred for treatment in sanitariums both in Germany and abroad.

In spite of the unprecedented degree of state involvement in student welfare, there was no comprehensive plan behind the social policy of the Weimar regime towards students. Student aid during the Weimar Republic was characterized by ad hoc measures

⁶ Hartmut Kaelble, Social Mobility in the 19th and 20th Centuries: Europe and America in Comparative Perspective, Leamington Spa, 1985, pp. 58-80.

designed to mitigate the devastating impact of the war upon students' lives. The Weimar state, born amidst revolutionary upheaval, lacked the will to pursue a radical course and, in the case of social policy towards students, the imagination for democratic experiments. The state entered this field only reluctantly; its measures were characterized by a desire to return to the order and normalcy of the imperial period. Inadequate state support, coupled with the general indifference of society towards the plight of students and the failure of fraternities to provide financial help and patronage for their members made the lives of most students extremely difficult during the Weimar Republic. Kater submits that poverty and gloomy prospects for employment after graduation contributed to the radicalization and Nazi infiltration of this important social group before 1933.⁷

The frugality of the Weimar state in this field was in part rooted in the financial difficulties of the state and the political short-sightedness of its leaders. Further, the survival of nineteenth-century liberal ideas only reinforced this tendency. University study continued to be seen as a private matter, one to be pursued on the basis of the talent and inner calling of the individual. The continuing dominance of these liberal ideals ensured that there was a widely shared aversion among both government officials and academics towards the use of university study as a legitimate channel for social mobility. This perception of students' activity went hand in hand with the conviction that the financing of university study should also be the responsibility of individuals and their families. Perpetuating the class arrogance of nineteenth-century academics, who often equated property with intellectual excellence, many university professors and politicians in the

⁷ Kater, Studentenschaft und Rechtsradikalismus, pp. 73-95.

conservative and liberal camps welcomed the onset of the economic depression and the overcrowding of the job market as the best way to dam the flood of students from the lower middle classes. Many of them argued that the denial of social assistance for poor students should be used as a substitute for the limitation of student numbers by governmental decree.⁸

The limited availability of aid made university even less attractive for students from the lower classes. Student aid did little to rectify the injustices enshrined in the system of admission to, and financing of, university study. The decentralized character of student aid, itself a remnant of the liberal past, reinforced this trend. The limited resources distributed on an ad hoc basis by a large number of agencies with little or no contact with one another offered poor students few prospects for adequate and continuous support. Secondly, the system of selection for scholarships and other forms of aid kept lower-middle-class students at a disadvantageous position. The criteria for selection reflected the upper-middle-class prejudices of administrators. The emphasis placed upon character and behavior gave preference to candidates who were born and raised in the milieu of the educated bourgeoisie. At the level of individual universities and municipalities, patronage, family ties, regional attachments and the religion of applicants often determined the distribution of student aid. Class prejudices embodied in the selection process, and the distribution of meager resources on an unsystematic basis made the use of financial and material help as the basis of a comprehensive social policy towards students impossible.

⁸ For a polemic against the use of student aid for this purpose see the referendum by Tillmann in Umschau in der Studentischen Selbsthilfearbeit, Sonderheft, October 1932. [n.p.]

Students hoped that the new Nazi government would radically change aid policy. There were realistic grounds for their expectations. The record of the Nazi movement was exceptionally good with respect to student affairs. The Nazi Party never formally abandoned its original program, which advocated access for talented members of all social classes to university. Supported by the left wing of the Nazi Party, the impetuous Wilhelm Tempel, who headed the National Socialist German Student League until 1928, steered the Nazi student organization in a revolutionary direction. For Tempel and his comrades, the fight for the realization of the original Feder program meant a drastic change in dominant ideas about the nature of university study. Radical Nazi students perceived studying as a public affair — a matter of paramount importance for the survival of the German nation. Related to this change in paradigm was the argument that university study should be at least in part financed by the state. University fees should be determined by parents' income as the first step toward their abolition. Even after the defeat of the left wing of the Party in 1928, the NSDStB did not retract from its revolutionary ideas. Under a new and much more conservative leader, Baldur von Schirach, the NSDStB remained the most effective advocate of students' social interests. Nazi students continued to criticize Weimar governments, university administrations and student fraternities for their unwillingness to ease the financial burden of university study and improve chances of employment after graduation. The unmistakably sympathetic attitude of the Nazi leadership towards the plight of students and young academics, an attitude that often manifested itself in such practical measures as short-term loans, grants, part-time jobs or hot meals, helped to make the Nazi movement popular among students. Under the impact

of the Depression, perhaps the majority of students came to believe that the Nazi leaders had both the right ideas and the will to improve their lives dramatically.⁹

However, the Nazi takeover in January 1933 did not lead to a sudden change in the position of students. True, letters showing the desperate financial situation of students and their unbroken faith in the good intentions of Nazi leaders continued to flood the cultural ministries, Party agencies and student organizations as late as 1935.¹⁰ Students with outstanding records in the Nazi movement and their close relatives with similar distinctions shamelessly demanded compensation for their contribution to Hitler's victory.¹¹ As time went on, these letters increasingly displayed the frustration of their composers. They expressed the fear of many Nazis and fellow travelers that their leaders might renege on their promises to increase support for students. Occasionally, such as in the case of an Old Fighter who demanded a scholarship for his son, the issue of assistance took on a symbolic significance. He reminded the ministry of education in Saxony that "the question is whether one takes now the old fighter and soldier of Adolf Hitler seriously. If this is not the case, at least they should have the courage to tell me where things stand."¹² These letters also suggest that many students and their relatives, especially in small and closely knit communities, considered scholarships not only a compensation for their services but a confirmation of their special relationship with the state as well. This

⁹ Kater, Studentenschaft und Rechtsradikalismus, pp. 111-117.

¹⁰ This conclusion is based upon the reading of a sample of approximately 100 applications in the SHSA. See the collection of letters and documents in SHSA, Akten des Kultusministeriums, Nr. 15 819, 15822, 15831.

¹¹ Erik Hübner, Truppführer im Stab der SA Gruppen Sachsen to Kultusministerium, [1933], SHSA, Akten des Kultusministeriums, Nr. 10245/79, pp. 202-203.

subjective aspect of student aid is discernible from a letter written by a Party member, who had two sons, both holding leadership positions in the lower hierarchy of the Hitler Youth. The father asked for financial assistance and argued that a positive response to his application would prove that the Nazi regime did not abandon its supporters.¹³ Desperate for help, a few degraded themselves by catering, and in the process conforming, to the most repulsive aspect of Nazi ideology. A student, for example, argued that the deprivation of his family, which was presumably the result of his father's dismissal by the Jewish owner of a textile factory because of his protection of German manual workers, should be compensated by a generous award of student aid.¹⁴

Acting under pressure from students in the NSDStB, the SA and other Party agencies, the Prussian Ministry of Education, soon followed by other states, withdrew scholarships from Jews and political opponents of the regime in April 1933. The same order stipulated that members of the SA and SS, who had fought for Nazi victory before 1933, had to be given priority in the distribution of student aid by state governments, universities and student organizations.¹⁵ However, the procurement of a few hundred scholarships through the elimination of these groups was inadequate to solve the pressing social problems of the student population. Letters continued to pour in, but the cultural ministries and Party agencies simply channeled these requests to the overburdened and

¹² See unsigned letter to the Rector of the University of Leipzig, May 25, 1933, SHSA, Akten des Kultusministeriums, Nr. 10245/79, p. 97.

¹³ See anonymous letter to Bayerisches Staatsministerium, April 28, 1933, BHSA, MK 40782.

¹⁴ See unsigned letter to Sächs. Kultusministerium, May 13, 1934, SHSA, Akten des Kultusministeriums, Nr. 10245/79, p. 154.

¹⁵ Erlass d. Preussischen Minister für Wiss., Erz., und Volksbildung, von 22 April 1933, UI Nr. 21 086.1, in SHSA, Akten des Kultusministeriums Nr. 10245/79.

inadequately financed universities and the local student-aid foundations. These local institutions received no substantial increase in government subsidies. In fact, one of the first acts of the new government was to lower the amount of money sent each year to the German Student-Aid Foundation. To add insult to injury, in February 1933, the Finance Ministry hesitated to pay out the half a million marks that had been set aside for the Germans Student-Aid Foundation in the previous central budget. The postponement of the transfer of subsidies became a source of instant resentment among students.¹⁶ This first budget crisis set the tone for future negotiations between the German Student-Aid Foundation and the cultural and financial ministries. In 1935, the recently renamed Reichsstudentenwerk (Reich Student Services or RStW) unsuccessfully requested the Finance Ministry to allow the distribution of at least part of the security fund of the central organization to individual students.¹⁷ The head of the RStW, Hanns Streit, pleaded desperately for more money. He repeated old arguments about the state's obligation to improve access to university and subsidize at least part of its costs. Streit even appealed to Hitler's dictum that the financial support of the future elite should be a priority.¹⁸ However, as Table 1 demonstrates, the Nazi state continued to cut financial help for the RStW until the outbreak of war.

¹⁶ Gustav Benrodt, "Die Geschäftsberichte des Deutschen Studentenwerkes: Eine kritische Betrachtung seiner Finanzwirtschaft," Deutsche Philologen, 1 February, 1933, pp. 53-55, in BA Koblenz, ZSg, 129/122.

¹⁷ RStW to REM, September 9, 1935, BA Koblenz, R 21/10.931, pp. 38-39; also Reichsminister der Finanzen to REM, November 18, 1935, BA Koblenz, R 21/10.931, p. 96.

Year	Contribution of the central government
1924	1 936,767.00
1925	3 000,000.00
1926	2 684,500.00
1927	3 056,500.00
1928	4 063,000.00
1929	3 031,000.00
1930	2.748,000.00
1931	1 808,500.00
1932	1 576,100.00
1933	1 583,935.00
1934	1 520,400.00
1935	1 223,288.00
1936	1 117,837.00
1937	1 052,000.00
1938	238,000.00

These data make it clear that Nazi leaders had broken their earlier promises to provide more aid and radically improve students' lives. Rather than increasing its support, the Reich had lowered its yearly subsidies to the German Student-Aid Foundation.

Furthermore, the Nazi state took a significant part of this contribution back in the form of increased taxes on the students' social organizations.²⁰ By forcing the RStW to channel part of its income into the operation of the Kameradschaft houses and the Nazified health services, the Nazi state made the financial problems of this organization even more acute.

The expansion of the services of the RStW to students in vocational schools in 1935

¹⁸ Streit to REM, December 13, 1935, BA Koblenz, R 21/10.931, pp. 98-112.

¹⁹ "Der Kampf um den Reichszuschuss," Umschau der Studentenwerke, Nr. 24, June 1939. [n.p.]

²⁰ In 1937 the Reich Student Services and its local offices paid 183 078 marks in taxes. Thus, the state got back almost one fifth of its subsidies in that year. See "Steuerlasten der Studentenwerke 1937," Umschau der Studentenwerke, Nr. 23, January 1939. [n.p.]

stretched the meager resources of this organization to its limits.²¹ Since Reich subsidies declined more rapidly after 1933 than did the number of students, there was less money available per student after the Nazi victory than had been the case in the last years of the Weimar Republic. Further, the rapid decline in admissions, a process that can, at least in part, be attributed to the measures of the Nazi government, lowered the income of the universities and student-aid foundations. Lower income from fees, in turn, meant that there was less money for student welfare. Finally, the gradual erosion of financial aid was not accompanied by an equivalent decline in the number of applications for assistance, a discrepancy that can be attributed to the slow improvement in students' living standards after 1933. The inadequacy of state support was so great that the RStW asked for a tripling of state contributions from the 1937 level to cover the most urgent needs of students in 1939.²²

The lack of positive measures to increase student aid was accompanied by a reluctance to use the bureaucratic power of the state to lower costs. The passivity of the Nazi state in the field of social policy towards students becomes clear from the statistics of the Reich Student Services. This organization annually published its estimate of the monthly cost of maintenance and studying until the end of the war.²³ Although these statistics suffer from some deficiencies, they do suggest that the costs of maintenance and studying remained high for students during the Third Reich. Students in humanities and

²¹ REM to RStW, October 16, 1935, BA Koblenz, R 21/10.931, pp. 47-48.

²² "Der Kampf um den Reichszuschuss," *Umschau der Studentenwerke*, Nr. 24, June 1939.

²³ Since the estimate of monthly cost of maintenance and studying is based upon the estimated medium costs, they cannot be directly applied to individual cases. See *Der Deutsche Hochschulführer: Lebens-und*

arts paid 160-180 marks per semester in various university fees; the figure for students of medicine and the natural sciences was 200-250 marks, while technology students paid 180-200 marks. On the average, students paid 30-100 marks for course-related books, stationery and instruments. The monthly cost of maintenance (food and lodging) without the use of student eateries was around 120-130 marks per month; since food was less expensive in student eateries, with the use of these facilities, the minimum cost was 65-90 marks.²⁴ Thus, in 1937, the average cost of maintenance and studying was 545 marks in summer semester and 676 marks during the winter semester. Student paid more during winter semester because it lasted longer: four instead of three months.²⁵

High costs continued to exclude working-class children from universities and placed a serious financial burden upon middle-class families. Students had to study at least 8 semesters to obtain a degree in evangelical theology, philosophy, law, natural science, economic, forestry. They had to pay at least 5,300 marks in fees and for maintenance. Students of machine engineering, underground and surface engineering, electronics, shipbuilding, mining engineering, mining surveying, metallurgy also studied 8 semesters but their costs, because of the higher fees, were about 5,800 marks. The most expensive course was medicine. Students of this faculty studied 6 semesters but paid 8,600 marks in study-related and living costs. An intermediate position was occupied by students in veterinary science, who studied 9 semesters and paid 6,500 marks.²⁶

Studienverhältnisse an den Hochschulen des deutschen Sprachgebietes, edited by the RStW and the Reich Student Leadership, Berlin and Leipzig, 1933-1945, in StAWü, RSF, I*6 y 535.

²⁴ See Der Deutsche Hochschulführer, Nr. 19, 1937, pp. 24-26.

²⁵ Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 141.

²⁶ See Der Deutsche Hochschulführer, Nr. 15, 1933, p. 11.

The state could have defrayed these costs by a dramatic increase in wages and salaries of students' parents. However, rearmament forced the Nazi government to curtail consumption by depressing wages and salaries. In spite of this policy, wages and salaries increased in the second half of the 1930s; however, this trend did not affect every profession and occupation in the same way and to the same extent. Although workers benefited from full employment and increased wages, especially in armament industries, their wages remained insufficient to cover the costs of university studies. On the other hand, middle-class salaries tended to stagnate or only slowly increase until 1939.²⁷

The lack of state interest in student welfare made a mockery of the socialist slogans that had attracted many students to the Nazi cause before 1933. Paradoxically, until 1939, the Nazi regime had not significantly strayed from the liberal ideas that had traditionally informed policy towards students: studying and its financing remained primarily the concern of individuals and their families. The reluctance of the state to increase the amount of money available for student aid continued to block open access to university. It also gave clear advantages to children from middle- and upper-class families vis-à-vis their lower-middle-class counterparts. The exclusion of non-'Aryan', socialist, pacifist and biologically unfit students from aid did little to improve the financial position of the majority of students. Thus, the regime's conservative social policy deprived the state of an important instrument for influencing student behavior and further alienated students from the Nazi regime before 1939.

²⁷ See Peukert, Inside Nazi Germany, pp. 111-116; Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution, pp. 230-231.

However, the war provided the Nazi state with a new opportunity to finally prove its revolutionary reputation. A dramatic increase in state contributions to the budget of the RStW during the war suggests that the Nazi state perceived and acted upon this opportunity. By 1943, state subsidies to this organization had surpassed even the highest levels achieved under Weimar.²⁸ A significant amount of money was set aside for war veterans, soldiers and their families.²⁹ Introduced by the REM in April 1941, special state support (Sonderförderung) provided discharged or temporally released soldiers with a monthly allowance (between 50 and 100 marks) and ordered the universities to remit at least part of their fees.³⁰ The special state support significantly increased the number of student aid recipients. At a few technical universities, where female students still continued to make up a small minority, at least two out of three students received some sort of support in 1942.³¹ Since nine out of ten male students were either soldiers or wounded war veterans and male students continued to make up half of the student body in the last

²⁸ In 1939, the central government contributed 2 000 000 marks to the budget of the RStW. See REM to Reichsminister der Finanzen, April 3, 1940, BA Koblenz, R 21/10.931, p.319. The following year, the government gave 2 662 400 marks. See REM to Reichsfinanzministerium, November 15, 1940, BA Koblenz, R 21/10.931, p.343. During the last two years of the war, contribution further increased. In 1944 the RStW asked for 4 708 900 marks, which was actually 673 000 marks less than it had received in the previous year. See RStW to REM, April 1, 1944, BA Koblenz, R 21/10.931, p. 388; also Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 142.

²⁹ In 1944 the RStW gave married students 640 000 marks in subsidies. See RStW to REM, April 1, 1944, BA Koblenz, R 21/10.931, p. 389.

³⁰ See "Sonderförderung der Kriegsteilnehmer bei der Durchführung des Studiums an den wissenschaftlichen Hochschulen (5. Durchführungs- und Ergänzungserlass), RdErl. des REM vom 1. 7. 1944, in BA Koblenz, R 21/10920; also Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 401.

³¹ At the Technical University of Karlsruhe, 433 students received full or partial remission of their fees. Since there were only 23 female students at the university, the number of students receiving financial help was extremely high. See "Eine Stichprobe über "Studienförderungsverhältnisse im Wintersemester 1941/42 (TH. Karlsruhe)," BA Koblenz, R 21/765.

three years of the war, it seems reasonable to argue that around 50 percent of students enjoyed some sort assistance after 1941.

However, it is questionable whether this increase in support signaled a radical change in outlook towards student aid. Modern states engaged in war usually hold out the promise of a more egalitarian society to maintain the fighting spirit of the population. The social policy of the Nazi regime after 1939 was a function of an overarching necessity to secure peace on the home front. Financial support for wounded and often crippled veterans served as compensation for past sacrifices, a bribe for silence and an encouragement to re-enter civil life. Other practical considerations were behind increased aid as well. The greater involvement of the Nazi state in the financial support of students encouraged high school graduates to take up university studies in order to secure a steady supply of professionals in the upper echelons of the army, economy and administration.³²

Much of the additional money provided in the form of subsidies to the RStW during the war was spent in supporting the larger ideological and political goals of the regime. In 1940, for example, one third of state subsidies was being spent on ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe. The RStW channeled proportionately more money into the universities along Germany's new eastern border. It increased support to the Langemarck study, a preparatory course that promoted loyal Nazis from the lower classes to university without a high-school diploma. The Reich student leadership planned to spend between 7

³² See "Bericht über den Stand der Nachwuchsfrage," Berlin, [1941], BA Koblenz, R 21/ 765.

and 10 million marks on the Langemarck study after the successful conclusion of the war. The plan was justified by the need to establish a socially just educational system.³³

Moreover, increased support did not make students' lives free of financial constraints during the war. Monthly allowances provided in the framework of special state support did not compensate for the adverse effects of the war.³⁴ The destruction of university towns and the closing of schools forced many students to take up their studies far from home, which meant increased expenditures. Moreover, the changing fortunes of war after 1943 meant not only increased prices but also deprivation for most people, including students. Thus, the progressive impoverishment of students during the last years of the war makes it difficult to accept the argument that state subsidies provided a care-free lifestyle even for a minority of students.³⁵ Married students in particular continued to disparage state support as a pittance or as an act of charity.³⁶ It is also doubtful whether student aid attracted high-school graduates to university in great numbers. While the student population expanded after 1940, this expansion cannot be attributed to an increased state involvement in student aid. Rather, other considerations, such as uncertainty about the future and improved chances for employment, prompted high school graduates to take up university study in unprecedented numbers.

The dominant role of the German state in student aid ensured that it either reaped the political benefits of increased support or suffered from the negligence of students'

³³ REM to Reichsminister der Finanzen, April 3, 1940, BA Koblenz, R 21/10.931, pp. 379-383.

³⁴ See Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 149.

³⁵ Waldemar Krönig and Klaus-Dieter Müller, Nachkriegs-Semester: Studium in Krieg- und Nachkriegszeit, Stuttgart, 1990, p. 31.

material interests. The attitude of the RStW and the REM to the involvement of private businesses in student aid was generally negative. Although they welcomed increased support, administrators in the local and central offices of the RStW feared that private businesses would set the criteria for, and supervise the distribution of, student aid. They argued that support from private organizations encouraged students to choose their professions purely on the basis of economic considerations rather than on talent and inner calling. The greater involvement of private businesses in student aid, they continued, reduced the responsibility of parents towards their children and thus contributed to the disruption of families. They contended that early commitments, based upon financial incentives, to certain professions made the changing of faculties during university studies difficult. Thus, according to Nazi educators, student aid limited academic freedom and led to premature specialization. More importantly, the RStW opposed help from businesses, churches, cultural associations and private foundations because these organizations failed to include or paid only lip service to political reliability as an important criterion in the selection process.³⁷

These negative sentiments on the part of Nazi administrators in the RStW notwithstanding, private support from such scholarships distributed by businesses, churches, various cultural associations and family foundations increased rapidly after 1935. The sharpest growth came in 1939, when the RStW estimated that the number of

³⁶ REM to Reichsminister der Finanzen, April 8, 1943, "Betrifft: Sonderförderung der Kriegsteilnehmer bei der Durchführung des Studiums an den wissenschaftlichen Hochschulen," BA Koblenz, R 21/10918.

³⁷ "Vermehrung des akademischen Nachwuchses und Vereinheitlichung der Studienförderung," Berlin, [1941], BA Koblenz, R 21/765.

students receiving financial support from private businesses had doubled.³⁸ The reason for this increase should be sought in practical rather than humanitarian considerations.

Business leaders expected, especially after 1940, that an early German victory in the war would result in an economic boom, which would make the need of the German and European economy for professionals even more acute. By giving grants and loans and promising well-paying jobs after graduation, they sought to tie future professionals to their companies.

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to exaggerate the importance of private support in the lives of students in the Third Reich. As Table 2 shows, private support was dwarfed by state subsidies in the mid-1930s and this picture probably changed little until the end of the Third Reich.

State	Remission of fees	3 000,000.00
	Ministries and Universities	580,000.00
	Reich Student Services	2 520,000.00
Municipalities		535,000.00
Private scholarships (churches, associations, family foundations, etc.)		185,000.00
Total		6 820, 000.00

Inadequate support from state and private organizations forced many students to supplement their income from part-time work in the 1930s. Part-time work was not new:

³⁸ See *Reichsstudentenwerk: Kurzberichte aus der Arbeit des Jahres 1939*, p. 35.

³⁹ See "Statistik der Ausgaben für die Förderung von Studenten im Rechnungsjahr 1934/35, Berlin, [1935], BA Koblenz, R 149/179.

indeed, it had become a general phenomenon among students after the First World War. During the Weimar Republic, the massive infusion of students into the labor market provoked a lively debate within a public still wedded to romantic views about the ostensibly carefree lifestyle of students. Some educators, politicians and even students welcomed the rejuvenation of student life through part-time work. Many hoped that physical labor would bridge the social, cultural and psychological gaps between students and workers and create the basis for a true national community. However, others rejected the idea of part-time work as a waste of time leading only to the negligence of one's studies. Workers also objected to their employment because they perceived middle-class students as potential strike-breakers and spies for factory owners and managers. Especially after the onset of the Great Depression in 1930, workers and their unions did everything to eliminate students from factories and workshops.⁴⁰

In competition for scarce jobs, the new Nazi government emphatically took the side of workers against students after 1933. The giant corporate organization for workers, the Labor Front, fought successfully against the employment of students in larger factories and excluded them from the majority of trades. Other measures such as the introduction of labor service in the summer of 1933 helped to keep students away from blue-collar jobs.⁴¹

The Nazi state even tried to suppress talk of working students or interpreted the

⁴⁰ In 1923, every second student worked full or part time. By 1929, the percentage was reduced to 9.1; working students almost completely disappeared during the Depression. See Hans L. Menzel, "Wirtschaftliche Grundlagen des Studiums vor und nach dem Kriege unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des deutschen Studentenhilfswerks," PhD. diss., Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin, 1930, pp. 41-42.

⁴¹ "Hochschule und Arbeitsmarkt: Das Ende des Werkstudententums. Aufwertung des akademischen Nachwuchses," *Der Tag* (Nachtausgabe), Berlin, 13 July, 1933, BA Koblenz, ZSg, 129/123.

disappearance of jobs as waiters and dancers in night clubs as a sign of progress.⁴²

However, enforced silence and fake optimism did not solve the problem of the high costs associated with university study. Indeed, the impact on the Nazi takeover on the job market for student was entirely negative. The expulsion of students from the market for blue-collar and what the Nazis called undignified jobs in the service sector left them with few opportunities to earn a living. There remained only a limited number of respectable positions such as tourist guides, translators, driving instructors and kindergarten teachers. Not surprisingly, Nazi activists in local student-aid foundations tried to monopolize this restricted labor market by initiating strict selection of the applicants for the jobs offered through their employment services. Political reliability and academic achievement became the basic criteria for employment in politically sensitive jobs as tour guides, who were in demand by both private and Nazi organizations.⁴³ Given the high number of qualified students, favoritism, ties of friendship and political connections probably determined the outcome of competitions for scarce jobs advertised through the local student-aid foundations.

Nonetheless, some changes in the official attitude towards part-time work became discernible as early as late 1934. By Christmas of 1934, the Labor Front had relaxed its policy by allowing student employment in most factories. The move generated great expectations among students for secure and well-paying positions. Simultaneously,

⁴² "Der Student von 1934: Der neue Typ des Akademikers," B.Z.-am Mittag, 7 July, 1934, BA Koblenz, ZSg, 129/123.

⁴³ "Studenten führen durch Berlin," Völkischer Beobachter, 28 July, 1934; also "Der Student als Fremdenführer," Dresdner Nachrichten, 12 September, 1934, BA Koblenz, ZSg, 129/123.

students were again allowed to take up reputedly undignified jobs such as waiters, dancers and vendors.⁴⁴ It is difficult to measure the impact of this change in Nazi policy on students. Scattered evidence suggests, however, that the return to full employment did not fully reconcile workers to the phenomenon of working students. Some educators continued to attack part-time work as incompatible with university study as well. Even more importantly, Nazi zealots in the NSDStB and the German Student Federation continued to express their fear that students' regular contact with the relatively free world of commerce and production would nullify the totalitarian impulses imparted by schools and Nazi organizations. They found it infuriating that students tried to excuse their absence from political events on the grounds of job obligations. In these hostile circumstances, it is surprising that many students could still keep their jobs. In 1936 still about ten percent of students worked part time during the semesters, a number that probably remained stable until the outbreak of the war in 1939.⁴⁵

Nevertheless, the revival of the phenomenon of the working student represented a defeat for the Nazi regime. The state was forced to admit at least tacitly that it had failed to deliver on its promises and take the financial burden of university study off the shoulders of poor students and their parents. Furthermore, part-time work signaled a setback for the totalitarian ambition of Nazi organizations. Time for work had to be spared

⁴⁴ "Werkstudenten - Studentenwerk: Erwerbsquellen für mittellose Hochschulbesucher," Völkischer Beobachter, 18 January, 1935, BA Koblenz, ZSg, 129/123.

⁴⁵ "Gibt es noch Werkstudenten?" Reichsstudentenwerk: Mitteilungsblatt der Leitung der örtlichen Studentenwerke, Nr. 1, February, 1936, pp. 7-8.

from other activities such as studying and participation in various Nazi organizations, thus diminishing Nazi control over their lives.⁴⁶

Besides increasing support for the members of the 'national community' and fostering an environment that would have allowed students to earn a living through part-time work, the Nazi state could have also improved the financial situation of students through a more equitable distribution of available aid. Indeed, during the Third Reich, the German Student-Aid Foundation strove to centralize financial support, in part, to achieve this goal. As mentioned earlier, from a purely administrative point of view, centralization made sense. The disparate levels of funding available for students at the local level and differences in the selection process for, and distribution of, student-aid had a negative impact on students. The decentralized character of student aid impeded geographical mobility and discouraged impoverished high-school graduates from undertaking university study.

However, centralization and standardization of student aid were not merely bureaucratic concerns; they also implied changes in the distribution of power at local levels. Not surprisingly, many organizations such as the Catholic Church opposed the involvement of Nazi students in the administration of their scholarships. Moreover, at the level of individual universities, centralization would have increased the power of Nazi students and administrators in the German Student-Aid Foundation at the expense of academic administrators, who would have been confined to advisory roles. University authorities justifiably feared that student aid could be used to expand the power of the

⁴⁶ Giles, Students and National Socialism, pp. 186-201.

state and Party over the admission of students to university study. There was no guarantee that, as a semi-state organization, the German Student-Aid Foundation would be satisfied with the monopoly over the selection of applicants for student aid, and that it would not demand more power over the admission process, perhaps to determine the number and social background of newly admitted students.

The coordination of scholarships administered by university authorities, churches, cultural associations and family foundations first registered only limited results because the REM did not want to challenge the elite on this issue immediately after its takeover of power. Left to its own devices, the German Student-Aid Foundation sought to conclude separate agreements with municipalities, churches, state-owned and private companies and social organizations. These agreements gave at least a consultative role to the RStW in the distribution of private scholarships. A further success was registered in the summer of 1935, when the REM gave the local student-aid foundations access to the personality cards of students at individual universities. Soon these local organizations began building their own information system by registering applications for, and awards of, scholarships. The RStW planned to create a central registry, which would inform the central organization about changes in the applicants' family background and thus help in the formulation of social policy.⁴⁷

The second initiative came in February 1936, when the REM ordered that students applying for any kind of support would be obliged to declare whether they had applied for,

⁴⁷ "Vereinheitlichung der Hochschulstipendien," in Reichsstudentenwerk: Kurzberichte aus der Arbeit des Jahres 1935, Oktoberheft 1935. [n.p.]

or had been receiving, support from other sources. Since the local student-aid foundations had the right to check this information and denounce students in cases of suspected fraud, this order gave administrators in local organizations increased policing power over students.⁴⁸ However, the RStW lacked legal authority to force most awarding institutions to give any information about the distribution of their funds. Therefore, it is doubtful that this order actually achieved its purpose. On the contrary, local examples suggest that there was little change in the distribution of student aid administered by other agencies in the second half of the 1930s. At most universities, representatives of the local student-aid foundations continued to share power with academics in the aid committees, which administered the scholarships of various faculties and university offices. The coordination of scholarships awarded by bodies other than the student-aid foundations and universities showed similar results. The RStW obtained at least an advisory role in the distribution of scholarship of a few, increasingly state-controlled, businesses and associations such as German Steel Construction Association, the Association of German Engineers, the Association of German Chemists. The RStW also advised on the distribution of scholarships by public bodies such as the cultural bureau of municipalities (Kulturamt der Heimatstadt), the Reich Railway Directory, the presidents of state governments (Regierungspräsidenten) and the Reich Ministry of Aviation.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ "Kampf den Stipendienjägern," Reichsstudentenwerk: Kurzbericht aus der Arbeit des Jahres 1936, Märzheft 1936. [n.p.]

⁴⁹ See Dipl. Ing. Ullrich, "Die Förderung und ihrer Finanzierung," Umschau der Studentenwerke, Nr. 14, Juni 1939. [n.p.]

Frustrated by the rejection of one of its longest-standing demands, the RStW undertook its greatest campaign for the coordination of student aid in 1941. Probably behind the back of the REM, the RStW announced a comprehensive plan for the unification of student aid under its aegis. The plan obliged the education ministries and other branches of the state governments to distribute their aid through the central and local offices of the Reich Student Services. Through this measure, the RStW wanted to achieve two goals. First, it sought to prevent the giving of economic support by the interior, finance and economic ministries in order to attract high school graduates to certain professions such as airplane construction. Secondly, the RStW wanted to control family welfare through measures such as support given to orphans and members of large families.⁵⁰ The plan also abandoned the hitherto liberal method of dealing with the municipalities and private organizations. It obliged every municipality to both report whether it intended to distribute student aid and request the opinion of the relevant local student-aid foundation before handing out its awards. According to the plan, the municipalities had to follow the principles of the selection process of the RStW. Thus, they had no right to support students whose health, character, political opinion or behavior contradicted the principles established by the student organization. The most controversial part of the draft was the concentration of control over the distribution of private

⁵⁰ "Erfahrungs-Bericht des Reichsstudentenwerks über die Ausbildungsbeihilfen des Reichsfinanzministeriums für Studierende aus kinderreichen Familien," Berlin, [1940?], BA Koblenz, R 149/44.

scholarships, including family foundations and scholarships preserved for theology students, in the hands of the local student-aid foundations.⁵¹

However, the disapproval of the REM doomed this plan to failure. The REM refused to recognize the authority of the RStW over family welfare administered by the Finance Ministry. Moreover, it continued to raise objections to the coordination of private foundations. Apart from legal complications involving property rights, the REM feared that coordination of private foundations would discourage individuals and associations from establishing new scholarships. It argued that the administration of scholarships should remain in the hands of private individuals and institutions, who would be advised to obtain the opinion of universities and student-aid foundations before distributing their scholarships.⁵² Lack of further information on centralization suggests that the rejection of this plan ended the drive towards control over the distribution of student aid in the Third Reich.

As a result of the failure of the RStW to centralize financial support, the level of funding available to universities continued to show great discrepancies and consequently reduced students' chances to obtain aid. In the mid-1930s, for example, the student-aid foundation and university administration of the Technical University of Berlin had three times more to spend in student aid than did Hanover or Königsberg. Karlsruhe had three times more money at its disposal than did Freiburg and its budget was two times bigger than that of Heidelberg. Not surprisingly, the percentage of students receiving aid and the

⁵¹ Der Vorsitzende des RStW to REM, "Betrifft: Entwurf über die Vereinheitlichung der Studienförderung an den deutschen Hoch- und Fachschulen," Berlin, June 17, 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/765.

amount of assistance distributed varied greatly. While only 2.6 per cent of students were supported by the local student-aid foundation (excluding loans and central scholarship) in Hanover in 1935, 11 per cent of the student population obtained support in Charlottenburg, Kiel and Breslau; the figure in Erlangen was 15 per cent. At the same time, the average level of support amounted to 38 marks per student at the University of Breslau and 37 marks at the University of Hamburg, while the lucky students of Hanover received an average of 231 marks.⁵³

These numbers suggest that there was significant ideological and moral opposition to the idea that support should be concentrated on a few carefully selected students and that these students should be on the payroll of the student-aid foundation during their entire university career. Many local student-aid foundations continued to distribute their limited funds on an ad hoc basis, reacting to the needs of individual students.⁵⁴ Moreover, the sources of the central and local offices of the RStW remained limited: it provided support to only about 8 or 9 percent of students before 1939. Although the gross amount of support increased during the war, the expansion of the student population makes it doubtful whether the percentage of students obtaining help from the central and local offices of the RStW exceeded more than 10 percent.⁵⁵

⁵² Kock, REM, to Ministerialrat Kasper, Berlin, September 10, 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/765.

⁵³ "Vergleich der örtlichen Förderung," Umschau der Studentenwerke, Nr. 17, May 1936. [n.p.]

⁵⁴ Only 45 percent of the financial and material support available at the local student-aid foundations were distributed in the framework of the Kameradschaftsförderung and Hochschulförderung in 1935. The remaining part was distributed on an ad hoc basis among needy students. See Umschau der Studentenwerke, Nr. 17, May 1936. [n.p.]

⁵⁵ According to a report by the RStW about 7 percent of the student body received support from the RStW in 1941, See Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 149.

The influence of the RStW was further diminished by the insufficient support given to the recipients of student aid. Table 3 shows the distribution of student aid in 1935.

Unfortunately no similar data exist for the later period.

Branch of support	No. of recipients		Total support in marks	Aver. amount of support per person in marks
	absolute	in %		
Darlehenskasse	1, 840	2.39	636, 407	346
Reichsförderung	420	0.55	111, 600	266
Kamerad.förderung	581	0.75	69, 453	120
Hochschulförderung	870	1.12	94, 482	109
Others	3, 672	4.70	198, 450	54
Total	7, 383	9.51	1, 110, 392	150

In 1935, a select group of students among the inhabitants, mainly first-year students, of the Kameradschaft houses received 120 marks per semester in the framework of the Kameradschaftförderung, an amount that never covered the basic costs of university study and maintenance. Social assistance provided to students in advanced semesters was also inadequate to cover their expenditures. The average award in this branch of support (Hochschulförderung) was 109 marks per semester. Even the most prestigious state scholarship, the Reichsförderung gave only 266 marks per semester, an amount that also had to be supplemented by other sources. Only loans (346 marks per semester) provided in the framework of Darlehnsförderung, could cover perhaps the basic living costs but not

the university fees.⁵⁷ However, the effectiveness of loans in garnering political support is questionable since students did not necessarily feel obliged to an organization that mortgaged part of their future. The number of students benefiting from student aid remained low: less than ten percent of the student population received some form of assistance in 1935. The situation did not change until the outbreak of the war.⁵⁸

The reluctance of the state to invest heavily into student welfare made a mockery of the positive aspect of the Nazi slogan of selection. Nazi student-aid policy did not make university more accessible to the working classes during the Third Reich. At best, it supplemented the income of students from the lower middle classes who could not otherwise complete their studies on parental assistance alone. Moreover, by denying financial assistance to students, the Nazi regime only made its need for professionals even more acute. In 1938, over half of the high-school graduates surveyed said that they could not consider university studies because of high cost and inadequate state support. The fear that student aid would be cut off after one or two semesters discouraged even those who had been promised support at the beginning of their studies.⁵⁹ Thus, if student living standards improved at all prior 1939, it was not due to greater state support, but rather the result of a decline in the proportion of applicants from the working and lower-middle

⁵⁶ See Reichsstudentenwerk: Kurzberichte aus der Arbeit des Jahres 1936. June 1936. [n.p.] also Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 143.

⁵⁷ "Bemerkungen zum Förderungshaushalt der Studentenwerke an den Hochschulen," Berlin, December 6, 1935, BA Koblenz, R 149/18, p. 3.

⁵⁸ Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 143.

⁵⁹ "Mitteilungsblatt des Reichsstudentenwerks Nr. 2," Berlin-Charlottenburg, February 1, 1938, StAWÜ, RSF II 90.

classes. The lives of average students registered, at best, limited gains prior to 1939, and only improved marginally during the war.

Therefore, we can conclude that as far as the gross amount of state support in the form of student aid is concerned, there was not a drastic change from the Weimar to the Nazi period: both the Weimar governments and the Nazi regime were reluctant to invest adequately in student aid. However, despite this shared feature of frugality, Nazi student-aid policy differed fundamentally from that of its Weimar predecessor. The major difference had to do with the application of the Nazi principle of selection to the distribution of student aid, that is the Nazi desire to expel undesirable students, on the one hand, and to reward student activists who had demonstrated their loyalty and provided proofs of their willingness to serve the Nazi cause on the other hand.

This ideological change in the principles of selection for student aid took place soon after the Nazi takeover. In April 1933, the Prussian Ministry of Education denied scholarships and other forms of social assistance to Jews and the political opponents of the regime. The same law ordered that members of the SA and SS, who had fought for Nazi victory before 1933, had to be given priority in the distribution of student aid by state governments, universities and student organizations.⁶⁰ Inspired by this law, the provisional executive committee of the German Student-Aid Foundation, on recommendations of a commission of experts (among them the philosopher Martin Heidegger), worked out the principles of selection for student aid in December 1933. These principles included:

⁶⁰ Erlass d. Preussischen Minister für Wiss., Erz., und Volksbildung, von 22 April 1933, UI Nr. 21 086.1, in SHSA, Akten des Kultusministeriums Nr. 10245/79.

'Aryan' ancestry combined with membership in the German Student Federation (Deutsche Studentenschaft or DSt); perfect physical and spiritual health; demonstrated talent in one's chosen field of study; high moral conduct in everyday life; active participation in various Party and state organizations such as the SS, SA, Hitler Youth, work service, NSDStB, local student-aid foundations and, for male students, membership in the Kameradschaft houses. Finally, the draft stipulated that female students could be supported only to the extent to which they were allowed to participate in various professions.⁶¹

The second part of this chapter will examine how changing principles affected the various branches of student aid. First, it discusses the fate of financial support including grants, loans and scholarships. Since the main subject of this chapter is the student-aid policy of the Nazi state, it focuses on the financial aid provided by the RStW, the German Student Federation, various state ministries and universities. Then this chapter turns to, and discusses the fate of, those branches of student aid that at least theoretically benefited the whole student population: employment and housing services, dormitories, Kameradschaft houses and student eateries (Mensas).

In regards to scholarships, the Nazi regime took over a system that was both underfunded and disorganized. During the Weimar Republic, the distribution of scholarships retained its prewar liberal character. There was very little contact between the awarding institutions, and the level of funds and the conditions of eligibility were very diverse. Many scholarships were confined to members of certain families, religious orders,

⁶¹ Hans Schlömer, "Die Ära der Gleichschaltung: Das Deutsche Studentenwerk im Dritten Reich," in Deutsches Studentenwerk 1921-1961, Bonn, 1961, pp. 71-72.

associations or depended upon the geographical origin of the applicants.⁶² In these circumstances, the increasing misery of the student population could only be halted either by a radical investment in student aid or by administrative measures limiting the number of students. As the first part of this chapter has shown, the Nazi regime did not choose the first option: student aid remained inadequate to satisfy the basic need of students in the Third Reich. Instead of providing more aid for students, the Nazi leaders sought a reduction in the number of students who were eligible for support. Thus, the denial of scholarships to various student groups served to realize the negative aspect of the Nazi idea of selection in student aid.

Among the first victims of this negative selection were Jewish students, who, on the basis of the above-mentioned order, were removed from the list of state scholarship recipients in Prussia and a few months later in every German state in 1933. The head of the German Student-Aid Foundation later considered this action as a revolutionary deed of the first order. In an article written in 1936, Streit argued, without providing quantitative information, that during the Weimar Republic Jewish students had been grossly over-represented among the recipients of scholarships and other forms of financial aid. Private foundations especially, the majority of which were in Jewish hands, Streit continued, had given unfair advantage to Jewish students. While German students had struggled to

⁶² For the lists of foundations in the Weimar Republic see "Das akademische Unterstützungswesen der Vergangenheit in seiner Zersplitterung und Eigentümelei ist zu Ende," Deutsches Studentenwerk, [1934?], BA Koblenz, 149/105.

survive on meager incomes, he concluded, their Jewish counterparts had lived well on the generous sums received as scholarships.⁶³

One may wonder about Streit's intentions or his inability to dampen his prejudices even in the face of contradictory evidence. Since Streit had written his dissertation on the German Student-Aid Foundation in 1931, he should have had a clear view on the Jewish students' financial situation. Unfortunately, the lists of organizations, which I found in individual cities such as Berlin and Frankfurt am Main are incomplete. Nevertheless, they suggest that confessional scholarships established for members of this religious minority were few in number and their impact on the living standards of Jewish students remained insignificant.⁶⁴ The aid that these foundations provided was certainly welcome but it did not lessen significantly the plight of poor Jews. Moreover, the discrimination against Jewish students in the selection process for scholarships had begun at latest after 1929, as more and more local student-aid foundations fell into the hands of Nazi students.⁶⁵

Paradoxically, discrimination against Jews during the Great Depression undermined the effectiveness of student aid as an instrument of racial selection after 1933:

⁶³ Hanns Streit, "Vom Studentendienst 1914 zur öffentlich-rechtlichen Anstalt," Reichsstudentenwerk: Mitteilungsblatt der Leitung und der örtlichen Studentenwerke, Berlin, February 1936, p. 2.

⁶⁴ In 1932, according to the Umschau, in Berlin, there were only four Jewish welfare organizations distributing small amount of financial aid in the forms of scholarship and loans to a few Jewish students. See "Wer vergibt noch Studienstipendien?" Umschau in der studentischen Selbsthilfearbeit, Nr. 5, February 1932. [n.p.]; The situation was similar in Frankfurt am Main, where there were only three foundations which provided aid exclusively to Jewish university students. In addition, three inter-confessional foundations, established by Jews, distributed scholarships among both Jewish and Gentile students. See Das Rechtsamt, Stiftungsabteilung an den Kommissar für die Jüdische Wohlfahrtspflege, 16 February, 1939, Kommission zur Erforschung der Geschichte der Frankfurter Juden eds., Dokumente zur Geschichte der Frankfurter Juden 1933-1945, Frankfurt am Main, pp. 144-153.

⁶⁵ In 1931, for example, the the local student-aid foundation in Munich gave no financial aid to Jews. See "Die Einzelfürsorge des Verein Studentenhauses München SS 1931," BA Koblenz, R 149/105, p. 25, Table XXIV.

the denial of scholarships and other forms of financial aid was a minor factor in the rapid decline in the number of Jewish students at German universities in the Third Reich.⁶⁶ On the other hand, the small number of scholarships that had become available as a result of the 'Aryanization' of student aid brought few political dividends for Gentile students. Certainly, the striking of the names of a few Jewish students from the list of recipients could not solve students' considerable social problems. Thus, as many students probably realized, the removal of Jews was a poor substitute for meaningful financial support.

After 1936, university administrators and bureaucrats in the municipal and state governments gradually removed Jewish members from the board of directors of inter-confessional foundations. At the same time, university administrators tried to tackle the difficult question of how to distribute the scholarships of these foundations. Since these foundations had been established by wealthy Jews, many schools such as the universities in Munich logically handed the capital of these foundations over to the Jewish community. In Frankfurt am Main, however, academic administrators planned to introduce a second numerus clausus that would limit the percentage of Jewish students to receive financial aid from these inter-confessional foundations to the percentage of Jews in the city's population. Not surprisingly, the Jewish community protested against the plan since it counted upon the capital of these foundations to help its impoverished members.⁶⁷

The Gordian knot was finally cut by an order of the Ministry of the Interior in May 1939. The change was connected to increased anti-Semitism after the November pogrom

⁶⁶ Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 216.

of 1938 and to the new policy of the Nazi regime, which pursued its policy of cultural de-Judaization and 'Aryanization' of economic life much more vigorously after that date. Since the last Jewish students had been permanently expelled from German universities at the end of 1938, it was only logical to prohibit the establishment of new foundations that would consider the support of Jewish students as their main purpose. The new order kept the foundations that had been established by Germans of Jewish descent to support scientific research intact. However, the order stipulated that these foundations had to change their names and remove Jewish members from the board of directors. On the other hand, foundations that had supported only Jewish students in the past would continue to exist but they would change the focus of their activities from helping students to giving aid to the older and more unfortunate members of the Jewish community. In the future, the capital of these foundations would also be used to hasten Jewish emigration and support the poor. Finally, the new order stipulated that university administrations had to change the constitution of the inter-confessional foundations. The board of directors had to be purged of Jewish members and funds would be distributed only among 'Aryan' students.⁶⁸

Needless to say that this legalized discrimination ran counter to the original intentions of the creators of the foundations. Although academics were keenly aware of this fact, they proceeded quickly with the 'coordination' of inter-confessional foundations. At University of Berlin, academic administrators began discussing the fate of the Rathenau

⁶⁷ Der Vorstand der israelitischen Gemeinde (unterzeichnet von Justizrat Blau) an das Rechtamt, Stiftungsabteilung, 28 January, 1938, in Dokumente zur Geschichte der Frankfurter Juden, pp.128-133.

⁶⁸ Erlass des Reichsinnenministeriums, 8. 5. 1939. An die preussischen Regierungspräsidenten, Betrifft: Jüdische and paritätische Stiftungen, in Dokumente zur Geschichte der Frankfurter Juden, pp.154-157.

Foundation almost a year before the order of the Ministry of the Interior. This scholarship for medical students was established during the First World War by Walther Rathenau's father, the industrialist Emil Rathenau, and his wife, Mathilde. The award of the scholarship did not depend on the applicants' religion or ethnic origins. The sources suggest that the university administration was more than ready to cooperate with the order of the Ministry of the Interior. In the spring of 1939, the university changed the name of the foundation to Studien-Stiftung der Medizinischen Fakultät.⁶⁹

A similar fate befell the Marckwald Foundation, which had been established by Otto Marckwald in 1878. The constitution of the foundation stated that both Christian and Jewish students could apply for and receive support. Its purpose was to help poor students. Except for Catholic theology students, who had their own welfare organizations, needy students of every faculty were welcome to apply. In the mid-1930s the student foundation of the University of Berlin took over the administration of the scholarship. Coordination was followed by changes in the criteria of selection: non-'Aryans' were excluded and party membership and one's standing in the student organizations became the decisive factors in the awarding of the scholarship. In 1937, for example, all three recipients were party members and one of them, Steffen Gerd, even made a name for himself with an article on Nazi education. In connection with the debate on the future of

⁶⁹ REM to Rektor der Universität Berlin, April 5, 1939, UAB, Akten des Universitätskurators, Nr.491, p. 58; also Rektor to REM, May 5, 1939, in Ibid., p. 59.

the Rathenau Foundation, the university senate decided to change the name of the Marckwald Foundation to the Rektorats-Stiftung an der Universität Berlin in April 1939.⁷⁰

Jewish students were only the first victims in the politicization of student aid. In the spring of 1933, the Prussian Ministry of Education also prohibited the support of communist, socialist, liberal, and pacifist students who made their views known and had worked against the Nazi movement before January 1933. Later in the Third Reich the circle of potential victims extended to include theology students as well. Thus, in 1939, as a sign of increasing radicalization of the regime, the Reich Ministry of Education issued a series of decrees that allowed Catholic and Protestant theology students to receive assistance from local student-aid foundations only as a last resort.⁷¹ This measure provoked some ill-feelings at local levels. At the University of Berlin, for example, the dean of the Protestant theology faculty indignantly rejected the insinuation that Protestant theology students represented a political danger to the Nazi regime and asked for not less but more financial support. However, the head of the student-aid foundation rejected his plea with the remark that theology was not vitally important for the war effort.⁷²

Understandably, Catholic theology students were also upset by these new decrees. To add insult to injury, in July 1939, the REM dissolved the Albertus-Magnus-Verein, which had

⁷⁰ "Betrifft: Rektorat-Stiftung der Universität (1936-1944)," UAB, Akten des Senates, Nr. 490, pp. 1-42.

⁷¹ Erlass des REM vom 24. 10. 1939; also Erlass des REM vom 6. 10. 1939; Erlass des REM vom 10. 10. 1939, in UAB, Akten des Senates, Nr. 264, pp. 6-7; also Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 131.

⁷² Dekan der Theologischen Fakultät der Universität Berlin to REM, September 14, 1939, UAB, Akten des Senates, p. 5.

distributed loans to Catholic students for decades. The possessions of the association were confiscated and handed over to the RStW.⁷³

Nazi takeover also led to increased discrimination against female students during the distribution of student aid. A combination of economic pressures, traditional prejudices shared perhaps by the majority of male students and teachers, and the decisively anti-feminist world-view of the Nazi leadership and rank-and file informed policy towards woman students after January 1933. Thus, before Christmas of that year, the Prussian Ministry of Education decreed that women students should be supported only “in those disciplines that lead to careers open to women, and only in proportion to the number of women required in the corresponding profession.”⁷⁴ Unfortunately, we have detailed information only about the percentage of female students among the recipients of the scholarship of the Study Foundation of the German People. Here the decline was rapid, as the share of female students fell from 14.3 percent in the summer semester of 1932 to 7.3 percent two years later.⁷⁵ At the same time, the share of female students receiving grants declined from 11 percent in 1932 to 7 percent in 1934. Only two percent of all women students received scholarships during the first years of the Third Reich. The beneficiaries

⁷³ Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 144; for the situation of theology student in the Third Reich see Hartmut Aschermann and Wolfgang Schneider eds., Studium im Auftrag der Kirche: Die Anfänge der Kirchlichen Hochschule Wuppertal 1935 bis 1945. Cologne, 1985; Remigius Bäumer, “Die Theologische Fakultät Freiburg und das Dritte Reich,” Freiburger Diözesan-Archiv 103 (1983), pp. 265-289; Gerhard Besier, “Zur Geschichte der Kirchlichen Hochschulen oder: Der Kampf um den theologischen Nachwuchs,” in Leonore Siegele-Wenschkewitz and Carsten Nicolaisen eds., Theologische Fakultäten im Nationalsozialismus, Göttingen, 1993, pp. 251-275; Rainer Hering, Theologische Wissenschaft und ‘Dritten Reich’, Pfaffenweiler, 1990; Robert P. Ericksen, “The Göttingen University Theological Faculty: A Test Case in ‘Gleichschaltung’ and Denazification,” Central European History 17 (1984), pp. 355-383.

