

THE TRAINING OF THE CANADIAN MILITARY  
AND  
THE SOMALIA AFFAIR

A THESIS

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## ABSTRACT

The primary purpose of this thesis is to examine the training programs of Canadian military specifically the Airborne Regiment's officers prior to 1993, and correlate this training to the events in the infamous Somalia Affair. The focus of the research will be on the Canadian Airborne Regiment, Canada's elite fighting force, and on the extent of ethics and moral development in their training programs.

Canada has a unique position in international security issues. In the author's opinion, Canada has an established reputation through a history of providing high quality, professional and compassionate forces to areas of political or social instability. Such an example as Cyprus stands testimony to this claim. However, in 1991-1992, Canada's Airborne Regiment, engaged an environment that was unlike any previous mission and that they were not prepared for. To make matters worse, the Regiment was having tremendous internal problems such as; lack of leadership, rampant indiscipline, and serious acts of violence and vandalism. As a result, an "SI" as the Department of National Defence termed it, or a Significant Incident, occurred during the Somalia operation; the death of Shidane Arone.

This investigation into the Airborne and the military's training programs reveals how the military and the Canadian

government has failed to provide its service personnel with the best possible training particularly in ethical and moral development. It will also show how the military had the ability to prevent a serious of catastrophes from happening, but did not take the appropriate action.

Finally, the conclusion will establish some important assertions that can be drawn as a result of this correlation between the training of the Officer Corps and the Airborne's actions in Somalia.

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I would like to dedicate this thesis to my grandparents (Jim and Lil Traynor, and Jean and Peter Metz) and to my parents Ken and Sharon Metz. Their confidence, dedication, and companionship form the backbone of my character. They hold all my love and have my greatest respect.

Finally I must dedicate this thesis to Shidane Arone. The sixteen year old Somali who caused Canadians to reevaluate the purpose of Armed Forces and the morals that we instill in our soldiers. It is my hope that his death, while tragic, will not be in vain and that Canada's Armed Forces will learn the importance of moral and ethical development in the training of its soldiers.

## 1. Introduction

The controversy with the Canadian Forces began in 1992 when the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group, stationed in Petawawa Ontario, was sent by the Canadian government to participate in a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia. Somalia was a nation that had been ravaged by civil disorder and had requested that the United Nations establish peacekeeping posts under chapter VI of the U.N. Charter. Security Council resolution 751 created a "United Nations (U.N.) operation in Somalia to facilitate an immediate cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of a ceasefire."

The original intent of the U.N. was to use non-violent means, economic sanctions and blockades, to resolve the internal conflict. By May of 1993, however, the situation had deteriorated and the international media was broadcasting reports of large-scale massacres in rival villages throughout Somalia. In order to resolve the increasing conflict, the Security Council had to change the mandate of its force from peacekeeping, under Chapter VI of the Charter, to a

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<sup>1</sup> Ceri Chisholm, United Nations Handbook, Published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Trade, (Wellington, New Zealand: Wright and Carman Ltd.: 1993)



peacemaking mission under Chapter VII. This section of the Charter states that:

“Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security...”<sup>2</sup>

This new enforcement operation replaced the United Nations Task Force to Somalia (UNITAF 1992-May 1993) with a strengthened United Nations Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOMII).

As a result of the many events which surrounded the Somalia mission, the Canadian Forces has had to review and investigate the professional conduct of its members. The officer corps, in particular, has faced the most serious scrutiny. The interest into the military's activities, particularly the Canadian Airborne Regiment, by the Canadian public was sparked by the torture and killing of a Somali youth that was shown on Canadian national television.

It is the object of this thesis to examine the training of Canadian officers in an attempt to discover what role, if any, training programs may have played as one factor in the cause of the Somalia affair. In particular, it will investigate the extent of ethics and moral development in an officers training program, and examine their application in the combat situations of Somalia.

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<sup>2</sup> United Nations Charter, Section VII, Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.

The Canadian Airborne Regiment, Canada's elite fighting unit, was sent to Somalia as its contribution to the international effort to stop the war. The Regiment was not the highly trained professional unit that many in the Canadian government had expected. It was instead, a Regiment with rampant behavioural problems, a lack of discipline and poor leadership. Donna Winslow prepared a Socio-Cultural Inquiry into the Airborne Regiment noted from one of the interviewees that "The Airborne had a reputation for physical toughness and for being aggressive, more than any other unit in the Canadian Forces. They also had an unparalleled reputation for being undisciplined."<sup>3</sup> Members of the number 2 Commando were considered to be the worst of the pack. "I felt that members of 2 Commando were very gung-ho" says one of Winslow's interviewees, " ' I can't wait to kill my first Black!' Some of them were trigger happy and too aggressive. I talked to the CO after an O [Orders] group about it and I remember him saying: 'Well, that's the way I like it!' The two other commandos weren't that aggressive."<sup>4</sup>

The situation at home could be considered nothing less than dangerous and when the Airborne was sent to Somalia, the environment intensified an already bad situation.

After their arrival in Belet-Huen, Canadian soldiers faced increasing incidents of thievery by local  
<sup>3</sup> Winslow, Donna; The Canadian Airborne A Socio-Cultural Inquiry; (Canadian Government Publishing, Ottawa, 1997)p.123

<sup>4</sup> ibid.

Somalis. In some situations, the Canadian response was immoral and inhumane and in some cases it was even illegal.

In one incident, the perpetrators had been caught and the Regimental Chaplain was called to intervene. However, instead of helping the children, he posed for a trophy photo "with bound and blindfolded Somali children who had been marked as thieves."<sup>5</sup> Abdi Awale, a cleaner at the Airborne camp, and a local Somali, questioned many of the unorthodox activities of the Canadian soldiers. He noted that "there was a drought at that time and people wanted to get food. Children would try to get something to eat from the garbage."<sup>6</sup> These captured children had been caught stealing discarded food from the garbage of the Canadian Forces.

In another situation, Abdilnasr Saney, a translator with the Airborne in Somalia, recalls a Somali who was tied to a chair and humiliated and ridiculed during a detainment in January 1993, shortly after the Airborne arrived. Once again photos were taken showing the Somali "in various poses including the holding of a bayonet and other weapons in the vicinity of the detainees throat."<sup>7</sup>

Saney remembers one event in particular which stands out as an example of how some Airborne soldiers

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<sup>5</sup> Allan Thompson, Ottawa Bureau of the Toronto Star, The Story Behind 'trophy' photo, Toronto Star, September 8, 1996

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> *ibid.*

treated Somali citizens. Several children were begging for water outside the wire fence surrounding the Canadian compound. A nation wide drought meant that water had become a scarce resource. An Airborne soldier went to the child and gave him what he thought was a bottle of water. He then turned away and began to laugh. When Saney asked the soldier what was so funny, the soldier replied that "there was piss in the water...(Saney) went to the soldier's superior and told him what had happened, but he said that the soldier was near the end of his rotation and there was nothing he could do about it."<sup>8</sup>

The officer could have launched an investigation, called in the Military Police and possibly charged the soldier under the Code of Service Discipline. He chose not to. Furthermore, this was not the most serious of incidents which occurred. In fact, the situation that brought disgrace to the Airborne Regiment and the entire Canadian military was the beating, torture and murder of a sixteen year old boy named Shidane Arone.

After learning about this and all the other events, the Department of National Defence Headquarters attempted to keep the information from the general public. Consequently, when the media began its investigation, there appeared to be a cover-up by some senior members of the Forces.

In response to public outcry resulting from the media revelation of the incidents, the Government of

<sup>8</sup> ibid.

Canada initiated a Federal Public Inquiry. Its mandate was to:

inquire into and report on the chain of command system, leadership within the chain of command, discipline, operations, actions and decisions of the Canadian Forces and the actions and decisions of the Department of National Defence in respect of the Canadian Forces deployment to Somalia and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, the following matters related to the pre-deployment, in-theatre and post-deployment phases of the Somalia deployment.<sup>9</sup>

In July 1997, this commission reported on its findings and detailed the events that transpired in the Somalia operation including a defence department cover-up.

The Inquiry made some important observations about the military and Canadian society. They noted that:

Nothing distinguished the soldier from the civilian more strikingly than the acceptance that one of the basic rights that may have to be forgone in the national interest is the right to life.<sup>10</sup>

This is the most central element of the military ethos separating it from its civilian counterparts.

However:

In light of the Somalia experience, it may not prove sufficient simply to articulate an ethos and exhort soldiers to follow it. It would seem that a more fundamental need exists for a confirmatory and probative exercise to demonstrate that all soldiers, but particularly the senior officers, live by the military ethos and personify its core values.

<sup>9</sup> Minutes of a Meeting of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Governor General on the 20th day of March, 1995, Meeting: P.C. 1995-442; Government of Canada, House of Commons, Ottawa, Ont.

