

**IMPLEMENTING NORAD, 1956-1962:
THE BUREAUCRATIC TUG OF WAR FOR ACCESS AND
INFLUENCE**

By

Robert Douglas Allin, B. A.

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
and Research In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts

Department of History
Carleton University
Ottawa, Canada
15 March, 1998

Copyright, @ 1998
R. D. Allin



National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Acquisitions et
services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-32355-2

ABSTRACT

This thesis is an analysis of the conceptions, misconceptions and intrigues which underpinned the adoption and execution of the North American Air Defence Command by the Canadian government. The study begins in December 1956, when a proposal to formally integrate the air defences of the continent under a single American commander was introduced as a serious topic for consideration within various departments of the Canadian government, and ends in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis. Throughout the period in question, the Departments of External Affairs, National Defence and the Privy Council Office all played crucial parts in managing the NORAD file. Differences between External and National Defence over the proper interpretation of the accord led not only to strained interdepartmental relations, but also to the political embarrassment of the Diefenbaker government in 1958 and to unrealistic expectations of American consultation during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In a project such as this, though only one person bears the responsibility for what appears between the covers, many more deserve recognition for their individual contributions to the final product.

First, I should like to thank my parents, Paula and Scott, who instilled in me a great appreciation for history. By the time I was sixteen, our dinner-time discussions were on par with any undergraduate history or political science seminar.

Next, I have to thank Dr. Norman Hillmer who supervised this academic endeavor. He forced me to keep my focus narrow and deep, stick to the facts of the case at hand and expunge the worst excesses of my prose. Throughout the process he seemed to know when to push and, more importantly, when to give me the time to wander around in the intellectual wilderness to sort things out. And while we are in the Carleton History Department, I should also acknowledge Joan White who helped me enormously when I first arrived in Ottawa jet lagged and in culture shock. Without her help throughout my M. A. my life would have been more difficult by at least a factor of ten.

Last, but most importantly, I want to recognize the contribution of my wife Lea. We spent our first year of marriage in a less than ideal situation; me researching and writing my thesis in Ottawa while she did her education degree in Toronto. When I hit a rough spot in writing she could always provide the encouraging words which made it easier to go back to the keyboard. At one point near the end she even barred me from travelling to Toronto until the manuscript was done. With an incentive like that, I was done in six days and on a bus. To her I owe much more than words on a page can ever express.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abbreviations	vi
Introduction	1
Chapter I: Dig In, 1956-1957	14
Chapter II: Pull, 1957-1958	44
Chapter III: In The Mud, 1958-1962	77
Conclusion	96
Bibliography	100

ABBREVIATIONS

CINCNORAD	Commander-in-Chief, NORAD
CUSRPG	Canada-United States Regional Planning Group, NATO
CCOS	Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, Canada
CDC	Cabinet Defence Committee, Canada
DEA	Department of External Affairs, Canada
DEW	Distant Early Warning Line
DL(1)D	Defence Liaison 1 Division, Department of External Affairs
DL(2)D	Defence Liaison 2 Division, Department of External Affairs
DND	Department of National Defence, Canada
JCD	Joint Committee on Defence, Canada/USA
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff, USA
JSW	Joint Staff Washington, Canada
MCC	Military Cooperation Committee, Canada/USA
MND	Minister of National Defence, Canada
MSG	Military Study Group, Canada/USA
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORAD	North American Air Defence Command, Canada/USA
PCO	Privy Council Office, Canada
PJBD	Permanent Joint Board on Defence, Canada/USA
PM	Prime Minister, Canada
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe, NATO
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, NATO

SG	Standing Group, NATO
SGLO	Standing Group Liaison Officer, NATO
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, NATO
SSEA	Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada
USSEA	Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada

INTRODUCTION

This thesis attempts an analysis of the conceptions, misconceptions and intrigues which underpinned the adoption and execution of the North American Air Defence Agreement by the Canadian government. This study begins in December 1956, when a proposal to formally integrate the air defences of the continent under a single American commander was introduced as a serious topic for consideration within various departments of the Canadian Government, and ends in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis. The story here, based on recently released Canadian government documents, explores a largely unexplored topic in Canadian history and contributes to a fuller understanding of Canadian foreign and defence policy during the Diefenbaker years, serving as a useful demonstration of the complexities and competing interests faced by the bureaucracy and the politicians.

The controversy which surrounded the implementation of the North American Air Defence agreement is a clear demonstration of the systemic and personal difficulties experienced by Canadian governments in the conduct of post-war Canadian-American relations. World War II had fundamentally altered Canada's international outlook. The isolationism which characterized Canada's inter-war external relations was replaced by active international engagement. In 1941, Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King and American President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced a turning point in the continental relationship. Through the Ogdensburg Declaration, both countries agreed to the setting up of a new bilateral forum for the co-ordination of North American defence planning.¹ This

¹ C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945*, (Ottawa, 1970). See chapter VI for the roots of the Declaration and the PJBD's first years of operation.

new body, which was called the *Permanent* Joint Board on Defence, implicitly recognized that Canadian/American defence relations had turned a corner and that a certain level of military integration would persist in the post-War period.²

The Cold War had imposed new sets of alliances, not to mention constraints. Canada's enthusiastic participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ratified in 1949, was in a sense, as much an expression of Canadian concerns about American international intentions as it was with the Soviet threat. The American nuclear monopoly immediately after the war made the U. S. at first the *de facto*, and after 1949, the *de jure* guarantor of the Western democracies but also heightened Canadian sensitivities about the asymmetries of power in the new continental relationship. NATO provided a forum of like-minded states where members were theoretically equal, and Canada could work in concert with others to guard against American dominance. As former Canadian diplomat turned academic John Holmes phrased it, Canada sought to "bring the Old World to redress the overwhelming imbalance of the New."³

The Cold War security paradigm demanded that the potential for further extension of the Soviet sphere in Central Europe by conventional armies be countered by a U.S. willingness and capability to meet any such attempt with massive nuclear responses. In the 1950's, with Soviet advances in nuclear and bomber technology, a new constraint was placed on Canada's policy options. "Once the United States, rightly or wrongly, considered itself threatened by direct Soviet attack across Canada, the option of military

² W.R. Willoughby provides a functional analysis of the PJBD from creation until the 1970's in, *The Joint Organizations of Canada and the United States*, (Toronto, 1979).

³ J. Holmes, "A Diplomatic Assessment," in J. L. Granatstein (ed.), *Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite?*, (Toronto 1969), p. 41.

neutrality was foreclosed.”⁴ Canada was not a grudging but rather a cautious partner in the air defence of North America, having accepted certain mutual security obligations through the NATO treaty. In recognizing that the U.S. nuclear retaliatory forces of the Strategic Air Command had to be protected from a preemptive strike, a sovereignty dilemma arose.

Canada [had] willingly assumed two basic responsibilities: aiding the United States in defending North America through a variety of continental defence arrangements; and helping the Strategic Air Command—NATO’s offensive punch—meet its continuing objective of preparing for an air-atomic offensive against the Soviet Union in the event of war. At the same time, however, Canadian leaders were acutely sensitive to the need to protect Canada’s sovereignty not only from Soviet attack, but from American encroachment as well. Canada was, therefore, constantly faced with the dilemma of how to help the United States while trying to establish clear lines beyond which the Americans were not to go.⁵

In continental air defence, Canada, therefore, had two options: co-operate with the U.S. in an air defence system on terms which would ensure a measure of Canadian control over continental air defence questions; or, go it alone and incur massive costs in terms of men and material. Canada opted for the first option and the air defence debate then turned to how to co-operate and draw a clear sovereign line simultaneously.

In the area of Canadian-American defence relations, the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence often sought to occupy the same ground simultaneously, requiring the deft hand of strong political arbiter. The efficient and effective management of portfolios required that ministers possess a considerable degree of administrative acumen in moving policy forward without being overwhelmed by the army of departmental experts. The federal bureaucracy, which had matured under twenty-two

⁴ B. Cuthbertson, *Canadian Military Independence in the Age of the Superpowers*, (Toronto 1977), p. 69.

⁵ D. Bercuson, “SAC vs. Sovereignty: The Origins of the Goose Bay Lease, 1946-1952,” in *Canadian Historical Review*, vol. 70 no. 2, (Toronto 1989), pp. 221-222.

consecutive years of Liberal Party rule, now had its own particular and sophisticated brand of politics which many of the Diefenbaker Tories viewed with suspicion. New communications and weapons technologies as well as the policy demands imposed by NATO alliance strategy were increasingly undermining traditional definitions of national sovereignty which the mandarins had recently worked so hard to define. The NORAD debate reveals a government, at both the political and official levels, wrestling with rising anti-Americanism, the realities of cold war alliance politics, the often competing interests of ministers and senior officials, and a serious breakdown of bureaucratic cohesion in dealings with the United States.

Bureaucratic power had flourished in the post-war period with increased government intervention in Canadian society and the extraordinary trust placed in senior civil servants by key Liberal ministers. The recruitment of the best and the brightest Canadian young men had produced an able and dedicated group in the finest traditions of Britain's Whitehall. As one admirer commented, "for some twenty years in the mid-century...the Canadian public service [was] a model of policy innovation and efficiency—conceivably the very best in the western world."⁶ To the more cynical, however, these mandarins represented something else altogether:

Recruited and led by Clifford Clark and O. D. Skelton, the long-time deputy ministers of Finance and External Affairs departments, the Establishment's members were bound together not so much by any conscious desire to manipulate the politicians as by their conviction that somebody had to restrain democracy from running wild, and that power was far safer when lodged with experts rather than demagogues. They viewed their mission as a ceaseless vigil against both the unbridled selfishness of the population and the opportunistic shortcuts of the politicians.⁷

John Diefenbaker leaned more towards the latter description, and with his surprise

⁶ J. L. Granatstein, *The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957.*, (Toronto 1982), p.18.

electoral victory in June 1957, cozy politico-bureaucratic relations and tacit policy-making conventions came crashing down.

Diefenbaker came to office as an outsider with a fierce libertarian streak which did not dispose him well to accepting the status and advice of charter members of the Ottawa establishment. The Department he scorned the most was External Affairs, owing to the fact that its one-time under secretary and then secretary of state, Lester Pearson, now sat across the aisle in parliament as leader of the opposition. In his memoirs, the Chief recalled how,

I had many times expressed my view that Canada was ill served by the practice of virtually limiting External Affairs appointments abroad to departmental professionals. In consequence, the Department had built up an inbred elite of 'Pearsonalities' which had been allowed to establish its own rules, a kingdom within a kingdom where diplomatic initiatives and negotiations were too often governed by democratically irresponsible perceptions of Canada's needs.⁸

As a consequence of the PM's management style, his tendency to view complex foreign policy questions in partisan political terms and his suspicion of External, officials became frustrated and simply resigned themselves to "doing the best [they] could under the current management."⁹

While the Department of External Affairs' relations with the Prime Minister were destined to be curt, DEA's relations with the Department of National Defence during Diefenbaker's reign were to be little better. Friction began with the NORAD agreement, and continued to deteriorate over the related question of nuclear arms for the Canadian forces. While the diplomats regarded bilateral defence arrangements with the United

⁷ P. C. Newman, *The Distemper of Our Times*, (Toronto 1968), p.54.

⁸ J. G. Diefenbaker, *One Canada: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker; The Years of Achievement*, vol. II, (Toronto 1976), p. 51. Also see, J. Hilliker, "The Politicians and the 'Pearsonalities': The Diefenbaker Government and the Conduct of Canadian External Relations," Canadian Historical Association, *Historical Papers*, delivered in Guelph, 1984, (Ottawa 1984), pp. 151-167

⁹ H. B. Robinson, *Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs*, (Toronto 1989), p.49.

States as dangerous territory to be avoided if possible, or very carefully managed and defined if not, the Services seemed to DEA far too eager to integrate the North American military establishments. As historian Trevor Lloyd noted, in obvious reference to NORAD:

In Canada, the military leaders have usually been in favour of close co-operation with Britain or the United States, even at the risk of a slight infringement of Canada's position. Political leaders in other countries have to defend the national interest by restraining the chauvinism of military commanders, but in Canada, they have sometimes had to restrain military leaders from entering into international agreements too hastily.¹⁰

This marked DND tendency to place questions of Canadian sovereignty below concerns for operational effectiveness did little to promote constructive civil-military relations, whether the civilians were politicians or officials. One former DEA official even described an "atmosphere of intrigue which permeated the two departments"¹¹ during the Diefenbaker period. This characterization is amply supported by interdepartmental documentation pertaining to the process which led up to the political approval of NORAD.

In the NORAD negotiations process, both DND and DEA claimed to be the primary agency concerned with both the shaping the accord and advising the government on the political aspects. This led to a situation where questions of civilian control of the Canadian military became desperately muddled. For foreign and defence policy to be legitimate and coherent in a liberal democracy, where the concept of civilian supremacy is absolute, certain structures need to be in place and maintained.

Central to satisfactory civil-military relations is a clear delineation of political boundaries and the roles within which the civilians and the military function in the resolution of defence issues. If this understanding is based on mutual trust and

¹⁰ T. Lloyd, *Canada in World Affairs, 1957-1959*, (Toronto 1968), p. 14.

¹¹ G. Ignatieff, *The Making of a Peacemaker: The Memoirs of George Ignatieff*, (Toronto 1985), p. 189.

respect, problems are less likely to arise. This, of course, is not possible if the principles governing the relationship are not understood or, if understood, are not accepted by either group.¹²

With both DEA and DND claiming the authority to deal with the Americans on NORAD, the boundaries and roles of each were apparently neither understood nor accepted. This, in turn, led to a situation in which the Diefenbaker government was pulled in contradictory directions by External and Defence in ratifying and explaining the accord, which ultimately led to political embarrassment at home and abroad.

The documents point to several important research questions. How did the NORAD agreement percolate through the Canadian government from proposal to policy to international agreement? Why did the new air defence accord's relationship to the NATO Treaty become such a contentious issue between the Departments of National Defence and External Affairs? How were the benefits and liabilities of the agreement interpreted within the Departments of National Defence, External Affairs and in the Privy Council Office? Did competing bureaucratic conceptions of NORAD lead to inconsistent foreign and defence policies concerning the link to NATO? Did the Diefenbaker government accept the counsel of various advisors with incompatible viewpoints? Was the Diefenbaker government misled by officials, either deliberately or otherwise, about the level of consultation the Canadian government could expect from its NORAD partner, the United States, on matters affecting North American security?

The literature of the early days of the NORAD agreement introduces these issues, but only that, and offers promising avenues for further research. The Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee from 1946 to 1960, Charles Foulkes, writing in

¹² R. B. Byers, "Canadian Civil-Military Relations and Reorganization of the Armed Forces: Whither Civilian Control?" in H. J. Massey (ed.), *The Canadian Military: A Profile*, (Toronto 1972), p. 198.

Behind the Headlines shortly after his retirement in 1961, outlined his view of the new level of commitment which the Canadian government could expect from the signing of the NORAD accord.¹³ This article, combined with his testimony before the House of Commons Special Committee on Defence in 1963, provides valuable insight into the reasoning which seems to have justified, at least in Foulkes' mind, the tactics employed by his office in securing political approval for the agreement. The first important scholarly work on the NORAD issue was Jon McLin's *Canada's Changing Defence Policy, 1958-1963*,¹⁴ published in 1967, which drew surprisingly accurate conclusions about the politics of the agreement from scant resources. Reginald Roy's portrait of Diefenbaker's first Minister of National Defence in *For Most Conspicuous Bravery: A Biography of Major-General George Pearkes V.C. Through Two World Wars*,¹⁵ provides an interesting account of the actions of Diefenbaker, Pearkes and Foulkes in approving NORAD, based on extensive interviews with both Pearkes and Foulkes. Roy's treatment, however, relies heavily on oral rather than documentary evidence and is inadequate in its consideration of the bureaucratic perspective. Denis Smith's recent biography of Diefenbaker, *Rogue Tory*,¹⁶ relied heavily on secondary sources and documents found in the Diefenbaker Papers in recounting the NORAD story. His treatment is largely a repetition of previous works based on the same documents which can be found in other record groups.

The most important work regarding the behind the scenes maneuvering and

¹³ C. Foulkes, "Canadian Defence Policy in a Nuclear Age," *Behind the Headlines*, vol. xxi, no. 1, May 1961.

¹⁴ J. McLin, *Canada's Changing Defence Policy, 1957-1963*, (Baltimore 1967).

¹⁵ R. Roy, *For Most Conspicuous Bravery: A Biography of Major-General George Pearkes V.C. Through Two World Wars*, (Vancouver 1977).

¹⁶ D. Smith, *Rogue Tory: The Life and Legend of John G. Diefenbaker*, (Toronto 1995).

debate comes from Joseph Jockel in his book *No Boundaries Upstairs*,¹⁷ which traces the origins of North American air defence integration from 1945 to 1958, the year the exchange of diplomatic notes formally establishing NORAD took place. While noting tensions between DEA and DND over the manner in which the agreement was approved and in defining NORAD's relationship to NATO, Jockel cannot, by the very nature of his study, examine whether or not this question was resolved by officials at DEA and DND, or indeed even raised, after the agreement was signed. Nor does he place DEA/DND discord front and centre in his study; interdepartmental conflict is portrayed as an interesting aside in a decade long march toward integration by the Canadian and U. S. militaries.

J.L. Granatstein's two books, *Canada 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation*, and *Man of Influence: Norman Robertson and Canadian Statecraft 1929-1968*,¹⁸ give only the briefest account based on official government documents of the political and bureaucratic controversy generated by NORAD in 1957 and 1958. Another book by Granatstein, *The Ottawa Men*,¹⁹ is a prerequisite for any examination of the civil service of this time, as is the official history of the Department of External Affairs compiled by J. Hilliker and D. Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs: Coming of Age, 1946-1968*.²⁰

H. Basil Robinson, the DEA liaison officer in the Prime Minister's Office from 1957 to 1962, has discussed NORAD in a section entitled "NORAD: Stumble and

¹⁷ J. Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958*, (Vancouver 1987).

¹⁸ J. L. Granatstein, *Canada 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation*, (Toronto 1986), and *Man of Influence: Norman A. Robertson and Canadian Statecraft, 1929-1968*, (Toronto 1981).

¹⁹ J. L. Granatstein, *The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957*, (Toronto 1982).

²⁰ J. Hilliker and D. Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs: Coming of Age, 1946-1968*, (Kingston 1995).

Recovery” in *Diefenbaker’s World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs*.²¹ His account, which notes his department’s confusion and displeasure with the tactics employed by General Foulkes in securing approval for the agreement, does not capture the level of animosity between DEA and DND, or discuss important interpretative aspects such as the NATO/NORAD link.

P. T. Haydon’s *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered*, goes a long way towards revising our understanding of the actions of the Canadian military, especially the navy, during the crisis. Haydon, however, has made claims regarding Diefenbaker’s expectations for political consultation which he derived from the NORAD framework which need correction. In a chapter entitled, “Decision-making in a Crisis,” after stating that Diefenbaker’s hasty approval of the agreement occurred in 1958, he characterized the expectation of formal consultation prior to the declaring of a NORAD alert as a “sad misconception.”²² While the 1958 exchange of notes which formally established the command is rather vague on the need for ‘regular’ and ‘consistent’ consultation, the exchange of two supplementary notes, one in October, 1959, the other in January, 1960, made explicitly clear that alerts, other than those necessary for training exercises or resulting from large scale surprise incursions into the system, had to be accompanied by formal consultation at the military, diplomatic and political levels. These notes were not mentioned by Haydon at all. Secondly, he made the claim that “the Department of External Affairs perpetuated the myth of the direct [NORAD] link to NATO and of binding prior consultation,” in the defence of a perceived

²¹ H. B. Robinson, *Diefenbaker’s World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs*, (Toronto 1989).

²² P. T. Haydon, *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered*, (Toronto 1993), p.181. The original confusion over dates occurs on p. 74 in a section entitled, “The NORAD Agreement.”

affront to national sovereignty.²³ The documents examined show that DEA actually waged a long and protracted war of attrition with the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and his Department in an effort to dissuade the Diefenbaker government from using the NATO/NORAD linkage strategy in defending the accord. In DEA's judgment, such a position was based on very unstable ground and was likely to lead to a serious embarrassment; which it did.