⁷⁴ Pauwels, Women, Nazis, and Universities, p. 22.

⁷⁵ “Prozentzahl der geförderten Studentinnen,” Berlin, [1935], BA Koblenz, R 149/179.

of this decline were male students with distinguished records in party organizations.

Although the proportion of women with scholarships increased slightly after 1936 with the return of better economic times, the survival of the same anti-feminist attitude remained important at the local level.⁷⁶

Unfortunately, no reliable statistics exist on the other groups of students who suffered as a result of changes in the principles of selection for student aid. For example, the archives have yielded no information on how many students were denied financial assistance in the form of scholarships because they were Marxist or pacifist or they were branded as asocial or unhealthy by the Nazi regime. On the basis of available sources, however, we can draw some tentative conclusions about the Nazification of scholarships administered by university authorities. My research suggests that the constellation of political forces at the level of provinces, municipalities and individual universities determined the success or failure of the attempt by Nazi activists to use student aid to realize their version of selection. At many universities, these attempts obviously failed. Thus, at Erlangen, for example, the local student-aid foundation's professed goal was to make political criteria the most important basis for selection for financial aid.⁷⁷ However, a reading of a sample of fifty applications for financial aid awarded by the Rector and individual faculties between 1933 and 1941 suggests that ideological commitment was a secondary factor in the distribution of financial assistance. As a sign of incomplete politicization, in the mid-1930s, most students neglected to make any reference to their

⁷⁶ Pauwels, Women, Nazis, and Universities, p. 22.

activities in Nazi organizations during their applicants for state grants. Instead, they emphasized the poverty of their parents and that they urgently needed assistance.

Similarly, university teachers tried to maintain objective standards in the distribution of the meager funds of various faculties. Applicants for scholarships in natural science, medicine and law mentioned political activities only sporadically. After 1937 the closing Heil Hitler also became a rare occurrence.⁷⁸

At the University of Berlin, on the other hand, political considerations seem to have played a more important role in the selection process. The United Study Foundation for Students of the University of Berlin (Vereinigte Studienstiftung für Studierende aller Fakultäten der Universität Berlin) distributed its scholarships in part on the basis of membership in Nazi organizations.⁷⁹ Political factors determined the fate of the rector's scholarship as well. In this case, membership in Nazi organizations as such did not suffice; instead, political activism measured by attained ranks and distinctions in those organizations served as a basis of selection.⁸⁰

At the University of Berlin, politicization also pervaded the foundations of large corporations and business associations, which entrusted the university with the administration of their awards. The scholarships awarded by the German central bank, for

⁷⁷ Studentenwerk Erlangen to Rektor der Universität Erlangen, March 29, 1934, UAE, Akten des Senats, Nr. 70.

⁷⁸ See UAE, Akten des Rektors und Senats, Nr. 10, 13-14, 23-24, 27, 33-37.

⁷⁹ Political reliability was emphasized in every application. Between 1936 and 1939, I found 14 applications. Membership in Nazi organizations: NSDAP: 5, SS: 1, SA: 4, HJ: 2, NSKK: 2. Between 1939 and 1943, I found 13 applications. Army: 4, SS: 2, SA: 2, NSDAP: 1, DAF: 1, HJ: 1, no affiliation: 2. See "Vereinigte Studienstiftung für Studierende aller Fakultäten der Universität Berlin Feb. 1936-Jan. 1945," Berlin, UAB, Akten des Senats, Nr. 522.

example, rewarded mainly political activism and devotion to the Nazi regime. In 1936 the rector proposed Hermann Eichler for this scholarship because this theology student had a distinguished record in the Nazi movement. The rector's low regard for intellectual merits in the selection process for scholarships is demonstrated by the fact that after a long description of Eichler's political exploits he merely added the sentence that the attached grades demonstrated the intellectual abilities of the applicant.⁸¹

This comparison of two universities is useful in highlighting the importance of the local constellation of power. However, the information obtained in the archives of the eight universities that I visited did not provide answers for the following questions, which should be the subject of further study. Did larger universities in the cities prove to be more resistant to the Nazification of their scholarships than smaller and provincial ones? Did religious factors play a role in the resistance of academic administrators and students to the same process? To what extent did the political careers of rectors determine the outcome of the selection procedures? How did the distribution of power between Nazi activists in the local student-aid foundations, on the one hand, and academic administrators, on the other, influence the selection procedures from university to university?

Apart from the local factors mentioned above, the type of scholarship and the position of the rewarding institution in Nazi society also determined the success or failure

⁸⁰ Only three out of 80 applicants were not Party members in October 1937. Membership NSDAP: 24, SA: 13, SS: 9, HJ: 8, BDM: 2, Bund der Auslandsdeutschen: 5, NSDStB: 2, NSV:1, NS Frauenschaft: 2, NSFK: 2, ANSt: 3. See UAB, Akten des Senats, Nr. 265.

⁸¹ Rektor to Studentenwerk Berlin, February 22, 1936, UAB, Akten des Senats, Nr. 267, p. 4.

of Nazi infiltration. Perhaps the most overtly politicized scholarship in Nazi Germany was the Gefallenen-Gedenkstiftung der Deutschen Studentenschaft. Established in 1925 by the German Student Federation in memory of fallen students in the First World War, the purpose of foundation was to support students undertaking university study abroad. After 1933, Nazi students turned the foundation into a political instrument to “refute enemy propaganda and to foster understanding for the ideas of the new Germany.” Not surprisingly, the scholarship attracted Nazi students with a strong sense of mission. Candidates were selected exclusively on the basis of their political reliability. Professional qualification mattered little: many applicants, for example, who requested financial help to study in Eastern and East-Central Europe, did not even know the local language. The main task of the scholarship recipients was to monitor the policy of the local governments and public opinion towards Germany and their German minority. However, the low quality of applicants cast doubt upon the reliability of their highly nationalistic reports, which they regularly sent back to the German Student Federation.⁸²

The troubled history of the Study Foundation of the German People (Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes) illustrates best the corruption of student-aid organizations in the Third Reich. This foundation owed its existence to the democratic impulses set free by the creation of the Weimar Republic.⁸³ During the Weimar Republic, selection for scholarship was based on the principles of meritocracy, openness, objectivity,

⁸² This conclusion is based upon the sample reading of approximately 100 applications in the StAWÜ. “Betrifft.: Gefallenengedenkstiftung, 1925-36,” in StAWÜ, RSF, I * 62 g 228, 229, 230, 231, 233, 234.

⁸³ Streit, Hanns. “Das Deutsche Studentenwerk: Wirtschaftshilfe der Deutschen Studentenschaft 1921-1931.” Ph.D. diss., Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin, 1931, pp. 106-108.

self-help and camaraderie.⁸⁴ The foundation did not disappear after 1933, but continued to support students under the name of Reichsförderung until the end of the Nazi regime. However, selection process for scholarships changed dramatically after the Nazi takeover. First, under pressure from Nazi students and conservative teachers, who, such as those at the Technical University of Munich, had demanded the expulsion of communist students from the foundation since 1932, the Reich Ministry of the Interior purged the scholarship of Jewish, Communist, Socialist and pacifist students in April 1933.⁸⁵ Then, in the summer of 1933, the principles of selection were worked out by a three-member committee of the German Student-Aid Foundation. The committee was headed by a fanatical Nazi, Professor Georg Dahm, who became the rector of the University of Kiel in 1935. The other members were Karl Blume, the president of the Management Office of the German Student Federation (Wirtschaftsamt der deutschen Studentenschaft), who had been active in the NSDStB before 1933, and Hanns Streit, the president of the German Student-Aid Foundation. In a report, the committee declared that the goal of the foundation had to change from merely supporting talent and human excellence to the creation of a political and intellectual elite. It emphasized that in the future, no financial support would be given to students who devoted themselves entirely to their studies and shunned engagement in Nazi organizations. The methods of selection, the report continued, should reflect the

⁸⁴ Professor Sartorius from Tübingen, "Ziele und Wege der Begabtenförderung," Umschau der Studentenwerke: Sonderheft, Wirtschaftstagung des Deutschen Studentenwerks, October 1932, Jena. [n.p.]

⁸⁵ Reichsministerium des Innern to Rektor der TH München, April 5, 1932, BA Potsdam, Akten des Reichsministeriums des Innern, Apt. III, 34/34. Nr. 26915, p. 70; Bayerisches Kultusministerium to Rektor der TH München, March 15, 1933, BHSA, MK 40780. See also Reichsminister des Innern to Deutsches Studentenwerk, April 4, 1933, BA Koblenz, R 149/24.

changes in the philosophy and political practice of the state. Participation in labor camps and military sport should be considered as the basis of selection; membership in Nazi organizations such as the SA and the SS or the Hitler Youth should be made a prerequisite for application. In the future, the report of the commission continued, the state would support only completely healthy individuals, who also possessed excellent hereditary traits. Women would be awarded this prestigious scholarship only if they had a good chance for employment after graduation. Adult examiners would be purged and only those who understood and supported the new principles of the foundation would maintain their position in the organization. To ensure that students understood the changes, the commission recommended that the RStW would demand detailed reports from the scholarship recipients. In these reports, students would have to write about their attitude towards the new state and their perception of the functions of the scholarship. The letters were to be scrutinized for signs of dissent. The political reliability of scholarship recipients who had come from high schools such as the Lichtwark School (whose teachers had been famous for their liberal sympathies during the Weimar Republic) in Hamburg was to be reexamined as well.⁸⁶

Since the legislation affected only relatively few students, the purging of the foundation proceeded without serious difficulties. In its July meeting, the small central commission discussed 65 cases. It decided to expel 25 students for racial reasons and 17

⁸⁶ "Der neue Weg der Studienstiftung ," Umschau der Studentenwerke, Nr. 9, October 1933. [n.p.] On the history of the Lichtwark School, which, despite the dismissal of a number of liberal teachers, preserved a high degree of intellectual independence in the Third Reich, see Die Lichtwarksschule: Ideen und Gestalt, edited by Arbeitskreis Lichtwarksschule, Hamburg, 1979.

others on political grounds. There were also twenty cases pending. The names of the expelled students were published and sent to every institution of higher learning.⁸⁷

By the summer of 1933, the scholarship had abandoned the promotion of upper-middle-class cultural values and became an instrument of political manipulation.⁸⁸ For the first time, the foundation explicitly served the goals of population policy. The leadership of the foundation supported students from larger families because it automatically assumed that these students would also create large households. Moreover, scholarships promoted early marriage among young professionals by shortening the length of their studies.⁸⁹ The Nazi state also gave preference to students from small towns and villages in order to undermine the middle-class domination of the universities and to create a more pliable student population. This policy dovetailed with the desire of the regime to attract students to small universities where they could be more easily controlled. Finally, the shift in the distribution of scholarships from the gymnasium and non-classical secondary school (Oberrealschule) to the intermediate school (Aufbauschule) served the same goals since these schools had a more rural character.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ "Rundschreiben an die Mitglieder des Kommissarischen Vorstandes des Deutschen Studentenwerks E.V. Betr.: Ausscheidungen aus der Studienstiftung," Berlin, Deutsches Studentenwerk, Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes, July 11, 1933, in BA Potsdam, Reichsministerium des Innern, Abt. III. 34/34, Nr. 26915, pp. 92-97.

⁸⁸ "Reichsförderung statt Studienstiftung," Reichsstudenwerk: Mitteilungsblatt der Leitung und der örtlichen Studentenwerke, p. 11.

⁸⁹ "Planmässige Förderung der Begabten," Nachwuchs und Auslese, December 1938, pp. 33-38.

⁹⁰ In the winter semester of 1934/35 students from peasant background obtained 7.46 percent of the scholarships, while their share in the student population stood at 6.27 percent. See Reichsstudenwerk: Kurzberichte aus der Arbeit des Jahres 1936. [n.p] Preference was also given to students from non-classical secondary high schools (Oberrealschulen, Oberschulen and Aufbauschulen). These students made up 60 percent of all the recipients. The rate of acceptance rate was 20 percent for students from Nazi educational institutions such as the Napola. See Reichsstudenwerk: Kurzberichte aus der Arbeit des Jahres 1937, pp. 22-23.

As a result of politicization, the selection process for the scholarships of the Study Foundation of the German People favored the lower middle classes at the expense of the elite. In 1937, for example, only 9.2 percent of the scholarship recipients came from the elite. On the other hand, only 1.2 percent listed their fathers as workers, and thus members of the lower class. The high majority (the remaining 89.6 percent) of the students who received this prestigious scholarship came from the lower middle class.⁹¹ According to the same statistics, almost three-fourth (74.5 percent) of students came from families, whose income was under 200 marks. Only 11.6 percent of them came from families whose income exceeded 300 marks per months. Finally, the majority of students stemmed from families that had more than 3 children.⁹²

By the mid-1930s, the new principles of selection had taken the form of bureaucratic procedures. From 1934 health registers and genealogies had to accompany the applications. However, the results of the compulsory medical examinations and recommendations by family doctors did not satisfy the curiosity of the administrators. In camps organized for the close scrutiny of the candidates, students had to undergo an examination by doctors specializing in eugenics and racial hygiene.⁹³ In early 1935, the production of reliable proof of 'Aryan' ancestry became mandatory for applicants as well;

⁹¹ These statistics from 1937 list seven groups on the basis of students' social background. I reorganized these groups into three categories (elite, lower middle class and lower class). For the definition of these categories see Michael H. Kater, The Nazi Party: A Social Profile of Members and Leaders 1919-1945, Cambridge, Mass., 1983, pp. 1-16.

⁹² See Reichsstudentenwerk: Kurzberichte aus der Arbeit des Jahres 1937, p. 22.

⁹³ In 1935, Streit asked the Reich Health Office to provide twenty young SS doctors specialized in racial biology and hygiene to conduct the medical examination and biological selection of candidates. See Reichsstudentenwerk: Kurzberichte aus der Arbeit des Jahres 1935. [n.p]

from 1936 on they had to verify that there had been no Jewish members in their families back to 1800.⁹⁴

After 1935, interviews by the trustees, usually teachers, lost their importance; their role was taken over by recommendations from the army and labor service and the evaluation of students' behavior and abilities in special camps of the foundation. The description of life in one of these camps gives us some insight into Nazi pedagogy. In the chosen example, the participants were all male students, who had just completed their army and labor service. In the camp, life was organized around sport activities, marches and political lectures. Sports provided the basis for the evaluation of the candidates' characters: their willpower, stamina and sociability. These activities were supplemented with medical and racial examinations, executed by young doctors of the SS. The intellectual abilities of the applicants were observed in seminars held on political and racial questions. The examiners, mostly university teachers, based their final decisions on a combination of three factors. First, they evaluated students on the basis of their ability to conform to camp life and achieve leadership positions. Secondly, the candidates' political reliability was assessed on the basis of participation in political seminars. Finally, by placing the students in embarrassing situations, examiners measured the willingness of the candidates to oppose majority opinion even if it meant humiliation and ostracism in the process.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ See Reichsstudentenwerk: Kurzberichte aus der Arbeit des Jahres 1937, p. 23.

⁹⁵ "Lager Tännich: Auslese für die Reichsförderung," Umschau der Studentenwerke, Nr. 16, December 1935. [n.p]

During the Third Reich, the emphasis in the selection process for this prestigious scholarship shifted from intellectual abilities and gentlemanly manners to political engagement in the service of the Nazi state. This shift was made conspicuous by the declining importance of teachers' recommendations. The recommendation of high-school teachers had become irrelevant by 1938 as the foundation restricted applications to students who were at least in their third semester. On the other hand, recommendation from the NSDStB, the labor service and army became prerequisites for support after 1935. Membership in other Nazi organizations such as the SA and SS gave additional advantages to politically active students. Indeed, as Table 4 shows, after 1933 the number of recipients from the whole Reich originally recommended by Nazi organizations, including the student-aid foundations, far outweighed those put forward by high-school and university teachers.

Table 4: Recommendations for Reichsförderung in the Fall of 1937.⁹⁶

Application handed in by		Accepted	Rejected	Referred
High school	3 = 1.9%	1 = 33.3%	2 = 66.7%	-
Napola	1 = 0.6%	-	-	1 = 100%
University	9 = 5.7%	4 = 44.5%	2 = 22.2%	3 = 33.3%
State Authorities	1 = 0.6%	1 = 100%	-	-
Individuals	2 = 1.3%	-	1 = 50.0%	1 = 50.0%
Staid foundations	99 = 63.1%	57 = 57.5%	17 = 17.2%	7 = 58.3%
Langemarck study	12 = 7.7%	5 = 41.7%	-	7 = 58.3%
NSDStB	15 = 9.6%	9 = 60.0%	2 = 13.3%	4 = 26.7%
SS	13 = 8.3%	8 = 61.5%	-	5 = 38.5%
SA	1 = 0.6%	1 = 100%	-	1 = 100%
HJ, DJ, BDM	1 = 0.6%	-	-	-
Total	157 = 100.0%	86 = 54.8%	24 = 15.3%	47 = 29.9%

Table 5: Membership of the recipients of Reichsförderung in Nazi organizations.⁹⁷

Pol. organization	Number of student	Member	Unterführer	Führer
SA	128	84	42	2
SS	115	79	32	4
HJ	84	-	-	84
DJ	13	-	-	13
BDM	12	-	-	12
Others	39	22	5	12
Total	391	175	79	127

⁹⁶ See Reichsstudentenwerk: Kurzberichte aus der Arbeit des Jahres 1937, p. 25.

⁹⁷ See Reichsstudentenwerk: Kurzberichte aus der Arbeit des Jahres 1938, p. 39.

The politicization of the scholarship was made blatantly obvious by the position of the recipients in the hierarchy of the Nazi party and state. In January 1938, for example, all 405 recipients were members of NSDStB. In addition, as Table 5 demonstrates, they also belonged to a number of Nazi organizations. The rank of scholarship recipients in the Nazi hierarchy makes the politicization of this scholarship even more conspicuous. As Table 6 shows, almost half of the recipients from the whole Reich served in the leadership of various Nazi organizations in 1938.

Organizations and ranks	Number of students
Gaustudentenführer	2
Studentenführer	11
Amtsleiter der Studentenführung	78
Kameradschaftsführer	40
Studentische Mitarbeiter	49
Mitarbeiter im Studentenwerk	34
Total	214

The high number of Nazi cadres raises the question of whether the elaborate system of selection was ever seriously applied to political activists. Rather, the politicization of selection ensured that the scholarship became an almost exclusive preserve of Nazi functionaries. Thus, competition was reduced to intrigues among Nazi officials. Instead of promoting talent and moral excellence, the foundation nurtured traits

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 39.

typical of modern bureaucracies: opportunism, lack of imagination and initiative, subservience to superiors, a hunger for power and a taste for manipulation and intrigue.

Nazi periodicals such as the Reichsstudentenwerk shed some light on the personality and character of the students who received the most prestigious state scholarship after 1933. Unfortunately, the Reichsstudentenwerk did not publish the recipients' full name. According to this periodical, the foundation awarded its scholarship, for example, to a medical student in 1938, who had been the Nazi student leader in Jena. This male student had finished a Nazi elite secondary school, the *Napola*, and become interested in anthropological and racial research during his university studies. He participated in the first Reich Vocational Contest in 1935/36 and won a prize with a work in racial research. In 1937 he published a much-acclaimed article on the racial composition of the population in one of the northern provinces. In the following year, he undertook yet another racial and anthropological survey in his home village in Silesia. This research served as the basis for his doctoral thesis. His supervisor described him as a person of strong will and political belief. In addition, he mentioned that the student also had promising talents and possessed a critical mind.⁹⁹

As this example suggests, one of the functions of the scholarship was to help in the creation of a new generation of Nazi scientists and artists. Another student (again his full name is not given) who wrote an ideologically-inspired account of Germany's pre-historical period received the scholarship in 1938. Others, such as the fledging poet who had won the praise of Nazi authorities for his poem, the Street of the Führer or the young

sculptor for a bust of Rudolf Hess, belonged to this group. On the other hand, the foundation rewarded students who did not have scholarly talents at all but had shown exceptional courage in the service of the Nazi state. A recipient of the scholarship, who was also a medical student and company commander of the SA, took an active part in the German minority's uprising in the Sudetenland in 1938. Working as a spy, he crossed enemy lines in a woman's dress to bring news, weapons and ammunition to his comrades. He even swam across a river while carrying weapons, hand grenades and pistols in a basket. Apart from this adventure, he helped to blow up a military train. The RStW portrayed this brave Nazi as an excellent student and a model for his comrades.¹⁰⁰

The unwillingness of the Nazi government to invest heavily in student aid ensured that the impact of this scholarship on students remained limited. As with the Weimar Republic, only 0.5 percent of all students received this prestigious scholarship every year.¹⁰¹ Thus, this scholarship could contribute little to the creation of a new Nazi elite. Furthermore, Reichsförderung faced increased competition, as businesses keen on attracting talented students began offering more financial incentives after 1936. Unlike the REM and the Nazi student organizations, corporations were interested solely in the qualifications rather than the political activities of the applicants. The result was that talented students tended to prefer private scholarships because it set less political demands. Although this competition did not challenge the existence of the

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 40.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 41.

¹⁰¹ See Table 4 in this chapter.

Reichsförderung, it underlined its marginal significance in controlling students' lives and influencing their political behavior.

Apart from scholarships, the remission of university fees offered an additional instrument with which to strengthen the ties between students and the regime. The remission of fees was not a Nazi invention. Originally, it was an act of charity on the part of university teachers, who set the fees for their lectures to be paid to themselves. After the First World War, the state became involved in the setting of fees and determined the amount of money that was to be channeled back to students in the form of remissions, thus creating the conditions for the political manipulation of this branch of student aid after the Nazi takeover. Acting on this perceived opportunity, the Prussian Ministry of Education ordered in 1934 that in the future members of the Kameradschaft houses should obtain a remission of fees automatically.¹⁰² The same institution also decreed that, among male students, only those who did their SA service could obtain a remission of fees.¹⁰³ In March 1935, the REM made the remission of fees dependent upon three criteria: political support for the Nazi state, achievement in school and suitability of character.¹⁰⁴

In July 1937, a new order by the REM explained the criteria for the remission of fees in details. Similarly to the other branches of state-controlled student aid, support became dependent upon the 'Aryan' ancestry, health, and political reliability of the applicants. Additionally, the applicants had to display talent in their chosen academic field

¹⁰² RdErl. des Preussischen KM vom 28. 5. 1934, referred to, in Rundschreiben des Studentenwerks, Nr. 274/34 vom 7. 6. 1934, in UAK, 28/268, pp. 2-3.

¹⁰³ Adam, Hochschule und Nazionalsozialismus, p.107.

¹⁰⁴ Erlass des REM, 25. 03. 1935.--W I a Nr.730. in UAJ, Bestand C, Nr. 1190.

and to prove that without financial support they could not continue their studies. Finally, information on membership in Nazi organizations and records of army and labor service as well as two recommendations from professors most familiar with the candidates' work had to be provided.¹⁰⁵

The remission of fees remained the most popular form of financial support in the Third Reich. In the mid 1930s, between 18 and 20 percent of students obtained full or partial remission of fees.¹⁰⁶ Money set aside for the remission of fees made up almost half of the amount available for financial support of students between 1931 and 1934.¹⁰⁷ Since the remission of fees touched upon the lives of a significant number of students, its manipulation offered the Nazi regime a useful instrument to punish, control and manipulate students. Unfortunately, however, we lack information about the number of students who were excluded from this branch of student aid on the grounds of their ethnicity or political beliefs immediately after the Nazi takeover. Scattered examples show, nevertheless, that, especially in the late 1930s, Nazi fanatics occasionally denied remission of fees to Protestant theology students.¹⁰⁸

It is clear, however, that the decree of politicization of this branch of student aid displayed significant differences at local levels. At the University of Freiburg, for example,

¹⁰⁵ Gebührenerlassordnung für die Deutschen Hochschulen vom 10 Juli 1937, WA 1520, in UAJ, Bestand C, I 190; also Adam, *Hochschule und Nazionalsozialismus*, p. 107.

¹⁰⁶ See "Bemerkungen zum Förderung der Studentenwerke an den Hochschulen," Berlin, December 6, 1935, BA Koblenz, R 149/18.

¹⁰⁷ In the summer semester of 1934, the money distributed in the form of remission of fees amounted to 1 711 426 marks. At the same time, other institutions distributed only 1 532 437 marks. See A. Deringer, "Denkschrift zur Neuordnung der Hochschulgebühren," Prepared at the request of the RStW and the Reich Student Leadership, October 1937, UA Dresden, Abt. Chemie und Biologie, A/86, p. 3.

¹⁰⁸ Adam, *Hochschule und Nazionalsozialismus*, p. 108.

Nazi students gained a decisive voice in the distribution of the money set aside for the remission of student fees. As a result, the selection for this type of aid closely followed the principles elaborated by the RStW. In the school year of 1936/37, the local student-aid foundation rejected over 100 out of 500 applications. This was an extremely high number since the university had only 2,639 students. In accordance with the proclaimed goals of Nazi social policy, preference was given to students from peasant, working and lower middle-class backgrounds. The student foundation also ranked the candidates according to their chosen field of study. As student administrators explained, they generally declined support for Catholic theology students because they feared that financial aid in any form would only strengthen political Catholicism vis-à-vis the Nazi state. Instead of providing help for future ministers and priests, the local student foundation requested more aid for students in the technical and science faculties. In Freiburg, Nazi students fought even against the idea that the remission of fees should be awarded on the basis of financial need. They argued that this practice reflected the tax policy of Marxism seeking to punish better-off citizens. The main criteria in the selection process, they concluded, should be academic achievement and political reliability.¹⁰⁹

As in Freiburg, Nazi radicals at the University of Cologne also initially had control over the selection process for the remission fees. In 1935, the dean of the philosophy faculty complained that student activists made practically all the decisions. The local student federation and aid foundation kept the applicants' files until the last days before the meeting of the committee, thereby preventing adult members from forming an opinion

¹⁰⁹ Studentenwerk Freiburg to RStW, July 14, 1937, BA Koblenz, R 149/155.

about the candidates. As might be expected, the decisions of student activists were not based on grades and scientific achievement. In this town, the local student federation sought to abolish report cards and teachers' recommendations as prerequisite for applications.¹¹⁰ However, the REM helped to rectify the situation. In March 1935, it ordered that in the future decisions over the remission of fees should be made by a four-member committee, which was to include the rector, the dean of the relevant faculty, the leader of the local student federation and the head of the local student-aid foundation.¹¹¹ Since complaints from Cologne ceased to pour in to the REM after March 1935, it is reasonable to assume that academic administrators at the University of Cologne used this order to increase their influence over the selection process.

The continuing debate on this branch of student aid after 1935 suggests, however, that stricter selection of candidates did not compensate for the inadequacy of support. As a survey conducted by the RStW in the summer of 1935 shows, the money set aside for the remission of fees could not even satisfy a carefully chosen circle of students. Twenty out of thirty universities replied that the money was inadequate to reward even the most qualified students.¹¹² It was calculated that the amount of money set aside for the remission of student fees had to be raised by 50 percent and the remission of lecture fees had to be doubled to mitigate the intolerable financial situation of students. Local student-aid foundations complained about the absurdity of the situation: they had to support

¹¹⁰ Philosophische Fakultät der Universität Köln to Rektor der Universität, January 4, 1935, UAK, 28/268, pp. 21-23.

¹¹¹ RdErl. des REM vom 25. 3. 1935, W I a Nr. 7300 in UAJ, Bestand C, Nr. 1190.

¹¹² Studentenwerk Köln to RStW, July 7, 1937, BA Koblenz, R 149/155; also Studentenwerk Braunschweig to RStW, August 2, 1937, BA Koblenz, R 149/155.

students so they could pay their fees. Thus, state subsidies to the aid foundations were simply channeled back to the state as university fees.¹¹³

The Nazi state clearly missed the opportunity to increase its popularity among students through a more generous policy with respect to the remission of fees. Moreover, the rapid decline in student numbers after 1933 diminished the amount of money paid in university fees. Thus, by 1937, the sum set aside for the remission of fees had also been reduced by almost 50 percent.¹¹⁴

School Year	Number of Students by Faculties					Applications by faculties				
	Science	Law	Medicine	Phil.	Total	Science	Law	Medicine	Phil.	Total
WS 1932/33	1,512	1,068	926	1,376	4,882	189	126	171	404	890
SS 1933	1,410	976	899	1,160	4,445	206	129	182	305	822
WS 1933/34	1,205	809	884	1,035	3,933	160	120	164	244	688
SS 1934	987	671	819	790	3,267	129	95	163	199	586
WS 1934/35	929	656	927	744	3,256	135	86	185	198	604
SS 1935	753	515	797	617	2,682	122	94	160	162	538
WS 1935/36	878	609	956	647	3,090	102	72	148	146	468
SS 1936	817	505	878	498	2,698	78	81	106	82	347
WS 1936/37	876	425	909	468	2,678	60	45	81	80	266
SS 1937	926	358	821	384	2,489	69	38	86	60	253
WS 1937/38	1,027	328	871	358	2,584	69	38	79	49	235
SS 1938	994	298	803	333	2,428	77	37	77	63	254
WS 1938/39	996	317	757	343	2,413	65	33	66	59	223
1940.2th.s.	432	173	588	371	1,564	17	12	56	41	126

¹¹³ Studentenwerk Leipzig to RStW, July 12, 1937, BA Koblenz, R 149/155.

¹¹⁴ Giles, *Students and National Socialism in Germany*, p. 242.

¹¹⁵ UAK, *Studentenschaft und Studentenwerk*, Nr. 28/267, pp. 227-339, Nr. 28/268, pp. 10-304.

As Table 7 suggests, applications for the remission of fees did not decline as rapidly as did the number of students. The result was that needy students had less chance to obtain a remission of their fees. To ameliorate this situation, the RStW, in cooperation with the leadership of the German Student Federation and the Economic and Social Office of the NSDAP began to reform the system of remission in 1936. They proclaimed that their long-term goal was the complete abolition of fees. In the short run, however, they were satisfied with less radical changes such as a modest increase in the money set aside for the remission of fees. There was also some disagreement among the administrators of the RStW on how to bring about this increase. The more radical option was to re-structure fees according to the income and wealth of students' parents. Rich students would pay twice or three times more, thus increasing the money for the remission of fees for their needy comrades. This proposal was almost immediately dropped, however, for fear of losing talented students from the middle and upper classes to other occupations. The option that was finally adopted involved a limited increase in the amount of money set aside for the remission of fees based upon the income of their parents and the size of their families.¹¹⁶

This new drive towards the regulation of fees and their remission after 1936 bore only limited results. First, the REM failed to abolish university fees. In fact, fees remained high, thus excluding the choice of university study for many potential students from the

¹¹⁶ RStW to Studentenwerke, May 10, 1937, BA Koblenz, R 149/155; Dr. Franz, Leiter des Wirtschafts- und Sozialamtes der NSDAP to RStW, May 20, 1937, R149/155.

middle and the lower classes.¹¹⁷ Moreover, the regime failed to significantly increase the money available for the remission of fees as well. The only reform, which had been implemented before 1939, was the removal of barriers between various types of fees. However, the upper limit for the redistribution of universities' income from fees remained at 15 percent. The regime allowed the redistribution of fees of up to 20 percent only at a few universities along Germany's eastern border in order to attract more students to these institutions.¹¹⁸

The question of whether more money was available for the remission of fees and whether more students obtained remissions after 1939 is difficult to answer because there is no comprehensive statistic on the remission of fees during the war. Male students with a record of two years of armed service were exempted from paying fees. In addition, the state gave a monthly allowance for war veterans and their families.¹¹⁹ However, as local examples suggest, favors to war veterans were given at the expense of female and male students at home.¹²⁰ Nevertheless, given the high number of war veterans, it is reasonable to assume that there was an increase in the number of students receiving this form of aid during the war.

¹¹⁷ Study fees were 160-180 marks for art and humanity students, 200-250 marks for students of medicine and natural science, and 180-200 marks for student of technology. These numbers remained the same during the Third Reich. See relevant articles in the Der Deutsche Hochschulführer, 1933-1944; Adam, Hochschule und Nationalsozialismus, p. 118; Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 140.

¹¹⁸ RdErl. des REM vom 28. 1. 1938, in UAK, 28/268, pp. 223-224.

¹¹⁹ RdErl. des REM vom 20. 4. 1941; also RdErl. des REM vom 1. 7. 1944, in BA Koblenz, R 21/ 10920.

¹²⁰ At the Technical University of Karlsruhe, only 13 out of 280 veterans did not receive remission; less than one third (66 out of 185) of male students, who were not veterans, obtained no financial help. On the other hand, none of the 23 female students received remission. See "Eine Stichprobe über Studienförderungsverhältnisse im Wintersemester 1941/94 (TH. Karlsruhe)," Karlsruhe, [1942], BA Koblenz, R 21/765.

The third most important form of financial aid was provided as loans from the Loan Bank of the German Student-Aid Foundation (Darlehnskasse des Deutschen Studentenwerkes). Similarly to other branches of student aid, the idea of student loans originated decades before the Nazi takeover. Already before the outbreak of the First World War, the Albertus-Magnus Verein offered loans for Catholic students who were in the last years of their studies. The loan bank itself was officially established as an independent society in June 1922.¹²¹ It became an instant success: between 1923 and 1928 the bank provided more than 17,000 students with loans, distributing 1,700,000 marks per year.¹²² However, the decline in state and private contributions and the inability of many graduates to repay their loans after the onset of the Great Depression threatened the very existence of the organization. Left with no other choice, the loan bank decided to tighten the selection of students, reduce the number of recipients, and enforce the repayment of loans.¹²³

The Nazi takeover left the structure of the loan bank intact; the organization preserved its independent legal character even after 1933. The greatest change came with the removal of Heinrich G. Merkel from the leadership of the central loan bank on racial grounds; this event was greatly resented by the majority of adult administrators and student activists.¹²⁴ Additionally, the regime introduced political criteria into the selection

¹²¹ Wilhelm Schlink and Reinhold Schairer, "Die Studentische Wirtschaftshilfe," in Doeberl et al, Das akademische Deutschland, p. 467.

¹²² *Ibid.*, pp. 468-469.

¹²³ Central contribution declined from 1, 261, 000 marks in 1928/29 to 1, 108, 562 marks in 1930/31. Even more drastic was the decline in state support. The states gave 336,325 marks in 1928/29 and only 193,100 marks in 1930/31. See Streit, Das Deutsche Studentenwerk, p. 129.

¹²⁴ Studentenschaft Kiel to Deutsche Studentenschaft, July 20, 1933, StAWÜ, RSF I/60 p. 507.

process excluding Communist and non-‘Aryan’ students from the services of the loan bank.¹²⁵ At the end of 1933, the bank decided to provide adequate help for fewer candidates rather than distributing its support in small sums among a large number of students.¹²⁶ By 1934, proofs of financial needs, physical and spiritual health as well as membership in party organizations also became prerequisites for this branch of support. The maximum amount of a loan was set at 1,200 marks for university students and 1,000 marks for students of technical schools. Loans had to be repaid in eight years; the interest on student loans was three percent in the first five years and four percent in the remaining years.¹²⁷

The coordination of the loan bank and the tightening of the selection process bore mixed results. The drive towards centralized student aid after 1933, a process that has been discussed above, meant that at many universities only students who had been hand-picked for support from the beginning of their studies could expect loans. Since financial support for first-year students depended almost entirely upon political considerations, the drive towards centralization often worked in favor of Nazi activists.

Nevertheless, local examples suggest that the RStW could never accomplish the complete politicization of student loans. Gerhard Armingier has shown that almost one-fifth of the recipients of loans were not members of any Nazi organization during the Third

¹²⁵ Rundschreiben der Darlehnskasse des Deutschen Studentenwerks, Nr. 261, April 8, 1933, BA Koblenz, R 149/171.

¹²⁶ Rundschreiben der Darlehnskasse des Deutschen Studentenwerks, Nr. 272, November 6, 1933, BA Koblenz, R 149/171.

¹²⁷ “Merkblatt für die Ausgabe von Darlehen an Hoch- und Fachschulstudierende ab April 1939,” BA Koblenz, R 21/47, pp. 23-24.

Reich.¹²⁸ Based on the evaluation of the personal files of almost twenty thousand loan claiming students, Arminger and Kater also suggest that the applicants' social background during the Third Reich differed little from the pre-1933 pattern. Students from the lower classes made up 3.5 percent of medical students but received 10.3 percent of all loans; numbers for the lower middle classes were 56.2 percent and 71.2 percent respectively. The elite's share in the medical student population was 40.3 percent but they received only 18.5 percent of the loans. The share of the elite was somewhat lower in other faculties. This number suggests that the loans did not aim at radical changes in the social structure of the student population.¹²⁹

Student aid in the Third Reich was not confined to financial support given to individuals. The student-aid foundations also provided services which focused upon the student community at large. Therefore, in the remaining part of the chapter I will discuss the extent to which these types of student aid became politicized in the Third Reich and how successful the Nazi regime was in using these services to promote its ideological and political goals.

After 1933, housing services remained popular with students, who turned almost exclusively to this new branch of student aid if they needed accommodation. Generally the housing services fulfilled three functions: finding accommodations, helping to improve hygienic conditions and leading the fight against rent increases. Because of this latter

¹²⁸ Gerhard Arminger, "Involvement of German Students in NS Organizations Based on the Archive of the Reich Student Services," *Historical Social Research — Historische Sozialforschung* 30 (April 1984), p. 21.

¹²⁹ See Kater, *Doctors under Hitler*, table 5.4 on p. 256; also Arminger, "Involvement," p. 23.

function, the housing services were natural targets of criticism by landlords, who were mostly widows forced by circumstances to rent one of their rooms. They were, however, very much conscious of, and were prepared to defend, their interests: in early 1933, for example, they collected signatures and turned collectively to the rector of the Technical University. In their letter, they described the student housing services as a remnant of the war economy. They argued that the administrators of this organization demanded luxury services such as central heating and telephones for their clients and encouraged students to pay only a pittance in rent. Poor landladies, they claimed, were forced to use the unsolicited services of the housing office and still did not get any students. The activities of this housing service, they continued, gave unfair advantage to rich landladies, who, for whatever reason, decided to rent out their better situated and equipped houses. The result of this unfair competition, they concluded, was that poor women in traditional student areas lost their clients to rich landlords in the suburbs. The landladies demanded that the housing service should stop its price-regulating activities. Instead, they argued, the situation should return to the old times, when landladies had put up a sign in their windows advertising their rooms.¹³⁰

Not surprisingly, the housing office rejected the landladies' argument as an exaggeration. The administrators acknowledged that the onset of the Depression forced many middle-class families to share their spacious houses with students. Thus, in Munich there was a surplus of rooms even during the highest peak of students' attendance in

¹³⁰ Protest letter signed by Emma Hennies and fourteen other women to Rektorat der Technischen Hochschule München, February 20, 1933, UAM, Sen. Nr. 365 b/3.

1931. They also knew that the decline in student numbers after that date further increased the plight of poor landladies. Nevertheless, they rejected the renters' practice to vent their frustration upon the housing office. While the administrators acknowledged that their clients preferred lodgings in the better parts of the town, they doubted that students demanded luxuries such as telephones. Moreover, they ridiculed the landladies' argument that the majority of students now lived in the best parts of the city such as Bogenhausen and Nymphenburg. On the whole, the housing office portrayed itself as the defender of students' legitimate interests.¹³¹

It seems that these and similar complaints went unheeded during the first years after the Nazi takeover. Instead of abolishing the mediating role of the housing offices, a few local student-aid foundations made their use mandatory for both students and landladies after 1933. However, even where they had succeeded, student activists were prepared to make concession to poor landladies by promising to exclude better-off competitors from the list.¹³² Although the mandatory use of housing services never became a central policy of the Reich Student Services, it is clear that where the housing office claimed and used such monopoly tensions increased rapidly. Middle-class renters, especially, felt their basic rights were being violated. In Göttingen, for example, a military officer and his wife could not procure the permission of the local student-aid foundation to rent their rooms. The elderly couple had four children, two of whom were students. They tried desperately to cut through the maze of university bureaucracy. However, both the

¹³¹ Studentenschaft München to the Rektor der Universität München, July 1, 1933, UAM, Sen. Nr.365 b/3.

rector and the student federation paid little attention to their problems. The couple's refusal to provide an assessment of their income led to the repeated rejection of their application by the housing office. The military officer, who drew the pension of a major, and his wife argued that the barring of better-off landladies from the business adversely affected students who often had lengthy relationships with their landladies. The termination of renting rights spelled financial trouble for middle-class families. Even more serious, they continued, was the political impact of this regulation. The shift of students' residence from middle-class neighborhoods to the poorer parts of the city would expose students to the contagious spiritual disease of Jewish-Marxism. On the other hand, they concluded, the impeccable nationalist credentials of middle-class families, like themselves, would guarantee that such a development would never take place.¹³³

Unfortunately, we lack information that would prove that the local student-aid foundations were able to solidify their monopoly over rental services. It is certain, however, that the increased power of housing services worsened the position of proprietors, especially that of poor landladies. The Nazi policy of obstructing migration between universities, the decline in the number of German and foreign students and the spreading practice of student exchange, spelled financial troubles for many proprietors.¹³⁴ Change came with the outbreak of war. The increase in student numbers after 1942, the destruction of buildings, the influx of foreign workers and refugees encouraged landladies

¹³² Studentenwerk Würzburg to Studentenschaft Würzburg, February 8, 1934, StAWÜ, RSF IV-1* 37/2.

¹³³ Anon. letter to Reichsministerium des Innern, [Berlin], November 18, 1933, BA Potsdam, Akten des Reichsministeriums des Innern, Nr. 26896, pp. 170-174.

¹³⁴ Studentenschaft Würzburg to Rektor der Universität, October 30, 1936, StAWÜ, RSF IV. 1-10.4/b.

to charge exorbitant prices for their rooms. They obviously won the battle with the housing offices of the local student-aid foundations, which faced increasing difficulties in finding rooms at reasonable costs for their clients during the last two years of the war.¹³⁵

Conflicting material interests and generational and cultural differences kept tensions between landladies and students high in the Third Reich. Especially the poor Studentenmütter envied the youth and what they often incorrectly perceived as the care-free lifestyle of students. Although this enmity was not new, tensions between the two parties acquired a new political dimension and outlet in the Third Reich. The fate of a student at the University of Jena, who was denounced by his landlady for making too much noise at night, makes this tendency and its consequences obvious. The denunciation pushed the university authority and the police to look into the student's background. Since spies also reported that he made some unsavory but politically harmless remarks in a restaurant, the rector, Professor Astel, who headed the local medical institute for racial research, expelled this student from the university on the grounds that he had injured his school's reputation.¹³⁶

The political consequence of a landlady's denunciation is even more conspicuous in the case of a female student from the Technical University of Dresden. She was first denounced by the local student leader for her unruly behavior at a Christmas party in 1940. However, it was only the testimony of her boyfriend's landlady that made her difficulties with the university authorities serious. The landlady informed the university

¹³⁵ See "Meldungen aus dem Reich," [1939], BA Potsdam, R 58/145, pp. 106-107.

that this female student spent a night with her Turkish boyfriend in his apartment. Since sexual contact with Turks was an offense, she was expelled from the Technical University of Dresden and prohibited from continuing her studies in Germany.¹³⁷

The housing services offered little opportunity for the manipulation and indoctrination of students. However, the creation of a system of dormitories would have greatly increased the power of the Nazi state over students' private lives. The example was set by the events during the first years of the Weimar Republic.¹³⁸ However, the movement towards the establishment of dormitories soon lost momentum. By the mid-1920s, most of the dormitories had been abandoned. Lack of state investment into the construction of modern dormitories and the renovation and upgrading of the existing ones, reasonable prices for rooms and the long tradition of individualism reinforced the students' desire to return to the old system and rent their own accommodation.

This tendency continued during the Third Reich. The state remained reluctant to invest significant amounts of money into dormitories.¹³⁹ The surplus of cheap private rooms forced many unprofitable student residences to close their doors in the second half of the 1930s. By the winter semester of 1937/38, there were only ten dormitories in the hands of the local student-aid foundations. As with the fraternity houses, these dormitories

¹³⁶ "Betrifft: Disziplinarverfahren der Universität Jena," Thüringisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Weimar, Akten des Thüringischen Volksbildungsministeriums, Bestand C, Nr.225, pp. 80-85.

¹³⁷ NSDStB Gaustudentenführer, Starke, to Rektor der Technischen Hochschule Dresden, February 5, 1941; also Rektor Jost to NSDStB Gaustudententtenführung, June 12, 1941, Archive der Technischen Hochschule Dresden, A/117.

¹³⁸ Streit, *Das Deutsche Studentenwerk*, p. 41.

¹³⁹ See "Liste der in Deutschland bestehenden Wohnheime für Studierende (nach unserer Umfrage b.d. örtl. Studentenwerken Juli/August 1933)," Dresden, 1933, BA Koblenz, R 149/84.

accommodated only a small number of students.¹⁴⁰ It seems that the Nazi state did not recognize the opportunities that the dormitories offered to control students. Its ignorance contrasts sharply with the Soviet experience, where over 50 percent of student lived in large dormitories after the Second World War.¹⁴¹

The only half-hearted attempt in this direction was made by the construction of Kameradschaft houses. The idea to assemble students into residential communities originated with Andreas Feickert and Heinz Roosch in the leadership of the German Student Federation. However, the realization of this plan ran into difficulties from the very beginning. The Ministry of Finance refused to subsidize the idea in August 1933.¹⁴² Furthermore, landladies pitted local administrators in party and municipal offices against student leaders by describing the Kameradschaft houses as unfair competitors.¹⁴³ Educators were also ambivalent about the idea; they worried about the negative impact that living in these residential communities would have upon the development of students' character.¹⁴⁴

In spite of these objections, the German Student Federation proceeded with the creation of student residences. Since they had failed to convince the state and central governments about the efficacy of their plan, Nazi activists turned to municipalities,

¹⁴⁰ Kress, Das Studentenwerk, p. 33.

¹⁴¹ The Soviets accommodated approximately 50 percent of the student body in large dormitories after the Second World War. See Mervyn Matthews, Education n the Soviet Union: Policies and Institutions since Stalin, London, 1982, p. 166. On the general problem of selection, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union 1921-1934, Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 48-51, 89-105.

¹⁴² Protocol, Reichsministerium des Innern, August 29, 1933, III. 3446/9.8, in SHSA, Akten des Kultusministeriums, Nr.10087/32, pp. 23-25.

¹⁴³ Deutsche Studentenschaft, Hauptamt für Wirtschaftsfragen to Dr. Niessen, Reichsministerium des Innern, March 17, 1934, BA Potsdam, Reichsministerium des Innern, Nr. 26 896, pp. 168-169.

universities and private businessmen for financial support. At the same time, they cast covetous eyes upon the fraternity houses. Under strong political pressure, the German Student Federation forced many fraternities to open their houses to non-fraternity members. Threatened with the denial of financial assistance, students also began to join the student residential communities in great numbers. The Nazi terror seemed to pay off as the number of Kameradschaft houses rapidly increased during the winter semester of 1933/34.¹⁴⁵ In early 1934, the German Student Federation ordered that every fraternity had to open its gates to non-fraternity members by the end of the summer semester. Thus, fraternity houses had to transform themselves into residential communities (Wohnkameradschaften) in order to accommodate students in their first three semesters of study.

Surviving descriptions of life in the new residential communities show the enormous opportunities that the new institution offered for the political indoctrination of students. Following a paramilitary line, activities in many Kameradschaft houses were controlled from early morning to the end of the day.¹⁴⁶ The interior of the houses reflected the desire for regimentation as well. Military equipment and furniture were often employed to suggest simplicity and order.¹⁴⁷ At a few places, the leaders of establishments imposed hard discipline on the rank and file. At most places, however, concessions to the tradition of student fraternities and to the members' desire for independence, turned

¹⁴⁴ University of Leipzig to von Seydewitz in the Sächs. Kultusministerium, August 1933, SHSA, Akten des Kultusministeriums, Nr.10087/32, pp. 12-18.

¹⁴⁵ See "Kameradschaftshäuser im Werden," Umschau der Studentenwerke, Nr. 9, October 1933. [n.p.]

¹⁴⁶ "Lebensformen des politischen Studenten: Das Kameradschaftshaus." Die Bewegung, 20 August, 1933.

paramilitary style into a mere facade. Generally, it seems that the time spent in the Kameradschaft houses marked the end of regimentation rather than the extension of close control; the residential communities, which were open to outside influences but maintained some semblance of an army barrack, allowed students to slowly adjust to civilian life.

Despite strong political pressure, less than half of the targeted group had been accommodated in Kameradschaft houses by the end of the summer semester of 1934.¹⁴⁸ The failure was especially obvious in the case of female students, who generally remained outside the residential communities.¹⁴⁹ The plan to herd students into the Kameradschaft houses in the shortest possible time failed because neither the fraternities nor the German Student Federation possessed enough houses to accommodate the large number of students. Secondly, the German Student Federation lacked the authority and the support of the Party and university administrations to enforce its orders. Thirdly, the idea foundered on the resistance of students, who generally resented the lack of privacy in these institutions. Finally, students shunned residential communities on financial grounds as well. Rents in the newly erected Kameradschaft houses remained high since administrators had to cover the yearly maintenance costs irrespective of whether students continued to stay and pay their rent during the holidays.¹⁵⁰ Thus, competition from the private sector threatened the survival of student residential communities from the beginning. Even where the German Student Federation succeeded in building their own

¹⁴⁷ Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, pp. 265-266.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 267, 505.

¹⁴⁹ There were ten Kameradschaft houses for female students in February 1935. See Ibid., p. 268.

Kameradschaft houses, the dormitory character of the new establishments drove students back to landladies.

The creation of residential communities gained new momentum with the appointment of Andreas Feickert in July 1934 to the head of the German Student Federation. His order from September 1934 repeated that all students of the first three semesters had to be accommodated in residential communities. Announcing an open war against the fraternities, Feickert demanded a complete coordination of the Wohnkameradschaften erected in their houses. In order to weed out unreliable elements and enforce total subordination, Feickert ordered that only a selected number of Wohnkameradschaften would be recognized as Kameradschaft houses of the German Student Federation. Moreover, in the future, the heads of the Kameradschaft houses would be appointed by the German Student Federation. To add insult to injury, the order stipulated that the inhabitants had to discard the traditional symbols of the fraternities such as the caps and bands; instead, they were forced to wear Nazi uniforms.¹⁵¹

The order created an uproar among members, who took great pride in the tradition, including the trappings of their fraternities. They sought support in the upper echelon of the ministerial bureaucracy and party to defeat the German Student Federation on this issue. Feickert was attacked even by the NSDStB, whose head, Derichsweiler,

¹⁵⁰ Full accommodation in the Kameradschaft houses of the student federation cost between 45 and 65 marks, an amount for which one can rent a cheaper room in town. See Georg Kress, Das Studentenwerk: Eine betriebswirtschaftliche Untersuchung, Berlin, 1937, p. 43.

¹⁵¹ Andreas Feickert, "Zur Frage der Kameradschaftserziehung," Berlin, October 6, 1934, SHSA, Akten des Kultusministeriums, Nr. 10087/32, pp. 134-142.

used the opportunity to strengthen the position of his own organization.¹⁵² Finally, the fate of Feickert's plan was sealed by Hitler's order on 11 November 1934. The Führer spoke out against the student residential communities as potential hotbeds of homosexuality. He argued that, after years in the army and work service, male students should be given the opportunity to socialize with members of the opposite sex. In the future, only one Kameradschaft house should exist at every university.

Hitler's order played havoc with the existing student residential communities. Deprived of much of its power, the German Student Federation had to give up the existing houses to the NSDStB. Even under the new administration, however, the residential communities continued to decline both in number and popularity. The continuing unprofitability of these establishments led to the closing of Kameradschaft houses at most universities.¹⁵³ By 1937, they had ceased to play an important role in student life.¹⁵⁴ Yet the idea did not completely disappear. Plans for the creation of "student villages" still appeared from time to time in student periodicals.¹⁵⁵ The final blow came in February 1939, when Hitler repeated his aversion to the residential communities. As a reaction to his new order, the Reich student leadership ordered that only one-bedroom

¹⁵² For the details of the struggle between fraternities and the German Student Federation see Steinberg, Sabers and Brown Shirts, pp. 154-173.

