

Combatting Culture:
The Silent Debate over the Canadian
Military Tradition

by

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A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

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Winnipeg, Manitoba

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ABSTRACT

Foreign policy and defence policy should be complementary. Recent reports suggest not only that foreign and defence policy are not always complementary but also that there is a lack of understanding between the foreign and defence policy communities. Different foreign and defence policy cultures could account for the inconsistencies in policy. As a result, this thesis examines the extent that culture plays a role in the apparent gap between foreign and defence policy.

Authorial interpretations present in published works on foreign and defence policy will be used to examine culture. Within these writings there are identifiable differences within the beliefs and assumptions surrounding the notion of a Canadian military tradition. Because tradition is a key element for an understanding of culture, the differences in recognition of a military tradition will be used to examine the differences in culture. Through this examination it is apparent that writers who predominantly focus on foreign policy believe that Canada has a non-military tradition while writers who focus on defence adhere to a belief in a Canadian military tradition. Although these writers hold differing beliefs and assumptions which lead to different cultural emphasis, there is room for reconciliation due to the consistent value of peace and stability. Recognition of the different notions surrounding tradition can help lead to greater cultural coherency and therefore more complementary policy formation.

INTRODUCTION

Canada's foreign policy is composed of many different facets including, inter alia, trade and economics, projecting Canadian values, international assistance, and defence and security.¹ As a result, foreign policy acts as an umbrella under which defence policy is formed. Thus, the two are integrally linked and should complement each other. A recent Canadian Government report outlines the concern that defence policy is currently not complementary to foreign policy. Further more, it suggests that defence policy is not understood in the foreign policy community.² The purpose of this thesis is to examine the apparent gulf between foreign and defence policy and to determine the extent to which policy inconsistency is a function of an incoherent foreign and defence policy culture in Canada. Without a consistent culture or self-realization, Canada can not achieve clear, consistent policy formation with a sense of direction or focus.

An examination of culture takes one into the realm of "essentially contestable concepts"³ for issues of culture can be ambiguous and therefore difficult to define. The ambiguity of culture can lead to a neglect of culture. Although one can identify past International Relations' studies which have used culture, in general culture is a term that has been overlooked. This situation is changing with recent publications that help outline the importance and significance of culture in international relations.

¹As outlined in the headings of, *Canada and the World*. Government Statement. Canada: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 1995.

²Thomas Dimoff. "The Future of the Canadian Armed Forces: Opinions from the Defence Community." Report to the Prime Minister, The Honourable M. Douglas Young, P. C., M. P., Canada March 27, 1997, p. 4.

³William Connolly. *The Terms of Political Discourse*. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1993. Connolly outlines the inherent problems in language and politics. According to Connolly many terms are reliant for meaning on the context for which they are used and therefore their meaning is not always easily recognized.

Because of the many uses of culture it must be well defined or situated within a text in order to ascertain its meaning. A meaning for culture which can be useful for international relations recognizes culture "as a historically transmitted system of meanings"⁴ which leads to "a tradition of values, of self-realization."⁵ This meaning requires a recognition of dualities. In essence, culture is formulated not from the biological nor the psychological elements of humanity but from the interchange between the two. The interaction between multi-dimensional human natures with the society created and changed by this interaction forms a culture. Throughout this process humans strive to understand themselves and society or participate in "value-seeking".

Tradition is a key component of culture for it is tradition which acts like the memory and foundation for the culture during the process of value seeking. Tradition is the self-conscious level of self-realization.⁶ However, tradition is also the foundation for change. Tradition is the cumulation of historical experiences and therefore evolves with historical change. The cumulation of historical experiences as they form traditions also form values. As a result, tradition is the hinge for value formation through value seeking which leads to culture. An understanding of tradition is important to an understanding of culture.

Tradition can be recognized through an examination of beliefs, assumptions and values. There are a variety of different ways to examine these traits. In order to gain a broader perspective on the beliefs, assumptions and values within the Canadian culture, this thesis will rely on published material. It would take years to survey all the written materials on Canada. Because the focus of this thesis is Canadian foreign and defence

⁴Yale H. Ferguson & Richard W. Mansbrach. "The past as Prelude to the Future? Identities and Loyalties in Global Politics." in Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (eds.). *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 19096, p. 1.

⁵Govind Chandra Pande. *The Meaning and Process of Culture*. Jaipur: Shiva Lal Agarwal & Company, 1972, p. 1.

⁶Pande, p. 48. It is recognized that this is a very simplistic definition of the tradition-culture relationship outlined by Pande.

policy, interpretations provided through the examination of written works in the areas of foreign and defence policy will be used. Not every book or article written on the subject was surveyed. However, after reviewing many sources certain patterns would emerge. It is the patterns within the belief structures that is most important for this study and as a result, sources were surveyed in an attempt to identify and analyze these patterns. The sources used are primarily from within the academic community although some other individuals with published works such as politicians, diplomats and government officials are referenced. Other methods could have been used to examine culture. For example one could focus on political elites as a reflection of culture. Political elites could be surveyed through personal interviews. However, there are significant methodological difficulties with this approach. In addition, such a method makes it impossible to attain the historical material needed for an understanding of tradition and culture. In order to get a historical perspective on political elites one could examine past speeches and votes taken in Parliament to try and surmise beliefs, assumptions and values. However, political speeches may often be drafted to fill other political agendas. Furthermore, political elites alone are too specific a source for understanding a broad topic such as culture. As a result, an examination of the writings allowed for the most easily accessible, reliable information by which to ascertain patterns and beliefs.

Within the writings, the predominate linkage between foreign and defence policy concerns the nature and role of armed force. This linkage can be understood through an examination of the values and assumptions present in beliefs about Canada's military tradition. Throughout the writings on Canadian foreign and defence policy, there are different beliefs and assumptions with regard to the true nature of the Canadian military tradition. This reference to a Canadian military tradition is not due to the various traditions of the military or the implicit and explicit practices or ceremonies that have lead to a way of life within the military. A recognition of the military tradition means recognizing the role

that the military has played in the Canadian consciousness as it seeks self-realization. In order to embrace the tradition as part of Canadian consciousness it is helpful to have an understanding and recognition of present military life and the traditions that it has formed and practices. However, more importantly recognition of the military tradition requires an understanding and recognition of the role that the military plays in the formation of the nation, in the people within the nation and in the consequent mode of self-realization or culture. In short it requires a recognition of the military as part of the Canadian identity.

The different recognitions of the role that the military plays in Canada's culture have resulted in an identifiable debate over the nature of Canada's military tradition. There are many writers who advocate the belief that Canada is a country with a non-military tradition or ethos. It is primarily foreign policy writers such as Tucker in, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary issues and themes*, and Hockin in, *Alliances and Illusions*, who assert a belief in the non-military nature of the Canadian society. However, other writers assert that the history of the Canadian military speaks of a tradition that has not been openly recognized by the rest of the country. This group is composed primarily of military historians and defence policy authors such as Morton in, *A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to the Gulf War* and Stacey in, *Introduction to the Study of Military History for Canadian Students*. This group advocates the presence of a military tradition and recognizes the lack of consideration of military affairs by Canadians.

Although these discrepant views are clear in the writings, the debate has not been formally engaged and there has been little dialogue between the opposing sides. As a result, the assumptions embedded in each view and the key components and beliefs surrounding the debate have not been directly compared and examined. The different perceptions are present in the authors' treatment of various areas including history and the French - English question. The authors also have identifiable beliefs surrounding Canada's

security situation and Canada's reliance on alliances. Canada's relationship with its strongest ally, the United States holds differing significance depending on the authors' view of the Canadian military tradition. Both groups of authors also hold beliefs surrounding the relationship that Canada enjoys with its other allies and the role that Canada plays in the world. The most striking area of difference that can be used to identify the beliefs and assumptions of the foreign policy and defence writers is in the beliefs surrounding Canadian moralism. For foreign policy writers, Canada holds a high morality inconsistent with their conception of a military tradition. For defence writers, Canadian morality is nothing more than an adherence to power and interests and has not precluded a Canadian military tradition. All of these factors will be used to outline the various beliefs and assumptions and to compare and contrast the two sides of the debate.

The assumptions and values inherent in this debate do not exist in a vacuum but rather are cultural elements and therefore can indicate the 'sense' of culture. Culture can be weakened when its traditions are not embraced. The reluctance to fully understand and embrace the military tradition, in its true form, has left a chasm between foreign policy and defence culture and therefore an incoherent foreign and defence policy culture. The resulting conflict from this cultural inconsistency can be traced to the inherent conflict in a Western value system that neglects the duality of being. Inconsistencies or discrepancies in culture can have ramifications on policy formation. Some examples of where this factor may have had an effect are issues such as the commitment-capability gap. As well, operational conflicts such as Somalia can be attributed, in part, to a cultural misunderstanding. Cultural incoherence also has ramifications for identity formation and understanding.

In order to rectify this break a true recognition of the identity and reality of all Canadian participants in foreign affairs needs to be realized. This debate has not been

formally engaged and there has been little dialogue between the opposing sides. As a result, the first step towards gaining self-realization would be to recognize cultural incoherency. The purpose of this thesis is to begin the process of engaging the two sides of the debate. Furthermore, this thesis serves to highlight culture as a contributing factor to policy.

The recognition of culture as a variable in international relations helps add greater insight into the evolution and execution of past and present policy decisions. As a result, culture recognition can be useful for future studies on foreign and/or defence policy in Canada. This added insight may be especially critical due to changing world circumstances. In particular, the evolution of peacekeeping into peacemaking and intervention⁷ requires greater coupling of the humanitarian and military force responses represented in the silent debate over the nature of the military tradition. Finally, the formula outlined may be used to examine the cultural experience and coherency in other nations.

Chapter one examines the concept of culture in general and of tradition as a central component of culture. The importance of culture to International Relations and considerations of foreign and defence policy will be assessed through a brief review of past considerations of culture in International Relations, as well as by outlining the need for the deeper understanding that culture can contribute to the field. Integral to culture is a duality in human nature which has implications for identity and self-realization once fully embraced. Of further importance to culture and self-realization through culture, is the element of tradition. Values interlaced with tradition can be used to understand policy, its nature and consistency. Thus tradition, as examined through the lens of the existing debate

⁷The Canadian move to intervention is outlined in Keating and Gammer's "The 'new look' in Canada's foreign policy." Operations such as Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti are used in his article as examples of Canada's changing roles and policies. Tom Keating and Nicholas Gammer. The 'new look' in Canada's foreign policy." *International Journal* Vol XLVIII No 4 (Autumn 1993).

in Canada about the military past and its relationship to national consciousness, provides a method for understanding and explaining Canadian foreign and defence policy.

Chapter two identifies the issues and debates incorporated within the writings of the authors who adhere to the predominant belief that Canada has a non-military tradition. This point of view is found predominantly in foreign policy writers both explicitly and implicitly. A brief history is outlined. Other factors that will be used to highlight the beliefs and assumptions of the foreign policy writers are the French-English question, the recognition of Canada's security situation and Canada's relationship and reliance on its allies. The role that Canada plays in the world will also be addressed. The time period used to examine these factors will be primarily the post-W.W.II period for this is the era of Canadian internationalism that is not only the direct focus of these authors, but also the dominant foundation of Canadian foreign policy today. One of the most striking elements within the foreign policy writings is the belief that Canada holds a higher sense of morality than many other nations. For foreign policy writers, this belief in Canada's sense of morality precludes notions of the military and therefore they have little sense of a military tradition.

Chapter three will echo the research agenda of chapter two. However, the chapter will centre on the writings of authors who advocate the belief that Canada has a military tradition. This group is composed primarily of historians and writers focusing on defence issues and will be referred to as defence writers. The history of the military with its roots even before confederation is utilized in order to examine the military tradition as outlined by these authors. As a result, this chapter will incorporate a longer time frame of study. While the historical background helps outline the basis for beliefs pertaining to the nature of a Canadian military tradition, the post-W.W.II. time period will be the primary focus for issues of comparison. The defence writers also demonstrate different beliefs and

assumptions which can be identified through their interpretations of the French-English question, Canada's security situation, Canada's relationship with its allies, most notably the United States and the role that Canada plays in the world. Defence writers do not share the sense of greater moral ideals forwarded by the foreign policy writers. These writers recognize the pragmatic reality of the roles that the military and Canada have played in the world. As a result, the military is well engrained in their consciousness and the view they have of Canada.

Chapter four will compare and contrast the writings of the identified opponents and proponents of a Canadian military tradition. While there are many similar issues of concern between them, the key components and the underlying assumptions of each side are quite different. Identifying the different assumptions and belief structures gives new insight into the exact nature of the debate, as well as an alternative explanation, based on culture, for the nature of Canadian foreign and defence policy. At the same time, it is apparent that although beliefs and assumptions are varied, some values remain consistent. As a result, there is a potential for reconciliation of the debate and a true recognition of culture. This reconciliation, in turn, may provide insight into the requirement to bridge the gap between foreign and defence policy in Canada.

Through an examination of the debate surrounding a military tradition in Canada, this thesis will lay the foundation for an alternative understanding of Canadian foreign and defence policy. This different analytical approach helps provide greater insight into the evolution and execution of past, present and future policy decisions and, therefore, is particularly useful as a basis for future analytical work.

CHAPTER ONE

Recognition of Culture

Although International Relations is a relatively new field of study, dominant theoretical patterns have emerged in the field. The prevalence of power and interests as first posited by authors adhering to the theoretical perspective labelled "realism" continue to be dominant factors in the field. As a result, realists and neo-realists enjoy a wide following. The idealists as counterparts to the realists enjoy a smaller following in the field. Other theorists such as the Marxist and neo-Marxist focus on a particular ideological perspective for developing theories of international order. Moreover, theoretical perspectives which focus on the importance of identifying paradigms or regimes continue to have influence in the field and have helped lead to other theoretical perspectives including critical theory and feminism. Still other theories such as poststructuralism or postmodernism claim to deconstruct or revolutionize patterns of thinking. Even though some of these theories help create an environment receptive to the use of culture, until recently, "culture" has consistently been overlooked in the study of International Relations.

Culture is a term surrounded by ambiguity and controversy. As a result, culture can be difficult to define and therefore easy to overlook. A number of international relations authors have examined culture in their work. However, the ambiguity of culture can lead to difficulties in its use. New studies in International Relations, that include more comprehensive reviews of culture, help illustrate that culture may not be the only or even the most important variable in a study of international relations, but it is definitely one that should not be ignored.

Culture can be understood as a process of self-realization. Through this understanding a meaning for culture which has political and therefore international relations utility can be ascribed. This meaning results in a definition that recognizes the complex interactions and relationships between human beings and their environment. A key component of this process is tradition. Tradition in this sense is understood not as a singular act or pattern but as the result of a sequence of historical events. Through historical instances a tradition of self-consciousness is constructed and continually re-constructed with other historical events. As a result, history is the motive for action which helps form traditions. In turn, tradition helps build the evolving self-consciousness and value formation which is integral to culture.

Culture has been defined in hundreds of ways by philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, psychiatrists, chemists, biologists, economists, geologists, and of course, political scientists.⁸ It has even been used without definition.⁹ The large inconsistencies in definition are due, in part, to the different ontological and epistemological perspectives and varying opinions about its significance. For example, Brady points out that variances in culture can depend on the authors subject of study. "Within certain logical and empirical limits, the definition of culture chosen or constructed by the observer depends to a large extent on the nature of the problem or theory to be investigated."¹⁰

William Connolly's work on "essentially contestable concepts" can be used to conceptualize the ambiguity of the term culture. Connolly believed that certain concepts reflect the recognition that the language of politics is not a neutral medium.¹¹ According to Connolly, there are certain normative concepts surrounding many terms which are open-

⁸A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions*. Cambridge, Mass.: Peabody Museum of American Archeology and Ethnology, 1952, p. 140.

⁹Kroeber and Kluckhohn, p. 149.

¹⁰Brady and Isaac. *A Reader in Culture Change: Volumes 1&2*. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1975, p. x.

¹¹Connolly, p. 1.

ended and therefore controversial.¹² Such concepts may be regarded as "cluster concepts" which do not have an invariant set of necessary and sufficient conditions for their proper application and therefore must be situated in a text. Connolly recognizes concepts such as politics, democracy and freedom as essentially contestable. Culture would also fit. As Richards remarked: "some words must bear a much heavier weight of meaning than others. It is the basic concepts like "value", "idea", and "culture" that are the hardest to circumscribe."¹³

Because culture is a human construct, when examining culture one has to be conscious of how one's own culture impacts on one's beliefs about culture and the world. This becomes a problem because humans do not possess an Archimedian point¹⁴ from which they can remove themselves from their own reality and objectively examine the world as it is. This hermeneutic problem was addressed by the Germans in the concept of *Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*,¹⁵ which recognizes that any writing about culture is culturally determined. According to Arnold, "culture can never be wholly conscious - there is always more to it than we are conscious of; and it cannot be planned because it is also the unconscious background of all our planning."¹⁶ Therefore, part of the difficulty in examining culture stems from the fact that one is in the precarious position of trying to ascribe a meaning to culture while also arguing for cultural relativity resulting in the uncomfortable paradox "of claiming to have absolute knowledge that one cannot have absolute knowledge."¹⁷

¹²Connolly, p. 11.

¹³in Kroeber and Kluckhohn, p. 41.

¹⁴Arendt recognizes the conquest of space as an attempt by some individuals to attain a neutral observation point of the earth. However, even in this way humans are not separated from their fellow human beings and in a sense are using the Archimedian point against themselves. Hannah Arendt. *Between Past and Future*. New York, N. Y.: Penguin Books Limited, 1977, p. 278 & 279.

¹⁵Kramer defines this term as, "an almost untranslatable phrase that means historically, culturally, and linguistically situated writing on history and culture" Eric Mark Kramer. *Consciousness and Culture*. Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1992, p. 2.

¹⁶ Matthew Arnold. *Culture and Anarchy*. Boston, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 94.

¹⁷Kramer, p. 2.

International Relations' conceptualizations of culture:

The inherent complexity of cultural nuances can be misinterpreted and result in an assumption that cultural influences are unimportant or even misleading. The misinterpretation or misunderstanding of culture has led many international relations authors to overlook its significance. Chay offers an explanation for this cultural neglect. As Chay explains, "culture and international relations easily appear to be mutually contradictory terms...From the dark depths of international relations, the term culture takes on an aura of frivolity. It appears to refer to the idealistic and utopian, to the veneer of civilized decency that is always stripped away by the harsh realities of power politics and international conflict."¹⁸

A more detailed explanation for the inclination to avoid detailed examinations of culture focuses on the Western ontology towards individualism and rationality. The problem with this ontology is the extent that it utilizes either /or simplicities rather than embracing dichotomies or ambiguities which therefore puts it in direct conflict with an ambiguous concept such as culture. The insistence upon rationality leaves humans with nothing but logical and scientific reason to guide irrational human drives and an anarchic international system.¹⁹ This desire for "cleansed" explanations has left International

¹⁸Jongsuk Chay (ed.). *Culture and International Relations*. New York, N. Y.: Praeger Publishers, 1990, p. 1.

¹⁹According to some individuals this leaves international relations in a state of perpetual conflict. Williams outlines an example of the conflict dilemma created by a reliance on rationality. "For example, if according to the 'law of nature' one equates right with strength alone, it may be possible to dominate another and claim that it is 'right' to do so. But others are under no obligation to obey, or even to leave you in peace, for as soon as they are strong enough...they will claim the right to enslave you in turn, a situation in which you can have no appeal at all to right as a means of redress." Michael C. Williams. "Reason and Realpolitik: Kant's 'Critiques of International Politics'." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* Vol. XXV No. 1 (March 1992) p. 109.

Relations unable to account for the drastic world changes that have occurred during the ongoing evolution of the field.²⁰ Culture can help counteract some of these deficiencies.

Although in the past, much of the field of International Relations did not recognize the value of culture, some authors did venture into the ambiguous world of this "notoriously nebulous concept."²¹ Past studies, although valuable, have often failed to capture the true significance or importance of how the recognition of culture can be used as a base to challenge traditional thoughts and perceptions. Other studies have also used culture to bring new insight into problems of international relations, but do not provide an adequate definition and/or framework for future study.

Morgenthau, often considered one of the fathers of International Relations, dedicated a portion of his work to the term "culture". One of the final sections of Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* deals with "the Cultural Approach". Morgenthau argues strongly against this approach. However, by the 'cultural approach' he is referring not to the recognition of culture but to the particular agenda of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).²² This agenda, as outlined by Morgenthau, is to bring peace through greater collaboration on educational and cultural activities.²³ The UNESCO agenda is thoughtfully criticized by Morgenthau. It should be recognized, however, that the UNESCO agenda is

²⁰Authors such as Milnar call for "more comprehensive theoretical interpretations" as the world evolves due to drastic changes incorporated with greater globalization. Zdravko Milnar. *Globalization and Territorial Identities*. Great Britain: Athenaeum Press Ltd., 1992, p. 3. (It should be noted that although Milnar is correct in recognizing the need for deeper and more comprehensive theory development, Milnar's claim that global changes are moving toward the eventual loss of territorial cultures is not supported in this thesis.)

²¹Ken Booth. *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*. Homes and Meier Publishers, Inc., : NY, NY, 1979, p. 14.

²²As quoted from the Unesco Constitution: "The purpose of the Organization is to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by the Charter of the United Nations." Hans J. Morgenthau. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. (fourth edition). New York, N. Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1967, p. 500.

²³Morgenthau, p. 501.

not the agenda of recognizing culture in international relations that this thesis incorporates. The purpose of a heightened awareness of culture in studies of international relations is to increase understanding and for purposes of this thesis, to allow for greater self-realization.

Other studies of culture combined with international relations have helped increase understanding of some issues. In 1960 Bozeman examined culture and international relations in the book, *Politics and Culture in International History*. Bozeman recognizes the importance of using culture to understand international relations. Bozeman examines different cultures during different epochs in order to challenge modern perceptions of myth and reality. It is recognized that history and one's understanding of what is real versus what is mythical can be interpreted on the basis of individual experience. Therefore the lessons used from history are contingent upon the particular time and frame of reference for which they are used. The real from the mythical "is conditioned by the time and place in which [one] finds [oneself]."²⁴ To Bozeman an examination of different cultures is helpful in international theorizing because "it invites the thoughtful to reconsider the realities and myths in international history that have called forth the present world society."²⁵ Bozeman's work is significant in its contribution to understanding history and using culture as a tool for analysis. However, Bozeman does not explicitly define what is meant by culture and how it can be used in future studies.

Tucker is another author to utilize elements of culture as found in his book, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary issues and themes*. Tucker opens with a brief section on political culture and Canadian internationalism. In this section he recognizes that the elements of political culture such as historical traditions, demography and geography can influence foreign policy. Although Tucker does focus on three elements which he

²⁴Adda Bozeman. *Politics and Culture in International History*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960, p.11.

²⁵Bozeman, p. 522.

believes have been dominant in Canadian political culture, he chooses not to describe the elements of culture in any detail.²⁶

There are many other works in which some cultural elements are included but culture is not the main or only focus of study and as a result culture receives only cursory mention. For example, Holsti's *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, (second edition) includes cultural constraints for decision makers in his discussion on ethics.²⁷ Alexander examines cultural elements, such as the influence of mass media on the Canada - United States relationship, in his book *Canadians and Foreign Policy*.²⁸ More recently, Doran in *Forgotten Partnership* includes cultural presence and psychological outlooks in his attempt to understand relations between Canada and the United States.²⁹ Even in the area of strategy, culture has been addressed. For example, both Booth and Gray attempt to add greater dimensions to strategy in their respective works, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* and *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*. Yet, culture remains predominantly on the fringes of international study.

The ambiguity of culture could help give greater nuance to past studies. Many past international relations theories have been deficient in their recognition of history. This characteristic is most noticeable in the neorealists such as Waltz, who has a stubborn neglect for world history. This ahistoricism has led to various debates surrounding his

²⁶Michael Tucker. *Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary issues and themes*. Toronto, Ont.: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1980, p. 2.

²⁷K. J. Holsti. *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (second edition)*. Englewood Cliffs N. J.: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1972.

²⁸Fred Alexander. *Canadians and Foreign Policy*. Toronto, Ont.: University of Toronto Press, 1960.

²⁹Charles Doran. *Forgotten Partnership: U. S.-Canada Relations Today*. Toronto, Ont.: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1984.

work³⁰ and its numerous corollary theories.³¹ The recent trend has been to try to develop theory that is more historically sensitive. The most popular way has been to approach it through the age old debate surrounding the effects that arise from structural transformation versus results from human agency. As recognized by Light, "one of the long-standing problems of International Relations has been reconciling the reciprocal interplay between agency and structure."³² The structure-agency debate is central to the understanding of a meaning of culture.