In researching this topic, it was necessary to examine as wide a spectrum of government documents as possible, in order to assess the opinions and interpretations of different people and departments within the government. At the Directorate of History and Heritage, Department of National Defence, there is a vast collection known as the Raymont Series, which houses the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Papers. The Secretary to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Colonel Raymont, had a penchant for hoarding any and all documents concerning foreign and defence policy which came across his desk. As a result, there exists a well organized and detailed collection of materials previously classified Top Secret for the 1956-1963 period. All but a select few of the over one thousand files are open to public inspection.

A similar situation pertains to the H. Basil Robinson Papers at the National Archives. As an External Affairs officer assigned to the Prime Minister's Office, and later as the number two man at the Canadian embassy in Washington, Robinson was ideally positioned to accumulate notes, briefs and memoranda, associated with this subject. These papers are also exceedingly well organized, both chronologically and by subject (largely as a result of the demands associated with the writing of the Diefenbaker book), and surprisingly thorough.

²³ *ibid.* p.182.

In a study such as this, access to documents in their proper departmental home would have been an enormous asset. The documents which exist in the two previously mentioned collections concerning NORAD can also be found in RG 25, the External Affairs record group and RG 2, the Privy Council Office records, along with crucial supporting documentation and marginal notes from officials in these respective offices. The Access to Information and Privacy officials charged with screening requests for these documents have, for the most part, been thoroughly unco-operative in providing access to the official record groups. This presented a near fatal obstacle to the project, which was saved only by the sheer girth of the Raymont and Robinson collections. Nothing is more discouraging to the would-be researcher than to comb the secondary literature on a topic written before the passage of the Access to Information and Privacy Act when *bona fide* researchers were granted very liberal access privileges, only to be told that the files previously cited are now closed with no anticipated date of review attached. If the writing of recent Canadian political history is to continue in any meaningful way, the ATIP regime must be revamped. Files, once opened, must remain open, so that the conclusions of past historians can be tested and contested by new generations of scholars.

Chapter one of the thesis opens with the Canada-United States Military Study Group report in the spring of 1956, which went on to become the NORAD agreement. This is followed by the interdepartmental bargaining between DND and DEA over how the continental air defence proposal should be presented to the politicians; the unorthodox manner in which the accord was approved; the growing rift between DEA and DND over the form and substance of the agreement; and the process by which the Diefenbaker government's stance on the relationship of NORAD to NATO became public policy.

Chapter two begins with the first session of Parliament under the Diefenbaker government in the fall of 1957. After a brief review of the accord's preliminary debate in Parliament, attention returns to the official level. Here, the main elements are the continued friction between External Affairs and National Defence over the NATO/NORAD link; attempts by Chairman Foulkes to retain control of the NORAD file; Canadian difficulties in negotiating an exchange of notes consistent with the expressed Canadian political position; NATO Secretary-General Spaak as the wild card which could trump the Foulkes/Diefenbaker interpretation of the agreement; and the June 1958 Parliamentary debate which followed the tabling of the NORAD notes.

Chapter three deals with DEA's attempts to construct and define a consultative framework to reinforce civilian roles in the NORAD system; requests made of the Canadian government by NORAD HQ during the Cuban missile crisis in October, 1962; and the reviews carried out by DEA and PCO in November, 1962, to assess whether or not the NORAD agreement had failed Canadian interests.

This story is, by and large, a story of personalities—both human and institutional. Wherever possible, the views of those involved have been presented in their own words. This study shows, amongst other things, that those charged with protecting the Canadian national interest within the civil service were people, no better, no worse. And that differences on policy existed and could not always be amicably resolved over oysters at the Rideau Club.

CHAPTER I

DIG IN, 1956-1957

The evolution of NORAD from policy proposal to interim international accord in 1956 and 1957 can be characterized as a protracted war of attrition between the Department of External Affairs (DEA) and the Department of National Defence (DND) involving access to and influence over the key members of the Diefenbaker Administration in its early days. The broad objectives of both DEA and DND were remarkably similar. Both wished to provide the greatest national security possible for Canada during these Cold War years; they differed only in approach and expectations. The Canadian military was quite happy with the close relationship they enjoyed with their American counterparts in continental defence and sought to preserve the informality of their working level relationships to allow for necessary good faith adjustments in defence posture. External Affairs, on the other hand, took great comfort in formality. To them, the degree of formal and informal integration between the Canadian and American militaries in the post-war years often appeared to be a problem in and of itself, instead of a solution to a problem. Closer defence arrangements with the Americans invariably raised the question of Canadian sovereignty, which had to be safeguarded through careful analysis and hard bargaining. Both Departments had very real and pressing interests in the air defence integration process but very different agendas. Seen in this light, it is perhaps understandable that NORAD led to strained inter-departmental relations.

By 1956, the U.S. strategic doctrine of 'massive retaliation' against Soviet adventurism was being questioned. The North American continent was no longer beyond

the reach of the Soviet nuclear air force which had been a cornerstone of the deterrence stance. This forward defence posture was predicated on overwhelming American nuclear superiority and the ability to deliver thermonuclear payloads anywhere on the face of the globe within hours of the executive order to engage the enemy (the U.S.S.R.). However, recent Soviet technological advances in the areas of nuclear warheads, long range bombers and ballistic missiles meant that the continental United States was increasingly vulnerable to preemptive or retaliatory Soviet nuclear strikes. Canadian and American defence planners now had to develop a proposal which would allow for the most effective utilization of North American air defence forces in conjunction with the Pinetree, Mid-Canada and (soon to be operational) Distant Early Warning lines of radar installations which guarded the airborne approaches to North America by the Soviet air force.

The road towards the formal integration of Canadian and American air defences under a single American commander began 14 May, 1956. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff (COS) and the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (USJCS) agreed to refer the matter of continental air defence integration to an ad hoc committee of the Military Study Group (MSG), a branch of the Canada-U.S. Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) created in 1946. Although steps towards amalgamating continental air defence resources in peacetime had been put in train in 1945, it took eleven years for the Canadian and U. S. militaries to feel secure enough that politicians on either side of the border would not derail their plans for the creation of a new air defence command ¹

The ad hoc committee's report concluded that geography and modern military technology and tactics required Canadian and U. S. air defence to be treated as one

¹ Joseph Jockel's work, *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, The United States and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958*, (Vancouver 1987) remains the standard analysis of the process.

common dilemma requiring a new solution. In the Committee's view, "[t]he flexibility of employment of forces and the split second decisions necessitated by the tempo of the air battle can only be achieved by decentralization of control under a single authority responsible for the operational control of all forces available for the air defence of North America."² The Committee called for the creation of a new joint Canadian-American air defence command to police the skies of the continent. The report noted the inherent advantages in delegating operational control of collective forces to a single commander—a principle both countries accepted through their membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—as opposed to the system of purely national commands then in place, and suggested that the same rationale should be applied to North American air defence problems.³ Conspicuous by its absence, however, was the view that once integrated, the new air defence command should be brought under the direct control of a NATO commander. Since the report had spoken in glowing terms of the NATO command structure, it would have been logical to assume that such a step would have been mentioned.

At the thirteenth meeting of the Military Study Group on 19 December, 1956, the paper on integration prepared by the ad hoc group was presented, discussed and apparently approved for further consideration by all present, including J. McCordick of the Defence Liaison (1) Division of the Department of External Affairs (DL(1)D). The Defence Liaison Division was created in 1948 as part of the departmental reorganization which took place during Arnold Heeney's tenure as Under Secretary of State for External. According to the official history of the department, "[t]he decision to create the

² Directorate of History and Heritage, Department of National Defence (DHH) 73/1223, file 84, Memorandum to Cabinet, 23 July, 1957, Appendix C p. 6.

division reflected the increasing time and attention being paid to defence issues and the consequent need to consolidate responsibility for them and for liaison with the Department of National Defence.”⁴ In 1950, the division was split in two with DL(1)D responsible for liaison on defence aspects of foreign policy and DL(2)D co-ordinating interdepartmental security and intelligence matters for External with other concerned departments and foreign governments. DL(1)D was to be External’s troubleshooter in their relations with DND, making sure that departmental differences were identified early and serious ruptures avoided at the most senior levels.

On 10 January, 1957, a memorandum was sent from the Office of the Chairman Chiefs of Staff to the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs with a copy of the ad hoc committee’s report of 19 December attached.⁵ It was this report of the MSG’s ad hoc committee on continental air defence integration that went on to become the NORAD Agreement.

The next step in the evolution of the ad hoc committee’s report from proposal to international agreement took place on 1 February, 1957, when the issue of integration was discussed at the 604th meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee with R. M. Macdonnell, McCordick’s superior in DL(1)D, in attendance.⁶ The proposal was now being considered in theory at the deputy minister level, thus quickly working its way up the bureaucratic chain of command as an issue demanding serious consideration. At this meeting no firm decisions were taken except an agreement to meet again in two weeks

³ *ibid.*

⁴ J. Hilliker and D. Barry, *Canada’s Department of External Affairs: Coming of Age, 1946-1968*, vol. II, (Ottawa 1995), pp. 49-50.

⁵ This chronology is based on a memorandum dated 5 December, 1957, by General Charles Foulkes, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee outlining the progression of the NORAD agreement to date. National Archives of Canada (NAC), MG 31, E83, vol. 8, file 6, “NORAD: February 1957 to November 1962” of the H. Basil Robinson Papers (hereafter Robinson Papers).

time to hammer out the document that would be submitted to the Cabinet Defence Committee (CDC) for the political consideration of the St Laurent government. The approval of the CDC would be the final step necessary for the implementation of the proposal. All parties—representatives of the Privy Council Office (PCO), DEA and DND—then returned to their respective corners to mull over the implications of air defence integration and produce advice for their ministers.

At this juncture, between the 604th and 605th meeting of Chiefs of Staff Committee, External Affairs officials at DL(1)D became concerned with the political implications of having Canadian servicemen in Canada, technically under the command of an American officer. In a memorandum written by McCordick to Macdonnell for use in the upcoming Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting, it was noted that “nowhere in it [the MSG’s ad hoc committee report] does it even reflect the political problems inherent in the control of Canadian forces in peace-time by an outsider....” McCordick’s opinion was that the report under discussion, if presented to the public as is, would expose the government to attack on the grounds of a surrender of Canadian sovereignty and that, “officials cannot be blind to the political aspects of this question, and the original submission to the Cabinet Defence Committee should reflect some political awareness.”⁷

The rest of McCordick’s memorandum went on to outline what the Canadian government should require as compensation for delegating Canadian forces to an integrated North American air defence command. The points he raised and the positions he advocated in this memo were adopted by his superiors in DEA, right up to Jules

⁶ *ibid.*

⁷ Robinson Papers, vol. 8 file 6, J. A. McCordick DL(1)D to R. M. Macdonnell DL(1)D Feb. 13, 1957 Re. Agenda Item 6 of the 605th Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee “Integration of Operational Control of Canadian and Continental United States Air Defence Forces in Peace-Time”.

Leger, the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs.

This Department [DEA] has constantly stressed the necessity for close United States consultation with the Canadian Government prior to the taking of decisions which might involve us and the rest of the world in hostilities. Canadian consent to enter into an agreement with the United States to set up a single operational commander should certainly provide us with an opportunity once again to impress upon the United States Government Canada's special place among the many countries allied to the United States.

Geography and our willingness to cooperate in joint continental air defence give us a special right to demand closer consultation. We should not lose any opportunity to re-assert this right and especially an opportunity such as this when the Canadian Government is called upon to take a decision without precedent in Canadian history, namely the granting in peace-time of control to a foreign representative over our security forces.⁸

Item 25 of the Minutes of the 15 February Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting confirms that McCordick's ideas were well received by Macdonnell.

Mr. Macdonnell stated that the Department of External Affairs was in general agreement with the principles outlined in the paper, but suggested that an additional paragraph be inserted to read as follows: 'The United States authorities should be reminded that Canadian willingness to agree to joint operational control of the continental air defence forces should be met by a corresponding United States recognition of the need for adequate consultation with the Canadian authorities on matters which might lead to the alerting of the air defence system.'⁹

The Chiefs of Staff Committee then agreed that the proviso insisted upon by Macdonnell would be incorporated into the document which would be brought before the CDC.¹⁰

Therefore, in these critical stages of Canadian consideration of the integrated command issue, DEA (at the very least the DL(1)D), had not only been consulted, but had had its views noted and acted upon.

The proposed paper on integration for the CDC was then turned over to a drafting

⁸ *ibid.* p.3.

⁹ Robinson Papers, vol. 8 file 6: Extract of the Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting regarding the Document on North American Air Defence Integration to go to the CDC.

¹⁰ *ibid.*

committee at the Department of National Defence on 18 February, 1957. On 11 March, forty copies of the Aide -Memoire were delivered to the Secretary of the Cabinet Defence Committee in preparation for the scheduled 13 June meeting.¹¹ But before the Liberal government could consider the integration issue, a more pressing domestic political circumstance arose.

Prime Minister Louis St Laurent called a federal election on April 6, 1957 to be held on 10 June. The Liberal party had, by this point in 1957, become the 'government party' and one more mandate would have seen them celebrating their silver jubilee in office. St. Laurent had fully expected the Canadian electorate to cooperate in the planned festivities. On 10 June, 1957, Canadian voters did the unthinkable and gave the Diefenbaker Tories a plurality, thus ending over twenty-two years of continuous Liberal rule.

In the time between the DND release of the integration agreement draft for CDC consideration on 11 March and the meeting planned for 13 June, the proposal had come to the attention of Leger. On 12 June, Leger forwarded a memorandum to his minister, Lester Pearson, including a copy of the DND draft up for discussion the next day and his Department's official views on the subject. The message read in part,

The attached brief on this subject [North American air defence integration], prepared by the Department of National Defence, is concerned with a decision of great importance for which there is no precedent in recent Canadian history, namely, a decision to grant in peacetime, to a foreign representative, operational control of Canadian security forces in Canada. There is a precedent in the NATO structure for the operational control of Canadian units by non-Canadian commanders, but this, of course, does not apply to forces within the national boundaries... [DEA] was not consulted on the drafting of the memorandum to the Cabinet Defence Committee.¹²

¹¹ See Foulkes Chronology.

¹² Robinson Papers, vol. 8 file 6: Memorandum for Minister from USSEA June 12, 1957 re: CDC meeting June 13, 1957, "Item I- Integration of Operational Control of Canadian and Continental United States Air

External Affairs was quite anxious over questions of Canadian sovereignty and the political implications for Canadian foreign policy vis-à-vis the Americans. While being relatively unconcerned with the strictly military implications of the proposal, External put forward the position that, in a political sense, comparisons of this proposal to the North Atlantic Treaty were faulty and unrealistic. Canadian forces operating under the direction of NATO regional commanders (Americans), such as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe or Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, did not include forces for home defence. This proposal specifically did. DEA had therefore drawn a clear line between NATO and the command proposed in the DND draft—a position DEA would stick by throughout. Leger's memo made clear that DEA could not support the piece of work in question without further time to work out the tricky political aspects involved. Lest there be any doubts about how seriously DEA viewed the political implications of the integration proposal, Leger ended by counseling his minister that "[a]ny moves into this new state of continental cooperation in defence matters should be by carefully controlled stages,"¹³ the kind where DEA could play a more influential role. Though the St. Laurent administration had been reduced to caretaker status just two days before, DEA was now on record as opposing the agreement under the terms worked out by DND.

The June 13 CDC meeting where NORAD was to be considered never took place. St Laurent cancelled the session on the grounds that it would be inappropriate to decide such matters in light of the Liberal defeat just three days previously. It was left to the Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, General Charles Foulkes, to inform Major-

Defence Forces in Peacetime" p.1. Leger's emphasis.

¹³ *ibid.* p.2

General Sparling, the Canadian head of the Joint Canada/U. S. Staff in Washington (JCS) that the Canadian Government was no longer in a position to ratify international agreements and that the American Joint Chiefs of Staff should be advised accordingly. This matter would have to wait until the subject could be broached with the new administration.¹⁴

What happen during the month of July when the Diefenbaker administration assumed the reigns of power can best be described as a brilliant piece of bureaucratic slight of hand by General Foulkes, who had nurtured the proposal from inception to its near abortion in the June fiasco.

General Charles Foulkes had occupied the post of Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee since 1950 when the post was created to perform co-ordinating duties between the three service Chiefs and the minister. Though well versed by 1957 in the subtle contours of official Ottawa procedure, Foulkes displayed a marked distaste for bureaucratic formality, except when it suited his purposes. He conceptualized complex political and defence issues along very functional and utilitarian lines which emphasized efficiency and military logic in considerations of the national interest over the hazy politics of sovereignty. In Foulkes' mind, the decision to integrate the air defences of North America was taken in 1946 when the Chiefs of Staff of both Canada and the United States drew up the first joint air defence plans. The proposal being put forward in 1957 was simply the last step towards a rational continental air defence system.¹⁵ For Foulkes, continental defence arrangements could also be fit quite comfortably into a

¹⁴DHH, 73/1223, file 84 Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Papers "Continental Air Defence-NORAD 02/17/57-08/06/57, Foulkes: Telephone Conversation with General Sparling, Washington, 18 June, 1957—note for files.

¹⁵ C. Foulkes, "Canadian Defence Policy in a Nuclear Age," in *Behind the Headlines*, vol. xxi no. 1, May

broader picture. In an article which appeared in 1961, after he had retired from service, Foulkes described how “the early organization of NATO provided for a series of regional groups of countries who could mutually support each other if attacked,” one of these being the Canada-United States group.¹⁶ The three other Regional Planning Groups mentioned in the original NATO text had evolved into two formal commands under Supreme Allied Commanders to co-ordinate the defence activities in Europe and in the North Atlantic. For Foulkes, the fact that the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group had not been transformed into a formal NATO command did not alter his opinion that “Canada-U. S. defence arrangements came under the NATO umbrella in 1949,” when the Treaty was signed.¹⁷ Therefore, all joint Canada-U.S. defence arrangements were *de facto* NATO arrangements, including the proposed NORAD agreement.

Foulkes was well aware of official and political sensitivity in Ottawa over increasing reliance on the United States in security matters since World War II. But for Foulkes, military integration cut both ways. Any perceived reduction in Canada’s ability to act independently of the United States would be offset by a greater degree of access to and influence in American foreign policy-making. As he explained in 1961:

There is [an] important advantage to Canada in fully co-operating with the U. S. in the defence of this continent. This action puts Canada in a preferential position because, as we are full partners in the defence of North America, we have to be consulted every time the U. S. contemplates using force anywhere in the world. This consultation is necessary as this use of force may bring about retaliation and our joint air defences must be in a high state of readiness. Therefore, we are in a very favourable position to influence U. S. policy.¹⁸

The Chairman’s trust in the close working relationship built up between the Canadian and

1961, pp. 2 & 11.

¹⁶ *ibid.* p. 3-4.

¹⁷ *ibid.* p. 4.

American militaries, his reading of the NATO-North America relationship and belief that the benefits of air defence integration far outweighed any perceived loss of sovereignty, combined to produce NORAD's most tireless and effective advocate.

Two days after the swearing in of the Tory government on 21 June, 1957, the new Prime Minister and his Minister of National Defence, George Pearkes, were to leave Ottawa for a Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in London. Foulkes impressed upon his minister the need for timely decisions on several outstanding defence files. The integration plan had already been approved by the U.S. Secretary of Defense Wilson, and Foulkes, as he stated in evidence before the House Special Committee on Defence in 1963, was worried that news of the agreement might leak unless the issue was resolved quickly.¹⁹ He suggested that Pearkes should avail himself of the opportunity to discuss the issue with Diefenbaker on the flight to London. Upon his return, Pearkes told an increasingly anxious Foulkes that the Prime Minister had given his tentative approval to the scheme and that a formal decision was simply a matter of time.²⁰ However, things were not progressing quickly enough for Foulkes who, with the consent of his minister, approached R. B. Bryce, Clerk of the Privy Council, Secretary to the Cabinet and the Prime Minister's gatekeeper, who in turn spoke to Diefenbaker on 24 July about placing the matter before the Cabinet Defence Committee (which at the time did not even exist). The Prime Minister apparently resented Foulkes' query and was rebuffed. Later that day Pearkes appeared before Diefenbaker with a copy of the DND draft agreement. About an

¹⁸ *ibid.* p. 12.

¹⁹ House of Commons Special Committee on Defence, *Minutes*, Tuesday October 22, 1963, p. 510.