¹⁵³ At the Technical University of Dresden, the Kameradschaft house operated with loss; therefore, it had to be closed down in the winter semester of 1934/35. See Werner Starke, "Denkschrift zur Errichtung eines Kameradschaftshauses in Dresden," Dresden, October 26, 1935, SHSA, Akten des Kultusministeriums, Nr. 15777, pp. 93-98. Financial loss remained a major factor for the failure of the enterprise: by 1938, the still existing Kameradschaft houses closed the year with a deficit of 65 000 marks, see Kress, Das Studentenwerk, p. 43.

¹⁵⁴ While the German Student Federation had 36 Kameradschaft houses in 1933/34, their number declined to 18 by 1937. These 18 Kameradschaft houses had 920 places but only 620 were occupied. See Giles, Students and National Socialism, p. 213; also Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, pp. 270-271.

¹⁵⁵ See "Das studentische Dorf," Die Bewegung, July 20, 1937.

accommodations could exist as guest rooms in the Kameradschaft houses.¹⁵⁶ Henceforth the Kameradschaften functioned only as debating clubs and places for social activities whose political usefulness also declined rapidly during the war. This development was to some extent counterbalanced by the war, which forced many Kameradschaft houses to accommodate students in great numbers. However, the NSDStB had lost much of their power over students in general and the Kameradschaften (which had increasingly resembled the fraternities after 1939) in particular to strengthen the ties between students and the Nazi regime.¹⁵⁷

As with the case of other branches of student aid, the Nazi regime failed to capitalize upon the potential political capital present in the student eateries as well. Modeled on soup-kitchens, these institutions were created and underwent a rapid expansion in the period after the First World War. After the consolidation of the German economy by the mid-1920, many eateries successfully transformed themselves from welfare institutions into cheap restaurants competing with private establishments for the favors and purses of mostly student customers. Others, lodged in military barracks, the basements of the universities, warehouses and other empty buildings, preserved the character of an emergency institution. Only a few found their place in modern student houses. The quality of food and services was often poor; at many places, students continued to use cutlery and furniture borrowed from the army. Not surprisingly,

¹⁵⁶ Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 324.

¹⁵⁷ See Friedhelm Golücke, "Das Kameradschaftswesen in Würzburg von 1936 bis 1945," in the Institut für Hochschulkunde an der Universität Würzburg ed., Studentenschaft und Korporationswesen an der Universität Würzburg, Würzburg, 1982, pp. 139-196; Giles, Students and National Socialism, pp. 211-220 and Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, pp. 403-409.

attendance at student eateries declined rapidly after the consolidation of the German economy in 1924. The reputation of eateries as poor people's kitchens, the impersonal character of service and the often poor quality of food kept better-off students away from these establishments.¹⁵⁸

After the Nazi takeover, the German Student-Aid Foundation sought to make important changes in the ways students consumed their meals. They wanted to improve the quality of food and services. They also dreamed of moving student eateries from the basements of universities, stables, military barracks and other temporary buildings to more respectable locations. They preferred to put the eateries in newly-erected student houses, where the largest room could serve as an eatery during the day and as a place for political lectures, concerts and other activities in the evening. The improvement in services and food, however, served political and ideological purposes as well. Citing the examples of Spartan warriors and medieval religious orders, Nazi students planned to use these students eateries to foster the spirit of comradeship among students. The RStW even contemplated the introduction of compulsory attendance, especially for students in their first semesters. Shared meals, student activists argued, would be especially useful to break up the close groups formed by Catholic theology students.¹⁵⁹

The takeover and centralization of the eateries in Cologne demonstrate perhaps best the fate of these institutions after 1933. The most popular student eatery in Cologne

¹⁵⁸ Streit, Das Deutsche Studentenwerk, pp. 62-69.

¹⁵⁹ Memorandum, Deutsches Studentenwerk, November 11, 1933, BA Koblenz, R 149/25; also Memorandum, Deutsches Studentenwerk, 14 November, 1933, BA Potsdam, Reichsministerium des Innern, Abt. III. Nr. 26 897, p. 223.

was the GOA (Restaurant with no Alcohol Service or Gaststätte ohne Alkohol), which was located in the university garden. It was founded and administered by the local women's society (Kölner Frauenverein) and financed in part by the university. The local student-aid foundation had no influence on the operation of this organization. Secondly, there was the Mensa Academica that had been founded by a local noble woman and member of the Franciscan order, Sister Ignatia, in 1919; it remained under her tutelage until 1934. Until the early 1930s, only male students could attend this establishment. A dormitory for female students, Kloster Maria Hilf, also provided food for its members. Finally, the Medizinerheim, a dormitory for medical students, also sold meals at low prices for about seventy students per day in a normal school month.¹⁶⁰

The campaign by the local student-aid foundation in the summer of 1933 to take over the GOA provoked acrimonious debates, which finally ended in a compromise that allowed student representatives to participate in the directorate. However, the local student-aid foundation was not satisfied with this outcome and took over the leadership of the GOA in the same year.¹⁶¹ The question of the Mensa Academica seemed to be settled with the building of a student eatery on the new campus in October 1934. However, the strive towards centralization soon suffered a serious setback. Although her establishment was made redundant by the changes, Sister Ignatia and her co-workers in the Franciscan order did not give up the fight for the stomachs and souls of university students. She planned to open a new "student kitchen" close to the new university. The local student-aid

¹⁶⁰ "Tätigkeitsbericht des Studentenwerks Köln e.V. für das Geschäftsjahr 1933/34," UAK, Akten des Vereins Studentenbourse, Nr. 28/331, p. 10.

foundation tried unsuccessfully to block the reopening of a student eatery under Catholic supervision. Its administrators put the blame for this turn of events squarely upon the shoulders of university teachers and students. They argued that revival of the Catholic eatery could be attributed to students, “who were good Catholics and anything else but National Socialist.”¹⁶² Moreover, by 1936, the new Mensa, now under the supervision of the Nazified student-aid foundation, fell into a serious financial crisis. Decline in student numbers and rising foodstuff prices hit the eatery hard. By 1936, less than one-fifth of the student population ate their lunch at this institution. Activists and administrators cited the unfortunate location of the new student eatery as the main reason for the losses. The medical faculty and clinics were twenty-minutes distance from the Mensa; there were a number of cheap restaurants in close proximity where students and faculty members could take their lunch. Moreover, part of the philosophy faculty was situated at the other end of the town. The high number of students who still lived with their parents in Cologne or in its vicinity reduced attendance even further. These factors kept the percentage of users slightly above ten percent of the local student population.¹⁶³ Low attendance undermined the power of the student-aid foundation and seriously limited the use of the eatery as a means of political control and indoctrination.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 11.

¹⁶² Studentenwerk Köln to NSDAP Gauleitung , August 29, 1935, UAK Akten des Vereins Studentenburse, Nr. 28/337.

¹⁶³ “Tätigkeitsbericht des Studentenwerks Köln e V. über das Geschäftsjahr 1935/36,” UAK, Akten des Vereins Studentenburse, Nr. 28/331.

In Heidelberg and Freiburg, the story of student eateries mirrored the events in Cologne.¹⁶⁴ In Munich, the removal of religious personnel did not happen in one blow either. In this city, the local student-aid foundation took over the eatery of the Stammhaus of the NSDStB in 1937. Until then, Catholic nuns cooked for and served Nazi students.¹⁶⁵ The reason for this delay could be explained by inadequate state support and interests that helped to perpetuate Catholic presence in, and possible ideological influence over, this branch of student aid at least until 1937.

The indifference of the state doomed plans regarding the increased role of student eateries to failure. The Nazi state did not invest large sums into the expansion of student eateries. It also denied legal support for making attendance compulsory. Only students who obtained free meals from the student-aid foundation as a welfare measure were forced by circumstances to use the Mensas. They made up, however, only between 10 and 20 percent of the regular guests.¹⁶⁶

At most universities, however, student eateries failed to attract more than half of the student population. In the period between 1932 and 1937, approximately 25 percent of the students used the student eateries regularly during lunch hour. Students at the technical universities tended to attend more often: in normal semester months about 50 percent of students ate their lunch at the Mensas. The figure for students at non-technical universities in great cities was only 10 percent. Attendance for supper was even lower:

¹⁶⁴ "Übernahme der Mensa in Freiburg," Dresden, March 19, 1934, BA Koblenz, R 149/25.

¹⁶⁵ Studentenwerk München to RStW, January 16, 1937, BA Koblenz, R 149/23.

¹⁶⁶ In WS 1932/33 9 percent of all portions were consumed in the form of free meals in Dresden and 17 percent in Würzburg, See "Speisungs-Bericht," Dresden, January 27, 1934, BA Koblenz, R 149/32.

only between 1 and 2 percent of the whole student population used the services of the student eateries in the evening.¹⁶⁷

Low attendance was usually attributed to the location of the eatery, the dispersion of university buildings and to the high number of native students.¹⁶⁸ Even more important was the continuing low regard of many students for these establishments. Students generally preferred restaurants and visited the eateries only when they were short of cash. The fifty-percent decline in student numbers between 1932 and 1937 affected the turnover of student eateries as well. The number of meals consumed by students also plummeted from 6 million to 4 million in this period. Decline in student numbers and the inability of many eateries to compete successfully with private businesses spelled financial trouble for these institutions. Many eateries were simply too large; they were built in the late Weimar period with the expectation of rising student numbers. As these expectations were not realized, many student eateries were forced to operate at half of their capacity. To balance the losses, the administrators tried to rent the eateries and their equipment to various Nazi organizations such as the German Labor Front. Nevertheless, this was only a half-measure. Declining student numbers, increased foodstuff prices, higher taxes and rising wages for personnel - a trend that was in part the result of the removal of nuns and other

¹⁶⁷ In the summer semester of 1939, only 4.2 percent of students ate their lunch in the student eatery at the University of Erlangen. In Cologne, the percentage was 5.7, in Breslau 6.6, in Frankfurt 7.9, in Würzburg 9.1. On the other hand, participation was much higher in Dresden (45.4 percent) and Karlsruhe (42.5 percent). See "Speisungsstatistik 1938," Umschau der Studentenwerke, Nr. 24, June 1939. [n.p]

¹⁶⁸ Every second student lived or studied more than ten minutes' distance away from the student eatery. In larger cities, most students had to travel more than thirty minutes to reach the Mensa. See "Zur Pflege des Speisungsbetriebes," Umschau der Studentenwerke, Nr. 18, December 1936. [n.p]

volunteers - continued to increase operational costs and undermined the profitability of the student eateries in the second half of the 1930s.¹⁶⁹

Structural weaknesses also prevented the semi-state Mensas from competing with private restaurants on an equal basis. An examination of the operation of the student eatery at the University of Tübingen revealed that a private business of equal size operated at 80 percent of the costs. The owner employed more part-timers and spared on foodstuff prices either by producing it himself or using his connections with wholesalers to obtain a better deal.¹⁷⁰ Private businesses were not addicted to state subsidies; they used their savings more rationally to improve services and to lower prices.

The student-aid foundations tried desperately to remain competitive. Many imitated private restaurants by placing cloths and flowers on the tables, employing friendly waitresses and waiters and paying greater attention to cleanliness. Others saved money by increasing the prices for meals and drinks or by introducing the system of self-service.¹⁷¹ Still other tried to convince the education ministries and the universities to provide more subsidies. They argued that student eateries heralded a new age in economic organization, that of the state-run business enterprises.¹⁷² Meals consumed in peer groups were substitutes for family dinners. These institutions had a beneficial impact upon society, by curtailing the greed of private businesses, thus ensuring social peace. In short, they

¹⁶⁹ The local student-aid foundations constantly complained about rising costs, see Studentenschaft Erlangen to Bayerisches Kultusministerium, October 30, 1934, BHSA, MK 40782.

¹⁷⁰ Kress, Das Studentenwerk, pp. 92-93.

¹⁷¹ Rudolf Thomas, Die Grundsätze der Studentenspeisungen: Gesammelte Aufsätze aus den Arbeitsgebieten des Reichsstudentenwerks, Berlin, 1939, pp. 10-11.

¹⁷² "Zeitgemässe Ernährung und ihr Einfluss auf den Besuch der Speisungen," Umschau der Studentenwerke, Nr.24, June 1939. [n.p]

continued, student eateries represented community over private interests: they brought rich and poor students together as a first step towards the realization of German socialism.¹⁷³

Nevertheless, low attendance not only jeopardized the realization of these political and pedagogical goals but raised serious questions about the viability of student eateries. The failure of student eateries did not lie in the presumed superiority of private businesses over public institutions. Instead, the roots of the problem should be sought in the ideological rigidity of Nazi administrators to recognize and conform to students' expectations. Extolling the Nazi ideals of austerity, simplicity and manliness, they reacted slowly to what they perceived as extravagant demands. They were surprised to discover that students, who in the army and labor service had been forced to put up with simple meals, became very choosy in student eateries. Contrary to their expectation, their clients demanded a large selection of meals and showed preference for spicy food "prepared with more love." They constantly complained about slow service and inadequate hygienic conditions. Finally, students did not hesitate to punish the administrators of these institutions for their reluctance to react positively to their demands. Unhesitatingly, they opted with their feet if they were not satisfied with the service.¹⁷⁴

Thus, by the mid-1930s, the tide turned against the Nazis. During the Weimar Republic, they could forge political capital out of students' dissatisfaction with the quality of service and food in student eateries. Now, the same dissatisfaction worked against

¹⁷³ Thomas, *Die Grundsätze der Studentenspeisungen*, p. 14.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-24.

them. Students' complaints poisoned the political atmosphere and further diminished the trust between the Nazified student organizations and average students. Inadequate state subsidies, structural deficiencies leading to unprofitability, and student resistance condemned the Nazi idea of selection through food provision to a failure. Moreover, the unprofitability of the enterprise meant that the local student-aid foundation had to channel desperately needed funds from other branches to the eatery.¹⁷⁵

This chapter has examined the changes in student aid in the Third Reich. It has demonstrated that in quantitative terms there was no significant change in state support until the outbreak of the Second World War. The Nazi state clearly neglected the opportunity to use student aid to diversify the composition of the student body. Neither did the Nazi state resort to other means, such as increasing the income of students' parents, lowering the cost of maintenance and studying and providing more part-time jobs to help students to improve their living standards. Some positive changes came after the outbreak of the war, but they were clearly inadequate to compensate for the deterioration in the students' standard of living. Thus, as far as the majority of students were concerned, the Nazi regime failed to deliver on its earlier promises. Paradoxically, the frugality of the Nazi state worked against the realization of its ideological goals. Inadequate support vitiated against the Nazi principle of selection, which advocated support for students who were full members of the Nazi 'national community.'

¹⁷⁵ In 1937 the students eateries administered by the local student-aid foundations had a deficit of 225 000 marks. See *Ibid.*, p. 7.

This failure to live up to its promises does not mean, however, that the Nazi state took no action in the field of student aid. On the contrary, the changes in principles and distribution practices were fundamental. Unlike its Weimar predecessors, the Nazi regime openly acknowledged and even emphasized that student aid in the Third Reich served mainly ideological and political goals. Based on this proclaimed intention, Nazi administrators changed the principles of selection for the social services provided by the German Student-Aid Foundation in 1933. These changes aimed at the realization of the Nazi idea of selection. The goal of Nazi student-aid policy was to hasten the removal of so-called undesirable elements from the universities by denying social support for them. Second, student aid in the Third Reich aimed at increasing the popularity of the Nazi regime among students. Closely connected to this function of social support was the desire of Nazi activists to use various branches of student aid, such as dormitories and student eateries, to gain control over important aspects of students' private lives.

How successful was the attempt of Nazi activists to use student aid to realize their totalitarian ambitions and the ideological goals of the regime? On the one hand, this chapter has shown that the negative aspect of selection, namely elimination, was put into practice soon after Nazi takeover. Both the political opponents of the regime and non-'Aryans' were removed from the lists of recipients who had obtained scholarships from state, university and student organizations. After 1933, female students also faced a more difficult time in receiving financial support. As the next chapter will show, students branded as unhealthy by doctors and Nazi authorities were also denied student aid on the basis of Nazi laws in the Third Reich.

The systematic and centrally-supported discrimination against the above-mentioned groups set Nazi student-aid policy clearly apart from its Weimar predecessor. However, given the fact that only a minority of students had received financial support before 1933, and the same tendency continued during the Third Reich, legalized discrimination in student aid alone did not necessarily lead to the removal of unwanted students from the universities. This was certainly true for non-‘Aryans’ and we have very little reason to assume the denial of financial aid had a serious impact on the number of female students. Nevertheless, these measures remain important. Combined with other forms of discrimination, they created an atmosphere that, at least in the case of Jewish students, led to a rapid decline in their numbers and to their eventual disappearance from German universities.

Thus, we can conclude that the introduction of the Nazi concept of selection into student aid had serious consequences for certain groups of students. If we return to the support side of selection, however, the picture becomes more complex. The failure of the Nazi regime to act upon its promises and to increase student aid dramatically did precious little to endear Hitler’s state to the average student. The Nazi state obviously missed the opportunity to seduce students through more generous provisions of social support. Second, Nazi activists were apt to recognize the possibilities that various branches of student aid, such as dormitories and student eateries, could be used to gain control over important aspects of students’ private lives. However, they received little support from either university administrators or the central government to expand these facilities and reorganize them according to Nazi principles. This chapter has argued that this negligence

contracts sharply with the equally totalitarian ambitions of the communist states, which used these facilities with much more effectiveness.

Inadequate financial and wavering administrative support from the central government failed to bring average students closer to the Nazi government. On the other hand, student aid fulfilled an important purpose. By providing social assistance to Nazi activists, who had proven their loyalty to the Nazi cause and demonstrated their willingness to serve, the Nazi regime reinforced the bond between itself and its most fanatical supporters among students. Even here, however, the frugality of the Nazi state worked against an increase in the size of loyal cadre. Thus, it remains doubtful whether student aid played a vital role in bringing up a new generation of Nazi leaders. Moreover, the employment of student aid for this purpose had serious consequences, which were, in turn, not lost on average students. The systematic use of student aid to support Nazi activists, a routine that was always justified with the notion of selection, led to an unprecedented corruption in the structure of scholarships and other forms of social support. In practice, selection for student aid, particularly at the local level, often meant that Nazi activists distributed support among themselves. This perceived corruption of aid practices, in turn, increased the disillusionment of average students with the social policy of the Nazi regime.

Chapter Two: Nazi Policy towards Foreign Students

The first chapter examined the impact of Nazi ideology in general and the concept of selection in particular on the distribution of student aid in the Third Reich. This chapter looks at how the same concept influenced Nazi policy towards foreign students. It argues that ideological considerations played a relatively minor role in setting the parameters of Nazi foreign-cultural policy until the outbreak of the Second World War. Motivated by economic and diplomatic considerations, the various education ministries, against the wishes of Nazi students, lowered fees and relaxed admission requirements for foreign students after 1933. The Nazis also tried to convince foreign students of the correctness of their ideology, but their efforts were half-hearted and achieved little success before 1939. This lenient policy, however, changed dramatically after the outbreak of the war. During the war, the REM, and especially the SS, advocated the admission and assimilation of a carefully selected group of Eastern European students (while barring others of the same ethnicity from German universities) as part of their single-minded drive to create a racially-based empire. The subject of this chapter is to ascertain the extent to which these organizations achieved their goals.

There was no clearly defined and centrally directed German cultural policy in external affairs before the First World War. Although Imperial Germany maintained a number of scientific institutions abroad and supported lectures by German scholars in foreign countries, the existence and purpose of these organizations remained independent

of the goals of German foreign policy. Only after the French and English propaganda successes during the last phase of the First World War did bureaucrats in the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt or AA) recognize the propaganda value of cultural organizations in improving the country's image. Based on this war-time experience, both the Foreign Office and the Reich Ministry of the Interior (Reichsministerium des Innern or RMdI) established their own cultural departments in 1920. In theory these two institutions should have fashioned a comprehensive cultural policy in external affairs. In reality, their activities fell short of that goal. Instead of concentrating on a common task, these institutions became entangled in a struggle over status and influence. During this bureaucratic entanglement, the AA developed close ties with the Prussian Ministry of Education (Preussisches Ministerium für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Volksbildung or PrEM). This alliance allowed the AA to exercise a strong influence over the German University Conference, which served as the most important forum for the discussion of university concerns during the Weimar Republic. However, the University Conference also suffered from an important institutional weakness: its authority was not anchored in the Weimar Constitution. Thus, it remained dependent upon the good will of administrators in the education ministries of individual states to enforce its resolutions.¹

The slowly evolving nature of German cultural policy in foreign affairs can be seen in the treatment of foreign students. There was no national institution to formulate guidelines about their admission or to help them to adjust to the way of life in Germany

¹ For more information on cultural policy during the war and on the role of the University Conference during the Weimar Republic see Volkhard Laitenberger, Akademischer Austausch und auswärtige

before the First World War. The education ministries occasionally discussed admission policies but left the right to admit foreign students in the hands of university administrators. At the level of individual universities, there were very few organizations which provided social assistance for needy foreigners or helped in organizing extra-curricular activities.²

This lack of interest by German authorities in the well-being of foreigners favored the spread of xenophobic sentiments among domestic students. The xenophobia had its roots in the late nineteenth century; then it was connected to the spread of an exclusivist variety of nationalism, especially among the members of dueling fraternities.³ According to Volkhard Laitenberger, hostility towards foreigners, especially those from Eastern Europe, continued to color the policy of student organizations after the First World War. It set the tone for the first student convention at Würzburg in July 1919. This conference passed a resolution to the effect that foreign students should bear the full cost of their studies. During the convention, student activists also demanded that university authorities examine the educational background of foreigners more rigorously in order to prevent the admission of unqualified candidates. Some even called for a national law that would limit the number of foreign students at each university and in any faculty to five percent.⁴

Kulturpolitik 1923-1945, Göttingen, 1976, pp. 11-16.

² Herbert Scuria, "Umfang und Richtung der zwischenstaatlichen Studentenwanderung," Ph.D. diss., University of Leipzig, 1933, pp. 1- 10.

³ Jack Wertheimer, "The Ausländerfrage at Institutions of Higher Learning: A Controversy Over Russian-Jewish Students in Imperial Germany," Leo Baeck Institute [LBI] Year Book 27 (1982), pp. 187-218; Guido Hausmann, "Der Numerus Clausus für Jüdische Studenten im Zarenreich," Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 41 (1993), pp. 509-531.

⁴ Laitenberger, Akademischer Austausch und auswärtige Kulturpolitik, p. 246.

In the early 1920s, the majority of university teachers and administrators in the education ministries shared the aversion of German students to foreigners. They were also supported by bureaucrats in the Foreign Office. During the last years of the war, this institution made the admission of foreign students contingent upon the approval of the education ministries, and upon the presentation of certificates to attest to the friendly disposition of foreign candidates towards Germany. Although the AA had abolished the certificates by 1922, it continued to support discriminatory financial measures. The same organization pushed the German University Conference to raise the fees for foreigners in 1922 and 1923.

The Foreign Office began pursuing a more constructive policy towards foreign students only after the consolidation of the German economy in 1924. Already at the end of 1923, the administrators of the Cultural Department of the AA were prone to point out to their colleagues in the various education ministries that foreign-cultural policy was one of the few areas in which Germany was not hampered by Allied supervision. To make the most of this freedom, in early 1924 the AA began advocating a reduction of fees for visa students in order to entice more foreigners into the country and thereby improve its image. However, the initiative of the AA was first opposed by other organizations, most importantly by the Association of German Institutions of Higher Learning (Verband der Deutschen Hochschulen or VDH), which, using fiscal arguments such as Germany needing more hard currency, rejected the idea of reducing fees. On the other hand, the various education ministries received the proposal of the AA more favorably. Administrators in these ministries recognized that high fees discouraged many foreigners from taking up or

continuing their studies in Germany. After some hesitation (informed by their legitimate fear that a radical reduction in the fees of visa students might elicit negative reactions from domestic students and university teachers), the majority of the education ministries came to support the proposal of the AA. At the University Conference in Cuxhaven in September 1924, the education ministries accepted the principle that visa students should not pay more in fees than their German counterparts. However, the implementation of this resolution at every university and faculty took more time: higher fees for foreign students were uniformly abolished only in 1927.⁵

Disagreements about fees, coupled with a decentralized education system, represented a serious obstacle to the development of a comprehensive policy towards foreign students. Decentralization also hindered the standardization of admission requirements, which was first undertaken by the Central Office for the Study by Foreigners in Prussia (*Zentralstelle für das Studium der Ausländer in Preussen*). The PrEM established this institution and placed it under the leadership of Professor Karl Remme in 1922. By 1924, Remme and his colleagues created a fairly sophisticated evaluation system. Foreign high-school diplomas were compared with the German Abitur as the basis of admission. The University Conference in Cuxhaven in 1924 recommended this system as a model for individual universities to determine admission standards for foreign candidates. However, as in the case of the reduction of fees, the Conference lacked legal power to enforce its decision. As a result, the universities and states continued to operate independently and consulted Remme's institution only in controversial cases. Only during

⁵ Ibid., pp. 247-249.

the University Conference in Berlin in February 1929, did the education ministries finally pledge to follow closely the model developed by Remme's office.⁶

The end of discrimination in fees and the standardization of admission requirements helped the German Academic Exchange Service (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst or DAAD) to fashion the first comprehensive German foreign-cultural policy after 1931. The DAAD came into being as the result of a merging, by the end of 1930, of three organizations: the Academic Exchange Service (Akademischer Austauschdienst or AAD), the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, and the German Academic Foreign Office (Deutsche Akademische Auslandsstelle or DAASSt). The official ideology of the DAAD reflected the political beliefs of its charismatic head, Adolf Morsbach, who supported the Young Conservatives and maintained close ties to the Center Party. Morsbach and his friend, Arnold Bergsträsser, who was in charge of long-term planning, argued that nations were large organic entities, whose interests transcended those of individuals and social groups. Therefore, neither individual rights nor the universal desire for peace but only the intuitive understanding of the other party's uniqueness could serve as a legitimate ground for cooperation between nations. This cooperation would be pioneered by the cultural elites, which, according to this interpretation, incorporated all the important features of their nations. The task of the DAAD was to promote such "meetings of cultures" in the form of academic exchanges, scholarships and social assistance for foreign students.⁷

⁶ Ibid., pp. 250-254.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 73-80.

Because of their lack of expertise in foreign affairs, the new Nazi government left German foreign-cultural policy in the hands of the conservative administrators of the DAAD after January 1933. Moreover, the Nazis needed their conservative allies to reverse the decline in the number of foreign students after Hitler's victory.⁸ This decline was, indeed, dramatic. In the period from the winter semester of 1932/33 until the summer semester of 1934, the number of students from the United States fell by 53.9 percent. The decrease was also serious in the case of other countries such as Hungary (53.6 percent), Yugoslavia (47.4 percent), Poland, (46.4 percent), the Baltic states (40.6 percent), Austria (39.4 percent), and Czechoslovakia (38.9 percent).

There were a number of reasons for this decline: the economic crisis, the increasingly isolationist policy of European states for this decline and, most importantly, the anti-Semitic policy of the Nazi regime (Jewish students had made up almost one-fifth of the foreign-student population in the 1920s). It is interesting to note, however, that the number of students from the Netherlands, China, Greece, Turkey, and Bulgaria continued to increase after the Nazi takeover.⁹ The continuing influx of students from the Balkans was related to the relative backwardness of the university system in this region on the one hand, and to the traditional admiration for German culture among the Balkan elites, especially from Bulgaria and Turkey, on the other.¹⁰ Moreover, the continuing influx of students from the Balkans resulted from the imaginative propaganda efforts by German

⁸ See Grüttner, *Studenten im Dritten Reich*, p. 489.

⁹ Laitenberger, *Akademischer Austausch und auswärtige Kulturpolitik*, pp. 267-273.

¹⁰ About half of the Bulgarian professors, for example, had studied in Germany and German books in the Sofia University library almost outnumbered the total of those in Russian, French and English in the mid-1930s. See Marshall L. Miller, *Bulgaria during the Second World War*, Stanford, 1975, p. 7.

industrialists. They had encouraged the migration of students from this region since the 1920s as part of their strategy to integrate the Balkans, as sources of raw materials and markets, into the future German-dominated continental system.¹¹

After the Nazi takeover, Party and state organizations concentrated their efforts on the reversal of the decline in the number of foreigners at German institutions of higher learning. The basically defensive stand of German authorities on the issue of foreign students can be seen from the practical measures undertaken by the education ministries and the DAAD in this period. For example, the PrEM conducted surveys among foreign students in September 1933 to prove that the lives of foreigners did not change for the worse after the Nazi takeover. At the same time, the DAAD and university authorities urged the organizations of foreign students at many German universities to convince the education ministries, universities and the press in their homelands of the normalcy of life in the Third Reich.¹² Journalists, probably under pressure from the education ministries, published the praises that many foreign students had for Nazi Germany and its leader at length.¹³

Apart from this shared propaganda effort, the education ministries also agreed on the need to lower admission requirements and make academic examinations easier for

¹¹ Ludolf Herbst, "Die Krieg und die Unternehmensstrategie deutscher Industrie-Konzerne in der Zwischenkriegszeit," in Martin Broszat and Klaus Schwabe eds., Die deutschen Eliten und der Weg in den Zweiten Weltkrieg, Munich, 1989, pp. 72-135.

¹² Laitenberger, Akademischer Austausch und auswärtige Kulturpolitik, pp. 272-273.

¹³ Vogtländischer Anzeiger, 24 March 1934, BA Koblenz, ZSg, 129/52

foreign students.¹⁴ The DAAD supported these measures but wanted to make a distinction between students who planned to stay in Germany only for a few semesters and were taking art, social science, humanity or theology courses and those who planned to obtain a degree in technology, the sciences or medicine. While the DAAD supported the relaxation of requirements for the first group, it sought to maintain stricter standards for the second. The DAAD also planned to lead the fight for the standardization and relaxation of admission requirements. For this purpose, it put forward two drafts (the first in October 1933 and the second in March 1934) for the creation of a Central Office for the Admission of Foreigners (Zentralstelle für die Zulassung der Ausländer) under its authority. These were radical initiatives because they would have invested the local representatives of the DAAD with authority over admission. Not surprisingly, the education ministries, most importantly the PrEM, supported by the AA, the RMdI, and the Reich Ministry of Propaganda fought against and defeated these proposals in early 1934. In August 1934, the REM, instead of establishing a new office, turned Remme's Central Office for the Study by Foreigners in Prussia into the Reich Central Office for the Study by Foreigners (Reichszentralstelle für das Studium der Ausländer). In practice, this move left the power of admission yet again in the hands of university administrators who remained free, within the framework set by the REM, to decide on individual cases.¹⁵ In addition, the education

¹⁴ Der Minister des Kultus, des Unterrichts und der Justiz, Karlsruhe, to REM, 19 May, 1934, "Sachbetreff: Behandlung der Ausländer an den Hochschulen, 1932-1942," SHSA, Akten des Kultusministeriums, Nr. 10281/23, pp. 131-133.

¹⁵ See Laitenberger, *Akademischer Austausch und auswärtige Kulturpolitik*, pp. 60-72. Unfortunately, we are unable to say whether the education ministries followed up on earlier proposals to lower admission requirements and to make examinations easier for foreigners. However, frequent complaints (which will

ministries, the AA and the DAAD demanded more money for the social support of foreign students after 1933. Their demands were supported even by the head of the SA, Ernst Röhm, who, in October 1933, requested more money for the financial support for foreign students in order to improve relations with foreign governments.¹⁶

The lenient policy of the DAAD, the SA, the AA, the RMdI and the education ministries towards foreigners did not go unchallenged after the Nazi takeover. The major opponent of this policy was the German Student Federation which tried to accommodate the violent xenophobia of many of its members. Although exact numbers are difficult to establish, isolated cases suggest that Nazi students committed a number of atrocities against students from other countries. In early 1933, for example, a marching SA column made up mostly of students beat up Geoffrey S. Cox, a student from New Zealand, because he had failed to greet the flag of the division. It is true that this could have happened to any German as well. Nevertheless, the case sheds light on an important new feature in the lives of foreigners in Nazi Germany: the spread of arbitrary aggression and lawlessness, promoted in large part by Party organizations and tolerated by the German Student Federation. Ironically, Cox was a Nazi sympathizer who had come to Germany with the mission to collect stories that might change the negative opinion his fellow citizens had of Hitler's regime. Seeking confirmation of his preconceived ideas, he developed a very flattering view of German youths, as he had observed them in a labor camp in 1932. Thus, the incident with the SA came to him as a great shock and

be discussed later in this chapter) of German students about the quality of foreign students during the war suggest that academic standards for admission were indeed lowered after 1934.

disappointment. The case was hushed up by the DAAD, who promised that the perpetrators would be punished.¹⁷

The challenge that the Nazi students posed to the DAAD was not confined to such embarrassments. The goal of Nazi students in the DSt was much more ambitious. The head of this organization, Gerhard Krüger, and his colleagues wanted to draw the DAAD into the political orbit of the DSt in order to break what they considered the reactionary and clerical influence over the DAAD and, at the same time, to gain monopoly over German foreign-cultural policy. To achieve this goal, the DSt tried to gain the support of the PrEM and the Office of the Deputy Führer. However, they found a tough adversary in Morsbach who sought to defend his organization by allying it with the AA, the RMdI, Rosenberg's Foreign Policy Office of the NSDAP, Goebbels' Ministry of Propaganda and, most importantly, with the SA. The latter supported the DAAD in exchange for a promise to help improve the image of the SA abroad.¹⁸ Morsbach was also astute enough to appoint two Nazis, Richard M. Maier (a member of Röhm's entourage and later an administrator in Rosenberg's Foreign Policy Office of the NSDAP) and Ewald von Massow (a Major General, personal acquaintance of Hitler and a highly respected figure even in the radical DSt) into the leadership of the DAAD. These shrewd moves blocked the planned takeover of the DAAD by the DSt in the short run. However, they could never completely remove the danger represented by the DSt, which continued to plot

¹⁶ Memorandum DAAuslandstelle, 18 October, 1933, BHSA, MK 40788.

¹⁷ Der Preussische Minister für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Volksbildung to die Oberste SA-Führung in München, 2 September, 1934, BA Potsdam, Akten des REM, 49.01. Nr. 1582, pp. 100-103.

¹⁸ Laitenberger, Akademischer Austausch und auswärtige Kulturpolitik, pp. 50-51.

against Morsbach and his colleagues in 1934. Nevertheless, it was not these intrigues but the strong ties of the DAAD to the SA leadership that proved to be Morsbach's undoing. He was kept in jail for two months after the murder of Röhm and other SA leaders on 30 June 1934, and dismissed from his post as head of the DAAD in the fall of 1934. With his removal, the DAAD lost much of its influence over German cultural policy.¹⁹

The weakening of the role of the DAAD over German cultural policy in foreign affairs after 1934 did not destroy the lines of continuity with the previous period. On the contrary, as far as the treatment of foreign students is concerned, there was little change until the outbreak of the Second World War. The concerted propaganda campaign of those institutions that were involved in the formulation of the goals of German foreign-cultural policy continued after 1934. Newspapers did not stop publishing the positive remarks of foreign students about the Third Reich. In September 1934, for example, they reported the first, and still positive, impressions of a group of Americans, who came to study in Germany for a year.²⁰ A year later, Nazi newspapers quoted a young Englishman who described the political transformation of Germany in the most glowing terms.²¹ They did not neglect to inform readers about the similar impressions that Swedish students gained during their stay in Germany.²²

In a similar manner, the DAAD, the education ministries and the REM continued to fight for more financial assistance for foreign students. In May 1934, one month before

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 53-80. Unfortunately, Laitenberger fails to explain how and by what measures the DSt planned to take over the DAAD and, even more importantly, how its foreign-cultural policy differed from that of the DAAD.

²⁰ Kölnische Volkszeitung, 9 September, 1934, BA Koblenz, ZSg, 129/52.

²¹ Völkischer Beobachter, 13 August, 1935, BA Koblenz, ZSg, 129/56.

the arrest of Morsbach, the education ministry in Baden proposed that foreign students could also apply for the remission of their fees. In addition, it recommended that the education ministries should ease restrictions on foreign students obtaining a degree in Germany. This proposal, however, floundered because of the resistance of the PrEM which feared that these measures would negatively influence the mood of domestic students. Nevertheless, the education ministry in Baden, supported by the DAAD, continued fighting for more financial support for foreign students. In 1935, the same ministry ordered its universities to provide more financial support for foreign students. It is not clear whether the education ministries in other states followed Baden's example. Nevertheless, the agitation of the DAAD on the behalf of foreign students had borne some results in that the Lufthansa and the Reich Railway offered reduced prices for foreign students, while large manufacturing companies began distributing scholarships among foreigners before the outbreak of the war.²³

These measures failed, however, to have the desired impact on the number of foreign students before the outbreak of the war. After a short interruption in 1935, the decline in their numbers at the traditional universities continued until the end of 1940. On the other hand, the absolute number of foreign students at technical universities did not decrease as rapidly. The decline also seems less dramatic if compared with the data on German students. In fact, the proportion of foreigners in the student population at

²² Berliner Börsen-Zeitung, 6 June, 1935, BA Koblenz, ZSg, 129/54.

²³ Protocol, Berlin, March 1935, "Betreff: Ausländer-Zulassung und Ausschliessung," SHSA, Akten des Kultusministeriums, Nr. 16262, pp. 108-129; Laitenberger, Akademischer Austausch und auswärtige Kulturpolitik, pp. 274-277.

technical universities actually increased during this period. German universities continued to attract students mainly from Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.²⁴

The political consolidation of the Nazi regime, the end of the depression, and diplomatic successes, especially after 1935, bolstered the confidence of individuals and institutions engaged in the drafting of German cultural policy in foreign affairs. Newspaper articles suggest that after 1935 the DAAD, and especially the DSt, spent more time and energy on trying to convince foreigners of the superiority of the Nazi regime. Student activists discussed politics with their English counterparts at a ski camp at Berchtesgaden in January 1935.²⁵ In the same year, German and French law students held a conference on “the core issue of national socialism: the racial question.” During the conference, French students rejected the accusation of their German comrades that they lacked “racial consciousness”. They argued that the “Negroization and Judaization” of French society were limited to a narrow circle of people mainly in Paris. On Jews, French students claimed that their nation was more anti-Semitic than Germany. While there was general agreement about the necessity to maintain “racial purity” in both countries, German students had a more difficult time convincing their French comrades of Hitler’s historic greatness.²⁶

It is difficult to ascertain the impact that these political lectures had on foreign students. The First World War and the general crisis of liberalism and democracy in the 1920s and 1930s made foreign students probably receptive to the exultation of violence

²⁴ See Grüttner, *Studenten im Dritten Reich*, pp. 108-109, 488.

²⁵ *Kölnische Zeitung*, 10 January, 1935, BA Koblenz, ZSg, 129/53.

and hero cult. On the other hand, their own, equally intense, nationalist sentiments often put them on guard against Nazi propaganda. Thus, their behavior reflected by and large the attitude of their national leaders.²⁷ Indeed, as an incident at the University of Munich suggests, academic administrators in the 1930s found it extremely difficult to find a middle way among competing groups of chauvinistic foreigners. In 1938, the German-Foreign Student Club in Munich planned to organize a “Danube Night” which would have provided entertainment for students from South-Eastern Europe. The invitation was angrily turned down by Hungarian students, who felt that the whole idea of this, in itself innocent, event was a major insult to their country. In a long letter to the rector, the Hungarian consul (after chastising the German hosts for their lack of knowledge about South-Eastern Europe in general and Hungary in particular) rejected the invitation with the remark that “We, Hungarians, would have to settle first a few questions with the Romanians before we could dance with them.”²⁸

The removal of Adolf Morsbach from the leadership of the DAAD first raised the danger that the DAAD would be dissolved or at least brought under the supervision of the DSt after 1934. However, thanks to the close ties that the new head of the DAAD, Wilhelm Burmeister, had with the PrEM, the DAAD escaped from this fate: instead of being incorporated by the DSt, the DAAD became an auxiliary organization of the new REM. Since the REM suffered from a lack of qualified personnel in foreign-cultural

²⁶ *Kieler Zeitung*, 17 April, 1935, BA Koblenz, ZSg, 129/53.

²⁷ See Martin Broszat, “Deutschland-Ungarn-Rumänien,” in Manfred Funke ed., *Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte: Materialien zur Aussenpolitik des Dritten Reiches*, Düsseldorf, 1976, pp. 524-565.

²⁸ DAAuslandstelle München to Rektor der Universität München, 23 May, 1938, BHSA, MK 789.

affairs, the DAAD continued to maintain some influence over German foreign-cultural policy even after 1935. Its official ideology underwent only cosmetic changes. Herbert Scuria, who took over the formulation of long-term goals after 1934, did not completely abandon Bergsträsser's and Morsbach's ideas. Like his predecessors, Scuria emphasized the uniqueness of ethnic cultures, rejected pacifism and opposed the "fraternization of nations". He also stressed the importance of elites in facilitating the "meeting of cultures" and continued to consider scholarly achievements and gentlemanly values as the most important selection criteria for the scholarships of the DAAD.²⁹

The success of the DAAD to weather the storm after Morsbach's removal did not mean, however, that it could preserve its dominant position in German foreign-cultural policy. On the contrary, due to the weakness of the DAAD and the REM, after 1935, a number of organizations such as the AA, the Ministry of Propaganda, Ribbentrop's Office, the Foreign Policy Office of the NSDAP, the Reich Student Leadership, and the National Socialist German Lecturers' Association (Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Dozentenbund) tried, with increasing success, to influence German cultural policy in external affairs. The first challenge to the REM and the DAAD came from Goebbels' Ministry of Propaganda, who, in early 1935, proposed the creation of an Institute of German Cultural Exchange (Anstalt Deutscher Kulturaustausch) under its control. Only the staunch opposition of the AA, which came to the aid of the REM, made the defeat of Goebbels' plan possible.³⁰

²⁹ Laitenberger, *Akademischer Austausch und auswärtige Kulturpolitik*, pp. 142-146.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 87-90.

Ironically, after the defeat of Goebbels' plan in 1935, the greatest challenge to the DAAD and the REM came from the AA, which gradually took over many of the responsibilities of the REM before the outbreak of the war. This change in the policy of the AA was in part connected to changing personnel in the same organization. The entry of the foreign policy expert of the NSDAP, Wilhelm Bohle, into the AA in 1937 made the Foreign Policy Department of the AA stronger and more competent to decide issues of foreign-cultural policy. The appointment of Ribbentrop (who had developed a strong interest in foreign-cultural policy during his ambassadorship in London) to the post of Foreign Minister in early 1938 further strengthened the hands of administrators such as Bohle, who wanted to curtail the power of the REM. In the short run, the most important consequence of the ascendancy of the AA was the subordination of the DAAD cells abroad to German embassies.³¹

The outbreak of the Second World War led to a further reduction in the influence of the REM and the DAAD over German cultural policy in foreign affairs. During the war, both Goebbels' Ministry of Propaganda and the AA continued to improve their position vis-à-vis the REM. The importance of the REM in foreign-cultural policy declined so rapidly that the Reich Student Leadership, supported by the Party Chancellery, was able to defeat its plan to create foreign departments at individual universities in 1941. After the death of von Massow in October 1942, the Reich Student Leader, Gustav Adolf Scheel

³¹ Ibid., pp. 91-92.

took over the presidency of the DAAD. In so doing, he ended the long-lasting battle between the DAAD and the student organization.³²

How did the decline in the influence of the REM and the increasing bureaucratic chaos in the field of German cultural policy in foreign affairs influence the admission of foreign students to universities? How did this impact upon their treatment in the Third Reich? Did the lives of foreign students change after the outbreak of the war? Unfortunately, a lack of primary sources prevents a detailed reconstruction of Nazi policy towards students from the independent or the occupied, but not annexed, Western European states. This is probably the result of the fact that French, Spanish and Portuguese students had never been numerous at German universities. The detailed picture of Nazi policy towards the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands would be more relevant, however, since these countries had traditionally provided more students. It would be interesting to know, for example, whether young Dutchmen studying at German universities opposed their Nazi overlords with as much determination as they did at Dutch universities, where they organized strikes to prevent the expulsion of Jewish professors and students after the Nazi occupation. Students also figured prominently in organizations that resisted the Nazi occupiers. German sources asserted that as many as one-third of persons executed as freedom-fighters were students. Although under severe pressure from the Nazi authorities, only about 15 percent of all students signed the loyalty pledge that permitted the continuation of their studies but implied that they agreed to work in

³² Ibid., p. 311.

Germany after graduation in 1943. Others went into hiding or, if drafted into labor service, spent the remaining part of the war in labor camps in Nazi Germany.³³

The treatment of students from Luxembourg paralleled that of students from those countries of Western Europe, whose population spoke Germanic languages. Although not officially annexed to the Reich, Luxembourg became attached to the Party administrative district of Koblenz-Trier to form Gau Moselland after 1940. The Nazis took important steps towards the so-called Germanization of the Grand Duchy. They imposed their language, administration, currency, education system, and laws on the inhabitants. Compulsory labor service was introduced for both men and women in May 1941. The Nazi administration also urged the population to volunteer in the Waffen SS as early as 1941. In early August 1942, Luxembourg boys were herded into the Hitler Youth; those who refused were sent to the SS education camp at Burg Stahleck. At the end of August 1942, all men of draft age were subjected to compulsory service in the German army. To remove all legal barriers to the draft, the Nazi government granted definite or provisional German citizenship to the majority of the inhabitants by the end of that year. Simultaneously, Nazis prepared plans to expel all Italians, French, Walloon Belgians and persons of so-called mixed blood from Luxembourg. On the other hand, the head of the SS, Himmler, ordered the compilation of a comprehensive racial registry that would help

³³ Werner Warmbrunn, The Dutch under German Occupation, 1940-1945, London, 1963, pp. 146-153. For Nazi occupation policy and Dutch resistance see also Gerhard Hirschfeld, Fremdherrschaft und Kollaboration: Die Niederlande unter deutscher Besatzung 1940-1945, Stuttgart, 1984.

the Nazi authorities to find individuals and families even in these ethnic groups who could be eventually assimilated.³⁴

The Nazi policy towards students from Luxembourg was conceived as an integral part of this transformation process. The Nazi government supported students from Luxembourg for two reasons. First it wanted to aid the rapid and complete integration of the Grand Duchy into Nazi Germany by the training of native administrators loyal to the Third Reich. Second, Nazi administrators in the REM argued that incentives such as the recognition of high-school diplomas as equivalent to the German Abitur and the remission of fees for the first semester would entice more students into Nazi Germany and perhaps persuade them to stay, thus mitigating the country's pressing needs for professionals.³⁵

The policy of the REM, which was in general favorable to students from Luxembourg, was not free of contradictions. Instead of providing support for all Luxembourgers, the REM ordered that, at least until 1942, only members of the German Folk Movement of Luxembourg (Volksdeutsche Bewegung Luxemburg) who had received provisional German citizenship, could apply for scholarships or remission of their fees in subsequent semesters.³⁶ Nevertheless, sources suggest that the policy of the REM still compared favorably with that of other organizations. At the request of the Reich Student Leadership, for example, in the fall of 1940, the Gestapo arrested a group of students during an introductory camp to university and, as punishment for their innocent

³⁴ Norman Rich, Hitler's War Aims: The Establishment of the New Order, New York, 1974, pp. 163-169.

³⁵ RdErl. des REM vom 1. 10. 1940, BA Koblenz, R 21/450.

³⁶ RdErl. des REM vom 20. 11. 1940, BA Koblenz, R 21/450.

remarks, prohibited their enrollment to German universities.³⁷ At the end of the same year, again at the prompting of Nazi students, the Gestapo interrogated five Luxembourg students because they had presumably denied the German character of the Grand Duchy, supported England and the United States in the war, and “displayed Bolshevik-Marxist tendencies.”³⁸ It was probably under pressure from the Reich Student Leadership and the Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst of SD) of the SS that, in 1941, the REM confined students from Luxembourg to a few universities in the western part of the country until the summer.³⁹ The abolition of this measure in 1943 was an empty gesture since there must have remained (because of the drafting of men into the German army after August 1942) very few Luxembourgers at German institutions of higher learning in the last two years of the war.⁴⁰

After 1940, the policy of the REM towards students from the recently annexed Alsace were informed by the same motives: it was to help the integration of this much disputed territory into the Third Reich and, as a concomitant and to some extent contradictory goal, procure professionals for Nazi Germany. These motives were not part of a blueprint drawn up years before the outbreak of the war. On the contrary, until 1939 Alsace occupied a subordinated position in Hitler’s plans. He used the question of Alsace as a bargaining chip with the French to gain a free hand in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, intoxicated with their easy victory over France, Nazi leaders decided to annex Alsace in

³⁷ REM to Reichstudentenführung, 9 January, 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/450.

³⁸ NSDAP Gauleitung Koblenz-Trier to das Rektorat der Universität München, 28 December, 1940, UAM, Akten des Rektorats, Nr. 147.

³⁹ RdErl. des REM vom 10. 1. 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/450; RdErl. des REM vom 5. 11. 1942, BA Koblenz, R 21/450.

the summer of 1940. They also set out to destroy the autonomy of the province by giving Party administrators in Baden the right to unify the two territories as an intermediate solution toward the creation of Gau Oberrhein. The new rulers were not satisfied with the redrawing of borders but sought to turn this ethnically and culturally diverse province into a bulwark against French cultural and political influence. The re-education of the local population took many forms. Zealous Party officials changed street names, forced people to change their French-sounding names and use high German instead of their local dialects. Theaters and newspapers catered to the taste of the new rulers, who even made the wearing of Basque caps punishable under the law. Nazi authorities herded Alsatians into the Hitler Youth, the Labor Service and, in August 1942, into the army. These actions were accompanied by the use of terror against the native population. People who refused to change their political and cultural allegiance were stamped as racially undesirable and deported together with their families into France or the conquered territories in the East.⁴¹

In Alsace the REM had to contend with other organizations, mainly with the SS, over the direction of cultural policy. Perhaps the short history of the Reich University in Strasbourg (whose equivalent in the East was the University of Posen) provides the best example of the developing bureaucratic struggle between the REM and the SS. The planners had great hopes for this university. They wanted the Nazi government to invest a large amount of money into this institution and to appoint SS personnel to teach politically

⁴⁰ RdErl. des REM vom 30. 4. 1943, BA Koblenz, R 21/450.

⁴¹ Lothar Kettenacker, Nationalsozialistische Volkstumspolitik im Elsass, Stuttgart, 1973, pp. 131-173, 269-270.

sensitive subjects such as history, anthropology, biology and medicine.⁴² The new institution soon turned out to be a failure, however, because the REM and the Ministry of Finance, supported by Hitler, refused to provide adequate financial means for the significant enlargement of the university. However, this defeat did not discourage Nazi academics, many of them high-ranking SS members, from continuing their drive towards the Nazification of the curriculum and student life. Their effort was successful enough to alienate large numbers of students, many of whom emigrated and later helped to re-establish their university as the Université de Strasbourg in Clermont-Ferrand. However, one year after the German occupation of the whole of France in November 1942, the Nazi government put an end to the existence of the Université de Strasbourg in Clermont-Ferrand as well. An SS squad occupied its buildings and, with the help of doctors, they selected 39 out of the 107 students as carriers of what the Nazis called biologically valuable blood. The rest of the students, together with their teachers, were packed into cattle trucks and shipped to Auschwitz and Buchenwald.⁴³

Within the Third Reich, the authority of the REM was also challenged by the Security Service, which became frequently involved in the disciplining of foreign students after 1939. Thus, the SD reported on the presumably neglected outlook and easy-going attitude of many Alsatians, who liked to greet one another with the French “Salut”. The report described them as politically unreliable: Alsatians studying in the Reich allegedly spread rumors, avoided work service especially in armament industries and withdrew from

⁴² Der Reichsminister und Chef der Reichskanzlei to REM, May (?) 1941, BA Koblenz, R 43 II/940a, p. 39.

sports and political activities. The police complained that these students did not like mixing with their German counterparts. They went home regularly for the weekends and found re-enforcement of their anti-Nazi attitudes in the circle of their families and friends. Alsatians were allegedly against conscription; according to these reports, very few registered in the army as volunteers. At the University of Heidelberg, students from Alsace grew beards in solidarity with French students, who swore that they would not shave until France was free again.⁴⁴

As a sign of the growing influence of the Reich Student Leadership over Nazi foreign-cultural policy, local student leaders became repeatedly involved in the disciplining of Alsatian students. At the University of Strasbourg, the local student leader interrogated Andreas Germann, for example, because he claimed during his registration that he was French. At the request of the local student leader, the secret police revealed that Germann and his family were Francophile; even his grandfather had supported the French during the Franco-Prussian War of 1871. The local student leader was so enraged by the fact that Germann dared to repeat his claim about his French nationality that he demanded his immediate expulsion. The REM did not even get involved in this case because the Nazified university administration complied eagerly with the request of the Reich Student Leadership and promptly removed Andreas Germann from the University of Strasbourg.⁴⁵

⁴³ Kettenacker, *Nationalsozialistische Volkstumspolitik*, pp. 184-194

⁴⁴ Der Reichstatthalter in Baden und Chef der Zivilverwaltung im Elsass to REM, 12 December, 1942, BA Koblenz, R 21/439, pp. 213-214.