<sup>10</sup> Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, July 1997, Vol.5

The military, led by its senior officers, needs to reclaim the ethical high ground.<sup>11</sup>

In short, the Inquiry found that the military's ethos and its ethical foundations had deteriorated to unacceptable levels. It no longer reflected the values and morals of main stream Canadian society and consequently no longer held the confidence of Canadians in the performance of its duties. The commission recommended that soldiers and officers be reminded that they wear a national uniform. "They display the Canadian flag on those uniforms when on missions out of country. Society's expectations of the nations's flag-bearers are indeed higher than for the average citizen. Those expectations include the notion that soldiers serve as a symbol of the national character."<sup>12</sup> It is therefore, important to study the development of ethical and moral instruction in the Canadian forces to ensure the Canadian Forces are representative of the national character and display an ethical high ground in their actions.

To narrow the scope of study for this thesis an extensive literature review has been conducted. This has produced a framework for analysis in order to study the Canadian Officer corps. One of the most important documents in this review is the final Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry. The report details the

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<sup>11</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> *ibid.*

results of two years of testimony from Canadian Forces members, with regard to the training they received and incidents that occurred in Somalia. It facilitates an investigation that seeks to determine whether or not the values, ethics and morals that the military claims are being taught, are in fact, being followed.

The thesis is divided into three subsequent sections. Chapter 2 investigates a number of training materials that both the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Airborne received prior to their mission in Somalia. These are considered internal training programs and numerous materials have been provided by the Department of National Defence. The chapter will analyze the philosophic assumptions and leadership styles taught in the manuals in order to determine the degree of emphasis that is placed on a soldier's ethical and moral development.

It will also review a variety of external training programs and international agreements to which Canada has committed itself. Some of these include agreements of International Humanitarian Law, the Convention Against Torture, the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Charter, and the Geneva Conventions.

Chapter 3 will review the history of Somalia and its clan based social structure. It will look at the role of the United Nations and Canadian participation in the peacemaking mission. As well, this chapter will look at the history, preparations and rules of engagement of

the Canadian Airborne Regiment and describe the events which led to its dismantlement. This review will determine whether or not the Canadian government and its military have violated these international agreements through the training programs and conduct of its officers in Somalia.

Chapter 4 will present the conclusions found from the investigations and analysis in the thesis. It will determine whether or not the training programs of the Canadian Officer corps were a factor that caused the tragedies that occurred in Somalia.



## **2. Canadian Armed Forces: Officers and their Training**

The training programs of the Canadian Force's officers (commissioned and non-commissioned) are divided into two methods of instruction, internal and external. The internal instruction teaches general and special combat skills and technical qualifications. These are taught within Canada at specialized bases or special institutions. They provide the officer with leadership and soldiering skills in order to complete a variety of tasks in a combat or crisis situation.

The second type of training is external because either it did not originate in Canada, is not part of a regular training program, or is taught by an agency other than the Department of National Defence. This type of training provides an officer with non-combat skills and familiarization with the Laws of War.


### **2.1 History and Background of Military Training**

From the mid-1850's through the first World War, many officers of the Canadian Armed Forces were chosen on the basis of social status, wealth and heredity. Most of the officers, particularly senior officers, were from Great Britain. Their background reflected a system of nobility whereby an individual had the right to be an officer by virtue of his family's social status or relationship to a member of the Royal family. Officers were generally inexperienced in combat and in the strategies of waging war.

Formal officer training was a new concept and rarely employed. So, most officers depended solely on their advisors and those with experience for combat strategy. Since no formal process of selection or training existed a successful officer or commander was a rarity. Although history is replete with these rarities, particularly in Europe where the history of military conquerors is ancient, Canada's history in military affairs is relatively young.

The following continuum (fig.2.0) illustrates the evolution of the Canadian Forces between 1873 and 1945:

Figure 2.0 History Continuum



<sup>13</sup> Gerald Friesen, The Canadian Prairies: A History, (1990; Toronto; University of Toronto Press), p.163

The two world wars brought remarkable changes to the Canadian Military. Because there was no formal ethical instruction during either war, the development of ethics was solely community based. The reason for this was that the military had become a 'people's' army and as a result of the mass mobilizations and the priority by the military placed on combat skills the only ethical development given were the personal ethics each individual carried with them from their communities.

Following WWI & WWII the Canadian Military had combat experienced commanders and junior officers, and the resources to create an effective training program particularly for its officer corps. However, the training remained the same. Instead of creating its own program, Canada relied on the training materials and data provided mainly by the British military.

During the 1960's the Canadian military system began updating its training programs for Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers. A study by the Directorate of Training and the Directorate of Personnel Selection and Research in 1964 and 1965<sup>14</sup> found that the training programs was weak in two areas; Theory and Practice. By the early 1970's a series of manuals and texts were developed to address these deficiencies. They were designed to reflect the values, ethics and professionalism that Canadian society

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<sup>14</sup> Department of National Defence, Leadership, Volume 2: *The Professional Officer*, reference number A-PD-131-002/PT-001 (Formerly CFP 131(2)), issued on the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff, 30th of November 1970 and 31st of July 1973.

expected in its military. The military establishment determined that Canadian "leadership involves a relationship with followers that is intellectual, emotional, technical, and ethical. For this reason it is necessary to consider certain features of philosophy, behavioural science and the direct experience of military authors to cover the subject comprehensively."<sup>15</sup> These new elements of Canadian training which the soldier is taught, formed the foundation for leadership training for officers in the Canadian Forces.

These are:

- A.) Philosophic Assumptions,
- B.) Scientific Principles, and
- C.) Direct Military Experience.

## **2.2 Philosophic Assumptions**

There are two main authors whose writings have formed the basis of the Canadian military's philosophy. They are John Locke (1632-1704) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)<sup>16</sup> two very influential philosophers whose works when compared, are quite contradictory.

John Locke proposed an empirical system of military training. His system conditioned soldiers through a process of repetitive drill training based on an action to reaction scenario, or, as the military interprets it, "quick response to appropriate stimuli".<sup>17</sup> This type of teaching may be

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<sup>15</sup> *ibid.*, p.1-1

<sup>16</sup> *ibid.*, p. 2-2

<sup>17</sup> *ibid.*

referred to as robotic training where a soldier is not required to think or feel, but only react. Officership in this system avoids the moral and emotional choices when making decisions.

Whether in the battle field or in the simulations of combat training, the soldier is trained to recognize certain actions and react in an appropriate manner under the guidance of his superiors. The military teaches its members that "Locke is a materialist who believes that reality can be explained in material terms and ...Locke's epistemology is empirical".<sup>18</sup> In this way, the teachings of military experience would constitute the fundamental element in a training program.

To further his philosophy, Locke introduces the concept of the State of Nature, where humanity is in a "condition of perfect freedom as well as perfect equality".<sup>19</sup> He would not agree that the condition of perfect freedom gives any person the right to harm or kill another. Therefore, in Locke's *The Second Treatise*, he begins by qualifying his concept of the State of Nature in Chapter II, by suggesting that:

But though this [state of nature] be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of license: though man in that state have an uncontrollable [sic] liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession....The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind....[that] Everyone, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his

<sup>18</sup> Brian R. Nelson, *Western Political Thought: From Socrates to the Age of Ideology*, (1982; New Jersey; Prentice-Hall Inc.), 161

<sup>19</sup> *ibid.*, p.164

station willfully, so by the like reason...ought he, as much as he can, to *preserve the rest of mankind*, and may not... impair the life, or what tend to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.<sup>20</sup>

Thus, the state of nature is one of peace and order. In his society, freedom must be limited and restricted when it begins to harm another person. This concept of limited rights and freedoms is used by the judicial and political structures of 20th century Canadian politics in the interpretation of the fundamental freedoms of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

For Locke, in Chapter 3 of the Treatise, enmity and destruction form the basis for his definition of war. War is not an impassioned conflict to be dealt with as quickly as possible. Rather, it is a declared, well planned and calculated event designed to take another person's life.<sup>21</sup>  
Therefore:

*The plain difference between the state of nature and the state of war, which however some men confounded, are as far distant, as a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance and preservation, and a state of enmity, malice, violence and mutual destruction, are from one another. Men living together according to reason...is properly the state of nature. But force, or a declared design of force, upon the person of another...is the state of war.*<sup>22</sup>

In other words, Locke suggests that the state of nature is one of peace because people are naturally rational beings

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<sup>20</sup> John Locke, *The Second Treatise of Government*, Originally published in 1690, edited by C.B. Macpherson. (1980: Indiana, U.S.A.; Hackett Publishing Company), p.9

<sup>21</sup> *ibid.*, p. 14

<sup>22</sup> *ibid.*, p. 15

capable of thought and moral development. As a result, they are able to transcend the emotive plane and rise above a state of war for the preservation of humanity. Alternatively, if people live in a state of war, it would imply that rational thought and morality have collapsed. Society would return to its primitive state of the hunter and the hunted.

