

**THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POST-COMMUNIST (TRANSITIONAL)
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE**

by

Mark Yaniszewski, B.A./M.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
December 11, 1997
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0-612-32352-8

ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates two related questions regarding the collapse of Communist and Soviet rule in Poland and Hungary: (1) what analytical tools are best employed in evaluating post-Communist civil-military relations, and (2) what system of civil-military relations is emerging in these two states. The principal theoretical contribution of this thesis consists of a Typology of Relevance which analyzes: (1) historical or background variables, (2) universal themes which relate to real or potential sources of civil-military tension or conflict; (3) themes of a universal or wide-ranging nature which the critical analysis suggests may *not* be appropriate for these cases; and (4) exogenous variables which are either absent or under-represented in the existing theoretical formulations.

After applying this theoretical framework to the Polish and Hungarian cases, this study concludes that both Poland and Hungary are well on their way to developing a system of democratic civilian control over their armed forces. At the same time, this study concludes with a more positive assessment of the Polish case. In Poland, the main areas of civil-military tension are currently either stable (i.e., the fiscal situation) or they are demonstrating marked and continuing improvement (i.e., the resolution of questions of civilian authority over the military). In Hungary, the opposite is true. The most serious sites of tension (i.e., the budgetary and procurement crises) show few if any signs of improving in the near or medium terms. In fact, the material condition of the Hungarian armed forces continues to decline markedly. It is largely on this basis that the Polish case is rated more positively than the Hungarian case.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Despite the claim of solo authorship on the title page, no doctoral thesis is ever really the product of a single person. It is a long and very difficult endeavour and it can only be brought to completion if one has both the support and friendship of a large number of people.

I would like to take this opportunity to first thank my supervisor, Dr. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, for all of her efforts on my behalf. Dr. Rakowska-Harmstone provided me with invaluable advice and encouragement during both the research and writing of this thesis. She also served to give me “good kick” whenever I fell into one of the typical grad student traps. I owe a great debt to Dr. Rakowska-Harmstone.

I would also like to thank Dr. Carl G. Jacobsen and Dr. Harald von Riekhoff. Their support as committee members is deeply appreciated. Thanks also to departmental Supervisors of Graduate Studies, Dr. Scott E. Bennett, Dr. Sharon L. Sutherland, and Dr. Vince Della Sala, for their support.

In addition to my academic advisors, I would like to take this opportunity to thank my family (Mom, Dad, and Peter) for their support. As well, I would like to say thanks to several of my colleagues for their assistance and friendship over these many years. To

Richard, Chris, Tim, Yasse, Scott, Roman, Emer, Thierry, Mike, and Rena, I say “thanks” (especially during the “before time”).

Finally, I would like to extend my special thanks to Valerie Pereboom. Without her unfailing assistance, I would never have managed to find my way through the “mine-field” of rules and regulations which constitute the Ph.D. program.

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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Introduction:

Prior to the events of 1989-1990, the conventional theoretical wisdom on the subject of East European civil-military relations suggested that the military establishments of Leninist Eastern Europe almost certainly would support the *status quo* and their Communist Party benefactors in times of crisis. Although the severity of the political, social, economic, and environmental crises that challenged these regimes was believed to be dysfunctional in the long run, these problems were not expected to lead to the overthrow of these regimes in the near future (i.e., “in our lifetime”). Most scholars expected the East European regimes to *solve* problems of popular discontent in the short and medium terms with the tried and true application of the “iron fist” or by a series of half-hearted reforms which would allow these regimes to “muddle through” or otherwise continue to lurch from crisis to crisis.

These predictions were obviously unfounded. The crises of 1989-1990 instead proved to be disastrous for the national Communist Parties of Eastern Europe. Forty-five years of domination — monitoring, propagandizing, coopting, and punishing the national military establishments — failed to create useful, dependable pillars of Communist rule. When push came to shove, the various national militaries (with the notable exception of the Rumanian armed forces) swung the balance of power away from their national governments and towards the opposition forces by standing idly by and effectively neutralizing themselves. In the case of the one exception — Rumania — the military

actively and successfully fought to unseat the neo-Stalinist regime of Nicolae Ceaucescu alongside the various opposition movements. So much for the notion that the military of a Leninist state was simply “an administrative arm of the Party.”¹

To a certain extent, the existing general literature on civil-military relations and the specific literature on East European civil-military relations have attempted to explain for the transformation that has occurred in Hungary and Poland since 1989. It is, however, probably safe to argue that the totality of the crisis that swept across Eastern Europe (and later the Soviet Union itself) and the speed with which the storm broke left the academic community unprepared to provide any real indication of the future direction of East European civil-military relations in a post-Communist context.

Although an interesting piece in the overall puzzle, this project is not designed to study the role of the East European military establishments in the collapse of Communist and Soviet rule in 1989-1990.² Instead, it has set for itself the more difficult task of critically analyzing the subsequent impact of this transition on the Hungarian and Polish military establishments and upon the broader topic of East European civil-military relations in the post-Communist (transitional) period.³ To that end, the Typology of Relevance presented

¹ This position was articulated by William E. Odom in “The ‘Militarization’ of Soviet Society,” *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XXV, No. 5 (September-October 1976), pp. 34-51 and “The Party Connection,” *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XXII, No. 5 (September-October 1973), pp. 12-26.

² This topic is discussed in Zoltan D. Barany, “East European Armed Forces in Transition and Beyond,” *East European Quarterly*, Vol. XXVI, No. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 1-30.

³ The qualifier “transitional” is used here and throughout this thesis to distinguish the current, dynamic reform process from the more stable “end-product” which will ultimately emerge in Hungary and Poland. At this point, it appears likely that the end of the “transitional” period will be symbolically marked by the

in this thesis is intended to offer answers to two related questions: (1) what is the nature and form of the developing system of post-Communist civil-military relations in Eastern Europe, and (2) what analytical tools can be employed to undertake this analysis. By shedding light upon those areas of real or potential conflict and confrontation between the civilian authorities and the national military establishment, this analysis will contribute to a better understanding of the Hungarian and Polish cases and it will contribute to the process of theory-building in the general issue area of civil-military relations.

East European Civil-Military Relations in Transition (An Overview):

Until 1989, the armies of Communist Eastern Europe could be categorized rather succinctly as performing two basic roles: one internal and one external to the state.⁴ Internally, the military establishment was assigned the role of Praetorian guardian of the communist regime. The Defence of Socialism — a concept that Lenin initially devised — entailed the following (potential) tasks: (a) acting as a deterrent to the regime's opponents, (b) "backing-up" police and other internal security services in times of trouble, or, if all else failed, (c) leading the direct military struggle against counter-revolutionary elements within the state. Externally, the armed forces were expected to act

ascension of these states into the NATO alliance in 1999. (This project is current as of August 1997.) Use of the terms "Communist" and "post-Communist" to describe the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies of Eastern Europe reflects the practice of most Western academic literature. In Soviet parlance, the terms "Socialist" and "Socialism" were used to describe the socio-economic system in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China while terms like "Socialist-oriented" were used to describe allied regimes in the Third World.

⁴ The following thesis was first articulated in Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Christopher D. Jones, John Jaworsky, and Ivan Sylvain, *Warsaw Pact: The Question of Cohesion, Phase II/Volume I — The Greater Socialist Army: Integration and Reliability*, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment ORAE Extra-Mural Paper No. 29 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1984), especially chapters 4, 6-8, and 11.

as military allies of a foreign power (i.e., the Soviet Union) in the spirit of “socialist internationalism.” In the event of an armed conflict with NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the East European armies were to play important offensive or defensive roles. To that end, all East European militaries (with the partial exception of Rumania) were tied bilaterally to the Soviet armed forces.

In neither the internal or external contexts were the armed forces to be accorded an independent societal role by the Soviet or East European Communist Party machines. Moreover, in virtually no contexts did the Communist-era militaries exercise such independence (the Polish martial law regime of General Wojciech Jaruzelski perhaps being a partial exception to this rule).

Internally, the system by which basic military issues were resolved (i.e., career advancement, assignment to duties, awards, and other decisions and policies that normally comprise the sovereign corporate domain of any modern military establishment as well as issues of doctrine, training, procurement, the military mission, and other areas that typically are decided by civilian authorities with the advice of the armed forces) was completely penetrated by the Communist Party political apparatus. The decision-making process was subject to the vagaries of the *nomenklatura* (i.e., the system of politically motivated appointments), the discipline of Party membership, the intelligence gathering activities of the various security agencies, and the Main Political Administrations (which operated as both a department within the Central Committee of the Communist Party and as an institutional component of the Ministry of Defence).

Externally, the role of the East European armed forces was circumscribed exclusively by the exigencies of the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact. This took the form of political controls (i.e., the various organs of the Warsaw Pact — the Political Consultative Committee, the Foreign Minister's Committee, and the Council of Defence Ministers) and the various associated military controls (i.e., the Warsaw Pact's Soviet-dominated Joint Military Command, Soviet-East European bilateral maneuvers, training programs at Soviet military academies, arms transfers and weapons standardization programs largely based on Soviet weapons systems, Soviet garrisons, and military doctrine and unit dispositions designed to assist a Soviet-led war against the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization).

Now, all this has changed. The armed forces' role as guarantor of a quasi-legitimate Party is finished. Instead of politicizing military affairs by penetrating every level of the military establishment (as was the practice in the Communist era), these new regimes are attempting to create a system in which the military abstains from involvement in the political process in return for a promise by the civilian elites not to politicize the armed forces or interfere in the military's legitimate internal affairs. Instead of extra-legal controls exercised at the whim of the Party hierarchy (the dominant pattern of control for more than four decades), the post-Communist regimes and military are moving to codify their relationship in the national constitution, in legislation implementing these constitutional principles, and in routine administrative practices. And instead of a system of "subjective" civilian control (to use Huntington's terminology), the democratic

regimes (with the assistance of their NATO patrons) are working to create a system of “objective” civilian control.

In terms of their external functions, the role of these military establishments has changed as well. As a military alliance, the Warsaw Pact is now as dead *in fact* as its political consultative organs always were *in practice*. Instead of serving as quiescent pawns of a foreign power, the Hungarian and Polish armed forces are now the defenders of sovereign states. Instead of following the dictates of Moscow through the thinly-veiled machinery of the Warsaw Pact, these armies are in the process of becoming junior partners in the NATO alliance.

Variables Affecting the Reform Process (An Overview):

In the aftermath of the collapse of Communist rule, the development of a new civil-military relationship has been one of the top priorities for the new democratic regimes of Hungary and Poland. Although these regimes stand on the threshold of membership in the West’s defence structures, the process of civil-military reform is not yet complete. A number of factors — some which further this process and others which retard this process — are at work here.

First, the establishment of a new civil-military relationship is being influenced to a certain degree by older, pre-Communist patterns of civil-military relations. Historical traditions do run deep in Hungary and Poland (as they do in most societies) and, in times of great change, it is not surprising that the traits of the underlying political culture are re-

asserting themselves. Second, totalitarianism left its own unique mark on post-reform civil-military relations. Third, a whole host of specific doctrinal, organizational, constitutional, fiscal, and administrative arrangements have to be settled to the satisfaction of the two sides. And finally, external factors (especially the process of meeting NATO's expansion criteria) also influence this relationship and have affected both the civilian and the military sides of the civil-military equation.

In Hungary, most overt mechanisms of the politicization of the armed forces were terminated as Communist rule collapsed. The Hungarian MPA was transformed into a relatively unimportant teaching and training institution in early 1990 and Communist Party cells were banned from within the military on July 20, 1989. As democratic forces consolidated their control, security forces were no longer directed to penetrate the military establishment to look for politically unreliable cadres and paramilitary organizations were no longer expected to act as counter-weights to the regular armed forces.

By 1991, a ruling by the Constitutional Court successfully resolved the major constitutional issues involving the command of the armed forces (by setting forth the relative jurisdiction of the president, prime minister, and defence minister) and this allowed the National Assembly to begin the long and difficult process of establishing democratic civilian oversight of the armed forces. The legislature has set up legislative committees to oversee military affairs, passed legislation governing the duties and obligations of armed forces personnel, and worked towards redefining the national military doctrine (and so on).

On the other hand, the process of establishing an effective system of democratic civilian control in Hungary has been impeded by several other factors. Most deleterious to the fostering of good civil-military relations has been the financial crisis which has befallen the armed forces. In many cases, officers and enlisted personnel live in poverty or are forced to supplement their incomes with jobs in the civilian sector. And procurement of new weapons systems is virtually non-existent. Overall, the crisis is so severe that the viability of the military as an institution may even be threatened. This has only worsened the already low social prestige of a military career and made the resolution of the outstanding issues between the military and the civilian powers difficult to achieve.

In Poland, the process of establishing an effective system of democratic civilian control is also incomplete and the reasons for this delay are different than they were in the case of Hungary. In Poland (like Hungary), most mechanisms of overt Communist politicization were terminated relatively early in the reform process. The Polish MPA was transformed and ultimately disbanded between December 1989 and April 1990 and Communist Party cells were banned from within the military in late 1989. Paramilitary organizations were no longer expected to act as political counterweights to the regular forces and the security forces no longer worked for a monolithic political party instead of the state as a whole.

Unlike the case in Hungary, the financial crisis that faces the Polish military — although serious — does not threaten the viability of the Polish military as an institution. As such, financial issues are not the most serious impediments to good civil-military relations. In

addition, the Polish military as an institution enjoys enormous and widespread social prestige.

On the other hand, the process of resolving constitutional, legislative, and administrative issues in Poland was blocked until late 1995. The transition was first slowed by the retention of key positions of power (i.e., the presidency, the Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry of Interior) by the Communists and later — the the post-Communist era — it was again delayed by a series of conflicts which arose between President Lech Wałęsa and the Sejm. These issues are only now in the process of being resolved. Unfortunately, the military even now continues to be the site of conflicts between civilian authorities and this has further retarded the process of establishing a complete and effective system of democratic civilian control.

General Organization of the Thesis (An Overview):

In organizational terms, this thesis is divided into six chapters one of which (Chapter Five) is itself divided into eight sections. Following this introduction and overview (Chapter One), the thesis turns its attention to the general methodological issues which will guide the subsequent analysis (Chapter Two). In terms of the general methodological framework, the decision to employ a comparative approach will be justified as will the selection of the two cases: Hungary and Poland. As well, discussion will turn to the contribution this thesis intends to make in filling the “theoretical void” which has arisen in the aftermath of the collapse of the Communist order in Eastern Europe (especially as this pertains to the issue area of civil-military relations).

The following chapter (Chapter Three) constitutes the literature review. Although the transition that is occurring in Poland and Hungary (as well as the rest of the formerly-Communist world) represents a unique confluence of international, political, and historical factors; existing theoretical formulations — designed to explain civil-military relations in disparate contexts — can and do contribute to an understanding of the cases under review as well as the more theoretical issue of civil-military relations in general. In this chapter, key underlying concepts as well as five “families” of theories of civil-military relations will be critically analyzed.

In Chapter Four, the Typology of Relevance is presented.⁵ The Typology of Relevance brings together the insights garnered from the evaluation of the existing literature into a single analytical tool. The Typology of Relevance involves the distillation of these insights in order to search for any recurring themes or variables relevant to the analysis of post-Communist (transitional) civil-military relations. Recurrent themes *may* have universal validity while non-recurrent themes *may* be area, time, or system specific. Finally, the critical analysis of the general milieu and the existing theoretical formulations may reveal areas where existing theory is lacking and new formulations or variables need to be added or developed. All of these theses will be *analyzed individually* in order to access their potential utility to the study of the cases under review. This original, albeit preliminary, research will guide, in turn, the analysis of the specific East European cases: Poland and Hungary.

⁵ This term was the suggestion of the thesis supervisor — Dr. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone.

With the Typology of Relevance as an analytical guide, the thesis next turns to the empirical test of the specific “Propositions” which the analysis of the existing theoretical formulations suggests may be significant in the development of post-Communist civil-military relations in Poland and Hungary. Chapter 5.1 begins this process by critically analyzing the historical factors (i.e., political culture) which are affecting this reform process. Political culture, at the same time, represents only one-half of the context of the current civil-military transition. In Chapter 5.2, the second background or historical variable - the legacy of totalitarianism - is presented. Contemporary Poland and Hungary are experiencing the aftereffects of a totalitarian political order which collapsed principally as a result of internal factors rather than through defeat at war and occupation by a foreign power. This history left a unique mark on the reform process.

In the next section (Chapter 5.3), the empirical analysis of the post-Communist system turns to the issue of the legitimacy of civilian rule and the related question of the *form* such civilian control will take in the post-Communist era. In both Hungary and Poland, the replacement of the previous system of subjective civil-military control by a system of objective civil-military control was widely accepted by civilians and the military alike, but disputes arose in both states over which civilian authorities should legitimately exercise control over the military (i.e., the president or parliament). These disputes, moreover, occasionally caused the military to take sides with one civilian faction against another.

In Chapters 5.4 and 5.5, the two general strategies which civilian authorities can employ to perpetuate civilian rule are analyzed. These non-exclusive strategies are as follows: (a) the state can employ a system of recurrent legal and administrative mechanisms to manage the armed forces (i.e., the civilian authorities can move to *institutionalize* the civil-military relationship), and/or (b) the civilian authorities can employ adjunct or special mechanisms to control the military (i.e., the civilian authorities can move to *subordinate* the military component of the civil-military equation to civilian direction). Each of these strategies are associated with certain costs and benefits in terms of perpetuating a system of harmonious civil-military relations.

In the next chapter (Chapter 5.6), the “military” side of the civil-military relationship is investigated (especially the areas of potential conflict and confrontation between civilian authorities and the military establishment). There are a considerable number of issue areas which may be sites of civil-military tensions, but there are also issue areas where the civilian and military establishments are in agreement. Each issue area is individually analyzed and certain preliminary conclusions are drawn.

In Chapter 5.7, the thesis turns its attention to a potentially non-relevant theme culled from the existing literature. Specifically, it is noted that amongst existing theoretical formulations there is a near universal focus upon the officer corps as the most important and representative military component when analyzing national civil-military relations. In the Typology of Relevance, it is theorized that such a concentrated focus — often to the total exclusion of all other elements of the military establishment — represents a

theoretical weakness which needs to be filled. In this chapter, this observation is empirically tested.

In the final section of Chapter Five (Chapter 5.8), the thesis turns to the analysis of the effect exogenous variables (i.e., the geopolitical context) will have on post-Communist civil-military relations. This international context will involve more than just issues of victory or defeat in foreign military contests (or the prospect of such a defeat in the near-term). Longer-term and more multifaceted security issues and international institutions will also be analyzed.

And finally, in Chapter Six, the preliminary conclusions which were presented in the context of the individual “Propositions” are brought together. Based on these preliminary conclusions, an overall assessment of Polish and Hungarian civil-military relations in the post-Communist (transitional) period is undertaken.

CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY

I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.

Sir Winston Spencer Churchill, October 1939

Introduction:

Churchill's famous aphorism about politics in the Soviet Union indicated that the British wartime leader could not foretell what the Soviet Union would do following the German invasion of Poland. But this observation could just as easily have been penned by a contemporary social scientist to describe the inability of academics, analysts, and policy-makers to make any sense of the many varied developments and changes that have swept across the Soviet Union and the Communist states of Eastern Europe since 1989. In point of fact, Churchill's maxim was echoed by Alfred Meyer who wrote: "It is safe to assert that every important event that has taken place in the Communist world within the last five years or so has come as a surprise to the profession, i.e., to students of the USSR and its client states."¹ In spheres as varied as economics, politics, international relations, and civil-military relations, shopworn theories and models of numerous social scientists have, in most (but significantly not all) cases, failed abjectly to either predict the timing of these changes or they have proved incapable of explaining the nature of these developments

¹ Alfred G. Meyer, "Politics and Methodology in Soviet Studies," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (June 1991), pp. 127-136; rpt. in *Post-Communist Studies and Political Science: Methodology and Empirical Theory in Sovietology*, eds. Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. and Erik P. Hoffmann (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1993), p. 163.

and their underlying causes.²

Needless to say, both Churchill's and Meyer's comments are salient particularly in regard to the study of civil-military relations in Eastern Europe. The inability of the existing theoretical literature to chart these troubled waters is especially problematic given the central role that theory has occupied for subject areas such as civil-military relations. Traditionally, the analysis of civil-military relations has been theory driven because direct, empirical data usually has been at something of a premium. Security concerns, misinformation, and outright propaganda (from friend and foe alike) frequently have served to hide the truth from scholastic and professional investigators. The result has been to place the analytical focus on the internal logic of the theories themselves as much as the available data. Thus, in general, methodological and theoretical questions take on a renewed importance for social scientists seeking to answer parts of Churchill's riddle.

Moreover, this problem has been compounded (perhaps exponentially) for students of Communist and/or totalitarian civil-military relations and their historical derivatives. In the fields of Soviet and East European studies, the traditional sources of reliable and

² Significant exceptions within Social Science research which have successfully anticipated and analyzed these changes include: (1) Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965) and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1990) on the subject of the theoretical analysis of Soviet politics (i.e., Totalitarianism); Bubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger (eds.), *The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society*, The John M. Olin Critical Issues Series (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1990) on the subject of national and ethnic issues and their importance in Communist regimes; and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "USSR," in *Warsaw Pact: The Question of Cohesion, Phase II/Volume 3 — Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Bulgaria; Czechoslovakia and Hungary; Bibliography*, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment ORAE Extra-Mural Paper No. 39 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1986) on the specific interplay of ethnicity and civil-military relations.

accurate demographic and economic data have been extremely rare. The so-called “Smolensk archive” (i.e., the records of the Smolensk Oblast Communist Party captured by the Germans in 1941 and then re-captured by the Americans in 1945) was for a long time one of the few direct statistical sources of information on the Soviet Union available to Western scholars that was not first processed for external consumption by Soviet political and intelligence agencies. Still, the predictive record of Soviet studies (Kremlinology *et al*) is, in the opinion of Meyer, no better nor any worse than the record of specialists studying Iran, Portugal, the process of decolonization, or the phenomenon of Ronald Regan for that matter — all areas with considerably greater supplies of direct, empirical data. In the end, Meyer argues, “the study of society and politics is not a science in the strict sense of the word but is at least to some degree an art.”³

Civil-military relations (in general), Soviet and East European civil-military relations, and related fields have also tended to exist towards the methodological edges of Political Science (especially when compared to its more statistically oriented elements). The paucity and unreliability of the direct, quantifiable sources available to scholars within this area of specialization (when compared with the mainstream of political science) frequently means that quantitative analytical techniques must, out of necessity, be supplemented or even replaced by more eclectic, qualitative analytical techniques.

In an attempt to fill, at least at part, this analytical void, this study will begin by addressing certain key methodological issues. In organizational terms, this study will

³ Meyer, p. 174.

attempt this task by first investigating the general methodology which will be used here to analyze post-Communist, post-totalitarian civil-military relations. Specifically, the decision to employ comparative historical techniques will be examined in general terms by contrasting this technique to the experimental, statistical, and area study alternatives. Next, the method by which large-scale social phenomena are analyzed will be examined in the context of two specific antecedents. And finally, the specific research design of this project will be explored.

General Methodological Issues:

The present study explicitly and deliberately utilizes comparative methodological techniques to study the large-scale social phenomenon of civil-military relations. This methodology will be used to critically analyze existing theories of civil-military relations in order to predict probable sites of civil-military conflict and/or confrontation as these may pertain to post-Communist (transitional) civil-military relations in the geographic area of Eastern Europe (with particular reference to Poland and Hungary).

This study will also attempt to analyze the aftereffects of the transition to democratic rule upon the general topic of civil-military theory. In particular, this study is interested in determining whether or not civil-military relations in these two cases will confirm or reject the dominant global pattern of civil-military relations (as typified by the product of the Typology of Relevance). The process of theory-building will be advanced as these cases confirm or contradict previously existing theoretical formulations.

In terms of specific methodological techniques, the comparative case study method employed in this study is best situated to analyze direct and indirect, quantitative and qualitative data comprehensively for the following reasons: (1) because the experimental and statistical methods are inappropriate, (2) because a simple area study — although part of the overall puzzle — would not (by itself) generate sufficiently interesting theoretical observations, and (3) because a properly structured comparative study can be conducive to theory-building. The comparative method occupies an important analytical place between competing theoretical and atheoretical studies (i.e., between abstract analyses and descriptive histories or storytelling) and between deductive and inductive analyses. In other words, the comparative methodology exists in "the eclectic messy centre" of the methodological spectrum.⁴

The Experimental and Statistical Alternatives

(a) The Experimental Method:

Before describing how the comparative method facilitates the research being undertaken in this project, the reasons for rejecting alternative methodologies (i.e., the experimental or statistical methods) will be explained. To begin, the experimental method, utilizing one of two identical groups as a "control" while exposing the other "experiment" group to a particular stimulus in order to determine if the stimulus had any measurable effect, is often unavailable to social scientists who wish to study complex, large-scale social phenomena.

⁴ Atul Kohli, Peter Evans, Peter J. Katzenstein, Adam Przeworski, Susanne Hoerber Rudolph, James C. Scott, and Theda Skocpol, "The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium," *World Politics*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (October 1995), p. 2.

When attempting to employ experimental techniques to the study of large-scale social phenomena, there are numerous practical problems to surmount. For example, the experimental method is not equipped to determine effectively or conclusively whether arms transfers⁵ or inter-ethnic competition⁶ are responsible for more instances of military coups in the developing world. One simply cannot create two equivalent groups of military officers in identical states in order to determine if the introduction of a certain set of circumstances will cause the experimental subjects to stage a coup. Nor could such an experiment be replicated by other social scientists so that the results of these experiments could be either confirmed or reputed. It simply cannot be done.

On top of these practical problems, ethical concerns also enter into the equation. Most coups involve violence and death (sometimes on an enormous scale). The morality of the hypothetical "coup" experiment alluded to above (were the former possible) would cause Stanley Milgram's authority and obedience experiments to pale to insignificance. Consequently, social scientists seeking to analyze such intricate social phenomena experimentally are frequently forced to study their subjects *indirectly* by creating systematic and reproducible experiments which they hope will model, on a much smaller and more manageable scale, the particular social phenomena they are interested in studying.

⁵ See, for example, Talukder Maniruzzaman, "Arms Transfer, Military Coups, and Military Rule in Developing States," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (December 1992), pp. 733-755.

⁶ See, for example, J. Craig Jenkins and Augustine J. Kposowa, "The Political Origins of African Military Coups: Ethnic Competition, Military Centrality, and the Struggle over the Postcolonial State," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (September 1992), pp. 271-292.

The experimental method has other deficiencies for the social scientist. The experimental method is designed to search for causal links between particular variables. It represents a search for *law-like* regularities between specific causes and their effects. This method emphasizes the search for general theories and, moreover, it equates prediction with explanation.

However, this Newtonian model of causality, generally successful in most of the natural sciences, produces fewer and less meaningful regularities with social phenomena. Invariably, social phenomena are explained only partially in terms of such law-like regularities because human actions exist within a context that exhibits unique positive and negative feedback characteristics. Social actors are aware of their history and the effect of these memories and learning processes on subsequent decisions has no counterpart in the physical sciences (at least those sciences dealing with inanimate objects). Therefore, the law-like regularities of social phenomena (such as the theory of voting behaviour) "appear to have a short half-life" when compared to law-like physical regularities.⁷

In other words, people (unlike atoms, chemicals, or planets) learn, grow, change, and develop over time. Consequently, it comes as no surprise that success or failure by one group of actors in the international system influences the actions of many other actors faced with similar choices. Thus trends in irregular warfare, for example, tend to be

⁷ Gabriel A. Almond and Stephen J. Genco, "Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics," *World Politics*, Vol. XXIX, No. 4 (July 1977), pp. 494.

replicated in the military doctrines of guerrilla or counter-insurgency forces across the globe as each side learns the "lessons" arising out of a particular military campaign. This is a pattern to be found in a great many spheres of human behaviour.

As a matter of fact, the study of these regularities themselves can affect subsequent iterations of the phenomenon. Social actors not only learn by experiencing a phenomenon firsthand, but they can indirectly benefit from the analysis of the phenomenon as well.⁸ If an experimenter tells a group of subjects that they are being watched for a specific purpose, the subjects of the experiment may behave self-consciously and project in their behaviour actions that they perceive the observer wishes to see. It is almost the social science equivalent of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle: the phenomena is altered by the act of attempting to measure its parameters.⁹ So in the end, the experimental method, "most nearly ideal" for most of the natural sciences, "can only rarely" be used by social scientists.¹⁰

(b) The Statistical Method:

Social scientists often are drawn to the experimental method in an effort to duplicate the success of their physical science counterparts. But because the experimental method is

⁸ Almond and Genco, p. 494.

⁹ In theoretical physics, the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle refers to Werner Heisenberg's suggestion that it is impossible to simultaneously determine the position and the momentum of an atomic particle. Specifically, any photon of light used to observe the position of an electron would affect and distort its velocity and path around the nucleus of an atom. See Ernest R. Toon and George L. Ellis, *Foundations of Chemistry* (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1978), pp. 216-217.

¹⁰ Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XLV, No. 3 (September 1971), pp. 683-684.

not available in all cases to researchers who wish to study large-scale human phenomena, many researchers turn to statistical methodologies as an alternative means of manipulating data critically and discerning causal relationships.

Whereas the experimental method involves the direct, *physical* manipulation of variables under controlled conditions, the statistical method (i.e., the Behavioralist approach) involves the application of advanced statistical techniques to data in order to manipulate variables *mathematically* under controlled conditions. Empirically observed interval or ordinal data are collected and categorized according to a series of explicit criteria set *a priori* to the data collection process. And this data is then analyzed according to how certain independent variables influence other dependent variables.

Of course, the statistical method, which is sometimes regarded as "an approximation of the experimental method,"¹¹ also presents difficulties to the scholar analyzing large-scale social phenomena. As is the case with data in the natural sciences, operationalizing social data (i.e., measurement and scaling) is very difficult. For example, "How hard is a diamond?" This cannot be quantified by science except as a concept relative to other concepts which are themselves relatively determined (i.e., one substance is more or less hard than another, but there is no absolute standard).¹² Similarly, consider the question, "How stable is a political regime?" This also cannot be quantified except as a relative

¹¹ Lijphart, p. 684.

¹² Arthur L. Kalleberg, "The Logic of Comparison: A Methodological Note on the Comparative Study of Political Systems," *World Politics*, Vol. XIX, No. 1 (October 1966), p. 75.

concept.

Operationalizing concepts relatively does not preclude employment of statistical techniques to the analysis of discrete problems, but the researchers must be wary of how such efforts to quantify particular phenomena affect the results which the statistical analysis may produce. This is especially problematical in the case of the gross empirical indices that statistical studies frequently are forced to employ. For example, William R. Thompson defines a “successful” coup as the forceful, extralegal removal of a national executive by a military group for a period of at least one week. An “unsuccessful” coup, on the other hand, is differentiated from a “plot” by the fact that the former must include “a recorded and recognizable physical attempt to seize control [of the state].”¹³

Unfortunately, such a definition — illustrative of many facets of interest to the researcher — belies other significant details. For example, a large-scale conspiracy discovered and suppressed with great difficulty by pro-government security forces is *only* a “plot” while the actions of a small group of soldiers who fire a few shots in the air and are arrested almost immediately is labeled an “unsuccessful coup” — even though the former is probably much more threatening to the established political order than the latter.¹⁴

Of course, one of the most serious problems for scholars seeking to apply statistical

¹³ William R. Thompson, *The Grievances of Military Coup-Makers* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973), pp. 52-53 (fn. 4).

¹⁴ This example is taken from Harvey G. Kebschull, “Operation ‘Just Missed’: Lessons From Failed Coup Attempts,” *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Summer 1994), especially 566-567.

techniques to the study of large-scale social phenomena is the relative dearth of cases. Statistical studies generally do not produce reliable results with small data sets. And this may be a problem because sometimes only one case may be available for the study of a particular set of controlled variables. In other words, the larger the number of individual variables which need to be controlled, the lower the number of individual cases which tend to be available for study in each cell of the distribution matrix. For example, the analysis of six British general elections may be an "n = 120,000,000" study if the focus of the study is individual voters, it may be an "n = 6" study if the object is the analysis of elections, but it may be only an "n = 1" study if the object of the study is electoral systems.¹⁵ The complex the set of variables associated with large-scale social phenomena — of which civil-military relations is but one example — almost invariably involves "small n" studies.

Finally, statistical studies frequently are plagued by the inability of the social scientist to gather the direct, quantifiable empirical data necessary to employ advanced statistical techniques. Typically, sources (such as minutes of meetings, legal documents, transcripts of speeches, diaries and other eye-witness accounts, newspaper reports, and internal administrative reports) are unavailable, incomplete, or even deliberately misleading. Obviously, such deficiencies plague social scientists employing other analytical methodologies (especially area studies), but the comparative methodology (as will be discussed below) is able to surmount some of these limitations through the analysis of a

¹⁵ Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in *Strategies of Inquiry*, eds. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, *Handbook of Political Science*, Vol. 7 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1975), p. 85.

wider range of more indirect, less easily quantifiable, *qualitative* data sources which demonstrate social interactions and social relationships.

Case Studies and the Development of Theory:

The experimental and statistical methodologies, it would seem, are incapable of fully analyzing complex, large-scale social phenomena such as civil-military relations. For the social scientist seeking to investigate these and other social questions, data collection and data manipulation problems abound. But what about the other end of the methodological scale: case studies? Would a case study generate the requisite analysis? The initial answer is "no," but the long-term answer — in the context of comparative analysis — is an unqualified "yes."

(a) Configurative-Idiographic Case Studies:

A case study can take many different forms and may (as a result) have many different uses for the researcher. According to separate studies of the comparative method by Harry Eckstein and Arend Lijphart, a case study may take one of three principal forms.¹⁶

The first, a *configurative-idiographic* study,¹⁷ is akin to the physician's *clinical* study or

¹⁶ In the following sections, references to Eckstein's typology of case studies are from Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory....," pp. 96ff. References to Lijphart's typology are taken from Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," pp. 691-693. Eckstein's typology differs slightly from that of Lijphart, but in all significant respects they are interchangeable. Differences between the two are mostly terminological. Moreover, for purposes here, Eckstein's five categories and Lijphart's six categories are reduced to three categories: one explicitly non-theoretical category, one "applied" theory category, and one truly theoretical category. This simplification better illustrates the theoretical developments that are desired for purposes here. (See, also, Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy*, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren [New York: The Free Press, 1979], pp. 43-68 esp. fn. 26.)

¹⁷ The term is taken from Eckstein (see Eckstein, pp. 96ff).

the social scientist's *area* study. A researcher engaged in a configurative-idiographic study wants to know as much information as possible about a particular subject. The subject is treated as a single "whole" and the facts are allowed to "speak for themselves." Prediction is not the goal of a configurative-idiographic study. Rather, the researcher is interested in documenting as much as is possible about the subject matter.

The weakness or limitation of a configurative-idiographic study — and an important reason why this project was not designed to be a simple area study — is apparent from the name that Lijphart gives to this type of case study: an *atheoretical* case study.¹⁸ A configurative-idiographic case study emphasizes the uniqueness of each individual case (i.e., individual patient, country, or region). And although not without their value thanks to the rich detail they may encompass, such atheoretical histories generally only indirectly contribute to the process of theory building. Like traditional country-by-country comparative studies, these studies are entirely descriptive. They do not employ existing theoretical frameworks nor do they generate explicit, generalized prepositions for application to other case histories. Theory, to the degree it may touch upon this type of study at all, is usually implicit in the mind of the individual researcher.

(b) Disciplined-Configurative Case Studies:

A second type of case study is the *disciplined-configurative* study.¹⁹ In a disciplined-configurative study, a pre-existing theoretical formulation is applied to a particular case.

¹⁸ Lijphart, p. 691.

¹⁹ Eckstein, pp. 99ff. Lijphart uses the term "interpretive case study." (Lijphart, p. 692.)

A disciplined-configurative study resembles a configurative-idiographic study because: (1) the subject is again treated as a single "whole," and (2) description and knowledge are taken by the researcher to be more important than prediction. (The researcher may not even believe that prediction is possible.)

As was the case above, however, a disciplined-configurative case study is limited by the fact that this type of study is not intended or designed to generate new theoretical insights. The explicit purpose of a disciplined-configurative case study is to help the researcher understand the *case*; not the *theory* used to analyze the case. To be sure, a disciplined-configurative case may affect the theoretical framework applied by a social scientist to a particular case *indirectly*, but that is not the focus of attention. For example, if a theory fails to explain a case it otherwise should explain, such feedback might suggest the need for new theorizing about the data at hand. Otherwise, a discipline-configurative study is rather descriptive in tone.

(c) Theoretical Case Studies:

The third major type of case study is much more closely linked to the process of theoretical analysis. Specifically, with *theory-generating* or *theory-testing* case studies, an effort is explicitly made to utilize one or more cases to further the development of new theories (i.e., *heuristic* case studies) or to critically evaluate existing theories (i.e., *crucial* case studies).²⁰

²⁰ Eckstein refers to "heuristic" case studies, "plausibility probes," and "crucial-case" studies while Lijphart uses the terms "hypothesis-generating" case studies, "theory-confirming and theory-infirming" case studies, and "deviant case analyses." (See Eckstein, pp. 104ff and Lijphart, p. 692.)

Theory building is one of the most important functions of case studies.²¹ Theories help social scientists cut through the apparent chaos of everyday life in order to discern such regularities in the structure, behaviour, and interaction of discrete variables as may exist. Furthermore, these statements of regularity are designed to be as reliable or valid as possible and they should be scripted as parsimoniously as possible. Finally, theories can help the analyst predict the course of future events.

Of course, the regularities discovered in large-scale social phenomena are invariably less rigorous compared with their natural science counterparts (because of the feedback phenomena described earlier). And the importance of prediction (i.e., foreknowledge) should not be overstated either. One can "predict" the configuration of the stars in the heavens without understanding anything about physics or astronomy; one only requires the "science" of astrology. Still, there are discernible patterns amongst the myriad variables affecting large-scale social phenomena and analyzing these patterns — rather than simply describing them — is an important and potentially productive exercise.

Utilizing observations from one or more case studies, social scientists can construct new theoretical formulations incrementally where none currently exist. One case may not be sufficient, but as the number of observations grow, these cases may begin to lend themselves to systematic analysis and the production of generalized hypotheses.

Perhaps surprisingly, case studies are an important source of hypotheses for both

²¹ The following is based on Eckstein, pp. 88ff.

inductive and deductive theories. For inductive theories this link is obvious. Case studies form the building blocks of larger theoretical formulations. The number of potential variables that may arise from the analysis of one or more cases may lead initially to the formulation of numerous "proto-theories," but eventually this data may coalesce into manageable theoretical formulations. First, recurrent patterns in the empirical evidence may suggest to the researcher which variables possess the most explanatory power. Eventually, the close analysis of these patterns may prompt the theorist to bring forth generalized statements about the entire population under review. Next, the researcher may attempt to test these generalizations against the empirical evidence generated from the study of additional cases. And, ultimately, the initial generalizations may tend to be confirmed, they may tend to be falsified, or they may suggest further modification of the initial generalization.

This is how (in general) case studies can be the source of inductive theories, but the study of particular cases can contribute to the development of deductive theories as well. After all, deductive theories do not spring forth from a vacuum. Nor do the assumptions that need to be added to abstract deductive general theories when they are applied to specific situations arise from divine inspiration. Instead, these processes are inspired at least in part by case studies and the generalizable empirical observations they generate.²² Deductively-generated theories — despite their internal logic — need to be operationalized in order to be useful to policy-makers and others interested in particular

²² George W. Downs, "The Rational Deterrence Debate [Special Issue on Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies]," *World Politics*, Vol. XLI, No. 2 (January 1989), p. 229.

outcomes. Until that occurs, prediction in specific instances is impossible.²³

Case studies also assist the researcher in the process of testing existing theoretical formulations. Until an abstract deductive theory is tested in a particular instance (i.e., in the real world), it remains "difficult, if not impossible, to refute."²⁴ The researcher can use data generated from a case study in order to determine if the case observations are in accord with those predicted by the particular theory. If the observations agree (or very nearly agree) with the anticipated empirical measurements, the theory under analysis may tend to be validated. On the other hand, if the observations generated by a case are unanticipated; the existing theory may tend to be invalidated.

Of course, a social scientist should not be too eager to either accept or reject a particular theory based on the results of only one deviant case study. One deviant case, in all likelihood, would not invalidate a "large n" (i.e., statistical) study and the same should be true for a "small n" comparative study where often a single deviant case "tends to loom large."²⁵ One deviant case may tend to weaken a particular theory, or it may suggest the theory is in need of some revision, or it may help the researcher decide between competing theories.

²³ Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, "Deterrence and Foreign Policy [Special Issue on Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies]," *World Politics*, Vol. XLI, No. 2 (January 1989), p. 175.

²⁴ George and Smoke, p. 179.

²⁵ Lijphart, p. 686.

At the same time, one successful result does not necessarily confirm a theory. In fact, several case studies may be needed for the researcher to decide between competing theories. For example, several theories may explain one set of observations, but only one theory may explain all of the data in a particular case study cell.

The Comparison of Large-Scale Social Phenomena:

Having to this point discussed theory-building and theory-testing case studies in general terms, it is now time to turn to the specific comparative methodologies which will guide the present study. Specifically, the comparative methodology employed in this study is based largely upon two antecedents: (1) Theda Skocpol's "Comparative Historical Method,"²⁶ and (2) "The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison" as described by Alexander L. George.²⁷

Essentially, there are two related advantages to be gained by utilizing a pre-existing methodology instead of designing an utterly new one. First, by adopting or adapting a methodology successfully employed in another study (or better yet a series of studies), the researcher hopefully will be able to avoid potential pitfalls associated with employing a new and as yet untested methodology. It only makes sense that if a particular research design is successful in shedding light on one large-scale social phenomenon (i.e., Social Revolutions); then it should be able to shed analytical light on another (i.e., civil-military

²⁶ Theda Skocpol, *States & Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge, UK.: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

²⁷ Previously cited as Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy*, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 43-68.

relations).

The second related advantage associated with adopting a pre-existing methodology is that such an action increases the likelihood of theoretical cumulation. In a sense, the effectiveness of a methodology is being tested in a far larger case study than the subsequent researcher is capable of employing.

(a) The Comparative Historical Method:

Theda Skocpol's Comparative Historical Method shares many attributes with the more general comparative method. It is part of a broader reaction against the two methodological extremes within Social Science: the "large-n" statistical method and the "natural history" approach which views every event as unique.²⁸ Skocpol, in fact, traces her cumulative pedigree back to John Stuart Mill's *A System of Logic*.²⁹ Again, it represents a search for patterns of causality amongst variables associated with particular "small-n" phenomena and is not interested in simple description.

Skocpol's specific research design combines two designs first put forth in Mill's *A System of Logic*.³⁰ The first, the "Method of Agreement," employs cases which share a common phenomenon and which also share common causal factors. Differences between the cases are solely the product of non-causally relevant factors. The second research

²⁸ Skocpol includes Crane Brinton's *Anatomy of a Revolution* among the latter category. (Skocpol, p. 33.)

²⁹ Skocpol, p. 36.

³⁰ The following is from Skocpol, pp. 36-37.

design, the “Method of Difference,” employs cases in which neither the phenomenon under study nor the common, causal factors are present, but which otherwise appear quite similar. Skocpol argues that it is both possible and desirable to combine elements of these two designs in one study. The two designs, in effect, would serve to bring the causal factors into sharper focus by increasing the likelihood that non-causal factors will be discovered and thus be removed from consideration.

While generally in praise of this methodology, Skocpol offers several caveats to the researcher seeking to employ this research design. First, Skocpol acknowledges that the selection of cases may be somewhat problematic.³¹ Since the object of study for the Comparative Historical Method is large-scale social phenomena (Social Revolutions in the case of Skocpol’s own study) and because large-scale social phenomena invariably involve the interplay of numerous interconnected variables (each potentially part of a feedback loop involving one or more additional variables), the researcher almost certainly will find it impossible to find perfect historical pairings for this research design.

Instead, “strategic guesses”³² or logical extrapolations will have to be made from the available cases which attempt to account for most if not all of these unmatched variations. If these variations cannot be accounted for directly by the quasi-experimental research design of the Comparative Historical Method; then hopefully they can be dealt with by logical, but more intuitive and *ad hoc*, abstract theorizing. Ideally, these variations will

³¹ Skocpol, pp. 38-39.

³² Skocpol, p. 39.

be accounted for or they will be sufficiently minor so as to leave the overall results unaffected. A similar caveat is made by Adam Przeworski who warns that neither the universe of historical cases nor the selection amongst available alternatives is likely to encompass the entire range of possible worlds. Therefore, if the researcher is to avoid the pitfalls of a potential selection bias, logic dictates that, where necessary, hypothetical null cases be posited for comparison.³³

Skocpol's second caveat warns the researcher that the historical cases employed in a Comparative Historical study are not necessarily independent of each other.³⁴ This is rarely, if ever, true in the case of large-scale social phenomena (be it "social revolutions" or civil-military relations). Human beings, as animate objects, readily learn from successes and (especially) failures — their own and those of other contemporary or historical antecedents. These lessons may not always represent progressive learning (i.e., history can be misinterpreted just as easily as it can be interpreted properly), but the consequent process of feedback (both negative and positive) must be factored into the equation.

Finally, Skocpol reminds the researcher that Comparative Historical analysis "is no substitute for theory."³⁵ In other words, the Comparative Historical Method — existing as it does in Kohli's "eclectic messy centre" between theoretical and atheoretical,

³³ Kohli *et al*, esp. pp. 18-21.

³⁴ Skocpol, p. 39.

³⁵ Skocpol, p. 39.

deductive and inductive studies — is by no means divorced from “the macro-sociological imagination, informed by the theoretical debates of the day, and sensitive to the patterns of evidence for sets of historical cases.”³⁶ Hypothesis generation and testing, intuitively drawn logical conclusions, and the other aspects of theorizing about the socio-historical world are all a necessary component of the Comparative Historical Method.

(b) The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison:

Alexander L. George’s Method of Structured, Focused Comparison also exemplifies the best attributes of the general comparative method. This method differs somewhat from Skocpol’s research design in general terms, but in the end it is interested in answering the same questions.

The heart of George’s detailed comparative methodology is his suggestion that theoretical development depends upon treating idiosyncratic events and variables as “classes” or “categories of variables.” Events, in other words, should be generalized albeit not to the point where events are trivialized (i.e., events should not be placed into categories which cause their uniqueness to be lost — even if this occasionally means some categories are “n = 1” categories). Unique events must be seen, for example, as instances of alliance formation, escalation, revolution, or whatever.³⁷

This methodology places George, like Skocpol, in the moderate middle of the Social

³⁶ Skocpol, p. 39.

³⁷ George, pp. 45-47.

Science methodological spectrum (i.e., between the extremes of the “large n” statistical method and the historian’s documentation of non-generalizable cases). It permits him to search for real or spurious causal relationships by comparing more than one example of each generalized phenomena in an intensive fashion (like the historian).³⁸

George’s specific research program involves three distinct phases: (1) the research design, (2) the case studies, and (3) the theoretical conclusions. Phase I, the research design, is itself divided into several components.³⁹ The first task for the researcher is to set forth the research problem and the research objectives of the particular study. This task includes describing the phenomena under investigation, determining what existing theory bears upon these questions, and outlining what aspects of the existing theoretical formulations will be singled out for assessment and/or refinement and elaboration.

Another task for the researcher is to specify which variables are dependent, independent, intervening, or constant. Following this, the researcher is invited to consider the best ways to operationalize the various variables. The researcher also must select the appropriate cases for the study from amongst a well defined universe of possible cases. And, finally, the researcher must outline the study’s empirical and more abstract data

³⁸ Such procedures, George argues, are not uncommon in “large n” statistical studies as well. There the researcher is using the technique: (1) to investigate whether or not a causal relationship is or is not influenced by some previously unknown intervening variable, or (2) to identify which statistical cells should be employed in the study. (George, pp. 45 & 59.) Statistical studies are better at demonstrating statistical, rather than causal, relationships. They also try to demonstrate causal relationships, but usually they are unable to accomplish that task in as rich and detailed (and thus convincing) a fashion as a comparative study.

³⁹ The following sections are from George, pp. 54-57.

requirements (i.e., data of both a quantitative and qualitative nature).

Phase II of George's research program involves undertaking the actual case studies.⁴⁰ Each case in a Structured, Focused Comparative study is subjected to the analytical process outlined in the research design. At this point, the rich detail of the historian is analyzed in terms of the more generalized "classes" or "categories" of variables. However, any theoretical implications drawn from the individual case studies at this point must be considered to be provisional in nature. In general terms, additional historical material or alternative, plausible causal explanations may cause the reassessment of a particular case, but undoubtedly George would agree that the analysis of one case also may be influenced by the theoretical feedback generated by the other cases in a particular study.

Finally, Phase III of the Structures, Focused Comparative research design involves drawing the theoretical implications from all of the available case studies.⁴¹ At the onset, George argues that most of the time a controlled comparison will not constitute a crucial case study. All too often, the available theories are not formulated sufficiently to be subjected to verification or falsification.⁴² Still, because of the relative importance accorded to theory-building by the Structures, Focused Comparative Method, the

⁴⁰ The following sections are from George, pp. 57-58.

⁴¹ The following sections are from George, pp. 58-63.

⁴² Although specifically referring to theorizing in the field of International Relations, George's admonition about the weakness of contemporary theory is almost certainly true of most other areas of Social Science research.

possibility of such verification or falsification remains.

On the other hand, a Structured, Focused Comparative study more likely contributes to the process of theoretical cumulation by revealing new causal relationships as part of a broader typology of causal links. Such typological theory — which George calls “rich, differentiated theory” — has the advantage of suggesting much more discriminating explanations than abstract or general metatheories.⁴³ In other words, instead of suggesting “war is caused by miscalculations” (a general theory); a contingent generalization from a controlled comparison might suggest “which types of miscalculations lead to which types of war outbreaks” (a typological theory).⁴⁴

This type of theorizing also offers greater explanatory power due to its wealth of historical data and, for the same reason, it is of far more practical use to policy makers. But unlike a “large n” statistical study, a Structured, Focused Comparative study is not concerned with determining how representative a case or causal chain is of an entire population.

The Comparison of Civil-Military Relations

(a) The Weakness of Existing Theory:

It is something of a cliché, but a good rule of thumb with which to evaluate theoretical developments is summed up in the phrase: “Models are to be used, but not believed.”

⁴³ George, p. 59.

⁴⁴ George, p. 59.

This is no less true for the subfield of civil-military relations than it is for the rest of the Social Sciences. Models and theories make for good tools with which to study a problem, but even the strongest of them are (at best) pale reflections of the reality being investigated.

Unfortunately, treating theories as simple tools often tempts the analyst to fall into the trap of proposing a simple “grand synthesis” of the existing literature in the hope of covering all of the bases. In other words, if differing models and theories highlight different aspects of a situation (as their proponents frequently argue), then it apparently makes logical sense to use all of the available theories together in order to get a more complete picture of reality. As a matter of fact, Gabriel Almond and Laura Roselle advocate just such a procedure arguing that use of a “battery of models” is best able to illustrate the nature of change in the Soviet Union.⁴⁵

Such a procedure, however, is not likely to succeed. Most of the time theories can not simply be thrown together in a haphazard fashion without something being lost in the translation. Theories invariably rely on irreconcilable assumptions and it is not simply a case of splitting the differences between the two (or more) views in order to arrive at a better model of reality.⁴⁶ Taking note of this caution, this study will make no attempt to propose such a “grand synthesis” of the theories of civil-military relations on the order of

⁴⁵ Gabriel A. Almond and Laura Roselle, “Model Fitting in Communism Studies,” in *Politics and the Soviet System*, ed. Thomas F. Remington (London: The Macmillan Press, 1989), p. 211.

⁴⁶ This point is cogently argued in Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed., International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. 2, No. 2: Foundations of the Unity of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), *passim*.

that advocated by Almond and Roselle.

Somewhat isolated from the general literature on civil-military relations, the existing subfield literature has also proven to be of relatively little help for scholars attempting to analyze the nature of post-Communist civil-military relations. The existing theoretical efforts possess a rather low predictive capacity and, perhaps more damningly, appear to have been incapable of accounting for the changes that have already occurred.⁴⁷

Some of this literature was designed to analyze only Soviet civil-military relations while some of this literature was designed to analyze East European civil-military relations as well. In either case, the prevailing wisdom suggested that the Communist military establishments would operate as loyal servants to their Party masters, but the Velvet Revolutions of 1989-1991 put the lie to most of those expectations.

It is also unclear from the existing theoretical formulations, whether or not the post-Communist regimes of Eastern Europe should be expected to develop civil-military relations similar to those of their West European cousins or will some other model of

⁴⁷ Examples of this literature include the following: Daniel N. Nelson, "Empirical Estimates of 'Reliability' in the Warsaw Pact," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Winter 1985), pp. 292-316 and "The Measurement of East European WTO 'Reliability,'" in *Soviet Allies: The Warsaw Pact and the Issue of Reliability*, ed. Daniel N. Nelson (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 2-41; A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean, and Alexander Alexiev, *East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier* (New York: Crane Russak, 1982); William E. Odom, "The Party-Military Connection: A Critique," in *Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems*, eds. Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 27-52; Timothy J. Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1979); and Ellen Jones, *Red Army and Society: A Sociology of the Soviet Military* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985).

civil-military relations come to the fore? Will the new East European military establishments adopt to democratic, civilian rule or can these militaries be expected to intervene (perhaps repeatedly) in the political process? In other words, there seems to be a theoretical void which this study will attempt to fill.

(b) An Alternative Approach:

William Odom, writing on another topic, suggests that there is perhaps an obligation on the part of a critic of an unsuccessful model or theory (even a grand theory) to offer a better alternative in its place (even though failure to do so does not necessarily undercut the validity of the original critique).⁴⁸ In general terms, the analysis presented in this study will undertake the following two tasks: (1) to use the *existing* literature (or more accurately its distillate) to predict the possible areas of conflict or confrontation in the civil-military relations of the target cases, and (2) to use the analysis of the theories themselves to suggest or predict *additional* sources of tension not otherwise indicated by the existing theoretical formulations. Subsequently, the products of this two-front analysis will be tested by the analysis of the two empirical cases: Poland and Hungary in the post-Communist (transitional) period.

Given the limitations of the existing theoretical formulations, the focus of this study has shifted increasingly towards the theories themselves. Nevertheless, by focusing on theory, this project does not intend to present a new *global* theory of civil-military

⁴⁸ William E. Odom, "A Dissenting View on the Group Approach to Soviet Politics," *World Politics*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 4 (July 1976), p. 566.

relations. On the other hand, this project, as already mentioned, cannot be conceived of as being a clinical or area study either (i.e., applying an *existing* civil-military relations theory to one or more East European countries). Such a comprehensive project is beyond the scope of this study and is much more suited as an academic's "life project."

Instead of such an inductive or deductive edifice, this project will attempt to achieve the much more limited and hence manageable goal of contributing another unique building block in the development of such a global theory. It will attempt to develop what might be called a "typology of relevance."⁴⁹

Utilizing the two previously described methodological antecedents (Skocpol's "Comparative Historical Method" and George's "Method of Structured, Focused Comparison") as inspiration, the specific research design of the present study can now be detailed. The Typology of Relevance that serves as the analytical cornerstone of this project begins with the critical analysis of the five families of theories of civil-military relations described in general terms in the following section and analyzed in detail in the third chapter. The "Western," "Interventionist," "Social Relevance," "Communist," and "Transitional" families of civil-military relations models serve as the basic building blocks of the Typology of Relevance and are detailed and analyzed in order to search out as many explanatory or predictive themes or variables as possible.

The Typology of Relevance presented in the fourth chapter furthers this project by

⁴⁹ This term was the suggestion of the thesis supervisor - Dr. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone.

bringing together the insights garnered from the evaluation of the five theoretical perspectives. The Typology of Relevance will begin with the distillation of these insights in order to search for recurring themes or variables relevant to the analysis of post-Communist (transitional) civil-military relations in Poland and Hungary. Recurrent themes *may* have universal validity while non-recurrent themes *may* be area, time, or system specific. Additionally, the critical analysis of the general milieu and the theoretical formulations may reveal areas where existing theory is lacking and new formulations or variables need to be added or developed. In turn, each of these themes will be *analyzed individually* in order to assess their potential utility to the study of the cases under review.

If only a few universal themes are discovered, this exercise will not be in vain. Even a limited typology should be able to shed valuable analytical light on the specific cases. Certainly, the original analysis of the typology of relevance will add to the process of theoretical cumulation so desperately needed in this subject area.

(c) Existing Theories:

To date, a wide variety of models of civil-military relations have been developed. Some of these models purport to have universal application while others are designed to explain developments in only a very limited number of cases. In this study, the existing literature will be grouped and analyzed in the context of five major theoretical “families.”

The first family, what might be called the “Western” family of models, includes the

Traditional and Liberal models of civil-military relations. It is called the “Western” family because these models typify and were designed to explain the experiences of the West European and North American regimes. Of course, the characteristics of this family are not exclusive to these regimes and have broader applicability.

Cases of military rule or a “revolving door” of military and civilian rule constitute the second or “Interventionist” family of models. The experiences of a number of Latin American, African, and other countries (including Turkey) serve as the empirical foundation of these theories.

A third group, the “Social Relevance” family of civil-military relations models, is itself divided into four major sections. These occasionally overlapping models include the following: (1) the military and economic development; (2) the military as “middle class” economic and political modernizers; (3) the ethnic model; and (4) the class model.

The fourth or “Communist” family of models was designed principally to explain Soviet civil-military relations. Some authors also sought to explain civil-military relations in the other Leninist regimes of Eastern Europe and throughout the Communist world, but these efforts were generally not as sophisticated as applications to the Soviet experience. In any case, as defenders of the regime as well as the state, civil-military relations in Communist states constitute a separate category.

Finally, the fifth or “Transitional” family of models represents the newest theoretical

literature. These models were developed to explain the spread of democracy and the return to the barracks that occurred in many parts of Latin America and Southern Europe since the 1970s. These models and the specific cases of Spain and Portugal (as will be discussed below) may be of particular relevance to this study.

(d) The Typology of Relevance (A Final Caution):

This project deliberately began with the critical analysis of a broad range of models of the civil-military relationship for several important reasons. First, this study, by employing a wide variety of cases from many parts of the world and from several different historical contexts, hopes to break out from some of the imposed and self-imposed isolation typified by most subfield research. This isolation is especially prevalent in the case of comparative Communist studies and in the analysis of the related subfield of comparative Communist civil-military relations. In point of fact, the entire field of Soviet and Communist studies has traditionally exhibited an uneasy relationship with the discipline of Political Science.⁵⁰

Much more importantly, this study, by drawing inferences from a general theoretical milieu that includes (but is not limited to) the analysis of earlier Communist-era civil-military relations, also hopes to avoid the charge of having employed “circular” reasoning.⁵¹ Any theoretical approach that draws solely upon a single, narrow set of

⁵⁰ This unfortunate reality is ably recounted in detail by Alfred G. Meyer in the previously cited “Politics and Methodology in Soviet Studies.” See note 1.

⁵¹ This critique - and much of the response to this critique - is inspired by a parallel debate within the literature on political culture between those political scientists described by Archie Brown as employing a

cases for its theoretical inspiration and subsequently is “tested” on the very same set of cases in order to determine its analytical “validity” is not nearly as interesting or theoretically productive (if at all) as a more independent analytical test. In other words, this project will not develop a theoretical formulation based solely on the experiences of the East European military establishments and political regimes and subsequently test its conclusions against empirical evidence garnered from these very same cases.

The issue then becomes one of deciding whether or not the East European cases should be included at all in the process of developing the theoretical typology. If the theoretical mix is “contaminated” when it relies solely upon data and theoretical formulations drawn from the East European cases, it could be argued that the same danger remains when the East European models are thrown into the broader set of theoretical approaches (as is the case in this study).

Upon reflection, this danger is probably overstated. First, the relationship between the East European models and the general set of models is not one to one. The former only partially affects the other and any theoretical consistencies and inconsistencies between

“subjective” definition of political culture and those who employ a broader definition of political culture which includes “behaviour” as a component. The latter school of thought is sometimes accused of circular reasoning because it uses aspects of a target group’s behaviour to determine the general orientation of that group to political phenomena and then this orientation is employed as an “explanation” of other behaviour. The defence of this latter position is particularly relevant here. See David J. Elkins and Richard E.B. Simeon, “A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (January 1979), pp. 127-145; Gabriel A. Almond, *A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Political Science* (Newbury Park, CA.: Sage Publications, 1990), chapters 5 & 6; Robert C. Tucker, “Culture, Political Culture, and Communist Society,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 88, No. 2 (June 1973), pp. 173-190; and, especially, chapters contributed by Archie Brown, Mary McAuley, John Miller, and Stephen White in Archie Brown, ed., *Political Culture and Communist Studies* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1984), pp. 1-99 & 149-204.

the two will be brought out during the distillation process.

Much more significantly, the East European cases which will be employed as the empirical test of this Typology of Relevance are separated temporally from the cases used in the construction of the "Communist" family of models and subsequently analyzed in the overall distillation process. The empirical test involves the application of the Typology of Relevance to a unique historical period: post-totalitarian (transitional) civil-military relations. Therefore, the cases employed in the empirical test and in the development of the Typology of Relevance are sufficiently different (albeit related) to deny the charge of tautological reasoning. In other words, not all circularities are "vicious."

(e) The Comparative Case Studies:

It must be emphasized at the onset that this is not an area study; it is a comparative study. This project is designed to aid the process of theoretical cumulation as much as it is an investigation of the cases themselves. In any event, the generalizations brought forth in the typology of relevance will be subjected to an empirical test and this test will consist of the two comparative case studies: Poland and Hungary.

The two case studies were chosen for several reasons. First, there appears (at first blush) to be a considerable amount of similarity between the two cases. Amongst the similarities is the fact that both nations are relatively homogeneous and roughly equivalent middle powers. Broadly speaking, these states also share the same

approximate level of socio-economic and political development. Moreover, they share a similar (recent) history in the regional context of Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe (i.e., totalitarianism). The similarities of the two cases, when contrasted to the cases that encompass the General Milieu, will allow for the application of both the Method of Agreement (i.e., the two cases compared to each other) and the Method of Difference (i.e., the two cases compared to the General Milieu) as Skocpol advocates.

Of course, the researcher must exercise caution while investigating the cases in detail. The cases, although selected for their intuitive comparability (i.e., the Method of Agreement), may not necessarily result in theoretical cumulation. In other words, what appears at first glance to be similar and thus cumulative may not, upon deeper reflection, be the case. The cases, in fact, may diverge in terms of certain critical characteristics. Consequently, the researcher must be prepared for negative conclusions (useful but not as *exciting* as a positive affirmation of theoretical expectations).

Second, as was suggested above, the selection of two cases from Eastern Europe helps to fill a major theoretical void in the existing literature. In fact, a great many opportunities for original research and analysis present themselves to the researcher. This study is attempting to analyze *a new type* of civil-military relations: post-Communist or post-totalitarian civil-military relations. Of course, civil-military relations in post-war (West) Germany and Italy could be considered to be antecedents of these post-totalitarian civil-military relations, but both of these cases included a significant systemic variable: these states were defeated and physically occupied by a liberating power (the Allies) that

imposed a new political and military order. As for Spain and Portugal, these cases should be conceptualized as authoritarian regimes. Consequently, the post-Communist Polish and Hungarian regimes are original and unique comparative case studies.

In analyzing the two comparative cases, this study will employ both primary and secondary, quantitative and qualitative data sources. Primary sources will include published interviews, speeches, government reports and other official documents, intelligence reports, and similar types of material. A great deal of this information exists in the public domain and much of this data — due to its interest to governmental policy makers — has been translated into English.

However as discussed in an earlier section, the issue area of civil-military relations — due to its security implications — is also clouded in much mystery, misinformation, and outright propaganda. (Imagine the researcher interviewing members of the Soviet General Staff in the summer of 1991: “General, is the Soviet military planning to stage a coup?”) In effect, this research area suffers from both an overabundance and a dearth of primary information — vast quantities of some information alongside areas hidden or otherwise obscured from the researcher.

In an effort to overcome these deficiencies, this study will emphasize *actions over words*. In addition, some questions must — out of necessity — be answered indirectly. To this end, historical antecedents, political culture, and “Kremlinology” will also act as empirical evidence.

In the end, it should be possible to analyze the dependent variable in terms of several independent variables. The dependent variable in this study, obviously, is the nature of future civil-military relations in the two post-totalitarian cases: Poland and Hungary. Potential independent variables include: (1) the legacy of totalitarian rule, (2) the absence (or suppression) of a civil culture emphasizing the values of civilian rule over the military, (3) historical antecedents in the national political cultures, (4) geopolitical factors (such as anti-Russian tendencies and the power politics legacy of the Cold War), and (5) economic considerations and the level of development. These variables will be discussed in more detail in the context of the Typology of Relevance (Chapter Four).

CHAPTER 3: THEORY

Introduction:

Because the radical transformation that is occurring throughout the former Communist bloc (i.e., the retreat from totalitarianism and the creation of a new civil-military relationship) represents such a unique confluence of historical forces, existing theoretical formulations — designed to explain civil-military relations in other (albeit disparate) contexts — are unable to explain this transformation fully. Despite this limitation (which the Typology of Relevance seeks to redress), the current transformation in Eastern Europe does bear some resemblance to other systems of civil-military relations which the existing literature has addressed. Consequently, this chapter will survey the existing theoretical formulations with the specific aim of highlighting those elements most helpful to the analysis of post-Communist (transitional) civil-military relations.

Organizationally, this chapter is divided into two parts. In Part A, key concepts are defined. This constitutes the general theoretical milieu. In Part B, the five major “families” of theories of civil-military relations are surveyed. The five are as follows: the “Western,” “Interventionist,” “Social Relevance,” “Communist,” and “Transitional” models of civil-military relations.

Part A — The General Theoretical Milieu

Before the major theories of civil-military relations and the typology of relevance can be presented and critically analyzed, the terms and concepts that will be utilized in this study

must be explicitly defined. Not surprisingly, the first concept that has to be defined is that of the *military* itself.

(a) Regular Armed Forces:

The term “military” refers to several analytically distinct elements. The most important components of a military establishment are the regular armed forces. The regular armed forces of most nations are comprised of various personnel engaged in full-time active duty in a variety of military formations. Whether conscripts or long-term volunteers (or a combination of both), these personnel are the main societal group dedicated doctrinally and in terms of their equipment and logistical support to the task of defending the state with force (if necessary) from its external *and* internal enemies.

Regular forces are designed to fight irregular (counter-insurgency), conventional, or even nuclear wars — on their own soil or possibly on that of their allies or enemies. In times of crisis, they may also be called upon to restore order internally. However, defence of the state against foreign aggression is considered to be the most important task — traditionally and in terms of the regular military’s own corporate identity.

The regular armed forces of most nations are typically divided into three functionally differentiated military services: the army, navy, and air force. In the modern era, there have been very few exceptions to this tripartite division. As a partial exception, the Kenyan Air Force was disbanded in 1982 after air force officers staged an abortive coup,

but later it was reconstituted after a thorough purge.¹ In Canada, an effort was begun in 1964 by Paul Hellyer (Minister of Defence under Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson) to unify the three traditional services into a single unified defence force.² The idea was to save money, eliminate duplication of services, provide for one military uniform, and promote the interoperability of some personnel (i.e., technicians who could be transferred to wherever they were needed regardless of service distinctions). This effort, however, met with significant resistance from within the armed forces and was abandoned by the government of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in 1984.³

This tripartite division sometimes persists in the face of absurd circumstances. For example, Bolivia, which has been landlocked since Chile captured its Pacific Ocean coast and associated ports in the 1880s, maintains a separate, albeit small, naval service! Of course, in the case of Bolivia, the preservation of a naval tradition symbolizes Bolivian refusal to recognize *de jure* almost a century and a quarter of geopolitical reality and is not the product of pressure from the naval establishment.⁴

Beyond the army, navy, and air force, some states also maintain additional military

¹ Harvey G. Kebschull, "Operation "Just Missed:" Lessons From Failed Coup Attempts," *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Summer 1994), p. 577.

² Units forthwith would be divided according to functional roles: Maritime Command for naval and airborne anti-submarine formations, Mobile Command for most of the army and all tactical support air squadrons, Training Command, Material Command (i.e., logistics), Air Transportation Command, and (later) Communications Command.

³ Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to the Gulf War*, 3rd ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1992), pp. 250-253, 261, and 265.

⁴ See Wyre Davies, "Navy has this Little Problem...(no seashore)," *The Gazette [Montreal]* (May 19, 1996), p. B.5.

services. Most of the time, these other services simply represent subdivisions of the main services, but sometimes they enjoy considerable institutional autonomy within the military framework. Modern examples of separate combat services include: (1) artillery branches, (2) anti-tank or anti-air services, (3) strategic (rocket) forces, (4) assault engineers, (5) marines, (6) cavalry (existing today as helicopter-borne “cavalry”), (7) commando and special forces, and (8) airborne or paratroops.

In virtually every regular military establishment, there are also numerous support, technical, and administrative branches including: (1) military staffs (responsible for overall operational planning), (2) logistics services (i.e., the modern Quartermaster General), (3) legal and military police services, (4) medical services, (5) the Chaplaincy, (6) ordinance and vehicle repair services, (7) railroad, airport, and other construction operations (i.e., “Seabees”) and (8) training operations. These service branch divisions and subdivisions will vary somewhat depending on the precise organizational structure adopted and developed over time to fulfill the requirements of a particular nation.

(b) Reserves:

A second component of most military establishments are the military *reserves*. Reserve forces are usually comprised of individuals who have completed their training and service in the regular armed forces. Typically, reserve units and reserve personnel are subject to periodic retraining regimens (albeit at far lower and less intensive levels than is the case for active duty units and personnel).

Although no longer on active duty, members of the Reserves are subject to recall (on short notice) from their civilian employment to a higher level of military preparedness in the case of a national military emergency. Reserve units, such as the American National Guard, are also sometimes activated to assist in the case of civil disorder or a natural disaster. Placement at active duty status may take the form of individuals (generally specialists) assigned to existing active duty units or it may involve reserve units which are brought into active duty *en masse* to support operations undertaken by the regular armed forces. Reservists may be called to active duty for a specified period of time or they may be activated “for the duration” of the emergency.

(c) Paramilitary Units:

Analytically distinct from the regular and reserve military are a third component of many military establishments: the *paramilitary* forces of a nation.⁵ Types of paramilitary forces include militarized police or border guards, local defence units (i.e., militia or *Landwehr* representing a specific geographical region), and/or workers’ militias (i.e., militia recruited from a politically reliable segment of society). “Militarized” police and border guards differ from non-militarized police and border guards in that the former are trained to act as independent and integrated military units or as parts of larger military formations in the event of war. Moreover, these units train with and possess at least some equipment (i.e., a limited supply of armoured vehicles or heavy weapons) not normally associated

⁵ Private, non-state armed groups (such as the Irish Republican Army or the German *Freikorps* [Free Corps] of the 1920s) — although sometimes referred to as “paramilitary” forces in the popular press and some academic literature — are not the object of this study. Instead, this study is limited to *state-sponsored* paramilitary groups.

with their day-to-day duties.

Paramilitary forces can be differentiated from regular military units on the basis of their training and doctrinal attributes as well as on the basis of their TO&E (Table of Organization and Equipment). Typically, paramilitary forces are designed to fight counter-insurgency campaigns and/or unconventional (guerrilla) wars against potential aggressors. They are usually not trained in the full range of activities associated with regular military formations (i.e., offensive conventional operations or nuclear war-fighting).

In terms of their TO&E, paramilitary units differ from regular military units in the degree to which the former generally lack offensive or extra-territorial capabilities and are outfitted with weapons and equipment that is significantly lighter (and usually much older) than that of the regular military. Paramilitary units are typically motorized to a lesser extent than their regular forces counterparts and this fact limits their employment in distant theaters of operations. Paramilitary forces may also be lacking in one or more of the specialized technical arms that modern forces require to operate against advanced opponents. For example, artillery may be limited or even lacking in the case of paramilitary forces and any armoured vehicles in their possession (i.e., tanks or armoured personnel carriers) may be under-gunned or under-armoured by current standards.

Despite these doctrinal and *matériel* shortcomings, in a few instances (most notably Communist Yugoslavia and Ceaucescu's Rumania) paramilitary forces were — for all

intents and purposes — designed to supplant the regular armed forces of the state. For example, Rumania’s “Territorial Defence” doctrine — the “struggle of the whole people” — was designed to undertake a campaign of unconventional and guerrilla warfare in defence of the Rumanian regime in the event of armed aggression.⁶ Although Rumanian paramilitary forces employed obsolete weapons and equipment and were chronically underfunded (as were the regular armed forces for that matter), this system was designed to supplement the 179,000 soldiers of the regular forces and the 500,000 soldiers of the Reserves with more than 20,000 militarized Border Guards, a further 20,000 militarized Security Troops, and at least 250,000 “Patriotic Guard” militia troops.⁷ Some contemporaneous Rumanian estimates for the Reserves and Patriotic Guard ran considerably higher and projected total Rumanian strength upon full mobilization at 6,245,000 soldiers!⁸

(d) Conceptualizing the Military as a Corporate Body:

A second point of general application also concerns this concept of the “military.” It is important to note that the armed forces should not always be treated as analytically distinct or unified. On the contrary, despite the modern army’s emphasis on cohesion and

⁶ Detailed legislation governing the Rumanian system of territorial defence is documented in “Law Concerning the Organization of the National Defence of the Socialist Republic of Rumania,” *Scinteia [Bucharest]* (December 29, 1972), pp. 4-7 translated in *Joint Publication Research Service*, No. 58017 (January 18, 1973), pp. 32-88.

⁷ *The Military Balance: 1988-1989* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988), pp. 52-53.

⁸ See, for example, various Rumanian language sources cited in Ari Chaplin, “The ‘Popular War’ Doctrine in Rumanian Defence Policy,” *East European Quarterly*, Vol. XVII, No. 3 (September 1983), p. 273 and Aurel Braun, “The Yugoslav/Rumanian Concept of People’s War,” *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (September 1977), p. 41.

hierarchy, factionalism and division can and do exist within its ranks.⁹

Divisions within the military frequently occur along service lines. Usually, this takes the form of competition over budgetary allotments. Occasionally, however, this inter-service rivalry results in the bizarre phenomenon whereby officers and enlisted personnel from one service launch a coup which is opposed by personnel from a second service while members of the other services perhaps remain neutral and await developments! The August 1982 attempted coup in Kenya, for example, involved air force troops fighting more heavily armed units of the Kenyan army.¹⁰ (The army won easily.) And in February of 1997, Guatemalan army troops exchanged fire with military police units who were facing demobilization as part of the negotiated end to the Guatemalan civil war.¹¹ (The army emerged victorious in this conflict as well.)

Another potential source of differences within the military may be generational. In newly independent regimes in particular, there may be differences in attitudes between those older officers who fought and struggled for national independence and younger officers who grew up in a post-colonial regime. Similarly, members of the military who have learned their military and historical lessons first-hand over the course of an earlier war or revolutionary situation are likely to have at least somewhat different attitudes than

⁹ S.E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1988), p. 5.

¹⁰ Kebschull, p. 572.

¹¹ "Guatemalan Army Moves on Rebellious Military Police," *The Gazette [Montreal]* (February 3, 1997), p. E8.

younger personnel whose principal life experiences were those of peace-time.¹²

A military establishment may also experience splits between staff and line officers, or between line and technical officers, or between “politicians” (i.e., those promoted for their political loyalty) and “technicians” (i.e., those promoted on the basis of their ability). Some scholars have argued that these sort of tensions existed within the military establishments of the Soviet Union and Communist Eastern Europe where politically reliable (i.e., “Red”) officers supplanted technically more competent (i.e., “Expert”) officers to the detriment of Communist military preparedness.¹³

A fourth potential source of factionalism and division within a military establishment is the hierarchical separation of the military into two functional components: (1) the officer corps, and (2) the enlisted personnel. The officer corps is, in the words of Harold Lasswell, charged with “the management of violence.”¹⁴ On the other hand, enlisted personnel (including Non-Commissioned Officers) are, according to Samuel Huntington,

¹² The concept of “learning” is subject to a considerable amount of debate in the academic literature. It seems that the manner in which individuals learn (or mis-learn for that matter) the lessons of history is influenced by a number of factors. Specifically, individuals generally take to heart what they understand to be the lessons of events: (1) which they experience first-hand, (2) which occur early in the life of the individual (i.e., during their “formative years”), (3) which were failures (i.e., successes leave more room for complacency and non-critical thinking), and (4) which were large-scale and dramatic. See, for example, Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1981) and “Generational Learning and Conflict Management,” *International Journal*, Vol. XL, No. 4 (Autumn 1985), pp. 555-585.

¹³ For perhaps the strongest proponent of this model see Roman Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967).

¹⁴ Lasswell quoted in Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 11.

“specialists in the application of violence not the management of violence.”¹⁵ These roles, although complementary, may lead to the fostering of divergent attitudes. The former, according to Huntington, is a “profession;” the latter “a trade.”¹⁶

Finally, divisions within the military may, to some extent or another, mirror those that exist within society at large. Thus, the military establishment may exhibit ethnic, class, religious, or caste tensions. These tensions may reinforce existing cleavages (i.e., one ethnic group may dominate the officer corps or one particular service) or they may cut across these other variations.

(e) Conceptualizing Military Regimes (in General):

On another level, when analysts write of either a military or a civilian regime, they are, in reality, referring to two ideal types. The designation “military” or “civilian” refers to differences of degree and not to differences of kind. In even the most “civilian dominated” regime, the military is regularly called upon to contribute to the political decision-making process. As will be discussed in more detail below, technical advice is virtually never apolitical. And where military advice affects budgetary outlays, every decision concerning the military is political (especially to groups denied resources accorded to the military).

At the other extreme, to speak of a “military regime” is equally somewhat of a misnomer.

¹⁵ Huntington, p. 18.

¹⁶ Huntington, pp. 11 & 18.

Military or Praetorian regimes are perhaps the most prevalent type of modern authoritarian regime. And along with modern aristocracies, one party dictatorships, and civilian oligarchies, they tend to share certain characteristics. Specifically, authoritarian regimes tend to limit themselves to controlling what might be called the “commanding heights” of society’s economic and social structure. Authoritarian regimes are not interested in controlling all economic activity, all social action, and all social groups and institutions. In other words, *civil society* continues to exist in military-dominated regimes and it continues to exhibit some influence over regime decision-making. In every case where the military has taken power, significant segments of the civilian bureaucracy and economy have continued to retain their institutional autonomy.

Part B - Existing Theoretical Formulations

Beginning with this section, the five major “families” of theories of civil-military relations will be presented and analyzed. The analysis of these theoretical families will serve as the building blocks for the Typology of Relevance presented in the next chapter. The five families are: the “Western,” “Interventionist,” “Social Relevance,” “Communist,” and “Transitional” families of models.

(a) The “Western” Family of Models:

The “Western” family of models gets its name from the fact that these models were principally designed to explain the experiences of the West European and North American states. Of course, other states (including Tsarist Russia, Imperial China, and modern Japan) have shared characteristics of these Western states and thus the name —

the “Western” model of civil-military relations — should not be taken too literally or be assumed to be too exclusive in its applicability. This group of theories itself is comprised of two components: the Traditional Models and the Liberal Model.

(i) The Traditional Model (Western Europe):

Most conceptualizations of the civil-military relationship are broadly premised on the assumption that serious divisions do or can exist between military and civilian leaders. It can be argued, however, that this need not necessarily be the case. In the “traditional” form of civil-military relations, the civilian and military elites are comprised of essentially the same individuals. In the absence of social divisions between military and civilian leaders, there cannot be any serious conflicts and thus no circumstances under which the military will intervene against the political elites. According to Eric Nordlinger and Samuel Huntington, this situation was most prominent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the European monarchies.¹⁷

The emergence of the traditional form of civil-military relations was primarily a product of the forces unleashed by the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) — most notably the rise of

¹⁷ Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers and Politics: Military Coups and Government* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), pp. 11ff and Huntington, pp. 19ff. Stanislav Andreski, writing on the topic of 19th Century Latin American civil-military relations, points out that overlapping civilian and military elites are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the political neutralization of the military. Latin American military leaders repeatedly overthrew civilian governments through *coups d'etat* despite coming from the same land-owning families as their civilian counterparts. Andreski suggests this difference, when compared to the European monarchies, is due to the bitter class divisions that existed within Latin American society at large and the further divisions and incompetence within the ruling elites. See Stanislav Andreski, *Military Organization and Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), p. 198 cited in Claude E. Welch, Jr., and Arthur K. Smith, *Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil-military Relations* (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1974), pp. 14-15.

the nation-state. The secular monarchs, who with the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia emerged victorious against the transcendent authority of the Pope in Rome and the Holy Roman Emperor in Vienna, were simultaneously able to consolidate their power at the expense of the numerous semi-sovereign feudal lords and princes that existed within their imperial realms.

Previously, wars had been fought with mercenary armies and/or armies raised for a specific campaign. A powerful ruler (i.e., a King or the Emperor) might raise some troops directly (primarilyly by hiring mercenaries), but most troops for a given campaign would be raised by the lessor nobles who owed fealty to the sovereign. It would be the local lord — not the sovereign — who would gather specific forces from amongst the subjects of that noble's local territory.

The problem for the national monarch, however, was that increasingly these kinds of troops (i.e., mercenaries and troops of dependant nobles) were proving to be of little military value. Neither type of force could be fully trusted to obey the commands of the sovereign at the best of times and this was certainly a problem for the monarch when the going was tough.

But there was another factor at work as well. Warfare for the new European powers was beginning to change. As the increasingly rich and powerful nation-states began to vie with one another to fill the vacuum left in the wake of the defeat of Rome and Vienna, war became increasingly common and expensive. And continuous warfare could no

longer be fought utilizing short-term armies. Permanent military establishments were required and only the nation-states could afford to undertake such massive operations. By the end of the Thirty Years War, the new national monarchs found it necessary and possible to dispense with mercenary armies and armies raised by lesser nobles altogether.

To replace the armies of the mercenaries and feudal vassals with permanent armies loyal to the sovereign required a fundamental shift in the way European armies were organized. The rank and file of these new forces would now consist of long-service “volunteers” (which could include nefarious individuals offered military service as an alternative to prison, individuals kidnapped or “press ganged” off the streets, and even genuine volunteers in search of money, fame, or glory). Typically, service for these soldiers and sailors would last for 8 to 12 years.¹⁸ In some cases, however, terms of service were considerably larger (i.e., in 1793, service in the Russian army was *reduced* to only 25 years from “for life.”)¹⁹

For their officer corps, the national monarchs employed the previously semi-sovereign feudal lords. The national monarchs, now in a dominant position within their societies, could control and direct the many petty vassals within their territory by dispensing or denying feudal rights and privileges (i.e., land, money, and titles). In the end, the change in the way armies were raised and organized was dramatic. It was now the sovereign who

¹⁸ Huntington, p. 21.

¹⁹ John Keep, “The Origins of Russian Militarism,” *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique*, Vol. XXVI, No. 1 (janvier-mars 1985), p. 11.

raised the army and paid for its operations out of the national treasury. The aristocracy was relegated to a subservient position.

Eventually, entry into the officer corps for all branches of the military (except for the technical arms of the artillery and engineers) was on the basis of birth and wealth.²⁰ Similarly, advancement and promotion occurred on the basis of birth, political connections (especially to the Royal Court), and it was even possible to purchase military commands! As for military training and education for these aristocratic officers, this was believed to be unnecessary; the nobleman's inborn talent was considered to be sufficient to bring victory at the art (not science) of war.

Over time, the relationship between monarch and aristocrat developed even further. Instead of maintaining an identity and power base (economic as well as military) apart from the monarch, the nobles came to depend upon the sovereign for their privileges. With their own powers diminished, they needed the political and economic protection of the monarch from the demands of the bourgeois and peasant classes. In the end, the monarchy and the aristocracy became "imbued with similar values, and they maintained familial bonds through blood and marriage."²¹ On those rare occasions when differences arose between the civilian and military leaders, these military leaders put their civilian interests ahead of their military concerns. Or, as Huntington writes: "The aristocrat was an amateur at officership; it was not for him a vocation with ends and standards of its

²⁰ The following is from Huntington, pp. 22ff.

²¹ Nordlinger, p. 11.

own, but an incidental attribute of his station in society.”²² These officers had a greater stake in their positions in the civilian hierarchy than they did in their military careers.

(ii) The Traditional Model (Imperial Russia):

The situation in Tsarist Russia paralleled and perhaps even exceeded that of the West and Central European monarchies in many ways. In Tsarist Russia, a non-conflictive civil-military relationship existed in the form of what John Keep calls the Russian “service state.”²³ In general terms, the Tsarist state was organized with the sole purpose of directing and mobilizing the vast human and material resources of the nation towards military ends (with the goal of enhancing national power). In turn, the military establishment supported the political system in order to protect its relatively privileged status.

In specific terms, the interdependent links between the Russian sovereign and the Russian aristocracy were even greater than the comparable links between sovereign and lord in Western and Central Europe. On the one hand, the Russian Tsar or Tsarina relied on the Russian military to a degree unmatched even in Prussia. As Count Sergey Witte, Chairman of the Tsarist Council of Ministers (1905-1906), wrote:

In reality what was the Russian Empire based on? Not just primarily, but exclusively on its army. Who created the Russian Empire, transforming the Muscovite Semi-Asiatic tsardom into the most influential, and dominant European power? It was accomplished strictly by the army’s bayonets. It was not before our culture, bureaucratized church, or wealth

²² Huntington, pp. 26-27.

²³ John Keep, “The Origins of Russian Militarism,” pp. 5-20.

and prosperity that the world bowed. It bowed before our power.²⁴

In other words, Russia was (and perhaps always has been) a *military* empire. Military defence against foreign aggressors and military conquest in the service of imperial expansion seemed to go hand in hand. Consequently, the Russian military establishment was denied few of the resources of the state (even to the detriment of civilian economy) in order to meet its enormous needs.

In addition, the military was used, *within* imperial Russia, in a variety of political and economic tasks.²⁵ The military was used to administer conquered territories (such as Poland, Transcaucasia, and the Ukraine) directly as well as areas within Russia-proper which might engage in revolt. Active duty and retired officers were also used to monitor and administer mines, forests, canals, and roads and the officer corps was also employed to watch over the civilian bureaucracy in general (in concert with the state security apparatus).

On the other hand, the Russian aristocracy was in turn very dependent on the Imperial Court and imperial *largesse*. In the first place, the Russian nobility enjoyed even fewer privileges (in terms of land or property), political and legal rights, and local autonomy

²⁴ Quoted in Dimitri K. Simes, "The Military and Militarism in Soviet Society," *International Security*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Winter 1981/82), p. 126.

²⁵ The following are from Keep, "The Origins of Russian Militarism," pp. 8ff.

than their Western or even Central European cousins.²⁶ The usual practice, as it was in the other European monarchies, was for wealth, birth, seniority, and imperial favour to direct the promotion of military officers and, in the case of an officer of the Imperial Guard, the privilege of attending the Imperial Court might be extended.²⁷

Moreover, there was, during the Muscovite period, a direct link between military service and the control of serfs and lands.²⁸ Later, in the rare case where an individual from outside the aristocracy obtained a military commission (i.e., someone rising from the ranks on the basis of exceptional merit), that officer automatically obtained noble status! The extension of this privilege was undoubtedly designed to ensure the loyalty of that individual to the Tsar or Tsarina.

To be sure, the relationship between the sovereign and the Russian military-aristocracy has not been entirely without strain. The assassination of Paul I (1801) by officers and *courtiers* and led by the military governor of St. Petersburg, Count Peter Pahlen, should not, however, be considered a *military coup*. Paul's son and heir, the future Alexander I, may or may not have assented to the *murder* of his father (the historical record is unclear), but he almost certainly gave his tacit approval to his *overthrow*. This event, therefore, is

²⁶ Simes, p. 129. See, also, John Keep, "No Gauntlet for Gentlemen: Officers' Privileges in Russian Military Law, 1716-1855," *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 1-2 (janvier-juin 1993), *passim*.

²⁷ Keep, "The Origins of Russian Militarism," pp. 12-13.

²⁸ The following are from Keep, "The Origins of Russian Militarism," pp. 8-12.

probably more accurately described as a “palace coup” or “palace revolt.”²⁹

As well, the military rebellion, which later followed Alexander’s own death in December of 1825, was also at least partly the product of the somewhat messy succession of Alexander by his two brothers: Constantine and Nicholas.³⁰ In fact, the revolts of the “Decemberists” (1825) demonstrated the inter-dependent relationship between the Tsar and the aristocratic-officer. According to Keep, most of the participants in these revolts were not true revolutionaries or Praetorians. Instead, these individuals wished to push the Tsar into making necessary reforms.³¹ In other words, “if only the Tsar knew....” It is an event analogous to the assassination of the so-called “Mad Monk,” Gregory Rasputin, in December of 1916 by a well-known aristocrat, a member of the Duma, and a member of the Imperial family which can also be seen as an attempt not to overthrow or destabilize the monarchy, but to bring some sanity to the Romanov dynasty.³²

(iii) The Liberal Model:

A second conceptualization of the civil-military relationship is represented by the *liberal* model. This model represents the dominant mode of civil-military relations in the industrialized West and it can also be found in Chinese (Confucian) theory. In Western

²⁹ George Vernadsky, *A History of Russia*, 6th ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1969), pp. 193-194 and Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia*, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 273-275.

³⁰ Riasanovsky, pp. 319-322.

³¹ Keep, pp. 13-14.

³² See Vernadsky, pp. 284-285.

Europe and North America, the liberal model refers to a situation in which the military is essentially *depoliticized*. In Imperial China, “rule by the pen [the civilian bureaucracy] rather than the sword formed the ideal, if not always the reality, of Confucian political reality.”³³

Samuel Huntington’s, *The Soldier and the State*, represents one of the earliest and most thorough treatments of the liberal model. In this work, Huntington documents both the rise and the nature of military professionalism and the related issue of civilian control of the military establishment. As Huntington writes: “A highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state.”³⁴ Such a military establishment is not disposed to intervene in the politics of the nation except to protect a very narrow range of corporate interests and when it does so it generally relies upon normal constitutional and bureaucratic channels.