Past international relations theories have also been deficient in the recognition of identity which is critical to the meaning of culture as a process of self-realization. As demonstrated by Pasic, even Wendt's theory of collective identity remains deficient because it lacks the nuance that culture could supply.³³ Wendt does not acknowledge culture for he considers it to be "overtly social and, therefore, atheoretical."³⁴ The non-recognition of culture limits Wendt to narrow and static concepts which cannot fully embrace the true complexity and dynamism of identity. Identity is another area in which the ambiguity of culture can be helpful.

As pointed out by Der Derian, ironically, ambiguity should be well suited to International Relations for the term "international relations" itself has been identified as a term surrounded by ambiguity. In the book, *Intertextual/International Relations: Postmodern readings of world politics*, Der Derian traces the meandering root of the word

³⁰Ruggie and Cox are two notable authors who highlight Waltz's historical deficiency as outlined in Richard Little. "International relations and large scale historical change." in A. Groom and Margot Light (eds.). *Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory*. New York, N. Y.: Pinter Publishers, 1994, p. 18.

³¹An example is Gilpin's exploration of hegemonic powers which uses Waltz's ahistorization. Little in Groom and Light(eds.), p. 17.

³²Margot Light. "Foreign Policy Analysis." in Groom and Light, p. 99.

³³see Sujata Chakrabarti Pasic. "Culturing International Relations Theory: A Call for Extension." in Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (eds.). *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*. Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996.

³⁴Pasic in Lapid and Kratchowil, p. 89.

"international" and tries to link it with its eventual coupling with the term "relations". He concludes that "no other term lives up simultaneously to the power of consensus and ambiguity that has been - for the most part unselfconsciously - invested in *international relations*."³⁵ True to its etymological roots, the ambiguity associated with world events addressed by International Relations is increasingly becoming apparent. The world today is changing in previously unforeseen ways. National boundaries and notions of sovereignty are being questioned, the definition of security is changing, and the end of the Cold War saw super powers behave in previously inconceivable ways. As Kegley explains, the internal combustion of the USSR was something that had formerly seemed impossible. Yet, "the second most 'powerful' state on the face of the earth did voluntarily give up power, despite the insistence of international relations theory that this could never happen."³⁶ Other events, such as the war in the Balkans, demonstrate "contradictory tendencies in the transformation of territorial social organization"³⁷ which require new patterns of explanation. The changing world order seems to have surpassed the explanatory potential of past theories and offers new challenges to countries such as Canada, which is trying to adjust to the changing global system. Authors such as Milnar, who recognize the drastic changes occurring with greater globalization, also recognize the need for "more comprehensive theoretical interpretations."³⁸ The acceptance of greater ambiguity within these theories such as through greater acceptance of the use of culture, may help fill the need.

It is in part to address past deficiencies and to allow for greater recognition of elements of international relations that the need for the recognition of culture is currently gaining momentum in the field. As stated by Kratochwil, "it is in this context of national

³⁵James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (eds.). *Intertextual/International Relations: Postmodern readings of world politics*. Lexington Mass.: Lexington Books, p. 4.

³⁶Charles W. Kegley Jr.. "The Neoidealist Movement in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Realities." *International Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 37 (1993) p. 136.

³⁷Milnar, p. 7.

³⁸Milnar, p. 3.

and personal identity that the "cultural" makes its most explicit appearance both in the political discourse and within the organization of knowledge (academe)."³⁹ Nationhood and identity, along with elements of history and change, are surfacing in the writings in International Relations theory as demonstrated in such books as Lapid and Kratochwil's *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* ; Groom and Light's *Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory* and Milnar's *Globalization and Territorial Identities*.

These books demonstrate that culture can have a true meaning for politics and an important use when the predominant Western ideology is expanded to include the meaning of culture. The key to using culture is to ensure that it is well defined and that it is understood in a particular context. A recognition of a political meaning of culture helps it be understood as a term that helps heighten the awareness of the complexity of human interactions and identities. This increased awareness is helpful in gaining insight and understanding of politics and the actions and policies of all levels of politics, including international politics.

A meaning of culture for political use:

Consistent with Western philosophy, many approaches to international relations have leaned toward a simplified unit of analysis which can lead to deficiencies. Kratochwil recognizes that "the positivistic and individualistic bent of much of this type of attitude research neglects crucial elements of conceptual interconnectedness and historicity within the symbolic universe that provide some suggestions of why "private issues attain 'public' support".⁴⁰ In order to set a more insightful research agenda for international relations

³⁹Kratochwil. "Is the Ship of Culture at Sea or Returning." in Lapid and Kratochwil, p.205.

⁴⁰Kratochwil in Lapid and Kratochwil, p. 210.

both the psychological and sociological elements - the duality of human nature - must be recognized. This agenda can be achieved through culture once it is properly defined to combine all elements of the human experience.

The Western ontology, which includes most international relations writers, adheres to the individualistic and less spiritual framework of thought. Modern Western culture places great emphasis on the individual, believing that "chaque homme porte la forme entière de l'human condition."⁴¹ The individual is necessary for the concept of identity in the West for in modern Western thought, "one is not only complete in oneself, one is *completely oneself*."⁴²

Consistent with Western thought, it is often acknowledged that for politics one needs humans and that human individuals have an identity. It is through the freedom of action to assert one's identity that political processes occur. This theory of politics can be traced to Aristotle. Aristotle outlined a *bios politikos*, which consisted of action (*praxis*) and speech (*lexis*), out of which arises the realm of human affairs.⁴³ Therefore, incumbent on a meaning of culture useful for politics, is a recognition of the individual. However, the existence of culture necessitates a more complicated theory. Not only do individuals influence their states and societies, but, society and the state also have an influence on the individual.

An examination of the etymological root of the word "culture" shows that culture is a molding of dual conceptualizations. It holds a spiritual and a material element. The root of culture was inextricably linked to the word "civilization" with its meaning from

⁴¹Translated as: "each man embodies the human condition in its entirety" by Richard Handler in Brett Williams. *The Politics of Culture*. Washington, D. C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991, p. 64.

⁴²Williams, p. 64.

⁴³Hannah Arendt. *The Human Condition*. University of Chicago Press: Chicago. 1958, p. 25.

cultivation.⁴⁴ Many authors initially used the words as synonyms. However, it was recognized that one could differentiate between the material artifacts by virtue of the science and technology of a society and the religious, artistic or spiritual elements of a society that gives it a sense of humanness. This duality can be identified in the German word "Kultur" which contained the concepts of "geistige" and "materielle Kultur".⁴⁵ The use of the meanings associated with the terms "geistige" and "materielle Kultur" as meanings for the terms "culture" or "civil" has been very inconsistent over time.⁴⁶ Through the different emphasis on each term, culture has taken on a variety of amalgamated and differentiated meanings of both a non-reductionist (focusing on culture as its own entity incorporating a notion of 'geist') and reductionist (focusing on the biological aspects and achievements of the individual as recognized in 'materielle culture') nature. This debate is most clearly demonstrated through the split in sociological and psychological theorizing of Western society. The inconsistencies, as traced through the etymology, serve to underscore the notion that culture is not a unidimensional and easily identified concept but rather one in which an incorporated meaning of all its elements needs to be addressed.

White is a strong representative of the extreme non-reductionist and sociological end of the spectrum. In the book, *The Science of Culture: A Study of Man and civilization*, White defines culture as "an organization of phenomena - acts (patterns of behaviours),

⁴⁴The older definition of civilization has a meaning consistent with cultivating, that is, to become cultured. Kroeber and Kluckhohn, p. 35.

⁴⁵'Geistige' refers to the spiritual or natural (spirit-nature) versus 'materielle Kultur' which refers to material or matter. [values vs. artifacts]. Kroeber and Kluckhohn, p. 10 and p. 35.

⁴⁶This inconsistency is mentioned by Kroeber and Kluckhohn. When referring to German authors, they describe the split as episodic. "That it was essentially an incident is shown by the fact that the number of writers who make culture the material or technological aspect is about as great as the number of those who called that same aspect civilization. More significant yet is the fact that probably a still greater number of Germans than both the foregoing together used culture in the inclusive sense." Kroeber and Kluckhohn, p. 18. This characteristic is also true of American authors: "To summarize the history of the relations of the concepts of culture and civilization in American sociology, there was first a phase in which the two were contrasted, with culture referring to material products and technology then a phase in which the contrast was maintained but the meanings reversed, technology and science being now called civilization; and, beginning more or less concurrently with this second phase, there was also a swing to the now prevalent non-differentiation of the two terms." Kroeber and Kluckhohn, p. 15.

objects (tools: things made with tools), ideas (beliefs, knowledge), and sentiments (attitudes, 'values') - that is dependent upon the use of symbols."⁴⁷ Such a definition is consistent with sociological views that "individualism is a social product, and is controlled by socially generated rules."⁴⁸

The greatest extension of this philosophy would have one believe that it is culture that is responsible for behaviour and not individuals. As a result, it is believed by authors such as White, that culture should be studied as its own phenomenon. According to White, "paradoxical though it may seem, the proper study of mankind turns out to be not Man, after all, but Culture."⁴⁹ In order to come to this conclusion, White breaks human behaviour into biological and cultural elements, and recognizes that every human is born into a cultural environment as well as a natural one. The natural or biological composition of humans does not dictate human behaviour outside of its somatic functions. Therefore, culture must be the element that is responsible for human action. "The event is something that the culture has done to the individual rather than the other way around."⁵⁰

As a further extension of White's belief, the human mind becomes explainable in terms of culture. This conceptualization of the mind then attributes all elements of the individual mind such as thinking, feeling, acting and even believing to sociocultural systems. "The 'human mind' - human minding - is obviously a variable. And its variations are functions of variations of the cultural factor rather than of the psychosomatic factor, which may be regarded as a constant."⁵¹ This almost Foucauldian⁵² version of

⁴⁷Leslie A. White. *The Science of Culture: A study of man and civilization*. New York, N. Y.: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1969, p. 140.

⁴⁸Robert Bocock. *Individual and Culture: Durkheim and Freud*. Princeton, N. J.: Open University Press, p. 12.

⁴⁹White, p. 141.

⁵⁰White, p. 173.

⁵¹White, p. 148.

⁵² Among statements that outline Foucault's belief is his statement at the end of the book where he states that the book serves as a study of "the power of normalization and the formation of knowledge in modern

consciousness creates an unconscious which is a human construct. Because of the inability of individuals to identify the source of purpose and their set of values and beliefs, the individuals ascribe it to themselves.⁵³ Order is achieved in society through culture, in a way that individuals are not fully aware of because they are removed from all the historical elements that led to the formation of their culture. They therefore attribute this to themselves as an element of human nature. However, according to non-reductionist thought, human nature is not really natural but rather a function of culture. Human nature is "culture thrown against a screen of nerves, glands, sense organs, muscles, etc."⁵⁴

Criticisms of this perspective of culture abound. In Copeland's critique of White, he first examined the assertion that man cannot control culture. Copeland argues that White's assertion that man cannot control culture simply means "that man cannot regulate its complete course"; man is not omnipotent.⁵⁵ Such an assertion is obviously self-evident. Others have also claimed that in essence all that White and his followers have done is removed an abstraction from its source and reified it so that the abstraction ends up endowed with the causal influence over its original source of abstraction.⁵⁶ Moreover, White's belief of humans as the ultimate dependent variable is the most debilitating when subject to scrutiny. In the assumption that within the culture-human system, humans cannot control culture but culture can control humans, it becomes apparent that taken to its logical end one would have to believe that the search for truth in the area of human beliefs is irrelevant. Subsequently White has laid the foundation to question all human beliefs, including his own.⁵⁷

society." See Michel Foucault. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. New York, N. Y.: Vintage Books, 1979, p. 308.

⁵³White, p.158.

⁵⁴White, p. 149.

⁵⁵John W. Copeland. "Culture and Man: Leslie A. White's Theses Re-examined." in Brady and Isaac (eds.), p. 48.

⁵⁶Allan Hanson. *Meaning in Culture*. Boston, Mass.: Routeledge & Kegan Paul, 1975, p. 2.

⁵⁷Copeland in Brady and Isaac, p. 56.

Reductionists look almost entirely to individual beings in order to explain culture.

According to this ontology, "man in his creativity, as a complete and total being, man as a creature of rational and irrational forces, man as a social and ethical entity, communicating and interrelating with others, yet transcending social and historical limits in his uniqueness and utter loneliness, really provides the central questions in the philosophy of culture."⁵⁸ Human nature and psychological theories such as those outlined by Freud are central elements for such beliefs that biology can be turned to as an initial point for understanding the world.

This belief helps allow for conflict between an individual and one's culture.

According to this view, "however much societies may differ, they all must cope with man's common biological features, especially his prolonged infantile dependency; the adaptively viable means for coping with the latter condition exhibit common social and cultural features across a narrow range of social and cultural variability; these common biological, cosical, and cultural features are a set of constants which, in their interaction, preclude a universal human nature."⁵⁹ In this belief, culture plays a conditioning role on human natural desires and instincts. Culture can be seen as a choice between allowing human nature to thrive or thwarting it.⁶⁰

This ontology can also be explained through Freud's concepts of the Id, Ego and Superego. The Id represents the fundamental biological aspect of life which each individual wants to satisfy. The Id also incorporates the unconscious. However, recognizing individuals as members of society, Freud constructed the Ego which combines the physical and social aspects of being. Finally, individuals adhere to the super-ego, or

⁵⁸Sneh Pandit (ed.). *Perspectives in the philosophy of culture*. New Dehli: S. Chand, 1978, p. xiv -xv.

⁵⁹B. Kilborne and Langness. *Culture and human nature: theoretical papers of Melford E. Spiro*. Chicago: Univeristy of Chicago Press, 1987, p. 27.

⁶⁰Hugh Black. *Culture and restraint*. New York, N. Y.: Fleming H. Revell Co. 1901, p. 36.

consciousness as the pure social ideal.⁶¹ This relationship is sophisticated in Pandit's book, *Perspectives in the Philosophy of Culture*. Pandit outlines a process whereby the individual is born into and formed by a group. However, the individual also recognizes him or herself as distinct from others. Pandit explains that "side by side with the development of 'social' consciousness there is also the development of 'self' consciousness."⁶²

The reductionist authors do a good job of attributing identity necessary for politics, to the individual. However, they fail to account for the fact that biological explanations do not explain differences in societies. For example, Toynbee found that there is "no evidence of a correlation of biological and cultural differences."⁶³ Furthermore, historical factors become neglected when one strengthens the individual as a source of identity. The aggregation of societies becomes a symbol of the individual psyche. History enters only at "the tale stages of development and of the highly speculative assumption that individual and social formations follow the same path."⁶⁴

In order to better understand humanity as is needed for politics, the meaning of culture needs to be recognized. Like culture, meaning can be "essentially contestable". One must be aware of the conceptual problems of designating meaning to a human construct for "the meaning of a whole is in its parts and their organization; the meaning of a part is in its logical articulation with other parts to form a whole."⁶⁵ Context is critical to assigning meaning for "every proposition has systematic or logical meaning, so that its full

⁶¹Pandit, p. 187.

⁶²Pandit, p. 185.

⁶³Bock. *Human Nature and History: A response to Sociobiology*. New York, N. Y.: Columbia University Press, 1980, p. 140.

⁶⁴Kratochwil in Lapid and Kratochwil, p. 207.

⁶⁵Hanson, p. 10.

meaning consists in all the propositions which it logically implies and which are required to define its terms."⁶⁶

A meaning of culture which is useful for politics recognizes that culture is a dual process which incorporates a reciprocal relationship between an individual and that individual's environment. The two cannot be separated and favouring one over the other causes imbalance and conflict. Humans are "bothered on the one hand, by the fact that the human psyche seeks a meaning, it tends to identify and reach the ideal. On the other hand, it is bothered by the fact of an actual world of sensations all along. So long as these two are kept apart no meaningful statements about man can be made."⁶⁷

In order to incorporate this perspective, culture can be defined as "a historically transmitted system of meanings"⁶⁸ which leads to a "tradition of values, of self-realization."⁶⁹ An elaboration of this viewpoint is offered by Carroll in *Cultural Misunderstandings*. Although individual differences are important in forming identities, society also plays a strong, but invisible role. Culture can be conceptualized through the compilation of stories and tradition, both elements which any nation, including Canada, can claim. Culture is the logic by which one gives order to the world. As stated by Carroll:

and I have been learning this logic little by little, since the moment I was born, from the gestures, the words, and the care of those who surrounded me... from the way I was raised, rewarded, punished,... From the stories I was told, from the books I read, from the songs I sang...in all things right down to my sleep and the dreams I learned to dream and recount. I learned to breathe this logic and to forget that I had learned it. I find it natural. Whether I produce meaning or apprehend it, it underlies all my interactions.⁷⁰

⁶⁶Hanson, p. 10. Etienne Vermeersch also recognizes the interconnectedness of terms. Vermeersch explains that since the 'culture concept' "has strong connections with other ones, such as learning, symbol, etc., no definition can be conclusive, unless we have a theory to link these concepts." Etienne Vermeersch. "An analysis of the Concept of Culture." in Bernardo Bernardi (ed.). *The Concept and Dynamics of Culture*. The Hague, Paris: Mouton Publishers, 1977, p. 9.

⁶⁷Pande, p. 49

⁶⁸Kratochwil in Lapid and Kratochwil, p. 211.

⁶⁹Pande, p. 1

⁷⁰Raymond Carroll, *Cultural Misunderstandings: The French-American Experience*. The University of Chicago Press, 1987, p. 3

Culture is embedded in values. Valuing implies seeking, and seeking is an inherent aspect of human nature. Human nature is not unidimensional but rather exists at both the biological and spiritual level.⁷¹ This belief is consistent with the etymological root of culture which incorporated both "Kulture" and "geist". The combination of human nature with society implies a collective search for individual self-fulfillment which results in culture. As Pande explains, "the expression and communication of valued experiences gives a socio-historical actuality to the ideal process and the cultural world is thus created as the historical tradition of the human endeavour for self-realization."⁷²

The result of this process is not one unidimensional culture, but an organic flow of numerous cultures that form a whole. This point is important to recognize in order to counteract the problems that occur from unidimensional conceptions of culture. A shallow, unidimensional conception of culture, based on religion and/or language, results in difficulties recognizing culture groups. As pointed out by Pasic, "indeed, with such a definition, the acceptance of a common culture in India or the United States is problematic, as these are multilingual, multireligious, multiethnic societies. Yet there would be consensus on the point that "an Indian culture" or "an American culture" exists."⁷³ Because of the inherent complexity within the cultural process, within any given group there exists not only a culture, but also, many cultures which can be referred to and identified through the process of self-realization. For example, one can refer to the Canadian foreign and defence policy culture as distinct from the Canadian culture, notwithstanding the intertwined relationship between these two cultures. Furthermore, separate foreign policy and defence cultural groups may exist within the broader spectrum of foreign and defence policy culture.

⁷¹Pande, p.1.

⁷²Pande, p. 1.

⁷³Pasic in Lapid and Kratochwil, p. 94.

Although the ambiguity and flexibility of culture is useful, one has to be careful that the term is kept in context and not manipulated to the extent that it can become viewed as the ultimate variable - "the panacea for our theoretical woes."⁷⁴ In such a case culture takes on that debilitating characteristic of being something that explains everything and therefore explains nothing. Using culture as an element of consideration is not to remove the material elements and power from international relations theories and historical experience. Culture helps one gain a better understanding of how the discovery of self simultaneously leads to the recognition of other. Culture becomes one aspect of "the social construction of human agency in a culturally full international society where the search for identity and meaning requires that the self discover the other."⁷⁵

The key to understanding culture is in recognizing the distinction of culture as not merely social or natural but rather a combination of both elements constituting "the valuable core of the actual life of a given set of people."⁷⁶ This recognition allows identity to take on a meaning of difference and not sameness. It is this difference that helps recognize identities, new groups and the either conflictual or co-operational patterns they may incorporate.⁷⁷ This incorporation of difference has implications for the problems of international relations in the 'new world order' and attempts to grapple with concepts such as sovereignty and nationhood. It is the heterogeneity of new communities and new patterns of conflict which are of paramount importance today. Heterogeneity within groups is also useful for studying elements within a culture. For example, it makes it possible to identify subcultures within and between the foreign and defence policy communities in Canada. Most importantly, the recognition of difference with identity gives a research agenda for

⁷⁴Kratochwil in Lapid and Kratochwil, p. 205

⁷⁵Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney. "Knowing Encounters: Beyond Parochialism in International Relations Theory." in Lapid and Kratochwil, p. 74.

⁷⁶Pande, p. 45.

⁷⁷Kratochwil in Lapid and Kratochwil, p. 206.

international relations which directs the study of culture as not just an empirical, tautologous or arbitrary one. One must attempt to understand different cultures as different expressions of a universal self-consciousness, which use different symbols according to what they are aspiring after. That is:

The true identity of a society must be sought in terms of its self-consciousness of culture at the heart of which lies a distinctive value-experience. This basic value-experience is nothing except a mode of human self-awareness, for value is nothing except the Self, revealed or felt to be revealed as a content of experience. On this foundational experience is reared the underlying world-view of the culture with its multiform expressions in institutions, beliefs and symbols.⁷⁸

There is a need for an appreciation of history in a meaning of culture.

"Understanding the complex relations between the individual and society requires not only an understanding of the complex structure of co-constitution but an appreciation of the historical changes that occur in the importance and weight of these elements."⁷⁹ It is through history and tradition that one can get a deeper sense of the significance of identity for the meaning of culture as well as understanding the relationship between culture and change.

Through the conceptualization of culture as outlined above, history becomes the underlying motive for action which results in change. One has to be cautious not to apply a causal component to the notion of history as a cultural process. To do so one may assign a chronological order in the space-time continuum which is not the intention here.⁸⁰ Nonetheless, the recognition of history is important for it is the sequence of historical events which composes a tradition. As explained by Pande, at the level of self-

⁷⁸Pande, p. 104.

⁷⁹Kratochwil in Lapid and Kratochwil, p. 207.

⁸⁰As cautioned by Pande, "one must, however, remember that it is difficult for the historian to establish a causal connection since spatial contiguity and temporal succession, while necessary for a causal sequence among events, are not sufficient to establish one." Pande, p. i For clarification of how history without sequence can be conceptualized it is helpful to examine Pande's discussion on category, phase, level starting Pande, p. 22.

consciousness tradition is the process of self-realisation and evolving self-consciousness at the macrosocial level. Three processes of evolving self-realisation are outlined by Pande. The third level is the historian or external individual compiling fragments of tradition into one ideal tradition or "reconstructed self-consciousness."⁸¹ In this manner history forms the building blocks of tradition and tradition is the step to culture.

Tradition, with its formation through history, is also an integral component of identity and change. An interesting analogy, raised by Pande, outlines tradition in society similar to memory in life.⁸² The institutional and educational components of tradition serve to keep alive the past experience and learning of society which becomes the basis for new experiences and lessons. Tradition also has an organic component for it changes and evolves over time. As memory evolves and changes history with new perspectives, tradition is not only constructed, but also, continually re-invented.

Through this continual past - present interchange values are identified. Values are not easily defined. Nonetheless, they are most easily understood when tied to valuing which is the process of "seeking, choosing and approving."⁸³ Valuing is inherent in humans and produces values or "immediate objects of self-conscious individual experience."⁸⁴ Tradition is fundamental in the creation of values and value experiences. Values are manifested by insight which is gained through experience and learning, but which cannot be imposed or arbitrarily assigned. Values are communicated in society and form symbols which become the building blocks of tradition and culture. As explained by Pande, "in this sense the world of culture is a world of symbols expressive of knowledge

⁸¹Pande, p. 48.

⁸²Pande, p. 102.

⁸³Pande, p. 1.

⁸⁴Pande, p. 2.

and experience evolved in the process of value-seeking. Culture emerges as a revelation in the individual psyche and enters social tradition creatively as a symbol."⁸⁵

Tradition, values and culture are not fixed constants but are continually developing. Because tradition is a process like culture, there can be numerous traditions. For example, each heterogenous group within Canadian society can develop its own traditions which help them identify within their own subculture. These group traditions may then polenate into the mass conciousness. At the same time, a recognized tradition may evolve over time as the society evolves. It is the accumulation of traditions which form a culture.

The continually developing elements of tradition, value and culture can also have ramifications for the coherency of a culture. It is through the evolutionary process that the distinct identity of a culture in society may be discovered. According to Pande, "the continued vitality of the culture, thus, depends on the continuity of its underlying communication of value which is the heart of tradition."⁸⁶

Without a strong recognition of tradition, cultural identity can be weakened. A weakened tradition can lead to weakening of "the very substance of social being which is a fellowship extending in time."⁸⁷ This is not to say that tradition cannot be consistent with change. As has already been explained, tradition is an element of change through historical processes. However, complete change in values is not consistent with tradition as an element of change. With a complete change in values, one actually witnesses the replacement of one tradition for another. ⁸⁸

⁸⁵Pande, p. 2.