The Canadian Forces has placed Locke's works in a modern context, by applying them to the leader and leadership training. It determined that a leader is following Lockean techniques when training troops in complex skills and technical information. He is Lockean because he is instructing them on an intellectual level. Another way to view a Lockean influence over Canadian officers is by the attributes that society wants from its military leadership. The *Professional Officer* training manual, from the Department of National Defence, states that, "professional competence, justice, example, self-discipline, and decisiveness...are... manifestations of leadership which are outward, visible, and subject to a rational analysis that is fundamentally Lockean."<sup>23</sup>

The Department of National Defence, in order to simplify many of the teachings of Locke's works, identified ten characteristics which form part of the philosophical foundations of officer and leadership training. They are as follows;

- a. common sense;
- b. the avoidance of logical extremes and

<sup>23</sup> Department of National Defence, Leadership, Volume 2: *The Professional Officer*, reference number A-PD-131-002/PT-001 (Formerly CFP 131(2)), issued on the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff, 30th of November 1970 and 31st of July 1973. p. 2-2/2-3

- paradoxes;
- c. practical solutions to problems;
- d. tolerance as opposed to dogmatism;
- e. knowledge as gained through sense impressions and experience, but by no other means;
- f. the intellect as passive, responding to external stimuli, but not in itself capable of spontaneous activity;
- g. the equality of men at birth;
- h. the importance of education as a factor in bringing about individual differences;
- j. the avoidance of emphasis on will and emotion; and
- k. the ethic of happiness as the chief end of man.<sup>24</sup>

The military's second philosopher, Immanuel Kant, unlike Locke, believed that the mind was not passive but active and dynamic. He also believed that an individual's will and emotions are a very important part of a person's character that must be taken into account during an officer's training particularly in their leadership development. For example when an officer uses a less authoritative approach to leadership and employs a system of consultation and trust in the skills and abilities of the troops, also known as participative, he/she is using a Kantian approach. Elements of encouragement, persuasion, and inspiration are common aspects of this type of leadership.<sup>25</sup>

The Department of Defence simplified Kant's philosophies into nine characteristics which form the second part of the philosophical foundations of leadership training. They are:

- a. idealism and a moral imperative;
- b. the pursuit of logic even to extremes;
- c. idealistic solutions to problems;
- d. the dogmatic presentation of truths;

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<sup>24</sup> *ibid.*, p. 2-2

<sup>25</sup> *ibid.*, p.2-3



- e. knowledge gained from the intellect itself, apart from sense perceptions;
- f. the intellect as active, dynamic, impinging on and shaping the environment, capable of insight independent of experience;
- g. the importance of the individual;
- h. the importance of the emotional experience and the exertion of the will; and
- j. an ethic of duty, striving and sacrifice as the chief end of man.

By applying the knowledge of these two philosophers in combination with the history of Canada's military development and experience, the Canadian Department of National Defence has combined the contradictory principles of Locke and Kant to establish their own set of principles. After taking these new characteristics and molding them with the traditions and behaviours of Canadian soldiers and officers, the Department of Defence created the ten Principles of Leadership. As a result, the "officer can be sure that his relationships and consequently his effectiveness, both with his leaders and his followers, will improve if he heeds the following series of positive injunctions:

- a. achieve professional competence;
- b. appreciate your own strengths and limitations and pursue self-improvement;
- c. seek and accept responsibility;
- d. lead by example;
- e. make sure that your followers know your meaning and intent, and then lead them to the accomplishment of the mission;
- f. know your men and promote their welfare;
- g. develop the leadership potential of your followers;
- h. make sound and timely decisions;
- j. train your men as a team and employ them up to their capabilities; and
- k. keep your followers informed of the mission, the changing situation, and the overall

picture."<sup>26</sup>

By using these ten principles the leader/officer is expected to have the ability to employ the intellect, will and emotions, and personal military experience, toward a variety of situations that will challenge their leadership and decision making abilities. However, in the creation of the Ten Principles, the military has disregarded the teachings of Kant. There is little appreciation for the moral and ethical side of the professional competence of a soldier. This lack of Kantian influence is evident throughout the military training programs. Officer training programs lack significant moral development and are ambiguous in ethics instruction.

The next section deals specifically with the training of the Canadian Forces. It will explain the process that officers and non-commissioned officers must go through to be considered good leaders and skilled soldiers. It will also show whether or not the Principles of Leadership and subsequently the teachings of Locke and Kant are important elements in their training programs. Before beginning this discussion, however, it is important to provide some definitions of the recurring terms used in this investigation.

- 1.) Officer / Officership: "An officer must promote the welfare, efficiency and good discipline of all those who are subordinate to him...An officer's responsibility includes the

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<sup>26</sup> ibid.,p.2-11/2-12

prevention of irregularities and offenses".<sup>27</sup> Furthermore, "As a member of the officer corps it is a man's duty to display absolute and uncompromising integrity of character. He must live honestly by a code of ethics, influenced to a large degree by the customs and traditions of the services."<sup>28</sup> An officer is any individual with the rank of Officer Cadet or higher.

- 2.) Leadership: "Leadership is the process of motivating. Military leadership is the art of influencing human behaviour so as to accomplish a mission in the manner desired by the leader."<sup>29</sup> The leader must accept the responsibility for the conduct of those persons under his authority and for the unlimited liability contract under which they serve.<sup>30</sup>
- 3.) NCO: Non-commissioned Officer. This person is trained in many, but not all of the same leadership tactics as an officer but is responsible for the enacting and delegation of the orders given by an officer. An NCO may have the rank of Master Corporal, Sergeant, Warrant Officer, Master Warrant Officer and Chief Warrant Officer.

### 2.3 Internal Training Programs

The training programs of the two streams of officers (officers and Non-Commissioned Officers) are broken down into two programs; 1) the Junior Leadership Course completed by

<sup>27</sup> Department of National Defence, Basic Officer Training, Military Knowledge Manual, number CFP 195, issued under the authority of the Queen's Regulations and Orders, Article 1.23, 15th September 1972. p. 14-1

<sup>28</sup> Department of National Defence, Leadership, Volume 2: The Professional Officer, reference number A-PD-131-002/PT-001 (Formerly CFP 131(2)), issued on the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff, 30th of November 1970 and 31st of July 1973. p.13-3

<sup>29</sup> Department of National Defence, Leadership in Land Combat, Volume 15: Military Training, reference number B-GL-318-015/PT-001, April 7th, 1988, p.5-3

<sup>30</sup> *ibid.*

NCO's, and often the officers; 2) the professional officer training and development course designed specifically for the officers. It excludes NCO's.

The Junior Leadership Course includes a number of manuals in its training. For the purposes of this study, one manual in particular is considered fundamental. It is the first volume in a series of three which illustrate the varying degrees of leadership at the junior leaders (NCO) level. The others are the Professional Officer and the Officer Assessment manuals.

The first volume is divided into two parts; Part I contains the background knowledge, the 'how's' and 'why's' of leadership instruction. Part II is the practical leadership component. Students at the beginning of their program are given the manual in reverse order, Part II before Part I. The reasoning behind this is so junior leaders (NCO) can apply the practical knowledge to its theoretical basis.

As mentioned, the military completed a series of studies which included information provided by American research before the introduction of the Junior Leaders manual in 1973. One of its premises was that new recruits, specifically those in non-officer roles such as basic riflemen and privates, came from less affluent, less skilled and less educated sections of Canadian society. Specifically, this training notes that "our volunteer system of obtaining recruits tends towards a lower average standard of education, particularly

in times of peace." <sup>31</sup> This type of information stresses the importance of good leadership and supervision, and emphasizes the need for the junior leader to become involved in the private and social aspect of his soldier's life.

Not only is the new recruit considered to have an empty mind to be filled by the knowledge of training from the military, he is also considered by his superiors to be disrespectful and irresponsible. "Canada's high standard of living has made him (the new recruit) extravagant and wasteful of his property and even more so of government property."<sup>32</sup> Therefore, with this understanding, the junior leader is required to teach respect and responsibility to his soldiers.

In order to condition soldiers not only for war but also to act in a trained, uniform and cohesive manner during a crisis, the junior leader must approach his role in the relationship with his men as a father figure. By making these assumptions the junior leaders are able to begin their conditioning by treating everyone as equals. The training begins by instilling the most basic of military behaviours; discipline, cohesion and unity, respect and obedience. This is accomplished through a series of repetitive training techniques. Like common secondary educational practices, the recruit is provided with training information, allowed to ask questions in a classroom setting, and following each section

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<sup>31</sup> Department of National Defence, Leadership, Volume 1: Junior Leaders Manual, reference number A-PD-131-001/PT-001, issued under the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff, 31st of July 1973. p. 1-6

<sup>32</sup> *ibid.*

of the course, is thoroughly examined on his knowledge. The recruit must pass each exam to continue further in his training. Recruits study together in groups and as a result, there is tremendous peer pressure to succeed as a unit, rather than as an individual.