Huntington argues that professionalism, in general terms, is comprised of three elements: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.³⁵ *Expertise* refers to the highly specialized knowledge and skill that individuals possess in a particular field of study. Extended study and experience is needed in order to acquire this ability and to apply its lessons to new circumstances (i.e., this expertise is universal in applicability). *Responsibility* means that

³³ Claude E. Welch, Jr., “Civil-Military Relations: Perspectives From the Third World,” *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Winter 1985), p. 186.

³⁴ Huntington, p. 84.

³⁵ The following sections are from Huntington, pp. 7-18.

this knowledge and skill is employed on behalf of all of society. The individual is seeking to serve society and is not performing tasks solely on the basis of financial remuneration. And finally, *corporateness* refers to the sense of organic unity and separateness that members of a profession possess as a result of the extended process of developing their specialized skill and due to their sharing a unique responsibility.

Huntington argues that the modern military (particularly the officer corps) exhibits each of these three characteristics. *Military expertise* is acquired through a long process of study and practical experience and revolves around the interrelated duties of training, organizing, equipping, and leading a modern military force. This is, moreover, a universal skill because it enables the officer to plan for any and all eventualities and to adopt to changing circumstances. *Military responsibility* refers to the special duty of the military to employ its knowledge and skill at the direction of the sovereign power in defence of the entire society. And finally, the sense of *military corporateness* is the product of the sharing of the responsibility to protect the state, the hierarchical organization of the military establishment (including its ranks and uniforms), and the bureaucratic separation of the military from the other branches of government.

Huntington suggests that the traditional mode of civil-military relations represents more than just a chronological intermediate stage of development between pre-Westphalian civil-military relations (i.e., mercenary and vassal armies) and civil-military relations in the industrialized West (i.e., mass, professional armies). In many ways, the rise of a depoliticized or professional armed forces in the modern era represents the logical

culmination of many of the same processes that led to the development of the traditional mode of civil-military relations.

Huntington dates the beginning of the development of truly professional armed forces with the reforms undertaken in Prussia following Napoleon's crushing defeat of King Frederick William's armies at Jena and Auerstädt in 1806. Although limited antecedents to these reforms can be found in many places, only in the Prussian army of Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, *et al* can all of these elements be found in fully developed and integrated form. Prussian military professionalism — later to be the model of virtually every other military establishment — represents a sharp break with the idea of the “aristocrat as amateur officer” which typifies the traditional model of 17th and 18th Century civil-military relations.³⁶

The defeat at Jena forced the Prussian military establishment to critically re-evaluate its entire structure and operation. In this sense, Jena was a watershed event. However, the actual reforms undertaken first in Prussia and later elsewhere were themselves a response to large-scale underlying factors (many of which were already beginning to emerge during the previous period).³⁷

In terms of specific factors, the Prussian adoption of the ideal of military professionalism was partially a byproduct of the continued growth and development of the post-

³⁶ Huntington, pp. 30-32.

³⁷ The following sections are from Huntington, pp. 30-39.

Westphalian nation-state which had also partially served as the stimulus for the adoption of the traditional mode of civil-military relations. Large, urbanized populations backed-up by increasingly sophisticated industrial capacities and under the overall command of one sovereign power meant that armies were forever getting larger and much more difficult to supply and direct. The aristocratic amateur, skilled primarily by the virtues of birth, wealth, and the favour of the Court, could no longer be expected to intuitively possess the skills necessary to train an army with all of its technical requirements. Admission of non-aristocratic individuals to the officer corps had always been more open in the case of the technically sophisticated fields of artillery and the engineers, but the technical demands on the officer now extended even further to include broader areas of training and supply.

As for command of the army in battle, here too amateurs were beginning to exhibit their limitations. The coordination of modern armies on the field of battle — their logistical trains and disparate arms — was proving to be less and less practical for the gifted amateur astride a horse or on a hilltop. As first exhibited by the Napoleonic Wars, the nation-state was now conducting war on a continental scale. Command and coordination of such forces during a modern campaign required a large staff and planning skills beyond the intuitive abilities of most individuals enjoined in the “art” of war. The sovereign leading a nation-state, who in the traditional period was rich enough to coopt the aristocracy to the needs of the nation, now proved rich and powerful enough to support full-time, trained, and skilled *professional* military establishments.

On another front, the creation of a professional military was also partially the product of the spread of liberal-democratic ideals across Europe. The absolutist European monarchies resisted these democratic tendencies (as exhibited by the events of 1848-1849), but they were not capable of entirely suppressing the influence of this new ideology. Eventually, professionalization of the military allowed for the neutralization of the military in general and the officer corps in particular. The military, as a result, would not constitute a battleground between the absolutist and democratic ideals. It would be isolated from their conflicts and therefore would be capable of still performing its primary purpose; that of defending the state from foreign aggression.

And finally, the adoption of a professional officer corps in Prussia and elsewhere was intimately related to the rise of universal military service. By the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the long service “volunteers” of the traditional period were proving incapable of facing France’s *levée en masse*. God, after all, was said to be on the side of “the big battalions.” And if Prussia and the other European states were going to try to compete with the Napoleonic “Nation in Arms,” they could no longer rely on the relatively small numbers of long service enlisted personnel. In the traditional period, experienced and skilled non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel had somewhat sustained the amateur aristocrat. In the future, however, a professional officer corps would be needed to sustain the new mass army of the citizen-soldier.

To this end, the officer corps was increasingly opened-up to service from individuals outside the noble classes. Professional standards (as well as seniority) became the basis

for military advancement. Cadets received both a military and a liberal education (to turn them into both officers and gentlemen) and military staffs were taught to organize and train the army and to design war plans. Ultimately, the identity of the military as a separate caste was created through the values of competence and *esprit de corps*.

The end result of this professionalization of the military was to separate the military from the rest of society. In fact, civil-military relations as a field of study is, according to Huntington, largely the product of the military becoming a distinct, professional group. It may be something of an exaggeration, but (as Huntington argues) the term civil-military relations, in this sense, *did not exist* for the European monarchies or in earlier historical periods. There was, in effect, no “military” which existed apart or separate from the “civilian” authorities.³⁸ Subsequently, however, the civilian leadership needed to find a way to control this necessary (but otherwise potentially dangerous) societal actor and the only two avenues available to them were: subjective control or objective control.³⁹

Subjective control represents the form of civil-military relations found in the European monarchies, the early American Republic, and even totalitarian regimes. The monarchies utilized their economic strength and their control over aristocratic rights and privileges, the early American Republic demobilized the military in peacetime in favour of a citizen militia, and the totalitarians employed terror and brute force, but in all of these cases the

³⁸ Huntington, pp. 19-20.

³⁹ The following sections are from Huntington, pp. 80ff.

effect was the same.⁴⁰ In all of these states, a civilian social actor possessed more power than the military establishment and used this advantage to maintain control over the military. Unfortunately, such arrangements invariably precluded the development of powerful military establishments (i.e., the military can never be more powerful than the most powerful civilian actor) and this in turn tends to prevent the military from successfully undertaking its special mission of protecting the state from aggression.

The alternative, Huntington argues, is *objective control*. Under this system, the military establishment is not *dominated* by the civilian actors. Instead, the military is *indirectly* controlled through the cultivation of a professional ethic which reifies civilian leadership of the state. As Nordlinger writes:

Obviously the liberal model cannot rest securely upon civilian assertions, claims, and warnings. *Subordination to civilian authority has to be internalized as a set of strongly held beliefs and values.* Soldiers who are imbued with these beliefs and values — what might be referred to as the *civilian ethic* — are attitudinally disposed to accept civilian authority and to retain a neutral, depoliticized stance even when in sharp disagreement with the government. [Emphasis added.]⁴¹

The internalizing of this set of beliefs creates within the military establishment (and in particular in the officer corps) creates an autonomous sphere in which the military

⁴⁰ For a more detailed discussion of civil-military relations in the early American Republic, see Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (New York: The Viking Press, 1964), pp. 331-365. Brzezinski and Huntington note, amongst other facts, that the American republican's distrust of standing armies and their parallel faith in the virtues of an armed citizen militia was demonstrated by the virtual demobilization of the American army after the Revolution (i.e., the army was reduced to only 80 officers and men within six months of the end of the Revolution!) and by the maintenance of only a minimal peacetime military establishment until the post-World War II period (i.e., the American army generally never rose above 25,000 men during the 19th Century). (See Brzezinski and Huntington, p. 336.)

⁴¹ Nordlinger, p. 13.

operates while also ensuring that the military will not get involved in the political or social problems of the civilian sphere. The advantage of this professional model is that the military can be as powerful as is necessary to defend the interests of the state in the anarchic international environment and it will not threaten the place of the civilian authorities. In other words, the political power of the military is voluntarily decreased, but the fighting strength of the military is maximized.

(iv) Limits to Military Professionalism in the Liberal Model:

On the downside, the cultivation of this professional military ethic — based as it is on the values of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness — can not readily be created in many societies. Beyond the causal factors enumerated by Huntington (i.e., the shift to mass, volunteer armies, the increased frequency of war between nation-states, and so on), there is one other *enabling* variable to which Huntington only makes passing reference. Specifically, the effective development of a professional and politically neutral military is essentially a two-sided affair. While the military, because of its inculcated professional ethic, is expected to refrain from entering the political realm, the other half of the agreement represents a promise on the part of the political elite not to draw or push the military into political disputes.

A fully depoliticized or professional military may feel itself forced to intervene in the political process or even come to seize the reigns of power if its sphere of professional autonomy comes under direct attack by the political elite or if the political authorities are so corrupt, ineffective, or internally divided as to lose their legitimacy in the eyes of the

military and/or civil population. In order to maintain an effective, professional, and depoliticized military establishment, the military can not be used by one political faction against another. Nor must the political actors attempt to divide the military against itself by manipulating inter-service, ethno-regional, or other rivalries in order to gain domestic political advantage.

A recent Canadian incident illustrates the kind of tensions to which a professional military can be subjected even in the most democratic political regime. In late October 1995 (just prior to a Referendum on Quebec sovereignty), Jean-Marc Jacob — the Official Opposition (*Bloc Québécois*) Critic for National Defence and Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs — faxed a letter to Canadian military personnel which stated in part: “The day after a YES win [i.e., after a nationalist victory in the Quebec Referendum] Quebec should immediately create a Department of Defence, the embryo of a major state, and offer all Quebecers serving in the Canadian Forces the chance to integrate into the Quebec Forces....”⁴²

In the heated context of the referendum campaign, this letter caused a political firestorm. A Liberal Member of Parliament, Jim Hart, suggested the letter was seditious and infringed upon the privileges of Parliament, but in the end the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs issued Jacob with only a mild rebuke. The majority of the Committee concluded that although Jacob’s actions were “ill-advised,” Parliament’s

⁴² *Twenty-Second Report of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs* (Ottawa: House of Commons, 1996), p. 2.

privileges had not been infringed upon in this instance.⁴³

When — in more serious contexts — the “civilian” half of the civil-military equation is not being upheld, the military may come to feel it is its *duty* to intervene in the political realm. Moreover, because it has direct access to the inner sanctum of the decision-making process (via the office of the Minister of Defence who may even be a member of the armed forces), the military is well positioned to articulate its demands should it chose to do so. This does not, however, invalidate the basic premise of the liberal model. Even after intervention, the civilian and military elites continue to believe that long-term or permanent military rule is illegitimate.⁴⁴ A return to the barracks is desired albeit impractical given the existing crisis.

There are many other contexts which may lead the military to take it upon itself to intervene in the politics of the nation even when the military has internalized the *civilian ethic* and is attitudinally disposed in favour of accepting the notion of civilian control. Internalized professionalism — whereby there is a clear division of labour between the *security* concerns of the armed forces and the *social and political* concerns of the government — does not preclude a political role for the military. According to R. D. McKinaly, “it may also precipitate such a role.”⁴⁵

⁴³ *Twenty-Second Report of the Standing Committee...*, p. 5.

⁴⁴ Welch, pp. 187-190.

⁴⁵ R.D. McKinaly, “Professionalization, Politicization, and Civil-Military Relations,” in *The Perceived Role of the Military*, ed. M.R. van Gils, Contributions to Military Sociology, Vol. 1 (Rotterdam, Neths.: Rotterdam University Press, 1971), p. 252.

Democratic governments and professional military establishments may, for example, find that the boundaries between what is considered to be objective, technical advice or a subjective, political policy decision change over time. Civilian authorities may assume more direct control over increasingly wider spheres of activity (and thus decrease the sphere of military autonomy) or the Legislature and/or Executive may come to defer more of their authority to their military administrators (and thus increase the sphere of professional military competence).

Both external and internal variables may be responsible for these changes. A change in the external context (such as a declaration of war) may alter this relationship. During periods of national or international emergency (real or imagined), the military may typically be called upon, by the political authorities, to undertake greater responsibilities “for the duration.” Because the military is supposedly apolitical, civilian authorities may not believe that the expansion of the military’s prerogatives in such a case will create political difficulties. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. Supposedly objective “technical” advice may have political implications and this may involve the military in serious political debates.

On the internal front, the relative influence of the military may be affected by the following: (1) the degree of consensus at the political level (i.e., divided politicians leave more room for civilian and military “civil servants” to exercise power), (2) the degree to which one institution (i.e., the military) enjoys administrative “hegemony” (i.e., the

degree to which overlapping ministerial jurisdictions are avoided), and (3) the degree to which the military is itself united or divided.⁴⁶

The example of Canada during the two conscription crises illustrates the phenomenon whereby the provision of supposedly apolitical, technical advice drew the military into civilian political debates. In 1917, an election held on the issue of conscription divided the Canadian electorate along linguistic lines. Every riding with a Francophone majority voted against the government. In 1942, the government of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King held a plebiscite to ask the Canadian electorate to release it from its earlier pledge not to institute a policy of conscription. The measure garnered the support of approximately 80 percent of the Anglophone electorate, but Francophone voters opposed the measure by almost the same margin.⁴⁷ In neither case did Canadian military leaders directly intervene and force conscription upon a recalcitrant government. From virtually the start of both wars, conscription for overseas service was a divisive issue for a number of purely partisan, political reasons, but technical, "military" decisions *indirectly* affected the course of the debate.

In World War I, for example, the Canadian Expeditionary Force was allowed to grow an enormously large and wasteful logistical train in England (camps, hospitals, offices, depots, and so on) while reinforcements for front-line combat forces went for naught. In

⁴⁶ For a detailed look at how these factors have worked in the Norwegian civil-military relations context, see Tom Skauge, "Contraction and Detraction: Non-Equilibrium Studies of Civil-Military Relations," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (May 1994), *passim*.

⁴⁷ Morton, p. 190.

1944, a similarly large logistical train was compounded by the diversion of part of the Canadian army to fight in Italy (after almost four years of garrison duty in England). This combat experience may have been good for military morale, but it increased the numbers of command and logistical personnel required to field an army Corps in two widely separated European battlefields.⁴⁸

During the early part of 1944, Canadian military commanders reported to their political bosses that the reinforcement situation was adequate. The eventual shortfall in replacements, therefore, burst upon the political agenda with renewed vigor. It could not, as it had in the past, be glossed over. It may have been that the military authorities in Europe were slow in communicating the changed circumstances because they were charged with expectations of a quick victory (especially following the massive breakout from the Normandy lodgment) or they may have delayed their reports to shield the government from a politically sensitive issue or to cover up their unfounded optimism of an immediate victory. A more sinister theory suggests the crisis was contrived by the military in order to force conscription upon a recalcitrant government, but there is no hard evidence of this.⁴⁹ In any case, the policies and operations of Canadian military commanders operating within narrow technical boundaries resulted in a significant political crises for the civilian political leadership.

⁴⁸ See, for example, J.W. Pickersgill, *The Mackenzie King Record: Volume I (1939-1944)* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), esp. chapter 18 and R. MacGregor Dawson, *The Conscription Crisis of 1944* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), *passim*.

⁴⁹ Dawson, p. 15.

Another reason why a depoliticized military may find itself drawn into the civilian political realm occurs whenever there is a question as to which civilian authorities the military is supposed to obey. This is especially possible in the case where civilian authority is constitutionally divided between the executive, legislature, and the courts. In the United States, for example, the constitutionality of the 1973 War Powers Act has never been tested.⁵⁰ This law, passed by the American Congress during the administration of President Richard Nixon, maintains that the authority to commit American military forces in most circumstances rests with Congress. All subsequent American Presidents (both Democratic and Republican) have refused to recognize the legitimacy of that law, but it has never been put before the American Supreme Court so its validity and the reaction of American military commanders is open to some question.

And finally, military leaders may balk at following illegal orders (i.e., orders not within the purview of civilian authorities to give), they may refuse to obey orders that violate international law or are immoral, or they may oppose certain orders for political reasons.⁵¹ Kenneth Kemp and Charles Hudlin are certainly correct in asserting that “History” looks quite favourably upon the very “political” actions of French General Charles de Gaulle. In 1940, de Gaulle disobeyed the orders of Marshal Philippe Pétain (then Prime Minister of a defeated France and signatory to the Armistice with Germany) and General Maxime Weygand (Commander of the French Army) with his refusal to

⁵⁰ Kenneth W. Kemp and Charles Hudlin, “Civil Supremacy over the Military: Its Nature and Limits,” *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Fall 1992), pp. 9-10.

⁵¹ Kemp and Hudlin, pp. 7-26.

surrender and with his efforts to carry on the battle against Germany from beyond the borders of France.⁵² This historical assessment can be contrasted quite sharply with the unfavourable judgment passed upon French Admiral François Darlan who refused to order the French fleet to carry on the fight from Britain or from French colonial ports.⁵³

(b) The “Interventionist” Family of Models:

The “interventionist” family of models is designed to explain cases of military coups and military rule or the somewhat prevalent model of a “revolving door” of alternating military and civilian rule. Although examples abound from Africa, the Middle East, Southern Europe (especially Turkey), Southeast Asia, and elsewhere; these models are most closely associated with the historical experiences of Latin America and Turkey.

In the case of Latin America, Alfred Stepan writes: “[T]he military is repeatedly called into politics to be the moderator of political activity, but is denied the right [i.e., legitimacy] to attempt to direct changes within the political system.”⁵⁴ The result in many countries in Latin America has been a seemingly endless series of military interventions and disengagements from politics. However, in Latin America (and several other parts of

⁵² Kemp and Hudlin, especially pp. 17-19.

⁵³ See, in particular, Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: Volume II - Their Finest Hour* (New York: Bantam Books, 1962), especially chapters 9-11.

⁵⁴ Alfred Stepan, “The Moderating Pattern of Civil-Military Relations,” in *The Political Influence of the Military: A Comparative Reader*, eds, Amos Perlmutter and Valerie Plave Bennett (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 255. The pattern of “revolving door” interventions (presently found most prominently in Turkey) is somewhat analogous to the Roman system of the *magister populi* (i.e., “temporary dictator”) wherein a military ruler was called upon to lead the state for the duration of a particular crisis or a maximum of six months after which control of the polity would be returned to the legitimate authorities. See M. Cary and H.H. Scullard, *A History of Rome Down to the Reign of Constantine*, 3rd ed. (London: The Macmillan Press, 1975), pp. 56 & 63.

the world) in the 1980s and 1990s, this circle seems to have been broken. The factors behind this trend, however, will not be discussed here, but will be discussed in the “Transitional” family of models.

(i) Military Intervention — Motivation:

Ulf Sundhaussen has observed that much of the literature on military coups consists of “a largely unnecessary” debate between those who believe regime vulnerability (opportunity) is the principle explanatory factor and those who hold that the military’s disposition to intervene (motivation) is the main variable explaining military takeovers.⁵⁵

Both are, in fact, necessary.

[I]f there is only disposition (because the political system is essentially sound in itself and capable of solving problems), a coup would fail; and if there is opportunity (systemic weakness or serious shortcomings on the part of civilian elites) without disposition, intervention is unlikely, or at least less likely, to occur. Obviously, uncausal explanations of coups, whether focusing on factors endogenous or exogenous to the military, are unconvincing: a synthesis of explanatory factors is essential.⁵⁶

This explanation of the causal chain was first posited by Samuel Finer in the first edition of *The Man on Horseback*. It has also been adopted in reverse by those studying military disengagements from politics. The return to the barracks also has to include a willingness on the part of the military to leave or lessen its participation in government (motivation) as well as the existence of societal forces to urge them out and take their place

⁵⁵ Ulf Sundhaussen, “Military Withdrawal from Government Responsibility,” *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Summer 1984), pp. 543-562.

⁵⁶ Sundhaussen, p. 545.

(opportunity).⁵⁷

Motivation includes inhibiting as well as enabling dimensions. It may seem somewhat counterintuitive, but many military establishments are not predisposed to take power at every opportunity. Having internalized the civilian ethic, the military may, in fact, be quite reluctant to seize the reigns of power.

Moreover, military leaders may be quite cognizant of the perils involved in such a move. For instance, by intervening directly in the political realm, the military itself may become divided internally, it may become weakened, or it may be replaced (should it fail in its efforts) by a civilian paramilitary force.⁵⁸ Opposition within the German *Wehrmacht* to the policies of Hitler's regime, for example, was muted first by the institutional threat posed by the S.A. (*Sturmabteilung* or "Brownshirts") and later by the threat posed by the militarized (or *Waffen*) units of the S.S. (*Schutzstaffel*). The army's fears were somewhat justified. Both Ernst Röhm (the head of the S.A. purged in 1934) and Heinrich Himmler (head of the S.S.) had designs on replacing the regular army and both undoubtedly would have taken advantage of any failed coup to expand their own personal fiefdoms even further.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Sundhaussen, pp. 550ff and Henri J. Barkey, "Why Military Regimes Fail: The Perils of Transition," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Winter 1990), pp. 169-192.

⁵⁸ Finer, pp. 20ff.

⁵⁹ See, for example, John Toland, *Adolf Hitler* (New York : Ballantine Books, 1976), *passim* and William L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany* (New York: Fawcett Crest [Random House], 1950), *passim*.

On the other hand, there are certain elements of the military's internalized belief system that do predispose it towards intervention. Huntington, as was suggested in an earlier section, suggests that the officer corps' "professionalism" is based on three elements: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. Most important amongst these three characteristics, for purposes here, is the element of responsibility. Responsibility arises from the individual's membership in the military organization and contribution to the completion of the military's functional tasks. For the military, this means self-identification as the "saviors" of society; protectors of the national interest against foreign foes or domestic ones for that matter.⁶⁰ Therefore, in times of extreme crisis, even the most non-intervention-oriented military may feel that it is its "duty" to act to save the situation.

(ii) Military Intervention — Corporate and Not-so-Corporate Interests:

As suggested above, for coup leaders amongst the most frequently cited rationales used in attempts to justify a seizure of power are: (1) the existence of a dire national emergency or (2) the need to act on a caretaker basis.⁶¹ Of course, the military often takes it upon itself to decide whether or not a national emergency exists and to decide what length of time constitutes a temporary/caretaker intervention. These public pronouncements, however, should not be confused with reality. These justifications are designed primarily for public consumption and may or may not be indicative of the totality of the military's underlying grievances.

⁶⁰ *Finer*, pp. 28ff.

⁶¹ *Nordlinger*, pp. 19-21 and *Finer*, pp. 14-20.

According to W. R. Thompson, actual motivations are frequently less “noble and righteous” than coup leaders would like the public to believe. In addition to societal and political concerns, coup leaders frequently are motivated by such pedestrian concerns as the distribution of resources in the national economy (i.e., the military’s share) or the fulfillment of personal ambitions. In terms of specifics,⁶² the military’s corporate interests include the following:

- a) autonomy: the military seeks to retain control over its own sphere of internal interests and concerns (c.f., micromanagement by politicians and/or civilian bureaucrats);
- b) hierarchy: the military seeks to retain control over the chain-of-command and avoid challenges to its internal discipline;
- c) functional monopoly: the military wants to maintain its monopoly as the state’s principle instrument of violence *vis-à-vis* paramilitary and other institutions;
- d) cohesion: the military wants to avoid having its internal factions and divisions manipulated by political actors;
- e) honour: the military does not want to be blamed for military defeats nor have its role in society “shamed” by the performance of civilian leaders;
- f) political position: the military seeks to maintain its position relative to the civilian political system; and
- g) resource conflicts: the military wants to influence decisions regarding pay and promotions, the overall military budget and interservice allocations, and/or allocations for specific tasks (i.e., the conduct of a war, campaign, or effort against insurgents).

As for the military’s not-so-corporate interests, these include the following:

⁶² W.R. Thompson, *The Grievances of Military Coup-Makers* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973), pp. 12-39.

- a) individual concerns: threats to the position, resources, or person of individual coup leaders;
- b) threats to the position of a political faction in the military; and
- c) threats to a particular ethno-regional group within the military.

The significance of these corporate and not-so-corporate interests, according to Thompson, is their ability to act as *triggers* precipitating coups; “necessary (although rarely sufficient)...preconditions to the event.”⁶³

This conclusion may appear counter-intuitive at first glance. It could be argued, somewhat cynically, that the military “always looks after its own first.” But to the contrary, it is the internalized belief of the military that it must act as society’s guardians which frequently serves as a clarion call to direct political action. Because the military sees itself (and is seen) as closely identified with the national interest (at least as foreign powers are concerned), it comes to believe that “anything that is good for the military *must* be good for society!” They may *in fact* act to protect their own prerogatives, but in all but the most exceptional cases they invariably *believe* that what they do is in the national interest.

There is, in fact, a very good reason why this ethical dimension is almost always present to some degree or another. Besides representing an *opportunity* for a coup, precipitous military action which is staged for entirely selfish reasons and is seen as such by society

⁶³ Thompson, p. 6.

and other factions within the military, will almost certainly not achieve legitimacy.⁶⁴ The leaders of a coup must be in a position to make some semblance of a plausible claim that their actions are in the national interest. If they do not, they will not be able to placate *any* segments of society and, perhaps more importantly, they will not be able to rely on the *more principled* elements within the military establishment - the true believers in the civilian ethic who may otherwise come to the defence of the civilian regime by staging a counter-coup.

(iii) Military Intervention — Opportunity:

The concept of “opportunity” has already been tangentially referred to above. Civil society (or the government) may be in the midst of an economic, social, or political crisis that so weakens the civilian powers as to provide an opening for a military intervention. There are, however, difficulties associated with defining the parameters of regime vulnerability.

In particular, there is a danger of circular reasoning; a regime may be “vulnerable” because its own military threatens it or refuses to protect it which in turn “explains” the weakness of the regime and the “opportunity” for military intervention.⁶⁵ Therefore, when conducting an empirical test of “vulnerability,” it is necessary to choose a wide range of indicators so as to avoid (or at least minimize) the pitfalls of circular logic.

⁶⁴ The importance and difficulty in achieving legitimacy is taken up in much more detail in the Typology of Relevance.

⁶⁵ Ekkart Zimmermann, “Toward a Causal Model of Military Coups d’Etat,” *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1979), pp. 400-401. Finer also notes this logical danger. (Finer, pp. 244ff.)

Vulnerability must refer (where applicable) to fundamental economic, social, and ethno-regional crises and their impact on the political system.

It is also important to note the military's opportunities to intervene in domestic politics can come in a number of guises. Intervention may come as a result of overt crises or even as an attempt by the military to fill a power vacuum. But it can also occur when the military is drawn into the domestic political structure.

Gretchen Casper argues that just such a dynamic — the civilian government assigning and abdicating power to the military — occurred in the Philippines as the Marcos regime attempted to use the military in more and more varied roles. Initially empowered to fight the Leftist resistance, the military eventually was ordered to undertake development projects and to create an infrastructure for the nation and later, under martial law, the military's role expanded into the administrative and judicial spheres.⁶⁶ Ultimately, the Philippine military "intervened" against Marcos by not coming to his defence in 1986 and it was able to do so successfully given its wide-ranging authority and experience in virtually all spheres of power in the Philippines.

(c) The "Social Relevance" Family of Models:

The "Social Relevance" family of models consists of a rather disparate collection of models. They share a common link, however, in the way in which the theory of civil-

⁶⁶ Gretchen Casper, "Theories of Military Intervention in the Third World: Lessons from the Philippines," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Winter 1991), pp. 191-210.

military relations is linked to specific, broad societal concerns: political and economic development or class and ethno-regional issues.

(i) The Military and Economic and/or Political Development:

One aspect of the civil-military relationship that has to be evaluated critically involves the relationship of the military to the underlying national political context. To understand this, however, requires dispelling some popular misconceptions of the role of the military in domestic politics. Specifically, the automatic association (in the popular Western psyche) of the concepts *reactionary* and *military dictatorship* is overstated.

Not all military coups represent the overthrow of a left-wing or progressive regime (*à la* Salvador Allende) by a brutal and reactionary Generalissimo (*à la* Agusta Pinochet). Sometime coup leaders are relatively progressive when compared with the autocratic or traditional ruler(s) they replace. The Marxist-Leninist regime of Lieutenant-Colonel Mengistu Haile-Miryam which displaced Ethiopia's Emperor Haile-Selassie in 1974, the progressive — albeit anti-Communist — regime of General Juan Velasco Alvarado which overthrew Peruvian President Fernando Belaúnde Terry in 1968, and the reform-minded government of Colonel Abdel Nasser who ultimately emerged at the head of the Revolution Command Council which deposed Egyptian King Farouk I in 1952 are all examples of military regimes that put the lie to the “reactionary” *cliché*.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ For the Ethiopian case see Christopher Clapham, “Ethiopia: The Institutionalisation of a Marxist Military Regime,” in *The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes*, eds. Christopher Clapham and George Philip (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 255-276; for the Peruvian case see Abraham F. Lowenthal, *The Peruvian Experiment: Continuity and Change Under Military Rule* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975) rpt. in part as “Peru’s Ambiguous Revolution,” in *The Political Influence of the Military: A*

More often than not, the left-right ideological conception is “either absent, neutralized in the short run, or too ambiguous probably to have a great deal of meaning.”⁶⁸ In Thompson’s somewhat dated study, 60 percent of all coups fall into this category and “only in Asia do coups [consistently and over time] take on a strikingly conservative flavour.”⁶⁹ Sometimes coups can represent a liberal or conservative turn for the better, but most coups simply represent the displacement of one batch of brutal thieves by another and, as such, they do not have an ideological dimension.

This conclusion is in marked contrast to an earlier literature that argued that military regimes (representing as they did a “middle class/technocratic” seizure of power) could be relatively progressive modernizers. Lucian Pye, in particular, speculated that military rulers could (under certain clearly defined circumstances) contribute to the political and economic modernization of their societies.⁷⁰ The bureaucratic and technical skills accorded “modern and professional” military leaders were both scarce and valuable in many less developed countries. Moreover, participation in what was likely the most modern segment of the state apparatus (the “industrial” army) and a more general

Comparative Reader, eds. Amos Perlmutter and Valerie Plave Bennett (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 272-280; and for the Egyptian case see Morroe Berger, *Military Elite and Social Change: Egypt Since Napoleon* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960) rpt. in part as “The Military Elite and Social Change in Egypt,” in *Garrisons and Government: Politics and the Military in New States*, ed. Wilson C. McWilliams (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing, 1967), pp. 203-226.

⁶⁸ Thompson, p. 40.

⁶⁹ Thompson, pp. 41-42.

⁷⁰ Lucian W. Pye, “Armies in the Process of Political Modernization,” in *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, ed. John J. Johnson (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 69-89.

“acculturation to modern life” should have made the members of the officer corps acutely aware of the limitations of their own societies.⁷¹

Politically the most significant feature of the process of acculturation within the army is that it usually provides some form of training in citizenship. Recruits with traditional backgrounds must learn about a new world in which they are identified with a larger political self. They learn that they stand in some definite relationship to a national community. In this sense the army experience tends to be a politicizing experience.⁷²

Of course, the historical record of this acculturated class has not been as forward-looking as Pye might have expected. Ali Mazrui has written that in East Africa, at least, military rulers have, in fact, been “greater traditionalizers than the more westernized civilians they [have] ousted.”⁷³

(ii) The Military and Economic Development:

The bulk of the contemporary studies on the economic impact of military regimes suggests that on the issue of development there is little to differentiate military regimes from their civilian counterparts. William Dixon and Bruce Moon write: “Military control of the government...appears to make little appreciable difference one way or another for socioeconomic performance measures....”⁷⁴ Similarly, Robert Jackman writes: “[The data] indicate[s] that military governments have no unique effects on social change,

⁷¹ Pye, “Armies...,” pp. 77ff.

⁷² Pye, “Armies...,” pp. 82-83.

⁷³ Ali A. Mazrui, “Soldiers as Traditionalizers: Military Rule and the Re-Africanization of Africa,” *World Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (January 1976), pp. 246-272.

⁷⁴ William J. Dixon and Bruce E. Moon, “The Military Burden and Basic Human Needs,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (December 1986), p. 681.

regardless of the level of economic development.”⁷⁵ He concludes: “In short, the civil-military government distinction appears to be of little use in the explanation of social change.”⁷⁶

It has been argued that military regimes, by diverting resources towards the military sector and away from the civilian economy, have a net negative impact on the process of economic development.⁷⁷ But Dixon and Moon argue that the answer cannot be found simply by measuring levels of defence spending (where such data is available). Increased defence spending in the aftermath of a coup *may* represent a positive social benefit if it manifests itself in mass armies. If large defence expenditures are directed towards military personnel — their education, training, provisioning, and maintenance (housing, medical treatment, and so on) — and not spent on expensive (and usually imported) military technology, there will be a net “positive contribution to the welfare performance” of a nation.⁷⁸ Such a program would be of more immediate benefit to a larger number of citizens than an inappropriate “civilian” project to develop heavy industry! In short, gross indices such as defence spending do not tell the whole story.

⁷⁵ Robert W. Jackman, “Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in the Third World,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 70, No. 4 (December 1976), p. 1097.

⁷⁶ Jackman, p. 1097.

⁷⁷ Kim Quaile Hill, “Military Role vs. Military Rule: Allocations to Military Activities,” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (April 1979), pp. 371-377 and Robert E. Looney, “The Political Economy of Third World Military Expenditures: Impact of Regime Type on the Defence Allocation Process,” *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spring 1988), pp. 21-29.

⁷⁸ Dixon and Moon, *passim*.

(iii) The Military and Ethnic Relations:

One frequently overlooked model of civil-military relations is the ethnic model. It has, however, been the focus of the research of some analysts including Cynthia Enloe and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone.⁷⁹ This research seeks to explain the links between the military and the underlying ethno-national character of a particular country.

For Enloe, most “national security” concerns are, in fact, “state security” regimes (i.e., designed to protect the ruling hierarchy) with external threats perhaps less dangerous than internal threats to the state. Consequently, state elites consciously design “‘ethnic state security maps’ which trace the expectations that elites have regarding the political dependability of various ethnic groups.”⁸⁰ Policies designed to protect the existing power structure will attempt to manipulate these perceived underlying ethnic cleavages. This is especially true in the case of the *ultima ratio* of state security — the military. She writes:

[t]he groups that will figure most prominently on such “maps” will be (a) ethnic groups residing along sensitive frontiers, (b) ethnic groups fulfilling strategic economic roles (exploited or privileged), (c) ethnic groups with sufficient political resources to challenge the existing political order, (d) ethnic groups with ties to potential foreign state rivals, and, finally, (e) ethnic groups with greatest access to the state structure as currently organized.⁸¹

⁷⁹ Cynthia Enloe, *Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies* (Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1980) and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, “Nationalities and the Soviet Military,” in *The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society*, eds. Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 72-94 and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, “The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” in *Warsaw Pact: The Question of Cohesion, Phase II, Volume 3 – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Bulgaria; Czechoslovakia and Hungary; Bibliography*, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment ORAE Extra-Mural Paper No. 39 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1986), pp. 1-290.

⁸⁰ Enloe, pp. 13-14.

⁸¹ Enloe, p. 15.

This is not to argue that ethno-regional cleavages are the only crucial variables in determining civil-military relations in a particular state. Class, generational, and other cleavages are important as well. But the salience of ethnic factors becomes apparent whenever state elites feel threatened and policies designed to exploit the particular ethnic state security map become explicit.⁸²

Such a pattern of ethno-regional policies and their impact on the military has probably best been documented in the case of the former-Soviet Union. It is apparent that Party decision-makers never considered the vast bulk of the non-Russian and non-Slavic conscripts to be politically reliable.

Rakowska-Harmstone has argued that this meant that the Soviet leadership applied “an ethnic security map” to its military manpower considerations. Under this system, potentially suspect minority groups were effectively barred from strategically sensitive military formations such as the following: the airborne units in the Red Army, the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Air Force, and the Navy. Slightly less stringent criteria were applied when selecting conscript recruits for the Army as a whole (artillery, armour, and infantry) while the bulk of the undesirable conscripts served in non-combat railroad and construction units. Moreover, even when these conscripts found themselves serving in combat *formations*, they usually were assigned to non-combat, support *roles*.⁸³

⁸² Enloe, pp. 19-21.

⁸³ Rakowska-Harmstone, “Nationalities...,” pp. 84-85 and for a more detailed treatment see Rakowska-Harmstone, “USSR,” pp. 139-184.

Such a system of assignment preferences clearly went beyond the need to reflect the generally low educational status and poor Russian-language abilities of the non-Great Russians. The conscripts from the Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), for example, clearly met the educational demands of the Soviet Forces, but they were amongst the most politically suspect segments of society and thus were under-represented in key strategic units.⁸⁴ When forced to choose between political reliability and other criteria, political reliability won out. In short, concerns about the political reliability of the non-Russian ethnic groups (Ukrainians, Belorussians, and assimilated, secular Jews apparently excepted) indicated that the “consensus” between the Party and the military was, at the very least, exaggerated considerably (especially in reference to the conscript element).

(iv) The Military and Class Relations:

The final member of the “Social Relevance” family will be called (for purposes here) the class model or the revised traditional model. Typified by the later writings of Friedrich Engels, this model — like the traditional model — rejects the assumption that serious divisions necessarily occur between the civilian and military realms. However, unlike the traditional model, this revised traditional model envisages more than a simple consensus between civilian and military *elites*; it suggests that divisions can disappear *in toto* between the popular classes and a mass-conscription army.

⁸⁴ Rakowska-Harmstone, “Nationalities...,” p. 88 and “USSR,” p. 182.

Distilling a theory of civil-military relations from the voluminous writings of Engels and Karl Marx (who was clearly the junior half of the alliance when it came to military affairs) is no easy task. This is true especially because civil-military relations *per se* were not the central focus of even their military writings. Much of their work consisted of biographies of famous military leaders and reports published in the popular (bourgeois) press about the conduct and likely outcome of the campaigns and wars of their day.⁸⁵

Moreover, even when Engels and Marx turned to more theoretical issues, not only were there writings less systematic and precise than was the case with their economic and social tracts,⁸⁶ but they generally concerned themselves with issues involving the revolution to come and not with the nature of the army's role in society. Central to their military writings were two related issues: (1) the odds facing an insurrection (i.e., the chances of success in specific historical and social contexts), and (2) the likely impact of wars on the advancement or retardation of the cause of the revolution.⁸⁷ In reference to these last points, however, the issue of civil-military relations came to take on renewed importance as Engels came to revise his theories on the nature of insurrection and war.

Initially convinced of the invincibility of truly popular mass insurrections in the face of counter-revolutionary assaults (as the French supposedly had been in 1793), Engels and

⁸⁵ See Bernard Semmel (ed.), *Marxism and the Science of War* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 8-12 and Martin Berger, *Engels, Armies, and Revolution: The Revolutionary Tactics of Classical Marxism* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1977), especially pp. 19-63.

⁸⁶ Berger, p. 12.

⁸⁷ See, especially, Berger, pp. 67-137.

Marx were forced to reevaluate their opinions in light, more generally, of the victory of the forces of reaction in 1848-1849 and, no doubt more specifically, as a result of the former's practical experiences on the front-lines as a revolutionary soldier fighting in Baden. Later, in light of these events, Engels was to write: "The fighting methods of 1848 [i.e., citizens arming themselves and building barricades to ward off the attacks of pro-government troops] are obsolete today in every respect."⁸⁸

In addition to the growing tactical sophistication of the regular armies (quickly learning to envelop the rebels rather than assault them frontally), technological advances (railroads, more powerful artillery, better small arms) conspired to penalize the side without direct access to industrial facilities and logistical trains (i.e., the rebels). Untrained rebels — armed with pikes and manufacturing their own explosives and ammunition — were no match for a "modern" army. As Engels wrote: "*If the troops fight, resistance is madness.*" [Emphasis in original.]⁸⁹

Obviously, the key question was *would the troops fight* for the government and against the masses? For Engels (and this is where his model bears striking resemblance to the traditional model), the troops would not fire on the masses if they themselves were drawn from the masses. If the army was of the people, it could not be used by the ruling elite against itself! In 1892, Engels wrote that the growing electoral strength of the Socialists

⁸⁸ Engels quoted in Sigmund Neuman and Mark von Hagen, "Engels and Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 279.

⁸⁹ Engels quoted in Berger, p. 155.

in Germany indicated that

the ranks of the German army are being filled with more and more supporters of the socialist cause as the years go by. Even today one soldier in five is a socialist and within a few years there will be one in three. By the end of the century the ranks of the army — once the stronghold of Prussianism in Germany — will be filled with socialists. Nothing can withstand the fateful march of events. The government in Berlin knows what is happening just as well as we do but it is powerless to remedy the situation. The army is falling from its grasp.⁹⁰

The government in Berlin could do nothing to arrest these tendencies because of the need to produce ever-larger armies for the field of battle in Europe. War created a dynamic of its own and Prussia (Germany) in particular needed every soldier it could muster due to its geographic position between (cumulatively) more populous adversaries (most dangerously France plus Russia).⁹¹ This meant that more and more members of the lower classes had to be conscripted and given military training. Engels is reputed to have said on a number of occasions that if one-third of the German army could be relied upon by the leadership of the socialist parties, revolutionary action should be attempted.⁹² The masses, after all, would already be schooled in the art of war — courtesy of the reactionary state.

(d) The “Communist” Family of Models:

There is a large body of literature dealing with Communist civil-military relations, in

⁹⁰ Friedrich Engels, “Socialism in Germany, 1891-1892,” trans. and rpt. in W.O. Henderson, *The Life of Friedrich Engels*, 2 Vols. (London: Frank Cass, 1976), pp. 799-800.

⁹¹ Berger, p. 148.

⁹² Berger, p. 164.

general, and Soviet civil-military relations, in particular.⁹³ In this section, the models of Roman Kolkowicz, Timothy J. Colton, and William E. Odom will be reviewed. This literature was not designed to explain Eastern Europe civil-military relations, but it has, nevertheless, been applied to these cases as well.

(i) Kolkowicz and the Conflict/Penetration Model:

The first major conceptualization of Soviet civil-military relations is represented by Roman Kolkowicz's conflict or penetration model.⁹⁴ This model assumes that the military-political relationship is essentially antagonistic. The military frequently desires to intervene in the political affairs of the nation; consequently, the civil authorities are forced to take active measures to avoid such a possibility.

A unique set of circumstances necessitates the adoption of the conflict or penetration

⁹³ See, for example, A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean, and Alexander Alexiev, *East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier* (New York: Crane Russak, 1982); Christopher D. Jones, *Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact* (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1981); George C. Malcher, *Poland's Politicized Army: Communists in Uniform* (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1984); Andrew A. Michta, *Red Eagle: The Army in Polish Politics, 1944-1988* (Stanford, C.A.: Hoover Institution Press, 1990); the previously cited Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Christopher D. Jones, John Jaworsky, and Ivan Sylvain, *Warsaw Pact: The Question of Cohesion, Phase III/Volume I - The Greater Socialist Army: Integration and Reliability*, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment ORAE Extra-Mural Paper No. 29 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1984); Michael Sadykiewicz, *Organizing for Coalition Warfare: The Role of the East European Warsaw Pact Forces in Soviet Military Planning* (Santa Monica, C.A.: The Rand Corporation, 1988) and *The Warsaw Pact Command Structure in Peace and War* (Santa Monica, C.A.: The Rand Corporation, 1988); Jeffrey Simon, *Cohesion and Dissension in Eastern Europe: Six Cases* (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1983) and *Warsaw Pact Forces: Problems of Command and Control* (Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 1985); Ivan Volgyes, *The Political Reliability of the Warsaw Pact Armies: The Southern Tier* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1982); and Edmund Walendowski, *Combat Motivation of the Polish Forces* (London: The Macmillian Press, 1988).

⁹⁴ Roman Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967); "Interest Groups in Soviet Politics: The Case of the Military," *Comparative Politics*, Vol.2, No. 3 (April 1970), pp. 445-472; and "The Military," *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*, eds. H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press), pp. 131-169.

model of civil-military relations. For Nordlinger, the adoption of the liberal model of civil-military relations is not always practical. He writes:

It usually takes at least a generation to socialize [soldiers] into a given set of attitudes, and considerably longer for these attitudes to develop into a group tradition. It then becomes somewhat unrealistic to expect the officer corps of newly formed armies to be imbued with the civilian ethic.⁹⁵

In the interim, a series of direct controls have to be exerted over the military by the political leadership in order to prevent either a counter-revolution or a coup.

Kolkowicz provides a detailed account of how the penetration model is employed in a Leninist state. According to Kolkowicz, the Party attempted to bolster its control over the military by setting up a whole series of political controls within the military's organizational structure. But, in the opinion of Kolkowicz, these efforts by the Party did "not fully succeed[...in suppressing the many strains and disagreements that exist between the two institutions."⁹⁶

The addition of a MPA (Main Political Administration) to the organizational structure of the Armed Forces, the efforts of the MPA's political officers to indoctrinate and monitor members of the military, the intelligence activities of the various secret police forces, the links between the military's political organizations and the local Party organizations, and the Party's control over the posting and promotion of senior officers (the *nomenklatura*) combined to keep the Party in its position of dominance, but these arrangements,

⁹⁵ Nordlinger, p. 14.

⁹⁶ Kolkowicz, "Interest Groups in Soviet Politics:..." p. 448.

according to Kolkowicz, did not alter the underlying and fundamental conflict between the Party and the military on some issues. That did not change. For Kolkowicz, “[w]hen threatened by a challenge to its basic professional and institutional prerogatives and values, the military *usually closed its ranks.*” [Emphasis added.]⁹⁷

(ii) Odom and the Consensus Model:

The second major conceptualization of Soviet civil-military relations is represented by William Odom’s consensus model. While most conceptualizations of the civil-military relationship are premised on the assumption that serious divisions do or can exist between the military and civilian elites, Odom (much like Nordlinger in the case of the traditional model of civil-military relations and Engels in the case of the class model) argues that this does not necessarily have to be the case.

In a vein similar to the traditional model — but for very different reasons — Odom implicitly adopted a non-conflictive conceptualization in his model of Soviet civil-military relations. Stated briefly, Odom accepted the possibility of occasional conflicts arising along functional or institutional lines, but he decried the significance of these tensions between civilian and military elites. In his view, “the military [was] an administrative arm of the Party, not something separate from it and competing with it.”⁹⁸ Differences between the military and civilian leaders had to be viewed, he wrote, “against

⁹⁷ Kolkowicz, “Interest Groups in Soviet Politics:....,” p. 451.

⁹⁸ William E. Odom, “The Party-Military Connection: A Critique,” in *Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems*, eds. Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), p. 41.

a background of broad pragmatic consensus.”⁹⁹ For Odom, there was a shift in “emphasis from vertical institutional alignments to intra-institutional horizontal alignments.”¹⁰⁰

Odom suggested there were many issue areas which served to unite, rather than divide, the military and the Party.¹⁰¹ First, the Party and the military usually had a common interest in the perpetuation of the economic *status quo*. Economic reform and decentralization threatened the power of the party’s economic functionaries and the privileged position of the armed forces in regard to resource allocations. Similarly, the armed forces’ leadership could be expected to side with the Party on the issue of intellectual dissent. The conservative bias in the military made it a natural ally of the Party against dissident elements within the intelligentsia. According to Odom, “[w]hen there [were] cleavages in the leadership over military policy, they [were] intra-Party factional divisions, not just a division of party vs. military [sic].”¹⁰²

Unfortunately, Odom’s consensus model focused too closely upon the relationship between the Party and the officer corps. While it may be argued that the consensus between these two groups was significant, the model breaks down when the attitudes of the military rank and file (i.e., the conscripts) are considered. This was (and continues to be) especially true in the case of the various non-Russian and especially non-Slavic ethnic

⁹⁹ Odom, p. 32.

¹⁰⁰ Odom, p. 38.

¹⁰¹ The following are from Odom, pp. 32-34.

¹⁰² Odom, pp. 41-42.

minorities.

(iii) Colton and the Participation Model:

The final conceptualization of the Soviet civil-military relationship is represented by Timothy J. Colton's participation model. While the liberal model specifically referred to the practice of civil-military relations in the United States and most of Western Europe, Colton applied many of its features to Communist civil-military relations. For Colton, when resolving routine administrative matters and a slightly broader category of institutional issues (such as an officer's ideological self-image, material well-being, status, and professional concerns), the military would be quite jealous in protecting its interests. On the other hand, in terms of issues with a wider societal impact, the role undertaken by the military resembled one of apparent deference to the interests of the Party.¹⁰³

Colton retained a dichotomous categorization of the "Party" versus the "military." But at the same time, he also rejected notions of the Party "controlling" the military or the military becoming subsumed within the Party as an "administrative arm." Instead, Colton recognized that the military would develop a number of its own institutional interests on a number of issues. However, this would not force the military to intervene in the political realm because "Party policies on most [of these] institutional issues at most times

¹⁰³ See Timothy J. Colton, "The Party-Military Connection: A Participatory Model," in *Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems*, eds. Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 62-69.

[would] indeed [be]...consistent with the apparent preferences of most...officers.”¹⁰⁴

Of course, Colton’s emphasis on the apparent “consistency” of civilian and military attitudes in the Soviet Union belies an earlier history of conflict, division, and involvement in the principal political struggles of the day. In particular, the struggle during the 1920s to remove Leon Trotsky from the Commissariat of War and prevent him from replacing Lenin serves as an example of the exploitation of the military by various political factions. The fact that a struggle of this ferocity did not occur within the military during the subsequent leadership struggles logically does not mean that such an occurrence was impossible. Alliance to major factions within the military remained a necessary albeit far from sufficient condition for success in the struggle for political leadership.

(e) The “Transitional” Family of Models:

The spread of democracy and the return to the barracks that has occurred in many parts of the world since the 1970s (especially in Latin America and Southern Europe) has led to the development of a new theoretical literature. This “transitional” literature seeks to explain how and why this phenomenon can occur. More importantly, for purposes here, this literature has been applied (with varying degrees of success) to the process of democratization that has begun in Eastern Europe following the Revolutions of 1989. Although the East European case does not exactly parallel that of Latin America, the latter can still shed some light on the former.

¹⁰⁴ Colton, p. 72.

(i) Democratization Models:

The literature on the transition to democracy has, to date, gone through three phases.¹⁰⁵

In the first phase, democratization was conceptualized as requiring a certain series of *preconditions* in order for it to occur. These conditions could include economic, social, cultural, international, or other factors.¹⁰⁶ Unfortunately, such *overdeterministic* models have proven to be poor predictors of reality.

In the second phase, the agency of actors replaced structural determinants in the explanation of democratization. Theorists shifted their focus onto the strategic choices, shifting alliances, and other actions of the principle political actors in a polity.¹⁰⁷ Of course, in correctly rejecting the overdeterminism of the previous models, these theorists went too far and opened themselves to the charge of “excessive voluntarism.”¹⁰⁸ Political actors do not enjoy absolute free will; they are both constrained by circumstances and (at least in part) in control of their own destinies.

In the third phase, this relationship between actors and their circumstances is again reconsidered. The relationship is posited as being one of *relative autonomy*. Political

¹⁰⁵ Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, “Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern, and Eastern Europe,” *International Social Science Journal*, No. 128 (May 1991), pp. 270-271.

¹⁰⁶ See, for example, Samuel P. Huntington, “Will More Countries Become Democratic?” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 99, No. 2 (Summer 1984), pp. 193-218.

¹⁰⁷ See, for example, Nancy Bermeo, “Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship,” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (April 1992), pp. 273-291.

¹⁰⁸ Karl and Schmitter, p. 271.

actors (to paraphrase Marx) make their own transitions to democracy, but not necessarily in the form of their own choosing. The relationship is neither pre-determined nor is it utterly voluntary. It is interactive.

In *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead propose one such third generation model.¹⁰⁹ For O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, the prospects for democratization in Latin America and Southern Europe are the result of a combination of structural constraints and strategic choices in both the domestic and international realms.¹¹⁰ Domestic factors include: (1) the historic pattern of civil-military relations; (2) the configuration of civil society (including its party structures, history of political representation, and the degree of social inequality); (3) ideological factors (including the nature of the *ancien regime* and the desired model of democracy); and (4) factors specific to a particular country or region. International factors, on the other hand, include: (1) direct foreign intervention (political, economic, or military); (2) the legacy of colonialism (both positive and negative); (3) the role of international institutions (both government and non-government); and (4) the international discourse on democracy (i.e., the legitimacy of "democracy" as a concept versus other political systems).

¹⁰⁹ Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects from Democracy*, eds. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 47-63.

¹¹⁰ See, in particular, the following chapters: Philippe C. Schmitter, "An Introduction to Southern European Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey;" Guillermo O'Donnell, "Introduction to the Latin American Cases;" and Laurence Whitehead, "International Aspects of Democratization," in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule...*, Part I, pp. 3-10, Part II, pp. 3-18, and Part III, pp. 3-46.

Although no one variable is “sufficient” in explaining either the transition itself or the nature of the successor regime, O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (as well as several other theorists) have pointed to the role of the military and its relationship to civilian authorities (in both the old and the successor regimes) as being perhaps the key determinant. The importance of this military factor can occur either directly (because the military itself intervenes in the political struggle) or indirectly (because the military remains “neutral” and thus provides the opportunity for opponents of the existing regime to act).¹¹¹

In Southern Europe, for example, the national military establishments were essentially depoliticized and did little to block or promote the transition to democracy (except in the case of Greece).¹¹² They essentially remained on the sidelines and allowed events to take their course. Moreover, the national armed forces largely were not responsible for the repression that occurred within their national borders (Greece, again, being the exception to this rule - but not Spain in the period *following* the Civil War). Instead, that was the domain of the other instruments of the state. This meant that the prospect of democratization and legal retaliation for extra-legal excesses was not a concern for Southern European military leaders in most cases. They had less to fear from democratization than, say, most of their Latin American counterparts. Consequently, they

¹¹¹ Richard Snyder calls it a “critical variable” (Richard Snyder, “Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships,” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 24, No. 4 [July 1992], p. 380) while Schmitter calls good civil-military relations an “enormous advantage” for those states moving towards democracy (Schmitter, “An Introduction...,” Part I, p. 5).

¹¹² The following is from Schmitter, “An Introduction...,” Part I, pp. 5-6.

were less inclined to oppose democratization. In Latin America, military excesses and military privileges gained during the rule of highly militarized or pro-military regimes often provided important incentives for the military to oppose democratization.¹¹³

Elsewhere in Latin America and the Third World as a whole, the patterns are similar. Where military autonomy is constrained severely (because the military hierarchy is coopted or internally divided), the military will be less of a direct factor in the political struggle and “political transformation (if it occurs at all) [will] tend[] to be revolutionary.”¹¹⁴

(ii) Democratization Models Revisited:

The O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead study comparing the spread of democracy in Latin America with the virtually complete process of democratization in Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey) was written in 1986. Their study, although providing important methodological clues, did not address the question of the prospects for democracy in Eastern Europe. Perhaps it was because Southern Europe and Latin America held out the greatest potential for democratization when compared with the states of Eastern Europe which were dominated by Honecker, Kadar, Jaruzelski, Husak, Zhivkov, and Ceausescu and backed up by the Red Army.

By 1990, however, Lucian Pye was able to write about “the crisis of authoritarianism

¹¹³ O’Donnell, “Introduction....,” Part II, p. 11.

¹¹⁴ Snyder, pp. 380-381.

[which] during the last decade [had] been sweeping the world, bring into question both the legitimacy and the competence of all manner of authoritarian systems.”¹¹⁵ The obvious question arising from these events is as follows: “How does this “new ‘Great Transformation’” compare with the earlier transformation to democracy in Southern Europe and the continuing process of democratization in Latin America?¹¹⁶ Are the old models still valid or are different methodologies necessary?

In point of fact, the existing literature on the transition to democracy in Southern Europe and Latin America is only partially relevant to the study of the transition to democracy in Eastern Europe and the role of the East European militaries. The primary political constraint defining the authoritarian regimes (in Latin America in particular) was and is the nature of their national civil-military relations. In many cases, the transition to democracy was away from a military regime! This suggests that the authoritarianism of Southern Europe and Latin America was a much more limited system than that which existed in Eastern Europe.

By way of contrast, the transition in Eastern Europe and East European civil-military relations have to be understood in the context of the overall state-society relationship — totalitarianism. In effect, a very different pattern of civil-military relations existed in Eastern Europe compared with that which has dominated Southern Europe and Latin

¹¹⁵ Lucian W. Pye, “Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 84, No. 1 (March 1990), p. 5.

¹¹⁶ The term is from Pye, “Political Science....,” pp. 4ff.

America. East European civil-military relations are best conceptualized in terms of the penetration model. In Eastern Europe, democratization, therefore, involves not only a shift from authoritarian to liberal civil-military relations (as it did in Latin America and Southern Europe), but it requires a more fundamental shift in the entire political and social system. The democratization models to be used in this study of East European cases will, therefore, have to be adjusted to reflect these differences if they are to be properly utilized.

CHAPTER 4: THE TYPOLOGY OF RELEVANCE

Introduction:

The Typology of Relevance is based upon a detailed and critical analysis of the general milieu of civil-military cases and existing theoretical approaches to the study of civil-military relations. The distillate of this analytical process will consist of four principal parts: (1) those historical or background variables which serve to form the context in which the post-Communist transition is occurring, (2) the universal or near universal themes culled from the existing literature which appear *likely* to be relevant to the study of the post-Communist cases and which relate to real or potential sources of civil-military tension or conflict; (3) the themes and factors of a universal or wide-ranging nature which the critical analysis suggests may *not* be appropriate for these cases; and (4) the exogenous variables which the critical analysis suggests might need to be added to the analytical mix, but which are either absent or under-represented in the existing theoretical formulations. These “Propositions” detail the various factors which need to be empirically tested in order to develop a comprehensive understanding of civil-military relations in Poland and Hungary in the post-Communist (transitional) period.

In the first empirical section, political culture (which looks for potential continuities between the current era and the past) and the totalitarian legacy (which looks at discontinuities that are the specific product of totalitarianism) are critically analyzed as historical or background variables. The propositions associated with these two variables jointly constitute the context for the remainder of the study. In Hungary, a history of

military failures and domination by foreign powers has lessened the political influence of the military while in Poland the military has been able to exercise political influence due to a political culture which associates the armed forces with the cause of Polish nationalism. At the same time, both of these military establishments continue to suffer the aftereffects of the totalitarian era in which the military was heavily penetrated and controlled by the Communist Party and by Moscow.

The second empirical section critically analyzes those themes or variables culled from the existing literature which appear likely to be relevant to the study of the post-Communist cases because they influence most (if not all) other civil-military relationships (i.e., they are universal or near-universal themes in the existing literature). There are many potential sources of civil-military tension or conflict (i.e., the role to be played by paramilitary forces, political officers, and security agencies as extra-legal control mechanisms as well as the mechanisms by which the military budget and weapons procurement programs are determined). Each of these variables will be analyzed in order to determine if they represent sources of real or potential conflict or confrontation between civilian political forces and the national armed forces.

In the third empirical section, the critical analysis will turn to a theme which — even though it is found in most existing theoretical formulations — may not apply in the cases under review. In particular, the Typology of Relevance will suggest that a complete picture of Hungarian and Polish civil-military relations is only possible if the analysis focuses on more than just the officer corps.

And in the fourth and final empirical section, the critical analysis will focus on several exogenous variables which influence current efforts to reform civil-military relations in Hungary and Poland. These variables constitute the most under-represented variables in many existing analyses of civil-military relations. The Typology of Relevance will attempt to overcome this deficiency by analyzing a wide range of geopolitical factors (i.e., the immediate security environment as well as international institutions such as the Western European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization).

The overall purpose of the Typology of Relevance is to create a new and original analytical tool which can be tested and otherwise be used to analyze contemporary East European civil-military relations (especially areas of conflict and/or confrontation between the military and its civilian masters). To this end, theoretical questions are analyzed to the same degree as the empirical evidence.

Of course, the cases themselves (post-Communist Hungary and Poland) are also unique. They represent examples of a political system emerging from a totalitarian political order which collapsed principally as a result of implosion rather than through defeat at war and occupation by a foreign power (the latter example occurred in 1944-45 in Fascist Italy and in 1945 in National Socialist Germany). So in effect, this study serves two vital roles. It serves to fill a theoretical void and it helps to answer some key questions about two unique cases!

Part A — Historical or Background Variables:

In the following section, political culture and the legacy of totalitarianism are critically analyzed. Together, these propositions constitute the historical or background variables which are shaping the general context of the current transition in Hungarian and Polish civil-military relations.

Proposition One — Political Culture:

In the general literature on civil-military relations, one frequently under-emphasized variable in the determination of contemporary civil-military relations is political culture. Some of this literature — even when narrowly focused upon relatively few cases — treats civil-military relations as if it occurred in an historical vacuum. In otherwise useful studies such as those of George C. Malcher (*Poland's Politicized Army: Communists in Uniform*) and Andrew Cottey (*East-Central Europe after the Cold War: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary in Search of Security*) historical antecedents are either ignored in their entirety or they are given passing reference.¹

And although there are exceptions to this rule, very few studies attempt to draw out important historical tendencies in a systematic fashion. Historical events are often presented as mere antecedents without suggesting how or why these events may influence the present.

¹ George C. Malcher, *Poland's Politicized Army: Communists in Uniform* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984) and Andrew Cottey, *East-Central Europe after the Cold War: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary in Search of Security* (London: The Macmillian Press, 1995).

For purposes of this study, political culture is defined as representing past tendencies whose resilience influences current patterns of behaviour. In this way, political culture is analogous to David Easton's description of "feedback" in a political system (i.e., "Systems Theory").² Political culture is also linked *inversely* to the totalitarian legacy which is described in the following section (Proposition Two). Whereas the analysis of political culture seeks out apparent *continuities* in widely-held political attitudes between the present and the past (including those attitudes which persisted during the Communist-era), the totalitarian legacy analyzes the effects of Communist-era events and policies (especially those factors linked to the totalitarian nature of the political system) which have resulted in *discontinuities* between these two eras.

Although the overall political cultures of Hungary and Poland share many similarities, more important are those aspects of the national political culture which involve societal attitudes towards the armed forces and civil-military relations. On these topics, important differences can be found.

In Hungary, popular and elite attitudes towards the military institution have often been negatively affected by the military's historically poor performance on the battlefield and by the fact that the institution has typically been dominated by foreign states. As a result, the military has traditionally not had a very strong influence in the political realm and this appears to also be the case in the post-Communist (transitional) period. In Poland,

² See David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," *World Politics*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (April 1975), pp. 383-400.

popular and elite attitudes towards the military have been much more positive as the result of the historic role the military has played in both defending the nation's independence and in recovering this independence when it has been lost to foreign powers. This political culture has historically afforded the armed forces considerably more influence in the political realm than that which is enjoyed by their Hungarian counterparts (albeit sometimes this influence goes beyond that which the civilian authorities consider to be proper). In the post-Communist period, the Polish military appears likely to continue to exercise significant political influence.

Political Culture (A Caveat):

It should be noted at the onset that the use of political culture as an empirical variable — like many other social variables — must be undertaken with care. In particular, there is a danger, as both Stephen White and Mary McAuley write, that either an analyst will use 20/20 hindsight to determine the baseline political culture variable or events will be taken out of context.³

Unfortunately, as White writes: “The past...is not a single undifferentiated phenomenon.”⁴ Specific attitudes, behaviours, or events must be understood in the context of their times as well as in the context of today. Peripheral or very marginalized

³ See Mary McAuley, “Political Culture and Communist Politics: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back,” and Stephen White, “Soviet Political Culture Reassessed,” in *Political Culture and Communist Studies* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1984), pp. 13-39 & 62-99 as well as the latter’s “Political Culture in Communist States: Some Problems of Theory and Method,” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (April 1984), *passim*.

⁴ White, “Political Culture in Communist States...,” p. 356.

tendencies in the context of “the past” make for poor *explanations* of later, dominant tendencies without recourse to *ad hoc* intervening variables. The future, in other words, often looks very different once it too has become part of the past.

McAuley also warns against assuming that the existence of two similar sets of beliefs, orientations, or behaviour in two widely disparate periods of time is proof of either the continued, unbroken presence of a political culture or the development of this political culture from the same underlying historical roots.⁵ She writes:

If what we are trying to do is to explain the existence of political beliefs, then we must choose our words carefully or the language we use obscures two quite different explanations. “Traditional beliefs resurfaced,” “pre-revolutionary beliefs still exist today” — are these statements saying that people today, finding themselves in a particular situation, independently produce ideas that *resemble* those of their counterparts of an earlier period or does their author mean that today’s views owe their existence to an earlier set?⁶

Obviously, advocates of a political culture approach must demonstrate explicitly the causal link between past and present if this variable is to be of any analytical importance.

In any case, political culture — despite these difficulties — offers several advantages to the researcher. Any particular political culture (although extremely difficult to measure directly and subject to false interpretations) is a relatively fixed object. Political cultures are not very malleable. Barington Moore, for example, sardonically describes the process of political socialization:

⁵ McAuley, pp. 21-25.

⁶ McAuley, p. 25.

To maintain and transmit a value system, human beings are punched, bullied, sent to jail, thrown into concentration camps, cajoled, bribed, made into heroes, encouraged to read newspapers, stood up against the wall and shot, and sometimes even taught sociology.⁷

Yet despite these exertions *and more*, explicit efforts to redesign human nature (to create, for example, the “New Socialist Man” [sic] or to imbue the military with the “civilian ethic”) frequently fail to take hold or they fail to take hold completely. A political culture can be altered, but only with extreme difficulty and only over a very extended period of time.

In the short term, political culture is relatively static. This provides the researcher with a relatively stable baseline from which to draw comparisons of continuity or contrast. Analytically, the values of a particular political culture are as permanent as the “relatively stable patterned relationships” or structural components of Talcott Parsons’ structural-functional model. In other words, the values are fixed (especially in the near term), but they are not inviolable.⁸

Political culture is a particularly effective analytical tool in those cases where the group under study has gone through a period of major change. As Archie Brown and Jack Gray write:

The possibility of discussing sensibly the harmony or dissonance between values, on the one hand, and political structures, on the other, are perhaps

⁷ Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 486.

⁸ Talcott Parsons, *Essays on Sociological Theory*, Rev. ed. (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1954), pp. 228-237.

greater in the case of Communist societies where there has been (a) a radical break in the continuity of political institutions, and (b) an unusually overt and conscious attempt to create new political values and to supplant the old.⁹

The contrasts between the old and the new and the possibilities of analyzing continuity and change are especially salient in the case of the now post-Communist states of Eastern Europe and the former-Soviet Union.

Finally, Mary McAuley and John Miller propose a precise methodology that one should employ when using a political culture approach.¹⁰ First, they suggest that in order to reduce the danger of circular reasoning, one should establish the political culture baseline contextually (i.e., without recourse to subsequent developments). Next, one should attempt to explain the current situation without recourse to the traditional political culture. This is the null hypothesis. Finally, if this can not be demonstrated (i.e., the two subjects did not independently arrive at the same conclusions in similar contexts), one can attempt to explain precisely how the traditional orientations and behaviours have come to influence the present period.

Proposition One — Political Culture:

As a new political and social order is being created, traditional mass and elite attitudes towards the military as an institution (i.e., aspects of a broader political culture) may re-emerge or otherwise influence the shape of post-Communist (transitional) civil-military relations.

⁹ Cited in Archie Brown, "Introduction," in *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States*, eds. Archie Brown and Jack Gray (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1979), p. 12.

¹⁰ McAuley, pp. 15-25 and John Miller, "Some Preennial Questions Reopened," in the previously cited *Political Culture and Communist Studies*, pp. 50ff.

Proposition Two — The Totalitarian Legacy:

Forty-five years of Communist rule left an indelible mark on the social, legal, economic, and political structures of contemporary Hungary and Poland. By the same token, this political and ideological system also left its mark on post-Communist (transitional) civil-military relations.

With the collapse of the *ancien régime* in Eastern Europe and the Communist hegemonic centre, the USSR, shortly thereafter, the totalitarian suppression of civil society came to an end. And it is in this relatively rare context wherein a society (in general) and a military establishment (in particular) are *simultaneously* seeking to re-define themselves (i.e., by resolving constitutional issues) and their relationship to each other (i.e., by determining corporate boundaries and areas of respective responsibility) that Communist totalitarianism left its most telling historical legacy.

In order to fully understand and analyze this legacy, it is first necessary to categorize the political regimes that held power for so long. This, however, is no easy task. Since the advent of the first Marxist regime in Russia in 1917, numerous models have been put forth in the academic literature; each purporting to explain, in whole or in part, the Soviet system and its (subsequent) East European variants. As early as 1958, Daniel Bell was able to survey the then existing literature and find ten pre-existing theories and still find it necessary to offer his own theory as eleventh!¹¹ Many of these theories were borrowed

¹¹ Daniel Bell, "Ten Theories in Search of Reality: The Prediction of Soviet Behaviour in the Social Sciences," *World Politics*, Vol. X, No. 3 (April 1958), pp. 327-365.

from an almost equally broad cross-section of the social sciences. Anthropology, psychology, sociology, and a host of other disciplines have contributed to this debate on the nature of Communist studies. Only the totalitarian model (which is discussed below) was more or less the indigenous creation of Soviet and East European studies.

The Totalitarian Model:

The totalitarian model was the first model to dominate Soviet and East European studies. This was especially true during the 1950s as scholars attempted to come to grips with the excesses of Stalin's rule.¹² The actual term "totalitarian" was first used by Benito Mussolini on June 25, 1925 to describe the Fascist ideology and Fascism's "totalitarian will" in Italy. The term was also used favourably by some Nazi ideologues. As political scientists attempted to move beyond the country-by-country approach which typified early comparative research, they were drawn by the similarities and coincident development of Fascism, Nazism, and Soviet Marxism to make comparisons. The term "totalitarianism" was eventually adopted by the academic community to describe not only the Fascist and National Socialist states, but Soviet Russia as well.¹³ Ideological and other differences between these societies were, of course, considerable, but (for many scholars) these differences were overshadowed by the shared characteristics of these systems.

¹² Gabriel A. Almond and Laura Roselle, "Model Fitting in Communism Studies," in *Politics and the Soviet System*, ed. Thomas F. Remington (London: Macmillian Press, 1989), pp. 173-174.

¹³ See Daniel Tarschys, "The Soviet Political System: Three Models," *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 1977), p. 294.

The principal theorists of the totalitarian model are Hannah Arendt (*The Origins of Totalitarianism*) and Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski (*Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*).¹⁴ John S. Reshetar, Jr. provides a useful summary of the totalitarian model as presented in these works.¹⁵ In his opinion, totalitarianism's characteristics can be summarized as follows: (1) there is a mass party or movement; (2) there is a legitimizing ideology; (3) there is a tendency for the party to justify itself through momentous undertakings, monuments, and military power, and for the party to recognize no legal limits to its rule; (4) the party refuses to share power or meaningful authority with non-party organizations; (5) virtually the entire economy is owned or controlled by the movement; (6) the party retains a monopoly over the media; (7) the party maintains an internal security service to control and intimidate dissidents; (8) the party attempts to atomize the populace through a network of spies, informants, and agents (9) the party tends to thrive on the tension generated by domestic and foreign threats *real or imagined*; and (10) the party needs to continually expand its influence and otherwise justify its rule by delivering on at least some of its self-proclaimed promises.

There is one more important observation that needs to be made concerning totalitarian regimes. Friedrich and Brzezinski argue that the development of a totalitarian system requires - as a precondition - a certain minimum level of technological and organizational

¹⁴ Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (Orlando, FL.: Harvest/Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1948 [1973]) and Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967).

¹⁵ John S. Reshetar, Jr., *The Soviet Polity: Government and Politics in the USSR*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1989), pp. 337-339.

development.¹⁶ Totalitarian movements are fundamentally different from simple absolutist or authoritarian regimes because the former utilize the full extent of modern technology to achieve their aims. Specifically, mass communications (to convey the movement's message throughout the land), modern surveillance techniques (to spy on citizens), advanced information processing techniques (to process secret police files), modern weapons (to conquer opponents), and modern bureaucratic and organizational techniques (to control the economy); all of these modern advances mean that totalitarian regimes are able to monitor, control, and influence their citizens to a degree unimaginable, for example, by the absolutist monarchs. This makes Totalitarianism a unique product of the Twentieth Century.

Authoritarian, Modernization, and Pluralist Critiques of the Totalitarian Model:

The totalitarian model is not, by any means, without its critics. The very term "totalitarian" has become highly politicized within academia and is often employed as a general term of condemnation. As an alternative to the totalitarian model, some theorists have argued that the Leninist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were really just particularly brutal and efficient authoritarian regimes. And at first glance, there does seem to be a basis for claiming that these regimes were of this more limited order. The conceptual differences between authoritarianism and totalitarianism *as they are practiced in the real world* often appear to be rather grey.¹⁷ This is especially true of post-Stalinist

¹⁶ Friedrich and Brzezinski, especially pp. 23ff.

¹⁷ Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in *Macropolitical Theory*, eds. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 3 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1975), pp. 264ff. Some theorists, in fact, argue that there essentially was continuity between the

totalitarianism which relied upon terror to a degree quite comperable to that utilized in many authoritarian regimes.

Upon closer examination, this apparent difference in degree is actually a difference in kind. Totalitarian regimes are not just particularly brutal authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian regimes typically limit themselves to control over the “commanding heights” of the economic and social order. They do not penetrate into all areas of civil society. There is, in addition, no effort to re-make society after some ideological image.

Lucien Pye, employing a modernization perspective, has observed that modernity and at least some technological innovations are dysfunctional for contemporary “authoritarian” regimes.¹⁸ (Pye does not differentiate between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes.) The demands of modern economic and bureaucratic management require a degree of rationality and knowledge that is incompatible with authoritarian (and totalitarian) rule. In modern states, scientific knowlegde and advanced technological innovations need to be disseminated to a whole host of technocrats and administrators, but these same moden communications systems can also spread “subversive” ideals and knowledge of “forbidden” topics. Thousands of individuals need to be educated to operate these systems, but educated people can question the system as well as obey orders. In short, the

Soviet Union and its Tsarist antecedents. See, for example, Chalmers Johnson, “Comparing Communist Nations,” in Chalmers Johnson, ed., *Change in Communist Systems* (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 1970); Richard Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime* (New York: Scribners, 1974); and (to a lesser degree) Adam Ulam, *Stalin: The Man and His Era* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973).

¹⁸ Lucien W. Pye, “Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 84, No. 1 (March 1990), pp. 7ff.

knowledge requirements of modern states are anathema to tight government controls.

Modernization theorists (such as Pye) take a long-term historical perspective which notes the similarities of all modern industrialized societies when compared with their pre-industrial and traditional precursors.¹⁹ Modernization theory also reflects a belief in the inevitability of progress and democracy for all industrialized societies.²⁰ Pye has written that although this progression cannot be predicted with clockwork precision, the events of the last decade in Eastern Europe and throughout the Third World have “vindicated” these models.²¹

For modernization theory, “modernity” — because of these dysfunctional elements — would appear to be a good indicator of totalitarian longevity. Unfortunately, the modernization model contributes little to our understanding of the former Soviet Union and Communist Eastern Europe. Despite the rather self-congratulatory tone of Pye’s analysis of the fall of Communism in Europe (somewhat reminiscent of Francis Fukuyama’s *The End of History?*), the modernization model is conceptually rather weak. First, the model begs the question as to what it is about the process of urbanization, mass literacy, and so on that *necessarily* results in the transition to Western-style democracy or social democracy? Second, what is it about modernity that prevents stagnation or backsliding on the road to democracy? Totalitarian theorists view these same factors as

¹⁹ David Lane, *Politics in the USSR* (Prescott, U.K.: C. Tinling, 1970), pp. 184-185.

²⁰ Reshetar, p. 352.

²¹ Pye, *passim*.

preconditions for the emergence of totalitarian rule.

Mass literacy can obviously be used to spread propaganda. Technology can be used to monitor citizens in all aspects of their life. The problems associated with mass urbanization may lead to calls for “law and order” as readily as they may lead to calls for popular representation. The precedent of Europe in the 1930s (wherein Germany led or was near the top in many measures of modernity compared to its liberal and non-liberal neighbours) should give pause to those who would argue in the *inevitability* of pluralism due to modernization.

In the totalitarian model, a minimum level of modernity is viewed as a necessary precondition for the the rise of totalitarianism, but no direct correlation is suggested between a specific level of modernity and the consequent strength of the totalitarian regimes. Significantly (as Thomas Remington, Stephen White, and Daniel N. Nelson argue), several of the key empirical indicators associated with modernity in the Soviet Union and (especially) Eastern Europe exhibited stagnation or even decay instead of growth in the years preceeding the totalitarian collapse.²² Thus the casual link in the period in question was precisely the opposite of that posited by modernization theory.

Modernization theory would appear to be in error because the process of genuine change

²² Thomas F. Remington, “Regime Transition in Communist Systems: The Soviet Case,” *Soviet Economy*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (April-June 1990), pp. 168-169; Stephen White, “Communist Systems and the ‘Iron Law of Pluralism,’” *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (April 1978), pp. 101-117; and Daniel N. Nelson, “Political Convergence: An Empirical Assessment,” *World Politics*, Vol. XXX, No. 3 (April 1978), pp. 411-432.

occurred *in spite of* the process of socio-economic decline not because of it. For Remington, the reform process is better explained “by the accumulated popular grievances against the old regime” than by modernization theory.²³

Other critiques of the totalitarian model (i.e., H. Gordon Skilling’s interest group model, Franklyn Griffiths’ interest articulation model, or the bureaucratic politics model employed by A.G. Meyer or Graham Allison) suggest that power in Leninist regimes was much more diffuse (even pluralist) than would be allowed for by the “monolith” of the totalitarian model.²⁴ In Skilling’s words:

There is no doubt that Communist society, in spite of its monolithic appearance and the claims of homogeneity made by its supporters, [was] in fact as complex and stratified as any other, and [was] divided into societal classes and into other categories distinguished by factors such as nationality or religion.²⁵

Functionally differentiated groups (Skilling), indeterminant and variable coalitions of interests (Griffiths), or some combination of the two (Meyer or Allison) were said to compete against on another in an authoritarian context in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.²⁶

²³ Remington, pp. 174ff.

²⁴ See *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*, eds. H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971); Alfred G. Meyer, “USSR, Incorporated,” *American Slavic and East European Review [Slavic Review]*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (August 1961), pp. 369-376; and Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

²⁵ H. Gordon Skilling, “Interest Groups and Communist Politics: An Introduction,” in *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*, eds. H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 13.

²⁶ Allison, unlike Skilling, Griffiths, and Meyer, does not offer his theory as a macro-theory. Instead, he has created a mid-range theory which is intended to supplement existing theoretical formulations. Allison is seeking a more nuanced analysis which takes into account the effects of bureaucracies, standard operating procedures, and similar factors. His model is, in his opinion, compatible with other more general models

Unfortunately what proponents of these non-totalitarian theories have failed to take into account was the fact that the “pulling and hauling” and political struggles that occurred within Communist bureaucracies, between bureaucracies, and between the bureaucracies (as a whole) and the national Communist Party was “tainted” by the dual membership of many of these individuals (especially at the most senior levels) in both the administrative unit and the Communist Party.²⁷ Party control and domination of the *nomenklatura* allowed for the insertion of Party functionaries into key administrative positions and the requirement of Party membership as a prerequisite for advancement in virtually all fields of endeavour provided yet another means to monitor and control behaviour. In other words, the Party stacked the deck in its own favour in advance of any political struggle involving the bureaucracy.

The fact that debate appeared to occur within the system was not evidence of “pluralism” in any form. As William Odom writes: “The key question has always been *how* power is dispersed, not *whether* it is dispersed.”²⁸ Put in other terms, civil society, in an authoritarian regime, retains some of its autonomy (albeit heavily constricted by the regime). In a totalitarian regime, civil society virtually disappears. Disputes do not occur between sovereign social forces.

(i.e., rational actor models) and could (in principle) operate in conjunction with the totalitarian model as well.

²⁷ Karen Dawisha, “The Limits of the Bureaucratic Politics Model: Observations on the Soviet Case,” *Studies on Comparative Communism*, Vol. XIII, No. 4 (Winter 1980), pp. 300-346 plus commentaries.

²⁸ William E. Odom, “A Dissenting View on the Group Approach to Soviet Politics,” *World Politics*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 4 (July 1976), pp. 542-567.

The Continued Utility of the Totalitarian Model:

Pluralism — in its interest group and bureaucratic politics guises — contributes to the debate by drawing attention to the non-monolithic practice (if not theory) of politics in the Soviet Union. However, in doing so, pluralist theorists have been hardly original and they greatly overstate their case. The pluralist insight, “announced in tones of discovery and achievement,” merely replace the totalitarian model’s supposed myth of the monolith with a new myth of the duffusion of power.²⁹

The totalitarian state, as exhibited by the Communist system, could not reform; it could not become truly pluralist. The groups, factions, and bureaucratic interests that periodically rose in the various Communist states were either crushed by the Party (as repeatedly happened before 1989) or (as happened after 1989) they in turn crushed the Communist Party! It is the fundamental insight of the totalitarian model that “in the final determining instance” (to borrow Engels’ phrase), these regimes *cannot relinquish their monopoly on political power*. As Thomas F. Remington writes: “The characteristic dilemma of reform, then, is that there is either too much or too little of it.”³⁰ Either the system is overthrown or spontaneously arising political challengers are defeated. Or as William Odom wrote (*after* the collapse of the Communist order in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union): “Once moderate reform begins, Soviet-style systems seem to become

²⁹ Odom, “A Dissenting View...,” p. 543.

³⁰ Remington, p. 165.

unstable.”³¹

In the context of the history of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, there was a qualitative difference between top-down or “legislated” reform (i.e., Khrushchev’s 1956 “De-Stalinization” program) and genuine “grass roots” or spontaneous reform (i.e., Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1980-1981). Most of the major reforms that have occurred in the Communist world were of the former kind. But what the state “allowed;” the state could “disallow” at some later date.³² Usually the process of reasserting control was relatively straightforward and (after the death of Stalin) relatively terror-free, but occasionally (as happened in Eastern Europe in Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968) the process could still be quite violent.

The totalitarian model, despite some flaws and its misuse by propagandists, remains the best tool to use when analyzing Leninist states. This is not only true of the Stalinist era (as Almond and Roselle have argued), but more generally as well.³³ The totalitarian model correctly directs attention to the top-down and hierarchical nature of the Soviet political process — including the process of reform — and the intrusion of the Party

³¹ William E. Odom, “Soviet Politics and After: Old and New Concepts,” *World Politics*, Vol. XLV, No. 1 (October 1992), p. 77.

³² For a discussion of earlier instances of “false pluralist prophets” in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, see Andrew C. Janos, “Group Politics in Communist Society: A Second Look at the Pluralist Model,” in *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems*, eds. Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (New York: Basic Books, 1970), p. 443. The “unreformable” nature of totalitarianism is also discussed by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, “Stalinism,” *Encyklopedia Sociologii*, ed. W. Kwasniewicz (Cracow: Jagiellonian University, forthcoming).

³³ Almond and Roselle, p. 176.

(directly or indirectly via the *nomenklatura*) into all political, economic, and social agencies and institutions.³⁴

The Party could not allow threats to its monopoly on power go unchallenged. This was especially true in the case of the armed forces (one of the few societal groups with the potential to threaten Communist rule). As a consequence, the military was subjected to particularly intense forms of penetration and extra-legal control.

The accusation that the totalitarian model is “static” is not really a legitimate criticism of the model because, at a fundamental level, Communist systems *are static*. Communism was and is incompatible with genuine notions of pluralism. Democratic Centralism was incompatible with liberal democracy. Communist regimes cannot relinquish their monopoly on political power. The manifestations of totalitarianism may change — from the overt terror of an establishing regime to the administrative controls of the *nomenklatura* of an established regime — but at a most basic level it remains the same; the Party seeks to direct as much of the polity as it possibly can. Reform is not inevitable (as modernization theorists propose) nor is reform even possible. A great deal of “muddling through” may occur, but ultimately the choice must be made between retrenchment (and a return to tried and true totalitarian methods) or capitulation to those elements of society which have successfully resisted the totalitarian incursion.

³⁴ See Karen Dawisha’s article on the limited applicability of the bureaucratic politics model (Dawisha, pp. 310ff) and Archie Brown’s advocacy of (essentially) a variation of the totalitarian model (Archie Brown, “Pluralism, Power, and the Soviet Political System: A Comparative Perspective,” in *Pluralism in the Soviet Union*, ed. Susan Gross Solomon [London: Macmillan Press, 1983], pp. 61-107).

The Totalitarian Legacy:

Having defined the characteristics of the *ancien régime* in theoretical terms, it is now possible to outline some of the legacies of the Communist era that are the specific product of totalitarianism. Perhaps not surprisingly, relatively few totalitarian tendencies survived the collapse of Communism. In many areas of civil-military interaction, few vestiges of the totalitarian past remain. Military strategy and doctrine, missions, educational programs, and many other relics of the previous system have all but disappeared in the short time since Communism collapsed in these two countries.

From a military perspective, perhaps the most enduring legacy of totalitarianism is manifest in the military's sensitivity to most forms of civilian intrusion into areas the military considers to be part of its corporate domain. After almost five decades of penetration and Communist Party control, the Hungarian and Polish armed forces have come to resent many efforts to remove the military from the policy process. This reticence is particularly pronounced in those cases where the military perceives the civilian authorities to be motivated by partisan politics. The Polish military in particular has resisted the efforts of the government to "civilianize" or otherwise control the military establishment. At several points, the Polish military has resisted what it sees as the "imposition" of civilians in the Defence Ministry and corresponding efforts to extend the influence of these individuals in military affairs. For the military, some of these projects by the civilian authorities evoke too many memories of the extra-legal control mechanisms of the recent totalitarian past.

From the perspective of the civilian governments, the most pressing legacy of totalitarianism has involved the need to employ democratic civilian controls instead of extra-legal penetration to reduce the influence of the military — especially its highest commands — on military policy-making. In the post-Communist era, the military is being asked to play a more professional (i.e., apolitical) role. In attempting to create this ethos, the civilian authorities, unfortunately, have had to contend with the military's reaction against the totalitarian past of penetration and extra-legal control. Thus efforts to reduce the influence of the military have often come to be seen as representing attacks on the military and this situation is worsened by the indisputable fact that in Hungary and especially Poland political factions have attempted to use the armed forces to further their own political ends. This has led to occasionally serious strains in the civil-military relationship.

Proposition Two — The Totalitarian Legacy:

Although relatively few totalitarian tendencies survived the collapse of Communism, the post-totalitarian civilian and military establishments have been affected by certain legacies of the previous totalitarian system.

Part B — Universal and Near Universal Themes:

In this section, themes or variables culled from the existing literature which appear to be relevant to the study of post-Communist (transitional) civil-military relations will be critically analyzed. This section is itself divided into four subsections.

In the first subsection (Proposition Three), the legitimacy of civilian rule will be analyzed. In the second and third subsections (Propositions Four and Five), the two

general strategies which civilian authorities can employ to perpetuate civilian rule will be analyzed. These non-exclusive strategies are as follows: (a) the state can employ a system of recurrent legal and administrative mechanisms to manage the armed forces (i.e., the civilian authorities can move to *institutionalize* the civil-military relationship), and/or (b) the civilian authorities can employ adjunct or special mechanisms to control the military (i.e., the civilian authorities can move to *subordinate* the military component of the civil-military equation to civilian direction). In the fourth subsection (Proposition Six), the “military” perspective of the civil-military relationship will be empirically tested and analyzed (especially the areas of potential conflict and confrontation between civilian authorities and the military establishment).

Proposition Three — Legitimacy and Civilian Rule:

The most universal theme in the existing literature on civil-military relations — especially literature published in the West but also literature published in such disparate temporal and geographic locations as Soviet Russia, ancient Rome, Imperial China, and post-war Japan — is the underlying assumption of the desirability or propriety of civilian rule and control over the military and the corresponding counter-assumption of the fundamental impropriety of significant military intrusions into the political realm. This particular theme is pervasive in the literature and must be discussed in detail.

In the literature, the relationship between civilian authorities and national military establishments on the subject of political governance, broadly speaking, is described as following one of three patterns: (1) civilian domination, (2) rule by military elites, or (3)

cases of contested or joint civilian and military rule.³⁵ The most significant underlying presumption with all of this literature (even when sympathetic to the concept of military rule) is one that favours and supports the concept of *civilian rule* as the most appropriate and practical governmental form.

Of course given that the military possesses a near monopoly over the domestic instruments of violence, S.E. Finer somewhat rhetorically has speculated: “The wonder...is not why [the military] rebels against its civilian masters, but why it ever obeys them.”³⁶ The key factor underscoring this entire question of Praetorianism is a widely held political culture and process of political socialization that defines political *legitimacy*. At its most essential level, civilian rule is a *more legitimate* form of governance than military rule. Only in the very limited example of the “revolving door” model of civil-military relations is rule by the military conceptualized as a proper or desired form. But in the case of this model (reminiscent of the ideal of the Roman *magister populi* or “temporary dictator”), military rule is viewed as a short-term, emergency response to a particularly trying political crisis and is not viewed as a permanent solution. Military rule, in such circumstances, is a “necessary evil.”

Legitimacy is a complex and multifaceted concept. Historically, the legitimacy of a ruler’s rule over a particular polity has been based upon the following rationales: (1) the

³⁵ Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers and Politics: Military Coups and Government* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), pp. 28-29.