⁸⁶Pande, p. 104.

⁸⁷Pande, p. 102.

⁸⁸"There is no necessary contradiction between tradition and change but only between tradition and a change of values *ab extra*, which is really a case of replacing one tradition by another." Pande, p. 104.

Because tradition is such an integral component of culture, it is useful as a variable for examining the nature and coherency of a culture. An examination of history and the lessons and beliefs resulting from historical experience helps identify a tradition and will be used in part to identify the understanding surrounding the notion of a Canadian military tradition. Tradition as a locus for identity and values can help delineate a culture. Tradition is the process of self-realization at the macrosocial level while values are self-realization at the individual level. Therefore, the cultural process of self-realization necessitates the true recognition of tradition. Without tradition, there is no culture. Without a clear recognition and communication of tradition outlining the valued experiences, the cultural process of self-realization becomes unfocused and incoherent.

Conclusion

Culture is an ambiguous concept which can breed misunderstanding but which also can assist in adding greater theoretical sophistication and understanding. Although International Relations has periodically grappled with the notion of culture, the full implications and value of the use of the concept has yet to be fully discovered. In order to embark on a study using culture, one must first outline the parameters and elements that can help give this ambiguous term meaning. A meaning of culture useful to politics and international relations recognizes a dual nature of humanity. The recognition of this duality leads culture to be defined as a historical mode of valuing which leads to self-realization. Tradition is an important element of culture so defined, for tradition is the element of identity as well as an element of change.

Understanding culture as a process of self-realization is helpful for understanding international relations and for the various issues incorporated in the field of International

Relations. A research agenda incorporating culture recognizes the theoretical importance of cultural identity. If a nation's identity is not coherent, that is, whole or fully integrated, it can lead to significant problems manifested in policy terms. It is possible to examine the coherence of a culture through utilizing tradition, when tradition is understood as a process along the path to cultural self-realization. The cultural identity present in the Canadian foreign and defence arena as represented through writings on each subject is examined through a notion of tradition. The perceived military tradition that exists in both Canadian foreign and defence policy writings is the notion of tradition that will be examined. Inconsistency in the perception of Canada's military tradition can have ramifications on the culture and all elements of that culture including policy formation.

CHAPTER TWO:

Foreign Policy and a Non-Military Tradition

Canada's foreign and defence policy has a distinct nature of its own. As outlined in many of the writings on Canadian policy, Canada shares many characteristics with its Western counterparts, especially its closest neighbor, the United States. However, a separate Canadian identity is easily distinguishable. As pointed out by Peter Emberly, in *By Loving our Own: George Grant and the Legacy of Lament for a Nation*, Canadians are "a people animated by their own unique historical origins, their own particular land, their own founding myths, their own distinctive political symbols and self interpretations."⁸⁹ This distinct identity, as well as the myths and self interpretations used in attaining self-realization, are what are present in general Canadian culture and also are key components of the culture of Canadian foreign and defence policy.

Tradition is a key component of culture and thus it can be used as a variable to help identify the vitality and coherency of culture. Within Canadian foreign and defence policy culture there is a distinct pattern of opinion with regard to the Canadian military tradition as represented through writings in these areas. This element of tradition will be highlighted to help discover the communication of valuing which is also present and which can have ramifications for the culture. For this purpose discussions of military tradition should be understood in the broadest sense as a form of self-consciousness.

A group of writers, which may be classified primarily as foreign policy writers, explicitly and implicitly adhere to a belief that Canada holds a non-military tradition or

⁸⁹Peter C. Emberly (ed.). *By Loving Our Own: George Grant and the Legacy of Lament for a Nation*. Ottawa, Ont.: Carleton University Press, 1990. p. xiii.

ethos. This chapter will outline a number of the areas within the foreign policy writings that can be used to identify this belief. The proponents of a military tradition as identified in the next chapter hold different conceptualizations of many of the same elements in keeping with different beliefs and assumptions held towards the nature of the military in Canada.

Within both groups of writers there are a number of debates and varying points of view that will be examined. A simplified or compiled version of these debates will be used for clarity in analysis, notwithstanding the recognition that other viewpoints do exist. This simplification is necessary in order to highlight the factors that help identify each group as an adherent to one side or the other of the debate over a military tradition in Canada. For example, although periodically throughout Canada's history there have been debates over the extent that Canada should be, or truly is, an internationalist nation, the current predominant view held by both groups of writers, identifies Canada as a country committed to internationalism. Through this overarching context, the areas that will be examined to outline the foreign policy belief in the non-military tradition of Canada include interpretations of the history of the country, the French-English division that shapes the nation, Canada's security perception, Canada's relationship with the United States, Canada's role in the world, and the Canadian sense of morality.

The use of history by foreign policy writers helps give insight into their characterization of Canada as a country void of a military tradition. Other factors that can be identified in the writings, such as the French-English question, help outline the belief structure present in the writings. To foreign policy writers, the lack of any pressing security threat by virtue of Canada's geo-political situation allows Canada the privilege of not having to hold or maintain a strong sense of the military presence in Canada. Canada relies on others through alliances for its security. One of Canada's closest allies is the

United States. However, for many foreign policy writers enjoying such a close relationship with a power as great as the United States holds other threats. Canada's relationship with the United States is characterized by these writers as a constant struggle to differentiate the countries and ensure a separate identity. Canada's role on the world stage is identified by these authors through idealistic beliefs underpinning internationalism. Characteristics such as "middlepower" are conceptualized by foreign policy writers through idealistic visions that seem inconsistent with a military tradition. Idealist images of the peacekeeping role are also present within the writings. These writers also often highlight the non-military related roles that Canada plays on the world stage such as the one that Canada plays in international economics. Finally, the most striking characteristic of these writers is the strong adherence to a sense of Canadian morality. Canada is seen as a country committed to "good government, law and order" which is believed to include an international benevolence inconsistent with a military tradition.

The belief that Canada has a non-military tradition has been openly asserted by a number of writers and is implicitly present in a number of other writings. For example, Hockin asserts a belief that an identifiable trait in foreign policy is Canada's non adherence to the military: "one distinguishing characteristic of Canada is its unmilitary ethos."⁹⁰ Tucker agrees with Hockin's assessment of Canada and the military. Tucker's review of Canadian foreign policy sets out to determine whether significant patterns are discernible in the making and execution of Canadian foreign policy. Tucker identifies three dominant characteristics of Canadian foreign policy. One of these characteristics is a non-military tradition.⁹¹ Implicit indicators are also present in other authors who dismiss or completely neglect the military in their writings.

⁹⁰Lewis Hertzman, John W. Warnock and Tomas A. Hockin. *Alliances and Illusions*. Edmonton, Alb.: M. G. Hurtig Limited, 1969, p. 98.

⁹¹The other two are a quiescent nationalism and a fondness for legalistic and diplomatic solutions to pressing problems. Tucker, p. 3.

Claims of a non-military tradition do not neglect the empirical reality of the military and should not be confused with the individual regimental and general practices or traditions within the military. By claiming or implying that Canada is without a military tradition or ethos these authors are propagating the belief that a sense of a military consciousness does not exist in the formation of the Canadian culture.

For most foreign policy writers, this concept of a non-military tradition or ethos is not consistent with antimilitarism. Rather it is associated with an inherent sense of non-violent solutions as the most effective method of problem solving and conflict resolution. Tucker attributes the Canadian non-military tradition to the legalistic and diplomatic history surrounding the founding of Canada which serves as the foundation for Canadian political culture. According to Tucker "the absence of a revolutionary tradition has had profound implications for Canadian political culture."⁹² As a result, Canadian society values dialogue for solutions to conflict rather than valuing the military as the dominant force for maintaining security. Hockin explains this ethos as "a tremendous faith in the possible results of sensitivity, goodwill, good intentions and hard work."⁹³ It is this implicit valuing of the legal at the expense of the military, as well as tremendous faith in goodwill and an overall idealist philosophy, that also characterizes the other writers who can be classified as adhering to a non-military tradition.⁹⁴ Writers who propagate this belief fall predominantly in the field of foreign policy, although there are some exceptions. Nonetheless, the dominant beliefs and assumptions that lead to the characterization of Canada as a country void of a military tradition can most often be found in foreign policy writing.

⁹²Tucker. p. 2.

⁹³Hertzman et. al., p. 99.

⁹⁴A recognition of this is expressed by Donneur and Alain who state, "the role of *mediator/integrator* has often been highlighted by the vast majority of Canadian foreign policy specialists, who, unconsciously rather than consciously, adhere to the idealist current in international relations, and share an internationalist vision." Andre P. Donneur and Caroline C. Alain. "Canada: A Reassertion of its Role as a Middle Power." in Phillipe Le Prestre (ed.). *Roles, Quests in the Post Cold War Era: Foreign Policies in transition*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill Queen's University Press, 1997, p. 225.

History:

Canada is a relatively new actor on the international stage. Historically, any foreign matters were at the discretion of the United Kingdom, as Canada's colonial master. Although many events occurred that helped Canada develop an international role of its own prior to the signing of the Westminster Statute in 1931, the signing of the Statute was the first legal recognition of Canada's authority outside its own borders.⁹⁵

The initial period of Canadian sovereignty was dominated by isolationist policies.⁹⁶ For example, even though Canada was involved in organizations such as the League of Nations, Canada's primary goal was to gain greater sovereignty, and Canada's goal in the League was mainly towards lessening League obligations.⁹⁷ The primary foreign policy issues of concern included "securing autonomy from Britain, settling bilateral disputes with the Americans and avoiding any further participation in the affairs of the world, especially the European world."⁹⁸

Canadian foreign policy experienced a significant transformation during the 1940s. Canadians came to recognize the importance of events outside of their borders. This awakening vaulted Canada into the internationalist role that it so proudly claims today. Because of this awakening during and after W. W. II, the post-W. W. II period is most often highlighted by writers of Canadian foreign policy. This is the 'golden era' or 'golden

⁹⁵For example, in the 1920s, many Canadians were involved in international peace organizations such as the League of Nations Society. Keating, p. 15.

⁹⁶It is recognized that the belief in the virtue of isolationism was not held by all Canadians. However, relative to the change in attitude and behaviour that occurred during and after W. W. II, the pre-War period was definitely more isolationist. For more information see Keating, p. 15.

⁹⁷Keating, p. 14. In particular this can be seen with Canada's treatment of Article X of the League Charter. Like most League members Canada was loathe to accept the commitment of protecting other members' territorial and political integrity as outlined by Article X.

⁹⁸Keating, p. 13.

decade' of Canadian foreign policy in which Canada held a unique influence in world events by virtue of its position as it emerged from the war.⁹⁹

Although there have been varying differences of opinion with regard to the specific policy options for Canadian foreign policy, the foreign policy culture has retained many of the beliefs established in the post W. W. II period. "In 1947, Louis St. Laurent enumerated the principles of Canadian foreign policy as: national unity, political liberty, the rule of law in national and international affairs, the values of Christian civilization, and 'the acceptance of international responsibility in keeping with our conception of our role in world affairs'."¹⁰⁰ Paul Martin, two decades later, announced a list of principles strikingly similar: "national security, national unity, political liberty and social justice, the rule of law in national and international affairs, economic development in Canada and the world, the values of Christian civilization, and 'acceptance of international responsibility in accordance with our interest, and our ability to contribute towards the building of peace'."¹⁰¹ In the 1990s these foreign policy principles have been reinforced as: "fostering economic growth; safeguarding sovereignty and independence; working for peace and security; promoting social justice; enhancing the quality of life; ensuring a harmonious natural environment."¹⁰² The 1995 government document, *Canada in the World* echoes most of these traits, and summarizes them into three baskets: "(t)he promotion of

⁹⁹The "golden decade" first coined by Escott Reid refers to the years 1941-1951 and therefore overlaps with W. W. II. However other authors have maintained a reference to a 'golden era' from approximately 1948-57. It is this later time frame that is most often referred to. Throughout both these time periods Canada enjoyed unprecedented international influence due to many extraordinary factors including European loss of power and financial stability, the residual state of colonization, Canadian strategic relevance with the outbreak of the Cold War and the fact that Canada emerged from the war as one of the few creditor nations. Tucker, p. 108.

¹⁰⁰Dale C. Thomson and Roger F. Swanson. *Canadian Foreign Policy: Options and Perspectives*. Toronto, Ont.: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1971, p. 30.

¹⁰¹Thomson and Swanson, p. 30.

¹⁰²J. L. Granatstein. *Canadian Foreign Policy: Historical Readings*. Toronto, Ont.: Copp Clark Pitman Limited, 1993, p. 60-61.

prosperity and employment; (t)he protection of our security, within a stable global framework; and (t)he projection of Canadian values and culture."¹⁰³

Non-Military Characteristics:

In order to outline the beliefs and values that lead foreign policy writers to propagate the non-military tradition of Canada some of these foreign policy traits will be discussed further. Two general factors have consistently been dominant considerations in all Canadian policy decisions. These factors are the French-English question and Canada's relationship with the United States. As stated by Trudeau, "the two inescapable realities of all Canadian policies, domestic and foreign...are the necessity of maintaining unity at home, and living distinct from but in harmony with the world's most powerful and dynamic nation."¹⁰⁴ These two factors will be examined first. The perspective of Canadian internationalism and how that has shaped the roles that Canada plays in the world will also be outlined. Intrinsic to these roles is a belief in a higher Canadian morality which is identified as being inconsistent with a military tradition.

It is widely believed that Canada has not one, but two, political cultures and national styles. In his book, *Politique Etrangère canadienne*, Donneur states unequivocally that "la société canadienne se caractérise par le fait qu'elle renferme deux styles nationaux, produits de deux sociétés: le style canadien-anglais et le style canadien-français."¹⁰⁵ This view of a bi-cultural Canada is not uncommon. However, in the realm of the silent debate over the nature of the military tradition, the domestic cultural split plays a lesser role.

¹⁰³ *Canada in the World*. Government Statement. Canada: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada 1995, p. i.

¹⁰⁴ Thomson and Swanson, p. 6.

¹⁰⁵ André Donneur. *Politique Etrangère*. Montreal, Quebec: Guérin Universitaire, 1994. p. 19.

Quebec as a separate identity, representing French Canadians, has tried to assert its influence internationally, but the federal government still holds the primary role in foreign affairs. Although technically foreign policy is the domain of the federal government, the constitution does provide economic, educational and cultural powers to each province that can be used for access into matters of foreign policy. The challenge to federal supremacy through provincial attempts to extend economic and cultural links first became a potential threat in the 1960s and 1970s, largely as a result of actions by Quebec.¹⁰⁶ As a result of growing interest by Quebec and to a lesser extent the other provinces, the federal government negotiated a number of agreements and set policies to ensure its pre-eminence in the area of foreign policy. One of the first was a 1965 agreement with France which allowed a province to enter into agreements with France, as long as the federal government was informed of, and sanctioned, the agreement.¹⁰⁷ Through a number of similar techniques the federal government has managed to allow a provincial role in foreign affairs but has kept the provinces under its watchful eye. As a result, the federal government has technically retained control over the assertion of Quebec foreign relations. As Cooper recognizes, "as the single voice of Canada abroad, only the federal government was entitled to conduct foreign policy, including treaty-making and participation in international conferences."¹⁰⁸

Notwithstanding this technical control, Quebec's attempts to assert its influence abroad has served to influence the nature of foreign policy decisions. The federal government's desperate attempts to pre-empt Quebec's attempts at foreign independence and the desire of the Government to appease Quebec interests internationally has resulted in Canada entering into international agreements and organizations as a result of domestic

¹⁰⁶Tucker, p. 53.

¹⁰⁷This "umbrella" agreement became official policy on November 17, 1965. Tucker, p. 53.

¹⁰⁸Andrew Fenton Cooper. "Canadian Cultural Diplomacy: an Introduction." in Andrew Fenton Cooper (ed.). *Canadian Culture: International Dimensions*. Waterloo, Ont.: Canadian Institute for International Affairs, 1985, p. 13.

needs rather than to fulfill foreign policy initiatives. Examples of this include the Canadian link to la Francophonie and many of the aid projects to French-speaking, developing countries.¹⁰⁹

Despite attempts by Quebec to assert its own international identity and despite the influence of French-English tensions in foreign policy, the differences between Canada's founding nationalities become moot. Both French and English policy writers can be identified on either side of the silent debate over the nature of the Canadian military tradition. With regard to Canada's role in the world, both French and English Canadian foreign policy writers embrace the non-military tradition characteristics. Within this group the belief in the rule of law, and "peace, order and good government" in the international arena transgresses domestic rivalry. As explained by Morton:

Not life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, but peace, order and good government are what the national government of Canada guarantees. Under these, it is assumed, life, liberty, and happiness may be achieved, but by each according to his tastes. For the society of allegiance admits of a diversity the society of compact does not, and one of the blessings of Canadian life is that there is no Canadian way of life, much less two, but a unity under the Crown admitting of a thousand diversities. For this reason it is not a matter of political concern that Canada has two major cultures and many smaller ones.¹¹⁰

This sentiment is enforced by Donneur: "les sociétés canadienne-anglaise et québécoise partagent leur manque d'expérience et de tradition révolutionnaires. Les révoltes de 1837-38, tant au bien minces et de toute façon des échecs. Ce passé renforce la tendance au gradualisme et à l'internationalisme fonctionnel."¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹Tucker explains that "foreign aid was in the early mid-1970s especially seen by the Trudeau Government as a potent instrument of its quest for national unity." Tucker, p. 31.

¹¹⁰William L. Morton. *The Canadian Identity*. Toronto, Ont.: University of Toronto Press, 1972, p.112.

¹¹¹Donneur, p. 19.

Other factors which could be identified as belonging to the domestic realm such as geography, population and resources help dictate Canadian capabilities and therefore have an influence on foreign policy. Because of its geography and geopolitical position, Canada is devoid of threats to its own territory. The perception that Canada is without a significant territorial threat has led foreign policy writers to embrace the conceptualization of Canada as a "fireproof house".¹¹² Canada as a "fireproof house" is tempered by the reality that Canada never fully developed an ability to defend its territory.

Holmes termed Canada's threat assessment as 'relative security'. According to Holmes, Canadians are not completely secure in their borders and as a result, Canadians have been quick to assist other nations in need with the belief that the actions will be reciprocated. Canada feels compelled to be involved with others in part because of the belief that Canada has a stake in an orderly world.¹¹³ This Canadian 'relative security' has lead to a unique Canadian reality with some benefits as well. "Le Canada a des options qui sont peut-être inhabituelles ou même uniques, parce que pour décider de ses options politiques en matière de défense, le Canada ne se sont pas obligé, comme beaucoup d'autres pays, pour assurer la sécurité militaire du pays, de se mesurer plus ou moins directement à la capacité de forces militaires adverses."¹¹⁴

Regardless of any potential physical threats Canada has also always had the luxury of knowing that it had a Great Power to help protect its interest. The United Kingdom first played the role and since the end of W. W. II, the United States has acted as Canada's protector. The close relationship between Canada and the United States is sometimes seen

¹¹²This term was first raised by Senator Dandurand in his address to the League of Nations on October 2, 1924.

¹¹³John W. Holmes. "Is There a Future for Middlepowermanship?" in J. King Gordon. *Canada's Role as a Middle Power*. Third Annual Banff Conference on World Development August 1965. Lindsay, Ont.: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1966, p. 23.

¹¹⁴C. R. Nixon. "Les Éléments Nationaux Déterminants de la Capacité du Canada en Matière de Défense." *Les Politiques de Défense du Canada dans les Années 1980*. Université Laval Québec: Centre Québécois de Relations Internationales, 1981, p. 22.

as threatening in itself and foreign policy writers are devoted to differentiating Canada from the American giant.¹¹⁵ The American fixation is present even during Canada's historical beginnings when it has been described that "being Canadian meant more than just being a country called Canada; it also denoted that each inhabitant had a psychological and cultural dimension that made him [or her] dissimilar from Americans."¹¹⁶ Many studies¹¹⁷ continue this devotion to differentiating Canada from the United States.

A strong debate exists over whether Canada is truly sovereign or is merely a satellite of American foreign policy.¹¹⁸ Throughout the various elements of this debate, Canada is perceived as a country with a non-military tradition. Because of foreign policy writers' adherence to the belief in a non-military tradition it is especially important for these writers that Canada differentiate and protect itself from the American culture with its strong military ethos. On the one hand, there are writers who adhere to the belief that Canada is an internationalist nation and middle power state. This role is characterized by a number of traits. Included in these traits are Canadian support for international organizations, Canada as a peacekeeping pioneer and ardent disarmament supporter, the quality of international Canadian aid, Canada as a liberal trading partner and Canada as overall good world citizen.¹¹⁹ Contrary to this view is the belief that Canada is really an American satellite tied politically and economically to American decisions and actions. As an American satellite

¹¹⁵This area of study is so prevalent it caused Stairs to remark, "the literature on Canada's all-important relationship with the United States is more fully developed and refined than is that on Canada's role in the world." Denis Stairs. "Will and circumstance and the postwar study of Canada's foreign policy." *International Journal* (Winter 1994-95) p. 19.

¹¹⁶Joseph Levitt. *A Vision Beyond Reach: A Century of Images of Canadian Destiny*. Ottawa: Deneau Publishers, 1982. p. 190.

¹¹⁷To name just a few there are: Seymour Martin Lipset. *North American Cultures: values and institutions in Canada and the United States*. Borderlands monograph series, 1990. Jack Granatstein's *Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite?*. Norman Hillmer (ed.). *Partners Nevertheless: Canadian-American Relations in the Twentieth Century*. Toronto, Ont.: Copp Clark Pitman Limited, 1989. Peyton Lyon and Brian Tomlin. *Canada as an International Actor*. Toronto, Ont.: Macmillan Co. of Canada Ltd., 1979. Michael Hawes. *Principal power, middle power, or satellite?*. Toronto, Ont.: York Research Program in Strategic Studies, 1984.

¹¹⁸It is recognized that there are many other dimensions within this debate; however, they will not be examined here.

¹¹⁹Lyon and Tomlin, p. 1.

Canadian foreign policy is a reflection of American national interest, and not Canadian needs. The comparison between the American values of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, versus, the peace, order and good government of Canadian interests is often a focal point in the writings for the threat of American dominance and can be interpreted, in part, as a threat towards the greater militarization that exists in the United States. Organizations such as the North American Air Defence agreement (NORAD) are seen to enhance the perception that Canada is an American satellite.

It is argued that foreign policy decisions are made not on the basis of what is best for Canada, but in order to conform to American expectations as outlined through NORAD. The concept of continental defence began with Ogdensburg and the integration of the two countries was further strengthened through Hyde Park. Canada solidified its contributions to North American security through the acquisition of American radar placed on Canadian soil in 1951. However, the radar line moved progressively north and Canada became overwhelmed by the American giant.¹²⁰ The signing of NORAD in 1957 strengthened the embrace of the continental defence concept and therefore, according to many foreign policy writers, put Canada further in the grasp of the Americans. Continental defence is seen by some writers as a potential security threat, for the increased access to Canadian airspace afforded to the Americans through NORAD is seen to exemplify a loss of Canadian sovereignty.¹²¹

The threat from the Americans is also present in other areas, particularly economics. Economic issues tend to be a preferred focus for foreign policy writers. After W. W. II, Britain and most of Europe were in economic ruins. Canada attempted to pursue a

¹²⁰The cost of the final Distant Early Warning or DEW line system proved too expensive for Canada so "American dollars, American equipment, American personnel, and American security provisions were dispatched to the High Arctic. Continental defence began to exact a toll on Canadian sovereignty." Keating, p. 154.

¹²¹Doran, p. 165.

multilateralist economic policy through organizations such as the IMF, World Bank and GATT. However, factors such as the slow economic recovery of the European nations after the war, the inability of nations to reach agreement in GATT negotiations, and increased access to American markets made it very difficult for Canada to diversify fully its import-export portfolio. Economically, Canada became increasingly reliant on the United States.¹²² As a result, Canadian exports to the United States increased from 31 per cent in 1939 to 78 percent by 1986.¹²³ The implication of the increased levels of integration with the United States was realized in the 1970s. In 1971, President Nixon implemented a new American economic policy - the "Nixon shock" - that had profound implications for Canada. The United States sought to offset its growing balance of payment deficit, and along with ending the convertibility of the dollar to gold, Nixon levied a 10 per cent surcharge on all imported manufactured goods. This policy was especially detrimental to Canada given that approximately two-thirds of Canada's exports in manufactured goods went to the United States.¹²⁴ The "Nixon shock" woke many Canadians to the realization that increased integration with the United States could prove detrimental.