To succeed as a group is another important element in a military environment. The section, platoon and unit of soldiers represents the basic and most important elements in any military structure. It is at this level where the cohesion of an army is crucial, particularly in battle. A breakdown in cohesion within a fighting unit can have catastrophic consequences. Maintaining cohesion among soldiers during peace time and during combat is, therefore, an important part of a junior leader's responsibilities. The "most successful Junior Leader will understand, predict and control the behaviour of his men."<sup>33</sup> In military circles one example regularly used to teach the importance of maintaining cohesion and illustrating the consequences if you don't, is the battle of 1812 with the United States. Less than one thousand "Canadian" troops maintained their discipline and defeated an American force of over 4000 troops attempting to take possession of Montreal. The American army was defeated, not because of superior fire power, but because their forces divided, and cohesion at the front-lines quickly disintegrated. When cohesion breaks down, panic and disorder are its replacement. As a result many of the American forces turned and fled in retreat. The victory was not one of power,

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<sup>33</sup> *ibid.*, 2-2

ability, or technology, but of superior cohesion in organization, discipline, leadership and training.<sup>34</sup> How officers and junior leaders control and shape the behaviour of their subordinates is obviously an integral part of a successful military structure.

To understand the behaviour of soldiers, the junior leader must be able to identify the characteristics that constitute human behaviour. For the junior leaders, the Military has done this for them and found three main indicators. Human behaviour is to be interpreted through; 1) Roots of Behaviour (represented by the physical and learned needs), 2) Personal and Moral values, and 3) Goals and Frustrations, as described below.

#### 1. Roots of Behaviour

- Physical Needs. (Air water, food, clothing, shelter, and the normal body functions are basic physical needs which motivate the individual.
- Learned Needs. (These concern man's relationship with other men. They are acquired as the individual learns what other people value and the importance of his fellow men to him. Three classes of learned needs are of particular importance in motivating men. They are:
  - a) Security
  - b) Social Approval
  - c) Recognition

#### 2. Personal and Moral Values

- In addition to the physical and learned needs men are motivated by personal and moral values. These values not only strengthen the individual's character, but also provide him with a source of inner strength and stability during a crisis. Man's striving to live up to the accepted personal and moral code of his society will help him to overcome fear.

<sup>34</sup> Department of National Defence, seminar on the importance of team work and unit cohesion, October, 1996.

### 3. Goals and Frustration

- Experience in the struggle to satisfy his physical and learned needs leads a man to place certain values on objects in life. Highly valued objects become "goals."
- When a man is blocked in his attempts to reach a certain goal, he is likely to become frustrated. The observed behaviour brought on by frustration may take various forms such as anger, cursing, weeping or nervousness. The unobserved behaviour may well result in a serious breach of regulations.<sup>35</sup>

Of these, the junior leader must place importance on the avoidance of frustration by his men. This breach, if not recognized and corrected, can lead to the destruction of cohesion, personal injury and injury toward others through carelessness, neglect or fighting. In a worst case scenario it can lead to the destruction of property, premeditated violence or death.

The importance of a junior leader's ability to understand the behaviours of his men cannot be stressed enough. However, this knowledge is only as effective as the leadership capabilities of the junior leader in correcting or avoiding potential situations. Manuals of leadership from the Royal Navy in 1964, for example, stated that "Good discipline depends on good leadership and not the other way around."<sup>36</sup> This is not to suggest that the junior leader is solely responsible for the creation and maintenance of discipline in his troops. Rather, a good leader or "a good

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<sup>35</sup> *ibid.*, p.2-3

<sup>36</sup> Royal Navy Leadership training 1964 cited in Department of National Defence, Leadership, Volume 1: *Junior Leaders Manual*, reference number A-PD-131-001/PT-001, issued under the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff, 31st of July 1973. p. 2-7



disciplinarian is one who can influence a group of people to keep themselves in order." <sup>37</sup>

Once an individual has learned the variety of skills of leadership, he must be taught how to command. Leadership and command are often used synonymously, however, they are very different concepts requiring very different skills. Leadership "is the art of influencing human behaviour in order to accomplish a mission in a manner desired by the leader." <sup>38</sup> Command however, is an appointment to a position. There are times when command will use a participative approach, when the junior leader requires the input and opinions of others. There will also be times when a free-rein approach is required, if the troops are highly skilled or technically trained. There will also be moments when an authoritative approach is required. In this instance, the Junior Leader, particularly in combat situations, will need to make quick and unquestioned decisions. At times these types of decisions may knowingly cause harm or death to one or many of his followers. Sending a person into a situation knowing he may not survive in order to accomplish a mission, is one of the heaviest responsibilities of command. After all, the accomplishment of a mission is the junior leader's first priority in active duty. <sup>39</sup>

<sup>37</sup> The Royal Canadian Air force Leadership pre'cis, 1963, cited in Department of National Defence, Leadership, Volume 1: Junior Leaders Manual, reference number A-PD-131-001/PT-001, issued under the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff, 31st of July 1973. p. 2-7

<sup>38</sup> Department of National Defence, Leadership, Volume 1: Junior Leaders Manual, reference number A-PD-131-001/PT-001, issued under the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff, 31st of July 1973. p. 4-1

<sup>39</sup> *ibid.*, p. 4-3/4-4

Leadership in the military is significantly different from leadership in a civilian environment. In the military a leader is responsible for every aspect of a soldier's personal, professional and social life, 24 hours a day seven days a week, on and off duty.<sup>40</sup> In contrast, leadership in the civilian world is an 8 to 5 responsibility. Furthermore, "the paramount task of the Service Leader is to ensure accomplishment of the mission even if the mission may result in the death of those being led. This is the ultimate in leadership and of course far exceeds normal civilian requirements."<sup>41</sup> Therefore while the *Principles of Leadership* may be applicable in both the military and civilian environments, the consequences of acting out these principles, bearing in mind the unlimited liability under which soldiers operate, are far greater to a military leader.

The final principle, which is not listed in the *Principles of Leadership*, but one that officers are taught, is the Golden Rule from the King James Bible where Jesus reproves rash judgment. Chapter 7 verse 12 states that "Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets."<sup>42</sup> This is interpreted to mean that one should do good deeds to expect them in return. To treat others in the manner in which you wish to be treated. If peace is the

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<sup>40</sup> *ibid.*, p. 4-5

<sup>41</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>42</sup> The Holy Bible, Authorized King James Version, "The Golden Rule" (Matthew, VII,12), (Chicago, Illinois: Consolidated Book Publishers: 1958)

objective, then deal with others in a peaceful manner. However, like the parable of houses in the Bible, if one uses the golden rule incorrectly then one places danger upon themselves. The parable of the house is as follows:

Therefore whosoever hearth these sayings of mine, and doeth them, I will liken him unto a wise man, which built his house upon a rock: And the rain descended, and the floods came, and the wind blew, and beat upon that house; and it fell not: for it was founded upon a rock. And everyone that hearth these sayings of mine, and doeth not, shall be likened unto a foolish man, which built his house upon the sand: And the rain descended and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon the house; and it fell: and great was the fall of it.<sup>43</sup>

The Airborne twisted these DND teachings, to justify a kill or be killed approach. In situations such as Somalia, soldiers are regularly taught about the risks involved in combat and consequences to themselves of misjudging a situation. In other words kill if you need to, rather than risk being killed. As in the parable of the house, when the teachings are not followed properly the house can fall down. The outcome of the Somalia affair has toppled many from the highest positions in the Canadian Forces, including the Chief of Defence Staff.<sup>44</sup> It is doubtful that religious leaders, however, would give this interpretation of biblical scripture to these military applications. This is a clear example of the breach in morality and the twisting of ethics instruction in the Canadian Forces.

The junior leader cannot expect those under his command to take risks if he himself is not willing to take the same

<sup>43</sup> *ibid.*, Parable of the houses, Matthew, Chapter 7, verses 24-27

<sup>44</sup> Paul Koring, The Globe and Mail, General's ejection inevitable, October 9, 1996

risks. This leads to a second important quality of being a junior leader, knowing how to reduce risk by understanding the mission and situation at hand.

Any order that a junior leader receives follows a standard format. As a rule most of the information required for the completion of his mission is contained in the mission's statement of orders and includes details about the mission, its execution, and administrative directives. In particular the section on Administration provides instruction on weapons, detention centres and the handling of prisoners. In fact the exact format that mission orders regarding prisoners must detail and follow are;

- (4) Administration and Logistics. (preparations required, clothing, weapons, ammunition, equipment and rations.)  
-special administrative matters (often paperwork duties) such as the locations for handling of prisoners and detention centers, what to do with and where to send casualties, etc.<sup>45</sup>

Once the orders have been received, it is up to the junior leader to examine them and do the necessary planning to successfully carry out the mission following a six step planning process.

First, the Leader must consider the order for the mission. The Junior Leader must review the plans set out in the orders and their requirements. If the Junior Leader finds that the requirements are inadequate he must refer the matter to his superior. If the order is deemed appropriate the Junior leader must function within the parameters he has been given.