³⁶ S.E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1988), p.5.

descent of the ruler from a divine source; (2) the descent of the ruler by blood ties from an established political line; (3) the effective exercise of power for a long period of time, or during the modern era; and (4) the election of a ruler in a free and fair political contest. Regardless of the mechanism, underlying each of these claims to legitimacy is a single, dominant belief as to what constitutes the right to rule. If no one definition is dominant within a particular political culture, then legitimacy is impossible.³⁷

For military rulers, gaining legitimacy is problematical. The attempt, however, is very often the first order of business. As Finer suggests:

Such [new military] governments, therefore, either fall to further coups or hasten to convert themselves into something else: that is to say, to ground their claim to govern on something other than their successful seizure of power. They seek, in short, to exercise a *right* to govern; or, as the expression goes, to *legitimize* themselves. [Emphasis in the original.]³⁸

Or, as Rousseau writes:

If force creates right, the effect changes with the cause. Every force that is greater than the first succeeds to its right. As soon as possible to disobey with impunity disobedience is legitimate; and the strongest being always in the right, the only thing that matters is to act so as to become the strongest.³⁹

A coup may disrupt the existing social order and tempt “equally legitimate” forces to attempt further coups. Military rulers may, in effect, find it easier to challenge the

³⁷ Carl Joachim Friedrich, *Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), pp. 232-246.

³⁸ Finer, p. 15-16.

³⁹ Jean Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, Book I, Chapter 3 cited in Finer, p. 15.

domestic political culture of civilian rule than to reconstitute a new political culture based on the ethic of military rule.

In practice, a number of factors help determine the success or failure of a military's attempt to achieve legitimacy in the aftermath of a coup. First, the military's ability to gain legitimacy may be affected by the existence or absence of alternative political actors. If no such credible alternative exists or if public perceptions of potential rivals to the military governors are negatively conditioned by the memory of a particularly corrupt or discredited civilian regime, the military may gain legitimacy by default.⁴⁰

Second, the military may gain legitimacy by making and/or delivering upon promises to end or solve existing political, social, or economic crises. As a unified, hierarchical organization, the military may be able to succeed where a faction-ridden, corrupt, or ineffective legislature failed.

Unfortunately for the military, the problems associated with governing a nation are usually beyond its abilities. Despite being well versed in bureaucratic, logistical, and administrative techniques, even the most modern and sophisticated military only rarely is able to live up to its promise to solve the preexisting crisis. All but the smallest and least developed nations are beyond the capabilities of most military establishments to govern for any extended period of time.

⁴⁰ Henri J. Barkey, "Why Military Regimes Fail: The Perils of Transition," *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Winter 1990), p. 171.

Third, legitimacy also can be conceived of as representing a dynamic process. According to Jacques van Doorn, "The party demanding legitimacy must...possess the requisite capabilities [to demand obedience], while the dependent party must show by its actions or its support that recognition is more than simply paying lip service to the idea."⁴¹ Legitimacy, in other words, can not be equated with compulsion. The dependent party, to use van Doorn's term, is not forced to merely comply; they believe and accept the propriety of the demanding party's claim.

Military regimes, it seems, can not achieve legitimacy by means of brute force alone (at least not easily). On this point Finer provides a wonderful and very witty illustration of the inefficiencies associated with the use of force as a governing instrument. His example of a male schoolmaster and his charges is worth quoting at length. Finer writes:

Suppose, for instance, a village schoolmaster. Suppose that his only means of getting his charges to school, keeping them there, making them regular attenders and - presumably - trying to teach them something, were by physical force alone. Imagine him motoring to the houses of the children; dragging them protesting and arguing from their homes; beating one or two to make the others more compliant; forcing them to sit, to exercise, to learn - all by threat and physical violence. We must suppose, too, for the sake of the example, that the children are determined, as ever expediency allows, to defy him, disobey him and if possible get rid of him. In these circumstances, calculate how much more of the schoolmaster's time would be spent in rounding them up, punishing them and devising schemes to beat down their opposition than would be spent in teaching them.

Contrast this with the other more common possibility, that his authority as "the schoolmaster" is recognized...[and the children] recognize it as their

⁴¹ Jacques van Doorn, "The Military and the Crisis of Legitimacy," in *The Military and the Problem of Legitimacy*, eds. Gwyn Harries-Jenkins and Jacques van Doorn, Sage Studies in International Sociology 2 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976), p. 19.

duty to get to school, attend regularly and behave themselves in class.⁴²

The former is obviously the less efficient system.

Finally, military leaders typically do not make good *politicians*. Once they are in control of the government, military leaders frequently have little tolerance for domestic opponents and political debates and they tend to be overly harsh in dealing with opponents — thus precluding political compromise.⁴³ The hierarchical tradition of military organizations does not seem to mix well with the political tradition — found in liberal and even many non-liberal regimes — of bargaining and compromise. After all, political jockeying (of a kind) occurs even in civilian authoritarian (albeit not totalitarian) regimes between, for example, members of the local aristocracy, bourgeoisie, clergy, and perhaps other actors as well and it is only in the case of totalitarian regimes — where much of civil society is atomized — that this political phenomenon is largely absent. In the end, this political awkwardness lessens the likelihood that the military will find it wiser to disengage from politics and return to the barracks while there is still time to manage the overall situation (i.e. before it is driven out). Usually military leaders wait too long.

Proposition Three — The Legitimacy of Military Rule:

The question of legitimacy and the relationship between legitimacy and civilian control are key factors in determining the nature of civil-military relations. Civilian rule remains a more legitimate form of governance

⁴² Finer, pp. 16-17.

⁴³ Ulf Sundhaussen, "Military Withdrawal from Government Responsibility," *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Summer 1984), pp. 545-546.

compared with military rule. Post-Communist (transitional) civil-military relations, therefore, will be constructed on the underlying principle of civilian rule.

Proposition Four — Legislative and Administrative Control Mechanisms:

A second major observation arises from the analysis of the variety of regimes that have been the targets of military coups and attempted military coups. Despite efforts by all of these regimes to institutionalize their civil-military relationship (with legislation, executive decrees, administrative procedures, organizational and command structures, and so on), all types of regimes and political systems have (at one time or another) been subject to political interference or even displacement by military powers.

As W.R. Thompson and S.E. Finer (amongst others) suggest, authoritarian regimes (and especially those which themselves have come to power through extra-legal means) are particularly susceptible to the dangers of Praetorianism.⁴⁴ Specific examples are numerous, but, in general terms, military regimes have supplanted traditional monarchies, one-party dictatorships, civilian oligarchies, personal dictatorships, and numerous other military juntas wherever these regimes have existed in the equally disparate corners of the world.

Significantly, these are by no means the only types of regimes to experience military coups or attempted coups. Although comparatively rare (as are the regimes themselves in a historical context), military rule has replaced democratic rule as well. For example, a

⁴⁴ W.R. Thompson, *The Grievances of Military Coup-Makers* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973), *passim* and Finer, especially chapter 3.

democratic government in Greece was displaced in 1967 while the democratically elected government of Poland was overthrown by Marshal Jozef Pilsudski in 1926. And post-war France also came close to a military coup and civil war at the close of the Fourth Republic (1961).

Examples of the breakdown in the civil-military relationship can be found to have occurred amongst totalitarian states (which are an even rarer historical regime-type than democratic states). Amongst totalitarian regimes, examples of overt military involvement in the political process and outright military coups include the 1989 overthrow of the Communist regime of Nicolae Ceausescu in Rumania and the attempted assassination of Adolf Hitler by German officers led by Lieutenant Colonel Count von Stauffenberg in 1944.

It is clear from these examples that creating and institutionalizing a permanent or fixed civil-military relationship using legislative and administrative control mechanisms (i.e., by delineating the civilian chain of command, by specifying the military's role in a particular society, by institutionalizing civilian oversight, and so on) is no easy matter. The process of inculcating a specific ethic or culture of civilian control within a military establishment is fraught with difficulties and even reverses. This is true regardless of the type of regime that is applying pressure or supplying inducements to the military.

Proposition Four — Legislative and Administrative Control Mechanisms:

Because of the perceived illegitimacy of military rule, all types of regimes attempt to use legislative and administrative controls to create and institutionalize a professional military system which avows the ethic of

civilian control. On the other hand, these controls do not guarantee civilian rule in all instances. All regimes, democratic, authoritarian, or totalitarian, are subject to military interference and even military coups in certain circumstances.

Proposition Five — Special or Adjunct Control Mechanisms:

The existing literature suggests there are a number of special or adjunct measures which regimes may employ in order to support their recurrent legislative and administrative control mechanisms and otherwise promote the development of an ethos of civilian rule. As Proposition Four suggests these measures may not meet with success in all instances, but the existing theoretical formulations suggest that all types of regimes must undertake some combination of these specific measures if they are to affect control over their national military establishments. Democratic regimes, for example, will tend to emphasize socialization as its key adjunct mechanism while authoritarian regimes will also resort to a much wider variety of control mechanisms.

(a) Convergence:

One specific means by which a civilian elite can attempt to create a loyal armed forces is by drawing the members of the military (especially the officer corps — but in some instances the entire military establishment) from the same societal groups which comprise the governing elite itself. This may refer to individuals in a particular economic or social class or to members of a particular ethnic group.

The suggestion is that the shared interests of a civilian leadership and a convergent military elite will preclude most conflicts and thus decrease the probability of a military

coup. If, on the other hand, the military is comprised of individuals who are outside of the governing elite, political struggles and conflicts are more likely to occur.

At the same time, the civilian authorities must ensure that the process of bringing the civilian and military elites together is not itself a source of tension. In the United States, for example, the racial integration of the armed forces was initially met with some resistance and the same is true in the case of current efforts to codify the role of women and homosexuals in the military. Currently in Poland and Hungary, these three issues are not politically troublesome (i.e., the two states are ethnically homogeneous and the latter two social criteria have not made it onto the political agenda), but ideological considerations and links to the *ancien regime* (especially the security forces) are controversial.

Proposition Five (a) — The Social Composition of the Military Establishment:

Civilian regimes may seek to minimize the likelihood of civil-military tensions by drawing the officer corps or possibly the entire military establishment from the same societal segments as the civilian elite.

(b) Penetration:

A second, specific means whereby civilian authorities may actively attempt to prevent military intervention in the political process is through the employment of security services to monitor the military. An efficient security apparatus may be able to uncover or deter military conspiracies well in advance of their becoming a threat to the governing

civilian regime.

On the other hand, oppressive security operations may be dysfunctional in the long-term (see Proposition Six f). Members in the armed forces may come to resent the civilian elite's interference in the military's performance of its societal mission. A professional military's sense of corporateness and expertise may be challenged by extreme security measures.

Proposition Five (b)—Monitoring the Military Establishment:

Civilian regimes may seek to minimize the likelihood of a military coup by employing security services to infiltrate and monitor the military establishment. These operations, however, may be dysfunctional in some circumstances.

(c) Balance of Power:

A third, specific means whereby civilian authorities actively attempt to prevent military intervention in the political process is through the creation or development of parallel militia or paramilitary formations to act as more reliable political counterweights to the regular armed forces. If the regular armed forces threaten the civilian regime, these militia or paramilitary forces may be called upon to oppose the actions of military conspirators.

Of course, the creation of powerful militia or paramilitary forces also may be dysfunctional in terms of the military's corporate identity (see Proposition Six j). The

officer corps, in particular, may come to see these alternative formations not as aids to the regular forces in times of foreign invasion or domestic insurrection but as potential replacements. Such forces would threaten the military's sense of shared responsibility or corporateness.

Proposition Five (c) — Militia and Paramilitary Counterweights to the Military:

Civilian regimes may seek to minimize the likelihood of a military seizure of power by developing militia or paramilitary formations to act as counterweights to the military establishment. The existence of these formations, however, may be dysfunctional in some circumstances.

(d) Fragmentation:

A fourth, specific means whereby civilian control over the armed forces is promoted essentially comes as a by-product of the increasing technical specialization of modern armed forces. Contemporary military establishments — out of necessity — are divided into more and more specialized technical components: armour, airborne, chemical-weapons, military police, staff, and so on.

A functionally-differentiated military establishment is somewhat less likely to intervene in the political debates of the state. Functional differences may preclude the formulation of a unified military “opinion” on political issues as the services compete with one another over the resources the state is able to provide for defence. At the same time, service differentiations may also inhibit conspiracies and other coup preparations as officers and other ranks are forced to work with less-familiar members of separate chains-

of-command.

Proposition Five (d) — The Functional Differentiation of the Military:

A military establishment which is highly differentiated along functional lines is somewhat less likely to be in a position to intervene against civilian authorities.

(e) Socialization:

A final, specific means whereby a civilian elite can attempt to instill a civilian ethos in members of the national armed forces is by teaching these values in its military educational institutions or by employing propaganda which supports these views. In most societies, the educational system is a principal means through which citizens are socialized to the values of that particular society and these efforts may be supplemented by effective propaganda. The military may be taught the value of civilian rule and the illegitimacy of military rule and it may be encouraged to focus on the technical aspects of fulfilling its societal imperative: defending the state.

As was the case above, these efforts are fraught with difficulties and dangers. First, the civilian ethic may not take hold in some instances. But even in the case where it does take root, the instillation of these values may cause members of the armed forces to feel duty bound to intervene in the political process during times of crisis or deadlock “for the greater good.”

Proposition Five (e) — The Military Educational System:

Civilian regimes may seek to lessen the likelihood of military intervention

in the political process by teaching the values of professionalism and civilian control in its military educational institutions or by employing political propaganda which supports these precepts. These efforts, however, also may be dysfunctional in some circumstances.

Proposition Six — Sources of Civil-Military Tension and Conflict:

There is broad agreement in the literature as to kinds of factors that can lead to the involvement of the military in the political process. These various factors arise within the military establishments of all regime types — authoritarian, totalitarian, or democratic — and may, in their most benign form, result in the alteration of the national conceptualization of the differences between apolitical, technical advice and subjective policy decisions or they may, in more extreme cases, lead to the extra-legal seizure of power by elements within the armed forces.

The regime, obviously, desires to influence the definition of what constitutes “military professionalism” for its national armed forces, but, as was suggested in Propositions Four and Five, this is no small task. In lieu of a professional military exhibiting the civilian ethic, conflicts may be minimized where there exists overlapping civilian and military elites (as occurred in the traditional European monarchies), in cases where the military is divided into competing, functionally-differentiated units (which make conspiracies more difficult to coordinate), or where effective security efforts have been undertaken (with the proviso that ineffective or overly oppressive security arrangements may be counter-productive in the long-run).

Unfortunately for civilian governments, most modern military establishments are not

simply a blank slate for the national regime to design as it may wish. Modern, professional militaries, as Huntington writes, are imbued with certain values — expertise (i.e., knowledge of the *means* which the military requires to fulfill its societal role), responsibility (a clearly *defined* sense of the military’s societal role), and corporateness (identification of the military’s *right* to fulfill its societal role) — which characterize their members and influence their orientation to society and politics at large. Threats to these self-identified values, individually or in concert with one another, may trigger resentment amongst elements within the armed forces and thus precipitate an effort (legal or otherwise) to increase the political influence of the military.

Moving beyond these general categories, there also is considerable agreement in the literature as to the *specific* areas of civilian and military interaction which potentially may become sites of political tension or even overt hostility. As will be discussed in the Propositions which follow, these potential flash points are broadly indicative of the overall civil-military relationship in a particular polity. On the one hand, there is the “pull” of regime weakness, incompetence, and/or dependence and, on the other hand, there is the “push” of regime attacks or pressure upon the military’s common interests as defined by that military establishment’s conceptualization of military professionalism (i.e., efforts by civilian authorities to deliberately involve segments of the armed forces in their own political squabbles; deliberate, politically-motivated actions that exacerbate inter-service rivalries; abrupt and/or unilateral decisions to diminish the sphere of military autonomy or to decrease the military’s share of the resources of the state; and attempts to

supplant the military as the guardians of the state).⁴⁵

(a) The “Pull” of National Crises:

Precise examples of factors that increasingly “pull” the military into the political realm include the following: (1) the existence of a dire national emergency (i.e., foreign invasion or war), and (2) the continuation or worsening of a domestic political, economic, or social crisis which results in division or deadlock amongst civilian authorities. Amongst these factors, however, probably the most influential arises following a defeat in war (at home or abroad) for which the military (rightly or wrongly) blames the civilian government. In such circumstances, military establishments frequently seek to redeem their own “honour” or “the nation’s” honour (sic) with a political success that shifts blame away from the battlefield and onto responsible (i.e., non-military) decision-makers.

Proposition Six (a) — The “Pull” of National Crises:

Serious military, political, economic, or social crises may serve to “pull” the military into the political realm.

(b) Use of the Military in Non-Traditional, Non-Military Roles and Activities:

On the other hand, numerous specific factors may serve to “push” the military into taking political action. Specifically, civilian authorities often wish to call upon soldiers to undertake civilian, economic projects. In countries as varied as the Philippines, Rumania, and the Soviet Union, military forces have been involved in agricultural production and the gathering of essential harvests, transportation and infrastructure development, public

⁴⁵ The metaphors of “push” and “pull” are borrowed from Thompson, *passim*.

health projects, and so on. For their part, military leaders may not oppose such efforts and in some cases they may even welcome these opportunities to demonstrate their utility to the state, but the potential for tension exists in those cases where these civilian economic projects interfere with the military's efforts to train its members for their primary task — war.

In a similar fashion, a potential conflict can arise when the military is inserted in the civilian sector as an explicit means of linking the army and the people. In countries such as Communist China, the issue again becomes one of balancing the civilian government's efforts to instill a desired civil or political ethic amongst members of the armed forces and the military's efforts to instill a professional ethic which strengthens military capabilities.

Proposition Six (b) — Non-Traditional, Non-Military Roles and Activities:

Civilian efforts to employ the military in non-military, civilian economic or social projects may meet with resentment if these activities negatively influence or detract from the military's ability to carry out its self-identified, primary mission — the defence of the state from aggression. Under circumstances where military expertise and competence is threatened, the military may come to oppose the civilian political leadership of the state.

(c) Budgetary and Financial Conflicts:

Yet another potentially serious source of friction between a civilian government and its armed forces involves the share of the national budget assigned to the defence of the realm. On the one hand, the military leadership of most states is acutely aware of the

extent to which their nation suffers from a security dilemma; in only rare cases are national resources sufficient to counter all possible threats to national security. Yet it is upon efforts to counter all of these threats that the military's sense of expertise and competence is predicated. The military will, therefore, attempt to secure a budget it believes to be proportional to the social mission it has been assigned. For its part, the civilian government must balance the needs of the military against the legitimate needs of other societal forces and then compare this to the ability of the state to pay. Of course, these negotiations may be complicated by exogenous factors such as corruption in the civilian and/or military spheres.

Proposition Six (c)— Budgetary and Financial Conflicts:

Civilian and military authorities may come into conflict over the share of the nation's resources which should be employed in defence of the state. Under circumstances where military expertise and competence is threatened, the military may come to oppose the civilian political leadership of the state.

(d) Conflicts over the Procurement of Weapons Systems:

Related to conflicts over the gross military budget are conflicts arising over how that budget should be spent. This may involve decisions to procure or forego specific weapons systems such as modern aircraft, advanced armoured fighting vehicles, sophisticated naval vessels, and so on. The military may favour the creation of an elite military establishment complete with advanced (and expensive) top-of-the-line weapons systems while the state favours mass formations which utilize large numbers of individual soldiers to make up for less advanced technology. Differing visions of the proper mix of

procurement policies may bring the military into conflict with the civilian political leadership especially if the former is not confident it can fulfill its societal task. In such circumstances, the military may push for the revision of these policies.

Proposition Six (d) — Conflicts over the Procurement of Weapons Systems:

The procurement of specific weapons systems may be — in the case of competing visions — a source of tension between military and civilian leaders. Under circumstances where military expertise and competence is threatened, the military may come to oppose the civilian political leadership of the state.

(e) Conflicts over the Composition of the Armed Forces:

On yet another related front, civilian and military policy makers may disagree on the nature of the overall composition of the armed forces. Relatively small and possibly all-volunteer, elite military formations may serve to increase the security of the state relative to the mass, conscript armies, but the former are far more expensive than the latter. A potential therefore exists for a conflict to develop between the mission of the military — defence of the state against foreign powers — and the wider societal mission of the civilian government which has to balance competing demands on its finite resources. These goals may sometimes be mutually exclusive.

Proposition Six (e) — Conflicts over the Composition of the Armed Forces:

The overall composition of the armed forces (i.e., the development of a mass or elite organization) may be — in the case of competing visions — a source of tension between military and civilian leaders. Under circumstances where military expertise and competence is threatened, the military may come to oppose the civilian political leadership of the state.

(f) Civilian Intrusion in the Internal Affairs of the Military:

On still another front, intrusions in the legitimate internal affairs of the military may generate political consequences. Undue, politically motivated interference in the promotion of military officers, arbitrary and politically motivated assignments of commands, and similar efforts to block the modern military's chain-of-command or exploit inter-service rivalries may be resented by military commanders. The presence of large numbers of foreign military advisors (who may have the ear of the political leadership) may threaten the prestige and authority of the national military leadership. The imposition of a parallel, internal chain-of-command - as initially was intended in the case of Soviet military *commissars* - also affects the ability of the military to direct its own members. And interference — for political reasons — in the exercise of internal discipline (i.e., by the government instituting or abolishing hazing, corporal punishment, or other means of discipline) may not meet with the approval of the military.

Proposition Six (f) — Civilian Intrusion in the Internal Affairs of the Military:

The military's sense of expertise may engender tensions with civilian authorities whenever the latter intrudes in areas which the former considers to be sacrosanct (i.e., areas such as military discipline, promotions, and the internal chain of command). Under circumstances where military expertise and competence is threatened, the military may come to oppose the civilian political leadership of the state.

(g) Threats to Military Competence and Expertise:

Finally, the first aspect of modern military professionalism — military expertise — also may lead to civil-military tensions whenever, for example, the boundaries between

objective, technical advice (the purview of the military) and subjective policy (the purview of political operatives) must be determined. In civilian controlled regimes, these boundaries are determined by the state (i.e., the civilian authorities have the last word), but even here the boundary may vary somewhat over time. The problem arises when the military and civilian authorities fundamentally disagree as to where this line must be drawn.

Military elites may also object to being shut out of the military and foreign-policy decision-making process (i.e., if members of the armed forces are not accorded influential posts or if they are denied access to the highest decision-making levels). If military advice is ignored and military advisors are displaced — and particularly in cases wherein the military finds itself the executor of policies which result in negative military outcomes at home or abroad — the military may take it upon itself to intervene in the political process.

Proposition Six (g) — Threats to Military Competence and Expertise:

The military may perceive as a threat any measure which abruptly or arbitrarily impinges upon its perceived sphere of military competence and expertise (i.e., when the state ignores technical advice offered by the military establishment) and for this reason the military may — under certain circumstances — come to oppose the civilian leadership of the state.

(h) Alterations to the Military Mission:

Another specific arena of potential conflict between military and civilian authorities

revolves around the process of defining the military's mission (i.e., the sphere of military responsibility). The military, as part of its professional ethic, defines this role as that of society's "guardian" especially as this pertains to foreign military threats (and also some domestic threats in the case of military establishments such as the Communist militaries of Russia and Eastern Europe, certain Latin American armies, and the Turkish army but not — for the most part — the armies of North America or Western Europe). Civilian authorities, on the other hand, may have a wider, political agenda to solve. Correspondingly, the civilian authorities may define military responsibility in a particular fashion which is at variance with what the military wishes.

Proposition Six (h) — Alterations to the Military Mission:

The military's sense of responsibility may engender tensions with civilian authorities whenever the military's societal role is abruptly or arbitrarily constrained or altered. Under circumstances where military responsibility is threatened, the military may come to oppose the civilian political leadership of the state.

(i) Loyalty to the State or Political Executive:

At other times, military officers (such as American General Douglas MacArthur and Russian Lieutenant-General Alexander Lebed) have defined their responsibilities in terms of their loyalty to the state or the nation and not necessarily in terms of their loyalty to a particular political executive. The former definition of military responsibility is very much at variance with the civilian ethic. It places the military in the role of determining for itself when a particular civilian executive or legislature fails the test of fulfilling the national interest. It is usurping a role otherwise handled by civilian powers.

Proposition Six (i) — Loyalty to the State or Political Executive:

The civilian ethic is at variance with military views that place loyalty to the state or nation above conceptions of loyalty to the duly constituted civilian political authorities. Military establishments which subscribe to the former view are more likely to intervene in the political process.

(j) Institutional Threats to the Military's Societal Role:

The military's sense of corporateness may be the source of still other tensions. Specifically, modern military establishments jealously guard what their professional ethic defines as their "unique" social task: the defence of the state. The military leadership may feel this special status is under threat if the civilian authorities undertake to create parallel military structures. In Nazi Germany, to take but one classic example, the unique and essential place of the *Wehrmacht* (regular armed forces) was threatened first by the development of the *Sturmabteilung* (the paramilitary S.A. or Brownshirts) and later it was imperiled even further by the evolution of the *Schutzstaffel* (S.S.) from a palace guard into an important front-line military formation. (the armed or *Waffen* S.S.)

Proposition Six (j) — Institutional Threats to the Military's Societal Role:

The military may perceive as a threat any measure which impinges upon its unique right to fulfill its social function and institutional position as guarantor of society in an anarchic environment. Under circumstances where military corporateness is threatened, the military may come to oppose the civilian political leadership of the state.

(k) Drawing the Military into Civilian Political Disputes:

Use of the military in domestic political struggles may also diminish the military's ability to carry-out its primary mission. This is especially true if employment of an ethnic

security map creates or exacerbates divisions within the military. If, for example, one service branch is derived from one (dominant) ethnic group and another is dominated by another (subordinate) ethnic group, any effort by partisans of either camp to draw the armed forces into a political struggle may — at the least — reduce the ability of the armed forces to carry out its societal imperative or — in the worst case — it may lead to civil war.

Proposition Six (k) — Drawing the Military into Civilian Political Disputes:

The military value of corporateness may be threatened by civilian efforts to draw the military or portions of the military into its own civilian, political disputes. Under circumstances where military corporateness is threatened, the military may come to oppose the civilian political leadership of the state.

Part C — Counter-Indicated Themes

In this third section of the Typology of Relevance, universal or near-universal themes in the existing literature which do not appear to apply to the cases under review will be presented. Such countervailing themes will further demonstrate the uniqueness of these cases.

Proposition Seven — The Importance of the Officer Corps:

Amongst the most recurrent of civil-military themes to be found in the five “families” of theories — and one of the more problematic — is the treatment of the military as an analytically distinct and unified entity in contrast to the other forces within society. Moreover, subsumed within this theme is invariably a focus upon the officer corps as the

most important component of the overall military establishment (from a theoretical point of view). The dangers associated with treating the military as distinct or unified have been touched upon in an earlier chapter and by some of the existing theoretical formulations, but more needs to be mentioned in relation to the second point — the focus on the officer corps. Such an analytical perspective belies important empirical indicators that — if missed — would generate an inaccurate picture of the totality of Polish and Hungarian civil-military relations (or civil-military relations of most other countries for that matter).

There are, obviously, a number of solid reasons for focusing primarily upon the officer corps when analyzing military coups. First, while the number of military regimes and/or attempted coups in the world is high, the number of these events which have been undertaken by NCOs (Non-Commissioned Officers) and enlisted personnel is extremely low. NCOs and other ranks are usually not in a position to undertake on their own initiative the kind of broadly based and well coordinated action that is necessary in order to stage a coup.

The lower ranks, moreover, usually do not command sufficiently large forces nor do they enjoy sufficient individual autonomy to threaten the established order. For this reason, coups led by individuals from the lower ranks have occurred almost exclusively in some of the smaller countries of Africa where the national armed forces are themselves relatively small and thus susceptible to displacement by a relatively small group of conspirators. Examples of this type of *coup d'état* include the military government of

Sierra Leone which was itself overthrown — for a brief time — by a force led by privates and NCOs in the late 1960s and the government of Flight-Lieutenant Rawlings which took power in Ghana in 1979.⁴⁶

The extra-legal violence that is associated with the actions of NCOs and enlisted personnel typically manifests itself in the form of mutinies. Mutinies can be distinguished analytically from coups and attempted coups due to the fact that the former is generally a more or less spontaneous response to particularly intolerable conditions. Mutinies may involve large numbers of troops and extend over a long period of time or they may sometimes affect a comparatively small component of the overall military establishment for a comparatively short period of time. And unlike coups, mutinies generally are not associated with the production of political manifestos and such other documents involving “societal” concerns.⁴⁷

And, finally, although the loyalty of the other ranks is needed for most (but not all) coups to succeed, the numbers of troops directly involved in most coups are usually small in number and typically they are engaged in active operations for relatively brief periods of time. This may make it possible for their commanders to deceive them as to the purpose and legitimacy of their actions for sufficient time to attempt the coup.

⁴⁶ J. 'Bayo Adekanye, “The Politics of the Post-Military State in Africa,” in *The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes*, eds. Christopher Clapham and George Philip (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 64-94.

⁴⁷ Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers and Politics: Military Coups and Government* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1977), p. 2 (fn.) and Claude E. Welch, Jr., and Arthur K. Smith, *Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil-military Relations* (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1974), pp. 20-21.

All this, however, does not mean that the attitudes and actions of NCOs and other ranks are only important as they pertain to the staging of coups. On the contrary, the attitudes and actions of enlisted personnel are of considerable theoretical importance in other contexts. For some theorists, the disposition of these elements is crucial. This is especially true in the circumstances suggested by the class (Engels) and ethnic (Enloe and Rakowska-Harmstone) models. With both of these conceptualizations, cleavages are not only possible but are expected to occur between, on the one hand, the attitudes of the officer corps and, on the other hand, the NCOs and other ranks.

The differences in the attitudes of the various segments of the armed forces are relevant especially when they pertain to the suppression of civil unrest. In such cases, the *inaction* of NCOs and enlisted personnel is potentially as important as that of the officer corps. Coups and attempted coups require explicit action to succeed; during incidents of civil unrest, military inaction is potentially as dangerous.

As was already suggested, the leaders of a coup may be able to get away with employing a small number of troops; some or all of whom have been kept in the dark until the last moment regarding the nature or extent of their activities. On the other hand, suppression of wide-scale social unrest — precisely the kind of crisis that may lead a government to put troops in the streets — is not likely to be either as brief or as secret as to prevent individual soldiers from considering the propriety of their own actions. For this reason, the attitudes of all segments of the armed forces must be critically analyzed and evaluated.

Proposition Seven — Officers, NCOs, and Other Ranks:

The orientation of the officer corps is the most important military component in determining whether or not the armed forces will intervene in the political process or even seize political power for itself (especially in the case of conscript armies). At the same time, the attitudes of both the officer corps and enlisted personnel are important in determining whether or not the armed forces will obey the directives of civilian authorities when ordered to support the current government by suppressing dissent.

Part D — Exogenous Variables and Themes

In this fourth and final section, the Typology of Relevance turns to the analysis of the exogenous variables which influence civil-military relations. In particular, the Typology of Relevance will analyze foreign influences on the determination of Hungarian and Polish post-Communist (transitional) civil-military relations.

Proposition Eight — The Geopolitical Context:

Even a cursory review of the existing theoretical literature on the general topic of civil-military relations will show that possibly the most under-represented theoretical variable in the analysis of specific civil-military systems is the geopolitical context. In many instances, the only aspect of the international dimension that is referenced in the analysis of specific civil-military systems is the effect that foreign wars have upon the balance of political power between civilian and military forces.

Victory or defeat in foreign military contests (or the prospect of such a defeat in the near-term) is viewed as an important factor in the determination of specific civil-military

systems, but otherwise civil-military relations are viewed as being primarily an *internal* political contest. Longer-term and more multifaceted security issues are often missing from consideration. Much of the literature discussed in the context of the “Western,” “Interventionist,” and “Social Relevance” families of models of civil-military relations provides ample evidence of this theoretical inadequacy.

Obviously, such a one-dimensional representation of civil-military relations is not up to the task of providing a complete picture of many civil-military systems. International factors may affect some civil-military systems more or less significantly than others, but these factors cannot and should not be reduced to only one aspect. In this one sense, the analysis of East European civil-military relations in the Soviet era proved to be somewhat of an exception to this critique. In Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union typically was viewed as casting a large and smothering shadow over the affairs of its client states and their military establishments. And as another (partial) exception, some analysts emphasized the international dimension of Latin American civil-military relations (in this case casting the United States in the role of hegemonic power).

The above two instances were very much the exception to the rule. Typically, the geopolitical context in most civil-military studies is reduced to the immediate question of foreign war or peace. The East European and Central American cases can suggest to the researcher, however, that the geopolitical context is worth revisiting. In the case of Hungary and Poland, the definition of the geopolitical context has to be cast much wider than this immediate question of war and peace. The international dimension affecting

Polish and Hungarian civil-military relations is both more multidimensional and longer-term than typically is represented in most general studies of civil-military relations.

Proposition Eight — Geopolitical Factors:

Geopolitical factors are typically under-represented in the analysis of civil-military relations. These pressures are important because they may extend their influence into the sphere of civil-military relations.

PART A: BACKGROUND OR HISTORICAL VARIABLES

CHAPTER 5.1: EMPIRICAL RESULTS PROPOSITION ONE

Introduction to Part A:

As was outlined in chapter four, one frequently under-emphasized variable in the determination of contemporary civil-military relations is political culture. Analogous to the “feedback” in Easton’s Systems Theory, political culture is also linked inversely to the totalitarian legacy which is described in the following section (Proposition Two).

While political culture consists of apparent continuities in widely-held political attitudes between the past and the present (including those attitudes which persisted in the Communist era), the totalitarian legacy refers to the effects of Communist-era events and policies (especially those linked to the totalitarian nature of the political system) which have produced discontinuities between the two eras. Together these two variables constitute the background or historical context in which post-totalitarian (transitional) civil-military relations are being determined.

Proposition One — Political Culture:

As a new political and social order is being created, traditional mass and elite attitudes towards the military as an institution (i.e., aspects of a broader political culture) may re-emerge or otherwise influence the shape of post-Communist (transitional) civil-military relations.

Introduction:

The overall political cultures of Hungary and Poland share many similarities. There are, however, quite a number of differences in their historical experiences and political cultures as they relate to the specific development of national civil-military relations.

In Hungary, popular and elite attitudes towards the military institution have often been negatively affected by the military's historically poor performance on the battlefield and by the fact that the institution has typically been associated with foreign powers. As a result, the military has had relatively little political influence. In the post-Communist (transitional) period, these attitudes have manifested themselves (at least in part) in widely held feelings of low regard towards the armed forces as an institution and in low levels of national funding for the military.

In Poland, popular and elite attitudes towards the military have been much more positive as the result of the historic role the military has played in both defending the nation's independence and in recovering this independence when it has been lost to foreign powers. Because it has been so closely associated with the cause of Polish nationalism, the armed forces have been able to exercise considerable political influence (especially in times of crisis). In this way, the Polish case was quite different than the Hungarian case. In the post-Communist (transitional) period, the Polish military has continued to be held in high regard (even when it has become embroiled in civilian political disputes). For the most part, it has enjoyed the material as well as popular support of the nation. In this way, too, post-Communist Poland is different than post-Communist Hungary.

Hungary:

For the citizens of nations “born by the sword,” the national military is typically at or near the centre of the popular consciousness. Numerous historical examples of such a political culture can be found. They include the following: the Vietnamese after the victory at Dien Bien Phu, the Soviet Union following the Russian Civil War (and subsequent Great Patriotic War), Maoist China in the aftermath of the Long March, Israel after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the United States and the citizen-soldier of the Revolutionary War, Republican France and the victorious soldiers of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, and so on. In the case of Hungary, this model is not applicable. Hungarians — despite *or perhaps because of* their conflict-prone origins and history — have only sometimes associated the national military with national survival. Over its recorded history, Hungary has, for example, lost many more wars than it has won.¹ In these instances, the military has failed in its primary mission.

Of course, this fact only partly explains the frequent ambivalence of Hungarians to the armed forces. The military has, in many instances, been absolved of blame for these defeats. For example, the defeat of the nationalist forces in 1848-49 was blamed on Russian intervention on the side of the Austrian armies.

¹ This poor military record is especially true of Hungary’s history since 1526. In 1526, Hungary was conquered by the Ottoman Empire and was liberated (1683-1699) largely by the armed intervention of Habsburg Austria (the Holy Roman Empire), Poland, and Venice. Between 1697 and 1711, Hungarian forces fought an unsuccessful revolt against Austrian rule. In 1848-1849, another unsuccessful revolt against Austrian rule was launched. In 1914-1918, Hungarian armies (as part of the Dual Monarchy) were defeated in the Great War and this pattern of defeat continued in the inter-war period. Finally, Hungarian armies were on the losing side of World War II.

To a greater degree, the status of the military establishment in the political culture of modern Hungary has suffered from the fact that the military has more often than not been the tool of a foreign power. Beginning with its liberation from the Ottoman Empire (1683-1699), the Hungarian military has not been a *national* military institution. Even when “national” in name, modern Hungarian armies have effectively served or been controlled by foreign interests. When this association with foreign powers has brought victories, the military has been popular. But when, on the other hand, victories have faded or defeat has followed, this support has quickly evaporated.

As will be demonstrated in the following section, the Hungarian military has not been a national institution in the same way that the Polish military has been a national institution. Culture, language, and religion typically occupy a more central place in the Hungarian nationalist pantheon than the armed forces. This troika of forces has served to preserve the nation whenever the military has failed (i.e., in the wake of military defeats and foreign occupations). As a result, the military establishment has frequently not been accorded the same level of respect or social standing that similar careers have enjoyed elsewhere (i.e., in more militarized states such as Prussia). Respect for the military has risen or fallen in rapid succession.

The Hungarian Army After 1848:

For modern Hungary, many aspects of this phenomenon begin in the aftermath of the 1848 Revolutions (the so-called Springtime of the Peoples). The ultimately unsuccessful revolt — like similar failed revolts across Europe at this time — left in its wake a

renewed nationalist spirit which the French Revolution (fifty years earlier) had set into motion. Although defeated on the battlefield by an Austrian army and 200,000 Russian troops (a fact not lost to the nation's historical consciousness), Hungarian nationalism did not die and these sentiments eventually led to the transformation of the Habsburg "Austrian Empire" into the Habsburg "Dual Monarchy" (or "Austro-Hungarian Empire") in 1867.²

Militarily, the new constitutional arrangement was marked by the re-organization of the Habsburg armed forces into three parts: (1) the Imperial and Royal Army (sometimes called the Common or Joint Army), (2) the Austrian National Guard (i.e., the Austrian *Landwehr*), and (3) the Hungarian National Guard (i.e., the Hungarian *Landwehr* or *Honvéd*).³ This tripartite division was to last until the collapse of the Dual Monarchy in 1918.

Despite these reforms, the new Hungarian National Guard should not be considered a "national" institution in the modern sense of the word. There are several reasons for this. First, the Imperial and Royal Army (as well as the Joint Navy) continued to employ many

² The effects of this complex and overlapping civil war on the armies of the Habsburg Empire are recounted in István Deák, *Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848-1918* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 31ff.

³ For a detailed analysis of the Austro-Hungarian armies, see István Deák, "The Ethnic Question in the Multinational Habsburg Army, 1848-1918," in *Ethnic Armies: Polyethnic Armed Forces From the Time of the Habsburgs to the Age of the Superpowers*, ed. N.F. Dreisziger (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1990), pp. 21-49; Deák, *Beyond Nationalism...*; and Zoltan D. Barany, *Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945-1990: The Case of Hungary* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 29-34.

ethnic Hungarian officers and other ranks.⁴ Hungarians continued to serve in all service branches and constituted an especially important part of the cavalry and (horse-drawn) transportation corps. Overall, Hungarians served in numbers proportionate or even over-proportionate to their weight in the Empire's population in all ranks of the Imperial and Royal Army.⁵

Many Hungarians — including many of the best and the brightest — voluntarily chose to join or remain in the Imperial and Royal Army instead of joining the Hungarian National Guard because the latter represented (at least initially) a less prestigious career path. The National Guards began as secondary forces (although their condition improved over time). These formations, for example, did not possess artillery and technical branches of their own before 1912.⁶

In part, this phenomenon can also be explained by the fact that Hungarian society was divided as to what constituted the national identity. Hungarian officers (in particular) constituted (along with the Hungarian element of the national bureaucracy) the most “loyalist” segment of Hungarian society. In other words, many Hungarian officers (and civil servants) saw themselves as loyal members of one of Europe's great dynastic empires and they recoiled from efforts by nationalists to weaken or even break up the

⁴ In fact, nearly 80% of the annual conscript intake was inducted into the Imperial and Royal Army and Navy. Deák, *Beyond Nationalism...*, p. 56.

⁵ Deák, “The Ethnic Question...,” pp. 32ff.

⁶ Deák, *Beyond Nationalism...*, p. 56.

Austrian Empire.⁷ For many officers and bureaucrats, the Habsburg monarchy was “their” monarchy and they just happened to be Hungarian-speaking subjects of this dynasty.⁸

Another reason why the Hungarian National Guard can not be considered a “national” military formation is the fact that the composition of the *Honvéd* was by no means homogeneous. The Hungarian National Guard included its own semi-autonomous subdivision — the Croatian-Slavonian National Guard — whose language of command and service was Serbo-Croatian.⁹

And finally, many nominally “Hungarian” units within the Hungarian National Guard were comprised of ethnic minorities which spoke little or no Hungarian (although Hungarian was the official language of command and service for most of the Hungarian National Guard).¹⁰ Thus the Hungarian National Guard replicated (on a much smaller scale) the ethnic complexities and inter-relationships found in the post-1868 Imperial and Royal Army and the earlier Imperial-Royal Army of the Austrian Empire.

⁷ Aladár Urbán, “Count Lajos Batthyány and the Organization of the Hungarian National Army, 1848-1849,” in *East Central European War Leaders: Civilian and Military*, eds. Béla K. Király and Albert A. Nofi, War and Society in East Central Europe, Vol. XXV (Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 1988), pp. 42-43.

⁸ During the 1848-1849 civil war, different battalions of the same Hungarian regiment sometimes fought on opposite sides – and sometimes against one another! See, Deák, *Beyond Nationalism...*, p. 33.

⁹ Deák, “The Ethnic Question...,” pp. 22-23. In the Austrian National Guard, troops from Galicia (i.e., Austria’s Polish partition lands) were also accorded semi-autonomous status similar to that granted to the Croatian-Slavonian National Guard.

¹⁰ Deák, “The Ethnic Question...,” pp. 22-23.

The Hungarian Army After World War I:

Although tensions occasionally flared (especially in regard to the issue of the use of Hungarian as the language of command in Honvéd units and units of the Imperial and Royal Army which contained large numbers of Hungarian speakers), the Hungarian National Guard — like the Imperial and Royal Army and its *Landwehr* counterparts in Austria — was generally successful in managing its internal ethnic problems. This is probably best represented in the casualty list from the First World War which showed that hundreds of thousands of non-Austrians and non-Hungarians were willing to serve and die at on behalf of the Habsburg monarchy.¹¹ All of this, however, was to change in the aftermath of Austro-Hungary's defeat in the Great War.

With the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy in 1918, a newly independent Hungarian state and a new “national” military establishment were brought into existence. This change, however, did not lead to a positive change in Hungarian military fortunes. The new armed forces — like their Austro-Hungarian antecedents in the Great War — were subjected to a series of military defeats and humiliations.

In quick succession, individual Hungarian soldiers served under as many as three different post-war regimes.¹² The first of these regimes, led by Count Mihály Károlyi,

¹¹ The scale of these casualties — as well as those suffered by the Dual Monarchy's Austrian and Hungarian units — is documented in Deák, *Beyond Nationalism...*, pp. 192ff.

¹² There are several excellent sources of information on Hungary's overall history. Perhaps one of the best and most famous is *A History of Hungary*, eds. Peter F. Sugar *et al* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1990). Additional information on this period can be found in Admiral Nicholas Horthy (Regent of Hungary), *Memoirs* (London: Hutchinson, 1956); *Revolutions and Interventions in Hungary and Its Neighbour States, 1918-1919*, ed. Peter Pastor, War and Society in East Central Europe, Vol. XX

was driven from Cluj and most of the rest of Transylvania by a Rumanian army in 1919. Subsequently, the Károlyi regime itself collapsed and, in its stead, Béla Kun's Communists came to power briefly and formed the Hungarian Soviet Republic. Kun's 133-day Communist *interregnum* was overturned by force of Rumanian arms, but the worst (from a Hungarian nationalist point of view) was yet to come. In 1920, Hungary's third post-war ruler, Admiral Miklós Horthy (Regent to the vacant Hungarian throne), came to power, but Admiral Horthy was soon forced to accede to the Treaty of Trianon (June 4, 1920).

The Treaty of Trianon was part of the post-war Versailles system which treated Hungary as a defeated enemy state. Although some nationalist leaders hoped that Hungary's separation from the Dual Monarchy would insulate their nation from the more punitive aspects of the post-war settlement, the victorious powers presented Hungary with a *fait accompli* which consigned vast territories and large ethnic-Hungarian populations to Czechoslovakian, Rumanian, and Serbian (Yugoslavian) control. According to the provisions of this treaty (which immediately became widely resented in Hungary), seventy percent of the land which had been administered by Hungary under the auspices of the Dual Monarchy was lost as was sixty percent of Hungary's pre-war population. Worse still, almost thirty percent of the state's Hungarian-speaking population was now

(Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 1988); *The First War Between Socialist States: The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and Its Impact*, eds. Béla Király, Barbara Lotze, and Nándor F. Dreisziger, War and Society in East Central Europe, Vol. XI (Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 1984); and the previously cited *East Central European War Leaders: Civilian and Military*, eds. Béla K. Király and Albert A. Nofi, War and Society in East Central Europe, Vol. XXV (Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 1988).

outside its borders as were many important industrial areas.¹³

Throughout this period, the Hungarian military was unable to protect Hungarian interests from the advances of foreign armies. And after the war, the military (limited to only 35,000 troops by the Treaty of Trianon) was incapable of serving as an effective tool of civilian governments concerned about the fate of Hungarians living under foreign rule (and sometimes foreign misrule). As a result, the military's prestige plummeted in the eyes of most Hungarians.¹⁴

The fact that after 1920 the nominal head of state as well as several key government ministers (including Prime Ministers) were active or retired military personnel initially did little to correct this situation or to ensure the independence or autonomy of the Hungarian armed forces. Only the victorious rise of German power in Eastern Europe and the return of the lands lost in the Trianon settlement could raise the prestige of the Hungarian military, but this renewal of faith was very short-lived.

During Admiral Horthy's rule (1920-1944), successive Hungarian governments fell increasingly under the orbit of Hitler's Germany. And by the same token, the Hungarian military fell increasingly under foreign (i.e., German) control. In 1941, Hungarian military units (approximately 30,000 troops) played a minor role in the German

¹³ Tibor Hajdú and Zsuzsa L. Nagy, "Revolution, Counterrevolution, Consolidation," in *A History of Hungary*, eds. Peter F. Sugar *et al* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 314.

¹⁴ Barany, p. 29.

Wehrmacht's occupation of the southern portion of the Ukraine. Additional units served in German-occupied Yugoslavia. In 1942, the 200,000 troops of the 2nd Hungarian Army were dispatched at Germany's behest to guard a long segment of the Don River near the Russian city of Stalingrad.¹⁵ After this second force was destroyed in the Stalingrad debacle, the Horthy government was forced by the Germans to send the 1st Hungarian Army to the Eastern Front (where it met a similar fate at the hands of the advancing Red Army).¹⁶

In many ways, the position of Hungary's armed forces relative to Nazi Germany (especially after 1944 when the Horthy regime was deposed by the puppet government of Ferenc Szálasi and the "Arrow Cross") mirrored the subsequent subordination of Hungary's armed forces to the Soviet Union. In both cases, the Hungarian armed forces acted primarily under the direction of a more powerful foreign state. The Hungarian military in the Soviet era (as will be discussed below) was dominated more systematically and thoroughly than it was during the last, chaotic months of the Third Reich, but the

¹⁵ The figures are from Horthy, p. 193 and Istvan Nemeskurty, *Requiem egy hadseregert* (Budapest: Gondolat, 1968) cited in Barany, p. 31.

¹⁶ Throughout this period, Hungary's sovereignty in military affairs was further compromised because thousands of Hungarian citizens (mostly ethnic Germans living in Hungary) were recruited into Nazi Germany's militarized or *Waffen SS (Schutzstaffel)* instead of the Hungarian armed forces. Initially the SS was authorized to recruit a maximum 20,000 soldiers from within Hungarian territory, but the Horthy regime retaliated by stripping Hungarian citizenship from anyone who volunteered for the SS. This changed in 1942. Under extreme pressure from Berlin, the Horthy government submitted and restored the citizenship of those soldiers who had previously served in the SS. At the same time, the SS was actually allowed to conscript ethnic Germans living in Hungary. Eventually the SS was authorized to recruit approximately 60-80,000 Hungarians (i.e., enough men to fill out five divisions), but events rapidly overtook these grandiose plans and they never came to fruition. In any event, the spectacle of a foreign country recruiting military personnel on national territory represented a diminution of Hungarian control over national military affairs. See Loránd Tilkovszky, "The Late Interwar Years and World War II," in *A History of Hungary*, eds. Peter F. Sugar *et al* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1990), pp. 348-351.

main characteristic (i.e., the absence of sovereignty in military matters and domination by a totalitarian neighbour) was true of both periods.

The Hungarian Army under Soviet Control:

From the Communist seizure of power until 1989, the mission of the Hungarian armed forces (and this can be said equally of the Polish armed forces) could be described with the term “Socialist Internationalism.” Autonomous national defence capabilities were not encouraged during the Communist-era; these armies were designed, equipped, and trained to fight in the context of a Soviet-dominated coalition.¹⁷ The Polish armed forces, for example, were expected to use their extensive amphibious and bridge laying capabilities to assist Soviet *offensive* operations against Denmark and the northern part of West Germany. The Hungarian army — based on territory contiguous to only neutral Austria and Socialist Yugoslavia — was assigned a more limited role on the Warsaw Pact’s southern flank.

During this time, Soviet power and control over the Hungarian and Polish defence establishments was exercised indirectly through the manipulation of the East European political systems (including the *nomenklatura* system). But these forces were also controlled more directly via the integration of the national military command-and-control

¹⁷ Note, for example, Soviet resistance to proposals to develop a semi-autonomous “Polish Front” after 1956. This debate is chronicled below in the section on the “Rise of the Polish People’s Army.” Source: Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, “Poland,” in *Warsaw Pact: The Question of Cohesion, Phase II/Volume 2 - Poland, the German Democratic Republic, and Rumania*, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment ORAE Extra-Mural Paper No. 33 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1984), pp. 65ff.

systems into the Warsaw Pact's command structure. As part of the Warsaw Pact military system, the autonomous national war-fighting capabilities of the Polish and Hungarian armies were blocked or minimized at every opportunity.¹⁸

In addition to having to purchase Soviet armaments (sometimes at the expense of national defence industries) and playing host to Soviet (and never non-Soviet Warsaw Pact) military garrisons, large-scale military maneuvers were always organized on a bilateral basis (i.e., national units trained with Soviet military formations - never alone with other non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces) or if multilateral maneuvers were planned they always included Red Army formations. Military exchanges almost always involved East European officers visiting Soviet units (and vice versa) and only rarely involved exchanges between two East European states. And the same was true in regards to military educational programs (i.e., East European officers attended Soviet military and technical academies and only rarely those of other Warsaw Pact members).

More importantly, command-and-control was removed from national political and military hands and was exercised by Soviet political and military personnel. Key command posts in the Warsaw Pact integrated military command structure were invariably filled by Soviet personnel - despite the fact that the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact armies represented almost one-third of the Warsaw Pact's order of battle. By way of contrast, NATO apportions command positions in proportion to the relative size of the

¹⁸ Amongst NATO members, only West Germany's military command structure was constrained in the same way as the command structures of the East European militaries. Certain West German units were, for example, directly subordinated to NATO wartime command.

national armed forces (except for the position of Supreme Commander which has always been held by an American).

Even more significantly, the Air Defence forces of the Warsaw Pact (including the national contributions of the various East European allies) were subordinated to Soviet command (i.e., national *and* Warsaw Pact command structures were paralleled or bypassed). Thus the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Air Defence Forces shared *direct* operational command of the Hungarian and Polish air defence forces along with the national air defence commanders (who could also employ these units to protect national borders).¹⁹

Finally, East European military formations within the Warsaw Pact were typically subordinated to operational command as part of Soviet military formations above the division level. In the most extreme case, the divisions of the East German Army were supposed to operate “sandwiched” between units of the Soviet Group of Forces in Germany, but Polish and Czechoslovakian forces also were not permitted to operate national corps, army, or (where applicable) front-scale formations which did not include at least some Soviet military formations.²⁰ (The much smaller Hungarian army did not

¹⁹ Michael Sadykiewicz, *The Warsaw Pact Command Structure in Peace and War* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1988), p. 12.

²⁰ According to Christopher D. Jones, in some cases and for some types of units Soviet planners wished to integrate non-Soviet military units into Red Army and other Soviet command structures below the divisional level (i.e., at the regimental level or even lower). See Christopher D. Jones, “Warsaw Pact Exercises: The Genesis of a Greater Socialist Army?” in *Warsaw Pact: The Question of Cohesion, Phase II, Volume 1*, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment ORAE Extra-Mural Paper No. 29 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1984), pp. 235-267.

really apply in this case.)

The cumulative effect of all of these structural constraints on the Hungarian and (especially) Polish armed forces was the diminution of autonomous national defence capabilities. Unable to train collectively as a single integrated military command and unable to exercise effective operational command over all units of the national armed forces, the East European military establishments were less able to oppose Soviet hegemony in the region should such a political circumstance arise. This was the intended effect of these policies.

But the East European military establishments also paid a price in terms of the defence capabilities of the forces under their command. Increased command, control, communications, and intelligence (C³I) difficulties (i.e., having to coordinate with Russian speaking commanders), logistical difficulties (i.e., supplying national units in disparate Soviet formations instead of centrally located national corps, armies, and fronts), as well as the loss of prestige associated with the loss of autonomy were the unintended consequences of Soviet-era practices. National military commanders became *executors* of foreign (i.e., Soviet) military policies and not the *initiators and executors* of national defence policies. In the post-Communist period, this would change.

Attitudes Towards the Hungarian Armed Forces (Conclusion):

Modern Hungary has experienced virtually no sustained periods of autonomous military control. Under the Dual Monarchy, the armed forces were semi-autonomous national

institutions. For many ethnic Hungarians, the Imperial and Royal Army was as much a legitimate national institution. Later, under the direction of Nazi Germany and then Communist Russia, the military became utterly subjected to foreign command.

From the perspective of Hungarian nationalists, the armed forces also failed to act as a national institutions during the Communist era. And this was especially true during the 1956 Revolution against Communist and Soviet rule. Although a few individual soldiers handed their weapons over to the rebels in the early days of the crisis rather than support the internal security forces in suppressing the revolt, the army by and large remained in its barracks throughout most of the crisis and offered no resistance to the Red Army during the latter's march on Budapest.

Not surprisingly, the Hungarian military continues to suffer from low social prestige and poor social standing amongst the general population.²¹ The military has only occasionally represented the touchstone of the Hungarian national identity. Other social forces have carried that torch. The military, unfortunately, can not fall back upon a "glorious past" of military victories to counter the perception of its quiescence during the last forty-five years.

As a result, the military establishment continues to have relatively little influence on the

²¹ As recently as 1995, the persistence of these attitudes were noted by the authors of a British Defence Department study. See Ministry of Defence [U.K.]: Directorate of Management & Consultancy Services, *Review of Parliamentary Oversight of the Hungarian MOD and Democratic Control of the Hungarian Defence Forces* (London, U.K.: Directorate of Management & Consultancy Services, 1996), pp. 56-57.

policy-making process. By way of contrast, the Polish military (because of its association with the cause of Polish nationalism) has sometimes exercised considerable influence on the political realm. Historically, the Polish military — again unlike its Hungarian counterparts — has been willing to play a more pro-active political role.

This history may also explain, to some degree, the low levels of military spending that have marked the post-Communist (transitional) period (see Propositions Six c and d). Other countries (including Poland) have had to endure comparable economic dislocations, but — unlike Hungary — they have still proven to be willing to spend a greater percentage of their scarce resources on the national military. It may be some time before this legacy can be overcome (if indeed it is even possible).

Poland:

Unlike Hungary, Poland must be included amongst those nations for whom the military and military history form an integral part of the national consciousness. In turn, this political culture has had a significant effect on contemporary Polish civil-military relations. By linking itself to the ideal of Polish nationalism, the army has sometimes gained considerable political influence. At the same time, this political role has brought the army into conflict with civilian authorities who have sought to counter the influence of the military by exercising civilian control over military affairs.

The most significant difference between Hungary and Poland in terms of military affairs and political orientations towards the military is the fact that in Poland the military has

traditionally been seen to be one of the most important (if not *the* most important) guarantors of Polish independence. In the absence of an autonomous Polish state, the military (as will be discussed below) has also been seen to be one of the principal means by which Polish independence could be reclaimed from foreign hands. As a result of the good will generated by the military's historic place in the national consciousness, military rulers have also played a significant and surprisingly popular role in Polish domestic politics. In this, the army is rivaled only by the Catholic Church in terms of its importance as a *national* institution.

The Army and the Rise of Polish Nationalism:

Ironically, the decline of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the eventual elimination of Poland as a European state marked the general onset of modern Polish nationalism and the linkage of that nationalism to the force of Polish arms.²² In 1772, Poland suffered the first of three partitions at the hands of its Prussian, Austrian, and Russian neighbours. A second partition occurred in 1793 and Poland was finally partitioned out of existence in 1795.

Although Prussia instigated the partition process, it was Russia which benefited the most. Russia eventually gained more than 63 percent of the territory of the former Polish-Lithuanian state while Prussia seized about 19 percent and Austria (which declined to

²² On the question of the rise of modern Polish nationalism, see Roman Szporluk, "Poland and the Rise of the Theory and Practice of Modern Nationality, 1770-1870," *Dialectics and Humanism*, Vol. XVII, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 44-48.

participate in the Second Partition) gained just under 18 percent.²³

In part because the rule of the Tsar and Tsarina in the Russian partition lands was the most autocratic (especially when compared with the relatively liberal rule of the Dual Monarchy in Galicia), Russia was also the object of the most significant Polish opposition to the partition process. In 1792-3, the War of the Second Partition was fought between Polish and Russian troops (with a Prussian army advancing against the Polish rear). A little over a year later, the National Rising of 1794 occurred.

Inspired in part by the French Revolution and the execution of Louis XVI, Tadeusz Kościuszko led Polish regular and irregular forces against the troops of the Tsarina (Catherine II) during the National Rising. Militarily, the struggle was in vain. The Polish forces were defeated and Poland was partitioned off the European map the following year. Politically, the struggle was not entirely in vain. The National Rising — with its anti-Russian overtones — represented another important building block in the development of a Polish national identity. In this way, armed opposition to Russian rule was an important factor in the development of a Polish national identity.

In subsequent years, Polish nationalism appeared to find its strongest support in Republican France. The Polish Legions (1797-1802) and the Army of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw (1807-1813) fought for Poland in the service of Napoleon's France. And

²³ The figures are from Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland in Two Volumes - Volume I: The Origins to 1795* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 522. The following sections are based (except where noted) on Davies' seminal study.

Prince Józef Poniatowski even served as one of Napoleon's Marshals. Unfortunately for Poland, these efforts were unsuccessful. Napoleon continued to make peace with his Prussian and Russian enemies at the expense of a truly independent Poland.

Following the Congress of Vienna (which marked the end of the Napoleonic Wars), the Polish Army of the quasi-autonomous Congress Kingdom (1815-1831) attempted to preserve the ideal of the Polish nation in the service of the autocratic Russian Tsar Alexander I. Again, the hopes of Polish nationalists would be unrealized. Following an unsuccessful revolt against Russian authority in 1830-31, the Congress Kingdom lost much of what little sovereignty it possessed. Although formally the Congress Kingdom was not dissolved for another thirty years, absolutist Russian rule reigned supreme.

At several other stages, regular and (more often) irregular Polish military formations revolted against Russian rule (i.e., 1846, 1848, and especially 1863), but none of these efforts were successful in reestablishing Polish independence. The major revolt of 1863 (like its 1830-31 predecessor) was crushed mercilessly by Imperial Russian troops. The leaders of the uprising were either killed in battle or executed and thousands of other implicated in the revolt were exiled to Siberia. In the years that followed, the last vestiges of Polish autonomy were erased and the Congress Kingdom was formally incorporated as a province of Russia.

The "Partition" Armies:

For a while, it appeared that the forces of Russian absolutism had succeeded in dousing

the flame of Polish nationalism. But for Polish nationalists, this state of affairs began to change following the Russian Revolution of 1905. In 1914, the state of affairs changed even more radically. With the outbreak of World War I, the same Great Powers which had previously partitioned Poland out of existence found themselves in armed conflict with one another. Many Polish nationalists looked upon this rupture as an opportunity for Poland to regain its independence. Polish military formations were formed in all three partition territories with the aim of furthering the cause of the Polish nation.

In 1914, the Supreme National Committee (NKN) was formed in “Austrian” Cracow with the aim of uniting Polish nationalists under the aegis of the Dual Monarchy. The Supreme National Committee included (as its military head) Władysław Sikorski who would later lead the Polish Government-in-Exile during the Second World War.²⁴ The Supreme National Committee was also linked (in an uneasy alliance) to the Polish National Organization (PON) which was headed by another future Polish leader — Józef Piłsudski. Together these organizations established a new Polish Legion of three brigades which fought under Austrian command on the Russian Front.

²⁴ For a comprehensive account of General Sikorski and the London Government-in-Exile, see *Sikorski: Soldier and Statesman - A Collection of Essays*, ed. Keith Sword (London: Orbis Books, 1990). Sikorski initially gained prominence as a member of Piłsudski's Polish Legions in 1914. In 1920, he commanded the 5th Army in northern Poland during the Battle of Warsaw. After the assassination of President Gabriel Narutowicz in 1922, Sikorski was named prime minister. When Piłsudski launched his *coup d'état* in 1926, Sikorski sided with the government and this caused his political star to wane. After the German invasion, Sikorski was the perfect candidate to serve as head the Polish Government-in-Exile and Commander-in-Chief of Poland's exile armies. He was a veteran of the Polish Legions and the “Miracle on the Vistula” and his estrangement from the “Government of the Colonels” distanced him from the defeat at the hands of the Nazis. Sikorski served in these capacities - in trying circumstances (including the break in relations with the Soviet Union) - until 1943 when he was killed in a plane crash *en route* from Gibraltar.

In the Russian-occupied portion of Poland, Roman Dmowski and the National Democrats organized the Polish National Committee and raised the volunteer *Pulawy* Legion. In addition, a Polish Rifle Brigade was formed within the Russian Imperial Army. (Most Poles who were conscripted by the Tsar, however, served in regular units of the Russian army.) The National Committee wanted to support Russia in the hopes that a victorious Tsar would restore Poland's autonomy. When the Tsar abdicated in 1917, soldiers from the Russian partition lands made their way to France to carry on the fight against the Germans. Control of these forces (together with Poles released from Allied prisoner of war camps) was not, however, achieved by the National Committee (despite Dmowski's best efforts). Instead, the French eventually placed General Józef Haller, a Legionnaire who had escaped German internment, in command.

And finally, the German military created the *Polnische Wehrmacht* (Polish Army) in 1916. The *Polnische Wehrmacht* was designed to act as rear-echelon and garrison troops in the Polish lands conquered from Russia by the German *Wehrmacht*. German leaders, however, made only a few vague promises in regards to Poland's future. As a result of this prevarication, efforts to absorb the Austria's Polish Legions into the *Polnische Wehrmacht* caused most Legion officers to refuse to take an oath of loyalty to the Kaiser and many Legion officers and men — including Piłsudski — were subsequently interned by the Germans.

In a sense, all of these efforts to regain Poland's independence (or at least autonomy) by force of arms in the service of others succeeded because all of these efforts failed. The

Great War would ultimately lead to the defeat of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and German Empires and an independent Poland would re-emerge — not as a result of Polish arms *per se* — but as a consequence of the collapse of Imperial authority.

Of the three “partition” armies which were created following the outbreak of hostilities and which later came to constitute the nucleus of the new Polish army, the most important from a military and political perspective was Piłsudski’s Polish Legions. Least important was Dmowski’s *Pulawy* Legion.

Amongst the “partition” armies, the Poles who served in the *Polnische Wehrmacht* or the regular German (*née* Prussian) armed forces were on average the most literate and educated. For this reason, these Poles were also the most assimilated. These Polish soldiers served mostly as NCOs in the *Wehrmacht*, but this was a plus from a military perspective because NCOs represented the greatest strength of the German army.²⁵

The Poles who had served in the Polish Legions and in other units under Habsburg command were, on the other hand, the most important from a political perspective and they also contributed more officers to the new army than either of the other two “partition” armies. Politically, the disbanding of the Legions and the internment of many of its personnel for opposing German policies just months prior to the restoration of Polish independence gave its members considerable legitimacy in the eyes of most Poles.

²⁵ Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland in Two Volumes - Volume II: 1795 to the Present* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 270.

It also meant that Legionaries — such as Piłsudski — would exercise considerable influence in the new state.

Militarily, the fact that overall educational levels were far lower in Galicia (and many other parts of the old Dual Monarchy) than they were in Prussia's partition lands meant that educated Poles (including members of the aristocracy) were needed and accepted in the Austrian officer corps as well as the Polish Legions. Although there were exceptions, these opportunities did not present themselves to the same degree in either Germany or Russia where the dominant officer corps attempted to freeze out Poles (and other minorities). Polish Legionaries and (to a lesser extent) officers from regular Austrian units, therefore, provided the new united army with experienced leadership it could not as readily obtain from its German or Russian components.

Piłsudski and the Polish-Soviet War:

Jozef Piłsudski, newly released from a German prison, embodied Poland's tradition of armed opposition to foreign rule and was widely accepted as the head of the independent Polish state in 1919. But for the Polish military, the real test was yet to come. Only a few months remained before a potentially fatal clash with the Bolsheviks was to arise. In the intervening months, the three "partition" armies needed to be consolidated into one unified force. A tradition of armed resistance to foreign rule inspired by the failed revolts of 1830-31 and 1863 would not be enough to ward off the Red Army. Numerous preparations had to be undertaken. In the end, Piłsudski and the Polish army would triumph, but only by the narrowest of margins.

The Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1920 is one of the seminal events in Polish history and has been a significant factor in the determination of popular attitudes toward the military in modern Poland.²⁶ Poland's victory in this war — Poland's first and only unaided military victory over Russia (Imperial, Soviet, or otherwise) — symbolizes the army's role in preserving the modern Polish state.²⁷ It also catapulted Piłsudski to even greater prominence.

Direct Polish-Soviet clashes, of course, predated the escalation of hostilities in 1920 and, in fact, can be traced back to early 1919 when the German army began to withdraw from the east (in accordance with directives issued by the victorious Western powers) and this combined with the incomplete victory of the Red Army in the Revolutionary struggle to leave a huge power vacuum in what is now East-Central Europe. It was into this vacuum (and several others along Russia's periphery) that Red (Communist), White (Imperial and anti-Communist), Green (anarchist), and sundry nationalist armies plunged in an effort to secure for themselves the spoils of the late Romanov and Hohenzollern dynasties.²⁸

²⁶ By far the most comprehensive account of the Polish-Soviet War can be found in Norman Davies, *White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War, 1919-1920* (London: Macdonald, 1972). Other important works include Józef Piłsudski, *Year 1920 and Its Climax Battle of Warsaw during the Polish-Soviet War, 1919-1920* (London: The Piłsudski Institute of London, 1972); Marshal M. Tukhachevski, *The March Beyond the Vistula: Lectures Delivered to the Advanced Class of the Moscow Military Academy, February 7th to 10th, 1923* published as an Annex to Piłsudski's *Year 1920*, pp. 223-266; and, of course, Viscount D'Abernon, *The 18th Decisive Battle of the World: Warsaw, 1920* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1931).

²⁷ "Russia" did not officially become known as the "Soviet Union" until 1922 when Russia, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Transcaucasia were joined under the banner of Communism.

²⁸ This period of history is immortalized by Churchill's oft repeated comment to David Lloyd George on the conclusion of the Armistice with Germany: "The War of the Giants has ended; the quarrels of the pygmies have begun."

Poland — attempting to reclaim historic territories and otherwise construct an alliance of East-Central European states to counter-balance both Russia and Germany — clashed with Communist Russia which was itself bent on crossing the Polish land-bridge into Germany as a means of exporting the Russian Revolution to the world or (at least) regaining all of Imperial Russia's territory.

Actual shooting between Polish and Red Army forces first occurred on February 14, 1919 in the city of Wilno (Vilna or Vilnius as it is now called in Lithuania). Combat (little more than skirmishing by the standards of the Great War) gradually extended over the entire length of what passed for the Polish-Russian border south of Lithuania and north of the Ukraine (i.e., the along what would become Soviet-controlled Byelorussia). These clashes, however, were only a precursor to the main event. After a brief summer lull during which sporadic and dilatory negotiations took place, fighting resumed with a vengeance.²⁹

As it turned out, it was the Polish army which struck first. On March 25, 1920, Piłsudski launched his offensive into the Ukraine and by May 6 his forces were in Kiev. Unfortunately for Piłsudski, his sojourn in Kiev did not last long. Piłsudski's Ukrainian allies (under *Ataman* Semen Petruła [Symon Petliura]) proved to be ineffective and, with almost as much speed as the Polish forces who first took Kiev, the Red Army recaptured Kiev and began its own march on Warsaw. In the perhaps apocryphal words of one

²⁹ These negotiations are recounted in great detail in Piotr S. Wandycz, "Secret Soviet-Polish Peace Talks in 1919," *Slavic Review*, Vol. XXIV, No. 3 (September 1965), pp. 425-449.

Polish combatant: “We ran all the way to Kiev and we ran all the way back.”³⁰ The initial Polish victories were quickly undone and it was soon the Poles who were fighting for survival — this time at the gates to Warsaw.

Once again, however, the tide of war was about to turn and vanquished was once again to become the victor as Polish armies dealt the Red Army a fatal blow north-east of Warsaw. The Battle for Warsaw, of course, has been called “the Miracle of the Vistula” (in tribute to France’s “Miracle on the Marne”) and the “18th Decisive Battle of the World” (to cite two examples of Viscount D’Abernon’s eloquent prose), but it must always be remembered that the battle itself was very nearly a defeat for the Polish side. If, for example, Soviet Marshal M. Tukhachevski had been able to launch his attack on the city three or four days earlier than he did, he might have caught the Polish forces not fully prepared. At the same time, the stiffening of the Polish defence — although the product of Piłsudski’s daring and strategy — was also the product of the fact that Polish forces were retreating upon their own supply lines (while Red Army supply lines were becoming increasingly strained) and Polish forces were now fighting on their own soil. In either case, the Polish victory in front of Warsaw and the subsequent Treaty of Riga not only served to determine the Polish-Soviet border (at least until such time as another treaty was signed — this time in Moscow — on August 23, 1939), but the events also served to cement the salient role of the army in the Polish national consciousness.

³⁰ Quote attributed to an unnamed and unsourced “Polish veteran” in Davies, *White Eagle, Red Star...*, p. 105.

The Piłsudski Regime:

After the Polish-Soviet War, the social prestige of the army was extremely high. The political standing of Piłsudski was similarly high. Unfortunately for Piłsudski, a war-weary population was unable and unwilling to undertake Piłsudski's plan to create an East Central European Confederacy (under Polish leadership) to oppose Germany and Soviet Russia. As well, Piłsudski bristled at civilian efforts (especially by the Right) to interfere in military affairs. Consequently, Piłsudski retired from most of his public offices shortly after the Treaty of Riga officially brought an end to the war with Soviet Russia. Significantly, Piłsudski, despite his retirement, retained his position as the army's Inspector General. And it was with this institutional position that Piłsudski launched his *coup d'état* in May of 1926.

The crises that motivated Piłsudski to return to power after his brief absence were chiefly domestic. The Poland that Piłsudski came to rule over was suffering from severe political and economic problems. An economic malaise had resulted in monetary inflation and the depreciation of the living standards of large segments of the population. Politically, the integration of the three previously partitioned territories into one economic unit were beyond the abilities of a fractious parliament. The Sejm was beset by unstable majorities and the government was further rocked by the assassination of President Gabriel Narutowicz by an ultra-nationalist. This latter act worsened an already tense ethnic debate in Poland (especially between Poles and Ukrainians) and retarded efforts to unify the administration of the three partition territories. Finally, Piłsudski was also motivated by ideological concerns. By 1926, a right-wing coup was widely expected to be in the

offing and Piłsudski, a pre-war Socialist as well as a nationalist, wished to pre-empt such an eventuality.

Interestingly, the form of Piłsudski's *coup d'état* highlights Piłsudski's political beliefs as well. Although staging the military component of his coup in May of 1926, Piłsudski did not reap the fruits of his labour until the following year. This delay, however, is not attributable to the incomplete nature of Piłsudski's victory, but, rather, it reflects the philosophy of Piłsudski and his followers who believed (somewhat naively) that they were the twentieth-century heirs to the pre-partition *szlachta* (nobility).³¹ As such, the role he saw for his movement was that of guardians of the "affairs of state" (i.e., defence and foreign relations). Piłsudski did not see the need to interfere in the day-to-day operations of the government (especially in economic and social areas).

Piłsudski may also have been uncertain of his own overall plans. The historical record is unclear, but instead of a full-fledged coup, Piłsudski initially may have only intended to stage an armed demonstration to bring down the current right-of-centre government coalition and to send a message to the "Right" that it would meet resistance if it staged its

³¹ Joseph Rothschild, "Marshal Józef Piłsudski's Concept of State *vis-à-vis* Society in Interwar Poland," in *East Central European War Leaders: Civilian and Military*, eds. Béla K. Király and Albert A. Nofi, War and Society in East Central Europe, Vol. XXV (Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 1988), *passim*. For another useful source of information on this period, see Waclaw Jedrzejewicz, *Piłsudski: A Life for Poland* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1982), pp. 239-291. According to Jerzy J. Wiatr, Piłsudski was also motivated by several personal concerns. Piłsudski was determined to ensure that a *correct* interpretation of his military exploits during the Polish-Soviet War remained the officially sanctioned view. Piłsudski was also concerned about the degree of autonomy that would be accorded to the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army in times of war (a position he, Piłsudski, was likely to occupy). Finally, Piłsudski was motivated in part by revenge. The assassinated President, Narutowicz, happened to have been a personal friend of the Marshal. See Jerzy J. Wiatr, *The Soldier and the Nation: The Role of the Military in Polish Politics, 1918-1985* (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 23-27.

own coup.³² In either case, events soon took a life of their own.

Although a rather sharp fight accompanied Piłsudski's bid for power (i.e., three days of street-fighting and aerial bombardment resulted in 379 dead — including 164 civilians — and a further 920 wounded), the Piłsudski regime (and the “Government of the Colonels” which followed his death in 1935) derived most of their popularity — and certainly its authority to govern — from the army's special place in contemporary Polish political culture.³³ During this era, the governing system can best be described as being “semi-authoritarian” (i.e., certain political parties were suppressed and some opponents were jailed), but it nevertheless enjoyed considerable legitimacy amongst the population at large (especially in the face of a divided opposition). The general acceptance of the Piłsudski regime is evidence of the high standing of the military institution in Poland and it is also evidence that many of the factors that motivated Piłsudski were shared by large segments of the population.

Immediately after his *putsch*, Piłsudski attempted to demonstrate his *bona fides* by setting up the Nonpartisan Bloc for Cooperation with the Government as an apolitical instrument to govern in the Sejm. For Piłsudski, the Nonpartisan Bloc was to act in the national interest in the Sejm while he remained aloof of any particular special interest.

³² Davies, *God's Playground: ...*, Vol. II, p. 270.

³³ Andrew A. Michta, *Red Eagle: The Army in Polish Politics, 1944-1988* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), pp. 28-29.

Pilsudski emphasized the external threats to Poland's sovereignty and the urgent need to reform the military, economy, and polity. Piłsudski used the very real prospect of German and Russian "intervention" should the Polish polity decay into anarchy to consolidate his regime.³⁴ Piłsudski's relative success in reforming the educational system and segments of the economy (especially when compared with the "Government of the Colonels" which followed after his death) also contributed to his ability to gain legitimacy.

The Polish Army During World War II:

In less than twenty years, Polish independence would again be threatened by war. For Poland, the conflict which the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact was to unleash in many ways represented a return to the situation as it existed prior to 1919. With the renewed partition of their state (this time by *Führer* and General Secretary and not Kaiser and Tsar), Polish soldiers would again find themselves fighting underground or under foreign command in an often futile effort to restore Polish independence.

After the fall of Warsaw, a large resistance movement arose to carry on the fight against the Nazis on Polish soil. By far the largest of these underground movements was the Home Army which numbered almost 400,000 individuals. By way of contrast, the Communist underground — the People's Army — numbered no more than 10,000.³⁵

³⁴ Rothschild, "Marshal Józef Piłsudski's Concept of State...", p. 297.

³⁵ The figures are from Davies, *God's Playground:...*, Vol. II, p. 466.

At the same time, some Polish soldiers, sailors, and airmen would also make their way to the West through neutral Rumania and Lithuania or across the Baltic Sea in time to take part in the Allied defeats in France and Norway. Still others would serve with more fortuitous results in England (where Polish pilots would account for 15 percent of the *Luftwaffe's* losses in the Battle of Britain),³⁶ in Italy (where General Władysław Anders' 2nd Polish Corps would lead the final assault on Monte Cassino as the culmination of an epic journey which started in Stalin's prison camps), in France (where as part of the 1st Canadian Army the 1st Polish Armoured Division would assist in the closing of the "Falaise Gap" and the liberation of the channel coast), and, with somewhat less success, in Holland (where the 1st Polish Airborne Brigade would take part in the failed attempt to capture the Rhine bridge at Arnhem). In the West, a total of almost 230,000 Poles would eventually constitute the personnel of three infantry divisions, two armoured divisions, one airborne and one armoured brigade, sixteen air force squadrons, and twenty warships.³⁷

In the east, the situation was somewhat different. Some 400,000 Polish soldiers would eventually serve in various units of the Red Army. These formations (including the 1st Polish Army of the Red Army's First Byelorussian Front) were, however, only nominally "Polish." Unlike comparable Polish formations in the West, more than fifty percent of the 1st Polish Army's officer corps consisted of non-Polish, Red Army officers and more than eighty percent of all of the unit's line officers were Soviets (i.e., the unit's few Polish

³⁶ The figure is cited in Davies, *God's Playground:...*, Vol. II, p. 272.

³⁷ Michta, p. 31.

officers were overwhelmingly assigned to non-combatant, staff duties).³⁸

There are many reasons why this situation arose. Most notably, many pre-war officers failed to survive Soviet internment. At least 15,000 Polish officers perished at the hands of Stalin's secret police (the NKVD) in the Katyn Forest and other still unknown locations in April of 1940.³⁹ Additionally, many other officers (who did survive) chose to serve alongside Western soldiers rather than serve in a revolutionary army that participated in the nation's "Fourth Partition." And General Anders led the first Polish army raised in Russia (comprised largely of Poles captured and deported from eastern Poland in 1939) to the West after he became frustrated with the treatment of his soldiers at the hands of his Soviet "allies." All of these factors caused a shortage of combat experienced officers to develop when the 1st Polish Army was supplemented with Polish *levees* drawn from the cities and towns occupied by the Red Army's advances in 1944. It is more likely, however, that the real explanation for the predomination of Soviet officers rests with Stalin's desire to control and potential forces that might oppose his plans to reconstruct Poland along Soviet lines.

By 1944 when the Red Army re-entered Poland, Polish military formations on all fronts

³⁸ Michta, pp. 34-35.

³⁹ The bodies of 4,321 of these officers were found by the advancing German armies in the Katyn Forest in 1943. The exact location of the remainder is still unknown even though the Soviets (under Gorbachev) eventually acknowledged what the Government-in-Exile had known since 1943 (i.e., that they were indeed responsible for these murders).

(and especially in the West) had undone much of the negative perception of the armed forces which arose in the aftermath of the Nazi *Blitzkrieg* and contributed to the rehabilitation of the military's tradition as the guardians of the nation.⁴⁰ Unfortunately, the leaders of most of these forces did not reap the harvest of their toils. Much of the Home Army was destroyed during the 1944 Warsaw Uprising (while the Red Army sat idle on the banks of the Vistula) and the leaders of the Government-in-Exile (which controlled Polish forces in the West) was supplanted by the Soviet-sponsored Lublin Committee in the wake of the Red Army's advances.

The Rise of the Polish People's Army:

The Polish People's Army (PPA) was created during the course of the Red Army's march across Poland. When the war against Germany was concluded, the PPA was used (in conjunction with Polish and Soviet security forces, militia units, and Border Guard troops) to suppress the anti-Communist resistance between 1944 and 1948 (i.e., the remnants of the pro-West and anti-Communist Home Army). The internal employment

⁴⁰ Even the Russian-dominated Polish People's Army (as the combination of the 1st and 2nd Polish Armies and various Communist underground units came to be called) enjoyed a *limited* cachet in nationalist circles. In September of 1944, several battalions of the 1st Polish Army crossed the Vistula River near Warsaw in an apparent attempt to come to the assistance of the pro-Western *Armia Krajowa* (Home Army) during the Warsaw Uprising. (See Michta, pp. 33-37.) Unfortunately, the historical evidence is unclear as to whether this action was an autonomous act on the part of General Zygmunt Berling (the Polish commander of the 1st Polish Army) or whether it was a cynical effort on the part of Stalin's regime to demonstrate symbolic support for the Polish independence movement while the overwhelming bulk of the Red Army stood idly by on the banks of the Vistula.

On the one hand, General Berling was removed from his command shortly after the failed Polish assault across the Vistula and this might indicate he acted without orders. On the other hand, General Berling later served in several key positions of trust in the Polish Communist regime during the Stalinist era (i.e., his "punishment" for disobeying Soviet directives was comparatively mild in the context of the times) and it is hard to believe that the Red Army officers who made up the bulk of Berling's command would act out of a sense of "loyalty" to the Polish nation.

of a Polish army did not, however, irreversibly diminish popular attitudes towards the armed forces. The dominant attitude in reference to the actions of the army at this time was one of resignation. With the Red Army in control, there appeared to be no option.⁴¹

As part of a broader effort to legitimize the armed forces (and *indirectly* their own hold on power), a conscious effort was made by the Communist authorities in the early post-war period to emphasize the “Polishness” of the Polish People’s Army. Many of the Russian officers serving in the Polish armed forces returned to the Soviet Union over the course of the post-war demobilization program and the role of the remainder was minimized in official publications. As well, officers repatriated from the West and some individuals who served in the Home Army were integrated into the Polish People’s Army (although almost invariably in marginal or secondary positions).⁴² And finally, many of the symbols, insignia, and traditions of Poland’s non-Communist past were coopted or adapted by the Communist authorities.⁴³ This was just the first of many “re-nationalization” which periodically arose whenever the authorities felt the need to bolster their own legitimacy by co-opting Poland’s non-Communist past.

In subsequent years, widespread support for the armed forces survived and, in some

⁴¹ This attitude of resigned acceptance of the “Sovietization” of Poland (in conjunction with residual bitterness towards the quasi-authoritarian “Government of the Colonels” which was held responsible for the military collapse in 1939) is found - at least retrospectively - even amongst Poland’s Communists! For a fascinating look at the *ex post facto* rationalizations of the imposition of Communist rule, see Teresa Tronska, *Them: Stalin’s Polish Puppets* (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), *passim*.

⁴² Rakowska-Harmstone, “Poland,” pp. 59-60.

⁴³ Rakowska-Harmstone, “Poland,” pp. 167ff.

instance, was even strengthened by the role these forces played during the series of crises that periodically shook the Communist order. In 1956, units of the 19th Armoured Division joined police, internal security troops, and officer cadets in battling demonstrators in the western city of Poznan.⁴⁴ But while the 19th Armoured Division was suppressing the rioters, other regular forces were reportedly refusing to fire on the strikers and some soldiers are alleged to have turned over their weapons to the demonstrators.⁴⁵ In addition, at least two Polish military commanders — General J. Frey-Bilecki (Commander of a Poznan area bomber squadron) and Admiral Jan Wisniewski (Commander of the Baltic defence forces) — are known to have planned to fight Red Army units when it became known that the Soviets were seriously considering intervening and restoring order. As internal security troops under General Wacław Komar went on alert and prepared to defend Warsaw against the Red Army, Admiral Wisniewski closed the Baltic ports to Soviet shipping.⁴⁶

The historical record is still unclear as to what degree other regular army units were prepared to oppose a Soviet invasion. It is certain, however, that from 1956 onwards the Soviet leadership began to have serious doubts about the political reliability of the armed forces as a means of perpetuating Communist rule.⁴⁷ And to a degree, the Polish military

⁴⁴ Michta, p. 50.

⁴⁵ Robin Alison Remington, "The Leading Role of the Polish Military: Implications for the Warsaw Pact," in *Sisyphus and Poland: Reflections on Martial Law*, eds. J.L. Black and J.W. Strong, The Carleton Series in Soviet and East European Studies, Vol. IX (Winnipeg: Ronald P. Frye, 1986), pp. 43-64.

⁴⁶ Rakowska-Harmstone, "Poland," p. 66.

⁴⁷ Remington, p. 52.

— by supporting the opponents to Communist orthodoxy — increased its own influence in the political process.

Under the patronage of Władysław Gomułka and the “National” Communists, nationalist elements within the armed forces pushed for greater autonomy from the Soviet Union (albeit in a context where Communist rule was not jeopardized). The most important of these efforts was led by General Zygmunt Duszynski, chief of the Inspectorate of Training and Deputy Minister of National Defence, who pressed for the removal of all Soviet troops from Polish soil and the organization of Polish army forces into a “Polish Front” which would remain under national command in the event of hostilities with the West. At the same time, Marshal Marian Spychalski (Polish Minister of Defence after the recall of Konstantin Rokossovskii), proposed the development of a “Polish socialist defence doctrine.”⁴⁸

In the end, these nationalist efforts were unsuccessful. The alliance of the nationalist-Communist military and political elites were unable to disentangle Poland from the Soviet alliance structure (*à la* Rumania). The influence of the Soviet Union was re-established. Moreover, the alliance of the military and civilian elites did not last. The Polish Party re-established its control over the armed forces. Liberals and reformers in the military (i.e., nationalists) were purged as the Gomułka regime retreated from its own dalliance with nationalism and reform.⁴⁹ During this period, the basic structures of the

⁴⁸ Rakowska-Harmstone, “Poland,” pp. 65ff.

⁴⁹ Rakowska-Harmstone, “Poland,” pp. 74-75.

system of post-Stalinist civil-military relations (i.e., the “socialist internationalism” of the Warsaw Pact) were put into effect and the Polish army again served a foreign master. (This system described in detail in the Hungarian section above.)

In 1970 and 1976, the supposed nationalist credentials of the armed forces were nevertheless rehabilitated to a degree. These opinions became associated to a certain degree with the person of the Defence Minister - General Wojciech Jaruzelski. In 1970, General Jaruzelski allegedly contributed to the downfall of the unpopular Gomułka regime by supposedly refusing to obey the orders of Gomułka's Politburo ally, Zenon Kliszko, to use the army against workers rioting in several cities along Poland's Baltic coast. During a later series of strikes in 1976, Jaruzelski is reputed to have stated that “Polish soldiers would never fire at Polish workers.”

There are, of course, serious doubts as to the veracity of either of these stories. While Jaruzelski was Minister of Defence, some regular army units certainly did participate in the suppression of the 1970 riots.⁵⁰ As for Jaruzelski's widely reported comments during the 1976 riots, no documentation or other empirical evidence has ever been produced to independently verify the fact that any such statement was ever made by the Polish Defence Minister.⁵¹ Still, the myth has remained.

⁵⁰ See, especially, Michta, pp. 67-70.

⁵¹ For an excellent history of this latter “myth,” see Roman Laba, *The Roots of Solidarity: A Political Sociology of Poland's Working-Class Democratization* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 88-90.

Whether based on myth or fact (more likely the former), popular support for the armed forces remained high throughout the 1960s and 1970s.⁵² The army continued to be regarded as a national institution. Nevertheless, a “re-nationalization” campaign was launched in the 1970s.⁵³

The Polish Army and Martial Law:

Popular faith in the military was to meet its greatest Communist-era challenge in the 1980s. Beginning in August of 1980, a series of strikes and protests resulted in the formation of the independent Solidarity trade union (*Solidarnosc*). Solidarity and the government were soon locked in a bitter struggle for the future of the Polish state. As relations between the two sides deteriorated and Poland faced the prospect of a Soviet invasion, General Jaruzelski (Prime Minister — since February 1981 — and Secretary General of the Polish Communist Party — from October 1981) imposed martial law.

The speed and effectiveness with which martial law was imposed came as a surprise to most observers. It also surprised Solidarity’s leadership (most of whom were interned in the first few hours of the military crackdown). Ironically, it may have been the Solidarity leadership’s faith in the armed forces that caused it to largely be taken by surprise by Jaruzelski’s actions. Although some action on the part of the military was expected, few

⁵² Timothy Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity* (London: Granta Books, 1991), pp. 258-259.

⁵³ Rakowska-Harmstone, “Poland,” pp. 165ff.

believed it would be as wide-ranging or serious as what eventually occurred.⁵⁴

Amongst Poles in general, the image of the army was somewhat tarnished by the imposition of martial law. However, most Poles at that time considered martial law and the army's role in the suppression of Solidarity to be a "lesser evil" compared with the prospect of a Soviet and East German invasion.⁵⁵ As happened in the early post-war period when the army was used to suppress the anti-Communist resistance, the activities of the armed forces in the 1980s were met with widespread feelings of resignation and apathy amongst average citizens. These attitudes were reflected in Solidarity's own surveys during martial law.⁵⁶

Not surprisingly, Jaruzelski has, since leaving the presidency, said little to endanger the nationalist myth that has grown up around his actions. In 1993, Jaruzelski said: "Martial law was the lesser evil, but it doesn't cease to be evil." Jaruzelski has also reported that he would again impose martial law if he were presented with identical circumstances (i.e., the decision was "inevitable"). At the same time, Jaruzelski claims *in retrospect* that he would rather shoot himself in the head than again impose martial law.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Ash, pp. 258-259. When Jaruzelski was appointed Prime Minister, Lech Wałęsa told a reporter from *Le Monde*: "I like soldiers...but, seriously, I have respect for him [Jaruzelski]: I think he's all right, that he's a good Pole." (Cited in Ash, p. 152.)