The resulting reaction was the Trudeau government's Third Option. The Third Option stemmed from a Department of External Affairs review of Canadian-American relations in which three options were outlined. Option One suggested a retention of the status quo. Option Two called for greater integration with the United States. The Third Option was to lessen Canadian vulnerability to the United States by strengthening the Canadian economy through greater diversification.¹²⁵ Greater diversification did not mean shunning the United States. It did not "sanction a vigorous assertion of Canadian sovereignty claims, vis-à-vis the United States, but rather the "judicious use of Canadian

¹²²For more information on these factors see Keating, p. 66-73.

¹²³Keating, p. 193.

¹²⁴Tucker, p. 81.

¹²⁵Keating, p. 186.

sovereignty".¹²⁶ The Third Option was to allow Canada to live "distinct from, but in harmony with" the United States.¹²⁷

The axiom of the Third Option is outlined by Sharp: "There has been a growing and widely felt concern about the extent of economics, military and cultural dependence on the United States, and the implications for Canadian independence."¹²⁸ This threat of American dominance reflects a common Canadian response in matters of foreign policy and identifies a common element within the debates on the American-Canadian relationship. The United States, a giant neighbour to the south of Canada, is a dominant factor in the formation of Canadian foreign policy. The reasons for this effect go beyond geography and stretch into areas such as economics and national security. Throughout Canadian policy the American question exists. However, the fact of an American presence does not necessitate Canadian acquiescence to American desires. "If Canadian foreign-policy-making begins, of necessity, with a consideration of the United States, it does not follow that that country should be the determinant of Canadian decisions."¹²⁹

Foreign policy writers who challenge the conception of Canada as an American satellite highlight the fact that Canada has developed many policies inconsistent with, or in direct opposition to, American initiatives. The overwhelming focus is outside the military realm. As a result these policies can also be attributed to a tradition in Canada inconsistent with an emphasis on military affairs. Canada played a leading role in initial Western actions against South Africa under apartheid.¹³⁰ Canada was one of the first countries to

¹²⁶Tucker, p. 86.

¹²⁷Mitchell Sharp. "Canada - U. S. Relations: Options for the Future." International Perspectives (Autumn 1972) Special Issue. External Affairs, Canada. p. 1.

¹²⁸ Sharp, p. 2.

¹²⁹Pierre Elliot Trudeau and Ivan Head. *The Canadian Way: Shaping Canada's Foreign Policy, 1968-84*. Toronto, Ont.: McClelland and Stewart, 1995. p. 166.

¹³⁰By 1971, Canada had taken the Western lead in opposition to racist policies such as apartheid in South Africa and by 1977 the Canadian Government announced its intention to "phase-out" government sponsored, commercially-supported activities in South Africa. Tucker, p. 114 and p. 116.

recognize the People's Republic of China. Canada has consistently opposed U. S. attempts to isolate Cuba. Finally, Canada's work with the Law of the Sea included steps to protect its Arctic frontier despite American assertions that the Northwest passage was an international strait.¹³¹

In order to achieve a place in the international arena and an identity distinct from the United States, Canada has also turned to other nations for assistance. This so-called search for counterweights is a characteristic recognized by foreign policy writers. It was in part to accomplish a counterweight to American influence that Canada saw the need for involvement in organizations such as GATT, the Commonwealth and NATO.¹³² As well, identifying and solidifying support from other nations is key to Canadian foreign policy goals such as the attempt to legitimize the Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Act of 1970,¹³³ through the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS III). Foreign policy writers generally believe that through broadening Canadian involvement in other organizations Canada could lessen the American influence.

Alliances and other international organizations have been used not only as a counterweight to the United States but also in recognition of Canada's 'relative security'. Canada realized very quickly that its security was tied to international stability and that it was not a power great enough to influence world events on its own. To address its security needs Canada decided to try to assert its influence through international organizations. Buteux outlines this policy: "Whether within the multilateral context of NATO, or

¹³¹Tucker, p. 180.

¹³²This fact is pointed out by many authors including Keating (GATT), Trudeau and Head (Commonwealth) and Thomson and Swanson (NATO). Authors such as Gellman also recognize this characteristic in Canadian leaders. In reference to Pearson, Gellman states, "He saw international organization as a way of reducing Canada's reliance on the United States." Peter Gellman. "Lester B. Pearson, collective security, and the world order tradition of Canadian foreign policy." *International Journal* Vol XLIV No 1 (Winter 1988-89) p. 83.

¹³³Through this Act Canada established a 100 mile zone in Canada's Arctic waters for pollution control that was to be controlled by Canada. Tucker, p. 177. Tucker continues to discuss the need for allies in order to enforce this zone. Tucker, p. 181.

bilaterally with the United States, little or no consideration was given to the possibility of developing a national security policy based on a self-sufficient territorial and force protection capability that could be brought independently to an alliance with others."¹³⁴ This is the foundation of Canadian internationalism which links Canadian security to world security.¹³⁵ Internationalism with its element of idealism as outlined by foreign policy writers demonstrates their belief in a non-military tradition.

Internationalism is an element most often used to describe, define or characterize Canadian foreign policy.¹³⁶ Tucker defines internationalism as "an exercise in collaboration on the part of Canadian governments, groups or individuals with like-minded governments or peoples elsewhere."¹³⁷ Internationalism as such was propagated after W. W. II, during the 'golden era' or 'golden decade' of Canadian foreign policy. Some authors may challenge the notion of Canadian internationalism.¹³⁸ The greater integration with other nations through internationalism has also lead to debates over how internationalism affects Canadian sovereignty.¹³⁹ However, despite its detractors, internationalism remains a constant variable for policy decisions today. As stated by Nossal in reference to challenges to internationalism, "it is indicative of the persistence and

¹³⁴Paul Buteux, "NATO and the Evolution of Canadian Defence and Foreign Policy," in David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown. *Canada's International Security Policy*. Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice Hall Canada Inc., 1995, p. 157.

¹³⁵As defined by Nossal, "Internationalists hold that the fate of any one state and the peace of the international system as a whole are interconnected." Kim Richard Nossal. *The politics of Canadian foreign policy. (third edition)*. Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice Hall Canada Inc., 1997, p. 155.

¹³⁶As stated by Donneur, "l'étude de la politique étrangère canadienne est dominée par l'approche internationaliste." Donneur, p. 22.

¹³⁷Tucker, p. 2.

¹³⁸See Keating, p. 15. Ernie Keenes also challenges the predominant view of internationalism with an examination of the truth to multilateral preferences within Canadian foreign policy in the area of economics. Ernie Keenes. "The myth of multilateralism: exception, exemption and bilateralism in Canadian international economic relations." *International Journal* (Autumn 1995) pp. 755-778.

¹³⁹For example writers such as James M. Minifie claim that Canada should be neutral rather than internationalistic. James M. Minifie. *Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey*. Canada: McClelland & Stewart Limited, 1960. Other discussion of neutrality has occurred in James Eayrs. "The Nostrum of Neutralism" in Innis. Other individuals have commented on Trudeau's attempt to question Canada's internationalist role. see Hugh Innis (ed.) *Issues for the Seventies: International Involvement*. Toronto, Ont.: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1972, p. 75 and Kim Richard Nossal. *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy. (third edition)*. p. 159.

dominance of the internationalist idea that such alternatives failed to move large numbers of people."¹⁴⁰

Canada enjoys membership in many international organizations.¹⁴¹ This multilateralist and internationalist commitment is one defining element of Canadian foreign policy culture. As stated by Stephen Lewis, "we have...a lasting and visceral commitment to multilateralism which is ingrained and endemic to the Canadian culture."¹⁴² Canada's vast world membership and involvement is highlighted in order to demonstrate Canada's role as an international helper. It is through the committees and organized dialogue of international organizations that Canada focuses its international influence and also works towards guaranteeing its own security. The perspective is that "Canadians have displayed an exceptional commitment to multilateral organizations as the appropriate mechanism for the resolution of global problems."¹⁴³

Internationalism is characterized in foreign policy writings as a state of being particularly suited to a Canadian reality void of a military tradition. The composition of Canada, Canadian multiculturalism, its strong ties to international organizations such as the UN, the Commonwealth, la Francophonie and the bi-cultural nature of the country have all been raised as reasons for inherent Canadian internationalism. Lipset states that "Canada is uniquely an international country - in its lack of a strong and single minded nationalism in its specific bi-nationalism..., in the composition of its population, and in the assortment of

¹⁴⁰Nossal, p. 159.

¹⁴¹To name just a few there are: the United Nation (UN); the Commonwealth; the Organization for Economic co-operation and Development (OECD); the Organization of American States (OAS); the Group of Seven (G7); the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE); La Francophonie; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

¹⁴²As quoted in Blair Fraser. "Canada: Mediator or Busybody?" in J. King Gordon. p. 9.

¹⁴³Lyon and Tomlin, p. 163.

its international ties and associations. Our national identity is to be found in our internationalism."¹⁴⁴

Although internationalism has come to mean many things to many people, a hallmark of Canadian internationalism has been consensus building and support to other countries.¹⁴⁵ However, it should also be recognized that internationalism initially was based more on pragmatism than idealism. National interest is a strong component of internationalism. Canada found that international stability was in its national interest and recognized that the best way to achieve stability would be through international co-operation. Internationalism has been recognized for the past five decades as a necessity for Canada in order to work towards a stable international system, in which Canada has both the opportunity and the capability to inject the Canadian view.¹⁴⁶ Holmes points out that internationalism "was based on a very hard-boiled calculation of the Canadian national interest rather than on woolly-minded idealism. It was a simple belief that Canadians could neither survive nor prosper in isolation in a fire-proof house because the rest of the world just wasn't going to let them be so lucky."¹⁴⁷

Entangled in the term "internationalism" are the many roles that Canada plays on the international scene. Canada is involved in many international organizations of both a multilateral and bilateral character. Canada was a strong proponent of functionalism in the international model and Canada often identifies itself as a middle power. Each of these elements carries key assumptions. Foreign policy writers tend to highlight and favour Canada's use of these roles in an idealist manner seeing Canada as an international helper working towards attaining greater world peace and harmony.

¹⁴⁴Tucker, p. 2.

¹⁴⁵Buteux in Dewitt and Leyton-Brown, p. 159.

¹⁴⁶Keating, p. 246.

¹⁴⁷John Holmes. *Canada: Middle-Aged Power*. Toronto, Ont.: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1976. p. 6.

Functionalism, or the belief that members within an organization should have a voice in organizational conduct proportional to its contribution, coupled with the belief that a country's voice in a matter should be proportionate to its direct national interest,¹⁴⁸ is integral to the concept of Canadian internationalism. Canada adopted functionalism as a policy to be incorporated within the collective security model of the United Nations. Functionalism was a way to help bridge the separation between technical and political problems within the UN given its vast membership and each countries' different capabilities.¹⁴⁹ Canada realized that "authority in international affairs must not be concentrated exclusively in the hands of the largest powers; nor could it be divided equally among all sovereign states or all effective authority would disappear."¹⁵⁰ At the end of W. W. II Canada also enjoyed unprecedented international influence and functionalism was a way to help ensure that this influence would continue. As a result, at San Francisco, Mackenzie King argued for the functional theory of membership which meant that membership on the various UN bodies would be determined by the ability of the countries to play an effective role within them. "This Canadian viewpoint is reflected specifically in Article 23 of the United Nations' Charter, which states that in electing the six non-permanent member of the Security Council, due regard should be given to the contribution of members to the maintenance of international peace and security."¹⁵¹ Through functionalism, even as Canada's relative strength changes, Canada continues to forge a place for itself in world affairs separate from the role it would achieve by virtue of its military strength alone.

¹⁴⁸Norman Hillmer and J. L. Granatstein. *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s*. Toronto, Ont.: Copp Clark Longman, Ltd., p. 175.

¹⁴⁹Hawes, 5.

¹⁵⁰Thomson and Swanson, p. 25.

¹⁵¹Thomson and Swanson, p. 25.

To some individuals, functionalism is seen to have given birth to the role of the middle power.¹⁵² The term "middle power" has been used in reference to many states for many reasons.

Il s'agit d'une douzaine d'États qui ont influence certaine, quoique inférieure à celle des grandes puissances, grâce à leur statut d'anciennes puissances coloniales (Pays-Bas, Belgique), à leur contribution majeure à la victoire des alliés (Canada, Australie), à leur prééminence dans une région donnée (Mexique, Brésil, Argentine, Égypte), à leur situation géopolitique (Suède, Pologne) ou en combinant plusieurs de ces caractéristiques (Inde)."¹⁵³

A dual essence of middlepowermanship is outlined by Painchaud. He sees two distinct positions of the middle power role; one scientific, and the other ideological.¹⁵⁴ The scientific refers to middle power as a term to incorporate realities in the power distribution in the international system. It is a practical recognition that not all powers are either great or small. Middle power ideology refers to the adoption of the concept as both symbol and a general objective for diplomatic and foreign policy relations. For writers adhering to a non-military tradition in Canada the term middle power is assumed to evolve from the scientific to the ideological. As pointed out by Holmes: "it originally implied a power of medium strength but it began to develop also the connotation of a middle or mediatory position in conflicts."¹⁵⁵

¹⁵²Holmes states that the role of the middle power "grew out of the functional concept of the role of nations in world organizations developed at the end of the last war [W. W. II]." Holmes in J. King Gordon, p. 14. Stairs also recognizes that Canada's military contributions in the war put it in the position of significant strength compared to other nations. As a result, functionalism was not entirely about removing military considerations from the power formula but in making sure that power recognition was fair. Considering world affairs in terms of small and great powers was unfair to Canada. As a result, the Canadian delegation argued that a third level in the hierarchy, that of the middle power, should be inserted "thereby fine-tuning the taxonomy, and in the process making the case for assigning themselves a special place in the UN system." Denis Stairs. "Political Culture of Canadian Foreign Policy." Canadian Journal of Political Science Vol XV No 4 (December 1982) p. 673.

¹⁵³Donneur, p. 1.

¹⁵⁴Paul Painchaud. "Middlepowermanship as a Ideology." in J. King Gordon, p. 29.

¹⁵⁵John Holmes. *The Better Part Of Valour: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy*. Toronto, Ont.: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1970, p. 17.

The middle power role as ideology gives Canada special status. The belief is that Canada, as a middle sized power, is especially suited to act as a mediator for major powers. As Innis explains, "after W. W. II there grew in Canada a belief in her special role on the international scene. It was thought that as a medium-sized power, relatively without enemies, Canada could act as a broker or arranger for the major powers. Thus our influence would actually be out of all proportion to our size."¹⁵⁶ More importantly, as an ideology, it became divorced from its scientific origins and also divorced from pragmatic functionalism with its central military component.

Sense of Morality:

Embedded in all of the above traits is an element of benevolence. Incorporated in the varying facets of international relations as seen from the perspective of these writers is the belief in a higher Canadian ideal and morality which is manifested through "enlightened internationalism"¹⁵⁷. Canada's geopolitical reality contributes to an "idealist impulse" or "voluntarist tradition" to "search for moral opportunity" in Canadian international affairs.¹⁵⁸ It is this morality and reliance on "peace, order and good government" which neglects the use of the military that is the essence of the belief in a non-military tradition.

The British North America Act can be seen as the root of Canadian morals due to its adherence to "peace, order and good government".¹⁵⁹ Canada's commitment to law and order is demonstrated in foreign policy writings by the supremacy assigned to international

¹⁵⁶Innis (ed.), p. 3.

¹⁵⁷This term is attributable to Tucker's explanation of Trudeauvian foreign policy "aimed at creating a better world order". Tucker, p. 236.

¹⁵⁸Tucker, p. 4.

¹⁵⁹This factor has been pointed to by authors such as Seymour Lipset; Joseph B. Levitt; and even Pierre Berton. More particularly, it is used in comparison with the U.S. system of "life, liberty and happiness" which is believed to spawn disorder.

law and the use of negotiation over unilateral decisions and the use of force. As stated by Keating: "one of the more important objectives for Canadian foreign policy has been in preserving the habit of international consultation and co-operation."¹⁶⁰ Stairs refers to the Canadian desire to "depoliticize issues so that they can be dealt with largely by reference to functional, technical and administrative criteria."¹⁶¹ Finally, the preference for negotiation has lead Hillmer and Granatstein to label Canada an 'umpire'.¹⁶² The umpire label recognizes Canadian moralism to do the legally proper thing and the willingness that Canadians have shown to take the lead in this role.

It is this assumption of a higher moral value that most characterizes the foreign policy writers and their opposition to the concept of a Canadian military tradition. Canadian moralism is also seen as a deeply embedded cultural characteristic. Emberly outlines this Canadian moralism as identified by Grant as "a commitment to Tory strains of respect for the community and nation, recognition of cultural practices that sustain orderly, political right, and diverse philanthropic strains of charity and duty based on the moral project of equality."¹⁶³ Granatstein refers to the "deep seated desire in this country to make a distinctive contribution to human betterment."¹⁶⁴ Holmes states that "beneath the skin of every Canadian there lurks a missionary."¹⁶⁵ Donneur mentions "l'idealisme canadien défend les bonnes causes. Il refuse toute souillure et purifier les autres."¹⁶⁶

This trend to attribute moral ideals to Canadian foreign policy continues through the nineties. As stated by Bernard Wood, "many Canadians...have come to expect our foreign policy to be a kind of pious running commentary on the conduct of others. It was this

¹⁶⁰Keating, p. 246.

¹⁶¹Stairs, *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, p. 683.

¹⁶²Hillmer and Granatstein, 1994.

¹⁶³Emberly (ed.), p. xiii.

¹⁶⁴Granatstein, *Canadian Foreign Policy*. p. 55.

¹⁶⁵Holmes, *Valour*. p. x.

¹⁶⁶Donneur, p. 19.

tendency of Canadians to see themselves as the self-appointed conscience of the world."¹⁶⁷ Trudeau and Head forecast that "now, as possibly never before, moral principle has become the defining element in effective policy."¹⁶⁸ Finally, Hampson and Maule recognize that Canada's traditional concerns of democratic values and human rights add certain characteristics to Canadian foreign policy culture. "Although such preoccupations often make Canada sound like miss Goody-Two-Shoes at multilateral get togethers, they are an enduring element in Canada's image at home and abroad."¹⁶⁹

Canada's commitment to areas traditionally considered non-military such as international law and economics are highlighted to stress the non-military tradition of the country. The use of economics for influence was a role forecasted by Holmes who believed that "our role in international security will be more economic or diplomatic and thus our power depends less on armed might than on our GNP and our wisdom in international policies."¹⁷⁰ Towards this end, Canada played an instrumental role in inserting Article II into the NATO agreement.¹⁷¹ Canadian moves towards more liberal trade, widened markets and greater international agency involvement have also been used to demonstrate the belief in Canada's reliance in non-military factors such as economics as a morally superior instrument of policy.

Foreign aid as an instrument of policy has also been seen to address the Canadian moralistic impulse. Canada's foreign policy is reportedly "to resolve global problems for contributing to world betterment, and for attempting to improve the lot of people in the

¹⁶⁷Bernard Wood. *Peace In Our Time?: A Canadian Agenda into the 1990s*. Ottawa, Ont.: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1990, p. 2.

¹⁶⁸Trudeau and Head, p. 317.

¹⁶⁹Fen Osler Hampson and Christopher J. Maule (eds.). *Canada Among Nations 1992-93: A New World Order?* Ottawa, Ont.: Carleton University Press, 1992, p. 15.

¹⁷⁰Holmes, *Canada: Middle-Aged Power*, p. 40.

¹⁷¹Article II opens the door for the alliance to become an economic union and not just a military alliance for it addresses cultural and economic ties between the NATO countries.

Third World."¹⁷² It has been stated that Canada holds the belief that "the world will not become a peaceful place until poverty has been abolished."¹⁷³ This has led Canada to establish organizations such as CIDA, CUSO and WUSC.

The numerous elements, beliefs and values highlighted by the foreign policy writers which attest to the non-military nature of the country is not intended to negate reality. Foreign policy writers recognize that elements of war and the Canadian military do exist. However, the writers do not place value on the contribution of these elements to the overall tradition leading to the Canadian consciousness or culture. The Canadian cultural morality is attributed even to the elements of defence in order to prove that Canada does not possess a military mentality. The Canadian use of military alliances is documented as support for greater Canadian morality. Outside of NATO, Canada has never been involved in a peacetime military alliance. Even within NATO, Canada insisted on an avenue to open the door for the Canadian world vision of co-operation and dialogue. As already explained, Canada worked to incorporate Article II into the NATO charter which was inserted to ensure that NATO was seen not solely as an alliance for defence, but also as an avenue towards greater cooperation in times of peace.¹⁷⁴

Canada's role in disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is also seen as a key variable for identifying Canadian morality and ignoring or downplaying the concept of a military tradition. Canada was the first country to possess the capability to produce nuclear weapons through scientific knowledge and infrastructure yet chose not to do so.¹⁷⁵ In the 1940s the Canadian decision not to develop nuclear weapons capability has been attributed to a Canadian abhorrence of the military application of atomic

¹⁷²Hillmer and Granatstein, p. 351.

¹⁷³Eric Hanson. "The Economic Policies of a Middle Power." in J. King Gordon, p. 120.

¹⁷⁴Hertzman et al., p. 104.

¹⁷⁵Trudeau and Head, p. 70.

energy.¹⁷⁶ Although Canada had a nuclear role through its participation in NATO and even acquired a nuclear capability in the 1960s, it has retained a strong moral belief against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.¹⁷⁷ Canada is seen by some individuals to play a mentor role in the area of nuclear weapons and disarmament. As Doran states, "Canada's self-abnegation regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons...gave significant moral weight to its advocacy of arms control."¹⁷⁸

From the beginning of the Cold War, Canada established itself as a disarmament supporter. Canada's status as the only non-permanent Security Council member with a permanent seat on the Atomic Energy Commission, that it had acquired as a result of the Canadian role in developing atomic energy, helped lead to a seat on the UN Disarmament Commission.¹⁷⁹ At first, the Canadian contribution was questionable as Canada focused more on retaining dialogue between the Cold War adversaries, rather than formulating proposals.¹⁸⁰ However, in the 1960s, Canada took a leading role in advocating nuclear disarmament and has continued to work on all facets of disarmament within the United Nations.

Within the military itself Canadian moralism prevents a military ethos. The voluntary nature of the military, rather than mandated military service, is an element used to indicate the non-military tradition of the country. Furthermore, even when military means are used, Canadian military actions are interpreted to be morally superior for forces are used in order to work "towards the *ought* of a better world order, rather than centering on ways in which the given international system can be exploited for national advantage."¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁶Trudeau and Head, p. 70.

¹⁷⁷In 1975 Prime Minister Trudeau referred to "the moral challenge of preventing nuclear proliferation." Tucker, p. 197.

¹⁷⁸Doran, p. 175.

¹⁷⁹Keating, p. 114.

¹⁸⁰Keating, p. 114.

¹⁸¹Hertzman et al., p. 96.

The armed forces are most often recognized for their participation in peacekeeping operations in which the forces "were not the traditional 'brutal licentious soldiery' but arbiters in blue helmets, umpires enforcing the world's rules on the unruly."¹⁸² Foreign policy writers also refer to peacekeeping as preventive diplomacy.¹⁸³ The preventive diplomacy synonym symbolizes the Canadian belief that peacekeeping, like dialogue, is another method for the peaceful resolution of international conflicts and therefore may be classified as an element attesting to a non-military tradition.

Conclusion

Within the silent debate over the nature of the Canadian military tradition there are a number of writers who imply that Canada holds an ethos incompatible with a military tradition. This reference refers not to the various regimental and ceremonial traditions in the military but rather to tradition as a process towards greater self-realization. Writers who support this belief tend to be foreign policy writers. There is strong agreement on the nature of the military in Canada within the writings examined. Canada's historical evolution speaks of a country without a history of revolution and therefore a lack of military recognition. Canada transferred its security needs from one great power to another and so never developed fully its own military and defence capabilities. During the 1940s Canadian foreign policy was drastically altered to the internationalist form that it can most easily be characterized by to date. The post W. W. II characterization of foreign policy has largely remained intact.

The two major questions in Canadian policy throughout history, the French-English and the American question, also support the non-military nature of the country. The

¹⁸²Hillmer and Granatstein, p. 350.

¹⁸³For example: Keating, p. 102.

influence of the French-English question on foreign policy has always been to further the common goal of "peace, order and good government"; values not deemed consistent with military affairs. These values are contrasted with the American values of rugged individualism from which Canada has needed to differentiate itself. Foreign policy writers extensively debate the extent to which Canada has succeeded in retaining its sovereignty over American influences. In part to counteract the influence of the United States on Canada and in part in reaction to Canada's security reality, Canada is committed to internationalism. Canada's role in internationalism is characterized by international dialogue and cooperation. Canada has been exceptional in its support for greater world harmony through its extensive involvement in international organizations and its own unique characteristics.