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<sup>45</sup> Department of National Defence, Leadership, Volume 1: *Junior Leaders Manual*, reference number A-PD-131-001/PT-001, issued under the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff, 31st of July 1973. p. 5-8

Second, the Leader must consider the current conditions. To that end, the current situation of the unit and possible friendly units in the vicinity are important....

Thirdly, the Leader must examine the available resources....

Fourth, the responsible leader will prepare alternative procedures and worse case scenarios for a variety of potential situations.

Fifth, the Leader must make a decision....

Sixth, the Leader must see that his decisions are carried out with dispatch. After a decision is made the Junior Leader must ensure that the men are carrying out his orders and accomplishing the mission at hand.<sup>46</sup>

If any of these steps is missed or not properly considered, the consequences can result in serious loss of life and/or failure to properly accomplish a mission.

The junior leaders are required to their skills of leadership and command to motivate their troops to learn about the jobs, goals and skills that are required. Once this is accomplished, the leader must ensure that their learning is based on standard Canadian Forces practices, through a training process designed to assimilate the soldier into the military's system. Finally, after constant repetition and revision, the recruits achieve a level of soldiering proficiency that allows them to enter a combat zone.

Any breakdowns in this sequence of learning will cause the proficiency and cohesion of the group to become weakened. For example, the military would consider a breakdown in the

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<sup>46</sup> *ibid.*, p. 6-6/6-8

this sequence if soldiers maintains their individuality and exhibits moral or ethical decision making thereby possibly jeopardizing the lives of others. The role of junior leaders in the education and instruction, in combat skills as well as moral and ethical skills, is clearly very important.

Once these leaders have developed skills in instruction, leadership, command and knowledge of their subordinates, they must understand their limits of responsibility and authority in the chain of command. Many of his duties are similar to those of an officer's and at times spheres of authority may appear to overlap or be clouded in ambiguity. This is a common recurring theme in many aspects of the military system. However, as determined by the Department of National Defence, the junior leader's scope of authority and responsibility range from a soldier's hygiene, sanitation/personal appearance, and physical conditioning, to preparation for special missions and tactical activities including the searching and guarding of persons.<sup>47</sup>

The last elements to be mastered in a junior leader's training are problem recognition and corrective action. Being able to identify a problem occurring within the unit or platoon or section is a skill that is often learned solely through experience. However, there are some symptoms that a junior leader can use to identify a potentially serious problem. These are when "...there is fighting, excessive complaining, or hostile arguments between members of the

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<sup>47</sup> *ibid.*, p. 8-5/8-87

group".<sup>48</sup> If this occurs and other methods of non-formal disciplinary procedures have been exhausted, the junior leader may wish to either refer the matter to a superior or lay a charge. The laying of charges is the most drastic action for disciplinary violations that any leader can take. It is also the most ambiguous and least defined in the consistency of application. Often, it is the decision of the junior leader or officer in charge to determine whether or not to lay a charge. Such a process involves formal investigations, possible court martial, sentencing which may include substantial fines, confinement or imprisonment. Some of the more common charges that a junior leader might face under the Code of Service Discipline are:

- (1) Section 114; "Negligent Performance of a military duty". This is not to be used for cases of continued carelessness or the like.
- (2) Section 118; "Neglect to the prejudice of good order and military discipline". This charge must refer to willful neglect.
- (3) Section 74; "Disobedience of a Lawful Command". (Note that an individual who only states that he will not obey cannot be convicted under this section.)

Laying a charge is a last resort. The military system is very different from its civilian counterpart in that the laws in the civilian world clearly define the actions which would result in certain charges such as premeditated murder. The military does not have this method of determining the appropriateness of a charge and thus is very ambiguous in its application. For example, Leading Seaman Bezo, of HMCS Queen,

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<sup>48</sup> *ibid.*, p. 10-2

notes an incident where he was charged with *Negligent Performance of Duty*, when he left his post in engineering to perform a security inspection of the ship. Both were duties he was required to perform.<sup>49</sup> Likewise Major Seward, a senior officer in the Canadian Airborne in Somalia was also charged with *Negligent Performance of Duty*, for his role in ordering his men to abuse a Somali prisoner. Seward faced a court martial and was "convicted...for negligent performance of duty...The panel sentenced Seward to a severe reprimand."<sup>50</sup> An appeal of this verdict sentenced Seward to a three month imprisonment and a dishonorable discharge. Bezo, however, was sentenced by his superior officer and required to pay a small fine. Both Seward and Bezo fell within the scope of the charge of *Negligent Performance of Duty*, however, in its application, both were treated very differently. Therefore, the junior leader must carefully consider the circumstances and the environment in which the violation took place. Finally he must use this information to determine the seriousness of an offense and fit the punishment to the crime.

The Junior Leaders Course does not contain a section on individual ethics or moral development. Nor does it contain a section that acknowledges how the military is obligated to follow the standards set out by the international declaration of human rights. The manual is structured to test and examine the junior leader at the end of each section to ensure that

<sup>49</sup> Letter of Incident from Leading Seaman Clark R.R. Bezo, Department of National Defence, HMCS Queen, Jan.1997

<sup>50</sup> John Ward, Canadian Press, Ottawa, cited in the Winnipeg Free Press, Somalia Major Sent to Jail, May 28, 1996.



the junior leader has properly retained and understood the material. Some of the other manuals which are used in this course are more specific to elements of combat routine, section battle drills, platoon battle drills, weapons maintenance and usage, dress and organization. The next section deals with the training of officers beyond the junior leader level.

#### 2.4 The Commissioned Officer

Officers in this context occupy the ranks of Officer Cadet, Second Lieutenant, Lieutenant, Captain, or Major in Canada's Land Forces (the Army). The officer in the Canadian Armed Forces is an individual who has received a commission and is formally in the service of the British Crown stated in the following;

Elizabeth the Second, by the grace of God of the United Kingdom, Canada and Her other Realms and Territories Queen, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith...Hereby appointed an officer in Her Majesty's Canadian Armed Forces...We reposing especial Trust and Confidence in your Loyalty, Courage and Integrity, do by these Presents Constitute and Appoint you to be an Officer in our Canadian Armed Forces. You are therefore, carefully and diligently to discharge your Duty as such in the rank of Second Lieutenant or in such other Rank as We may from time to time hereafter be pleased to promote or appoint you to, and you are in such manner and on such occasions as may be prescribed by Us to exercise and well discipline both the inferior Officers and men serving under you and use your best endeavour to keep them in good Order and Discipline...according to Law, in pursuance of the Trust hereby reposed in you.<sup>51</sup>

In commissioning an officer, there is no prerequisite for ability. Recruitment for officers favors those with a

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<sup>51</sup> Commissioning Scroll, Department of National Defence, Government of Canada, 1968.

post secondary degree, or relevant civilian employment experience, and good physical and mental condition. Unfortunately, prior to 1993, there was little to prevent persons with racist or harmful prejudices from entering the service. What existed, according to NDHQ, was a series of lectures which lacked substance and focus. In order for a person to receive an appointment or commission, following their recruitment, an individual was given an aptitude and medical examination to establish their overall mental and physical fitness. As well, the officer must be aware and respect the unlimited liability and the military ethos under which he operates.

The unlimited liability of a soldier is "an unwritten clause of the military contract."<sup>52</sup> It is the most honourable obligation under which a soldier lives. In the discharge of his duty, he must be willing and able to accomplish his mission despite fear or inherent danger, personal injury or death. It is an aspect of soldiering that exists 24 hours a day, everyday of the year, in peacetime and in war. Moreover, it is the responsibility of the officer to employ the unlimited liability of his soldiers which "distinguishes the Canadian Forces institutionally and its members individually from the rest of Canadian society, the cenotaphs across the nation bearing solemn witness to this truth."<sup>53</sup>

The ethos of the military and its officer corps are

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<sup>52</sup> Department of National Defence, Military Ethos, *Canada's Army*, reference number CFP 300, issued under the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff, October 31st, 1996.p.2-4

<sup>53</sup> *ibid.*

founded on a "set of values, beliefs and [a] code of conduct."<sup>54</sup> Aside from the code of conduct, the values and beliefs of the military are once again very ambiguous and not laid out or formally established. While there is no standard ethos among the different services in the military, there are some characteristics beyond self sacrifice which an officer's training seeks to instill. These are duty, discipline, honour and integrity. In the army, these characteristics are taught to be used in tandem in order to "close with and defeat an enemy in face to face combat."<sup>55</sup> In adopting these traits through training an officer may appear to remove himself from the responsibilities of mainstream society. However, the military teaches the officer that he must present himself as both a member of the citizenry and a protector of its interests. Nicholas Rescher, cited in the Department of National Defence's manual "Military Ethos", describes the role of an officer in Canadian society in the following manner "In being a member of the Profession of Arms, one does not cease to be a citizen, a responsible person, or a human being."<sup>56</sup> To that end, aside from the pledge that an officer makes upon recruitment such as; non-participation in traditional social vices, drugs, alcohol abuse, and racism, the military does not attempt to remove prejudices or biases that an individual brings with them. The training of an officer therefore, is not designed to remove or replace the

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<sup>54</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>55</sup> *ibid.*, p. 2-5

<sup>56</sup> *ibid.*

individual's values, ethics, or morals. Rather, it molds them to the military's in order to accommodate the demands of a profession where self sacrifice and service to the nation are of greater importance than an individual's needs or wants.