⁴⁵ Der Studentenführer, Gau Baden, to die Reichsstudenführung, 4 January, 1943, BA Koblenz, R 21/451, p. 267.

The attacks on the authority of the REM could come from unexpected directions. For example, the Office of the Reich Master Forester (Reichsforstmeister), supported by local Party officials wanted to expel six Alsatians from the University of Heidelberg for their refusal to follow their native comrades into the army in the summer of 1942. Although the REM protected these students with the argument that military service had not yet been made compulsory for Alsatians, the harm had already been done; in fear of punishment, the Alsatians left the University of Heidelberg without waiting for the final decision.⁴⁶ In March 1943, the German governor in Alsace, Robert Wagner, wanted to restrict students, except those at the University of Strasbourg, to small German towns like Münster, Erlangen, Göttingen and Marburg. He argued for increased police surveillance and political indoctrination because he believed that it might help to turn Alsatians into “good National Socialists”.⁴⁷ However, this time, the REM refused to carry out the request because it feared that a retraction of its earlier order which had allowed students from Alsace free mobility in Germany would have only exacerbated the situation and led to increased resistance. Improvement in political indoctrination was not possible either, according to administrators in this ministry, because student leaders and many teachers were at the front. Instead, the REM proposed exemplary punishments that might frighten other Alsatians into submission.⁴⁸ The governor in Alsace was not convinced by this

⁴⁶ Der Reichsforstmeister to REM, 31 July, 1942, BA Koblenz, R 21/451, p. 138; Der Badische Minister der Kultur und Unterrichts to REM, 15 January, 1943, BA Koblenz, R 21/451, p. 200.

⁴⁷ Der Chef der Zivilverwaltung im Elsass to REM, 28 March, 1943, BA Koblenz, R 21/439, pp. 218-221.

⁴⁸ Memorandum Kock, REM, 6 April, 1943, BA Koblenz, R 21/439, pp. 222-223.

argument and continued to press for restriction of their movement.⁴⁹ However, the REM did not give up its position and made only one concession that allowed the rector of the University of Freiburg to initiate a stricter selection and lower the number of Catholic theology students from Alsace.⁵⁰ This concession did precious little to improve the image of the Nazi government in the eyes of most Alsatian students during the last two years of the war. Frustrated by their treatment at the hands of the Nazi authorities, especially after the spring of 1943, many Alsatian students crossed the border into occupied France.⁵¹

The unfair treatment and harassment of many foreigners by the police and Nazi students raise the interesting question of why they continued to study at German universities under such adverse circumstances. They probably had taken many criteria (the fame of scientists, good libraries, well-equipped research facilities and the attraction of the remnants of traditional student culture on the one hand, and possible molestation by the police and Nazi activists on the other) into consideration before they made their decisions about their place of study. The continuous decline in the number of foreign students suggests that intellectual freedom remained an important factor, especially for students from the Anglo-Saxon countries. The greater sensitivity of Anglo-Saxon students to the violation of their basic rights can be, in part, explained with the deeply-rooted liberal traditions of these countries. Second, the majority of students from the Anglo-Saxon

⁴⁹ NSDAP Reichsleitung to der Chef der Zivilverwaltung im Elsass, Gauleiter und Reichstatthalter, Robert Wagner, 17 April, 1943, BA Koblenz, R 21/439, p. 264.

⁵⁰ REM to der Rektor der Universität Freiburg, der Chef der Zivilverwaltung im Elsass and das Badische Staatsministerium für Unterricht und Kultus, 30 April, 1943, BA Koblenz, R 21/439, p. 225.

⁵¹ Der Rektor der Reichsuniversität Strassburg to die Herren Rektoren der deutschen Hochschulen, 13 May, 1943, BA Koblenz, R 21/451, p. 251. For one of the many examples of emigration, see Der Rektor

countries, especially from the United States, came from well-to-do families. Since they were not dependent upon government scholarships, they could leave on the spur of the moment, perhaps in protest against racial discrimination or police molestation.

Most students from the Balkan countries, on the other hand, were not free to choose their place of study outside their countries. Perhaps the majority of students from the Balkan states (unfortunately, no reliable statistics exist in this respect) were recipients of scholarships. Since their governments or other sponsoring institutions had close ties with Nazi Germany, these students could choose between accepting the scholarships (thus coming to Nazi Germany) or refusing them (thus staying at home). Second, although Balkan students often became the targets of xenophobic sentiments, especially during the war, they could still count on the support of their embassies if they had minor troubles with the German police or university authorities. For diplomatic reasons, Nazi administrators, especially in the REM and the AA remained attentive to the wishes of these embassies and tried to restrain the Nazi radicals from molesting students from the neutral and Axis-allied countries in South-Eastern Europe. The fact that the number of students from Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey grew steadily until Bulgarians made up by far the largest contingent of foreign students during the war testifies to the success of this policy.⁵²

In contrast to the relatively good treatment of students from the allied Axis countries in South-Eastern Europe, Nazi authorities showed a more inflexible attitude

der Reichsuniversität Strassburg to die Herren Rektoren der deutschen Hochschulen, 23 May, 1944, BA Koblenz, R 21/451, p. 450.

towards students from the conquered countries of Eastern Europe. The harsher treatment meted out to these students reflected the position of their countries as objects of racializing ideology. In September 1939, the Nazis began eliminating the Polish intelligentsia and expelling a large segment of the Polish population. In an attempt to destroy Polish culture, they leveled historical buildings and stole art treasures and scientific objects from churches, museums and private persons.⁵³ In the larger part of occupied Poland, the Nazi authorities liquidated the school system of the previous regime. In its place, they created schools that provided children only with basic skills in a drastically shortened study period. In Krakow they arrested and sent 183 university teachers into concentration camps. Teachers and students were also brutally handled at the universities in Łódź and Kattowitz. In Danzig, a numerous clausus was introduced for Poles.⁵⁴ In Posen, the Nazis confiscated the buildings, equipment and the library of the university in order to create the Reich University of Posen as a bulwark of German culture in the East.⁵⁵

After a short period of relative tolerance, the Nazi conquerors began the systematic cultural impoverishment of the Czech lands as well. In Prague, the new

⁵² See Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 109.

⁵³ Michael H. Kater, Das "Ahnenerbe" der SS 1935-1945: Ein Beitrag zur Kulturpolitik des Dritten Reiches, Stuttgart, 1974, pp. 154-158; Jakob Kurz, Kunstraub in Europa 1938-45, Hamburg, 1989; Ernst Kubin, 'Sonderauftrag Linz', Vienna, 1989; David Roxan, Der Kunstraub: Ein Kapitel aus den Tagen des Dritten Reiches, Munich, 1966 and Jonathan Petropoulos, Art as Politics in the Third Reich, Chapel Hill, 1996, pp. 100-122; 145-155.

⁵⁴ Martin Broszat, Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik 1939-1945, Stuttgart, 1961, pp. 41-51; Eugeniusz Cezary Król, "Die nationalsozialistische Schulpolitik im besetzten Polen 1939-1945," Nordost Archiv, 1992, pp. 539-543.

⁵⁵ See "Gründungsfeier des Instituts für Deutsche Ostarbeit," in Werner Präg and Wolfgang Jacobmeyer eds., Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939-1945, vol. 20, Stuttgart, 1975, p. 173.

authorities first transferred the German Karl-Universität in the city to the jurisdiction of the Reich in early November 1939. Then on November 17, in reprisal for a student demonstration held as a protest against the killing of one of their comrades, Nazi security forces attacked university dormitories, sending 1200 students to concentration camps and executing nine students on the spot. After this event, the Nazis ordered the closure of all Czech institutions of higher learning for three years. In fact, the universities remained closed during the entire period of German occupation.⁵⁶

The destruction of Slavic cultures shifted into high gear after the attack on the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941.⁵⁷ The Nazis officially closed all institutions of higher learning in the Ukraine, Belorussia and the Baltic states after November 1941. In the Baltic states, however, they allowed teachers to work and a limited number of native students to study at practical faculties such as medicine, agriculture, science and technology. In these states, the ultimate goal of Nazi authorities sought to Germanize rather than completely destroy institutions of higher learning. Therefore, they restricted

⁵⁶ Vojtech Mastny, The Czechs Under Nazi Rule: The Failure of National Resistance, 1939-1942, New York, 1971, pp. 114-117.

⁵⁷ For the Nazi motives behind the provocation of war in Eastern Europe, see "Ein neuer Germanenzug," Anon. Memorandum in the file for "Generalplan Ost," 8 July 1942, in Czesław Madajczyk ed., Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan, Munich, 1994, pp. 479-481; Andreas Hillgruber, "Noch einmal: Hitlers Wendung gegen die Sowjetunion 1940," Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 33 (1982), pp. 214-226; Robert Cecil, Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia 1941, London, 1975; Gerhard L. Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939-1941, Leyden, 1972. On Nazi occupation and treatment of POW, see Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia 1941-1945: A Study in Occupation Policies, London, 1957; Theo Schulte, The German Army and Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia, Oxford, 1989; Christian Streit, Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941-1945, Stuttgart, 1978; Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45: German Troops and the Barbarization of Warfare, New York, 1985.

the number of non-German students and tried to replace native teachers with German personnel.⁵⁸

To facilitate the destruction of high cultures in the occupied countries, the REM prohibited the admission of Poles and Czechs from conquered Poland and Czechoslovakia to German institutions of higher learning at the end of 1939. Only students who had begun their studies before September 1939 could complete them.⁵⁹ Russians, except for those who had registered at German universities before September 1939, were permanently barred from German institutions of higher learning after June 1941.⁶⁰ The influence of racism on the policy of the REM was evident in its treatment of Ukrainians. Although Ukrainians in general were at least potential allies against Stalin's Russia, Ukrainian students could only complete their degree requirements in Germany if they had begun their studies before September 1939.⁶¹ Similarly, Lithuanians, Estonians and Latvians, despite their anti-Soviet attitude, could study only with the Ministry of Education's permission.⁶² After the successful conclusion of the war with Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941, the REM also prohibited Serbs and Slovenians from enrolling in German universities.⁶³

Unfortunately, unlike the SS personnel, administrators in the REM did not elaborate on their motives. It would be interesting to know, for example, the extent to

⁵⁸ Margot Blank, *Nationalsozialistische Hochschulpolitik in Riga (1941 bis 1944)*, Lüneburg, 1991, p. 63.

⁵⁹ See RdErl. des REM vom 10. 11. 39; RdErl. des REM vom 13. 11. 39; RdErl. des REM vom 28. 12. 39; RdErl. des REM vom 21. 10. 40; RdErl. des REM vom 24. 1. 40 as referred to in a letter by REM to Unterrichtsverwaltungen der ausserpreuss. Länder mit Hochschulen, 17 April, 1942, BA Koblenz, R 21/439, pp. 162-165.

⁶⁰ RdErl. des REM vom 18. 2. 1942, BA Koblenz, R 21/439, p. 156.

⁶¹ RdErl. des REM vom 20. 2. 1942, BA Koblenz, R 21/439, p. 155.

⁶² RdErl. des REM vom 13. 3. 1943, BA Koblenz, R 21/449.

⁶³ RdErl. des REM vom 6. 11. 1943, BA Koblenz, R 21/449.

which administrators in this organization based their earlier policies on ideological or military-diplomatic considerations, and to what extent they shared the desires of the SS, to assimilate groups of Eastern European students selected on the basis of biological and political criteria after 1941. The barring of potential allies such as Ukrainians from German institutions of higher learning shows, however, that racism did play an important role in the REM. At the same time, the loopholes in the regulations such as the exceptions that were made for students who had begun their studies before the outbreak of the war suggests that administrators in the REM were still reluctant to completely abandon traditional principles and procedures. Apart from this conservatism, the REM showed less flexibility, especially if compared with the SS, to adjust its policy to changing circumstances. As a sign of this inflexibility, administrators in the REM tended to treat Eastern Europeans in the same manner. Thus, along with the Czechs, in mid-1939, they prohibited Slovaks, who were ready to integrate into Hitler's new order, from enrolling in German schools. Only after months of bickering and pressure from the AA, did the REM remove all the barriers to the admission of Slovaks.⁶⁴

Because of its perceived inflexibility and declining influence, it was not the REM but the SS that gradually became the main force behind Nazi policy towards students from the occupied countries of Eastern Europe during the war. The cultural policy of the SS was closely tied to the final goals of the war in the East. The process of elaborating these goals began with the appointment of Himmler as Reich Commissar for the Consolidation

⁶⁴ Dr. Katschinka, DAAD Berlin to der Staatskommissar für Erziehung, Kultus und Volksbildung, Prof. Dr. Friedrich Plattner, 15 December, 1939, BA Koblenz, R 21/439, p. 3.

of German Nationhood (Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums) in October 1939. By the end of 1941, planners in the Reich Central Security Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt or RSHA) of the SS had prepared a number of drafts for the reorganization of Europe. In January 1942, Himmler charged Professor Konrad Meyer in the Main Section on Planning in the RSHA to develop a structural plan on all problems related to the Germanization and colonization of the eastern regions. In May 1942 Professor Meyer presented Himmler a memorandum entitled "General Plan East, Foundation of the Judicial, Economic, and Territorial Reconstruction of the East." The memorandum was signed by Himmler in June 1942.

Since, apart from the RSHA, Alfred Rosenberg's Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories and the Office for Racial Policy of the Reich Leadership of the NSDAP (Rassepolitisches Amt der Reichsleitung der NSDAP) also participated in the drafting of the proposal, the General Plan East could be considered as the official Nazi occupation policy. For the next twenty-five years, the plan predicted the expulsion of 31 million people from Poland, the Baltic region and the western part of the Soviet Union. Their territory would be taken over by settlers from Nazi Germany, Holland, England and the Scandinavian countries as well as by ethnic Germans from Rumania, South Tirol and Hungary. The plan also foresaw the assimilation of approximately 14 million so-called racially valuable elements, mainly from the Baltic states and to a lesser extent from the Ukraine. The assimilation of these people would be necessary, the planners argued, for

both economic and strategic reasons. They would not only hasten the rebuilding of these territories but also help Nazi Germany to better prepare for the next war.⁶⁵

The theoretical framework for the Germanization process (Eindeutschung) was worked out by Erhard Wetzel. He was employed as the director of the central advisory council of the Office for Racial Policy of the Reich Leadership of the NSDAP. But he also maintained close ties to the Reich Ministry for the East and to the RSHA. It was also Wetzel, who, during the fall of 1941 and the spring of 1942, prepared three memorandums in which, among other things, he discussed the policy of the SS towards students from Eastern Europe. Wetzel argued for an increase in the number of students from the Baltic states at German universities for four reasons. First, he contended that a few Eastern European students might be persuaded to remain in the country after graduation, thus mitigating Germany's acute need for professionals. Second, professionals trained in Nazi Germany would help the occupying German forces to destroy the national institutions and identities of the conquered ethnic groups. Third, since neither the physical destruction of millions of people nor their rapid transfer were feasible in the short run, Metzel argued, Germany needed native professionals to facilitate the smooth and cheap exploitation of the subjugated eastern territories. Since no institutions of higher learning were allowed to operate in the occupied eastern territories, these professionals would have to be trained at German universities. Finally, Wetzel proposed concrete measures for the selection and treatment of foreign students from the East. Candidates should undergo a strict medical

⁶⁵ See Helmut Heiber, "Der Generalplan Ost," Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 6 (1958), pp. 280-325; Czesław Madajczyk, "Generalplan Ost," Polish Western Affairs 3 (1962), pp. 391-442.

examination that would ascertain their racial value (Rassewert). Then, those selected would be transported to Germany where they would work in labor camps before their admission to German universities. Only after the completion of their studies would these students be allowed to return home and find employment in the Nazi bureaucracies.⁶⁶

Wetzel's arguments were repeated in part in the plan of the RSHA at the end of 1942. Apart from outlining the future ethnic and political map of the conquered lands in the East, Hans Ehlich, who had the rank of SS-Standartenführer, discussed SS policy towards students. He argued that students would be among the first targets for assimilation since the Third Reich suffered from a lack of professionals. Moreover, the assimilation of the talented and the ambitious, he continued, would preclude organized resistance against German power. Selection of students should be based upon ideological and political considerations. Slovaks, for example, should be attracted to German schools in order to turn them away from Pan-Slavism. Serbs should be totally excluded, while Slovenians should be admitted in rare cases. Although the policy towards Ukrainians could change in the future, at present they had no place in German institutions. Poles should be barred from German schools; yet, similarly to the Czechs, a selected group of students should be allowed to register and even obtain financial assistance. Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians should undergo a strict selection process, administered by the Reich Student Leadership and the SS, before their enrollment. According to Ehlich, by the end of 1942, more than thirty students from the Baltic had passed this process and begun their studies at German universities. The goal of Nazi policy towards foreign students, he concluded,

⁶⁶ Blank, Nationalsozialistische Hochschulpolitik in Riga, pp. 54-61.

was to select the racially most valuable elements and help their assimilation into the German people.⁶⁷

Thus, by the end of 1942, the goals of Nazi policy towards Eastern European students became clear: it generally excluded Slavs from Eastern European countries with which Nazi Germany was at war. However, it made exceptions for groups of candidates selected upon the basis of favorable racial and political criteria. The question is whether the REM and the SS were able to enforce these policies. Unfortunately, to my knowledge, no statistics exist on the ethnic distribution of foreign students during the war. The sources suggest, however, that both Nazi authorities in the occupied countries and university administrators in the Third Reich tended to ignore the REM's orders. Thus, after the occupation of their country, Czechs, for instance, continued to enroll at the University of Vienna and the Institute for International Trade (Hochschule für Welthandel). They also considered studies at the Consul School (Konsulakademie) in the same city. Despite restrictions imposed on their movement by the REM, many went abroad, mainly to Italy, to obtain a degree. Although Czechs who had received foreign citizenship through marriage could not theoretically study at German universities without previous selection, a Czech woman, the wife of a Hungarian chemistry professor, was not only allowed to take courses but worked as an assistant at the Technical University of Prague. She was probably not a rare exception.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ "Die Behandlung des fremden Volkstums," Referat des SS-Standartenführer Dr. Ehlich, Reichssicherheitshauptamt, auf der Tagung des Volkspolitischen Reichsreferats des RSF am 10/11 December 1941 in Salzburg, BA Koblenz, R 21/764, pp. 4-9.

⁶⁸ Rektorat der Technischen Hochschule in Prag to REM, 22 September, 1943, BA Koblenz, R 21/439, p. 245.

The regulations were not rigorously applied to other groups either. Although the Reich Ministry of Education barred Ukrainians from German universities, they continued to enroll at German institutions of higher learning until the end of the war. In 1942, the Security Service reported that many Ukrainians found their way to Italian universities as well. The SD was especially angry at the German authorities in Lemberg who continued to give graduates of Soviet schools automatic permission to study in Germany. Over three hundred of these Ukrainians pestered the academic administrators at the University of Munich and demanded that their school-leaving certificates (Reifezeugnisse) should suffice for admission. The same report argued that chaos ruled in the admission of Slovenians as well. There were many Slovenians of Italian and Croatian citizenship who continued their studies at German universities. At the German University of Prague, the secret police discovered a resistance group made up of Slovenians from Italy, Croatia, and the German-occupied lands. Despite restrictive regulations, in 1942 there were approximately 100-140 Slovenian students at German universities from Upper Carinthia alone. These Slovenians, most of whom attended the University of Graz, had been admitted without proper selection and proof of political reliability.⁶⁹

The SS plans for the restructuring of the ethnic map of the conquered eastern territories in general and the assimilation of Eastern European students in particular met with even greater failure. The naturalization of Eastern Europeans was a torturously slow process. It started slowly only in early 1942. Because of the low quality of administrators

⁶⁹ SD report, November 1942, BA Koblenz, R 58/177, pp. 9-10; also Heinz Boberach, Meldungen aus dem Reich, vol. 11, Neuwied, 1965, pp. 4409-4410.

in occupied Eastern Europe, the naturalization bogged down in the quagmire of ineptitude and corruption. The reversal of German military fortunes in early 1943, finally, relegated the SS plans increasingly into the background until they became almost completely abandoned during the last year of the war.⁷⁰

The fate of Nazi policy towards Eastern European students mirrored the outcome of these naturalization plans. Student activists and local Party officials opposed the influx of a large number of foreigners from Eastern Europe because they feared that the admission of these students would provoke opposition from German, especially male, students, who were fighting on the front often against the same ethnic groups. Even more importantly, the assimilation of students from the East failed because the Nazi authorities were unable to attract students from the occupied territories in significant numbers. Lack of financial support and the extreme imperialist intentions of the Nazi regime discouraged Eastern European students from undergoing the strict selection process and take up their studies in Nazi Germany.⁷¹

The evolving nature and ultimate failure of Nazi policy can be perhaps best demonstrated with the example of Czech students. As mentioned earlier, the student riot in the fall of 1939 was followed by the closing of Czech universities and the prohibition of the members of this ethnic group from attending German universities.⁷² This and similar Nazi measures (such as language ordinances and school restrictions in ethnically mixed

⁷⁰ See the complaining letter by Kohlbach, REM, to Dr. Eichholz, Hauptabt. Wiss. u. Unterricht in der Regierung des Generalgouvernements, 30 December, 1943, BA Koblenz, R 21/449, p. 447.

⁷¹ Blank, Nationalsozialistische Hochschulpolitik in Riga, p. 73.

areas), their draconian character notwithstanding, at first did not go beyond traditional methods of assimilation. The Nazi authorities in the Protectorate and the bureaucrats in the Reich Ministry of Education even contemplated opening the Czech universities in June 1940. They argued that the closure of these institutions placed an unnecessary burden on Nazi administration. Academic pursuits would have at least preoccupied the minds of the Czech intelligentsia and confined them to a few institutions where they could have been easily observed.⁷³

This moderate policy, represented mainly by the REM and by the Reich Protector, Konstantin von Neurath (and his state secretary, Karl Hermann Frank, who possessed the real power) contrasted sharply with the attitude of Nazi radicals in the Office for Racial Policy of the Reich Leadership of the NSDAP. They began preparing proposals regarding emigration, assimilation and forced resettlement after the Nazi conquest of the remaining parts of Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1939. However, under the economic imperatives of the war effort, Hitler remained reluctant to endorse these radical proposals. The change came in the spring of 1940, when, enraged over the news of frequent sexual liaisons between German men and Polish and Czech women, Hitler ordered the immediate dismissal of any officials violating the racial tenets of Nazi ideology. Thus, during the spring and summer of 1940, it seemed that racial fanaticism, inspired by Hitler, would gain the upper hand over pragmatic considerations.

⁷² Reference to RdErl.des REM vom 13.11.1939 in a letter from Ministerium für innere und kulturelle Angelegenheiten, Abt. IV, Erziehung, Kultus und Volksbildung, Wien, to Rektorat der Universität Wien, 28 December, 1939, BA Koblenz, R 21/439, p. 107.

⁷³ Unsigned memorandum, REM, 17 July, 1940, BA Koblenz, R 21/439, pp. 124-125.

However, Neurath's memorandum in September 1940, which argued that the majority of the Czech population was racially suitable for assimilation, led again to a drastic change in the direction of Nazi policy. Now the dictator himself came over to the assimilationist side by suggesting that only a minority of so-called racially useless and politically unreliable elements would be subjected to what the Nazis called special treatment after the war.⁷⁴ Although Hitler had argued that the realization of this plan should proceed only after the successful conclusion of war, in typical fashion, Himmler seized upon his announcement and jumped into action immediately. In October 1940, he conferred with Reinhard Heydrich, who, in addition to his other duties, was to become deputy Reich Protector in September 1941, about the necessity to conduct racial examinations in the Czech territories. Heydrich, in turn, ordered the Race Settlement Main Office (Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt) of the SS to draw up questionnaires to be completed by Czech doctors during the routine medical examination of school children. The questionnaires had to include information on physical characteristics (such as the size and shape of their bodies, the color of their hair and eyes) deemed vital for the determination of race. Examinations were in fact carried out and data collected, although there is no evidence about the fate of questionnaires sent to Berlin. In a similar effort, Nazi authorities contemplated the introduction of compulsory labor service. As part of the screening process, the draftees had to undergo medical and racial examinations. The idea

⁷⁴ Mastny, The Czechs Under Nazi Rule, pp. 127-128.

was dropped only in 1943.⁷⁵ Meanwhile German anthropologists and historians scrutinized old conscription records for information such as the height of the recruits that they thought would provide clues to the racial composition of the Czech population. In 1942, mobile X-ray units (SS Röntgensturmbann) traveled the countryside conducting mass screening and racial examinations under the pretext of fighting tuberculosis. Racial experts drew the conclusions from the collected data that the majority of Czechs could be assimilated without detrimental effects on the racial value of the German people.⁷⁶

In order to speed up the assimilation of Czechs, in August 1942, Nazi authorities withdrew previous legislation that prohibited intermarriage and sexual conduct between Czechs and Germans. They also encouraged Czechs to apply for Reich citizenship. Nevertheless, despite the obvious leniency of the Nazi authorities, especially if compared with their brutal treatment of Poles and Russians, these measures failed to attract a considerable number of converts. During the entire occupation, the number of Germans in the Protectorate increased only by 70,000 including immigrant workers and officials from the Reich, thus putting the actual number of converts below one percent of the total population.⁷⁷

The failure of Nazi assimilation efforts becomes obvious in the case of students. At the end of September 1940, prompted by Hitler's favorable decision, Nazi authorities began discussing the enrollment of Czech students at German universities. In March 1941,

⁷⁵ Der Reichsarbeitsführer im Reichsministerium des Innern to REM, 26 January, 1943, BA Koblenz, R 21/439, p. 211.

⁷⁶ Mastny, The Czechs Under Nazi Rule, pp. 123-135.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p.137.

Hitler authorized the Reich Ministry of Education to allow the enrollment of a group of carefully selected students at the German Universities of Rostock, Greifswald and Freiburg as well as at the Technical Universities of Darmstadt and Dresden.⁷⁸ Excellent racial characteristics and political reliability were prerequisites for admission. Out of an unspecified number, the Nazis selected thirty-three students. They were put under police surveillance and the REM received regular reports on their behavior. According to these reports, one of them applied for Reich citizenship, another one for membership in the Waffen-SS, and a third expressed great admiration for everything German. The majority of them, however, remained “politically extremely cautious.” The experiment was repeated in the fall of 1941. Out of 20,000 eligible students, only 27 applied.⁷⁹ A few months later, due to continuing demand for more professionals, regulations were further relaxed: now, virtually any Czech who had obtained the permission of the Reich Student Leader and the civil authorities in the Protectorate could study at German institutions of higher learning.⁸⁰ Although the Reich Student Leadership declared the selection of Czech students a success at the end of 1943, it is doubtful that these new measures attracted more than a handful of Czechs to German universities in the Third Reich.⁸¹

As the Czech example has demonstrated, Nazi authorities faced serious difficulties in ingratiating themselves with the young and talented members of the conquered nations.

⁷⁸ Abschrift. Der Reichsminister und Chef der Reichskanzlei, 24 September, 1940, BA Koblenz, R 43 II/939b, p. 179; REM to der Rektor der Technischen Hochschulen Dresden, 14 November, 1941, in SHSA, Akten des Kultusministeriums, Nr. 15815, p. 288.

⁷⁹ Mastny, *The Czechs Under Nazi Rule*, pp. 137-138.

⁸⁰ Menzel, REM, to die Herren Rektoren der wissenschaftlichen Hochschulen, 30 November, 1942, BA Koblenz, R 21/449.

Yet the scattered evidence also suggests that a less rigid policy would have gained more supporters among Eastern Europeans. Instead of welcoming him as a potential collaborator, for example, the police arrested Andreas Muschinski, who had applied to a German university on the basis that he was on the German National List, because they discovered that he was an ethnic Pole.⁸² Maria Bozena Steuer had also studied medicine with the permission of the local student leadership at the University of Breslau, when the Party disclosed in 1941 that she was in fact Polish and subsequently expelled her from the university.⁸³

The propensity of many Eastern Europeans to put their lives and careers ahead of the interests of their nation was not confined to prospective students. In Łódź, for example, a professor of law, Julius Korener, claimed that he was an ethnic German and as such sought employment as a university teacher in the Warthegau. However, the SD reported that he was in fact Ukrainian known by the name of Koronec. It was true that he had studied in Vienna and had written his dissertation in German; yet his heavy accent betrayed his true ethnicity.⁸⁴ The case of Alfred Kokoschinski, a chemist, demonstrates even better the precarious position and moral failings of many intellectuals in the occupied lands. Kokoschinski was Polish on his father's side and German on his mother's side. He worked for years as an assistant at the University of Czernowitz (Chernovtsy). After an investigation into his political beliefs, the SD reported that as a young man he had been a

⁸¹ Memorandum Kiesel, Beauftragter des Reichsstudentenführers beim Reichsprotector in Böhmen und Mähren, 1 October, 1943, BA Koblenz, R 21/764.

⁸² REM to Herren Rektoren der wiss. Hochschulen, 6 July, 1942, BA Koblenz, R 21/451.

⁸³ Der Kurator der Universität Breslau to REM, 24 March, 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/451, p. 14.

Polish nationalist but later transferred his loyalty to the Romanians. (This move was probably connected to the changing borders after the First World War, leaving this ethnically mixed Galician town in the hands of the Romanians.) As the war was approaching, Kokoschinski made friends with the German consul and became his hunting companion. By 1939, he had become an ardent German nationalist and the following year even applied for membership in the SS. However, his goal to obtain a teaching position at the University of Posen was probably frustrated by the SD report.⁸⁵

The contradictions between Nazi plans and actions in the occupied East were mirrored by the chaotic nature of Nazi policy towards foreigners already studying at universities in the Third Reich. The growing influence of Nazi student activists and the SS took place at the expense of university administrators and the REM. It was probably Nazi students who provided information for the Security Service, which constantly demanded the introduction of tougher measures against foreign students during the war. Thus, it reported that German students complained at the Technical University of Munich that foreigners, especially Bulgarians, behaved outrageously in the student eatery. These students purported that Bulgarians did not master the German language and brought translators to their examinations. Bulgarians allegedly neglected their studies and showed up only occasionally at lectures and seminars. Based probably on reports given by Nazi students, the SD tried to forge connections between different targets of the same

⁸⁴ Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführer SS, SD-Abschnitt Litzmannstadt to der Universitätsbeauftragte des Reichsstatthalters, 15 November, 1940, BA Koblenz, R 21/ 10788.

⁸⁵ Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers SS, SD-Leitabschnitt Posen to Kurator der Reichsuniversität Posen, SS-Sturmbanführer Dr. Streit, 22 August, 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/10788.

xenophobic sentiments. Thus, it argued that in Berlin over fifty per cent of foreign students rented their accommodation in Jewish homes. Jews, who were forbidden to rent their houses to Germans, offered cheaper rates to foreigners and allegedly acted as go-betweens between foreign students and German women. The report accused Jews of spreading enemy propaganda among students, thus destroying sympathies and ideas implanted during political lectures and social events. The Security Service also painted a dark picture about the sexual appetite of foreigners, especially those from South-Eastern Europe, who found willing partners among German girls and women.⁸⁶

To preclude further resistance among foreign students, at the end of 1941, the Security Service put forward a proposal advocating a stricter selection of candidates for the fellowships of the Humboldt Foundation. It argued that the political past of these candidates should be disclosed in detail; the recipients of this prestigious scholarship should remain under constant police surveillance during their studies in Nazi Germany. Professional standards and language requirements should be raised to weed out unworthy elements. Foreigners should be lodged in dormitories where they could be closely observed. Even before their enrollment, they should be instructed on how to behave towards German girls. Foreign students who had transgressed ethnic lines should be expelled from the country and their names sent to every university to prevent future admission.⁸⁷ Since these demands coincided with the gradual takeover of the DAAD by

⁸⁶ SD report, March 1941, BA Potsdam, R 58/158, pp. 4-6; also Boberach, Meldungen aus dem Reich, vol. 6, pp. 2059-2061.

⁸⁷ SD report, October 1941, BA Potsdam, R 58/165, pp. 164-167; also Boberach, Meldungen aus dem Reich, vol. 8, pp. 2905-6.

the Reich Student Leadership (a process which ended in October 1942), it is reasonable to assume that Scheel, who was also a high ranking officer in the SD, and his organization stood behind the demands for stricter control of foreign students.

The relatively frequent sexual affairs between German women and foreign students provided additional opportunities for the Security Service to get involved in university affairs and draw up bizarre plans to solve the so-called racial question at German universities. Thus, in the spring of 1942, anticipating the German breakthrough on the Eastern Front towards the Caucasus, the RSHA put forward a proposal to establish a few universities in the southern part of the Soviet Union. The RSHA wanted to transfer all Turkish and Middle-Eastern students (unfortunately no further information is given on ethnicity) to these universities, thus eliminating even the possibility of sexual contact between German women and these foreigners. Graduates from these new universities would find employment in the same region. The SS decreed a similar fate for children of mixed marriages. Despite their German citizenship, the SS foresaw no place for these individuals in the new Reich. However, they encouraged children of mixed marriages to find employment on the periphery of the future empire, where they could utilize their education and work for Nazi Germany without endangering its racial purity.⁸⁸

The sensationalist tone of these reports failed to alarm the bureaucrats in the Reich Ministry of Education. They argued that the behavior of foreign students was an issue that should have been settled without too much ado between this ministry and the universities.

⁸⁸ "Stellungnahme und Gedanken von Dr. Erhard Wetzel zum Generalplan Ost des Reichsführers SS," 27 April, 1942, in Madajczyk, Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan, pp. 80-81.

They pointed out that the state simply lacked the means and the time in the circumstances of the war to examine the political past of prospective students and scholarship recipients. Resenting the expanding power and increasing involvement of the SS in university affairs, the REM demanded that the Security Service should first inform universities and the Reich Ministry of Education about its findings. The right to initiate expulsion from schools, they continued, should remain in the hands of academic administrators. Bureaucrats in the Reich Ministry of Education admitted that foreigners often possessed inadequate language skills and scientific training. However, they argued, these problems could be easily corrected by more hours devoted to language instruction and tougher examinations during the first semesters. Finally, they rejected the proposal that foreigners should be instructed on how to behave towards German women. Administrators in the REM contended that instruction of this kind would do injury to the feelings of foreigners who respected the customs of their host country. Moreover, lectures on sexual morality would amount to an open request; foreigners would think that they did a favor to the German government, which could not control its own people. They argued that the sexuality of German women should remain an internal German matter; it was a question of education. The government should proceed with great circumspection without unwarranted alarm.⁸⁹

Although the REM refused to fulfill the demands of the SS, its victory was transitory since it did not end the involvement of the Security Service in university affairs. Instead, the demands of the SD for stricter measures forced the REM to compete with the

⁸⁹ Memorandum Kock, REM, "Betreff: Verhalten ausländischer Studenten im Reich," 17 November, 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/10922, pp. 69-84.

SS over the disciplining of foreign students. Thus, at the end of 1941, the REM ordered academic administrators to report regularly on the behavior of foreigners attending their institutions.⁹⁰ Moreover, as a sign of the declining power of the REM, other institutions such as the AA and the Propaganda Ministry also began advocating measures to prevent the development of sexual relations between foreign students and German women. In early 1942, the AA and the Propaganda Ministry proposed the removal of foreign students to small towns where they could be better observed. However, the REM again refused to act because, as an administrator in the REM pointed out, the research institutions and faculties that had attracted foreigners to Germany were located in the cities. Furthermore, the large number of foreign students simply could not be accommodated in small towns.⁹¹

While a comprehensive solution to the problem of foreign students eluded Nazi authorities, their obsession with race guaranteed that worries about sexual relations between German girls and members of other ethnic groups would plague Nazi purists until the end of the war. After 1939, due to the influx of foreign workers and the absence of German males, such contacts became common. The Nazis reacted to this open violation of their moral universe with extreme harshness. They punished workers from the East and even the French for their transgressions with death. The lot of German women was public humiliation and imprisonment. In the countryside, however, Nazi authorities could not easily enforce their sanctions. On the farms, foreigners continued to receive and even

⁹⁰ Schnellbrief, REM, 19 November, 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/10922, p. 85.

⁹¹ Memorandum Gottstein, REM, 26 January, 1942, BA Koblenz, R 21/10922, pp. 99-100.

demand sexual favors in return for hard work and loyalty to their mostly female employers.⁹²

In the case of students from the neutral and the Axis-allied countries the power of Nazi purists was even more limited. As the story of Ursula Richter, a philosophy student at the University of Berlin and her Turkish lover, Yalcindag, who studied at the Technical University of Berlin suggests, diplomatic considerations restrained Nazi authorities from venting their wrath on foreigners. On the advice of her lover, Richter visited a Turkish doctor who helped her get an abortion. As the story broke, she tried unsuccessfully to put the blame on Yalcindag by arguing that he had raped her. At the same time, Nazi students led a virulent campaign against Yalcindag, demanding his expulsion. Although both Richter and her lover were sentenced to prison, the involvement of the Turkish consulate ensured that he was released within a few weeks. Despite the protest of Nazi students, Yalcindag was not even expelled from the university, and completed his studies in early 1944. This example suggests that diplomatic considerations still carried enough weight to prevent the use of punitive measures, informed by racial dogmas, against influential citizens of neutral and Axis-allied states.⁹³

⁹² On sexual relations between German women and foreign workers, see Jill Stephenson, "Triangle: Foreign Workers, German Civilians, and the Nazi Regime. War and Society in Württemberg 1939-45," German Studies Review, 15, no. 2 (May 1992), pp. 339-359. On the life of foreign workers, including their treatment by Nazi authorities and the German population, and see Ulrich Herbert, Fremdarbeiter: Politik und Praxis des "Ausländer-Einsatzes" in der Kriegswirtschaft des Dritten Reiches, Berlin and Bonn, 1985; Edward L. Homze, Foreign Labour in Nazi Germany, Princeton, 1967; Peukert, Inside Nazi Germany, pp. 125-144; Robert Gellately, The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy, Oxford, 1990, pp. 215-252; Bernard. P. Bellon, Mercedes in Peace and War: German Automobile Workers, 1903-1945, New York, 1990, pp. 251-252.

⁹³ Rektor der Universität Berlin to REM, 2 December, 1942, BA Koblenz, R 21/451, p. 205; Rektor der TH Berlin to REM, 12 August 1943, BA Koblenz, R 21/451; Rektor der TH Berlin to REM, 28 February 1944, BA Koblenz, R 21/451, p. 383.

In most cases, sexual relations between German women and foreign students were the result of the numerical imbalance between the genders that developed during the war. The open rejection of racism by German women probably played little part in these love affairs. Most likely many German women engaged in sexual relations with foreigners without denying the validity of racial and ethnic stereotypes. They may have taken foreigners into their beds because they had become excited by the mysterious power and high sexual potency attributed to aliens. Sexual relations became a political matter only because Nazi policy was too rigid; it did not allow for exceptions, which could otherwise have strengthened the belief in the overall validity of Nazi ideology.

Yet non-conformity in sexual matters could also spell danger for the regime in that sexual relations based on real sympathy and need for social partners amounted to at least the partial rejection of Nazi propaganda that preached the inherent inferiority of foreigners. This partial rejection of Nazi ideology could be seen in the case of Pia Mayer and her family. During her work service at an armaments factory in Augsburg, this student of the University of Prague fell in love with a French prisoner of war named Etienne Coste. She introduced him to her parents who agreed to their engagement. However, this love story soon had a tragic end as Nazi students, probably motivated by jealousy, reported the affair to the police. Mayer was arrested and sentenced to prison for six months because her relationship with a foreigner violated the sensitivities of the population. Jealousy clouded the Nazi students' minds so much that, while the rector was

reluctant to expel Pia Mayer, the Reich Student Leadership asked for her permanent removal from German universities.⁹⁴

In a few cases, however, the potential for protest in sexual relations with foreign students manifested itself in forms that went beyond non-conformity and reached the level of open resistance to the Nazi regime especially during the last two years of the war. In 1941, at the University of Munich, a female student refused to stand up during the national anthem. During the interview with the district student leader, she declared that, as a wife of a Bulgarian, whom she had married only recently, she ceased to consider herself a German any longer.⁹⁵ Three years later, at the Technical University of Karlsruhe, a chemistry student, Lieselotte Burkard, who chose her boyfriends among Bulgarians, denied her nationality by pretending that she was Bulgarian. Although the university administrators first hesitated and tried to defend Burkard with the argument that she had been under the influence of alcohol, finally they fulfilled the request of the local student leader and expelled her from the school.⁹⁶

The presence of foreign students provided German girls with an opportunity to enjoy life and try to forget the misery and suffering of the war. For others, foreigners could serve as scapegoats for the disintegration of state and society during the last years of the war. Scattered evidence suggests that widespread xenophobia did not leave German students unaffected. In Erlangen, for example, female students in the labor service

⁹⁴ Dr. Brasse, Rechts-und Gerichtsamt, Reichsstudentenführung, to REM, 12 November, 1944, BA Koblenz, R 21/451.

⁹⁵ SD report, 1941, BA Potsdam, R 58/165, pp. 164-167.

⁹⁶ Rektor der Technischen Hochschulen Karlsruhe to REM, 25 February, 1944, BA Koblenz, R 21/451, p. 428.

protested that they were lodged in the same barracks with Dutch, French, Italian and Bulgarian female workers, from whom they were separated only by barbed wire.⁹⁷ A female student even denounced a male foreign laborer, who worked under horrible conditions, for loafing on the job.⁹⁸ The complaints of German students forced the Reich Ministry of Education to decree that any Bulgarian student caught in profiteering would be immediately expelled.⁹⁹

As more and more universities closed their doors in 1944, admission of foreigners became even less important. Nevertheless, it seems that foreign students faced less prejudice during the admission process in the last year of the war. Occasionally, even those Russians who had proven their reliability in the Waffen SS, were allowed to enroll at German universities. However, these concessions remained exceptions; they only reinforced the general tendency, which was to limit the number of foreign students as much as possible. In 1944, the Reich Ministry of Education decreed several times that every able-bodied male, including foreigners, should take up arms in the defense of Germany. Female foreign students had to do their duty in the work service. Only seriously injured war veterans and students whose studies were vital for the war effort were allowed to remain at universities.¹⁰⁰ These orders only exacerbated the situation of foreign students, especially those from Eastern Europe: as members of the old elite or collaborators, they faced an uncertain future in their countries threatened or already

⁹⁷ Der Studentenfürher der Universität Erlangen to Rektor der Universität, 18 September 1944, UAE, Nr. 816.

⁹⁸ Der Studentenfürher der Universität Erlangen to Rektor der Universität, 18 September, 1944, UAE, Nr. 816.

⁹⁹ RdErl. des REM vom 20. 3. 1943, BA Koblenz, R 21/449.

occupied by the Red Army. Few of these students returned to their countries that now lay in the Soviet-occupied zone. Probably the majority remained in Germany and increased the number of displaced persons.

This chapter has examined the ideological content of Nazi policy towards foreign students in the context of German cultural policy in foreign affairs. It has argued that the conservative DAAD remained in control of German foreign-cultural policy until the removal of Morsbach and his close associates from leadership of this organization in the summer of 1934. This event seriously weakened the DAAD, which came under the supervision of the REM. After 1935, the inability of the REM to defend its field of competence led to an increasing decentralization of German foreign-cultural policy. However, this decentralization had no immediate impact on Nazi policy towards foreign students. On the contrary, there was a consensus among state and Party organizations to improve the lives of foreign students. The only new feature was the aggressive propaganda campaign, which, especially after 1935, aimed at convincing foreigners about the superiority of the Nazi regime. Yet there is little evidence to suggest that foreign students embraced the regime's ideology, or sympathized with its goals. Instead, the extreme nationalism of Nazi propaganda tended to provoke opposite reactions.

Ideology and thus the concept of selection became much more important in setting the goal of Nazi policy towards foreign students after the outbreak of war. After 1939, racism became a defining feature of the admission policy of the REM towards Eastern European students. The main advocate of this racially-based admission policy was the SS,

¹⁰⁰ RdErl. des REM vom 14. 9. 1944, BA Koblenz, R 21/268, pp. 13-14.

which played an increasingly dominant role in foreign-cultural affairs during the war. Its ascendancy took place mainly at the expense of the REM and the DAAD, which came under the control of the Reich Student Leadership in 1942. As an indication of the rapidly declining power of the REM, academic administrators and bureaucrats in the education ministries often ignored its regulations and admitted foreign students of undesirable ethnic origins. Paradoxically, the increase in the power of the SS did not mean that it was able to put all its plans into practice. On the contrary, in regards to foreign students, the 'fishing-for-good-blood' policy of the SS floundered because of the resistance of the local population and on the incompetence of Nazi administrators in the occupied eastern territories. The utopian plans of the SS became increasingly abandoned after the change in military fortunes in early 1943, and played only a minor role in Nazi foreign-cultural policy during the last two years of the war.

Moreover, the frequent reference to the concept of selection, especially after outbreak of the war, implied the expansion of administrative and police powers over the lives of foreign students. The Nazi authorities justified this expansion by evoking the ideological goals of the regime. At the local levels, however, especially during the last years of the war, repressive measures (apart from providing an opportunity for the Nazi faithful to prove ideological loyalty and for the police to prove their usefulness) acquired an additional function. The paranoid reactions of the secret police, Nazi students and Party administrators to the news of sexual relations between foreign male students and German women testified to the increasing frustration of Nazi fanatics over the course of the war. Although these sexual relations did not represent a fundamental danger to the existence of

the regime, they showed that the Nazi state had faced increasing difficulties in controlling the German population during the war. The Nazis failed to make their racially-based admission system to universities work. They also failed to prevent the development of sexual contacts between so-called racially undesirable foreigners and German women.

Chapter Three: Student Health Services

This chapter sheds light on the origins of student health services in Imperial Germany and the Weimar Republic and examines their developments during the Third Reich. It focuses on the question of how and to what extent Nazi ideology penetrated student health services in the Third Reich. More specifically, it examines how well student health services served the purpose of the Nazi form of selection. As mentioned in the introduction, the Nazi form of selection implied first and foremost the elimination of certain groups. In regards to student health services, the Nazi state introduced two important changes. The order of the REM in February 1935 made the participation of students in medical examinations both a prerequisite for their enrollment at universities and the basis for the creation of a comprehensive system of medical control. Second, the order of the REM in December 1935 sanctioned the expulsion of students who fell into categories of hereditary ill and racially less valuable as defined in the Law for the Alteration of the Law for the Prevention of Hereditary Diseased Progeny of 26 June 1935. The main subject of this chapter is to examine whether these measures achieved their purpose. Secondly, this section looks at the changes informed by the same Nazi obsession with selection in the various forms of insurance funds which were also part of student health services.

Compulsory medical examination became the most important feature of Nazi health policy towards university students in the Third Reich. Yet the idea of regular

medical examination of various social and occupational groups, including students, originated independently of Nazism. It was connected to the emergence of social hygiene as a medical discipline in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Social hygienists sought to solve the most pressing health problems of the industrial age, such as tuberculosis, through improved hygienic conditions, housing, diet and tightened medical supervision of the most exposed social groups.¹ They were especially interested in the organization of health insurance funds, which served to alleviate some of the most flagrant injustices associated with modern capitalism. These insurance funds proved important for anchoring the “discipline of health” in the world of the urban workers, thus neutralizing much of the revolutionary potential inherent in the social position of the working classes in late nineteenth-century bourgeois society.² Social hygiene accelerated the convergence of values, mentalities and patterns of behavior related to health, as nurtured by social classes and subcultures, without changing or even challenging the basic class structure of society.³ Thus, social hygiene represented a biologically-based alternative to socialism. At the same

¹ Alfons Labisch and Florian Tennstedt, Der Weg zum ‘Gesetz über die Vereinheitlichung des Gesundheitswesens’ vom 3. Juli 1934: Entwicklungslinien und-momente des staatlichen und kommunalen Gesundheitswesens in Deutschland, Düsseldorf, 1985, p. 358.

² Hartmut Diessenbacher, “Der Armenbesucher: Missionar im eigenen Land,” in Christoph Sachsse and Florian Tennstedt, Soziale Sicherheit und soziale Disziplinierung: Beiträge zu einer historischen Theorie der Sozialpolitik, Frankfurt am Main, 1986, pp. 209-245 and Gerd Göckenjan, “Medizin und Ärzte als Faktor der Disziplinierung der Unterschichten: Der Kassenarzt,” in Sachsse and Tennstedt, Soziale Sicherheit, pp. 286-304; Florian Tennstedt, “Sozialgeschichte der Sozialversicherung,” in Maria Blohmke ed., Handbuch der Sozialmedizin, vol. 3, Stuttgart, 1976, p. 386; Gerhard A. Ritter and Klaus Tenfelde, Arbeiter im Deutschen Kaiserreich 1871-1914, Bonn, 1992, p. 698, 705; Florian Tennstedt, Vom Proleten zum Industriearbeiter: Arbeiterbewegung und Sozialpolitik in Deutschland 1800 bis 1914, Cologne, 1983, pp. 33-34, 90-96, 242-250, 423-429, 448-471, 511-533.

³ Reinhard Spree, Health and Social Class in Imperial Germany: A Social History of Mortality, Morbidity and Inequality, New York, 1988, p. 183.

time, it taught the middle classes self-respect through the preaching of the virtues of a rational lifestyle, self-reliance and control. Hence, it facilitated the creation of a modern labor force capable of discharging complicated, specialized and increasingly technological tasks in economic organizations and state bureaucracies.⁴

In the late nineteenth century, the pioneers of this new discipline supported the democratic regulation of political and social conflicts through parliamentarism, a free media and the welfare state. They either came from, or expressed their sympathy for, the socialist party, left-liberalism and the more progressive wing of political Catholicism.⁵ However, for two reasons, liberalism and socialism lost much of their appeal to the practitioners of social hygiene by the outbreak of the First World War. First, the waning interests of social hygienists in liberalism and socialism was a logical result of long-term structural changes within the medical profession. This included a rapidly expanding market for medical services; the technocratic manipulation of the life process that isolated the ill and the dying from the rest of the society and lowered the level of toleration of the healthy for the sick; and a process of professionalization that increased the prestige and power of doctors, whose esoteric language and practices shielded them from public scrutiny.⁶

⁴ Gerd Göckenjan, Kurieren und Staat machen: Gesundheit und Medizin in der bürgerlichen Welt, Frankfurt am Main, 1985, p. 91.

⁵ Labisch, "Hygiene ist Moral - Moral ist Hygiene — Soziale Disziplinierung durch Ärzte und Medizin," in Sachsse and Tennstedt, Soziale Sicherheit, p. 363.

⁶ Christian Ganssmüller, Die Erbgesundheitspolitik des Dritten Reich: Planung, Durchführung und Durchsetzung. Cologne, 1987, pp. 55-56.

Second, the gradual degeneration of social hygiene to eugenics — a discipline that at least in Germany tended to be associated with right-wing politics from the beginning — had a strong impact on the political beliefs of its proponents. Influenced by the deteriorating political climate and the threat of war, social hygienists, similarly to the eugenicists, became obsessed with the declining birth rate and the presumed degeneration of the German population. In order to conform to fashionable political ideas such as the organic theory of national development, doctors and medical scientists, especially in the rapidly expanding state and municipal health services, gradually shifted their focus of attention from the well-being of the individual to larger units such as social groups and nations. Since only state support could legitimize their new image as the guarantors of the health and survival of the nation, doctors and medical scientists began extolling the virtues of the state and increasingly came to see themselves as its loyal servants.⁷

In the first decade of the twentieth century, constitutional hygiene emerged with the goal of analyzing and correcting the harmful effects of urbanization and industrialization upon the health and physical attributes of clearly defined social groups.⁸ Equally interested in inheritance and environment, constitutional hygiene merged social hygiene with eugenics and racial anthropology.⁹ The basic assumption behind

⁷ On the German eugenic movement see Benno Müller-Hill, Deadly Science: The Elimination of Jews, Gypsies and Mentally Ill 1933-1945, Hamburg, 1984; Robert N. Proctor, Racial Hygiene: Medicine Under the Nazis, Cambridge, Mass., 1988; Paul Weindling, Health, Race and German Politics between National Unification and Nazism 1870-1945, Cambridge, Mass., 1989 and Michael Burleigh, Death and Deliverance: 'Euthanasia' in Germany c.1900-1945, Cambridge, Mass., 1994.