⁵⁵ See, for example, David S. Mason, *Public Opinion and Political Change in Poland, 1980-1982* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 218.

⁵⁶ Mason, pp. 213ff and Rakowska-Harmstone, "Poland," pp. 181-182.

⁵⁷ See, John Darnton, "Jaruzelski Regrets Imposing Martial Law in Poland in 1981: 'I'd Rather Shoot Myself in the Head,' Retired General Admits Solemnly," *The Ottawa Citizen* (March 4, 1993), p. F11 and Adam Michnik (interviewer), "Talking Without Hatred [Interview with General Wojciech Jaruzelski]," *Gazeta Wyborcza* (April 25-26, 1992), pp. 8-11 translated as "Jaruzelski Discusses Martial Law

Jaruzelski's feigned or real feelings of remorse over the imposition of martial law are — in either case — reflected in current attitudes of Poles in general. A 1996 poll suggested that 54 percent of those polled believed the decision to impose martial law in 1981 was justified while only 30 percent felt it was not and a further 16 percent were undecided.⁵⁸ And while Jaruzelski's pronouncements need to be taken with a large grain of salt (he is hardly a disinterested observer), it is interesting to note that Jaruzelski's personal popularity was such that 74 percent of respondents initially favoured the election of Jaruzelski to the Polish Presidency in 1989.⁵⁹ Although his approval rating declined steadily over the next fifteen months, these initial figures do indicate the degree to which Jaruzelski and the army transcended Poland's Communist and internationalist past.

The Polish Military and Polish Political Culture (Conclusion):

Polish political culture (as it pertains to civil-military relations) has generally held the armed forces in high regard. These attitudes have even proven to be resistant to negative historical experiences. Although tested by the defeats of 1939, the struggle against the anti-Communist underground in 1944-1948, and the various crises of the Communist era,

Declaration," *JPRS-EER*, No. 92-058 (May 12, 1992), pp. 32-33. For an insider's argument that Poland's *Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego* (Military Council of National Salvation) government was a tool of the Soviet government see, especially, Colonel Ryszard J. Kuklinski (Ret.), "The War Against the Nation Seen From the Inside," *Kultura*, No. 4/475 (1987), pp. 1-46.

⁵⁸ Source: Beata Pasek, "Martial Law Anniversary in Poland," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 241, Part II (December 16, 1996), p. 2.

⁵⁹ See, for example, poll results cited in Jakub Karpinski, "Opinion Polls Reflect Political Stability," *Transition*, Vol. 1, No. 20 [November 3, 1995], pp. 44-47. It is interesting to note that Jaruzelski's approval ratings at the time of his resignation were higher than Wałęsa's at the end of his term in office!

the military has continued to be viewed as a popular, national institution.

During times of crisis (even — as happened in 1956 — during the Communist era), the association of the military with the cause of Polish nationalism has afforded the military some influence in the political sphere. At the same time, this political role has usually brought the military into conflict with civilian authorities who (particularly during the Communist era) have sought to counter this influence by exercising their own control over military affairs.

In the inter-war period, the balance of power swung heavily towards the military (i.e., first under Piłsudski and later under the “Government of the Colonels”). Subsequently, the Government-in-Exile appointed General Sikorski Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief as a reflection of the important role the “Army-in-Exile” would play in attempting to regain the nation’s sovereignty. In the post-war period, the civilian authorities would penetrate and dominate the military, but during times of crisis the military would still exercise a certain degree of influence (i.e., in 1956) as an important (albeit temporary) ally of “National Communist” elements within the Communist Party. Even more importantly, the military would constitute the last Communist bastion when the civilian Party collapsed in 1980-81.

As will be documented in several of the following Propositions, this generally pro-military political culture may explain, in part, the relatively high levels of financial support for the Polish military as an institution over the course of the difficult transition

to a market economy. It may also explain, in part, the relatively muted criticism of the army's political interventions in the post-Communist (transitional) period.⁶⁰ Whereas President Wałęsa and the many governments of the Sejm came in for severe criticism for failing to resolve their differences (i.e., overall command structure, doctrine, and reforms of the armed forces), the criticism of the army (and even its embattled Chief of Staff) was far less severe.

The military emerged from the Communist era with its prestige relatively intact. Even the imposition of martial law continues to be interpreted in a favourable light. And this has placed the army in a position of strength from which to exercise political influence (even though this sometimes crosses the boundary of what is right and proper in a democratic context).

⁶⁰ Karpinski, "Opinion Polls Reflect Political Stability," pp. 44-47.

PART A: BACKGROUND OR HISTORICAL VARIABLES

CHAPTER 5.2: EMPIRICAL RESULTS PROPOSITION TWO

Proposition Two — The Totalitarian Legacy:

Although relatively few totalitarian tendencies survived the collapse of communism, the post-totalitarian civilian and military establishments have been affected by certain legacies of the previous totalitarian system.

Introduction:

Since 1989, Eastern Europe and the nations of the former Soviet Union have undergone a rare “dual” transformation. A new ruling system is being created at the same time that the previously suppressed civil society is re-emerging. Such a combination of circumstances is unlike most forms of change.

Regime change typically occurs in the context of a relatively stable civil society (i.e., a particular regime is overthrown, defeated, or replaced but society itself remains essentially unchanged). The last ten years of change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, however, are more akin to revolutionary change. Revolutionary change involves changes to the regime and civil society at more or less the same time and at more or less the same pace (i.e., witness the transformation of Russian political culture in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution).

Because revolutionary change is itself a relatively rare event and because totalitarian

systems are a relatively rare regime type, history offers very few clues as to what to expect in the aftermath of the collapse of a totalitarian regime. Between 1943 and 1945, a number of European totalitarian regimes were destroyed, but (unlike Eastern Europe in the post-1989 period) these changes were the product of the military defeat of these nations and their subsequent occupation by the victorious Allied powers.¹ For the most part, it was the Allied regimes which dictated the nature of the post-totalitarian regimes. Indigenous political forces — frequently tainted by their collaboration with the previous totalitarian regimes — were largely ignored. In the case of Eastern Europe, this process was further complicated by the re-totalitarianization of these societies under the Communist banner.

The few clues available from this period would seem to suggest that totalitarianism (at least in its Fascist and National Socialist guises) leaves little in the way of a permanent legacy. Across the previously Fascist and Nazi world, the new ideologies of liberal democracy or *socialist* totalitarianism took hold with relative ease. Totalitarian forms and practices all but disappeared or (in Eastern Europe) were “re-labeled.”

In contemporary Hungary and Poland, this pattern appears to be continuing. Although some segments within these polities are wary about the return of Communists to power

¹ This is not to say that all of the defeated Axis powers were “totalitarian.” Many, including Admiral Horthy’s Hungarian regime, can more accurately be categorized as “authoritarian.” The same applies to General Franco’s Spanish regime. Totalitarian regimes from this period include Hitler’s Nazi government in Germany and Mussolini’s Fascist regime in Italy (although this second example fits the model to a lesser degree than the German case). Several of the puppet regimes of occupied Europe can also be categorized as Totalitarian (i.e., Hungary’s “Arrow Cross” government of 1944-1945), but the brevity of their existence makes categorization difficult.

while others welcome the return to prominence of “reformed” Communists (invariably called “social democrats”), few recognizable vestiges of the totalitarian past have survived to the present. In some cases, the totalitarian system could only suppress (but not eliminate) aspects of the traditional political culture (i.e., the nationalism of the post-1956 Polish military). In other instances, the totalitarian system actually reinforced earlier tendencies (i.e., the generally poor role played by the Hungarian army’s NCOs). In either case, surprisingly few totalitarian tendencies remain following the collapse of Communist rule.

The Totalitarian Legacy:

The most significant legacy of the totalitarian era is exhibited by the military’s sensitivity to what it perceives as “excessive” and “partisan” civilian interference in defence and security policy-making. For the past forty-five years, military and defence policy-making was heavily politicized and the Party penetrated into all areas of defence policy-making (frequently by extra-legal means). In Huntington’s terms, the Party employed “subjective” control mechanisms to shape civil-military relations in its favour.

In general terms, the Communist Party (via the mechanism of the *nomenklatura*) controlled promotions and assignments of all senior military personnel. Moreover, this control extended to relatively low-level positions in the military hierarchy. These decisions — which except at the most senior levels are routinely handled by the armed forces in Western democracies — were taken out of the hands of the armed forces and subjected to the partisan political influence of the Communist Party.

A *de facto* requirement for officers and, to a lesser degree, Non Commissioned Officers and other ranks to join the Communist Party subjected these individuals to the force of Party discipline. If an individual hoped to advance in rank or be assigned to a choice command, that individual would have to demonstrate fealty to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and to the concept of “socialist internationalism.” This extra-legal requirement ensured that only “loyal” officers were placed in sensitive military positions.

At the same time, the state security apparatus and Main Political Administration provided additional checks on the behaviour of military personnel. In addition to support from the local Communist Party cell, an individual would need a favourable report from that unit’s political officer and from the secret police in order to be promoted. Political officers were also charged with writing annual progress reports on each individual in their units and in furthering unit morale through propaganda and political education.

Finally, the Communist authorities threatened the corporate identity of the military by encroaching upon areas of military responsibility. For example, large paramilitary organizations acted as political counterweights to the regular forces and the armed forces themselves were frequently employed in non-traditional, non-military tasks (i.e., civilian economic projects). As well, the partisan political interests of the Communist Party determined key military policies such as military doctrine, procurement, deployment, mission, training, and so on (see Proposition One).

Most if not all of these subjective control mechanisms were resented by the armed forces as diminutions of its corporate interests. Now free of this egregious system of totalitarian control, the military establishments in Hungary and (especially) Poland have reacted cautiously to some efforts to develop a system of democratic civilian control. In cases where the military believes these efforts are motivated by partisan political factors or in cases where the military believes its legitimate prerogatives are threatened, it has actively opposed these measures.

In both Hungary and Poland, the pace of the “civilianization” programs, for example, have slowed or even reversed (see Proposition Six g). The Hungarian and Polish military commands have - with good reason - opposed programs which substitute civilians for military personnel within the Defence Ministries. Placing civilians - especially when they are poorly trained and not very knowledgeable of military affairs - in key positions merely for the sake of having civilians perform certain tasks (good, bad, or indifferently) does not make for good policy and it evokes memories of the totalitarian era when the military was monitored and evaluated by the Party at every turn.

The memory of the totalitarian past also explains — in part — the reticence of the Polish military to embrace proposals to rotate military commanders between various assignments (see Proposition Six f). Although intended to improve military accountability to the legislature by preventing “empire-building” by military personnel, this program may in fact lead to the politicization of the military. In Poland (in particular), frequent changes in the ruling coalition in the Sejm might lead to equally

frequent rotations of key military personnel. This would weaken and politicize the civilianization process and could negatively shift the balance of knowledge and power between legislators, bureaucrats, and military personnel.

Political conflicts which threatened to divide the military or threatened its corporate interests have also provoked a response from the armed forces. In Hungary and Poland, the debate between proponents of the presidential and parliamentary systems of democratic civilian control dragged the military into civilian debates (see Propositions Three and Four). The seriousness and (in the case of Poland) prolonged nature of these debates served to politicize the armed forces to a degree which is inappropriate in a system of objective control.

In these contexts and others, concern over the potential for the politicization of military commands would appear to be well founded. In Poland, the battle for authority between the Sejm and President Lech Wałęsa took the form of numerous attacks by the Leftist majority in the Sejm on the prerequisites of the Polish General Staff (see Proposition Six g). The breadth and viciousness of these attacks went far beyond what was needed for the legislature to exercise civilian authority.

For their part, the post-Communist legislatures (and their current Leftist majorities) have developed what might be considered to be the corollary to the attitudes of the post-Communist militaries. These “reform” Communist majorities have sought to minimize the political influence of the military at every turn. In the Communist era, these heavily

penetrated military establishments constituted an important pillar of Party rule.² In the post-Communist (transitional) period, the legislatures have attempted to limit the influence of the military not by extra-legal means but by installing a democratic civilian ethic amongst military personnel.

In the opinion of the military, these efforts have occasionally gone “too far” and have diminished the capacity of the military to undertake its societal role. For several years the Polish military (and especially the General Staff) fought a rear-guard action against these attacks. With the Sejm and Presidency now controlled by the same parliamentary faction (the Democratic Left Alliance), the position of the military may be further imperiled. The Polish Left (the Democratic Left Alliance, the Polish Peasant’s Party, and other reformed-Communists) share with their Communist antecedents a certain level of antipathy towards the military as an institution. Just as the Communist regimes were forever wary of any signs of “Bonapartism,” the post-Communist Left continues to fear the resurgence of “Piłsudskiism.” The memory of Piłsudski’s *coup d’état* is behind many of the current efforts to minimize the role of the General Staff in policy-making procedures.

Clearly, the methods employed by the post-Communist regimes were radically different than those employed by their predecessors. As one senior Polish defence official put it: “I don’t see myself in the role of a Bolshevik commissar whose job is to put the army at

² As Barany and others have noted, the regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were very militaristic (much more than liberal democratic regimes). And this was at least in part due to their Marxist-Leninist political culture which emphasized militaristic values as part of an ideology of conflict and armed struggle (i.e., Revolution). See Zoltan D. Barany, *Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945-1990: The Case of Hungary* (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1993), p. 8.

attention and rebuild it according to his own plans.”³ In both Hungary and Poland, the current political majorities have favoured legal, evolutionary approaches, but the degree to which these majorities have sometimes moved to minimize the role of their military establishments occasionally appears to be excessive and beyond that which would appear to be necessary to ensure civilian democratic control (see, in particular, Proposition Six g and the various sections of Proposition Five).

Conclusion:

The totalitarian system’s most telling legacy — a military establishment wary of certain civilian control mechanisms and a current legislative majority seeking to place further limits on the role of the military establishment in the policy-making process — is a significant source of civil-military tensions. This is especially true in Poland where the military emerged from the Communist era with its power and prestige relatively intact. In Hungary, the military emerged from the Communist era as a far less powerful institution. Consequently, the Hungarian legislature has had fewer difficulties imposing its vision of civil-military relations upon the Hungarian defence establishment.

As Huntington suggests, the civilian ethic demands that the military be prepared to carry out the orders of whatever political group legitimately wields political power in the state. But this cannot mean that soldiers must act as automatons. Even Huntington acknowledges that even the most “civilianized” of military establishments must have its

³ Unnamed official cited in Dale Herspring, “‘Refolution’ in Eastern Europe: The Polish, Czech, Slovak, and Hungarian Militaries,” *European Security*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Winter 1994), p. 669.

expertise, corporateness, and responsibility respected by the nation's political actors. Otherwise, the military — even one imbued with the civilian ethic — can be expected to resist the national political authorities.

In Poland in particular, efforts to limit the influence of the military (especially the General Staff) have often approached or even crossed the line of what constitutes a reasonable and proper system of democratic civilian control. Again in Poland in particular, efforts to limit the influence of the military were also frequently motivated by partisan political machinations. The Left attacked the prerogatives of the military as a means of attacking Lech Wałęsa and Wałęsa and his supporters responded in kind. In this context, it is perhaps surprising that the reaction of the armed forces has not been even more vocal.

**THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POST-COMMUNIST (TRANSITIONAL)
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE**

PART B: UNIVERSAL AND NEAR UNIVERSAL THEMES

**CHAPTER 5.3: EMPIRICAL RESULTS
PROPOSITION THREE**

Introduction to Part B:

Beginning with this section, additional propositions included in the Typology of Relevance are empirically tested. Part B includes those propositions which the analysis of the existing theoretical formulations suggested were universal or near universal themes.

In the first subsection (presented below), the legitimacy of civilian rule (particularly as it relates to the choice between systems of presidential or parliamentary civilian control) is analyzed. Although the replacement of the previous system of subjective control by a system of objective control is widely accepted by civilians and the military alike, disputes have arisen in both Hungary and Poland over which civilian authorities should legitimately exercise control over the military. These disputes, moreover, have occasionally caused the military to take sides with one civilian faction against another.

In the second and third subsections of Part B (Propositions Four and Five), the two general strategies which civilian authorities can employ to perpetuate civilian rule are analyzed. These non-exclusive strategies are as follows: (a) the state can employ a

system of recurrent legal and administrative mechanisms to manage the armed forces (i.e., the civilian authorities can move to *institutionalize* the civil-military relationship), and/or (b) the civilian authorities can employ adjunct or special mechanisms to control the military (i.e., the civilian authorities can move to *subordinate* the military component of the civil-military equation to civilian direction). In the fourth subsection of Part B (Proposition Six), the “military” perspective of the civil-military relationship will be empirically tested and analyzed (especially the areas of potential conflict and confrontation between civilian authorities and the military establishment).

Proposition Three — The Legitimacy of Military Rule:

The question of legitimacy and the relationship between legitimacy and civilian control are key factors in determining the nature of civil-military relations. Civilian rule remains a more legitimate form of governance compared with military rule. Post-Communist (transitional) civil-military relations, therefore, will be constructed on the underlying principle of civilian rule.

Introduction:

It comes as no surprise that in both Hungary and Poland civilian control over the military is being emphasized in the post-Communist (transitional) phase. The civilian model is, after all, a nearly universal model of civil-military relations. And while both Poland and Hungary have been led by military figures in the past (i.e., General Sikorski in Poland and Admiral Horthy in Hungary) and Poland has experienced a military coup (i.e., Marshal Piłsudski) and seen the military come to the rescue of an utterly demoralized government (i.e., General Jaruzelski), neither society has deviated from the basic model. Piłsudski, for example, quickly legitimized his military seizure of power in civilian terms by holding

(and then winning) elections while Admiral Horthy could claim legitimacy from his nominal position as Regent to the Hungarian throne. Sikorski, for his part, held his positions at the behest of the Government-in-Exile and General Jaruzelski was Prime Minister in the civilian government when martial law was declared.

As both Hungary and Poland are in the midst of democratic reforms and under pressure to meet NATO's expansion criteria, it is also not surprising that they have both attempted to create a system of *democratic* civilian rule to replace the Communist-era system of penetration and domination. This process began as Communist power waned in the two states (and throughout the rest of Eastern Europe). It has undergone various phases and has involved reforms in several areas involving the civil-military relationship.

The difficulty in both of these countries has not arisen from the decision to introduce democratic civilian rule over the military. With but very few exceptions, the military and government in both Hungary and Poland have accepted the *principle* of civilian rule. Instead, problems have arisen as political forces contend with one another over the *model* of democratic civilian control each wishes to create. The difficulty is that there is no one model of democratic civilian control which is tailor-made for their particular conditions. Not even NATO has proposed a specific model. Instead NATO has outlined the general requirements and left it to the prospective members to find their own path. As both the regime, the military, and (for that matter) civil society in general are simultaneously trying to establish their relations with one another, the problem is both complex and dynamic.

As will be detailed in the empirical sections below, these conflicts *within* the political realm have on occasion resulted in tensions arising between the military and its civilian masters. For example, the Hungarian military, in 1990, found itself very nearly subject to conflicting orders from the civilian authorities as to what actions it was or was not to take during a major strike in the transportation sector. In 1992, the Polish Defence Minister, Jan Parys, accused President Lech Wałęsa of manipulating the army command for partisan political gain (charges the Sejm ultimately rejected). And in 1994, President Walesa (during a dinner at the Drawsko Pomorski training facility) did in fact attempt to manipulate the armed forces command to weaken authority of another Minister of Defence.

For its part, the military in Poland and Hungary has taken an active interest in the debate over the precise model of civilian control. In Poland in particular, the military has been guilty of jumping into the debate instead of quietly waiting for the civilian authorities to resolve their differences. In Poland, the military has generally sided with the President against the Sejm. To be sure, the prolonged and intractable nature of the political conflict between Wałęsa and the Sejm as well as the fact that both sides in the dispute deliberately attempted to involve the armed forces in the dispute are extenuating circumstances, but the actions of the military nevertheless were somewhat incompatible with what is expected from the armed forces of a democracy. Hopefully all sides will learn from these experiences.

In terms of the overall success of the Hungarian and Polish regimes in resolving these difficulties, the analysis of the empirical evidence will demonstrate that the process of establishing a new system of democratic civilian control is incomplete in both countries. This process is, however, taking hold. Both regimes have made considerable progress and — more importantly — the principle of democratic civilian control is not threatened.

This level of progress is especially evident in Hungary where the contentious issue of presidential versus parliamentary democratic civilian control was resolved (for the most part) in 1991. Poland only reached that stage of development in late 1995. In both countries more work needs to be done before the process can be considered to be complete, but the overall picture is one in which the principle of democratic civilian control appears to be firmly rooted in the constitution and in key pieces of legislation governing the civil-military relationship.

Hungary (Introduction):

There have been significant efforts undertaken in Hungary to reform the civil-military relationship on the basis of democratic civilian control. These efforts — which in part predate the final collapse of Communism in Hungary — were designed to separate the military from the control of partisan political forces and to introduce the rule of law to Hungarian civil-military relations.

Unfortunately, efforts to establish democratic civilian control over the Hungarian Armed Forces have been complicated by the political arrangements adopted for the overall

political system. Hungary, like many of the new democracies of Eastern Europe (including Poland), chose to adopt a variation of the French-style mixed presidential-parliamentary constitutional system.¹

Unlike the case of a pure parliamentary system where the entire executive component of the state (the effective Head of the Government as well as its Ministers) is derived from the majority party or party coalition within the legislature (except for a nominally powerful symbolic element — the formal executive — which in many Commonwealth countries is monarchical), the principal members of the ruling governmental executive in a mixed presidential-parliamentary system (the President and Ministers — including the powerful figure of the Prime Minister) are chosen separately — often at different times and for different terms of office. In Hungary, the President is currently indirectly elected by the legislature for a fixed term while the legislature is elected by direct, popular mandate. And unlike the case of a pure presidential system in which various members of cabinet are answerable directly to the President and whose positions are subject only to the process of confirmation or non-confirmation by the legislature, Ministers (including the Prime Minister) in a mixed presidential-parliamentary system are members of the legislature and are accountable to the legislature whenever the government is subject to motions of confidence or non-confidence.

¹ The debate over the choice emerging democracies should make between presidential, parliamentary, and mixed presidential-parliamentary political systems is particularly salient given the context of some new research which suggests that military interventions into the civilian political sphere - specifically military coups - are far less likely to occur in parliamentary constitutional regimes. For a very interesting treatment of this topic, see Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism," *World Politics*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (October 1993), pp. 1-22.

The difficulty with the mixed presidential-parliamentary system can occur when the two legitimate components compete with one another for control of the state. Essentially such a struggle occurred in Hungary between the President, on the one hand, and the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence, on the other. The struggle did not involve the question of whether or not the military should be subject to civilian control, but it did involve the question of which civilian authorities should exercise that control.

The 1989 Constitution and Defence Reform:

The struggle for power between the President of Hungary and the legislature (i.e., Prime Minister and Minister of Defence) was initially the product of the last days of Communist rule in Hungary.² Under the provisions of the 1949 *Constitution of the Hungarian People's Republic*, the Hungarian People's Army had been headed by the leader of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (in his capacity as president of the Defence Council).³ But this arrangement increasingly came under attack as Communist power began to ebb in the late 1980s.

² For a detailed (albeit incomplete and occasionally inaccurate) chronology of the initial period of post-Communist reforms, see Jeffrey Simon, *Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion*, McNair Paper 39, Institute for National Strategic Studies (Washington, D.C.: National Defence University, 1995), *passim*. Simon's study (with additions and corrections) is used here to provide the basic chronology of events in the period leading up to 1994.

³ For the Communist era see, for example, A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean, and Alexander Alexiev, *East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier* (New York: Crane Russak, 1982); Jeffrey Simon, *Warsaw Pact Forces: Problems of Command and Control* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985); Ivan Volgyes, *The Political Reliability of the Warsaw Pact Armies: The Southern Tier* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1982); and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Christopher D. Jones, John Jaworsky, and Ivan Sylvain, *Warsaw Pact: The Question of Cohesion, Phase III/Volume I - The Greater Socialist Army: Integration and Reliability*, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment ORAE Extra-Mural Paper No. 29 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1984).

Round-table talks in 1989 eventually pushed the Communist-dominated legislature to pass a series of new constitutional arrangements governing - amongst many other things - command and control over the armed forces. Under the 1989 Constitution (October 1989), control over the Hungarian military was to be shared between the National Assembly (which had power to make some decisions concerning the use of the armed forces) and the President of the Republic (who — indirectly elected by the legislature for a fixed five year term — would retain the position of commander-in-chief of the armed forces).

This bifurcated arrangement was designed by the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) leadership to keep as much power as possible out of the control of the Prime Minister and Defence Minister because both offices were expected to be held by non-Communists after the promised upcoming elections. By doing this, significant control could be retained by the President of Hungary who was still expected to be a Communist (albeit a *reformed*-Communist).⁴ This reform was also designed to begin the process of depoliticizing the armed forces. The worst excess of the penetration model were to be suspended and another, less intrusive system of civilian control was to be implemented. (These reforms are discussed in more detail in the context of Proposition Six.)

This arrangement, however, did not entirely satisfy the parties involved. Nor were its provisions sufficiently detailed to encompass the multifaceted-faceted contexts under

⁴ Simon, p. 86.

which command of the Hungarian Armed Forces might be exercised. When asked (in July 1989) who the commander-in-chief of the Hungarian Armed Forces was, Miklos Nemeth, Hungary's last Communist Prime Minister, replied: "[I]t is not possible at present to give an unequivocal reply to this."⁵ This was a particularly telling and candid admission from such an important political figure.

An additional reform in December of that year sought to further clarify this arrangement. Under the reform package, the Hungarian Ministry of Defence was divided into two separate components. A new Defence Ministry was jointly subordinated to the Prime Minister and the legislature and was left in control of routine administrative and budgetary matters. In a published statement, Prime Minister Nemeth defined the sphere of authority of the reformed Defence Ministry as encompassing "governmental administrative work [as opposed to] direct, military management-direction activities."⁶

Less than 10 percent of the personnel of the old Ministry of Defence, however, remained under the control of the post-reform Defence Minister. The Ministry of Defence was reduced in size from 1,348 personnel in 1989 to a post-reform low of only 135.⁷ The

⁵ "[Untitled: Interview with Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth,]" *Radio Budapest*, 0430 GMT (July 1, 1989) translated by Zoltan D. Barany, "East European Armed Forces in Transitions and Beyond," *East European Quarterly*, Vol. XXVI, No. 1 (March 1992), p. 18.

⁶ "[Untitled: Announcement by Nemeth,]" *Budapest Domestic Service* (December 1, 1989) translated as "Armed Forces Reductions, Changes," *JPRS-TAC*, No. 89-041 (December 15, 1989), p. 21.

⁷ Figures are from *Honvedelem '92 [National Defence '92]* (Budapest: Ministry of Defence, 1992) cited in Alfred A. Reisch, "Military Affairs: The Hungarian Army in Transition," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 2, No. 10 (March 5, 1993), p. 50 and Ferenc Merngo, "Army Crisis: Self-Centred, All Around Defence," *Heti Világkaszag* (April 13, 1991), pp. 77-79 translated as "Military Chain of Command, Restructuring Debated," *JPRS-EER*, No. 91-083 (June 14, 1991), pp. 31-33.

remainder were placed under the authority of the Hungarian President. According to Ferenc Karpati, the then Minister of Defence, the President also retained the authority to appoint commanders (including generals) at the highest levels of the military chain of command.⁸ In addition, *employment* of Hungarian forces was subordinated to the dictates of the Hungarian President. The Commander of the Hungarian Army reported directly to the President. According to Lieutenant-General Laszlo Borsitis (Chief of Staff of the Hungarian Army), command of Hungarian forces in combat situations during this period devolved from the President (who was Commander-in-Chief) to the General Staff, to the Staffs of the various branches of the armed forces, and finally to Staff commanders at the various operational-tactical levels of command who exercised direct leadership.⁹

Unfortunately for the HSWP leadership, the precipitous collapse of Communism in Hungary as well as throughout the rest of Eastern Europe left these reforms obsolete just as they were going into effect. This would open the door to a constitutional crisis and a new round of constitutional and legislative reforms.

The Constitutional Crisis of October 1990:

The legally ill-defined relationship between the Hungarian President, on the one hand, and Prime Minister and Defence Minister, on the other, did not grow to crisis proportions until sometime after the HSWP was swept from office in the two-rounds of free, multi-

⁸ “[Untitled: Interview with Defence Minister Ferenc Karpati,]” *MTI* (March 22, 1990) translated “Karpati: on Military Service Cut, Rumania,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 90-057 (March 23, 1990), p. 48.

⁹ Lieutenant-General Laszlo Borsitis, *Statement to the Vienna Military Doctrine Seminar - January 19, 1990*, p. 8 cited in Simon, p. 88

party elections of March and April 1990. In these elections, the Hungarian Socialist Party (the reformed-Communists) won only 8.55% of the vote compared with the Hungarian Democratic Forum which won 42.9% of the vote and the Alliance of Free Democrats which won 23.83% of the vote.¹⁰

The product of these elections was the creation of a politically divided legislature and executive. The Hungarian President, Arpad Goncz (indirectly elected by the legislature in August 1990), was a member of the Free Democrats while the Defence Minister, Lajos Fur, and Prime Minister, Jozsef Anatall, were both members of the Democratic Forum.

The constitutional ambiguity, which had been bubbling under the surface for some time, burst forth and became a crisis in October of 1990. In that month, Hungary was hit with a major strike by workers in the transportation sector. Taxi drivers attempted to pressure the legislature for relief from the effects of higher gasoline prices by blockading major city downtown cores and border crossings. The Cabinet, led by its Democratic Forum Ministers, wanted to order military units to help break up the strike and restore service, but they were opposed in this by President Goncz of the Free Democrats.

A situation had thus arisen whereby the intentions of the Minister of Defence conflicted with the orders of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief. The military

¹⁰ The Independent Smallholders' Party won 11.40% of the vote, the Alliance of Young Democrats won 5.44% of the vote as did the Christian Democratic People's Party. No other parties cleared the four percent threshold required to gain representation in the legislature. Source: Judith Pataki, "Hungary: New Government Prefers Cautious Changes," *Report on Eastern Europe*, Vol. 1, No. 28 (July 13, 1990), p. 20.

command was on the brink of being put into the dangerous and unenviable position of having to choose between following the conflicting orders of two legitimate civilian authorities. It was an untenable position for the military and it threatened the very system of democratic civilian control which was being established. In deciding to follow the orders of one side or the other, the military — not the civilian authorities — would have effectively been making military policy for the nation

Ultimately, the immediate crisis was diffused when the Prime Minister and Defence Minister backed down on their plans to use the army to break the strike, but the crisis had served to expose the limitations of the existing constitutional order. Moreover, this reprieve was short lived. Further disputes between the two sides — over plans to reorganize the top command of the armed forces and to clarify the precise role of the General Staff (*vis á vis* field commanders and the state) — soon followed and it appeared the nation was headed towards another political showdown over who was to control the armed forces. As well, the attempted coup in Russia (in August 1991) and the outbreak of fighting in Yugoslavia along Hungary's southern border exposed the need for clear channels of authority over the armed forces.¹¹

The constitutional deadlock — occurring as it did in the context of a political deadlock — soon became too much for the senior military command to stand. Statements attributed to the Defence Minister — alleging Army commanders were merely the puppets of the President (i.e., “the figurehead on the Army's body”) — proved to be the “final straw”

¹¹ Simon, pp. 90-91.

which led the Commander of the Hungarian Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Kalman Lorincz, to submit his resignation in protest.

Lorincz's offer to resign was not, however, accepted by either the President, Prime Minister, or Defence Minister. Reports emanating from the President's Army Office and broadcast in Hungary on April 2, 1991 seem to suggest that President Goncz and Defence Minister Fur, in refusing to accept Lorincz's resignation, may have promised the Army Commander that they would no longer use the military as a battleground in their own conflict over authority in defence matters. In addition, both Goncz and Fur publicly denied the obvious truth that a "dual leadership" effectively had developed for the military despite the fact that the President, Prime Minister, *and* Defence Minister had each taken a public stand on the issue of Lorincz's resignation!¹² This somewhat lessened the level of the rhetoric of all of the participants.

The Reference to the Constitutional Court and the 1992-93 Defence Reforms:

Clearly the constitutionally ambiguous powers of the President and the Cabinet's top two Ministers needed to be resolved. In August of 1991, Defence Minister Fur attempted to break the deadlock. Less than a year after the crisis over the taxi driver's strike and less

¹² See the following: "[Untitled: Announcement of Lorincz's resignation,]" *Budapest Domestic Service*, 0700 GMT (May 30, 1991) translated as "Army Commander Lorincz Voices Desire to Resign," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 91-064 (April 3, 1991), p. 22; "[Untitled: President Refuses Resignation,]" *Budapest Domestic Service*, 1300 GMT (April 2, 1991) translated as "Goncz Turns Down Resignation Request," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 91-064 (April 3, 1991), p. 22; "[Untitled: Defence Minister and President Refuse Resignation Request,]" *Budapest Domestic Service*, 1500 GMT (April 2, 1991) translated as "Lorincz to Continue as Army Commander," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 91-064 (April 3, 1991), p. 22; and "[Untitled: Prime Minister Refuses Resignation Request,]" *MTI [Hungarian Telegraph Agency]*, 1853 GMT (April 2, 1991) translated as "Antall Voices Confidence in Lorincz," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 91-064 (April 3, 1991), p. 22.

than five months after the threatened resignation of the Army Commander, Fur submitted a reference to the Hungarian Constitutional Court asking it to decide upon and otherwise define the limits of the Presidential powers to command and direct the Hungarian armed forces. And while the Hungarian Constitutional Court is a product of the National Assembly and for this reason may have been expected to automatically side with the legislature against the President, the fact that the Court is composed of members selected by at least a two-thirds majority of the legislature imparts great psychological legitimacy on its decisions and rulings.

On September 23, the Constitutional Court ruled in favour of the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence and against President Goncz (Decision 48/91).¹³ The Court held the President, as Commander-in-Chief, was limited to providing “direction” to the armed forces, but he was not authorized to issue operational commands or provide “leadership” to the armed forces (except in specific crisis situations). As a Presidential power, “direction” — in the Court’s opinion — implied a status separate from or *outside* that of the military while the concept of “leadership” was ruled to be a prerogative of the top executive positions *within* the military-defence community (a position held by the Cabinet’s top Ministers). The Court also ruled that any unspecified powers to direct or control the affairs of the military (i.e., residual powers not explicitly accorded to the President or the National Assembly as a whole) belonged to the Cabinet which in turn is

¹³ The following references to the Constitutional Court ruling (except where noted) are taken from “[Untitled: Summary of the Decision of the Constitutional Court - No. 48/91,]” *Magyar Kozlony*, No. 103 (September 26, 1991), pp. 2,111-2,125 translated as “Constitutional Court on Presidential Powers,” *JPRS-EER*, No. 91-168 (November 13, 1991), pp. 14-16.

ultimately subject to votes of confidence or non-confidence in the National Assembly.

The Court added: "The function of the president of the Republic as the commander in chief is a constitutional function, and is not...a position or rank. Accordingly, the commander in chief is not a superior in the chain of command of any of the armed forces."¹⁴ The President has the authority to appoint senior military personnel, but such appointments (or equivalent appointments in non-defence spheres) must be countersigned by the Prime Minister or the relevant Minister (i.e., the Defence Minister in the case of defence appointments). The Cabinet, consequently, takes political responsibility for these appointments in the legislature. On the other hand, the President can refuse to accept an appointment nominated by the Cabinet only if the legal requirements pertaining to that position or the appointment process itself have not been met or if the President substantially believes the democratic functioning of the relevant state organization are gravely threatened by the appointment of the nominee in question.

Further Constitutional Reforms:

The decision of the Constitutional Court was extremely important. It clearly delineated the principal elements of the system of civilian authority being established in Hungary and it allowed the battle for authority to be resolved more quickly here than was the case in Poland (as will be described below). Other much needed reforms could now take place.

¹⁴ Ruling of the Constitutional Court quoted by a parliamentary representative of the MDF. Source: Josef Debreczeni, "The King Has No Clothes," *Nepszabadsag* (May 26, 1992), p. 11 translated as "Debreczeni's Commentary," *JPRS-EER*, No. 92-088 (July 10, 1992), p. 14.

With the aim of further codifying the Constitutional Court's ruling, the principle elements of this ruling were acted upon in a series of defence reforms in 1992-93 and again in 1994. This first reform package (1992-93) included constitutional amendments as well as legislative changes.¹⁵ (The legislative aspects of this program will be discussed in the context of Proposition 4.) Unfortunately, this series of reforms did not resolve all of the conflicts between the President and the legislature. Further constitutional changes were still required.

For example, the Hungarian President still retained significant powers over the military in times of crisis or national emergency (particularly when the legislature was unable to act), but the scope of these powers and the circumstances which entitled the President to act needed to be further defined. And as Defence Minister Fur's Constitutional Court reference inquired only as to the direction of the Hungarian Armed Forces in "times of peace," the Constitutional Court chose not to expand its mandate and thus limited the scope of its September 1991 decision by excluding the President's emergency powers from its deliberations.¹⁶

Consequently, the powers of the President to direct the Hungarian military were further

¹⁵ "[Untitled: Parliament Approves Constitutional Amendment and Defence Law,]" *MTI*, 2107 GMT (December 7, 1993) translated as "Parliament Amends Constitution for Defence Law," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 93-236 (December 10, 1993), p. 26.

¹⁶ See the previously cited "[Untitled: Summary of the Decision of the Constitutional Court - No. 48/91,]" *Magyar Kozlony*, No. 103 (September 26, 1991), pp. 2,111-2,125 translated as "Constitutional Court on Presidential Powers," *JPRS-EER*, No. 91-168 (November 13, 1991), pp. 14-16.

limited during a third major round of constitutional amendments in 1994.¹⁷ Specifically, the President — who could not be an active member of the armed forces — could still appoint and promote general officers to top commands, but the President was now only authorized to choose candidates on the advice of the Minister of Defence.¹⁸ The President retained the power to declare a State of War, Emergency, or Exigency (i.e., Extraordinary Readiness) should circumstances prevent the legislature from acting effectively (i.e., in the event of a surprise attack on Hungarian territory while the National Assembly was prorogued).¹⁹ Such a Presidential decree, however, could only last a maximum of thirty days,²⁰ could not be used to suspend the Constitution,²¹ was subject to immediate review by the National Assembly,²² and had to be reviewed and verified jointly by the Speaker of the Hungarian National Assembly, the President of the Constitutional Court, and the Prime Minister.²³

The Hungarian President continued to chair the National Defence Council (i.e., the War

¹⁷ According to at least one analyst, the Hungarian President - along with the Polish President - is still amongst the most powerful executives in the new states of Eastern Europe. See James McGregor, "The Presidency in East Central Europe," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (January 14, 1994), pp. 23-31. This opinion is seconded by Attila Agh, "The Strength of Hungary's Weak President," *Transition*, Vol. 2, No. 25 (December 13, 1996), pp. 24-27.

¹⁸ These provisions can be found in Article 30 section 1 and Article 30/A section 1(I). See "Hungary [Constitution as Amended to May 1995]," in *Constitutions of the Countries of the World*, ed. and trans. Gisbert H. Flanz (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1995).

¹⁹ Article 19/A section 1 - Hungarian Constitution.

²⁰ Article 19/C section 4 - Hungarian Constitution.

²¹ Article 19/B section 6 - Hungarian Constitution.

²² Article 19/A section 4 - Hungarian Constitution.

²³ Article 19/A section 3 - Hungarian Constitution.

Cabinet), but other members of the government constituted a majority on this body. Members of the National Defence Council now included the Speaker of the National Assembly, the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the heads of all parties represented in the legislature (i.e., those political parties crossing the electoral threshold of 5% of the vote in the previous national election), the military Commander of the Hungarian Defence Forces, and the Chief of the General Staff.²⁴

Continuing Sources of Tension:

The Constitutional Court's 1991 limitation on the President's peacetime role as titular, but not operational, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces has not been altered and would appear to be the watershed event in the delineation of civilian control over the Hungarian armed forces. The contest for power between the President and the Cabinet now appears to be a non-issue in Hungary amongst political and military leaders. However, there still are areas where further constitutional and legislative reform is necessary to alleviate tensions between the Hungarian military and its civilian bosses.²⁵

²⁴ Article 19/B section 2 - Hungarian Constitution. A presidential veto, on the other hand, may be overturned by a simple majority! See Article 26 section 3 - Hungarian Constitution.

²⁵ Jeffrey Simon incorrectly records passage of an amendment to the Hungarian Constitution (Article 19/E) by the Hungarian National Assembly on December 7, 1993 (to be enacted on January 1, 1994). This amendment supposedly authorized the government (Cabinet) to mobilize and deploy a maximum two brigades of the army (approximately 5,000 troops) without the advanced authorization of the President and without declaring a state of emergency in three contexts: in the event of an invasion of Hungarian airspace, in the event of an air attack on Hungarian targets, or in the event of a surprise invasion. (Simon, pp. 96-97.) This reform does not appear to have been "enacted" and does not appear in the current text of the Hungarian Constitution as amended to June 1995. In point of fact, Article 19E of the Hungarian Constitution was *abrogated* in 1994. The complete English and Hungarian-language texts of the Hungarian Constitution are presented in the *Constitutions of the Countries of the World* series published by Oceana Publications. This source may be considered to be the definitive reference source on the subject of national constitutions.

Hungary's Constitution provides one potentially troubling problem in fixing existing forms of civilian control over the military. Specifically, many observers in Hungary and the West have noted that constitutional amendments are relatively simple to make under the current constitutional amending formula. A two-thirds majority in the National Assembly is sufficient to pass constitutional amendments.²⁶

Although this threshold has served the Hungarian legislature well in the difficult initial period of reform, the results of the most recent national election have exposed a potentially serious weakness. After the second round of voting in May of 1994, two parties — the reformed-Communist Hungarian Socialist Party and their coalition partners the centre-left Alliance of Free Democrats — together emerged controlling more than the requisite two-thirds parliamentary majority. In the 386-seat National Assembly, the Hungarian Socialist Party held 209 seats and the second place Free Democrats held 70. The Hungarian Democratic Forum — which had been at dissolution the largest party in the legislature — returned with only 38 seats and none of the other parties represented in the legislature by multiple members held more than 26 seats.²⁷ In the words of Istvan Fodor, Political State Secretary at the Hungarian Defence Ministry, the problem is that “[w]hen the [constitutional amendment] regulation was formulated, no one thought that

²⁶ Article 24 section 3 - Hungarian Constitution.

²⁷ In addition, the Independent Smallholders' and Civic Party won 26 seats, the Christian Democratic Peoples' Party won 22 seats, the Alliance of Young Democrats won 20 seats and two members were returned representing minor parties (one of whom subsequently joined the Free Democrats). Source: Edith Oltay, "Politics: The Former Communists' Election Victory in Hungary," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 3, No. 25 (June 24, 1994), pp. 1-6.

any cabinet might get into a position like that at the moment.”²⁸

To date, the overwhelming domination of the National Assembly by the Hungarian Socialist Party/Democratic Alliance coalition has not seriously threatened to re-politicize the direction of Hungarian armed forces (assuming that it wanted to do so in the first place). The ruling coalition has been too busy dealing with a serious privatization scandal for one thing. And fortunately for the minority opposition, relations between the two coalition partners have been rocky. Legislation in several non-defence-related areas has been delayed due to political infighting between the coalition “partners” and the junior members of the coalition — the Free Democrats — have even complained bitterly that they have learned about some “joint” government decisions from the media!²⁹

This issue is one that the legislature needs to revisit before the next round of constitutional amendments are put into place. Discussion has, in fact, begun on a more complete and thorough replacement of the current Constitution — which when all is said and done is still the product of the 1949 Communist Constitution — but this process is as yet incomplete.

Poland (Introduction):

Poland, like Hungary, adopted a variation of the French-style mixed presidential-

²⁸ Vereckei (Interviewer), “Underpants or MiG-29 Aircraft - Baffling Budget,” *Magyar Nemzet* (June 27, 1995), p. 6 translated as “Fodor Views Civilian Control of Armed Forces,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-124 (June 27, 1995), pp. 18-19.

parliamentary system as Communist rule collapsed in 1989. And as was the case in Hungary, this political model ultimately led to a conflict arising between the President of Poland, on the one hand, and the legislature (Prime Minister and Defence Minister), on the other hand, over who was to control the Polish military. Unlike the case in Hungary, however, unique historical factors (i.e., the residual power of the Communist authorities, the military's recent history of political activism, and the fact that the Polish President came to enjoy a direct, popular mandate) caused this conflict to last longer and be far more contentious in Poland than it was in Hungary over the same period.

For the military, the absence of clearly defined lines of civilian authority was exacerbated by the fact that both the Sejm and the President attempted to use the armed forces to their own respective advantage. The military was essentially being asked to take sides in the struggle for authority instead of awaiting the resolution of this dispute. In the end, the Polish military — predisposed by its history to take an active role in political affairs — tended to side with the President, but it was the Sejm which ultimately won the contest. It would, however, take several years before the lines of authority would become clearly defined. In the meantime, the Polish military would not always act in the politically neutral fashion expected of the armies of democracies.

First Steps — The “Round Table” Negotiations:

The transition from Communist rule occurred earlier in Poland than anywhere else in

²⁹ See, for example, Edith Oltay, “Hungary: The Return of the Former Communists,” *Transition*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (January 30, 1995), pp. 34-37.

Eastern Europe. As Poland was the first state of Eastern Europe to take meaningful steps towards non-Communist rule, the negotiations between the leaders of the Solidarity trade union movement and the Communist regime occurred in a context that did not clearly delineate the precise limits which Communist powers inside and *outside Poland* would tolerate. All sides — including the “lame duck” Communist government — were therefore navigating uncharted waters and uncertain of precisely what system would be produced as the result of the “Round Table” negotiations.

As part of an over-all compromise package that would (amongst other things) allow for the first partially free, multi-party elections in the Eastern bloc, the non-Communist opposition was eventually allowed to contest 35% of the 460-seat Polish Sejm (the lower house of the legislature) and all 100 of the seats of a newly reconstituted Senate (the upper chamber which had been abolished in 1946). In exchange for these concessions, Solidarity negotiators agreed to the creation of a Polish Presidency (indirectly elected for a six-year term of office by the Sejm and Senate together). As the Polish Constitution of 1952 made no provision for a Presidency and no longer made provision for a Senate, this agreement effectively amounted to a first round of constitutional reform.

The Polish Presidency (initially held by General of the Army Wojciech Jaruzelski) was accorded extensive powers over the Polish military and would play an important role in areas such as Polish foreign policy. The President, for example, was authorized to designate the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Interior Affairs, and the Foreign Minister while other Cabinet members were to be designated by the Communist-

dominated Sejm. Under this arrangement, the President would also chair the Polish Defence Council or National Defence Committee (known by its Polish acronym KOK). This Committee — the principal advisory and policy committee on defence issues — would also include the Chairman of the Council of Ministers (the Prime Minister); the Ministers of Defence, Finance, Internal Affairs, and Foreign Affairs; the minister of Transportation and the Sea Economy; one Minister of State (i.e., Minister without Portfolio); two Deputy Ministers of Defence; the First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs; the Marshall (Speaker) of the Sejm; the Chief of the Presidential Office (Chancery or Chancellery); and the Chief of the General Staff.³⁰ A 1990 Resolution passed in the KOK officially designated the President as “the Superior of the Armed Forces” (i.e., Commander-in-Chief). At the same time, the Communist-dominated Sejm was reserved the right to nominate the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces in times of war (unless the Sejm was not in session when this duty fell to the President).³¹

Investing the new presidency with extensive powers over such key policy areas as the

³⁰ According to General of Brigade Zenon Poznanski (Chief of the Secretariat and Deputy Secretary of the KOK), the KOK was not a “supergovernment,” but was subordinate to the Sejm and the Senate “[like] all other state organs” via the mechanism of the Supreme Chamber of Control. However (as Poznanski acknowledged), only the membership of the President (or the President’s representative) and the Minister of Defence in the KOK were institutionalized by law. All other members were appointed by the President. This gave the President significant influence over the decision-making ability of the Committee. As even Poznanski admitted, this arrangement placed the KOK in a position analogous to the United States “National Security Council [which] operates under the leadership of the [American] president.” Stanislaw Reperowicz (interviewer), “Is KOK a Supergovernment?” *Trybuna* (March 28, 1990), p. 2 translated as “National Defence Committee as ‘Supergovernment’ Denied,” *JPRS-EER*, No. 90-086 (June 18, 1990), pp. 22-23.

³¹ See, especially, Section VI published as: National Defence Committee, “(Extract) Resolution No. 1/90 of the National Defence Committee Concerning the Defence Doctrine of the Polish Republic,” *Zolnierz Wolnosci* (February 26, 1990), pp. 1-8 translated as “National Defence Committee Presents 1990 Defence Doctrine, Aims,” *JPRS-EER*, No. 90-038 (March 26, 1990), pp. 27-31.

armed forces and placing this office in the hands of the leader of the Polish Communist Party (the Polish United Workers Party — PUWP) was a compromise decision for Solidarity negotiators, but it was probably unavoidable. The real difficulty arose as Communist rule in Poland continued to slip away in staggered increments. Although the Polish Communists expected to be able to hang on to power after the semi-free elections, they were unprepared for the sheer magnitude of their defeat in those seats openly contested.

The First Solidarity Government:

In June of 1989, Solidarity won all of the seats that it was permitted to contest in the Sejm (i.e., 161 out of 460 seats in the lower house) and 99 out 100 seats in the Senate (the other seat was held by an independent candidate). As a result, the legitimacy of the non-Solidarity members of the Sejm plummeted. In August, a member of the Solidarity movement, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, became Poland's first non-Communist Prime Minister since the installation of Communist rule in 1946.³² Poland now had a non-Communist Prime Minister, a Communist-dominated legislature with little real legitimacy, and a politically weakened Communist President who — as a result of the Round-Table negotiations — held extensive powers over the military (including the right to appoint PUWP deputies to important Ministries such as Defence and Internal Affairs.) Unfortunately for Polish lawmakers, important terms such as “the Superior of the Armed Forces” were left nebulously undefined by the stillborn Round-Table reforms and these

³² For a summary of the election results see: Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, “The Government Reaches a Turning Point,” *RFE: Report on Eastern Europe*, Vol. 1, No. 28 (July 13, 1990), pp. 25-31.

reforms were rapidly being overtaken by events.

As the power and authority of the Communist government collapsed, different institutions came to be influenced by reformist elements and others continued to be influenced by the *ancien regime*. Solidarity attempted to expand the authority of those institutions it controlled (i.e., the Senate and — to a lesser degree — the Sejm) while minimizing the power of institutions still controlled by the Communists (i.e., the Presidency, the Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry of Interior). The Communists, for their part, simultaneously attempted to hold onto as much power as possible. The long-term effect of these contests for authority was more dependent on the respective political power of the two sides than it was the product of clearly defined constitutional or legislative arrangements.

Because the Sejm continued to be dominated by members who were elected under Communist rules in only partially-contested elections and because the President held such power, the Solidarity members of the executive — in conjunction with their allies in the Senate and Sejm — attempted to establish a partial system of democratic civilian oversight over the Polish armed forces from within the legislature by creating a number of *ad hoc* defence committees. Given the power of the President and PUWP control over the Defence and Internal Affairs Ministries, such actions were urgently required if the anti-Communist Solidarity Movement was to exercise *effective* political power and civilian oversight. Unfortunately for Solidarity, the effectiveness of these early efforts at civilian oversight were mixed. Communists continued to wield considerable influence.

The first of these civilian oversight committees was a 15-member Home Defence Committee.³³ The Home Defence Committee was designed to oversee the extensive operations of the Defence Ministry.³⁴ The Home Defence Committee was chaired by the President and included the Prime Minister; the Ministers of Defence, the Interior, and Finance; the Speaker of the Sejm; and the Speaker of the Senate.

The second oversight committee was solely the product of the Sejm. The Sejm's Commission for National Defence was designed to oversee defence and military-related legislation. Its twenty deputies came from the ranks of the Communist and non-Communist members of the Sejm and each individual had the right to inspect any Polish military facility at any time.³⁵

The third oversight body was the Defence Ministry Social Consultative Council. This body was again comprised of Communist and non-Communist Sejm deputies and its most important task was to inspect Polish military facilities (whenever necessary) in order to advise the government about living conditions for military personnel. The Council was

³³ The description of these four committees (except where noted) is based on Simon, pp. 44-45.

³⁴ At this time, the Defence Ministry consisted of the following: the Minister, a Deputy Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, the Chief Inspector of Territorial Defence, the Chief of the Main Combat Training Directorate (in charge of combat training of the Army as well as general military training and physical fitness training), the Chief of the Main Instructional Directorate, the Chief Quartermaster, the Chief Inspector of Armed Forces Technology; the head of the Personnel Department, and the Chief of Internal Military Service (in charge of counterintelligence and military discipline). A number of joint agencies and internal advisory agencies also operated within the context of the Ministry of National Defence. Source: Lieutenant General Marek Ryszkowski, "The Polish Army: Facts and Figures," *Przegląd Wojsk Lotniczych*, No. 5 (May 1990), pp. 8-12 translated as "Polish Army 'White Book' Containing Statistics Outlined," *JPRS-EER*, No. 90-132 (September 21, 1990), pp. 22-26.

³⁵ See, also, Ryszkowski, "The Polish Army...." p. 23.

empowered to advise the Defence Minister about social conditions within the military, civic education programs, and military cooperation and coordination with various non-military political and social organizations (i.e., youth organizations).³⁶

And finally, a fourth legislature advisory body — the National Defence Minister's Political Advisory Committee — was made up of a maximum nine Sejm and Senate members and included a representative of the President. This purely advisory body (established on December 11, 1989) oversaw the actions, decisions, and policies initiated by the Defence Minister on such questions as the “humanization and democratization of military life, soldier's rights and duties as well as the conditions of their life, billets, food, and health care.”³⁷

As might be expected, Sejm deputies and Polish military leaders occasionally squabbled over the shape and pace of the democratization program during this period. When, for example, a member of the Sejm Commission on National Defence, Jacek Szymanderski, complained about the “highly cosmetic” nature of Defence Ministry reforms (February 6, 1990), a spokesman for the Polish General Staff, Colonel Ryszard Pawlikowski, objected to comments that “sound[ed] like the accusation of a tribunal” and then proceeded to

³⁶ General Florian Siwicki (Polish Minister of National Defence), “[Untitled: Speech by Defence Minister During 15th PUWP Central Committee Plenum,]” *Zolnierz Wolnosci* (September 26, 1989), p. 2 translated as “Defence Minister on Party Structures in Army,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 89-188 (September 29, 1989), p. 50.

³⁷ “[Untitled: Council of Ministers Resolution,]” *PAP*, 0035 GMT (December 13, 1989) translated as “Defence Advisory Body to be Formed,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 90-003 (January 4, 1990), p. 70.

outline some of the changes the military leadership had already undertaken.³⁸ The Minister of National Defence, General Florian Siwicki, also acknowledged during the 15th and last PUWP Plenum that “frustrations” existed amongst elements within the military affected by these changes.³⁹

It should be noted, however, that these do not appear to have been serious disputes between civilians and military personnel on the issue of civilian control. Reformers within the civilian and military establishments agreed to ban Communist Party cells from within the military (as of late 1989) and to reform and then disband the Main Political Administration (between December 1989 and April 1990). (See Propositions Five and Six.) Rather, it seems more a case of high expectations meeting the realities of the massive scale of the reforms necessary to institute a new model of civilian control along with a few cases of genuine resentment by Communist-era holdovers within the military.

The Election of Lech Walesa:

As difficult as this situation was, tensions between the office of the President and the government’s top Ministers really began to grow when Lech Wałęsa was elected to the Polish Presidency on December 9, 1990. Earlier that year, General Jaruzelski — his initially high popularity now waning — had resigned his position (less than two years

³⁸ See, for example, Jan Forowicz (interviewer), “The Army in a Different Way,” *Rzeczpospolita* (February 6, 1990), pp. 1 & 3 translated as “Army’s Future Role: Sparring Between Sejm Commission, Military,” *JPRS-EER*, No. 90-054 (April 24, 1990), pp. 9-10 and Z. Janos, “Army Issue is Issue of Unusual Importance,” *Zolnierz Wolnosci* (February 14, 1990), p. 3 translated as “Army Provides Rebuttal,” *JPRS-EER*, No. 90-054 (April 24, 1990), pp. 11-13.

³⁹ Siwicki, “[Untitled: Speech by Defence Minister...,” p. 50.

into his six year mandate) and the Sejm had voted to make the Polish Presidency a popularly (i.e., directly) elected position. Poland now was governed by non-Communist President (with a direct, popular mandate), a Solidarity-dominated Senate (also with a direct mandate), and a non-Communist Cabinet which still held its minority mandate in a legislature dominated by Communists and reform-Communists elected in controlled elections.

It can be argued that it was during this period that civilian political figures allied with the Polish President — seeking to overthrow Communist rule and (amongst other things) retain civilian jurisdiction over military affairs (albeit in a very different and less oppressive manner than during the Communist era) — joined forces with powerful military figures — willing to accept some form of democratic presidential control in exchange for freedom from the Communist “penetration” model of civil-military relations — in a powerful political alliance. This argument is suggested in comments by then Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Tadeusz Wilecki, who argued (at the height of the presidential-parliamentary conflict in 1995) that the actions of the Polish armed forces “shielded the [democratic] transformations and continue[d] to support them.”⁴⁰

In this context, the powers of the President in the area of military affairs (as set forth in the Round-Table negotiations) were now no longer a liability but a strength for the forces

⁴⁰ Janina Paradowska and Jerzy Baczynski (interviewers), “The Armed Forces have the Right to Defend Themselves,” *Polityka* (September 9, 1995), p. 3 translated as “Chief of Staff on Status, Control of Army,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-176 (September 9, 1995), p. 1.

seeking to end Communist rule in Poland. Walesa attempted to use this power to his advantage and thereby increase democratic civilian control over the military — albeit democratic *presidential* control.⁴¹ In subsequent years (as will be demonstrated in subsequent sections), this alliance retarded the reform process (i.e., once Wałęsa's opponents in the Sejm were no longer Communists but democratically-elected reformed-communists). At that point, the military began to be the subject of a political tug-of-war between Walesa and the new Polish Left, but for the time being this alliance served the interests of reformers within the military and society at large.

It is also not surprising, given this history, that the Polish military (especially its highest command elements) has tended to support the presidential variant of civilian democratic control over the parliamentary variant. It was, for example, only after the ascension of Wałęsa to the presidency that many of the worst vestiges of the former system of penetration and domination were removed (i.e., Party cells and the MPA). Thus the military owed a political debt to Wałęsa. As well, the military remains sensitive to civilian policies which politicize its operations. Thus the military is adverse to being controlled by the fractious and politically divided Sejm. Such an alternative is less attractive than civilian control being vested in the person of the President. And finally, Wałęsa appeared more willing to grant the armed forces greater institutional autonomy

⁴¹ It is interesting to note that less than two and a half months into Wałęsa's term of office and following the creation of an inter-ministerial reform commission under Krzysztof Zabinski, the *TVP* television network reported the following: "Within a period of three months, all legal rules concerning national defence will be modified." This report on Wałęsa's reform efforts obviously proved to be optimistic. Source: "[Untitled: Report on Inter-Ministerial Reform Commission]," *TVP [Television Network]*, 1500 GMT (February 25, 1991) translated as "Commission Launches Defence Reform Teams," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 91-038 (February 26, 1991), p. 27.

than the legislature which appeared more inclined to “micro-manage” military affairs.

Unfortunately, the theory (albeit not always the practice) of democratic civilian control maintains that it is not up to the armed forces to decide between these two options. In a democracy, a truly neutral armed forces is supposed to await the resolution of civilian disputes and accept whoever is elevated to power. In Poland, this did not happen.

Early Efforts to Resolve the Issue of Civilian Authority:

As part of his overall plan to create a system of democratic presidential control, Walesa’s multifaceted defence reform began with an attempt to force the quasi-legitimate Sejm to reconstitute the KOK by expanding the KOK’s membership. According to a spokesman in the Presidential Chancery (Jerzy Milewski the Acting Minister of State Security Affairs), the Chief of the General Staff as well as the Speakers of the Sejm and Senate were to be added to the Committee of National Defence. The inclusion of the Chief of the General Staff and the Speaker of the Sejm had, however, already had been declared officially to be part of the KOK as the result of the Round-Table negotiations thus it is not clear from this announcement whether this appointment constitutes a return to the KOK by these two officials or whether it represents the institutionalization of their membership (c.f., their being members “at the pleasure” of the President).⁴²

The KOK was supposed to be renamed the National Security Council (NSC). However,

⁴² Andrzej Miklaszewicz (interviewer), “Command Level,” *GLOB*, No. 24 (Jan 24-26, 1992), p. 2 translated as “Security Office in Presidential Chancery Viewed,” *JPRS-EER*, No. 92-023 (March 2, 1992), pp. 13-14.

the term “National Defence Committee” (a name based on a similar organization created in the pre-war Pilsudski era and re-introduced in 1977 by the Communist regime) still was used frequently and interchangeably by many including President Wałęsa.⁴³ The formal change in name from the National Defence Committee to the National Security Council was delayed by a legislative impasse when the Sejm and the President could not agree on legislation and constitutional amendments defining each other’s relative authority.⁴⁴

The National Defence Committee was supposed to meet every two months or more frequently if the need arose.⁴⁵ In addition, one major administrative difference between the KOK and the new Council (as intended) was that Wałęsa wanted the operations of latter (i.e., its secretariat and staff) to be funded from the President’s budget rather than from funds obtained from the Ministry of Defence.⁴⁶ The NSC’s staff — approximately 50-70 people — were to be organized into four departments: military, defence systems,

⁴³ Lech Wałęsa, “Text [of Polish President Lech Wałęsa’s Address to the National Defence Committee (July 30, 1992),]” *Polska Zbrojna* (July 31-August 2 (1992)), pp. 1-2 translated as “Wałęsa Addresses National Defence Committee,” *JPRS-EER*, No. 92-114 (August 24, 1992), pp. 8-9.

⁴⁴ Mirosław Cielemecki, “Dream of Power,” *Przegląd Tygodniowy*, No. 24 (June 16, 1991), p. 5 translated as “Defence Budget, Training, Authority Issues Viewed,” *JPRS-EER*, No. 91-118 (August 7, 1991), pp. 50-53.

⁴⁵ Unnamed PAP (Polish Press Agency) Correspondent, “What is the Format of the National Security Council,” [*Supplement to*] *Rzeczpospolna* (February 6, 1991), pp. 1-2 translated as “Description of New Security Council,” *JPRS-EER*, No. 91-044 (April 5, 1991), pp. 22-23.

⁴⁶ “[Untitled: Chief of Chancery Kaczynski on Organizational Reforms,]” *PAP*, 1507 GMT (January 3, 1991) translated as “Kaczynski Outlines Structure of Presidential Office,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 90-003 (January 4, 1991 [incorrectly dated January 4, 1990]), p. 18.

research, and legal and organizational.⁴⁷ This would (in theory) provide the President with a sufficiently large staff to begin to control the armed forces without having to rely on the Ministry of Defence.

The inclusion of a democratically elected President at the head of the National Defence Committee/National Security Council was, in the opinion of Colonel Stanisław Dronicz (member of the Advisory Group on Army Reform in the Office of the Deputy Minister of Defence), a significant step forward in the process of de-politicizing the Polish armed forces.⁴⁸ A Presidential advisor (Jacek Merkel formerly the Minister of State for National Security Affairs) stated the National Security Council still was intended to serve as the principal political advisory board to the President and the Prime Minister on internal and foreign security matters (including the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland and the transit of troops crossing from East Germany to Russia), Polish military doctrine (especially doctrinal reform), military democratization, military structures (including the reorganization of the higher command of the Polish armed forces), military budgetary issues, and oversight of the peacetime military operations of the Polish military.⁴⁹ (These issues are discussed in more detail in the context of Proposition Six.)

⁴⁷ “[RFE/RL] Weekly Record of Events,” *Report on Eastern Europe*, Vol. 2, No. 8 (February 22, 1991), p. 50.

⁴⁸ Wiesława Kwiatkowska (interviewer), “Contaminated Army,” *Tygodnik Gdanski*, No. 26 (June 30, 1991), p. 3 translated as “Sluggish Reform Process in Military Explained,” *JPRS-EER*, 91-127 (August 22, 1991), pp. 20-23.

⁴⁹ Jacek Merkel, “The Military Should Implement the Tasks to Which it is Called,” *Polska Zbrojna* (January 31, 1991), pp. 1-2 translated as “Merkel: Security Council, Other Military Reforms,” *JPRS-EER*, No. 91-041 (April 2, 1991), pp. 47-49.

Dissatisfied with the degree to which the partially reformed KOK was able to exercise over military and security affairs, Wałęsa's second major reform was to create a National Security Bureau (Polish acronym BBN) to work under the National Security Council. The BBN began operations as a professional advisory and analysis body under the secretariat of the KOK (NSC). The plan was for membership in the BBN to include the Chief of the General Staff, the Chief of the Office for State Protection, the Commander of the Border Guard, the Commander of the Police, and the Undersecretary of State at both the Ministry of Finance and Foreign Affairs as well as a staff of professionals and specialists.⁵⁰

The BBN was intended initially to prepare and coordinate analyses and forecasts for the Polish President as well as the Prime Minister. These briefs previously had been produced by a wide variety of state institutions.⁵¹ The BBN was supposed to cut through this mass of paper in order to facilitate Presidential decision-making.⁵² The Military Department within the National Security Bureau prepared recommendations in the fields of military organization, arms, command, training, personnel policy, logistical security, and deployment of the armed forces during peacetime and war.⁵³

⁵⁰ Merkel, "The Military Should Implement...", p. 48.

⁵¹ President Walesa was also assisted by a military affairs bureau within the Presidential Council (Chancery). This office maintained contacts within the security and defence establishment and advised the President on policy issues. See Marek Henzler (interviewer), "Acceleration Will Come Later," *Politika* (January 19, 1991), p. 4 translated as "Kaczynski on Role of Presidential Council," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 91-016 (January 24, 1991), pp. 45-47.

⁵² Merkel, "The Military Should Implement...", p. 48.

⁵³ Lieutenant Colonel Andrzej Medykowski (interviewer), "We Are Building a Cohesive State Defence System," *Polska Zbrojna* (September 18, 1991), p. 3 translated as "New Military Bureau Described, Issues Addressed," *JPRS-EER*, No. 91-154 (October 15, 1991), pp. 43-45.

The National Security Bureau, in effect, was intended to take over many tasks formerly undertaken by the Communist-era National Defence Committee, but it was also intended to undertake a much more substantive role. According to Brigadier General Jan Swiatowiec (Chief of the Military Department of the National Security Bureau), the BBN — with the addition of employees from the Defence Ministry, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs — could act as an effective wartime headquarters under the direction and command of the President. It would — in wartime — also serve to “relieve” the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of many duties and thus allow these two government Ministers to “perform effectively the functions of executive organs.”⁵⁴ This reform would effectively consolidate the powers of the President relative to the legislature and (to a degree) the General Staff.

Unfortunately for Wałęsa, plans to transform the National Defence Committee and develop the National Security Bureau were not fully implemented. These efforts broke down in the context of the overall struggle between President Wałęsa and the leaders of the Polish Sejm over who would control the Polish armed forces. This conflict eventually reached crisis proportions.

The 1991 Parliamentary Elections and Efforts to Reform the Constitution:

As a backdrop to the developing power struggle between President Wałęsa and the Sejm, efforts were made to reform the Polish Constitution. Initial efforts to institutionalize

⁵⁴ Medykowski (interviewer), “We Are Building a Cohesive State Defence System,” p. 44.

Presidential authority by Wałęsa and his supporters in the Polish Senate, however, were blocked by Wałęsa's opponents in the Sejm. Communist deputies (with good reason) feared losing power while non-Communist deputies in many instances were supporters of candidates who had lost to Wałęsa in the 1990 Presidential election. The President's supporters, for their part, argued that the inclusion of the Prime Minister and several key Ministers (Defence, Interior Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and Finance) in the National Defence Committee was sufficient to ensure parliamentary (Sejm and Senate) accountability in military and security affairs even though three of those Ministers (i.e., Defence, Interior Affairs, and Foreign Affairs) were "Presidential" Ministries.⁵⁵

In the end, bitter disagreements between Wałęsa's supporters and opponents over what political body should control the armed forces, on the pace and direction of the economic reforms, on efforts to remove Communists from positions of power, and even plans to reform Poland's election laws (as well as the constitutional issues) eventually drove Wałęsa to dissolve the Sejm and call for early elections in October of 1991.

The 1991 elections — Poland's first truly free elections — resulted in a democratically elected Senate and Sejm, but a legislature that was very divided. Under Poland's hyper-proportional electoral law, a total of twenty-nine parties won seats in the Sejm (out of 67 fielding candidates) while 22 parties and six independent candidates won seats to the

⁵⁵ Zbigniew Lentowicz, "The President's Three Defenders," *Rzeczpospolita*, (July 9, 1991), pp. 1-2 translated as "Changes in Defence Structure, Command," *JPRS-EER*, No. 91-105 (July 17, 1991), pp. 29-30.

Senate.⁵⁶ Reform of the Polish constitution, economy, and military affairs was no longer a contest between Communist and non-Communists, but it was a multifaceted battle between several democratic groups with different political visions.⁵⁷ The unity of the Solidarity Movement was broken (perhaps irretrievably).⁵⁸

Polish politics now began to take on a more “personal” dimension as issues became clouded by the vitriolic debate between supporters and opponents of President Wałęsa. Wałęsa’s supporters (particularly in the Senate) favoured the maintenance of a relatively powerful presidency while his opponents (generally in the Sejm) favoured shifting more power into the hands of the Prime Minister and Defence Minister. Several constitutional drafts were eventually put forward for consideration, but none was able to surmount the political divisions.

Continued Tensions in the Absence of Constitutional Reform:

One of the lowest points in relations between the President and the government occurred in early 1992 when Poland’s first civilian Defence Minister, Jan Parys, accused President Wałęsa and some of his political associates of attempting to bribe General Tadeusz Wilecki (at that time Commander of the Silesian Military District) by offering the

⁵⁶ David McQuaid, “The Parliamentary Elections: A Postmortem,” *Report on Eastern Europe*, Vol. 2, No. 45 (November 8, 1991), pp. 15-21.

⁵⁷ Louisa Vinton, “After Elections: A ‘Presidential Government?’” *Report on Eastern Europe*, Vol. 2, No. 45 (November 8, 1991), pp. 22-27.

⁵⁸ For an interesting discussion on the pattern of post-Communist politics, see Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, “Post-Communist East Central Europe: Dilemmas of Democratization,” unpublished paper presented at the Conference on Democratic Politics: Fifty Years of Political Science at Carleton University (November 13-14, 1992), pp. 5ff.

General the position of Chief of Staff if the latter supported the concept of a strong presidency.⁵⁹ (This crisis will also be discussed in greater detail in relation to Proposition Six k.)

Ultimately, a special legislative committee concluded that there had in fact been no such effort on the part of Wałęsa and that Parys' accusations were "unfounded and detrimental to the states [sic] interests," but even so relations between the President and the Sejm and Government remained strained.⁶⁰ Military frustration arising from the Parys Affair seems to have been more the product of the military being drawn into civilian political squabbles over the *model* of democratic civilian control and was not the product of military resentment to the *principle* of democratic civilian rule. (Again, the frustration and tension within the armed forces caused by these political debates will be discussed in a later context.) As a postscript, General Wilecki eventually was named Chief of the General Staff, but this only followed the establishment of yet another government in the ever-shifting Sejm.

The Small Constitution:

Despite this crisis — or perhaps even more *because of* the continuing deadlock between the two sides — constitutional reform remained a priority in Poland at this time. Pending

⁵⁹ For Parys' initial statement see "[Untitled: Parys' Statement to Press,]" *TVP [Television Network]*, 1730 GMT (April 6, 1992) translated as "Support for 'Political Games' Sought," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 92-067 (April 7, 1992), p. 19.

⁶⁰ "[Untitled: Report of the Sejm Extraordinary Committee,]" *PAP*, 1056 GMT (May 15, 1992) translated as "Parys Investigation Concluded; Resignation Accepted," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 92-097 (May 19, 1992), pp. 10-11.

an agreement on a complete constitutional package; the Sejm, Senate, and President Wałęsa eventually agreed to what came to be known as Poland's "Small Constitution."⁶¹

Under this provisional constitutional arrangement, the Polish President was accorded significant powers. The President could, for example, veto legislation passed by the legislature, but this veto could be overturned by a two-thirds vote in the lower house (an unlikely event in most cases given the fractured nature of the Sejm).⁶² The President, as head of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland,⁶³ reserved the right to approve or block assignments to top military positions on the advice of the Minister of Defence⁶⁴ while his power to appoint the Commander in Chief of the Polish armed forces in times of war was absolute.⁶⁵ The President was authorized by the Constitution to introduce martial law⁶⁶ or a state of emergency,⁶⁷ but the President could only declare a state of war if the Sejm was not in session.⁶⁸ And finally, the Prime Minister was required to "consult" with the President on the appointment of the Ministers of Defence, the Interior,

⁶¹ "Constitutional Law of 17 October 1992 on Mutual Relations Between the Legislature and the Executive of the Republic of Poland, and on Local Government," *Zycie Warszawy [Supplement]* (November 19, 1992) translated as "Text of 'Small Constitution,'" *JPRS-EER*, No. 93-009-S (January 28, 1993), pp. 29-35.

⁶² Article 18.3 - "Text of the Small Constitution," p. 30.

⁶³ Article 34 - "Text of the Small Constitution," p. 32.

⁶⁴ Articles 35.1 and 35.2 - "Text of the Small Constitution," p. 32.

⁶⁵ Article 35.3 - "Text of the Small Constitution," p. 32.

⁶⁶ Article 36.1 - "Text of the Small Constitution," p. 32.

⁶⁷ Article 37.1 - "Text of the Small Constitution," p. 32.

⁶⁸ Article 24.1 - "Text of the Small Constitution," p. 31.

and Foreign Affairs.⁶⁹ This last provision effectively continued the practice of making these three Ministries into so-called “Presidential” Ministries.

Although relations between the President and the Cabinet improved somewhat following the introduction of the Small Constitution, disagreements remained. Many of the duties and powers mentioned in the Small Constitution were vague and untested and — consequently — subject to contradictory interpretations. Wałęsa also was still unable to complete his plans to reform the National Defence Committee.⁷⁰ In addition, the Government opposed Wałęsa’s intention (announced in February of 1993) to create a large National Guard which would be subordinated directly to the President.⁷¹ (This issue will be discussed in more detail in the context of Proposition Five c.)

The Parliamentary Elections of 1993:

Relations between the Sejm and the President took another downward turn following the September 1993 national elections.⁷² With the Solidarity movement now hopelessly divided and with the effects of Poland’s “shock therapy” economic reforms still being felt

⁶⁹ Article 61 - “Text of the Small Constitution,” p. 34.

⁷⁰ Colonel Stanislaw Lukaszewski and Major Mariusz Jedrzejko, “Defence and State Security are not Just the Army’s Business,” *Polska Zbrgjna* (November 9, 1993), pp. 1-2 translated as “Leaders Briefed on Military Restructuring,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 93-217 (November 12, 1993), pp. 20-24.

⁷¹ “[Untitled: Lech Walesa meets Delegates at Gdansk Shipyard,]” *TVP [Television First Program Network]*, 2200 GMT (February 26, 1993) translated as “Walesa Answers Solidarity Delegates’ Questions,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 93-040 (March 3, 1993), pp. 26-28 and Wojciech Staszewski, “The Guard Will Protect Us,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* (February 27-28, 1993), p. 2 translated as “KOK Approves Plan for ‘National Guard,’” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 93-040 (March 3, 1993), p. 30.

⁷² The details of the 1993 Polish election are covered in Louisa Vinton, “Poland Goes Left,” *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 2, No. 40 (October 8, 1993), pp. 21-23.

by millions of Poles, the reformed-Communists and their allies were able to return to power — with a vengeance — via the ballot box.

The Democratic Left Alliance (the successor party of the PUWP) won 20.41% of the 1993 vote while their political allies, the Polish Peasant Party (another reform-Communist party), won another 14.40% of the vote. Almost unbelievably, the reformed (and far less proportional) electoral process put into effect for these elections eliminated all but seven parties or alliances from the Sejm and accorded the two post-Communist parties 303 of the Sejm's 460 seats and 76 of 100 Sejm seats! In addition, the new and higher electoral threshold meant that fully one-third of the votes cast in this election were ineffectual.

At the same time, Wałęsa's own political popularity continued to slide. Presidential elections were not due until late 1995, but Wałęsa already was not expected to emerge victorious. Wałęsa — if he was to have any chance in the 1995 elections and because the Parliamentary opposition to the post-Communist alliance was so weak — was forced to oppose the government at every turn. Such a strategy at least was well suited to Wałęsa's own "confrontational" political style!

Continued Tensions and the Drawsko Affair:

Tensions between President Wałęsa and the government of Democratic Left Alliance Prime Minister Waldeman Pawlak exploded on a number of political fronts. Wałęsa once again tried to use his powers as President — especially his powers to appoint the

Defence, Interior, and Foreign Ministers — to promote a plan to replace the KOK with the NSC. In part, Wałęsa now wanted to add “executive powers” (i.e., the power to implement policy decisions) to the KOK/NSC’s advisory duties.⁷³ Although the Prime Minister, Finance Minister, Sejm Speaker, and Senate Speaker still were to be part of the NSC, this plan would have increased the President’s power significantly because Presidential appointees (including the so-called “Presidential” Ministers) would have continued to dominate the NSC.

In response to these moves, Prime Minister Pawlak attempted to consolidate his control over the three “Presidential” Ministries by appointing Democratic Left Alliance and Polish Peasant Party loyalists to the posts of Deputy Minister within the Defence, Interior, and Foreign Affairs Ministries. These moves were strongly opposed by Wałęsa and his “Presidential” Ministers. Defence Minister Piotr Kołodziejczyk (now a civilian and a close Presidential ally albeit one who soon was to have a very serious falling out with Wałęsa) complained bitterly about the imposition of a “political commissar” into his department to challenge his authority.⁷⁴ The Deputy Defence Minister, the Democratic Left Alliance appointee Danuta Waniek, was a particularly sharp critic of Wałęsa.

Amongst other charges, Waniek accused Wałęsa (on May 9, 1995) of treating the

⁷³ Piotr Swiac (interviewer), “Directly from the Belweder [Polish ‘White House’],” *TVP [Television First Program Network]*, 1900 GMT (February 14, 1994) translated as “Milewski on Planned Changes in Supreme Defence,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 94-031 (February 15, 1994), pp. 36-37.

⁷⁴ Marek Chorabik, “I Will Choose My Vice Minister Myself, Minister Kołodziejczyk Says on His Return from Paris,” *Czas Krakowski* (March 5-6, 1994), p. 2 translated as “Kołodziejczyk to Choose Own Vice Minister,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 94-051 (March 16, 1994), pp. 18-19.

Department of National Defence as his own personal fiefdom and of having acted in a way “much further than the [Small] Constitution allows.”⁷⁵ The politicization of Waniek was exhibited by the fact that she eventually left the Defence Ministry in June of 1995 to head the political campaign of Democratic Left Alliance Presidential candidate Aleksander Kwasniewski.⁷⁶ The charges she leveled at Wałęsa were, however, made just days *prior* to her announcement on May 15, 1995 that she would head Kwasniewski’s ultimately successful campaign.

Finally, the biggest political explosion during this period occurred following a September 30, 1994 dinner at the Drawsko Pomorski training facility. Shortly after a luncheon with top military and Defence Ministry officials, President Wałęsa expressed his belief that the top military command had lost confidence in the current Defence Minister and former Wałęsa ally — Piotr Kołodziejczyk. In the presence of the Defence Minister, Wałęsa allegedly polled the officers present (by a show of hands) and expressed his intention of appointing a new Defence Minister who would assist in the exercise of Presidential prerogatives. Wałęsa supposedly asked the military commander as to who they thought would best replace Kołodziejczyk. In return, Kołodziejczyk accused Wałęsa of using the military to usurp the powers of the legislature (by allowing the military leadership — and not the Sejm — to undertake a vote of non-confidence in a civilian Minister) and he

⁷⁵ “[Untitled: Press Conference Held by Deputy Defence Minister Danuta Waniek,” *Polskie Radio First Program Network*, 1700 GMT (May 9, 1995) translated as “Walesa Treats Defence Ministry as ‘Own Party,’” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-090 (May 10, 1995), p. 45.

⁷⁶ Luiza Kowalska, “Danuta Waniek is Leaving the Defence Ministry: Is the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] Laying Down Its Arms?” *Zycie Warszawy* (May 15, 1995), p. 2 translated as “MON’s Waniek to Head Campaign,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-095 (May 17, 1995), pp. 30-31.

accused the Chief of the Polish General Staff, Lieutenant General Tadeusz Wilecki, of deliberately refusing to carry out his orders as Defence Minister.⁷⁷

These events — which came to be known as the Drawsko Affair — developed into perhaps the most serious political dispute in Poland involving the military in the post-Communist era. Ultimately, a Sejm special committee criticized all the parties to the dispute for what could only be described as unprofessional conduct.⁷⁸

This crisis should not, however, be seen as an example of military opposition to the principle of civilian rule. The military — after five long years of political wrangling and vitriolic debate — wanted clear and unambiguous rules as to the precise political command structure.⁷⁹ To be sure, the top military establishment of the Polish armed forces seemed to favour the presidential model of civilian control and they almost certainly expanded their sphere of authority over military affairs in the absence of clear-

⁷⁷ See, for example, “[Untitled: Report on Drawsko Affair],” *TV Polonia Network*, 1830 GMT (October 11, 1994) translated as “Kolodziejczyk, Wilecki Give Accounts of Drawsko,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 94-197 (October 12, 1994), p. 27; “[Untitled: Testimony of Kolodziejczyk Before Sejm Subcommittee],” *TV Polonia Network*, 1600 GMT (October 14, 1994) translated as “Kolodziejczyk Testifies Before Sejm Subcommittee,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 94-200 (October 17, 1994), p. 21; and Pawel Wronski and Agnieszka Kublik, “War Games,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* (October 11, 1994), p. 1 translated as “Progression of Walesa-Kolodziejczyk Conflict,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 94-197 (October 12, 1994), pp. 27-28.

⁷⁸ For preliminary comments from a member of the special committee (Bronislaw Komorowski) see Roman Suwik (interviewer), “[Untitled: Interview with ‘Drawsko’ Committee Member],” *Gazeta Poznanska* (October 26, 1994), p. 3 translated as “Commissioner Interviewed About ‘Drawsko Affair,’” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 92-214 (November 4, 1994), pp. 16-17.

⁷⁹ See, for example, Colonel Tadeusz Mitek, “Army Expects Unambiguous Rules,” *Polska Zbrojna* (June 26, 1995), p. 1 translated as “Commentary on Civilian Control of Army,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-124 (June 28, 1995), pp. 35-36 and an earlier report by the same author “Not Unimportant Reflections: Civilian Control Over Army and Democracy Standards,” *Polska Zbrojna* (October 11, 1994), p. 2 translated as “Military Daily Points to Need to Specify Powers,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 94-197 (October 12, 1994), p. 31.

cut direction, but the basic premise of civilian command was not threatened by the military or by Wałęsa (politically motivated personal attacks notwithstanding). Only the form of this control was in doubt. (The Drawsko Affair will be discussed in more detail in the context of Proposition Six k.)

Presidential-Sejm Relations in the Aftermath of the Drawsko Affair:

In the end, relations between President Wałęsa and the Sejm remained tense (at best). No meaningful progress was made at clarifying the issues at stake. Squabbling between the two sides in fact continued. In November of 1994, Defence Minister Kołodziejczyk refused a request from Chief of the General Staff Wilecki to promote three officers present at the Drawsko dinner. In retaliation, Wałęsa (in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief) refused to accept Kołodziejczyk's nomination of six officers who worked for Kołodziejczyk in the Defence Ministry.⁸⁰

On January 11, 1995, Walesa used his Presidential authority to award monetary bonuses to three top military commanders (including Chief of the General Staff Wilecki) who had been denied annual monetary supplements by the Defence Minister the previous December. All three officers had been in attendance at the Drawsko dinner.⁸¹

⁸⁰ "Drawsko Continues," *Gazeta Wyborcza* (November 8, 1994), p. 1 translated as "Walesa Rejects Defence Minister's Nominations," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 94-216 (November 8, 1994), p. 25.

⁸¹ The Presidential awards approximated those awarded to the Minister of Defence. (Such monetary bonuses were commonplace and were designed to help senior state officials cope with the disruption of the Polish economy.) When asked about *grossly* exaggerated reports in the paper *Trybuna* as to the size of the bonuses, the Speaker of the Sejm (Jozef Oleksy) refused comment. Much to his chagrin, Chief of the General Staff Wilecki (who happened to be accompanying the Speaker) freely quipped: "I am on my way to pick up the money." To this an apparently shocked Oleksy replied: "General, they will broadcast this. I would advise you to deny it immediately." It is nice to see some people can make light of even the most

On January 19, 1995; Wałęsa addressed a session of the Polish Sejm. In his comments, Wałęsa criticized the deputies for failing to find the time yet again to comprehensively debate defence issues (especially in relation to the issue of the model of civilian control over the military). Wałęsa also complained about the slow pace of legislative reform in this area and argued that if not for his tough stand at the Drawsko Pomorski dinner defence issues would not have re-entered the Polish political discourse.⁸² Prime Minister Pawlak, during his speech to the Sejm earlier that day, equated democratic civilian control of the armed forces to *parliamentary* civilian control of the armed forces.⁸³

And there was still *more* political snipping between the two sides. In late January 1995, Wałęsa threatened to dissolve the Sejm and Senate and call new Parliamentary elections if the deadlock between the Sejm and Presidency could not be broken. Wałęsa undoubtedly hoped that a positive result in Sejm and Senate voting would carry over into the November Presidential campaign. For that matter, the mere *threat* of Parliamentary dissolution may have been designed to demonstrate resoluteness to Polish voters. Unfortunately for Wałęsa, his threats and warnings to the Sejm opened the door to a

annoying and petty political controversy! For an account of this controversy, see “[Untitled: Report on Presidential Bonuses to Top Military Commanders.]” *TV Polonia Network*, 1830 GMT (January 11, 1995) translated as *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-008 (January 12, 1995), p. 19.

⁸² Lech Walesa, “[Untitled: Walesa’s Address to the Polish Sejm.]” *Radio Warszawa Network*, 1235 GMT (January 19, 1995) translated as “Walesa Speaks on Defence Issues,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-013 (January 20, 1995), pp. 15-18.

⁸³ “[Untitled: Pawlak’s Address to the Polish Sejm.]” *Radio Warszawa Network*, 1000 GMT (January 19, 1995) translated as “Pawlak Address to Sejm on Defence Policy,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-013 (January 20, 1995), pp. 18-22.

whole new series of vicious political attacks and he was ultimately forced to take the extreme step of issuing a statement denying he had plans to dissolve the Sejm by force.⁸⁴

In March, the new Polish Defence Minister, Zbigniew Wojciech Okonski, began to hint that there might be room for a compromise solution (i.e., a “golden mean”) to the issue of Presidential versus Parliamentary civilian control over the Polish armed forces.⁸⁵ But whether this “solution” represented an effort to placate NATO planners, a genuine effort to promote compromise, or was merely an effort to indirectly promote Wałęsa’s “statesmen-like” image with Presidential elections looming; the effort ultimately failed.

On June 29, 1995, the Sejm passed a Law on the Office of the Minister of National Defence.⁸⁶ This legislation rejected the Presidential compromise plan and also served to foreshadow further constitutional changes.⁸⁷ The law was vetoed by Wałęsa, but it would

⁸⁴ “[Untitled: Statement by Walesa.]” *Radio Warszawa Network*, 1300 GMT (February 2, 1995) translated as “Walesa Rejects Use of Force Against Deputies,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-023 (February 3, 1995), p. 7.

⁸⁵ See, for example, Mirosław Cielemiecki and Dobrochna Kedzierska (interviewers), “We Are Probably Not Mature Enough to Adopt West European Models of Commanding the Armed Forces; I am the Boss,” *Wprost* (June 11, 1995), p. 29 translated as “Defence Minister Discusses Control over Army,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-113 (June 13, 1995), pp. 37-38; Zbigniew Lentowicz (interviewer), “I Will Smooth Away Edges If I Have Enough Time,” *Rzeczpospolita* (March 24, 1995), p. 3 translated as “Defence Minister on Work, Arms Industry, F-16’s [sic],” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-059 (March 28, 1995), pp. 11-13; Colonel Tadeusz Mitek and Colonel Marek Zdziech (interviewers), “I Value Pragmatic Action,” *Polska Zbrojna* (March 31-April 2, 1995), p. 3 translated as “Defence Minister on Projects, Policies,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-066 (April 6, 1995), pp. 19-22; and LUZ [sic], “Defence Controversy Over Presidential Powers: Do Walesa’s Prerogatives Have to Be Broadened?” *Zycie Warszawy* (May 10, 1995), p. 2 translated as “Security Office Seeks Broader Presidential Powers,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-091 (May 11, 1995), pp. 53-54.

⁸⁶ “[Untitled: Sejm Passes Defence Law],” *Third Program Radio Network*, 0900 GMT (June 29, 1995) translated as “Sejm Passes Law on Defence Ministry Hierarchy,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-125 (June 29, 1995), p. 125.