An officer's duty to place the nation above the individual is reinforced in the military's Code of Service Discipline. The "Code of Conduct demands that an officer or man must be prepared to so condition himself that he will immediately obey an order even if it may result in his injury or death..."<sup>57</sup> Through a process of conditioning, the officer will better understand his higher order of commitment and come to the realization that "as a member of the officer corps it is a man's duty to display absolute and uncompromising integrity of character."<sup>58</sup> The officer must also recognize that the soldiers under his command have emerged from a training environment of imposed discipline. Part of his responsibilities is to assist his troops in their transition from an environment of imposed discipline to an environment which demands self-discipline and restraint.

Once this transition has been made, the officer's responsibility changes from guiding his troop's transition, to maintenance of their self discipline. In order to accomplish this, the officer must use skills similar to those of the junior leader, such as knowledge of the men under his command. Using creative methods in conjunction with standard

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<sup>57</sup> Department of National Defence, Leadership, Volume 2: *The Professional Officer*, reference number A-PD-131-002/PT-001 (Formerly CFP 131(2)), issued on the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff, 30th of November 1970 and 31st of July 1973. p. 7-1, "leadership approaches"

<sup>58</sup> *ibid.*, p.13-3

military procedures, the officer can create an environment which is conducive to the maintenance of discipline, respect, professional development and combat readiness. An undisciplined group of soldiers can be attributed to failure in exhibiting proper leadership skills from an officer. "The common denominator in all outbreaks of indiscipline, apart from these which had their origin in pay or food, has been the sheer stupidity, unimaginativeness or want or ignorance on the part of the leaders."<sup>59</sup>

In order for an officer to understand the variety of elements in the make up of his command, he must be familiar with the multitude of groups that will establish themselves within the framework of his company, regiment, unit, platoon, or section. " The strong sense of brotherhood among its members (the unit) and in its tribal-familial nature... bonds them (the soldiers) in devotion, loyalty and selflessness to each other. These traits are strongest at the platoon and section level...[the] system is most effective in war. In peace, it must be carefully commanded and controlled to ensure that it does not assume greater importance than the corporate well being of the army or larger organizational unit."<sup>60</sup>


When the officer recognizes these groups, he must take the proper steps to maintain the trained attitudes of his men in order to avoid a breakdown in the soldier's stimulus and response process. The following diagram illustrates how a

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<sup>59</sup> *ibid.* p.7-7

<sup>60</sup> *ibid.*, p. 2-21

particular stimulus is interpreted through a soldier's attitudes and creates a response.



This relationship demonstrates that a stimulus such as an object, particular event, or situation (sniper fire, trust with other soldiers, respect for superiors) is interpreted through the affected perceptions and attitudes as a result of both the military training and social/group relationships. Depending on how these relationships have affected the soldier, a proper (trained and expected) or an improper (untrained and unpredictable) response will occur.

Notwithstanding physical separation, there is no method of deterring unwanted group associations without effective leadership. The leader must understand that "informal groups result from the close relations which occur stronger and stronger the more you associate with others on and off the job."<sup>62</sup> The officer must be equally careful not to be drawn into the sphere of relations that exist among his men.

One of the capabilities that an officer is taught, is to recognize the characteristics of informal groups in order to maintain control and target disciplinary measures. For example, in a section of men (usually around 10 members) there is an established formal authority, the section

<sup>61</sup> ibid., p. 5-2

<sup>62</sup> ibid., p. 5-4

commander (usually a non-commissioned officer; master corporal or sergeant) and an informal leader. "Informal authority is earned or given permissively by the members of the group...[it] is unstable since it is subject to the feelings of the members."<sup>63</sup> These informal groups rarely grow in size. In fact, the larger the formal organization, the more smaller and informal groups there will be. Often it will be the role of the NCO to act as a mediator between interpersonal or intergroup conflicts that may arise.

Depending on the strength of the informal leader and the strength of the formal leadership, smaller groups may resist change in their operating methods or occupations. They may develop loyalties to one another which exceed the loyalties to the service, or country. They may fall victim to rumour or exhibit actions deemed unacceptable by military standards to satisfy the need for conformity within the group.<sup>64</sup> One example is the illegal hazing rituals that occurred in the Canadian Airborne Regiment and continue without authorization throughout the Canadian and American military establishments. Hazing rituals are an example of informal group activity, conformity, peer pressure and lack of leadership. Arguably, without these activities a military unit might not develop strong bonds with one another, thereby damaging the unit's overall cohesion. In the Airborne, however, these activities exceeded acceptable bonding behaviours. In repeated instances a hazing ritual of the Airborne required members to eat vomit

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<sup>63</sup> *ibid.*, p. 5-6

<sup>64</sup> *ibid.*

and excrement and they were urinated upon by other members. The officers, who presumably were aware of the illegality of this type of hazing, turned a blind eye and chose to ignore the events, in the end justifying them as a necessary evil. In the United States, despite 52 marines facing courts martials over the past several years, the initiation tradition continues as an important element in social relations particularly within elite units such as the Airborne and the Marine Corps.<sup>65</sup>

Once the officer is able to identify these group loyalties, he must approach his men through one, or a combination, of three styles of leadership that are taught at military schools. These were developed to assist officers in the way they might approach a variety of irregularities which can occur in different military situations. It is hoped that by using appropriate styles, situations such as certain hazing rituals can be averted.

The commissioned officer represents the beginning and end of accountability within the military system. He/she is responsible for their own conduct and the conduct of those under their command. Officers are to lead by example in integrity, combat skill, moral judgment, and soldiering ability. The officer must also ensure cohesion, clarity of communication in command, and effective/appropriate training programs for subordinate soldiers. In essence, the officer creates the mold for the soldier. It is an enormous responsibility. If there are unqualified officers or poor

<sup>65</sup> The Leader Post, Hazing Condemned, from American Press in Washington, printed January 21, 1997



leadership there can be dire consequences. The Airborne and the actions of some of its members stand testimony to the poor quality and lack of leadership of its officers. The abilities of the officers to command can be linked to the quality and content in the training programs they themselves received.

## 2.5 Leadership Styles

Leadership instruction is not difficult. It is a standardized course designed to be easy to understand. To make matters even easier, the DND has established leadership styles that are to be followed. Understanding the different styles can help an officer avert an unwanted situation. Their use, however, depends on a variety of factors, situations and personalities that can only be taught through simulations and exercises. The military has developed guidelines to assist the officer in determining when a particular leadership style would be most effective. The first style of leadership,<sup>66</sup> an authoritative approach, requires an officer to be able to make quick decisions and to command. Very often, in this type of situation, the officer has little time to consult with others and is required to take immediate action. Combat, emergencies, or urgent time factor scenarios are situations requiring an authoritative officer, as would the prevention

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<sup>66</sup> Department of National Defence, Leadership, Volume 2: *The Professional Officer*, reference number A-PD-131-002/PT-001 (Formerly CFP 131(2)), issued on the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff, 30th of November 1970 and 31st of July 1973. p.3-3/3-4

of excessive hazing rituals. To be effective, an officer must be knowledgeable of the skills and abilities of his men and have their full confidence in his ability to command. The military also teaches an ethical decision making process to ensure that in an authoritative situation, the officer can be depended on to make proper decisions.

A second type of approach is the participative style. As the term suggests, the officer uses the resources at his disposal and discusses options and alternatives with other junior leaders and officers. A discourse occurs where other leaders have the ability to be part of a decision making process. This is particularly effective in complex problem solving situations, in instructing and teaching skills, and in the encouragement and persuasion of those under an officer's command. This style of leadership is rarely used in combat situations and proves most effective in planning and preparation and during peacetime operations.

The third method is the free-rein approach. The officer allows the men under his command to conduct their activities with little guidance or supervision. He depends on their highly specialized skills and abilities, which often are superior to his own, in order to fulfill the requirements of a mission or training exercise. The officer is ultimately responsible for their conduct and success, and although they are given greater freedom to accomplish their tasks the officer retains an arms-length control over their activities. This style of leadership is most effective for special services training and in peacetime training

exercises. This method if used improperly can lead to disastrous results such as the hazing rituals of the Airborne.

One of the fears of any military leader is to use the wrong approach in a given situation. Using the wrong approach can have disastrous results. If an officer employs a participative approach in a combat situation, where instant decisions are required and the luxury of having time to discuss alternative plans is not available, delays in making decisions can be fatal. Alternatively an authoritative officer enforcing his leadership in an environment which calls for a free-rein approach can cause confusion or the emergence of an informal leader to take control.