⁸ Weindling, Health, Race and German Politics, pp. 138-139, 158-159.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

constitutional hygiene was that there existed different constitutional types (such as ascetic, muscular and pygmy) and that people who belonged to these types exhibited different degrees of susceptibility to illnesses. Although environment remained important as a setting for the unfolding of hereditary attributes, in the final instance, it was the Mendelian law of heredity that determined the spread and final outcome of contagious diseases such as tuberculosis, asthma, diphtheria and syphilis.¹⁰

Constitutional hygiene became the backbone of the regular medical examination of schoolchildren, infants, army recruits, industrial workers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. In the 1890s, the establishment of medical services in municipal schools and the emergence of a new profession in the person of the school doctor had created the institutional framework for the regular medical examination of children in German public schools. Although before the First World War medical examinations were usually confined to the screening of children for tuberculosis and diabetes, anthropological surveys were also becoming increasingly common. Building upon this precedence, doctors regularly added constitutional and racial surveys to annual medical inspection in the 1920s.¹¹ A similar tendency can be observed in the case of soldiers. In the last years and immediate aftermath of the First World War, not only recruits but also servicemen on leave had to undergo screening for tuberculosis and venereal diseases.¹² Moreover, in the 1920s,

¹⁰ Horst Tiedeken, "Die studentischen Pflichtuntersuchungen an der Philipps-Universität Marburg/Lahn und Ihre Ergebnisse," *Med. diss.*, University of Marburg, 1944, p. 24.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 209-214, 410-411.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 357-358.

hospitals for infant care conducted regular examinations of mothers and their infants and collected information on their health. Welfare officials even sought to make these examinations compulsory.¹³ Finally, in 1921, the Krupp company sponsored the first regular medical examination of its employees ostensibly to prevent the spread of contagious diseases.¹⁴ This example was followed by doctors and medical researchers in other companies, who in the 1920s combined psychological tests and anthropological surveys in order to measure the aptitudes and determine the so-called racial characteristics of workers and other occupational groups.¹⁵

This, seemingly irreversible, expansion of medical control depended not only upon the inner dynamic of medical science. It was influenced by outside political events as well. The First World War acted as a midwife for the emergence of a eugenically-based welfare state. During the last years of the war, medical scientists put forward radical proposals to increase the birth-rate of the German population and to populate the recently acquired living space (Lebensraum) in the East. After the war, the same scientists sought to mitigate the impact of the economic crisis on the health of the population. With state sponsorship, medical scientists created enormous hereditary databanks combining the records of health centers, schools, the police, churches and hospitals. In the late 1920s, the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology, Human Heredity and Eugenics put forward a plan calling for a nation-wide program of anthropological surveys. After the onset of the

¹³ Weindling, Health, Race and German Politics, pp. 203-209, 424-425.

¹⁴ Tiedeken, "Die studentischen Pflichtuntersuchungen," p. 7.

Great Depression, medical experts in this institution called for the creation of a scientific dictatorship which would not coil back from radical measures like the sterilization of the mentally ill in order to facilitate the regeneration of the nation.¹⁶

The introduction of regular medical examinations of students took place both against the serious social problems of the 1920s and the expanding medical control of the state over the population. The demand for regular medical examinations was first raised by the representatives of the German Student Federation's economic organization, later called the German Student-Aid Foundation, during a conference of the German Student Federation in Erlangen in 1921. They reacted to the predicament of local organizations, which had been flooded by the applications of needy students, asking for help not only to finance their studies but also to pay their medical expenses, since the end of the war. Student leaders suggested that a regular medical examination of students should be introduced in order to prevent fraud and to facilitate the just distribution of meager financial resources.¹⁷ Thus, from the beginning, medical examinations acquired a function which had nothing to do directly with students' health.

An additional function of regular medical examinations was to collect information on students' health in order to secure steady financial and moral support from various state and private organizations. The clever combination of numbers and elaborate charts to

¹⁵ Weindling, Health, Race and German Politics, pp. 402-405.

¹⁶ Paul Weindling, "Understanding Nazi Racism: Precursors and Perpetrators," in Michael Burleigh ed., Confronting the Nazi Past: New Debates on Modern German History, New York, 1996, pp. 71-74.

¹⁷ Tiedeken, "Die studentischen Pflichtuntersuchungen," p. 6.

suggest the impending demise of the German elite appealed to feelings of class solidarity among the middle and upper classes. In the eyes of many, publications on students' health helped to satisfy the hunger of the middle classes for sensationalism by providing additional scientific support for fashionable notions about the decline of German and Western culture. Simultaneously, such data legitimized the claims of doctors and medical officials to be the guardians of the health and virility of the nation. Moreover, by depicting the declining health and pressing social problems of the mostly middle-class students as a national issue, doctors and student leaders sought to transcend class boundaries by eliciting support from such unlikely places as the offices of the Social Democratic representatives of the Weimar Republic.

The idea of regular medical examination was accompanied from the beginning by the demand for the introduction of compulsory physical education for students. The demand was connected in part to the changes in students' attitude towards sport. As an integral part of the reformed lifestyle propagated by the youth movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, sport in the forms of hiking, athletics and team competition was popular among high-school students before the outbreak of the First World War. It faced, however, serious obstacles at universities, where the majority of students, imprisoned in the traditional culture of the fraternities, still considered regular physical exercise unworthy of young gentlemen. However, after the war, students also began joining sport clubs in significant numbers and generally devoted more time to physical exercise. Simultaneously, limitations on the size of the army imposed by the Treaty of Versailles raised the value of sport as a substitute for military drill. It was in this

context that the regular medical examination of students gained special importance. Many doctors, public servants and students considered the procedure as a possible surrogate for the medical examination of army recruits until the restoration of Germany's full military strength.¹⁸

Perhaps because of this perceived link to rearmament and national rejuvenation, the first advocates of medical examination (in contrast to the proponents of social hygiene in the late nineteenth century) came mainly from the political Right. Regular medical examination of students was introduced by the renowned eugenicist, Fritz Lenz, in Munich after the First World War. Othmar von Verschuer, also a eugenicist, and his brother-in-law, Wilhelm Weitz, a clinician, organized and published the results of the first medical examination of students in Tübingen in the mid-1920s. At the Technical University of Dresden, the bacteriologist, Philaletes Kuhn, who founded the local cell of the Racial Hygiene Society in the town, introduced and published the results of the first regular medical examination of students in 1923.¹⁹ Kuhn was probably also the most vocal advocate of compulsory medical examination of students in the Weimar Republic. The eugenicist Rainer Fetscher, in collaboration with Kuhn, examined students at the Technical

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 5.

¹⁹ For the results of these first examinations see Philaletes Kuhn and Rainer Fetscher, "Über die Notwendigkeit der Gesundheitsüberwachung der deutschen Studentenschaft," Medizinische Klinik 21 (1923), pp. 711-714; Wilhelm Weitz, "Über die ärztliche Untersuchung der Tübinger Studentenschaft," Klinische Wochenschrift 2 (1923), pp. 841-843; Lothar Loeffler, "Über ärztliche Untersuchungen der Tübinger Studentenschaft im SS 32/24," Klinische Wochenschrift 3 (1924), pp. 892-894; Othmar von Verschuer, "Zur Frage Körperbau und Rasse," Zeitschrift für Konstitutionslehre 11 (1925), pp. 754-761.

University of Dresden in the early 1920s.²⁰ At the same time, the anthropologist Rudolf Martin headed the medical examinations of students in Munich.²¹ Incidentally, it was he and Alfons Fischer, whom the Foreign Office appointed in 1921 to examine the effects of the so-called black curse, as the occupation of the Rhineland by French colonial troops was called in nationalist circles, on the racial purity of the local population.²² Lothar Loeffler, also a man of the political right, examined students at the University of Tübingen in the 1920s. Loeffler reached the zenith of his career as professor of racial biology and racial hygiene at the University of Vienna under the Nazi regime.²³

Not surprisingly, publications about students' health usually appeared in periodicals which were controlled by the right-wing supporters of racial hygiene and anthropology. Thus, the Münchener Medizinische Wochenschrift and the Archiv für Rassenkunde und Gesellschaftsbiologie published regularly the result of medical examinations of students at various institutions of higher learning in the 1920s. These periodicals were in the hands of Julius Friedrich Lehmann, who was the most important publisher in the field of racial hygiene both in the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich.²⁴ Articles on students' health also appeared in periodicals such as the Zeitschrift für Konstitutionslehre, Medizinische Klinik, Klinische Wochenschrift, Zeitschrift für

²⁰ Weindling, Health, Race and German Politics, pp. 383-385.

²¹ Rudolf Martin, "Anthropometrische und ärztliche Untersuchungen an Münchener Studierenden," Münchener Medizinische Wochenschrift 71 (1924), pp. 321-324.

²² Weindling, Health, Race and German Politics, pp. 387-388.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 515-516, 503.

²⁴ Proctor, Racial Hygiene, pp. 26-27.

Morphologie und Anthropologie and Zeitschrift für Tuberkulose, periodicals which may have been sympathetic but were not closely connected to the cause of the political right.

Medical examinations of students in the Weimar Republic were carried out in the context of the basic ideas and practices of constitutional hygiene. As mentioned above, constitutional hygiene stood on the borderline between social hygiene and eugenics. Although constitutional hygienists were not necessarily racist, many of them, especially those coming from the eugenics movement, tried to define exact relationships between diseases, constitutional types and races in the 1920s. Thus, based on the results of the medical examinations of students in Tübingen, Verschuer argued that in Northern and Middle Germany, where the so-called Nordic race was assumed to remain in a purer form, the ascetic type dominated, while in Southern Germany, where the population was racially more mixed, the pygmy and the muscular were most common.²⁵ According to Horst Tiedeken, who wrote a medical dissertation on the topic in 1944, in the early 1920s, doctors had conducted similar examinations at the University of Freiburg, Halle and Munich. During these examinations, medical scientists registered the weight and height of students. They measured the form of skulls and described the characteristic features of the students' faces. They examined the color of their eyes and hair as well as the complexion of their skin. According to Tiedeken, the professed goal of these anthropological surveys was to gain a general picture about the racial characteristics of students.²⁶

²⁵ Othmar von Verschuer, "Zur Frage Körperbau und Rasse, sowie zur Konstitutions- und Rassegeographie Deutschlands," Zeitschrift für Konstitutionslehre 11 (1925), pp. 754-761.

²⁶ Tiedeken, "Die studentischen Pflichtuntersuchungen," p. 56.

Elements of coercion were present in the regular medical examination of students since the early 1920s. The eugenicist Kuhn proposed to make medical examination of students mandatory by national law as early as April 1922. Although legal support from the government was not forthcoming until the Nazi takeover, other, more localized, instruments were available to force students to undergo medical examinations. Doctors tried to convince the teachers of individual universities of the importance of the procedure. In Tübingen, Weitz pressured the Academic Health-Insurance Fund (Akademische Krankenkasse), which was part of the university administration, to declare participation in medical examination compulsory in 1923. However, the university was soon forced to retract this declaration because it lacked the legal basis for its enforcement. Moreover, the economic organization of the German Student Federation made its financial support and services conditional on students' participation after 1922. At various places such as Dresden and Tübingen, student fraternities also pressured their members to undergo medical inspection.

In spite of the efforts of social and racial hygienists and pressure from the German Student Federation, the idea of compulsory medical examination of students instituted by national law was not realized during the Weimar Republic. This failure was mainly the result of opposition by students, the majority of whom rejected the idea of compulsory, or even regular, medical inspection as an infringement upon their individual rights. Others were less ideological and avoided the clinics out of convenience and indifference to the whole procedure. A few students, who suspected that they suffered from contagious

diseases such as tuberculosis and syphilis, shirked medical examinations because they feared that the discovery of their illness would lead to open discrimination and ridicule.

Reports from doctors suggest that student opposition to regular medical examination varied according to the location of the university and the gender and family background of students. In small towns, such as Giessen and Marburg, participation in medical examination remained low throughout the 1920s. Student opposition to the procedure at these universities can be explained, in part, by the strength of student fraternities, which, as the main guardians of student culture especially in small towns, objected to the medical examinations of their members. Moreover, students in small towns were generally less exposed to health hazards created by industrialization and urbanization. The more generous support of private and public organizations in the form of loans and grants improved the life of many students in small towns, thus undermining the economic justification, as put forward by medical scientists, for the introduction of compulsory medical examination.²⁷

Female students opposed more than their male counterparts the regular medical examination of their bodies. As a report from the University of Hamburg suggests, they remained staunch opponents of the procedure throughout the 1920s.²⁸ Their opposition was probably rooted in a bourgeois sense of propriety and fear of sexual harassment. Students of medicine were also more ambivalent about the procedure than their comrades

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 13-15.

²⁸ Anonymous memorandum, Hamburg, [1929], SHSA, Akten des Kultusministeriums, vol. 2, Nr. 15802. p. 80.

in other faculties.²⁹ Since both female and medical students tended to come from the upper-middle rather than the lower-middle classes, we can assume that opposition to the idea of regular medical examination increased proportionately with the social status of students' parents. Students from the middle and upper classes probably felt that medical examination posed a greater threat to the honor of their families. Financial reasons could play a role as well. In spite of the economic crisis of the post-war period, members of the middle and upper classes still lived in better material circumstances and thus felt much less need for student health services. On the other hand, it is also possible that they simply dared to air their opposition to the procedure more openly than did students from the lower-middle classes. Students from the lower-middle classes normally lacked the confidence, which is usually the attribute of insiders in the dominant culture, to directly challenge large bureaucratic organizations.

In the early 1920s, the proponents of medical examination had claimed that the procedure was necessary to combat the negative effects of economic dislocations. However, as the economy returned to normal after 1924, and students experienced a slight improvement in their living standards in the second half of the 1920s, doctors faced increasing difficulties in justifying regular medical examinations even among the lower-middle class students in the cities. As a result of these difficulties, students tended to shirk examinations. In Munich, where the procedure had been made compulsory by ministerial degree a few years earlier, for example, 33 percent of first-year students failed to show up

²⁹ Tiedeken, "Die studentischen Pflichtuntersuchungen," p. 14.

for medical examination in the winter semester of 1932.³⁰ Although there might have been a small gap between the theoretical acceptance of the procedure and the willingness to participate, it seems safe to conclude that highly manipulated student support would never have sufficed to make medical examination of students compulsory at German universities before the Nazi takeover of power in 1933.

Moreover, doctors employed by the health-insurance funds or the local student-aid foundations showed little enthusiasm for the idea of compulsory medical examinations as well. They usually worked only part-time at institutions of higher learning or they simply discharged their services without accepting pay. Regular medical examination brought more work for them with no or very little financial compensation. Not surprisingly, the majority of doctors exerted little pressure upon academic administrators to make the procedures compulsory.³¹ Secondly, as the issue became openly politicized by radical groups such as the NSDStB in the late 1920s, many teachers retracted their former support. They joined with liberals and socialists, who argued that the coercive nature of the medical examination was a threat to individual rights and academic freedom.³² Finally, administrators in the majority of the education ministries remained at best indifferent to the idea of compulsory medical examination of students. With the exemption of Bavaria,

³⁰ Studentenschaft München to Senat der Universität München, July 19, 1932, BHSA, MK 40770.

³¹ For complaints about low salaries see Krankenkasse to Senat der Universität München, May 23, 1932, BHSA, MK 40770.

³² Dr. Albert, Braunschweigisches Kultusministerium, to Dr. Thoma, Ministerialrat im Badischen Kultusministerium, April 8, 1932, BHSA, MK 40770. By using the same argument, the senate of the University of Hamburg rejected the Nazi proposal to introduce compulsory medical examination in February 1933. See Giles, *Students and National Socialism*, p. 103.

Baden and Württemberg, the states did not heed the advice of the main advocates of medical examination such as the German Student-Aid Foundation, the DSt, the NSDStB and remained reluctant to provide the legal basis for the procedure.³³

However, the greatest obstacle to the introduction of compulsory medical examination involved the lack of adequate funding. The organizers of medical examinations failed to secure adequate state funding for their endeavor. Medical examinations were for the most part financed and carried out by the underfunded local unions of the German Student-Aid Foundation. Occasionally private organizations as well as municipal and university authorities, including the separate health-insurance funds for students, channeled some money into the procedure. However, as Germany entered the Great Depression in 1930, these sources of financial support rapidly dried up. The lack of funding threatened the hallowed practice of regular medical examination of students with collapse before the Nazi takeover in 1933.

The Nazi takeover in that year finally broke the deadlock over the issue of compulsory medical examination of students. Nazi students in the German Student-Aid Foundation, the German Student Federation and the Nazi Student League pushed for the introduction of compulsory medical examination in early 1933. First they convinced the education ministries to introduce compulsory sport for students in the first three semesters

³³ E. Meyer, "Ergebnisse der Untersuchungen an 3254 Freiburger Studenten SS 1928 bis WS 1930/31. (Ein Beitrag zur Konstitution des Deutschen Studenten)," Zeitschrift für Konstitutionslehre 16 (1932), pp. 2-5.

in 1933.³⁴ Since the link between sport and medical supervision had been already forged in the early 1920s, the SA University Office (SA-Hochschulamt), together with the German Student-Aid Foundation felt that they did not need an additional authorization to go ahead with the medical examination of students. Thus, they began screening the whole student population in the autumn of 1933.³⁵

Compulsory medical examination complemented military training of students in the SA University Office, which claimed undisputed power over the planning and execution of the procedure.³⁶ However, this claim did not go unchallenged with the education and interior ministries in individual states. Bickering among these agencies over details of a comprehensive plan and individual responsibilities in execution of the procedure kept the system of medical examination of students in disarray in 1933. After the abolition of the SA University Office in the wake of the Röhm affair in the summer of 1934, the German Student-Aid Foundation strove to gain monopoly over the procedure. With the support of the Reich Ministry of the Interior, it reached an agreement with the Office for People's Health of the NSDAP (Amt für Volksgesundheit der NSDAP) in Berlin on 26 October 1934. By this agreement, the German Student-Aid Foundation obtained extensive power

³⁴ Hermann Bach, "Körperliche Wiederaufrüstung: Die Einführung des Pflichtsports für Studenten," in Eckhard John ed., Die Freiburger Universität in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus, Freiburg, 1991, pp. 57-73;

³⁵ Tiedeken, "Die studentischen Pflichtuntersuchungen," p. 15.

³⁶ Dr. Wagner, Der Vertrauensartz des Stellvertreters des Führers to the education ministries, March 3, 1934, THSA, Akten des Thüringischen Volksbildungsministeriums, C 206, pp. 97-99.

in the planning and execution of the procedure.³⁷ The Reich Ministry of Education confirmed the newly gained power of the German Student-Aid Foundation and declared the participation of students in medical examination a prerequisite for registration in February 1935.³⁸

Interestingly enough, contemporary observers both inside Germany and abroad did not necessarily perceive medical examination in the Third Reich as a specifically Nazi instrument of coercion and control. One of the reasons for this observation was the fact that medical examinations of students existed at many European universities such as Paris, Strasbourg, Basel, Barcelona, Bucharest and Lwow, as well as at many American colleges between the wars.³⁹ These examinations showed great similarities, even in their racist features, to their counterpart in the Weimar Republic. They differed, however, from the Nazi model in an important respect: they were not part of a centrally sponsored system of racial rejuvenation. By the late 1930s, the German model did not stand alone; it was copied by doctors in Axis states such as Hungary, which created a similar system for selection of students in the second half of the 1930s.⁴⁰

The health order of the Ministry of Education in 1935 made medical examinations part of a comprehensive health-care system. As a blueprint, the order divided the first

³⁷ Reichsstudentenwerk: Kurzberichte aus der Arbeit des Jahres 1935, pp. 4-5.

³⁸ Deutsches Studentenwerk to REM, January 12, 1935, BA Potsdam, Akten des REM, 49.01., Nr. 874, pp. 19-20.

³⁹ Walter Trabert, "Tuberkulose unter der Studentenschaft," Med. diss., University of Cologne, 1940, p. 7.

⁴⁰ See Dr. Endre Jeney, A Debreceni Egyetemi Hallgatók Egészségügyi Vizsgálata az 1939-40-es Tanévben (Medical Examination of Students at the University of Debrecen in the Schoolyear of 1939/40), Debrecen, 1940.

medical examination into two parts. Students who gained admission to university had to be first examined by a physician, ideally by their family doctor, in their home town. The family physician conducted a general examination of the student and noted any, especially inherited, anomalies, in a health register (Gesundheitsstammbuch). This book then was sent to the doctor of the student-aid foundation of the university, to which the student intended to become enrolled. At either the university clinic or a hospital within the locality of the university, the student had to undergo a second medical examination, during which specialists examined, measured and classified different parts of his or her body and gave a final judgment on the suitability of the candidate for university study. Those who succeeded could proceed with their studies but had to submit to a similarly detailed medical examination in the fifth semester.⁴¹

The order of the Reich Ministry of Education drastically expanded the power of the medical profession over students' lives. It also set free the coercive and anti-humanist potentials in eugenics and social hygiene. At the same time, the decree showed, however, the lengths to which Nazi regime was willing to embrace the program of eugenicists and other medical scientists. Many in this latter group remained dissatisfied with the scope of compulsory medical examination. They wanted students to undergo medical examination in every semester or at least once a year. Thus, doctors and student politicians continued to raise demands for a third medical examination until the end of the Nazi regime.

⁴¹ "Gesundheitsdienstordnung für die Deutschen Hochschulen," Berlin, June 1, 1937, BA Koblenz, R 149/36, pp. 57-59.

However, the idea of more frequent examinations floundered, because the state proved reluctant to provide the additional resources necessary for its realization.⁴²

Moreover, as a result of conflicting interests, medical inspections at the local level never even entirely conformed with the model created by the health order of the REM in 1935. The introduction of compulsory labor service in 1934 and conscription a year later created a lag between the application to university and the actual start of study. Moreover, the existence of parallel procedures in the Hitler Youth, the Labor Service and the Army made the examination of recent high-school graduates in their home town both impractical and superfluous. To make matters worse for Nazi fanatics, many family doctors failed to collect data on students' family illnesses, thus putting the plan for the creation of a comprehensive health-care system in jeopardy. The situation was further complicated by the failure of student administrators at the local level to keep the files on individual students up to date. Less attentive to administrative details than professional bureaucrats, student administrators frequently forgot to send over the health register of students to their new schools.⁴³ Paradoxically, the Reich Ministry of Education strengthened the same tendency by repeatedly frustrating the initiatives of the German Student-Aid Foundation to impose more rigorous control over student administrators. The objective of this policy was to spare student activists as much as possible the burden of administration.⁴⁴ Plans for

⁴² Professor Dr. Unverricht, Studentenwerk Berlin, to Reichsgesundheitsamt, February 26, 1937, BA Koblenz, R 149/36, pp. 10-13.

⁴³ Tiedeken, "Die studentischen Pflichtuntersuchungen," pp. 68-70.

⁴⁴ REM to Deutsches Studentenwerk, March 1, 1937, BA Koblenz, R 21/10933, pp. 4-5.

the creation of a health passport (Gesundheitspass), which would have even included the fingerprints, the blood type and all the hereditary characteristics of the holder, were given some publicity and support after 1938 but they never left the planning stage.⁴⁵ Although the volume of information collected on the health of students by the German Student-Aid Foundation was probably unprecedented, the Nazi regime ultimately failed to create a comprehensive system of medical control of students.

Until 1942, the basic ideas and methods of constitutional hygiene continued to dominate the medical examination of students. Doctors remained preoccupied with the search for norms and constitutional types and their relations to various illnesses. However, individual cases reveal many different procedural orientations. Some made no concession to the ruling ideology and concentrated their attention only upon illnesses directly related to social environments and sporting activities.⁴⁶ In other cases, however, the political conviction and ideological orientation of doctors and their assistants became more obvious. Herbert Leumer, for example, conducted medical examinations of students in Leipzig in order to establish a good basis for a comparative study of various races both inside and outside Germany.⁴⁷ Helmut Schmidt ascribed the cause of chronic stomach illnesses of certain students at the University of Munich in part to their different

⁴⁵ J. Meller and E. Risak, "Über Reihenuntersuchungen und ihre Ergebnisse," Wiener Medizinische Wochenschrift 41 (1940), pp. 454-458.

⁴⁶ See Erich Russ, "Die konstitutionellen Veränderungen bei Leipziger Studenten in der Zeit von 1925/26 bis 1934/36 als Folge vermehrter planmässiger körperlicher Erziehung," Med. diss., University of Leipzig, 1939; Heinz Dietzsch, "Konstitutionsuntersuchungen an Leipziger Studenten in den Jahren 1925-1934," Med. diss., University of Leipzig, 1939.

constitutional and racial types.⁴⁸ Maria Kaub, who examined female students at the University of Freiburg, drew the conclusion that female students exhibited the same racial characteristics as their American and Norwegian counterparts.⁴⁹ Ingeborg Willigmann, who conducted research on female students at the Reich Academy for Physical Exercise in Berlin (Reichsakademie für Leibesübungen), found that psychologically the majority of female students belonged to the “integrationist type” characterized by childlike behavior and the dominance of emotions over rational thinking.⁵⁰

Contrary to the plans of the Reich Ministry of Education in 1935, compulsory medical examination in the Third Reich preserved its earlier diversified character. At the majority of universities, anthropological and racial surveys only complemented normal medical procedures. In extreme cases, such as those of the University of Munich and the University of Berlin, the medical examination of students bore a close resemblance to the biological selection of candidates for the Reich Vocational Contest and the SS. In the camps established by these organizations, the goal of medical examination was to assess the racial value of the candidates by merging the results of clinical examinations with the

⁴⁷ Herbert Leumer, “Körperbauuntersuchungen an deutschen Studentinnen,” Med. diss., University of Leipzig, 1936.

⁴⁸ Helmut Schmidt, “Untersuchungen über die häufigsten Formen von chronischen Magenstörungen bei Studenten und ihre Beziehung zu einigen konstitutionellen Merkmalen: Nach Ergebnissen von Reihenuntersuchungen,” Med. diss., University of Munich, 1936.

⁴⁹ Maria Kaub, “Körperbaustudien an 354 Freiburger Studentinnen,” Med. Diss., University of Freiburg, 1941.

⁵⁰ Ingeborg Willigmann, “Untersuchungen zur Konstitutionsfrage an Studentinnen der Reichsakademie für Leibesübungen in Berlin,” Med. diss., University of Berlin, 1938, pp. 16-17.

evaluation of personality traits such as bearing and appearance as well as racial anthropological features, into a comprehensive picture of the individual.⁵¹

Medical examinations were carried out at the majority of German universities regularly until 1939. After 1938 the Nazis introduced the same system in Austrian universities, the University of Prague and eventually in Strasbourg. First it seemed that the outbreak of the war would have no serious impact on the procedures. Between 1939 and 1942 over 52,000 students were forced to undergo medical examinations in Germany. At local levels, the majority of universities succeeded in keeping the level of participation high until 1942.⁵² The tide turned, however, after the German defeat at Stalingrad on 3 February 1943. Student participation in medical examinations declined rapidly in the last years of the war. In retrospect, the reasons for this decline are obvious: war undermined the financial basis of the procedure, removed qualified personnel and created more loopholes for students to avoid examinations.⁵³ Under these pressures, racial anthropological surveys increasingly fell by the wayside, while screening for tuberculosis and other infectious diseases became a priority. Utopias for biological and racial improvements were shelved, as doctors tried desperately to slow down the rapid deterioration of students' health with little success.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Tiedeken, "Die studentischen Pflichtuntersuchungen," pp. 157-158; for biological selection in the SS see Bernd Wegner, The Waffen-SS: Organization, Ideology and Function, Oxford, 1990, pp. 133-135.

⁵² Tiedeken, "Die studentischen Pflichtuntersuchungen," pp. 187-191.

⁵³ Dr. Walter Herberg to Rektor der TH Dresden, October 14, 1942, SHSA, Akten des Kultusministeriums, Nr. 15803.

⁵⁴ Tiedeken, "Die studentischen Pflichtuntersuchungen," pp. 164-167.

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to ascribe the failure of compulsory medical examination exclusively to the changing fortunes of war. The failure of the Nazi regime to impose its will upon local administrators and create a standardized health system for students became obvious by the late 1930s. The lack of central direction, adequate financial assistance and unqualified administrative, including police, support favored the local forces of resistance. At small universities such as the University of Münster, teachers and students boycotted the compulsory medical examination as early as 1935. In Münster, the rector himself argued that the “result of the present form of compulsory examination does not correspond to the invested energy.”⁵⁵ In Marburg, commonly at least one of the medical examinations remained a formality. Students obtained the necessary certificate of good health after a few minutes’ inspection by the doctor of the local student-aid foundation.⁵⁶

Resistance to the system came from many directions. First, the power invested in the school doctor by the Nazis did not produce the dividends expected by the regime. After 1935 the social, legal and moral power of school doctors employed by the health-insurance funds and student-aid foundations increased tremendously. School doctors, who had to be admitted to, or at least re-confirmed, in their jobs by the Office for People’s Health of the NSDAP, could break their oath of discretion in regard to the students with impunity. They had the right and obligation to recommend sick students for further

⁵⁵ Rektor der Universität Münster to REM, May 11, 1936, BA Potsdam, Akten des REM, R 49.01, Nr. 874. p. 355.

⁵⁶ Tiedeken. “Die studentischen Pflichtuntersuchungen,” p. 73.

medical treatment or expulsion. School doctors sat on the board of the local student-aid foundations which decided the distribution of scholarships. In theory, at least, they became the health leaders (Gesundheitsführer) of German universities.⁵⁷

Although it is difficult to judge how successful the Nazi attempt was to indoctrinate school doctors, impressionistic evidence suggests that, like most physicians, school doctors employed by the health-insurance funds and the student-aid foundations remained reluctant to step over the moral boundaries of their profession.⁵⁸ We can only speculate about the causes of their conservatism. The majority probably continued to adhere to the Christian and liberal ideals of their youth. Secondly, lack of financial incentives could also play an important part in their reluctance to wholeheartedly embrace Nazi health policy. The introduction of the compulsory examination of students brought more professional and administrative work but little financial compensation for school doctors, who remained underpaid during the Nazi regime.⁵⁹

Even greater resistance to the system of compulsory medical examination came from the doctors and administrators of municipal and university clinics. Examinations of students involved considerable work for doctors and additional costs for their clinics. In the case of complex procedures, the medical examination of one student took more than thirty minutes. Even in optimal cases and with the help of twelve assistants, a doctor could examine only fifty students in an afternoon. Thus, the compulsory examination at larger

⁵⁷ Die Bewegung, 10 (1942), Nr. 4, BA Koblenz, ZSg 129/124.

⁵⁸ Kater, Doctors under Hitler, p. 46.

universities could often drag on for more than a week. The material burden of the procedure fell upon the clinics and doctors who were expected to carry it out for nominal compensation.⁶⁰ Thus it is not surprising that the clinics were not enthusiastic about the requests of student activists. In Berlin, for example, the student-aid foundation complained that doctors in the First and Second University Clinics, who, as student activists charged, knew nothing and cared even less about the purpose of the compulsory medical examination of students, turned down the request of student leaders, claiming that their institutions were already overburdened by regular duties. Thus, the students pinned their hopes on the head of the Third Clinic, who had been active in student health services for years. The examination was finally carried out after a delay but, because of the lack of personnel and adequate equipment, it remained confined to basic procedures.⁶¹

The sources also suggest that older or established doctors tried to avoid any involvement in the compulsory examination of students. At the university clinic of Leipzig, for example, no professor took any interests in the result of these procedures. The examinations were entirely carried out by young assistants, who devoted, with no compensation, seventeen evenings to complete the work.⁶² They probably hoped that the collected and published data would help to advance their careers. Indeed, in contrast to

⁵⁹ See Studentenwerk München to Rektor der Universität München, January 13, 1939, UAM, Nr. 836/1.

⁶⁰ Dr. Hertel, "Bericht über die Auswirkungen der studentischen Pflichtuntersuchungen an der Universität Leipzig," May, 1936, BA Potsdam, 49.01. Akten des REM, Nr. 874, pp. 343-344.

⁶¹ Studentenwerk Berlin to REM, September 14, 1937, BA Koblenz, R 149/36, p. 137.

⁶² Dr. Hertel, "Bericht über die Auswirkungen der studentischen Pflichtuntersuchungen an der Universität Leipzig," May, 1936, BA Potsdam, 49.01. Akten des REM, Nr. 874, p. 344.

the practices in the Weimar Republic, it was mainly the older students and fledgling scientists who published the results of medical examinations of students in the Third Reich. However, older and more established scientists had serious doubts about these procedures, which one of them described as “primitive” and the results as “unreliable.” He argued that only the greater involvement of established doctors as supervisors seemed to offer some hope for change.⁶³ Thus, this complaint seems to confirm Kater’s conclusion about the decline in the quality of training received by doctors in Nazi Germany.⁶⁴

Compulsory medical examinations did little to prevent disease and improve the health of students. Fearing expulsion, discrimination and ridicule, students were reluctant to share information with the school doctors even when they could reasonably hope to obtain financial support from the health-insurance fund. Moreover, the use of a compulsory medical examination for the prevention of illnesses was severely impaired by the often cursory nature of the procedure. Especially at smaller universities with no clinics, the omission of X-ray examination and blood tests made objective evaluation of the individual difficult. Finally, medical examination was not necessarily followed by specialist treatment because expensive therapies were left out of the new coverage of the health-insurance fund.⁶⁵

⁶³ Prof. Victor Schilling to Kurator der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität, April 27, 1936, BA Potsdam, Akten des REM, Nr. 874, p. 365.

⁶⁴ Michael H. Kater, “Medizinische Fakultäten und Medizinstudenten,” pp. 90-92.

⁶⁵ Prof. Victor Schilling, to Rektor der Universität Münster, April 27, 1936, BA Potsdam, Akten des REM, Nr. 874, p. 362.

Aside from the reluctance of established doctors and administrators of various clinics, the resistance of students contributed the most to the ultimate failure of compulsory medical examinations in Nazi Germany. The initial misgivings of many students about the procedure did not disappear after the Nazi victory in 1933. Even students who agreed with the general aims of the examination perceived its actual form as cumbersome and time-consuming. Perhaps the majority of students continued to oppose the procedure on principle, however, because they were not prepared to acquiesce in medical control over their lives. Sometimes even Nazi students, who prized their health and masculinity very highly, did not hesitate to evoke the liberal idea of individual rights because they feared that an unsatisfactory result of the medical examination might leave a permanent stain on their reputation and compromise their self-respect.⁶⁶

Female students also remained vocal in their opposition to compulsory medical inspections. They felt that these examinations injured their sense of propriety, honor and dignity. It was especially true in the cities such as Munich and Berlin, where the procedure was in part based on a military model. In these cities, female students had to line up barely dressed and wait until the male doctor and his assistants had the time to examine them. Only in 1939 did the German Students Aid Foundation order that female students should be examined only by female doctors.⁶⁷ Unfortunately, to my knowledge, no statistics exist on the gender distribution of medical personnel responsible for the execution of medical

⁶⁶ Reichsstudenwerk to REM, March 23, 1937, BA Koblenz, R 149/36, pp. 11-12.

⁶⁷ Die Bewegung, 57 (1940).

examinations. However, it seems possible that following the general trend during the war the number of woman doctors responsible for the medical examination of female students did increase after 1939.

The expansion of the health bureaucracy coupled with the professed misogyny of Nazi leaders provided an ideal breeding ground for abuses, which, ironically enough, the Nazis had combated so zealously before 1933. A typical example of such abuses occurred at the University of Munich. According to the testimonies of female students, the young doctor of the local student-aid foundation used the examinations as a source of obtaining sexual pleasure, short of intercourse, for years. He was not satisfied, however, with the sight and touch of naked bodies of young women during these procedures but continued the molestation of young girls during his regular hours. Finally, the doctor became subjected to a humiliating legal procedure, when the mother of a female student complained to the rector that during a visit the young doctor had examined only her daughter's genitalia, although she had complained about heart problems.⁶⁸

Student opposition to the system of compulsory medical examination intensified and proved more effective in the last years of the war.⁶⁹ This opposition was fueled in part by the reluctance of the rectors to use their disciplinary power against the absentees. At the University of Berlin, for example, the student-aid foundation demanded in vain the

⁶⁸ Student's mother to Rektor der Universität München, UAM, Akten des Senates, February 19, 1938, Nr. 836/1.

⁶⁹ In Munich, for example, SS 1939: 134 students; SS 1941: 119 students, WS 1941/42: 84 students, SS 1942: 99 students, WS 1942/43: 103 students, WS 1943/44: 42 students failed to show up for medical examination. This data do not include those who served in the army or work service. It seems reasonable to assume that after the WS 1942/43 the lists were taken up only randomly. See UAM, Akten des Senates, Nr. 836/1.

expulsion of a student, who had twice ignored the invitation to compulsory medical examination. Ignoring the request of the aid foundation, the rector only warned the student that in the future he should go about his business with greater punctuality.⁷⁰ Moreover, in the chaotic circumstances of the war, students could often simply claim that they did not receive the invitation to the medical examination or that they left town.⁷¹ Finally, the army provided protection for male students on leave against unwanted molestation by Nazi zealots as well. The decree of the Ministry of Education at end of 1944, which removed students serving in the army from the authority of school doctors and exempted them from compulsory medical examination at their schools, belatedly sanctioned the long-existing practice.⁷²

The war created unprecedented opportunities for the Nazi leadership to attempt the realization of racial utopias. At the same time, it jeopardized other ideologically inspired procedures such as the compulsory medical examination of students. Even where it survived after 1942, the medical examination of students increasingly lost its ideological edge, as anthropological surveys gave way to the detection and cure of individual illnesses. Originally aimed at the racial improvement of the student population, medical examinations registered a general decline, described by Nazi authors as the result a counter-selection, in students' health in the last years of the war.⁷³ Compulsory medical

⁷⁰ Rektor to Baron Alexander Behr, February 19, 1941, UAB, Akten des Senates, Nr. 1108, pp. 21-27.

⁷¹ Universitätsrat Berlin to Studentenwerk Berlin, February 18, 1945, UAB, Akten des Senates, Nr. 1108.

⁷² REM to Kurator der Universität Berlin, September 15, 1944, UAB, Akten des Senates, Nr. 1108.

⁷³ Tiedeken, "Die studentischen Pflichtuntersuchungen," pp. 139-144.

examination failed in its main purpose of preserving and improving the health of an important section of the population and facilitating the creation of a physically superior elite.

The fate of compulsory medical examinations foreshadowed the failure of biological selection based on the expulsion of students on the grounds of weak health and hereditary illnesses. Biological selection of students was legally justified and regulated by an order of the Reich Ministry of Education, promulgated on 16 December 1935. This document was basically the work of Hans Reiter, a eugenicist, who soon became the President of the Reich Health Office, and Adolf Bartels, an expert on industrial health and later one of the main advocates of the Nuremberg Blood Laws.⁷⁴ According to the order, academic administrators had to give preference during admission to students whose physical and mental health was beyond question. Students who fell under the Law for the Alteration of the Law for the Prevention of Hereditary Diseased Progeny of 26 June 1935 were permanently and unconditionally barred from institutions of higher learning. The list of illnesses belonging to this category included, among other, schizophrenia, epilepsy, multiple sclerosis and spine paralysis. The university administration had the obligation to permanently exclude students with a high degree of psychopathy, especially when it manifested itself in sexual deviation (homosexuality) and drug addiction. They also had to remove students with serious bodily malformations, open tuberculosis, syphilis and various

⁷⁴ Deutsches Studentenwerk to REM, October 20, 1934, BA Potsdam, Akten des REM, 49.01. Nr. 874. On Reiter's career see Kater, "Medizinische Fakultäten und Medizinstudenten," pp. 86-87; on Bartels' life see Weindling, Health, race and German politics, pp. 309-310.

skin diseases. By expanding the boundaries of illness until it became virtually meaningless but could still be used to include anyone with less than enthusiastic support for the regime, the law judged students who lacked the hardiness, the will for physical exercise and the readiness for action as permanently and unconditionally unfit for university study.⁷⁵

The final decision to expel students in the case of unsuitability lay in the hands of the rector. His decision was, in part, based on the recommendation of the doctor of the university, who, in turn, had to discuss each case with the specialists of the university clinic. The result of the compulsory examination alone did not constitute a basis for exclusion. In cases of conditional unfitness, such as when students suffered from heart and kidney disease, a commission made up of the rector, the school doctor and a doctor from the Office for People's Health of the NSDAP decided the fate of the student. Appeal against the decision of the rector and the commission had to be handed in to the Reich Ministry of Education, where each case was reviewed in cooperation with the German Student-Aid Foundation and the Office for People's Health of the NSDAP. Only students with exceptional mental abilities could be exempted from the stipulations of the law. Even in these cases, however, students who failed to live up to the health standards set by the law, could not obtain financial support from the federal, state or municipal authorities, the German Student-Aid Foundation or the university.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ RdErl. des REM vom 16. 12. 1935, BA Potsdam, Akten des REM, 49.01. Nr. 874, pp. 220-221.

⁷⁶ RdErl. des REM vom 16. 12. 1935, BA Koblenz, R 149/36, pp. 70-71.

The process of biological selection began with the creation of a medical diagnosis by the family physician or the school doctor. The nature of the medical diagnosis exhibited the level of knowledge that the examining doctor possessed. At the same time, it reflected some personal traits and, in a few cases, the social prejudices and political inclinations of its creator. As the example of a student, Hans Zimmermann, demonstrates, many doctors in the 1930s tended to concentrate in their diagnoses on the outrageous, even scandalous, aspects of illnesses. The doctor at the University of Munich, where Zimmermann was a student, for example, filled much of his diagnosis report with shocking details of his patient's life. Following the assumption that shocking illness must have roots in dramatic changes in the patient's life, he thought that the cause of Zimmermann's mental illness lay in his turbulent love affair with an American female student and the sudden death of his father. The obvious disposition of the doctor toward gossip and his barely disguised need for entertainment led to the creation of a long document, which bears a strong resemblance to a cheap novel. This presumably objective diagnosis deprived Zimmermann of all personality traits, as his past and present character were reduced a function of the dynamic unfolding of the illness. Thus depersonalized, it was easy to label Hans Zimmermann's depression as a sign of schizophrenia and to recommend, on the basis of the Nazi law on biological selection, his expulsion from the university.⁷⁷

Pride in their accomplishments often led physicians to be stubborn and arrogant with respect to differing points of view. This pattern of behavior, coupled with a fear of

⁷⁷ Vertrauensarzt to Rektor der Universität München, 3 April, 1940, UAM, Akten des Rektorats, Nr. 934.

losing the respect of colleagues and patients, led many doctors participating in the process of biological selection of students to maintain their professional opinions even in the face of new or contradictory evidence. The case of Kurt Adams is a good example of how a student could become a victim of the innate inflexibility of professionalism and bureaucratized medicine in Nazi Germany. Adams studied medicine at the University of Jena. Just before the outbreak of the war in 1939, he fell into a serious depression which was later diagnosed as a sign of schizophrenia by the doctors of the university clinic. The affiliation of his father with social democracy before 1933, which was emphasized in the medical diagnosis, probably reinforced the rector's determination to apply the stipulations of the Nazi law rigidly in this case and expel the student from the university. Kurt Adams was drafted into the army in 1940 and fulfilled his duties in exemplary fashion. In mid-1941 he decided to continue his studies in medicine. To dispel any doubts about his health, he underwent a second medical examination in the university clinic in Frankfurt am Main. With the positive results in his hands, he was admitted to the University of Greifswald. However, Adams was determined to continue his studies at Jena. His application was rejected by the rector, however, because the director of the university clinic in Jena, Dr. Berger (first name is not given), refused to change the verdict of his previous diagnosis. Berger defended his judgment with the derogatory remark that no professional accepted the opinion of the Frankfurt clinic.⁷⁸

⁷⁸ Kurt Adams' father to Rektor der Universität of Jena, May 6, 1941; also Dr. Berger to Rektor Universität of Jena, May 26, 1941, UAJ, C 1132.

The lack of primary sources makes more generalization about the attitude of school doctors, whose recommendations served as the basis for the exclusion, difficult. It would be interesting to know, for example, what kind of correlation, if any, existed between the age, status, gender and party affiliation of doctors employed at universities and their attitude towards the system of biological selection. The sources allow us, however, to draw conclusions about the attitude of other agencies in the process. The position of the Nazi Party, and more specifically the Office for People's Health of the NSDAP, was unequivocal. The Party bureaucrats tended to represent the extreme and most ideologically inspired position. They were especially concerned about the sexual life of students with its possible dangers for the racial purity of the population. In the biopolitical language of the regime, Party officials vented their prejudices on individuals deviating from the narrowly defined norm. The reaction of a local Party boss to the application of Gertrud Braunsberger for admission to the University of Munich could be considered typical in this respect. Since she was living together with a foreign student from Peru, who was rumored to suffer from an unspecified hereditary disease, in 1942, the Party boss branded her ill as well, and thus unworthy to become a member of the academic community.⁷⁹

Student organizations usually followed the Party line on the issues of biological selection. At the local level, Nazi activists advocated and watched over the execution of Party policy. At the same time, they had sharp ears for, and helped to spread, rumors

⁷⁹ NSDAP Gauleitung München-Oberbayern to Rektor der Universität München, November 20, 1942, UAM,

about the health of fellow students and acted as informers for the Party.⁸⁰ On the other hand, the attitude of student administrators in the local student-aid foundations was often more ambivalent. While they generally adhered to the guidelines of their Nazified center organization, student administrators at the local level were often reluctant to apply the principles of biological selection to the medical problems of their fellow students. At the University of Munich, for example, the student-aid foundation recommended to send two students, suffering from tuberculosis, to the sanatorium and even to pay part of their medical expenses. The rector took a hard-line position, however, and expelled the students from the university.⁸¹

The ultimate power to expel students from the university on the grounds of ill health was in the hands of the rectors. Documents suggest that the rectors at the universities of Munich, Berlin, Jena and Leipzig occasionally took an uncompromising position on the admission and exclusion of sick students. However, they constituted only a small minority. The Reich Ministry of Education usually accepted the judgment of the rectors without further investigation. This tendency generally worked in the favor of students. However, as the case of Elfriede Rittmeister suggests, the unqualified support of the REM could also help to perpetuate and sanctify the stigmas attached to sick students

Akten des Rektorats, Nr. 934.

⁸⁰ Nazi students drew the attention of the local Party leadership to two students rumoured to have been suffering from tuberculosis. See Gaustudentenführer Baden-Elsass to Dr. Otto, Reichsfachsgruppenleiter Volksgesundheit, January 29, 1944, BA Koblenz, R 21 Nr. 837.

⁸¹ Rektor der Universität München to Studentenwerk München, November 13, 1939, UAM, Akten des Senates, Nr. 934.

by local doctors and university administrators. Rittmeister, who studied medicine at the University of Jena, suffered from serious depression, which was later diagnosed as schizophrenia. In accordance with the Law for the Prevention of Hereditary Diseased Offspring of 14 July 1933, she was sterilized. After her sterilization, she exhibited no sign of her illness for over a year. She worked in an office and then applied for re-admission to the University of Jena. Since the rector rejected her application, she tried her luck at the Reich Ministry of Education. The bureaucrats of this agency, however, rejected her application, although they concurred that it was possible that she was not sick anymore. Instead, they argued that the fact she had been sterilized made her re-admission and thus her life as a professional in Nazi Germany impossible.⁸²

Continuing belief in the merits of the procedure and bureaucratic inertia moved a few university administrators and bureaucrats in the education ministries to apply the principles of biological selection to students even after the collapse of the Nazi regime. Thus, in May 1945, the Ministry of Education in Thuringia asked the rector of the University of Berlin, by now in the Russian-occupied zone, to expel one of their former students from that university. Finally, at the end of 1945, the rector of the University of Berlin informed the Ministry of Education in Thuringia that the Nazi law of biological selection of students had lost its validity.⁸³

⁸² REM to Elfriede Rittmeister, October 14, 1941, UAJ, C 1132.

⁸³ Rektor der Universität Berlin to Thüringisches Landesamt für Volksbildung., October 5, 1945, THSA, Akten des Thüringischen Volksbildungsministeriums, C 207, p. 171.

German students and their parents were generally hostile to the idea of biological selection. Stigmatization and expulsion were especially resented by the real and potential victims of the procedure. The feelings of shame were exacerbated by close contacts between middle and lower-middle-class families, particularly in small and middle-sized towns, where the news of expulsion gave occasion to speculation and gossip for weeks. Although it is difficult to reconstruct past emotions, sources suggest that the sense of shame was particularly acute among the parents of students who were expelled on the basis of their homosexuality. The letter of a father whose homosexual son had been expelled from the University of Berlin in 1940 does not fail to impress the reader even today. In a tone vacillating between the contradictory feelings of loss and pride, the father informed the rector about the death of his son at Stalingrad at the end of 1942.⁸⁴

As the case of Alphons Spielhoff suggests, the disclosure of homosexuality could even destroy the career of a student who had possessed an outstanding record in the service of the Nazi cause. Spielhoff came from a lower-middle-class family from Northern Germany. The modest social background of his parents suggested a similar career path for the son, who had attended a technical high-school instead of the more prestigious Humanistisches Gymnasium in late 1920s and early 1930s. Spielhoff was at best a mediocre student, getting low marks in almost every subject except history and physical education. In search for compensation for his failings in school, he threw himself into the frantic political struggles of the late Weimar period. He had joined the Hitler Youth in

⁸⁴ Case of Max Huber, UAB, Akten der Universitätsrates, Nr. 3023.

1929 or 1930. For a short period of time, he worked in the central leadership of the same organization, which probably helped him to gain admission to the University of Berlin in 1933. There, he became engaged in the work of the NSDStB and entered the Nazi Party in 1936. Spielhoff was a diligent student, interested mainly in geopolitics and the question of race. His final research paper towards his diploma dealt with the racial problems of the Auel-Aachen region and was received favorably by all save one examiner. Professor Albrecht Haushofer justified the low but still passing grade he had given for the work with the rather sarcastic remark that Alphons Spielhoff's ability to pass scientific and political judgments did not keep up with his diligence. However, this rather unfavorable opinion did not deter Spielhoff from choosing an academic career.⁸⁵

By the time of his application to the doctoral program in 1937, however, events occurred that threatened and ultimately destroyed what had been a successful, albeit rather typical, career in Nazi Germany. A police report sheds light on the double life and hidden political allegiance of Alphons Spielhoff. At his arrest for homosexual activities, the police found literature and the insignia of the forbidden Weimar youth leagues known as Bündische Jugend in his room. Spielhoff confessed that he had solicited the friendship of the members of this movement, notorious for its homoerotic tendencies.⁸⁶ His arrest, short imprisonment and subsequent expulsion from all Party organizations sealed Spielhoff's

⁸⁵ Case of Alphons Spielhoff, UAB, Akten des Universitätsrates, Nr. 3021.

⁸⁶ On the similarities and differences between the Bündische Youth and the Hitler Youth see Michael H. Kater, "Bürgerliche Jugendbewegung und Hitlerjugend in Deutschland von 1926 bis 1939," Archiv für Socialgeschichte 17 (1977), pp. 127-174; Peter D. Stachura, The German Youth Movement 1900-1945: An Interpretive and Documentary History, London, 1981, pp. 38-70.

fate in Nazi Germany. Although his diploma was not revoked, the affair permanently blocked his admission to the graduate program. He served in the army during the first years of the war and tried to gain re-admission to the University of Berlin in 1942. His excellent war record, however, did not annul his past mistakes. His homosexuality and flirtation with the forbidden youth movement made him unfit forever for university study in Nazi Germany.