⁸⁷ For the text of the draft law as ultimately passed by the Sejm and signed by the new President see “Law Dated 14 December 1995 Detailing Duties of the Minister of National Defence,” *Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 10

be signed by his successor.⁸⁸

Yet another round of squabbling between the President and the Prime Minister erupted on May 9, 1995 when Wałęsa promoted nine officers to the rank of general — including two of the so-called “Drawsko Affair” guests. These promotions represented a victory for the President and his new Defence Minister. Polish press reports recorded that Prime Minister Oleksy “did not look very satisfied” during the announcement ceremonies.⁸⁹

Late summer and early fall produced yet another particularly nasty round of political fighting as Poland began the run-up to the November Presidential elections. Leftist deputies in the Sejm and their press allies launched a series of particularly harsh attacks against Chief of the General Staff Wilecki. Amongst other things, Wilecki was accused of acting in an undemocratic fashion and of having allied himself to President Wałęsa.⁹⁰ (This dispute will be discussed in more detail in the context of Proposition Six g.)

Finally, both President Wałęsa and his opponents accused each other of involving the

(January 30, 1996), pp. 159-161 translated as “Poland: Law on Duties of the Defence Minister,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-120 (January 30, 1996), pp. 1-4.

⁸⁸ Marek Henzler, “Civil War: The Ministry Has Attacked the General Staff,” *Polityka* (October 12, 1996), pp. 20-21 translated as “Poland: General Staff, Defence Ministry Dispute Viewed,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-217 (October 12, 1996), p. 2.

⁸⁹ Luiza Kolwalska, “Walesa Wants Generals: President Promoted Nine Officers,” *Zycie Warszawy* (May 9, 1995), p. 3 translated as “Walesa Promotes Nine Officers to Generals [sic],” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-090 (May 10, 1995), pp. 44-45.

⁹⁰ See, for example, Włodzimierz Kalicki with Krzysztof Grybos, “The Hat Under the Four-Cornered Cap,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* (October 16, 1995), pp. 18-19 translated as “Wilecki Impedes Civilian Rule in Defence Ministry,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-202 (October 19, 1995), pp. 49-54.

military in their presidential political campaigns. Officers allegedly gathered signatures on behalf of reformed-Communist presidential candidate Aleksander Kwasniewski while top generals in the Polish armed forces were accused of actively campaigning for President Wałęsa.⁹¹ There is almost certainly an element of truth to many of these reports. The military as well as other major political institutions in Poland (such as the Catholic Church) were drawn into what promised to be a pivotal election. (This dispute will also be discussed in more detail in the context of Proposition Six k.)

The Presidential Elections of 1995 and the 1996 Constitutional Draft:

In the end, the Polish Presidential elections were won in the second round of voting by the reformed-Communist candidate — Aleksander Kwasniewski. In a very tight finish, Kwasniewski polled 51.72% of the vote to President Wałęsa's 48.28% of the vote.⁹²

In much the same way that the 1991 decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court was the watershed event in the struggle for supremacy between the Presidential and Parliamentary models of democratic civilian control in Hungary's mixed Presidential-Parliamentary political system, the election of the Democratic Left Alliance's candidate in the 1995 Polish Presidential election was a watershed event in the similar — but much

⁹¹ See, for example, Janina Paradowska and Jerzy Baczynski (interviewers), "The Armed Forces have a Right to Defend Themselves," *Polityka* (September 9, 1995), p. 3 translated as "Chief of Staff on Status, Control of Army," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-176 (September 12, 1995), pp. 31-35 and KRZEM [sic], "Wilecki: Somebody is Trying to Stir Up Conflict Between the Top and the Bottom in the Armed Forces - The Draftee has Problems," *Gazeta Wyborcza* (August 17, 1995), p. 3 translated as "Gen. Wilecki on Reports of Campaigning for Walesa," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-160 (August 18, 1995), pp. 43-44.

⁹² Results of the Polish Presidential elections are presented in Jakub Karpinski, "Kwasniewski Unseats Walesa as President," *Transition*, Vol. 1, No. 23 (December 15, 1995), pp. 48-50.

more vicious and prolonged — debate over these same issues that occurred in Poland between 1989 and 1995. Almost immediately after the election, Wałęsa's three "Presidential" Ministers (Zbigniew Okonski in Defence, Andrzej Milczanowski at the Interior Ministry, and Wladyslaw Bartoszewski in Foreign Affairs) resigned their positions (as expected).⁹³

President-elect Kwasniewski also announced that he was willing to work with his Democratic Left Alliance-Polish Peasant Party allies in the Sejm to resolve outstanding issues between the two parts of the Polish executive structure. Kwasniewski clearly favoured *parliamentary* democratic civilian control over the armed forces and the elimination of the "duality of power" over the armed forces.⁹⁴

By the Summer of 1996, a committee of Sejm and Senate delegates finally was able to complete a draft of a new Polish Constitution.⁹⁵ This draft greatly reduced presidential powers over military (and other) affairs.⁹⁶

⁹³ "[Untitled: Announcement by the Prime Minister," *PAP*, 1213 GMT (November 28, 1995) translated as "Milczanowski, Bartoszewski, Okonski Dismissed," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-228 (November 28, 1995), p. 47.

⁹⁴ See Janusz B. Grochowski, "Newly Elected President on Defence," *Polska Zbrojna* (November 21, 1995), pp. 1-2 translated as "Kwasniewski's Defence Platform Detailed," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-226 (November 22, 1995), pp. 25-26 and Antoni Witkowski and Colonel Jerzy Markowski (interviewers), "I Will Respect and Protect the Polish Armed Forces," *Polska Zbrojna* (December 22-26, 1995), pp. 1-2 translated as "Army Paper Interviews Kwasniewski," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-250 (December 29, 1995), pp. 37-41.

⁹⁵ For a complete draft of the proposed Polish Constitution see "Draft of the Constitution, 19 June 1996," *Rzeczpospolita* (June 21, 1996), pp. I-VIII translated as "Polish Draft Constitution," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-135-S (June 21, 1996), pp. 1-45.

⁹⁶ On May 25, 1997, the Constitutional Draft was passed in a national referendum. Almost 53 percent of the votes cast were in favour of the draft while 46 percent were opposed. Voter turnout was approximately 43 percent. See "Polish Constitution Approved," *RFE/RL Newswire*, Vol. 1, No. 39 (May 27, 1997), p. 3.

The President retained the post of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, but this will now become a mostly symbolic post.⁹⁷ Presidential authority over the armed forces in peacetime is to be hereafter exercised through the office of the Defence Minister, but the President no longer possesses the authority to appoint the Defence Minister.⁹⁸ The President will still be able to appoint senior military commanders, but this authority now requires the consent of the Minister of Defence (for general promotions) or the Prime Minister (in the case of the wartime Commander-in-Chief).⁹⁹ And even the President's ability to declare a State of Emergency or permit allied troops to cross Polish territory in the case of sudden attack is limited by the requirement that such declarations be "recommended" by the Prime Minister and be reviewed by the Sejm at the earliest possible moment.¹⁰⁰ Clearly the balance has shifted significantly in favour of the *parliamentary* model of democratic civilian control over the armed forces.

Now that the long battle to reform the Polish Constitution is complete, the President and Sejm increasingly are turning to the various legislative and administrative requirements that are associated with their model of parliamentary democratic civilian control over the armed forces. (The changes will be discussed in more detail in the context of Proposition Four.) This process, however, did not end all of the squabbling over the final form of all

⁹⁷ Article 117.1 - "Draft of the Constitution...."

⁹⁸ Article 117.2 - "Draft of the Constitution...."

⁹⁹ Articles 117.3 through 117.5 - "Draft of the Constitution...."

¹⁰⁰ Articles 101.3 and 217 - "Draft of the Constitution...."

of these reforms. Chief of the General Staff Wilecki continued to be subject to political attacks for his efforts to protect the institutional integrity of the General Staff until he was replaced by Kwasniewski. (This conflict will be discussed in more detail in the context of Proposition Six g.)

Conclusions:

The expectation that post-Communist (transitional) civil-military relations in both Hungary and Poland would take the form of a model of civilian control seems to have been validated by subsequent developments. In both Hungary and Poland, the model of civilian control appears to be solidly grounded. No major challenges to this model have appeared.

On the other hand, the debate over the *variation* of democratic civilian control to be adopted in these two countries was — and (to a lesser degree) continues to be — subject to debate within the political and military spheres. This debate lasted considerably longer in Poland than it did in Hungary, but even the Hungarian crisis should not be underestimated.

As the political transformation from totalitarian rule to democratic rule was by no means smooth in the two countries, it should not be too surprising that critical issues — such as control over the armed forces — came to be the object of fierce political battles. Moreover as “new democracies,” it really should be no surprise that the military was drawn into these debates. In Poland, the prolonged nature of the conflict and the frequent

efforts by supporters of both the presidential and the parliamentary systems of democratic civilian control to pull the armed forces into partisan political debates meant that it was almost inevitable that the military would fall somewhat short of the ideal of political neutrality. In Hungary, the involvement of the army's top commander in the debate (i.e., Lieutenant General Lorincz's threatened resignation) helped to spur the two sides to lower the tone of their discourse and ultimately allow the Constitutional Court to resolve the issue. In Poland, the intervention of the military into the political debate did not lead to a settlement.

At the same time, it must be emphasized that the debate over the variation of democratic civilian control occurred in a context of broad general consensus. The civilian authorities and the military agreed that the old system of penetrative domination had to be dismantled and a new relationship constructed. In both Hungary and Poland, the model of parliamentary democratic civilian control - although bruised and bloodied - emerged victorious. And while there was debate within the civilian authorities and between the civilian authorities and the military, these debates did not prevent the basic principles of democratic civilian control from becoming firmly rooted in the national constitution.

PART B: UNIVERSAL AND NEAR UNIVERSAL THEMES

CHAPTER 5.4: EMPIRICAL RESULTS PROPOSITION FOUR

Proposition Four - Legislative and Administrative Control Mechanisms:

The perceived illegitimacy of military rule, on the one hand, and the desire of all regimes to use legislative and administrative controls to create and institutionalize a professional military system which avows the ethic of civilian control, on the other hand, do not guarantee civilian rule in all instances. All regimes, democratic, authoritarian, or totalitarian, are subject to military interference and even military coups in certain circumstances.

Introduction:

In the previous chapter (Chapter 5.3), the general issue of civilian control was analyzed. It was suggested that in the post-Communist (transitional) period the principle of *democratic civilian control* has met with little resistance in either Hungary or Poland. On the other hand, sharp political differences have arisen between civilian political factions and between the civilian authorities and the military on the question of *who* should control the army. After a long and sometimes extremely bitter debate (which on several occasions led the armed forces to take sides), the proponents of parliamentary control won out over proponents of presidential control in both countries.

In this chapter, the Typology of Relevance turns from the general issue of civilian control (i.e., *parliamentary* democratic civilian control) and focuses its attention upon the first of two non-exclusive strategies which regimes may use to implement civilian rule. As was suggested in Chapter Four, the two strategies are as follows: (a) the state can employ a

system of recurrent legal and administrative mechanisms to manage the armed forces (i.e., the civilian authorities can move to *institutionalize* the civil-military relationship), and/or (b) the civilian authorities can employ adjunct or special mechanisms to control the military (i.e., the civilian authorities can move to *subordinate* the military component of the civil-military equation to civilian direction).

The process of establishing these legislative and administrative control mechanisms is still incomplete in both states. It is also more fully developed in Hungary than it is in Poland because the conflict between the president and the legislature was settled earlier in the former than in the latter. Both states, however, have made considerable progress in replacing the Communist-era system of subjective civilian control with a system of objective civilian control. The two regimes (after considerable debate) have moved to codify and institutionalize the principle of democratic civilian control by passing legislation covering the activities of the armed forces (i.e., the non-political character of the armed forces, the military budget process, the rights and duties of military personnel, and so on) and they have begun the process of establishing legislative oversight bodies (i.e., organizations charged with developing military policy and regulating military activities). More work needs to be done, but the fundamental building-blocks of the system of objective civilian control are being put into place.

As part of the overall democratic reform process, the Hungarian and Polish regimes are relying principally upon recurrent legal and administrative mechanisms to manage their armed forces. For now, adjunct or special control mechanisms (i.e., security forces

penetrating the armed forces, paramilitary forces acting as political counterweights, or socialization or education programs) play a much less important role. Because they are attempting to create a system of democratic civilian control, the adjunct mechanism most frequently employed in these two states involves the socialization and education of military personnel. Most other adjunct control mechanisms are incompatible with democratic rule. (Adjunct or special mechanisms will be discussed in the context of Proposition Five and the reaction of the military to both the recurrent and special mechanisms will be discussed in the context of Proposition Six.)

Hungary - Legislative Control Mechanisms:

In concert with amendments to the Hungarian Constitution dealing with the establishment of democratic *parliamentary* control and direction over the armed forces, the Cabinet and the National Assembly have carried forth an extensive legislative and administrative agenda to *implement* the constitutional principle. On the legislative front, the Cabinet and National Assembly have dealt with many military issues including military doctrine,¹ defence preparedness,² the military budget,³ the rights of soldiers,⁴ military manpower

¹ "National Assembly Resolution No. 27 of 23 April 1993 concerning the Basic National Defence Principles of the Hungarian Republic," *Magyar Kozlony*, No. 48 (April 23, 1993), pp. 2701-2705 translated as "Resolution on National Defence," *JPRS-EER*, No. 93-061 (July 1, 1993), pp. 28-32.

² "Government Decree No. 124 of 27 September concerning temporary rules for regional defence management," *Magyar Kozlony*, No. 104 (September 27, 1991), p. 2130 translated as "Decree on Defence Preparedness Functions," *JPRS-EER*, No. 91-181-S (December 24, 1991), pp. 6-7.

³ A new *budget law* is, however, still pending.

⁴ Act XLIII. of 1996 on the Service Status of the Commissioned Members of the Armed Organizations (Commissioned Status Act), Act XLIV. of 1996 on the Service Status of the Conscripted Soldiers (Conscript Status Act), and Act XLV. of 1996 on the Status of the Leaders, Instructors, and Students of Military and Law Enforcing High Training Institutes (Training Institutes Status Act). "Summary of the New Status Acts," (Unpublished Manuscript Courtesy of the Hungarian Embassy to Canada).

levels,⁵ the protection of military secrets,⁶ and cooperation with NATO.⁷ (The specific details of these measures will be covered in the context of Propositions Five and Six).

The most important measures dealing with the overall administration of the armed forces are contained within the provisions of the National Defence Act.⁸ This Act, although the object of fierce political debate and subject to more than 500 proposed amendments, was passed almost unanimously in the National Assembly (277 votes yes, 1 vote no, and 1 abstention) on December 7, 1993 and its provisions took effect on January 1, 1994.⁹

The National Defence Act serves to put into practice many of the principals set forth in the reformed Hungarian Constitution. For example, the Act details the circumstances in which the National Assembly or the President can invoke a State of Emergency or State of Exigency (Extreme Readiness).¹⁰

⁵ Parliamentary Resolution No. 85/1995 noted in Ministry of Defence [U.K.]: Directorate of Management & Consultancy Services, *Review of Parliamentary Oversight of the Hungarian MOD and Democratic Control of the Hungarian Defence Forces* (London, U.K.: Directorate of Management & Consultancy Services, 1996), p. 27. (Hereafter cited as MOD [U.K.], *Review of Parliamentary Oversight....*)

⁶ “[Untitled: Text of Minister of Defence Decree No. 27 of 15 December 1992 Concerning State and Official Secrets Related to the Military plus Appendix,]” *Magyar Kozlony*, No. 125 (December 15, 1992), pp. 4387-4390 translated as “Decree on Military Secrets,” *JPRS-EER*, No. 93-012-S (February 23, 1993), pp. 37-39.

⁷ Hungary signed the Partnership for Peace Framework Document on February 8, 1994 and agreed to its first Individual Partnership Programme on November 15, 1994. Source: “Focus on NATO: Partnership for Peace Participants (as of 30 April 1995),” *NATO REVIEW*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (May 1995), p. 5.

⁸ “Act CX. of 1993 on Home Defence” (Unpublished Manuscript Courtesy of the Hungarian Embassy to Canada).

⁹ On the scope of the legislative debates see: Rozgics (interviewer), “[Untitled: Defence Ministry Official Discusses New Defence Law,]” *Uj Magyarorszag*, (December 9, 1993), p. 4 translated as “Defence Ministry Official Views New Defence Law,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 93-239 (December 15, 1993), pp. 25-26.

¹⁰ “Act CX. of 1993 on Home Defence,” especially sections 32-38.

The Act also places limits on the use of military personnel during outbreaks of internal unrest. Only when rebels are armed (as defined in the Constitution) can military personnel be used to defend the state. In such circumstances, troops may only be deployed in limited geographical areas and their units commanders retain normal operational control (i.e., the regular chain of command is not bypassed).¹¹

The 1993 Defence Act also codifies the responsibilities and authority of the various political actors which direct the armed forces. It details, for example, which posts in the military command structure are appointed by the President on the advice of the Minister of Defence (i.e., the Commander of the Defence Forces and the Chief of the General Staff) or the Minister of the Interior (i.e., the Commander of the Border Guard).¹²

Finally, the National Defence Act also codifies the non-political character of armed forces personnel. For example, active-duty members of the military are barred from sitting in the National Assembly and may not hold political offices (i.e., they are forbidden from serving as President of the Republic). Active-duty personnel are prohibited from participating in election campaigns, expressing political views, or influencing the votes of their subordinates. And military facilities are considered to be “off-limits” to political events.¹³

¹¹ “Act CX. of 1993 on Home Defence,” especially section 22 §1(d) and section 22 §2.

¹² “Act CX. of 1993 on Home Defence,” section 7 (b).

¹³ See, especially, “Act CX. of 1993 on Home Defence,” section 57.

Overall these measures reduce the armed forces' susceptibility to partisan political interference. The state of emergency provisions in particular serve to prevent military units from being politicized by expressly recognizing the validity of the military chain of command. Unit commands can only accept commands from their superiors. They cannot accept commands from local political authorities. And as the civilian chain of command is also expressly defined, situations where the military receives conflicting commands from separate civilian authorities (as very nearly occurred in 1991) will be even less likely to arise in the future.

Such clear-cut regulations are to the advantage of both the military and the civilian authorities. For the military, *a priori* procedures prevent the military from being drawn into civilian political disputes. And for the civilian authorities, these rules obviate the need for the military to play the role of "kingmaker" between political alternatives and this furthers the principle of democratic civilian control.

Hungary - Administrative Control Mechanisms:

As important as legislation governing the armed forces, the second cornerstone of the Hungarian system of democratic civilian control is manifest in the parliamentary oversight committees which have been established since 1989. In terms of furthering its specific agenda of institutionalizing democratic civilian control, the National Assembly took an important step forward with the passage of a detailed bill covering the National Assembly's own internal rules and procedures — "The House Rules of the National

Assembly of the Hungarian Republic” — in the fall of 1994.¹⁴ Most salient of the measures contained in this piece of legislation are the rules governing standing and temporary (*ad hoc*) committees of the National Assembly.

Legislative committees are an important means by which civilian oversight over the military (and other state organs) is exercised in democratic regimes.¹⁵ With their narrow, specialized policy focus, these committees help individual legislators gain valuable, direct experience in the management of issues under their supervision — much more experience and knowledge than the average (non-specialist) legislator is able to incur.

The committee system also serves to open lines of communications between legislators and individuals or groups affected by legislative oversight. Legislative committees are typically authorized to hold public or *in camera* hearings, call and question relevant witnesses, and view important documents which are otherwise inaccessible.

According to Imre Mecs, the chair of the National Assembly’s National Defence Committee, the Hungarian National Defence Committee — the legislature’s most important committee on security and defence issues — works in concert with the office of the President of the Republic to “supervise” the armed forces. Like the President,

¹⁴ “National Assembly Resolution No. 46. OGY of 30 September 1994 on the House Rules of the National Assembly of the Hungarian Republic,” *Magyar Kozlony*, No. 96 (September 30, 1994), pp. 3023-3053 translated as “National Assembly’s Internal Rules, Procedures,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-023-S (February 3, 1995), pp. 1-30.

¹⁵ See, for example, Sir Arthur Hockaday, “Parliamentary Control of Defence: The Role of Select Committees,” *Royal United Service Institute Journal*, Vol. 135, No. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 7-10.

however, this does not mean that the Committee can or should interfere with the operation of the military. As Mecs has stated, “supervision does not, can not, mean direct control [over operational matters]!”¹⁶ In other words, the Committee can issue reports on military activities, but it cannot give orders to military commanders.

Areas of Legislative and/or Administrative Weakness:

Despite passage of the National Defence Act of 1993 and the development of a series of standing and *ad hoc* legislative committees to oversee and monitor issues of military policy, much more work is required if the Hungarian legislature is to fulfill its civilian oversight functions. Until this work is completed, the National Assembly will not be fully effective as a civilian oversight institution.

Many problems persist. For example, National Defence Committee Chair Mecs has expressed an interest in seeing the statutes on legislative committees (particularly the National Defence Committee) revised and expanded to allow the National Defence Committee to “send out an investigating team at any time and without special authorization.” This power — accorded to the defence committee of the German Bundestag — would enhance civilian control and improve the National Assembly’s supervisory functions by giving greater initiative to the National Defence Committee.¹⁷

¹⁶ Attila Kovacs and Gyorgy M. Toth (interviewers), “We Asked the Chairman of the National Defence Committee: Does Civilian Control Work?” *Magyar Honved.* (April 21, 1995), pp. 4-6 translated as “Mecs Discusses Civilian Control of Military,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-113 (June 13, 1995), pp. 16.

¹⁷ Kovacs and Toth (interviewers), “We Asked the Chairman...,” p. 17.

Instead of having to wait until the National Assembly expanded its terms of reference and assigned a particular issue for investigation, the National Defence Committee could — under such revised rules — take the lead and investigate potential problems sooner rather than later. Its members would be less likely to be subject to politically motivated interference or cover-ups because they would not have to wait for another political body to assign specific defence related issues to the Committee. This would greatly improve the oversight capabilities of the National Defence Committee and the legislature.

On the other hand, the *Deputy* Chair of the National Defence Committee, Sandor Szili, has acknowledged that Hungary's new democratic traditions and new system of democratic civilian control over the military occasionally has resulted in the *over-*regulation of the armed forces and that this has impeded "fast decision-making in the Army." Szili has noted that the Hungarian legislature has taken it upon itself to take decisions which — in Western military-political systems — are left in the hands of the military, but he accords this phenomenon to growing pains and feels that this tendency is not currently resented in the military because of the broad societal legitimacy of the legislature (compared with its Communist predecessors).¹⁸

Such micro-management may be more conducive to civilian control (at least in the short term) than its antithesis, but a recent Canadian example suggests that such over-regulation can come with a price in terms of civil-military relations. In Canada, a report

¹⁸ Peter Matyuc (interviewer), "Civilian Control of the Army," *Nepszabadsag* (May 20, 1995), pp. 1 & 8 translated as "Ministry Official on Army's Civilian Control," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-100 (May 24, 1995), pp. 18-19.

prepared by the Ministry of National Defence complained about politicians and civilian bureaucrats impeding Canadian deployment and peacekeeping operations with their constant requests for information on the most petty details while at the same time these same civilian oversight bodies failed to provide essential information (i.e., mission definitions and rules of engagement for peacekeeping operations) until the last moment. This made it virtually impossible for the military to plan operations effectively.¹⁹

Striking a balance between over-regulation and administrative neglect is difficult. As the Canadian example suggests, it is also an ongoing process. There is no single “correct” answer to maintaining this balance. Experience and precedents will eventually allow Hungarian legislators and their military subjects to determine this balance. In the meantime, examples of administrative neglect and over-regulation will be relatively common.

A recent report by the Directorate of Management and Consultancy Services in the British Ministry of Defence cited several additional problems involving the civilian control over the armed forces in Hungary. In terms of the effectiveness of the National Defence Committee, the *rapporteurs* concluded that although there has been some continuity in the composition of the committee (seven of its nineteen members returned after the 1994 election), few of the members have managed to gain a sufficient depth of knowledge on

¹⁹ For a summary of this report, see “Political Interference Impedes Military, DND Report Says,” *The Globe and Mail* (April 28, 1997), p. A7.

defence issues to be truly effective.²⁰

The inexperience of most National Defence Committee members is compounded by the limited resources individual committee members are able to bring to bear in the analysis of specific defence issues. These resources pale when compared with the scope of the task at hand. Funds for staff research, for example, are extremely limited. More money has been promised by the National Assembly, but given the current economic climate these funds have not been forthcoming. Committee members also are assisted in their task by the past Defence Minister as well as by two retired generals (all of whom are members of the National Defence Committee), but as it currently stands committee members are forced to rely mostly upon outside academics for expert assistance.²¹

For the time being, legislative oversight in Hungary is more “theoretical” than “effective.” Some areas receive too much regulation while others escape the attentions of the civilian authorities. This has meant that — depending on the issue — the relative balance between the military and its civilian oversight bodies is often weighted in favour of one side or the other. The military is not an autonomous institution, but neither is it subject to effective parliamentary oversight. A proper, comprehensive balance between the two has not yet been struck.

Turning to the related issue of the military budget, the Administrative State Secretary at

²⁰ See MOD [UK], *Review of Parliamentary Oversight...*, p. 14.

²¹ MOD [U.K.], *Review of Parliamentary Oversight...*, pp. 14-15.

the Defence Ministry, Jozsef Feher, has noted that additional administrative control mechanisms are still needed if the Hungarian legislature (through the National Defence Committee and the State Audit Office) is going to exercise complete control over military spending. Specifically, Feher notes the absence of legislation governing budgetary planning and budgetary implementation as well as legislation governing the process of military defence system planning (i.e., the integration of new weapons systems into the overall national defence plan).²²

Currently, spending decisions within the various spending envelopes are almost entirely within the purview of military planners (except to the degree to which they are subject to financial audit). In the words of another Defence Ministry official, the current system of budgetary planning and implementation “allocates funds to various places, like land forces, air forces, and so on, and the [budget] papers do not specify whether we [in the Defence Ministry] buy T-72 tanks, MiG-29 aircraft, or underpants for the soldiers from this money.”²³

Although the Chairman of the National Defence Committee acknowledges this problem and has pressed for legislation in this area, measures are still not in place.²⁴ Legislative reforms are planned in this area and the State Audit Office began a major study of

²² Matyuc (interviewer), “Civilian Control of the Army...,” pp. 18-19.

²³ Comments made by Istvan Fodor, Political State Secretary at the Hungarian Defence Ministry, in Verecke (Interviewer), “Underpants or MiG-29 Aircraft - Baffling Budget,” *Magyar Nemzet* (June 27, 1995), p. 6 translated as “Fodor Views Civilian Control of Armed Forces,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-124 (June 27, 1995), p. 19.

²⁴ Kovacs and Toth (interviewers), “We Asked the Chairman...,” p. 16.

reforms in September of 1995, but until this process is completed the ability of the legislature to control the military by monitoring defence spending (as opposed to the overall defence budget) will be severely limited.²⁵

This administrative weakness represents a significant diminution of the legislature's ability to exercise civilian oversight over the armed forces. Needless to say, it is not a source of civil-military tensions. The civilian bodies do not have the resources to threaten the military's corporate interests!

On yet another front, the National Assembly only recently passed legislation on the security screening of military personnel. National Defence Committee Chairman Mecs acknowledged this legislative weakness, but legislation took a long time to come forward and this legislation has been criticized from all sides as being either too harsh or too weak.²⁶ (This subject is discussed in more detail in the context of Proposition Five a.)

Finally, legal clarification of broad concepts such as "engaging in politics" by military personnel is needed. The present law, for example, fails to differentiate between political campaigning by soldiers (a clearly illegitimate activity) and private political discussions between individuals who happen to be in uniform (an activity legitimate given that

²⁵ The planned reforms of the State Audit Office are discussed in MOD [U.K.], *Review of Parliamentary Oversight...*, p. 25.

²⁶ Peter Matyuc (interviewer), "We Need a Professional Army," *Nepszabadsag* (January 21, 1995), pp. 1&7 translated as "Defence Official Favours Professional Army," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-015 (January 24, 1995), pp. 35-37 and Zsofia Szilagyi, "French President wants Hungary to Join EU in 2000," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 12, Part II (January 17, 1997), p. 3.

soldiers continue to be members of the Hungarian electorate and retain the right to vote in elections).

A spokesman for the military union, Mihaly Volonter (Deputy Chairman of the Military Interest Representation Alliance) publicly pressed the Defence Ministry for a clarification of the rules and regulations governing political activity during a round-table discussion of defence issues in late 1995. Unfortunately for the military union representative, Defence Ministry Administrative State Secretary Feher acknowledged that he does not have an answer to that question. "I would also like to know," was his reply.²⁷

This legal ambiguity lessens the effectiveness of the civilian oversight process for two reasons. First, the imprecision of the proscriptions makes any legal or administrative sanctions subject to judicial review and possible reversal. Second, the imprecision of the law may come to be resented by military personnel who may find that identical activities permitted at one time are not permitted at another.

National Defence Committee Chair Mecs has acknowledged this problem.²⁸ A solution, however, requires more than simple legislation. No law — no matter how well it is drafted — can cover all contingencies. Hungarian civilian and military authorities really need to build up a body of legal and political precedent to assist in the development of an

²⁷ Istvan Harsasi, "HOVET's Interpretations - A New Law for the New Year?" *Magyar Honved*, (August 4, 1995), p. 6 translated as "HOVET's [Reconciliation Council of the National Defence Forces] Discussion of Armed Forces Bill," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-187 (September 27, 1995), pp. 14-15.

²⁸ Matyuc (interviewer), "We Need a Professional Army," p. 36.

ethic of permissible and impermissible speech, but such developments take time.

Poland - Legislative Control Mechanisms:

Poland, like Hungary, is relying upon recurrent legal and administrative mechanisms to control the armed forces. Adjunct or special mechanisms (such as those which existed during the Communist era) have all but disappeared. Socialization and military education programs represent virtually the only adjunct or special control mechanisms still being employed.

Turning to the recurrent mechanisms, the legislative and administrative agenda which has been put into place in Poland is not nearly as complete as that which has been developed in Hungary. The reason for this is obvious. In Poland, the selection of the model of democratic civilian control took considerably longer than it did in Hungary and the political battle that had to be fought before agreement could be obtained between the various interested parties was also far nastier than was the case in Hungary. Most major legislative reforms awaited resolution of this conflict.

In Poland, the worst struggles for authority lasted from 1989 (i.e., the Round-Table talks) to late 1995 (i.e., when Aleksander Kwasniewski defeated Lech Wałęsa). In Hungary, the basic issues were resolved in the aftermath of the Constitutional Court ruling of 1991. Thus Hungary has had an almost four year head-start on developing its legislative and administrative structure.

Despite the difficulties in surmounting the political impasse between the former President and the various factions in the Sejm, Poland still has managed to complete several important legislative and administrative reforms. One early, tentative effort to institutionalize democratic civilian control (albeit *imperfect* democratic civilian control) arose when the National Defence Committee — now counting a non-Communist Prime Minister amongst its membership — passed a resolution on Polish defence doctrine in early 1990. This resolution — signed by General Jaruzelski in his capacity as President of the Republic and Chairman of the National Defence Committee — is interesting because it is *only* as part of the *title* of the resolution that the term “People’s Republic” is used to describe Poland. At all other times in this document, the still nominal Polish People’s Republic is simply referred to as the “Republic of Poland.”²⁹

This measure was of importance to the military establishment because it linked Poland’s future defence doctrine to the cause of Polish nationalism. As early as 1956, elements within the armed forces had joined nationalist political factions in proposing such a doctrine. This resolution symbolically indicated that the armed forces might be freed from the extra-legal constraints of the existing system of “socialist internationalism.”

Another tentative effort to establish democratic civilian control over military affairs was to follow in late 1990 when the “Round-Table” Parliament passed a package of legislation governing the state border and the organization and utilization of the Border

²⁹ “(Extract) Resolution No. 1/90 of the National Defence Committee Concerning the Defence Doctrine of the Polish Republic,” *Zolnierz Wolnosci* (February 26, 1990), pp. 1-8 translated as “National Defence Committee Presents 1990 Defence Doctrine, Aims,” *JPRS-EER*, No. 90-038 (March 26, 1990), pp. 27-31.

Guard service.³⁰ This legislation — democratic in that it explicitly or “transparently” defined operational procedures *a priori* to their execution — institutionalized or spelt out the “rules of engagement” for Border Guard troops. The legislation covered the context in which force could be used to defend the state border and determined the degree of force that could be employed by Border Guard troops in the course of their operations.

Still more democratic changes extending the rule of law were forthcoming on a number of other military issues following Poland’s first totally free Parliamentary elections. In 1991, the new Cabinet moved to extend democratic control over military policy by passing an executive order revising the rules and emergency circumstances under which police units were to be subordinated to military command.³¹ As well, preliminary reforms were begun on the selective service system and the procedures for granting military service deferments.³²

³⁰ For the law defining the state border see “[Untitled: Law Dated October 12, 1990 Governing the Protection of the State Border,]” *Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 78, Item No. 461 (November 19, 1990), pp. 1049-1051 translated as “Law on the Protection of State Border,” *JPRS-EER*, No. 91-021-S (February 15, 1991), pp. 43-45. For the law on the duties and responsibilities of the Border Guard see “[Untitled: Law Dated October 12, 1990 Governing the Operations of the Border Guard,]” *Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 78, Item No. 462 (November 19, 1990), pp. 1051-1066 translated as “Law Governing Border Guard Service,” *JPRS-EER*, No. 91-021-S (February 15, 1991), pp. 45-64.

³¹ “[Untitled: Order Dated March 12, 1991 on the Use of the Police and Armed Forces in Times of Emergency,]” *Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 26, Item No. 104 (March 30, 1991), pp. 369-370 translated as “Order on Use of Police, Armed Forces, Firearms,” *JPRS-EER*, No. 91-106-S (July 19, 1991), pp. 26-28.

³² The selective service reforms were included in the reform of the uniform text of the 1967 Law Concerning the General Duty of Defending the Republic of Poland. For the 1991 Amendments as well as the original 1967 Law (which is published *in toto* as a supplement) see “[Untitled: Ministry of National Defence Proclamation Dated December 11, 1991 Governing the Publication of the Uniform Text of the November 21, 1967 Law Concerning the General Duty of Defending the Republic of Poland (As Amended),]” *Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 4, Item No. 16 (January 22, 1992), pp. 25-64 translated as “Law on Duty to Defend the Republic of Poland,” *JPRS-EER*, No. 92-111-S (August 20, 1992), pp. 1-44. For details on the reform of the system of military deferments see “[Untitled: Ministry of National Defence Proclamation Dated September 13, 1991 Governing the Publication of the Uniform Text of the Executive Order of the Council of Ministers Dated December 11, 1989 Governing the Granting of Deferments to

This legislation (in conjunction with the 1990 reforms), improved Polish civil-military relations by clearly establishing the function of the paramilitary Border Guard to be more analogous to that of a police force instead of a counterweight to the regular army. In this way, one more adjunct control mechanism of the Communist era was abolished.

As part of this last reform package, the 1967 Defence Law was also amended. Due to the political impasse between President Wałęsa and the new Sejm however, the provisions most relevant to the issue of democratic civilian control — the definition of the roles of the National Defence Committee, the President, and the Defence Minister — remained unchanged. As well, the institutional position of the National Security Bureau in the Polish defence policy-making structure remained undefined. The Bureau existed in an institutional void and — as far as the Constitution was concerned — it was accountable to no one.

During this period of presidential-parliamentary conflict and dual authority (which only worsened when the “reformed” Communists returned to power in the Legislature in 1993), the only important military reforms that the two sides could agree upon touched upon military issues with an international dimension. Specifically, Poland signed on to the NATO Partnership for Peace program in 1994 in addition to continuing to participate in the CSCE (Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe), CFE (Conventional

Mandatory Military Service,]” *Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 82, Item No. 370 (September 14, 1991), pp. 1157-1163 translated as “Proclamation on Order Granting Military Deferments,” *JPRS-EER*, No. 9-181-S (December 24, 1991), pp. 16-23.

Forces in Europe), and Open Skies processes.³³ It was almost as if the political forces in Poland required the discipline of international negotiations and external political pressures to impose some order on their own political squabbling. (The international dimension — especially as it pertains to the expansion of NATO — will be discussed in more detail in the context of Proposition Eight.)

Unresolved Issues During the Era of Dual Authority:

The fallout from the conflict between the President and Sejm significantly reduced the ability of both sides to effectively exercise control over military affairs. Although some relatively minor reforms continued to unfold (i.e., the Sejm passed several laws: On the Establishment of the Day of the Polish Army, On the Military Oath, On the Insignia of the Armed Forces of the Polish Republic, and On Retirement Benefits for the Career Military), the competing civilian authorities failed to agree to legislation governing much more critical civil-military issues.³⁴ Legislative deadlock, in other words, was the rule — not the exception in these policy areas.

³³ For Poland's international military agreements see Leonard Lukaszuk, "The International-Law Context of Poland's National Security and Defence," *Mysl Wojskowa*, No. 1 (January-February 1995), pp. 5-14 translated as "Impact of International Pacts on Defence Policy," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-059 (March 28, 1995), pp. 14-17. As far as Poland's participation in the Partnership for Peace program is concerned, Poland signed the Framework Document on February 2, 1994 and agreed to its Individual Partnership Programme on July 5, 1994. Source: "Focus on NATO: Partnership for Peace Participants (as of 30 April 1995)," *NATO REVIEW*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (May 1995), p. 5.

³⁴ On the minor issues passed by the Sejm see Stanislaw Lukaszewski, "This Impasse Should Not Exist," *Polska Zbrojna* (October 17, 1994), pp. 1-2 translated as "Legislative Work of Defence Ministry Discussed," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 94-216 (November 8, 1994), pp. 27-29. See, also, Acting Minister of National Defence Jerzy Milewski (speech), "[Excerpts of a speech to the Sejm entitled:] Objectives for the Ministry of National Defence for Now and the Immediate Future," *Polska Zbrojna* (January 20-22, 1995), p. 2 translated as "Milewski's Speech in Sejm Defence Debate," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-014 (January 23, 1995), pp. 34-36.

Amongst the more serious jurisdictional disputes involved divergent plans to reconstitute a Polish National Guard and conflicting efforts to reorganize the Polish General Staff. In the summer of 1992, President Wałęsa — working through the National Defence Committee — announced his desire to fill the void created when the Communist-era ZOMO (Motorized Reserve of the Citizens' Militia) was disbanded. Wałęsa wanted to organize a National Guard which would be under the command of the President and which would enable the Polish President to “restore order in any voivodship.”³⁵ On the other hand, the Sejm Defence Committee was willing to authorize the formation of a National Guard, but only if the units in question were subordinated to the Defence minister (and thus ultimately to the Prime Minister and the Sejm) and not if they were under the command of the President.³⁶ Given these competing visions, both plans languished.

As for the reform of the Polish General Staff, Wałęsa resisted efforts by the Sejm to remove the Military Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service from the control of the General Staff and, moreover, he resisted efforts to reduce the powerful role of the Chief of the Polish General Staff within the military and Defence Ministry hierarchy. Wałęsa, instead, wanted to make the Chief of the General Staff the “Inspector General” of the Armed Forces and effectively designate that individual as the Commander of the Armed

³⁵ See “[Untitled: Public Discussion at Gdansk Shipyard],” *TVP [Television First Program]*, 2200 GMT (February 26, 1993) translated as “Walesa Answers Solidarity Delegates' Questions,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 93-040 (March 3, 1993), pp. 26-28. For Walesa's announcement in the National Defence Committee, also see “[Untitled: Text of Walesa's Address to KOK],” *Polska Zbrojna* (July 31-August 2, 1992), pp. 1-2 translated as “Walesa Addresses National Defence Committee,” *JPRS-EER*, No. 92-114 (August 24, 1992), pp. 8-9.

³⁶ Simon, pp. 56-57.

Forces in times of war.³⁷ (This dispute is also discussed in the context of Proposition Six g.)

These, of course, are only some of the more prominent and public debates that occurred in this era of “dual authority.” At several points (as will be discussed in the context of Proposition Six k), the military was dragged into these civilian political disputes and was asked to take sides. At several points it did just that (i.e., usually siding with the Polish President). This did not, however, represent the ideal of what was expected of the military in a system of democratic civilian control.

In the end, both presidential and parliamentary military oversight suffered. Neither presidential defence commissions nor the parliamentary defence commissions were able to effectively monitor and direct all aspects of Polish defence policy. The military was frequently left to choose to follow whichever authorities it wished. Overall, this crisis of civilian oversight was so bad that an exasperated Jerzy Milewski (at that time Chief of the National Security Bureau) was taken to remark:

Right now, there are different *ad hoc* committees within the government and in its close environment; there are also anticrisis committees and committees dealing with specific topics. Such committees are established, nobody knows how they function or when they are supposed to cease to

³⁷ See, for example, Anna Marszalek, “Secret Services Under Special Control: Muzzle or Loose Bridle for Scorpions,” *Rzeczpospolita* (January 17, 1995), p. 12 translated as “Civilian Control Over Secret Services Viewed,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-017 (January 26, 1995), pp. 13-18; Janina Paradowska and Jerzy Baczynski (interviewers), “The Armed Forces Have a Right to Defend Themselves,” *Polityka* (September 9, 1995), p. 3 translated as “Chief of Staff on Status, Control of Army,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-176 (September 9, 1995), pp. 1-9; and Pawel Wronski, “MON Proposals - Calls for a Commander,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* (May 5, 1994), p. 2 translated as “Changes in Supreme Defence Structures Viewed,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 94-088 (May 6, 1994), p. 27.

function.³⁸

Milewski, then a Wałęsa ally, was particularly critical of the Sejm's oversight efforts, but his critique could apply equally to presidential oversight efforts as well. The situation obviously was intolerable. Something had to give, but this intolerable condition was to last for almost two more years!

The Law on the Duties of the Defence Minister:

For better or for worse, Poland finally was able to begin to resolve the internal political debate over the adoption of a model of democratic civilian control with the election of Aleksander Kwasniewski in late 1995. Much of the current system of parliamentary civilian control followed in the wake of Kwasniewski's victory and was codified and institutionalized with the passage of the "Law on the Duties of the Defence Minister" and various enabling statutes.³⁹

The Law on the Duties of the Defence Minister makes the Minister of Defence the individual who "exercises overall control of national defence" and explicitly extends this control to include the Polish General Staff which is defined as being an integral part of

³⁸ Piotr Swiac (interviewer), "Directly from the Belweder [television program]," *TVP [Television First Program Network]*, 1900 GMT (February 14, 1994) translated as "Milewski on Planned Changes in Supreme Defence," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 94-031 (February 15, 1994), pp. 36-37.

³⁹ For the text of this law see "Law Dated 14 December 1995 Detailing Duties of the Minister of National Defence," *Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 10 (January 30, 1996), pp. 159-161 translated as "Law on Duties of the National Defence Minister," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-120 (January 30, 1996), pp. 1-4. The two enabling statutes are discussed by two legal experts from the Legal Department of the Ministry of Defence in the following: Stanislaw Malecki and Piotr Pabisiak-Karwowski, "Statute for MON, Tasks for the Minister," *Rzeczpospolita* (August 16, 1996), p. 14 translated as "Defence Ministry Structure, Tasks Detailed," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-161 (August 21, 1996), pp. 1-5. See also Robert Kowal, "Reforming the Ministry," *Polska Zbrojna* (July 15, 1996), pp. 1 & 3 translated as "Defence Ministry Structure Reform Detailed," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-137 (July 17, 1996), pp. 1-4.

the Defence Ministry (as opposed to being answerable to the President).⁴⁰ As the Defence Ministry is no longer a “Presidential” Ministry, this legislation greatly diminishes the power of the President *vis á vis* the legislature in the determination of Polish defence policy.

The Law on the Duties of the Defence Minister also reforms the organizational structure of the Defence Ministry. Many redundant and overlapping components within the Ministry have either been eliminated in their entirety or they have been merged with other administrative entities. The Ministry — which had been comprised of 52 organizational units — now comprises only 32 departments, administrations, offices, and sections.⁴¹

In addition to the actual Minister of Defence, the “civilian” side of the Ministry of Defence consists of 14 departments, two offices, 14 administrations, and one independent section. The 14 departments are as follows: the Administrative Coordinating Department, the Department of International Security, the Budget Department, the Department of Armament and Military Equipment Supply, the Economic Department, the Department of Infrastructure, the Department of Cadres and Military Education, the Inspection Department, the Legal Department, the Department of Research and Project Implementation, the Socioeducational Department, the Department of the Defense System, the Department of Foreign Military Affairs, and the Department of Cooperation with NATO.

⁴⁰ Articles 1.1 and 1.2, “Law on Duties of the National Defence Minister,” p. 1.

⁴¹ The details of this reorganization are reported in Malecki and Pabisiak-Karwowski, p. 2.

The 14 administrations which constitute the “military” side of the Ministry of Defence (i.e., the General Staff) are as follows: the Administration of Command, the Administration for Materials, the Administration for Mobilization and Recruitment, the Administration for Territorial Defense, the General Administration, the Operational Strategic Administration, the Organizational Administration, the Administration for Logistics Planning, the Administration for Programming the Development of the Armed Forces, the Administration for Reconnaissance and Radio Electronic Warfare, the Administration for Troop Training, the Technological Administration, the Administration of the Communications Troops and Information Science, and the Administration of the Military Health Service. In addition, the Ministry of Defence also encompasses the Offices of Press and Information, the Office of Complaints and Interventions, and the Topographical Section.

The other significant reform covered by this legislation involves the reorganization of the top military command structure. Under this reform package, a new Ground Forces Command has been created to parallel the Navy and Air Force & Air Defence Commands. Formerly, the army was under the direct supervision of the General Staff. Now the General Staff is responsible for the various military Administrations within the Ministry of Defence (i.e., the Administration for Troop Training, the Administration of the Military Health Service, and the Administration of Command) as well as the Topographical Section while the various military Departments (i.e., the Department of Armament and Military Equipment Supply, the Department of Cooperation with NATO,

and the Administrative Coordinating Department) as well as the two Ministry of Defence Offices (i.e., the Office of Press and Information and the Office of Complaints and Interventions) are directly subordinated to the Minister of Defence. More significantly, the various operational Commands of the armed forces (including the Commands of the Ground Forces, the Air Force and Air Defence Forces, and the Navy) also are directly subordinated to the Minister of Defence - by-passing the Polish General Staff.⁴² (This topic also will be re-visited in the context of Propositions Six f through Six h.)

Areas of Legislative and/or Administrative Weakness:

The Law on the Duties of the Defence Minister represents only the beginning of a long and difficult program of establishing Parliamentary civilian control. Much more needs to be done if this system is to operate efficiently. But as is the case in Hungary as well, "the devil is in the details."

First, new statutes are required for *each* of the departments, administrations, sections, and offices of the Ministry of Defence. These statutes, when completed, will detail the internal organization of these individual units as well as specify the scope of their particular tasks. Work on these internal regulations has begun, but - due to the sheer

⁴² Also directly subordinated to the Minister of Defence are the following: the Headquarters of the Military Police, the Inspectorate of the Military Information Service together with the units subordinated to it, the National Defense Academy, the editorial staffs of *Polska Zbrojna* and the *Zolnierz Wolnosci* illustrated magazine, the Central Military Library, the Museum of the Polish Armed Forces, the House of the Polish Armed Forces, the Representative Artistic Ensemble of the Polish Armed Forces, the Central Military Archives, the Printing House of the General Staff, military retirement offices, the Central Clinical Hospital, and the Staff of the Civilian Defense of the Country. Source: Malecki and Pabisiak-Karwowski, p. 2.

magnitude of the task at hand - this process is incomplete.⁴³

In addition, work has begun — but is incomplete — on the process of reforming the military budget oversight process. The government wants to adopt the defence financing and administration system to conform to NATO norms and standards, but — as is the case in Hungary — this task is very complicated and is perhaps the most difficult reform to undertake. Presently, as Deputy Defence Minister Andrzej Karkoszka admits, the situation is one where defence officials “do not know at the moment what the assets of [the Ministry of Defence] are, only that they are enormous.”⁴⁴

Critics have also noted that neither the Ministry of Defence nor the military itself can accurately estimate the cost of such policies as Poland’s ascension to NATO. Too much essential information — such as the basic book value of Polish military equipment and infrastructure — is missing or incomplete. As a result, different accounting techniques and costings regularly produce figures whereby outlays for military units in one region are “dozens of times higher” than outlays for similar units in different military garrisons.⁴⁵

The government has expressed its intention of instituting a five-year military budget

⁴³ Malecki and Pabisiak-Karwowski, p. 2.

⁴⁴ Jerzy Markowski (interviewer), “We Are Not a Sabbat,” *Polska Zbrojna* (February 12, 1996), pp. 1-2 translated as “Deputy Defence Minister on MON Restructuring,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-032 (February 16, 1996), p. 3.

⁴⁵ Marek Henzler, “Poland in NATO: The Time has come to Reckon the Cost - The Price of Alliance,” *Polityka*, No. 20 (May 18, 1996), pp. 31-32 translated as “Cost of NATO Integration Discussed,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-121 (June 24, 1996), p. 2.

planning program, but the legislative agenda of the current government is very heavy and this process is unlikely to be completed in the near term. Prime Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz has stated that the legislature now has before it more draft legislation than it can reasonably be expected to handle. And defence issues must fight for attention in the Sejm and Senate with social and economic reforms, plans to institute a professional civil service, and efforts to reform the administration of the central government.⁴⁶

Polish defence officials also have begun — in anticipation of Poland's ascension to NATO — the labourious process of bringing the rest of Poland's defence standards and procedures into conformity with NATO defence standards and procedures. To date, some 800 out of 1200 NATO standards and procedures have been submitted to Polish military and Defence Ministry personnel, but according to Polish Deputy Minister Andrzej Karkoszka only a small proportion (perhaps entailing several dozen) of these needed reforms have led to changes in Polish defence regulations.⁴⁷

In addition, former Polish Defence Minister, Stanisław Dobrzański, has noted the need for more legislation amending the old 1967 Law Concerning the General Duty of Defending the Republic of Poland. Although amended in 1991, the current law still is mostly a relic of the Communist-era. As well, laws are required governing the imposition

⁴⁶ “[Untitled: Polish Prime Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz's Address to the Sejm],” *Polskie Radio First Program Network*, 0850 GMT (February 14, 1996) translated as “Prime Minister Cimoszewicz's Address to Sejm,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-032 (February 16, 1996), pp. 2-3.

⁴⁷ PAP News Agency (Warsaw), “Deputy Defence Minister Satisfied with Reforms in Ministry,” *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19961204*00193 (December 4, 1996), p. 1.

of states of emergency and martial law, on the Military Information Services (i.e., military counter-intelligence), on the Military Police, and on military discipline.⁴⁸

And finally, Roman Kulczycki (consultant to the Prime Minister and professor of the National Defence Academy) has noted the need to complete the democratic reform of Polish defence doctrine and military strategy.⁴⁹ Legislative drafts exist covering these measures (and many others), but — given a crowded legislative agenda and an occasionally fractious and acrimonious Sejm — the process is far from complete.

Hungarian and Polish Democratic Control Mechanisms - Conclusion:

As expected, civilian authorities in both Hungary and Poland have moved to *institutionalize* the principle of democratic control by means of recurrent legislative and administrative mechanisms. The Hungarian National Assembly is well on the way to creating an effective system of civilian (i.e., Parliamentary) oversight. Issues of military doctrine, accountability, spending and weapons procurement, defence preparedness, military manpower levels, the protection of military secrets, and cooperation with NATO are all coming under effective Parliamentary supervision.

However, this system of control mechanisms is still incomplete. The Hungarian National

⁴⁸ Antoni Witkowski and Ryszard Choroszy (interviewers), "Reforms Yes, but Without Haste," *Polska Zbrojna* (April 12-14, 1996), pp. 1 & 3 translated as "Defence Minister on Achievements, Plans," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-074 (April 17, 1996), p. 3.

⁴⁹ Włodzimierz Kaleta (interviewer), "On Effective Control of National Defence," *Polska Zbrojna* (September 9, 1996), pp. 1-2 translated as "Democratic Control Over Army, Defence," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-197 (October 10, 1996), p. 2.

Assembly despite (or perhaps *because of*) its large governing majority has frequently become deadlocked by political infighting and scandal. This political maneuvering has impeded the pace of legislative and administrative reform even though the basic issues of democratic Parliamentary control were settled by the 1991 ruling of the Constitutional Court.

In addition, the civilian authorities engage in the “micro-management” of some military issues while other areas escape their intentions due to financial and other constraints. As of yet, there is no effective, comprehensive balance between the two sides. Given time and additional resources, these issues can be resolved. In the meantime, the system of recurrent and administrative control mechanisms will be flawed.

In Poland, the legislative program was delayed significantly due to the political impasse that existed between the President and the Sejm. Democratic reforms were undertaken in several areas including the following: on the operations of the Polish Border Guard Service, on the subordination of the police to military control in times of emergency, on the military draft, on participation in the Partnership for Peace Program, and on several other minor issues. Most important reforms, however, awaited resolution of the civilian political battle.

In 1995, the political impasse was broken. With the passage of the Law on the Duties of the Defence Minister, Poland started building a system of democratic parliamentary control over the armed forces. Unfortunately for Poland’s parliamentarians, this program

still is far from complete. After almost six years of bitter political infighting and gridlock; the final version of the Polish Constitution has just been ratified, but the general Defence Law requires extensive revision, budgetary and financial controls must be developed further, and a whole host of additional legislative control measures await the attention of the legislature. The basic elements are in place, but many of the details remain to be resolved.

In the absence of further reforms, democratic civilian control will remain more theoretical than practical; a situation much more problematic in Poland than in Hungary. In the meantime, the military will enjoy a considerable amount of autonomy from its political masters. Currently this system falls far short of the ideal of democratic civilian control, but it nevertheless does constitute the basis for the development of a more comprehensive and effective system (especially if in the future the armed forces are provided the opportunity to gain more experience in the realities of democratic civil-military relations and if the government decides to provide more resources to fund oversight agencies).

PART B: UNIVERSAL AND NEAR UNIVERSAL THEMES

CHAPTER 5.5: EMPIRICAL RESULTS PROPOSITION FIVE

Proposition Five — Adjunct or Special Control Mechanisms

Introduction:

In Proposition Three, the near universal acceptance of the *principle* of civilian rule — in the long term and almost always in the short term — was presented. Subsequently, Proposition Four turned to the first of two major, non-exclusive strategies which civilian authorities can employ to perpetuate their control over the national military establishment — the system of recurrent legal and administrative mechanisms.

With Proposition Five, the empirical test of the Typology of Relevance moves beyond the *institutionalization* of the civil-military relationship and turns to the issue of the special or adjunct control mechanisms which civilian authorities may employ in order to *subordinate* the national military to democratic civilian control. In particular, the role played by the selection of military elites from specific societal sectors, the employment of security forces to monitor the military, the creation of militia or paramilitary counterweights, the functional differentiation of the armed forces, and the teaching of the values of professionalism and civilian control in military educational institutions will be empirically tested.

As was suggested in Proposition Four, both Hungary and Poland — as they attempt to

build a system of democratic civilian control — are relying primarily upon recurrent legislative and administrative control mechanisms to shape national civil-military relations. These mechanisms are more acceptable to the post-Communist military and civilian authorities. In point of fact, in neither Poland nor Hungary have the civilian authorities chosen to implement any of these adjunct mechanisms to any significant degree — other than in the case of the national military educational systems.

In the case of the military educational institutions, the democratic regimes have emphasized the rule of law and the democratic civilian ethos as well as technical military subjects and non-traditional defence operations. This is in contrast to the indoctrination and propaganda of the previous system which politicized the army in a frequently extra-legal fashion on behalf of the partisan political interests of the Communist Party.

In authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, all of these adjunct or special mechanisms may be employed. In democratic regimes, however, only certain of these mechanisms are appropriate.¹ Democratic civil-military relations are based on the principles of transparency and legality while most of the adjunct or special mechanisms are designed to

¹ The empirical evidence presented in the sections below suggests these mechanisms are necessary only in cases where the fundamental legitimacy of civilian authorities is threatened. This calls for a reconceptualization and refocussing of the propositions generated by the Typology of Relevance which predicted the presence of these control mechanisms in virtually all civil-military relationships (see Chapter Four). That expectation now appears to have been too optimistic.

Although not strictly relational in an inverse *quantitative* sense (given the problems with quantifying such factors as identified in methodology chapter), there nevertheless does appear to be an inverse *qualitative* relationship between the degree to which a regime is legitimate and the exercise of these adjunct control mechanisms. In other words, the evidence here reinforces the salience of legitimacy (Proposition Three) as the most important, universal concept behind any understanding of any specific case of civil-military relations.

operate in an extra-legal fashion. The Communist regimes' practice of employing all of these adjunct or special mechanisms in an extra-legal manner to penetrate and dominate the armed forces is no longer acceptable to either the military or the civilian authorities. As a result, the Communist-era adjunct and special mechanisms which penetrated and controlled the armed forces for almost five decades have been dismantled and disbanded.

Proposition Five (a) — The Social Composition of the Military Establishment:

Civilian regimes may seek to minimize the likelihood of civil-military tensions by drawing the officer corps or possibly the entire military establishment from the same societal segments as the civilian elite.

One means by which civilian authorities can attempt to supplement their control over the national military establishment is by drawing the membership of the armed forces (especially the military's highest commands) from the same societal component as comprises the civilian elite. Certainly, this is exactly what occurred in Eastern Europe in the wake of the Red Army in 1945.

In the aftermath of the collapse of the Communist order in 1989, a considerable amount of elite circulation again occurred in the social, political, economic, and military orders of Eastern Europe. In the military sphere, many of the top field and staff personnel (as well as military personnel in the Ministry of Defence) were retired, dismissed, or otherwise removed from their existing positions. And in their place, new — and typically younger — officers were promoted to fill the vacated positions and otherwise represent the new

post-Communist political order.²

But while there certainly was an effort to remove or replace those top-ranking members of the military establishment *most closely associated* with the previous political regime (i.e., the highest levels of the *nomenklatura*) and although these personnel changes occurred in Poland and Hungary at a rate that far surpassed the glacier-like turnover of the Communist era, in neither Poland nor Hungary has a full-scale political purge occurred *throughout* the military establishment (or in other societal areas for that matter). The new democratic regimes did not follow the practice of their Communist predecessors.

In Poland, for example, approximately 110 of the Polish army's 240 generals left the armed forces in the wake of Lech Wałęsa's victory in the 1990 Polish presidential elections, but most of these personnel changes can be accounted for as being the product of the truly massive reductions in the size of the Polish armed forces that occurred during this period and they cannot be blamed entirely on "political" motivations.³ In Hungary, almost one out of every two members of the pre-1989 officer corps holding the rank of general left the armed services by the end of 1990 (i.e., only 44 out of 87 remained in the active forces), but again the cause can be attributed to reductions in the overall size of the post-Communist armed forces (especially its top-heavy command structure) and to a deliberate policy of generational renewal as readily as these changes can be explained by

² See Zoltan D. Barany, "East European Armed Forces in Transitions and Beyond," *East European Quarterly*, Vol. XXVI, No. 1 (March 1992), pp. 1-30.

³ The figures are from Krystian Piatkowski, "Poland Courts Western Favour: Army Seeks Modernization and NATO Membership," *Jane's International Defence Review*, Vol. 29, No. 6 (June 1996), p. 33.

“political” motivations.⁴

To be sure, the new Hungarian government’s policy of retiring older officers in favour of their younger comrades had the *effect* of purging some hard-line Communists from positions of power, but their replacements invariably would have studied at the same Soviet military academies as their predecessors and they all would have been subject to the same Communist vetting processes during the Communist era. Initially, the only difference between the “old guard” and the “new guard” would have been that the latter generation of Communist-educated officers would have owed their promotions and careers to the new post-Communist governments and not to the *ancien regimes*.

The relatively mild nature of the Polish and Hungarian de-politicization processes becomes especially apparent when these figures are contrasted with similar statistics produced by the Czech experience. By 1996, the number of generals in the Czech armed forces had declined from 240 to only 20 and exactly half of these officers had received promotion to the rank of general after 1989. Even factoring in the reductions caused by the split of the Czechoslovakian armed forces into Czech and Slovak armed forces, the reductions are very significant. And even more significantly, the Czech General Staff had

⁴ The figures are from B. Sauerwein, “Hungary’s National Defence,” *International Defence Review*, No. 11 (November 1990), p. 1220 cited in Andrew Cottey, *East-Central Europe after the Cold War: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary in Search of Security* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p. 120.

experienced a complete turnover of personnel by 1996; no pre-1989 generals remained in service on the General Staff.⁵

In Poland, a partial exception to the notion that the democratic transition did not include a full-scale purge has to be made in the case of the State Security Office (UOP). Only 4,000 of the 24,000 Communist-era secret service operatives were retained in the new agency.⁶ As well, more than 70 percent of the personnel in the military intelligence and counter-intelligence services were removed from their positions by 1991.⁷

The same, however, cannot be said of the personnel of the Polish Main Political Administration (MPA). Somewhat surprisingly, in late 1991 almost half of the political officers of the now disbanded MPA still retained positions within the armed forces (i.e., 2,500 out of 5,000). To be sure, these officers were now "educational officers" and not political officers, but this fact is indicative of the moderate pace of Polish "de-Communization" efforts.⁸ The institution was gone, but those lower-ranking individuals who could still serve the new regime were retained.

⁵ The figures are from Réka Szemerényi, *Central European Civil-Military Reforms at Risk: Progress in Establishing Democratic Controls over the Military has not been Sustained*, Adelphi Paper, No. 306 (Oxford: Oxford University Press/The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), p. 40.

⁶ Jakub Karpinski, "Polish Security Services and the Oleksy Case," *Transition*, Vol. 2, No. 22 (November 1, 1996), pp. 9-13.

⁷ Anna Marszalek, "Civilian Control Over Secret Services Viewed," *Rzeczpospolita* (January 17, 1995), p. 12 translated as "Civilian Control Over Secret Service Viewed," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-017 (January 26, 1995), pp. 13-18.

⁸ Wiesława Kwiatkowska (interviewer), "Contaminated Army [Interview with Colonel Stanislaw Dronicz - Member of the Advisory Group on Army Reform in the Office of Deputy Minister of Defence Janusz Onyszkiewicz]," *Tygodnik Gdanski*, No. 26 (June 30, 1991), p. 3 translated as "Sluggish Reform Process in Military Explained," *JPRS-EER*, No. 91-127 (August 23, 1991), pp. 20-23.

It has been argued that the absence of a full-scale political purge in Poland and Hungary has helped to prevent a pro-Communist backlash from developing amongst the “*lesser*” *nomenklatura* who consequently came to see that they had little to fear from the post-1989 changes at the top.⁹ At the same time, the purge that was undertaken was directed at those individuals and institutions most closely associated with the Communist-era system of subjective control (i.e., the security services and the MPA). From a military perspective, this was a positive development. It meant the institutional death of the *ancien regime*’s most egregious mechanisms of penetration and domination.

There is also a “pragmatic” explanation for the relatively moderate nature of the democratic transition. Because the previous Communist system so permeated all segments of Polish and Hungarian civil society — from intellectuals and the church through the political and economic elites — no post-Communist social group has been willing to risk an *uncontrolled* investigation of the *ancien regime*’s relationship with society.¹⁰ Realistically, no significant societal group in Poland and Hungary has been in the position to claim the high moral ground necessary for such an enormous effort as

⁹ See Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, “The Government Reaches a Turning Point,” *Report on Eastern Europe*, Vol. 1, No. 28 (July 13, 1990), pp. 25-31.

¹⁰ Popular attitudes are also somewhat mixed on the issue of the Communist era. A 1996 poll in Hungary, for example, revealed that more than half of those surveyed had no opinion on the events surrounding the 1956 Hungarian Uprising and of those that had an opinion almost half again (i.e., 48%) had only a superficial knowledge of the actual events. (Source: Ben Slay, “Hungarian Poll Shows Ambiguous Attitudes Toward 1956 Uprising,” *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 204, Part II [October 21, 1996], p. 2.) In Poland, a 1996 poll suggested that 54 percent of those polled believed the decision to impose martial law in 1981 was justified while only 30 percent felt it was not. Source: Beata Pasek, “Martial Law Anniversary in Poland,” *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 241, Part II (December 16, 1996), p. 2.

would be required to remove the beneficiaries of the Communist regime from positions of power and influence in the new political order. Additionally (in the case of Poland), the timing of the transition from Communist rule (i.e., almost a year before the rest of Eastern Europe) meant that certain compromises had to be made with the *ancien regime* — compromises that the post-Communist regime subsequently found were difficult to undo. (This last point is discussed in more detail in the context of Proposition Three.)

Perhaps as a consequence of “blood being on the hands” of so many individuals, Polish and Hungarian efforts to prosecute individuals for Communist-era crimes to date have focused mostly on events that happened during the earliest years of Communist rule.¹¹ The Hungarian judicial system, for example, has moved to deal with alleged crimes associated with the 1956 Hungarian Revolt, but even in this case few successful prosecutions have been forthcoming. In late 1996, the Hungarian Supreme Court ordered the re-trial of two officers previously convicted in a military court of having engaged in “crimes against humanity” in connection with the 1956 events.¹² And it was only in 1997 that three individuals were sentenced by the Supreme Court to terms of four to five years in prison for their parts in the killing of 46 protesters in the town of Salgotarjan in

¹¹ See, for example, Mark Gibney, “Prosecuting Human Rights Violations from a Previous Regime: The East European Experience,” *East European Quarterly*, Vol. XXXI, No. 1 (March 1997), pp. 93-110. Of course, not only Hungary and Poland have had difficulty prosecuting Communist-era crimes. Prosecutors - in a united Germany relatively unaffected by Communist-era ghosts in the current political and judicial machineries - have twice been unable to convict Markus Wolf (the former head of East Germany’s spy agency and the so-called “man without a face”) on anything but the most minor charges. Other high-profile former Communists have also escaped German justice. See, Mary Williams Walsh, “Spymaster Free: Markus Wolf Eludes Most Charges,” *The Gazette [Montreal]* (May 28, 1997), p. A17.

¹² See Duna TV [Budapest], “Supreme Court Orders Retrial of 1956 Shooting Case,” *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19961206*00273 (December 6, 1996), p. 1. For a discussion of the impact of the Kuklinski case, see Beata Pasek, “Poland’s Contentious Communist Legacy,” *Transition*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (January 10, 1997), pp. 20-21.

December of 1956 (i.e., more than a month after the Uprising had been crushed).¹³

Similarly, the most important prosecution in Poland to date involves the case of Adam Humer, former director of the Investigating Department of the Ministry of Public Security, who was convicted of torturing political detainees during the late 1940s and early 1950s.¹⁴ Efforts to investigate officials responsible for the introduction of martial law in 1981, on the other hand, were blocked in the Sejm by the reform-Communist Democratic Left Alliance.¹⁵ At the same time, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who headed the Military Council of National Salvation, has vowed that he “is ready to stand before any court or tribunal” and testify on his decision to impose martial law.¹⁶ To date, however, charges have only been brought against Jaruzelski in connection with his role as Defence Minister during the 1970 riots which left at least 44 protesters dead at the hands of regular army troops and internal security forces.

And finally, Polish military and civilian authorities additionally have had to struggle with the case of Colonel Ryszard Kukliński. Kukliński, convicted by Communist-era courts for treason and sentenced *in absentia* to death for having spied for the United States, has

¹³ Zsofia Szilagyi, “French President wants Hungary to Join EU in 2000,” *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 12, Part II (January 17, 1997), p. 3.

¹⁴ Gibney, p. 98.

¹⁵ The Polish Peasant Party abstained on the motion to investigate the Martial Law era while the other opposition parties voted in favour of it. Source: Baeta Pasek, “Polish Parliament on Responsibility for Martial Law,” *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 207, Part II (October 24, 1996), pp. 2-3.

¹⁶ Pasek, “Martial Law Anniversary in Poland,” p. 2.

had his case revisited several times since the fall of Communism.¹⁷

Even the East European military establishments themselves have been divided over the question of the proper way of deal with this Communist past. Groups such as *Viritim* — an informal Polish officers organization — have pressed for greater changes at the top of the military high command, but many Communist-era graduates of Soviet military academies remain in positions of power.¹⁸

In addition, Polish military personnel (like many other Poles) are divided as to whether or not individuals such as Colonel Kukliński should or should not be prosecuted. Turning Kuklinski into a national hero for spying on his own country on behalf of a foreign power (even one now an ally) would, in the opinion of some, serve to denigrate the efforts of the remaining military personnel who worked within the existing system by implying that they (and not Kukliński) were the traitors to Poland.¹⁹

Consequently, efforts to screen the now post-Communist elites for their ties to the old order have not been a top political priority (except for those political factions seeking to use the lustration process as a political weapon against their enemies) and the focus of

¹⁷ For a discussion of the impact of the Kukliński case, see Pasek, "Poland's Contentious Communist Legacy..." pp. 20-21.

¹⁸ Andrzej Miklaszewicz (interviewer), "Command Level: [Interview with Jerzy Milewski - Acting Minister of State]," *GLOB [Warsaw]* (January 24-26, 1992), p. 2 translated as "Security Office in Presidential Chancery Viewed," *JPRS-EER*, No. 92-023 (March 2, 1992), pp. 13-14.

¹⁹ For an interesting review of some of the varying attitudes within Poland on the Communist past, see Pasek, "Poland's Contentious Communist Legacy..." pp. 20-21.

indictable offenses now is confined to the relatively narrow charge of willing collaboration with the defunct security services. High Communist Party status — although a political liability for many in Poland and Hungary — is no legal barrier to high office in post-Communist Poland and Hungary.

Currently, both Hungary and Poland are working to devise lustration laws which will screen out from positions of power and influence those individuals who too closely cooperated with the Communist-era security services. To date, however, both states have struggled to bring forward screening legislation that is effective and satisfies the national courts and the various political factions which seek to use the screening process to their own political advantage.

In Hungary, the first effort to devise a lustration law was ruled to be unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in 1994. The Court ruled that the law was too vague as to what was considered to be unacceptable behaviour during the Socialist period. An effort to narrow the focus of the law made its way back onto the legislative agenda in late 1995 when the National Assembly began debate on a legislative measure that would ban anyone who had worked for the Communist-era III/IV Department of the secret service or the fascist-era Arrow Cross from holding a public office.²⁰ The law would be in effect until the year 2000 and would permit the lustration supervisory committee to release its

²⁰ The following details are from Zsofia Szilagyi, "Hungary Narrows Scope of Screening Law," *OMRI Daily Digest - Search* (October 26, 1995), p. 1; Zsofia Szilagyi, "Hungarian Parliament Divided over Screening Law," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 27, Part II (February 7, 1996), p. 3; and Zsofia Szilagyi, "Hungarian Parliament Amends Screening Law," *OMRI Daily Digest - Search* (July 8, 1996), p. 1.

findings publicly if an individual compromised by past activities did not resign within thirty days of an official finding.

Despite the large parliamentary majority held by the ruling coalition, a new lustration law was not passed until July of 1996. The debate in the National Assembly revolved around the definition of which public offices and office-holders would be covered by the provisions of the screening law. Initial reports from senior Interior Ministry officials claimed that the new law (in contrast to the previous legislation) would reduce the number of officials affected by the lustration process from approximately 5,000 individuals to about 500 to 600 individuals. Under the proposed legislation, only those officials who are required to take an oath before the President or the National Assembly would be subject to the screening process. Opposition politicians and even factions within the governing coalition, on the other hand, wanted to broaden the scope of the legislation to include judges, prosecutors, senior police commanders, and senior officers of the armed forces.

In the end, most military positions escaped scrutiny under the Hungarian lustration law. Instead, the legislation covers the Deputies of the National Assembly, the President, the Government (Prime Minister and Cabinet), the state Ombudsmen, members of the highest courts (the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court), the heads of Hungarian Radio and Hungarian Television, and other senior public officials who take oaths before the President or the National Assembly. Under this law, only military officers such as the Chief of the Hungarian General Staff (who is appointed by the President on the advice of

the Minister of Defence) would be investigated.

In Poland, the first effort to systematically and administratively screen public officials collapsed in 1992. Then, the government of Jan Olszewski was defeated in the legislature when the Minister of Internal Affairs, Antoni Macierewicz, delivered his first list of 60 names for consideration before the Sejm and the debate on the merits of his accusations became highly politicized. Conservative politician and former aide to President Lech Wałęsa, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, used the debate to attack Mieczyslaw Wachowski, another long-time advisor to Wałęsa and the *éminence gris* of Polish politics, and other government officials. And members of the left-wing Democratic Union (then in opposition) accused Macierewicz of engaging in a witch-hunt. Wałęsa's supporters in turn attacked Kaczynski and the whole lustration exercise collapsed in a wave of political acrimony when it ultimately was revealed that many of the names on Macierewicz's list had actually rejected secret police efforts to be recruited as informants.²¹

Renewed efforts to pass a Polish Lustration Law began in early 1996 — shortly after the election of Aleksander Kwasniewski as President of Poland.²² Kwasniewski initially

²¹ See Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, "Poland: A Year of Three Governments," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (January 1, 1993), pp. 102-107; Louisa Vinton, "Walesa and the Collaboration Issue," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 2, No. 6 (February 5, 1993), pp. 10-17; and Jakub Karpinski, "Screening Law in Poland," *OMRI Daily Digest - Search* (February 2, 1996), p. 1.

²² The following section is based upon Karpinski, "Screening Law..." p. 1; Beata Pasek, "Polish Parliamentary Commission Decides on Draft Lustration Law," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 231, Part II (December 2, 1996), p. 2; Beata Pasek, "Journalists in Poland to be Subject to Lustration," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 7, Part II (January 10, 1997), p. 2; Beata Pasek, "Polish Parliamentary Commission Approves Lustration Law," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 22, Part II (January 31, 1997), p. 2; Jakub Karpinski, "Polish Government on Screening Law," *OMRI Daily Digest - Search* (March 5, 1997), p. 1; and Beata Pasek, "Polish Parliamentary Commission on Screening Law," *OMRI Daily Digest - Search* (March 26, 1997), p. 1.

proposed creating a Commission of Public Confidence to search secret police files (covering the period from the Communist take-over until 1990) and to screen individuals holding high public office. (Communist-era secret police files also were to be opened to the public.) However other than screening public officials, the proposed law did not include provisions for any legal sanctions against individuals who cooperated with the Communist-era authorities. Individuals would only be judged in the court of public opinion or by the electorate (in the case of politicians).

As was the case in Hungary, disagreements arose in the state administration — between the Sejm and Senate and between the President and the legislature — as to which public officials should be subject to lustration and what procedures should be applied. Debate also surrounded efforts to legally distinguish between voluntary and coerced collaboration and cases where individuals were required to make reports to the secret police as part of their jobs (i.e., rectors, chief editors, managers, and similar office-holders).

In the Sejm, even the governing coalition was divided. The Democratic Left Alliance was deserted by its allies in the Polish Peasant Party who joined with opposition parties in passing a lustration law in early 1997. However, President Kwasniewski, acting in support of his party allies, has so far failed to approve the measure by claiming that while he supports the bill in principle he feels that in its present form the legislation may hurt the security services.²³ Critics, on the other hand, have charged that the debate is

²³ "Polish Parliament Passes Lustration Law," *RFE/RL Newswire*, Vol. 1, No. 10, Part II (April 14, 1997), pp. 2-3.

designed to delay the introduction of a lustration law. Opposition from the Polish Left may be based on the fact that the Left may have the most to lose from an open and comprehensive lustration process due to its close relationship to the *ancien regime*.

Although the Polish lustration law has still not made its way through the Polish legislative process, the legislation that is ultimately produced appears likely to mirror that which the Hungarian National Assembly has passed. Again, most of the Polish military establishment will be exempted from its provisions — except for the Chief of the Polish General Staff and similar top military commands.

In summary, the democratic governments of both Poland and Hungary have not engaged in wholesale efforts to redefine the composition of the national armed forces. Certainly, nothing comparable to the extra-legal excesses of the previous system are in place or are anticipated.

The new democratic regimes have moved very carefully in terms of this adjunct control mechanism. They have removed those individuals most closely associated with and loyal to the Communist order and they have focused their attentions upon those institutions most heavily involved in the system of subjective control (i.e., the MPA and the security services).

From a military perspective, these policies suggest two conclusions. First, the “*lesser*” *nomenklatura* within the military need not worry about their personal future. And

second, no repetition of the previous penetrative model is likely to occur. Lustration laws in both Hungary and Poland are focusing upon individuals who collaborated with the security services. No “witch hunts” are under way.

Proposition Five (b) — Monitoring the Military Establishment:

Civilian regimes may seek to minimize the likelihood of a military coup by employing security services to infiltrate and monitor the military establishment. These operations, however, may be dysfunctional in some circumstances.

In the Communist era, extensive efforts were undertaken by the authorities to infiltrate and monitor the military establishment at all levels. This was, obviously, also the case in virtually every other segment of the social structure. Formally, the role of military monitor was undertaken by the Main Political Administration (MPA) which occupied an institutional place in both the Communist Party and the Ministry of Defence chains of command. In this role the MPA was supplemented by additional security and secret police organizations. Together these bodies severely constrained the autonomy of the armed forces and the methods they employed were frequently extra-legal (i.e., they served partisan political interests of the Communist Party and not the rule of law or the national interest).

In the post-Communist phase, this type of pervasive penetration and control has not been duplicated. The Hungarian MPA was transformed into a relatively unimportant teaching and training institution in early 1990 and, as democratic forces consolidated their control, the security forces were no longer directed to penetrate the military establishment to look

for politically unreliable cadres. In Poland, the MPA was transformed and ultimately disbanded between December 1989 and April 1990.

Both Poland and Hungary continue to maintain secret police forces, but efforts have been made to ensure that these forces operate within clearly defined legislated limits. To accomplish this goal, the new regimes typically have divided secret police and security operations amongst several agencies (i.e., internal affairs forces, civilian counter-intelligence forces, and military counter-intelligence forces).²⁴ This was designed, in part, to prevent one agency from gaining too much power or becoming too difficult to control.

Unfortunately for the political leaderships of these regimes, the division of security service tasks amongst several organizations has complicated the process of democratic, civilian oversight.²⁵ As a result, in both Poland and Hungary, there have been significant instances in which the secret services have strayed from the course normally expected from such institutions in a democratic state.

These incidents — as inappropriate as they are — may be expected in the case of a new democracy. In Hungary, for example, the security forces have been accused of spying

²⁴ In Hungary, the intelligence services have been split into the National Security Office and the Information Office since 1990. In Poland, civilian intelligence operations are handled by the Office of State Security. See Jeff Freeman, "Security Services Still Distrusted," *Transition*, Vol. 3, No. 5 (March 21, 1997), pp. 50-52 & 56.

²⁵ Freeman, p. 50.

upon government and opposition politicians without proper authorization.²⁶

And in Poland, Andrzej Milczanowski, Internal Affairs Minister and presidential appointee of then-President Lech Wałęsa, accused the then-Polish Prime Minister, Jozef Oleksy, of having passed intelligence onto Soviet and then Russian intelligence agencies. The charges against Oleksy — leveled just three days before the end of Walesa's Presidential term of office — were ultimately dropped, but Oleksy was forced to resign because of his close “social” relationship with two Soviet/Russian officers.²⁷ In addition, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Security Office came under intense criticism for their unprofessional conduct.²⁸ The Ministry of Internal Affairs also was accused of spying on Polish politicians in the early 1990s.²⁹

Significantly, in neither Hungary nor Poland have comparable “unprofessional” incidents come to light involving the national military establishments. To date, probably the only significant charge of political abuse involving the employment by a political faction of the security services against the military was leveled by Poland's Lieutenant General

²⁶ See “Hungarian Government Orders Investigation into Intelligence Service,” *RFE/RL Newswire*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Part II (April 1, 1997), p. 3 and “Hungarian Intelligence Office Scandal,” *RFE/RL Newswire*, Vol. 1, No. 14, Part II (April 18, 1997), p. 3.

²⁷ Oleksy ultimately recovered from this scandal and was elected President of the Democratic Left Alliance.

²⁸ For a summary of the Oleksy case, see Jakub Karpinski, “With the Left Fully in Charge, the Polish Right Prepares for 1997,” *Transition*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (February 7, 1997), pp. 17-19 & 101 and Jacob Karpinski, “The Mystery of ‘O’,” *Transition*, Vol. 2, No. 12 (June 14, 1996), pp. 36-38.

²⁹ Third Program Radio Network (Warsaw), “UOP Surveillance Allegations Denied,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-103 (May 30, 1995), p. 57.

Tadeusz Wilecki.³⁰ Wilecki — recalled from his post as Chief of the Polish General Staff by President Kwasniewski and replaced by Deputy Chief of Staff, General Henryk Szarecki, on March 10, 1997 — shortly thereafter informed the Supreme Military Prosecutors Office about an incident in which Polish security services allegedly were used for “political purposes.”

The timing of Wilecki’s allegations — coming only one day after his recall from his post — suggests there may be a link between his removal and the accusations made or perhaps it represents Wilecki’s last shot at his opponents. In either case, no explicit public connection has yet been made and the activities of the secret services — which were such a pervasive and detested force during the previous era — have not otherwise been a source of significant civil-military tensions.

Proposition Five (c) — Militia and Paramilitary Counterweights to the Military:

Civilian regimes may seek to minimize the likelihood of a military seizure of power by developing militia or paramilitary formations to act as counterweights to the military establishment. The existence of these formations, however, may be dysfunctional in some circumstances.

The Typology of Relevance suggests that the creation and maintenance of militia, Interior Ministry, and other paramilitary forces can be an effective strategy for regimes seeking to counterbalance the domestic political influence of a potentially seditious military establishment. During the Communist era, the Communist Party created several large

³⁰ Details on Wilecki’s charges are reported in Jacob Karpinski, “New Chief of General Staff in Poland,” *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 49, Part II (March 11, 1997), p. 2 and Jacob Karpinski, “Polish Political Update,” *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 50, Part II (March 12, 1997), p. 2.

paramilitary forces which the Party hoped could be relied upon to defend the *status quo* should the spectre of Bonapartism cast its shadow over the workers' state. These forces took their orders directly from the Communist Party leadership and served in an extra-legal capacity (i.e., they served partisan political interests and were directed at internal and not external enemies). In Poland, the Border Guard was used as a paramilitary organization (to suppress the anti-Communist resistance and Home Army) as early as 1945.

Paramilitary and militia forces plus highly socialized and vetted long-service "career" cadres in the regular forces were intended to ease Party fears of the short-term conscript elements of their military establishments. In both Poland and Hungary, such "reliable" forces were at least as numerous as the "suspect" elements.³¹

In the post-Communist era, these paramilitary forces have either been disbanded or they have been greatly reduced in effective strength. In neither Hungary nor Poland can paramilitary forces now be expected to act as serious institutional counterweights to the regular armed forces. As such, a threat to the military's corporate interests and a site of potential civil-military tension has been eliminated (see also Proposition Six j).

In the case of Hungary, one indication of the reduced importance of paramilitary forces is

³¹ See the "Ratios of Distrust" in Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Price of Cohesion and Performance Expectations," in *Warsaw Pact: The Question of Cohesion, Phase II, Volume I*, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment ORAE Extra-Mural Paper No. 29 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1984), especially p. 325.

reflected by the massive reductions that these forces have endured since the Communist order collapsed (see Table 1). Whereas Hungary's regular armed forces have fallen from 91,000 personnel in 1989 to 64,300 personnel in 1996, Hungary's paramilitary forces have fallen even more precipitously from 76,000 personnel in 1989 to only 13,800 personnel in 1996.³² In short, the regular armed forces have declined by approximately 30% in seven years while the paramilitary forces have declined by more than 80% over the same time period!

To be sure, the economic dislocation that has accompanied the transition from a planned to a market economy has affected all Hungarian institutions, but the reductions which have hit the various Hungarian paramilitary organizations have far outstripped the corresponding reductions which the Hungarian regular forces have had to endure. As paramilitary forces are less expensive to equip than regular forces, they should, in fact, be relatively isolated from economic factors, but this obviously has not been the case.

The Hungarian government also moved quickly to disband the paramilitary institution most closely associated with the *ancien regime's* ideological motivations — the Workers' Guard units of the Ministry of Interior. A workers' militia obviously did not fit in with

³² All figures used in Table 1 as the basis of these calculations are taken from the International Institute for Strategic Studies' *The Military Balance* (various editions from 1989 to 1997). For the years 1994 and 1995, the IISS lists the size of the Hungarian Border Guard as including only 730 troops! In 1996, the figure is again listed at 12,000 troops (compared with the figure of 15,900 for the previous year. It is not clear from the IISS studies whether these anomalous figures are the result of differences arising from the IISS changing its accounting procedures or if they are an oversight. In any case, the figures used for these two years have been altered to reflect information provided by Balazs Novaky, Commander of the Hungarian Border Guard, in an 1995 interview with the *Magyar Hirlap* newspaper. Source: "Border Halt to Illegal Immigration," *Magyar Hirlap* (April 29, 1995), p. 6 translated as "Border Police Reorganization, Prospects Viewed," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-086 (May 4, 1995), p. 16.

the post-Communist political order.

At the same time, Hungary's Border Guard retains some paramilitary capability. Subordinated to the Ministry of Interior in peacetime and the Ministry of Defence in times of war,³³ the Hungarian Border Guard has — since fighting broke out in Yugoslavia in 1991 — been reorganized to include up to 28 rapid reaction companies designed to counter any small-scale, armed border incursions that might spill over from the Yugoslav Civil War. These Border Guard rapid reaction companies are equipped with some heavy (anti-tank) weapons and 100 BTR-80 armoured personnel carriers.³⁴

Opposition politicians have complained that the creation of these rapid reaction companies might place too many forces under the direct command of the government in times of civil unrest, but by the same token these forces could just as easily be used to react to episodes of military insubordination. Of course, such an employment would only be practical in cases of relatively small-scale military insubordination given that the Border Guard is relatively lightly armed and now is only one fifth the size of the active component of the regular armed forces (i.e., 12,000 Border Guard troops to 64,300 active

³³ Act CX. of 1993 on Home Defence (Courtesy of the Hungarian Embassy to Canada), especially section 65. For details on the peacetime operations of the Border Guard and its conversion from an organization intended to prevent Hungarian nationals from fleeing to the West into an armed law enforcement organization designed to fight illegal immigration, smuggling, and similar activities, see “[Untitled Report],” *MTI*, 2107 GMT (December 7, 1993) reprinted as “Parliament Amends Constitution for Defence Law,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 93-236 (December 10, 1993), p. 26; and “Border Halt to Illegal Immigration,” *Magyar Hirlap* (April 29, 1995), p. 6 translated as “Border Police Reorganization, Prospects Viewed,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-086 (May 4, 1995), p. 16.

³⁴ Alfred A. Reisch, “Military Affairs: The Hungarian Army in Transition,” *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 2, No. 10 (March 5, 1993), pp. 45-46.

members of the regular armed forces).³⁵ As such, the Border Guard has only a limited capacity to act as a counterweight to the regular armed forces in times of extra-legal activity.

In the case of Poland, the reduced importance of the paramilitary forces to the governing regime is again indicated by the nature of the reductions that these forces have incurred since 1989 (see Table 2). During this period, the active component of the regular armed forces has declined by almost 40% (i.e., from an effective strength of 412,000 troops to 248,500 troops) while the paramilitary component has declined by more than 90% (from 465,000 troops to only 36,400 troops).³⁶

And like their Hungarian counterparts, the first post-Communist government in Poland moved quickly to disband those paramilitary organizations most closely associated with Communist Party control and the Communist ideology. In 1989, both the huge (350,000 strong) Voluntary Militia Reserve (ORMO) and the hated (28,000 troop) Motorized Reserve of the Citizen's Militia (ZOMO) were disbanded.

³⁵ Current force levels are from *The Military Balance, 1996-97* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), pp. 89-90.

³⁶ All figures are from the International Institute for Strategic Studies' *The Military Balance* (various editions from 1989 to 1997). For reasons unknown, the IISS does not include a separate listing for the NJW (Vistula Army Units). These specially trained Ministry of Interior formations (numbering approximately 13,000 troops) are available to the government to protect government buildings and other key points in times of crisis. These forces may be counted amongst the regular army formations by the IISS, but they are added to the paramilitary total for purposes here. For details on the NJW, see Assembly of the Western European Union, "Security and Military Co-operation in the Baltic Sea Area," *Assembly of the Western European Union Proceedings: Forty-First Ordinary Session (Assembly Documents), First Part, Vol. I, Document 1494* (Paris, The Western European Union, 1995), p. 309.

Even earlier than was the case in Hungary, the new post-Communist Polish government passed legislation that clearly subordinated the Border Guard to the Defence Ministry in times of war (October 1990) and it also passed legislation that codified the rules of engagement for the Border Guard (March 1991).³⁷ The former legislation eliminated mobilization duties from the list of tasks assigned to the Border Guard service. And the latter government order modified the previous practice of defending the border with “shoot-to-kill” tactics by requiring police and Border Guard personnel (or military personnel assisting either of these groups) to warn transgressors before the use of “direct coercion” (i.e., deadly force).

Finally, the Polish authorities have undertaken a series of structural reforms that have significantly reduced the “paramilitary” nature and capabilities of the Polish Border Guard. Since 1990, the Border Guard has no longer retained its brigade or battalion structure.³⁸ This reform significantly reduces the ability of the Border Guard to act in an effective and coordinated fashion in areas beyond its normal day-to-day responsibilities (i.e., as a military counterweight to the regular armed forces).

³⁷ For the law on the duties and responsibilities of the Border Guard see “[Untitled: Law Dated October 12, 1990 Governing the Operations of the Border Guard],” *Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 78, Item No. 462 (November 19, 1990), pp. 1051-1066 translated as “Law Governing Border Guard Service,” *JPRS-EER*, No. 91-021-S (February 15, 1991), pp. 45-64. For details on the codification of the rules of engagement for the police, army, and Border Guard, see “[Untitled: Order Dated March 12, 1991 on the Use of the Police and Armed Forces in Times of Emergency],” *Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 26, Item No. 104 (March 30, 1991), pp. 369-370 translated as “Order on Use of Police, Armed Forces, Firearms,” *JPRS-EER*, No. 91-106-S (July 19, 1991), pp. 26-28.