Within all these elements is embedded a belief in benevolent moralism through which Canada is identified as a world helper and peaceful negotiator. It is this belief that Canada is a highly moralistic country that most clearly leads to the belief that Canada also has an absence of a military tradition, "in which the armed forces might otherwise have grown and prospered as the most vital component of the nation's defences against external foes."¹⁸⁴ Even when the military or elements of defence are recognized by these writers they are given morally superior characteristics or used in support of positions such as international diplomacy to demonstrate that a separate military tradition is not a significant contributor to Canadian culture.

¹⁸⁴Tucker, p. 23.

CHAPTER THREE

Defence and a Military Tradition

Although few Canadians may recognize the significance, most people have heard of the Canadian victory at Vimy Ridge or the disaster of Dieppe. However, most do not associate these events as factors contributing to a military tradition. In addition, other international events that contribute to the Canadian military tradition such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Gulf War are recognized only for the impact that they had on other nations such as the United States. Canada's troops are recognized, if at all, only in their role as peacekeepers. Within the writings on Canadian foreign and defence policy there is an identifiable group of writers that recognize these events as factors which contribute toward the Canadian military tradition. The group of writers recognizing a military tradition is composed primarily of military historians or writers focusing on defence policy.

The writers within the military tradition camp recognize the roots and history of the Canadian armed forces. These writers also believe the military played a large role in Canada's formative years and continues to do so to the present. However, they also often realize that Canadians have been loathe to embrace the military tradition. Understanding Canadian history as it pertains to military involvement is very important to the recognition of a military tradition. Canadians have a long and proud history of involvement in key conflicts and engagements overseas. Despite the apparent lack of a physical threat to Canada, the military has also played an important security role on Canadian soil. These writers embrace the fact that Canadians have a long history of military involvement in war as well as in other international and national crisis and events. Such a history is not only the foundation of traditions within the military but also must be recognized for the

formation of self-consciousness, or the recognition of the Canadian military tradition, necessary for cultural self-realization.

The Canadian military tradition is influenced by many factors. Canada has unique relationships within its borders between the descendents of its founding nations and with its nearest neighbour, the United States. These relationships influence all Canadian policy and defence policy is no exception. Consequently, these relationships have had an effect on the military tradition. Unlike foreign policy writers who may downplay or ignore this military tradition, defence writers realize that Canada's military not only holds its own traditions which are part of the culture, but also that the military plays a formative role in the identity of Canadians. This tradition has an impact in all of the roles Canada plays in the world. Recognizing this tradition helps ground Canada as a pragmatic nation protecting its interests rather than the benevolent, morally superior nation that many foreign policy writers embrace. Outlining the factors that contribute to the pragmatic reality of the military serves to highlight the beliefs and assumptions held by defence writers with regard to the role of the military tradition in forming Canadian culture. Because defence writers embrace the factors surrounding the military and military affairs, they also forward a recognition of the military in their vision of Canada. This chapter brings to attention some of the many Canadian military factors and events which help form the Canadian history, tradition and culture.

Despite the numerous assertions by authors attesting to the non-military tradition of Canada, a number of authors recognize that the military has played a significant role in the formation of the culture. As proclaimed by Finan and Flemming, "Canada can claim an admirable military history. Canadian participation in major wars has been recognized as notable by allies and opponents alike."¹⁸⁵ Willet recognizes a Canadian military tradition

¹⁸⁵J. S. Finan and S. B. Flemming. "Public Attitudes Toward Defence and Security in Canada." in Dewitt and Leyton-Brown, p. 291.

when he states "Canadians have produced a remarkable colorful and proud record in peace and war."¹⁸⁶ With reference to the military heritage, Willet asserts; "it is rooted so obviously in Canada's history that it would be misleading to regard Canadians as an unmilitary people."¹⁸⁷ Massey best summarizes the views of the proponents of a Canadian military tradition stating that "the military has been an important element in the development of Canadian society, and yet their role has been consistently misunderstood and under-emphasized."¹⁸⁸

Throughout the social sciences, military studies are either frowned upon or simply omitted.¹⁸⁹ Willet points to the omission of the military by Canadian sociologists. As recognized by Willet, it seems curious that sociologists manage to analyze social change without recognizing the armed forces or the influence of two world wars on society. According to Willet, "evidently, Canadian sociologists have "thought the military away", from their consciousnesses, and in so doing they reflect a general trend."¹⁹⁰ However, the writers who recognize a Canadian military tradition realize that thinking away an influence does not negate its importance. Furthermore, recognizing the military tradition is important for anyone wanting to understand foreign and defence policy. As explained by Morton, "Canada's attitude to war rests on more than innocent illusion; it is a product of historical

¹⁸⁶T. C. Willet. *Canada's Militia: A Heritage at Risk*. Canada: Domak Printing Service Ltd., 1987, p. 8.

¹⁸⁷Willet, p. 203.

¹⁸⁸Hector J. Massey (ed.). *The Canadian Military: a profile*. Toronto, Ont.: the Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1972, p. 1.

¹⁸⁹ Negative attitudes, or outright neglect of the military and issues surrounding military affairs, is a phenomenon that can be identifiable through consistent omissions or misrepresentations in writings on foreign issues. Many authors have recognized this element of Canadian society. Roch Legault, in his article "Armée et Société Au Bas-Canada: une permanence à souligner" states: "nous pouvions lire dans le guide du chercheur en histoire canadienne que l'histoire militaire du Canada n'intéressait qu'un groupe restreint de chercheurs et que pourtant, il y avait là un vaste domaine en friche susceptible de renouveler l'historiographie canadienne." as printed in the *Canadian Defence Quarterly* (April 1992) p. 38. Allen Sans in "Canada, NATO, and the Widening Atlantic: Canadian Defence Policy into the 1990s" recognizes "the general disinterest of the Canadian public in military and defence issues." *Canadian Defence Quarterly* (Feb. 1991) p. 14

¹⁹⁰Willet, p. 2.

experience. Unless this experience is understood, neither would-be defenders nor disarmers will ever understand the Canadian response to their respective programs."¹⁹¹

Bercuson recognizes the neglect of the military and military affairs as a phenomenon of peacetime. This phenomenon is exaggerated in Canada for even when its soldiers have been actively engaged in military operations, they have been engaged primarily in conflicts outside of the Canadian borders. Bercuson also recognizes that neglecting the military can be dangerous.

During peacetime,...it has always been hard for citizens of democracies to acknowledge that armies are necessary and that the military way of life is, by definition, different. This reluctance to support things military varies from country to country, but it is almost always strong in nations like Canada, where people have a hard time understanding the connection between their personal well-being, national interests and armed force. That lack of understanding may have serious consequences.¹⁹²

Although Canadians appear to ignore the military, Canada has persisted in retaining an active and effective military force. The reasons for its retention are numerous but most importantly, it is because the possession of armed force is consistent with the Canadian values of world citizenship and Canadian policy objectives. The Canadian military has been involved in a number of traditional military activities proving that Canada itself does not hold some unique benevolent moralism. The Canadian military has also been used in a number of para-military or quasi-military roles in order to enhance diplomacy, peacekeeping and internal crisis management. Although such roles may not fall within a common conception of the military as a fighting machine, they are military roles nonetheless. Moreover, they are integral to the Canadian military tradition and therefore also integral to Canadian culture.

¹⁹¹Desmond Morton. *A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to the Gulf War*. Toronto, Ont.: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1992, p. x.

¹⁹²David Bercuson. *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia*. Toronto, Ont.: McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1996, p. 25.

History:

As demonstrated in the first chapter, history is an aspect of tradition and traditions act as the building blocks of cultures. The elements in these reciprocal relationships are also processes with no definitive beginning and end. Nonetheless, examining history helps one gain insight into what the traditions of a particular culture are. Canada enjoys a long military history. As stated by Stacey, "the history of the army in Canada is as long as the history of the country itself. The Canadian soldier of today is the heir of a very old and a very proud tradition, and a tradition peculiarly its own."¹⁹³ An examination of this history helps one identify elements of Canadian identity and culture

The history of the military in Canada has been traced as far back as 1651 when Pierre Boucher, captain of Trois Rivières, formed settlers into militia units.¹⁹⁴ Other notable historic uses of the military, even before the recognition of Canada as a country, include the battles of 1760 that lead to the seizure of the fortress of Quebec and brought the conquest of Canada by the British, 1764 during the Pontiac War, the era of heightened alert and involvement during the American revolution, Canada's involvement in the war of 1812, and the Fenian raids.

Throughout the above events Canada's militia was heavily influenced by both of its founding countries, France and Britain. The formation of a formal militia first transpired in the late 1600s in New France. After the British conquest the system that had been established by the French remained intact. As declared by Stacey, "the most remarkable thing about the military system in the early days of British rule is the extent to which the

¹⁹³Colonel C. P. Stacey. *Introduction to the Study of Military History for Canadian Students*. Ottawa, Ont.: Queen's Printer, 1960, p. 1.

¹⁹⁴Massey, p. 1.

French system simply continued to exist."¹⁹⁵ Despite this French influence, it is the British military that has been the dominant influence shaping the Canadian military tradition since 1759.

Almost every part of the Canadian military, from the regimental system to the badges, has evolved at one point from its European ancestors, especially the British.¹⁹⁶ Despite the heavy British influence, ironically, it was also resistance to British dominance and the need for greater Canadian based military control that helped strengthen sentiments for Canadian independence.¹⁹⁷ The need for Canada to define its own role for the military helped lead to the impetus for the British North America (BNA) Act. After the American Revolution, defence was seen as an instrument of survival and identity for Canada.¹⁹⁸ The new British North America was very much a military society, although superficial and transitional in nature. Military officers were instrumental in many aspects of life, including the distribution of tools, seed and rations, and it was the army doctors who were relied on for any medical needs in the outposts.¹⁹⁹

Canada passed its first Federal Militia Act in 1868. The first time that the newly enacted forces were called to action was in 1885 during the Riel Rebellion. This is of historic significance for it was the first time that the Canadian forces were involved in a campaign that was entirely Canadian.²⁰⁰ As a result the Riel Rebellions are sometimes thought of as Canada's first war.²⁰¹ The next time that the forces were to see action was in

¹⁹⁵Stacey, p. 21

¹⁹⁶ For example, the colours and badges were modeled after the British until they were "Canadianized" in 1968. Lieutenant-Colonel N. A. Buckingham. "Canadian Heraldry for the Canadian Forces." Canadian Defence Quarterly. Vol. 2 No.3 (Winter 1972-73) pages 42-44.

¹⁹⁷It should be noted that Britain also was anxious to off load its colonial defence burden. see Desmond Morton, p. 85 and Stacey, p. 10.

¹⁹⁸Hillmer and Granatstein, p. 9.

¹⁹⁹Desmond Morton, p. 49.

²⁰⁰Stacey, p. 18.

²⁰¹Desmond Morton, p. 99.

1899 when Canada became involved in the Boer War in South Africa. Canadian troops were still under the authority of the United Kingdom and paid primarily by Britain. However, the Canadian battalion served under a Canadian lieutenant colonel. Canada's involvement in South Africa was also significant for it was Canada's first full overseas experience. Prior to this time, Canada had largely retained a North American focus. However, from the point of Canada's involvement in South Africa onward, Canada would not be able to avoid international involvement.²⁰²

Following Canada's involvement in South Africa, the Canadian military reverted to an internal focus until 1914 and the beginning of W. W. I. With the onset of W. W. I the new international identity that had first emerged for Canada during the Boer War was extended and broadened even further. It was a critical time period in the formation of the Canadian military and the country it served. The purpose of the Canadian war effort in W.W.I was more than just the stated war objectives. Part of the purpose, and the result, was to help Canada gain international stature. As Middlemiss and Sokolsky state: "the decision to mount a major effort in World War I can also be seen as part of Canada's determination to assert its international independence."²⁰³

During W. W. I the forces grew and matured. Although all Dominion forces were initially under British command, Canadian troops developed greater autonomy as the war progressed.²⁰⁴ As well, prior to W. W. I, Canada had relied primarily on land forces but

²⁰² As stated by Stacey, "Participation in the war in South Africa set a precedent for larger participation in the greater crises which the new century was to bring." Stacey, p. 21.

²⁰³ D. W. Middlemiss and J. J. Sokolsky. *Canadian Defence : Decisions and Determinants*. Toronto, Ont.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989, p. 12.

²⁰⁴ Richard A. Preston. "The Military Structure of the Old Commonwealth." *International Journal*. Vol. XVII, No. 2 (Spring 1962) p. 103. Middlemiss and Sokolsky also outline developments during the War which helped alter the relationship between Canada and the United Kingdom such as the formation of an Imperial War Cabinet which allowed dominion leaders a voice in policy. Middlemiss and Sokolsky, p. 10.

both Canadian air and naval forces also played a role in W. W. I.²⁰⁵ The fact that Canada was recognized as a separate signatory of the Treaty of Versailles demonstrates the growth and increased international relevance that Canada attained through its accomplishments in W. W. I. The role of the military in helping Canada achieve a greater state of international importance was recognized at the time. As stated by Milner, "generations of Canadians believed that their new international stature after 1918 owed something to their military effort during the Great War."²⁰⁶

By the time of W.W. II, Canada had truly forged its own military identity. During W. W. II, the "Army served under Canadian command up to the Army Headquarters level; and as in the previous war many of the public saw in it the embodiment of the national spirit."²⁰⁷ The distinct Canadian role gave birth to proclamations that "Canada's part in the last war raised her to the status of a nation."²⁰⁸ By the end of W. W. II the strong role of the Canadian military as an aspect of Canadian culture was embraced. In 1945, David B. Harkness characterized the effect of military involvement on the Canadian psyche:

The wars of two generations have made potent contributions. With these war experiences, interwoven as they are with our national achievements and our awareness of a common birth land, there has developed not only a sense of home citizenship but also a deepening consciousness of our relationship with and obligation toward other nations. We are learning that there is no possible proxy to whom Canadians may safely entrust the interpretations of their place among these other nations. None except themselves can discharge the obligations inherent in distinctive nationality. Participation in these wars has been jolting Canada toward self-realization somewhat as revolution jolted other peoples in earlier days.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁵Although Canada did not have an air force of its own, Canadian pilots played a significant role within the Imperial air forces and near the end of the war Canada was starting to organize its own squadrons. The Canadian Navy also played a limited role in the war. Both elements are outlined in Stacey, p. 29.

²⁰⁶Marc Milner. *Canadian Military History: selected readings*. Toronto, Ont.: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993, p. 56.

²⁰⁷Stacey, p. 40.

²⁰⁸Thomson and Swanson, p. 145.

²⁰⁹David B. Harkness. *This Nation Called Canada*. Toronto, Ont.: Elliott Press, 1945, p. 16.

The period after W. W. II and the start of the Cold War marks a period of dramatic change for foreign and defence policy and is a historic time for the Canadian military tradition. It was in this post - W. W. II period that Canada solidified its role as an international actor. Congruently it was in the period after W. W. II that Canada first retained significant peacetime permanent forces. After W. W. I Canada let the number of its forces fall. However, the attitude changed after W. W. II when Canada saw heightened pride and commitment to its role as a separate nation on the world stage.²¹⁰ As recognized by Stacey, "a people who traditionally had been very unwilling to do much in the way of military preparation in time of peace had clearly learned a great deal from the hard experience of two world wars."²¹¹ At this time Canada engaged itself in a peacetime military commitment in an attempt to remove itself from the previous perception that "national defence was a creation of emergency times."²¹² The move to retain permanent forces instead of relying on citizen soldiers was further instituted after the founding of NATO and solidified with the outbreak of the Korean war.²¹³

Despite the institution of a permanent force, the Canadian military also retained a reliance on citizen volunteers. Willet describes the interplay between professional and reserve soldiery in Canada when he states, "in both World wars and the Korean War, the brunt of the crises was borne by citizen soldiers (sailors and airmen also) because the professionals were too few, and perhaps, equally unfamiliar with the situations that they faced to make the vital decisions."²¹⁴ The nature of the mixture between professional and reserve forces in the Canadian military is an important characteristic of the military. Added to this is the predominant volunteer nature of the forces. Except for two brief periods of

²¹⁰ In 1939, there were about 4000 Permanent Force members and 51000 Non-Permanent members which is a number less than in 1914. Stacey, p. 35. These figures can be contrasted with the numbers of 1954 which show 49 978 Active force and 46 506 Reserve members. Stacey p. 42.

²¹¹ Stacey, p. 42.

²¹² J. Gellner. "The Place of Defence in the Economic Life of Canada." in Massey, p. 136.

²¹³ Gellner in Massey, p. 119.

²¹⁴ Willet, p. 88.

conscription during both world wars, Canadian forces have relied entirely on volunteer enlistment.

The Canadian military remained actively involved in international security issues throughout the Cold War. Canada played a role in international crises such as the Cuban Missile Crisis.²¹⁵ Canada was also a full and active military participant in the Western alliance. Canadian troops were stationed overseas and Canada accepted the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.²¹⁶ Canada's Cold War involvement played a role in strengthening the Canadian military tradition. In summation, as explained by Morton, "for two generations, the Cold War and its ramifications had justified Canadian defence policy from warning systems in the North to the men and women stationed in Germany. From Suez to Nicaragua, even peacekeeping had usually been linked to some new field of Soviet-American rivalry."²¹⁷ The Canadian military also played a strong role within its own borders during the time of the Cold War. In October of 1970 Prime Minister Trudeau invoked the War Measures Act and Canadian armed forces were on active duty in the province of Quebec. The military also was used for security during major international sporting events held in Canada such as the Pan Am and Olympic Games.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Canadian military has remained active in conflict overseas as is consistent with past practice, as well as continuing to offer support to civil institutions. Canadian forces saw action in the Gulf War and Canadian peacekeepers continue to be deployed into conflict areas around the world including Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Zaire. In 1990, just as the Cold War was diminishing, Canadian soldiers

²¹⁵Canada's role in the crisis is elaborated in Haydon's. *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian involvement reconsidered*. His basic thesis is to outline how "the Canadian role was, in fact, significant and had lasting effects on Canadian defence policy and the structure of the Canadian military." Peter T. Haydon. *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian involvement reconsidered*. Toronto, Ont.: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993, p. 1.

²¹⁶For a brief period during the 1960s Canada even accepted nuclear weapons as an instrument for its own use.

²¹⁷Desmond Morton, p.269.

were again stationed in Quebec as an aid to the civil power during the Oka crisis. As recently as the spring of 1997, Canadian soldiers were actively deployed to help fight against flooding in Manitoba and again in 1998, the military was called on to aid civil authorities during the ice storms in the Ottawa and Montreal regions.

Military Characteristics:

The history of armed force in Canada has lead to a number of uniquely Canadian characteristics that are the foundation of its military tradition and have influenced defence policy. These characteristics are a result of Canada's historic, geographic and political realities. Factors that can be examined to outline the military tradition as propagated by defence writers include the French-English question, Canada's geo-political security situation that has lead to a reliance on bilateral and multilateral alliances, Canada's relationship with the United States and the role that Canada plays in the world.

Throughout Canadian politics the French-English division has always been an issue. Defence policy and the nature of the Canadian military tradition have also been influenced by the history of, and interplay between, Canada's colonial nations. Both French and English characteristics are imbedded in the Canadian psyche and the military tradition is no exception to this. The combination of French and English elements in the Canadian military forces has influenced defence policy and has been a defining characteristic of the Canadian armed forces. The Canadian military tradition can trace its roots to the establishment of militia units in New France. It was later heavily influenced by Britain as the colonial master over its colony, Canada.

The Canadian political conflicts over French and English questions have also periodically surfaced in military affairs. For example, both conscription and force composition have been issues with French - English undertones. During both World Wars, conscription was a greater issue for French Canadians than for their fellow English speaking citizens. At the time of W. W. I, it was not until 1917 that Prime Minister Borden declared the need for mandatory service. Prior to this time many French Canadians had been in silent protest over the war; however, with conscription, French opposition took more decisive action.²¹⁸ During W. W. II King initially seemed determined not to repeat the mistakes of Borden. Avoiding the conscription issue was one way King believed he could emerge successful from the war.²¹⁹ However, King was unable to avoid the issue altogether and he allowed the issue of conscription to be brought before a plebiscite in 1942. The result was that King was released from his no conscription promise by the voting public. It is important to note however, that despite the conscription victory, French speakers in Canada voted resoundingly against conscription.²²⁰

French Canadian alienation from the armed services has also been an issue. Prior to the 1960s, the predominant English character of the armed services discouraged French involvement. French Canadians were hesitant to embark in a career that was bound to remove them from the familiarity of Quebec. As pointed out by Morton, "the forces illustrated most of the problems French Canadians experienced with federal institutions. Few enlisted; even fewer reached high rank."²²¹ An attempt was made in the 1960s to rectify the situation. The Canadian armed forces were to become bilingual and strict

²¹⁸Desmond Morton p. 154.

²¹⁹Desmond Morton, p. 180.

²²⁰The final tally of 2 945 514 in favour to 1 643 006 against can be broken down to approximately English-speakers four to one in favour and French Quebecois four to one opposed. Desmond Morton, p. 190.

²²¹Desmond Morton, p. 258.

policies were enacted to achieve this goal.²²² However, the issue of French disparity had still not been resolved because of ongoing problems with attrition and promotion. In the early 1970s twenty-eight per cent of the enrolment in the Forces was by French Canadians. This percentage was on par with the proportion of French Canadians in the general population. However, due to problems of retention French-speaking Canadians composed only 16% of the Canadian Armed Forces.²²³

The move to bilingualism caused some tension and is still not without problems.²²⁴ However, aside from the domestic significance of a bilingual force, the concept of a bilingual military force has also helped establish Canadian importance overseas. For example, Canadian bilingual signallers were in high demand by the United Nations during the UN peacekeeping operation in the Congo in 1960.²²⁵ It has also been recognized that "even in our NATO role there are many occasions where it is desirable and more efficient to conduct certain affairs in French. There are also many other areas of activity involving the Armed Forces where French is required."²²⁶ Overall, the nature of the French-English division and the accommodations that have been instituted to address French-English conflicts are contributing factors to the military tradition in Canada.

In addition to the French-English question, external factors relating to Canada's security assessment and the resulting alliances and alignments have influenced the Canadian military tradition. One of the most commonly recognized elements of defence policy is

²²²Some policies that helped achieve greater bilingualism were the establishment of French speaking units outside Quebec, recruitment and promotion quotas and bilingualism as a requirement for high command positions. Desmond Morton, p. 258.

²²³Colonel R. G. Heitshu. "The Training and Employment of Francophones in the Canadian Forces." *Canadian Defence Quarterly*. Vol. 2 No. 2 (Autumn 1972) p. 24. Heitshu also notes the significance of the fact that an enrollment consistent with the general population average demonstrated that French Canadians were equally as interested in armed service as their fellow English speaking citizens.

²²⁴Desmond Morton, p. 258 outlines some of the problems that the 1970s initial move to bilingualism raised.

²²⁵Heitshu raises this element as a concern that Canada was hard-pressed to provide the number of servicemen needed for the UN during the Congo operation. Heitshu, p. 29.

²²⁶Heitshu, p. 29.

Canada's unique geopolitical situation in relation to its security. Canada is bordered on three sides by water and on the fourth by a nation that is currently not considered a security threat.²²⁷ As a result, Canada is seen as a relatively secure country. However, the belief that Canada does not confront a security threat has not been separated from the recognition that Canada is an almost indefensible country. Because of its vast waterways and largely undefended borders, Canada is a country that does not have sufficient resources to truly defend itself.²²⁸ In the past, perceived border threats have never fully materialized yet that does not mean that they have never existed nor that they do not exist today. At the turn of the century there was a perceived threat from the United States.²²⁹ There was also always the potential for an attack on Canadian soil during W. W. II and thus the need for some precautions and military preparedness.²³⁰ Threats to the Arctic have also been a security concern for Canada. The writers advocating a military tradition recognize that Canada is largely a nation without external threats to its security. However, they also demonstrate that the military has played and must continue to play a role in helping to retain Canada's borders. The recognition of the indefensibility of Canada has not kept the country from recognizing threats and trying to attain security.

²²⁷Although U.S. domination is debatable as will be touched on later, the physical threat to the border has not been an issue in this century.

²²⁸The unique Canadian security situation is mentioned by numerous writers. Calder and Furtado state, "our geographic position between two superpowers, our vast territory and limited resource base and our wider political and economic interests in the world leave us no choice but to pursue Canadian security within a collective framework of like-minded nations." in Kenneth J. Calder and Francis Furtado. "Canadian Defence Policy in the 1990s: International and domestic determinants." Canadian Defence Quarterly (Aug 1991) p. 10. Neill exclaims, "what these geographic and demographic facts add up to is that Canada is virtually indefensible in the classical military sense." in Lieutenant Donald A. Neill. "Back to the Basics: Defence Interests and defence policy in Canada" Canadian Defence Quarterly (December 1991) p. 42.