²⁰ Robinson Papers, vol. 8 file 6, Letter from Foulkes to Holmes, 7 August, 1957, "Integration of Operational Control of Canadian and United States Air Defence Forces" p.2 The best account of this portion of the NORAD story is to be found in Reginald Roy's, *For Most Conspicuous Bravery: A Biography of Major-General George R. Pearkes, V.C. Through Two World Wars*, (Vancouver 1977), pp. 288-290, which is based primarily on interviews with both Pearkes and Foulkes by the author.

hour later Pearkes came into Foulkes' office, and, as the General recalled, "threw it onto my desk and said, 'there it is, approved'"²¹ The Diefenbaker Government had just made its first major foreign policy decision.

This, of course, begs the question of DEA's role in Diefenbaker's decision. The short answer is that there was none. Reginald Roy, in his biography of George Pearkes, maintains that Diefenbaker's approval of the integration agreement only came after the Prime Minister had consulted with an unnamed senior member of the Department of External Affairs,²² a claim for which there is apparently no official documentation. If such a consultation did in fact take place, the two most likely candidates at External would have been either Jules Leger, the USSEA, or Macdonnell of DL(1)D. However, both men were absent from the East Block when the all important decision was taken—Leger attending to a serious family illness and Macdonnell replacing Herbert Norman as head of the Canadian legation to Egypt after Norman's suicide.²³ Furthermore, both men were on record as opposing the accord without specific amendments regarding consultation at the diplomatic and political level over changes in alert status. DND had also curiously omitted the insertion Macdonnell had stressed at the 605th Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting.

In *Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs*, Basil Robinson, the DEA liaison to the Prime Minister's Office for much of Diefenbaker's tenure, takes issue with Foulkes' claim in an interview with Pearkes' biographer that the Minister of National Defence immediately informed USSEA Leger of the NORAD decision on the 24th of

²¹ *ibid.*, p.289. The original copy of the document bearing Diefenbaker's signature is in DHH, 73/1223, file 84, 24 July, 1957.

²² Roy, *op. cit.* p.290.

²³ Roy, *op. cit.* p. 290.

July. Based on the lack of any official documentation in government files and a first hand familiarity with the individuals involved, Robinson surmises that Leger would not have left his post without informing the Department that a major foreign policy decision had been taken. R. B. Bryce, who was ideally situated in the PCO to warn DEA that the agreement was being considered by the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence, only found out about the nature of Pearkes' business with the Prime Minister that afternoon when Pearkes left Diefenbaker's office with the proposal signed. Robinson states that Bryce was under the impression that Pearkes' next stop was Leger's office and therefore he did not contact DEA himself with the information.²⁴ The next logical choice as the person at DEA with whom Diefenbaker might have discussed the NORAD matter would have been the acting USSEA, John Holmes, but again, subsequent events seem to prove otherwise.

Proof of DEA's ignorance of the integration agreement which was about to be announced exists (or does not exist) in a briefing book prepared for the Prime Minister by DEA's American Section regarding the visit of U. S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on July 27 and 28, 1957, only three days after the decision had been taken but not publicized. In a section entitled "Canada-United States Defence", the brief states that, "[t]here are... likely to be service recommendations on both sides of the border that the air defences of the continent be placed under a single United States commander for operational purposes as an essential requirement for continental air defence," adding the gentle reminder that "[t]he Department of External Affairs is, on the Canadian side, the

²⁴ H. Basil Robinson, *Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs*, (Toronto 1989), p. 322 notes 9 and 12.

repository and interpreter of Canada-United States defence agreements.”²⁵ DEA’s briefing to the Prime Minister on these ‘service recommendations’ would hardly seem consistent with the policy on integration now in place. Considering that the final entry in the brief is dated 26 July, two days after the decision was made, and that nowhere does the term NORAD appear, it can be safely assumed that DEA was completely in the dark at this point that the proposal they had only recently come out strongly against in its unamended form was now a reality.

On 31 July, John Holmes received a piece of information which must at first, have appeared to be a bad joke on the part of a colleague. In a letter to Bryce, Holmes explained his confusion over the fact that the U. S. Ambassador had just paid a call and informed him that an announcement in the form of a press release was set for the following day outlining a Canada-United States agreement on the integration of operational control of continental air defence forces.²⁶ The first question of the day for Holmes and DEA was how this could have happened without the Department’s knowledge or approval? Were they not the ‘only formal channel, repository and interpreter’ of intergovernmental agreements?

Under normal circumstances, the answers to these questions would be yes, but in the early chaotic days of the first Diefenbaker administration, convention was the exception rather than the rule. Neither Foulkes, Pearkes or Diefenbaker (acting as SSEA as well as PM), saw fit to inform DEA of their course of action. Foulkes explained that, after being informed of the Prime Minister’s approval of the Study Group’s paper on 24 July, Pearkes instructed him to take the steps necessary to have a press release prepared

²⁵ NAC, RG 25, vol. 3522, file 18-1-A-USA—1957-1 “Brief for Use Of the SSEA (Mr. Diefenbaker) at Meeting With Mr. J. F. Dulles U. S. Secretary of State on His Visit to Ottawa, July 27-28, 1957” p. 4.

announcing the appointment of a Canadian Deputy Commander for the Canada-United States Air Defence Command and the Prime Minister had subsequently approved the press release.²⁷ While this sort of procedural leap-frogging, whereby a department of government with conventional rights to be consulted and a large stake in the issue at hand, was wholly kept in the dark, may be explained away on the part of the politicians as understandable for government rookies, General Foulkes behaviour suggests malice.

The confusion at DEA persisted throughout 1 August, 1957, as the time of announcement grew closer. In a letter formally responding to Holmes' query the day before, Bryce explained that the NORAD Agreement "was discussed by the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence in consultation, and they decided it was not necessary to discuss it in Cabinet before informing the United States of our agreement."²⁸ One can only imagine Holmes' frustration. Bryce went on to say that, "In fact the matter was discussed in Cabinet yesterday [31 July] at the time of Air Marshal Slemon's appointment as Deputy Commander of the integrated headquarters," and that Holmes might safely assume "that all the steps necessary for government approval of this matter have now been taken."²⁹ Foulkes had succeeded in keeping DEA's meddlesome hands off the integration agreement by taking his case directly to the politicians. He recognized an opportunity to further a DND objective and had now presented the diplomats with a *fait accompli*.

There are three sections of the 1 August press release proclaiming the creation of NORAD which deserve attention here. First, after some contextual remarks about the

²⁶ Foulkes Chronology.

²⁷ Robinson Papers, vol. 8 file 6: Foulkes to Holmes, 7 August, 1957, "Integration of Operational Control of Canada and United States Air Defence Forces," p. 3.

²⁸ Robinson Papers, vol. 8 file 6, Memorandum for Holmes from Bryce, 1 August, 1957.

state of the world and the state of current weapons technology and geography, it was declared prudent “to have in existence in peacetime an organization, including the weapons, facilities and command structure which could operate at the outset of hostilities in accordance with a single air defence plan approved in advance by national authorities.”³⁰ In this portion of the statement we are told that the development of standard operating procedures, agreed to by both governments and to be applied in times of crisis by the new commander of NORAD, is the operational key to the accord.

There is then a section which would seem to show that, while DEA had indeed been frozen out of the drafting and political decision-making processes, the concerns raised by Macdonnell at the 605th Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting had survived, if only in greatly watered-down form.

The two Governments consider that the establishment of integrated air defence arrangements of the nature described increases the importance of the fullest possible consultation between the two Governments on all matters affecting the joint defence of North America, and that defence co-operation between them can be worked out on a mutually satisfactory basis only if such consultation is regular and consistently undertaken.³¹

This clause calling for the “fullest possible” consultation which would be “regularly and consistently undertaken” caused great concern at DEA and remained open to interpretation by all concerned; the politicians, the officials and the United States, a fact which would become self-evident during the Cuban missile in October 1962.

The next portion of the statement relevant here is one which can best be described as calculated ambiguity, designed to placate Opposition criticisms and DEA concerns

²⁹ *ibid.*

³⁰ Robinson Papers, vol. 8 file 6 “Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Organization and Operation of the North American Air Defence Command,” Joint Press Release of the Canadian Minister of National Defence and the United States Secretary of Defence, 1 August, 1957, p. 1.

³¹ Joint Press Release, p.4.

regarding a constraint upon the sovereign control of Canadian forces in Canada. On page four we are told that:

The Canada-United States region is an integral part of the NATO area. In support of the strategic objectives established in NATO for the Canada-United States region and in accordance with the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty, our two Governments have, by establishing the North American Air Defence Command recognized the desirability of integrating headquarters exercising operational control over assigned air defence forces.³²

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is mentioned three times in this paragraph: NORAD once. This clause became the foundation for Diefenbaker's claim that NORAD and NATO were in fact one and the same, which they were not. The Canada-United States region was indeed recognized in the NATO Treaty as coming under the NATO defence umbrella. However, the region had never made the leap from 'planning area' to a formal 'command' under the care of a Supreme Commander, in turn responsible to the NATO Council of Ministers—such as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). NORAD had not changed this state of affairs .

Canada's ambassador to Washington, Norman Robertson, anticipated some trouble with the media and the Opposition over the wording of the press release. Just prior to the news conference by the Minister of National Defence on 1 August, Robertson cabled Ottawa after consulting with the State Department. Robertson suggested that "[i]f any questions are asked concerning the reference to NATO in the final sentence of the release, it could be said that while the integrated command would not be a NATO command in the same sense as SACEUR or SACLANT, such a command, nevertheless, furthered the 'mutual security objectives' of NATO."³³ Therefore, while the parties to the new integrated North American Air Defence Command may have chosen to render

³² *ibid.* p.4.

support to other NATO commands, they were in no way bound by the agreement to *report* to NATO authorities, or to pledge the air defence forces dedicated to the new command to a NATO commander operating in the North American area. This was to be a bilateral affair.

It should be kept in mind that the 1 August joint press release represented a gentlemen's agreement between the Minister of National Defence in Canada and the Secretary of Defense in the United States, not an official international agreement in the proper sense of the term. That, according to convention, would have required a formal exchange of notes between the two governments conducted through diplomatic channels. And, as we have already seen, DEA was totally uninvolved at this stage. The ensuing dogfight between General Charles Foulkes on the one hand and DEA on the other, over the propriety and desirability of recording the agreement in a formal exchange of diplomatic notes and the true relationship of NORAD to NATO, constitutes a decidedly dark period in interdepartmental relations.

On 2 August Holmes attempted to make up some of the ground lost to Foulkes in a letter sent to the Deputy Minister of National Defence, Frank Miller. Holmes expressed the Department's embarrassment at being approached by the embassies of NATO countries in Ottawa concerning the NORAD agreement while not feeling in a position to address their queries. First, he requested a copy of the transcript of the press conference held by the Minister the day before at the time of announcement, and second, questioned what had actually been agreed to. "We are not certain to what document exactly the Prime Minister gave his approval, but assume that it was the report of the Military Study Group." He ended by stating, in the polite language of the diplomatic corps, his

³³ DHH, 73/1223, file 84, Robertson to External, 1 August, 1957.

Department's displeasure with methods used by Miller's department in securing the agreement's approval and the manner in which it was made public: "For a matter of such importance as this, we believe that there should be some written Governmental agreement which would be completed through diplomatic channels."³⁴ Holmes had not sent a copy of this letter to Foulkes.

By 2 August, General Foulkes was fast becoming *persona non grata* at DEA. This explains why Holmes' letter was addressed to the Office of the Deputy Minister instead of the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Office where Foulkes held court. The letter did, however, come to the attention of the omnipresent Chairman at DND and Foulkes was not long in replying.

On 7 August a nasty and detailed note was delivered to Holmes from Foulkes which began with a reprimand for undermining his authority.

First of all, I would point out that it is not understood why this letter was addressed to Mr. Miller. I would draw your attention to the fact that External Affairs Personnel Administrative Notice of 6 January, 1954, clearly lays down that correspondence originated at External Affairs should be addressed to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, on: all NATO military matters; and all matters affecting strategy, tactics, employment of forces, etc. I thought it was well known in your Department that the integration of operational control of Canadian and United States forces was a matter which was being dealt with by my office and not by the office of the Deputy Minister.³⁵

In all likelihood, DEA was well aware by this point of just who had orchestrated the events of the preceding day and was attempting an end-run around the Office of the Chairman; a maneuver probably obvious to Foulkes. The inclusion of the two portions of the 6 January, 1954, Notice should have provided clues for DEA about how Foulkes

³⁴ Robinson Papers, vol. 8 file 6, Holmes to Frank Miller, 2 August, 1957 re. "Integration of Operational Control of Canada-United States Air Defence Forces."

³⁵ *ibid.*, Foulkes to Holmes, 7 August, 1957, "Integration of Operational Control of Canadian and United States Air Defence Forces" p. 1.

conceptualized the NORAD agreement. By including the reference to NATO military matters, Foulkes had implied that NORAD was, in fact, a NATO military matter. Other than the text of the press release, this is the first indication in the interdepartmental communications of the direction in which Foulkes is headed.

On the question of housing the air defence agreement within a formal government-to-government text, Foulkes' position in the letter to Holmes was two-pronged and resolute. First, he stated that "the action which has been taken by both governments is the approval of recommendations contained in [paragraph] 2 of the Canada- U. S. Military Study Group's 8th report of 19 December, 1956, and this recommendation deals with the setting up of a military command, "which was well within the Minister of National Defence's prerogatives, as stipulated by the National Defence Act.³⁶ Secondly, he met DEA criticism of the unprecedented nature of the NORAD agreement head on. By citing the Ogdensburg Agreement of 1940 as a case where the public pledges of responsible ministers, in that case the Canadian Prime Minister and the U. S. President, led to the co-ordination of Canada-U. S. military operations through the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.³⁷ In other words, this was to be considered a military matter where the proper authorities had been consulted and diplomatic concerns were negligible.

In what appears to have been a final dig at DEA, Foulkes concluded his letter with the suggestion "that if you [at DEA] have inquiries from interested foreign missions we [at DND] would be pleased to draft answers to these questions."³⁸ Two Departments within the Canadian civil service were now behaving openly in a most uncivil fashion,

³⁶ *ibid.* p. 3.

³⁷ *ibid.*

and it would only get worse with time.

After the publication of Roy's biography of Pearkes, Dr. John Hilliker of the Historical Section, Department of External Affairs, surveyed the official documentation surrounding the approval of the NORAD Agreement with an eye to testing Roy's anecdotal claims regarding DEA/DND liaison. In assessing the belligerent tone of Foulkes' 7 August, 1957 memorandum to Holmes, Hilliker thought it likely that Foulkes was on the defensive, "having recognized that the government's approval had been obtained in a rather unconventional way."³⁹ After speaking with a DL(1)D officer in close contact with Foulkes during the NORAD controversy, Hilliker reported that he concurred with Freeman Tovell's opinion that,

...Foulkes was very skillful politically in side-stepping consultation with External Affairs. In this instance he seems to have been quicker off the mark than External Affairs and, although he kept this department informed, he does not seem to have consulted it or even have heeded advice already given. But even Foulkes...was surprised by the alacrity of Diefenbaker's action and his tone may therefore reflect sensitivity to the possibility of being suspected of action that was not completely proper.⁴⁰

If issues of consultation between departments *within* the national government were causing serious strains, then the future for consultation over North American air defence *between* two national governments could not have looked promising from DEA's vantage point.

By September, 1957, Jules Leger was back at his post as the Under-Secretary. On the 10th of September Leger fired off a letter to Foulkes in response to his communication of 7 August to the acting USSEA. Leger began, politely enough, by stating that the root

³⁸ *ibid.* p. 4.

³⁹ Robinson Papers, vol. 8 file 6, Hilliker to H. B. R., 2 April, 1980, p.3.

⁴⁰ *ibid.*

of DEA/DND difficulties over the integration question appeared to be one of simple misunderstanding. Leger pointed out to the General that, while Holmes' letter "was certainly not meant to express dissatisfaction concerning your liaison with this Department,"⁴¹ by 2 August, DEA had still not received a copy of Foulkes' memorandum to Cabinet dated 22 July. In fact, DEA was in possession of the document, they simply had not realized that the DND draft prepared for the St. Laurent CDC which they had gone on record as opposing, had, on the 24th of July, been submitted to the new government for approval. How the document failed to reach Holmes' desk was not addressed by Leger, but he seemed to imply DND negligence, or worse.

Next, Leger reminded the Chairman of the previously expressed political importance with which DEA viewed the integration proposal. He restated the position that the assignment of operational control over Canadian forces in Canada to a foreign commander was an unprecedented move in recent Canadian history, and that the NATO precedent did not apply because Canadian forces attached to NATO, under the command of non-Canadians, were stationed outside the national boundaries.⁴² While not wishing to put into question the military necessity or desirability of air defence integration—and not directly question Foulkes' military expertise—Leger drew Foulkes' attention to the "importance of air defence integration to...political relations with the United States and other NATO Governments, for which of course this department is mainly responsible."⁴³ This is a clear demonstration of the see-saw battle between DEA and DND over the essence of the agreement, with Leger stressing the political and Foulkes relying on the

⁴¹ Robinson Papers, vol. 8 file 6, Leger to Foulkes, 10 September, 1957, "Integration of Operational Control of Canadian and United States Air Defence Forces," pp.1-2

⁴² *ibid.* p.2

⁴³ *ibid.*

military aspects as justification for the methods and propriety of implementation.

The bypassing of DEA over matters involving a foreign government aside, Leger's letter also makes clear that Foulkes had not played by the previously agreed upon rules of the air defence integration game in selling Diefenbaker, Pearkes, and the Cabinet for that matter, on the agreement. The Aide-Memoire for Cabinet dated 22 July (ironically the draft which had been approved unbeknownst to Leger at that time) did not include the paragraph which Macdonnell of DL(1)D had insisted upon at the 605th Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting, namely:

The United States authorities should be reminded that Canadian willingness to joint operational control of the continental air defence forces should be met by a corresponding United States recognition of the need for adequate consultation with the Canadian authorities on matters which might lead to the alerting of the air defence system.⁴⁴

It contained no references to consultation at all. Leger was expressing his personal consternation as well as the Department's real concerns over the difference between the general references to "fullest possible" and "consistent" consultation between the two governments on continental air defence matters found in the press release of 1 August, and specific pledges for consultation stipulating the who, what, when and why, and possibly additional intergovernmental political machinery regarding the proposed command's alert status. The reason for this criticism became quite obvious on page three of Leger's letter.

In a passage which seems a coldly calculated understatement, Leger added "We should have been happier if something along these lines [Macdonnell's proviso]...had appeared in your memorandum to Cabinet of July 22, which you indicate was the memorandum approved by Cabinet." DEA was in the process of negotiating procedures

on alerts with the U.S., which Foulkes was well aware of.⁴⁵ Foulkes had therefore, not only gone back on his word given on 15 February, 1956 at the Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting to include the Department's specific concerns regarding consultation in the document being prepared for the politicians. He had also seriously undermined Canada's position in on-going negotiations with the U.S..

Leger then turned his attention to Foulkes' attitudes regarding the departmental 'spheres of influence' concerning the propriety of the form of the new accord which was explicit in the August 7 letter. In that letter, Foulkes had stated his view that the delay incumbent in the working out a formal exchange of notes regarding NORAD after the U.S. Secretary of Defense had already agreed to the MSG terms would, in effect, be placing the Secretary's authority to set up a military command in question and an embarrassment to the government of Canada.⁴⁶ However, Foulkes added that while he felt at the time (1 August) that the announcement had to be made public, he would have no problem with any written governmental agreement which DEA and the State Department might now wish to draw up.⁴⁷ This would seem to make clear, once again, Foulkes' determination to present the matter of air defence integration in purely military terms thus accomplishing two things: first, justifying the exclusion of diplomats from both countries in the decision-making process, and second, de-politicizing the matter somewhat.

To Leger's mind however, this position contained some fundamental errors in logic. Attacking Foulkes' parochial department-to-department view of Canadian-

⁴⁴ *ibid.*

⁴⁵ *ibid.* p. 3

⁴⁶ Foulkes letter, 7 August, 1957, *op. cit.* p.3

⁴⁷ *ibid.* p.4.