³⁸ Captain Jan Moskwa (interviewer), “Halt! Frontier Guard [Interview with Colonel Ryszard Dobrowolski - Chief of Legal and Administrative Section of the Frontier Guard],” *Zolnierz Rzeczypospolitej* (April 20-22, 1990), p. 5 translated as “Primary Duties Viewed,” *JPRS-EER*, No. 90-086 (June 18, 1990), pp. 25-27 and Jolanta Kroner, “On the Frontier - the Frontier Guard,” *Rzeczpospolita* (March 15, 1990), p. 4 translated as “Modernization in Frontier Guard Ranks Viewed,” *JPRS-EER*, No. 90-086 (June 18, 1990), pp. 24-25.

Of course, considerable difficulties arose early in the reform process. As a result of these difficulties, the reform of the Polish paramilitary services has yet to be fully completed. Specifically, the reform program became entangled in the internecine power struggle between President Lech Wałęsa and his opponents in the Sejm.

As early as 1992, Wałęsa called for the elimination of the specially trained Vistula Army Units (NJW) of the Interior Ministry — calling them “a holdover of the former [Communist] system [which does not] fit the current democratic reality.”³⁹ In early 1995 an article in *Trybuna* (the newspaper of the Democratic Left Alliance) went so far as to suggest Wałęsa “might try to use the NJW against parliament” before the Presidential elections. And the article too went on to call for the disbanding of the NJW.⁴⁰ But though the left and the right of the Polish political spectrum wanted to eliminate the NJW, the units have remained in place.

Walesa wanted to replace the 13,000 troops of the NJW with a National Guard which would undertake the tasks of protecting diplomatic missions, restoring order during periods of civil unrest, fighting organized crime, assisting in overcoming the effects of natural disasters, and reinforcing the border in times of crisis.⁴¹ Wałęsa also wanted to

³⁹ Lech Walesa, “Text [of Polish President Lech Walesa’s Address at a 30 July Meeting of the National Defence Committee],” *Polska Zbrojna* (July 30–August 2, 1992), pp. 1-2 translated as “Walesa Addresses National Defence Committee,” *JPRS-EER*, No. 92-114 (August 24, 1992), p. 8.

⁴⁰ “Walesa’s Use of Vistula Army Units Viewed,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-070 (April 12, 1995), pp. 26-27.

⁴¹ Wojciech Staszewski, “The Guard Will Protect Us,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* (February 27-28, 1993), p. 2 translated as “KOK Approves Plan for ‘National Guard,’” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 93-040 (March 3, 1993), p. 30.

subordinate the National Guard directly to the Office of the President (c.f., the NJW which was subordinated to the President through the "Presidential Ministry" of Interior Affairs).

This proposal, if it had been implemented, could have echoed the Communist past by turning the National Guard into the partisan political counterweight of one political faction. These efforts, however, were blocked by Wałęsa opponents, such as Centre Accord head Jaroslaw Kaczynski, who argued that the creation of a National Guard responsible to the president would represent a step towards the development of a presidential dictatorship.⁴² In 1994, Defence Minister Piotr Kołodziejczyk (whose relations with Wałęsa were already strained) proposed making the proposed new National Guard responsible to the Defence Ministry and not the President's Office, but this plan too was rejected.⁴³

As it currently stands, the NJW remains the principal security arm of the Interior Ministry. Recently (in December of 1996), the troops of the NJW were granted significant police powers and now troops from the NJW can check identity papers, detain suspects, search the person of individuals, use truncheons or other weapons when the situation warrants it. As such, the NJW will supplement regular police units and support

⁴² "[Untitled Report on the KOK's Plan to Create a New National Guard]," *PAP*, 1712 GMT (February 28, 1993) recorded as "Onyszkiewicz Comments on Issue," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 93-040 (March 3, 1993), pp. 30-31.

⁴³ Jeffrey Simon, *Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion*, McNair Paper 39, Institute for National Strategic Studies (Washington, D.C.: National Defence University, 1995), pp. 66ff.

the Border Guard at critical locations as well as continue to protect government and diplomatic buildings and persons.⁴⁴

Despite the fact that the process of reforming the structure of Poland's paramilitary forces is incomplete, it can be concluded that neither the Border Guard nor the troops of the Vistula Army Units are in a position to act as an institutional counterweight to the regular armed forces (nor is either likely to play such a role). The Vistula troops, for instance, are equipped with only the lightest of weapons. Although possessing some helicopters (Mi-2 and Mi-24 type helicopters), some artillery pieces (approximately 60), mortars (300 x 82 mm), and infantry weapons, it maintains only 70 light armoured vehicles in the whole country (and some of these are equipped with water cannon).⁴⁵ As such, the NJW (or the Border Guard for that matter) would not stand up for long against determined regular armed forces opposition.

Proposition Five (d) — The Functional Differentiation of the Military:

A military establishment which is highly differentiated along functional lines is somewhat less likely to be in a position to intervene against civilian authorities.

Proposition Five (d) suggests that another way in which a regime can attempt to minimize the threat of a military coup is by breaking the national military establishment into several

⁴⁴ TV Polonia (Satellite Service - Warsaw), "Interior Ministry Crack Troops Given Police Powers," *BBC - Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19961211*00187 (December 11, 1996), p. 1.

⁴⁵ Assembly of the Western European Union, "Security and Military Co-operation in the Baltic Sea Area," p. 309.

functional components. Such a division may not preclude the onset of a coup, but the almost invariable inter-service rivalries that will arise under such conditions are believed likely to lessen the degree to which one faction of the military establishment will feel secure in launching its forces on such a dangerous course. When one faction of the military establishment is unsure as to the orientation and possible future response of another segment of the military, the theory suggests it may choose to accept inaction and the status quo.

Although the military establishments of Hungary and Poland are highly differentiated (as are all modern military establishments due to the highly specialized, technical nature of the equipment and operations expected of the various military components), in neither Hungary nor Poland can a *strategy* of service differentiation be employed to thwart a possible military coup. In both Hungary and Poland, one service (the Army) clearly dominates the defence establishment (see Table 3).

The figures for both Hungary and Poland are skewed somewhat from the norm due to geographic limitations. As a landlocked nation, Hungary (of course) operates without a Navy. And Poland — although possessing a coastal region and thus maintaining a relatively small Navy — is engaged solely in coastal defence and does not regularly engage in “blue water” operations outside of the Baltic Sea region. Consequently, service divisions within Hungary and Poland exist as such only between the Army, on the one hand, and the Air Force/Air Defence Commands, on the other.

In Hungary, Land Forces personnel represent almost three-quarters of the total active strength of the armed forces. In Poland, the Army constitutes more than 70 percent of the Polish total.⁴⁶ In the event of an inter-service conflict, it is clear which service would win out.

Naturally, factions can and do exist *within* service commands (i.e., between infantry and armoured forces of the Army and so on). But operating within one relatively narrow command structure and frequently sharing logistical, training, personnel rotation, and other support services (in whole or in part) with other sub-commands, such forces do not enjoy the same degree of autonomy which the theoretical formulations suggest is an important (albeit not essential) prerequisite for extra-legal activities by individual military *services*.

Proposition Five (e) — The Military Educational System:

Civilian regimes may seek to lessen the likelihood of military intervention in the political process by teaching the values of professionalism and civilian control in its military educational institutions or by employing political propaganda which supports these precepts. These efforts, however, also may be dysfunctional in some circumstances.

In post-Communist Hungary and Poland, the military educational system represents one area where significant efforts have been undertaken to put into place a special or adjunct military control mechanism. Perhaps because this system was such an effective control mechanism for the previous political order and because this mechanism also constitutes a

⁴⁶ *The Military Balance, 1996/197*, pp. 89-90 & 94-95.

legitimate strategy in a system of democratic civilian control, the new regimes have moved quickly to reform the military educational system.

The first move in this reform effort involved the disbanding of the Main Political Administrations (MPA) in both Poland and Hungary and the banning of Communist Party “cells” from within the armed forces. The MPA (sometimes translated as the Main Political Directorate) — in addition to its role as coordinator of propaganda activities in military formations (in cooperation with the Communist Party’s local organizations) and monitor of military morale and discipline (in tandem with the various secret services) — played a key role in the Soviet-era system of military educational institutions.

In Poland, the Solidarity-led government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki began the process of disbanding the Polish MPA and creating a new Central Education Board to depoliticize the military even before General Jaruzelski resigned the Polish Presidency (i.e., in the period December 1989 to April 1990).⁴⁷ For the military, this was an important symbolic gesture because it signaled a shift away from the Communist-era system of subjective civilian control towards a *democratic* system of objective civilian control.

At the same time as the national MPAs were being disbanded, the new Hungarian and Polish regimes altered the focus of their educational programs. A curriculum emphasizing the rule of law and the democratic civilian ethos as well as technical military subjects and non-traditional defence operations (such as peacekeeping) replaced a

⁴⁷ Jeffrey Simon, *Central European Civil-Military Relations...*, p. 45.

curriculum emphasizing Marxism-Leninism, “socialist internationalism,” and traditional military operations.

In Hungary, the Zrínyi Miklós Staff College now teaches aspects of democratic civil-military relations in several of its academic departments. The Sociology, Psychology, Political Science, Law, Philosophy, and Economics departments have each contributed to the furthering of this learning process by covering the issues of democratic control of the armed forces, legitimacy, constitutional and international military law, ethics, and others.⁴⁸ Beginning in late 1997, the János Bolyai Military Technical Academy will fulfill the same function for engineering and economics specialists. To be sure, programs covering civil-military relations currently are either absent or inadequate for Hungarian Non Commissioned Officers and enlisted personnel, but this weakness is scheduled to be corrected.⁴⁹

In the early post-Communist (transitional) phase, Polish military educational establishments shifted the relative proportion of academic subjects (including the topic of democratic civil-military relations) in the overall educational program from 21 percent to 35 percent of the total. Plans were even made to increase this share to 50 percent of the

⁴⁸ Ministry of Defence [U.K.]: Directorate of Management & Consultancy Services, *Review of Parliamentary Oversight of the Hungarian MOD and Democratic Control of the Hungarian Defence Forces* (London, U.K.: Directorate of Management and Consultancy Services, 1996), Annex I. (Hereafter cited as MOD [U.K.], *Review of Parliamentary Oversight....*)

⁴⁹ MOD [U.K.], *Review of Parliamentary Oversight....*, p. 52.

instructional curriculum.⁵⁰ This shift in emphasis was rather ironic given the Communist-era “Red versus Expert” debate that occupied so much of the Western academic literature during this period! The suggestion then was that the Communist-era military educational establishments were sacrificing technical expertise at the expense of increased political socialization and political reliability.

As for non-traditional defence roles, both Hungary and Poland have set up special training and educational centres in order to develop their national peacekeeping capabilities to a greater degree. Peacekeeping operations call for specialized skills (such as communication, observation, negotiation, and policing) which are quite different than traditional military skills (such as fire and movement) and need to be taught before troops can be used operationally.

Peacekeeping operations also have the benefit of exposing Hungarian and Polish officers and enlisted personnel to United Nations operating procedures (during training and field operations) and they frequently allow for direct cooperation with foreign (especially Western) military establishments in an operational context. Such contacts may well have the effect of enhancing and broadening the involved individual’s understanding of day-to-

⁵⁰ See Dariusz Otto (interviewer), “A Revolution From the Top Down (Interview with Colonel Jozef Jura - Deputy Chief of the Military Educational Directorate),” *Zolnierz Polski*, No. 4 (January 27, 1991), p. 5 translated as “Modifications Planned for Military Education,” *JPRS-EER*, No. 91-044 (April 5, 1991), pp. 23-24 and Lt. Col. Tadeusz Mitek, “Major Topic: A Model for Military Education,” *Polska Zbrojna* (January 25-27, 1991), pp. 1-2 translated as “Seminar on Military Educational, Training Changes,” *JPRS-EER*, No. 91-041 (April 2, 1991), pp. 49-50.

day (i.e., non-theoretical) foreign civil-military relations. (Specific Hungarian and Polish peacekeeping operations are discussed in the context of Proposition 4h.)

The Hungarian peacekeeping training and educational institute — the Budapest Peacekeeping Forces Training Centre — was created in 1994.⁵¹ Currently, the Training Centre operates at the level of a reinforced company-size unit; however, when budgetary restrictions permit, the Centre will be expanded to the equivalent of a regiment. In the interim, the Training Centre already is defined *operationally* as a regiment in the organizational roll of the Hungarian armed forces for purposes of command assignments and so on.

Since 1995, the Budapest Peacekeeping Forces Training Centre has consisted of four components. At the top is the Control Component (i.e., the permanent staff, logistics branch, personnel section, and finance section) which includes 24 officers, 20 NCOs, and 12 civilian workers. Next is the Training Component which consists of a combat training staff and a technical training branch. In addition, there is the actual (reinforced) Peacekeeping Company. And finally, there is a 12-man reserve for field operations.

At present, soldiers drafted for general military duty are not assigned peacekeeping training. All members of the centre must apply for assignment to the peacekeeping forces after they have completed their initial conscription service. If accepted, however,

⁵¹ The following details on the Hungarian peacekeeping program are taken from Sebestyen Gorka, "Hungarian Military Reform and Peacekeeping Efforts," *NATO Review*, No. 43, No. 6 (November 1995), pp. 26-29.

individuals are expected to sign up for an additional two-year tour of duty. This mitigates the high turnover effects of the Hungarian conscription system which otherwise would process conscripted individuals through the entire military system in only twelve months. (Should an individual not fulfill the two-year contractual obligation, it is expected that that person will reimburse the armed forces for that training.) At the same time, an individual serving with the peacekeepers receives higher than normal pay, is accorded special privileges (including the unique right to leave the Centre's base at night), and also is eligible for bonuses when serving out of country.

The actual training program for soldiers accepted into the Hungarian Peacekeeping Company involves a four month-long training period. The first month is akin to the basic training all soldiers undergo (i.e., basic drill, marksmanship, nuclear/biological/chemical warfare protection). Soldiers also begin English-language lessons. This is followed up with two months of specialized technical training on the use of Peacekeeping weapons and vehicles or other related peacekeeping tasks (such as mine clearance). And, finally, the fourth month involves learning United Nations peacekeeping procedures (i.e., observation and record-keeping procedures, check point management, search and seizure operations, and interposition and negotiation tactics) as well as the specific details of potential/past peacekeeping deployments (i.e., local conditions, political history).

Poland has operated its Polish UN Peacekeeping School at Kielce since 1989 and it also

maintains a readiness training and field exercise facility at Nowa Deba.⁵² Currently, more than 2100 personnel are involved in Polish peacekeeping efforts.⁵³

At Kielce, training programs cover the whole gamut of United Nations operations all the way from “observers” to infantry and logistics battalions. The total training program at Kielce lasts from six to ten weeks. All soldiers are trained in a week-long “common course” (covering UN peacekeeping history as well as the details of specific peacekeeping deployments) before being assigned specialized training in operational units (i.e., tactics and field operations), HQ Staff functions, logistics, military police operations, or military observer operations. As was the case in Hungary, English-language education is a priority and all specialists (i.e., doctors, mechanics, technician, and lab personnel) and at least 100 soldiers per infantry battalion must be proficient in English in order to be deployed in the field.

Again as was the case in Hungary, individuals are not conscripted for United Nations peacekeeping service; they must apply for the honour (as well as the slightly higher pay and benefits, opportunities for travel, and of course the “action” of UN operations). Presently, more than twice as many individuals apply for peacekeeping training than there

⁵² Details in the following section are taken from Major A.L. Zaccor (US Army), “Polish Peacekeepers and Their Training (or Training Poland’s Blue Berets),” *NATO Integrated Data Service* (August 1993) Paper written at the Conflict Studies Research Centre (The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst) and (especially) John McKinley and Jorn Olsen, “Squaring the Circle,” *Jane’s International Defence Review*, Vol. 28, No. 10 (October 1995), pp. 74-78.

⁵³ A 1994 paper prepared by the Polish General Staff for the Ministry of Defence recommended a ceiling of 2,000 individuals be assigned to Polish peacekeeping operations and training programs, but this limit was crossed in 1995.

are positions to fill. As a result, the peacekeeping command can apply fairly rigorous selection criteria.

At the same time, former Chief of Staff Wilecki was critical of Poland's legislated requirement that only volunteers be accepted for peacekeeping duty. By selecting individuals from many different units and bringing them together in special peacekeeping units, the training cycle and thus the efficiency of many units is disrupted. It would be better, he argued, to send whole units on peacekeeping operations (i.e., conscripts and contract soldiers alike). Such a unit would train as a unit and would be less affected by personnel changes as is the case with the current system.⁵⁴

Professional soldiers (i.e., long-service officers and senior NCOs) constitute approximately 35% of the total Polish peacekeeping force and serve for 12 month tours of duty while technical specialists make up 5% of the total force and sign-up for variable terms as required. Finally, the remaining 60% of the force is made up from conscripts who sign up for up to two 6 month assignments with the peacekeepers.

Finally, both Hungary and Poland are now sending officers to study at foreign military colleges. Since 1991, Hungary has sent 705 officers to study at foreign military educational institutes. The top four foreign destinations for these exchanges are Germany (162), the USA (154), NATO (94), and Canada (74). By way of contrast, only 4 officers

⁵⁴ Article by "ALF", "General Wilecki Praises Young Soldiers, Criticizes Legal System; Not a Dinner but a Visitation in Drawsko," *Trybuna* (February 20, 1996), p. 3 translated as "Wilecki on Troops for Bosnia, Changes in Army," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-035 (February 22, 1996), p. 1.

have studied in Russia during this same period.⁵⁵ These exchanges provide Eastern European officers with yet another avenue of first-hand experience in the theory and actual workings of democratic civil-military relations.

In conclusion, Hungary and Poland are moving quickly to reform their national military education institutions — their technical aspects and their political aspects as well. Instead of technical issues and the indoctrination and propaganda of the MPA (which politicized the army on behalf of the partisan political interests of the Communist Party), the new systems teach technical skills and promote the values of democratic civilian control (i.e., the civilian promise not to interfere in the legitimate internal affairs of the armed forces in return for a promise by the military to refrain from involving itself in civilian political disputes). The former system threatens the corporate interests of the military; the latter protects them.

Adjunct and Special Control Mechanisms (Conclusion):

Unlike their Communist predecessors who employed a wide variety of adjunct or special control mechanisms to penetrate and dominate the armed forces, the new Polish and Hungarian regimes have been quite selective in their application of these mechanisms. For example, only those individuals most closely associated with the Communist order have been dismissed and only those institutions most closely associated with the Communist-era system of subjective control have been disbanded. Only in the case of the

⁵⁵ Republic of Hungary Ministry of Defence, *National Defence '96* (Budapest: Ministry of Defence Press Department, 1996), p. 12.

socialization and military education programs have the new regimes engaged such mechanisms, but in the case the mechanism is compatible with a system of democratic civilian control.

For the military, the dismantling of the widespread, extra-legal system of adjunct or special control mechanisms which marked the previous era is a positive development. It indicates clearly the intent of the civilian authorities to replace partisan politics with the rule of law. It also obviates — as will be discussed in the following chapter — many sources of potential civil-military tensions.

**TABLE 1:
Hungarian Regular and Paramilitary Forces
1989-1996**

Year	Regular Forces				Paramilitary Forces					
	Active	Reserve	Total	Notes	Active	Reserve	Total	Notes	Total	Notes
1989	91,000	28,000	68,000	N/A	23,000	16,000	N/A	N/A	60,000 (W.G.)	76,000
1990	94,000	134,000	72,000	N/A	22,000	18,000	700	7,900	N/A	26,600
1991	86,500	210,000	66,400	N/A	20,100	18,000	N/A	800	N/A	18,800
1992	80,800	192,000	63,500	N/A	17,300	20,000	2,000	750	1,500 (I.S.)	24,250
1993	78,000	195,000	60,500	N/A	17,500	15,900	2,000	N/A	1,500 (I.S.)	19,400
1994	74,500	195,000	56,500	N/A	18,000	-18,000	N/A	N/A	1,500 (I.S.)	-19,500
1995	70,500	173,000	53,700	N/A	16,800	-18,000	N/A	N/A	1,800 (I.S.)	-19,800
1996	64,300	173,000	48,000	N/A	16,300	12,000	N/A	N/A	1,800 (I.S.)	13,800
Change 1989-1996	-29.3%									-81.8%

Legend: C.T. = Construction Troops (Ministry of Defence), C.D. = Civil Defence Forces, W.G. = Workers' Guard of the Ministry of Interior, I.S. = Internal Security Forces (Police), N/A = Not Available or Not Applicable

Source: All figures are from the International Institute for Strategic Studies' *The Military Balance* - various editions from 1989 to 1997 (except as noted below).

Note 1: For the years 1994 and 1995, the IISS lists the size of the Hungarian Border Guard as including only 730 troops! In 1996, the figure is again listed at 12,000 troops. It is not clear from the IISS studies if these anomalous figures are the result of differences arising from the IISS changing its accounting procedures. In any case, the figures used for these two years have been altered to reflect information provided by Balazs Novaky, Commander of the Hungarian Border Guard, in an interview with the *Magyar Hirlap* newspaper. (Source: "Border Halt to Illegal Immigration," *Magyar Hirlap* (April 29, 1995), p. 6 translated as "Border Police Reorganization, Prospects Viewed," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-086 (May 4, 1995), p. 16.)

Note 2: The percentage change refers to the difference in the overall size of the active armed forces and all paramilitary forces between 1989 and 1996. Reserve figures are included for comparison only.

**TABLE 2:
Polish Regular and Paramilitary Forces
1989-1996**

	412,000	505,000	217,000	25,000	105,000	22,000	28,000 (ZOMO)	65,000 (WOW) 350,000 (ORMO)	465,000
	312,000	505,000	206,600	20,000	86,200	15,500	18,000 (OPOMO)	10,000 (WOW)	43,500
	305,000	507,000	199,500	19,500	86,000	15,000	18,000 (OPOMO)	N/A	33,000
	296,500	435,200	194,200	19,300	83,000	20,000	18,000 (OPOMO)	N/A	38,000
	287,500	465,500	188,500	19,200	79,800	16,000	7,400 (OPP) -13,000 (NJW)	N/A	-36,400
	283,600	465,500	185,900	19,000	78,700	16,000	7,400 (OPP) -13,000 (NJW)	N/A	-36,400
	278,600	465,500	188,200	17,800	72,600	16,000	7,400 (OPP) -13,000 (NJW)	N/A	-36,400
	248,500	466,000	178,700	17,800	52,000	16,000	7,400 (OPP) -13,000 (NJW)	N/A	-36,400
	-39.7%								-92.2%

Legend: ZOMO = Motorized Reserve of the Citizens' Militia (Riot Police), WOW = Internal Defence Troops (Ministry of Defence), ORMO = Voluntary Militia Reserve, OPOMO = Prevention Units of Citizens Militia, OPP = Prevention Units of Police, NJW = Vistula Army Units, N/A = Not Available or Not Applicable

Source: All figures are from the International Institute for Strategic Studies' *The Military Balance* - various editions from 1989 to 1997 (except as noted below).

Note 1: For reasons unknown, the IISS does not include a separate listing for the NJW (Vistula Army Units). These specially trained Ministry of Interior formations (numbering approximately 13,000 troops) are available to the government to protect government buildings and other key points in times of crisis. These forces may, for purposes here, be counted amongst the regular army formations. For details on the NJW, see Assembly of the Western European Union, "Security and Military Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Area," *Assembly of the Western European Union Proceedings: Forty-First Ordinary Session (Assembly Documents), First Part, Vol. I, Document 1494* (Paris, The Western European Union, 1995), p. 309.

Note 2: The percentage change refers to the difference in the overall size of the active armed forces and all paramilitary forces between 1989 and 1996. Reserve figures are included for comparison only.

TABLE 3:
Hungarian and Polish Regular Forces
1996

Hungarian Regular Forces		
Army	Navy	Air Force/Air Defence
48,000 (74.6%)	N/A	16,300 (25.3%)

Polish Regular Forces		
Army	Navy	Air Force/Air Defence
178,700 (71.9%)	17,800 (7.2%)	52,000 (20.9%)

Source: *The Military Balance 1996/97* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), pp. 89-90 & 94-95.

Note 1: The Polish "Navy" total includes 2,800 Naval Aviation troops.

PART B: UNIVERSAL AND NEAR UNIVERSAL THEMES

CHAPTER 5.6: EMPIRICAL RESULTS PROPOSITION SIX

Introduction:

In the last three sections of Part B, the empirical test of the Typology of Relevance analyzed three related issues: (1) the model of civilian democratic control being established in Poland and Hungary, (2) the strategies which the new democratic regimes were seeking to employ in order to reform national civil-military relations, and (3) the degree to which the actions of these new governments matched the norms predicted in the Typology of Relevance. In this next section, the “other side of the coin” (i.e., the “military” component of the civil-military relationship) will be empirically tested and analyzed (especially the areas of potential conflict and confrontation between civilian authorities and the military establishment). This analysis will also serve to determine the degree to which sites of tension are accurately predicted by the Typology of Relevance.

As was suggested in Chapter Four, there is considerable agreement amongst the existing theoretical formulations as to the particular sites of civil-military interaction which have the potential to lead to tensions and/or confrontations. Broadly speaking, these sites may be generated, on the one hand, by the “pull” of regime weakness, incompetence, and/or dependence or they may, on the other hand, be the product of the “push” of regime attacks or pressure upon the military’s common interests as defined by that military establishment’s conceptualization of military professionalism.

The Typology of Relevance (as will be documented in the sections below) correctly identified the sites of civil-military tension in post-Communist Hungary and Poland (i.e., no sites of tension were discovered which were not predicted by the Typology of Relevance). At the same time, the Typology of Relevance also suggested a couple of sites which — in this specific context — have not produced tensions but which nonetheless must be investigated in order to develop a complete picture of Hungarian and Polish civil-military relations.

In Hungary, one significant source of tension can be found in terms of the severe financial crisis which has befallen the armed forces. The military is currently not a high priority in terms of national budgetary outlays. Many members of the armed forces (including many officers) live in poverty and this situation will only get worse if the military budget continues to decline in real terms.

Related to this first site of civil-military tension is a procurement crisis. The situation in regards to current levels of armaments and spare parts replacement (let alone efforts to modernize the armed forces) is so serious that voices in Hungary and NATO have begun to question the very viability of the armed forces as an institution.

Although not as serious as the related financial and procurement crises, Hungarian civil-military relations have also come into conflict over the pace of the government's "civilianization" program. The military (given the totalitarian past) is particularly

sensitive to efforts to replace military personnel with civilians (especially inexperienced and unprepared civilians).

And finally, civil-military tensions have arisen in Hungary in cases where the military has been drawn into civilian political disputes. In the case of the so-called “Taxi Blockade,” the military was almost subject to conflicting orders from a constitutionally unclear civilian chain of command.

In Poland, the financial and procurement situation — although serious — is not as bad as the situation in Hungary. The overall financial situation is relatively stable (at least for now). This certainly is a source of concern for the military, but the situation is much less serious than it is in Hungary.

On the other hand, other sites of civil-military interaction have produced much more serious civil-military tensions. In Poland, the military has repeatedly been drawn into civilian political disputes (i.e., the most notable are the Parys and Drawsko Affairs). The civilian authorities have begun to intrude quite deeply into the military’s internal affairs (i.e., with proposals to rotate military commands). And the civilian authorities in the legislature have launched a number of attacks on the sphere of military competence and expertise (i.e., particularly as this relates to the duties of the Polish General Staff).

But while these sites of conflict and confrontation have arisen, the picture is not all bad. Many other issue areas have demonstrated no serious civil-military tensions or — more

significantly — they have fostered close and positive civil-military relations. For example, civilian policies in Poland and Hungary which pertain to the non-military employment of the armed forces (i.e., in the civilian economy), the existence and role of paramilitary forces, the types of forces being developed (i.e., conscripts versus professionals), and the role and mission of the armed forces (i.e., the “re-nationalization” of the military) have been quite positive from the standpoint of fostering good civil-military relations.

Overall, the situation calls for guarded optimism in the case of both Hungary and Poland. In Hungary, a solution requires more financial resources and more time to gain experience in the practice of democratic civilian control. More money may not be in the offing, but — assuming the situation does not worsen — the situation should remain stable. In Poland, the final settlement of the debate over presidential versus parliamentary forms of democratic civilian control should reduce the likelihood of the military being drawn into future civilian political disputes. At the same time, if the legislature (especially the Left) fails to escape from its prejudices and suspicions of the military, civil-military tensions over the definition of what exactly constitutes the military’s legitimate sphere of corporate interests may continue or even worsen.

Proposition Six (a) — The “Pull” of National Crises:

Serious military, political, economic, or social crises may serve to “pull” the military into the political realm.

Proposition Six (a) theorizes that certain situations may arise which cause the military to

take advantage of the existence of a power vacuum to insert itself into the political realm in an extra-legal manner. In other words, an essentially apolitical military establishment (or a military establishment otherwise dominated by civilian authorities) is “pulled in” from its place on the political sidelines and *chooses* to take centre-stage in a crisis situation. Certainly, the Polish military has — in the past — not been adverse from entering the civilian political realm when the national interest was threatened.

Such a context, however, much be differentiated from a situation where the military is *forced* by the actions of other politicized forces into taking sides, playing the role of political peacemaker, or even dispensing with civilian authorities. Those latter contexts represent examples of a military “pushed” into the political realm.

In Hungary and Poland, the major political crises involving the military to date are much more akin to the latter than the former. Crises such as the Hungarian “Taxi Blockade,” the attacks on the Polish General Staff, the Drawsko and Parys Affairs, and numerous other political fights that have marked the struggle between national presidents and legislatures in both Poland and Hungary for control of the national military are better categorized by the metaphor of the “push” of regime attacks or pressure on the military’s interests than by the metaphor of the “pull” of regime weakness. As such, Proposition Six (a) does not currently apply in either the case of Poland or Hungary.

Proposition Six (b) — Non-Traditional, Non-Military Roles and Activities:

Civilian efforts to employ the military in non-military, civilian economic

or social projects may meet with resentment if these activities negatively influence or detract from the military's ability to carry out its self-identified, primary mission — the defence of the state from aggression. Under circumstances where military expertise and competence is threatened, the military may come to oppose the civilian political leadership of the state.

During the Communist era, the various East European military establishments were frequently utilized in non-traditional, non-military roles. Throughout the region, personnel from the regular forces helped with fall harvests, worked to eliminate (or at least *try to* eliminate) supply bottlenecks, and contributed engineering expertise to various infrastructure projects. The most numerous examples of the non-military employment of the national armed forces during the Communist era could be found in Ceaucescu's Rumania and the Soviet Union.¹ Complete figures for all countries during this period are unavailable, but some indication of the scope of these activities is suggested by one estimate which indicates non-military work in Communist Czechoslovakia took up 10,000,000 hours of the military's time in 1989 while in Hungary in the 1970s the amount of time involved was 7,000 to 8,000 hours per year and 2,500,000 km of transportation services.²

¹ The literature on this topic is also most developed in the case of the former-Soviet Union. The development of the Soviet military-agricultural infrastructure was mainly a response to crises in the civilian agricultural sectors and it was also predicated on a need to supply soldiers stationed at remote military installations. See, for example, Steve R. Waddell and Charles L. Smith, "Soviet Military Agriculture," in *Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual, 1987-1988 (Vol. 11)*, ed. David R. Jones (Gulf Breeze, F.L.: Acadian International Press, 1989), pp. 332-352 and Laure Després and Ksenya Khinchuk, "The Hidden Sector in Soviet Agriculture: A Study of the Military Sovkhoz and Auxiliary Farms," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (April 1990), pp. 269-293.

² Unattributed source reported in Réka Szemerényi, *Central European Civil-Military Reforms at Risk: Progress in Establishing Democratic Controls over the Military has not been Sustained*, Adelphi Paper, No. 306 (Oxford: Oxford University Press/The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), p. 46.

Ostensibly designed to foster working class solidarity between members of the armed forces and society (and thus lessen the likelihood of Bonapartism), these deployments also represented government efforts to circumvent deficiencies in the national command economy. The problem, from a military point of view, is that non-military activities such as agricultural work contribute little or nothing to the military training program and for this they are deeply resented. This problem, moreover, is compounded whenever conscripts are diverted from their training programs. There is, after all, only a limited amount of time to train conscripts in the myriad of weapons, tactics, and skills they will need in a war-fighting situation. Thus time lost picking crops represents no gain to the military establishment and also may be felt to be beneath the “dignity” of soldiers.

Of the two cases under review in this study, the force most active performing non-traditional, non-military activities was the Polish armed forces. And the most active period for their Polish armed forces, ironically, occurred during the Martial Law period when the politicized military elite (i.e., General Wojciech Jaruzelski and the Military Council of National Salvation) attempted to use a supposedly modernized, hierarchical, and professional military institution to reform a chaotic national economy which had defied the efforts of the previous civilian leadership. In the post-Communist phase, the Hungarian and Polish regimes have shifted their efforts radically and now wish to develop a more professionally-oriented armed forces. As a result, there is far less emphasis on non-military activities involving the armed forces and this has effectively eliminated a potential source of civil-military tension.

In Poland, there was some discussion in 1991 of assigning regular military personnel to joint military-police patrols in Polish cities, but this plan fell by the wayside.³ It is just as well that this plan fell through. The training soldiers typically receive is inadequate and inappropriate for civilian police tasks and poorly trained "soldier-police" may react injudiciously to criminal episodes or they may find themselves exposed to compromising circumstances (i.e., corruption).

On the other hand, the Polish Air Force and Air Defence Forces have been made responsible for monitoring and patrolling Poland's air borders. Additionally, these forces are responsible for intercepting illegal air traffic (i.e., foreign military reconnaissance flights, illegal immigration, smuggling, and lost or errant aircraft).⁴ This role, although not a traditional military role (except in the case of intercepting foreign military reconnaissance flights), does not diminish the military's sense of professionalism because the skills, equipment, and tactics employed by the military in this capacity are comparable to those employed in more traditional military missions.

In Hungary (like Poland), the Air Force and Air Defence commands are also utilized in air traffic and air border control duties. And again as was the case in Poland, these duties are compatible with their traditional professional ethic. As a matter of fact, Hungarian air

³ Unnamed Polish Press Agency Correspondent, "What Is the Format of the National Security Council," [*Supplement to*] *Rzeczpospolita* (February 6, 1991), pp. 1-2 translated as "Description of New National Security Council," *JPRS-EER*, No. 91-044 (April 5, 1991), pp. 22-23.

⁴ Eugeniusz Mleczak, "The Armed Forces and Winged Smugglers," *Polska Zbrojna* (March 24, 1995), pp. 1&8 translated as "Army Control of Illicit Air Traffic Viewed," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-057 (March 24, 1995), pp. 19-20.

defence forces have engaged in several “real” operations over the course of the Yugoslav Civil War as Federal Yugoslav aircraft overflew Hungarian territory at least twenty separate times and on one occasion (October 1991) actually bombed the Hungarian town of Barcs.⁵

More significantly (for purposes here), the post-Communist government of Prime Minister Jozsef Antall early in its mandate banned the use of Hungarian soldiers in agricultural work.⁶ This alleviated one potential source of civil-military tension. On the other hand, *specialized* armed forces personnel (i.e., engineers and construction specialists) are still employed occasionally on civilian projects (along with their specialized equipment), but in such instances the use of these military troops is strictly regulated under the terms of the 1993 Defence Act.⁷

Of course, use of military personnel and their equipment on civilian projects can be beneficial to military commanders in instances where those activities complement military training programs. “Non-military” activities such as disaster relief provide the military establishment with the occasional opportunity to demonstrate its value to society

⁵ The inability of the Hungarian air and air defence forces to prevent these Federal Yugoslav aircraft from violating Hungarian airspace spurred Hungarian officials to conclude a “debt-for-weapons” agreement with Russia in 1993 which saw the Russians deliver 28 MiG-28s to the Hungarian air force. Details of this agreement are discussed in the context of Proposition Six d below.

⁶ The ban was put into effect in March of 1990. “[Untitled Interview with Ferenc Karpati],” *MTI [Budapest]*, 1958 GMT (March 22, 1990) translated as “Karpati on Military Service Cut, Rumania,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 90-057 (March 23, 1990), p. 48.

⁷ “Act CX. of 1993 on Home Defence” (Unpublished Manuscript Courtesy of the Hungarian Embassy to Canada), Section 22, § 1(j) and 1(k).

and put to test logistical, transportation, communication, and similar “military” systems, equipment, and training under realistic conditions. Such projects — which may raise the profile of the military in civilian eyes — do not necessarily represent a loss from a military training perspective. For example, building civilian bridges or bridges for military traffic involves the use of identical skills and is a far cry from using highly trained troops to pick crops. From the perspective of military commanders, the former represents the practical application of technical military training; the latter is a waste of the troops’ time and efforts.

In conclusion, the issue area of the employment of the armed forces in non-traditional, non-military activities — which had been a source of civil-military tension in the Communist era — is now a positive site of civil-military interaction. Not only have the Communist-era practices been ended in both states, but in Hungary legislative steps have been taken to prohibit such practices from recurring in the future.

Proposition Six (c) — Budgetary and Financial Conflicts:

Civilian and military authorities may come into conflict over the share of the nation’s resources which should be employed in defence of the state. Under circumstances where military expertise and competence is threatened, the military may come to oppose the civilian political leadership of the state.

There can be little doubt that the armed forces of both Hungary and Poland are experiencing the effects of a severe financial and budgetary crisis. There also can be little doubt that this crisis has generated an occasionally very vocal reaction from various

elements of the military establishment. The only real issue that remains to be determined is the question of what effect this crisis ultimately will have on long-term civil-military relations. In other words, will the budget grumblings remain just that — grumblings — or will the situation worsen?

In terms of the overall financial and budgetary picture, the picture is less than ideal in Poland and it is particularly bleak in Hungary (see Table 4). In Poland, the defence budget has hovered around the level of 2.5 percent of the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in the last three years for which figures are complete (i.e., 1993-1995). The situation, therefore, is serious, but it is relatively stable. In Hungary, however, the situation is far, far worse and shows no real signs of improving. The Hungarian defence budget has declined precipitously to the point where it represents (as of 1995) only 1.4 percent of the GDP.⁸ This issue is already a very significant source of serious civil-military tensions in Hungary and it may get worse if conditions do not improve.

One indication of the severity of the financial crisis as it pertains to Hungary can be seen when the effects of inflation are taken into account. When Hungarian defence expenditures are expressed in real terms, it becomes apparent that — with the exception of a small increase in 1993 — the defence budget has declined (often quite steeply) every

⁸ Figures are from The International Institute for Strategic Studies cited by Szemerényi, p. 25. Figures for Hungary and Poland should probably only be used to indicate general trends (especially figures from the earliest years of the transition to democracy and capitalism). It is difficult to account for defence expenditures at the best of times. Some items are hidden for security reasons, others show up in the budgets of related agencies (such as the Border Guard or appear under the rubric “construction”), and others have dual civilian-military use (i.e., radar systems in some instances), but in the case of the transitional regimes of Eastern Europe the exercise of measuring changes in defence spending has been compounded by the fact

year since 1988 (see Table 5). And although complete figures are not available for 1996, this trend has continued. For 1996, defence expenditures were budgeted to increase by a small nominal amount, but this would again represent another decrease in real terms.⁹

Evidence of the effects of this funding crisis on the Hungarian military can be found in many areas. (The effects of this crisis on the procurement of specific weapons systems will be discussed more fully in the context of Proposition Six d.) Before he became Chief of Staff, the then Major General Ferenc Végh (Deputy Chief of the General Staff) cited “American” concerns that 1.4 percent of the GDP was insufficient to carry out the defence obligations of a NATO member state.¹⁰ Later as Chief of Staff and Commander of the Hungarian Army, Lieutenant General Végh warned that the continuing and deepening crisis has created “a situation in which the reform of the armed forces might become questionable if we fail to do everything possible to eliminate the problems as quickly as possible.”¹¹

Concerns such as these have even brought into question the continued viability of the

that these societies are in the process of changing over from a command economy with a non-convertible currency to a capitalist economy with a fully convertible currency.

⁹ The Republic of Hungary Ministry of Defence, *National Defence '96* (Budapest : Ministry of Defence Press Department, 1996), p. 27.

¹⁰ Oszkar Fuzes (interviewer), “There is No Way Into NATO Without Military Reform [Interview with Major General Ferenc Végh - Deputy Chief of Staff],” *Nepszabadsag* (April 22, 1996), pp. 1&3 translated as “Major General Végh Assesses US Visit,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-079 (April 24, 1996), p. 2.

¹¹ Frigyes Varju (interviewer), “We Must Break Away From the Ghetto State [Interview with Ferenc Végh - Hungarian Army Commander and Chief of the General Staff],” *Magyar Nemzet* (June 15, 1996), p. 6 translated as “New Army Commander Views Tasks, Prospects,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-118 (June 19, 1996), p. 1.

Hungarian armed forces. And much evidence for this concern abounds. For example, even though the Hungarian Defence Minister, Georgi Keleti, has publicly stated that the Hungarian Air and Air Defence Forces represent the top priority when it comes to defence procurements, the Hungarian military (in general) and the Hungarian air force (in particular) have been forced to endure a series of embarrassing episodes.¹²

In August of 1996, for example, the 47th Air Force Unit in Papa attempted to carry out live-fire exercises with its aircraft.¹³ Unfortunately, amongst the aircraft prepared for this exercise — two (a MiG-21 and a MiG-23) failed to take-off due to malfunctions. The aircraft providing weather information for the exercise was only able to land after its pilot performed some “tricks” to get the wheels of the aircraft lowered. And despite the fact that the functioning aircraft were loaded with only very limited amounts of ammunition, the firing range at Hajmasker caught fire. And the story does not end there! The engine on the air force Mi-8 helicopter outfitted with fire-fighting equipment and assigned to deal with such a contingency proved to be faulty as did the engine on the fire truck dispatched to the scene — so the fire could not immediately be put out.

In September of 1996, one of Hungary’s aging MiG-21 aircraft crashed near the Papa

¹² The priority of the Air and Air Defence Forces is reported in Janos Desi (interviewer), “Who Threatens Hungary? [Interview with Defence Minister Georgi Keleti],” *Magyar Hirlap* (May 7, 1996), p. 10 translated as “Defence Minister Views Army Reorganization Tasks,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-090 (May 9, 1996), pp. 1-4 and MTI News Agency, “Air Defence Spending Top Priority,” *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19960420*00032 (April 20, 1996), p. 1.

¹³ The following details are from “We Do Not Have an Air Force,” *Uj Magyarorszag* (August 3, 1996), pp. 1&4 translated as “Air Force ‘Unable to Fulfill Its Mission,’” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-152 (August 7, 1996), pp. 1-2.

airfield while on a training flight.¹⁴ Although the pilot survived in this case, this was not the first such training accident in the post-Communist era and may have been the result of poor equipment or poor pilot training. At the same time, Hungary's fleet of Soviet-built Su-22 ground support aircraft have been described as being "practically undeployable."¹⁵ And Hungary is no longer able to maintain a system of permanent aerial surveillance of its borders because of fuel shortages.¹⁶

The situation in the air force — ancient equipment and inadequate maintenance — is compounded by reductions in the numbers of hours of flight time allotted to air force pilots. In 1993, the number of hours was already in the process of being reduced from 80 hours per year to merely 60 hours of flight time per year (because of budgetary constraints) and in 1996 the situation improved only slightly to 70 hours per year. The amount of in-flight training accorded to Hungarian pilots compares quite unfavourably to the average of between 100 to 200 hours per year NATO pilots receive.¹⁷

And finally, the situation for the air force is so bad that the government and military are

¹⁴ Hungarian Radio, "MiG-21 Fighter Aircraft Crashes in Hungary: No-one Dies," *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19960919*00047 (September 19, 1996), p. 1.

¹⁵ "We Do Not Have an Air Force....," p. 1.

¹⁶ Erzsebert J. Kun and Peter Matyuc (interviewers), "The Hungarian Army is the World's Most Expensive - Bela Gyuricza [Retired General and National Assembly Deputy] on the Reform of Military Forces," *Nepszabadsag* (July 29, 1996), pp. 1&11 translated as "FIDESZ Expert Interviewed on Army Reform," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-147 (July 31, 1996), pp. 1-4.

¹⁷ Alfred A. Reisch, "Military Affairs: The Hungarian Army in Transition," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 2, No. 10 (March 5, 1993), p. 46. The 1996 statistic on in-flight training time is from *The Military Balance, 1996-1997* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), p. 90.

also considering multi-tasking the Taszár military airfield. The Taszár airfield — the military's most advanced — may eventually be shared between the Hungarian air force, IFOR/SFOR, and civilian aircraft as a means of reducing expenditures.¹⁸

In the Hungarian army, the situation is at least as bad. Complaints have been raised about virtually every aspect of the military program. For example, Colonel István Demeter, General Training Chief of the Hungarian Army, has complained that conscripts are being discharged untrained from the army because the army does not have enough money for military exercises and training.¹⁹ Basic training, he argues, is becoming increasingly deficient. The army participates almost exclusively in international (i.e., Partnership for Peace) exercises even though these usually cost more money. But in order to train and equip a few units to parade in front of NATO, the army has to basically rob Peter to pay for Paul. Almost no other exercises of any significant size are being scheduled for the Hungarian army.

The army still does have some stocks of surplus ammunition that could be used for exercises, but military commanders are worried that increased weapons usage would result in weapons breaking down or wearing out and — in the current budgetary climate — they would not be replaced. As a result, conscripts are leaving the army with only a

¹⁸ *gulyas* [sic], "More Than One Scenario in Preparation Because of IFOR - Taszár's Future Depends on Political Decision," *Magyar Nemzet* (October 1, 1996), p. 4 translated as "Article Sees Joint Military, Civil Role for Taszár Airfield," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-191 (October 2, 1996), pp. 1-2.

¹⁹ The following details about the deficiencies of the Hungarian army training program are taken from Peter Matyuc, "Untrained Discharged Soldiers," *Nepszabadsag* (August 13, 1996), pp. 1&5 translated as "Army Officer on Training Level of Soldiers," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-158 (August 15, 1996), pp. 1-2.

minimal level of training and, in the opinion of General Demeter, within a very short period of time even these skills will be lost and the individuals will be of no use as Reservists.

According to Lieutenant-General Nandor Hollosi, the military is even having trouble simply guarding and maintaining all of the facilities rendered surplus because of force reductions. Abandoned facilities — as well as stockpiles of older weapons and ammunition and disused military firing ranges — are growing in number and, in the opinion of General Hollosi, will be beyond the capabilities of the Hungarian army to protect from vandals and thieves by the end of 1997. The army cannot even afford to dispose of this *matériel* because of the cost!²⁰

On yet another front, the ability of Hungarian military personnel to provide disaster relief has also come into question. According to Major General Tamas Fehervari (Head of the Hungarian Military Technology Group), the Hungarian army was unable to order any new gas masks or protective clothing in 1995 or 1996 despite having developed such equipment domestically to world-class standards.²¹

²⁰ Nepszava (Budapest), "Army Faced With Problem of Eliminating Huge, Worthless Stockpiles," *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19961213*00201 (December 13, 1996), pp. 1-2. In 1996, an estimated 122 facilities - including barracks and residential developments - had been declared to be surplus. See Irene Szabo (interviewer), "General Végh Concerned About the Future of the Honved Forces," *Nepszava* (March 11, 1996), pp. 1&8 translated as "Major General Végh on Military Reform," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-098 (May 21, 1996), pp. 1-5.

²¹ Zoltan Alfoldi, "We Would Not Be Able To Avert a Catastrophe," *Nepszabadsag* (October 1, 1996), p. 8 translated as "Capability in Catastrophe Prevention Assessed," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-192 (October 3, 1996), p. 3.

Of course, the crisis in the Hungarian military is made worse by a series of spending priorities which are skewed against both research & development and the procurement of new systems (see Table 6). Essentially no research and development occurred within the armed forces in 1995 and 1996 and spending on procurement has languished at under 10 percent of the diminished defence budget.²² By way of contrast, procurement represents approximately 30 percent of the defence budgets of NATO countries.²³

The government has promised to rise the share of the defence budget spent on development (i.e. research & development plus procurement) to between 15 and 20 percent of the overall defence budget, but this would appear to be unlikely.²⁴ Servicing older weapons systems already takes a disproportionate share of the defence budget because such systems tend to break down more frequently than newer systems and this drives up “maintenance” costs. As there is little money left to cut out of other areas of the defence budget to shift the relative balance amongst spending priorities, this change can only be only be brought about by an infusion of new money into the defence development sector and there is no money for new weapons systems. In the past, the government also promised to spend approximately 3 percent of the GDP on the military and it failed to keep that promise, thus a future failure to adjust spending priorities with an infusion of new money should not come as a surprise to anyone.

²² Szemerkenyi, p. 26.

²³ Krystian Piatkowski, “Poland Courts Western Favour: Army Seeks Modernization and NATO Membership,” *Jane’s International Defence Review*, Vol. 29, No. 6 (June 1996), p. 34.

²⁴ The figures are from The Republic of Hungary Ministry of Defence, *National Defence ’95* (Budapest : Ministry of Defence Press Office, 1995), p. 16.

Finally, the financial crisis for the armed forces has also affected the living conditions of members of the armed forces in a most negative manner and morale within the military — especially the professional component — has suffered considerably.²⁵ As a Canadian study suggests, this crisis can affect a soldier's family life — as well as professional life — as ill-paid soldiers are more prone to alcoholism and engaging in spousal abuse.²⁶

According to some reports, 20 percent of the Hungarian officer corps and 45 percent of Hungarian NCOs live below minimum subsistence levels and this has forced many individuals to either leave the services (especially in the case of the best and the brightest who have the best chance to succeed in the civilian economy) or take on outside employment (often in jobs for which they are over qualified).²⁷ The situation for enlisted personnel can hardly be much better!

To be sure, the various military trade unions have complained bitterly of the condition their members are forced to endure. The trade unions have also organized signature campaigns in which a large number of individuals even chose to write down their military

²⁵ See "Sociological Survey in the Army - Morale is Lost without Money," *Magyar Nemzet* (November 16, 1994), p. 6 translated as "Survey Shows 'Deteriorating' Army Conditions," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 94-222 (November 9, 1995), pp. 1-4.

²⁶ Murray Brewster, "Ill-Paid Soldiers Prone to Spousal Abuse: Report," *The Gazette [Montreal]* (August 5, 1997), p. A10.

²⁷ The figures are from Laszlo Szabo, "Fostering Civil-Military Relations: The Case of Hungary," Paper Presented at a Joint SOWI-IUS Conference - "Fostering Democratic Civil-Military Relations" - Strausberg, Germany, June 8-12, 1996 cited in Szemerényi, pp. 46-47.

rank!²⁸ And while such displays are usually considered to be partisan political acts, there does not appear to be much likelihood that individuals will be dismissed from the armed services because so many trained and experienced personnel have already left.

The effect that the economic crisis is having on members of the armed forces has even been reported in the Ministry of Defence's own annual review publication. In *National Defence '96*, for example, lower standards of living for all personnel were reported as were the hardships experienced in particular by young officers and NCOs.²⁹ This reportage is significant because this publication — like those produced by most other defence ministries and defence establishments — is designed to accent the strengths of the national military. For example, these publications are usually full of colour pictures of young soldiers riding tanks, participating in field exercises, visiting exciting foreign lands, and so on. They usually do not accent the negative (i.e., soldiers are never depicted pulling guard duty in the middle of the night or slogging through rain or mud with heavy field-packs). Thus for negative commentary to appear in such a publication, the situation must truly be serious.

Of course, this begs the question of “how serious” the financial situation is for the Hungarian military and what effect this will have on national civil-military relations. To

²⁸ Erzsebet J. Kun and Peter Matyuc (interviewers), “The Hungarian Army is the World’s Most Expensive - [Interview with Retired General] Bela Gyuricza on the Reform of Military Forces,” *Nepszabadsag* (July 29, 1996), pp. 1&11 translated as “FIDESZ Expert Interviewed on Army Reform,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-147 (July 31, 1996), p. 3 and *National Defence '96*, p. 30.

²⁹ *National Defence '96*, p. 30.

begin, it can probably be argued that the situation is not serious enough to provoke a coup or even a mutiny. The situation — bad as it is — is not as serious as that found to the east in Russia. Also, mindful of the pressure to conform to NATO standards — the military leadership is not likely to act precipitously.

On the other hand, the Hungarian military can almost certainly be expected to increase the pressure on the government to increase the military's share of the national budget. The requirement to perform new NATO roles and missions should provide the Hungarian military with leverage to demand a greater share of national resources. And while public displays of displeasure and discontent may not represent the ideal of subjective civil-military relations, it should probably not be unexpected given the increased roles that the military will be asked to perform as a new NATO member.³⁰

Turning to the case of Poland, it becomes apparent that the situation — although serious — is not as serious as is the case in Hungary. The military establishment is under considerable financial pressure and public quarrels have broken out between top military leaders and the civilian government over the size of the defence budget, but the situation

³⁰ For both Hungary and Poland, the cost of NATO membership will vary considerably depending upon the military missions that NATO and the prospective members agree to undertake when the membership negotiations are completed. The cheapest alternative would involve NATO simply providing C³I, logistics, and similar assistance to the new member states who would otherwise be responsible for their own national defence capabilities. Costs would increase for both NATO and the East Europeans if the two sides planned to have NATO provide combat air capabilities to the new members and integrate these forces with national military assets or if NATO land forces were prepared to intervene in Eastern Europe in the event of hostilities. The most expensive option involves the forward deployment of large NATO ground and air forces in Poland and Hungary. For a detailed discussion of these various alternatives and the costs associated with their implementation, see Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "What Will NATO Enlargement Cost?" *Survival*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Autumn 1996), pp. 5-26.

appears — at a minimum — to be relatively stable. In point of fact, the financial bottom may have been reached in the case of the Polish defence budget and some improvement — although too slow from a military perspective - may be on the horizon.

Certainly, there have been problems. Defence budgets were subjected to the same pulling and hauling between President Lech Wałęsa and the Sejm as typified many other aspects of the defence reform process. But funding levels have at least remained fairly constant. As previously mentioned, the amount of money allotted to the maintenance, operations, and development of the Polish armed forces has remained fairly constant during the period 1993-1995. During this time, the defence budget has hovered at around 2.5 percent of the Polish Gross Domestic Product.³¹ Although low by NATO standards (as previously mentioned the NATO average is closer to 3 percent of GDP), the figure compares quite favourably to Hungarian totals.

For 1996, General Tadeusz Grabowski, head of the Finance Department of the Polish Ministry of National Defence, calculated that the Polish army would be receiving a real

³¹ It is interesting to note that in 1995 Jerzy Milewski (then Acting Minister of Defence) estimated that a defence budget of 3.5 percent of the GDP would be needed for Poland to maintain a defence capability equal to the maximum allowed under the terms of the CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) treaty (i.e., 234,000 men under arms plus naval forces). A defence budget equal to 3 percent of the GDP could only support a military establishment 15 percent lower than CFE limits (i.e., 200,000 men plus the navy) and a defence budget of 2.5 percent of the GDP could only support a military establishment 30 percent lower than the CFE limits (i.e., 160,000 men at arms plus the navy). These figures are ironic and illustrative because in 1995 a defence budget equal to approximately 2.5 percent of the Polish GDP attempted to support an active military of 248,500 men! In other words, the military is being asked to do with 2.5 percent of the Polish GDP what the Minister of Defence has stated would require at least 3.5 percent of the GDP. This is a significant shortfall. See Jerzy Milewski, "[Excerpts of a Speech before the Polish Sejm Entitled] Objectives for the Ministry of National Defence for Now and the Immediate Future," *Polska Zbrojna* (January 20-22, 1995), p. 2 translated as "Milewski's Speech in Sejm Defence Debate," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-014 (January 23, 1995), pp. 34-36.

increase of 4 percent over the previous budget. And more importantly, this represents the first real increase in a decade.³²

Unfortunately for the Polish military, the figures are not as promising for the 1997 fiscal year. Although the government has promised to raise the defence budget by at least 3 percent in real terms beginning every year after 1997 and a planned 5 percent real increase has been submitted to the Sejm, Colonel Marcin Krzywoszynski, director of the Budget Department of the Ministry of Defence, estimates the defence budget will actually grow by only about 0.6 percent in real terms in 1997 once the effects of certain tax changes are included. Specifically, the military has failed to gain an exemption from Poland's new Value Added Tax (VAT) and this tax will eat away most of the projected increase.³³

There are additional problem areas. Although the Sejm has passed a resolution (February 16, 1995) calling for defence spending to be increased to 3 percent of the GDP, Prime Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz has acknowledged that such a policy will involve the Sejm making "a hellishly difficult choice between the various social needs that are

³² Paweł Wronski (interviewer), "Quadrillions Not to be Sneered At [Interview with General Tadeusz Grabowski Head of the Finance Department of the Polish Ministry of National Defence]," *Gazeta Wyborcza* (January 23, 1996), p. 4 translated as "defence Official on Army Spending," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-022 (February 2, 1996), p. 2

³³ See Ryszard Choroszy (interviewer), "What is Profitable for the Military [Interview with Colonel Marcin Krzywoszynski - director of the Budget Department of the Ministry of Defence]," *Polska Zbrojna* (November 8, 1996), pp. 1&3 translated as "Defence Official on Military Budget," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-224 (November 20, 1996), pp. 1-3 and Ryszard Choroszy, "No Breakthrough in the Defence Ministry Budget," *Polska Zbrojna* (October 31, 1996), pp. 1&3 translated as "Military Daily Assesses Military Budget," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-219 (November 13, 1996), pp. 1-3.

financed by public money.”³⁴ At the same time, high ranking Polish generals (and especially former Chief of Staff Wilecki) have pressured the government to increase expenditures more quickly. Wilecki on several occasions publicly chastised successive Polish governments for their “neglect” of the Polish armed forces.³⁵

As well, existing budgetary priorities are still somewhat skewed by Western standards (see Table 6). For example, military R&D is virtually non-existent and the percentage of the budget allocated for procurement in 1996 represents less than one-half of the 30 percent of the defence budget typical in NATO countries. According to one source, there used to be approximately 600 R&D projects financed by the Ministry of Defence, but that figure is now closer to one-tenth the previous amount.³⁶ For 1997, higher wages and benefits to military personnel will eat away any potential increase on the procurement side of the defence ledger. In fact, real *matériel* expenditures are projected to decline by another 2.9 percent in 1997.³⁷

The situation in regard to procurement of new weapons systems has been made somewhat worse by a decision by the Ministry of Defence to shift additional funds into the purchase

³⁴ “[Untitled Report],” *PAP*, 1428 GMT (August 14, 1996) translated as “Cimoszewicz Seeks Increased Defence Spending,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-159 (August 19, 1996), pp. 1-2.

³⁵ See, for example, Janina Paradowska and Jerzy Baczynski (interviewers), “The Armed Forces have a Right to Defend Themselves,” *Polityka* (September 9, 1995), p. 3 translated as “Chief of Staff on Status, Control of Army,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-176 (November 7, 1995), p. 4.

³⁶ Ryszard Choroszy, “Disarming the Arms Industry: How Much Equipment can the Military Order in 1997?” *Polska Zbrojna*, (October 7, 1997), pp. 1&3 translated as “1997 Army Purchases, Arms Industry Viewed,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-197 (October 10, 1997), pp. 1-3.

³⁷ Choroszy, “No Breakthrough in the Defence Ministry Budget...,” p. 2.

of new uniforms and spare parts for older systems. In the opinion of the Ministry of Defence, these other procurement areas were considered to have been even more grossly underfunded in previous defence budgets.³⁸ In 1996, for example, Krzysztof Wegrzyn, under secretary of state at the Polish Defence Ministry, estimated that only 25 percent of the demand for spare parts was met.³⁹

Another problem for the Polish military has been its inability to come up with the funds necessary to retain its cohort of contract soldiers. For 1997, the pay of contract soldiers was budgeted to increase by 15 percent, but this figure was only marginally higher than the projected rate of inflation of 13 percent.⁴⁰ According to a Ministry of Defence report ("The Basic Problems of the Defence System of the Polish Republic") submitted to the Sejm in late 1996, the Polish military currently has 18,200 fewer career soldiers than envisaged. And more than 35 percent of these vacancies are NCOs.⁴¹ In 1996, more than twice as many professional soldiers left the armed forces than expected.⁴²

As for the effect of the budget crisis on training programs within the armed forces,

³⁸ Choroszy (interviewer), "What is Profitable for the Military...", p. 2.

³⁹ Ryszard Choroszy and Ryszard Rogon (interviewers), "We Must Be Trustworthy [Interview with Krzysztof Wegrzyn - Under Secretary of State at the Polish Defence Ministry]," *Polska Zbrojna* (October 4, 1996), pp. 1&3 translated as "Defence Official on Progress of Arms Tenders," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-197 (October 4, 1996), pp. 1-5.

⁴⁰ Choroszy, "No Breakthrough in the Defence Ministry Budget...", pp. 1-3.

⁴¹ Jan Forowicz, "Defence Issues in the Sejm," *Polska Zbrojna* (October 22 1996), pp. 1&3 translated as "MON Document on Basic Defence Problems Reviewed," *FBIS-EEU* (October 29, 1996), pp. 1-3.

⁴² "[Untitled Interview with Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski]," *Polskie Radio First Program Network*, 0620 GMT (March 8, 1996) translated as "President Kwasniewski Interviewed," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-048 (March 12, 1996), p. 8.

General of Division Leon Komornicki, Chief of the Training Directorate and Deputy Chief of the General Staff, remains optimistic that the change to a twelve month enlistment can be accommodated, but there is room for improvement. Although not nearly as bleak as is the case in Hungary, General Komornicki has complained publicly that the budget for military training “does not *assure* the training minimum [emphasis added].”⁴³ As well, certain projects — such as the development of the Polish-Ukrainian joint peacekeeping battalion and other Partnership for Peace exercises — have been delayed or reduced in scope for budgetary reasons.⁴⁴

But at least the Polish army can afford to conduct live fire exercises with obsolete equipment and older stocks of ammunition without worrying, as is the case in Hungary, if such inventories can be replaced!⁴⁵ And while the Polish air force (like its Hungarian counterpart) has suffered several embarrassing accidents involving some of its older aircraft (Polish combat pilots — like their Hungarian counterparts — fly as few as sixty hours a year) and it has announced plans to convert some of its air fields to private

⁴³ See General of Division Leon Komornicki, “Essentials of the Training Effort in 1995,” *Przegląd Wojsk Lądowych*, No. 12 (December 1994), pp. 5-12 translated as “Military Training Needs for 1995,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-042 (November 18, 1995), pp. 1-8 and “Troop Training in 1996,” *Przegląd Wojsk Lądowych*, No. 1 (January 1996), pp. 5-11 translated as “Goals of 1996 Military Training,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-091 (May 10, 1996), pp. 1-7.

⁴⁴ Jacek Szustakowski (interviewer), “The Polish-Ukrainian Battalion - First Exercises to be Held in September [Interview with Major General Zenon Bryk - Commander of the Krakow Military District],” *Polska Zbrojna* (July 24, 1996), pp. 1-2 translated as “General on Formation of Polish-Ukrainian Battalion,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-144 (July 26, 1996), pp. 1-2 and Luiza Zalewska, “Bosnia is Too Expensive: MON is Scrimping on Money for the Polish Battalion,” *Zycie Warszawy* (April 19, 1996), p. 3 translated as “MON ‘Scrimping’ on PFP to Salvage Bosnia Battalion,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-078 (April 23, 1996), pp. 1-2.

⁴⁵ For details on the Polish army’s training programs, see Komornicki, “Essentials of the Training Effort in 1995...,” *passim* and “Troop Training in 1996...,” *passim*.

civilian use, the Polish armed forces at least have enough money to hire private security services to guard some military installations (such as air fields) as part of a program to reduce the number of Polish military personnel acting as military guards by more than half. This program will also free soldiers from much sentry-duty and make them available for more military training.⁴⁶

In conclusion, the financial situation in Hungary is extremely serious. It is approaching crisis proportions (if it has not already done so). This situation represents a site of considerable civil-military tension and it should be expected that the military will — if the situation does not improve — increase its pressure on the government to rectify at least the most glaring weaknesses. For the military, the situation is worse than might be expected given the overall economic dislocation that is taking place in Hungary. There are very few signs that the situation will improve in either the short or medium term. It will likely only worsen as the military share of the national budget continues to decline.

In Poland, the situation is less than ideal, but at least it is relatively stable. The Sejm has found enough money to keep funding levels at approximately 2.5% of the GDP for the last three years and small increases in real terms are anticipated for the future. Although

⁴⁶ Jadwiga Jarzebowicz (interviewer), "Private Security Firms to Guard Military Facilities [Interview with Major Witold Rynkiewicz - Press Spokesman for the Silesian Military District]," *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19960730*00133 (July 30, 1996), p. 1. The 1996 figure for pilot training is taken from *The Military Balance, 1996-1997*, p. 95. The comparable figure for 1995 was 70 hours a year. Polish air accidents are discussed in "[Untitled Report]," *Polskie Radio First Program Network*, 0600 GMT (August 5, 1995) translated as "Commission Reports Reasons for Su-22 Plane Crash," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-151 (August 7, 1995), p. 40 and "[Untitled Interview with Defence Minister Zbigniew Okonski]," *Radio Zet Network*, 0610 GMT (August 2, 1995) translated as "Okonski on Purchase of Planes, Bemowo Incident," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-149 (August 3, 1995), pp. 41-43.

the military and the government agree that more needs to be done, at least the situation is not worsening (as is the case in Hungary). The situation may have “hit bottom” and thus — as the financial situation improves — so should civil-military relations.

Proposition Six (d) — Conflicts over the Procurement of Weapons Systems:

The procurement of specific weapons systems may be — in the case of competing visions — a source of tension between military and civilian leaders. Under circumstances where military expertise and competence is threatened, the military may come to oppose the civilian political leadership of the state.

Quite simply put, the situation in Hungary in regard to the procurement of specific weapons systems and military technology has been — from a military perspective — a near total disaster. Hungary is making very little progress towards the modernization of its armed forces and, in many instances, it is unable to maintain the *status quo* (i.e., the antiquated equipment it does possess).

There have been virtually no purchases of new equipment or weapons systems since the Communist order collapsed in 1989 and this issue has become a significant source of tension between the military and its civilian masters. In a very few instances, Hungary has managed to replace some of its *most* obsolete equipment with *slightly less obsolete* “used” equipment, but this represents virtually the entire extent of Hungary’s “modernization” efforts. About the only other exception occurred in 1993 when the Hungarian air force was provided with sufficient funds to make its air traffic control system compatible with NATO and ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization)

standards and additional funds enabled the air force to install the American IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) system in its aircraft. These improvements (which also served to increase civilian air safety) constituted one of the very few bright spots in the procurement area.

According to a report attributed to an anonymous member of the Hungarian National Assembly, the only significant purchase of *new* weapons by the Hungarian military in 1993 (as opposed to the air traffic control system) was “a few thousand hand grenades.”⁴⁷ Other than this modernization project, Hungary’s only significant purchases of military hardware and weapons systems have come in the form of purchases of mostly “used” equipment from Hungary’s former Warsaw Pact allies — Russia, the Ukraine, and Belarus.

Amongst the arms deals with Hungary’s former Warsaw Pact allies, the largest of these transactions involves Russia’s sale of military equipment to Hungary as a means by which Russia is paying off its Soviet-era debt to Hungary. Originally amounting to some US\$2 billion, Russia is in the process of paying down its debt to Hungary by approximately US\$1.5 billion (under the terms of a 1993 agreement) through the supply of BTR-80 armoured personnel carriers (40 out of a total of 500 have already been shipped and are intended to replace Hungary’s obsolete D-944 APCs), anti-tank equipment, and 28 new

⁴⁷ Unattributed report cited in Szemerényi, p. 25 fn. 3. This may have been a cynical, off-hand comment on the part of the unnamed legislator, but Szemerényi is definitely incorrect when she records the purchase of the US IFF system and air traffic control equipment as representing the only major purchases undertaken by the Hungarian armed forces since 1989. Purchases from the Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia certainly

MiG-29s (with spare parts and a training package). In 1996 alone, 555 military pieces and hardware worth a total of US\$ 320 million were to be delivered with US\$ 80 million going to the Border Guard and US\$ 240 million going to the regular forces.⁴⁸ Although some of this equipment is destined for the Hungarian Border Guard service, most of it will serve to somewhat “modernize” the Hungarian Army relative to neighbouring military establishments.

In addition to these purchases from Russia and smaller purchases from the Ukraine, Hungary has also agreed to take delivery of 100 used T-72 tanks from Belarus. As part of a brilliant deal, the Hungarians have agreed to purchase tanks which Belarus is obliged to destroy or otherwise render inoperable under the terms of the CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) treaty. The Hungarians have agreed to purchase these tanks for 5 percent of the cost of new tanks. This earns the Belarusian government foreign exchange and saves Belarus the cost of destroying the vehicles. At the same time, Hungary — after destroying some of its older stock of T-55s — is able to use the relatively modern former-Belarus tanks to equip its armed forces up to the limits set by the CFE!⁴⁹ According to

qualify as major acquisitions. And although these systems mostly consist of “used” equipment, they nevertheless represent a small step forward for the Hungarian military and should at least be noted.

⁴⁸ For more information of the Hungarian-Russian arms-for-debt swap, see Reisch, “Hungary Acquires MiG-29s from Russia...,” pp. 49-56; ITAR-TASS News Agency (Moscow), “Hungary Rejects Metro Line as a Way to Settle Russian Debt,” *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19960913*00309 (September 13, 1996), p. 1; Interfax News Agency (Moscow), “Some Debt to Hungary to be Repaid with Armoured Cars,” *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19960917*00250 (September 17, 1996), p. 1; “[Untitled Report],” *MTI*, 1423 GMT (September 19, 1996) recorded as “Defence Minister Views Russian Military Supplies,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-185-A (October 8, 1996), p. 1; and *MTI* News Agency (Budapest), “Hungary Receives Russian Military Supplies,” *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19960919*00288 (September 19, 1996), p. 1.

⁴⁹ For more information on the Hungarian-Belarus tank deal, see Janos Desi (interviewer), “Who Threatens Hungary? [Interview with Defence Minister Georgi Keleti],” *Magyar Hirlap* (May 7, 1996), p. 10

Hungarian Defence Minister Keleti, the Belarusian tanks will be deployed in eastern Hungary together with Hungary's "new" Russian-made BTR-80 armoured personnel carriers.⁵⁰

The Hungarian government and military have also discussed the urgent need to replace Hungary's aging fleet of MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighters. Unfortunately for Hungarian defence planners, no new aircraft (except for the 28 "used" MiG-29s acquired from Russia in late 1993) have been purchased. There simply is no money available at this time for additional aircraft purchases.

Hungarian officials have considered several options. Russia has offered to sell Hungary more MiG-29s.⁵¹ Israel has offered to upgrade Hungary's fleet of MiG-21 aircraft with NATO-compatible avionics, weaponry, and radar.⁵² Sweden's SAAB aerospace company has offered to sell Hungary its new JAS-39 "Gripen" fighter.⁵³ The Belgian

translated as "Defence Minister Views Army Reorganization Tasks," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-090 (May 9, 1996), pp. 1-4 and MTI News Agency (Budapest), "Hungary Receives Russian Military Supplies...." p. 1. This last reference also records the expected delivery of 31 of the 100 tanks from Belarus in late 1996.

⁵⁰ Desi (interviewer), "Who Threatens Hungary?...." p. 2.

⁵¹ Although the MiG-29s of the old East German air force have successfully been integrated into the air force of a united Germany, some Hungarian officials note that the MiG-29 is not well suited to a ground-support role, it has a shorter range than comparable American aircraft, its engines need more service and need to be replaced sooner (i.e., engines typically can withstand 300-350 flying hours), and the total life span of a MiG-29 is only 2,500 flying hours compared with an F-16's 8,000 hour operational life span. At the same time, the MiG-29 is much cheaper to purchase, it is less complicated to operate, and can even land on grass airfields. For more on this debate in Hungary, see Reisch, "Hungary Acquires MiG-29s from Russia...." especially pp. 52-53.

⁵² Susan Caskie (with Saulius Girmius and Zsofia Szilagyi), "Hungary: New Jets can Wait," *Transition*, Vol. 2, No. 14 (July 12, 1996), p. 67. In 1993, Finland made a similar offer to upgrade Hungary's large fleet of MiG-21s. See Reisch, "Hungary Acquires MiG-29s from Russia...." p. 53 fn. 25.

⁵³ Caskie, p. 67.

government has offered to sell Hungary some of its now surplus F-16s.⁵⁴ And the American navy has suggested that it might be willing to sell used F-18 fighters to Hungary.⁵⁵

But what Hungarian defence officials really seem to want are new Lockheed F-16s. These aircraft, however, are prohibitively expensive to purchase. Hungarian officials, consequently, have repeatedly delayed making a final decision on the acquisition of new aircraft. Hungary has now postponed its “final” decision on what option to choose until after NATO’s Madrid Summit.⁵⁶ What is not clear from this most recent announcement, however, is the answer to the question of whether this postponement is designed to keep American manufacturers hanging on as *de facto* lobbyists in favour of Hungary’s admission to NATO or whether this delay is designed to provide Hungary with the opportunity to quietly cancel its aircraft purchase in its entirety once Hungary has been offered an invitation to join the Alliance.

In either case, the seemingly never ending saga of Hungary’s proposed fighter replacement program is not the circumstance most indicative of the crisis in the overall procurement process. That crisis is most aptly demonstrated by the refusal of the Hungarian Defence Ministry in 1996 to accept deliveries of any more military equipment

⁵⁴ “[Untitled Report],” *MTI*, 2007 GMT (November 4, 1996) transcribed as “Keleti, Poncelet Held [sic] Press Conference in Brussels,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-217-A (November 8, 1996), p. 1.

⁵⁵ Fuzes (interviewer), “There is no way into NATO without Military Reform...,” p. 1.

⁵⁶ “Hungarian Defence Minister Says No Deal Soon on NATO Fighters,” *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol. 1, No. 6, Part II (April 8, 1997), p. 3.

from Germany *free of charge!* Since 1992, Hungary had accepted deliveries of spare parts and other equipment (including 20 L-39 training aircraft and 20 Mi-24 helicopters) from amongst Germany's stock of former-East German *matériel*, but Hungarian officials found that they no longer had sufficient funds available to refurbish (let alone operate) this equipment so they refused to accept any more deliveries. The 20 Mi-24 helicopters, for example, are not currently operational as they have not been refurbished.⁵⁷ (For their part, the Germans gained from these transactions by not having to dispose of equipment which is obsolete by their standards.)

For Poland, the situation in regard to military procurement is serious, but it is nowhere as bad as it is in Hungary. Officers in the Polish General Staff have complained that Polish equipment — even in cases where it is new — is typically a generation behind comparable equipment used by NATO countries. And they have complained that Poland's stores of spare parts have shrunk to only 20 percent of those needed. As a result of the shortage of spare parts, they continue, only 30 percent of defective equipment is undergoing necessary repairs.⁵⁸

Nevertheless, Poland has managed to find sufficient money to undertake some significant military purchases. Specifically, the Polish military in 1997 is expected to make several

⁵⁷ See, "[Untitled Report]," *MTI*, 1136 GMT (October 31, 1996) transcribed as "Agreement on Military Technology Concluded with Germany," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-216-A (October 11, 1996), p. 1.

⁵⁸ Marek Henzler, "Poland in NATO: The Time has come to Reckon the Cost - The Price of Alliance," *Polityka*, No. 20 (May 18, 1996), pp. 31-32 translated as "Cost of NATO Integration Discussed," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-121 (June 24, 1996), pp. 2-3.

important purchases including Grom anti-tank missiles, radar stations and improved IFF equipment, digital radio links, ultrahigh wave transmitters, and various types of shotguns.⁵⁹

In terms of its major weapons systems, however, there are some problems. For example, Poland currently manufactures an upgraded version of the Russian T-72M1 main battle tank - the PT-91 "Twardy" ("Hard") - for the Polish and export markets. Unfortunately, Krzysztof Wegrzyn, Under Secretary of State for the Ministry of Defence, reports that the army will be able to purchase only 15-20 of these tanks in the next five years and this total compares quite unfavourably to the 50 tanks per year that the military would like to buy and the 70 tanks per year that need to be built if Polish production runs are to achieve economies of scale.⁶⁰ And similar problems are associated with Poland's W-3 Sokol and Huzar combat and assault helicopter programs. The Polish air force can afford to buy 6 to 8 of these machines annually, but annual air force requirements are for almost three times as many machines.⁶¹

There has been some discussion in Poland of trying to lower production costs by selling

⁵⁹ Choroszy, "Disarming the Arms Industry:...", pp. 1-2 and Choroszy, "No Breakthrough in the Defence Ministry Budget...", pp. 2-3.

⁶⁰ For more details on the PT-91 "Twardy" program, see Jan Sek, "Poland Develops Long-Range T-72 Tank for Domestic and Export Markets," *Jane's International Defence Review*, Vol. 26, No. 6 (June 1993), p. 489. For the figures for Polish military purchase requirements and the numbers needed to achieve production economies of scale, see Choroszy and Rogon (interviewers), "We Must Be Trustworthy...", p. 4.

⁶¹ Choroszy and Rogon (interviewers), "We Must Be Trustworthy...", p. 4.

PT-91s to the export market.⁶² The level of technology employed in these tanks is more appropriate to Third World markets than more advanced models and it is also less expensive than typical American, French, or German armoured vehicles. Unfortunately for the Polish industry, the export market in the post-Cold War era is relatively flat and full of competitors. In the case of the nations which will be determining NATO's expansion, prospective NATO members like Poland also have to be cautious not to steal market shares or sell to markets which are politically sensitive (i.e., Libya, Iraq, and so on)!

Poland too must eventually decide upon a new fighter-interceptor aircraft for the Polish air force. The choices (similar to Hungary's) include the purchase of the Lockheed Martin F-16, the McDonnell Douglas F-18, the SAAB JAS-39 "Gripen," the Dassault (France) "Mirage," and Russia's MiG-29 "Foxbat."⁶³

Ideally, Poland would like to buy one of the American fighters (i.e., the F-16 or F-18) and build some of its components domestically (Poland — unlike Hungary — has a fairly extensive domestic arms industry), but to date this proposal has not been accepted by either manufacturer.⁶⁴ Poland, like Hungary, has made no final decision on which aircraft to buy, but Defence Minister Dobrzanski has gone on record as stating that a tender will

⁶² Sek, p. 4.

⁶³ Piatkowski, p. 37.

⁶⁴ PAP News Agency, "Delegation Ends Military Purchase Visit to USA," *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19961218*00199 (December 18, 1996), p. 1.

be announced in 1997 at the latest.⁶⁵

In conclusion, the situation (as it pertains to military procurement) is generally a disaster in Hungary. There really are very few bright spots. This issue represents a significant source of civil-military tension. When combined with the financial crisis (i.e., Proposition Six c), the continued viability of the Hungarian armed forces as an institution is brought into question. As equipment continues to age and training uses up existing supplies of spare parts and ammunition, the situation — in the absence of the political will to find more money — can only be expected to get worse.

Certainly, the complaints of the military — from an institutional perspective and on the part of individual soldiers and the military unions — can be expected to become more vocal. This crisis situation counter-acts much of the positive feelings generated by the armed forces' new mission, exemption from participation in the civilian economy, and so on. Fortunately, the situation — bad as it is in Hungary — is not as bad as that which exists in Russia. As a result, the increased pressure by the armed forces upon the civilian authorities to increase funding levels will almost certainly not take the form of an armed demonstration — although the actual form of this opposition may well strain or even cross that which is considered “appropriate” in a democratic context.

In Poland, the overall situation is serious, but relatively stable. Civil-military relations,

⁶⁵ PAP News Agency, “Defence Minister in Washington,” *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19960828*00208 (August 28, 1996), p. 1.

therefore, are not threatened at this time. There is even reason for some optimism. Funding levels (as indicated in Proposition Six c) are increasing in real terms (albeit slowly) and it appears the worst, from a fiscal perspective, may be over.

It is interesting to speculate upon the reasons why this is the case. Poland, after all, is also in the process of converting a command economy into a market economy. Money is tight and many groups and institutions are pulling at Poland's purse strings.

It may be the case that the government as a whole — cognizant of the "interventionist" tendencies of the Polish military historically — has attempted to forestall such an eventuality by finding enough money to keep the armed forces satisfied. The military may not have everything that it wants, but neither is its future as an institution in jeopardy (as is the case in Hungary).

In addition, this phenomenon may be the product of the very civilian political squabbling that has so frequently drawn the military into civilian political disputes. In other words, perhaps the proponents of the presidential and parliamentary political factions have attempted to "bribe" the armed forces to one degree or another. Certainly this accusation was leveled at President Walesa on many occasions.

And finally, geopolitical factors may also be at play in Poland. Specifically, all sides to the military debate recognize Poland's size and location in east-central Europe between Germany and Russia give added importance to the state of the armed forces and their role

as protectors of the nation. All sides may understand that that legacy cannot be threatened without threatening the security of the Polish state.

Proposition Six (e) — Conflicts over the Composition of the Armed Forces:

The overall composition of the armed forces (i.e., the development of a mass or elite organization) may be - in the case of competing visions — a source of tension between military and civilian leaders. Under circumstances where military expertise and competence is threatened, the military may come to oppose the civilian political leadership of the state.

There is general agreement between the civilian and military authorities in both Hungary and Poland on the future overall composition of the armed forces. In both states, civilian and military elites have proclaimed their support for the creation (in principle) of a professional (i.e., all volunteer/non-conscript) military along the lines of those armed forces found in the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and (beginning in 1998) Belgium and Holland. The development of such force structures is part of a general trend that can be found amongst many mature democratic states with advanced economies.

As a result of this general agreement, the issue of conscription has not become a source of civil-military tension. Specifically, all sides to this debate recognize that the transition to an all-volunteer armed forces cannot be accomplished immediately. The money to undertake such a total transformation is not available. The process, therefore, will have to be evolutionary. As the professional/career component is increased, the conscript component will decrease — but not disappear (for quite some time).

At the same time, one issue related to the conscription issue has resulted in some relatively minor complaints arising from the armed forces. Specifically, the military training command has complained that the reductions in the terms of service for conscripts is preventing these individuals from being properly trained in the complex tasks that are a function of modern warfare. As conscripts continue to constitute an important component of the overall armed forces, the military hierarchy worries about the lessening of military potential that will arise from the presence of semi-trained individuals in regular military units.

In terms of their specific reform programs, in both Hungary and Poland the goal of eliminating conscription has not been achieved. Smaller, professional armies with advanced weapons systems are far too expensive given the means available; somewhat larger, mass conscription armies with less advanced equipment will out of necessity remain the norm.

As a matter of fact, in both Hungary and Poland the armed forces now include slightly more conscripts as a percentage of the overall total active forces than was the case in 1989. This figure is, for now, holding relatively steady. Conscripts currently constitute 64.1% of the Hungarian armed forces and this figure was as high as 67.4% of the forces in 1995. In 1989, only 52.7% of the forces were conscripted. In Poland, 59.2% of current armed forces personnel are conscripts compared with only 56.1% of the total in 1989. In the post-Communist (transitional) period, the highest concentration of conscripts in the

Polish armed forces was 65.2% and this figure was reached in 1990.⁶⁶ (A complete breakdown of the Hungarian and Polish conscription figures is presented in Tables Seven and Eight.)

In Hungary, the Ministry of Defence no longer provides a timeline for the creation of an all-volunteer force and the ending of conscription.⁶⁷ Budgetary constraints mean such a plan is unrealizable in the foreseeable future. In Poland, budgetary considerations also mean that defence planners and military commanders will be forced to work within the limits of a system of national conscription.

For Hungarian and Polish military leaders, the move to an all-volunteer military service is something of a mixed blessing. Perhaps this is why there has been relatively little public debate on the subject or controversy on the issue within military circles.

On the one hand, a system of voluntary enlistment invariably results in the creation of smaller professional armies containing individual soldiers who are more skilled (on average) than their conscript counterparts. Professional soldiers stay in the service longer and, as a result, receive more training and obtain more military experience. Most conscripts take whatever skills they have mastered with them when their short-term

⁶⁶ All figures are from *The Military Balance* (various editions from 1989-1997).

⁶⁷ The Republic of Hungary Ministry of Defence, *National Defence '95* (Budapest: Ministry of Defence Press Office), p. 16 and Karoly Csabai and Lajos Moricz, "Toward a Volunteer Armed Forces," *Uj Honvedsegi Szemle* (May 1995), pp. 102-105 translated as "Conversion to Voluntary Armed Forces Analyzed," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-143 (July 26, 1995), pp. 15-17. Previously, Hungarian authorities predicted that the conversion of the Hungarian military to an all-volunteer enlistment system could occur as early as 2005.

enlistment is completed. On the other hand, conscripts tend to be somewhat more *representative* of all segments of society than volunteers who (unfortunately) usually tend to be drawn from the less educated and poorer elements of society.⁶⁸

Conscription - with its high turnover - has another military advantage. Such a system results in the creation of a large pool of reservists who are available for mobilization in times of national emergency. For a country like Poland which historically has found itself trapped between the large Russian and German "war machines," such considerations cannot be ignored. A large reserve of trained personnel would be a valuable asset until such time as Poland is integrated into a multilateral security institution (i.e., NATO).

In Poland, the former Chief of the Polish General Staff, Lieutenant General Tadeusz Wilecki, agreed with this latter argument and stated that universal conscription and the associated large military reserves were "a deterring factor, just like the number of planes, tanks, or guns."⁶⁹ Still Wilecki supported the interim creation of a "mixed" conscript/contract soldier system in which draftees filled out territorial defence and other units while contract soldiers performed more specialized tasks.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Of course in countries undergoing massive economic restructuring and/or dislocation, this phenomenon tends to be true of conscript armies as well. In Hungary, for example, somewhere between a quarter and a third of the 1992 draft intake were unemployed at the time of their enlistment. Source: Alfred A. Reisch, "Military Affairs: The Hungarian Army in Transition," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 2, No. 10 (March 5, 1993), p. 41.

⁶⁹ Janina Paradowska and Jerzy Baczynski (interviewers), "The Armed Forces Have a Right to Defend Themselves [Interview with Lieutenant General Tadeusz Wilecki - Chief of the Polish General Staff]," *Polityka* (September 9, 1995), p. 3 translated as "Chief of Staff on Status, Control of Army," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-176 (November 7, 1995), p. 8.

⁷⁰ Paradowska and Baczynski (interviewers), p. 3.

In either case, there currently does not appear to be a conflict between the Hungarian and Polish military and civilian leaderships on the issue of retaining conscription. Certainly, there has been little evidence of a public debate on the issue.

In both Hungary and Poland, public support on the issue of conscription has been pretty evenly divided. In Hungary in 1993-94, for example, 81 percent of the public supported retention of the “patriotic duty” of conscripting individuals into military service, but large numbers (i.e., 25 percent) considered such service to be “a waste of time” and large segments of the population (41 percent) considered military service to be a “necessary evil.” When asked to choose between only two alternatives, 51 percent of Hungarians favoured retaining the system of conscription while 47 percent favoured the creation of an all-volunteer/professional military. In Poland, 41.8 percent of the general population favoured conscription while 44.1 percent favoured its elimination.⁷¹ In the existing budgetary context, such a debate really is moot. There really is no room to maneuver on this issue. Conscription will remain for the foreseeable future in both countries.

Of course, there have been grumblings within the Hungarian and Polish military establishments as the result of another aspect of the conscription issue. In

⁷¹ These figures are from Ferenc Molnár, *A Magyar Honvédség Civil Kontrolljának Helyzete és Lehetőségei* (Budapest ZMKA, 1996), p. 15; Hungarian Ministry of Defence, *A Honvédelem Négy Éve 1990-1994* (Budapest: Zrinyi Kiado, 1994), p. 129; and Adam Kolodziejczyk, “The Importance of Conscription versus Voluntary Service in Poland,” Paper Presented at a Joint SOWI-IUS Conference - “Fostering Democratic Civil-Military Relations” - Strausberg, Germany, June 8-12, 1996 cited in Szemerkényi, p. 59.

Hungary, conscription enlistments are now set for a term of twelve months, but this is scheduled to change to nine month-long enlistments in late 1997. In Poland, terms of enlistment for conscripts are currently for eighteen months, but pending legislation will shorten this to twelve months. For the armed forces, such reforms come with a military price.

Hungary's new armed forces Commander and Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Ferenc Végh, has complained that the military cannot meet the National Assembly's November 1997 target date for the shortening of the terms of enlistment for Hungarian conscripts.⁷² If the reforms were to go ahead as planned, there would be significant financial and organizational consequences for the Hungarian armed forces.⁷³

Despite the fact that the size of the Hungarian active force component is scheduled to be reduced again, a shorter enlistment period would still mean that the same number of *individuals* need to be processed at Hungarian military training facilities as is currently the case. As such activities are the most expensive components of military service, more individual conscripts (at least compared to the number that would be processed under a comparable twelve month enlistment program) will mean more uniforms and other military supplies for a smaller military. And this too costs money.

⁷² "[Untitled Report]," *MTI (Budapest)*, 1429 GMT (November 15, 1996) transcribed as "Army Commander Views Military Service, Continuing Reform," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-223-A (November 19, 1996), p. 1.

⁷³ The following details are taken from Peter Matyuc (interviewer), "We Need More Uniforms," *Nepszabadsag* (October 8, 1996), pp. 1&8 translated as "General Views Army Restructuring, Military Budget," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-197 (October 10, 1996), p. 2.

Finally, training authorities will somehow have to cram twelve months of training into a nine month period. And as a nine month enlistment is unlikely to produce sufficient numbers of trained individuals to fill all of the highly specialized and highly skilled jobs within the Hungarian armed forces (i.e., weapons specialists, military mechanics, and so on), more professional contract or “volunteer” soldiers will have to be found — and paid!