Medical diagnoses and surviving letters from relatives and various authorities have allowed us to draw some preliminary conclusions about the changing boundaries of health and illness in Nazi Germany. This approach has concentrated exclusively on the gray areas, where medical knowledge, social prejudices, political ideology and the idiosyncrasies of doctors intermingled and reinforced one another. However, politics affected not only the definition of health in the Third Reich. The case of a young woman at the University of Jena, who suffered from a nervous breakdown, suggests that fear of persecution on the basis of Nazi laws colored the manifestations, and even perhaps contributed to the development, of illnesses. She confided to her friend in a moment of hallucination that "I have been sterilized. Yes, they have sterilized me," when, in fact, she had not been. But her prediction came true after she was expelled from the university at the end of 1944.⁸⁷ The same conclusion about the importance of politics in influencing the manifestation of illnesses could be drawn from the case of a male student at the University of Munich, who, during a fit, mistook a piece of furniture, oddly enough, for an electric

⁸⁷ Studentenwerk Jena to Rektor der Universität Jena, June 24, 1944, BA Koblenz, R 21/10859.

chair and yelled out: “My neighbor should not be executed! Not even the Führer has the right to execute you! Switch the electricity off! Maximum 5 Volts should be given! And now, let’s sing the national anthem!”⁸⁸

Moreover, a fanatical belief in, and ultimate disappointment with, the Nazi cause in an increasingly skeptical environment could lead to the suicide of students.⁸⁹ Although suicide normally does not qualify for an illness, the case of Heinz Mallick suggests that Nazi administrators in the local student-aid foundations perceived it as an important political concern, a result of counter-selection among students. Mallick studied engineering at the Technical University of Dresden. The father, who described himself as an old Nazi, headed a department responsible for technology in the district Party cell at the time of his son’s suicide in early 1940. As his letter explains, he raised Heinz Mallick in the “spirit of National Socialist performance, sense of duty and honor.” His father’s influence and his own susceptibility to the Nazi variant of idealism pressured him to excel in political activities first in the Nazi organization for schoolchildren (NS-Schülerbund) and later in the local branch of the Hitler Youth. After graduating from a Humanistisches Gymnasium with honors, Mallick went into the labor service and the army, which he left with the rank of corporal in 1937. Convinced that it was the engineering profession which was to play a key role in the new Germany, he enrolled in the Technical University of Dresden in the same year. There, he continued to work for the Nazi cause in the NSDStB

⁸⁸ Rektor der Universität München to Studentenwerk München, April 3, 1940, Akten des Rektorates, Nr. 934.

⁸⁹ For an excellent survey on the history of suicide see Georges Minois, Geschichte des Selbstmords, Düsseldorf, 1996.

and soon became the head of one of the Nazi residential communities (Kameradschaften). However, he could not reconcile his activities in Party organizations with his duties as a student. As a result of overburdening, he committed suicide in the spring of 1940. The father and the comrades in the Nazi student organization naturally blamed the rigidity of the school system and the conservatism of its teachers for Mallick's death. They argued that the conservative teachers of the university kept the workload artificially high in order to draw students away from the Nazi movement and thus undermine the foundations of the state. The teachers easily refuted these charges, however, by pointing to the increased need to maintain high educational standards under wartime circumstances.⁹⁰ The case was soon forgotten but the fact that the correspondence ended up in the files of the student health services indicates that contemporaries perceived his death as a function of biological counter-selection among students.

The last example has already hinted at the weaknesses in the Nazi system of biological selection. This impression is further reinforced by the low number of students who had been expelled on the basis of the REM order of 16 December 1935. The most complete list of students expelled on the basis of ill health can be found in the archive of the University of Munich. This list includes the names of 60 students expelled between 1936 and 1944. However, scattered data in the federal and in various university archives suggest that this list is not complete. Thus, I estimate the number of students expelled from German universities in the Third Reich around 100. Even if we take into account the number of students who, for

⁹⁰ Heinz Mallick' father to Rektor der TH Dresden, April 22, 1940; Studentenführer Jäger to Rektor der TH

fear of humiliation, did not apply for admission, the policy of biological selection was still a failure.⁹¹

Since the majority of students opposed the cleansing of the student body on the basis of Nazi racial laws, they did not blame university authorities for their apparent softness on this issue. Instead of negative measures, they expected increased funding for other branches of student health services such as health and accident insurance and sick-assistance fund (Krankenfürsorge). Indeed, the majority of students measured the success or failure of Nazi health policy on the basis of financial subsidies for these services. Therefore, the remaining part of the chapter will examine of whether the Nazi takeover of these organization increase benefits and students' control over these organizations.

The idea of a comprehensive health-insurance plan for students, financially supported and legally guaranteed by the state, emerged in conjunction with the attempt by the workers' movement to provide health insurance for their members after the establishment of the Second Empire in 1871. By the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, the majority of universities had some sort of health insurance for their students.⁹² The creation of separate health-insurance funds (Krankenkassen) for students was dictated by the special social position and limited financial resources of the students themselves.

Dresden, October 7, 1940, SHSA, Akten des Kultusministeriums, vol. 6, Nr. 15779.

⁹¹ See UAM, Akten des Senates, Nr. 934.

⁹² Menzel, "Wirtschaftliche Grundlagen," pp. 63-64.

Both socialized medicine, along the lines of health-insurance funds for organized workers, and private insurance were simply too expensive for students.⁹³

Health-insurance funds for students exhibited great diversity in the Weimar Republic. At larger universities, they were based upon clinics where doctors, who also taught at the same institutions; these doctors usually examined and treated students without accepting financial compensation for their services. Smaller institutions, on the other hand, provided health insurance for their students through a collective agreement with a municipal clinic or hospital. Whereas health-insurance funds were usually created and maintained by the university administrations, in a few places they were administered by the local student-aid foundations. Although the state provided legal support for their creation, membership in the health-insurance funds was still not made compulsory at many universities before 1933. Fees also varied greatly and so did the method of payments and the upper limits of benefits. The health-insurance funds either reimbursed students for their expenditures or dealt directly with the doctors and hospitals. At many universities, services were limited to certain illnesses, excluding dental problems and various, especially shameful, afflictions such as venereal diseases. The majority of health-insurance funds helped students suffering from tuberculosis only when they could prove that they had contracted the disease after their enrollment in the university. Some provided health insurance for recent graduates who faced difficulties in finding employment.⁹⁴ With a few

⁹³ Rudolf Thomas, "Die Krankenversicherung an den Hochschulen," UAM, Sen. 831/1, pp. 49-50 and "Tätigkeitsbericht der Kölner Studentenburse e.V. für das Geschäftsjahr 1932/33," UAK, 28/331, pp. 15-16.

⁹⁴ "Akademische Krankenkasse der Münchener Hochschulen, 1920-1937," October 5, 1934, BHSA, MK 40806.

exceptions, health-insurance funds did not cover school breaks and confined their benefits to the locality of the university.⁹⁵

The need for a more unified system was widely recognized by the organizers of the student health services. The creation of a central organization to facilitate the standardization of services and fees was hampered, however, by a lack of state support and opposition by academic administrators. Teachers were not prepared to forfeit their power over the health-insurance funds, which they considered integral parts of their institutions. Finally, students also expressed concern about centralization and outside interference. They feared that centralization would further reduce their otherwise limited influence over the health-insurance funds.⁹⁶

It was the Nazi students in the central and local offices of the German Student-Aid Foundation that strove for the centralization of health-insurance funds after the Nazi takeover. They convinced the Reich Ministry of Education to make health insurance part of the services of the local student-aid foundations in November 1935. This organizational change also involved the creation of a centralized institution responsible for the coordination and the leveling of services and fees. Thus, the German Student-Aid Foundation, which was renamed Reichsstudentenwerk (Reich Student Services or RStW) in 1935, created the Cash Office for Compensation (Ausgleichskasse) in the same year in

⁹⁵ Rudolf Thomas, "Die Krankenversicherung an den Hochschulen," UAM, Sen. 836/1, p. 52.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

order to collect information from the local student-aid foundations.⁹⁷ This institution also controlled the purse strings of local student organizations by forcing them to channel five percent, reduced from an originally planned ten percent, of their yearly premiums to the Cash Office for maintenance and security.⁹⁸

Sources suggests that both university teachers and students resisted the re-organization of health insurance after 1933. Academics especially resented the plan to create the Cash Office, which, as they correctly perceived, was mainly meant to challenge their entrenched power over the administration of local health-insurance funds. They argued that the replacement of academics, who had worked in the local organization without payment, by student activists at the local, and by professional bureaucrats at the central levels would make health insurance less efficient and more expensive for students.⁹⁹

Resistance by university administrators also took the form of procrastination in order to prevent the loss of what they considered their organizations. At the University of Munich, for example, they refused to transfer the money of the health-insurance fund over to the student-aid foundation, whose new leaders and administrators they considered both too young and inexperienced. The quarrel about the funds continued until the early months

⁹⁷ "Studentischer Gesundheitsdienst: Musterordnung," [Berlin], January 29, 1934, UAM, 28/331, p. 76.

⁹⁸ "Gesundheitsdienstordnung für die Deutschen Hochschulen," Reichsstudentenwerk Berlin, July 1, 1937, BA Koblenz, R149/36.

⁹⁹ Dr. Hanns Dorn to Studentenwerk Dresden, February 12, 1934, BHSA, MK 40770.

of 1935.¹⁰⁰ A similar event occurred in Erlangen, where the refusal to transfer the funds was accompanied by charges of a lack of professionalism in the local student-aid foundation.¹⁰¹ A veritable war developed between the administration of the University of Leipzig and its student-aid foundation over 26,000 marks, which had been generated by the university independently of student contributions. In this fight, the university allied itself with the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Education of Saxony. The local student-aid foundation, on the other hand, found support in the higher echelons of the Party and in the NSDStB and German Student Federation. Finally a compromise was reached whereby the university kept the money but the administration of the health-insurance fund was still transferred to the local student-aid foundation.¹⁰²

The reaction of most students to the reorganization of health insurance was equally negative. They felt alienated from the new bureaucracy, which, they argued, abandoned the principles of academic freedom, independence and self-help. Alienation also manifested itself in a growing student indifference to the affairs of this institution. Nazi activists were shocked to discover that the majority of students knew little and cared even less about the principles of Nazi health policy in the late 1930s. They complained that students failed to recognize and praise the advantages of the new health system. Many students, they

¹⁰⁰ Akademische Krankenkasse München to Bayer. Kultusministerium, April 1, 1934, BHSA, MK 40770; Studentenwerk München to Bayer. Kultusministerium, May 5, 1934; Studentenwerk München to Bayer. Kultusministerium, October 12, 1934, UAM, Akten des Senates, Nr. 836.

¹⁰¹ Studentenwerk Erlangen to Universität Kanzlei, November 14, 1934, BHSA, MK 40770.

¹⁰² Correspondence of Studentenwerk-Rektorat-Kultusministerium, (summer 1933-spring 1935), SHSA, Akten des Kultusministeriums, vol. 2, Nr.10083/1, pp. 293-304.

argued, could not even make a distinction between health and accident insurance. In a typical reaction, one student, when refused assistance, reproached the representative of a local student-aid foundation: "Now, tell me, what do we students have to pay so much money for?"¹⁰³

Indifference to political issues, euphemism and grumbling were common forms of resistance to indoctrination in Nazi Germany.¹⁰⁴ Since the regime prided itself on its intolerance, clearly formulated protest remained the privilege of a few Party activists, whose loyalty to the regime was beyond doubt. Thus, the criticism of Siegfried Lippert, who was active in the health service of Technical University of Berlin, is important because, in a pointed way, he expressed the general opinion of many students about the re-organized health services. Lippert described the centralization of student health insurance as a result of political short-sightedness. In particular, he vented his anger against the bureaucrats in the Cash Office for Compensation. He argued that the constant involvement of this organization in the operation of the local student-aid foundations dampened the spirit of self-reliance among student administrators and diminished their sense of responsibility. Lippert blamed the bureaucrats in the Cash Office for failing to take local conditions into consideration and attempting to order socialism from above.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ Die Bewegung, 7 (1939), in BA Koblenz, ZSg 129/124.

¹⁰⁴ See Peukert, Inside Nazi Germany, pp. 100-130.

¹⁰⁵ Siegfried Lippert, "Ausführungen über den studentischen Gesundheitsdienst und Vorschläge zu seiner Verbesserung," April 26, 1937, BA Koblenz, R 149/36, p. 113.

However, it was the level of benefits which was for most students of the greatest importance after the Nazi takeover of power in 1933. First, there was no significant change in fees for health insurance. Compared to fees during the Weimar period, students at smaller universities without clinics tended to pay less, while students of larger institutions with clinics paid a little more after 1933.¹⁰⁶ Fees were set at 6 marks in 1934, and only slowly increased afterwards. The most significant change in benefits came with the introduction of 70 percent coverage. In practice, students had to cover the remaining 30 percent even in the case of expensive treatments, including operations. While partial coverage was known before 1933, standardization meant a definite reduction in benefits for students at larger and better organized institutions such as the Universities of Berlin, Munich and Leipzig.¹⁰⁷ Dental work was covered by the new plan only up to 10 marks, a definite worsening if compared to the services at most universities before 1933.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, health insurance applied only during the semester not during the breaks. This caused great indignation among students, many of whom remained in the labor service

¹⁰⁶ Students paid 6 Marks in fees for sick insurance per semester at the University of Berlin in 1926; 5 Marks at the TH Dresden; 4,2 Marks at the University of Munich; 4 Marks at the TH Berlin and Stuttgart; 3 Marks in Leipzig, Münster, Marburg, and Tübingen. See Menzel, "Wirtschaftliche Grundlagen," p. 66; also Studentenwerk Erlangen to Universität Kanzlei Erlangen, November 14, 1934, BHSA, MK 40770.

¹⁰⁷ Students paid no additional charge for medical treatment and operation at the Universities of Munich, Leipzig, Marburg, Münster, Tübingen, Stuttgart, Clausthal, Dresden in the mid-1920s; however, at the University of Berlin students had to cover half of the cost; at TH Berlin students paid 1/3 of the doctoral treatment and 40 per cent of the operation. See Menzel, "Wirtschaftliche Grundlagen," p. 66; also Studentenwerk München to Bayer. Kultusministerium, October 12, 1934, UAM, Akten des Senates, Nr. 836.

¹⁰⁸ Minor dental treatment was free in Munich, Leipzig, Tübingen and Münster in 1926; Student paid half of the expenditure at TH Berlin and Dresden and the University of Marburg; students payed 2/3 of the expenses at the University of Berlin. See Menzel, "Wirtschaftliche Grundlagen," p. 67; the upper limit was also higher at the TH Berlin, for example, where students were cover up to 20 Marks before 1933, BA Koblenz R 149/39, p. 106.

after the end of the semester.¹⁰⁹ As a result of their complaints, coverage was extended for the school breaks after 1937. However, students had to pay an additional 2 marks thus raising the fee to 8 marks every six months.¹¹⁰ The new plan made a rigid distinction between health and accident insurance with the result that misfortunes such as a ski accident were left out of the coverage. Young academics, who had been members of the health-insurance funds at many German universities before 1934, were forced to switch to the more expensive private insurance companies. Although after 1935 young academics were again re-admitted into the system, they still had to pay an additional fee.¹¹¹

Students who were forced by material circumstances to work during their studies also had reasons for complaining about the re-organization of health insurance. Students in the technical faculties who found work connected to their future occupation were covered by the health-insurance funds after 1933. However, medical and philology students who were often forced to accept any kind of work with no connection to their education and future employment were denied coverage.¹¹² Recognizing the problem, the German Student-Aid Foundation decreed the membership of working students in the health-insurance funds of their home universities mandatory. The order, however, only further complicated bureaucratic procedures, since students who worked as well as studied were often forced to join the various health-insurance funds at their workplace. The result was

¹⁰⁹ Reichsstudentenwerk, August, 1935.

¹¹⁰ BA Koblenz, R149/18. p. 6.

¹¹¹ Studentenwerk München to Rektor der Universität München, June 25, 1936, UAM, Akten des Senates, Nr. 836.

that they had to pay double fees for health insurance.¹¹³ Students protested in vain against this perceived injustice in letters to the Reich Ministry of Education. The latter's bureaucrats argued that the exemption from compulsory membership in the student health-insurance funds would lower the income of these organizations, destroy their unity and undermine the "idea of student self-help."¹¹⁴ This remark ignored the fact that the compulsory and politicized nature of health insurance could hardly be reconciled with the students' desire for independence as expressed in the idea of self-help. In a total perversion of its original meaning, this principle was turned against those students who embodied it in its clearest form.

The few advantages of the new health insurance were advertised as symbols of progress and the invaluable gifts of the Nazi regime. The system did raise the upper limits for medical costs and covered longer stays in hospitals. Health insurance was also extended to the sub-university technical schools (Fachschulen) in December 1935. Moreover, the new order gave students the right to choose their own doctors. The free choice of doctors was an old and, by 1933, completely politicized issue, which was concerned much less with the welfare of students than with the creation of unity among doctors and medical personnel and the reorganization of the health-care system based on

¹¹² Rhein NSZ Front, Saarbrücken, Nr. 204, 1939, BA Koblenz, ZSg 129/124.

¹¹³ Alfred Ott to REM, Hamburg, May 17, 1936, BA Potsdam, Akten des REM, Nr. 874.

¹¹⁴ REM to Reichsstudentenwerk, December 2, 1936, BA Potsdam, Akten des REM, Nr. 874, pp. 392-393.

general practitioners.¹¹⁵ Although free choice of doctors was known to students at a few universities in the Weimar Republic, it became their right only after the coordination of the student health services in 1934.¹¹⁶ As expected, the measure hurt the university and municipal clinics financially, since they lost many of their patients to physicians not working within the health-insurance scheme.¹¹⁷ However, free choice of doctors enjoyed some popularity among students, who welcomed the measure, especially if the closest clinic mandatorily available to them was on the other side of the town.¹¹⁸ On the other hand, family physicians often misdiagnosed illnesses and neglected to send students to specialists.¹¹⁹

The reorganization of health services at universities displayed an astonishing level of ignorance on the part of Nazi bureaucrats about the special interests, mentality and lifestyle of students. The 70 percent coverage was intended as an educational instrument to teach students responsibility.¹²⁰ Nazi bureaucrats overlooked the fact, however, that many students lived in serious financial difficulties and they were not in the position to spare money for an unexpected medical emergency. Moreover, the exclusion of holidays

¹¹⁵ See Kater, "Doctor Leonardo Conti and his Nemesis: The Failure of Centralized Medicine in the Third Reich," Central European History 18 (1985), pp. 299-325; Weindling, Health, Race and German Politics, pp. 518-522.

¹¹⁶ Free choice of doctor existed at Universität Berlin and TH Berlin in 1926. See Menzel, "Wirtschaftliche Grundlagen," p. 67.

¹¹⁷ Medizinische Fakultät der Universität München to Bayer.Kultusministerium, July 13, 1936, UAM, Akten des Senates, Nr. 836; Berliner Tageblatt, November 22, 1935, BA Koblenz, ZSg 129/123; Deutsches Ärzteblatt, 46, 47.48 (1935), in BA Koblenz, R 21/47.

¹¹⁸ Studentenwerk Erlangen to Universität Kanzlei Erlangen, November 14, 1934, BHSA, MK 40770.

¹¹⁹ Studentenwerk München to Bayer. Kultusministerium, August 8, 1937, UAM, Akten des Senates, Nr. 836.

from the coverage hit students hard since usually they were too preoccupied with their studies and social lives to visit doctors before the end of the school year. Students also had to pay 1 mark for a medical voucher (Krankenschein), which was to facilitate payment of doctors, thus further increasing the cost. Reduction in benefits and bureaucratization of health services worked in the direction of student alienation from the health-insurance funds. Sigfried Lippert's question expressed the frustration of the majority of students with the Nazified health services: "What happened to the practical socialism?"¹²¹

A similar reduction in benefits was observable in the coverage of accident insurance, which finally became part of the student health services after 1935. At the end of that year, the RStW concluded a collective agreement with a private insurance company. As a result of this agreement, a more unified system of accident insurance was put into practice at German universities. Membership became compulsory and fees were set at 1 mark per semester, which was lower than it had been at most universities before 1935.¹²² Benefits were, however, slashed. At Technical University of Berlin, which had had an agreement with the Nordstern Insurance Company until 1935, for example, costs for sanatoriums had been covered up to 500 marks and in the case of hospital treatments, students had been allowed to occupy second-class beds. The company had paid day allowances and was not petty in the assessment of students' claims. All this changed for

¹²⁰ Report by Dr. Rühberg to Bayer. Kultusministerium, April 21, 1934, BHSA, MK 40770.

¹²¹ "Ausführungen über den studentischen Gesundheitsdienst und Vorschläge zu einer Verbesserung," Charlottenburg, April 26, 1937, BA Koblenz, R 149/36, p. 115.

¹²² Fee was set at 1.4 marks at TH Dresden and 1.5 marks at TH Berlin before 1935, See "Ausführungen über den studentischen Gesundheitsdienst und Vorschläge zu einer Verbesserung," p. 104.

the worse after 1935. First, students could not choose their physicians but had to visit a panel doctor in case of an accident. During their stay in hospitals, they were confined to third-class beds. Day allowances were stopped and the insurance company became very parsimonious. In Berlin, for example, it refused to compensate a student who had a minor accident on the way to university.¹²³ Changes in accident insurance worked against student interests and thus further eroded their support for the Nazi regime during the 1930s. The outbreak of the war did not lead to an increase in the health and accident insurance benefits at German universities. Even Nazi authorities were forced to admit that benefits did not keep up with the decline in the health of students after 1943.¹²⁴

A similar reduction in benefits took place in the case of the assistant funds for sick students. This branch of the health service was mainly concerned with the financing of sanatorium treatment of students suffering from tuberculosis, which continued to be a very serious problem between the wars.¹²⁵ Although they helped many students, the assistance funds for sick students suffered from a permanent lack of money during the Weimar Republic.¹²⁶ Since treatment in sanatoriums was expensive, administrators often raised the

¹²³ Ibid., pp. 104-105.

¹²⁴ "Arbeitsbesprechung Gesundheitsdienst," November 16, 1944, Berlin, Reichsstudentenwerk, BA Koblenz, R 21 837, pp. 2-3.

¹²⁵ Doctors estimated that three percent of all freshmen suffered from tuberculosis in 1929. Numbers were probably higher among older students. Female students suffered less from tuberculosis, a fact that could be related to their higher social status. See Franz Ickert, Die Tuberkulose in ihrer sozialen Bedingtheit: Ergebnisse der Gesamten Tuberkuloseforschung, Leipzig, 1940, pp. 521-525; also Kater, Studentenschaft und Rechtsradikalismus, pp. 52-55.

¹²⁶ Wilhelm Schlink and Reinhold Schairer, "Die Studentische Wirtschaftshilfe," in Michael Doeberl et al., Das akademische Deutschland, vol. 3, p. 465; and Dr. Balder Kattentidt, "Die Finanzierung der studentischen Gesundheitspflege, insbesondere der studentischen Tuberkulosefürsorge," UAM, Sen. 836/1, p. 47.

demands for the stricter selection of worthy students.¹²⁷ The term selection acquired a more sinister meaning for students in Nazi Germany. In contrast to earlier practices, only students who had a good prospect not for partial but complete recovery could obtain help after 1933.¹²⁸ On the positive side, the unification of various branches of the health services as well as the introduction of compulsory fees for students improved the financial position of the sick-assistance funds. The number of state and Party agencies involved in financing and controlling the local organizations also increased. In addition to the German Student-Aid Foundation, private, state and Party organizations such as the Reich Committee for Tuberculosis, the Office for People's Health of the NSDAP and the Office for Public Welfare (Amt für Volkswohlfahrt) gave occasional support for the sanatorium treatment of students. Nevertheless, despite the involvement of more organizations, there were at best only minor improvements in the services of the health-insurance fund. The German Student-Aid Foundation received on the average 250 applications per year for financial help from students suffering from tuberculosis between 1933 and 1939. It supported 160 claims. It also financed on the average 90 short-term recovery treatments per year until 1939.¹²⁹ Although these numbers look impressive, they do not signal a major

¹²⁷ In Munich, for example, the income of the Verein Studentenhaus for treatment of tuberculosis could not keep up with the expenditure. The Verein spent 84 000 Marks in 1928, 100 000 Marks in 1929, 110 000 Marks in 1931, and 116 000 Marks in 1932 for fighting this illness. See Kattentidt, "Die Finanzierung der studentischen Gesundheitspflege," p. 48.

¹²⁸ Dr. Otto Reise, "Der Studentische Gesundheitsdienst in Deutschland: Bericht für die Vierte Internationale Universitätskonferenz in Genf vom 6.-10. Juli 1938," BA Koblenz, R 149/18, p. 7.

¹²⁹ Umschau, Nr. 21, January, 1938.

break with the Weimar period.¹³⁰ Since the Nazi state did not improve the financial position of the German Student-Aid Foundation, it is safe to assume that money for the treatment of tuberculosis among students remained limited in this period.¹³¹ Doctors involved in student-health service generally agreed that there was no major breakthrough in the treatment of this illness in the student population before the outbreak of the Second World War.¹³² Since war led only to a general deterioration in students' health, it seems certain that the limited resources of the student health services proved inadequate to successfully combat tuberculosis among students during the Nazi regime.

The examination of measures taken by the Nazi state in the field of insurance funds has disclosed an important feature of Nazi social and health policy. It has shown that the Nazis not only failed to eliminate students who did not measure up to their definition of health, but they also remained reluctant to provide increased support for healthy and Gentile students. Behind the facade of propaganda stood a regime which did precious little to improve the life and social position of its students. In reality, bureaucratization and centralization of health services for students at German universities resulted in a lowering of benefits. The main beneficiaries of this policy were not the students but the doctors and administrators of the German Student-Aid Foundation. In an important way,

¹³⁰ In 1927/28 the Deutsches Studentenwerk sent 306 students to sanatorium; the following year it sent 334 students. See Schlink and Schairer, "Die Studentische Wirtschaftshilfe," p. 466.

¹³¹ Umschau, Nr. 24, June 1939.

¹³² Tiedeken, "Die studentischen Pflichtuntersuchungen," p. 141.

bureaucratization and centralization contributed to the corrosion of civic responsibility, self-reliance and humanitarianism in the student population.

This chapter has examined the changes in student health services after 1933. It has argued that the new Nazified student health services after 1935 rested on two pillars: compulsory medical examinations of students, on the one hand, and the expulsion of students found unhealthy on the basis of Nazi laws. The immediate goal of Nazi doctors and student activists, especially in the DStW, was to use these two measures to prevent the registration, and if they were already at school, the removal of the allegedly sick and thus racially less valuable students from the universities. Secondly, compulsory medical examinations were to become an integral part of the developing comprehensive system of medical control, which was to encompass not only students but theoretically the whole population.

These were revolutionary goals. If fully implemented, they would have changed the criteria of admission to university studies. Good health, as interpreted by the Nazis, would have become more important both for enrollment and for renewed membership in the academic community than merits and achievements in the chosen field of study. Second, they would have forced academic administrators to share their power over the admission of students with doctors and student administrators in the local student-aid foundations. Not surprisingly, the idea of biological selection came to face massive resistance from school doctors, university teachers and students, whose interest was to maintain the traditional system of admission. Although these groups could not air their grievances openly, they did their best to frustrate the execution of Nazi measures.

Fortunately for academic administrators, the support for compulsory medical examination and biological selection of students clearly lay outside the interests of Nazi leaders. Given the financial difficulties of the government, full support for these schemes would have implied that the Nazi leaders had accepted the notion that universities still had a special place in German society and student status still sufficed for automatic membership in the elite. To dispel this illusion, no major organization (apart from the weak REM) gave more than nominal support for the medical examinations of students. The disinterest of Nazi leaders in these procedures, in turn, encouraged opposition by academic administrators, doctors and students, who began sabotaging the inspections as early as 1935. Although medical examinations were carried out until the end of the war, after 1942 they increasingly fell by the wayside or were reduced to basic procedures. The failure of medical examinations and biological selection was accentuated by the lowering of benefits provided by insurance funds. Thus, the changes in health services after 1933 produced the opposite effect from what the Nazi doctors and student activists originally had intended. They led to a deterioration in, rather than to an improvement of, students' health.

Chapter Four: Nazi Policy towards Non-‘Aryan’ Students

This chapter presents evidence on the origins of Nazi racial policy towards Jewish and part-Jewish students and examines the dynamism and outcomes of this policy in the Third Reich. The inquiry focuses on the question of how the persecution of Jewish and part-Jewish students fitted into the framework of Nazi education policy, which, as argued in the introduction, aimed at the selection of the student body on the basis of Nazi ideas. This chapter seeks to refute Peter Chroust’s suggestion that the Nazi measures taken against Jewish students were motivated primarily by their desire to solve the problem of overcrowded universities.¹ It argues that even the early anti-Jewish measures such as the numerus clausus on non-‘Aryans’ carried a strong ideological message directly related to the utopian element in Nazi ideology: the cleansing of the ‘Aryan race’ of its greatest enemy, the Jew.² This ideological element informed the principle of selection, which, as I have argued in Chapter 2, had a biological aspect, and, as the chapter on student aid has shown, a social function as well. However, anti-Jewish measures at the universities served additional goals. These were to impress and intimidate Gentile students with the power and arbitrariness of the Nazi state. Second, anti-Jewish measures served to lessen the importance of the merit principle, upon which the traditional university had been based. Third, anti-Semitic rhetoric and political actions encouraged Gentile students to develop pride in their ethnicity at the expense of their Jewish and part-Jewish comrades. The Nazis

¹ Chroust, Giessener Universität, p. 54.

perceived this artificially created 'racial pride' as part of the process of building, and a prerequisite for the successful functioning of, their 'national community'. Thus, anti-Jewish measures invited Gentile students and academic administrators to participate in the realization of this Nazi utopia. At a more prosaic level, they served to implicate Gentile students and university teachers in the crimes of the Nazi regime. Whether the persecution of non-'Aryan' students (apart from the success measured by the declining number of Jewish and part-Jewish students at German universities) achieved these additional goals is also a theme of this chapter.

By emphasizing the role of ideology, this chapter does not seek to deny that social resentment played an important role in the formulation and implementation of early Nazi measures, especially at the level of individual universities. However, this chapter argues that this resentment, in combination with culturally or religiously inspired prejudices (which were widespread among academic administrators and constituted the most important aspect of student anti-Semitism), fueled the engine of discrimination only during the early stage of Nazi rule. Especially after 1936, it was not Nazi students and academic administrators but fanatics in the Nazi Party, and most importantly in the Party Chancellery, who set the pace of persecution. Like their Führer, these fanatics subscribed to a unique, in Saul Friedländer's term, redemptive brand of anti-Semitism. According to Friedländer, this brand of anti-Jewish hatred differed from the pseudo-scientific variety of racial anti-Semitism (which used eugenics and racial anthropology to give anti-Jewish

² For the same conclusion, see Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews: The Years of Persecution, 1933-1939, New York, 1997, p. 33.

sentiments a veneer of respectability) by its emphasis both on religious elements borrowed from German Christianity as well as the mythic dimension of race and the sacredness of 'Aryan' blood. In regards to students, redemptive anti-Semitism was best represented by the Party Chancellery, which spearheaded the continuing campaign against part-Jewish students after 1938. The campaign exhibited special features. The reluctance of Hitler to take a definite stand on the issue of part-Jews hampered the radicalization process spearheaded by the Party Chancellery, thus preventing the complete expulsion of part-Jewish students from German universities. Nonetheless, the Party Chancellery gradually won over Hitler (who otherwise was the main apostle of this brand of anti-Semitism) to its side and, by mid-1944, it came very close to realizing its goal: the eradication of the last remnants of Jewish presence at German institutions of higher learning.

Since the origins of modern anti-Semitism and even its "redemptive" variety are well known, this introduction to Nazi policy towards Jewish students in the Third Reich discusses only the special features of anti-Jewish sentiments among the two groups whose cooperation after 1933 proved vital for the success or failure of the Nazi policy of racial selection: university teachers and Gentile students.³ As Fritz K. Ringer has shown, already

³ On the economic and social origins of anti-Semitism see Hans Rosenberg, Grosse Depression und Bismarckzeit: Wirtschaftsablauf, Gesellschaft und Politik in Mitteleuropa, Berlin, 1967, pp. 88-117; Richard S. Levy, The Downfall of the Anti-Semitic Political Parties in Imperial Germany, New Haven and London, 1975, esp. pp. 85-102, 254-265. On anti-Semitic ideologies and the intellectual origins of Nazism see George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich, New York, 1964, pp. 127-146; Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of the German Ideology, Berkeley, 1961, pp. 41-42, 91-95, 181-185, 187-188; Thomas Nipperdey, "Antisemitismus — Entstehung, Funktion und Geschichte einer Begriff," in Thomas Nipperdey ed., Gesellschaft, Kultur, Theorie: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur neueren Geschichte, Göttingen, 1976, pp. 89-113; Shulamit Volkov, "Kontinuität und Diskontinuität im deutschen Antisemitismus 1878-1945," Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 33 (1985), pp. 221-243; Detlev Claussen, Von Judenhass zum Antisemitismus: Materialien einer verleugneten Geschichte, Darmstadt, 1987; Ernst Simmel, "Anti-Semitism and Mass Psychopathology," in Ernst Simmel ed., Anti-Semitism: A

in the late nineteenth century, the majority of German professors embraced a 'cultivated' form of anti-Semitism, which ascribed all negative features of modernity, such as materialism, decadence and Marxism to the so-called Jewish spirit. However, in contrast to racists, most professors still believed that the 'Jewish spirit' was not the exclusive property of Jews. Similarly, they rejected the racist argument that presumably typical Jewish characteristics such as rationality, political talent and business sense had anything to do with blood. In practice, this form of anti-Semitism often led to less dangerous forms of discrimination as well: to the reluctance of Gentile academics to allow the promotion of their Jewish colleagues or, much less frequently, to the social isolation of Jewish teachers.⁴

Similarly to other professional groups, academics were more inclined to embrace anti-Semitism after the First World War. Disappointed with the outcome of the military conflict, frightened by the revolutions and angered by the democratic pretensions of the Weimar governments, most German professors proved receptive to the messages of the political Right, which blamed the lost war, the miseries in its aftermath and the perceived shortcomings of the new democratic governments on the Jews. A few academics went so far as to embrace racial anti-Semitism, although mainly its pseudo-scientific variety rather than its redemptive form. Thus, the majority of professors continued to disassociate themselves from radical anti-Semitism, which they continued to regard as too plebeian for their taste. They also defended their Jewish colleagues, especially if they were nationally-

Social Disease, New York, 1946, pp. 46-49 and Peter G. J. Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria, New York, 1964.

mind, against attacks from Nazi students. Similarly, a few rectors did not hesitate to punish Nazi students with expulsion for anti-Jewish slurs and suspending their organizations. Nevertheless, the majority of professors remained ambivalent towards Nazi students and nazism in general. They shared too many of the nationalist goals and much of the anti-Jewish sentiments of Nazi students to proceed against them with more determination. The same convergence in values, coupled with opportunism, provided the basis for cooperation between the Conservative professors and the Nazis after 1933.⁵

The second important group that played an important role in the implementation of Nazi policy included university students, who at least since the 1880s had showed more willingness than their teachers to embrace stronger forms of Judeophobia. In the late nineteenth century, most students internalized anti-Semitism as part of their socialization into the culture of the German elite. Perhaps the majority had acquired the aversion towards Jews from family members, friends and teachers well before their enrollment in university. Moreover, intense nationalism and thinly disguised ethnic prejudices that permeated many teachers' lectures and seminars also contributed to the spread of anti-Semitism among students.⁶ Finally, increasing specialization, which led to what Konrad H. Jarausch called the destruction of the "Humboldtian symbiosis between science and morality," coupled with pressures from an overcrowded job market, left students with no time or need to contemplate the larger significance of their education. As a result,

⁴ Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins, pp. 135-139, 239-240; Christian Jansen, Professoren und Politik: Politisches Denken und Handeln der Heidelberger Hochschullehrer 1914-1935, Göttingen, 1992, pp. 176-180, 289-296.

⁵ Donald L. Niewyk, The Jews in Weimar Germany, Baton Rouge, La., 1980, pp. 65-68.

universities increasingly turned out graduates whose outlook on the world was marked with particularism. The corrosion of humanist values, in turn, provided a fertile ground for the spread of anti-Semitic ideas feeding on the ignorance of an expanding student population. These factors, coupled with the passion with which young people usually embrace new ideas and use them against their elders, gave student anti-Semitism a more radical character.⁷

Nevertheless, if compared with the interwar period, student anti-Semitism in Imperial Germany remained a relatively harmless affair for three reasons. First, it lacked dynamism because its proponents preferred to use cultural rather than pseudo-scientific arguments or myths— thus depriving themselves of the mobilizing and legitimizing power of modern science — to recruit new followers. Secondly, in relatively prosperous Imperial Germany, most students still had no need for sweeping explanations and universal remedies as promised by fanatical anti-Semites. Finally, professional bureaucrats, instilled with a deep respect for law and order, were not prepared to make concessions to radical anti-Semites, whom they associated with the rabble. At the university level, support for student anti-Semitism was limited to the toleration of verbal abuse directed at German Jews. However, discrimination reached a higher level in the case of foreigners: in the first decade of the twentieth century, education ministries and university administrations passed

⁶ Jarausch, *Students, Society and Politics*, pp. 164-168.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 401-405.

legislation and introduced regulations which significantly lowered the number of Eastern European, mainly Russian, Jews at their institutions of higher learning.⁸

The relatively harmless character of student anti-Semitism changed rapidly after the First World War. Military defeat, the end of the monarchy, the humiliating peace treaty and civil war traumatized the German elite and turned perhaps the majority of their members into supporters of counter-revolution. Students, as members of this elite, experienced the crisis of the old order even more intensely. Many participated in the war and fought against Communists in the revolutions. Perhaps the majority came to share the belief (based on the correct, yet one-sided, observation that many revolutionary leaders in Germany but also in Hungary and Russia were Jewish) that Jews in general were somehow responsible for the political disturbances. The most radical anti-Semites among them probably thought that there existed a Jewish world conspiracy aimed at the total destruction of the established order and Christianity. Apart from this new ideological element, which equated Jews with Bolsheviks, social factors also played a role in the increasing anti-Semitic agitation on German campuses after the war. The difficulties that war veterans faced during their readjustment to civilian life heightened anti-Jewish sentiments and functioned as a catalyst for the transformation of student anti-Semitism from an elitist and culturally-based ideology into plebeian and racist varieties.⁹

During the Weimar Republic, anti-Semitism came to satisfy important psychological needs stemming from the post-war economic crisis and drastic changes in

⁸ See Chapter Two on foreign students.

the social composition of a rapidly expanding student population. By 1932, the student population had increased 74 per cent from its 1914 level. This increase was mainly the result of demographic changes on the one hand, and the disproportionately greater influx of children from the new middle classes and a rapid increase in the number of female students on the other. Since the academic job market expanded only slowly, however, this growth led to high unemployment among recent graduates. Gloomy prospects for future employment weighed especially heavily on students, who came from families which either had lost male members during the war or were seriously affected by the economic crisis of the early 1920s. Often undernourished and living in less affluent urban areas, these students were forced to work in factories and offices in order to earn the bare minimum for survival. However, even part-time jobs tended to disappear after the revival of the German economy in 1924 until students found it almost impossible to find work during the Great Depression in the early 1930s.¹⁰

Insecurity about jobs and social status increased tensions in the student population, which, in turn, in the presence of already embedded prejudices and stereotypical images, heightened negative sentiment towards Jews. Moreover, Gentile students, irrespective of their social background, considered Jews as competitors in an already overcrowded job market. Indeed, even a cursory look at statistical data proves that Jews were over-represented at German universities. In 1930, for example, Jews constituted only 0.9

⁹ See Peter Loewenberg, "The Psychological Origins of the Nazi Youth Cohort," American Historical Review 76 (1971), pp. 1457-1502.

¹⁰ Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, pp. 23-24; Kater, Studentenschaft und Rechtsradikalismus, p. 63; Titze, "Die zyklische Überproduktion von Akademikern," p. 92.

percent of the German population but they made up 4.3 percent of the entire student body at regular, and 2.4 percent at technical, universities. Their percentage was however, much higher in the faculties of law and medicine, especially in big cities, where most Jews lived. They also tended to be over-represented among foreign (18.1 percent in 1930) and German female students (32.8 percent in 1930).¹¹ Nevertheless, despite this overrepresentation, it would be a mistake to attribute anti-Semitism to economic factors alone. Competition led to increased anti-Semitism only because students already harbored negative sentiments towards their Jewish fellow students.

These sentiments stemmed only in part from the high percentage of Jewish students in certain faculties and universities; the behavior of many Jewish students tended to increase their visibility as well. Foreign, especially Russian, Jews generally avoided social contact with Germans. German Jews, on the other hand, were eager to shed a large part of their tradition and to integrate into the wider society. Paradoxically, however, in the increasingly anti-Semitic atmosphere of the 1920s and early 1930s, this eagerness often led Jewish students to create their own subculture. A Communist journalist during the Weimar period, Hans Jaeger, has estimated that only 3 out of the 240 members of the Socialist student group at the University of Frankfurt-am-Main were non-Jewish in the 1920s. Other observers put the percentage of Jews among Social Democratic students at the University of Heidelberg at 25 percent. The figure at the University of Berlin was probably twice as high. Given the deep aversion of Gentile students towards the

¹¹ Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, esp. p. 29, 212.

Communist and Social Democratic parties, such a political choice, although completely rational from the Jewish students' point of view, could only increase their isolation.¹²

Apart from social causes, the survival and short-lived renaissance of the antiquated culture of student fraternities in the second half of the 1920s reinforced the basically negative image of Jews. In 1929, every second male student was still a fraternity member, and the majority of incorporated students belonged to dueling fraternities, which, especially in small towns, still dominated student life. With the exception of the Jewish, Socialist and Pacifist organizations, all fraternities tended to accept and propagate the stereotypical image of the Jews as careerists, weaklings and dodgers of military duty. Religious and thus non-dueling fraternities usually subscribed to the milder, religiously-inspired form of anti-Semitism (although many of their members came to embrace more radical views in the early 1930s). Dueling fraternities, on the other hand, tended to have stronger views. The largest dueling fraternity, the Deutsche Burschenschaft, embraced the völkisch form of racism in the 1920s. The most radical among the dueling fraternities was the Kyffhäuser Verband, whose Judeophobia could hardly be distinguished from the Nazis' redemptive anti-Semitism. On the other hand, members of the more conservative Corps persisted in their culturally and aesthetically-inspired anti-Semitism.¹³

¹² Niewyk, The Jews in Weimar Germany, p. 30.

¹³ Kreuzberger, Studenten und Politik 1918-1933, , pp. 91-92; Norbert Kampe, Studenten und 'Judenfrage' im Deutschen Kaiserreich, Göttingen, 1988, pp. 98-102; on anti-Semitism among Austrian fraternity students see Michael Gehler, Studenten und Politik: Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft an der Universität Innsbruck, Innsbruck, 1990, p. 96, 116; Robert Hein, Studentischer Antisemitismus in Österreich, Vienna, 1984; Herbert Rütgen, Anti-Semitism in allen Lagern: Publizistische Dokumente zur Ersten Republik Österreich 1918-1938, Graz, 1989, pp. 338-359.

The exclusion of Jews had begun in the dueling fraternities before the First World War and by the early 1930s there were few fraternities that accepted Jews as new members. The dueling fraternities also constituted the major force behind right-wing national organizations such as the German University League (Deutscher Hochschulring), established in 1920, that agitated on a völkisch and anti-Semitic platform. Only fully 'Aryan' Germans, including racial Germans from Austria and the Sudetenland, were allowed to obtain membership in the League. Both dueling and Catholic fraternities joined the German University League until it became the most important student organization at most universities. However, its influence declined after 1925, as Catholic fraternities turned again towards the Center Party. Anti-Semitism was also strong in the German Student Federation, established in 1919 as the national organization of all German students not only from the Reich but also from Austria, the Sudetenland and Danzig. In 1926, leaders of this federal organization challenged the Prussian minister of culture, Carl Heinrich Becker on the issue of Jewish membership and remained on a war footing with the Weimar state over this issue until the Nazi takeover.¹⁴

Established in 1926, the National Socialist Student League (Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund or NSDStB) spearheaded anti-Jewish agitation among students in the late 1920s and the early 1930s. Ruthless and dynamic, the NSDStB demanded the immediate introduction of a numerus clausus for Jewish students.¹⁵ Although it is difficult

¹⁴ Schwarz, Studenten in der Weimarer Republik, pp. 362-366; Steinberg, Sabers and Brown Shirts, pp. 51-71.

¹⁵ On the anti-Semitic agitation of Nazi students see Faust, Der Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund, vol. 1, pp. 128-135; Kater, Studentenschaft und Rechtsradikalismus, pp. 146-147; Kreuzberger, Studenten und Politik, pp. 104-114 and Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 29.

to estimate the relative importance of this demand, historians generally agree that the strong stand of the NSDStB on the so-called Jewish question made this organization more popular among students, thus contributing to its electoral successes during the Great Depression.¹⁶ Yet it would be a mistake to conclude that the majority of students subscribed to the Nazi variety of anti-Semitism. Conversely, fanatical Nazis did not intend to stop at imposing restrictions on the admission of Jews but sought their complete expulsion. Nevertheless, the sense of a general crisis, the temporary convergence of values and the plausibility of Nazi promises convinced students to join the demonstrations against liberal and pacifist Jewish teachers in the 1920s and early 1930s.¹⁷

Student demonstrations against Jewish, Marxist and Pacifist teachers continued after the Nazi takeover of power.¹⁸ Their arbitrary actions were encouraged by the official policy of the new Nazi government. On 7 April 1933, in the infamous Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service, the Nazi state ordered the retirement and

¹⁶ On student membership in the Nazi Party before 1933, see Michael H. Kater, The Nazi Party: A Social Profile of Members and Leaders, 1919-1945, Cambridge, Mass., 1983, p. 67, 176, 184; On voting, see Kreuzberger, Studenten und Politik, pp. 171-175; Faust, Der Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund, vol. 2, pp. 147-149; Giles, Students and National Socialism, pp. 53-72; Karl Dietrich Bracher, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik: Eine Studie zum Problem des Machtverfalls in der Demokratie, Villingen, 1955, pp. 147-148; Ursula Dibner, "The History of the National Socialist German Student League," Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1969, pp. 82-85; Giovannini, Zwischen Republik und Faschismus, pp. 135-140.

¹⁷ Bracher, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik, p. 134; Vézina, Die Gleichschaltung der Universität Heidelberg, p. 19; Faust, Der Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund, vol. 2, pp. 51-87; Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, pp. 30-31.

¹⁸ See Hans Ebert, "Die Technische Hochschule Berlin und der Nationalsozialismus: Politische 'Gleichschaltung' und rassistische Säuberungen," in Reinhard Rürup ed., Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Technischen Universität Berlin 1879-1979, vol. 1, Berlin, 1979, pp. 455-468; Klaus-Peter Hoepke, "Auswirkungen der nationalsozialistischen Rassenpolitik an der Technischen Hochschule Fridericiana Karlsruhe 1933-1945," Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheims 137 (1989), pp. 383-413; Helmut Heiber, Universität unterm Hakenkreuz, part I: Der Professor im Dritten Reich, München, 1991, pp. 54-134.

dismissal of Jewish civil servants, at first only those who had not fought in the First World War. As Friedländer has pointed out, this law did not aim at simply satisfying the interests of various professional groups. Instead, it sought to realize one of the most important goals of Nazi ideology, which posited a direct relation between cultural achievements and the strength of the state on the one hand, and the racial purity of the population on the other. Thus, the exclusion of Jews from all the important areas was a prerequisite for the realization of this utopian vision. In addition, the Civil Service Law was also perceived by the Nazi government as an educational instrument that would instill Nazi ideology in the population.¹⁹ As a result of this law, by the end of 1933, about twelve hundred Jewish academics were forced to leave their university positions.²⁰

Thus prompted by the central government, Nazi students often took matters into their own hands to speed up the expulsion process. Boycotts of non-‘Aryan’ professors were organized at almost every university. Moreover, Nazi students made it known early on that they regarded the ‘Aryan paragraph’ in the Civil Service Law as a temporary and burdensome concession. Therefore, they protested against the teaching of Jewish professors even if they were well known for their national sentiments or served in the German army during the First World War. Their ruthless campaign, which lasted almost two years, achieved its purpose: almost every Jewish professor, who was legally still allowed to teach, had resigned from his position by 1935.²¹

¹⁹ Friedländer, *Nazi Germany and the Jews*, p. 33.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

²¹ Grüttner, *Studenten im Dritten Reich*, pp. 69-70.

Encouraged by semi-official toleration of these excesses, Nazi students at a few universities also turned against their Jewish comrades. In February 1933, members of the German Student Federation attacked American Jews in Königsberg, claiming that these foreigners abused German hospitality.²² Members of the NSDStB stormed a Jewish fraternity house in Heidelberg.²³ At the same university, Nazis even manhandled an Afghan student because of what they perceived to be Jewish features.²⁴ On April 1, 1933, eighty students in SA uniforms occupied the university buildings in Frankfurt am Main. They denied Jewish students entry into the buildings and chased those found inside off campus. The same students even slapped around an 'Aryan' who failed to produce his identification card.²⁵

At most universities, however, discrimination took less violent forms. For example, Nazi students pestered the ministry of education in Baden with complaints about Jews, who, according to their letters, still dared to occupy the best places in the lecture rooms and laboratories. The refusal of these students to empty their seats prompted incensed Nazis to request that only Gentiles could sit in the first rows.²⁶ They advertised their prejudices even in the washrooms, where they listed the names of Jewish teachers and students on toilet walls. Only under pressure by university teachers did the German

²² Frankfurter Zeitung, February 25, 1933, BA Koblenz, ZSg, 129/151.

²³ Giovannini, Zwischen Republik und Faschismus, p. 172.

²⁴ Arye Carmon, "The Impact of the Nazi Racial Decrees on the University of Heidelberg," Yad Vashem Studies 11 (1976), p. 156.

²⁵ Der Prorektor in Vetreung des Rektors der Universität an den Minister für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Volksbildung, 1 April, 1933, BA Koblenz, R 21/341; also Kater, Doctors under Hitler, pp. 169-170.

²⁶ Geoffrey Giles, "Die Fahne hoch, die Reihen dicht geschlossen: Die Studenten als Verfechter der völkischen Universität?" in Eckart Krause et al., Hochschulalltag im Dritten Reich. Die Hamburger Universität 1933-1945, vol. 3, Berlin, 1991, p. 47.

Student Federation finally order Nazi students in June 1933 to stop using the toilets for propaganda purposes.²⁷

In the spring of 1933, Nazi students also led the campaign against communist, socialist and pacifist students. In Heidelberg the student leader, Gustav Adolf Scheel, demanded the removal of twenty-seven communist, and presumably Jewish, students.²⁸ At the University of Berlin, 110 of the 125 students expelled for political activities were also listed as non-‘Aryans’.²⁹ Although it is possible that the majority of Marxists were indeed Jewish, the sources suggest that anti-communism could also serve as a pretext to remove non-‘Aryans’, who played no active role in politics. In Heidelberg, for example, the twenty-seven students, who were listed both as Marxist and Jewish, denied any connection with communism.³⁰ At the University of Leipzig, the Jewish sounding name of Helga Abrahamson was enough for a local student leader to request her expulsion. As it later turned out, she was neither Jewish nor had she any affiliation with Marxist parties.³¹

Although their administrative power was limited, the NSDStB and the Nazified German Student Federation also tried to go beyond physical abuses and channel discrimination into more regulated and bureaucratic forms. Their first success came in April 1933 when, fulfilling an old demand of racist students, the Prussian Ministry of Education finally ordered that only non-Jewish Germans could become members of the

²⁷ *Jüdische Rundschau*, Berlin, July 13, 1933, BA Koblenz, ZSg 129/151.

²⁸ Carmon, “The Impact of the Nazi Racial Degrees,” pp. 158-159.

²⁹ This number was arrived at by comparing the list of non-‘Aryans’ with the names of students expelled for political activities, see UAB, Akten des Universitätsrats, Nr. 3016 and Nr. 3018.

³⁰ Carmon, “The Impact of the Nazi Racial Degrees,” p. 159.

³¹ Letter by A. Blochberger, the lawyer of Helga Abrahamson, to Sächsisches Kultusministerium, October 20, 1933, SHSA, Akten des Kultusministeriums, vol. 2, Nr. 10055/2.