American defence relations, he stated that “[a]n inter-governmental agreement, by its very nature, cannot fail to respect the authority of the ministers most concerned. This Department does not make agreements with the State Department; the agreements are between the Canadian and United States Governments.”⁴⁸ This quick lesson in civics underscored the DEA position that all official inter-governmental business transacted, such as the NORAD agreement was, by the very nature of things, an agreement between governments, not corresponding departments. And this of course was most definitely DEA’s business. He then ended by serving notice that his department would be taking up the issue of a formal exchange of notes to govern the agreement with SSEA Smith in the very near future, at which time, DND’s views on the subject would be entertained.⁴⁹ It was time for Leger to move this inter-departmental turf war to the negotiating process

A clear indication of the animosity the NORAD agreement had created between DEA and DND in the fall of 1957 can be found in a supplementary document for Leger drawn up in preparation for a meeting between American and Canadian officials on defence issues. At the upcoming meeting, both Leger and Foulkes were to be part of the Canadian team and the officials at DEA seemed to feel that Foulkes, not the Americans, was going to be the real opposition. The author of the supplemental memorandum justified its inclusion in the briefing package for Leger by stating that “[s]ince you may, however, be showing your Brief to General Foulkes, we have not in it, dealt with a number of controversial points which General Foulkes raised...”⁵⁰ In other words, this document was for the Under-Secretary’s eyes only, for use in the inevitable confrontation

⁴⁸ Leger letter, Sept. 10, 1957, op. cit. P.4

⁴⁹ *ibid.* p. 5.

⁵⁰ Robinson Papers, vol. 8 file 6, P. Tremblay to USSEA re: “Meeting of Consultation with United States Authorities,” September 27, 1957.

with Foulkes prior to meeting the Americans.

The memorandum noted the views expressed by the Chief of Defence Staff to members of DL(1)D regarding NORAD at a 20 September preparatory meeting. Paul Tremblay, the note's author and new head of DL(1)D, recounted that Foulkes remained unconvinced of the need to record a formal exchange of notes on the matter in that NATO represented a precedent for the placing of Canadian troops under the operational control of a foreign commander. According to his memory,

When External Affairs officers present [at the Sept. 20 meeting] argued that there was a real distinction between placing Canadian troops in Europe under foreign command and placing Canadian forces in Canada under foreign command, General Foulkes repeated his argument that all of this was within the NATO concept. He referred in passing to the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group as, in essence, a NATO command.⁵¹

While the supplementary brief conceded that the General's position on this aspect contained a "kernel of truth," there was much, in Tremblay's view, in need of correction.⁵²

DL(1)D's continued opposition to this interpretation stemmed from the fact that, although the decision to set up an integrated air defence command had been taken, the all important terms of reference for the commander which would outline his responsibilities over forces *under his direction and responsibility to* Canadian and American superiors, either military or political, had not been clearly established. With respect to the NATO command structure, Tremblay pointed out that unlike the CINCNORAD, "SACEUR's [Supreme Allied Commander, Europe] command was set up under the terms of the NATO Treaty and each year his forces and his plans are examined by the ministers of the countries which have placed forces under his command. In practice, therefore, everything

⁵¹ *ibid.*

he does stems directly from intergovernmental agreement reached in ministerial council.”⁵³ It went without saying that since the NORAD agreement had not been expressed in accordance with accepted international practices, considered by the NATO Council, nor the command structure worked out at all, that the linkage position was weak at best.

The paper conceded that NORAD may have well been ‘within the NATO concept,’ whatever that nebulous phrase entailed. On the flip-side, however, the present status of the Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group made all comparisons to the other NATO commands irrelevant.⁵⁴ This interpretive inconsistency had, in fact, been acknowledged by Foulkes himself at the 20 September meeting when he declared that “the Commander-in-Chief NORAD is not responsible to the [NATO] Standing Group and indeed nobody desires that he should be.”⁵⁵ This would hardly seem to be in keeping, at least politically, with the ‘NATO concept’ angle being championed by the Chairman. In explaining this apparent inconsistency, Tremblay speculated that “[t]he logic of General Foulkes’ argument surely is that if there were difficulty in explaining the creation of NORAD to Parliament, the Government should contend that it was, in truth, a NATO command.”⁵⁶ The problem with this position, the author observed, could easily lead, as with most rhetorical spins, to the serious embarrassment of the government. “The NATO Council and the Standing Group were merely informed...that NORAD was being established on the day that it was established.”⁵⁷ Presumably a situation with which DEA could relate.

⁵² *ibid.*

⁵³ *ibid.*

⁵⁴ *ibid.*

⁵⁵ *ibid.*

Furthermore, the USSEA was reminded that the other party to the agreement was not likely to look favourably on the Foulkes line. "To the best of our knowledge, there is no desire at this point to create in North America a truly NATO command which would leave the way open for the service in it of senior officers of our NATO allies."⁵⁸ DEA felt that inviting U.S. comment would only expose the government to an unacceptable degree of criticism by increasing the likelihood of direct American involvement in the Canadian debate. In essence, this memorandum underlined the view that while the NORAD agreement was indeed a rational and possibly even desirable military arrangement to utilize the combined continental air defence infrastructure through a single commander, issues of consultation and civilian oversight of the new headquarters remained wholly unresolved and unsatisfactory in the eyes of DEA. Any North American accord which recognized the superiority of the United States, in their view, was bound to be politically charged, with lasting effects, either real or perceived, on Canada's foreign policies.

On 14 October 1957, Queen Elizabeth II was to open the first parliamentary session of the Diefenbaker government. Opposition criticism of at least the form, if not the substance of the integration agreement was sure to follow shortly thereafter. The Departments of External Affairs and National Defence were still at loggerheads over the need to complete a formal exchange of notes to govern the new accord and NORAD's proper place within the 'NATO concept'. The time had come for the politicians—Diefenbaker, Pearkes, and the new Secretary of State for External Affairs Sidney Smith—to work out a politically defensible position.

⁵⁶ *ibid.*

⁵⁷ *ibid.*

On 7 October, Leger forwarded to his new Minister, Smith, a memorandum written by J. J. McCardle of DL(1)D, which outlined the present state of the interim arrangement (Air Marshal Slemon, the Canadian deputy Commander-in-Chief NORAD, having taken up his duties at NORAD HQ on 12 September) and of DEA/DND discord. The document explained that:

We have...[at External] always considered it desirable that the setting up of the integrated command should be recorded in an intergovernmental agreement. The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff is unconvinced of the need for an intergovernmental agreement on the subject. He has argued that the Minister of National Defence has the authority to set up military commands and that the command is within the NATO concept and should not therefore be difficult to explain to Parliament or the public.⁵⁹

The brief outlined DEA's view of the unprecedented nature of the accord, the conventional methods usually employed in international matters such as NORAD and the political benefits of being able to point to negotiations in train concerning a formal intergovernmental agreement in explaining the matter to Parliament over the coming weeks and months. McCardle then told the Minister why the Department was so insistent on the exchange of diplomatic notes.

It is possible to conceive of an action taken by the United States which would not involve her allies....It is difficult to conceive that the United States could take any overt action to protect itself which would not immediately affect Canada....Canadian consent to the establishment of NORAD should provide us with an opportunity which should not be lost to reassert formally the need for close consultation and to impress upon the United States Government Canada's special place among the countries allied to the United States.⁶⁰

Here the objectives of DEA with regards to the accord and the views of General Foulkes as stated in his 1961 article seem to be remarkable similar. Both the Chairman and

⁵⁸ *ibid.*

⁵⁹ Robinson Papers, vol. 8 file 6, Memorandum for Minister, October 7, 1957, p.1.

⁶⁰ *ibid.* p.3

McCardle (whose superiors had signed off on as in agreement with) could envision a situation where a threat to U.S. global security interests could lead to the activation of the integrated command while NATO might remain unaffected. NORAD would ensure that the Canadian government would be consulted, outside of NATO Council, each and every time the U.S. considered actions which could possibly lead to an alert of the continental air defence system. NORAD was to be one in a series of agreements to provide Canada with greater access to and possibly influence over U.S. foreign policy than any of the other NATO members. DEA and DND differences revolved around the need for explicit and formal definitions for U.S. commitments to consult. Since these differences could not be resolved at the official level, and since External perceived the political stakes to be high, the note ended by imploring Smith to discuss the matter with Pearkes so a decision could be made one way or the other before Parliament began sitting.⁶¹

⁶¹ *ibid.*

CHAPTER II

PULL, 1957-1958

By 23 October the House was in session and in the middle of the Throne speech debate, the traditional first order of business for the House beginning a new session. In preparation for his upcoming meeting with Smith over the NORAD issue, Foulkes provided Pearkes with his views on DEA's criticisms of his handling of the file. Foulkes advocated that his Minister should stick to his guns in keeping NORAD out of a formal intergovernmental agreement. The 1940 Ogdensburg Declaration and the North Atlantic Treaty, in the General's opinion, both provided precedents for the actions taken thus far. He feared that an exchange of notes might greatly complicate the task underway at NORAD HQ of working out the terms of reference for the CINCNORAD because the notes would unnecessarily "compel either side...to exchange further notes for any alterations of the terms of reference."¹

Then General Foulkes came very close to a line which, by convention, public servants, civilian or military, must be very careful not to cross. Having informed Pearkes on numerous occasions that approval of the accord as it would have been forthcoming and virtually immediate if the Liberals had been returned to power, he now offered the following tactical suggestion:

I feel that as Mr. Pearson [now Opposition Liberal leader] was one of the principal advisers of the Prime Minister of Canada at that particular time, he would not be prepared to challenge the legality of the actions taken by the former Prime Minister.²

This was the sort of advice that probably should have come from the Minister's political

¹ DHH, 73/1223, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Papers file 879, Foulkes to Minister, "Integration of Operational Control of Canadian and Continental United States Air Forces in Peacetime", Oct. 23, 1957.

² *ibid.*

staff, not from a public servant. Ethical issues of propriety aside, let us examine the logic of this statement from the perspective of Pearkes. Much has been written by both academics and first-hand participants about the Diefenbaker administration's uneasy relations with the civil service it inherited after more than two decades of Liberal government.³ If the civil service, and especially DEA, truly was the nest of 'Pearsonalities' that the Tories claimed, "living cheek-by-jowl"⁴ with former Liberal Ministers, should not the repeated opposition to the DND proposal of External Affairs, that veritable hive of Pearson drones, have signaled to the Tory minister that the agreement he and Diefenbaker had approved would have been rejected or significantly amended by any incoming Liberal administration with Pearson at the head? Apparently not.

In a surprise move, however, the Prime Minister had decided the question of the need for notes on his own when he accompanied the Queen on a visit to Washington after the opening of Parliament. In explaining the political difficulties he expected to encounter upon his arrival back in Ottawa to President Eisenhower, Diefenbaker suggested that a formal intergovernmental text concerning NORAD would possibly defuse much of the anticipated Opposition criticism, to which Eisenhower agreed.⁵ Diefenbaker had inadvertently come down on the side of External in the DEA/DND NORAD turf war, for partisan rather than national interest reasons, at least as far as questions of form were

³ J. L. Granatstein in his book, *The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957*, (Toronto 1982), provides a compelling analysis of the influence and power wielded by a small cabal of senior civil servants during the King/St. Laurent period and the difficult adjustment to life under Diefenbaker and his Ministry. pp. 266-270. Also see, J. Hilliker, "The Politicians and the 'Pearsonalities': The Diefenbaker Government and the Conduct of Canadian External Relations," in Canadian Historical Association, *Historical Papers*, (Ottawa 1984).

⁴ C. Ritchie, *Diplomatic Passport: More Undiplomatic Diaries* (Toronto 1981), 157.

⁵ Joseph T. Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958*, (Vancouver 1987), p.109.

concerned. On questions of interpretation and presentation however, DEA's warnings were to be ignored.

The Parliamentary debate over the NORAD agreement was a somewhat sporadic affair. Beginning in late October and November 1957, at the outset of the Diefenbaker's first session, the integration accord only received a full airing in the late spring of 1958, after the Diefenbaker landslide in March and the subsequent tabling of the notes negotiated between Canada and the U. S. on May 18, 1958, which formally ratified the new continental air defence command. While the government had been swayed by DEA's insistence upon the need for a formal written agreement based on political rather than military considerations, the politics Diefenbaker and his ministers emphasized in their handling of the affair were partisan rather than international. It would appear that the political decision to complete a formal exchange of notes was taken as a kind of holding action to keep Pearson's Liberals and the CCF at bay by being able to point to negotiations in progress when facing questions in the House in late 1957 and early 1958. By the same token, Diefenbaker, Pearkes and Smith clung to the NATO/NORAD linkage interpretation advanced by General Foulkes in spite of repeated warnings from DEA.

Diefenbaker, particularly, had a great appreciation for the way in which NATO transacted business.⁶ Representatives of the ambassador rank from participating states were permanently stationed in Paris at NATO HQ, which ensured ready access to the various heads of government. All questions of policy were brought before the NATO Council and consensus was required for approval, regardless of the relative strength of each member. The hierarchical operational structure of NATO, where power flowed

⁶ P. T. Haydon, *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered*, (Toronto 1993), p. 179.

downwards from the Council to the Military Committee and then to regional commanders, recognized civilian control as the pinnacle. This Framework seemed to have served Canadian interests well since 1949.

With Sydney Smith set to appear before the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs in early December 1957, where the NORAD issue was sure to factor heavily, DEA attempted to bring the new Minister up to speed on the complexities and political dangers encountered thus far. In anticipation of Committee questions regarding the NORAD relationship to NATO, Leger's briefing memo began with the warning that this would not be an easy question. He made Smith aware of Foulkes' opinion that NORAD was actually a NATO command set up in the Canada-United States region and that a command such as NORAD "does not necessarily have to be designated a NATO command to come under the NATO umbrella...."⁷ He then included his Department's competing analysis that,

CUSRPG relations with the NATO Council have been more nominal than real. The paradox has existed, therefore, that while constantly stressing that North America is part of the NATO area and that continental defence is a part of the NATO defence effort, there has not been full integration of CUSRPG activities in the NATO military organization.⁸

Leger warned Smith that any attempt to bind NORAD explicitly to NATO would require the consent of the United States. DEA had discovered through discreet overtures made in Washington, that the U.S. military authorities could be counted upon to resist such a development strongly.⁹ As Joseph Jockel noted, "NATO, in American eyes, was for the defence of Europe, not North America", and a formal link such as that proposed by

⁷ DHH, 73/1223, file 879, Jules Leger, Memorandum for Minister (SSEA), 2 December, 1957, "NORAD-Possible Reserve Statement in External Affairs Committee", p. 2

⁸ *ibid.*

⁹ *ibid.*

Foulkes “remained anathema to the Pentagon.”¹⁰ Leger therefore counselled his Minister to step very carefully around the NATO/NORAD linkage question in defending the agreement in the House and in Committee. A misstep could very easily result in not only domestic but international embarrassment.

Having warned his Minister to be wary of some of the NATO/NORAD interpretations being brandished about Ottawa, Leger turned his attention once again to the source of much of the contestable information being provided. In a letter to Foulkes dated 11 December, 1957, Leger once again summarized his department’s thinking on the linkage issue. After conceding that NORAD, if held under a certain light, was “within the NATO concept” and that the new air defence command would “naturally have close relationships with other NATO commands,” circumstances dictated that all references to linkage remain in the most general of terms.¹¹ The reasons for Leger’s insistence on ambiguity was that the CINCNORAD Terms of Reference were still under negotiation in Washington and that it would take the agreement of the United States for NORAD to live up to the interpretation being advanced. On this, he warned again that after some informal inquiries made by Robertson regarding an explicit NATO/NORAD link, that the “United States military [were] not prepared to implement such a concept at [that] time.”¹² Since Leger’s access to and influence upon the Minister of National Defence and the Prime Minister was limited, he was pleading with the man they were listening to that an adjustment in government thinking was required.

As with the question of form, the question of official government interpretation of the integration accord was resolved by the Prime Minister, this time in fairly dramatic

¹⁰ Joseph Jockel, *op. cit.* pp. 96 and 107 respectively.

¹¹ DHH 73/1223, file 85, Leger to Foulkes Re. “NORAD-Terms of Reference,” 11 December, 1957.

fashion. In mid-December, 1957, Diefenbaker traveled to Paris to take part in a NATO Heads of Government Meeting. In his address to the Meeting, Diefenbaker seemed to get carried away in his rhetoric when describing the importance of the new air defence command to Western security, and in doing so, went beyond what even General Foulkes was advocating in linking NORAD to NATO. Diefenbaker stated with pride that:

As a result of this integration [NORAD], we hope to achieve a more efficient and more economical defence for the retaliatory forces based in North America. I would emphasize that this integrated force is an integral part of our NATO military structure in the Canada-United States Region and will report to the Standing Group* and the NATO Council [the military and political branches respectively] in a manner similar to that followed by the other NATO military commands.¹³

Apparently Diefenbaker was not receptive to the advice from DEA prior to his Paris visit. He had been explicitly warned against any attempt at establishing such a link at that time, for by using the word “report” instead of “inform” in describing the NATO/NORAD relationship, the Prime Minister had unilaterally established a new NATO command, at least rhetorically.

Upon learning of the Prime Minister’s remarks in Paris, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington were furious and prepared letters of clarification to be sent to the U.S. Secretary of Defense Wilson and to Canadian civilian and military authorities at the highest levels. From the U. S. point of view,

the JCS were...faced with a Canadian government that not only had declared NORAD a NATO command but also apparently wanted the otherwise insignificant CUSRPG to begin passing on intimate details of

¹² Ibid. p.3

* Now defunct, the Standing Group of NATO was an executive committee of flag officers seconded to NATO and based in Washington. This Group occupied a place under the NATO Ministerial Council but whose relationship to the Military Committee—the official NATO military body just under the political level in the NATO hierarchy—was ambiguous enough to cause much resentment within NATO during these years when Europe was getting back on its feet and Germany was about to re-arm with a vengeance.

¹³ Robinson Papers, vol. 8 file 6. “Extract From NATO Paris Telegram 2503 To External—Prime Minister’s Statement to Meeting of NATO Heads of Government -16 December, 1957.”

North American defence to the at times untrustworthy Europeans.¹⁴

Once the text of Diefenbaker's statement in Paris reached Washington, the situation became urgent for Canadian diplomatic and military representatives. On 19 December, Ambassador Robertson cabled Ottawa expressing his surprise and concern over Diefenbaker's Paris statement. He described how in November he had had discussions with the State Department's Canadian desk about bringing NORAD formally within the NATO fold, that this was originally a State Department suggestion, and that at the time he had stressed the importance of reaching a common Canada/United States position before raising the issue at NATO.¹⁵ Since discussions between the Embassy and State about placing NORAD within NATO had been a non-starter due to the Pentagon's expressed opposition, Robertson quite naturally was curious as to whether some alternative arrangement had been made at the political level in Paris, to which he was not privy. He cautioned that the drafts of the NORAD Terms of Reference he had seen thus far were quite inconsistent with what the Prime Minister had just said and that to bring words and deeds into line, the Terms of Reference would have to contain "expanded references" to the NATO relationship.¹⁶ As Robertson and virtually every other Canadian civilian or military representative involved in the NORAD issue knew, this was likely to prove most difficult.

General Sparling, Chief of the Canadian section of the Joint Staff in Washington had the unenviable job of explaining the Prime Minister's untenable position to the military brass at the Pentagon. Sparling was anxious over the fact that the only official

¹⁴ Jockel, *op. cit.*, p.115.

¹⁵ Robinson Papers, vol. 8 file 6, Telex: Washington to External re. PM's Remarks at NATO Paris, 19 December, 1957.

¹⁶ *ibid.*

information concerning the NATO/NORAD relationship he had to go on was that contained in the 1 August press release and the Prime Minister's statement of 16 December.¹⁷ With the U. S. military position on this matter being quite clear, Sparling expected to be placed in the dock in the very near future.¹⁸

At this point General Foulkes made a call to his opposite U. S. number in Washington, General Twining, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. In a long telephone conversation Foulkes explained that, while the Canadian Chiefs of Staff were opposed to any multilateralization of the integration accord in principle, the domestic political situation in Canada called for a delicate approach. Rising anti-American sentiment, combined with an "almost sacrosanct" regard for NATO required the government to play down the bilateral realities of NORAD by showing deference to the highly popular NATO Treaty.¹⁹ General Twining accepted Foulkes' assurances that the command's reporting procedures would be kept strictly bilateral and killed the already drafted communiqué.