Lieutenant General Végh estimates are that 1,400 additional contract soldiers will be needed if this reform goes through. Unfortunately for Hungarian military leaders, contract soldiers cost money and, in the context of the current budgetary crisis, money is in extremely short supply. According to one poll, 23 percent of Hungarian conscripts would volunteer for military service if the wages and benefits they received were higher.⁷⁴ The system of contract enlistments has, unfortunately, gotten off to a slow start. In 1992, for example, the Hungarian military was unable to fill even 2,000 specialist positions with contract enlistments because the wages being offered were too low.⁷⁵

In Poland, the situation is similar and complaints are also being heard. The change from an eighteen to a twelve month enlistment has been attacked publicly by Pawel Nowak, Deputy Director of the Technical Department of the General Staff of the Polish Armed

⁷⁴ See Szabo, “Fostering Civil-Military Relations:....” cited in Szemerényi, p. 48.

⁷⁵ “[Untitled Interview with Defence Minister Lajos Fur],” *Radio Budapest* (November 23, 1992) cited in Alfred A. Reisch, “The Hungarian Army in Transition....,” p. 41.

Forces, who argued (along the same lines as Hungary's Lieutenant General Végh) that a twelve month enlistment will make it virtually impossible "to provide proper training for experts needed by the military...[s]oldiers drafted into the Armed Forces will be able to perform only the most basic functions, and will serve as a reserve force primarily for the territorial defence units of the Armed Forces."⁷⁶

And junior officers from Poland's 17th Mechanized Brigade created a public controversy when they sent an open letter to President Aleksander Kwasniewski complaining about the budget crisis facing the armed forces. Because there is no money for proper training or new equipment, soldiers, they argued, are not shooting but only "reading about shooting" during their basic training and under such circumstances it would be impossible to train soldiers in twelve months.⁷⁷

Cost, too, will be a factor for the Polish military. Training will be condensed (but not cheaper) and more expensive professional (contract) soldiers will be required to undertake even more specialized duties beyond the limited capabilities of the short-term conscripts.

In conclusion, the issue of conscription is a site of widespread consensus between the

⁷⁶ Pawel Novak, "The Future of the Armed Forces; Politicians' Unjustified Optimism," *Rzeczpospolita* (September 17, 1996), p. 5 translated as "Military Official Views Defence Situation," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-191 (October 2, 1996), pp. 3-4.

⁷⁷ Jakub Karpinski, "Young Polish Officers Complain About Army Conditions," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 2, Part II (January 3, 1997), p. 2.

military and the civilian authorities in both Poland and Hungary. Only on the issue of the terms of service for conscript personnel have any disagreements arisen. In any event, these latter disagreements have been relatively minor and do not pose a serious threat to the overall civil-military relationship. In point of fact, the civil-military relationship on the issue of conscription is - on balance - quite positive.

Proposition Six (f) — Civilian Intrusion in the Internal Affairs of the Military:

The military's sense of expertise may engender tensions with civilian authorities whenever the latter intrudes in areas which the former considers to be sacrosanct (i.e., areas such as military discipline, promotions, and the internal chain of command). Under circumstances where military expertise and competence is threatened, the military may come to oppose the civilian political leadership of the state.

Examples of civilian intrusion in the internal affairs of the military in Hungary and Poland in the post-Communist (transitional) period are not difficult to find. However, most examples of this intrusion are far removed from the forms of civilian penetration and domination exercised in the Communist era so they have not resulted in the development of serious civil-military tensions. The activities of civilian legislative oversight bodies, for example, are generally seen by the military to be a legitimate part of a democratic system of civilian control.

On the other hand, there are some important exceptions to this rule. In Poland (in particular), some serious points of contention are developing. The rotation of military commands, for example, has the potential of politicizing the military hierarchy and may in the future become a sore spot between the military and its civilian masters. In

Hungary, no such plans are in the offing; therefore, civil-military relations in this issue area are stronger than is the case in Poland.

To begin, civilian efforts to purge Communist elements from within the armed forces have (for the most part) been rather muted. As a result, there has been no backlash from within the military establishment. In point of fact, the only significant public criticisms of the government lustration process have emanated (at least in the case of the Polish military) from middle ranking officers who early in the reform period (i.e., 1991) complained about the slow pace of the “de-communization” program in the Polish high command. (The lustration process was discussed in more detail in the context of Proposition Five a.)

The Hungarian and Polish civilian leaderships have also made no effort to place foreign military officers within the national military chain of command. There are no “Rokossovskii” in the Polish or Hungarian command structures.⁷⁸ On the contrary, both the military and the civilian elites of these two states are in the process of implementing programs of command and doctrinal nationalization. (See Proposition Six h below.)

On an even more positive note (from a military point of view), the civilian authorities in

⁷⁸ Konstantin Rokossovskii, of course, was the most famous (or infamous) example of a foreign military commander in Eastern Europe during the early Communist era. Of Polish origin, Rokossovskii was a Soviet General “promoted” to Marshal in the Polish Army and given the positions of Defence Minister, Deputy Premier, and voting member of the Polish United Workers’ Party - positions he held from 1949-1956. For an interesting account of Rokossovskii’s tenure, see Andrew A. Michta, *Red Eagle: The Army in Polish Politics, 1944-1988* (Stanford, C.A.: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), especially pp. 45-50.

both Hungary and Poland moved very early in the reform period to disband the national Main Political Administrations. Although never utilized in Eastern Europe as *commissars* (i.e., as necessary counter-signatories of military orders and commands), political officers did serve to propagandize and otherwise monitor the actions of military personnel on behalf of the political elite. As part of the Ministry of Defence and the Communist Party, the MPA operated in an extra-legal capacity to further the partisan political interests of the Communist regimes and not the rule of law. (This issue was discussed in more detail in the context of Propositions Five b and Five e.)

There are, of course, points of contention. Some members of the armed forces working in the Polish Ministry of Defence have complained about being subject to civilian disciplinary procedures.⁷⁹ These complaints were not without some foundation. Military and civilian codes of conduct are not necessarily compatible. Nor are the military and civilian justice systems. For example, military officers can be sentenced to prison for “crimes” (such as insubordination) which have no civilian equivalent.⁸⁰ Soldiers convicted of such breaches of military discipline should not be punished alongside “common” criminals in civilian prisons because, in the case of military crimes, the sentence is designed to teach the offender the values of discipline and obedience and is not intended to simply “punish” the transgressor.

⁷⁹ Zbigniew Lentowicz, “Civilians and Servicemen in MON: Cutting the Suit,” *Rzeczpospolita* (November 15, 1996), p. 4 translated as “Civilian Role in Defence Reform Examined,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-224 (November 20, 1996), pp. 3-4.

⁸⁰ For an interesting look at some of the tensions between the civilian and military systems of justice and discipline in Canada (tensions which can be found more generally), see Peter Moon, “Life Moves Smartly at Military Prison: No Jail Like It/It’s a Tough Regime and It’s Expensive,” *The Globe and Mail* (February 3, 1997), pp. A1 & A4.

At the same time, there are other policies — currently being put forward only in Poland — which have the potential (at least) of being quite disruptive of the military's internal organizational structure. First, a great deal of anxiety was created within the top echelons of the Polish military in 1996 when the Ministry of Defence canceled English-language training programs for officers over 45 years of age. The implications of this decision were obvious. These soldiers (including several generals) were effectively being written out of consideration for top military posts in the Polish armed forces.⁸¹

Secondly, Jerzy Milewski (who in 1995 was acting in his capacity as Deputy Minister of Defence) proposed a policy whereby top military commands and postings would be subject to compulsory personnel rotation after fixed periods of time.⁸² This suggestion was then taken up in 1996 by Stanislaw Dobrzanski, the current Minister of Defence, and by Jerzy Szmajdzinski, Chairman of the Sejm Defence Committee, who also called for the removal of many officers from the highest posts of the Polish military command structure.⁸³

Unconfirmed reports suggest this policy of compulsory rotation — should it ever become law — would affect all military positions from the Chief of the General Staff down to

⁸¹ Z.L. [sic], "Cuts in the Staff," *Rzeczpospolita* (September 26, 1996), pp. 1-2 translated as "Personnel Cuts in General Staff Outlined," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-189 (September 30, 1996), pp. 1-2.

⁸² Pawel Swieboda, "In NATO's Waiting Room," *Transition*, Vol. 2, No. 8 (April 19, 1996), pp. 52-53.

⁸³ Beata Pasek, "Poland Strengthens Civilian Control Over Army," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 226, Part II (November 21, 1996), p. 2 and "[Untitled Report]," *TV Polonia Television First Program Network*, 1900 GMT (November 18, 1996) translated as "Changes Forecast in Armed Forces Leadership," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-224 (November 20, 1996), p.1.

divisional commanders and would limit terms in the highest posts to a maximum of five years while lower ranking posts would be assigned for periods of at least two years.⁸⁴ In effect, this policy is intended to prevent officers (such as the now “former” Chief of the General Staff) from creating bureaucratic “empires” which might then be used to challenge civilian authority.

More akin to the extra-legal machinations of the Communist era, such a rotation policy could be used to “politicize” the assignment of key military personnel as successive governments in the ever-changing Sejm repeatedly rotate personnel to reflect current political trends. Promotions and assignments should be given out by the military itself or — in the case of only the *very top* commands (i.e., the Chief of the Defence Staff, commanders of military service branches, and similar postings) — by the civilian authorities and in either case decisions should be made on the basis of military competence, technical expertise, and normal career development (i.e., the system should be a meritocracy) and not on the basis of partisan political interests.

Past Polish practice suggests that the military should be concerned by these proposals. During the era of “dual authority,” civilian factions (allied with Wałęsa and the Left-majority in the Sejm) both attempted to place “their” people into key positions in the Ministry of Defence. The Polish “Left” even tried to parachute political loyalists into new institutional positions (i.e., in the roles of Deputy Ministers) during this time. (This

⁸⁴ See the previously cited “[Untitled Report],” *TV Polonia Television First Program Network*, 1900 GMT (November 18, 1996) translated as “Changes Forecast in Armed Forces Leadership,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-224 (November 20, 1996), p.1.

practice — especially the case of Democratic Left Alliance loyalist Danuta Waniek — is discussed in the context of Proposition Six g.)

Career officers — from a personal perspective — may find that their lives (and the lives of their families) are disrupted even more frequently than is currently the case. This may cause the armed forces to lose even more of the “best and the brightest” to the relative stability of the civilian economy.

And finally, officers may find — from a professional perspective — that their frequent career changes (and the associated learning curves at each stop along the way) place them at an institutional disadvantage in discussions and negotiations with politicians and (especially) civilian bureaucrats who are not subject to fixed terms in office and have the potential (especially in the case of the civilian bureaucracies) to draw upon many, many more years of accumulated experience and “institutional memory.”

As was discussed in the context of the areas of legislative and administrative weakness within the system of recurrent control mechanisms (Proposition Four) and is discussed below in terms of the Hungarian and Polish “civilianization” programs (Proposition Six j), the advantage of the civilian powers over their military counterparts is currently more “potential” than it is “actualized.” The civilian authorities have yet to recover from the isolation they experienced during the Communist era when they were cut-off from any real decision-making power by the Communist Party and were employed as “transmission belts” between the Party and the military.

Hopefully the intention of these “rotation” proposals is not to create a level playing field in security and defence policy-making between the civilian and military authorities by lowering the military to the lowest common denominator! Certainly in the West, such a program would place the military at a severe institutional disadvantage and as such would be more akin to Huntington’s system of subjective control rather than his idea of objective control.

In conclusion, most forms of civilian involvement in the internal affairs of the military in the post-Communist period cannot be considered to be illegitimate. Certainly when compared with the extra-legal excesses of the Communist era (which now have been ended), the civilian oversight activities of the democratic legislatures have not fostered civil-military tensions in either Hungary or Poland.

On the other hand, there is one *potential* blemish in this issue area. In Poland, proposals to rotate numerous military commands may have the effect of politicizing the military hierarchy and may in the future become a sore spot between the military and its civilian masters (especially given the former’s experiences during the Communist era). In Hungary, no such plans are in the offing. Civil-military relations in this specific issue area are, therefore, more positive in Hungary than in Poland.

Proposition Six (g) — Threats to Military Competence and Expertise:

The military may perceive as a threat any measure which abruptly or arbitrarily impinges upon its perceived sphere of military competence and expertise (i.e., when the state ignores technical advice offered by the

military establishment) and for this reason the military may — under certain circumstances — come to oppose the civilian leadership of the state.

In both Hungary and Poland, the civil-military reform process has affected several areas which touch upon the question of what constitutes the military's legitimate sphere of competence and expertise. In part, this is a legacy of the previous system in which the Communist Party determined what constituted the legitimate sphere of military competence and expertise. The military was not treated as a politically neutral and "professional" organization (*à la* Huntington). Instead, the Ministry of Defence, the MPA, and the security services acted as a transmission belts of partisan political values and the military was penetrated and dominated.

In the aftermath of the collapse of this system of subjective control, the need arose to re-establish a balance between the two sides. Since 1989, however, efforts have frequently been unsuccessful. Significant instances have occurred where the military feels its legitimate technical advice has been ignored or rejected. As a result, both the Hungarian and (especially) Polish armed forces' leaderships have come to oppose civilian policy edicts and this issue area has come to be the site of serious civil-military tensions.

Some of these instances relate to the process of establishing civilian and democratic parliamentary oversight over military command and budgetary decision-making. (These issues were discussed in the context of Propositions Three and Four.) These reforms — after some initial opposition — are largely completed and have come to be accepted by all

sides. No meaningful opposition to the *principle* of democratic civilian control over the armed forces has been uttered in some time. Similarly, efforts to re-define the national military mission along autonomous and national lines have met with a favourable response as have efforts to eliminate political officers from the military chain of command. (See Propositions Six h and Six f respectively.)

On the other hand, there have been some areas where the civil-military relationship has been much more strained because the civilian authorities threatened the military's perceived sphere of competence and expertise. As was discussed above (in Propositions Six f and Six c & d respectively), civilian leaders have not as yet responded to public criticism emanating from the military over plans to reduce the duration of conscript enlistments in Poland and Hungary. Also, the severe budget crisis facing the Hungarian military in particular shows no signs of being resolved.

More ominously, certain legislative oversight policies implemented in Hungary and Poland have been a little more difficult for the military establishments to adjust to than was the case with the policies mentioned above. For example, Hungarian and Polish efforts to "civilianize" the national Ministries of Defence by replacing military officers with civilian bureaucrats in various Ministry agencies and departments have met with resistance and this opposition — especially in the case of Poland — has occasionally been quite vocal.

Civilianization programs are considered by civilian political authorities to be a necessary

corollary to stated government intentions of bringing more of the defence and security decision-making process under the supervision of civilian powers. Unfortunately (for both the civilian and military sides of the equation), this process has been somewhat flawed in its implementation.

The speed with which the “civilianization” programs initially were implemented in both Hungary and Poland, for example, meant that civilian bureaucrats had very little time to become familiar - let alone expert - in the complexities of managing and transforming a modern military establishment. By many accounts, the civilians within the defence ministries found themselves outclassed by their military counterparts because they did not possess the detailed, technical knowledge necessary to make informed defence and security policy decisions.⁸⁵ The absence of specialized knowledge on the part of the civilians in turn prevented the development of mutual respect necessary for good relations between the military and society.⁸⁶ It also evoked memories of the MPA in which individuals were chosen for their political “reliability” and not their military expertise (which was typically quite low).

In Poland and especially Hungary, the pace of “civilianization” has now slowed and —

⁸⁵ For a discussion of the weakness of the civilian components within the Polish and Hungarian Ministries of Defence, see Szemerényi, pp. 71-73 and Ministry of Defence [U.K.]: Directorate of Management & Consultancy Services, *Review of Parliamentary Oversight of the Hungarian MOD and Democratic Control of the Hungarian Defence Forces* (London, U.K.: Directorate of Management and Consultancy Services, 1996), pp. 46-49. (Hereafter cited as MOD [U.K.], *Review of Parliamentary Oversight....*)

⁸⁶ Chris Donnelly (NATO Special Advisor for Central and East European Affairs), “Defence Transformation in the New Democracies: A Framework for Tackling the Problem,” *NATO Review*, Vol. 45, No. 1 (January 1997), p. 18.

particularly in post-1994 Hungary — even reversed somewhat. Additionally, many “officers in suits” (i.e., recently retired officers) have been employed in the defence ministries.⁸⁷ In the short-term (i.e., the transition period until civilians “get up to speed”), this is a more acceptable solution to the military.

Despite concerns being expressed domestically and in Western academic and political circles, this slowing of the pace of the “civilianization” programs need not be seen as a negative development. Placing civilians — especially ill-prepared civilians — in positions of power within the Ministries of Defence *merely for the sake of having civilians fulfill certain functions* (good, bad, or indifferently) transforms these civilians from civilian “watchdogs” into civilian “commissars.” The former works to make the transformation to democratic civilian more effective; the latter merely spies on the military for the government and — given the totalitarian history — is bound to be resented by the military.

In Poland, the “civilianization” of the Ministry of Defence was also retarded when it became embroiled in the skirmishing between Wałęsa and the Sejm in the era of “dual leadership.” In the aftermath of the Drawsko Affair, Prime Minister Pawlak attempted to consolidate his control over the three “Presidential” Ministries by appointing Democratic Left Alliance and Polish Peasant Party loyalists to the posts of Deputy Minister within the Ministries of Defence, Interior, and Foreign Affairs.

⁸⁷ Szemerkényi, pp. 12-13.

In a manner eerily reminiscent of the procedures employed in the Communist period, candidates for these posts were clearly chosen for their political reliability rather than just their expertise in resolving bureaucratic difficulties. The most notorious of these appointments was the Deputy Defence Minister, Danuta Waniek of the Democratic Left Alliance, who eventually left the Defence Ministry in June of 1995 to head the ultimately successful political campaign of Democratic Left Alliance Presidential candidate Aleksander Kwasniewski.⁸⁸ Appointments such as these — which can come and go as quickly as governments change in the Sejm — retarded the development of civilian “institutional memory” and further denigrated civilian defence officials in the eyes of military personnel.

And finally, efforts by civilian Ministry of Defence officials to get up to speed on the democratization of complex defence and security issues have been hindered and otherwise placed in a position of “comparative disadvantage” because of the policies of the West. Specifically, while programs like NATO’s Partnership for Peace (see Proposition 8) have served to provide numerous military personnel with expert technical advice on the fostering of democratic civil-military relations, corresponding programs designed to assist civilian Ministry of Defence officials have been comparatively rare.⁸⁹ The civilian authorities are still trying to make up for the fact that during the Communist

⁸⁸ Luiza Kowalska, “Danuta Waniek is Leaving the Defence Ministry: Is the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] Laying Down Its Arms?” *Zycie Warszawy* (May 15, 1995), p. 2 translated as “MON’s Waniek to Head Campaign,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-095 (May 17, 1995), pp. 30-31.

⁸⁹ The metaphor “comparative disadvantage” and details on the scarcity of programs designed to assist civilian Ministry of Defence officials are taken from Szemerényi, pp. 68-73.

era they were themselves removed from the policy-making loop and served only as transmission belts.

This deficiency has been offset somewhat by American, Canadian, and West European efforts to work with East European parliamentarians. Both the Hungarian and Polish legislatures have been assisted in their efforts to establish a system of legislative and administrative control by Western interparliamentary organizations such as the North Atlantic Assembly. These Western organizations have provided inexperienced East European parliamentarians with firsthand knowledge of the pitfalls and obstacles that need to be overcome if the parliamentary oversight process is to operate effectively. The North Atlantic Assembly, in particular, has emphasized the importance of creating a support infrastructure (staff, research institutes, and in-house research departments) for parliamentarians (who also can work with non-parliamentary organizations such as the mass media) in order to bring forward the public debate on defence and military issues.⁹⁰ Unfortunately for the East European parliamentarians, more work needs to be done to level the playing field.

In terms of the greatest (non-budgetary) attacks on the sphere of military competence and expertise, the best and most dramatic examples relate to the conflict in Poland between the Parliamentary leadership and the Polish General Staff (as personified by the *bête noir* of the Polish Left — former Chief of the Polish General Staff Lieutenant-General

⁹⁰ See Charlie Rose, "Democratic Control of the Armed Forces: A Parliamentary Role in Partnership for Peace," *NATO Review*, Vol. 42, No. 5 (October 1994), pp. 13-17.

Tadeusz Wilecki). There has been no parallel to this struggle in Hungary (except perhaps in terms of the budget crisis).

In almost the same way that Karl Marx was forever affected by the Bonapartist “betrayal” of the French Revolution, Polish political elites (especially on the Left) seem to be mesmerized by Marshal Józef Piłsudski’s 1926 *coup d’état*. And in the post-Communist period, the Polish General Staff have come to be seen by the Left as representing the worst of the Bonapartist and Piłsudskiist traditions. Of course, in sharp contrast to the suspicions of the Sejm’s current leftist majority, popular opinion in Poland has generally looked favourably upon the armed forces. And while this support may not always translate into popular support for the Chief of the General Staff, the Polish military, as an institution, has consistently ranked amongst the nation’s most popular and trusted.⁹¹

The reasons tensions have been higher in Poland than in Hungary are varied. Historically, the military has played a greater social role in Poland than it has in Hungary. (See Proposition One.) In Poland, the political atmosphere has been much more highly charged than it has been in Hungary and this context has been further disturbed by the vitriolic attacks that went back and forth between the Polish President - Lech Wałęsa - and successive Governments in the Sejm. (See Proposition Six k below.) In this latter case, the situation has been made worse as the result of the strong personalities involved - former-President Wałęsa, Lieutenant General Wilecki, President Aleksander

⁹¹ See, for example, poll results cited in Jakub Karpinski, “Opinion Polls Reflect Political Stability,” *Transition*, Vol. 1, No. 20 (November 3, 1995), pp. 44-47.

Kwasniewski, and various Prime Ministers and Defence Ministers.

On several fronts, this *bataille rangée* has manifested itself as efforts to take the Polish General Staff “out of the loop” when it comes to command and policy-making decisions. Lieutenant General Wilecki, subject to personal attacks even prior to his ascension to the position of Chief of the General Staff (i.e., during the Parys Affair), later found his institutional position to be under attack. Specifically, a new Army (service) Command was organized, military education programs as well as economic and budgetary functions were removed from the overview of the General Staff, military intelligence and counter-intelligence operations were directly subordinated to the civilian Minister of Defence, and peacekeeping operations were removed from the operational command of the military. On all of these fronts, the Chief of the General Staff opposed the governmental reforms — often quite vocally and often in alliance with President Wałęsa — but in the end this opposition was futile and the reforms went through.⁹²

After the December 1995 victory by Kwasniewski in the Polish Presidential elections, Wilecki’s opponents were able to increasingly isolate the General Staff and its Chief of Staff. Many of the elements of the current system of *parliamentary* civilian control over the military followed in the wake of Kwasniewski’s victory and were codified and institutionalized with the passage of the Law on the Duties of the Defence Minister and

⁹² One of General Wilecki’s most public and comprehensive defences of the Polish General Staff occurred on August 14, 1996 when he submitted an article to the Polish journal *Rzeczpospolita*. For the complete text of Wilecki’s defence, see General Tadeusz Wilecki, “The General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, a Relic of the Past or a Modern Command Organ,” *Rzeczpospolita* (August 14-15, 1996), p. 5 translated as “Gen. Wilecki on General Staff Tasks, Structure,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-160 (August 20, 1996), pp. 1-6.

various enabling statutes.⁹³ (Details of this legislation were discussed at great length in the context of Proposition Four.)

Under the terms of the Law on the Duties of the Defence Minister, a new Army (service) Command was supposed to be created in parallel to the Navy and Air Force/Air Defence command structures. Regulations were drafted to this effect in early 1996.⁹⁴ Previously, the Polish Army had been under the direct operational supervision of the Polish General Staff. Subsequently, these functions were subordinated to the civilian Minister of Defence who would also direct the older service commands. As a result, the functions of the Polish General Staff were reduced to those of planning and administration.

On a second front, the General Staff's Economic Directorate was dissolved and military budgetary functions were again subordinated to the Minister of Defence. This took most direct budgetary control out of the hands of the General Staff. These regulations were

⁹³ For the text of this law see "Law Dated 14 December 1995 Detailing Duties of the Minister of National Defence," *Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 10 (January 30, 1996), pp. 159-161 translated as "Law on Duties of the National Defence Minister," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-120 (January 30, 1996), pp. 1-4. The two enabling statutes are discussed by two legal experts from the Legal Department of the Ministry of Defence in the following: Stanisław Malecki and Piotr Pabisiak-Karwowski, "Statute for MON, Tasks for the Minister," *Rzeczpospolita* (August 16, 1996), p. 14 translated as "Defence Ministry Structure, Tasks Detailed," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-161 (August 21, 1996), pp. 1-5. See also Robert Kowal, "Reforming the Ministry," *Polska Zbrojna* (July 15, 1996), pp. 1 & 3 translated as "Defence Ministry Structure Reform Detailed," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-137 (July 17, 1996), pp. 1-4. As discussed in Propositions Three and Four, this legislation was also designed to attack the power enjoyed by President Walesa during his term in office. That purpose may have been even more important to legislators than efforts to reduce the role of the General Staff.

⁹⁴ Details on the specific regulations drafted to implement the Law on the Duties of the Minister of Defence are covered in an article by "Z.L."[sic], "MON Head Announces Changes; Secret Services Under Minister," *Rzeczpospolita* (January 18, 1996), p. 2 translated as "Defence Minister Views Restructuring," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-013 (January 22, 1996), pp. 1-2.

also drafted in early 1996.⁹⁵

Next, control of Poland's military education system was again subordinated to the civilian side of the Ministry of Defence. Initially, the Department of Military Education (i.e., the Central Education Board) was responsible for military education programs after the Polish MPA was disbanded, but control was passed onto the General Staff in 1993. With the passage of the Law on the Duties of the Minister of Defence, the Ministry of Defence once again came to hold the reigns of power over the Polish military educational system.⁹⁶

More significantly, a rather nasty fight developed over efforts to subordinate military intelligence and counter-intelligence operations to the Minister of Defence instead of to the General Staff. Parliamentarians complained that the existing situation allowed the Polish President (Wałęsa) to use the Military Information Services (WSI) as his own personal intelligence service (because of the close working relationship between Wałęsa and Wilecki) while opponents of the change (including Wilecki and the head of the WSI) countered by arguing that such a move would politicize (and thus compromise) military intelligence operations. They maintained that direct military control over the WSI was essential if the armed forces were to be able to plan for any military contingency.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ Piatkowski, p. 34 and Swieboda, pp. 52-53.

⁹⁶ Malecki and Pabisiak-Karwowski, "Statute for MON..." pp. 1-5 and Kowal, "Reforming the Ministry..." pp. 1-4. Szemerényi incorrectly list control over military education as still being in the hands of the General Staff. See Szemerényi, p. 44.

⁹⁷ For an excellent review of efforts to develop a system of democratic civilian control over the military and civilian intelligence services and the associated political infighting, see Anna Marszalek, "Civilian Control

Wilecki even went so far as to claim that the efforts to strip the WSI away from the General Staff were “pure bolshevism.”⁹⁸ In the end, however, the reforms went ahead. Regulations subordinating the WSI directly to the Defence Minister were finally drafted in early 1996.

On yet another front, the competence and expertise of the military (or at least that part of the military symbolized by the Polish General Staff) has been diminished by the role played by the civilian Department of Military Foreign Affairs within the Ministry of Defence. In addition to coordinating military contacts with foreign armies and organizing arms limitation and reduction verification missions, the Department of Military Foreign Affairs controls and directs peacekeeping operations through the Vice-Minister of Defence for Policy. At present, there is no evidence that the General Staff participates in either the direction or planning of peacekeeping operations.⁹⁹

Military District Commanders do play some role in the planning and preparation process (i.e., Military District Commanders are assigned responsibility by the Ministry of Defence for the selection of individual troops for peacekeeping operations from amongst the

Over Secret Services Viewed,” *Rzeczpospolita* (January 17, 1995), p. 12 translated as “Civilian Control Over Secret Service Viewed,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-017 (January 26, 1995), pp. 13-18.

⁹⁸ Paradowska and Baczynski (interviewers), “The Armed Forces Have a Right to Defend Themselves....” p. 3.

⁹⁹ Major A.L. Zaccor (US Army), “Polish Peacekeepers and Their Training (or Training Poland’s Blue Berets),” *NATO Integrated Data Service* (August 1993). Paper written at the Conflict Studies Research Centre (The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst).

personnel under their command).¹⁰⁰ The danger, of course, in denying so much of the military chain of command operational control over peacekeeping operations is that these operations may become subject to “micro-management” by civilian Ministry of Defence officials who do not benefit from the same level of military training and experience as military personnel.

In Canada, military officers have complained that precisely just such an occurrence has developed in regards to Canadian peacekeeping operations - so the concerns of the Polish military in this case seem somewhat justified. A report prepared by the Canadian Ministry of National Defence complained about politicians and civilian bureaucrats impeding Canadian deployment and peacekeeping operations with their constant requests for information on the most petty details while at the same time these same civilian oversight bodies failed to provide essential instructions (i.e., mission definitions and rules of engagement for peacekeeping operations) until the last minute (thus inhibiting mission training) and they designed mission parameters in haste and without regard to the military's ever-diminishing resources. Given the minimal capabilities civilian oversight organs possess in both Poland and Hungary, such problems as these would seem to be inevitable in Poland and Hungary.¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰ Zaccor, p. 4 and John Mackinlay & Jørn Olsen, “Squaring the Circle,” *Jane's International Defence Review*, Vol. 28, No. 10 (October 1995), p. 75.

¹⁰¹ For a summary of this report, see “Political Interference Impedes Military, DND Report Says,” *The Globe and Mail* (April 28, 1997), p. A7.

In addition, the Defence Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented a 27 page "Letter of Discussion" before NATO representatives in Brussels in April 1996 without first consulting the Polish General Staff on the text of the final draft. This document - which detailed Poland's preparations for possible NATO membership - was shown to the Chief of Staff only two weeks after the Brussels meeting.¹⁰² In democratic systems, the civilian Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs would certainly have the authority to make such policy statements, but it would also be expected that they would do so after considering the advice of the individuals and institutions who are going to have to implement those policies (i.e., the experts in the General Staff).

Individually, each of these moves to re-define (read: "diminish") the role of the Polish General Staff and increase the amount of civilian control over defence policy-making appear reasonable and legitimate. Cumulatively, these efforts appear more malevolent and would appear to inject civilian authority too deeply into some areas that should best be left in the hands of the military. As an institution, the General Staff — as the result of these reforms — is in the process of being cut by one-third (i.e., from 1,800 to 1,200 personnel) and this has to have a negative effect on moral and efficiency.¹⁰³

Thus it was not without reason that Wilecki and the General Staff came to oppose these reforms (in concert with President Wałęsa). Democratic civil-military relations, after all,

¹⁰² Marek Henzler, "Poland in NATO: The Time has Come to Reckon the Cost - the Price of Alliance," *Polityka*, No. 20 (May 18, 1996), pp. 31-32 translated as "Cost of NATO Integration Discussed," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-121 (June 24, 1996), pp. 4-5.

¹⁰³ The figures are from "Z.L." [sic], "Cuts in the Staff..." p. 1.

are a two edged process. And while military leaders are expected to remain outside of the political arena (providing technical advice and expertise to their civilian masters), it is also incumbent upon civilian leaders to reciprocate this division of powers by representing the interests of the military in the political arena and by listening to the technical advice of the experts who will have to implement the policies chosen.

In Hungary, budgetary and procurement decisions are increasingly falling under the control of civilians within the Ministry of Defence. In 1995, for example, the Procurement and Research & Development Economics Department of the General Staff was disbanded and its functions were taken over by new structures reporting to the Deputy State Secretary for Economic Affairs within the civilian component of the Ministry of Defence.¹⁰⁴ And intelligence operations have been divided between four security and intelligence services. The National Security Office and the Information Office are controlled by a civilian Minister without Portfolio working through the Office of the Prime Minister while the Military Security Office and the Military Intelligence Office are part of the armed forces and as such are overseen by the Defence Minister.¹⁰⁵ These changes, however, do not appear to be part of an overarching “plan” to denude the military command of all of its authority — as appears to be the case in Poland!

¹⁰⁴ See MOD [U.K.], *Review of Parliamentary Oversight...*, p. 36.

¹⁰⁵ See Jeffrey Simon, *Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion*, McNair Paper 39, Institute for National Strategic Studies (Washington, D.C.: National Defence University, 1995), pp. 89-90.

Such an equation, of course, begs the question of what the military is expected to do when the civilian leadership appears bent upon cutting the military leadership entirely out of the policy-advising process. For while the principle is widely acknowledged that spending and doctrinal decisions in democratic regimes are political decisions and should not be made solely by military personnel, neither is the reverse true; politicians (even democratically elected politicians) should not make these decisions (i.e., to purchase one weapons system and not another) solely by themselves and without specialized technical advice from the military and without reference to objective security needs.¹⁰⁶ The relationship between the two sides should be symbiotic.

Wilecki, however, was not driven out of his position as Chief of the General Staff until March 10, 1997. As President Kwasniewski himself acknowledged, many people (especially amongst the Polish Left) expected Wilecki to be removed from office in the immediate aftermath of the December 1995 Presidential elections. Kwasniewski, however, claimed: "I have never said in any of my public addresses that the new president was a new broom that would sweep clean the General Staff."¹⁰⁷ Still, Wilecki was recalled just over a year later.

¹⁰⁶ In an important article on the East European transition, Chris Donnelly, NATO's Special Advisor for Central and East European Affairs, makes the first argument (i.e., policy is a political decision), but he does not make the second (i.e., that good policy requires advice from experts in the field). See Donnelly, p. 17.

¹⁰⁷ "[Untitled Interview with President Aleksander Kwasniewski]," *Polskie Radio First Program Network*, 0620 GMT (March 8, 1996) translated as "President Kwasniewski Interviewed," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-048 (March 12, 1996), p.8.

In retrospect, the strategy of attack against Wilecki was brilliant. Wilecki suffered “the death of a thousand cuts” and was institutionally isolated when he was finally retired. As such, he was no longer in a position to oppose the civilian authorities when the axe fell.

In the end, it was probably good that Wilecki’s dismissal did not follow too closely upon the heels of the presidential election. Since there is no evidence that Wilecki had engaged in extra-legal (as opposed to “inappropriate”) activities in opposing certain aspects of the reform process, the delay is both reasonable and possibly symbolic of an improvement in future civil-military relations. If Wilecki had been removed in late 1995, it would have constituted clear evidence that the top military commands were going to continue to be highly politicized under Kwasniewski. At the same time, one of the two officers who abstained during the Drawsko non-confidence vote, General Zbigniew Zalewski, was later appointed by President Kwasniewski to the position of Commander of the Ground Forces when an Army service command was separated from the General Staff in late 1996! Kwasniewski may (in part) be rewarding Zalewski’s “proper” political behaviour, the appointment may be “a coincidence,” or it may mean that Kwasniewski and Zalewski are allied politically. It is perhaps too early in Kwasniewski’s term to know for certain which explanation is true.

In conclusion, the tensions in Hungary between the civilian and military components of the Ministry of Defence and between the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff have been comparatively muted. As might be expected, tensions do exist in Hungary as they do in virtually every other country (even the most democratic — or authoritarian for that

matter). However, these tensions manifest themselves more as administrative inefficiencies — such as the duplication of efforts by military personnel and civilian bureaucrats and the failure to develop good lateral communications between various agencies working on related projects — than as outright conflicts.¹⁰⁸ In other words, reports from one organization are first passed up the internal chain of command and only then are they delivered to the other organization where the information must then be disseminated downward to the relevant people and departments.

In Poland, this issue area has been the site of perhaps the most serious civil-military tensions. In this it is rivaled only by the tensions generated by the armed forces being drawn into civilian political disputes (i.e., Proposition Six k). At the same time, there is room for optimism. With the resolution of the struggle between the presidential and parliamentary models of democratic civilian control, perhaps the civilian authorities can turn their attention to the resolution of the outstanding areas of civil-military conflict. An undivided civilian authority may be able to succeed where a divided authority previously failed.

Proposition Six (h) — Alterations to the Military Mission:

The military's sense of responsibility may engender tensions with civilian authorities whenever the military's societal role is abruptly or arbitrarily constrained or altered. Under circumstances where military responsibility is threatened, the military may come to oppose the civilian political leadership of the state.

¹⁰⁸ MOD [U.K.], *Review of Parliamentary Oversight...*, p. 36.

Since 1989, the military mission demanded of the Polish and Hungarian military establishments by their political masters has changed radically. In most circumstances, this kind of sudden change can very easily become a source of tension between the military and political elites. In Hungary and Poland, however, this has not been the case. In both of these states, the national government has been careful to alter the national military mission in ways that are either *neutral* or *positive* from a military perspective (even when such changes include a potential or real political price for the civilian leadership). As a result, this push for change has not threatened the military's sense of institutional responsibility when compared to the situation that existed during the Communist era. In fact, quite the opposite has occurred.

As described in more detail in the introductory chapter, the mission of the Hungarian and Polish armed forces prior to 1989 could be categorized rather succinctly as performing two basic roles: one internal and one external to the state.¹⁰⁹ Internally, the "Defence of Socialism" entailed the following (potential) tasks: (a) acting as a deterrent to opposition to the regime, (b) "backing-up" police and other internal security services during crises, and, if all else failed, (c) leading armed struggle against the enemies of the regime. Externally, the armed forces were expected to act as offensive and defensive military allies of a foreign power (i.e., the Soviet Union) in the spirit of "Socialist Internationalism." In neither the internal or external contexts were the armed forces to be

¹⁰⁹ As mentioned in the introduction, this thesis was first articulated in Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Christopher D. Jones, John Jaworsky, and Ivan Sylvain, *Warsaw Pact: The Question of Cohesion, Phase II/Volume I - The Greater Socialist Army: Integration and Reliability*, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment ORAE Extra-Mural Paper No. 29 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1984), especially chapters 4, 6-8, and 11.

accorded an independent societal role by the Soviet or East European Communist Party machines.

Since 1989, the Polish and Hungarian political and military establishments have worked to create a new independent, national command-and-control system and national defence capability to replace the previous system of Soviet penetration and otherwise enable the post-Communist regimes to enact new *national* defence doctrines. This represents a net positive development from the perspective of the Polish and Hungarian military establishments. The armed forces are no longer defenders of the Communist *regime*. They are now defenders of the *national state*.

In Hungary, a 1993 parliamentary resolution ("National Assembly Resolution No. 27 of 23 April 1993 Concerning the Basic National Defence Principles of the Hungarian Republic") set forth the six related roles the Hungarian armed forces were expected to undertake in the post-Communist era.¹¹⁰ The six roles (some of which parallel Communist-era functions) include the following: (1) national defence in the (now less likely) event of total (i.e., European or world) war; (2) defence of the nation in the event of internal conflicts in neighbouring countries spilling over into Hungarian territory; (3) prevention of Hungarian territory being crossed by a belligerent in the process of

¹¹⁰ The following section is based on "National Assembly Resolution No. 27 of 23 April 1993 Concerning the Basic National Defence Principles of the Hungarian Republic," *Magyar Kozlony*, No. 48 (April 23, 1993), pp. 2701-2705 translated as "Resolution on National Defence," *JPRS-EER*, No. 93-061-S (July 1, 1993), pp. 28-32. The key parts of this Resolution are Part II, Sections 8-13. This document is also available as Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Basic Principles of National Defence in the Republic of Hungary," *Fact Sheets on Hungary*, 1993 No. 9 (Budapest: MTI Printing Shop, 1993).

attacking a third party; (4) protection of Hungarian sovereignty from regional or local threats or attacks; (5) preparation for UN mandated peacekeeping operations; and (6) establishment of a general deterrence capability.

In Poland, formal promulgation of a national defence doctrine has been repeatedly delayed (along with many other measures) as the result of the interminable conflicts that beset relations between the Sejm and President Wałęsa. They were last updated in November of 1992 in a document entitled: "Security Policy and Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland."¹¹¹ Nevertheless, it can be deduced that the basic principles of Polish doctrine are similar to those formally enacted in Hungary.¹¹²

The changed military mission for the Hungarian and Polish armed forces perhaps is best demonstrated by the new all-round or omni-directional defence postures that these forces now are developing.¹¹³ In both Hungary and (especially) Poland, the national armed

¹¹¹ Piatkowski, p. 71.

¹¹² In late 1996, the National Defence Committee (KOK) prepared a new document outlining a strategic plan for Poland's defence. The document - "The Basic Problems of the Defence System of the Polish Republic" - has been submitted to the legislature, but the Sejm has yet to deal with the proposal. See PAP New Agency (Warsaw), "Deputy Defence Minister Satisfied with Reforms in Ministry," *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19961204*00193 (December 4, 1996), p. 1 and Forowicz, "Defence Issues in the Sejm....," p. 1.

¹¹³ The Hungarian military does not use the term "all round" to describe its new force posture. For the Hungarian military, that term implies fixed lines of defence along all of the frontier. Instead, Hungarian armed forces are in the process of being concentrated into key areas with an emphasis being placed on mobile response to attacks. As such, officially it does not matter from which geographic direction an attack originates. For purposes here, however, the two concepts are indistinguishable. See, Irene Szabo, "The Army to Concentrate Forces and Equipment," *Nepszava* (November 7, 1996), pp. 1&4 translated as "Article Details Army Reorganization Plans," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-219 (November 13, 1996), pp. 1-3; Maria Rozgics (interviewer), "Chief of Staff Végh: The Army is Implementing Conscious Changes - Fewer People, but with Honesty," *Uj Magyarorszag* (November 29, 1996), p. 5 translated as "Army Chief Views Reorganization, Discipline," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-223 (December 4, 1996), pp. 1-3; and Endre B. Bojtar (interviewer), "The Hungarian Armed Forces are Capable of Cooperating only if they are Capable of

forces were - in the Soviet period - concentrated in areas nearest to NATO territory and (not coincidentally) in areas least useful to the defence of these states against a Soviet invasion. As recently as 1991 (i.e., two years into the post-Communist reform process), more than twice as many Hungarian military units were still stationed west of Budapest than were located east of the capital. And in Poland, approximately forty percent of the Polish armed forces were located in the western third of the country; thirty-five percent were located in the middle third; and only twenty-five percent of the forces could be found in the east.

Moreover, this uneven distribution was compounded by the fact that the units in the western regions tended to be those that were kept at the highest levels of defence readiness. Eastern formations tended to be "Category C" or cadre units (i.e., understrength divisions which would be raised to full strength only following a mobilization order).¹¹⁴ Currently, forces are distributed more evenly throughout the two countries although budgetary limitations have hampered the process (especially in Poland).

Poland's all-round defence posture began to be put into place in the aftermath of the 1991 Polish Parliamentary elections which added a Solidarity-dominated Sejm and Senate to a

Operating," *Magyar Narancs* (November 7, 1996), pp. 6-7 translated as "Defence Ministry Official on NATO Integration Efforts," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-233 (December 4, 1996), pp. 1-7.

¹¹⁴ Douglas L. Clarke, "A Realignment of Military Forces in Central Europe," *Report on Eastern Europe*, Vol. 2, No. 10 (March 8, 1991), pp. 41-45. It is interesting to note, the east and south-east redeployment of Hungarian military formations actually began during the government of reform-Communist Imre Pozsgay who may have been playing the "Rumanian threat" card in advance of the Hungarian national elections. (See Clarke, p. 43.)

Solidarity-controlled Presidency.¹¹⁵ In 1992, an important step forward was undertaken when a fourth military district (the Krakow Military District) was set up in eastern Poland to compliment the three existing military districts (the Pomeranian Military District in north-west Poland, the Warsaw Military District, and the Silesian Military District in south-west Poland).¹¹⁶

The Krakow Military District utilizes some facilities previously maintained for the now-departed Northern Group of Forces (NGF). Unfortunately for Polish defence officials, most of these facilities were left in a horrific state of disrepair by the time the last Soviet

¹¹⁵ The details about the Polish armed forces presented in the following sections are taken from Piatkowski, pp. 33-37; Assembly of the Western European Union, "Security and Military Co-Operation in the Baltic Sea Area," *Assembly of the Western European Union Proceedings: Forty-First Ordinary Session (Assembly Documents), First Part, Vol. I*, Document 1494 (Paris, The Western European Union, 1995), pp. 308-309; and *The Military Balance, 1996-97* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), pp. 94-95.

¹¹⁶ Presently, the Polish Army is distributed as follows. First, the Warsaw Military District retains operational control over three divisions (the 1st, 15th, and 16th Mechanized Infantry Divisions), the 1st Artillery Brigade, the 2nd Engineering Brigade, the 49th Assault-Helicopter Regiment, and various support units (including one Territorial Defence Brigade). The Pomeranian Military District (HQ Bydgoszcz) controls the 2nd and 12th Mechanized Divisions, the 8th Coastal Defence (Mechanized) Division, the 6th Artillery Brigade, the 5th Engineering Brigade, the 3rd Bridgelaying Regiment, the 56th Assault-Helicopter Regiment, and various support units (including one Territorial Defence Brigade). And the Silesian Military District (HQ Wroclaw) commands the 4th, 5th, and 10th Mechanized Divisions, the 11th Armoured Cavalry Division, the 5th and 23rd Artillery Brigades, the 1st and 4th Engineering Brigades, and additional support units (including two Territorial Defence Brigades).

In the new Krakow Military District (HQ Krakow), a new unit - the 25th Air Cavalry Division - has been formed. This unit is designed to be the nucleus of Poland's rapid reaction capability and is the most important unit in the Krakow Military District which also includes one armoured brigade, one mechanized brigade, one air assault brigade, one mountain brigade, one mechanized infantry regiment, and various support troops (including special operations forces and one Territorial Defence Brigade).

The Polish Air Force, for its part, is divided into 4 Corps centred on Warsaw, Bydgoszcz, Wroclaw, and Poznan. And the ground-to-air missile brigades of the Air Defence anti-aircraft forces are deployed mainly in the Warsaw-Poznan region and along the Baltic Coast. The Polish navy, designed solely for coastal defence in the Baltic, is headquartered in Gdynia and consists of the 3rd Ship Flotilla (Gdynia), the 8th Coastal Defence Flotilla (Swinoujscie), the 9th Coastal Defence Flotilla (Hela), and a naval air brigade (Gdynia).

troops pulled out (i.e., most of the buildings were gutted).¹¹⁷ As a result, most facilities for the Krakow Military District have had to be built from scratch.

Another small step forward in the creation of a truly *national* defence posture was represented by the creation of “territorial defence” units within the Polish army. Since 1993, five Territorial Defence Brigades have been created. These units have reduced offensive capabilities when compared with regular army brigades, but they possess anti-tank and anti-aircraft defence capabilities and are distributed in all four Polish military districts.

Hungary’s all-round defence posture (involving an army much smaller than its Polish neighbour’s) is organized into two Military District/Mechanized Corps-level commands.¹¹⁸ The Ministry of Defence Central Command Corps (Budapest) controls the 32nd Guard Regiment (Military Police), the Danube River Flotilla, a regiment of

¹¹⁷ For a report on the condition of the ex-Soviet bases in Poland, see Katarzyna Nazarewicz, “An Inheritance in Ruins: The Basic Repair of Post-Soviet Garrisons Will Cost at Least 1.5 Trillion Zlotys,” *Wprost*, No. 29 (July 19, 1992), p. 30 translated as “Costly Overhaul of Former Soviet Naval Bases,” *JPRS-EER*, No. 92-114 (August 24, 1992), pp. 15-16. The NGF - containing only two Soviet divisions - was also the smallest of the Soviet Groups of Forces in Eastern Europe and the extent of its facilities were correspondingly slight. As its primary role was to protect the lines of communication stretching between the Soviet Union and the critical Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG), it could be comparatively small. It did not have to act as an occupying garrison in Poland in the same way that some of the other Soviet Groups of Forces were expected to act. It was, after all, backed up to the east by the enormous forces maintained by the Red Army and Red Air Force in the Baltic, Kiev, Carpathian, and Belorussian Military Districts in what was then the western territory of the USSR and to the west lay the powerful Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

¹¹⁸ From 1992 to 1996, the Hungarian Army was divided into four Military Districts: the Budapest (city) Military District, the 1st Military District (north-west Hungary), the 2nd Military District (south-west Hungary), and the 3rd Military District (eastern Hungary). Details on the Hungarian forces and command structure presented in the following sections are taken from *The Military Balance, 1996-97*, pp. 89-90; *National Defence '95*, pp. 14-15; and *National Defence '96*, pp. 26-29.

engineers, and the 11th Danube Air Defence Missile Brigade. The remainder of the army is under the operational command of the 4th Mechanized Corps (HQ Székesfehérvár).¹¹⁹

In conclusion, it can be said with some certainty that the redefinition of the military's mission and role represents perhaps the brightest spot in the civil-military relationship in post-Communist Poland and Hungary. Not only were the Communist-era internal and external roles abolished, but the armed forces were assigned important functions in support of *national* interests.

This latter development is important because it re-established what is traditionally the military's key corporate function. It is also important because the Hungarian and Polish military establishments may be able to use the prospect of new *national* responsibilities and duties as leverage to extract more resources from the national treasury. In this task, the armed forces may find powerful political allies. Overall, this development is very good from a military perspective!

Proposition Six (i) — Loyalty to the State or Political Executive:

The civilian ethic is at variance with military views that place loyalty to the state or nation above conceptions of loyalty to the duly constituted civilian political authorities. Military establishments which subscribe to the former view are more likely to intervene in the political process.

¹¹⁹ The 4th Mechanized Corps is itself divided into two mechanized infantry divisions - the 2nd Mechanized Division (HQ in Kaposvár in south-west Hungary) and the 3rd Mechanized Division (HQ in Cegléd in eastern Hungary). The 4th Mechanized Corps also directs the operations of several reserve, training, and independent brigades along with many associated support units.

Proposition Six (i) suggests that military officers who define their responsibilities in terms of their loyalty to the state or the nation and not necessarily in terms of their loyalty to a duly constituted civilian political executive by definition threaten the principle of civilian control. The ethical position typified by officers such as General Douglas MacArthur in the United States and Lieutenant General Alexander Lebed in post-Communist Russia place the military in the role of determining for itself when a particular civilian executive or legislature fails the test of fulfilling the national interest. It is usurping a role otherwise handled by civilian powers and the civilian political process.

In neither Hungary nor Poland has any evidence emerged indicating such values as those held by MacArthur and Lebed have taken root amongst the top military elite. Not even Poland's Lieutenant General Wilecki (who would appear to be a likely candidate for such views — *at least in the opinion of his critics*) has been recorded as making such an utterance (either publicly or privately).

Although the armed forces have been drawn into civilian political disputes and they have in some instances taken the side of one civilian faction against another; in no instances have the armed forces opposed the *principle* of civilian command. In other words, the military has occasionally increased its institutional autonomy and decided *between civilian factions* (especially when the lines of constitutional authority were blurred!), but it has never rejected the notion that a civilian faction should in the end command the armed forces. As such, the dangers suggested by Proposition Six (i) do not appear to be

relevant in the case of Hungary and Poland in the post-Communist (transitional) period. This has to be considered, therefore, a positive development in terms of fostering good civil-military relations in the post-Communist era.

Proposition Six (j) — Institutional Threats to the Military's Societal Role:

The military may perceive as a threat any measure which impinges upon its unique right to fulfill its social function and institutional position as guarantor of society in an anarchic environment. Under circumstances where military corporateness is threatened, the military may come to oppose the civilian political leadership of the state.

Proposition Six (j) in many ways constitutes the corollary to Proposition Five (c). But whereas Proposition Five (c) emphasized the role of paramilitary forces as domestic political counterweights in the resolution of potential disputes between the military and the civilian authorities, Proposition Six (j) looks at the threat paramilitary forces pose to the institutional position and social function of the regular armed forces. If the Polish or Hungarian governments had chosen to maintain or even build up their national paramilitary forces in the post-Communist (transitional) period (thus minimizing the mission of the national military establishments), the consequences of such a policy would be discussed in this section.

However as the empirical evidence presented in Proposition Five (c) indicated, in neither Hungary nor Poland do paramilitary forces pose any meaningful threat to the unique social function and institutional position of the regular military establishments as guarantors of national sovereignty in an anarchic security environment. In point of fact,

the Hungarian and Polish militaries now play a more important or even dominant role in the defence of their respective nations than was the case for their Communist counterparts.

Compared with the Soviet period, paramilitary forces in both of these countries have been disbanded or otherwise reduced to a far greater degree than has been the case with the national armed forces (which have also declined in size in the post-Cold War era). As well, organizational and administrative changes have been made to the remaining paramilitary forces of these two countries. And these changes lessen the ability of these paramilitary forces to come to the defence of the national civilian government in the event of an armed conflict.

In short, the paramilitary policies of the Hungarian and Polish civilian authorities in no way threaten the dominant position of the regular forces in the national defence system. This is a positive development from a military perspective and represents a positive site of civil-military interaction.

Proposition Six (k) — Drawing the Military into Civilian Political Disputes:

The military value of corporateness may be threatened by civilian efforts to draw the military or portions of the military into its own civilian, political disputes. Under circumstances where military corporateness is threatened, the military may come to oppose the civilian political leadership of the state.

In the post-Communist (transitional) period, both the Polish and Hungarian military establishments have been drawn into civilian political disputes by the civilian political factions themselves. This has negatively affected civil-military relations and threatened the neutral institutional position of the armed forces in society.

This issue area represents a very serious source of civil-military discord in both Hungary and Poland. In Poland, the dispute was more protracted and bitter, but in Hungary the civilian friction very nearly led to the military receiving conflicting operational orders. In short, both contexts were very serious in their own way.

Most of these disputes have arisen from efforts by divided and competing political executives to exercise power and authority over the national military. Specifically, the initial constitutional arrangements which emerged from the collapse of the Communist order in 1989 failed to clearly establish the relative authority of the national president and the legislature. (These constitutional and legislative arrangements and the Hungarian "Taxi Blockade" are discussed in much greater detail in the context of Propositions Three and Four.)

In Hungary, the defeat of the Hungarian Socialist Party (i.e., the "reformed" Communists) in the 1990 general elections produced a divided legislature and executive. The Hungarian President, Arpad Goncz, was a member of the Alliance of Free Democrats (which was the smaller of the two governing parties in the National Assembly) while the Prime Minister, Jozsef Anatall, and the Minister of Defence, Lajos Fur, were both

members of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (which was the largest party in the legislature).

In October of 1990, the uneasy relationship between the President and the legislature over the direction of the armed forces came to a head. In that month, Hungarian taxi drivers - upset about higher gasoline prices - blockaded the downtown cores of several Hungarian cities and they disrupted key border crossings. To break the strike, the Democratic Forum Ministers wanted to use the army, but they were opposed in this by the Free Democrats - led by President Goncz.

In effect, the Hungarian military was very nearly in the position of being given conflicting operational orders by antagonistic civilian factions. It was being placed squarely in the middle of a civilian political dispute. Ultimately the Government backed down and the army was not ordered to break the strike, but (in conjunction with several lesser disputes) the crisis served to illustrate the need for clear lines of authority over the army.

In early 1991, the commander of the Hungarian armed forces, Lieutenant General Kalman Lorincz, attempted to bring matters to a head by offering his resignation to the Hungarian President, the Prime Minister, and the Minister of Defence! All three refused to accept his resignation. Instead, all parties to the dispute made public pronouncements to the effect that they would not work at cross purposes to one another. Six months later, Minister of Defence Fur asked the Hungarian Constitutional Court to rule on the dispute

and the issue was essentially resolved when the Court ruled in favour of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence in September.

In Poland, the struggle between the President and the Sejm manifest itself in many varied forms. As previously discussed, the attacks on the Polish General Staff (and its former head Lieutenant General Tadeusz Wilecki) by the Sejm can only be understood in this context. There are numerous other examples as well, but the most classic examples in Poland are represented by the now famous Parys and Drawsko Affairs.

The “Parys Affair” is named after Poland’s first civilian Minister of Defence — Jan Parys. Parys was Minister of Defence in Prime Minister Jan Olszewski’s government which slowly fell out of favour with President Wałęsa over the pace of “de-Communization” efforts, economic reform, and especially on the question of who ultimately possessed power to make policy decisions in military and other affairs (i.e., the President or the Sejm).

The actual conflict between Wałęsa and Parys erupted in early 1992 when Walesa decided to seek a replacement for General Zdzisław Stelmazuk as Chief of the Polish General Staff. Wałęsa had intended to choose Vice Admiral Piotr Kołodziejczyk to be Stelmazuk’s replacement, but Minister Parys retired Kołodziejczyk to the military reserve list on December 31, 1991 without consulting President Wałęsa. Consequently, Wałęsa — acting in his capacity as “superior of the armed forces” — ordered two of his aides (Mieczysław Wachowski and Jerzy Milewski) to approach General Wilecki (then

Commander of the Silesian Military District) to see if the latter would be interested in replacing Stelmaszuk. Wałęsa undertook this action without the permission of Minister Parys under the authority of Poland's poorly defined "Small Constitution."

On April 6, 1992, Parys indirectly accused Wałęsa of attempting to bribe General Wilecki with the position of Chief of Staff in return for certain political considerations (most likely Wilecki's support of the office of the President against that of the Minister of Defence). Parys alleged:

Certain politicians have been calling on select officers in recent days without informing the defence minister or the chief of staff to promise them promotions in exchange for, as it were, Armed Forces support in political games...Politicians who promote actions like these behind my back are promoting nothing more than conspiracy.¹²⁰

The irony was that Parys made his comments before a meeting of Polish military officers. Thus Parys effectively committed the same highly inappropriate "sin" he accused others of making (i.e., attempting to draw the military into a civilian political dispute and making it take sides). Parys also failed (initially) to name who the "certain politicians" were. And finally, Parys may have overstated (and thus weakened) his case when he claimed the meeting between Wałęsa's representatives and General Wilecki occurred without his prior knowledge. In reality, it was the *content* of the meeting to which Parys objected and not the meeting *per se*, but this misstatement provided an opportunity for Parys' opponents to attack the entire case of the Defence Minister.

¹²⁰ "[Untitled Report]," *Warsaw TVP Television Network*, 1730 GMT (April 6, 1992) translated as "Parys: Army Approached to 'Abolish Democracy' - Support for 'Political Games' Sought," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 92-067 (April 7, 1992), p. 19.

General Wilecki, for his part, provided a written statement to the Sejm's Defence Committee in which he stated his superiors — the Chief of Staff and the Minister of Defence — had been informed of his pending invitation to speak to Walesa's representatives and had approved of his visit ahead of time.¹²¹ Wilecki and outgoing Chief of Staff Stelmaszuk also deplored what they called (at least publicly) efforts to draw the Polish military into the dispute between the President and the Minister of Defence.¹²²

In the end, a Sejm "Extraordinary Committee" investigating Defence Minister Parys' allegations found that accusations that certain politicians had attempted to involve the Army in partisan political games were "unfounded and detrimental to the state's interests."¹²³ Three days later (May 18, 1992) Parys resigned, but the issue of who controlled the Polish military was far from resolved.

On September 30, 1994, the situation which gave rise to the Parys Affair was reversed. In an effort to possibly improve his electoral prospects in the upcoming Polish Presidential elections, it was the turn of Lech Wałęsa and (once again) Mieczysław

¹²¹ "[Untitled Report]," *PAP*, 1533 GMT (April 16, 1992) transcribed as "General Denies Part in Political Maneuvering," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 92-075 (April 17, 1992), p. 21.

¹²² For Stelmaszuk's comments, see Katarzyna Szymanska-Borginon (Interviewer), "[Untitled Interview with General Zdzisław Stelmaszuk - Chief of the Polish General Staff]," *Nowy Świat*, No. 87 (April 1-12, 1992), p. 1 translated as "Military Chief Comments on Alleged Plot," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 92-075 (April 17, 1992), pp. 20-21.

¹²³ "[Untitled Report]," *PAP*, 1056 GMT (May 15, 1992) transcribed as "Parys Investigation Concluded: Resignation Accepted: Commission Says Charges 'Unfounded,'" *FBIS-EEU*, No. 92-097 (May 19, 1992), pp. 10-11.

Wachowski to draw the military into a political dispute.¹²⁴ At a luncheon at the Drawsko Pomorskie military training grounds, Wałęsa asked the assembled military leaders — including the Chief of the General Staff, the commanders of Poland's Military Districts, and the Commanders of Poland's service branches — for their opinions of the then Defence Minister - the now "retired" Vice Admiral Kołodziejczyk. After a period of frank discussion, Wałęsa asked the commanders if they had confidence in the Defence Minister or if they wished that he be removed.¹²⁵ All but two of the officers agreed that Kołodziejczyk should be removed; the other two abstained from voting.

Needless to say, this event provoked a firestorm of criticism and debate and it once again highlighted the urgent need for the issue of civilian control to be settled in Poland. In terms of the ideal of democratic civilian control, not only was Wałęsa's request improper,

¹²⁴ Although his own serious conflicts with Wałęsa make his book a less than ideal and impartial source, Wachowski's role in what comes to be known as the Drawsko Affair is recorded in retired Vice Admiral and retired Defence Minister Kołodziejczyk's book - *Admiral Afloat: Mieczysław Ziemiński Talks with Piotr Kołodziejczyk*. Kołodziejczyk refers to Wachowski's admission "in jubilation" that he (Wachowski) engineered and organized the whole affair. Of course, it must also be noted that at the time of his admission, Wachowski too had been dismissed from his role as an advisor to President Walesa. In the absence of this dismissal, it is unclear whether Wachowski would have ever made such an admission. Kołodziejczyk's book (published in Warsaw by Editions Spotkania in 1995) is reviewed by Jakub Karpinski, "Polish Civil-Military Relations From an Admiral's Vantage Point," *Transition*, Vol. 1, No. 23 (December 15, 1995), pp. 44-45. As for the notion that the Drawsko Affair was designed to improve Wałęsa's electoral prospects in the upcoming Presidential elections, this argument is indirectly supported by Wałęsa's use of the Drawsko events in his continuing attacks on the Leftist-dominated Sejm. For example, Wałęsa, in a major speech before the Sejm in January 1995, claimed that the Drawsko controversy acted as a necessary and positive catalyst because it brought defence issues up for debate before an otherwise inattentive Sejm. Source: "[Untitled Address by Lech Walesa before the Polish Sejm on January 19, 1995]," *Radio Warszawa Network*, 1235 GMT (January 19, 1995) translated as "Walesa Speaks on Defence Issues," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-013 (January 20, 1995), pp. 15-18.

¹²⁵ Although no transcript of the vote of non-confidence in the Defence Minister is available, Wałęsa's speech to the assembled Polish High Command is recorded. See Lech Walesa, "President of the Polish Republic in Drawsko - Supplement," *Serwis Informacyjny Prezydenta*, 2201 GMT (October 11, 1994) translated as "President Walesa Gives Speech in Drawsko," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 94-198 (October 13, 1994), pp. 15-16.

but so was the response of most of the officers present (i.e., technically they all should have abstained).

The fact that the military response was divided, however, at least suggests that the incident — from the military's point of view and *probably* Wałęsa's as well — was a spontaneous event and not part of a pre-planned conspiracy. A pre-arranged or "staged" vote would undoubtedly have been called only if all of the officers present at the meeting were in agreement whereas the divided result suggests the call for a vote — as inappropriate as it was — occurred in the "heat of the moment."

After the fact, a Sejm subcommission looking into the Drawsko Affair condemned Wałęsa's actions (and not surprisingly called for the creation of a system of *parliamentary* democratic civilian control over the military), but it also concluded that the Polish generals behaved reasonably correctly given the circumstances in which they found themselves.¹²⁶ In effect, the subcommission argued that the military had been placed in an intolerable position by the presidential-legislative tensions and the Small Constitution's ambiguous lines of authority.

In terms of their overall effect on national civil-military relations, the "Taxi Blockade" in Hungary and the Parys and Drawsko Affairs in Poland represent very serious sites of civil-military tension. They are important for several reasons and illustrate several

¹²⁶ The subcommittee's findings are reported in Paul Latawski, "In Defence of Presidential Prerogative," *Transition*, Vol. 1, No. 8 (May 26, 1995), pp. 40-43.

different phenomena. First, the Hungarian “Taxi Blockade” (unlike the innumerable crises that marked the comparable battle for authority in Poland) involved the military in an *operational* dispute. In other words, the issues at stake were not merely those of overall reform or personnel changes, but the military was in effect being given conflicting operational instructions by the civilian authorities. In this sense, the “Taxi Blockade” is in some ways more serious than the Polish Parys and Drawsko Affairs. After all, conflicting operational instructions are possibly the most dangerous types of pressures to which a military establishment can be subjected. The consequences of a mis-step may readily manifest itself in armed confrontation between elements *within* the armed forces.

Second, the “Taxi Blockade” differs from the Polish examples in that the central military figure in the Hungarian crisis — Lieutenant General Lorincz — did not come to side with one civilian faction against another (as did Poland’s Lieutenant General Wilecki), but instead he chose to force the two sides to resolve their differences by themselves by the mechanism of offering his resignation.

Third, the “Taxi Blockade” differs from the Parys and Drawsko Affairs (and the other — almost innumerable — conflicts for authority in Poland) in that the “Taxi Blockade” and the actions of Lieutenant General Lorincz actually represented a turning point in efforts to resolve the Hungarian crisis of “dual leadership.” In Poland, the Parys and Drawsko Affairs represent merely sign-posts marking out the interminable conflict between Wałęsa and the Sejm. Nothing was really resolved by these crises and nothing really changed

until (for better or for worse) Wałęsa was defeated in the 1995 Polish Presidential elections. In the end, Lorincz's strategy worked. Wilecki's did not.

Finally, it is interesting to speculate what may happen now that the recent general elections have allowed the Polish Centre-Right to recapture the Sejm. Under these circumstances, the previous conflict-prone situation has been inverted and replicated. In other words, a "Rightist" Sejm may battle for authority with a "Leftist" President in the same way that the "Leftist" Sejm battled with a "Rightist" President Wałęsa!

From the perspective of the ideal of democratic civilian control, it should not make a difference whether or not the "Left" or the "Right" wins. Recent Polish history, however, suggests that this might not be the case. The military may find itself drawn into a civilian political dispute in the same way that occurred with the Parys and Drawsko Affairs. This indicates the military — although certainly not blameless in these disputes — is less to blame than the civilian authorities themselves for violating the norm of military neutrality in civilian political disputes. It is more the politicians who need to get their act together.

Sites of Civil-Military Tension (Overall Summary):

Although an overall assessment of the state of Polish and Hungarian civil-military relations will not be presented until all of the Propositions of the Typology of Relevance have been presented (i.e., only in the concluding chapter), it is possible to summarize certain interim conclusions as they pertain to the sites of possible civil-military conflict and/or confrontation. The empirical evidence presented in this chapter suggests that there

are a number of issues areas where the interactions of the armed forces with the civilian authorities are positive from the perspective of fostering good civil-military relations. At the same time, this relationship is not without problems.

First, positive areas of interaction in Hungary and Poland include the issue area of the overall composition of the armed forces. In both states, the civilian and military sides are in general agreement as to the future transformation of the armed forces from a largely conscript force into an all-volunteer and long-service professional force (i.e., once the economic limitations can be overcome).

Second, in neither Hungary nor Poland has the military's top command exhibited signs that it rejects the *principle* of civilian rule. Although the military has in some instances used the existence of ambiguous lines of civilian constitutional authority to increase its own relative autonomy and in other instances it has even become involved in civilian political disputes (i.e., the political neutrality of the armed forces has sometimes been violated), it has nevertheless rejected the notion that the armed forces should not be subject to the command of civilian authorities.

A third and very important site of positive civil-military interaction refers to the abandonment by the civilian authorities of the widespread Communist-era practice of employing military personnel in civilian economic projects. This practice was highly resented and in no way contributed to the military's performance of its societal function - the defence of the state against foreign aggression.

A fourth important site of positive civil-military interaction in the post-Communist era consists of the abandonment by the civilian authorities of the Communist-era practice of maintaining large paramilitary forces as institutional counterweights to the regular armed forces. Such forces had, in the past, threatened the military's corporate sense of responsibility and the disbanding and reduction of these forces since 1989 has removed a significant source of civil-military tension.

And finally, the most important development — from a military perspective — is related to the military's sense of corporate responsibility. In both Hungary and Poland, the role and mission of the armed forces has been radically altered from that which was expected of the military in the Communist era. Instead of the internal role of protecting the regime (i.e., the Communist Party) and the external role of operating at the behest of a foreign power (i.e., the Soviet Union), the main purpose of the post-Communist armed forces is now the defence of the *state* against foreign threats. This reorientation is a very positive development from a military perspective.

Of course, relations between the civilian authorities and the military are not without problems. In some cases these problems have manifest themselves in serious civil-military tensions. For example, the Polish and Hungarian militaries have resisted plans to expand "civilianization" programs which replace military personnel with civilian bureaucrats. Placement of civilians in the Ministries of Defence merely for the sake of

having civilians perform certain tasks evokes in the military an institutional memory of the role played by the MPA and other Communist agencies.


The military has also been drawn into civilian political disputes. Along with numerous lesser disputes, the "Taxi Blockade" in Hungary and the Drawsko and Parys Affairs in Poland strained civil-military relations. In the case of Poland, this issue area represents perhaps the most serious source of civil-military tensions.

In post-Communist Hungary, on the other hand, by far the most serious source of civil-military tensions revolves around the related financial and procurement crises which have befallen the armed forces. The situation is so serious and — in the face of aging equipment and diminishing stockpiles of weapons and ammunition — shows so very few signs of improving that the continued viability of the armed forces as an institution is in doubt.

On balance, a couple of interim observations can be made. In the case of Poland, the debates and tensions which have lasted most of the last decade placed an enormous strain on civil-military relations. At the same time, there is room for optimism about the future. The presidential-parliamentary debate is now resolved and there has been a slight upturn in the fiscal situation (these *were* two of the most serious sites of civil-military tension). In Hungary, on the other hand, there is less room for optimism. The two most serious sites of civil-military tension — the financial and procurement crises — show few signs


of being resolved in the near future. On the contrary, the situation appears likely to get worse.

TABLE 4:
Hungarian and Polish Defence Expenditures
as a Percentage of GDP
1989-1995



Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies cited in Réka Szemerkenyi, *Central European Civil-Military Reforms at Risk: Progress in Establishing Democratic Controls over the Military has not been Sustained*, Adelphi Paper No. 306 (Oxford: Oxford University Press/International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), p. 25.


**TABLE 5:
Defence Expenditures in Hungary
(Relative Change)
1988-1995**



Legend: Changes in Hungarian defence expenditures compared with the base budget year of 1988 - expressed as a nominal value and in real terms.

Source: *National Defence '95* (Budapest: Ministry of Defence Press Office, 1995), p. 2.

**TABLE 6:
HUNGARIAN AND POLISH DEFENCE SPENDING
BY FUNCTION AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE
OVERALL DEFENCE BUDGET
1995-1996**



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LEGEND: O & M = Operations and Maintenance, R & D = Research and Development

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies cited in Réka Szemerényi, *Central European Civil-Military Reforms at Risk: Progress in Establishing Democratic Controls over the Military has not been Sustained*, Adelphi Paper No. 306 (Oxford: Oxford University Press/International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), p. 26.

**TABLE 7:
Hungarian Professional and Conscript Forces
1989-1996**

91,000	48,000	52.7	18 month enlistment
94,000	50,500	53.7	18 month enlistment
86,500	45,900	53.1	12 month enlistment
80,800	53,900	66.7	12 month enlistment
78,000	52,000	66.7	12 month enlistment
74,500	53,400	71.7	12 month enlistment (10 month enlistment discussed)
70,500	47,500	67.4	12 month enlistment (9 month enlistment discussed)
64,300	41,200	64.1	12 month enlistment (9 month enlistment planned - see Note 1)

Source: All figures are from the International Institute for Strategic Studies' *The Military Balance* - various editions from 1989 to 1997 (except as noted below). The IISS figures differ from those reported by the Hungarian Ministry of Defence in its annual reviews (The Republic of Hungary Ministry of Defence, *National Defence '95* [Budapest : Ministry of Defence Press Office, 1995], p. 13 and The Republic of Hungary Ministry of Defence, *National Defence '96* [Budapest : Ministry of Defence Press Department, 1996], p. 27.), but the IISS figures are used here because the Hungarian Ministry of Defence totals include Ministry of Defence personnel and an unknown category entitled "background institutions." Use of the IISS figures also makes this data comparable with the IISS data on Poland presented in Table 5.

Note 1: Plans to shorten the Hungarian enlistment period to 9 months are reported in Antal Andrassy (interviewer), "The Armed Forces Reform is Overdue [Interview with Hungarian Defence Minister Gyorgy Keleti]," *Nepszava* (April 19, 1996), p. 12 translated as "Keleti Views Armed Forces Reform Process," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-076 (April 20, 1995), p. 13. The changeover was scheduled to begin in February 1996 and was due to be completed in February 1997.

Note 2: As of 1993, alternative civilian service for individuals refusing to serve in the armed forces was set at 18 months. Source: "Act CX. of 1993 on Home Defence" (Unpublished Manuscript Courtesy of the Hungarian Embassy to Canada), Section 118.

**TABLE 8:
Polish Professional and Conscript Forces
1989-1996**

412,000	231,000	56.1	24 month enlistment (36 month service in seagoing navy)
312,800	204,000	65.2	18 month enlistment (24 month service in seagoing navy)
305,000	191,100	62.6	18 month enlistment (all services)
296,500	167,400	56.5	18 month enlistment (all services)
287,500	162,400	56.5	18 month enlistment (all services)
283,600	160,300	56.4	18 month enlistment (all services)
278,600	158,100	56.7	18 month enlistment (all services) (12 month enlistment discussed)
248,500	147,100	59.2	18 month enlistment (all services) (12 month enlistment legislation prepared - see Note 1)

Source: All figures are from the International Institute for Strategic Studies' *The Military Balance* - various editions from 1989 to 1997 (except as noted below).

Note 1: The preparation of legislation to shorten the Polish conscription enlistment to 12 months is reported in Beata Pasek, "Military Service to be Shortened in Poland," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 215, Part II (November 6, 1996), p. 3.

PART C: COUNTER-INDICATED THEMES

CHAPTER 5.7: EMPIRICAL RESULTS PROPOSITION SEVEN

Proposition Seven — The Officer Corps, NCOs, and Other Ranks:

The orientation of the officer corps is the most important military component in determining whether or not the armed forces will intervene in the political process or even seize political power for itself (especially in the case of conscript armies). At the same time, the attitudes of both the officer corps and enlisted personnel are important in determining whether or not the armed forces will obey the directives of civilian authorities when ordered to support the current government by suppressing dissent.

Introduction:

When constructing the Typology of Relevance, it was noted that amongst existing theoretical formulations there is a near universal focus upon the officer corps as the most important and representative military component when analyzing national civil-military relations. Subsequently, it was suggested in the Typology of Relevance that such a concentrated focus - often to the total exclusion of all other elements of the military establishment - represented a theoretical weakness which needed to be filled.

Proposition Seven argued that it was possible to develop an accurate model of national civil-military relations only when the existing theoretical literature moved beyond its typical focus on the officer corps and expanded to encompass the attitudes and opinions of non commissioned officers (NCOs) and enlisted personnel. According to the predictions of the Typology of Relevance, the orientation of NCOs and enlisted personnel is especially important from a theoretical perspective when determining whether or not

the military as a whole can be counted upon in situations of domestic unrest.

In terms of the theoretical importance of the officer corps relative to the NCO and enlisted components of the armed forces in the cases under review, the empirical evidence is somewhat spotty and also somewhat mixed. There is some evidence of theoretically important differences between the two, but at the same time certain factors tend to work to minimize these differences both in theory and in practice in both Hungary and Poland.

Indications of Variation:

The differences between the two segments of the military establishment are illustrated by certain disciplinary difficulties in both Hungary and Poland and by certain political cleavages in Poland. In Hungary and Poland, the disciplinary difficulties that most separate the officer corps from the rest of the armed forces and the one that poses the greatest potential threat to stable civil-military relations involves the issue of the “hazing” of new conscript recruits by their seniors within the ranks (i.e., other enlisted personnel or even NCOs).

Although not nearly as widespread or serious as comparable activities in the Soviet and Russian armed forces (where fatalities due to hazing were and still are a not uncommon phenomenon), hazing incidents in Hungary and Poland have negatively impacted upon the quality of life of low ranking service personnel. Primarily a product of the Soviet experience (i.e., hazing was not a serious problem in either military establishment in the

pre-Communist era), hazing is currently a problem for new recruits in particular. Unlike officers who are protected by their rank, low ranking conscripts are often left to fend for themselves against an entrenched system of physical and psychological abuse. The situation has at times been so serious that in Hungary in the early part of the decade “hazing” incidents ranked amongst the top three most common disciplinary offenses committed by armed forces personnel.¹

Differences between the officer corps and NCOs and other ranks can also be illustrated - at least in the case of Poland - by the results produced by the 1995 Polish Presidential elections. Although exact figures are not available because polling stations are not permitted in military facilities (i.e., soldiers vote alongside the general public in polling stations located in the neighbouring community), voting results in areas with high concentrations of military personnel tended to suggest that in 1995 the military rank and file supported the candidacy of challenger Aleksander Kwasniewski against incumbent Presidential candidate Lech Wałęsa.² This voting pattern occurred despite widespread speculation that the top military command favoured retaining Wałęsa.

¹ Alfred A. Reisch, “Military Affairs: The Hungarian Army in Transition,” *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 2, No. 10 (March 5, 1993), p. 42.

² For press reports, see Zbigniew Lentowicz, “By Voting ‘For,’ Servicemen Were Rather ‘Against’; the Army is Lying in Wait,” *Rzeczpospolita* (November 28, 1995), p. 4 translated as “Reaction in Army to Presidential Elections,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-223 (December 5, 1995), pp. 45-46; “MAT” [sic], “Wilecki to Leave the Army?” *Trybuna* (November 16, 1995), p. 1 translated as “General Wilecki’s Dismissal ‘Speculated’ About,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-222 (November 17, 1995), p. 62; and Pawel Wronski, “Walesa does not Seem to have Lead in the Military; A Row of Uniforms Behind Olek [Kwasniewski],” *Gazeta Wyborcza* (November 7, 1995), p. 4 translated as “First Round Votes in Military Units Assessed,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-216 (November 8, 1995), pp. 49-50.

These differences (indicated by such indirect evidence) do not, however, appear to have been the source of genuine (as opposed to “manufactured”) tensions within the military or between the military and the civilian authorities. Although both the Polish Left and the forces in support of President Wałęsa repeatedly accused each other of using the military for political ends and the Left (especially the Leftist media) also accused elements within the military of political interference in the political campaign, a legislative committee set up to investigate these reports in the end concluded that except for one instance (i.e., a case where a warrant officer collected 15 names in support of the candidacy of Aleksander Kwasniewski from amongst the troops in his unit) all other reports of campaigning within the military establishment were unsubstantiated.³

Mitigating Factors:

As for those factors tending to minimize — from a theoretical perspective — the differences between the various components of the military establishment, the most significant amongst these were the product of the relatively poor NCO tradition that was typical of all East European militaries during the Soviet era and — in some cases — even

³ The report of the Sejm investigatory committee is reported in Pawel Swieboda, “In NATO’s Waiting Room,” *Transition*, Vol. 2, No. 8 (April 19, 1996), p. 52. For a few examples of the accusations leveled by the Polish Left as well as by Walesa’s supporters (some of which refer to events which - if not against the law - took advantage of the “grey zone” between what was and what was not permitted), see Janina Paradowska and Jerzy Baczynski (interviewers), “The Armed Forces Have a Right to Defend Themselves [Interview with Lieutenant General Tadeusz Wilecki - Chief of the Polish General Staff],” *Polityka* (September 9, 1995), p. 3 translated as “Chief of Staff on Status, Control of Army,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-176 (November 7, 1995), pp. 31-35; Pawel Wronski, “Politics in the Garrison,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* (October 17, 1995), p. 3 translated as “Minister Rejects Report on Electioneering in Army,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-202 (October 19, 1995), p. 61; “[Untitled Report],” *PAP*, 2049 GMT (June 21, 1995) translated as “Okonski Reprimands Generals for Statements,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-120 (June 2, 1995), pp. 42-43; and “Krzem” [sic], “Wilecki: Somebody is Trying to Stir Up Conflict Between the Top and the Bottom in the Armed Forces; The Draftee Has Problems,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* (August 17, 1995), p. 3 translated as “[General] Wilecki on Reports of Campaigning for Walesa,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-160 (August 18, 1995), pp. 43-44.

predated the communist period.⁴ Throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, junior officers performed many of the training and command roles and functions that career NCOs performed in Western military establishments. In other words, the role played by NCOs in Hungary and Poland during this period was less significant (and thus of less *theoretical* importance) than the comparable role played by NCOs in the American, German, and (especially) British armed forces.

In Poland, soldiers expressed less trust in the leadership and judgment abilities of their NCOs than they did for their officers. And as the average soldier was extremely critical of the officer corps, this is a telling critique of Polish NCOs.⁵

To be sure, both Hungary and Poland would like to correct this weakness. Both states — as part of their preparations for NATO membership and future force inter-operability — are seeking to redefine their military doctrine so as to emphasize greater independence and autonomy amongst lower echelon military formations.⁶ And skilled and competent NCOs would play an important role in any such plan.

⁴ Probably the best academic treatment on this subject is Ellen Jones' study on the Soviet military - *Red Army and Society: A Sociology of the Soviet Military* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985), especially chapter four. Jones details some of the Red Army's weaknesses in regard to its system of senior NCOs and well as some of its efforts to correct this deficiency (i.e., the warrant officer program). For the Polish case, see Edmund Walendowski, *Combat Motivation of the Polish Forces* (London: The Macmillan Press, 1988), especially chapter 3.

⁵ Walendowski, pp. 42-43.

⁶ Krystian Piatkowski, "Poland Courts Western Favour: Army Seeks Modernization and NATO Membership," *Jane's International Defence Review*, Vol. 29, No. 6 (June 1996), p. 33 and Jerzy Markowski and Stanislaw Lukaszewski, "The Today and Tomorrow of the Polish Armed Forces," *Polska Zbrojna* (October 28, 1996), pp. 1&3 translated as "Defence Minister Discusses Reforms," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-216 (November 7, 1996), p. 2.

In correcting this weakness, Poland (in contrast to Hungary) at least has a distant historical past upon which to draw. When Poland regained its independence in the aftermath of the First World War, those soldiers that joined the post-partition Polish army after having served in the Imperial German Army brought with them the German army's tradition of competent and effective NCOs. Soldiers who previously had served in either the Tsarist Russian Army or in one of the three armies of the Austro-Hungarian Empire contributed less to this tradition as a result of the fact that NCOs in these armies were typically less proficient than their counterparts in the German army.⁷

Of course, efforts to build or (in the case of Poland) rebuild a cadre of effective NCOs are predicated less upon historical antecedents than they are upon the military obtaining sufficient funds to train and retain a large pool of long-service career NCOs. Unfortunately (as was detailed in Proposition Six c), the training programs in Poland and (especially) Hungary have been stretched to the limit by the need to train increasingly large numbers of very short-term conscripts. Money is scarce and all training programs have had to suffer.

Funding shortfalls have also made it extremely difficult to retain NCOs in the armed forces. This has been a problem in Hungary in particular where NCOs have left the

⁷ See Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland in Two Volumes - Volume II: 1795 to the Present* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 270-271.

armed forces in considerable numbers.⁸ As it presently stands, Hungary now has almost a third fewer NCOs (as a percentage of the total armed forces) than is desired by military planners. The military plan calls for a force comprised of officers (18%), NCOs (18%), civilian employees (13%), and a remainder as enlisted personnel (51%), but currently only 13% of the military falls in the NCO category.⁹ And these figures are only slightly better than the figures for the period 1989-1992 where NCOs averaged just slightly under 10% of the Hungarian total.¹⁰ In fact, Hungary has had more officers than NCOs throughout the post-communist period.

In conclusion, NCOs currently do not figure very prominently within the Hungarian or Polish militaries. An under-staffed and militarily weak component of the post-Communist armed forces, NCOs do not exert much influence upon the future direction of national civil-military relations.

Until such time as sufficient funds are found to increase the numbers and capabilities of NCOs in the Hungarian and Polish armed forces along lines common to most NATO countries, it may (from a theoretical perspective) be possible to minimize — albeit not

⁸ Réka Szemerényi, *Central European Civil-Military Reforms at Risk: Progress in Establishing Democratic Controls over the Military has not been Sustained*, Adelphi Paper, No. 306 (Oxford: Oxford University Press/The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), pp. 47-48.

⁹ The figures for the Hungarian military's desired force composition are taken from The Republic of Hungary Ministry of Defence, *National Defence '95* (Budapest: Ministry of Defence Press Office, 1995), p. 16. The military plan calls for a force composed of officers (18%), NCOs (18%), civilian employees (13%), and the remainder as enlisted personnel (51%). Comparable figures for Poland have not been obtained.

¹⁰ Reisch, p. 40.

ignore — the impact of NCOs as an independent institutional element in the analysis of Hungarian and Polish civil-military relations. Attention (again from a theoretical perspective) can remain focused upon the officer corps.

PART D: EXOGENOUS VARIABLES AND THEMES

CHAPTER 5.8: EMPIRICAL RESULTS PROPOSITION EIGHT

Introduction to Part D:

In Propositions One and Two, it was argued that civil-military relations do not develop in a *temporal vacuum*. Historical factors (i.e., political culture and the legacy of totalitarianism) can and do influence the present. In Proposition Eight, a parallel argument is made which suggests that civil-military relations do not exist in a *spatial vacuum* either. Geopolitical factors are curtail to an understanding of contemporary Polish and Hungarian civil-military relations, but, somewhat surprisingly, such factors are absent from many (albeit not all) studies of civil-military relations.

In this section a broadly-defined geopolitical context (especially as it pertains to the security of these states and potential inter-state conflicts) will be analyzed in order to determine which external factors are affecting Hungarian and Polish civil-military relations. This context will involve more than just issues of victory or defeat in foreign military contests (or the prospect of such a defeat in the near-term). Longer-term and more multifaceted security issues and international institutions will also be analyzed. In this respect, the Typology of Relevance is taking into consideration a wider range of factors than was found in much of the literature discussed in the context of the “Western,” “Interventionist,” and “Social Relevance” families of models of civil-military relations. Those theories generally treat civil-military relations as if they were determined entirely

in a domestic context.

In Poland and Hungary, a wide-range of threats and issues influence civil-military affairs. To complicate matters, this international dimension was radically and irreversibly changed as the result of three inter-related factors: (1) the final collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe (beginning in Poland in 1989 in Hungary in 1990 and ultimately in the Soviet Union/Russia in August 1991), (2) the re-unification of Germany (in 1990), and (3) the *de jure* collapse of the Warsaw Pact first as a military alliance (April 1991) and shortly thereafter as a political body (July 1991). As an indicator of the dramatic changes underway, Communist Poland - once sharing borders with Communist allies Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and the Soviet Union — suddenly found itself as a post-Communist state contiguous to seven other post-Communist states — Lithuania, Russia (Kaliningrad), Belarus, the Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and the Federal Republic of Germany. In short, the entire security rationale of post-Yalta Europe — the Cold War — was overturned in a matter of months.

Proposition Eight — Geopolitical Factors:

Geopolitical factors are typically under-represented in the analysis of civil-military relations. These pressures are important because they extend their influence into the sphere of civil-military relations.

Introduction:

In Proposition Six h, the re-nationalization of the mission of the Hungarian and Polish armed forces was documented and analyzed. Instead of the interrelated tasks of

protecting the Communist regimes from their internal enemies and serving a foreign power (i.e., the Soviet Union) in an external capacity, the armed forces in the post-Communist period have been assigned the traditional task of defending the *national interests of the state* in an anarchic world. This development was very positive from the perspective of fostering good civil-military relations because it involved the elimination of the deeply resented system of Communist penetration and the restoration to the military of its traditional corporate function.

Proposition Eight moves beyond this initial conceptualization to suggest that pressures from the geopolitical environment represent a positive influence on domestic civil-military relations. International pressures demonstrate the continued need for the military in a security context (i.e., a conventional defence capability). These pressures also demonstrate the value of the military in a foreign policy context (i.e., the military as national “ambassador”). And, finally, these pressures may lead to improvements in military funding as the armed forces are asked to undertake additional functions and roles (i.e., in order for these states to meet the requirements of NATO membership or UN peacekeeping duties). Overall, these projects have turned the armed forces into one of the leading means of Eastern Europe’s integration into the West while at the same time providing their nations with the traditional guarantees of military security.

Three organizations are playing leading roles in this process of integration through military cooperation: (1) the Western European Union (WEU), the United Nations (UN), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Following the leadership of the

WEU, Poland and to a lesser extent Hungary have engaged in confidence-building activities with some of their neighbours. For the UN, Hungary and (especially) Poland are engaged in peacekeeping operations. And much more importantly, under the aegis of programs such as NATO's Partnership for Peace, the armed forces of Poland and Hungary have begun to fulfill a new set of institutional requirements which may lead to NATO membership as early as 1999. The influence of each of these institutions will be analyzed in turn as will some of Hungary and Poland's key security issues which the confidence-building measures are intended to resolve.

Poland, Hungary, and the West European Union:

The West European Union (WEU) was established in 1954 as the defence and security arm of the European Union. Its membership includes full members, associate members, observers, and now associate partners from the former-East Bloc, but it remains a very European organization and does not include the United States amongst its members.

Operating at arms length from the European Union, the WEU languished for much of its history until institutionalized decision-making capabilities were developed in the 1980s and 1990s. Although primarily a forum for the discussion of defence issues and security concerns, the WEU does have a limited operational capacity (the Combined Joint Task Forces) and has played a somewhat active role in the former-Yugoslavia. This operational capacity somewhat overlaps that of NATO, but NATO remains the most

important multilateral defence institution in Western Europe.¹

The WEU has sometimes been touted as an alternative to NATO membership for the states of Eastern Europe. According to a study conducted by the WEU, full membership in the WEU could be extended to at least some of the new democracies of Eastern Europe as early as the year 2000.² Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski, for example, has set a target date of the year 2000 for Poland's membership in the EU and he expects membership in the WEU to follow shortly thereafter.³

Unfortunately for Poland, Hungary, and the other states of Eastern Europe, the WEU does not offer the satisfactory solutions to their security requirements which NATO membership seems to proffer.⁴ Unlike NATO, the WEU does not link Europe directly to the United States. The organizational structure of the WEU and its operational capabilities pale when compared to those of NATO. And finally, the links between the

¹ Beginning in the 1990s, efforts have been made to coordinate the work of the WEU, NATO, and the EU. On December 10, 1991, a declaration was signed in Maastricht which - amongst other things - sought to synchronize the European memberships of the WEU and NATO. At present, however, the memberships of these organizations is not identical. For more on the WEU, see Monika Wohlfeld, "The WEU as a Complement - Not a Substitute - for NATO," *Transition*, Vol. 1, No. 23 (December 15, 1995), pp. 34-36.