²²⁹Most notably this threat was witnessed with the St. Alban Raids in 1864 and the Fenian attacks from 1865-66.

²³⁰"Although the attacks upon Canadian soil which had been widely foretold before the war never materialized, it was thought necessary to maintain considerable forces for home defence, particularly after Japan entered the conflict in December 1941." Stacey, p. 36.

Despite precautions, Canada has never truly been in a position to fully defend its own borders without the maintenance of an alliance with another great power. This element of Canadian policy is recognized by many writers. As stated by Leyton-Brown,

it has been a central tenet of Canadian defence policy since the end of the Second World War that, because of its relatively small population and large geography, Canada lacks the resources to defend itself unilaterally against all conceivable military threats to its interests, or to maintain international peace. Accordingly Canadian defence policy has been an alliance policy.²³¹

Calder and Furtado agree stating that, "our geographic position between two superpowers, our vast territory and limited resource base and our wider political and economic interest in the world leave us no choice but to pursue Canadian security within a collective framework of like-minded nations as embodied in the NATO alliance and our continental defence partnership with the United States."²³² Finally, Buteux states, "the assertion that Canada could not defend itself or use armed force to defend its interests independently of others was never really challenged, and to this day remains a basic assumption of official strategic assessments."²³³

One of the dominant allies that Canada has relied upon to help ensure its security is the United States. Early in the history of Canada, the United States was perceived as a potential security threat to Canada's physical boundaries. Canada perceived significant security threats, especially along its American border, in the mid-1800s. Britain and the United States were on the verge of war throughout the 1840s and the Canadian border was the site of many skirmishes. At the same time Britain was questioning the costs and benefits of its North American colonies. By 1850 British garrisons in the Dominion of Canada began to shrink as Britain tried to relieve itself from the burden of defending Canada and force a greater proportion of military responsibility onto its colony. This left

²³¹David Leyton-Brown, "Canadian Defence Policy in the 1990s: The North American Dimension." Canadian Defence Quarterly Vol. 21 No.1 1 (1991) p. 19.

²³²Calder and Furtado, p. 10.

²³³Buteux in Dewitt and Leyton-Brown, p. 157.

Canada in a very precarious position. It was facing one of its greatest threats at the same time that Britain, its greatest defender, was trying to remove itself from some of its colonial responsibilities. By 1861 and the start of the American Civil War it seemed certain that Canada would be the battlefield.²³⁴ Canadian-American tensions remained throughout this period in various forms and through various instances such as the St. Alban raids in 1864 and the Fenian raids of 1865-66. Eventually, the American threat to the border subsided.

Although British withdrawal impacted on Canada's perceived threats from the United States, British withdrawal was also important to the Canadian-American relationship because it forced Canada to develop its own relationship with the United States. This relationship was first solidified in the period of 1905 to 1912. At this time Britain recognized Canada's ability to negotiate with the United States and began pulling out of affairs between the two countries leaving Ottawa "increasingly on its own in its dealings with the United States."²³⁵

The 20th century has been a period of relatively accommodating relations between Canada and the United States. However, the Canadian-American relationship has not been problem free. Documents from the early to mid - 1900s show that both Canada and the United States continued to plan for war against each other.²³⁶ Nonetheless, as British world prevalence or the *pax Britannica* declined following W. W. I, Canada's ties to Britain in defence were increasingly being replaced with a reliance on the United States.

²³⁴Desmond Morton, p. 81.

²³⁵Hillmer and Granatstein, p. 35.

²³⁶Colonel Sutherland (Buster) Brown's, "Defence Scheme Number One" published in 1921 outlined Canadian Militia response in the event of a threat of United States invasion. In 1927 The Canadian Joint Staff Committee approved a strategic plan that included defending Canada from the United States as one priority. Meanwhile, American War College planning records show that as late as 1939 Canada was studied as a potential adversary. In Richard A. Preston. "Buster Brown Was Not Alone: American Plans for the Invasion of Canada, 1919-1939." Canadian Defence Quarterly Vol. 3 No. 4 (spring 1974) p. 29-36.

Continental defence talks had been initiated briefly in 1938.²³⁷ By 1940 a formal alliance with the United States was perceived as Canada's best defence option. As a result, the Canadian-American talks were carried through in earnest in 1940 when Canada and the United States agreed to set up a Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD), in the Ogdensburg Agreement.

The relationship between the two countries was strengthened even more in 1941 with the signing of the Hyde Park agreement. Hyde Park was a wartime agreement that proved beneficial to both its signatory nations. Prior to this time Canada faced a balance of payments problem. Both Canada and the United States realized that it was in their mutual interest to work together in the effort to supply war materials and so the Hyde Park agreement was outlined. Through Hyde Park the Americans provided the credit that Canada needed. In return the United States could rely on Canada for military supplies. As a result, "while Britain had gone irreversibly into debt, the Hyde Park agreement kept Canadian-American trade and settlements in balance."²³⁸

The Truman Doctrine of 1947 further increased defence coordination between the two countries and set the stage for continental defence through the North American Air (Aerospace) Defence Agreement or NORAD. NORAD was officially instituted in 1957. Since then, NORAD has been integral to Canada's attempt to secure its geographic space with military means and therefore integral to the Canadian military tradition.²³⁹

²³⁷Hillmer and Granatstein, p. 159.

²³⁸Desmond Morton, p. 225.

²³⁹It is acknowledged that NORAD is not and has never been seen as a completely successful continental defence system. For some of the initial problems see Hertzman et al., p. 50-54. However, it is clear in the text of the North American Air Defence Agreement of 1958, that NORAD is a result of the recognized air defence problem. (as printed in Hertzman et al., p. 144) The fact that Canada re-signed the NORAD agreement, even after the Cold War, demonstrates that this belief in collective defence of Canadian geographic space is still relevant.

Through NORAD, Canada and the United States have enjoyed close military ties due to the shared goal of defending North America. The jointly organized and commanded system outlined in NORAD has forged a strong relationship between Canada and the United States. This relationship is an element of the Canadian military tradition. Not only are Canadian soldiers stationed and employed through NORAD, but Canada shares in the defence of North America and participates in a "unified system of detection and guidance which includes a long-range detection network and short-range detection and guidance network."²⁴⁰

This relationship has not been without conflict. There is some debate in the literature over the effect and potential ramifications of having Canada's defence so closely integrated with that of the United States. Despite the relatively good working relationship between the two countries on matters of security, the massive power differential between Canada and the United States has had, and continues to have, an effect on policy.²⁴¹ The Canadian commitment to strengthen its defence relationship with the United States through NORAD has had an effect on the military and defence in the areas of weapons procurement, defence industries and the ability to contribute to other alliances, most notably NATO.²⁴² NORAD is seen by some writers of the Canadian military tradition as a test of Canadian influence. The cost of a number of the warning systems through NORAD put a strain on the Canadian ability to make defence decisions and retain sovereign control over its own soil. At the same time it was only through a partnership with the United States that Canada could embark on the costly venture of defending Canada with its extensive Arctic frontier.²⁴³

²⁴⁰Andrew Brewin. *Stand on Guard: The Search for a Canadian Defence Policy*. Toronto, Ont.: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1965, p. 55-56.

²⁴¹Watts discusses the realities of alliance constraints and influences on policy formation as "just a fact of global political life." Lieutenant C. S. Watts. "External Constraints on Canadian Foreign Policy." *Canadian Defence Quarterly* Vol. 2 No. 1 (May 1993) p. 49.

²⁴²Keating, p. 154.

²⁴³Middlemiss and Sokolsky outline the fact that NORAD has made it possible for Ottawa "to meet its perceived sovereignty needs at lower cost." Middlemiss and Sokolsky, p. 154.

In conjunction with the defence of North America, Canada's participation in continental defence also gave it an importance on the world stage during the Cold War, because the defence of North America was intrinsically linked to the defence of the Western world and the practice of deterrence. As stated by Brewin; "I cannot state too forcibly the view that Canadian-American co-operation to provide early warning of any possible bomber strike from the U.S.S.S.R. is of great and vital importance to the defence of North America and the free world, and indeed, to the cause of peace."²⁴⁴ In addition to NORAD, Canada contributed towards Western security through participation in NATO.

Canada's active participation in the defence of Europe through NATO has also influenced Canadian defence policy decisions and has a strong impact on the military tradition. Defence decisions and the use of Canadian forces have been dictated to a large degree by NATO needs.²⁴⁵ For example, through NATO, Canada stationed both air and land forces in West Germany. As well, Canadian weapons purchases such as the Leopard tanks and even the CF-18 were geared towards fulfilling Canada's role in NATO.²⁴⁶ Despite the deep integration between Canadian defence and NATO policy, most defence writers welcome NATO as a contributor to the military tradition.²⁴⁷ Thériault holds the belief that rather than acting as a threat to sovereignty, NATO helped further Canadian interest for it "obviated the need for more independent thinking and action."²⁴⁸ Middlemiss

²⁴⁴Brewin, p. 57.

²⁴⁵Thériault recognizes that, "after four decades' participation in the Alliance, it should not be surprising that NATO had become overwhelmingly the central focus of most Canadian defence thinking." General G.C.E. Thériault. "Reflections on Canadian Defence policy and its underlying structural problems." Canadian Defence Quarterly Vol. 22 No. 6 (July 1993) p. 4.

²⁴⁶Middlemiss and Sokolsky, p. 157.

²⁴⁷Langille is one notable exception as he claims that NATO involvement lead to lessened control for Canada over its troops. see Howard Peter Langille. *Changing the Guard: Canada's Defence in a World in Transition*. Toronto, Ont.: University of Toronto Press, 1990.

²⁴⁸Thériault, p. 4.

and Sokolsky focus any debate over NATO participation not on sovereignty but on "whether or not Canada should be doing more."²⁴⁹

NATO involvement is important not only for its influence over military roles that lead to tradition but also for the influence that Canada has on the world stage. Writers such as Thériault have recognized Canada's involvement in NATO as a counterweight to the otherwise overwhelming relationship Canada holds with the United States.²⁵⁰ Nonetheless, belonging to the world club of the big players is the benefit of NATO membership most implicitly present in the defence writings. According to Langeville, "participation on the central front provided Canada's forces with an additional opportunity to plot and plan with the big players in the NATO club."²⁵¹

The Canadian need to link its defence with the defence of others did not stop with the NATO or NORAD alliances but rather these alliances stemmed from the root of a Canadian global perspective of world security. As recognized by Byrne, "Canada since the Second World War has effectively considered its defence policy in the context of the defence as a whole."²⁵² The linking of Canadian security needs to those of the international system marked Canada's movement away from isolation, and towards its characteristic role of internationalism. With the dawn of the nuclear age and the inception of the Cold War, Canada developed the belief that its security was intertwined with that of its Western counterparts.²⁵³ The Canadian security threat was identified as the same as the

²⁴⁹Middlemiss and Sokolsky, p. 159.

²⁵⁰Thériault states, "two related themes have consistently been associated with Canada's defence policy: the theme of influence, and the notion of involvement in a European counterweight to an otherwise too intense, and presumably threatening relationship with the United States." Thériault, p. 6.

²⁵¹Langeville, p. 60.

²⁵²J. L. Byrne. "Notes on Canadian Defence Policy." Canadian Defence Quarterly Vol.21 No. 3 (December 1991) p. 40.

²⁵³ Jockel and Sokolsky demonstrate this fact when they state: "the presence of the CF-18 pilot in Northern Canada, the peacekeeper in the Sinai, the sailor on NATO naval excursions, the soldier in Germany in Geneva all reflected Ottawa's accurate assessment that as long as the United States and its allies sought to confront the Soviet Union across the globe, a regional clash anywhere might eventually affect

threat to all Western capitalist states, that is, communism and in particular the Soviet Union. Canada, therefore, decided to tie its fate to that of its allies. The defence of Canada became not so much the defence of a set of borders but the greater defence of a Western belief and value system. As stated by Hicks, "we stand for peace, freedom and human rights and the dignity of the person; and our defence capability exists not so much for the defence of Canadian territory as for the defence of our values and our hard-won rights and freedoms."²⁵⁴ This belief in the need for Canadian involvement in international security is a part of the military tradition.

The military is integral to Canadian internationalism and Canada's internationalist tradition has played a strong role in the formation and future of the Canadian military tradition. Roy recognizes the emergence of internationalism and the effect on the military: "the deterioration of the international scene in the post-war period which resulted in the so-called "cold war" between the East and West meant that Canada was unable to disarm, retreat into her pre-war, semi-isolationist shell and rely once again on the militia and reserves as she had in past years. For the first time the Canadian government entered into military alliances, and military commitments and required a comparatively large permanent force in all three services as well as reserves."²⁵⁵ Canada's active involvement in the creation and maintenance of the post-war international system demonstrated a firm belief that collective security, international organization and world peace were its main foreign policy tasks.²⁵⁶ This work was done and continues to be done through organizations such as the United Nations. "Collective security was the principal philosophical orientation of the United Nations system and, at the outset, its main task."²⁵⁷ Collective security meant

Canada." Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky. "Dandurand revisited: rethinking Canada's defence policy in an unstable world." *International Journal* (Winter 1992-93) p. 385.

²⁵⁴Bob Hicks. *They Stand on Guard: A defence direction for Canada*. Ottawa, Ont.: Conference of Defence Associations, 1991, p. 1.

²⁵⁵R. H. Roy. "The Canadian Military Tradition." in Massey, p. 47.

²⁵⁶Hawes, p. 4.

²⁵⁷Hawes, p. 5.

new strength for the military. As Stacey states, "the establishments fixed for the Canadian armed services...provided for larger regular forces than ever before."²⁵⁸ In turn, this military strength contributed to the military tradition.

Even with the end of the Cold War, the desire for Canadian involvement in world events has been reinforced. Dewitt maps the reinforcement of military roles in order to maintain international involvement into the nineties:

Aside from the not inconsequential aid to the civil power, for which there is an inherent requirement in any civil society, and our entirely legitimate but now much constrained commitment to continental, northern and European defence and security requirements the rationale for having a Canadian military expertise must lie squarely within the broader contexts of threats to international peace and security. This has been the case since 1945; but today, those threats do not come from the north or across the Atlantic, but rather reside within and between the rest of the world."²⁵⁹

The far reaching goals intrinsic to a Canadian security focus linked to world security have been claimed to be partly responsible for the commitment-capability gap within defence policy. Jockel and Sokolsky state that in making national security synonymous with international stability Canada is bound to overextend itself, for "with such a sweeping conception of Canada's security interests as a starting point, it is small wonder that the Canadian Forces suffered a "commitment-capability' gap."²⁶⁰

Although Canada's military tradition is heavily influenced by its conscious choice of using allied and collective defence, Canada has also shaped its own defensive abilities. Defence writers are aware that past security does not mean total security. Furthermore, Canada has never been willing to surrender completely its own sovereignty and policy decisions to another single or collective group of nations. As Newman exclaims, "I do

²⁵⁸Stacey, p. 40.

²⁵⁹David B. Dewitt. "Canadian Defence Policy: Regional Conflicts, Peacekeeping, and Stability Operations." Canadian Defence Quarterly Vol. 21 No. 1 (August 1991) p. 43.

²⁶⁰ Jockel and Sokolsky, "Dandurand revisited", p. 383.

believe this country is worth defending and that no one else can do the whole job for us."²⁶¹ The need to protect Canadian sovereignty²⁶² has always been an element of defence policy and influences the military tradition. As explicated by one commander of the Air Command:

I instinctly, as I think most Canadians do, have a feeling that unless we have the capability of controlling our airspace - that is, of knowing of the presence of an intruder and being able to intercept and identify that intruder to enforce our sovereignty in airspace - there is something lacking in the composition of the Canadian nation.²⁶³

The elements of functionalism, middlepowermanship and peacekeeping, although often not formally recognized by defence writers, helped Canada maintain its ability to play an active military role on the world stage. In an increasingly internationally focused world, functionalism represented a way for lesser power involvement. The Canadian conceptions of functionalism also contributed a *raison d'être* for the military. Middlepowermanship and peacekeeping, which became the two trade marks of Canada as it tried to forge a role for itself through functionalism, both required strong military involvement.

The role of the middle power "grew out of the functional concept of the role of nations in world organization developed at the end of the last war [W. W. II]."²⁶⁴ At this time the need for further classifications with relation to state power was recognized. The previous identification of great powers and small powers was not sufficient and functionalism allowed for more ambiguity between the states. Middle power was then used to refer to states who were not great, but which were also not without influence. Canada became recognized as a middle power because although it had a role to play internationally,

²⁶¹Peter C. Newman. *True North: Not Strong and Free. Defending the Peaceable Kingdom in the Nuclear Age*. Toronto, Ont.: McClelland and Stewart, 1983, p.13.

²⁶²defined as the "claim to be a country, to control our own territory, to decide what is best for this nation, and to have the ability to maintain authority over the land, sea and airspace claimed by our Canada." Hicks, p. 45.

²⁶³Middlemiss and Sokolsky, p. 169.

²⁶⁴Holmes, in J. King Gordon, p. 14.

its military was not of sufficient strength to classify Canada among the great powers.

Because Canada recognized that it couldn't compete if nations focused on military strength alone, it embraced the role of the middle power. Middlepowermanship for Canada took on the meaning of a mediator or facilitator for it was through this role that Canada could more effectively play a role in international conflict. However, it should be recognized that the role was initially forged to protect Canadian national interest by allowing Canada a say in international events.

Although it is not overwhelming in strength, the Canadian military plays a strong role in Canada's position of middle power. The Canadian military has been important in maintaining Canadian international credibility and influence as a middle power. Canada gained its influence and ability to use diplomatic type functions as a result of its military past. As Stairs outlines, "so far as the 'diplomatic support' functions were concerned, it was clear that such military-based influence as Canada might hope to wield had already been acquired as a result of the Canadian contribution to the conduct of [W. W. II]."²⁶⁵ After the war the continuation of Canadian influence was possible due to the retention of military capabilities.

Peacekeeping is a role of the Canadian military that Canadians have embraced. Canada was involved with peacekeeping operations from the inception of the peacekeeping role. Since that time, Canada has been involved with almost every UN peacekeeping operation and a number of non-UN peacekeeping operations as well.²⁶⁶ Peacekeeping has

²⁶⁵Denis Stairs. "The Military as an Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy." in Massey, p. 93.

²⁶⁶The Canadian participation in peacekeeping was recognized in 1989 by Manson. "Some 80,000 Canadian Forces personnel have participated in 21 international peacekeeping operations since 1945, including virtually every such operation under the aegis of the United Nations." General Paul D. Manson. "Peacekeeping in Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy." Canadian Defence Quarterly (August, 1989) p. 7. A similar statistic quoted by Bremner and Snell in 1992 claims more than 80,000 Canadian have served in peacekeeping missions since 1949. Colonel J. S. Bremner and Lieutenant-Colonel J. M. Snell. "The Changing Face of Peacekeeping." Canadian Defence Quarterly (August 1992) p. 6. Since 1989 Canada has participated in approximately 25 more operations.

been defined in numerous ways and the role of international peacekeepers is still evolving. However, a definition offered by Keating is useful. Peacekeeping is the "use of military personnel to monitor and supervise a cease-fire between belligerents."²⁶⁷ Through this definition it becomes clear that regardless of the role or mandate, peacekeeping is indeed a military operation. Through peacekeeping the Canadian military has helped forge a special purpose for its forces on the world stage. Bercuson recognizes this: "UNEF was the start of Canada's entry into the peacekeeping business, a business that has ostensibly become a Canadian specialty."²⁶⁸

In recognizing Canada's historic involvement in peacekeeping, Morton also highlights the concept of idealism intrinsic for some individuals in the concept of peacekeeping which has ramifications for the military and the military tradition.²⁶⁹ The events surrounding Canada's contribution to the civil war in the Belgian Congo in 1960 demonstrate this point. When the Secretary General of the UN, Dag Hammarskjöld, requested Canadian assistance in the conflict in the Congo, Canada initially responded with just a few aircraft and staff officers. The Canadian military wanted to preserve troops for protecting Europe and for fighting the Communists. However, the press and Canadians eventually pressured the government into a greater commitment. From this act it seemed Canadians were not only in favour of peacekeeping but wanted Canada to play a significant role in the peacekeeping arena due to the idealism identified in peacekeeping. Canadians have so heavily identified with the peaceful nature of peacekeeping that they neglect or forget other Canadian military roles. One example of this is pointed out by Milner. "Canadians are so used to seeing their troops as neutral enforcers of the peace that they tend

²⁶⁷Keating, p. 103.

²⁶⁸Bercuson, 1996, p. 58.

²⁶⁹Morton states "peacekeeping, a military means for Canada to play a more idealistic role in the world, began in 1948 with Canadian officers sent to Kashmir to supervise a shaky truce between Nehru's India and Pakistan." Desmond Morton, p. 232.

to forget the country's role in Korea. That is one reason why Korea remains largely an unknown war to Canadians, to the day."²⁷⁰

Although the Canadian forces have been heavily involved in peacekeeping operations, peacekeeping has not been a primary concern of defence. As Middlemiss and Sokolsky state, "peacekeeping, although one of the longest standing roles for the CF since 1945, has been of only marginal importance for the formulation of defence policy and for the shaping of the military's posture."²⁷¹ Even though peacekeeping has not been recognized as a primary military influence, it does have importance for defence writers. Peacekeeping can be seen as an instrument of forwarding Canadian interest and justifying the Canadian military. Peacekeeping is a military practice which is particularly attractive to Canada for it is within the range of Canadian military capabilities.²⁷² It also is a meaningful role for the forces since it is supported by the general public. Massey recognizes that "as the strain of justifying the more central aspects of Canada's military activities became increasingly difficult to bear, these features were to make of peacekeeping operations an extremely attractive alternative source of legitimacy."²⁷³ Peacekeeping is often identified as a more diplomatic and non-military source of Canadian involvement. Peacekeeping helps promote Canada's indirect influence over external events in part by providing support to diplomacy operations through the United Nations and elsewhere.²⁷⁴ Nonetheless, peacekeeping actually helps preserve the Canadian military tradition.

²⁷⁰Milner, p. 332.

²⁷¹Middlemiss and Sokolsky, p. 174. It should be noted that this role is evolving not only with regard to the nature of peacekeeping operations but also with regard to the Canadian emphasis in involvement. In 1993 George and Gervais stated, "A desire to continue to play a major role in peacekeeping operations in the UN, and the CSCE should the need arise, has been a factor in the formulation of our new defence policy." Vice-Admiral Robert E. George and Major Rene Gervais. "Canada's military contribution to the Alliance." Canadian Defence Quarterly Vol. 2 No. 2 (March 1993) p. 24. Numerous other articles and documents address the changes surrounding peacekeeping. Just one such article is Louis A. Delvoie. "Canada and Peacekeeping: A New Era?" Canadian Defence Quarterly Vol. 19 No. 2 (Autumn 1990).

²⁷²Denis Stairs. "The Military as an Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy." in Massey, p. 104

²⁷³Stairs in Massey, p. 104.

²⁷⁴Stairs in Massey, p. 103.

Sense of Morality:

Canadian internationalism and the corollary elements of international organization membership, functionalism, middlepowermanship and peacekeeping do not necessarily lead to the great Canadian moralism as many foreign policy writers believe. This lack of a higher moral belief helps differentiate the beliefs and assumptions of defence writers from the foreign policy writers. For defence writers, Canada has continued to associate its operations within the realist paradigm of international relations by concentrating on power and interests. Although Canada retains its sovereignty, reality dictates that Canada will be an international actor and Canada has chosen to embrace internationalism. Rather than this giving Canada some benevolent stance it has meant and continues to mean that Canada is closely tied to and reliant upon its military. During the Cold War, the Western realist paradigm to which Canada aligned itself asserted that "nuclear and conventional deterrence are accepted as unavoidable; Canada's membership within military alliances is imperative; a capacity for protracted warfare is required."²⁷⁵

Canada's alliance commitments have meant participating in the war-fighting capabilities of the military enterprise when need be. Although Canada has relied heavily on organizations such as the United Nations which highlight more legalistic solutions to international conflicts, Canada has also been an active participant in military operations. The base of peace for Canadian foreign and defence policy has been closely tied to alliance beliefs such as deterrence. In the era of the Cold War, nuclear deterrence as an avenue for peace meant a military commitment. In short it should be recognized that, "Canada has

²⁷⁵Langille, p. 5.

never been a choirboy in the concert of nations; it has fought wars and bargained for advantage like all the rest."²⁷⁶

Many Canadians have chosen to ignore this reality and assign an almost altruistic belief to Canadian policy, relying on internationalism and legalism as its foundations. Canadian policy has embraced as its security concern the desire to maintain international peace and stability. However, what such a declaration means is open to interpretation. As Langeville explains, "for roughly forty years, a primary security concern of Canadian governments has been to support efforts to maintain international peace and stability. This was accurately perceived as the best approach by which to ensure Canadian security. Matching the ideal means to this end, however, has been somewhat difficult."²⁷⁷

For example, although Canada has been an active advocate of disarmament, Canada has also been involved in producing defence goods. Canadian involvement in supplying arms was graphically outlined in an article on the Vietnam war by Walter Stewart:

When I read about an American soldier firing a clip of tracer bullets into a group of women and children in some Mekong hamlet, I feel a quiet thrill of pride. ... After all...it's our war, too. The ammunition for that soldier's rifle may have ridden in a De Havilland Caribou built at Malton, Ontario; that napalm-spraying fighter-bomber was almost certainly equipped with a Canadian-made Marconi Doppler Navigation System; those bombs along the Ho Chi Minh Trail may have been made from dynamite shipped out of Valleyfield, Quebec, and disgorged by a bombing computer fashioned in Reddale, Ontario.²⁷⁸

By 1993 Canada ranked eighth among manufacturers of military equipment and maintained a billion dollar industry supplying military goods.²⁷⁹ The Canadian commitment to the

²⁷⁶Hillmer and Granatstien, p. 350.