Having educated the U.S. Chiefs of Staff on the finer points of the current Canadian political situation, Foulkes did the same for General Sparling. In a cable responding to 20 December request for instructions, Foulkes explained to Sparling that,

It was necessary [for the PM to make the Paris] statement because of the criticism launched against this proposal by the Opposition, who have been attempting to establish the fact that NORAD was a purely Canada-United States arrangement and had nothing to do with NATO. It is our intention to report to the various NATO military and political authorities through the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group, which is an established practice which has been followed since NATO was set up. It is not intended that NORAD should report directly to anyone but

¹⁷ DHH, 73/1223, file 85, CJS (Wash) to CCOS "Concerning PM's Statement of 16 December, 1957." 20 December, 1957.

¹⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁹ Jockel, *op. cit.* p. 115.

the Canadian and United States Chiefs of Staff.²⁰

Once again the dubious use of the word 'report' appears in the NATO/NORAD debate.

In this message Foulkes was telling Sparling that the status quo regarding the CUSRPG's nominal relations with the NATO Military Committee were to remain in effect, and secondly, that the CINCNORAD would report only to the Canadian and American Chiefs of Staff. What was not said, but obvious to both parties to this communication was that on paper the Canadian and U. S. Chiefs were the CUSRPG. Furthermore, while CINCNORAD would be legally bound to 'report' to the Canadian and U. S. Chiefs, these same Chiefs, in their other role as CUSRPG members were only obliged to keep NATO 'informed' of continental defence arrangements outside of SACLANT. The combined Chiefs had only formally met once in their CUSRPG capacity in 1950 to inaugurate the new Regional Planning Group. Since 1950, the MCC, the body that had commissioned the MSG report from which the NORAD proposal had sprung from in 1956, performed the CUSRPG functions by briefly donning different hats in discussions of the state of continental defences at regularly scheduled MCC meetings.²¹ The Foulkes link had become so shrouded in the military mystique of committees, boards and liaisons that even fellow servicemen were having a tough go of sorting out NORAD's status, and it would get worse.

In late December, the Chairman came across the proposed agenda for a meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence to be held early in the new year. One of the proposed agenda items was the status of the terms of reference and the diplomatic notes to formally establish NORAD. The PJBD agenda, Foulkes felt, would not be politically

²⁰ DHH, 73/1223, file 85, Foulkes to Sparling CCJS (W), 27 December, 1957.

²¹ DHH, 73\1223, file 886, "Canada-United States Committees and Boards Concerned With Defence and

wise in light of Diefenbaker's NATO speech two weeks previous. In a letter to the Secretary of the PJBD Canadian Section, Foulkes explained his rationale:

You will recall that the Prime Minister has said in his statement in Paris and in other statements in the House that this is a NATO arrangement within the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group. It therefore should be dealt with as a CUSRPG matter and not a matter under the Permanent Joint Board on Defence which deals with Canada-United States matters outside the NATO concept. I am a bit afraid that if the [PJBD] deal in any way with NORAD, this may be interpreted by some members of Parliament as an indication that this is not a NATO arrangement but a bilateral arrangement under the PJBD.²²

While possibly politically expedient, there were several major problems with Foulkes' position. First, NORAD was not to be a NATO arrangement and this Foulkes knew full well from his recent discussions with Twilling. Secondly, the Canadian Chairman used the words 'arrangement' and 'concept' synonymously when describing the new air defence commands relationship to NATO which seemed designed to confuse the issue. The third concerns his view of the PJBD's scope for deliberation on continental defence questions. In 1946, under the auspices of the PJBD, the Military Co-operation Committee was founded to approve and amend, when necessary, the Canada-United States Basic Security Plan at the military level. If an issue under MCC consideration became political, then it was to be referred back to the PJBD.²³ Furthermore, since the MCC had been functioning since 1950 as the CUSRPG, and given the fact that NORAD was a continental defence question which had become political and fell outside the NATO structure, consideration by either body would indeed have been appropriate. Foulkes' hyper-sensitivity to encroachments on the NORAD file meant that valuable and informed opinions were being squandered.

Related Questions." 8 February 1963 p.13.

²² DHH, 73/1223, file 85, Foulkes to Secretary, Canadian Section, PJBD, 30 December, 1957.

²³ DHH, 73/1223, file 886, "Canada-United States Committees and Boards Concerned with Defence and

By early spring 1958, the Department of External Affairs and the U. S. State Department were trading drafts of the wording for the exchange of notes to proclaim formally the new command and reviewing draft terms of reference for the Commander in Chief NORAD which had been produced at NORAD HQ in Colorado Springs. The former would set the general tone and broad objectives while the latter would define and dictate the command's function. The Terms of Reference were to spell out explicitly which forces were to be placed under the CINCNORAD's operational control, his prerogatives in employing these forces and the chain of command which was to be followed. On the American side, the linkage interpretation which the Diefenbaker government had given the accord was troubling. While the U. S. Chiefs had been grudgingly cajoled by Foulkes into giving Diefenbaker some latitude in presenting the case for the command to the public, when it came to the terms of reference for NORAD—which would remain classified and hence not open to public debate—the American military would brook no deviations from a strictly bilateral structure. The text of the Terms of Reference contained not a single reference to NATO. Robertson's warning of 19 December was noted but ignored.

Though External and State were the two agencies theoretically charged with conducting day-to-day Canadian/American relations, on both sides of the border the most interested and informed participants in the negotiations were the Canadian and U. S. defence establishments. This resulted in a kind of military 'back channel' where negotiations and information exchanges were taking place parallel to the diplomatic discussions. The result was that diplomats in both countries, while nominally in charge of the situation, found themselves spending more time in liaison with their respective

militaries than with their opposite numbers in the foreign service. Canadian diplomatic representatives had also found it necessary to bypass State and approach Pentagon personnel directly for information and opinions, only further complicating an already dizzying situation.

Up until June 1958, the controversy over the NATO/NORAD linkage, if any, had only preoccupied Canadian, and to a lesser extent, American officials. Since a third party had been ‘incidentally’ drawn into this debate and only informed of developments on the date of NORAD’s inception, a pronouncement from the body at the eye of the interpretive storm was virtually certain. The security of the American strategic deterrent force of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) was the bedrock of NATO defence doctrine. According to the NATO Military Committee Resolution 14/2 (MC 14/2 Revised), adopted at the meeting on 9 May, 1957, North America’s strategic value could not be understated.

The importance of North America lies in the fact that it possesses the principal bases for the strategic air counter-offensive, which is the main deterrent to general war. North America is also the principle source of Allied production and support. It is geographically well placed to provide some of the bases required in general war to control the vital lines of communication with Europe.²⁴

SAC represented the sword of the sword and shield insignia adorning the NATO coat of arms. It was on this threat of counterstrike from ‘secure’ bases in fortress North America that European states ultimately based their defence posture. The Resolution also stressed that, “the knowledge throughout the world that the Strategic Air Command

²⁴ Robinson Papers, vol. 8 file 6, Foulkes to Leger re. NORAD—Relationship with NATO, annex 1, Canada/US Regional Planning Group and Relation to Other NATO Commands, 3 January, 1958.

base complex cannot be successfully attacked is of prime importance.”²⁵ Therefore, any increase in the ability of North American forces to alert and defend the strategic nuclear forces which guaranteed their survival was not, to the European NATO partners, a matter of semantics.

According to the memorandum originally compiled for Pearkes on 3 January, 1958—a copy of which was forwarded to Leger—MC 14/2 went on to spell out the strategic objectives for the North American continent within the ‘NATO framework’. These objectives were designed to guide the CUSRPG in their dual role as national Chiefs of Staff and as the senior NATO co-ordinating body for the North American region, in formulating long-range defence planning and expenditures. The 1957 objectives were:

- i) Provision of an effective base for, and effective protection of, the strategic counter-offensive capability
- ii) Maintenance of an effective early warning and air defence system
- iii) Protection of as much of the industrial mobilization and military potential, and population as practicable
- iv) Provision of the maximum practicable support of the overall war effort, consistent with i), ii) and iii) above.²⁶

At the time that these strategic objectives were identified, the Military Council was no doubt aware (through CUSRPG liaison with Paris HQ) that the last in the series of arctic radar installations—the Dew Line—was set to become operational some time during the summer of 1957. This would add substantially to the advance warning time

²⁵ *ibid.*

²⁶ *ibid.* pp. 1-2.

SAC could expect of a Soviet airborne attack and dovetail nicely with the part one of the second stated objective of providing for the earliest possible warning of attack. As for the effective air defence system mentioned in the objectives, neither U.S. nor Canadian military officials saw fit to consult or inform NATO Paris in May, 1957, that the U.S. Secretary of Defense had approved the NORAD plan and that Cabinet level consideration of the carefully worked out proposal was on the horizon in Canada. Again, this would hardly seem to be consistent with the Diefenbaker Government's emphasis on the importance of NORAD to the overall NATO structure.

Foulkes' prime concern at this point was not as much to cast Canada in the role of champion of high NATO principle. He was trying desperately to demonstrate that, if handled properly, NORAD could be all things to all concerned. In the cover letter attached to his analysis of CUSRPG's relationship to NATO commands, we see the Chairman's juggling at its best. First, in a passage responding to DEA concerns raised by Canada's Washington and NATO legations over the PM's NATO speech, he stated that, "It is not our [DND] desire to make any changes in the procedures for reporting the activities of the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group to the various political and military authorities of NATO."²⁷ He outlined briefly how, under procedures agreed to in April, 1949, the CUSRPG reported to the NATO Military Committee and that the Military Committee in turn reported to the Council, thus establishing political control over ultimate decision-making power in NATO. If DL(1)D's assessment of the CUSRPG/Council situation is to be trusted, this meant that relations were to remain "more nominal than real."²⁸ With respect to public statements by either politicians or

²⁷ Robinson Papers, vol. 8 file 6, Foulkes to Leger: NORAD—Relationship with NATO, 3 January, 1958.

²⁸ See footnote 8, ch 2, p.47.

officials about the accord, he suggested “that any answers regarding the relationship of NORAD to NATO be in accordance with the agreed directives from the Council to the Canada-U.S. Regional Group.”²⁹ In issuing these directives, the Council had to rely heavily, if not wholly, on information and advice provided by the representatives of the combined Chiefs of Staff who, in performing their CUSRPG function, had not seen fit to inform Council that NORAD was even in the offing as late as May. Therefore, Foulkes seemed to be suggesting that the curious be given a tour of the Potemkin village.

Finally, in dealing with the increasingly resolute Americans, Foulkes acknowledged that certain private concessions would have to be made.

It is not proposed that there should be included in the terms of reference to NORAD any further direction than that they should report to the Chiefs of Staff. It is not considered appropriate to include in the terms of reference of the commanders of NORAD the action to be taken by the Canada-U.S. Regional Group. However it will be appropriate to include in the note the provision that the other NATO authorities, political and military, will be kept *informed* of the progress and planning being made in NORAD through the Canada-U.S. Regional Group.³⁰

Foulkes was slyly advocating that the Government publicly say one thing while privately signing on to something quite different; Foulkes had counselled his Minister and the Prime Minister to lie. In keeping with the above, the public and the Opposition were to be told that everything NORAD did was more or less a response to directives from NATO Council to the CUSRPG while the classified terms of reference should affirm that NORAD would be a strictly bilateral accord which was to operate in co-operation with, but parallel to, the NATO structure. In the documents for Canadian consumption, Foulkes consistently inserted the word ‘report’ in reference to proposed NORAD/NATO relations, while in those needing American concurrence, the term ‘inform’ becomes the

²⁹ *ibid.*

norm. This was not inadvertent.

The Chairman was also apparently very concerned with his own department's handling of the NORAD file. In a note sent to the Deputy Minister of National Defence, Frank Miller, on 10 January, 1958, Foulkes attempted to bring the administrative branch of the Department in line with the operational. He began with his personal assessment of much of the briefing material available to both ministers and the public.

In...papers which have come to the attention of the Chiefs of Staff there has been frequent reference to Canada-United States defence arrangements which have tended to create the impression that the defence of North America is not part of NATO defence arrangements and reference is seldom made to the Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group in NATO. I would emphasize that the whole of Canada and the United States is part of the NATO area and as far as Canada is concerned the defence of this area is as much a NATO matter as the defence of Allied Command Europe. Therefore it is considered that much more attention should be paid to this aspect of our NATO planning in drawing up papers and in making submissions to the government and releases to the public.³¹

The rationale behind this was that "[t]his will give us much greater latitude and should clear up any public misunderstandings regarding defence arrangements with the United States."³²

Once again, however, the need to bring all North American defence arrangements under the NATO umbrella had to be reconciled with existing bilateral machinery which pre-dated the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949.

It is fully realized that there are still in existence the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and the Military Cooperation Committee, which are part of the organization which existed before NATO was formed. This organization has been maintained at the express wish of the United States, mainly on the grounds that there are certain defence matters on which the United States would prefer to deal directly with Canada for reasons of security. However, it is the intention of the government to give as much emphasis as possible to the NATO aspects of our

³⁰ *ibid.* Emphasis added

³¹ DHH, 73/1223, file 879, Foulkes to DMND Miller, "NATO Defence Arrangements in North America," 10 January, 1958.

³² *ibid.*

defence in North America and to play down any special arrangements which exist on defence matters with the United States.³³

While Foulkes was worried about the political impact that references to the bilateral PJBD and MCC could have on the NORAD debate, a new initiative proposed by Secretary of State for External Affairs Smith was to make things even more complicated.

If DEA/DND differences over NORAD demonstrated anything to Smith, it was that command and control of the North American defence establishments by political authorities was far too loose. If the official experts in his department and at National Defence could not agree on the 'pith and substance' of the accord now being negotiated, then surely the politicians would have to play a more influential role in overseeing the new command. In February, 1958, Smith decided to insist that an agreement to set up a joint committee of Canadian and U.S. ministers to coordinate the civilian control of the Services be included in the exchange of notes. Smith made the Clerk of the Privy Council, R. B. Bryce, aware of the form he now wished the final note to take.

After outlining the NORAD arrangements, the note would go on to indicate that the creation of NORAD was only one of a number of developments that were giving rise to a closer and closer involvement of the two countries in defence affairs in and around North America, which from time to time gave rise to problems of policy as well as administration and operational control. In order to deal more effectively with these and to coordinate the civilian control of the Services involved, it is proposed that there be a committee, to be called simply the Coordinating Committee on Defence, consisting of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense on the U.S. side and the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence on the Canadian side which would meet from time to time to review matters of common interest in connection with the defence of North America.³⁴

Once again, Leger was to learn of NORAD developments second hand, this time from the

³³ *ibid.*, p.2.

³⁴ Robinson Papers, vol. 8 file 6, Bryce to Leger Re. "New Political Machinery to Oversee NORAD", 14 February, 1958.

Cabinet Secretary. In his note to Leger, Bryce then added his own view that what was needed was not new intergovernmental machinery as much as the proper use of existing bodies. "I have some doubts as to whether the new machinery is really needed from the point of view of operations or policy but if you feel it is desirable, either as window-dressing or in order to further our relations with the United States, I would not wish to oppose it."³⁵

Ten days later, on 24 February, W. R. Martin, Secretary to the Cabinet Defence Committee, wrote to inform Bryce that in J. M. McCardle's (who was now attached to the PJBD) opinion, Smith had become "strongly wedded" to the idea of a bilateral ministerial committee.³⁶ Martin's analysis was that not only was the new machinery proposed by Smith superfluous, but might even prove damaging to Canadian interests. "If it proves to be useful window-dressing not much harm can be done, but I am fearful that it might get the government into trouble in the end that it did not anticipate. This could be a good forum for the U.S. to exert pressure on us, and it is bound to be a leaky vessel."³⁷ Concerns raised by PCO officials had little effect on Smith, who gave instructions to Ambassador Robertson that provisions for the committee should be discussed with U.S. officials with an eye to including them in the NORAD exchange. The Ambassador raised the issue twice with State, on 21 March and 1 May, 1958, and each time he was told that agreement depended on the views of Defense, which by 1 May had not responded to State's queries.³⁸ The NORAD notes were turning into a Canadian-American omnibus accord on consultation, with provisions for the commands operational effectiveness

³⁵ *ibid.*

³⁶ Robinson Papers, vol. 8 file 6, W. R. Martin to Bryce, 24 February, 1958.

³⁷ *ibid.*

³⁸ *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, 1958-1960, vol. VII, Washington 1993, pp.684 and 685.

tacked on.

Opinion at the Pentagon seemed to confirm what DEA had been warning the Canadian government of since NORAD's inception. Highly placed Pentagon officials were through with assuaging the Canadians and were now insisting that the wording of the note, the political window dressing to the operational elements of the accord, "should not give any ground for interference by our NATO allies in the disposal of forces in [the] Canada-United States Region nor should it even by inference suggest [the] possibility that NATO had a right to comment on plans for the air defence of North America."³⁹ To Ambassador Robertson, "[i]t was clear...that these officials wished the note to emphasize [the] bilateral character of the NORAD agreements."⁴⁰

Robertson was becoming acutely aware of his government's vulnerability over their NATO/NORAD position for, if American patience were wearing thin in matters concerning the symbolic preamble for NORAD, the future did not look promising for a multilateral component to the actual marching orders. He explained his difficult position to his American colleagues who were examining the Canadian draft of the note in Washington.

Departmental officials...recalled the political controversy which had arisen in the House last fall with respect to NORAD and emphasized that the Canadian draft had been carefully worked out to include only such references to the NATO link as would satisfy Canadian requirements, without, we hope, causing difficulties for the U.S.A. authorities.⁴¹

The Canadian 'controversy' was public and political, while U.S. difficulties were largely between State and the Pentagon. While the public NATO/NORAD charade was still

³⁹ DHH, 73/1223, file 87, Telex, External (Leger) to Washington (Robertson) Re. "NORAD-Exchange of Notes," 29 April, 1958.

⁴⁰ *ibid.*

⁴¹ *ibid.*

being played out for the benefit of Canadian politicians, the jig was up at the official level.

On 6 May, the Diefenbaker Cabinet Defence Committee convened to assess the state of negotiations with the Americans over consultative procedures related to continental air defence. Although the wording of the exchange of notes formally establishing NORAD took centre stage, there were various other initiatives intimately connected to the new command, dating back to the previous administration, which were only partially completed. Item six of the minutes noted that in 1956 negotiations on declaring alerts were initiated with the United States based on, first, the establishment of procedures for the exchange of intelligence information which could lead to the declaration of an alert; and second, for consultation on situations which could lead to the declaration of an alert prior to the outbreak of hostilities.⁴² The former had been worked out some time earlier, ensuring a measure of Canadian access to the vast American intelligence network.⁴³ The latter (which Foulkes had put in jeopardy) appears to have been an attempt by External to ensure that the Canadian government would be privy to any American deliberations on future initiatives, either diplomatic or military, which could result in armed confrontation regardless of whether or not the possible response would be directed at the European area of NATO. On this front, the Canadian enterprise had stalled because the American counter-proposal did not provide for mandatory diplomatic consultation prior to the implementation of possibly provocative measures. The American response only referred, “in rather vague terms, to the circumstances which

⁴² RG 2, Cabinet Defence Committee—Minutes, Item VI, “Canada-U.S. Bilateral Agreement Regarding Declaration of an Alert,” Doc. D-1, 58, 6 May, 1958, found in Robinson Papers, vol. 8 file 7.

⁴³ *ibid.* The text of the exchange of letters regarding this bilateral exchange of intelligence remains classified.

might prevent consultation prior to the institution of alerts.”⁴⁴

Smith reported to the CDC that his drive to establish a consultative body at the cabinet level to review and discuss continental defence arrangements with the Americans, which Robertson had initially floated in Washington, had been well received by the U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. In recent discussions with Dulles, Smith had explained “that this was a matter on which action was necessary and desirable in view of the wide spread public interest in Canada in such matters as alerts and the carriage of nuclear weapons over Canadian territory.”⁴⁵ A new bilateral political forum appeared to be in the offing in the near future, but American agreement in time for the NORAD exchange was unlikely.