German Student Federation.³² In extreme cases, such as the one in Baden, state administrators made membership in the same organization dependent on 'Aryan' descent back to three generations.³³

These regulations in effect ordered the expulsion of Jewish students from the German Student Federation. Simultaneously, most fraternities expelled their Jewish members in order to curry favor with the new Nazi state.³⁴ Sources suggest that on the university level the expulsion of full Jews from the federation and the fraternities proceeded quickly and smoothly. However, the removal of part-Jews or those related to Jews by marriage proved more difficult. At the University of Berlin, for example, the expulsion of Erich and Reinhold Michelly from the student federation met with the resistance of conservative professors.³⁵ The Michelly brothers came from a mixed marriage and were seen as half-Jews. Paradoxically, it was Eugen Fischer, one of the most important proponents of the racist eugenic movement, who became their most ardent defender. He conducted a racial examination of the brothers in his Berlin Institute for Research of Twins (Institut für Zwillingsforschung) and concluded that the brothers did not exhibit any Jewish features. However, his opinion carried little weight with the local student leader, who rejected the involvement of professors in racial selection, which he considered a student affair. Finally, the rector became involved and restored the membership of the two brothers in the German Student Federation. The story clearly

³² See Joseph Walk ed., Das Sonderrecht für die Juden im NS-Staat: Eine Sammlung der gesetzlichen Massnahmen und Richtlinien — Inhalt und Bedeutung, Heidelberg, 1981, p. 14.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

³⁴ Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, pp. 296-298.

shows that there was a definite limit to how far academic administrators were prepared to go to satisfy the radical demands of Nazi students.³⁶

Pressure from the NSDStB also moved the Prussian Ministry of Education to withdraw social assistance from Jewish students on 22 April 1933.³⁷ Since only a small percentage of students had received financial assistance during the Weimar Republic and local student-aid foundations, such as the one in Munich, had already refused financial aid to Jews before the Nazi takeover of power, this legislation contributed little to the decline in the number of non-‘Aryans’.³⁸ More important was the attempt by Nazi student organizations to become involved in the registration and classification of students. Thus, at Frankfurt am Main, members of the NSDStB occupied the entrances of the university and forced non-‘Aryans’ to hand over their identification cards soon after the Nazi victory.³⁹ At many places, such as the Technical University of Berlin, the local branch of the Nazified German Student Federation created its own card system in order to have a clear view on the number of non-‘Aryans’.⁴⁰ Finally, Nazi students led a campaign regarding the color of identification cards. This issue even became a source of embarrassment for the Nazi government as it had to face a minor diplomatic incident caused by the parents of two sisters of Japanese-German ethnic backgrounds, who were given yellow identification

³⁵ Erich and Reinhold Michelly to Rektor der Universität Berlin, July 20, 1933, UAB, Akten des Rektors und Senats, Nr. 419, p. 34.

³⁶ Kühn-Steinhausen, Führer der Studentenschaft, to Rektor der Universität Berlin, July 20, 1933, UAB, Akten des Rektors und Senats, Nr. 419, pp. 35-36.

³⁷ See Albrecht Götz von Olenhusen, “Die ‘nichtarischen’ Studenten an den deutschen Hochschulen: Zur nationalsozialistischen Rassenpolitik 1933-1945,” *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 14 (April 1966), p. 184; Walk, *Das Sonderrecht für die Juden*, p. 16; Grüttner, *Studenten im Dritten Reich*, p. 216.

³⁸ See chapter on student aid.

³⁹ Stuchlik, *Goethe im Braunhemd*, p. 86.

cards at the University of Leipzig.⁴¹ To prevent such events, the Prussian Ministry of Education ordered the standardization of cards at the end of 1933. Brown cards were given to non-Jewish German students. Foreigners received blue cards, while Jewish and half-Jewish students had to carry yellow cards.⁴²

As the fate of this measure suggests, the administrative power of the DSt and the NSDStB was inadequate to carry out a drastic reduction in the number of Jewish students. The power to do this remained in the hands of academic administrators and bureaucrats in the state ministries. However, much resistance to the centrally sponsored anti-Semitism could not be expected from Gentile professors who, apart from a few timid interventions, acquiesced in, and occasionally even welcomed, the dismissal of their Jewish colleagues.⁴³ The majority of academic administrators needed little encouragement to proceed against Jewish students. In fact, a few began preparing lists of students, as a first step towards their eventual expulsion, soon after the Nazi victory.⁴⁴ These lists display a surprising unanimity in the use of racist terms among the mostly conservative administrators and teachers.⁴⁵ The acceptance of the Nazi racial-biological point of view, which perceived the world in terms of a permanent struggle between races, can be seen from the fact that

⁴⁰ Ebert, "Die Technische Hochschule Berlin und der Nationalsozialismus," p. 462.

⁴¹ Studentenschaft Leipzig to Rektor der Universität Leipzig, November 17, 1933, SHSA, Akten des Kultusministeriums, vol. 2, Nr. 10077/3, p. 227.

⁴² RdErl. des Preussischen Ministers für Wiss., Kunst und Volksbildung vom 4. 9. 1933, SHSA, Akten des Kultusministeriums, vol. 2, Nr. 10077/3, p. 189-190.

⁴³ See Friedländer, *Nazi Germany and the Jews*, pp. 49-56; Beyerchen, *Scientists Under Hitler*, pp. 15-22; Heiber, *Universität unterm Hakenkreuz*, part 2, p. 26.

⁴⁴ At the University of Cologne, for example, the rector asked the faculties to prepare a list of Jewish students in May 1933. See Rektor der Universität Köln to Dekan der Philosophischen Fakultät, Professor Dr. Nipperdey, May 12, 1933, UAK, 28/Nr. 80.

occasionally even foreign students such as Finns, Turks, Japanese and Chinese were registered as non-‘Aryan’.⁴⁶

Even before the central government became involved, the Bavarian Ministry of Education had stopped the admission of Jews to the medical faculty on 7 April 1933; a few weeks later, Baden barred Jewish freshmen from all faculties.⁴⁷ Simultaneously, the rector at the University of Cologne ordered a halt to the registration of Jewish students.⁴⁸ The majority of academic administrators, however, waited anxiously for central direction. This expectation was finally realized in the Law against the Overcrowding of German Schools and Universities promulgated on 25 April 1933. This legislation was modeled on the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service of 7 April 1933.⁴⁹ The law called for a restriction on the admission of Jewish students to schools, including universities, until their numbers were reduced to the share of non-‘Aryans’ in the country’s population. Jewish students whose fathers participated in the First World War or had a Gentile parent or two non-Jewish grandparents were not affected by this legislation.⁵⁰ This law was complemented by the orders of the Prussian Ministry of Education, which stipulated that the share of non-‘Aryans’ could not exceed 5 per cent of the already

⁴⁵ For the analysis of these lists at individual universities, see Peter Lauf, Jüdische Studierende an der Universität zu Köln, Cologne, 1991, p. 71; Giovannini, Zwischen Republik und Faschismus, p.183; Götz von Olenhusen, “Die ‘nichtarischen’ Studenten,” p. 189; Adam, Hochschule und Nationalsozialismus, p. 115.

⁴⁶ Rektorat der Universität Köln, May 18, 1933; in the summer semester of 1933, 114 non-‘Aryans’ attended the university; the list also includes 3 Turks, 3 Finns, 1 Japanese and 1 Chinese. See undated list of non-‘Aryans’ from SS 1933 and WS 1933/34, UAK, 28/Nr. 80.

⁴⁷ See Walk, Das Sonderrecht für die Juden, pp. 13-14.

⁴⁸ Rektor der Universität Köln to Dekan der Philosophischen Fakultät, April 19, 1933, UAK, 29/Nr. 80.

⁴⁹ For the importance of this legislation for the persecution of Jews see Raul Hilberg, Destruction of European Jews, vol. I, Chicago, 1967, pp. 66-67; Kater, Doctors under Hitler, pp. 177-192.

⁵⁰ See Walk, Das Sonderrecht für die Juden, pp. 17-18.

enrolled students in any faculty. The enrollment of first year students was possible only when the portion of non-‘Aryans’ in the chosen faculty was under 1.5 per cent.⁵¹

The direct impact of this law on the number of non-‘Aryans’ students was very limited. It soon turned out that a significant portion, and at certain universities the majority, of non-‘Aryans’ could claim exemption either on the basis that part of their family was ‘Aryan’ or their fathers were war veterans.⁵² As a result of the high exemption rate, the number of students expelled on the basis of this law alone was relatively low.⁵³ Since at most universities the share of Jewish students was well under 1.5 per cent, this legislation alone could not significantly reduce the number of non-‘Aryans’ in the student population.

The significance of this legislation has to be assessed by its long-term impact. This law did not stand alone but was followed by measures that encouraged academic administrators to compete in the reduction in the number of non-‘Aryan’ students at their institutions. Thus, in June 1933, the Prussian Ministry of Education ordered the deans of individual faculties to keep statistics and regularly inform the rectors on the number of non-‘Aryans’ in their faculties. The same ministry soon gave universities the right to lower

⁵¹ See Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 213.

⁵² In Hamburg, 84 out of 143 non-‘Aryans’ could claim exemption on the basis of the law, see Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 214. In Tübingen, 25 out of 35 non-‘Aryans’ fell under the same category, see Adam, Hochschule und Nationalsozialismus, p. 114; at the University of Freiburg and the Technical University of Berlin the numbers were somewhat lower, see Götz von Olenhusen, “Die ‘nichtarischen’ Studenten,” p. 181; also Ebert, “Technische Hochschule Berlin und der Nationalsozialismus,” p. 459.

⁵³ 49 students were expelled from the University of Frankfurt am Main, the University of Königsberg, the Technical University of Berlin and the University of Leipzig. This number does not include, however, the number of Jewish students expelled on the basis of political activities. See Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 214.

the share of Jewish students from 1.5 per cent at will.⁵⁴ The arbitrary character of this process was made even more obvious by an order of the ministry of education in Baden in November 1934, which made the enrollment of full Jews dependent on the applicants' character and ties to the German people.⁵⁵ The introduction of a record of maturity for university attendance (Hochschulreifevermerk) for the year of 1934 by the Reich Ministry of the Interior served the same purpose: it gave high-school teachers all over Germany the power to prevent the admission of Jews.⁵⁶ The evasion of bureaucratic regulations was made more difficult by an order that forced incoming students from the winter semester of 1933/34 on to declare under oath that neither their parents nor their grandparents had belonged to the Jewish religious community. After the winter semester of 1935/36 oral declaration of ethnic and religious background did not suffice any more; instead, students had to provide university authorities with certificates of 'Aryan' descent.⁵⁷

These promptings from the government notwithstanding, the success of the purges continued to depend in large part on the cooperation of conservative university administrators. Anti-Bolshevism and anti-Semitism, especially their shared aversion towards Jews, served as a common ground for cooperation between academic administrators and Nazi leaders. This convergence of values was especially obvious in the case of Jewish students who also harbored sympathies for the political Left. The merging of racial and political considerations remained an important factor in the possible re-

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 215.

⁵⁵ See Götz von Olenhusen, "Die 'nichtarischen' Studenten," p. 182.

⁵⁶ As a result, out of 846 high-school graduates in 1934 only 60 received this certificate and thus the right to attend universities. See Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 215.

admission of students expelled on the grounds of their former political ties as well. Except for a few committed activists, non-Jews left the universities only temporarily; the majority of those expelled were readmitted after a few years. As the case of Adolf Rubinstein suggests, however, academic administrators treated Jewish students very differently. This talented student of German language and history, who planned to earn a doctorate in literature, had been expelled from the University of Berlin for Marxist political activity. Humiliated but not discouraged, he planned to continue his studies at the University of Cologne. Since the law of 25 April 1933 gave individual universities the right to decide about re-admission, Rubinstein could reasonably hope that his application would be accepted. The negative response of the rector of the University of Cologne, however, destroyed this expectation. The rector argued that the university “had no interest in the admission of a non-‘Aryan’, who had been excluded for Marxist activity and had never studied in Cologne.”⁵⁸

My random reading of over one hundred files on Jewish students in the archive of the Humboldt Universität in Berlin makes some general statements about their political activities possible. These statements should be put forward with caution since the majority of applicants had left the space provided for the description of political associations in the questionnaires blank. If Jewish students answered the questions about their social and political activities at all, they usually listed Jewish charity organizations. Thus, in spite of the distortion, resulting from intimidation and persecution, these answers suggest that the

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 213.

⁵⁸ Rektor der Universität Köln to Adolf Rubinstein, April 11, 1934, UAK, 28/Nr. 80.

Nazis, and perhaps the majority of conservative academic administrators, fell victims to the stereotypical image that automatically equated Jewish students with supporters of left-wing parties: in fact, in Berlin at least, the majority of Jewish students were not interested in party politics.⁵⁹

Centrally supported anti-Semitism turned academic administrators into petty bureaucrats, whose desire to satisfy the wishes of their masters not only destroyed careers but, as the case of Elisabeth-Charlotte Eppenstein demonstrates, inevitably injured the honor and dignity of their victims. This student of medicine at the University of Berlin was accused by the university council (Universitätsrat) of deliberately giving false information about the ethnic origin of her father. Eppenstein argued that she had no knowledge about the ancestry of her father. The injured tone of her letter suggests that she felt the accusation insulting to the memory of her father, who had died only a few months earlier. The university council replied that she, or at least her mother, had to know about her father's Jewish background. This was an obvious reference to the presumed circumcision of her father — a rather embarrassing topic for a young girl in the 1930s. Finally the administration summoned the mother, who explained that her spouse had been a Jewish orphan and his adopted father, an evangelical pastor, raised him as a Christian. Humiliated, although not officially expelled, Elisabeth Eppenstein left the university in 1936. A letter from 1943 still testifies to the anger and shame she had felt during the procedure. Even

⁵⁹ See UAB, Akten des Rektors und Senats, Nr. 1117/1. This file contains the applications of about 200 Jewish and half-Jewish students between 1933 and 1935. A similar file at the University of Hamburg contains 110 questionnaires. See Peter Freimark, "Juden an der Hamburger Universität," in Krause et. al., Hochschulalltag im 'Dritten Reich', p. 137.

then she refused to fill out the colored certificate of her removal from the registry (Exmatrikulationsschein) for foreigners and half-Jews by arguing that she was German.⁶⁰

As a result of centrally-sponsored anti-Semitism and the willingness of students and academic administrators to comply with the orders of Nazi students, the number of non-‘Aryan’ students declined by leaps and bounds after the Nazi takeover of power. In 1932 there were about 4,000 non-‘Aryans’ at German universities. By the summer of 1933 their number had declined to 1,900. By the next semester, many universities and faculties had no Jewish students at all. By the winter semester of 1934/35, there remained only 590 male and 223 female Jews in a student body of 92,000 (87,000 male and 15,000 German female students attended university in the same semester).⁶¹ The Hannover Kurier gave a slightly different number for the summer semester of 1934. At that time, the paper reported that 656 students belonged to Jewish religious organizations. Apart from these students, there were 1,316 non-‘Aryans’ who could not join the German Student Federation because of their race. The newspapers also informed the readers about the almost complete halt in the admission of Jewish students. In the summer semester of 1934 there were only 24 Jewish freshmen at German universities, who made up only 0.4 percent of the 6,189 first year university students.⁶²

The desire to expel Jewish doctors and limit the number of non-‘Aryan’ students of medicine had provided the ground for cooperation between doctors, among them

⁶⁰ See file on Elisabeth Eppenstein, 1936-43, UAB, Akten des Universitätsrats, Nr. 3020.

⁶¹ Niederelbisches Tageblatt, April 24, 1935, BA Koblenz, ZSg 129/151.

⁶² Hannover Kurier, September 10, 1935, BA Koblenz, ZSg 129/151. In the winter semester of 1934/35, Nazi officials put the number of students who belonged to the Jewish religious community at 538. There were also an

academics, and Nazi leaders since the late 1920s. This alliance continued after 1933 as a significant number of teachers and perhaps the majority of medical students sought to restrict the number of Jews at universities. They found ready support in the person of the Reich Physicians' Leader, Gerhard Wagner, who constantly demanded the radical curtailment of the number of non-'Aryan' candidates after January 1933.⁶³ Pressured by the NSDStB and the Office of the Deputy Führer, the REM prohibited non-'Aryans' from working as insurance-panel doctors except if they were war veterans in April 1933,⁶⁴ This later concession, which also allowed the medical study of children of war veterans or fallen soldiers, was revoked in May 1934.⁶⁵ As a result of heightened discrimination at local levels, even those non-'Aryans' who were close to graduation could not automatically expect to be admitted to the state examination or obtain a license in the field of medicine. In order to ensure some gains from their long studies, non-'Aryan' students requested admission to the state examination as foreigners. In Bavaria, the education ministry conceded this request and gave its permission if the students expressed the intention to emigrate after graduation.⁶⁶ On 20 October 1933, the Prussian Ministry of Education ordered that graduating Jewish students could not get their licenses as doctors

additional 594 non-'Aryans' who did not belong to the the Jewish religious community. See Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 215.

⁶³ Kater, Doctors under Hitler, pp. 169-170.

⁶⁴ Adam, Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich, p. 67; Walk, Das Sonderrecht für die Juden, p. 16.

⁶⁵ Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 217.

⁶⁶ Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Unterricht und Kultus to Preussisches Kultusministerium, September 20, 1933, BA Potsdam, Akten des Reichsministeriums des Innern, Abt. III, p. 392.

and dentists; they could receive their diploma only if they had renounced their German citizenship.⁶⁷

In order to dispel misunderstanding about the intention of the central government and to create a more unified system for the admission, graduation and licensing of non-‘Aryan’ students, representatives of Party and state met in the Ministry of the Interior in December 1933. The participants expressed a basic agreement on principles: they all wished to stop completely the approbation of non-‘Aryans’ in Germany; however, they were forced to admit that it was not yet feasible. In violation of the law of 7 April 1933, they set the limit of Jewish and half-Jewish candidates admitted to approbation at one per cent. The participants also supported the proposal that non-‘Aryans’ who had expressed their intention to emigrate could gain promotion before approbation. Disagreement surfaced, however, on the question of whether to allow Jewish students to complete their practical training in German hospitals. Paranoid about possible abuses of medical power on the side of Jewish doctors and candidates, the Nazi purist, Gerhard Wagner, proposed that the training of non-‘Aryans’ should proceed only in separate, Jewish, hospitals. Leonardo Conti, the founder of the National Socialist Doctors League (and after 1939 Wagner’s successor as Reich Health Leader), however, rejected Wagner’s proposal. He argued that it was impossible to fulfill Wagner’s demand since at the end of 1933 only 40 percent of doctors in Berlin were ‘Aryan’. Nevertheless, he agreed with Wagner that the

⁶⁷ RdErl. des REM vom 20. 10. 1933, BA Potsdam, Akten des Reichsministeriums des Innern, Abt. III, pp. 398-399; Walk, Das Sonderrecht für die Juden, p. 57; Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 217.

training of non-‘Aryans’ in German hospitals constituted a serious problem, the solution of which should be considered as a long-term goal.⁶⁸

Further restriction came with the new examination regulation (Prüfungsordnung) for doctors, dentists and pharmacists in April 1934, which forbade the admission to state examinations and the handing out of licenses in cases where there was serious doubt about the candidates’ national feeling or moral reliability. This again conformed to the racist view of many administrators, who denied that Jews could possess these qualities. After February 1935, Jewish and half-Jewish candidates of medicine could obtain licensure only if they had begun their studies before the summer semester of 1933. Preferential treatment was granted to candidates who had fought in the war and exhibited the physical and moral features of what was called the Nordic race.⁶⁹ Since there were very few war veterans among students ten years after the end of the First World War, the order gave only quarter-Jewish candidates the chance to finish their studies. Students who began their medical studies in 1933 or later had to leave the universities. The few who had enrolled before 1933 could complete their studies without being given the permission to practice medicine in Germany. Practical training also became extremely difficult. One after another, the departmental student groups (Fachschaften) excluded Jewish trainees from German hospitals. As the number of Jewish students declined, the continuing debate about non-‘Aryan’ trainees between the purists headed by Martin Bormann, Rudolf Hess and

⁶⁸ “Niederschrift über die kommissarische Beratung vom 13 Dezember 1933, betreffend die Prüfungsordnung für Ärzte und die Erteilung der Approbation für Ärzte,” BA Potsdam, Akten des Reichsministeriums des Innern, Abt. III, pp. 451-457.

⁶⁹ Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 218.

Gerhard Wagner on the one hand and the more conservative bureaucrats in the Ministry of Education on the other, took on an increasingly academic quality.⁷⁰ By the end of 1938 there were no Jewish students at German universities. The Nazi student paper, Die Bewegung, celebrated the victory under the title: “The end of medical doctor Cohn.”⁷¹

The removal of law students of Jewish background paralleled events in the faculty of medicine. In April 1933, the Prussian Minister of Justice, Hanns Kerrl, prohibited the appointment of non-‘Aryan’ law candidates as barristers. Other states soon followed suit. The completion of regular university study was possible only through the form of a promotion, which promised little chance for employment. non-‘Aryan’ barristers were also dismissed on the basis of the Civil Service Law if they were not the children of fallen soldiers and war veterans.⁷² In July 1934, the Reich Minister of Justice ordered students applying for the state examination to prove their own and their spouses’ ‘Aryan’ descent. The order made no mention of exemption on the grounds of war service.⁷³ While material interest played an important role in the expulsion of Jews from medical and law faculties, the priority of ideological principles is clearly recognizable in the removal of non-‘Aryans’ from the faculty of agriculture, which had traditionally attracted few Jews. At the same time, Jews were barred from academic studies for other professional positions such as pharmacist, notary public, teacher and even tax advisor.⁷⁴ After a long debate between the

⁷⁰ Kater, Doctors under Hitler, pp. 170-171

⁷¹ Die Bewegung 39 (1938), BA Koblenz, ZSg 129/152.

⁷² Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 217.

⁷³ See Walk, Das Sonderrecht für die Juden, p. 86.

⁷⁴ See Götz von Olenhusen, “Die ‘nichtarischen’ Studenten,” pp. 188-192; Adam, Judenpolitik, pp. 73-76.

Office of the Deputy Führer and the education and interior ministries, the Reich Ministry of Education prohibited German Jews from obtaining a doctorate in April 1937.⁷⁵

Foreign Jews posed a special problem for the regime. Initially, foreign policy considerations prevented the Nazi government from moving freely against Jews of foreign citizenship. The Ministry of the Interior decreed in May 1933 that the restrictions in the Civil Service Law did not apply to them.⁷⁶ By the end of 1933, there was even a setback as the Prussian Ministry of Education ordered the universities to cease the humiliating practice of asking proof of 'Aryan' background from foreign students.⁷⁷ Instead of central regulations, the central government gave the rectors and the five-members' committees the right to determine admission criteria.⁷⁸ As it turned out, local authorities needed little encouragement from above to remove foreign Jews. They were ready to use their increased power, for example, against eighty American Jews, who came to Germany to circumvent the restrictive quotas imposed mainly on Jews at American medical colleges.⁷⁹ German authorities rejected their applications with the flimsy argument that the Medical License Examination Board in New York would not recognize German university degrees.⁸⁰ However, the main thrust of this policy was directed against Jews from Eastern Europe, many of whom had suffered discrimination as members of the German minority. Now they found themselves in a no-man's land as the Nazi government sought to separate

⁷⁵ See Grütner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 220.

⁷⁶ See Walk, Das Sonderrecht für die Juden, p. 19.

⁷⁷ Götz von Olenhusen, "Die 'nichtarischen' Studenten," p. 182.

⁷⁸ RdErl. des Reichsministers des Innern vom 14. 10. 1933, SHSA, Akten des Kultusministeriums, Nr. 1028.

⁷⁹ Marcia Graham Synnott, "Anti-Semitism and American Universities: Did Quotas Follow the Jews," in David A. Gerber ed., Anti-Semitism in American History, Urbana, 1986, p. 251.

ethnic Germans from assimilated Jews. At German universities, they could not claim the privileges readily awarded to ethnic Germans from the East; instead, they were subjected to the same discriminatory treatment as the German Jews.⁸¹

In February 1937, the Party and state offices raised the issue of foreign Jews anew and decided that they should not be admitted to German universities in the future. Wary of reactions from abroad, however, the Ministry of Education did not decree but simply instructed the rectors that they should not allow the registration of foreign Jews.⁸² Only under the impact of the war, did the Nazi government force foreign students to declare under oath that neither they nor their spouses were Jewish.⁸³

Nazi policy towards non-‘Aryan’ students reflected the rapid deterioration in the position of the German Jewish population after 1933. The stages in this process were neither planned nor easy to predict — the road to Auschwitz was a twisted one.⁸⁴ Nevertheless the struggle between state and Party offices and the inherent contradictions between the goals of Nazi ideology and the limits imposed upon Nazi economic, social and foreign policy moved leaders and events in the direction of radicalization.⁸⁵ A new stage in this radicalization was introduced after the pogrom in November 1938. After that

⁸⁰ Der sächsische Minister für Wiss., Kunst und Volksbildung to REM, October 4, 1933, SHSA, Akten des Kultusministeriums, vol. 2, Nr. 10281.

⁸¹ Der sächsische Minister für Wiss., Kunst und Volksbildung to Rektor der Universität Leipzig, May 14, 1933, SHSA, Akten des Kultusministeriums, vol. 2, Nr. 10281/23.

⁸² Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 220.

⁸³ RdErl. des REM vom 5. 1. 1940, BA Koblenz, R 21/10850.

⁸⁴ See Karl A. Schleunes, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz: Nazi Policy toward German Jews, 1933-1939, Urbana, Ill., 1970.

⁸⁵ See Martin Broszat, The Hitler State: The Foundation and Development of the Internal Structure of the Third Reich, London, 1981; Hans Mommsen, “National Socialism: Continuity and Change,” in Walter Laqueur ed., Fascism: A Reader’s Guide, Harmondsworth, 1979, pp. 151-192.

date, the Nazi regime could not be satisfied by measures aimed simply at the reversal of the achievements of Jewish emancipation; now the goal was the total expropriation and emigration of the Jewish minority.⁸⁶ The pogrom also put an end to the centuries old tradition of Jewish learning at German universities. In various universities, Nazi students blocked the entry of Jewish students to the university buildings. On 11 November 1938, the Minister of Education, Bernhard Rust, instructed the rectors by phone to remove Jewish students from their institutions.⁸⁷ By this time, however, there remained very few Jews at German universities.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, the Nazi student paper, Die Bewegung, was euphoric about the event. It celebrated their expulsion with the headline: "The goal is achieved! No more Jews at German Universities." The article emphasized that students had long been in the vanguard for the creation of the Nazi university.⁸⁹

As a sign of the increasing radicalism of the Nazi regime, the anti-Semitic campaign at universities did not end with the expulsion of full Jews, but continued in the discrimination against students who had at least one Jewish parent or grandparent. The problem of part-Jews touched one of the most serious flaws in the theory of biological racism: until its very end, the regime failed to define the concept of Jew in scientific terms. The word non-'Aryan', which formed the basis of categorization, anti-Jewish legislation and action, remained ambiguous as well. Although this phrase was sometimes used to

⁸⁶ See Kurt Pätzold and Irene Runge, Kristallnacht: Zum Pogrom 1938, Cologne, 1988; Peter Loewenberg, "The Kristallnacht as a Public Degradation Ritual," Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 32 (1987), pp. 309-323; Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann, The Racial State: Germany 1933-1945, pp. 89-96.

⁸⁷ Freimark, "Juden an der Hamburger Universität," p. 138.

⁸⁸ Adam, Hochschule und Nationalsozialismus, p. 115; Giles, Students and National Socialism, p. 107; Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p.221.

imply a hierarchy of races on a global scale, its main thrust was directed against full and part-Jews. After the Reich Citizenship Law, promulgated in November 1935, the term non-'Aryan' was used to denote two main categories: Jews and individuals of mixed Jewish blood (Mischlinge). A Jew was defined as a person who had at least three Jewish grandparents, or descended from two Jewish grandparents and belonged to the Jewish religious community, or was married to a Jewish person, or stemmed from a marriage contracted between a full Jew and a three-quarter Jew, or was an offspring of extramarital relationship between such individuals. Mischlinge were, first of all, individuals who descended from two Jewish grandparents but did not belong to the Jewish religious community and were not married to Jews. Such half-Jews were called Mischlinge of the first degree. Second, individuals who descended from one Jewish grandparent were designated as Mischlinge of the second degree.⁹⁰

After 1935, an intense fight developed between the Reich ministries and the Nazi Party, which wanted to equate Mischlinge of the first degree with Jews. Unfortunately, this chapter cannot cover the details of this struggle, which was waged about ideological issues and often motivated by sheer hunger for power. Here it suffices to say that ideological uncertainties and political expediency saved the lives of the majority of half-Jews. Especially the Reich ministries expressed the concern that the removal of rich, highly educated and influential part-Jews would destroy German families and damage the economy. This argument seemed to have impressed Hitler, who (sensitive as he always

⁸⁹ Die Bewegung 47 (1938), BA Koblenz, ZSg 129/152.

⁹⁰ Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, pp. 27-32.

was to changes in popular mood that might adversely affect his image) refused to take a definite position on the issue of Mischlinge until the last two years of the war. Thus, as Jeremy Noakes pointed out, ideological uncertainties, bureaucratic fights between Party and state organizations, concerns about administrative rationality and economic efficiency helped the destruction of Jews in Eastern Europe, while the same motives proved vital for the survival of Mischlinge in the Third Reich.⁹¹

The prevention of the genocide of the majority of part-Jews notwithstanding, the Mischlinge experienced increasing discrimination throughout the Third Reich. In the case of students, the oppression of part-Jews after 1938 followed the pattern established after 1933: the gradual radicalization of the regime manifested itself in a series of decrees that progressively circumscribed the rights of part-Jews to start an academic career or complete their studies.⁹² Besides these similarities, however, there were important differences between the purges of Jewish students and the persecution of Mischlinge. On the one hand, social and economic causes played a negligible role in the anti-Mischling campaign especially after 1938. As prospects of employment in most professions improved after 1935, rationalization of anti-Jewish sentiments in terms of social conflict gradually lost its attraction among students because, as contemporaries recognized, part-Jews were numerically too insignificant to represent a perceived danger to Gentile students.⁹³ The lack of students' support, apart from that of a few Nazi fanatics, for the continuing

⁹¹ Jeremy Noakes, "Nazi Policy towards German-Jewish Mischlinge 1933-1945," Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook 34 (1989), pp. 291-356.

⁹² Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 223;.

campaign against Mischlinge shows that racial selection failed as an education instrument as well. I did not find any evidence that would suggest measures taken against part-Jews brought students ideologically closer to the Nazi regime.

The following case studies will demonstrate that the treatment of part-Jewish students was closely connected to the social policy of the Nazi regime towards what Noakes has described as “high society,” of which the nobility still constituted the most important part. Noakes repeats the well-known argument that Hitler had little respect for the nobility, regarding it as essentially degenerate. However, Noakes also points out that other Nazis such as Himmler recognized that winning nobles over was necessary to gain the respect of existing high society, and by doing so to achieve elite status for their organization. Himmler approved the two traditional practices of the nobility, namely careful breeding and the ownership of land. Therefore, especially in the SS, they sought to integrate the old upper class of birth with the new Nazi elite. Unlike the aristocracy, however, this new elite would not be based on traditional values such noble birth but on ‘good blood’ measured through pseudo-scientific medical examination and on Nazi values such as fanaticism and unswerving devotion to Hitler.⁹⁴

⁹³ Memorandum Lösener, “Betrifft: die Anwendung der Arierbestimmungen auf Abkömmlinge aus Mischehen”, October 30, 1933, IZG, F71/1.

⁹⁴ Major works on the SS include, Heinz Höhne, The Order of the Death’s Head, London, 1969; Robert L. Koehl, The Black Order: The Structure and Power Struggles of the Nazi SS, Madison, 1983; Herbert G. Ziegler, Nazi Germany’s New Aristocracy: The SS Leadership, 1925-1939, Princeton, 1989; on the Waffen SS, see Bernd Wegner, The Waffen SS: Organization, Ideology and Function, Oxford, 1990; on the Einsatzgruppen, see Heinz Artzt, Mörder in Uniform: Organisationen, die zu Vollstreckern nationalsozialistischer Gewaltverbrechen wurden, Munich, 1979; Helmut Krausnick and Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, Die Truppen des Weltanschauungskrieges: Die Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 1938-1942, Stuttgart, 1982.

The attempt of various Nazi organizations such as Himmler's SS to integrate traditional nobility into the new order first registered some success; however, ultimately it proved to be a failure. Although individual nobles had been attracted to the Nazi movement from the start, they began joining the Party in significant numbers only during the last years of the Weimar Republic. Even then, apart from a few fanatics, the majority was probably motivated by opportunism, namely by the desire to ensure a place in the developing Nazi order. Like its bourgeois counterpart, however, the mass of the nobility became members of Nazi organizations, mainly the SS, only after Hitler's victory. Moreover, by the late 1930s, the majority of nobles became disillusioned with the Nazi alliance. Some persevered in their original hostility towards nazism, while others grew bitter as their hopes for personal advancement in the new regime failed to be realized. Many more became aware of the Nazis' contempt for their values and disgusted by the widespread corruption, which was the result of the Nazi way of exercising power. Thus, they increasingly withdrew their support from the regime and retreated into their special spheres, which the Nazi regime, despite the efficiency of its secret police, found difficult to penetrate. As a result of growing disillusionment with the Nazis' handling of the war, a significant number of nobles became conspirators and participated in the assassination attempt on Hitler's life in July 1944.⁹⁵

The Nazi policy towards part-Jewish students reflected the inherent contradictions between the values of the nobility and those of the Nazi regime. The Nazis reproached

⁹⁵ Jeremy Noakes, "Nazism and High Society," in Michael Burleigh ed., Confronting the Nazi Past: New Debates on Modern German History, New York, 1996, pp. 51-66.

aristocrats for their international connections and their documented propensity to marry Jews. Hitler and other fanatical Nazis considered the latter, together with sterility and homosexuality, as betrayals of the 'Aryan' race and signs of degeneration. Thus, admission policy offered Hitler and other fanatical Nazis an opportunity to punish aristocrats for past sins and, at the same time, to undermine their influence.

The humiliation of aristocrats, such as Jürgen Graf von Schwerin, suggests that Nazi policy towards the influential Mischlinge served to undermine the traditional values of the German elite. Jürgen von Schwerin was the grandson of Albertus Graf von Zieten Schwerin and the son of a legation councilor (Legationsrat), Albert Constantin von Schwerin. His maternal grandfather was a banker, Ernst von Mendelssohn-Bartholdy. Despite his Jewish origin, Ernst von Mendelssohn-Bartholdy had enjoyed Bismarck's friendship, who had praised his patriotism and devotion to the royal family in a personal letter. Nevertheless, Mendelssohn-Bartholdy's background spelled trouble for his grandson. Although Jürgen von Schwerin was also a patriotic German, as the recommendation of his military commander suggests, he had to endure a long bureaucratic battle for admission. Finally, he was allowed to register at the Technical University of Berlin in 1942.⁹⁶ A similar motive can be observed in the case of Alfred Ritter von Catherin, the son of a senior civil servant in Austria. The father, a lieutenant in the First World War, lost two of his brothers on the battlefield. Catherin's mother was Maria Olga, born as Baroness Schwanzhuber. Although she had been baptized as a Catholic, the Nazis

⁹⁶ See correspondence between Jürgen von Schwerin and REM, 1940-1942, BA Koblenz, R 21/10873, pp. 11-16, 342.

declared her Jewish because of the Jewish religious and ethnic background of her parents. In spite of his decoration in the Polish campaign and excellent recommendations by his military supervisors, the Jewish ancestry of his mother prevented Catherin from gaining acceptance to German universities.⁹⁷

Unfortunately, we possess no statistics on the number of students who were both noble and had at least one Jewish grandparent. While their number was probably negligible, the impact of their persecution must have been significant. For the first time in German history, aristocrats had to fear the whims of administrators who often came from humble families. They had to pay the psychological price for finding their way through the Nazi bureaucracy. Their loss in status, however, represented a psychological gain for Nazi fanatics (especially at the district levels and in the Party Chancellery) who obviously enjoyed humiliating nobles. By barring noble applicants from universities, Nazi zealots exercised a perverted form of class justice, which rewarded them both with the pleasure of revenge and with the feeling of superiority. However, the purpose of their actions, especially during the last two years of the war, went beyond reaping cheap satisfaction from the degradation of the members of the old elite. It was part and parcel of the larger attempt of the Nazi leadership to destroy traditional high society and assume its position and status in German society.⁹⁸

Noble birth meant little to Nazis if the applicant had one Jewish parent or later in the war even one grandparent. Other traditional elite virtues, such as high regard for 'old

⁹⁷ NSDAP Partei Kanzlei to REM, November 7, 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/ 10874, pp. 599-600.

⁹⁸ See Petropoulos, *Art as Politics in the Third Reich*, pp. 299-307.

money' and family fortune became sins if they were represented by Jews. The case of Dieter Thomas shows the extent to which Nazi ideology corroded the social function of money and family fortune in the Third Reich. His mother came from an assimilated and highly respected Jewish family. Her father, the distinguished philanthropist Oscar Hirsch, was the owner of an old and profitable trading firm in Mannheim. Thomas' mother was raised as a Lutheran. She served in the First World War and received a decoration for her work in the Red Cross. Despite his half-Jewish background, Dieter Thomas had become a member of the Hitler Youth in the second half of the 1930s and even served shortly in the Army in 1940. After completion of his work service, he sought admission to the University of Heidelberg in 1941. However, his plan to become a chemist in Nazi Germany was frustrated by the rejection of his application.⁹⁹

If noble title and 'old money' mattered less in Nazi Germany than it had in the Weimar Republic, so did the third criteria of traditional elitist value system: high achievement in public service. Perhaps, the case of Dietgard Meyer demonstrates best how the denial of admission served the double purpose of racial selection and intimidation of civil servants. Her father, a major in the First World War, worked in a senior administrative position in the Ministry of Defense until his, possibly forced, retirement in 1933. On this occasion, however, he still received a letter from Reich President Hindenburg thanking him for his service to Germany. In spite of his service, however, his

⁹⁹ Dieter Thomas to Rektor der Universität Heidelberg, March 14, 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/10873, pp. 120-123; Rektor der Universität Heidelberg to REM, June 16, 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/10873, p. 124.

daughter, ostensibly on the basis of her mother's Jewish background, could not gain admission to university studies.¹⁰⁰

Racial prejudice and the desire to challenge the values of the German elite played a role in the rejection of Dieter Weiss' application as well. His father, a moderately successful diplomat, came from a prominent German family in Cologne. As a young graduate, he married the daughter of Eduard Sonnenburg, a professor at the University of Berlin. Later he served as a member of the German diplomatic corps in China, Latin America and the Middle East. Despite the merits of his father, and against the regulations that still allowed the admission of Mischlinge of the second degree, Dieter Weiss was denied admission, on the basis of his maternal grandmother's Jewish origin, to the University of Berlin in 1941.¹⁰¹

Fanatical Nazis, especially in the Party Chancellery, used the admission procedure to undermine the importance of learning and refinement (Bildung) as the fourth pillar in the value system of the elite. Thus, the offspring of such famous scientists as Emil von Behring, the inventor of the anti-diphtheria and anti-tetanus serums and Otto von Giercke, the famous jurist and writer evoked in vain the achievements of their fathers or relatives.¹⁰² According to Hans Nipkow's letter, his uncle, Paul Nipkow, played a pivotal role in the invention of television. He was so highly respected that Hitler awarded him a state funeral in the mid-1930s. The achievements of his illustrious relative, notwithstanding, the

¹⁰⁰ Rektor der Universität Berlin to REM, November 9, 1941, UAB, Akten des Rektors und Senats, Nr. 1167.

¹⁰¹ See correspondence between Rektor der Universität Berlin and Dieter Weiss, 1941, UAB, Akten des Rektors und Senats, Nr. 1121. pp. 117-130.

university rejected Hans Nipkow's application.¹⁰³ The same humiliation awaited Adelheid Klein. She listed Charlotte Heiden von Siebold, one of the first female doctors in Germany, the poet Eduard Stucken and the expert on Japanese culture, Philippe Franz von Siebold, among her ancestors. The intellectual contribution of her family, notwithstanding, the debate over her admission lasted so long that Klein lost patience and withdrew her application from the University of Berlin in 1944.¹⁰⁴

The completely apolitical case of Ludwig Mayer demonstrates that racism and bureaucratic chicaneries prevented the Nazis from showing respect for achievement in the field of sports. He was the brother of the famous Helene Mayer, who won the championship in fencing at the 1928 Olympics. In the 1920s, she was regularly depicted by the Hugenberg press as the "typical Aryan girl."¹⁰⁵ This Mischling of the first degree had come from California. She was allowed to compete and won second place at the 1936 Berlin Olympics. Her brother, Ludwig Mayer, volunteered in the army and was promoted to lance-corporal during the Polish campaign. Although his file is incomplete, his application to the Technical University of Berlin was initially rejected by Party authorities and the final decision still awaited the outcome of bureaucratic battles in 1941.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² Memorendum Lösener, "Betrifft: die Anwendung der Arierbestimmungen auf Abkömmlinge aus Mischehen," IZG, F71/1; on the life of Otto von Giercke, see Gerd Kelinheyer and Jan Schröder, Deutsche Juristen aus fünf Jahrhunderten, Heidelberg, 1989, pp. 96-101.

¹⁰³ Rektor der Universität Berlin to REM, July 22, 1942, UAB, Akten des Rektors und Senats, Nr. 1122, pp. 192-193.

¹⁰⁴ Adelheid Klein to Rektor der Universität Berlin,, UAB, Akten des Rektors und Senats, Nr. 1172, pp. 105-108.

¹⁰⁵ Peter Gay, Freud, Jews and Other Germans, Oxford, 1978, p. 179.

¹⁰⁶ Ludwig Mayer to Rektor der Technischen Hochschule München, March 16, 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/10874, pp. 156-157.

The Nazi regime sought to undermine the moral and cultural universe and social position of the old elite. As the years went on, it became increasingly clear, as Alfred Schmoll and his daughter were forced to realize, that the Nazi regime demanded more than occasional lip service to its ideals. In one of his letters to Göring and Hitler, Alfred Schmoll emphasized that he had descended from French Huguenots, whom the Party philosopher, Alfred Rosenberg, considered the early models for the National Socialists. As a member of the nationalist and anti-Semitic Mark Brandenburg section of the Free Corps, Alfred Schmoll fought against the Poles and the Spartacists after Germany's collapse in 1918. According to his letter, he also "found his way to National Socialism," although he did not state whether he actually entered the Nazi Party. His Jewish wife died before the outbreak of the First World War. Alfred Schmoll remarried and raised his only daughter from the first marriage, Thea Schmoll, as a Christian. After finishing high school, Thea Schmoll volunteered for work service and joined a number of Nazi auxiliary organizations in the mid-1930s. Later she studied chemistry at the Technical University of Berlin. She had only one semester to complete her degree when she was expelled in 1941. Despite her father's assurances that the "good old Huguenot blood had completely absolved the Jewish blood," Thea Schmoll could not regain admission to German universities in the Third Reich.¹⁰⁷

The parents' loyalty to the Nazi cause did not always protect part-Jews from persecution either. Peter Faldix evoked in vain the services of his father, an economic advisor to the German Labor Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront), who had published an article

¹⁰⁷ Alfred Schmoll to Reichsmarschall, Hermann Göring, July 24, 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/ 10873, pp. 164-167.

entitled “Adolf Hitler as an Economist” in Der Deutsche Wissenschaftler in May 1932. His services proved, however, insufficient to make Party and university authorities forget the Jewish origins of his spouse. Peter Faldix had been forced to interrupt his studies at the University of Bonn in 1940 and failed to gain re-admission in 1942.¹⁰⁸

Racial selection was taken so seriously that only the political services of the applicants, rather than those of their parents counted as a reason for possible exemption from racial laws. On this basis, part-Jews could upgrade their status from Mischlinge of the first degree to Mischlinge of the second degree or to German. This procedure was known as liberation (Befreiung). Liberation was an integral part of racial selection in the Third Reich. Similar to the attempt to assimilate young people in the occupied countries during the war, the Nazis saw this as a way to gain useful human material for the building of their racial empire. Secondly, liberation was a privilege and, as Victor Klemperer pointed out, privileges, such as the exemption from wearing the yellow star, served to create lasting resentment among, and thus divide, the victims.¹⁰⁹ Petitions for liberation were transmitted through the Ministry of the Interior and the Reich Chancellery to Hitler if the applicant was a civilian and through the Army High Command and the Party Chancellery if the petitioner was a soldier.¹¹⁰

As the case of Karl Noack demonstrates, there were a few students whose services were such that even the most rigid Nazis in the Party Chancellery did not block their

¹⁰⁸ Dr. Faldix to REM, February 12, 1942, BA Koblenz, R 21/ 10877, pp. 273-274.

¹⁰⁹ Victor Klemperer, Die unbewältigte Sprache: Aus dem Notizbuch eines Philologen. LTI, Darmstadt, 1966, pp. 185-188.

¹¹⁰ Hilberg, The Destruction of European Jews, pp. 78-79.

admission. Born in Budapest in 1912, Noack moved to Berlin with his family in the 1920s, where he finished high school. Already in the late 1920s, he became an enthusiastic supporter of Nazism, entering first the Hitler Youth and later the Nazi Party. To his shock, he learned in 1935 that he was half-Jewish. As a true believer of Nazi dogmas, he left the Party in the same year but remained a member of auxiliary Nazi organizations. He volunteered for the army in 1941 and became decorated for bravery. Noack's credentials were so good that his partly Jewish background was forgiven and he was allowed to study at German universities.¹¹¹

The case of Irmgard Pfeiffer demonstrates how racism could lead to or intensify conflicts in middle-class families and isolate their Jewish members. Irmgard Pfeiffer's father was one of the Old Fighters who claimed that they had suffered persecution for their political views and activities during the Weimar Republic. According to Pfeiffer's letter, the father did not even allow the Jewish grandparents to see their grandchildren. The impeccable Nazi past of her father and her own conformist behavior placed Pfeiffer higher in the racial hierarchy and secured her admission in 1941.¹¹²

However, Nazi convictions did not guarantee admission or re-admission to university, especially in the last two years of the war. Gerhard Engelmann, a Mischling of the first degree, was a law student at the University of Graz until his removal in the early 1940s. Against all the regulations guarding the racial purity of Nazi organizations, this

¹¹¹ Karl Franz Günther Noack to NSDAP Partei-Kanzlei, May 29, 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/10873, pp. 113-115; NSDAP Partei-Kanzlei to Rektor der Universität Berlin, July 14, 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/10873, p. 402.

¹¹² Letter by Irmgard Pfeiffer's mother to REM, May 26, 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/10873, p. 23; REM to Irmgard Pfeiffer, June 5, 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/10873, p. 24.

half-Jew entered the Hitler Youth and even joined the SA in 1942. He served two years in the army and was decorated for bravery. His records prompted the local SA leader to support his re-admission in March 1944. However, fanatical Nazis in the Party Chancellery rejected his application; only after a protracted struggle did the rector, supported by the local SA and the Reich Ministry of Education, allow him to continue his studies.¹¹³

As the last example suggests, the fate of applications depended upon the outcome of bureaucratic battles between two sides: students, university administrators and bureaucrats in the Reich Ministry of Education on the one hand, and Nazi fanatics in the regional Party offices and the Party Chancellery on the other. In this struggle, half-Jews had an ominous start. Already in early 1933, a few schools, such as the University of Frankfurt, refused to register Mischlinge of the first degree.¹¹⁴ At least on paper, after October 1937, half-Jews could receive a degree only if they pledged to leave Germany after graduation.¹¹⁵

The November pogrom in 1938 and Hitler's prediction in early 1939 that a future war would lead to the destruction of European Jews inevitably worsened the position of part-Jews.¹¹⁶ In the case of students, the Reich Ministry of Education proposed the re-examination of their right to university studies in the first months of 1939. The new plan confirmed old regulations and at first did not include additional restrictions. In fact, it

¹¹³ REM to NSDAP Partei-Kanzlei, March 16, 1944, BA Koblenz, R 21/10876, p. 197; NSDAP Partei-Kanzlei to REM, July 20, 1944, BA Koblenz, R 21/10876, p. 389; Dekan der Philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Graz to REM, September 20, 1944, BA Koblenz, R 21/10876, p. 426.

¹¹⁴ Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 222.

stated that, in the future, foreign students would not have to provide written proof but simply declare under oath that they and their parents were not Jewish.¹¹⁷

Despite its apparent leniency, the proposal encountered strong opposition from the bureaucrats in the other ministries. They argued, as it turned out correctly, that the re-opening of the whole question would adversely affect the position of part-Jews, whose contribution they deemed important for the future war effort.¹¹⁸ The proposal started a heated discussion which soon led to discriminatory measures. In January 1940, the REM released a new order that significantly lowered the chances of part-Jews gaining admission to universities. The order stipulated that students of mixed parentage had to obtain the permission of the REM for registration and continuation of their studies. Part-Jews had to provide certificates of 'Aryan' ancestry, a curriculum vitae and biographies of their close relatives, including the grandparents. They had to give information about the occupation, public and war service of the Jewish members of the family. Certificates of work and army service and two photographs, one of them showing the petitioner's face from profile, had to be attached to the application. Finally, they needed the rector's recommendation, who was expected to give a professional opinion on the question of whether the applicants "exhibited any of the characteristics of the Jewish race and to what extent."¹¹⁹

¹¹⁵ See Walk, Das Sonderrecht für die Juden, pp. 187-188.

¹¹⁶ See Lucy S. Dawidowicz, The War against the Jews, 1933-1945, New York, 1976, p. 106.

¹¹⁷ Der Generalbevollmächtigte für die Reichsverwaltung to Ministerrat für die Reichsverteidigung z.Hd. des Herrn Reichsministers und Chef der Reichskanzlei, February 16, 1940, BA Potsdam, R 43/941, pp. 105-107.

¹¹⁸ Ministerpräsident Generalfeldmarschall Göring, Beauftragter für den Vierjahresplan, to Reichsminister und Chef der Reichskanzlei, April 7, 1940, in BA Potsdam, R 43/941, pp. 113-115.

¹¹⁹ RdErl. des REM vom 5. 1. 1940, BA Koblenz, R 21/448, p I.

The outbreak of the war ended the favored status of foreign Jews, who had been exempted from most discriminatory measures before 1939. After February 1940, foreign Jews and those who were married to Jews were barred from studying at German institutions of higher learning. Confusion and uncertainty reigned, however, around the admission of foreign part-Jews to universities. Although no central legislation prohibited their admission, administrators at the state and university level usually opted for their exclusion. As a letter from the rector of the University in Hamburg in 1942 shows, during the war, academic administrators habitually applied the laws regulating the admission of German Mischlinge to foreign citizens as well.¹²⁰ Sometimes they even went so far to employ the term non-‘Aryans’ to the admission of students of non-European background. Thus, both academic administrators and bureaucrats in the Reich Ministry of the Interior rejected Elisabeth Assmy’s application, who was a German citizen, with the flimsy argument that “this Chinese Mischling has no chance to be admitted to the medical examination and to obtain a position in Germany as a doctor.”¹²¹ However, the same authorities change their minds about the admission of the half Japanese, Elisabeth Ast (the sources do not provide information on her citizenship), who, after a long bureaucratic battle, was finally given permission to enroll in the faculty of pharmacy at any German university in 1942.¹²² This case suggests that in cases of marginal importance such as the admission of this Japanese Mischling, the Nazi authorities were still able to make

¹²⁰ Rektor der Universität Hamburg to REM, April 8, 1942, BA Koblenz, R 21/10878, p. 276.

¹²¹ Reichsministerium des Innern to REM, July 25, 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/10873, p. 430.

¹²² Reichsministerium des Innern to REM, April 24, 1942, BA Koblenz, R 21/10878, p. 300.

concessions on ideological matters especially if other considerations (in this case probably concerns of foreign policy) demanded a more flexible response from them.

After 1939 the Reich Ministry of Education tried to balance the increasing radicalism of the Party with the conservatism of other ministries in order to preserve its monopoly over the admission process. The regulation of the Mischlinge's position in January 1940 notwithstanding, the Reich ministries, supported by the Army High Command and the Reich Propaganda Ministry, continued to argue that a deterioration in the status of part-Jews was economically damaging and morally harmful for a country at war. They challenged the legality of further restrictions by claiming that Hitler himself did not wish to see any change in the legal status of part-Jews during the war.¹²³ Under immense pressure from the Party, the Reich Ministry of Education parted company with the more conservative ministries and gradually adopted the position of the Party Chancellery. After October 1940 it allowed the continuation of study by Mischlinge of the first degree only when they were close to graduation. Their admission was permitted only in exceptional cases and in faculties where there was no hindrance to their future employment. To avoid further bureaucratic discrimination at local levels, the Reich Ministry of Education asked the rectors not to transfer candidates, who had obtained its permission, to other universities.¹²⁴

As a sign of increasing radicalization, administrators in the Office of the Deputy Führer demanded that its permission should be made mandatory for admission of part-

¹²³ Reichsminister und Chef der Reichskanzlei to Generalbevollmächtigte für die Reichsverwaltung, April 25, 1940, BA Potsdam, R 43/941, pp. 115-117.