²⁷⁷Langeville, p. 152.

²⁷⁸Walter Stewart "Proudly We Stand the Butcher's Helper in Southeast Asia." in Innis (ed.), p. 51-52.

²⁷⁹John M. Lamb. "Canadian Security Priorities for the 1990s." in Richard Stubbs (ed.). *Behind the Headlines. Canadian Foreign policy: Still in Flux*. Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1993, p. 13.

production of military supplies continues and the necessity of military spending continues. Even in the 1990s, with the end of the Cold War, the anticipation of a 'peace dividend'²⁸⁰ has not materialized. Instead, emerging world instabilities of the 1990s, such as Saddam Hussein's attack on Kuwait, civil unrest in areas such as Somalia and the conflict in Bosnia have put additional strain on the United Nations and its member countries such as Canada, who are asked to foot the bill for the necessary peacekeeping and humanitarian responses.²⁸¹

Conclusion

Despite the Canadian reluctance to embrace the military tradition, Canadian history helps demonstrate the military tradition. The military presence can be witnessed in the French-English question as well as in Canada's relationship with the United States and its other allies, and in the role Canada plays in the world. This presence is the foundation of tradition. Finally, defence writers do not adhere to an ideal sense of unique Canadian moralism as an element of Canadian policy, but rather see Canadian policy through a realist paradigm with power and interest governing policy choices. Overall, these writers recognize that "of all the traditions Canada has inherited in the military field, none is more persistent than public neglect of and indifference to national defence, until face to face with an emergency."²⁸² Idealist notions and attempts at dissociating the military from Canadian tradition does not negate its existence or its ability. As summarized by Roy:

Canada, always reluctant to grasp the sword despite her ability with it, has come a long way from the period when enthusiastic amateurs sacrificed their time to provide the core of the nation's defence. In one form or another their presence will

²⁸⁰It was a dominant belief that the loss of the Soviet threat would result in a freeing up of resources that had previously been used to propogate the Cold War machine. Western governments have yet to realize this surplus money. Lamb in Stubbs (ed.), p. 10

²⁸¹Lamb in Stubbs (ed.). p. 11.

²⁸²G. G. Simonds. "Commentary and Observations" in Massey, p. 289.

always be necessary and their traditions will die hard. No one can deny their value, least of all veterans who experienced their worth on the field of battle.²⁸³

²⁸³Roy in Massey, p. 47.

CHAPTER FOUR

Addressing the Silent Debate

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the coherency of Canadian foreign and defence policy culture through an examination of the different images with regard to the military tradition communicated in the writings on foreign and defence policy. Since tradition is an important element of culture, examining the perceptions with regard to the nature of the Canadian military tradition helps increase an understanding of Canadian foreign and defence policy culture. An examination of the ideas present in various writings on foreign and defence policy demonstrates contradictory beliefs²⁸⁴ surrounding the Canadian military tradition. Underlying this silent debate are different assumptions²⁸⁵ held by the defence writers who have been classified as recognizing a Canadian military tradition and the foreign policy writers who do not. This chapter will compare and contrast the different beliefs and assumptions of the silent debate over the nature of the military in Canada.

An examination of these beliefs and assumptions leads to a discussion of values. As defined in Chapter One, values which result from valuing are, "immediate objects of self-conscious individual experience."²⁸⁶ Values and valuing are fundamental to a sense of tradition and can be seen as a key component of culture. Values are self-realization at the individual level and are necessary for the process of self-realization at the macrosocial level which forms a culture. The expressed values of the culture are manifested through tradition. Although different assumptions and beliefs can suggest a different tradition and therefore a different culture, an overview of the values impacting on the tradition are also

²⁸⁴A belief can be defined as "a state or habit of mind in which trust or confidence is placed in some person or thing." Webster's 1981, p. 100.

²⁸⁵or "the supposition that something is true." Webster's 1981, p. 68.

²⁸⁶Pande, p. 2.

important to test coherency in culture. Even when the image communicated about a culture is different, consistency within values can lead to greater culture consistency and self-realization.

In the writings it is evident that there are significant differences in the way the authors deal with history including the interplay between Canada's two founding nations. Different interpretations of Canadian security and of the relationship Canada holds with the United States and its other allies are also present in the writings. Finally, there are differences in the assessments of Canada's role in the world and its consequent moral standing.

Foreign policy writers tend to overlook the deep historical roots that defence writers utilize to outline the military tradition. Different perspectives are also present in the interplay between the French and English in Canada. For both sets of writers French colonial history has had an impact on policy. However, the impact of French Canadian contributions to the military tradition is overshadowed by the foreign policy writers' preference to avoid military matters. Both sets of writers agree on Canada's strategic threat perception as being one of 'relative security'. However, the implications of this security situation are interpreted drastically differently. For foreign policy writers, relative security is a licence for ignorance. In contrast, defence writers use Canada's precarious ability to defend itself as greater justification for a military need. The consequent reliance on other nations for security is also viewed differently. Although many worry about its impact on Canadian sovereignty, foreign policy writers seem content to leave Canadian defence in the hands of the United States and its other allies. Because border threats are a non-issue, elements not traditionally identified with national security, such as economics, are the preferred area for threat analysis. Defence writers recognize that Canadian defence and military developments have been intimately linked to alliance needs and policy.

Nonetheless, they recognize the importance of retaining some degree of Canadian defence capability. Even internationalism, the hallmark of Canadian policy, holds different connotations for foreign policy and defence writers. The underlying ideal of internationalism as working towards world peace is highlighted by foreign policy writers who attribute a high moral standing to Canada. Defence writers do not recognize Canada's intrinsic moralism and understand internationalism simply as another way for it to assert influence on the world stage; a way that demands the maintenance of military forces. The implications for these different beliefs and assumptions are widespread.

Of course, it should not be assumed that there should be complete coherence within the writings. However, because tradition leads to self-consciousness, a major split in tradition recognition results in the lack of a coherent culture and self awareness. As a result, these different beliefs and assumptions have an impact on identity. As understood from the definition of culture as self-realization, the search for identity necessitates the removal of dichotomous conceptualizations. In Canada there is a need for "breaking down the dichotomies of Cartesian conceptualization as traditionally practised in the West."²⁸⁷ It is through breaking down dichotomies that culture can be most helpful. It is also through this process that cultural self-realization can occur.

Conflict is inevitable without a cultural coherency of self-realization or an understanding of identity, that can be attained through commonly recognized historical experiences leading to tradition. Taylor offers the insight that "much of the present defence controversy in Canada stems from our having mistaken effect for cause."²⁸⁸ Different beliefs and assumptions by foreign policy and defence writers lead to different

²⁸⁷Alaistar Taylor. *For Canada - Both Swords and Ploughshares: A Plea for an Integrated Defence and Foreign Policy for Canada*. Toronto, Ont.: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1963, p. 64.

²⁸⁸Taylor, p. 64. An example of what that meant to Taylor is Canada blaming the veto in the UN Charter for the failure of viable international security systems rather than recognizing the root of the problem which was the almost insurmountable difficulty of getting a sovereign state to prioritize international interest over its own interests.

understandings of the cause and effect of various events, such as Canada's role in the Cuban Missile crisis and Somalia. These differences also lead to different understandings of issues such as the commitment-capability gap. Although the different beliefs and assumptions intrinsic to the silent debate over the nature of the military tradition lead to different beliefs and assumptions during the time of the Cold War, the changing international system presses the need for change. The complex issues and patterns of change in the international system require new and deeper conceptualizations of concepts such as history and identity. Furthermore, new patterns of international intervention, such as peacemaking, require the integration of previously conceived separate responses such as humanitarian and military responses. Therefore the integration in national philosophy or a coherency in culture is needed.

History:

Pande believes that "above all, tradition is communion with the past, a continuing dialogue which reinterprets the past and also the present."²⁸⁹ An examination of the importance given to history by the foreign and defence policy writers helps give insight into their differing views surrounding the nature of the Canadian military tradition. Much of the history of the military is neglected by foreign policy writers²⁹⁰ leading to claims such as Tucker's belief in the "absence of a revolutionary tradition."²⁹¹ These writers give cursory mention to historical relationships between Britain and the United States. Foreign policy writers recognize Canada's historical role in war and in peacekeeping. However, they fail

²⁸⁹Pande, p. 103.

²⁹⁰According to Bothwell, "the first lesson for students of the history of Canada's foreign relations is not what is known, but what is not." Bothwell continues to state, "the number of historians publishing regularly in the field of Canadian foreign policy is, by recent scientific estimate (that is to say, as good as the polls surrounding the 1994 Quebec election), about the same as the digits on the feet of a three toed sloth." Robert Bothwell. "Journey to a small country: only in Canada you say? Pity". *International Journal* (Winter 1994-95) p. 128.

²⁹¹Tucker, p. 2.

to recognize the integral role that the military played throughout history in shaping Canada and its foreign policy.

The writers who recognize a Canadian military tradition tend to emphasize the historical role that the military has played in war and international conflict, as well as how that role impacts on identity. This role is exemplified through statements such as Harkness's comment that "participation in [wars] has been jolting Canada toward self-realization somewhat as revolution jolted other peoples in earlier days."²⁹² The history of the military is an integral element in the history of the country. Through examining Canada's history it becomes apparent that Canada has a military tradition, heavily influenced by both its French and English forefathers. Canada was an active participant in a number of major wars including the war of 1812, the Riel Rebellions, the Boer War, W. W. I, W. W. II, the Korean War, and the Gulf War. Also, it is the Canadian military that primarily fulfills Canada's peacekeeping duties. All of these international roles have been important to Canada's position and reputation in the world. The military has also played a role in the internal security of Canada. All of these functions are elements of the military tradition. Through these functions the Canadian military contributes to the characteristics of national identity because of the strong role that the military played in the formation of the country.

Canadian soldiers have historically been, and continue to be, active national and international participants. However, at the same time, the general Canadian populace remains relatively unaware and untouched by the role of the Canadian soldier because, until recently, it has been predominately manifested overseas. The fact that the public remains largely untouched directly by the military is recognized by defence writers and is used, in part, as an explanation of why military affairs are not a full part of the Canadian

²⁹²Harkness, p. 16.

consciousness. However, neglecting to recognize a military tradition does not negate the history of military involvement and the resulting military tradition.

The predominant vision of Canadian foreign policy for both foreign policy and defence writers is based on interpretations set around the time of W. W. II. It was during this 'golden age or decade' that Canada adopted the internationalist, goodwill nation image that characterizes the nature of foreign policy beliefs. For defence writers this is also a golden age during which the Canadian military clearly demonstrated its war fighting capability and prowess.²⁹³ The Canadian forces held key roles in certain battles that helped Canada demonstrate its military ability.²⁹⁴ Canada had in fact played a role "out of all proportion to its size"²⁹⁵ and this elevated image of Canada as a "major international player"²⁹⁶ has remained in the perceptions of the writers.

Elements of the debate:

One element of domestic policy which can be used to identify different beliefs and assumptions present in the silent debate over the military tradition is the French-English division. For foreign policy writers the French-English issue centres on differences in national styles through different cultures. These writers assume that although domestically Canada may witness great differences between French and English speakers, when it comes to the "high politics" of foreign affairs differences become less concrete. As noted by Holmes, "there never has been any such thing as an English-Canadian or a French-

²⁹³Roy verifies this perspective stating, "in the last twenty five years since the end of the Second World War, more attention has been paid to the Canadian armed forces than in the previous two centuries combined." R. H. Roy. "The Canadian Military Tradition." in Massey, p. 46.

²⁹⁴Examples of Canadian battles during W. W. II include the Conquest of Sicily (1943), the Battle of Normandy (1944) and the Battle of the Scheldt (1944). Each battle is outlined in Stacey.

²⁹⁵Middlemiss and Sokolsky, p. 16

²⁹⁶Middlemiss and Sokolsky, p. 16.

Canadian view of foreign relations, although there are,...identifiable differences in emphasis."²⁹⁷ The constitution acts as a buffer to lessen the differences at the international level between the French and English. Although provinces do have some direct international involvement, the federal government is the primary source of foreign and defence policy. As a result, the federal government has retained most control over foreign policy. However, the French-English question has had an influence on federal policy. For example, Canada forged a strong relationship with la Francophonie primarily for domestic, political reasons. Yet the decision was also formed within the belief of a moral superiority due to a commitment to non-violence which is believed to be inconsistent with a military tradition.²⁹⁸ In foreign policy writings, both English and French Canadians are attributed the same superior moral character that Canada exudes externally.

Defence writers give greater attention to the tangible effects of the French-English question on the Canadian military tradition. Canada's military tradition is shaped by the influence of both colonial nations and by the interplay between the English and the French. Distinct historic events such as conscription served to highlight the divide between Canada's two official languages. Government policy with regard to the military has attempted to address the reality of the split by strongly enforcing bilingualism and biculturalism. Although there are still problems in the attempt to integrate fully French and English within the armed forces, the attempts at integration have helped Canada gain a greater international presence. The bilingual services, when combined with the professional capability of the forces, have been an asset in external conflicts and have helped Canada forge a role in conflicts such as those in Haiti, Cambodia and Zaire.²⁹⁹ Although the French-English division has resulted in controversy, it has also had a developmental effect on the military tradition.

²⁹⁷Holmes. *Valour*, p. 42.

²⁹⁸The agreements with la Francophonie center around the very non-militaristic areas of science and culture. Donneur, p. 52.

²⁹⁹In all these conflicts French speaking soldiers were an asset.

In contrast to the different emphasis of the two sides with regard to the French-English question, an area in which there is general agreement is in the recognition of the paradox of Canada's security position. It is a common belief that Canada is an almost indefensible country, yet without any major security threat. Further, both sides recognize that Canada has relied heavily on alliances and in particular on one of the Great Powers, either Britain or the United States, in order to more fully address its physical security needs. Canada has also chosen to recognize its security as tied to its Western neighbours and has built its defence around that belief. However, the non-military advocates within the debate have a tendency to downplay or even ignore security realities. Past territory threats are either neglected altogether or the military contribution to containing those threats is ignored in favour of the belief in Canada as a "fireproof house". The implication is that the military is potentially dispensable.

The advocates of a military tradition agree with the nature of the Canadian security threat as explicated by their colleagues and with the fact that Canada has recognized its security as part of a question of global security. However, these writers also have a foreboding sense of potential disaster if the military is neglected. They are quick to point out that there have been historical threats that the military has been integral in subduing at both the international and national levels. There is also a recognition that Canada has a history of ignoring its military and then expecting it to be able to perform on command. This trend is historically entrenched. For example, a lack of military staff, support and provisions has been identified as a contributor to the magnitude of the Northwest campaign in 1885.³⁰⁰ Since that time similar problems have been identified by numerous writings up to the present March 1997 reports to the Minister of National Defence. Within the text of one of the reports, it states, "to operationalize foreign policy, the financial costs to defence

³⁰⁰Stacey, p. 85

must be considered. Canada's foreign policy is continually committing Canadian troops in support of international peace keeping/making and humanitarian relief missions without consideration for the ability of the CF to fulfill the mission."³⁰¹

Defence writers realize that the past good fortune of Canada's territorial security is not equivalent to a belief that Canadians have not been touched by war. Rather, these authors recognize that there has been a military price to pay for Canadian security. More than a million Canadians have served in wars abroad on behalf of Canada and many of these soldiers have paid with their lives.³⁰² Lessons from these wars should not be ignored and these authors call for Canadian recognition that the future is uncertain. The indifference that Canadians give to military affairs does not mean security. As professed by Morton, "old certainties persist until, one morning, they utterly vanish. Only then do experts push forward to explain the altered circumstances. In a shrunken world, Canada's immunity from conflict is one of those vanished certainties. It would be unfortunate if Canadians were the last to realize it."³⁰³ Because of this past and ongoing need for the military, Canada is recognized as a country with a military tradition.

Canada has been reliant on alliances to help fulfill its defence needs. One of Canada's closest allies is the United States. Within foreign policy writings there is a lively debate with regard to this relationship. The inescapable reality of the American influence on Canadian policy is looked at by some writers as threatening to Canadian independence in decision making while others see it as unavoidable, but not necessarily harmful. Organizations, such as NORAD, which tie Canada to the American giant are seen as potential sovereignty threats. There is also an assumption amongst the non-military group

³⁰¹Thomas Dimoff. "The Future of the Canadian Armed Forces: Opinions from the Defence Community." Report to the Prime Minister, The Honourable M. Douglas Young, P. C., M. P., Canada, March 27, 1997, p. 4.

³⁰²Desmond Morton, p. 272.

³⁰³Desmond Morton, p. 272.

of writers that Canada, as the 'good guy', has to be careful of American corruption that could occur by virtue of too close a relationship with its southern neighbour. The Canadian non-confrontational style of "peace, order and good government" is contrasted with American rugged, individualism and the emphasis on "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness". The foreign policy writers also emphasize the non-military ways that Canada has used to differentiate itself, such as through economics and cultural relations.³⁰⁴

The military tradition writers point to the relationship with the United States as an instrument of strengthening and solidifying the military and the country as a whole.³⁰⁵ Any debate about the extraordinary influence of Americans over Canadian policy is flavored by the realization that cooperation with the United States is integral to Canadian security. Some debate surrounding this close relationship exists such as in the area of weapon procurement policies.³⁰⁶ However, the relationship between Canada and the United States is important to the military tradition. American-Canadian ties through alliances such as NORAD have not only helped Canada fulfill its defence needs but have also helped Canada retain an important role in international security. Ironically, NORAD can also be seen as an organization that fulfills the foreign policy writers need for predominantly passive roles. As Byers and Gray explain, "the key element in the North American military posture is the system of massive surveillance... a relatively passive role."³⁰⁷

³⁰⁴Canada's recognition of China, trade with the Soviet Union during the cold war and role in the Commonwealth all work to assert a separate Canadian identity.

³⁰⁵For example Morton states, "historically, the Fenians were probably a blessing to Canada. They united the country as nothing else could." Desmond Morton, p. 89.

³⁰⁶For example, the situation surrounding the cancellation of the AVRO Arrow contract and the acquisition of the Bomarc system proved very controversial. see Desmond Morton, p. 243-244.

³⁰⁷T. C. Willet. "Military roles in the 1970s." in R. B. Byers and Colin S. Gray (eds.). *Canadian Military Professionals: the search for identity*. Toronto, Ont.: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1973, p. 50.

An example of how the different points of view have an effect on assumptions is available through a brief examination of the Cuban Missile Crisis. For some individuals the Cuban Missile Crisis called into question the extent that Canada had direct control over its own forces. For individuals adhering to the non-military nature of the country, the Cuban Missile Crisis should not have been a Canadian concern. However, the close links with NORAD meant that Canada was dragged into the crisis. For others, such as most defence writers, the Cuban Missile Crisis is an example of how well the military of the two countries work together. The Canadian military had been involved with the American plans from the beginning through liaisons between Canadian air defence and maritime operational commanders and their staffs. Such cooperation was consistent with routine procedure, in concert with NORAD, and is proudly outlined as an example of Canadian military involvement.³⁰⁸

Other allied relationships, such as NATO, are perceived quite differently by the two sets of writers. For foreign policy writers, NATO is seen as a potential positive counterweight to American dominance. Yet the fact that an alliance is first and foremost a military operation seems lost in the writings. Both the European and American societies that Canada is allied with are seen to incorporate a much more militaristic profile and belief system inconsistent with Canadian visions of the international system. Holmes recognizes that this "Canadian prejudice, a traditional uneasiness about the morality of military alliances, was reflected in the continuing effort to emphasize the economic, cultural, and spiritual aspects of the association."³⁰⁹ Some of this group of writers believe that Canada would hold more international influence if it cut its ties to others and became neutral. Another group, within these writers, believes that Canada should remain tied to international action and alliance defence in order to keep open avenues for the assertion of Canadian values. Although a military alliance, NATO was also seen as a way to assert a

³⁰⁸Haydon, p. 20.

³⁰⁹Holmes. *Valour*. p. 9.

Canadian world vision with greater emphasis away from pure military might. Emphasis is placed on the role of the Canadian delegation in the formation of NATO led by Louis St. Laurent, and the chance for provisions in the alliance to have broader ties than offered through military commitments. Canada's role with NATO has been not for defence reasons alone but for "eminently political and diplomatic reasons which had powerful economic undertones."³¹⁰ In particular, Canada worked to include Article II, the "Canadian Article", which speaks of greater economic ties and cooperation.³¹¹ Therefore, according to Thomson and Swanson, Canada's NATO policy was "to use a military instrument to achieve disarmament, to extract the maximum of leverage at the reduced cost they are authorized to pay; to use the Alliance as a means of reducing Canada's dependency on the United States... and to transform it to the largest possible degree into an organ of peacetime trans-Atlantic cooperation."³¹²

This view is drastically different from the perception of NATO offered in the defence writings. NATO is viewed as an organ that helps Canada keep its rightful place with the big players on the international scene. Canada is a full player in the alliance and, during the Cold War, a participant in the practice of nuclear deterrence. Canadian weapons and troops were used in accordance with NATO requirements. The impact of having troops stationed overseas and the other operations that Canada embarked upon contribute to its military experience and eventually to the tradition itself. There is some mention that Canadian policy is so entwined with alliance needs that it is not possible to make a decision based on Canadian interests. However, other authors believe that Canada has actually gained influence and therefore the ability to act internationally with less constraints due to

³¹⁰Tucker, p. 229.

³¹¹Article II states: "The parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them, strengthening economic links."

³¹²Thomson and Swanson, p. 55.

its activity within its alliances.³¹³ The most striking area of debate focuses on the extent that Canada can meet its own needs while also retaining influence within the alliance. These authors recognize that Canadian decisions are closely tied to those of their alliances. However, they also believe that Canada still has the ability to act independently. As Middlemiss and Sokolsky state, "to be sure, the nature of the international political and strategic environment has greatly influenced the formulation of Canadian defence policy, but, within that broader context, there has been scope for choice."³¹⁴ For example, the 1987 White Paper called for nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) which were not entirely consistent with NATO demands at the time. It was proposed that these submarines were necessary to provide a balanced fleet to help secure all Canadian maritime approaches including the Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic. The NATO emphasis at the time was almost entirely focused on the Atlantic and the alliance's primary needs were for surface combatants.³¹⁵ As a result, although Canada was aware and sensitive to alliance needs, it was also able to formulate a decision based on Canadian interests.³¹⁶ Just because a Canadian value may be tied to or congruent with that of an allied country does not mean that the decision was forced without Canadian choice and control.

In general, when contemplating alliances, the debate for foreign policy writers centers on the extent that alliances mean a loss of Canadian control over decisions which could lessen the Canadian focus on peace and goodwill. In contrast, the defence writers fully accept the concept of the Canadian military with its tradition that is inherently tied to

³¹³An example would be Canada's ability to better defend the Arctic due to co-operation through NORAD.

³¹⁴Middlemiss and Sokolsky, p. 10.

³¹⁵This decision is explained in more detail in Joel J. Sokolsky. *Defending Canada: U. S.-Canadian Defense policies*. New York, N. Y.: Priority Press Publications, 1989, p. 35-37.

³¹⁶The actual criteria for the decision needs to be differentiated from the consequent actions which were more a result of domestic politics than alliance pressure.

Canada's history of involvement in allied defence.³¹⁷ Allies have strengthened and enriched Canadian military capabilities and involvement.³¹⁸

Canadian alliance involvement is also tied to the roles that Canada plays in the world. Perhaps the most widely recognized characteristic of Canadian foreign and defence policy is Canada's adherence to internationalism. Canada perceives itself as a country with an important role to play on the world stage. The large number of international organizations, groups and agreements to which Canada belongs or is a signatory demonstrates this international commitment. Internationalism stemmed from a variety of beliefs. According to the authors, all states including Canada are not alone in the world but rather are affected by world events. As a result, Canada should be an active participant in world events. A further motivation for internationalism is the belief in a better world order and the necessity of all states to work together to achieve this goal. Furthermore, there is the belief that Canadian security is intimately connected to world security and therefore the best way to work towards Canadian security is to work for greater international cooperation. Almost all these basic beliefs are present in both the foreign policy and defence writings. However, the different perceptions and assumptions underneath the beliefs can be contrasted.