By early May, the discussions over the wording of the diplomatic note were nearing completion. As Robertson suspected, the most contentious sections dealt with what, if any, reference would be made to NATO. On 9 May, he cabled External as to the state of the bargaining process:

After considerable discussion, the U.S.A. authorities agreed to the wording originally suggested in our first draft, i.e. “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee will continue to be kept informed through the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group of arrangements for the defence of North America,” except for the reference to the Military Committee. We pointed out that the wording suggested by the U.S.A. could lead to further questions in the House of Commons, that our language was in deliberate general terms and that we could once more assure the U.S.A. authorities that we have no intention of bringing about any changes in the present procedures for the reporting by our services to NATO.⁴⁶

Again, the mere reference to the NATO chain of command beyond the CUSRPG (made up of the respective Canadian and American Chiefs) met with stiff U.S. resistance. The

⁴⁴Robinson Papers, vol. 8 file 4, Cabinet Defence Committee—Minutes, 6 & 7 February, 1957.

⁴⁵ *ibid.* Item VII. “Report by SSEA on Progress of NORAD Negotiations.”

⁴⁶ DHH, 73/1223, file 78, Telex, Washington to External Re.: “Wording of Exchange of Notes on

assurances of Foulkes, which had now become an important part of DEA's negotiating posture in Washington, were not enough. The Americans were insisting that the letter correspond to the agreed spirit of the accord.

Just three days after Robertson, once again, had had to call Ottawa to secure permission for the changes in the text demanded by the Americans, the notes were officially exchanged. Paragraphs four and five of the preamble to the May 12 agreement reflect the elements considered most important and essential to the Canadian side. The first was necessary to hold the line adopted by the Diefenbaker Government on Foulkes' advice stressing the NATO/NORAD relationship. The latter was meant to further Canada's continuing post-war objective of securing special access to and influence on the formulation of American foreign policy. Paragraph four reads that:

Studies made by the representatives of our two Governments led to the conclusion that the problem of air defence of our two countries could best be met by delegating to an integrated headquarters, the task of exercising operational control over combat units of the national forces made available for the air defence of the two countries. Furthermore, the principle of an integrated headquarters exercising operational control over assigned forces has been well established in various parts of the North Atlantic Treaty area. In support of the strategic objectives established in NATO for the Canada-United States region and in accordance with the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty, our two Governments have, by establishing the North American Air Defence Command recognized the desirability of integrating operational control over assigned air defence forces. The agreed integration is intended to assist the two Governments to develop and maintain their individual and collective capacity to resist air attack on their territories in North America in mutual self defence.⁴⁷

As for External Affairs' concerns over the degree of consultation which Canada would henceforth be entitled to under the accord, the language first used in the DND draft to the St. Laurent Cabinet Committee in early 1956 (to which the Department had strenuously objected), was now formalized.

NORAD," 9 May, 1958.

The two Governments consider that the establishment of integrated air defence arrangements of the nature described increases the importance of the fullest possible consultation between the two Governments on all matters affecting the defence of North America, and that defence co-operation between them can be worked out on a mutually satisfactory basis only if such consultation is regularly and consistently undertaken.⁴⁸

After the preamble came a list of eleven central principles to govern the operation and organization of the command in future. The first pertained directly to the duties of the new operational commander.

The Commander-in-Chief NORAD (CINCNORAD) will be responsible to the Chiefs of Staff Committee of Canada and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States, who in turn are responsible to their representative Governments. He will operate within a concept of air defence approved by the appropriate authorities of our two Governments, who will bear in mind their objectives in the defence of the Canada-United States region of the NATO area.⁴⁹

Here there was no mention of the Chiefs' role as CUSRPG. Item number two made clear that the forces under the direction of the CINCNORAD would be made available by the Canadian and U.S. forces alone. "The North American Air Defence Command will include such combat units and individuals as are specifically allocated to it by the two Governments."⁵⁰ In keeping with American concerns over the sharing of sensitive intelligence and doctrine with several European states, this clause gave either party the right to veto the secondment of any allied units or personnel to any part of the NORAD structure.

Principle four directed that the status quo was to be maintained for communication with NATO authorities where continental air defence was concerned: "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization will continue to be kept informed through the

⁴⁷ Canada, *Treaty Series*, 1958, no. 9, (Ottawa 1959).

⁴⁸ *ibid.*

⁴⁹ *ibid.*

⁵⁰ *ibid.*

Canada-United States Regional Planning Group of arrangements for the air defence of North America.”⁵¹ If Diefenbaker’s statements to May 1958 were to be accurate and consistent with what was actually recorded, this passage would have had to read ‘The Canada-United States Regional Planning Group will report to NATO on all arrangements for the air defence of North America.’ This would have multilateralized the agreement by making NORAD a subordinate command within the NATO structure.

The top secret Terms of Reference were formally released to the CINCNORAD on 10 June, 1958.⁵² With negotiations over the formal exchange of notes and the NORAD Terms of Reference completed, the American military liaison to the NATO Standing Group (SGLO) was instructed to brief NATO Secretary-General Spaak on the results of the negotiations which had established NORAD. In a cable dated 2 June, 1958, Foulkes was informed that the American liaison officer, General Parker, had spoken with Secretary-General Spaak in preparation for his North American tour that month, as to what NATO could expect from the newly constituted NORAD command. If the U.S. was prepared to accept certain ambiguities in the NORAD definition in Canada in order to make things politically expedient for the Diefenbaker, the information provided for the Secretary-General’s benefit emphasized different organizational and operational principles embodied in the note.

Spaak was informed by the American officer that, contrary to the public pronouncements of Diefenbaker government, which implied that NORAD would be a command virtually subordinate to the NATO system, NORAD was most definitely a bilateral affair. The main points of Parker’s briefing were that NORAD was a bilateral

⁵¹ *ibid.*

⁵² DHH, 73/1223, file 87, Foulkes to Minister, 11 June, 1958.

accord which depended on neither the approval of the NATO Council nor required any changes in any of the NATO commands. Here he put forward the American interpretation of the NORAD operational principle concerning CUSRPG liaison with NATO. The new command would not be included in the annual review process of NATO resources. The SGLO was drawing Spaak's attention to the section of the note which stipulated that:

The plans and procedures to be followed by NORAD in wartime shall be formulated and approved in peacetime by appropriate national authorities and shall be capable of rapid implementation in an emergency. Any plans or procedures recommended by NORAD which bear on the responsibilities of civilian departments or agencies of the two Governments shall be referred for decision by the appropriate military authorities to those agencies and departments and may be the subject of intergovernmental co-ordination.⁵³

NORAD financing was to be negotiated by Canada and the United States alone and not subject to any NATO input: "The question of the financing of expenditures connected with the operation of the integrated headquarters of [NORAD] will be settled by mutual agreement between appropriate agencies of the two Governments."⁵⁴ Finally, and most importantly, that the Standing Group, the group which Parker spoke for, "[could not] give orders to the NORAD commander, as it [could] to other commands."⁵⁵

The fact that Spaak had been briefed on NORAD came as a surprise to Foulkes. That an American officer attached to the NATO Standing Group—where Canada was not represented—and that Parker had described NORAD in terms which were politically explosive in Canada made it a most unwelcome surprise. According to the Canadian officer attached to SHAPE Paris, in reporting his discussions with Spaak to the Standing Group and presumably with the Secretary-General himself, Parker had touched on

⁵³ Canada, *Treaty Series*, 1958, no. 9 (Ottawa 1959).

⁵⁴ *ibid.*

⁵⁵ DHH, 73/1223, file 87, Telex, From: NMR Canada SHAPE Paris. To: CCOS Ottawa (Foulkes) 2 June, 1958.

CUSRPG's unique position within NATO.

General Parker has I believe raised the question in his report to the Standing Group of the relationship between CUSRPG and NATO and has asked for guidance. While I have not seen his report, I gather that he is of the opinion that some changes should be made in the present status of CUSRPG⁵⁶

Parker was obviously not up to speed on USJCS opinion in this regard.

Foulkes was told that, although the situation was potentially bad, Dana Wilgress, Canada's Ambassador to the NATO Council, would be accompanying Spaak as far as Canada and "intended to discuss this matter with Spaak en route...with special emphasis on the Canadian Government's position on this point."⁵⁷ There was now a clear and present danger that the Diefenbaker government would come under fire from either the NATO Military Council, NATO Secretary-General Spaak, Canada's NORAD partner the U.S., the Opposition, or all of the above.

The danger of a serious rift between Canada and her allies was heightened by the existence of a memorandum composed at DND, under Foulkes' direction, for use by the Prime Minister in Parliament that spring. This memo, which could be more accurately defined as a speech draft, laid out a position which was increasingly at odds with the American and NATO interpretation of the accord. In describing the general nature of the NATO/NORAD relationship, the paper began with the assertion that: "The relationship is so close that it is impossible to refer to one without involving the other."⁵⁸ This was true enough for the Canadian debate where Diefenbaker seemed unable to mention NORAD without reference to NATO, but as far as the allies were concerned, the proposition was questionable. In response to an Opposition question at the time the notes were tabled (19

⁵⁶ DHH, 73/1223, file 87, Telex, From: NMR Canada SHAPE Paris To: CCOS Ottawa, 2 June, 1958.

⁵⁷ *ibid.*

⁵⁸ DHH, 73/1223, file 87, Telex: CCOS Ottawa To: Chairman, CJS Washington, 4 June, 1958.

May) about the relationship of the CINCNORAD to NATO Council, the author gave an explanation of NATO reporting and appointment procedures.

Contrary to popular belief the Supreme Allied Commander Europe does not report directly to the NATO Council, but rather, to the Standing Group and through this body to the Military Committee, who, in turn, report to the NATO Council. The NATO Council did, of course, approve the appointment of SACEUR. It will be recalled that at the request of the NATO Council, the President of the United States appointed the [SACEUR] and this appointment was subsequently approved by NATO Council. The NATO Council does not, however, approve the appointments of subordinate commanders....⁵⁹

After this factual explanation of the NATO structure, clarity was lost and the piece became contradictory.

The previously expressed position of the Minister of National Defence in the House that, "A commander [had] not been appointed for the NATO North American area"⁶⁰ was affirmed. After noting that the North American area had not developed into a formal command within the NATO structure, the author drew an obvious and misleading parallel to the NATO example: "...C-in-C NORAD, who is in fact a subordinate commander for the North American area, [was] approved by the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group...."⁶¹ From this, one could easily draw the conclusion that CINCNORAD was subordinate to a group which was itself subordinate, ultimately, to NATO Council. While this was no doubt the intention of the explanation, it was somewhat less than forthright. The appointment of the CINCNORAD and the Deputy had been approved first by the Canadian and U. S. Chiefs acting as national commanders, not as CUSRPG, and then by the respective national political authorities, not the NATO Council.

⁵⁹ *ibid.*

⁶⁰ *ibid.*, Pearkes statement was made in the House on 5 December, 1957.

⁶¹ *ibid.*

This speech proposal, originally intended for the Prime Minister's eyes only, was passed on to the CJS Chairman to highlight the difficulties which the SGLO's briefing might cause for the Canadian government if the NATO Secretary-General chose to speak out on NORAD during his North American visit. "It will be noted that the extract quoted from the brief which the [SGLO] gave to Spaak...is at considerable variance with the above extract...."⁶² The Allies were now becoming the possible political adversaries.

DND and Foulkes were not, however, the only sources which the Prime Minister drew upon for guidance in the NORAD debate in Parliament. R. B. Bryce had gained the Prime Minister's confidence early on in the administration and had become not only an effective conduit for official opinion, but also an able interpreter and commentator, especially on foreign policy and defence questions.⁶³ Bryce had also provided Diefenbaker with a list of points which he had assembled from the various briefing papers which had come across his desk on their way to the PM. He seems to have attempted to strike some sort of balance between the political realities now faced by Diefenbaker's position and the contractual realities of the NORAD agreement itself. He suggested that Diefenbaker begin by emphasizing, for both domestic and foreign consumption, "that the defence of North America, and in particular, of the bases of the Strategic Air Command, is part of the NATO purpose and function."⁶⁴ Words such as 'concept,' 'structure,' and 'report' were to be absent from this text.

Next he suggested that Diefenbaker, more or less, come clean as to the true nature of the NATO/NORAD relationship and tone down the link advocated by Foulkes and

⁶² *ibid.*

⁶³ See J. L. Granatstein, *A Man of Influence: Norman Robertson and Canadian Statecraft, 1929-1968*, (Toronto 1981), p.324, J. Hilliker and D. Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs: Coming of Age, 1946-1968*, vol. II. (Kingston 1995), p. 136.

DND. As to the status of the CINCNORAD, Bryce suggested something along the following lines: "No NATO commander for North America has been established, or been needed. NORAD is the nearest thing to one, but it is a joint U. S./Canadian headquarters established by the two governments acting through their Chiefs of Staff."⁶⁵ Also absent in this list of points were diversionary references to the CUSRPG. Speaking directly to NATO involvement, the advice was to note that, "the other NATO countries [had] been informed of NORAD's establishment, but not asked to give it their sanction at the Council."⁶⁶ On the contentious issue of NORAD'S future relations with NATO, Bryce proposed the most direct and honest position possible:

NORAD will keep the NATO military authorities informed of its activities by means of reports made by the U.S. and Canadian Chiefs of Staff...but will do so by the authority and under the direction of the U.S. and Canadian governments and their organizations.⁶⁷

The thrust of this memorandum was clearly that there was more to be lost than gained politically by clouding the NORAD issue with dubious links to boards and groups with overlapping mandates. Ultimately, authority rested with and flowed from the Canadian and American governments, not NATO Council.

While Diefenbaker considered his options, Foulkes was trying to reassert a measure of control south of the border. To address possible NATO and U.S. military interference in the debate, Foulkes had a message sent on 3 June to the Canadian Chairman of the Joint Staff in Washington. The Joint Staff, Washington (JSW), a strictly bilateral body made up of senior Canadian and American service representatives, had

⁶⁴ DHH, 73/1223, file 87, "Notes Provided to the Prime Minister by R. B. Bryce Re. NORAD," 9 June, 1958.

⁶⁵ *ibid.*

⁶⁶ *ibid.*

⁶⁷ *ibid.*

become Foulkes' instrument of choice for making his views about NORAD known to the American Chiefs without, as was shown by the series of communications in December, 1957, imparting much background information to the Canadian officers. The JSW also provided the convenience of being very near to the NATO Standing Group authorities. Foulkes expressed to Chairman Sparling his annoyance with the Americans for having shut him out of an important step in the process where NATO was to be brought on board and requested that the JSW Chairman pass his sentiments to the American military authorities.

You will appreciate that the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff feels very strongly that any instructions sent to the SGLO to brief the Secretary General on NORAD and also its relationship to NATO should certainly have been cleared with Canada before dispatch in view of Canada's vital national interest in this matter.⁶⁸

In the NORAD note itself, the drafters had included provision which specifically called for consultation prior to the release of public information by the CINCNORAD. Principle eleven stated that: "The release to the public of information by CINCNORAD on matters of interest to Canada and the United States of America will in all cases be the subject of prior consultation and agreement between appropriate agencies of the two Governments."⁶⁹ Though the information involved in the Parker briefing was neither public nor released by the CINCNORAD, Foulkes was surely justified in feeling that certain parties within the U.S. military establishment were not fully honouring the terms of the new agreement.

Foulkes' attempts to personally manage the NATO/NORAD dilemma were being seriously undermined. Apart from NATO and U.S. military complications, External Affairs was now using NORAD as a lever to secure American agreement on files old and

⁶⁸ DHH, 73/1223, file 87, Telex, From: CCOS To: Chairman, CJS Washington, 3 June, 1958.

new. The bilateral negotiations on declaring alerts, which DEA felt Foulkes and DND had derailed with the 1 August press conference announcing the interim NORAD agreement,⁷⁰ were once again being pressed. Furthermore, SSEA Smith had made it clear, in both Ottawa and Washington, that he considered a new bilateral defence committee of responsible ministers a requirement brought on by an continental air defence scheme which operated outside the formal NATO structure. All this talk of bilateral machinery, even if still at the official level, was making Foulkes' NATO/NORAD position increasingly suspect.

The question of whose advice on the handling of NORAD held sway with the Diefenbaker government was settled in the House of Commons. On 19 May, 1958, the text of the notes establishing the command were tabled in the House by Sidney Smith. The tone for the substantive element of the debate was set when Smith stated,

The arrangements of the air defence of Canada and the United States and the allocation of forces to NORAD for that task will be reported...to NATO through the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group....The commander of NORAD will be directly responsible to that group.⁷¹

The emphasis on CUSRPG would seem to indicate that the government intended to stick closely to the Foulkes line. In response to a question from Opposition leader Lester Pearson as to whether the government intended to allow Parliament to debate the issue by submitting a resolution, Smith replied that, "The government regards this [NORAD] as an amplification of and extension under the North Atlantic Treaty." and as such, the new accord need not be debated again. However, the government did eventually concede to a debate, which got under way on 10 June.

⁶⁹ NORAD notes.

⁷⁰ See Leger to Foulkes, 10 September, 1957, note 41, ch. 1, p. 35.

⁷¹ *Debates*, 19 May, 1958, p. 191.

The criticisms leveled at the government over NORAD began with Pearson chastising the government for not following the parliamentary precedents set by the previous Liberal government (of which he had been a part of since 1948 as the Secretary of State for External Affairs) in considering such security agreements. Using the North Atlantic Treaty process as an example, he described how NORAD should have been first brought before the Cabinet Defence Committee (which did not exist when Diefenbaker approved the DND proposal) and then be considered by the full Cabinet, after which the agreement could then be signed and brought before Parliament in the form of a resolution.⁷² After these procedural criticisms, the debate turned to the substance of the agreement.

Diefenbaker's tone seemed to have moderated somewhat since his December 1957 NATO speech. On the NATO/NORAD link—which Smith had so recently and explicitly made—the PM confined himself to describing NORAD as “within the NATO concept,”⁷³ as opposed to “an integral part of our NATO military structure,”⁷⁴ as had been the case in Paris. Whether Bryce's memorandum had influenced him or not, his position was changing.

Pearson then rose and read into the record a portion of a news conference given by NATO Secretary-General Spaak a few day prior.

Q. Do you consider NORAD part of NATO? A. (Spaak) No, it is not under the command of NATO. Q. Do you think it is an extension of NATO? A. Well, we are very interested in it but NORAD is not under the command of NATO. I think it is a very good experiment.⁷⁵

⁷² House of Commons, *Debates*, 1958, 10 June, 1958, p.1000.

⁷³ *Debates*, *ibid.*, p.998.

⁷⁴ Robinson Papers, vol. 8 file 5, Telex: To All Heads of Posts Abroad, “NATO Heads of Government Meeting—December 16-19, 1957.”

⁷⁵ Quoted in J. McLin, *Canada's Changing Defence Policy, 1957-1963: The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance*, (Baltimore 1967), p. 56.

In an apparent direct response to assertions made by Smith the month before in tabling the notes, Spaak had publicly refuted the government's position.

As the debate over NORAD dragged on, the formal NATO/NORAD linkage tack was whittled away bit by bit until, on 19 June, Diefenbaker explained that NORAD represented,

the extension of the *principles* of NATO to the North American continent, in that it makes provision for the joining together of free nations within the context of NATO and for the purposes of NATO. Without discussing the connection between NORAD and NATO I wish to say that I believe, whether it is part of NATO or not, it does strengthen NATO, which is all that matters.⁷⁶

With that the NORAD debate ended, for a time.

Whether or not the NATO/NORAD link mattered to the effectiveness of the air defence of North America is not the point here. The point is that a bureaucratic squabble, precipitated by officials with competing agendas, had bubbled up to the political level and became a political embarrassment to the Diefenbaker government. With ministers being pulled in such different directions, it is somewhat surprising that no serious cabinet crisis developed over NORAD, as eventually would happen when the question of nuclear arms for Canadian NORAD and NATO forces was finally brought to a head in 1963. Foulkes retired from the Service in the spring of 1960, and set out to correct the misrepresentations of Canadian defence policy he saw everywhere. The 'Pearsonalities' of External Affairs, however, remained.

⁷⁶ *Debates*, 19 June, 1958, p.1423. Emphasis added.

CHAPTER III

IN THE MUD, 1958-1962

Even though Diefenbaker himself had virtually conceded the NATO/NORAD link argument to the Opposition in June, 1958, military spokesmen continued to fly the colours. Whether this was out of respect for the considerable efforts and risks Foulkes had taken in moving the NORAD file forward and selling it to the politicians or in deference to the obfuscations Diefenbaker had come to regard as facts is impossible to ascertain. Ambiguity, however, had become a fixture of Defence references to NORAD.