Once the officer has learned these approaches, he must be able to apply them. "The environment of the battlefield normally calls for decisive and authoritative leadership; by contrast, the group that is carrying out highly technical and complex tasks far behind battle lines may require a leader to exercise a participative approach."<sup>67</sup> Simulations such as war games, drills and command exercises are used to hone these skills and develop effective decision making abilities. When used at the level of a section or a platoon, the officer is better able to focus on one particular leadership approach to a given situation. As the officer is promoted in rank, his responsibility and realm of authority also increases. The officers who command units, regiments or companies, become even more vulnerable to the challenges and bad elements in

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<sup>67</sup> *ibid.*, p. 6-4

their organization. In order to address these concerns, an officer must be able to use more than one or a combination, of leadership approaches, for any situation.

When an officer reaches the senior levels of command, Lieutenant-Colonel, Colonel, or General Staff, they rely more heavily on a participative approach and consultations in their decision making processes. Often this is a result of the senior officers being greatly removed and distant, from the actual troops engaging in battles or exercises. They may be unfamiliar with the skills and combat readiness of particular sections or smaller specialized groups within their command. They rely on information provided by their sub-commanders and junior officers in order to make decisions which effect the operations of the overall organization. These persons generally command regiments, units, battalions, brigades, and battle groups whose memberships can vary from several hundred to several thousand members.

The officer must also take into account, when judging a soldier's behaviour, the close quarter environment that both he and the soldier live and work in. He must be able to understand the soldier's need to conform to social standards established by informal groupings in order to gain acceptance. This environment can be conducive to behaviour which may go against accepted military conduct such as hazing rituals. It is the responsibility of the officer corps to use their training and experience in identifying potential breaches of discipline and correcting them before they grow into situations of crisis. To emphasize the importance of

## **NOTE TO USERS**

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achievements of the past and of being a personal stakeholder in what transpires in the future."<sup>70</sup> Unfortunately, these values and ethics and military ethos are at best ambiguous and undefined. An officer is therefore left to determine for himself, based on his socialization into the military, what these qualities mean and how they are to be interpreted. Officer's must use their ethical abilities in making decisions to determine whether or not a particular activity is within the scope of tradition and custom or whether it is against the moral grain of what is deemed acceptable behaviour by the military or society. Jacques Thiroux in Ethics: Theory and Practice, outlined four categories of ethical decision making. These categories; 1) End-Results; 2) Rule; 3) Social-Contract; and 4) Personalistic, have been adopted by the Canadian military as a prism through which an officer can view a variety of situations that may require a variable set of ethics.

The first category is End-Result ethics. In this instance, the moral rightness of an action is determined by considering its consequences. In other words, where two moral judgements are in conflict, the officer should choose the lesser of the two evils, or the one which has the most benefit.

The second category deals with Rule ethics. The rightness of an action in this category, is determined by laws and standards. In the Canadian military these laws and standards are determined in the Rules of Engagement, the <sup>70</sup> Department of National Defence, Military Ethos, Canada's Army, reference number CFP 300, issued under the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff, October 31st, 1996.p. 2-8

Queen's Regulations and Orders, Codes of Conduct as well as other international agreements including the Geneva Conventions. These regulations prohibit and criminalize the torture and cruel treatment of prisoners and detainees. As well, such rules detail the use of deadly force so that non-military personnel are prevented from being injured or shot from military weapons.

Thirdly, Thiroux presents Social-Contract ethics. It is this category which is the most ambiguous in the military. The moral rightness of an action is determined by the customs, traditions and norms of a particular community. Such activities as initiation ceremonies, regimental protocols, and mess (regimental dinners) traditions may be interpreted through this category. Through the proper application of social-contract ethics, situations such as the unacceptable behaviour in some hazing rituals, can be avoided.

The final category, Personalistic ethics, is determined by an individual's moral values and conscience. To that extent, an officer is expected to have good judgment and an ability to think rationally in the discharge of his duties and in the command of others.<sup>71</sup>

The officer must be able to show flexibility in order to apply different sets of ethics to different situations. Only with simulation training can the officer learn the skill of adapting and applying these four broad categories of ethical decision making. A properly developed military ethos will allow the officer to "be able to differentiate between

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<sup>71</sup> Jacques Thiroux, Ethics: Theory and Practice, (New York; MacMillan; 1986) p. 145

right and wrong, between what is necessary and what is criminal. In an operational theatre, commitment to duty, discipline, integrity and honour provides the soldier with both personal freedom of action and a code of conduct which will assist him in choosing the right thing to do, especially if orders do not cover a particular situation, or are illicit, unclear or ambiguous."<sup>72</sup>


Nothing is more vital to an officer than to understand the situation and environment wherein a military activity is to take place. He must also understand the Rules of Engagement under which he will conduct his activity. Furthermore, he must be aware of the organizational structure of the military and its capacities, realizing, that a breakdown at any point in the system can potentially have far reaching consequences. For example in the following organizational chart (figure 2.3) , the symbol of the house is used to represent a military organization and how one piece is dependent on another. If a part of the house is missing or weak, the structure can collapse. Although this diagram was originally designed for the army, it can be representative of the most smallest organizational unit in the force.

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<sup>72</sup> Department of National Defence, Military Ethos, *Canada's Army*, reference number CFP 300, issued under the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff, October 31st, 1996.p. 2-7



Figure 2.3 The Design of the Army<sup>73</sup>



<sup>73</sup> *ibid.*, p. 2-10

According to the Military Ethos manual:

The foundation or base of the Canadian army is national purpose, the pursuit of which provides the army its *raison d'être*. Erected on this base are the army's two qualitative pillars - its Moral and Physical components. These moral and physical pillars are capped by, and at the same time support, the capstone - Cohesion and Will, the "glue" of the army. The pillars and the capstone hold up the roof which represents the army's institutional components, these being its organizational structure...<sup>74</sup>

In combat situations where the Government of Canada sends its military, such as peacekeeping or coalition forces, the federal government and Canadian society assume that its officers in control are well trained and representative of societal values. The officer is the link between the military structure and society. When a breakdown in officership occurs, both the military and society feel the effects and demand accountability. James Fallows makes the following observation relating to this matter:

The most important task in defence is the one most likely to be overlooked, since it lies in the realm of values and character rather than in quantities that can be represented on charts. Before anything else, we must recognize that a functioning military requires bonds of trust, sacrifice, and respect within its ranks, and similar bonds of support and respect between any army and the nation it represents.<sup>75</sup>

In the case of Somalia, there were numerous breaches of training by both officers and NCO's. Officers appear to have developed poor leadership styles and failed in establishing authority and in maintaining the chain of command. What

<sup>74</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>75</sup> *ibid.*, p. 2-26

little cohesion there might have been in the Regiment clearly broke down. The example used in military circles to train the importance of cohesion, the 1812 war, can now be compared with the example of the Somalia crisis. The internal training programs of the military, in this instance, have clearly failed from the most junior to the most senior officers of the Airborne's leadership. Recognizing that the Airborne are only one element in the Canadian Forces, their officers like all Canadian Force's officers, received a standard training program. Therefore, the breaches that occurred within the Airborne represent serious breaches in the training programs of officers throughout the Canadian Forces.

As for the teachings of John Locke and Immanuel Kant that the military notes form the foundations of its training, it would appear that their ideals and simplified principles represent nothing more than statements of intent and not the philosophical foundations for defence policy that they claim to be.

## **2.6 External Training Programs and International Agreements**

Canada has earned a reputation as a strong supporter of human rights. It condemned South Africa for its apartheid policies and gained support from other members in the international community for its trade and economic sanctions against that country. It strongly condemned China, one of its most important trading nations, for the massacre of university students at Tiananmen square. Historically,

Canada has played a leading role in the promotion of human rights and international law. John Humphrey, a law professor at McGill University was a central figure in the preparation of the United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Prime Minister Lester Pearson established the first peacekeepers to bring an end to international conflict. Canada has signed and ratified every international human rights convention and treaty including those of the International Labour Organization, and Organization of American States (over 20 in total). Some of the most important treaties that Canada has signed relating to the Laws of War are as follows: the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1949-1950 Geneva Conventions, and the 1984 Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment.<sup>76</sup> Despite Canada's commitments to human rights, the Somalia affair has besmirched the Force's reputation and that of the Canadian government.

Arguably the most important international agreements for Canada regarding the treatment of prisoners and conduct in war, are the 1949-1950 Geneva Conventions and Protocols and the 1984 convention against torture. The history of the Geneva Conventions and international Laws of War can be traced to a document prepared for U.S. President Lincoln on April 24th, 1863 by Francis Lieber. Lieber established some of the fundamental principles involved in Humanitarian Law and the Geneva Conventions. The 'Lieber Code' relates

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<sup>76</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Information package, Summary of Canadian Support for Human Rights, (1996)

directly to military conduct during war. Sections 14-17 determines the scope of conduct of an armed force by defining 'military necessity' in the waging of war. It states as follows:

Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, consists in the necessity of modern law and usages of war.