Jews at the end of 1940. They also challenged the REM on the question of education of war veterans. The Reich ministries and the Army High Command represented the view that Mischlinge of the first degree who had participated in the war, should be admitted or allowed to finish their studies. Fanatical Nazis in the Office of the Deputy Führer, however, wanted to apply a more rigorous selection and permit only the enrollment of distinguished war veterans. They pressed for the verbatim interpretation of Hitler's announcement, who had promised in October 1940 that the status of decorated Mischlinge would be upgraded to that of German after the conclusion of hostilities.¹²⁵ At the same time, however, he ordered the dismissal of the Mischlinge of the first degree and those married to descendants of Jews from the Army.¹²⁶

The Reich Ministry of Education was confused by Hitler's declaration and tried desperately to defend its favored position in matters of education. Paradoxically, the bureaucrats in this office first found Hitler's announcement too lenient towards half-Jews. They argued that if the declaration was taken verbatim it would exempt Mischlinge of the first degree from all the professional and social restrictions that had been imposed upon them by the racial laws and decrees since 1933. Thus, part-Jews who had distinguished themselves in the war, could enter such faculties as medicine, law and agriculture. On the other hand, the REM found the demand to exclude wounded soldiers and war veterans with no decorations too harsh. On the defensive, it sought to obtain the support of the

¹²⁴ RdErl. des REM vom 25. 10. 1940, BA Koblenz, R 21/448, p. 13.

¹²⁵ REM to Stellvertreter des Führers, October 25, 1940, BA Koblenz, R 21/448, pp. 14-17.

¹²⁶ Götz von Olenhusen, "Die 'nichtarischen' Studenten," p. 195.

other ministries whose conservative stand it had fought against a few months earlier.¹²⁷

The bureaucratic struggles about power, ideology and principles of administrative efficiency finally ended in a compromise. The Party Chancellery permitted the temporary admission of wounded Mischlinge of the first degree. At the same time, the REM agreed to share power with the Party Chancellery over their admission.¹²⁸

The relatively high number of Mischlinge of the first degree, who were distinguishing themselves in battle, was a constant embarrassment to Nazi zealots, who believed that the virtue of bravery could not be reconciled with even a drop of Jewish blood. By May 1941 there were around 150 petitioners of the same background who applied to universities on the basis of their outstanding war records.¹²⁹ The obvious injustice these war veterans suffered at the hands of Nazi zealots and conformist university administrators prompted even Göring to become involved in the case of a seriously wounded soldier, Hans-Paul Walbaum, and grant him permission to start his university studies.¹³⁰ In July 1941 Hitler himself declared that he would not want to show ingratitude to decorated half-Jews. Pressured by the army leadership on the eve of the Russian campaign, he promised that the status of half-Jewish war veterans and all but politically unreliable Mischlinge of the second degree would be upgraded to the level of Germans after the war.¹³¹

¹²⁷ REM to Stellvertreter des Führers, January 8, 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/448, p. 21.

¹²⁸ REM to Stellvertreter des Führers, January 8, 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/448, pp. 30-32.

¹²⁹ REM to Staatssekretär auf dem Dienstwege, May 7, 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/10875, p. 103.

¹³⁰ REM to Staatssekretär auf dem Dienstwege, May 7, 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/ 10875, p. 104.

¹³¹ Götz von Olenhusen, "Die nichtarischen Studenten," p. 196.

Renewed interest in part-Jews was connected to the Nazi preoccupation with finding a 'final solution to the Jewish problem' after the outbreak of war. Although the exact date is unknown, most historians agree that Hitler and his close associates decided upon the systematic killing of Jews between the spring and winter of 1941.¹³² Since the implementation of this decision required a more precise definition of 'Aryans' and Jews, at the Wannsee Conference on 20 January 1942 Nazi leaders tried to find a mutually acceptable definition that would make political actions possible. However, they failed to reach a decision because they realized that the death of a "half-Jew" would also mean the end of a "half-Aryan".¹³³ This failure provided a vital respite in the radicalization process and saved the majority of part-Jews from annihilation.

Nonetheless, the beginning of the genocide had an adverse effect on the position of part-Jews. In the case of students, concessions given to war veterans and other selected individuals involved bureaucratic procedures that dragged on often for a year and had an uncertain outcome. Meanwhile, the Party Chancellery advanced its position at the expense of the Reich Ministry of Education. In September 1941 the REM officially gave up its monopoly over the admission of part-Jews. The new agreement with the Party Chancellery stipulated that university administrators and the bureaucrats in the Reich Ministry of

¹³² Hans Mommsen, "The Realization of the Unthinkable: the 'Final Solution of the Jewish Question'," in Gerhard Hirschfeld ed., The Policies of Genocide, London, 1986, pp. 97-144; Martin Broszat, "Hitler and the Genesis of the 'Final Solution': An Assessment of David Irving's Theses," in H.W. Koch ed., Aspects of the Third Reich, London, 1985, pp. 390-429; Gerald Fleming, Hitler and the Final Solution, Oxford, 1986; Christopher Browning, The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office, New York, 1978; Andreas Hillgruber, " 'Die Endlösung ' und das deutsche Ostimperium als Kernstück des rassenideologischen Programms des Nationalsozialismus," in Manfred Funke, Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte, Düsseldorf, 1978, pp. 94-114.

Education had to consider the evaluation of the political reliability of the applicant by the district Party leaders (Gauleiter) as well.¹³⁴ By January 1942 the Party Chancellery further sharpened the admission requirement. Mischlinge of the first degree, except for distinguished war veterans and wounded soldiers, could be admitted only when they, without war service, had finished their studies in 1940 or were near graduation.¹³⁵

The next step in radicalization came with the secret order of the REM in June 1942. It stipulated that Mischlinge of the first degree could be admitted to university only in cases where they had been already declared German, received or would have received decoration and promotion for bravery had they not been half-Jewish, or Hitler himself had allowed them to stay in the army. The secret order recognized the equal status of the Party Chancellery with the Reich Ministry of Education on the admission of Mischlinge of the first degree. Rectors still preserved the right to admit quarter-Jews without asking permission from higher authorities. However, they had to request the political expertise of the regional Party leadership when there was doubt about the candidates' political reliability. Even they remained barred, however, from studying agriculture and from admission to the state examination in the field of public administration.¹³⁶

¹³³ Michael H. Kater, The Twisted Muse: Musicians and Their Music in the Third Reich, New York, 1997, p. 83.

¹³⁴ Götz von Olenhusen, "Die 'nichtarischen' Studenten," p. 196.

¹³⁵ NSDAP Partei-Kanzlei to Reichsminister und Chef der Reichskanzlei, January 31, 1942, BA Potsdam, R 43 II/941, pp. 124-126.

¹³⁶ RdErl. des REM vom 22.6.1942, BA Koblenz, R 21/448, p. 36.

The deterioration in the position of part-Jewish students was connected to the growing influence of Martin Bormann over Party affairs after 1942.¹³⁷ Bormann sought to destroy the separate category of Mischling, seeking to draw all half-Jews into the genocide. He also wanted the remaining Mischlinge of higher degrees to undergo a strict selection process and to prevent, if necessary by sterilization, the procreation of individuals who failed this procedure.¹³⁸ Probably under Bormann's influence, Hitler stated in July 1942 that the question of Mischlinge had been hitherto handled too softly. In the future, he argued, applications for equal status with Germans should be accepted only in exceptional cases, for example, when the applicant had demonstrated exceptional loyalty and service to the Party prior to 1933 without having any knowledge about the Jewish ethnicity of his ancestors.¹³⁹

In this announcement, Hitler displayed either cynicism or a high degree of ignorance. As the bureaucrats in the Reich Ministry of Education pointed out, candidates at the end of 1942 had been on the average between ten and fourteen years old in 1933, and thus hardly in a position to perform exceptional services in the early Nazi movement.¹⁴⁰ Giving in to pressure from the Party Chancellery, the REM ordered in December 1942 that in the future quarter-Jews had to obtain the recommendation of the regional Party leadership before their enrollment. Their admission to faculties of pharmacy

¹³⁷ On Bormann's career, see Joachim C. Fest, The Face of the Third Reich: Portraits of the Nazi Leadership, New York, 1970, pp. 125-136; William Stevenson, The Bormann Brotherhood, New York, 1973.

¹³⁸ Noakes, "Nazi Policy towards German-Jewish Mischlinge," pp. 337-352.

¹³⁹ Der Reichsminister und Chef der Reichskanzlei to Oberste Reichsbehörden, July 20, 1942, BA Koblenz, R 21/448, p. 41.

became dependent upon the permission of the Party Chancellery and the Reich Ministry of the Interior as well. In addition, quarter-Jews were prohibited from studying and practicing veterinarian medicine. While the employment of Mischlinge as doctors was still possible, conflicting orders produced an absurd scenario: in Nazi Germany, part-Jewish doctors could still examine people, while animals had to be attended only by non-Jews.¹⁴¹

Although the bureaucratic battle over the admission of Mischlinge seemed to have been decided in favor of the Party Chancellery and regional Party offices, formal concession to the Reich Ministry of Education was still possible. In April 1943, the Party Chancellery warned the district leaders not to hinder the admission of quarter-Jews if no political reason existed.¹⁴² At local levels, rectors habitually registered quarter-Jews without asking the permission of Party chiefs. They found ready support in the professional bureaucrats in the Reich Ministry of Education, who continued to admit distinguished war veterans with half-Jewish backgrounds, despite the open rejection of the same applications by the Party Chancellery.¹⁴³

These concessions notwithstanding, Nazi policy tended towards constant radicalization. As the destruction of European Jews switched into the highest gear, the logic of genocide demanded tougher actions against part-Jews as well. In April 1944

¹⁴⁰ Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, p. 79; reference to the order in a letter by REM to Partei-Kanzlei, March 14, 1944, BA R 21/10876, p. 189.

¹⁴¹ Götz von Olenhusen, "Die nichtarischen Studenten," p. 201.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 202.

¹⁴³ See REM to Rektor der Universität München, January 8, 1944, BA Koblenz, R 21/10876, p. 97; Memorandum Kock, REM, March 14, 1944, BA Koblenz, R 21/10876, p. 193.

Hitler ordered a further restriction on the Mischlinge's public lives.¹⁴⁴ As a response to his general directive, the Reich Ministry of Education began in early May 1944 to register part-Jewish students and university teachers. The list served as the first step towards their expulsion.¹⁴⁵ Less than two weeks later, the REM finally reacted to Hitler's order of July 1942 and made services to the early Nazi movement a pre-requisite for admission of Mischlinge of the first degree to German universities.¹⁴⁶ This was the last major initiative by the central authority to limit the number of part-Jews at German universities. Since the majority of universities had closed their doors by late 1944, it is difficult to assess the impact of these orders on university attendance. Nevertheless, the direction of events was clear: had the regime lasted for one or two more years, there would have been no Mischlinge at German institutions of higher learning.

Unlike cases of full Jews being purged, Gentile students played a relatively minor role in the radicalization of Nazi policy towards part-Jews after 1938. As a result, Mischling students rarely experienced open discrimination from their non-Jewish comrades.¹⁴⁷ Nevertheless, the national student leadership, with its close connection to the Party Chancellery, continued to hold radical opinions on the issue of non-'Aryans'. It consistently tried to frustrate the desire of these students to begin or complete their studies. Only in rare cases did they allow personal considerations to override Party discipline and fanatically held political ideas. In one such case, they conceded to the

¹⁴⁴ Reichsminister und Chef der Reichskanzlei to Oberste Reichsbehörden, April 8, 1944, BA Koblenz, R 21/448, p. 46.

¹⁴⁵ RdErl. des REM vom 4.5.1944, BA Koblenz, R 21/729.

¹⁴⁶ RdErl. des REM vom 13. 5. 1944, UAB, Akten des Universitätskurators, Nr. 765.

request of the local leader of the NSDStB at the Technical University of Vienna, who recommended that his friend, Franz Partisch, should be allowed to continue his studies. Partisch was a Mischling of the first degree. Incidentally, he was also a Party member and worked in the leadership of the local NSDStB.¹⁴⁸ Changing military fortune did not lead to more leniency on the part of the national student leadership. Even in February 1944, at the prompting of the local student leader in Baden, the Reich Student Leadership demanded the expulsion of a “Jew,” probably a Mischling of the first degree, from the University of Heidelberg.¹⁴⁹

Academic administrators continued to play an important role in the implementation of Nazi policy towards part-Jews. The rectors’ evaluation of the look and character of the candidates remained vital for the approval or rejection of their applications.¹⁵⁰ Although the order of the Reich Ministry of Education in June 1942 underscored the definite decline of their power, the rectors, as the heads of the universities, still maintained a considerable amount of formal and informal influence.¹⁵¹ They were the first to evaluate the so-called racial characteristics of future students. During the admissions process, rectors paid extra attention to the pictures attached to each application and to the impressions that students made during interviews. Abdicating their duties as academics, they judged the candidates merely on the basis of their names and facial features. The latter factors operated as vastly

¹⁴⁷ Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, pp. 224-225.

¹⁴⁸ Dworzak, Studentenfürer der Technischen Hochschule Wien, to Rektor der Technischen Hochschule Wien, January 17, 1942, BA Koblenz, R 21/10877, p. 42.

¹⁴⁹ Reichsstudentenfürer to REM, September 2, 1944, BA Koblenz, R 21/10876, p. 194.

¹⁵⁰ RdErl. des REM vom 5.1.1940, BA Koblenz, R 21/448, p. 1.

¹⁵¹ See Hellmut Seier, “Der Rektor als Führer: Zur Hochschulpolitik des Reichserziehungsministeriums 1934-1943,” Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 12 (1964), pp. 105-146.

important symbols, activating moral and intellectual categories that had nothing to do with names and physical features. The rector at the University of Berlin, for example, described the appearance of Hans Rosenthal, a Mischling of the second degree, as typically Jewish. Although Hans Rosenthal had excellent recommendations from other agencies, which praised him as punctual, talented and ambitious, his name and physical appearance distracted the rector's attention and prompted him to reject his application.¹⁵² Trapped in the logic of racism, rectors invented such symbols, if no perceptible signs of ethnicity existed. For example, the head of the University of Giessen described Günther Selig's appearance as "not particularly Jewish, although the eyes show some Jewish features. In regards to his racial soul, he did not make the impression of a Jew, although I [the rector] had only a short time to observe."¹⁵³

In a few cases, the rectors were so sure of their expertise that they did not even need visible signs to identify the applicants. Generally, rectors tended to attribute norms of behavior and inclination to the ethnic origin rather than the social background, family tradition or the character of individuals. The head of the Technical University of Berlin, for example, argued in one case that "the characteristics of the Jewish race were clearly recognizable, if not in the appearance, in the attitude, of the applicant."¹⁵⁴ Similarly, the Dean of the Philosophy Faculty at the University of Breslau stated that the applicant,

¹⁵² Rektor der Universität Berlin to REM, [1940], UAB, Akten des Rektors und Senats, Nr. 1124.

¹⁵³ Rektor der Universität Giessen to REM, March 4, 1940, BA Koblenz, R 21/10873, p. 207.

¹⁵⁴ Rektor der Technischen Hochschule Berlin to REM, August 6, 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/19873, p. 554.

Walter Boehlich, “made an unmistakably Jewish impression. He had strong interests in arts and drama, as was usual in intellectually oriented Jewish circles.”¹⁵⁵

The admission process offered rectors an unprecedented opportunity to act out their prejudices. However, rectors could also use racial legislation as a pretext to achieve goals which had little to do with anti-Semitism. The rector of the University of Berlin, for example, used racial selection to enforce discipline at the institution. Thus, he rejected the application of a Mischling of the second degree with the following remark. “The applicant, who has one non-Aryan grandparent, shows only a few signs of the Jewish race. They are, however, clearly recognizable on the attached photograph. Fräulein Schirmer, although she makes the impression of a strong, healthy and very sporty person, failed to fulfill her work service. On this basis, I do not recommend her admission.”¹⁵⁶

Despite of their deep-seated prejudices, academic administrators must have felt confused when the future of their colleagues’ children was at stake. In such cases, they usually showed strong sympathies for the students and their parents. The case of Maria-Eugenie Ehrenberg is perhaps the best testimony to the survival of collegial solidarity among professors in the Third Reich. She was the granddaughter of Victor Ehrenberg, a law professor at the University of Göttingen. Her father, Rudolf Ehrenberg, was teaching medicine at the same institution. On the maternal side, however, she had a Jewish grandparent. The rector recommended her admission very warmly, describing her as an “Aryan,” who showed “much fewer signs of Jewish blood than the picture might

¹⁵⁵ Dekan der Philosophischen Fakultät to Rektor der Universität Breslau, February 5, 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/10874, p. 142.

suggest.”¹⁵⁷ In another case a similar warm recommendation was given by the rector of the University of Berlin to Michael Franck. According to his letter, Michael Franck came from a prominent intellectual family, whose roots he traced back to the sixteenth century. His grandfather, Philipp Franck, was a renowned painter and a professor of art, who, until his retirement in the late 1930s, directed an art college in Berlin. Michael Franck’s father, Heinrich Franck, had taught chemistry at the Technical University of Karlsruhe until his dismissal on the basis of the Jewish background of his wife in 1937. Apparently the dismissal did not end his career. At the time of his son’s application in 1941, he still headed an important research institution and was even decorated by the Nazi government for his service in the war effort. Franck’s mother also came from a prominent, albeit Jewish family. Her brother, Ernst Steinitz was a lecturer at the Technical University of Berlin before the outbreak of the First World War. According to Frank’s letter, his uncle was also a war hero, a pilot, shot down by the English and rescued by a German torpedo boat. It comes as no surprise that the rector wrote very respectfully about the achievements of this family. Although the rector knew that regulations prohibited the admission of Mischlinge of the first degree, he still supported Michael Franck’s application. The Reich Ministry of Education, however, made no exemption in this case and refused to admit him in 1941.¹⁵⁸

Collegial solidarity moved the rector at the Technical University of Karlsruhe to request the admission of Reiner Probst as well. According to his letter, Reiner Probst was

¹⁵⁶ Rektor der Universität Berlin to REM, April 9, 1940, UAB, Akten des Rektors und Senats, Nr. 1119, p. 269.

¹⁵⁷ Rektor der Universität Göttingen to REM, April 18, 1942, BA Koblenz, R 21/10878, p. 223.

the son of the distinguished scientist, Emil Probst, who resigned from the rectorship of the same institution only after the outbreak of the war because of the rumors circulated about his Jewish origins. His colleagues, however, considered his good ties to English scientists rather than his unproved Jewish background as the reason for his resignation. The rector of the university, in agreement with the majority of professors, asked the Reich Ministry of Education to take Emil Probst' scientific achievements into consideration and grant admission to his son.¹⁵⁹

Yet the fight over the admission and the premission for part-Jews to remain enrolled reflected not only the survival but also the gradual corrosion of collegial solidarity among German professors. At the University of Danzig, teachers became divided over the admission of Gerhard Schulze-Pillot, whose father had taught at the same institution until his possibly forced retirement on the basis of the Jewish origins of his wife in 1938. In a letter the rector asked the Ministry of Education to admit Gerhard Schulze-Pillot to a different university. This less than warm recommendation ensured that both the Party Chancellery and the REM rejected the application in May 1941.¹⁶⁰

Beside professional solidarity, friendship between teachers and students could also provide some protection against persecution. At the Technical University of Dresden, Walter König protected at least one Jewish student between 1935 and 1938.¹⁶¹ Horst Tietz, a Mischling of the first degree, was allowed to finish his studies at the University of

¹⁵⁸ Professor Heinrich Franck to REM, July 12, 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/10873, pp. 418-422.

¹⁵⁹ Rektor der Technischen Hochschule Karlsruhe to REM, January 23, 1942, BA Koblenz, R 21/10877, p. 169.

¹⁶⁰ Rektor der Technischen Hochschule Danzig to REM, May 21, 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/10874, p. 96; REM to Rektor der Technischen Hochschule Danzig, June 25, 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/10874, p. 98.

Hamburg thanks to his teachers.¹⁶² As the case of Siegfried Moll suggests, the protection of part-Jews often had nothing to do with their rejection of Nazism. This Mischling of the first degree was a student at the Technical University of Berlin. He also worked as an assistant to Gottfried Feder, a prominent early Nazi and co-author of the Party Program. Out of favor with Hitler, Feder became a professor at the Technical University of Berlin after 1934. Under his protection, Moll could register for years without even asking the permission of the Party Chancellery and the Reich Ministry of Education. Feder's illness left Siegfried Moll in a vulnerable position in 1940. Even on his deathbed, however, Feder was determined to defend his student. Despite sharp protests from the Party Chancellery, Feder ensured that his assistant was allowed to continue his studies and eventually graduate from the Technical University of Berlin.¹⁶³

Since early 1940, regional Party leaders and their staff became increasingly involved in the admission process. After December 1942, applicants had to request their recommendation as part of the admission requirements. The attitude of Party officials was generally negative. They used every possible excuse to prevent the admission of Mischlinge. A typical comment was the "non-German behavior and Jewish features of the applicant did not justify exceptional treatment."¹⁶⁴ Perhaps, the case of the sisters Ingeborg and Margot Pohrt demonstrates best the attitude of local Party officials towards Germans of partly Jewish origin. These two sisters, whose grandmother was Jewish, were

¹⁶¹ Matthias Lienert, "Die Studenten der Technischen Hochschule Dresden unter dem Nationalsozialismus," Dresdner Hefte: Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte 35 (1993), pp. 5-25.

¹⁶² Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 226.

students at the University of Berlin. The father, Hermann Pohrt, a distinguished lawyer and decorated war veteran, still possessed enough influence to obtain good recommendations from the Reich ministries and the university. However, he could not pull any strings at the regional Party office, where Nazi fanatics had been collecting information on the two sisters for months. In a letter to the Party Chancellery, local Nazis argued that the Pohrt sisters remained under the influence of their Jewish grandmother, in whose house they still lived. Not surprisingly, they demanded striking the Pohrt sisters' names from the list of students.¹⁶⁵

Local Party officials took an extremely hard-line position on the admission of part-Jewish students in the last two years of the war. Generally, they denied recommendation of half-Jews, even if they were decorated war veterans. Every possible excuse was used by local Party officials to prevent their admission: the candidates lacked special services to the Nazi movement, the question of part-Jews had not been finally decided, or that the very issue was of secondary importance in the circumstances of war.¹⁶⁶ Occasionally, they even obstructed the admission of Mischlinge of the second degree "on the basis of principles."¹⁶⁷ A letter from the regional Party leadership in Strasbourg in 1943 perhaps suffices to demonstrate their attitude. In this letter, a local Party official, Schuppel, first made some distasteful remarks about what he perceived as the typical Jewish face of the

¹⁶³ Siegfried Moll to Stellvertreter des Führers, April 21, 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/10873, pp.148-149; Rektor der Technischen Hochschule Berlin to REM, January 12, 1942, BA Koblenz, R 21/10875, p. 351.

¹⁶⁴ Götz von Olenhusen, "Die 'nichtarischen' Studenten," p. 202.

¹⁶⁵ Rektor der Universität Berlin to REM, June 11, 1941, BA Koblenz, R 21/10873, p. 283.

¹⁶⁶ See the case of Richard Fleisch at the University of Frankfurt am Main, REM to NSDAP Partei-Kanzlei, February 10, 1943, BA Koblenz, R 21/10879, pp. 114-115.

applicant. Then, he emphasized that an uncompromising attitude on the issue of part-Jews had to be maintained. He finally closed the letter with the statement that the Nazi Party rejected as a matter of principle that quarter-Jews could study at institutions of higher learning.¹⁶⁸

The increasing radicalization of the Nazi regime had a devastating impact on the number of part-Jewish students. Lists of part-Jewish students and teachers, drawn up on Hitler's order, contained only 93 half-Jewish students in May 1944. There were also 346 Mischlinge of the second degree and 9 part-Jews of foreign citizenship. Certain universities such as the University of Berlin, University of Heidelberg, the University of Vienna and the Technical University of Vienna, which had attracted a large number of Jewish and part-Jewish students before the Nazi takeover of power in 1933, still registered the majority of Mischlinge in 1944. Apart from tradition, it is possible that part-Jewish students were attracted to large universities because the anonymity of big cities and universities offered them a better chance to evade Nazi control. Their enrollment was disrupted at the University of Hamburg and the University of Frankfurt am Main, however, where there remained only a few part-Jews by the end of war. On the other hand, many universities such as Erlangen, Bonn, Rostock, Würzburg, Kiel, Posen and the Medical Academy of Düsseldorf had no part-Jewish students at all.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁷ NSDAP Gauleitung, Baden-Elsass to Rektor der Universität Heidelberg, December 23, 1943, BA Koblenz, R 21/10876, p. 181.

¹⁶⁸ Schuppel, Leiter des Gaupersonalamtes, NSDAP Gauleitung Strassburg, to Rektor der Universität Heidelberg, August 11, 1943, BA Koblenz, R 21/10876, p. 45.

¹⁶⁹ See "Verzeichnis der zum Studium zugelassenen Mischlinge," BA Koblenz, R 21/729.

This chapter has shown that the expulsion of Jewish students was made possible in part by the cooperation of students and university administrators. The willingness of these groups to accept and even anticipate the wishes of the Nazi government often blurred the lines between traditional anti-Semitism, represented by academic administrators and perhaps the majority of students, and Nazi “redemptive anti-Semitism.” Nevertheless, these lines were never completely eradicated. The Nazi government did not simply seek to satisfy the demand of students and academic administrators: its proclaimed goals were to achieve the racial selection of the student body.

The tightening of admission requirements, mistreatment by academic administrators and, most importantly, prohibitions on the practicing of their future professions led to a drastic reduction in the number of Jewish students in the first years after the Nazi takeover. As the last Jews left the German universities in the wake of the November Pogrom of 1938, the attention of Nazi authorities turned to part-Jews. Here, however, ideological uncertainty about the definition of non-‘Aryan’, coupled with pressures from the German elite, worked in the opposite direction: foot-dragging on the part of academic administrators and bureaucrats in the Reich ministries and the lack of support for radical measures from the majority of students prevented the complete elimination of Mischlinge from the universities. This failure demonstrated the limits of racial selection as an educational instrument: the Nazis failed to turn the majority of students and academic administrators into racial fanatics. Nevertheless, we should not exaggerate the importance of this failure. During the last three years of the war, the Party Chancellery slowly succeeded in demolishing the resistance of conservatives. As a result of

this erosion process, the Nazi regime almost completely eliminated the last vestiges of Jewish presence at German universities.

Conclusion

In this dissertation, I have argued that the concept of selection played a central role in Nazi thinking about university students. As a programmatic element in Nazi ideology, the concept of selection served, to paraphrase Marx, not only as a tool to interpret the world but also as a means to change it. In its Nazi usage, selection referred to, and justified, two sets of political practices: the elimination of people of so-called lesser value on the one hand, and support for the full members of the 'national community' and the future leaders of the Nazi Party and state on the other. These leaders had to be not only racially pure and healthy but also had to prove their usefulness and exceptional loyalty to the Nazi regime.

In the field of Nazi education policy selection procedures fulfilled additional goals. By demonstrating the theoretically total power of the Nazi state over individuals, these procedures served to preclude student opposition to Hitler's regime. Second, selection procedures sought to reinforce the ties between the Nazi regime and its ideologically most committed supporters. Third, measures, especially those aimed at the removal of both reputedly unhealthy and non-'Aryan' students, provided an ideal opportunity for the Nazi regime to co-opt doctors, academic administrators and students, who, by assuming responsibility for the enforcement of the selection procedures (either because they had wanted to keep their jobs or simply because they enjoyed exercising power), became the *de facto* local representatives of the Nazi regime.

I have argued that Nazi ideological infiltration could be detected in the areas of student aid, Nazi policy towards foreign students, health services and Nazi policy towards non-‘Aryan’ students. Already in early 1933, the Ministry of the Interior ordered the expulsion of non-‘Aryans’, Marxists and pacifists from the list of recipients of scholarships distributed by universities, student organizations and various ministries. The same order stipulated that the Old Fighters among students should be given priority over others during the distribution of social assistance. In December 1933, the German Student-Aid Foundation published its new guidelines, which confirmed the validity of earlier discriminatory measures against non-‘Aryans’ and the politically unreliable. However, the imposition of new restrictions did not stop at the end of 1933. In the second half of the 1930s, reputedly unhealthy, and later Catholic and Protestant theology students experienced discrimination during the distribution of social support. Connected to these measures was the attempt of the DStW to centralize student aid. The goals of this centralization were twofold: it served to make the distribution of student aid more equitable and it attempted to complete the politicization of all forms of social support.

The impact of Nazi ideology on the treatment of foreign students was initially much less obvious. Recognizing their diplomatic and economic value, the new Nazi government first tried to prevent Nazi activists from harassing foreign students. The DAAD and various state and Party organizations also orchestrated a propaganda campaign to convince foreign governments that the lives of foreign students did not change significantly after 1933. Indeed, until the outbreak of the Second World War, the Nazis confined their activities to the distribution of propaganda literature among foreign

students and the organization of social events and political lectures for them. This relatively neutral stance changed dramatically after the outbreak of war. After September 1939, the Reich Ministry of Education initiated a highly selective admissions policy. The goal of this policy was to encourage students from the so-called Germanic states of occupied Western Europe, such as the Netherlands, to study in Germany, while barring students from the enemy states of Eastern Europe. Second, after the attack on the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, the SS introduced procedures aimed at the selection of what was termed racially valuable and politically reliable Eastern Europeans for university studies in the Third Reich. With this policy, the SS pursued two goals. On the one hand, Nazi authorities wanted to entice young and talented Eastern Europeans to renounce their nationality and remain in the Third Reich, thus mitigating its acute need for professionals. On the other hand, selection aimed at creating a future colonial elite, willing to exploit their co-nationals in order to bring benefits to the population of a new and racially-based German empire.

The Nazi concept of selection also provides the key for understanding the transformation of student health services under the Third Reich. Under pressure from the DStW, the DSt and various Party and state organizations, the REM made medical examinations compulsory for students by a federal law in early 1935. The Nazi state advocated this measure as an important step towards the racial improvement of the student population. Second, in December 1935, the REM ordered the rectors to expel students who fell under the Law for the Alteration of the Law for the Prevention of Hereditary Diseased Progeny of 26 June 1935. Lastly, Nazi ideological penetration

manifested itself in the transformation of various insurance funds which denied benefits to seriously ill students after 1935.

In the last chapter, I argued that the measures taken against non-‘Aryan’ students cannot be reduced to an attempt by the Nazi regime to ameliorate the negative effects of the Great Depression on students. On the contrary, Nazi policy towards non-‘Aryan’ students was informed by an ideological concern: the determination of the Nazi leadership to cleanse the German body politic of Jews as an important step towards the realization of the Nazi ‘national community’. In the case of students, the process of discrimination began with the imposition of restrictions on the admission of non-‘Aryans’ and soon encompassed barring graduates from entering various professions. As a sign of its obsession with the so-called Jewish Question, the Party Chancellery continued its anti-Semitic campaign even after the expulsion of the last Jewish students in November 1938. However, its target shifted from full Jews to assimilated Mischlinge, who experienced increasing discrimination both during their admission to universities and during their employment after graduation.

Together these measures suggest that ideological concerns played a vital role in setting the goals of Nazi policy towards students. The existence of these measures says little, however, about their results. The first chapter has shown that the Nazi state, by failing to provide adequate support for average students, missed the opportunity to ingratiate itself with members of this important section of the population. Moreover, student aid may have been enough to tie some Nazis closer to Hitler’s regime but it could not satisfy the financial needs of every student activist. Thus, student aid remained of

secondary importance as an inducement for students to enter the leadership corps of Nazi organizations. Further, the lack of adequate support from the central government frustrated the dreams of student activists in the German Student-Aid Foundation, who wanted to use certain branches of student aid such as dormitories and student eateries to expand Nazi control over the private lives of students. The same organization also failed to centralize student aid and hence prevent apolitical students from receiving financial assistance from universities and private institutions. Finally, the use of student aid to reward political loyalty led to an unprecedented corruption of distribution practices, which further disillusioned average students with respect to the social policy of the Nazi regime.

Bureaucratic infighting, so typical of the Third Reich, coupled with Nazi Germany's changing fortunes in the war, worked against the realization of the goals of Nazi policy towards foreign students as well. Already in the second half of the 1930s, the Social Darwinian struggles among constantly shifting power bases, such as the SA, the AA, the Ministry of Propaganda, the Ministry of the Interior and the Nazi student organizations, seriously weakened the power of the Reich Ministry of Education and the DAAD over foreign students. This process continued after the outbreak of the Second World War, during which the Reich Central Security Office of the SS became the most important organization to set the long-term goals of Nazi policy towards foreign students. However, the results of this bureaucratic chaos were not always negative. Many Eastern Europeans used the opportunity offered by the declining power of the REM to circumvent its orders and get admitted to German universities. At the same time, the changing fortunes of the war, the low quality of Nazi administrators in the occupied territories and

the resistance of young people in the occupied countries ensured that the SS would not be able to put its plans for the assimilation of thousands of the so-called racially desirable and politically loyal Eastern European students into practice. In Nazi Germany itself, the treatment of foreign students became a controversial issue during the war. While there was a general agreement among Party and state organizations on the diplomatic and economic value of foreign students between 1933 and 1939, this consensus was rapidly breaking down during the war. The main cause of friction between Party and state organizations was the increasingly common sexual contacts between foreign students and German women. Although university administrators and bureaucrats in the REM and other ministries prevented Nazi fanatics from unleashing their full wrath upon foreign students, they were much less successful in protecting German female students, many of whom fell victim to the jealousy of their male counterparts and to the ideological orthodoxy of die-hard Nazis during the war.

Furthermore, the Nazification of student health services failed to bring the desired results. A lack of agreement on the question of which organization should be in control of the medical examinations of students undermined the effectiveness of these procedures during the first two years of the Nazi regime. Finally, in February 1935, the Reich Ministry of Education officially recognized medical examinations as a permanent part of the admissions process. By then, as a result of the Röhm Affair in the summer of 1934, the SA University Office, which had been conducting the screenings after the Nazi takeover, was eliminated. Its responsibilities were taken over by the German Student-Aid Foundation, which supervised the procedures from then on. The settlement of bureaucratic disputes,

however, did not guarantee a smooth execution of medical examinations. In fact, students, doctors and academic administrators began sabotaging the procedures as early as 1935. Although the screenings were regularly carried out at most universities, the negligence of student administrators who were in charge of registering their results ensured that medical examinations could not fulfill their function as the basis of a tight and all encompassing system of medical control. As a continuation of these tendencies, medical examinations were either neglected or reduced to basic procedures during the last years of the war. At the same time, rectors expelled less than a hundred students from German universities on the basis of Nazi health laws. Originally envisioned as a means to create a physically superior elite, the system of biological selection proved counterproductive in its implementation. The coercive aspects of the examination and the lower benefits paid out by health and accident funds exacerbated existing health problems and alienated many students from the Nazi regime.

The hesitation of university administrators and bureaucrats in the education ministries both to punish foreign students for their violation of racial laws and to expel German students who could not pass the medical examinations contrasts sharply with the determination of the same authorities to expel full Jews after 1933. As a result of the education ministries' and university authorities' resolute stand on what was called the Jewish question, the number of Jewish students declined rapidly after January 1933. This decline suggests that Nazi policy towards Jewish students was successful in other respects as well. By turning academic administrators into enforcers, Nazi leaders co-opted, and at the same time switched part of the responsibility onto, people who did not necessarily

share their brand of anti-Semitism. This co-option, however, proved much less successful after the expulsion of full Jews in November 1938. With their expulsion, the already fragile consensus on the treatment of non-‘Aryan’ students began to break down. On the one hand, Nazi fanatics, mainly in the Party Chancellery turned their attention to part-Jews as their next target. On the other hand, the Reich Education Ministry and academic administrators, supported by the majority of students, considered the matter closed; therefore, they sought to prevent the expulsion of part-Jews. In the ensuing bureaucratic struggles, abetted in part by Hitler’s inability or unwillingness to clarify the issue of part-Jews, the Party Chancellery gradually won out and came very close to achieving its goal, the complete expulsion of part-Jews. While racial fanatics, with Hitler’s support, won the bureaucratic battles, they failed, however, to convince the majority of students and academic administrators of the correctness of their views. Thus, rather than eliciting additional support, the continuing harassment of part-Jews increased the alienation of students and academic administrators from the Nazi regime.

This dissertation has shown that the selection procedures that the Nazi regime introduced in four important areas proved to be only partially successful. Since the politically inspired selection of students was not confined to the four areas, in the remaining part of the conclusion I will compare the results of my research with the conclusions of other authors who have examined the additional measures that served to select students. These measures included: the purging of the student body of its politically unreliable members, making political reliability a criterion of admission to universities, herding students into Nazi organizations and forcing them to participate in Labor Service.

There is a general agreement among historians that the purges of politically unreliable students were, at best, only partially successful. According to Grüttner, only 548 individuals (0.5 percent of the total number of students at regular and technical universities in the winter semester of 1932/33) were expelled on the basis of their previous political affiliations during the first two years of Nazi rule. Moreover, as the dust settled after the most turbulent phase of the Nazi Revolution, many of them were readmitted to universities. Thus, even if we take into consideration the fact that many students had left the universities in fear of persecution, as well as other forms of discrimination, such as the denial of student aid to the politically unreliable, the results of the purges were anything but revolutionary. Although the Nazi state continued to punish its political opponents with expulsion from universities (it expelled a few students who sympathized with the Röhm Putsch in the summer of 1934 and removed an equally insignificant number of dissenters who opposed the regime on mainly religious grounds), the purges of the student body contributed little to the creation of a politically more loyal and supportive student population.¹

The failure of the purges mirrored the fate of Nazi measures aimed at making selection a permanent part of the admissions process. At the end of 1933, the Reich Ministry of the Interior put a limit on the number of high-school graduates to be admitted to universities. The same decree stipulated that only politically reliable candidates should receive the Notice of Maturity (Hochschulreifevermerk), which would allow them to

¹ See Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, pp. 206-212, 504; Bernward Vieten, Medizinstudenten in Münster: Universität, Studentenschaft und Medizin 1905-1945, Cologne, 1982, p. 342.

enroll at universities and that Old Fighters should be given priority over apolitical candidates.² While historians generally agree that this order marked a new stage in the politicization of admissions requirements, they also recognize that the short-term results of this order were limited. At many high schools, lower quality students among the Hitler Youth failed to obtain the Notice of Maturity and hence they were denied admittance to universities. On the other hand, after 1934 the rapid decline in the number of students made academic administrators more reluctant to expel, or to prevent the enrollment of, students who showed less than total enthusiasm for the Nazi regime.

Nevertheless, political reliability as a criterion of admission did not disappear after 1934, but continued to figure prominently in the agenda of state and Party organizations. After 1935, the REM used the same principle to stop the decline of small-town universities, many of which were quite adversely affected by the drop in students' numbers after the Nazi takeover. Between 1935 and 1938, the REM imposed a restriction on the number of students at seven regular and three technical universities. The purpose of this policy was to induce students who were not allowed to enroll or renew their student status at these institutions to transfer to small-town universities. At the same time, the REM decreed in 1936 that Old Fighters, the members of the Army and Party organizations as well as students who had studied at the frontier universities of Königsberg and Breslau should be given preference during the admissions process. Inspired by these measures and, at the same time, responding to the demands of radical Nazis, the student leader at the University of Berlin, supported by the rector of the same university, Wilhelm Krüger, took

² Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, p. 237.

matters into his hands and ordered that only students who were members of Nazi organizations could register for the winter semester of 1936/37.

However, both central and local initiatives to restrict student numbers failed to achieve their purpose for several reasons. First, the REM's orders limited student numbers at only ten big-city universities. Thus, students who had been denied admission could still transfer to other big-city universities, which were not included in the REM's list. Second, they failed because the number of students had declined so rapidly that there were not enough students to fulfill the quotas at the ten largest universities. Finally, the local initiative at the University of Berlin floundered because of the resistance of university teachers and the majority of students, whose protest forced the REM to order local student leaders to stop meddling in the admissions process. With this debacle the movement for the politicization of admissions requirements suffered a serious setback. Although the Reich Student Leadership continued to argue that admission should be contingent on membership in Nazi organizations, the Party Chancellery, worrying about the possible impact of such regulations on students, refused to grant their request until the end of the regime.³

Besides the politicization of admission criteria, it was mandatory membership in Nazi organizations that offered the Nazi regime the best means to select students on the basis of their political commitments. While the overwhelming majority of students probably became members of the NSDAP or its auxiliary organizations (unfortunately, no reliable statistics exist in this regard), historians generally agree that membership in Nazi

organizations alone did not automatically translate into enthusiastic support for Hitler's regime. Indeed, the majority of students resented the pressure that first the SA, and then later the NSDStB, put on them to enter their organizations. Some acquiesced to avoid harassment by Nazi activists. Others entered the NSDStB or the Nazi Party because membership gave them a better chance to obtain student aid. Many more joined the NSDAP and its auxiliary organizations to remove any possible barrier to their employment in the state service after graduation. While these rational calculations did not necessarily preclude ideological commitments, complaints of local Party leaders, especially during the war, show that it was fear and opportunism rather than fanaticism that pushed most students to enter and remain in the Nazi Party.⁴

Finally, the Nazis perceived mandatory labor service as an important instrument of selection in the Third Reich. From Easter 1934, both male and female high-school graduates who wished to enroll at university had to spend six months in the Labor Service. The goal of the Labor Service was to facilitate the economic recovery and to provide work for unemployed youth. Its second function was to bring the children of the lower classes together with those of the upper classes in order to usher in a future society ostensibly free of class antagonism. In addition, the Labor Service provided camp leaders with an opportunity to keep unworthy candidates away from the universities. It was these

³ Ibid., pp. 238-239.

⁴ Arminger, "Involvement of German Students in Nazi Organization," p. 15. Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, pp. 240-244.

last two functions that were responsible for the early introduction of labor service for university students.⁵

Historians tend to agree that the Labor Service failed to fulfill the hopes of Nazi radicals. Henning Köhler argues that labor service, because of low productivity, disorganization and compulsion, made an insignificant contribution to economic recovery. Although labor camps, where life was organized along military lines, provided an ideal opportunity for indoctrination, the results often fell short of expectations. Most camp leaders (many of them alcoholic ex-soldiers and officers who had failed to find their way back to civil society after the end of the First World War) could not command the respect of the rank-and-file. Sources suggest that they also took pleasure in humiliating students. Moreover, young workers frequently shared the camp leaders' contempt for students, who tended to be younger and less adept at physical work than their working-class counterparts. They also resented the haughtiness and snobbery of both male and female students, who liked to remind workers of their higher social status and their presumably superior culture. Thus, it comes as no surprise that labor camps failed to endear both workers and students to the Nazi idea of 'national community'. Similarly, the Labor Service could not fulfill its function as an instrument of selection of students. Most rectors ignored the requests of camp leaders to prohibit the enrollment of students who had received only a satisfactory or unsatisfactory rating. As a result, only a few dozen students were denied admissions to university or expelled on the basis of such ratings before 1939,

⁵ Compulsory labor service for all young men was introduced only in June 1935 and for all women only in September 1939.

and their numbers did not increase significantly during the war. The low number of expelled students suggests that labor service failed to contribute significantly to the Nazification of the student body.⁶

Since the Nazi regime generally attached great importance to the realization of its ideological goals, one may ask why the Nazi state failed to pursue its plan to create a new genus of student with more determination. One of the reasons for this failure was that Hitler himself took little interest in student affairs. Perhaps motivated by the embarrassing memories of his youth when he had tried unsuccessfully to gain admission to the Academy of Arts in Vienna, Hitler had developed a deep dislike for students well before his rise to power. In his memoirs, Baldur von Schirach relates a story about Hitler, who first refused to speak in front of a student audience in Munich in 1927, because he did not believe that they would be receptive to his brand of socialism.⁷ In spite of the electoral successes of the NSDStB on campuses before 1933, there is very little evidence to suggest that Hitler later changed his mind about students. Apart from sporadic interventions, such as in the case of the Kameradschaften, he continued to remain aloof from student affairs after 1933. His last speech before a student audience was held on the tenth anniversary of the NSDStB in January 1936, and even on that occasion he neglected to talk about student issues. As an indication of his continuing disregard for student affairs, Hitler did not give the Reich

⁶ See Henning Köhler, Arbeitsdienst in Deutschland: Pläne und Verwirklichungsformen der Arbeitsdienstpflicht im Jahre 1935, Berlin, 1967, pp. 243-268; Stefan Bajohr, "Weiblicher Arbeitsdienst im 'Dritten Reich': Ein Konflikt zwischen Ideologie und Ökonomie," Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 28 (1980), pp. 331-357; Wolfgang Benz, "Vom freiwilligen Arbeitsdienst zur Arbeitsdienstpflicht," Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 16 (October 1968), pp. 317-346; Peter Dudek, Erziehung durch Arbeit: Arbeitslagerbewegung und freiwilliger Arbeitsdienst 1920-1935, Opladen, 1988; Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich, pp. 227-237.

Student Leader, Gustav Adolf Scheel (who held this position from 1936), an audience until the end of the Nazi regime.⁸

Among Nazi leaders, Rudolf Hess and his Office of the Deputy Führer paid more attention to student affairs. Although both Hess, and later Martin Bormann as head of the Party Chancellery, sympathized with the goals of Nazi students, who wanted to destroy traditional hierarchies within the universities and complete the Nazification of the student body, they also knew that the further politicization of admissions criteria and student life would have a negative effect on the enrollment and quality of students. Therefore, they supported the plans of Nazi students only selectively. For instance, they backed Nazi student leaders who wanted to gain more power over administrative matters such as the appointment of teachers. They showed more reluctance, however, when it came to supporting initiatives like more student aid, which would have diverted financial resources from, and hindered, rearmament and later the war effort. On the other hand, the education ministries, and following its establishment in May 1934, the Reich Ministry of Education, steered a much more conservative course. The Reich Minister of Education, Bernhard Rust and his advisors, such as professor Wilhelm Groh (an administrator in the same ministry) and the civil servant Hans Huber, placed more emphasis on bureaucratic orderliness and discipline. Although they wanted to transform the university and student

⁷ Baldur von Schirach, *Ich glaubte an Hitler*, Hamburg, 1967, pp. 45-46, 56-59.

⁸ Grüttner, *Studenten im Dritten Reich*, p. 87.

life on the basis of Nazi principles, they also wanted the process to be gradual and one which the REM could control.⁹

The bureaucratic struggles between radical Nazi students, relying on the less-than-total support of the Party Chancellery on the one hand, and conservative university teachers, usually backed by the REM and various education ministries on the other, became a permanent feature of Nazi education policy until the end of the regime. In these fights, the REM had two serious handicaps. First, Bernhard Rust, a secondary-school teacher by profession, was never popular with other Nazi leaders. Rust had a reputation as an alcoholic and a man of limited intelligence and weak will. Second, the REM lacked support within the Nazi Party. Although in the second half of the 1930s the administrators in the REM developed close ties with the Army and the SS, these contacts did not discourage the Nazi Party, and especially the Party Chancellery, from attacking and taking over fields of responsibility from the REM.

The conflict between the REM and the Party Chancellery is too complex to be described here in detail. It is sufficient to say that this bureaucratic rivalry (which concerned preserving and extending their respective spheres of influence and disagreements over the pace of change more than the ultimate goals of the Nazi regime) ended in something like a draw. After a short revolutionary period, which saw Nazi students ordering the dismissal of teachers and burning books, academic administrators regained the initiative. Under their pressure, the REM put a limit on students' involvement

⁹ Hellmut Seier, "Universität und Hochschulpolitik im national-sozialistischen Staat," in Klaus Malettke ed., Der Nationalsozialismus an der Macht: Aspekte nationalsozialistischer Politik und Herrschaft,

in hiring policies but failed to completely domesticate Nazi students. The REM could not annul Hess' order, which had given the NSDStB full power over the ideological, political and physical training of the whole student body in July 1934. Because of the strong ties between the Party and the NSDStB, the REM was forced to remain a bystander during the fight between the fraternities and the two Nazi student organizations during the next two years. Moreover, instead of losing power, Nazi students actually solidified and even slowly increased their gains after the appointment of Gustav Adolf Scheel to the position of Reich Student Leader in November 1936. A physician, fanatical Nazi, SS officer and, most importantly, an astute politician, Scheel put an end to the rivalry between the two student organizations by merging the leadership of the DSt and the NSDStB at both the local and central levels. This union further reduced the power of the academic administrators and the REM over student affairs, since now it was Scheel who appointed the local leaders of the student federation. As an indication of Scheel's growing influence over education policy, the Reich Student Leadership took over the RStW from the REM in 1938. During the war, Scheel's functionaries began infiltrating the REM by slowly taking over important positions in the ministry. In 1941, two functionaries from Scheel's entourage were appointed as trustees at the universities of Posen and Strasbourg. A year later, the Reich Student Leadership assumed authority over the DAAD. By 1944, the Party Chancellery seriously considered replacing Rust with Scheel as the Reich Minister of Education. Given the support that Scheel enjoyed, both in the Party Chancellery and the SS, there can be no

doubt that had the Nazi regime survived, Scheel would have become the new Reich Minister of Education.¹⁰

The increasing power of the Reich Students Leadership, buttressed by the Party Chancellery's support on most issues, further undermined the authority of the beleaguered REM. However, Nazi students did not possess enough power to achieve the total politicization of the university and student life. They continued to face enormous opposition from conservative university teachers and administrators, who had been raised on, and had serious difficulties in completely abandoning, the idea of academic freedom. Moreover, the totalitarian drive of fanatical Nazis in the NSDStB and the DSt evoked a negative reaction among the majority of fellow students. In the second half of the 1930s, this negative reaction increasingly manifested itself in what Giles calls the "students' apathy."¹¹ The social and political requirements of rearmament and radical Nazi expansionism worked in favor of those students who wanted to escape regimentation and control. Preoccupied with declining student numbers and a shortage of academic professions, after 1935, the Nazi state had showed reluctance to support measures that would only have exacerbated these problems. The outbreak of the war strengthened this tendency. As members of the armed forces, male students who had the chance to study for a few semesters, could rely upon the army's protection against Nazi fanatics at universities. Moreover, the mass drafting of leaders and administrators into the army seriously weakened Nazi student organizations, which remained the most radical

¹⁰ See Grüttner, *Studenten im Dritten Reich*, pp. 87-100.

¹¹ Giles, *Students and National Socialism*, pp. 317-318.

advocates of indoctrination and control on the campuses. During the war, these organizations rapidly lost the respect of an increasingly apathetic and apolitical student body. However, this apathy did not lead to massive resistance by students against the Nazi regime: the five students who made up the core of the “White Rose” movement in Munich and who paid with their lives for their courageous actions, unfortunately did not speak for the majority of students.¹² Nevertheless, the growing indifference of students made it clear to Nazi educators and student activists that they had failed in their mission: they could not create a new genus of student, who, inspired by Nazi ideas, would be prepared to fight for the Nazi cause until the very end.

¹² See Christian Petry, Studenten aufs Schafott: Die Weisse Rose und ihr Scheitern, Munich, 1968.

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V. Akten lokaler Studentenfürhungen
Gestapostelle Würzburg
SD-Hauptausenstelle Würzburg
- UAJ Universitätsarchiv Jena
Rektor und Senat
Kurator (C)
- THSA Thüringisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Weimar
Thüringisches Volksbildungsministerium (C)
- UAK Universitätsarchiv Köln
Studentenschaft und Studentenwerk
Rektor und Senat
Kurator

BHSA	Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Bayerisches Volksbildungsministerium (MK)
UAM	Universitätsarchiv München Senat Studentenschaft und Studentenwerk
UAE	Universitätsarchiv Erlangen Studentenschaft und Studentenwerk Hochschulzeitungen Rektor und Senat
SHSA	Sächsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden Akten des Sächs. Min. für Volksbildung
TH Dresden	Technische Hochschule Dresden Rektor und Senat Kurator Philosophische Fakultät
UAB	Universitätsarchiv Berlin Rektor und Senat Kurator
IHK	Institut für Hochschulkunde, Würzburg Student press and other published material
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





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