In an address to the Canadian Industrial Preparedness Association in Montreal on 23 October, 1958, Air Marshal Roy Slemon, the Canadian Deputy CINCNORAD stated: "It [NORAD] functions as an integrated command, responsible to the Chiefs of Staff of both countries. This bilateral agreement extends the mutual security obligations of NATO to the air defence of the Canada-United States Region of NATO."¹ Here Slemon, who obviously knew better, as the second in command at NORAD headquarter, was playing fast and loose with reality by referring to NORAD as the means by which NATO security obligations were extended to North America. This had been accomplished 'at the creation' through Article five of the North Atlantic Treaty signed in 1949.

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them...will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.²

External Affairs, on the other hand, had, in essence, abandoned the

¹ DHH, 73/1223, file 522, "North American Air Defence," Address by Air Marshal C. R. Slemon to the Industrial Preparedness Association, Montreal, 23 October, 1958.

² Quoted in, J. Gellner, *Canada in NATO*, (Toronto 1970), p. 16.

NATO/NORAD link position put forward by their Minister in Parliament in 1958. In their annual report for 1957 (released in 1958), the typical DND ambiguity concerning NORAD reporting procedures was absent.

In order to improve the capabilities of the air defence forces of Canada and the United States to support the collective security of NATO, the air defence systems of this continent have recently been completely integrated through the establishment of a joint Canada-United States headquarters known as the North American Air Defence Command.³

The Report for 1958, the year the notes were exchanged, read:

During the year co-operative defence arrangements between Canada and the United States were extended with the formal establishment of the North American Air Defence Command, under which the air defence systems of the two countries have been completely integrated, and with the creation of the Canada-United States Committee on Joint Defence.⁴

On one level, the traditional roles of External and DND had been reversed. Defence spokesmen asserted Canadian independence from the Americans through their NATO interpretation, while DEA quietly acknowledged the reality of the new situation created by NORAD and even explicitly used the word 'bilateral.' On another level, however, the diplomats had picked a battle they thought more worthwhile as the reference to the Joint Committee on Defence above suggests. They quietly continued to further define and reinforce Canada's right to consultation.

Defining consultation in international affairs is a tricky business. However carefully thought out or scrupulously negotiated any accommodation may be, at root, pledges at times of relative calm are bound to be subject to the circumstances under which discussions are held. Whether it be *pro forma* annual meetings of boards and committees established years or even decades before, or the midnight call of an agitated

³ *Report of the Department of External Affairs, 1957*, Ottawa 1958, p. 8.

⁴ *Report of the Department of External Affairs, 1958*, Ottawa 1959, pp. 9-10.

ambassador, the substance of the consultation will invariably be influenced by the moment. This difficulty was raised by General Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in 1963, when pressed by a Canadian reporter:

I think it is very difficult to define consultation because it may mean something different in each particular case and I think it should mean something different; I think there should be some latitude. But, if I may loosely define it, I think that the definition that does apply within the alliance is that when a matter arises which is of interest to more than one member within the alliance, particularly if it is of interest to all members of the alliance, that the country or the individual, the agency having primary responsibility discusses this with the other interested parties as early as possible, either reaches an agreement where an agreement is necessary or appropriate; or, where this is not necessary or appropriate at least gives full consideration to the views of the other members. It does not in its general application necessarily mean agreement in every case.⁵

This, in a nut shell, was what Canadian diplomats had traditionally sought from NATO, and even more so, from the Americans through NORAD. External Affairs did not covet the ability to say yes or no to U.S. policy, they simply wished to ensure access to key American authorities early in a developing situation which would be necessary to influence outcomes one way or the other.

To this end, External was involved throughout most of the late-50's and early 60's period in discussions with the U.S. over consultative procedures to be followed when the international situation appeared to be deteriorating and military response was fast becoming a possibility. An agreement completed 10 November, 1958, addressed, to the greatest degree possible for the Canadian negotiators, concerns originally raised in 1956 over placing continental forces, including the armies and navies, on alert. The exchange of letters stipulated that:

- (a) Canada and the United States should consult when either Government concludes that alert measures are necessary;

⁵ Robinson Papers, vol. 9 file 6, Telex: From External to posts abroad, Transcript of General Norstad Press Conference in Ottawa 3 January, 1963, dated 5 January, 1963.

- (b) That such consultation should take place through both diplomatic and military channels;
- (c) That it would pertain only to the initiation of a full scale alert involving all the armed forces and the populace of the nation as a whole;
- (d) That each Government reserves the right to take alert measures before initiating consultation if impelled to do so by the time factor; and,
- (e) That the agreement shall not affect the freedom of action of either Government to take appropriate measures for its own defence or that of its treaty partners.⁶

DEA had succeeded in getting agreement for making consultation over military alerts, at the diplomatic level, a standard operating procedure, but had had to concede that this would only cover the highest states of alert. This note also recognized that certain domestic situations or treaty commitments to which Canada was not party to, as well as timing, could trigger unilateral American action. The degree of latitude which the U. S. felt necessary in its February, 1957, communication had been spelled out and preserved.

At the inaugural meeting of the Joint Committee on Defence, ironically held during the annual meeting of NATO ministers at Paris, 15 December, 1958, the Canadian and American ministers agreed to begin negotiations aimed at spelling out the degree of consultation which had to take place prior to the institution of a NORAD alert. The Canadian position going in to the Joint Committee meeting was that,

NORAD's power should be limited to declaring increased states of readiness [the Canadian equivalent of the graduated system of U.S. Defence Conditions—DEFCON's—which would ultimately place the command on a war footing] for purposes of training his command and in the event of an unacceptably large number of unidentified aircraft within the warning system. When international tensions increased there should first be consultation on the political, diplomatic, and Chiefs of Staff level.⁷

The U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense had responded favourably to this suggestion and new talks began, to be conducted through State and DEA respectively. Both parties

⁶ Robinson Papers, vol. 9 file 4, Ross Campbell: Memorandum for the Ambassador, 6 November, 1962.

⁷ RG 2, (Privy Council Office Records—PCO), A-5-a, vol. 1899, Cabinet Conclusions, 9 December, 1958.

agreed that the unique character of NORAD required further clarification of alert consultation procedures.

The terms of reference for these negotiations was premised on the fact that the declaration of a NORAD alert would come as the result of rising international tensions, such as a confrontation over Berlin. The other two possibilities for the declaration of an alert, for training and for large scale incursions into North American air space by presumably hostile aircraft, had been covered in the exchange of notes and the CINCNORAD Terms of Reference. The result of the talks begun after the inaugural JCD meeting was an exchange of letters completed 2 October 1959, which underlined the responsibility of the Chiefs of Staff to report developments or requests to their appropriate political authorities.⁸ The Canadian position here was that, "an increase in the state of readiness of forces in a period of international tension might have political implications, both international and domestic, as well as military implications."⁹ In addition to setting out the Chief's responsibilities to consult one another and report to their ministers, the agreement went on to outline the actions to be taken in times of crisis by Canadian and U.S. politicians. "In these circumstances parallel consultations will be carried on between the political authorities of our two countries prior to reaching such an agreement."¹⁰ Henceforth, the declaring of a NORAD alert as a result of ongoing international developments would require political agreement at the highest levels.

In January 1960, yet another exchange of letters took place concerning consultation within the NORAD structure. Not content with the vague mention of discussions at the diplomatic level contained in the 1958 and 1959 notes, External had

⁸ *ibid.*, Ross Campbell, 6 November, 1962.

⁹ Robinson Papers, vol. 8 file 6, Memorandum for File, 8 November, 1962.

succeeded in stipulating exactly who should be consulted and how. It was agreed that 'normal diplomatic channels' would be defined as "the Canadian Embassy and the Bureau of European Affairs of the State Department [where the Canada desk was located] or, in more urgent situations, direct telephonic communication between the Department of External Affairs and State [presumably at the Under-Secretary level]."¹¹ These two agreements, the 1959 exchange and the 1960 supplementary exchange, were to be interpreted in the spirit of the 1958 exchange concerning North American military alerts as a whole. External now felt comfortable that it had in place a consultative framework—spelling out in minute detail—the channels through which the Canadian government's views would be solicited in urgent security matters, thus ensuring both civilian and sovereign control of the Canadian Armed Forces dedicated to continental defence.

Not to be out done, National Defence was also working to make sure that Canada occupied a special place in the United States' system of alliances. Indicative of this, DND had put forward a proposal for political consideration in the fall of 1962, to construct an Alternative Command Post, NORAD at North Bay, Ontario. In an Aide Memoire to the Minister of National Defence, Douglas Harkness, who had replaced Pearkes on 11 October, 1960, the case for the construction of the new NORAD installation was portrayed as having invaluable political benefits. In the section titled 'Political Aspects,' the increased expenditures were justified because the existence of such a facility in Canada would:

- (i) preclude the possibility of the United States developing a type of aerospace defence system which would enable them to defend the United

¹⁰ *ibid.*

¹¹ *ibid.*

States (but not Canada) independent of any Canadian participation or influence;

- (ii) ensure Canadian 'need to know,' and therefore continued access to United States research, development and production plans and projects related to ballistic missiles and space activities;
- (iii) commit Canada more firmly and permanently to the 'mutual defence concept' under NORAD;
- (iv) tend to offset, for a very nominal cost to Canada, the fact that we have not made or been asked to make any contribution to either the capital or operational and maintenance costs (both of which are very large) associated with the prime NORAD facilities at Colorado Springs;
- (v) Ensure Canadian access, as a result of the complete intercommunication between the NORAD ALCOP and other major allied and United States commands and higher national echelons, to the most complete and up-to-date information available relative to both the Allied and enemy situation. Such information is vital at both the governmental and military levels, and is unlikely to be available to Canada as a result of any other arrangements we might make.¹²

This list of possible political benefits was reflective of serious shortcomings identified in the five years since NORAD had become operational.

The inability of the Diefenbaker government to take the hard decision to acquire nuclear warheads for weapons systems procured for the defence of North America and for the Canadian brigade in Europe, and the interdepartmental tensions this created, has been well documented.¹³ Its relevance to the subject at hand is that, by 1962, Canada had assumed certain defence responsibilities and purchased weapons systems which

¹² DHH, 73/1223, file 15, Aide Memoire: On the Proposal to Accommodate the NORAD ALCOP At North Bay, 9 October, 1962.

¹³ See, J. M. Ghent, *Canadian-American Relations and the Nuclear Weapons Controversy, 1958-1963*, University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation 1976 (available at York University); J. L. Granatstein, *A Man of Influence: Norman A. Robertson and Canadian Statecraft, 1929-1968*, (Toronto 1981); and, *Canada 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation*, (Toronto 1985); P. Lyon, *Canada in World Affairs, 1961-1963*, (Toronto 1968); J. McLin, *Canada's Changing Defence Policy, 1957-1963: The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance*, (Baltimore 1967); P. Nicholson, *Vision and Indecision*, (Toronto 1968), H. B. Robinson, *Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs*, (Toronto 1989).

demanded the acquisition of nuclear ammunition from the United States. DEA and DND were advocating conflicting positions, with External stalling for time and Defence insisting on timely resolution to negotiations with the Americans so that weapons systems could be armed. Canada's NORAD and NATO partner, the Americans, were becoming increasingly frustrated with the Canadian position which seemed, as in the 1957-58 NORAD debate, deliberately designed to confuse more than it clarified. These American sentiments, expressed in various bilateral exchanges, threatened to unravel the intricate web of consultation agreements DEA had negotiated, for the pledges, no matter how legally precise, were only as good as the American willingness to consult.

Warnings of what might happen if Canada failed to live up to the hardware end of the NORAD bargain by becoming nuclear-capable were visible when the government was considering how to fill the interceptor gap created by the cancellation of the Avro Arrow project. The short list of weapons systems suitable for Canadian requirements and available in the U.S. at substantial savings were the F-101B long-range interceptor and the Bomarc surface-to-air missile, both specifically designed with nuclear capability. In a memorandum to the Prime Minister advocating procurement of these weapons, it was pointed out that since the completion of the NORAD agreement, the Canadian contribution had consisted mostly of the manning and operation of a portion of the early warning radar sites and,

to a lesser extent, the fighter and now Missile Control Systems [Semi-Automated Ground Environment—SAGE—now being used to process radar information and direct fire control] on the one hand, and on the other, the [proposed] provision of Interceptor Squadrons and Bomarc Squadrons....If we do not accept these [F-101B's and Bomarcs] and withdraw completely from this part of our operations, I should think there would be some danger that the Americans would want to have a complete revision of the NORAD arrangement set up, with quite unforeseeable

implications for us.¹⁴

The message was clear; if Canada wanted to play, it had to pay, both financially and politically. The decision to acquire these systems was taken later that year, but an agreement to secure nuclear ammunition was not forthcoming.

In April, 1962, the American Chairman of the U.S. Section, PJBD, officially voiced his government's displeasure with the Canadian contribution to NORAD. In a speech which Dr. Hanna formally read into the record at the beginning of the session. Canada was called to book.

The inadequacy of our continental air defence has been of serious concern for a considerable time. It has only become more dramatically apparent with the deployment to North Bay of a Bomarc squadron lacking armament, and the deployment in Canada of 66 F-101B aircraft not armed for maximum effectiveness. Forward deployment of these weapons without nuclear armament not only forgoes planned improvements in North American air defence; it actually degraded our defence capability below the level we would have achieved by deployment just below the Canadian border. It must be assumed that the potential assailant understands the nature and location of this weakness in our air defences, consequently, the credibility of the deterrent is thereby downgraded. Present air defence capabilities in the U. S. were developed taking into consideration the joint planning for nuclear air defence in Canada. Further, reliance on capabilities in the U. S. will not assure timely engagement of an attacker with our best available weapons at the maximum possible range from his objective. We have reached the conclusion that without arrangements for the employment of our full nuclear air defence capability, major targets in Quebec, Ontario and the western provinces, and major targets in the north-eastern, north-central and north-western United States, and particularly our deterrent capability cannot be adequately defended. The survival of our two nations and the general security of the free world is linked to the military security targets like these.¹⁵

A more dramatic scolding from a friendly state would be hard to imagine, and Canadian diplomatic and military representative had now been put on notice that the U.S. was taking a long, hard look at the commitments surrounding the NORAD agreement.

¹⁴ Robinson Papers, vol. 9 file 3, Memorandum for the Prime Minister: "Air Defence Problems," undated and unsigned but appears to have come from the PCO and undoubtedly went through Bryce's hands on the way to the Prime Minister's desk.

On 14 October, 1962, a American U2 high-altitude spy plane on a routine reconnaissance mission over Cuba took photographs which seemed to show launch sites, in various degrees of readiness, for Soviet Intermediate and Medium range ballistic missiles, the larger of which was capable of delivering a nuclear payload as far north as Hudson's Bay. On Monday, 22 October, American President John F. Kennedy informed the world in a television broadcast of the existence of these sites and his government's determination that the Soviet missiles be removed at once. To this end, Kennedy announced that a U.S. naval blockade of Cuba would commence on Wednesday, October 24, at 10:00 am eastern standard time: any military equipment classified as 'offensive' would be subject to seizure. The Soviets, whose ships were en route to Cuba carrying the majority of the missiles destined for the new launch sites, countered that any American attempt to stop and search Soviet registered ships would be regarded as an act of war. The public phase of the Cuban missile crisis had begun and the NORAD framework—the operational command and the consultative processes—faced its first live test.

In the week prior to the Cuban situation becoming public, when Kennedy and his Executive Committee (ExCom) of close political advisers and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were considering the most appropriate course of action, certain Canadian diplomatic and military officials were informed that a crisis was brewing. On 17 October, Admirals Koch and Taylor of the United States Atlantic Command paid a visit to their opposite Canadian numbers in Halifax to discuss a "deteriorating situation" involving Cuba.¹⁵ How far up the chain of command the information provided to the Canadian Atlantic commanders went is unclear. P. T. Haydon maintains that consultations took place on a

¹⁵ Robinson Papers, vol. 9 file 4, Permanent Joint Board on Defence—Minutes, 30 April to 3 May, 1962.

¹⁶ P. T. Haydon, *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered*, (Toronto 1993), p.

limited basis at the Chiefs of Staff level,¹⁷ but offers no citations for this claim and files in the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Papers contain no evidence of such an exchange.

Evidence of information exchanges at NORAD HQ are unavailable but, on Thursday, 18 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued preliminary warnings to U. S. commands,¹⁸ including the American section of NORAD which operated hand-and-glove with the Canadians.

Two members of DEA's DL(2)D section—the security intelligence division of the department—happened to be taking part in a conference in Washington in the week before the crisis broke. Their American colleagues quietly took them aside and informed them that the administration was likely to bring certain matters concerning Cuba to a head very shortly. This information was conveyed by way of a telephone call to Bryce and Under Secretary for State for External Affairs Norman Robertson in Ottawa. Upon their return to Ottawa on Sunday, October 21, they made a full report to Bryce who then briefed the Prime Minister.¹⁹ Whether these two liaisons were a matter of courtesy or in fulfillment of contractual obligations contained in the still classified exchange of notes concerning intelligence sharing completed in 1957 is unknown, but the fact remains that both incidents constituted consultation at some level.

On the afternoon of Monday, 22 October, the former American ambassador to Canada, Livingston Merchant, arrived in Ottawa to speak to Diefenbaker about the Kennedy speech to be delivered that night. At roughly 5:00 PM, he briefed Diefenbaker, Harkness and Howard Green (Diefenbaker's choice as SSEA after the sudden death of

185.

¹⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁸ R. Reford, *Canada and Three Crises*, (Toronto 1968), p.173.

¹⁹ J. L. Granatstein, *A Man of Influence: Norman Robertson and Canadian Statecraft, 1929-1968*, (Toronto

Sidney Smith) about the missile sites in Cuba and showed them the photographic evidence. Merchant also read aloud a copy of the speech Kennedy would deliver. Diefenbaker interrupted once to take exception to a certain passage of the text. Immediately after the briefing, Merchant telephoned Washington with Diefenbaker's editorial comments and the passage in question was deleted.²⁰ This was to be the only instance of high level political 'consultation' between the United States and Canada throughout the crisis.

After the Merchant briefing, Harkness returned to his office where he found Frank Miller, now Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, waiting for him. Miller told him that the American component of NORAD had gone to Defense Condition three (zero being peaceful conditions, five being a state of war) and that a request had been made by NORAD HQ to place the Canadian contingent on an equal footing.²¹ Harkness and Miller were unclear about the prerogatives of the minister to authorize such a move. Harkness then went to Diefenbaker's office to obtain the PM's approval for precautions which he along with Miller and Green, thought prudent.²² Diefenbaker refused to authorize an alert until cabinet could consider the issue, which would be the following morning at the earliest. Harkness then returned to his office and discussed with Miller "what actions [they] could take, without declaring a formal alert, which could put us in a position of maximum preparedness short of this."²³ The actions taken amounted to a 'quiet alert' in that the Canadian intelligence and communications centres were manned and warning

1981), p.352, and, H. B. Robinson, *Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs*, (Toronto 1989), p. 285.

²⁰ Reford, op. cit. p. 175.

²¹ MG 32 B 19, Douglas Harkness Papers, (NAC), vol. 57, Unnumbered Series, "The Nuclear Arms Question," background, correspondence, memoranda, p. 9.

²² *ibid.*

²³ *ibid.*

orders were issued to operational commands.²⁴ The Canadian component of NORAD soldiered on at Colorado Springs, effectively working at a DEF CON 3 level with the Americans without formal authorization to do so. No one outside the military, including the Prime Minister or the Cabinet was informed of these actions.

The request for the Canadian NORAD section to be put at a heightened state of alert was not the only request to come out of NORAD that evening. The Canadian Deputy CINCNORAD had contacted the Chief of the Air Staff to request that U. S. aircraft carrying defensive nuclear weapons be allowed to disperse to Canadian air fields and that American special weapons teams be permitted to transport defensive nuclear warheads to Canada for use on the Bomarcas and F-101Bs operated by Canada as part of the NORAD system.²⁵ Whether or not these additional requests were relayed to the Defence Minister and considered at the time that he authorized discrete increases in military readiness is unclear.²⁶

At the cabinet meetings which took place on the twenty-third and twenty-fourth, approval for Canadian forces, including NORAD forces, to go on alert could not be obtained. On both occasions resentment over the extent of U.S. consultation prior to initiating their Cuba policy played a role. At the Tuesday session it was pointed out that the Americans had taken ten days to arrive at their decision, so a twenty-four hour delay in Canadian action would not be unreasonable.²⁷ On Wednesday, Diefenbaker began discussions by expressing his anger over the fact that when Merchant had showed him the

²⁴ *ibid.*

²⁵ Robinson Papers, vol. 9 file 4, Memorandum for the Ambassador, 12 November, 1962.