The trademark of internationalism for the non-military tradition adherents is the diplomatic type functions of international cooperation.³¹⁹ Legal resolutions and consultations are the preferred Canadian processes for conflict resolution. As a result, foreign policy writers utilize Canada's role in organizations such as the UN to support the

³¹⁷Middlemiss and Sokolsky, p. 10

³¹⁸For example, Middlemiss and Sokolsky recognize that allied commitments "generated demands for the kinds of modern armed forces that, in the absence of allied roles, would simply not have been as strongly present." Middlemiss and Sokolsky, p. 218.

³¹⁹Numerous authors refer to this ideological understanding surrounding internationalism including Donneur, "l'idéalisme canadien transcende les gouvernements.... Il est à la base de l'internationalisme canadien." Donneur, p. 19; a similar reference is available in Keating, p. 36. It is also recognized that this element is the subject of numerous debates such as found in Lyon and Tomlin.

Canadian commitment to using international law and international organization as a means to achieve greater harmony among states. Canada is conceptualized as a country inherently suited to its internationalist role because of its power status, multicultural composition and historic role as good world citizen. Concepts such as functionalism are understood as a way for states like Canada to have an influence in the international system without having to be a major military power.

For defence writers, internationalism and the international organizations that Canada belongs to are not solely mechanisms to spread goodwill. The military is an integral element of their conceptualization of the internationalist tradition. Canada plays a role in many multilateral and bilateral organizations. A number of the organizations that Canada has participated in involve military commitments and therefore contribute to the Canadian military tradition. Even the principle organization for idealist visions of internationalism, the United Nations, is a collective security organization. The UN understanding of collective security, with its practice of functionalism, helps ensure a place for the military in Canada. Because Canada was committed to internationalism, Canada's troops were heavily integrated within the world order and committed to Western concepts of security such as deterrence. Although Canada's support for functionalism can be recognized as a way for smaller states to offer the skills that they possess to dissipate international tensions and conflict, it should be fully recognized that functionalism is also a way for an otherwise deficient nation to gain international status. Canada saw this as an advantage for itself by virtue of the fact that Canada's military was not of sufficient strength to otherwise buy Canada a seat at the table.

The implications of the different assumptions and beliefs surrounding Canadian involvement in international events are striking when viewed through the lens of a corollary element of Canadian internationalism such as middlepowermanship. Stark contrasts in

assumptions and beliefs are recognizable in the concept of middle power. The foreign policy writers use the term almost as a synonym for mediator. This concept has been absorbed as an ideological perspective of the special function that middle powers can achieve by virtue of their less grandiose ambitions. It is the middle powers who are most easily the mediators and negotiators because they generally have less direct influence in the initiation of events and are perceived to have no immediate ulterior motives. For foreign policy writers, Canada had and has a special role to play in world order by virtue of her middle power status. Canada has a "worldly wisdom, the kind that a small country can sometimes contribute to its own and the international community, to enhance understanding of the common dilemmas of existence and survival in a deeply troubled age."³²⁰

The root of the middle power state recognized by those writers who acknowledge the Canadian military tradition leads to a different assumption. According to power and capabilities considerations, the previous recognition of small and great powers no longer was relevant and a new class for states had to be recognized. Canada became classified as a middle power because it was neither militarily great nor small. Furthermore, the special role that Canada has been able to play as a middle power is by virtue of past military records and achievements and not because Canada is recognized internationally as a non-military country. Although Canada has played a mediatory role in conflicts such as the Suez Crisis, it is absurd to believe that Canada has a special gift as a middle power to fulfill a mediating role. An important distinction that often gets lost by the idealism in the ideological perspective is the distinction between the special pragmatic circumstances that allow a power such as Canada to perform mediatory, legalistic functions from an innate moral higher ideal or natural tendency. As enforced by Fraser, "no nation has a natural gift for mediation. Some, and Canada is one of them, are free from their major *disqualifications* - not colonial or ex colonial powers, not defending or asserting special

³²⁰Hertzman; et al., p. 10.

interests in other parts of the world, not big enough to be feared or poor enough to be impotent."³²¹

Similar discrepant viewpoints are also outlined in perceptions of peacekeeping. One of the most active international roles in which Canada has participated is peacekeeping. Despite a strong understanding that peacekeeping is a military function, there is a denial that it contributes to a military tradition. For foreign policy writers such as Sarty, the name "peacekeeping" is used as a euphemism for diplomacy, and is therefore separated from the reality that in peacekeeping operations, it is the military that is involved. In the article *Sunset Boulevard revisited? Canadian internationalism after the Cold War* Sarty uses peacekeeping as the best example of "Canada's post-Cold War diplomacy."³²²

Peacekeeping as carried out by armed forces, can be seen to be contradictory to diplomacy which is "the art and practice of conducting negotiations between nations."³²³ One does not become a Canadian peacekeeper without first being a Canadian soldier. The country cannot consider itself a peace forwarding nation without a recognition of the role of the military. The defence writers emphasize that Canada's military and fighting capability are what has made its contribution to peacekeeping operations possible. The Canadian military holds many traits which enable it to be a more effective peacekeeper. First of all, the Canadian military has at its disposal professionally trained soldiers that are needed for peacekeeping operations. Also, Canada's past record as an effective military power, such as during the World Wars, influenced the perspective that other states had with regard to Canadian capabilities. The diversity of Canada as reflected in its military composition and in particular, bilingualism, is another asset that has helped lead to Canadian peacekeeping prevalence. Finally, Canada is sometimes called on for peacekeeping operations not

³²¹Blair Fraser. "Canada: Mediator or Busybody?", in Innis, p. 20.

³²² Leigh Sarty. "Sunset Boulevard revisited? Canadian internationalism after the Cold War." *International Journal* XLVIII (Autumn 1993) p. 776.

³²³Webster's, p. 319

because it is a more peaceful nation but because it is seen as a relatively innocuous state that can also represent the Western viewpoint.³²⁴

One conceivable ramification of an incoherent culture as witnessed through the different beliefs and assumptions of the foreign policy and defence writers with regard to Canada's role in the world is Canada's commitment-capability gap.³²⁵ The commitment-capability gap is a good indicator of how a failed understanding of what our true abilities are leads to potential disaster.³²⁶ Prior to the 1990s, Canadian defence had been primarily based on Western defence needs. Even then, Canada confronted a commitment-capability gap. As stated by Rempel, "all too often commitments assumed have not been matched by real capabilities. As long as this remains so, the political credibility of Canadian defence policy will continue in question."³²⁷ Into the 1990s with the end of the Cold War, foreign and defence policy have taken on an even broader mandate. The result has been forces thrown into situations in which they must try to put forth their best efforts despite recognized deficiencies in either preparation, equipment, human resources or budget. Allan uses the Gulf War as an example of a situation in which "Canadian political leaders demonstrated that they were prepared to throw poorly prepared forces into war for short-term political rewards."³²⁸ These oversights continue because of a lack of a coherent recognition of the reality of the forces in the culture. "For most Canadians there is no recognition of the inadequacies of our military forces, nor any comprehension of the unpreparedness of our Forces for war. During the Gulf War a majority of Canadians

³²⁴Such was the case in Korea.

³²⁵It is recognized that many other factors contribute to the commitment-capability gap as well.

³²⁶Allan lists Hong Kong, Dieppe and the Gulf War as all examples of disaster due to misunderstanding capabilities. Colonel James Allan. "Canadian Defence Policy After the Gulf." Canadian Defence Quarterly Vol. 21 No. 2 (October 1991). Rempel would add to this list the placement of troops in Germany. Roy Rempel. "The Canadian Army and the Commitment-Capability Gap: Central Europe, 1956-1961." Canadian Defence Quarterly Vol 25 No. 1 (Sept. 1995).

³²⁷Rempel, p. 26.

³²⁸ Allan, p. 22.

probably believed that our Forces on land, sea, and air were capable of fighting a modern war against a well armed foe."³²⁹

Although assumptions present in the writings with regard to Canadian roles in international affairs and peacekeeping help designate the two sides of the silent debate, the greatest difference is in the assumptions embedded in the differing moral beliefs propagated by each camp. It is widely believed by the authors who adhere to a belief in a non-military tradition that Canada also is a country of impeccable moral standards and almost altruistic values. The idealist notions incorporated with this sense of morality are inconsistent with these writers' conception of a military and thus they reject or ignore the notion of a military tradition. Therefore, other Canadian traditions become the focus. Hertzman outlines this notion stating, "the potential of Canada derives from the country's unusual advantages of strategic territory, our actual and projected wealth, technical and intellectual sophistication, cultural diversity, sense of moral commitment."³³⁰ Canada's reliance on law and order, economics and other non-violent means of international involvement is believed to be attributable to a higher sense of morality. Even military issues have been classified within this benevolent moralism and therefore removed from notions of a military tradition. Canada is identified as an adamant disarmament supporter and peacekeeper.

To defence writers, Canadian moralism does not stand up when scrutinized. Through a more pragmatic look at Canada's foreign and defence policy, they posit that Canada's roles internationally have been based not on the idealism of a higher moral authority but on the realism of Canada's place and power in the world order. Many of the economic and legal considerations that Canada has been committed to are based not on moral authority but on historical, geographical and political factors which have influenced Canada's ability to pursue its national interests. The majority of Canadians have the ability

³²⁹Allan, p. 22.

³³⁰Hertzman, in Hertzman et. al., p. 5.

to ignore war because they have little direct connection to it. This privilege is available to Canadians not because Canada is a country which has removed itself from the throes of battle. Indeed, Canadian soldiers have been widely used in international combat. Canadian military operations have been tied to almost all of the major Western wars of the last century. Canada has even contributed to mechanisms of war through its participation in the trade and manufacturing of instruments of war and through other commitments to the Western military apparatus. All of these factors lead to an undeniable military tradition which has helped shape the country and identity of Canadians.

Recognition of a Canadian tradition:

The different moral understandings are at the root of the silent debate over the military tradition. The confusion whether or not Canada has a military tradition may exist in part because of assumptions that exist over what a military tradition means. A reason for Canadian contradictory beliefs toward the military is hypothesized in Stanley's book, *A Military History of an Unmilitary People*. Stanley explains the adoption of a belief in higher ideals and the non-military nature of Canada by separating the military from the act it is most often associated with, that is, war. Stanley believes that Canadians "were an "unmilitary" people because they shunned large, permanent military establishments, not because they shunned war itself."³³¹ A corollary to this view is offered by Haydon in, *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian involvement reconsidered*. Haydon believes that Canadians may ignore or neglect their military in times of peace. However, "most Canadians are intensely proud of their country's military accomplishments in wartime."³³² Alternatively, there is a belief that the military causes war or any association with the

³³¹George F. G. Stanley. *Canada's Soldiers, 1604-1954: the Military History of an Unmilitary People*. Toronto, Ont.: Macmillan Company, 1960, p. 1.

³³²Haydon, p. 45.

military is an acceptance of war. Ignorance of the military can be attributed to "the apparently automatic association of the military with war and warmongering, and in a society that has been conditioned to abhor and fear war, it is not surprising that people would be apprehensive about supporting the armed forces."³³³ As a result, there is a belief that Canada can be disassociated from the military. However, this belief is erroneous. The distinction is clear for the writers of the military tradition: "weapons and armies are not the causes of war. Wars are the result of political conflicts when leaders resort to force to settle disputes or achieve gains."³³⁴

Despite adherence to the belief of the Canadian disassociation from the military, modern society desires an institution which can "protect, preserve, and perpetuate the social system."³³⁵ In modern Western society, the military has been one organization which has played that role. In Canada, as in many modern states, the military is like the police, not there to be violent but there because modern society has a belief that "coercive force is necessary to protect its key values, albeit in the last resort."³³⁶ Consistent with this it can be recognized that Canada has a military and that that military has played a role in shaping Canadian society. The military is an institution for protection and is not simply a fighting machine. As recognized by Willet, the military "is not an obedient machine but a human concern that reflects the culture of the host society to which it belongs."³³⁷ It is in fact the society and its culture that defines the organizations within it. "A business firm, a church, or any other institution functions within the cultural system of the society in which it is located."³³⁸ The military is no exception to this.

³³³Willet, p. 194.

³³⁴William J. Yost. *Peace Through Security: A Total Defence Approach*. Ottawa Ont.: Conference of Defence Associations, 1987, p. xii.

³³⁵G. J. Carpenter. "The military organization in an environment of social change." Byers and Gray (eds.), p. 33.

³³⁶Willet, p. 13.

³³⁷Willet, p. 13.

³³⁸Carpenter in Byers and Gray, p. 29.

The military tradition is not just a concept or notion but rather a part of a social institution and therefore it "is an essential characteristic of the society within which it is constituted. It symbolizes the society's history and reputation, yet it is more than a symbol: it exists."³³⁹ Willet outlines the necessity of recognition of the military for the formation of Canadian identity with great clarity. In reference to the works of Mills and Gerth, Willet outlines the groupings of social institutions as "kinship, religious, political, economic and military."³⁴⁰ In relation to these institutions Willet states: "These institutions constitute Canadian society as both an idea and a fact. Without each and all of them, Canada cannot exist in its own right. Hence the concerns expressed about having a national identity that is more than a mere label since it is emotional and 'felt'."³⁴¹ True Canadian identity can only come through true recognition and therefore self-realization or in other words a coherent culture. Canadians who neglect or ignore the military can not recognize the military tradition and fail to realize this effect on identity and its ramifications on culture.

For defence writers, the lack of self-realization or cultural coherency can be identified as one of the problems within the military itself. An article by Thériault outlines a number of problems within the Canadian armed forces. Thériault identifies "the consequence of the political culture that has evolved in Canada, of political institutions that have become ineffectual as a result, and of their effect on the whole function of government... as... fundamentally, the underlying problem affecting defence."³⁴² However, defence writers are also negligent in truly recognizing culture. While asserting a combat capable force, the other international roles and recognition of the societal responsibility of the institution need to also be embraced.

³³⁹Terry Willet. "The Canadian Military: A Design for Tomorrow." Canadian Defence Quarterly Vol. 22 No. 5 (May 1993) p. 44.

³⁴⁰Willet, "Design for Tomorrow.", p. 44.

³⁴¹Willet, "Design for Tomorrow", p. 44

³⁴²both quotes from Thériault, p. 9.

The Canadian military tradition is a pragmatic reality that cannot be ignored.

However, a sense of the idealism present in foreign policy writings is also needed. Olson in the book *Canadian Defence and the Pursuit of Peace* differentiates the two philosophies by stating that the trick is between "balancing two sets of needs; those for defence and those for peace."³⁴³ According to Olson, one can not be emphasized over the other. However, "governments attempt to avoid the dilemma by claiming that one is really the same as the other."³⁴⁴ Foreign policy writers may believe that peace is the best defence while defence writers assert that one cannot have peace without defence. However, the integration of these perspectives is needed for Canada to truly attain cultural coherency and therefore self understanding. In order to integrate the different beliefs and assumptions within the silent debate a different conceptualization of the military is needed.

In some ways, this discrepancy between the two sides of the debate regarding the nature of the military in Canada can be characterized in terms of the many classic dualities such as idealism versus realism. In examining this debate, Carr comes to the conclusion that understanding both elements and recognizing ambiguity is necessary for a full understanding of politics and therefore international relations. Carr states that "constant interaction of irreconcilable forces is the stuff of politics. Every political situation contains mutually incompatible elements of utopia and reality, or morality and power."³⁴⁵ However, the need to embrace dualities is often neglected by writers and theorists in international relations and it is for this reason that some attention to culture should be paid.

There are numerous elements that demonstrate contrasting assumptions and beliefs about Canadian recognition of its military tradition. However, assigning coherency to a culture through examining tradition also requires an understanding of values. In the first

³⁴³Theodore Olson (ed.). *Canadian Defence and the Pursuit of Peace*. Toronto, Ont.: York Centre for International and Strategic Studies, 1988, p. 2.

³⁴⁴Olson, p. 3.

³⁴⁵E. H. Carr. *The Twenty Years Crisis*. London: MacMillan & Co. Limited, 1940, p. 119.

chapter the tradition - value - culture link was discussed. It was stated that a change in value was in fact a replacement of tradition for it creates a new tradition - value - culture experience. If it can be assumed that the separate advocates of the nature of the Canadian military tradition hold different values, then it also must follow that they adhere to a different cultural identity.

In the writings on Canadian foreign and defence policy, one can demonstrate different beliefs and assumptions and therefore some different values, but not necessarily completely different values. Canadians value peace and stability. Throughout the mini debates and conflicts within the debate over the nature of the military tradition the common goal of greater peace remains. In pursuing this goal, Canada acts primarily according to its interests, even though Canada has never been a country with aggressive or expansionist tendencies. The true nature of the Canadian military tradition needs to be more fully recognized in order to allow for a greater understanding of identity through culture.

According to the views offered by the foreign policy writers, one can infer that a recognition of a military tradition would be inconsistent with their belief in Canadian morality and the assertion that Canada prefers legalistic solutions and goodwill in order to address international conflict. These beliefs are contradictory to military tradition writers who propagate a sense of Canada as a nation with a strong military history in combat. The impasse that arises can be breached when the nature of the Canadian military is recognized in its true form. There is a military tradition. However, it is distinctly Canadian and not consistent with either the notion of a reliance solely on legalities or with a view of Canada as a predominantly war-fighting nation. Recognizing a Canadian military is not inconsistent with believing in a more legalistic or peaceful nature of Canada for a recognition of the role of the military shows a distinctly Canadian tradition that includes these elements. Conceptualizations of the military need to combine "its specialized function

of applying force with a social function of contributing to the inner strength of the nation."³⁴⁶

The Canadian armed forces have their roots in colonial traditions and have also been heavily influenced by Canada's powerful American neighbour.³⁴⁷ Yet there are also a number of uniquely Canadian traits within the Canadian armed forces. Its influence on Canadian nationalism is one of the most striking and early indicators of unique Canadianism. The military tradition has fostered a sense of national identity and pride. Morton asserts that, "the young Canadians who embarked for South Africa on October 31, 1899, may have responded to the call of the Empire. Within a month of arrival at Cape Town, they no longer wondered what it meant to be Canadian. The experience would be repeated in two World Wars, in Korea, and in a host of minor peacekeeping excursions."³⁴⁸

Further to a source of pride, the unique identity of the military emerges through an examination of the Canadian military roles. Historically, the Canadian forces were not only geared to fight and win war but also to lend support to the settlement of the nation. The Canadian military continues to be involved in a number of war-fighting activities yet it has most often been embraced by Canadians through its para-military or quasi-military roles such as to enhance diplomacy or peacekeeping. These activities include: "emergency relief, the provision of aid to victims of and refugees from natural disasters civil strife, or war."³⁴⁹ Although such roles are not within the traditional conception of the military as a fighting machine, they are military roles nonetheless, integral to the Canadian military tradition.

³⁴⁶Willet, "Design for Tomorrow.", p. 46.

³⁴⁷Laurence Motiuk. "The officer corps and the future." in Byers and Gray, p. 43.

³⁴⁸Desmond Morton, p.xiii.

³⁴⁹Motiuk in Byers and Gray, p. 41.

After the 1971 White Paper, the forces gained even greater distinctly Canadian traits with the emphasis on sovereignty resulting in a further emphasis of internal security, aid to civil authorities, and national unity. Internal security as part of a social defence role was a major requirement of the Canadian forces in the 1970s.³⁵⁰ The military is being used more and more in quasi or para-military roles such as search and rescue, drug interdiction and disaster relief. However, lack of recognition of the military has meant that the public is slow to recognize these roles.³⁵¹

All of these roles have a strong influence on Canadian society. As remarked in 1972, "the changes over the past eight years may be characterized as a shift toward Canadianism."³⁵² Today, the unique Canadianism of the Canadian military, combined with traditional military ideas, can be witnessed within the Canadian military tradition. As Canada faces new challenges to its security, greater recognition of this tradition is needed. This recognition is needed in order for Canadians to truly attain self-realization or cultural coherency which will help in the formation of policy.

The need for Canadians to achieve greater self-realization is not new. In 1960, W. L. Morton called for Canada to "achieve a self-definition of greater clarity and more ringing tone than it has yet done."³⁵³ Achieving this through a recognition of culture leads to a balance between morality and realism, idealism and politics; ideas that are not new. Canadian foreign and defence policy and strategy needs to more concretely follow the

³⁵⁰Willet in Byers and Gray, p. 52.

³⁵¹A 1989 Longwoods survey indicated that 61% of respondents were aware of the military's peacekeeping role yet only 28% knew that the military was involved in emergency and rescue operations. Less than 20% of respondents were aware of the other functions of the military such as drug control and coastal surveillance. Although these numbers may be quite different given the recent domestic operations of the military in Canada, the figures do support the lack of knowledge about the military and its operations due to an ignorance of military affairs. statistics quoted in Michel Fortmann and Edouard Cloutier. "The Domestic Context of Canadian Defence Policy: The Contours of an Emerging Debate." Canadian Defence Quarterly Vol. 21 No. 1 (1991), p.17.

³⁵²Carpenter in Byers and Gray, p. 29.

³⁵³William Morton, p. x.

adage of Carr, in recognizing that operations should be based "on that uneasy compromise between power and morality which is the foundation of all political life."³⁵⁴ Canadians need to embrace tradition to ensure consistent values informing culture for it is culture, with its ambiguity, that helps one reach a compromise between dualities. Embracing these dualities is needed to truly understand the identity or culture of the country.

Conclusion

A silent debate over the nature of the Canadian military tradition exists. This debate can be examined through the different beliefs and assumptions contained in foreign policy and defence writings. Although the beliefs and assumptions attributed to the nature of the Canadian military tradition vary between the two groups of writers, the same core values are intact for the writers. Both sides value stability and peace. As a result, one can conclude that Canada does have a military tradition but one that has not been clearly identified. The lack of recognition of the true nature of the Canadian military tradition contributes to a lack of cohesive identity and thus culture in the area of Canadian foreign and defence policy. Canada does not fully attribute to its 'Self' the composite traits of identity. As a result, there is a lack of self-realization necessary for a coherent, consistent Canadian foreign and defence policy culture.

There are many potential ramifications of this lack of understanding. Some of the outcomes result in conflict within the military and defence community itself. Other ramifications can be witnessed in conflict between the foreign and defence policy communities in reconciling the implementation and execution of policy decisions. Recognition of this variable can be helpful for the formulation of future policies. For

³⁵⁴Carr, p. 220.

example, a more clear understanding of the Canadian role and abilities during future peacemaking operations may help prevent repetition of the incidents during the Somalia operation. Greater foreign policy recognition of the strengths and weaknesses of its forces with regard to both skills and resources coupled with greater sensitivity of all members of the military to the Canadian ideal of a higher morality may have had an impact in the Somalia situation. In retrospect one could surmise that had the foreign policy decision makers been truly conscious of the military situation, the Airborne regiment may not have been deployed. On the other hand, if the military had a deeper understanding of Canadian expectations in such an ambiguous security situation perhaps its soldiers and leaders would have made different decisions. Obviously many other scenarios are possible when one is taking a retrospective look at an issue. However, the greatest function of this thesis is to serve as a basis for future analytical work and policy formation.

Ironically both sides of the 'silent debate' are adhering to the same deficient Western, utopian philosophy. Attributing utopian idealism to a number of the military tradition authors may seem unsubstantiated. However, the reliance on science and technology as a guiding principle - a transcendent doctrine to be followed and obeyed locks them into the promise of utopia once science, the god of modernity - is given full power. This split over the nature of the Canadian tradition is consistent with Western culture neglect. Because Westerners do not fully embrace dualities and rely on rationality, the full complexity of beliefs and assumptions cannot be met, leaving a crisis. It is in embracing dualities that culture is useful. The recognition of culture teaches that dualities and complexities should be embraced and individuals should be cautioned against simple polarities. Simplistic, polar perceptions can lead to conflicting understandings of ends and means and therefore have ramifications on policy formation. As stated by Holmes, "However exasperating and however irksome, there is no escaping considerations on the

one hand and considerations on the other, even when they are not reconcilable."³⁵⁵ The ends of foreign and defence policy cannot be separated from the means. Canada's actions towards a peaceful world order cannot be separated from the military and historic realities that helped position the country for the international role it plays today and will continue to play in the future.

³⁵⁵As quoted in Denis Stairs. "The Pedagogics of John W. Holmes." in Nossal (ed.), p. 4.

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




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