² Assembly of the West European Union, *The Eastern Dimension of European Security*, Document 1542 (Paris: Assembly of the West European Union, 1996), article 87 (Published electronically by the *NATO Integrated Data Service*). In this study, WEU policy-makers minimize efforts to link WEU expansion to either NATO expansion or even expansion of the European Union itself. They argue that it makes no sense to hold the WEU expansion timetable hostage to delays arising from the actions of states which do not belong to the WEU (i.e., a Russian effort to veto NATO expansion talks) and it also makes no sense to delay WEU expansion while waiting for EU negotiators to resolve non-military issues such as the integration of Eastern Europe into European agricultural programs. See sections 117 and 145.

³ Aleksander Kwasniewski, *Statement by Aleksander Kwasniewski President of the Republic of Poland, at the Assembly of the Western European Union, Paris, 4 December 1996* (Paris: Assembly of the West European Union, 1996), p. 3. Co-published electronically by the *NATO Integrated Data Service*.

⁴ The following is from Wohlfeld, p. 35.

WEU, NATO, and the EU are — in the opinion of East European decision-makers — far too tenuous to be effective.

For the new democracies of Eastern Europe, NATO is the more desirable security guarantee. According to a report co-authored by several prominent Polish politicians, Poland (like the other states of Eastern Europe) requires an effective multi-national framework in order to effectively safeguard its sovereignty. Only a “system with high ‘entry’ and ‘exit’ costs” fulfills these requirements, the report continues, and by definition only NATO fits this criteria.⁵

On the other hand, the WEU, it should be noted, has been effective in promoting multinational military cooperation on several fronts. One of the most visible of these involves the establishment of a “Standing Baltic Sea Force” involving (at least initially) military forces from Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. This Force is intended to partake in border control missions, the monitoring of fishing and environmental regulations, shipping control, search and rescue, and (in the future) multinational security missions.⁶ As most of the activities Poland is involved in as part of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program involve units of the Polish air force and army, the WEU’s Standing Baltic Sea Force offers an opportunity for the Polish navy to participate

⁵ Andrzej Ananicz, Przemyslaw Grudzinski, Andrzej Olechowski, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, and Henryk Szlajfer, “Report: Poland - NATO,” *NATO Integrated Data Service* (September 1995), pp. 8-9. The authors of this report also reject efforts to link NATO expansion to expansion of the European Union because such a policy would greatly delay Poland’s ascension into NATO.

⁶ Assembly of the Western European Union, “Security and Military Co-operation in the Baltic Sea Area,” *Assembly of the Western European Union Proceedings: Forty-First Ordinary Session (Assembly Documents)*, First Part, Vol. I, Document 1494 (Paris: The Western European Union, 1995), p. 301.

more fully in multinational confidence-building activities.

Poland, Hungary, and the United Nations:

In both Hungary and Poland the prestige of the armed forces has been enhanced as a result of the renewed commitment the respective national governments have made towards peacekeeping operations. This commitment was undertaken despite the fact that the development of a peacekeeping capability and the assignment of peacekeeping forces to foreign operations includes a potential political price for any civilian government. Operations, for instance, are expensive in cases where national budgets are already strained to the limit by military modernization efforts. United Nations monies cover only part of the cost — when there is money available — and the remainder must be paid for from the national treasury.⁷

It is also undoubtedly the case that the civilian populations of Hungary and Poland will have the same relatively low tolerance for military casualties arising from peacekeeping operations as is found amongst the civilian populations of other peacekeeping democracies (i.e., the “human” costs of such operations cannot be hidden from the public in the same way that they can be hidden by an authoritarian or totalitarian regime). Already in Poland, for example, there was some political fallout in the wake of Serbian hostage-

⁷ For general details on the effects UN funding shortfalls have had on peacekeeping operations and the morale of peacekeepers, see Catherine Toups, “UN \$1 Billion behind in Peacekeepers’ Pay: Many Countries Reluctant to Serve,” *The Washington Times* (April 22, 1996), p. A1. According to this report, Ukrainian and Kenyan peacekeepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia were driven to the black market because they were so poorly paid.

taking incidents directed at Polish Blue Berets. (A similar political re-examination occurred in Canada in the aftermath of the 1995 Serbian actions.)

From a military institutional perspective, this military mission — new in the case of the Hungarian armed forces and enhanced in the case of the Polish armed forces — represents an opportunity for these two military establishments to reap numerous practical benefits.⁸ Foremost amongst these is the opportunity for units and their staff and line commanders to gain actual experience in active war zones using some or all of the weapons, communications, logistical, and other systems they train with in peacetime.⁹ In some ways, training is no substitute for the type of seasoning gained when individuals come under live fire (or the threat of the same) in the field. The armed forces also benefit from exposure to UN tactical and administrative procedures and they also benefit from the experience gained in cooperating and problem-solving alongside foreign troops.

As of August 1, 1996, the United Nations was conducting 16 peacekeeping operations of various types and sizes around the world and these missions involved the deployment of

⁸ For Hungary, peacekeeping operations are a new military mission. In the case of Poland, Polish forces have been active in UN missions since the Korean War (1953) although mostly in a logistics/medical support role.

⁹ In March 1995, Major General Mistal became the first Polish officer to command a UN mission when he took over the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). (Source: John Mackinlay & Jørn Olsen, "Squaring the Circle," *Jane's International Defence Review*, Vol. 28, No. 10 [October 1995], p. 75.) In 1996, another Polish officer, Colonel Włodzimierz Sasiadek (Deputy Commander of the IFOR Nordic Brigade), became the first Polish officer to command a NATO tactical unit when he took over from his commander while the latter was on leave. Later, Colonel Sasiadek joked: "I can only say that nothing unusual occurred in the brigade in the days I was in charge. Nothing, at least, which would indicate that the first Pole in NATO history to take command over the Alliance's tactical unit messed things up." Source: Krzysztof Szejner (interviewer), "We Have a Good Position," *Polska Zbrojna* (July 22, 1996), pp. 1&4 translated as "Deputy Commander of IFOR Brigade Interviewed," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-143 (July 25, 1996), pp. 1-4.

23,597 troops. Of those forces, Poland contributed the 7th largest complement — 1,054 troops.¹⁰ This constitutes a very large contribution for a country of Poland's size and financial capabilities. Hungary's contribution to United Nations peacekeeping operations to date has mostly involved military observers.

Currently, Poland participates in ten United Nations peacekeeping operations — nine of which involve Polish troops and/or military observers.¹¹ Along with troops from Canada, Austria, and Japan, one Polish infantry battalion (355 troops) helps to make up the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights. Another infantry battalion and a field hospital (637 troops) constitutes Poland's contribution to the much larger UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

In the Balkans, five Polish military observers participate in UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) in eastern Croatia, two more form part of the UN Preventative Deployment Force

¹⁰ *The Military Balance, 1996-97*, p. 293. In 1996, the top-10 contributors of troops to United Nations operations were as follows:

NATION	TROOPS
Bangladesh	1,722
Pakistan	1,718
India	1,214
Brazil	1,128
Russia	1,096
Jordan	1,078
POLAND	1,054
Canada	1,036
Finland	985
Uruguay	920

¹¹ Details on the following operations are taken from *The Military Balance, 1996-97*, pp. 293-305. The tenth UN mission involving Poland - the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) - involves civilian police monitors and only a limited military liaison team.

(UNPREDEP) in the Former-Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and one observer participates in the UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) in southern Croatia. In Africa, the UN Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III) includes five Polish military observers while three more Polish military personnel are active in the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). Finally, the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Force (UNIKOM) includes seven Polish military observers, the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) includes five observers, and the UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) includes two observers. (The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea also includes a small Polish Staff contingent.)

Hungary participates in six United Nations operations in one capacity or another - four of which currently involve Hungarian troops and/or military observers.¹² At present, thirty-nine Hungarian military personnel are assigned to the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) where they operate in conjunction with an Austrian peacekeeping battalion monitoring the Turkish-Greek cease-fire agreement. As well, six Hungarian military observers participate in United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Force (UNIKOM), ten observers work with the UN Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III), and seven observers are assigned to the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG).

¹² In addition to *The Military Balance, 1996-97*, details on Hungarian peacekeeping operations can be found in *National Defence '96*, pp. 24-25. Hungarian efforts to monitor the situation in Cyprus are reported in "[Untitled Report]," *MTI*, 1439 GMT (September 13, 1996) translated as "Peacekeepers Leave for Cyprus," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-182-A (September 19, 1996), p. 1. Hungarian military observers also have also participated in the now reduced UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) and civilian police monitors participate in the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH).

Poland, Hungary, and NATO:

As was already mentioned in several earlier sections, the most important multinational security institution affecting civil-military relations in Eastern Europe is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Almost immediately following the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, the first rumblings and calls for the eastward expansion of NATO were heard. But it was not until July 8, 1997 that NATO officially announced that it would be inviting three states (i.e., Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) to formally apply to join the alliance.

Of course, the invitation to apply to join the Western alliance is not the end of the line for prospective NATO members. According to one Polish source, an invitation to join would be followed by a program that would include: the establishment of a Permanent NATO Military Mission (and similar consultative institutions) in the host country, an increase in the activities of invitee Military Missions in Brussels; even greater standardization and interoperability of weapons systems and logistics; an increase in training exercises and peacekeeping operations; and an increase in the coordination of civilian and military air defence and control.¹³ In the interim, the Polish and Hungarian political and military establishments have operated under the aegis of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.¹⁴

¹³ Krystian Piatkowski, "Outline and Timetable for the Integration of Poland into NATO (January 1994)," *European Security*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Autumn 1994), pp. 520-522.

¹⁴ See also "Partnership for Peace," *NATO Integrated Data Service* (September 1996). The political arm of the PfP program is the North Atlantic Cooperation Council which provides an institutional framework for consultations and planning sessions between NATO countries and non-NATO PfP participants.

Previously, international military contacts took the form of programs like the “brother regiments” program which paired individual East European military formations with particular Soviet military formations in an ultimately unsuccessful effort to foster Socialist solidarity and a spirit of brotherhood-in-arms.¹⁵ Partnership for Peace, on the other hand, is designed to help prospective members such as Poland and Hungary prepare for the benefits and responsibilities of NATO membership while also engaging in confidence-building activities with states which will not likely be invited to join NATO in the first round of expansion (if indeed they are *ever* invited to join the alliance).¹⁶ The program helps to improve relations between states by improving “transparency” of military activities (reducing tensions and lessening the possibility of misunderstandings leading to confrontations) while it also promotes the development of national and multinational forces capable of undertaking peacekeeping and similar security missions on behalf of the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and the United Nations.

Hungary’s Individual Partnership Programme (IPP) gives special emphasis to efforts to improve democratic control over the armed forces; defence planning, procurement, and

¹⁵ See Christopher D. Jones, “Agencies of the Alliance: Multilateral in Form, Bilateral in Content,” in *Warsaw Pact: The Question of Cohesion, Phase II, Volume I*, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment ORAE Extra-Mural Paper No. 29 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1984), pp. 209-210.

¹⁶ In late 1996, NATO announced that it would be expanding the PfP program (called “Enhanced PfP”) to include a wider variety of confidence-building measures. The expanded program is designed to foster cooperation between NATO and East European states which are left outside of NATO’s first round of expansion. See, for example, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, “Allocution du Secrétaire Général devant la Commission de la Défense du Parlement Belge (22 Avril 1997),” *NATO Integrated Data Service* (April 22, 1997), *passim*.

budgeting practices; cooperation in the fields of C³I (command, control, communications, and intelligence); air traffic control; standardization and interoperability; and military education and training programs.¹⁷ And Poland's IPP focuses on improving military command and communications; military organizational structures; weapons systems for the army, navy, and air defence forces; logistics; military training programs (at the tactical, strategic, and operational levels); and military educational programs.¹⁸ For 1997, Poland's IPP is expected to involve 460 events.¹⁹

Both Hungary and Poland have also participated in the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) operations in the territory of the former-Yugoslavia.²⁰ The IFOR/SFOR operation represents Hungary's largest peacekeeping operation to date. A 500-man non-combat (i.e., no heavy weapons) engineering battalion — consisting of a sapper company, a pontoon bridge laying company, and a road and bridge construction company — was based in central Croatia near the town of Okucani-Pustara and mostly engaged in operations designed to facilitate the movement of IFOR's Rapid Reaction Corps.

¹⁷ See "The Individual Partnership Programme (IPP) Between Hungary and NATO," *Newsletter of the Hungarian Office of NATO/WEU Information*, No. 2 (February 1995), p. 1. (Co-published electronically by the *NATO Integrated Data Service*.)

¹⁸ Andrzej Medykowski, "Ready for NATO in Three Years,?" *Polska Zbrojna* (February 2, 1995), pp. 1 & 8 translated as "PFP Activities Scheduled for 1995 Discussed," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-042 (February 2, 1995), p. 2.

¹⁹ "Statement by H.E. Stanislaw Bobrzanski Minister of National Defence of the Republic of Poland at the Meeting of Defence Ministers of the Euro-Atlantic Co-operation Council in Brussels 13 June 1997," *NATO Integrated Data Service* (June 13, 1997), pp. 1-2.

²⁰ The following details are from *National Defence '96*, pp. 22-23.

As a “front-line” state, Hungary was able to contribute to the success of IFOR in other ways beyond the deployment of Hungarian personnel.²¹ Hungarian military and civilian personnel assisted IFOR contingents transiting through Hungary to the former-Yugoslavia (including troops from Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden, and the United States). The airfield at Taszár has been used as a command post and air base by the American Air Force, an airfield at Kaposújlak served as a base for American helicopters, and a logistics base for the IFOR Nordic Brigade (Danish, Finnish, Norwegian, Swedish, Polish) was set up in Pécs. And finally, the firing range near Kaposvár was used by American personnel as a small arms practice range while the Central Training Base at Táborfalva was employed by American troops practicing with heavier weapons.

As for Poland, IFOR represented a commitment of 660 personnel. Unlike Hungary, Poland contributed a combat unit to the peacekeeping operation in the former-Yugoslavia — an airborne battalion which operated as part of the Nordic Brigade in the American Sector of operations.²² Poland’s SFOR commitment — 430 soldiers from the 10th Battalion of the elite 6th Airborne Brigade — patrols the Zepce-Teslic region of Bosnia-Herzegovina and guards several arms and ammunition depots. This deployment was authorized on December 18, 1996.²³

²¹ The following details are from *National Defence '96*, pp. 20-21.

²² *The Military Balance, 1996-97*, p. 95.

²³ PAP News Agency (Warsaw), “More Polish Soldiers to go to Bosnia to Serve in Stabilization Force,” *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19970113*00336 (January 13, 1997), p. 1 and PAP News Agency (Warsaw), “Poland Confirms Its Participation in SFOR Operations,” *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19961218*00198 (December 18, 1996), p. 1.

Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion:

The prospect of the eastern expansion by NATO has caused major changes to occur in the relationship between the Polish and Hungarian military establishments and their respective civilian masters. In its September 1995 *Study on NATO Enlargement*, NATO outlined the kinds of political and military preparations and changes prospective East European members would be expected to undertake if they were to be invited to join the Alliance.²⁴

Politically, NATO applicants would be expected to undertake several tasks. Specifically, they would be expected to: (1) confirm to the basic principles typified by the Washington Treaty and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (i.e., a commitment to democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law, and the peaceful resolution of ethnic, border, and jurisdictional disputes), (2) integrate themselves into the NATO decision-making process (including future decisions to expand the Alliance), (3) contribute appropriate resources to NATO's operating budget and common defence capabilities, (4) provide qualified candidates to NATO administrative and command positions, (5) share intelligence (and otherwise protect this common intelligence from unauthorized usage), and, perhaps most importantly, (6) establish appropriate democratic and civilian control over their defence establishments.

Prospective members also would be expected to undertake certain military commitments.

²⁴ The following is from "Study on NATO Enlargement," *NATO Integrated Data Service*, (September 1995), sections 69-78. This study is also reprinted as "NATO Rationalizes Its Eastward Enlargement," *Transition*, Vol. 1, No. 23 (December 15, 1995), pp. 19-26.

Specifically, new members would have to be prepared to: (1) share in the common defence of all member states, (2) engage in efforts to standardize their armed forces along NATO lines (both in terms of the interoperability of their equipment, supplies, ammunition, and major weapons systems as well as in terms of the training, doctrine, and procedures employed in their operation), and finally (3) put into effect the more than 1200 agreements and technical specifications which NATO has created to date.

At the same time, NATO proclaimed that there was “no fixed or rigid list of criteria for inviting new members to join the Alliance.”²⁵ Thus the specific implementation of NATO’s membership criteria has — to a very significant degree — been left in the hands of the prospective new members. The solutions created by prospective members, therefore, will tend to be as varied as they are between existing NATO members.

From a military perspective, the prospect of NATO membership is quite a positive development. First, membership will help to secure the institutional position of the armed forces in society. In other words, the system of democratic civilian control and its underlying “deal” (i.e., the military promise to stay out of civilian political disputes and

²⁵ “Study on NATO Enlargement,” section 70. It is interesting to note that the criteria outlined in the “Study on Enlargement” would be difficult for some current NATO members to meet. Most glaringly, the proscription against unresolved ethnic/territorial disputes could not be met by current NATO members Greece and Turkey which have repeatedly skirmished in the Aegean and over the disposition of the island of Crete! In addition, the Turkish military has not been subject to effective civilian democratic control as called for in NATO’s Enlargement Study! For example, the Turkish military recently has been determining Turkish foreign policy. By maintaining close relations with Israel (in defiance of government demands), the military and the National Security Council has thwarted the civilian government’s efforts to improve its relations with its Muslim neighbours. See Jonathan Lyons, “Turkish Generals Continue to Flex Muscles: PM’s Dream of Closer Ties to Muslim World Buried by New Security Deals with Israel,” *The Globe and Mail* (May 12, 1997), p. A12 and “Thousands of Turks Protest Secularism: Huge Rally Asks Military to Let Country’s Islamic Schools to Stay Open,” *The Globe and Mail* (May 12, 1997), pp. A1 & A12.

obey the policy directives of the legitimate civilian authorities *as well as* the civilian promise not to politicize or interfere in the legitimate corporate interests of the armed forces) will be under NATO's scrutiny and — if necessary — influence. Second, membership in NATO implies a certain degree of operational interoperability and standardization. By undertaking a commitment to NATO, the civilian authorities are committing to certain levels of financial support for the armed forces. And finally, the new and very important mission of the armed forces as “good-will ambassadors” (i.e., in the context of NATO's PfP confidence-building programs) raises the prestige of the military.

Not surprisingly, NATO membership, from the perspective of the Hungarian and Polish military elites, is seen to be a desirable goal. Support for NATO membership has remained high in the case of the Polish military — at well over 60 percent of the officer corps — while in Hungary support now hovers at approximately 57 percent of the officer corps. This latter figure represents a vast improvement over figures for the 1990-92 period when the idea of neutrality (*à la* Austria) garnered considerable support amongst the officer corps.²⁶

Security Concerns and Confidence-Building Activities:

For Poland and Hungary, international threats, crises, and tensions now affecting civil-

²⁶ Marie Vlahova and Stefan Sarvas, “From Totalitarian to the Post-Totalitarian Military,” in *Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist States*, ed. Anton A. Bebler (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1995), p. 12. The Hungarian figures are confirmed by a 1997 poll reported in “Hungarian Foreign Minister on NATO,” *RFE/RL Newswire*, Vol. 1, No. 7, Part II (April 9, 1997), p. 3.

military relations represent a combination of the old and the new. These pressures include the following: (1) the unstable “East” (i.e., the Ukraine, Belarus, and an unstable and uncertain Russia looking for a new role in a new Europe, but unable to give up its “Imperial” heritage), (2) the Balkans (albeit somewhat mitigated now that there seems to be a pause in the shooting — but not peace — in the territory of the former-Yugoslav Republic adjoining Hungary), and (3) various historical grievances and concerns involving the political and cultural status of ethnic minorities living abroad (i.e., Poles living in Lithuania and — more seriously — Hungarians living in Rumania and Slovakia).

These potential conflicts highlight the emergence of a security vacuum in Eastern Europe and the continuing need for strong national defence capabilities throughout the region until such time as a new security order is established. In this complex security environment, the new and reformed Polish and Hungarian military establishments are playing a leading role in furthering their nation’s foreign policy interests. This role significantly improves civil-military relations in post-Communist Poland and Hungary not only because the Communist-era internal and external roles were transformed or abandoned, but because the armed forces are being assigned important functions in support of numerous bilateral and multilateral confidence-building programs between the various states of the region.

In the case of Poland, the most significant, immediate threat to national security — and the developing *raison d’être* for the Polish armed forces — is represented by the potential

for chaos and disorder that exists in three of the four states that border Poland to the East — Russia (Kaliningrad), Belarus, and the Ukraine. Belarus and Russia have demonstrated internal instability which could affect near-term relations and all three of these states (including Russia and the Ukraine which have signed agreements with NATO) have expressed reservations (to one degree or another) over the prospect of NATO expanding to incorporate Poland.

Poland and Russia:

Obviously, Russian attitudes to NATO expansion and Polish membership in the Western military alliance hinge on the health of Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the outcome of the next round of Russian Presidential elections. Even so, Russia has been the most ardent opponent to NATO expansion. As recently as February 4, 1997, the Speaker of the Russian Parliament, Gennadii Seleznyov, warned Polish President Kwasniewski (during an official visit) that Russia would have to undertake “adequate measures” to revise its national security and defence policies if NATO came closer to Russia’s borders. Moreover, he continued, these changes could involve altering Russia’s force structure as currently governed by CFE limits.²⁷ In late 1996, the Russian Duma unanimously passed a resolution warning of a “serious crisis” developing between Russia and an expanded NATO. The resolution claimed that Poland — along with Hungary and the Czech Republic — would have to spend an extra US\$100 billion in military expenditures by the

²⁷ Jakub Karpinski, “Russian Duma Speaker in Poland,” *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 25, Part II (February 5, 1997), p. 2.

year 2010.²⁸

Perhaps even more menacingly, the former Russian Defence Minister, Pavel Grachev, has warned that Russia might be forced to move additional Russian short-range nuclear weapons closer to Eastern Europe should NATO go ahead and expand to the East. In a speech delivered to officers at a Ukrainian military academy in early 1996 and thus intended for Polish, Western, and Ukrainian leaders, Grachev warned: "We will be obliged [in the face of NATO expansion] to re-examine our views on the role and place of tactical nuclear arms." Grachev's warning echoes threats made in a leaked Russian Defence Ministry document which earlier called for Russian tactical nuclear weapons to be deployed along the borders of Norway and Poland and even in the Baltic Republics should NATO expand.²⁹

On the other hand, it also should be noted that extreme polemics are not the product only of the Russian side of this debate. On February 15, 1996, the Polish Minister of Internal Affairs, Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, told the Polish newspaper *Rzeczpospolita* that Russian

²⁸ Scott Parrish, "Duma Blasts NATO Enlargement," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 209, Part II (October 29, 1996), p. 2. In contrast to this Russian claim, a group of Polish experts (which included former Defence Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz) estimated that the cost of joining NATO over the same period would be only US\$1.5 billion (or about 4% of the defence budget) beyond the costs of modernizing the Polish armed forces. The greatest financial challenge for the Polish military and society involves the cost of modernizing or replacing Soviet-era weapons systems which - according to the authors of the report - would have to occur anyway. (See Beata Pasek, "Polish Report on NATO Entry Costs," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 15, Part II [January 22, 1997], p. 2.) Based upon similar criteria, Hungarian officials have estimated the cost of NATO membership for Hungary at between US\$0.9 billion and US\$1.3 billion per year. See Katalin Karcagi, Martin Chiriac, and Wes Johnson, "Volunteering for NATO Regardless of Cost or Need?" *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 01084*19960412*00016 (April 12, 1996), pp. 1-2.

²⁹ Geoffrey York, "Russian Nukes Could be Moved Closer to E. Europe if NATO Expands," *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 01245*19960105*00030 (January 5, 1996), pp. 1-2.

agents were preparing “provocations” designed to sabotage Poland’s applications to join NATO and the European Union. According to Siemiatkowski, Russia was increasing its contacts with Polish politicians (inside and outside of the government), Russian capital was being used to buy-up large and influential segments of the Polish economy, and a Russian propaganda effort was being launched against Polish political and media circles. Moreover, all of this was part of a wider conspiracy aimed at Lithuania and Estonia as well as Poland!³⁰ Interestingly, Prime Minister Cimoszewicz not only refused to distance himself from the statements of his Internal Affairs Minister, but he added more fuel to the fire by agreeing that “[s]uch things are possible.”³¹

Polish Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati publicly has acknowledged the fact that Russian opposition to NATO expansion is in part something of a negotiating ploy (especially since NATO is planning to limit the first round of expansion to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary and this avoids the issue of expansion into the Baltic States and other areas much more sensitive to Russian security concerns). He has said that Russian opposition contains “an element of haggling about the price.” Moreover, he has indirectly warned the Russians that particularly harsh rhetoric by Russian officials actually hurts Russian efforts to negotiate a fair settlement to this issue because such undiplomatic language “evokes a certain anxiety and a certain lack of trust in Central

³⁰ See Jakub Karpinski, “Polish Internal Affairs Minister on Russian Sabotage,” *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 33, Part II [February 17, 1996], p. 2.

³¹ See Jakub Karpinski, “Polish-Russian Political Update,” *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 34, Part II [February 18, 1996], p. 2.

Europe and Eastern Europe.”³²

By way of contrast, the “carrot” employed with Russia’s “carrot and stick” approach to NATO expansion is exercised (in part) by the new Russian ambassador to Poland, Leonid Drachevskiy, who has worked to improve Polish-Russian relations in order to cut Russian losses should the *probable* become the *inevitable*. Drachevskiy has argued that Polish-Russian relations will survive Poland’s turn to the West although he acknowledges that such leanings will not necessarily serve to improve the relationship. In late 1996, for example, Drachevskiy stated: “I am convinced that there is nothing that could disturb the positive dynamics of the development of relations between Poland and Russia.”³³

No matter. Russia has had to accept NATO expansion in the end and such sabre-rattling as this has to be seen as something of an effort to extract as many concessions as possible from the West and the prospective NATO allies prior to the implementation of NATO’s expansion plans.³⁴ As part of its final deal with Russia, NATO again announced that it had no plans (at this time) to station nuclear weapons on the territory of any new allies (nor prepare installations for such weapons). The Alliance made a similar announcement in regard to the issue of stationing large combat forces in these countries and the Russians were offered certain assurances that the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty would be

³² TV Polonia, “[Polish Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati] Interviewed on NATO Enlargement, Foreign Policy,” *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19970110*00240 (January 10, 1997), pp. 2-3.

³³ PAP News Agency (Warsaw), “Russian Envoy: Poland’s NATO Entry will not Affect Relations,” *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19961229*00011 (December 29, 1996), p. 1.

³⁴ For the text of the NATO-Russia agreement, see “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation,” *NATO Integrated Data Service* (May 27, 1997).

adjusted to reflect the changed situation in Europe. As well, the two sides agreed to the creation of a Permanent Joint Council to facilitate consultations.

For both the Polish and the Russian sides, the national military has been assigned the important role of acting as the focal point for joint defence cooperation and security confidence-building measures designed to reduce inter-state tensions. Although the issue of NATO expansion is a potentially divisive one, Polish policy-makers feel that bilateral and multilateral military exercises can enhance *sub-regional* cooperation and minimize any tensions that may accompany NATO's eastward expansion.³⁵

Polish and Russian defence officials have met repeatedly to discuss new avenues of defence cooperation. Preliminary agreement was even reached between the two sides on the creation of a working group of experts "to work out a plan for new bilateral cooperation in [military] fields which interest [the two sides]."³⁶ (Interestingly, this last agreement followed Grachev's escalation of Russia's sabre-rattling strategy by only three short months.)

At the same time, Russia also agreed to sell desperately-needed military spare parts to Poland so that the Polish military could service its extensive holdings of Soviet-designed

³⁵ "Central European Security, 1994: Partnership for Peace (PfP)," *Strategic Forum [Institute for National Strategic Studies]*, No. 1-1994 (1994), p. 3. Published electronically by the *NATO Integrated Data Service*.

³⁶ Interfax News Agency (Moscow), "Russian and Polish Defence Ministers Discuss New Forms of Military Cooperation," *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19960403*00259 (April 3, 1996), p. 1.

military equipment.³⁷ At the very least, this behaviour would also have to be considered to be “ironic” if Poland — as a future NATO member — was expected to pose a security threat to Russia. Obviously in this case, the financial benefits to Russia outweighed security concerns. And for the Polish military, the purchase (and others like it) have helped to slow the decline in national defence capabilities until such time that the Polish military budget will allow re-equipment with new domestic production or the purchase of new (i.e., Western) weapons systems.

Poland, the Ukraine, and Belarus:

In the case of the Ukraine and Belarus, opposition to Poland’s potential membership in NATO has been much more muted and “officially” has centred on the issue of the placement of American nuclear weapons in new NATO states. Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, while acknowledging that sovereign states have the right to join whatever international organizations they wish, has called for a moratorium on nuclear expansion into East-Central Europe.³⁸ For his part, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka has proposed to NATO that Belarus, the Ukraine, the Baltic States, Poland,

³⁷ Reuters, “Russia, Poland Clinch Arms Cooperation Deal,” *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00849*19960404*00825 (April 4, 1996), pp. 1-2. Marek Siwiec, head of Poland’s National Security Bureau, has also suggested that Poland may continue to purchase Russian arms even after his country is admitted to NATO. (Source: “Poland May Buy Russian Arms Even After NATO,” *RFE/RL Newswire*, Vol. 1, No. 17, Part II [April 23, 1997], p. 2.) This policy - also applicable in the case of Hungary - was officially given the green light by NATO’s Deputy Secretary-General Norman Ray who said that new NATO members would be permitted to buy Russian arms if they wished to do so because NATO has no system of centralized control over armaments planning, budgeting, or procurement. Source: “NATO Official in Budapest,” *RFE/RL Newswire*, Vol. 1, No. 8, Part II (April 10, 1997), p. 3.

³⁸ Oleg Varfolomeyev, “Ukrainian President on NATO Enlargement,” *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 226, Part II (November 21, 1996), pp. 1-2.

Hungary, and the Czech Republic create a nuclear-free zone in East-Central Europe.³⁹

For both the Ukraine and Belarus, the prospect of NATO expansion is very problematical. Although members (along with Russia) in NATO's Partnership for Peace program, neither state has expressed its desire to join NATO in the near future (nor is such a possibility in the offing). Should Poland's current negotiations to join NATO be accepted in 1999, Belarus and the Ukraine could find themselves left awkwardly in the middle ground between the Western Alliance and its officially disavowed, but *de facto* military competitor — Russia.

To minimize these dangers, Polish President Kwasniewski and Ukrainian President Kuchma have worked to improve Polish-Ukrainian relations. Kwasniewski worked to push NATO to create a special relationship with the Ukraine (similar to that signed with Russia) and, in January of 1997, Kwasniewski and Kuchma announced plans to sign a formal "declaration of reconciliation" when the Ukrainian President next visited Poland.

This latest meeting builds further upon progress achieved with the signing of two related cooperation protocols by the two states in 1996. These earlier two documents pledged Poland and the Ukraine to increase military and military technical cooperation and to work together in strengthening overall European security.⁴⁰

³⁹ Sergei Solodovnikov, "NATO Rejects Belarusian President's Proposal for Nuclear-Free Zone," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 22, Part II (January 31, 1997), pp. 1-2.

⁴⁰ See Beata Pasek, "Poland, Ukraine to Sign Reconciliation Agreement in May," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 17, Part II (January 24, 1997), p. 3; UNIAN News Agency (Kiev), "Ukraine and Poland Sign Agreement on

As was the case with Polish-Russian relations, the Polish military is again at the forefront of efforts to improve Polish-Ukrainian relations. To this end, a wide variety of joint Polish-Ukrainian military projects have been undertaken. Recent confidence-building measures include the participation of a small unit of the Polish armed forces (approximately 35 soldiers) in a much larger US-Ukrainian military exercise (Peace Shield '96) at the Yavoriv military training ground in Western Ukraine in June of 1996.⁴¹

In September, Polish defence officials met with their Ukrainian counterparts at the Yavoriv facility to plan further military activities for the upcoming year. Present at this meeting were British military officials acting in the role of facilitators in the development of a tripartite military arrangement. At a follow-up meeting in Kiev between (then) Polish Chief of the General Staff, General Tadeusz Wilecki, and the Ukrainian Defence Minister, Oleksandr Kuzmuk, the two sides expressed their satisfaction with the state of

Military Cooperation and Other Documents," *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19961010*00267 (October 10, 1996), p. 1; UNIAN News Agency (Kiev), "Defence Minister Kuzmuk Signs Protocol on Military Cooperation with Poland," *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19961025*00224 (October 25, 1996), p. 1; and Wodzimierz Cimoszewicz, "Address by His Excellency Wodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Prime Minister of Poland, Before the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session, Brussels, 21 February 1997," *NATO Integrated Data Service* (February 21, 1997), p. 2. It is interesting to note that Canada was also at the forefront of those NATO members urging the Alliance to conclude an agreement with the Ukraine before NATO expanded. (See, for example, Lloyd Axworthy, "Statement by Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, to the North Atlantic Council Special Ministerial Meeting - February 18, 1997," *NATO Integrated Data Service* [February 19, 1997], p. 2.) By way of contrast, pronouncements coming out of NATO only talked about the desirability of NATO reaching an agreement with the Ukraine. (See NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, "Speech by the Secretary General at the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn - 17 January 1997," *NATO Integrated Data Service* [January 17, 1997], p. 5.) In the end, of course, agreement was reached with the Ukraine at the same time that NATO reached its agreement with the Russian Federation.

⁴¹ Agence France-Presse, "Ukraine Hosts Joint Partnership for Peace Exercises," *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 01188*19960603*01516 (June 3, 1996), pp. 1-2.

Polish-Ukrainian relations (including the development of the Polish-Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion) and promised to meet together with British defence officials the following September in the Crimea.⁴²

Poland and the Ukraine also have conducted the first field exercises for their joint armoured peacekeeping battalion at the Nowa Deba training facility in South-Eastern Poland. The battalion — consisting of troops from the 24th Ukrainian “Iron” Mechanized Brigada and the Polish 14th “Przemysl” Armoured Brigade — currently is operating with only one-third of its final complement in place (i.e., 180 soldiers out of a planned total of 560 officers and men), but it already has begun the process of learning United Nations peacekeeping procedures in addition to learning to overcome the more basic problems associated with binational military cooperation.⁴³

As far as the issue of NATO’s potential deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of

⁴² PAP News Agency (Warsaw), “Minister on Military Cooperation with Britain and Ukraine,” *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19960903*00207 (September 3, 1996), p. 1; Radio Ukraine World Service (Kiev), “British, Ukrainian, and Polish Defence Officials Hold Talks in Ukraine,” *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19960904*00350 (September 4, 1996), p. 1; and PAP News Agency (Warsaw), “Polish and Ukrainian General Staffs Satisfied with State of Their Relations,” *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19960911*00289 (September 11, 1996), p. 1. It should be noted that Canada has also tried to facilitate good military relations between Poland and the Ukraine. With large Polish and Ukrainian émigré populations and a history of close military ties to non-Communist Poland (thousands of Poles fought alongside Canadian troops during the Italian Campaign and in France and the Lowlands during World War II), Canada is well positioned to exercise some influence on these two states. For more information on Canada’s efforts to foster improved Polish-Ukrainian relations see, Juliet O’Neill, “Partnership Grooms East Bloc for NATO Growth (Co-operation: Canadian Training Aims to Change Cold War Military Thinking),” *The Ottawa Citizen* (March 24, 1997), p. A5.

⁴³ See PAP News Agency (Warsaw), “Polish-Ukrainian Battalion Begins Training,” *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19960923*00286 (September 23, 1996), p. 1 and TV Polonia (Warsaw), “Polish-Ukrainian UN Battalion Takes Part in Exercises,” *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19961004*00149 (October 4, 1996), p. 1.

prospective members is concerned, NATO planners have rejected the Belarusian proposal for a nuclear weapons-free zone in East Central Europe, but they have agreed to a proposal that is not far removed from that of the Ukrainian President's plan. While stopping short of a promise *never* to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of any prospective NATO member, the final communiqué of the December 10, 1996 session of the North Atlantic Council announced that the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe would not include the deployment of nuclear weapons at this time. According to NATO's announcement:

Enlarging the Alliance will not require a change in NATO's current nuclear posture and therefore, NATO countries have no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy - and we do not foresee any future need to do so.

At the same time, prospective NATO members would be expected to support all aspects of NATO's deterrence strategy — thus leaving open the door for possible revision of this doctrine should the need arise.⁴⁴

Although former President Lech Wałęsa and former Prime Minister Zbigniew Okonski agreed to the placement of NATO nuclear weapons on Polish soil should Poland be asked to do so as part of Poland's NATO commitment, the current Polish leadership has welcomed NATO's decision to side-step this increasingly thorny international issue claiming the move calms increasing "suspicions and distrust" amongst Poland's Eastern

⁴⁴ "Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 10 December 1996: Final Communiqué," *NATO Integrated Data Service*, Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (96)165 (December 10, 1996), section 5.

neighbours.⁴⁵ No doubt, such a move also removes a potentially thorny domestic issue as well.⁴⁶

Poland and Lithuania:

Continuing Eastward, Poland's relationship with Lithuania (Poland's fourth Eastern neighbour) is quantitatively quite different from its relationship with Belarus, the Ukraine, and Russia. Much smaller than the other states contiguous to Poland's Eastern border, Lithuania poses no military threat to Poland. Moreover, the two states share similar security worries.

⁴⁵ Jakub Karpinski, "Poland Comments on NATO Enlargement," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 239, Part II (December 12, 1996), pp. 2-3. By way of contrast, Hungarian President Arpad Goncz (perhaps anticipating NATO's December 10th moratorium on nuclear expansion) publicly stated his country's opposition to the placement of NATO nuclear weapons on Hungarian soil. It was unclear from Goncz's announcement what Hungary would have done should NATO have required such permission as part of the price for Hungary joining the Alliance, but it is significant that Goncz made his announcement during an official state visit to the Ukraine. For coverage of Goncz's announcement, see Oleg Varfolomeyev, "Ukraine, Hungary Agree on NATO Enlargement," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 223, Part II (November 18, 1996), pp. 1-2.

⁴⁶ This should not be construed as suggesting that support for NATO expansion faces significant opposition in Poland. On the contrary, popular support for Polish membership in the Western Alliance is not matched anywhere else in Eastern Europe. At the same time, Polish politicians already have a sufficient number of issues over which to squabble. One more is not needed! (For more information on Polish and other East European attitudes towards NATO expansion, see the survey results published in Michael Mihalka, "The Emerging European Security Order," *Transition*, Vol. 1, No. 23 [December 15, 1995], pp. 17-18.) In the Sejm, some members of the post-Communist Social Democracy of the Polish Republic Party (SdRP) have called for a national referendum on NATO membership, but the Deputy Defence Minister, Andrzej Karkoszka, and the Foreign Affairs Minister, Dariusz Rosati, have gone on record as opposing such a plan. They have argued that such a referendum would be superfluous because 90% of the electorate already supports Poland's application to join NATO. (See Beata Pasek, "Polish Ruling Party Proposes Referendum on NATO Entry," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 32, Part II [February 14, 1997], p. 2.) At the same time, Prime Minister Cimoszewicz has stated that his government is prepared to promise never to accept nuclear weapons or foreign troops on its soil if that is necessary to satisfy Russian concerns. (See "Poland Willing to Pay All NATO Membership Costs," *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol. 1, No. 24 [May 5, 1997], p. 3.) It also should be noted that popular support for Poland's admission to NATO has consistently been amongst the highest for any East European state since the fall of the Communist order. See Stephen Connors, David G. Gibson, and Mark Rhodes, "Caution and Ambivalence Over Joining NATO," *Transition*, Vol. 1, No. 14 (August 11, 1995), pp. 42-46.

Both Poland and Lithuania have noted with some concern the massive increase in the size of the Russian military presence in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad which followed the Russian withdrawal from Eastern Europe. As well, both states have been vexed by Russian demands for improved access to the isolated Russian military lodgment (although neither state appears willing to discuss the issue in public).⁴⁷ In the case of Poland, the memory of the demise of the pre-World War II Polish Corridor makes any Russian proposal to create a special transshipment corridor a political non-starter.

On the other hand, the close working relationship between Poland and Lithuania has not been without some difficulties. Despite numerous bilateral political and cultural contacts and exchanges, Polish efforts to protect and enhance the status of the not inconsequential Polish minority living in Lithuania have occasionally met with resistance in official Lithuanian circles. In January of 1997, for example, the Lithuanian Prime Minister, Gediminas Vagnorius, and Foreign Minister, Algirdas Saudargas, were forced to distance themselves publicly from comments made by the Lithuanian national Education Minister, Zigmantas Zinkevicius, who announced a plan to close schools using languages other than Lithuanian and who also stated that people who had an insufficient knowledge of Lithuanian would be denied citizenship. Zinkevicius went on to say that Belarusian was the main minority language in Lithuania and that Polish organizations within Lithuania

⁴⁷ The Political Committee of the Western European Union, *The Eastern Dimension of European Security*, Document 1542 (Paris: The Assembly of the Western European Union, 1996), Part II, Section 34. (Co-published electronically by the *NATO Integrated Data Service*.)

were attempting to impose the Polish language by force.⁴⁸

Zinkevicius' comments were particularly ill-timed coming as they did just days prior to the visit of the Lithuanian Foreign Minister to Poland and the signing of several new cultural treaties as well as the announcement of the formation of the Polish-Lithuanian peacekeeping battalion. At the same time, they represent the views of many nationalists throughout the Baltic States who chafe at the demographic legacy of decades of Soviet rule. The existence of the long-standing Polish minority is sensitive to Lithuanian nationalists in part because the presence of that minority (as well as historical claims) led to Poland's forceful seizure and incorporation of Vilnius (Wilno) into the Polish Republic in 1919.⁴⁹

In a move designed to foster improved security relations between the two states and counter-act the bad-feelings generated by irresponsible nationalist pronouncements, Poland and Lithuania have announced plans to form a joint peacekeeping battalion

⁴⁸ Jakub Karpinski, "Polish-Lithuanian Relations," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 1, Part II (January 2, 1997), p. 2.

⁴⁹ To one degree or another, all three Baltic nationalities felt themselves to be under demographic pressure from the presence of non-titular-nationals in the three republics. The largest minority groups are the product of Soviet resettlement programs, but older, indigenous also exist (i.e., the Polish minority in Lithuania). When Communism began to collapse in 1989, Estonians constituted only 61.52% of the Estonian population (down from 74.59% in 1959). In Latvia, on the other hand, Latvians represented only 52.04% of the population of the Latvian Republic (down from 62.00% in 1959). In Lithuania, the *objective* situation was not as threatening to the Lithuanian nation (i.e., since 1959 the proportion of Lithuanians in the Lithuanian Republic had held steady at around 79% of the total Republic population), but ethno-cultural tensions still manifest themselves. Source for the demographic data: Romuald J. Misiunas, "The Baltic Republics: Stagnation and Strivings for Sovereignty," in *The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society*, eds. Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger, The John M. Olin Critical Issues Series (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 204-227.

(similar to the one Poland is creating with the Ukraine).⁵⁰ The battalion — originally scheduled to be operational in 1997 and now projected to be operational in 1998 — is being developed (along with the Polish-Ukrainian battalion) under the auspices of NATO's Partnership for Peace program.⁵¹

Poland's Other Neighbours:

As for Poland's other immediate neighbours, relations are generally quite good. Poland has worked hard on its relationship with Germany, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the Scandinavian countries as part of Poland's overall strategy of preparing for NATO membership and once again the Polish military has been at the forefront of many of these efforts to improve relations.

As part of the so-called "Weimar Triangle" with Germany and France, Poland has agreed to the holding of annual military exercises and to the formation of a special coordinating body to oversee military links between the three states.⁵² As a result of these contacts, the number of bilateral Polish-German military projects has been growing exponentially. In 1990, only 10 projects were implemented, but this number grew to 52 in 1994. In 1995,

⁵⁰ Jakub Karpinski, "Lithuanian Foreign Minister Visits Poland," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 4, Part II (January 7, 1997), p. 2. Poland also participates in a joint tactical deployment as part of the IFOR/SFOR Nordic Brigade with personnel from the Danish, Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish armies.

⁵¹ The revised projection of when the joint Polish-Lithuanian peacekeeping battalion would achieve operational status was outlined in comments made by Polish Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati during a visit to Poland by Lithuanian Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas on January 6, 1997. See TV Polonia (Warsaw), "Lithuanian Minister Wants to Join European Structures with Poland," *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19970106*00161 (January 6, 1997), pp. 1-2.

⁵² Jakub Karpinski, "Polish, German, and French Defence Ministers Meet," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 24, Part II (February 4, 1997), p. 2.

85 projects were planned.⁵³

Poland has also been granted observer status in the new French-German Armament Agency. This has opened the door to cooperation in a number of armaments areas including the following: (1) the possibility of Polish armaments industries building components for a planned armoured vehicle, (2) the possibility of cooperation in military aviation and anti-aircraft defence (technological areas where the Polish Communist state was relatively more advanced than its non-Soviet Warsaw Pact allies), and (3) the consideration of the French Mirage-2000 fighter in prospective Polish aircraft purchase orders.⁵⁴

As one of the so-called "Visegrad" countries, Poland has also worked hard to improve its relations with Hungary and the Czech Republic (and Slovakia to a much lesser degree). The leaders of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary have attempted to coordinate their policies in regards to their efforts to gain membership in NATO and the European Union (E.U.).

Hungary — The Immediate Security Environment:

The immediate security environment for Hungary shares many of the same features as

⁵³ Jan Forowicz, "Building Mutual Trust," *Polska Zbrojna* (July 17, 1995), p. 3 translated as "German Officials on Bilateral Military Relations," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 95-137 (July 18, 1995), p. 52.

⁵⁴ Baeta Pasek, "Polish-French Military Cooperation," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 204, Part II (October 21, 1996), p. 2.

that of Poland. Certainly, admission into NATO and the European Union are the twin pillars of official Hungarian foreign policy as was the case in Poland.⁵⁵ As well, Hungary's security environment is shaped by many of the same concerns as is the case for Poland. For Hungary, relations with the Ukraine and Russia are very important and potentially troublesome thus necessitating the continued modernization of the Hungarian armed forces.

As was the case with Poland, Hungary has attempted to use its national military and foreign military contacts as an important means of improving Hungarian-Ukrainian and Hungarian-Russian relations. Recently, Lieutenant-General Ferenc Vég (the new Chief of the Hungarian General Staff) met with Lieutenant-General Oleksandr I. Zatynayko (the Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff and Deputy Defence Minister) for talks in the Hungarian town of Debrecen. After this meeting, the two sides announced plans to begin regular small-scale Hungarian-Ukrainian military exercises (beginning in 1997) and they announced plans to coordinate the training of their respective peacekeeping units. In addition, the Ukrainian side offered to lease a new Ukrainian coastal firing range to the Hungarian armed forces for use in air and anti-aircraft exercises and they offered to assist

⁵⁵ While official Hungarian government policy favours Hungary's admission into the European Union and NATO, public support for admission to these two international institutions is considerably lower. According to recent polls, less than fifty percent of the Hungarian public favours Hungary joining either institution and there is a growing movement in Hungary favouring neutrality over membership in the Western military alliance. (See Zsafia Szilagy, "A Year of Scandals and Resignations in Hungary," *Transition*, Vol. 3, No. 2 [February 7, 1997], pp. 14-15.) Even more extreme were the actions of hundreds of hard-line Communists who booed and jeered NATO troops (including Canadian troops) arriving in Hungary for Partnership for Peace maneuvers in 1996. (Source: "Hungarians Jeer Canadian Troops," *The Gazette [Montreal]* [July 21, 1996], p. A7.) Hungarian officials have even suggested they might hold a referendum on NATO expansion should they be offered formal admission to the Alliance. See "Hungarian Foreign Minister Denies Applying for NATO Membership," *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol. 1, No. 14, Part II (April 18, 1997), p. 4.

the Hungarian Army and Air Force in maintaining the latter's Soviet-era land and air defence equipment, aircraft, and aircraft engines. Finally, the two sides agreed to the scheduling of annual meetings involving their Chiefs of Staff and all of this occurred in a context where the two sides are preparing for ministerial-level negotiations in Budapest in 1997 preparatory to the signing of several defence protocols (involving security and secrecy issues).⁵⁶

Hungary and Minority-Hungarian Populations:

Compared with its Polish neighbour, there are, in the case of Hungary, certain factors which are quite unique. In practical terms, the states that pose the greatest immediate concern to Hungarian decision-makers are Slovakia, Rumania, and the countries that have emerged from the break-up of Yugoslavia.⁵⁷ Significant minority-Hungarian populations reside in all three neighbouring states and Hungarian relations with these states have (to some degree or another) been affected by tensions over their status of these minority groups.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ MTI News Agency (Budapest), "Hungarian and Ukrainian Chiefs of Staff Meet," *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19961210*00198 (December 10, 1996), p. 1. Hungary has also announced plans to form a joint brigade with Italy and Slovenia in 1998. See "Hungary, Italy, Slovenia to Establish Joint Brigade," *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol. 1, No. 35, Part II (May 21, 1997), pp. 3-4.

⁵⁷ For an excellent, albeit somewhat dated, study of Hungarian relations with Slovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia (especially concerning the ethnic dimension), see George Schöpflin, *Hungary and Its Neighbours*, Chaillot Papers No. 7 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies Western European Union, 1993). The following section is based largely on material provided in this source. Schöpflin considers the problem of the Hungarian-minority to be the second most significant security issue in East-Central Europe after the break-up of Yugoslavia! It would, therefore, have to be considered at least as serious as the tensions existing between Greece and Turkey - NATO "allies" who have clashed with one another repeatedly since the end of the Second World War.

⁵⁸ According to Schöpflin, the highest credible figures for the Hungarian ethnic minority living in neighbouring Balkan states are as follows: (1) in Rumania - 2,000,000; (2) in Slovakia - 650,000; and (3) in Serbia 350,000. (Schöpflin, p. 37.) Approximately 200,000 ethnic-Hungarians also live in the Ukraine, but

Current tensions between Hungary and its neighbours have centred less upon fears of Hungarian territorial revisionism (a major political plank in the pre-World War Two era but not currently) than they have upon Hungarian efforts to assist minority-Hungarian populations in obtaining collective political and cultural rights from their host governments. Some of these neighbouring governments see the granting of these collective rights as acting as a spring-board to subsequent calls for political autonomy or (in the worst case) for political secession by the Hungarian minority (or by other ethnic minorities taking their cue from the ethnic-Hungarian lead).

For their part, some Hungarian efforts to achieve these goals have suggested an ulterior motive on the part of the Hungarian government because these actions were somewhat awkward and even heavy-handed. For example, the first post-Communist Hungarian Prime Minister, József Antall, set-off some alarm bells in the region when he proclaimed early in his first term that he was “in spirit” the Prime Minister of some 15 million Hungarians (i.e., a population that had to include Hungarians living outside of Hungary’s borders).⁵⁹ In addition, the Hungarian Constitution proclaims: “The Republic of Hungary bears a sense of responsibility for what happens to Hungarians living outside of its

the status of this population has not been the source of significant Hungarian-Ukrainian political tension. On the other hand, the Hungarian minority living in the Vojvodina region of Western Serbia and the Slavonia and Baranja regions of Eastern Croatia has occasionally been caught in the cross-fire of the Yugoslav civil war. In October of 1991, the war briefly spilled-over into Hungary when a pilot of the federal-Yugoslav Air Force deliberately bombed the town of Barcs just inside the Hungarian border.

⁵⁹ Quoted in Schöpflin, p. 10.

borders and promotes the fostering of their relations with Hungary."⁶⁰

Hungary and Slovakia:

In addition to the long-standing dispute over the Slovak government's Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros dam project, Hungarian-Slovakian tensions recently have centred upon efforts by some Slovakian hard-liners to curb the use of languages other than Slovak in public institutions.⁶¹ Presently, ethnic-Hungarians are prohibited from addressing the Slovak legislature in their native tongue, the government has removed bilingual road signs from areas heavily populated by Hungarian-speakers, restrictions have been placed in the field of minority-language education and culture (beginning in January, for example, financial penalties were imposed upon schools that issued bilingual report cards), and an oft-promised law on minority language rights has not even been introduced to Parliament.⁶² Occurring in a context in which democratic rights more generally are seen to be under some pressure (i.e., the European Union recently warned the Slovak government to respect democracy and human rights), the activities of the Slovak government have led to occasionally heated exchanges between the two governments.⁶³

⁶⁰ "Hungary [Constitution as Amended to May 1995]," in *Constitutions of the Countries of the World*, ed. and trans. Gisbert H. Flanz (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1995), Article 6 (3).

⁶¹ For an overview of the Slovak language policy, see Sharon Fisher, "Making Slovakia More 'Slovak,'" *Transition*, Vol. 2, No. 24 (November 29, 1996), pp. 14-17.

⁶² Schöpflin, pp. 22-27; Sharon Fisher, "Slovak Hungarians Complain to EU, NATO," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 194, Part II (October 7, 1996), p. 2; Sharon Fisher, "Hungary Urges Slovakia to Pass Minority Language Law," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 24, Part II (February 4, 1997), p. 2; and Sharon Fisher, "Slovak Minority Language Law Discussed in Budapest," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 37, Part II (February 21, 1997), p. 4.

⁶³ The warning statement to the Slovak government was issued by European Commissioner Hans van den Broek on February 13, 1997 following a meeting with the Slovak Deputy Premier Katarina Tothova. See

In the most recent clash (in February 1997), the Hungarian government formally accused the Slovak government of having violated the provisions of the Hungarian-Slovak Basic Treaty (which had only been ratified recently by the two sides after long and difficult negotiations) by banning bilingual school reports and by failing to table and pass a minority language law. In response, the Slovak Foreign Ministry issued a strongly-worded statement that accused Hungarian officials of engaging in an "ongoing campaign that casts doubt on the real situation of the Hungarian minority." The real problem, the statement continued, had nothing to do with the rights of the ethnic-Hungarian minority in Slovakia, but was solely the product of "Hungary's minority policy in relation to Hungarian minorities abroad."⁶⁴

To be sure, hostilities between these two states are not imminent (it is not 1939 and this is not the Sudetenland). Both sides (and especially the Hungarians) have made a significant effort to rectify their differences if for no other reason than to improve their chances of making the cut for the first round of NATO expansion talks (i.e., NATO membership will not be extended to countries involved in serious border disputes with their neighbours). Still, ethno-cultural tensions do seem to be amongst the most persistent of security problems and Hungarian-Slovakian difficulties are amongst the most serious facing the

Sharon Fisher, "EU Urges Slovakia to Pass Minority Language Law," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 33, Part II (February 17, 1997), pp. 2-3.

⁶⁴ See Zsofia Szilagyi, "Hungarian Official says Slovakia Violates Basic Treaty," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 30, Part II (February 12, 1997), p. 4; Anna Siskova, "Slovak Foreign Ministry Condemns Hungarian Criticism," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 32, Part II (February 14, 1997), p. 3; and Zsofia Szilagyi, "...While Hungarian Foreign Minister Tries to Avoid 'War of Words,'" *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 33, Part II (February 14, 1997), p. 4.

new Europe. The Hungarian Foreign Minister even noted that the Slovak government was slow to ratify the new Hungarian-Slovak Basic Treaty.⁶⁵ And it probably is no coincidence that Hungarian-Slovak military cooperation has been conducted at a far lower level of activity than comparable Hungarian military conducts with the Czech Republic, Poland, the Ukraine, or even Rumania.

Hungary and Rumania:

Historically, the relationship between Hungary and Rumania also has been troubled. Its focus has been the status of the ethnically-mixed region of Transylvania. Currently, almost two million Hungarians (approximately one-quarter of the region's total population) live in Rumania where this population has been a particularly sore point for Rumanian nationalists who fear the worst from their Hungarian neighbours (no matter how petty or legitimate their specific demands) and by Hungarian nationalists who traditionally have feared the reverse.⁶⁶

During the Communist era, the nadir of Hungarian-Rumanian relations was reached when the neo-Stalinist regime of Nicolae Ceausescu embarked upon its "systematization" project (1987-1989). This campaign attempted to reduce the number of rural villages in Rumania by one-half (by moving people to other urban sites and leveling their old homes), but its effect (rightly or wrongly) was perceived in Hungary and by the

⁶⁵ *Mlada fronta dnes* (Prague), "Foreign Minister Comments on NATO Entry, Purchasing Fighters," *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19961113*00157 (November 13, 1996), p. 2.

⁶⁶ The figures are from Schöpflin, p. 37.

Hungarian minority in Rumania as being directed disproportionately towards the Hungarian population of Transylvania.

After the fall of Communism, tensions remained. Ethnic clashes followed an attack on Hungarians in Tirgu Mures in March 1990 and tensions were also heightened when the new mayor of the Central Translyvanian city of Cluj (Gheorghe Funar) banned the use of Hungarian in public notices (despite 25-30% of the residents of the city being Hungarian). Plans for a promised Hungarian-language university have languished and Hungarian leaders reacted sharply to the 1992 dismissal of ethnic-Hungarian prefects from the largest of the Hungarian-populated regions of Rumania (the Szeklerland region of Eastern Transylvania) and their subsequent replacement with ethnic-Rumanians.⁶⁷ Nevertheless, Hungary and Rumania (under pressure to comply with NATO admission standards) have worked hard to solve many of their differences.

Hungarian-Rumanian relations have improved markedly in the last few years as both states have attempted to meet NATO admission criteria. On September 16, 1996, the two countries took an important step forward to meeting NATO's requirements when they signed a Basic Treaty (despite the objections of some opposition members of each legislature who felt the minority-rights provisions of the agreement either went "too far"

⁶⁷ Schöpflin, pp. 27-31. Recently, the Rumanian Prime Minister, Victor Ciorbea, back-tracked on an earlier promise to re-open the Hungarian-language Bolyai University in Cluj by saying the final decision rested in the hands of the autonomous faculty senate of the existing Rumanian-language Babes-Bolyai University board. Ciorbea and Rumanian President Emil Constantinescu have also clarified their position in support of Hungarian-language post-secondary education by stating they favour the creation of a Hungarian section within a unified Babes-Bolyai University. (The original Hungarian-language Bolyai University was closed in 1958.) See, Michael Shafir, "Rumanian Prime Minister Steps Back from Hungarian University Promise," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 54, Part II (March 18, 1997), p. 3.

or “not far enough”).⁶⁸ Still, a few problems remain. For example, the hard-line mayor of Cluj has vowed to block the opening of a proposed Hungarian Consulate in his city (he even wants the Hungarian Embassy in Bucharest closed) and the Hungarian-language university project has still not gone ahead, but the Basic Treaty has allowed the two sides to move forward in the fields of military and security cooperation.⁶⁹

For Hungary and Rumania, the respective military establishments have played a very important role in fostering good relations through their participation in various bilateral military projects. The general components of this military cooperation regime are covered in a series of three military cooperation accords the two sides have negotiated in conjunction with their negotiations on the Basic Treaty. Two of these accords already have been signed by the two sides while the other one is very nearly complete.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ The major stumbling block revolved around a dispute as to whether the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities would be referred to in the final document (as the Rumanians wanted) or whether the broader and more restrictive Council of Europe Recommendation 1201 would be used to define minority ethnic rights (as the Hungarian side wished). For a complete draft of the Basic Treaty, see *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), “Hungarian-Rumanian Basic Treaty: Draft Text,” *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19960902*00287. The Rumanian legislature ratified the agreement in October and the Hungarian legislature overwhelmingly followed suit on December 10, 1996. Source: Zsofia Szilagyi, “Hungarian Parliament Ratifies Basic Treaty with Rumania,” *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 238, Part II (December 11, 1996), pp. 3-4. For more information on the opposition to the Basic Treaty in the Hungarian National Assembly, see Istvan Riba, “Debate on the Basic Treaty - Hungarian, Rumanian, Two Good Friends,” *Heti Vilaggazdasag* (August 31, 1996), pp. 7-10 translated as “Hungary: Basic Treaty with Rumania Assessed,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-171 (August 31, 1996), pp. 1-4.

⁶⁹ Hungarian Radio (Budapest), “Nationalist Leader Opposes New Hungarian Consulate,” *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19970110*00133 (January 10, 1997), p. 1 and Zsolt Mato, “Hungary, Rumania Agree to Open Consulates,” *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 40, Part II (February 26, 1997), p. 4.

⁷⁰ The following details on the Hungarian-Rumanian military confidence-building agreements are taken from: Hungarian Radio (Budapest), “Confidence-Building Accords with Rumania ‘Urgent’ - Defence Official,” *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19960729*00183 (July 29, 1996), p. 1; MTI News Agency (Budapest), “Hungarian-Rumanian Military Agreement to be Signed Soon,” *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19960902*00006 (September 2, 1996), p. 1; Rompres News Agency (Bucharest), “More Details of Military Agreement,” *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19960906*00113 (September 6, 1996), pp. 1-2; Rumanian Radio (Bucharest), “Rumania Signs Military Agreement with Hungary,” *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19960906*00043 (September 6, 1996), p. 1; Zsolt Mato, “Hungary, Rumania Boost

The first agreement (signed in Arad, Rumania, by Hungarian Defence Minister Gyöergy Keleti and Rumanian Defence Minister Gheorghe Tinca on September 6, 1996) commits the two militaries to notifying the other at least 42 days in advance of any maneuvers or other significant military activities within a 80 km zone along their common border. As well, five military observers (plus additional politicians and journalists) will be invited to any exercise that is staged in either country which involves (in a 48-hour period) more than 6,000 soldiers (including logistical support personnel) and/or 100 tanks or 150 armoured vehicles and/or 75 artillery pieces of 100 cm calibre (or larger). And no exercises involving a battalion or larger force will be allowed within 30 km of the frontier. In addition, the two sides promise to engage in yearly sub-unit exercises and to allow an increased number of visits to each other's military bases and barracks.

The second agreement — detailing the procedures which the two sides will employ to protect military secrets shared between their military establishments — was signed by Keleti and the new Rumanian Defence Minister, Victor Babiuc, on February 17, 1997. As for the pending agreement, the pact dealing with the maintenance of military cemeteries in Hungary and Rumania is — according to Istvan Gyarmati the Deputy State Secretary at the Hungarian Ministry of Defence — ready to be signed. But as of yet, no date has been set for the completion of this final treaty.

Military Ties," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 34, Part II (February 18, 1997), p. 3; and Hungarian Radio (Budapest), "Rumanian-Hungarian Military Agreement has 'Political Message,'" *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19960906*00112 (September 6, 1996), p. 1.

Hungary and Rumania also have undertaken a whole series of defence and security confidence-building exercises in order to improve bilateral military relations even further.⁷¹ For the two sides, 1996 was a particularly active year.

During this time, Hungarian military observers attended a major Rumanian military exercise that also included troops and aircraft from the United States, Turkey, Greece, Italy, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Moldova.⁷² Rumanian troops and aircraft took part in the multinational Cooperative Chance '96 air exercise which was staged in Szolnok in Eastern Hungary in July. This large Partnership for Peace exercise (which involved 1,100 troops and 50 aircraft) also included troops and aircraft from the United States, Belgium, France, Holland, Canada, Great Britain, Germany, Spain, Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.⁷³ And in October, a tank company from the Miklos Bercsenyi Mechanized Brigade in Hodmezovasarhely, Hungary, trained in Rumania for ten days with a unit from the Rumanian Turda regiment — using Rumanian equipment and operating under Rumanian armed forces regulations.⁷⁴

⁷¹ During a 1996 visit to both Hungary and Rumania (designed to facilitate even closer military relations between these two states), German Defence Minister Volker Ruehe praised the more than 70 joint military projects that the two states have undertaken and commented that the scope of this activity indicated a high level of bilateral cooperation. Deutsche Press-Agentur, "German Minister Discusses NATO in Hungary - Rumanians Uneasy," *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 01187*19960410*01141 (April 10, 1996), p. 1.

⁷² Michael Shafir, "Rumania and NATO," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 199, Part II (October 14, 1996), p. 5.

⁷³ Agence France-Presse, "Partnership for Peace Troops Practice Search and Rescue in Hungary," *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 01188*19960722*01629 (July 22, 1996), pp. 1-2 and MTI News Agency (Budapest), "International Air Force Exercises End in Hungary," *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 00805*19960726*00338 (July 26, 1996), pp. 1-2.

⁷⁴ MTI News Agency (Budapest), "Hungary: Tank Unit Leaves for Joint PfP Training in Rumania," *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-195-A (September 30, 1996), p. 1.

But most significantly, Hungary and Rumania announced plans to form a joint peacekeeping battalion in 1997. This battalion will have bases in both countries, will operate under joint command, and will exercise jointly. It is intended to be used in operations with NATO, the United Nations, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.⁷⁵

Still, Hungarian-Rumanian military and security relations are not without some problems. Concerned by the prospect of being left behind should NATO expansion come to Hungary but not Rumania, the former-Rumanian Defence Minister Tinca told the Hungarian newspaper *Magyar Hirlap* that the region could experience a new round of “competitive rearming” if both countries were not admitted to NATO together.⁷⁶ At the same time, Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs has stated publicly that while his government favours the simultaneous admission of Hungary and Rumania into NATO, his government is unwilling to sacrifice its chances at first-round membership on that account.⁷⁷

The Geopolitical Context (Conclusions):

Geopolitical factors (especially new and continued security concerns) have influenced the

⁷⁵ Zsolt Mato, “Hungary, Rumania Boost Military Ties,” *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 34, Part II (February 18, 1997), p. 3.

⁷⁶ Deutsche Press-Agentur, “German Defence Minister Visits Hungary, Rumania,” *BBC Global NewsBank*, No. 01187*19960409*00040 (April 9, 1997), pp. 1-2 and Deutsche Press-Agentur, “German Minister Discusses NATO....,” p. 1.

⁷⁷ Zsofia Szilagyi, “Hungarian Foreign Minister Optimistic on NATO Following U.S. Trip,” *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 48, Part II (March 10, 1997), p. 3.

reform of the Hungarian and Polish armed forces in several ways. In the case of the security threats facing their respective countries, the armed forces have been assigned three important functions: (1) the role of defending the interests of the state (i.e., the traditional military role except in the Communist era), (2) the role of military “ambassadors” to neighbouring states (i.e., the WEU and NATO confidence-building measures), and (3) the role of peacekeepers.

The international political role Hungarian and Polish military commanders and their units play in the post-Communist (transitional) period also provides the armed forces with exposure to NATO and United Nations operating procedures on a day-to-day basis. For prospective NATO allies, this provides an excellent opportunity to see firsthand how alternative (i.e., democratic) civil-military relations *systems* work in *practice* in the field. At the same time, the political windfall to the civilian regimes from enhancing the national military mission (and thus the improvement of civil-military relations) has been squandered to some degree in the case of Poland where the civilian element of the Ministry of Defence has cut the Polish General Staff out of the operational command structure of peacekeeping operations (see Proposition Six f).

In the case of Hungary (in particular), the prospect of NATO membership (with all of the military tasks and responsibilities that membership entails) may result in the Hungarian government finding the political will to at least arrest further deterioration in the armed forces’ capabilities. Already bilateral and multilateral military contacts serve to provide a particularly lucrative source of revenue for the Hungarian and Polish militaries and

governments. Hosting “guest troops” for training and the rental of artillery, air force, and missile firing ranges and other facilities to foreign nations and foreign militaries can generate large incomes — especially when the visitors are members of the relatively prosperous West European and United States military establishments. As part of these agreements, the foreign military visitors to Hungary are expected to finance the renewal of certain buildings, repair any environmental damage, and compensate local communities for noise pollution (and so on).⁷⁸

For now, participation in expensive PFP exercises prevents the Hungarian army from undertaking virtually any other significant domestic exercises (see Proposition Six c). In the future, however, the failure of the civilian authorities to fund the armed forces may have the dual consequence of further alienating the military (which may become increasingly vocal in its demands) and it may imperil NATO membership.

⁷⁸ According to a Defence Ministry Spokesman, Lajos Erdelyi, the Hungarian budget law obliges the Hungarian Defence Ministry to generate 10 billion forints per year. (See “Military Firing Range Deal - Area Chaos,” *Heti Világgazdaság* [May 25, 1996], pp. 99-100 translated and excerpted as “Hungary: Army Plans to Rent Firing Ranges to Foreign Troops,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-104 [May 25, 1996], p. 2.) In Poland, the rental of military facilities (especially firing ranges) benefits both the state treasury and the Ministry of Defence. Revenues - such as those generated by the 1996 maneuvers of Britain’s 7th Armoured Division (“The Desert Rats”) - are split between the two with 10 percent of the revenues going into the general revenue stream and the remainder going into the budget of the Ministry of Defence (which also is responsible for any expenses incurred). (See Ryszard Choroszy [interviewer], “What is Profitable for the Military [Interview with Colonel Marcin Krzywoszynski - Director of the Budget Department of the Ministry of Defence],” *Polska Zbrojna* [November 8, 1996], pp. 1&3 translated as “Defence Official on Military Budget,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-224 [November 20, 1996], pp. 1-3.) At the same time, defence officials in Hungary may have gone a little too far in their pursuit of profit. A report in the American military journal *Stars and Stripes* has alleged that companies controlled by the Hungarian Ministry of Defence were overcharging the US military for the provision of certain services in connection with the IFOR deployment. These allegations were strongly denied by Hungarian authorities. (See “simon” [sic], “The US Army is Disputing \$1 Million - Have the Hungarian Companies Overcharged?” *Magyar Nemzet* [October 11, 1996], pp. 1&3 translated as “Company Denies Overcharging IFOR Troops,” *FBIS-EEU*, No. 96-199 [October 15, 1996], pp. 1-2.)

CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Introduction:

In the Typology of Relevance (Chapter Four), a series of “Propositions” were presented which were the product of the critical analysis and distillation of the existing theoretical formulations. These “Propositions” detailed the various factors and variables which would be empirically tested in order to develop a comprehensive understanding of civil-military relations in post-Communist Poland and Hungary.

In the sections that followed (i.e., the eight subsections of Chapter Five), these individual factors were individually tested and preliminary conclusions were presented. In this chapter, these preliminary conclusions are summarized and followed by a brief overall assessment of the current state of Polish and Hungarian civil-military relations.

Evaluative Criteria:

Before evaluating individual Hungarian and Polish civil-military reforms, the question needs to be answered as to why this study does not employ NATO’s admission criteria as the basis of this analysis. There are important reasons for not doing so.

First, NATO included (in the September 1995 *Study on NATO Enlargement*) factors such as a commitment to liberal-democracy, individual liberty, and the resolution of

internal and international ethnic conflicts as part of its admission criteria.¹ These factors are clearly far beyond the scope of this study. NATO also proclaimed that there was “no fixed or rigid list of criteria for inviting new members to join the Alliance.”² Thus the specific implementation of NATO’s membership criteria has — to a very significant degree — been left in the hands of the prospective new members.

As for the specific criteria employed in this study, two factors are considered. First, the civil-military reforms are compared against a theoretical “ideal” as presented in the existing literature. As both Hungary and Poland are in the process of undertaking the creation of a *democratic* political system and wish to join the military alliance of the Western *democracies*, they are judged in this study by the degree to which they have created a system of *democratic* civilian control. To this end, Huntington’s model of “subjective” control is probably the most important theoretical ideal.

Second, the two cases are also judged on the basis of the distance they have come in reforming their civil-military systems. In other words, perfection is not required, but it is expected that the civilian and military sides of the equation will demonstrate continued progress - at least in the most important or troublesome areas of civil-military interaction.

¹ The following is from “Study on NATO Enlargement,” *NATO Integrated Data Service* (September 1995), sections 69-78. This study is also reprinted as “NATO Rationalizes Its Eastward Enlargement,” *Transition*, Vol. 1, No. 23 (December 15, 1995), pp. 19-26.

² “Study on NATO Enlargement,” section 70.

Summary of Main Findings:

As a visual aid in the summary of the main findings, the following chart is employed at the beginning of each empirical section. After each chart, a brief summary of the main findings as they pertain to each specific issue area is presented.

T	ST	N	SC	GC

Legend: "T" indicates that this issue area is a source of civil-military "tension" while "ST" indicates "some tension." The letter "N" indicates that the issue area is "neutral" in terms of its effect on civil-military relations. And finally, "SC" indicates "some consensus" while "GC" indicates "general consensus."

The words "Poland" and "Hungary" correspond to the relative status of each civil-military relationship in that particular issue area. The more frequently issues are a source of tension *and the more frequently important issues are a source of tension*, the worse the prognosis is for the civil-military relationship. Obviously, the reverse is true as well.

Proposition One — Political Culture:

T	ST	N	SC	GC

In terms of the effect political culture has had on the reform and democratization of Polish and Hungarian civil-military relations, the results are mixed. In the case of Poland, the traditional importance of the military as an institution and the association of the military with the cause of Polish nationalism has frequently led to political activism by the armed forces (i.e., Pilsudski, Jaruzelski). However, popular attitudes have generally

supported the army when it has entered the political realm. In many ways, this fosters the attitude of the military as “national savior.”

In Hungary, the armed forces have been a much less important national institution and thus have traditionally exerted less influence than is the case in the Polish case. This has been associated with a less “interventionist” military political culture. At the same time, the low social regard for the armed forces (which has frequently revealed itself in Hungary) is something of a problem area in as much as it explains — in part — the relative neglect of the military (i.e., in financial terms).

Proposition Two — The Totalitarian Legacy:

T	ST	N	SC	GC

In both Poland and Hungary, the totalitarian legacy left the armed forces especially sensitive to and suspicious of any civilian activities which evoke memories of the Communist-era system of extra-legal penetration and domination. As a result, legitimate efforts to institute democratic civilian oversight mechanisms have sometimes been interpreted as efforts to politicize the armed forces.

At the same time, post-Communist civilian authorities (especially the Polish “Left”) have remained suspicious of the motivations and trustworthiness of the military establishment. Together, these two legacies have manifest themselves in a certain level of civil-military

tension in Poland and Hungary.

Proposition Three — The Legitimacy of Military Rule:

T	ST	N	SC	GC

On the question of the *principle* of democratic civilian rule, there are no serious civil-military tensions in either Hungary or Poland. In point of fact, there is significant agreement on this principle.

On the other hand, the debate over the form of democratic civilian control (i.e., presidential versus parliamentary democratic civilian control) resulted in serious civilian and civil-military conflicts in both states. In Hungary, these tensions were by-and-large “solved” following the 1991 decision of the Constitutional Court. As a result, the codification of this principle was not seriously delayed. In Poland, on the other hand, the debate raged until late 1995. Poland, therefore, has been codifying the principle of parliamentary democratic civilian control for a much shorter period of time than was the case in Hungary.

In addition, the situation in Poland may be somewhat complicated by the fact that the codification process is incomplete and the pending legislative elections may return the Opposition to power. In this event, the situation which befell the reform process before 1995 will return (only in a reversed form). In other words, the Polish “Centre-Right” may

come into conflict with the “Left’s” President in the same way that the “Left-dominated” Sejm fought with the “Centre-Right” regime of Lech Wałęsa. Because the reform process is unfinished, control over the military may again become politicized to further partisan civilian political interests.

Proposition Four — Legislative and Administrative Control Mechanisms:

T	ST	N	SC	GC

As part of their democratic reform programs, the civilian governments of Poland and Hungary have replaced the Communist-era system of extra-legal penetration and domination of the military with legal and administrative control mechanisms. From a military perspective, the rule of law is much preferred.

At the same time, the development of this system of legal and administrative control has not been without certain difficulties. In Poland, the promulgation of this system was delayed by the incessant squabbling that occurred between the proponents of the presidential and parliamentary systems of democratic civilian control. And in both countries, financial limitations and inexperience on the part of legislators has limited the effectiveness of these programs.

Proposition Five (a) — The Social Composition of the Military Establishment:

T	ST	N	SC	GC

In the case of the first special or adjunct control mechanism, a general consensus can be found between the civilian and military authorities. In Hungary and Poland, the military is pleased that there has been no replication of the extra-legal methods of the Communist era.

In ensuring the loyalty of the armed forces, the new democratic regimes have only removed those elements most closely associated with the *ancien regime* and their efforts have focused on those institutions most closely associated with the previous system of subjective control (i.e., the security establishments and the Main Political Administrations). In both states the lustration process has not targeted the “*lesser*” *nomenklatura* and the process of vetting the regular armed forces has not produced any “witch hunts.”

Proposition Five (b) — Monitoring the Military Establishment:

T	ST	N	SC	GC

On the issue of the monitoring of the armed forces, once again a high level of civil-military consensus has been obtained in both Poland and Hungary. In particular, the military establishments have supported the elimination of the MPAs and secret police as

extra-legal spies of the partisan political interests of the Communist Party. In their place, secret police agencies now operate on the basis of the rule of law.

In the few instances where the civilian oversight of the security agencies has broken down, no instances targeting the armed forces have been recorded. As a result, this issue area is very positive in terms of fostering good civil-military relations.

Proposition Five (c) — Militia and Paramilitary Counterweights to the Military:

T	ST	N	SC	GC

In the post-Communist era, the practice of maintaining large militia and paramilitary forces as domestic political counterweights to the regular armed forces has ended. Instead of this extra-legal practice, the Polish and Hungarian civilian authorities are relying upon the development of a civilian ethos to control the political influence of the armed forces.

Proposition Five (d) — The Functional Differentiation of the Military:

T	ST	N	SC	GC

The division of the armed forces into numerous and (ideally) equally powerful functionally differentiated services is supposed to lessen the likelihood of a coup occurring. Because the inter-service rivalries typical of such a division increase the

uncertainty that any one military segment may or may not be opposed by other “loyal” elements of the armed forces, those individuals considering the extra-legal takeover of the state may become cautious.

In the case of Hungary and Poland, this strategy is not applicable. In both states, the armed forces as an institution are overwhelmingly dominated by the army. At the same time, no civil-military tensions are apparent in this issue area as the civilian authorities have not worked to set one military service against another.

Proposition Five (e) — The Military Educational System:

T	ST	N	SC	GC

The reform of the military educational systems in Hungary and Poland have not resulted in civil-military tensions. On the contrary, the military establishments have been pleased with the reforms that have taken place.

Specifically, the elimination of the indoctrination and propaganda campaigns of the MPAs was a positive development from a military perspective. As well, the military welcomed the refocusing of the military educational curricula on technical military matters, issues of democratic control, peacekeeping, and national defence instead of “socialist internationalism.”

Proposition Six (a) — The “Pull” of National Crises:

T	ST	N	SC	GC

Proposition Six (a) is not applicable. To date, no cases fitting the criteria of a “national crisis” have manifest themselves in either Poland or Hungary. Therefore, no empirical evidence exists to test this proposition.

Proposition Six (b) — Non-Traditional, Non-Military Roles and Activities:

T	ST	N	SC	GC

The abandonment of the Communist-era practice of employing the armed forces in non-military activities in the civilian economy represents a very positive development in terms of fostering positive civil-military relations. This practice was widely resented during the previous period. In Hungary, the limitation on the use of the armed forces in such activities is even constitutionally proscribed.

Proposition Six (c) — Budgetary and Financial Conflicts:

T	ST	N	SC	GC

Quite simply put, the financial situation in the Hungarian armed forces is a disaster. Worse still, there are very few indications that this situation is going to improve in the

near future. As such, this issue area represents a significant source of civil-military tension. In the case of Hungary, this issue area (and the related procurement area) are the most serious sources of conflict.

In Poland, the situation is serious, but relatively stable. Funding levels are lower than either the government or the military would like, but the military has at least seen its level of support increase in real terms in the last few budgets. Consequently, it may be the case that the worst is over. Certainly, the situation is not nearly as serious as the situation in Hungary where the very viability of the armed forces as an institution is imperiled.

Proposition Six (d) — Conflicts over the Procurement of Weapons Systems:

T	ST	N	SC	GC

Related to the overall financial health of the armed forces, the procurement issue area constitutes a more specific site of civil-military tension in Hungary and Poland. In Hungary, the situation in regards to military procurement is very poor and it is worsening. Equipment continues to age and reserves of ammunition and spare parts are being consumed, but virtually no purchases of new equipment take their place. Except for *used* equipment purchased from former-Warsaw Pact allies Russia, Belarus, and the Ukraine, no significant arms purchases are in the supply pipe-line for the Hungarian military.

In the case of Poland, the situation in regards to military procurement is less than ideal,

but it is nowhere as negative as the situation in Hungary. Poland has undertaken to purchase several different types of new weapons systems (albeit in quantities less than those which the armed forces have requested). Given that the financial situation for the Polish military is beginning to improve, it may also be that the procurement situation will improve as well but this will also require an adjustment in the spending priorities which are currently skewed in favour of expenditures on personnel.

Proposition Six (e) — Conflicts over the Composition of the Armed Forces:

T	ST	N	SC	GC

On the question of the future composition of the Polish and Hungarian armed forces, there is general agreement between the civilian and military authorities that conscription be phased out in favour of an “all-volunteer” force (as the military budget allows). The only source of tension in this issue area involves the question of the terms of service for the conscript element while the old recruitment system remains in place. The military establishments in both countries have complained that conscription terms have been cut to such a degree as to make training programs impossible to complete.

Proposition Six (f) — Civilian Intrusion in the Internal Affairs of the Military:

T	ST	N	SC	GC

The Polish and Hungarian military establishments have welcomed the abandonment of

the Communist-era practice whereby the internal affairs of the armed forces were heavily penetrated and politicized for partisan political purposes. In the post-Communist period, the only serious blight in this issue area involves proposals in Poland to rotate top military commands. This plan could re-politicize the armed forces because top military assignments would be subject to the selection by politically motivated factions in the ever-changing Sejm. Currently this is only a “potential” source of civil-military tension, but give past practice of the civilian authorities, the concerns of the military appear justified.

Proposition Six (g) — Threats to Military Competence and Expertise:

T	ST	N	SC	GC
Poland				

In both Poland and Hungary, the military establishment has chafed at the pace of the “civilianization” programs which the civilian authorities have attempted to put into pace. For the military, the problem with these programs is that it results in too many untrained and under-qualified civilians gaining too much control over military policy. Currently, these concern have been addressed by slowing these programs and by employing retirees officers as civilian administrators in the Ministries of Defence.

In Poland, military concern over the pace of the civilianization programs pales in comparison to the tensions generated by the conflict between the legislature and the Polish General Staff. On numerous occasions the legislature has attacked the

prerogatives of the General Staff. The legislature has essentially cut the General Staff out of the administrative and advisory “loop” on a whole range of issues. The General Staff plays virtually no role in Polish peacekeeping operations, its planning functions have been curtailed, and its ability to influence the budgetary process has also diminished. The General Staff has been radically reduced in size as an institution and this too has produced civil-military tensions. This is one of the most serious sites of civil-military tension in Poland.

Proposition Six (h) — Alterations to the Military Mission:

T	ST	N	SC	GC

The abolition of the military’s dual Communist era roles (i.e., internally “the defence of Socialism” and externally “socialist internationalism”) and the replacement of these missions with a doctrine of “national” defence was — from a military perspective — a very positive development. This reorientation restored to the armed forces a mission which is closely associated with the military’s traditional corporate function. This reform, therefore, represents one of the most important changes in the post-Communist era.

Proposition Six (i) — Loyalty to the State or Political Executive:

T	ST	N	SC	GC

Although the armed forces have — on several occasions — been drawn into civilian political disputes and have — in some instances — taken the side of one civilian faction against another, no evidence to date has come to light to indicate that the armed forces of either Hungary or Poland oppose the *principle* of civilian command. In other words, the military has occasionally increased its institutional autonomy and decided *between civilian factions* (especially when the lines of constitutional authority were blurred), but it has never rejected the notion that a civilian faction should in the end command the armed forces.

Even Poland's Lieutenant General Wilecki (who — *at least in the opinion of his critics* — would appear to be a likely candidate to define his responsibilities in terms of his loyalty to the state or the nation and not necessarily in terms of his loyalty to a particular political executive) has been recorded as making such an utterance (either publicly or privately). As such, the dangers suggested by Proposition Six (i) do not appear to be relevant in the case of Hungary and Poland in the post-Communist (transitional) period. This has to be considered, therefore, a positive development in terms of fostering good civil-military relations.

Proposition Six (j) — Institutional Threats to the Military's Societal Role:

T	ST	N	SC	GC

In neither Hungary nor Poland do paramilitary forces pose any meaningful threat to the unique social function and institutional position of the regular armed forces as guarantors of national sovereignty. This has eliminated an important site of civil-military tensions.

The Hungarian and Polish militaries now play a more dominant role in the defence of their respective nations than was the case for their Communist counterparts. Paramilitary forces in both of these countries have been disbanded or otherwise reduced to a far greater degree than has been the case with the national armed forces. As well, organizational and administrative changes have been made to the remaining paramilitary units which lessen the ability of these forces to undertake conventional military operations.

Proposition Six (k) — Drawing the Military into Civilian Political Disputes:

T	ST	N	SC	GC

In Hungary, the most serious (and potentially dangerous) civilian dispute to involve the armed forces occurred in 1991 (i.e., the “taxi blockade”). Since that time, no significant civilian disputes have spilled over into the armed forces. In Poland, on the other hand, the military has continued to be a political “football” (i.e., the Parys and Drawsko Affairs). The situation has improved since the presidential elections of 1995, but in this respect Poland still lags considerably behind Hungary.

Proposition Seven — The Officer Corps, NCOs, and Other Ranks:

T	ST	N	SC	GC

This Proposition is essentially a methodological question. As such it does not apply to the overall evaluation of Polish and Hungarian civil-military relations.

Proposition Eight — Geopolitical Factors:

T	ST	N	SC	GC

Poland and Hungary's current geopolitical context has led to the post-Communist armed forces being assigned three important functions: (1) defending the interests of the state, (2) serving as military "goodwill ambassadors" to neighbouring states, and (3) serving in peacekeeping operations. These tasks provide the armed forces with exposure to NATO and United Nations operating procedures on a day-to-day basis. They provide an excellent opportunity for the military to see firsthand how alternative (i.e., democratic) civil-military relations *systems* work in *practice* in the field. And they raise the prestige (and political influence) of the armed forces. In the future, the armed forces may find they have an important political ally in their calls for increased military spending (i.e., new NATO responsibilities and duties may well result in NATO pressure to increase funding levels).

Unfortunately, the positive effect of these reforms has been somewhat minimized in the

case of Poland where the civilian element of the Ministry of Defence has cut the Polish General Staff out of the operational command structure of peacekeeping operations (see Proposition Six f). In the case of Hungary, participation in expensive PfP exercises currently prevents the army from undertaking virtually any other significant domestic exercises (see Proposition Six c).

The Overall State of the Civil-Military Relationship:

T	ST	N	SC	GC

It should first be noted that the relative weight of the individual factors which go into the overall assessment of the civil-military reform programs of Hungary and Poland are measured in qualitative and not quantitative terms. In other words, the relative weight of the individual factors is determined in an intuitive and not mathematical fashion. Second, it should be noted that there are both positive and negative factors affecting the civil-military relations of both states.

Overall, the most important factors contributing to the fostering of good civil-military relations in Poland and Hungary are similar in both cases. First, the dismantling of the previous system of “subjective” control in both states (i.e., the use of security services, the Main Political Administrations, the military educational systems, paramilitary formations, the *nomenklatura*, and so on to penetrate and dominate the armed forces) and the institution of a system of “objective” civilian control in its place are amongst the most

positive developments since the collapse of Communism in 1989. In addition, the elimination of the Communist-era practice of employing the armed forces in non-traditional, non-military roles and activities has removed a significant thorn in the civil-military relationship. And finally, Hungarian and Polish civil-military relations have benefited from the “re-nationalization” of the military mission (i.e., the armed forces no longer serve the goal of “socialist internationalism”).

On the other hand, the relatively more positive assessment of Polish civil-military relations compared with Hungarian civil-military relations is based on one important fact. In Poland, the main areas of civil-military tension are currently either stable or they are demonstrating marked improvement in the last two years. In Hungary, the opposite is true. The most serious sites of Hungarian civil-military tension show few — if any — signs of improving in the short or medium terms. In point of fact, the situation appears to be worsening. In Hungary, the budgetary crisis and the procurement crisis — the most serious sites of national civil-military tension — show no signs of improvement. As a result, civil-military relations will remain at their current level or — if the fiscal situation continues to worsen — the situation could result in greater civil-military tensions. It is on this basis that the final overall assessment of the Polish and Hungarian cases is slightly more favourable to the Polish case.

In Poland, it may be the case that all sides have learned from the mistakes and crises of the last decade. This improvement in civil-military relations is particularly noticeable since late 1995 when the serious impasse between the authority of the Sejm and the

President was finally broken. The military now appears less likely to be drawn into political disputes such as the Parys or Drawsko Affairs. The creation of a system of *parliamentary* civilian control (for better or for worse) has probably progressed too far to be reversed again — even with the political “Centre-Right” regaining control of the Sejm and opposing the “reform” Communist President Aleksander Kwasniewski.

The ideological division between the current President and the Sejm also probably means that further acts to diminish the military’s competence and expertise which occurred under the auspices of the last parliamentary majority (i.e., by the diminution of the military’s power and authority) will not be repeated. It was, after all, only with the “Left” in control of both the presidency and the legislature that these restrictions were put into place.

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





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