²⁶ There are no documents to be found in either the Harkness Papers, the Robinson Papers, the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Papers or the Cabinet Minutes which reveal that these requests were being considered at the time.

²⁷ RG 2, Privy Council Office Records (PCO), (NAC), A-5-a vol. 6192, Cabinet Conclusions, 23 October, 1962.

reconnaissance photos on Monday, The Ambassador had stressed the top secret nature of the material, but that the State Department had now released these same photographs to the American press.²⁸ Diefenbaker apparently did not appreciate that he had the same degree of access to Kennedy as the *New York Times*. After the Wednesday Cabinet meeting, Miller approached Harkness and informed him that the Strategic Air Command had now gone to DEF CON 2. Only one more step remained before the United States was at war. Harkness then went to see the Prime Minister privately, and faced with these new developments, Diefenbaker gave his authorization for an alert.²⁹

On Sunday, October 28, the most dangerous phase of the Cuba crisis ended when Kennedy and Soviet Premier Krushchev reached an understanding where the Soviets would begin to dismantle the missiles and launch sites and the U.S. would suspend its naval quarantine of Cuba but keep warships already in place in a picket formation around the island. When the immediate threat of nuclear war had eased, questions began to be asked within the Canadian government about the consultative process during the crisis related to the NORAD agreement. Since the time that the accord had been sprung on them in 1957, DEA had devoted considerable time and energy to negotiating various side agreements to NORAD, which they felt bound the U.S. to consider Canada in a special light when contemplating the use of force anywhere in the world. Recent events had demonstrated some serious failings in this framework. The Prime Minister was furious that he had been informed of the developing situation in Cuba at such a late hour on the twenty-second. As recently as May, 1961, the President had given him his personal assurances after the Bay of Pigs fiasco that the U. S. would, “talk with Canada before

²⁸ *ibid.*, 24 October, 1962.

²⁹ Harkness Papers, vol. 57, “The Nuclear Arms Question,” p.11.

doing anything,” with regards to Cuba.³⁰ As for the Americans, Canada’s delay in placing national and NORAD forces on alert until the twenty-fourth had had the effect of putting the President’s judgement in question.

At that time the old maxim that those who are not with you are against you...governed all official, and much of the unofficial dealings with the U.S. administration....Ottawa’s response to the crisis had appeared to be grudging and Canada’s stock in Washington was low.³¹

R. B. Bryce was then given the delicate task of assessing U. S. actions against the various bilateral defence arrangements, specifically NORAD, which seemed to demand a higher degree of cross border consultation in times of rising international tensions.

By 2 November, 1962, the autopsy was under way. Bryce informed the Prime Minister that reports were circulating around Washington that Canadian co-operation during the crisis was hardly satisfactory. The opinion there seemed to be that “NORAD [had] been a failure when it was put to the test,” and he anticipated political trouble.³² News was now widespread that: Canada had failed to go to DEF CON 3 alert when NORAD had requested such a move; that the U. S. authorities had been denied permission to arm NORAD weapons stationed in Canada with nuclear warheads; and, that American requests to move fighters to Canadian bases had been refused.³³ Bryce then confessed his knowledge of the first instance, but pleaded ignorance to the other two.

I assume that no. 2 refers back to the request of two or three years ago which has never been met because of the desire to get agreement first on having warheads here for Canadian forces. I did not know of no. 3 but Miller told me this morning on the phone that there had been such a request. I assume Mr. Harkness dealt with it himself, either on his own or in consultation with you, or perhaps with Ministers

³⁰ H. B. Robinson, *Diefenbaker’s World*, (Toronto 1989), p. 277

³¹ *ibid.* p. 292.

³² Robinson Papers, vol. 9 file 4, R. B. B., Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 2 November, 1962.

³³ *ibid.*

at a private meeting.³⁴

In reality, the second request was not a reference to an American initiative some two or three years old, but to a part of the request package which had come from NORAD HQ on the twenty-second. There is no written record that shows that either the second or third request ever made it past Miller. That Canada's top civil servant was kept this much in the dark while the crisis swirled demonstrates the level of confusion rampant at the time.

Meanwhile, Ross Campbell at DEA was also examining the actual functioning of the NORAD framework to determine if Canada was justified in expecting a higher degree of consultation than was achieved. He began by explaining the 10 November, 1958, agreement concerning the general declaration of military alerts in North America. He found that, under that agreement, the U. S. could credibly argue it had no responsibility to consult Canada prior to taking action because of point three of the text which stipulated: "That it would pertain only to the initiation of a full scale alert involving the all the armed forces and the populace of the nation as a whole."³⁵ This the Americans had not done. He also noted that, "The United States authorities may have concluded (if they refereed to the treaty) that their unilateral action was in any event justified under point [5] above," which provided that, "the agreement shall not affect the freedom of action of either Government to take appropriate measures for its own defence or that of its treaty partners."³⁶ In all likelihood, they had not reviewed the 1958 agreement when the decision was taken to dispatch emissaries to key allied capitals

Attention was then focused on the 1959 and 1960 agreements directly pertaining to increasing the state of readiness for NORAD. Again, after detailing the operational

³⁴ *ibid.*

³⁵ Robinson Papers, vol. 9 file 4, Ross Campbell, Memorandum for the Ambassador, 6 November, 1962.

clauses involved, Campbell noted the carefully constructed ambiguities which could exonerate the American administration.

It seems to me open to argument as to whether the United States should have approached the Canadian Government at the political level concurrently with the request which was made through service channels. The main difficulty, however, in attempting to arrive at any conclusion is that the exchange of letters in 1959 and 1960 appear to have been designed to apply to a different set of circumstances, e.g., increasing tensions over Berlin or tensions resulting from communist aggression in some part of the world.³⁷

In other words, this was largely a matter of optics.

Ross Campbell and Basil Robinson had formed an ad hoc team to piece together the NORAD consultation puzzle for DEA at the Washington Embassy. For his part, Robinson decided to go to the root of the problem, and contacted a senior RCAF officer in Ottawa about the nature of NORAD requests and Canadian responses. Air Commodore Newsome confirmed that NORAD had sought permission to disperse American aircraft and arm the Bomarc with nuclear warheads, "but [was not] clear exactly how the Canadian refusal had been communicated to the NORAD authorities."³⁸ No one seemed to be able to state with confidence that the Bomarc request had actually been refused. Newsome then recounted for Robinson a situation which epitomized the RCAF experience during the crisis.

He had...recently visited Bangor Air Base in Maine, where it so happens that a Canadian RCAF officer is in command of a NORAD sector with a United States colonel as his No. 2. I gather that the four United States squadrons at the Bangor base had asked for permission to disperse northwards but were refused permission to do so and had to go south instead. This had, of course, raised an embarrassing command situation between the United States deputy and his Canadian commanding officer.³⁹

³⁶ *ibid.*

³⁷ *ibid.*

³⁸ Robinson Papers, vol. 9 file 4, H. B. R., Memorandum for the Ambassador: "NORAD and the Cuban Crisis," 12 November, 1962.

³⁹ *ibid.*

He told Robinson that, as a result of situations such as these, Canada could probably expect the U. S. to initiate some serious discussions to avoid any future repetition of similar scenarios.

Campbell had gone to Ottawa on a fact finding mission so that Ambassador Charles Ritchie could better explain Canada's actions in Washington. In reporting back to Robinson, Campbell noted that:

My impression was that DL(1)D was as much in the dark about developments as we were down here. The information regarding the crisis and United States requests relating to NORAD was restricted to relatively few officials in the Department. The view of DL(1) is that the NORAD procedures for consultation at the political level were not complied with. They think that there is nothing wrong with the procedures and tend to explain developments which took place in the light of what appeared to be a deliberate policy decision of the United States not to consult any of its allies. The Division is reluctant, however, to come to any firm conclusions in this regard because they do not know what transpired when Mr. Merchant saw the Prime Minister in the late afternoon of October 22. It is quite possible, they think, that he may have brought to the Prime Minister's attention the need to place NORAD forces in a state of increased preparedness.⁴⁰

Try as they might, certain pieces were tightly held by both the military and the Prime Minister and could not be shaken loose.

The most comprehensive post mortem was provided by the Privy Council staff to Bryce on 20 November, 1962. The report was entitled "Lessons of the Cuban Crisis." It began with the finding that:

The NORAD Agreement does not seem to have worked properly during the crisis, mainly because it was not designed for this sort of emergency when the United States took the initiative after a period of secret planning. The Agreement is designed to operate in a situation in which evidence accumulates of a danger of attack on North America resulting from deliberate planning for such an attack by the Soviets or from a worsening situation that may get out of control. From the Canadian point of view the crisis was in a sense interpreted as a worsening international situation that might get out of control, and therefore our decision to

⁴⁰ Robinson Papers, vol. 9 file 4, R. C. C., Memorandum for Mr. Robinson: "Canada-United States Defence Questions," 16 November, 1962.

increase the readiness of our air defence forces would seem, from our point of view, to have been taken at about the right time. But the United States Government had quite a different viewpoint of the crisis which for them was being planned for before Canada even knew of it and in which the alerting of air defence forces was probably regarded as part of the posture the United States wanted to assume from the outset. In these circumstances proper consultation as required by the Agreement [was] impossible. Even notification to Canada of the U. S. desire to act under the NORAD Agreement, if it had been given to us a few hours before the President's speech, would not have constituted consultation, since the U. S. had already taken its decision. Such notification might, of course, have been a useful political gesture.⁴¹

This situation had quite simply not been anticipated by DEA negotiators in 1959 and 1960.

Instead of pronouncing the NORAD agreement a dead letter as far as consultation was concerned, PCO opinion was that the Cuban crisis had served to clear up some of the misconceptions which had dogged the accord since its implementation and had caused considerable Canada/U. S. friction.

As a result of this experience, each country should now have a clear idea of the difficulties of the other in handling NORAD agreements in a crisis of this kind, and of the limitations of the NORAD Agreement itself. Since similar circumstances may occur again, any improvements in public understanding of these difficulties in both countries will be helpful. The oversimplified view that the crisis showed the NORAD Agreement to be unworkable is an unfortunate one and should be dispelled if possible.⁴²

The perception of NORAD's inadequacy as a mechanism for political consultation had arisen because Canada over-estimated its importance to and influence on American planning. Bryce accepted this analysis and scribbled "very helpful memo" at the bottom. He had to go see the Prime Minister.

⁴¹ Robinson Papers, vol. 9 file 4, D. B. D., Memorandum for Mr. Bryce: "Lessons of the Cuban Crisis," 20 November, 1962.

⁴² *ibid.*

CONCLUSION

The Canadian government's behaviour in the handling of the North American Air Defence Command file from 1956 through to 1962 can be best understood as a series of responses to perceived threats. When the *ad hoc* Military Study Group presented the report in 1956, calling for the integration of the air defence forces of the continent under a single American commander, it was responding to a weakness in the Canadian and American national air defence schemes which constituted a threat to the national interests of both countries. The new bilateral command which the MSG proposed would, it was reasoned, substantially reduce the risk of the Soviet Union launching a preemptive nuclear strike across the polar ice cap and catching the Strategic Air Command of the United States on the ground. By increasing the warning time that SAC could expect of an enemy attack, and by being able to engage hostile bombers, once identified, 'in depth,' the credibility of the American nuclear deterrent was bolstered, providing a larger measure of security for North America and the NATO Allies, which was an integral part of the Canadian national interest. This was the argument that the Department of National Defence made in presenting NORAD.

The Department of External Affairs took a somewhat narrower view of Canadian national interest. The accord, as originally proposed, and later approved, would place Canadian forces in Canada under the command of an American officer. For DEA, a situation such as this represented a serious affront to Canadian sovereignty, requiring American pledges to consult with Canadian authorities should international circumstances ever warrant the activation of the new command. In the late spring and

early summer of 1957, they advised their minister and the prime minister to delay approval of the agreement until the appropriate consultative machinery could be put in place. Access to the Americans in difficult times was to be External's top priority in considerations of NORAD.

General Charles Foulkes, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, saw the proposed integration accord and Canadian prestige in Washington threatened by DEA's moves to delay agreement. He reacted. Foulkes pressed the new Diefenbaker government for a speedy decision and assured the Minister of National Defence and the Prime Minister that the previous Liberal government had been on the verge of giving approval. The Prime Minister was swayed and measures were taken to announce the integration plan. External Affairs was not involved at this stage and NORAD was approved on an interim basis with ambiguous references to Canada/United States consultation, which was to be 'regularly and consistently' undertaken.

General Foulkes had succeeded in selling NORAD to the Diefenbaker government but he had also linked his fate to that of the agreement. If he was to maintain his personal and departmental position of influence over Diefenbaker, NORAD would have to be handled delicately so as not to expose the government to harsh public criticism over a perceived surrender of Canadian sovereignty. If NORAD became a political liability, a backlash against Foulkes and his department would likely be in the offing.

Foulkes' strategy for countering possible sovereignty related criticisms of the agreement was to invent the NATO/NORAD link. By substituting references to the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group of NATO for Chiefs of Staff of the United States and Canada—which happened to be one and the same—the chain of

command for the Commander-in-Chief NORAD could be portrayed as part of the NATO structure instead of a strictly bilateral arrangement. Cries of American military domination could then be deflected by pointing to the consensus-style decision-making of the NATO Council of Ministers and the fundamental NATO principle of civilian control of the combined military commands, of which NORAD was to be part.

External Affairs sensed political danger in this approach from the outset. CUSRPG, in 1957, had a very ambiguous, even 'nominal,' relationship to the NATO Council. Negotiations in Washington over the exchange of diplomatic notes to announce the command formally showed the Americans to be resolute in their determination to keep NORAD a bilateral affair, outside the NATO structure. External warned anyone who would listen that basing the political defence of NORAD on a supposed NATO/NORAD link would expose the government to embarrassment not only from informed Canadians, but also invite American intervention in the domestic debate. When the NORAD notes were tabled in Parliament in May 1958, the Diefenbaker government put forward the linkage position but was forced to retreat in the face of stiff Opposition questioning. An explicit NORAD link to NATO had been debunked.

The root cause of DEA/DND conflict over NORAD was the inability to reach a consensus as to what constituted acceptable levels of U. S. consultation. Foulkes firmly believed that NORAD would, by its very existence, require the Americans to consult Canada any time the U. S. considered using force anywhere in the world, which could in turn lead to the alerting of North American air defences. External Affairs did not place a great deal of faith in such implicit guarantees and, after the notes were completed, began a campaign to define explicitly the degrees of consultation required prior to the alerting

of the air defence system.

The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 put the entire NORAD framework to the test. American actions required that Canadian servicemen step into the breach but the prior consultation which Canada expected did not materialize. In the post mortems conducted by External Affairs and the Privy Council Office after the crisis, the perceived failings of NORAD's consultative machinery were closely scrutinized. The conclusions were that the lack of political consultation was not the fault of poorly drafted agreements or unworkable structures. Canada simply had to acknowledge the reality of the Canadian position relative to U. S. Cold War foreign policy. Considerations of Canadian national sovereignty were simply unlikely to ever be uppermost in the minds of American decision-makers charged with protecting U. S. national interests. DEA's initial response to the NORAD 'threat' was indeed prophetic.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Documents

RG 2, Privy Council Office Record Group, Box 28, File D-28-3, "Canada-United States Defence Relations".

-----Box 29, File D-28-3(f), "North American Air Defence".

-----A-5-a, Vol. 1899, Cabinet Conclusions.

-----A-5-a. Vol. 1692, Cabinet Conclusions.

RG 25, External Affairs Record Group, Box 15, 18-1-A-USA-1957/1, "Briefing for SSEA (Mr. Diefenbaker) on J. F. Dulles Visit".

MG 31 E83, H. Basil Robinson Papers, Vol. 8 and 9.

MG 32 B19, Douglas Harkness Papers, Vol. 57, "The Unnumbered Series."

Department of External Affairs, *Annual Report*, 1957 and 1958. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1958 and 1959.

Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH), Department of National Defence, The Raymont Collection, 73/1223, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Papers.

House of Commons Special Committee on Defence, *Minutes*. Tuesday October 22, 1963.

Secondary Sources

Bercuson, D. "SAC vs. Sovereignty: The Origins of the Goose Bay Lease, 1946-1952." *Canadian Historical Review*, vol. 70 no. 2, Spring 1989, 206-222.

Byers, R. B. "Canadian Civil-Military Relations and the Reorganization of the Armed Forces: Whither Civilian Control." In Massey, H. J. *The Canadian Military: A Profile*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972.

Cuthbertson, B. *Canadian Military Independence in the Age of the Superpowers*. Toronto: Fitzhenry & Whiteside, 1977.

Diefenbaker, John, G. *One Canada: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker*, vol. 3, *The Tumultuous Years 1962-1967*. Toronto: Macmillan, 1977.

Eayrs, James. *Canada In World Affairs, October 1955 to June 1957*. Toronto:

Oxford University Press and The Canadian Institute of International Affairs.
1959.

-----*In Defence of Canada: Peacekeeping and Deterrence*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972.

Foulkes, Charles. "Canadian Defence Policy in a Nuclear Age." *Behind The Headlines* vol. xxi, no.1, May 1961. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1961.

Gellner, J. *Canada In NATO*. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1970.

Ghent, J. M. "Canadian-American Relations and the Nuclear Weapons Controversy, 1958-1963." Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation. University of Illinois at Urbana. Champaign, 1976.

Granatstein, J. L. (ed.). *Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite?* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969.

-----*Man of Influence: Norman A. Robertson and Canadian Statecraft 1929-1968*. Toronto: Deneau, 1981.

-----*Canada 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986.

-----*The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957*. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982.

Gray, C. "Canada and NORAD: A Study in Strategy." *Behind the Headlines*, vol. xxxi no. 2-3, June 1972. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1972.

Haydon, P. T. *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered*. Toronto: The Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993.

Hilliker, J. "The Politicians and the 'Pearsonalities': The Diefenbaker Government and the Conduct of Canadian External Relations." Canadian Historical Association, *Historical Papers*. 1984.

Hilliker, J. and Barry, D. *Canada's Department of External Affairs: Coming of Age, 1946-1968*. Kingston: Queen's University Press, 1995.






Hillmer, N. (ed.). *Partners Nevertheless: Canadian-American Relations in the Twentieth Century*. Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1989.

- Hillmer, N. and Granatstein, J. L. *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990's*. Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1994.
- Ignatieff, G. *The Making of a Peacemaker: The Memoirs of George Ignatieff*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985.
- Jockel, Joseph, T. *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence 1945-1958*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987.
- Lloyd, Trevor. *Canada In World Affairs, 1957-1959*. Toronto: Oxford University Press and The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968.
- Lyon, Peyton. *Canada In World Affairs, 1961-1963*. Toronto: Oxford University Press and The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968.
- McLin, Jon. *Canada's Changing Defence Policy, 1957-1963*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1967.
- Minifie, J. M. *Peacemaker or Powdermonkey*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1960.
- Newman, P. C. *The Distemper of Our Times*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968.
- Nicholson, P. *Vision and Indecision*. Toronto: Algers Press, 1968
- Preston, Richard, A. *Canada In World Affairs, 1959-1961*. Toronto: Oxford University Press and The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1965.
- Reford, R. W. *Canada and Three Crises*. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968.
- Robinson, H. Basil. *Diefenbaker's World: A Populist In Foreign Affairs*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989.
- Roy, Reginald, H. *For Most Conspicuous Bravery: A Biography of Major-General George Pearkes V.C. Through Two World Wars*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1977.
- Saywell, John. (ed.). *Canadian Annual Review, 1960, 1961, 1962 and 1963*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961-64.
- Smith, Denis. *Rogue Tory: The Life and Legend of John G. Diefenbaker*. Toronto: Macfarlane, Walter & Ross, 1995.
- Stacey, C. P. *Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945*.

Ottawa: Ministry of National Defence, 1970.

Willoughby, W.R. *The Joint Organizations of Canada and the United States*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979.

IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3)



APPLIED IMAGE, Inc.
1653 East Main Street
Rochester, NY 14609 USA
Phone: 716/482-0300
Fax: 716/288-5989

© 1993, Applied Image, Inc., All Rights Reserved