Art 15. Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of armed enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the armed contests of the war; it allows of the capturing of every armed enemy, and every enemy of importance to the hostile government or of peculiar danger to the captor.

Art.16. Military necessity does not admit of cruelty - that is the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort confessions.<sup>77</sup>

These articles are very clear in detailing the unacceptable acts of torture and other forms of cruel punishment. Article 56 in Section III of the Lieber Code reinforces the importance of the treatment of prisoners of war when it states that, "[a] prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for being a public enemy, nor is any revenge wreaked upon him by the intentional infliction of any suffering or disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of food, by mutilation, death, or any other barbarity."<sup>78</sup> The Canadian government treats these elements of humanitarian law and ethics development as new concepts to be included in the training of a modern army. However, it is clear that these

<sup>77</sup> Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, (Washington: Government Printing Office: 1898)

<sup>78</sup> *ibid.* section III, Art. 56

ideals, particularly in the military's context, predated Canadian confederation. It is also surprising how little attention these ideals are given and how ambiguously they are applied in the training programs of officers and soldiers.

The Lieber Code is recognized as the foundation of international humanitarian law. As such, the laws exist, not as a set of rights, but as a series of duties that combatants are expected to assume.<sup>79</sup> The greatest statement and representation of these laws is in the United Nation's 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Touted as the most significant achievement in international politics, perhaps even greater than the United Nations itself, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights establishes the rights of people and the responsibility of governments to instill and uphold human rights. The Declaration is one of the basic tenets of the Geneva Conventions.

Of the many provisions in the U.N. Declaration, the ones which were most influential to the Geneva Conventions, and laws of war, are; the Proclamation, Article 3, Article 5 and Article 9. They state the following:<sup>80</sup>

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY PROCLAIMS THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and

<sup>79</sup> Louise Doswald-Beck and Sylvain Vité, International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, international review of the Red Cross, no. 293, Geneva, March 1st, 1993.

<sup>80</sup> United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. United Nations Department of Public Affairs.

international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction...

ARTICLE 3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person...

ARTICLE 5. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment...

ARTICLE 9. no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

These provisions represent an international statement for the treatment of persons whether or not they are victims or activists in a conflict or war. When soldiers of the Canadian Airborne tortured Somali children,<sup>81</sup> this violation of human rights constituted a failure of both the Airborne and the Government of Canada to uphold and instill these international human rights.

## 2.7 The Geneva Conventions

The Geneva Conventions are a set of agreements which are designed to detail and direct the conduct of military forces in conflict or war. The conventions are divided into four conventions, two protocols and a supplementary agreement and they are as follows:<sup>82</sup>

*Geneva Convention I - Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Aug, 1949)...*

<sup>81</sup> In Canada a person is considered adult or age of majority at the age of 18.

<sup>82</sup> The Geneva Conventions and Protocols, International Committee for the Red Cross, Department of Public Information, Geneva, Switzerland, 1995.

*Geneva Convention III* - Geneva Convention  
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Aug  
1949)

*Geneva Convention IV* - Geneva Convention Relative  
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Aug, 1949)

*Protocol I* - Geneva Protocol I Additional to the  
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating  
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed  
Conflict (June 1977)

*Protocol II* - Geneva Protocol II Additional to  
the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and  
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-  
International Armed Conflicts (June 1977)

*Torture Convention* - United Nations General  
Assembly Resolution on the Convention Against  
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading  
Treatment or punishment (1984)

Canada adopted these conventions in 1950 and ratified the Torture Convention in 1987. Five years later Canadian Troops breached these conditions and caused one of the worst crises in Canadian military history. The Conventions leave very little to military interpretation. They do not allow for discretion to be used by commanding officers in exceptional war circumstances. In this respect they are unambiguous. They especially do not allow for the punishment and torturing of civilians or prisoners of war. This is explicitly stated in the third Geneva Convention, where it states that;

Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. Any unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach of the present Convention. In particular, no prisoner of war may be subjected to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are not justified by the medical dental or hospital treatment of the



prisoner concerned and carried out in his interest. Likewise prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity. Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited. Prisoners of war are entitled in all circumstances to respect for their persons and their honour.<sup>63</sup>

Furthermore, in the event that an individual is not a prisoner of war, the fourth convention on the protection of civilian persons insists that;

(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction....To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

- (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
- (b) taking of hostages;
- (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;
- (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment..
- (e) the wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.

The Geneva Conventions were not the only laws which the Airborne was supposed to be governed by. In 1987, Canada ratified the 1984 Convention Against Torture. The convention notes, among other important sections, the following;

Having regard to article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights...which provide that no one may be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment...{Article 2} 1. Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative,

<sup>63</sup> Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, of 12 August 1949 (Geneva Convention III), Department of Public Information, ICRC, Geneva, Switzerland.

judicial or other means to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction. 2. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public agency, may be invoked as a justification of torture. 3. An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as a justification of torture.<sup>84</sup>

It is clear within the terms of this particular agreement that the government of Canada had a responsibility, once it ratified the convention, to ensure that the relevant institutions and agencies, especially the military, were implementing the convention's provisions. Article 10 of the convention illustrates a state's responsibility; "each State Party shall ensure that education and information regarding the prohibition against torture are fully included in the training of law enforcement personnel, civil or military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons who may be involved in the custody, interrogation or treatment of any individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment."<sup>85</sup> Once Canada ratified the agreement it committed itself to these requirements.

During the Canadian mission to Somalia, Canada had a representative serving on the UN's Committee Against Torture.<sup>86</sup> This committee is responsible for overseeing the adherence by member nations to the convention.

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<sup>84</sup> United Nations, General Assembly Resolution A/39/708 (1984), Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Department of Public Information, New York.

<sup>85</sup> *ibid.*, Article 10

<sup>86</sup> Ceri Chisholm, 1993 United Nations Handbook, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, (Wellington, New Zealand: Wright and Carman Ltd.: 1993)

In 1993, the Committee Against Torture received a Member Nations Report from Canada, noting successes in human rights development and how it had implemented the terms of the Torture Convention. While in session, the committee asked the Canadian delegation "whether education on torture-related matters was being applied restrictively or in the widest possible manner and in this connection they wished to know of any special training on torture-related matters being given to the military and border police, and to all medical personnel in Canada?"<sup>87</sup> The Canadian delegation to the torture committee responded to their questions with the following:

With regard to article 10 of the Convention, the representative informed the Committee of the training on the Convention and other related matters given to various public officials, including members of the correctional service and recruits for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Canadian armed forces called upon to assist civil authorities during a riot or disturbance in Canada or participating in United Nations peace-keeping and humanitarian operations outside Canada received specific training in, inter alia, the use of minimum force. The representative also indicated that he was unaware of specific training given to medical doctors on the detection of torture and more information on that subject would be sought.<sup>88</sup>

One obvious oversight in the response was the lack of information on what constituted minimum force, a term which was very ambiguous during the Somalia mission and is still undefined today. As well, there is no mention of peacemaking missions nor is there an indication of whether or not any

<sup>87</sup> Committee against Torture, Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under article 19 of the Convention, Canada, U.N. Doc. A/48/44 at 48. 20 April 1993

<sup>88</sup> *ibid.*, para.304

programs exist to instruct Force's members on the full text and meaning of the Torture Convention. During the research of this thesis, aside from a mention to review a portion of the Geneva conventions in an appendix<sup>89</sup>, the author with the assistance of the Department of National Defence Headquarters and the National Defence Saskatchewan District Headquarters, was unable to find any specific documents or materials that relate to the Convention's instruction in the military.

The Geneva Conventions represent an internationally accepted code of conduct for soldiers, officers and nations during war, in order to preserve and protect humanity. In particular it is meant to protect the non-combatants, the civilians, from being harmed, inhumanely treated, or killed in the name of war. For Shidane Arone, these conventions were his only protection. Unfortunately these conventions had not been part of the Airborne's training protocols, perhaps if they had been they could have saved his life<sup>90</sup>. It is ironic that in the year (1997) that Canada was declared the best nation to live in, the Somalia Inquiry presented its final report on the most horrid of war crimes, showing how the Canadian government and its military failed in its international agreements to uphold and preserve humanity.

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<sup>89</sup> Department of National Defence, Leadership, Volume 1: Junior Leaders Manual, reference number B-GL-318-001/PT-001, issued under the authority of the Chief of Defence Staff, July 31st, 1973.

<sup>90</sup> Personal communication with the Department of National Defence, Somalia Liason Office, November 1996.

## 2.8 The International Committee of the Red Cross

One of the best recognized institutions for its commitment to Human Rights and Rights instruction is the International Committee of the Red Cross. It has a wide range of activities including the "dissemination of knowledge of international humanitarian law, and the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, visits to detainees, measures in [sic] of the population affected by conflict or strife, tracing of persons reported missing, (and) provision of food or medical assistance - to name but a few."<sup>91</sup> It is a neutral organization highly dedicated to the maintenance of international humanitarian law, the foundation of which is the "distinction between combatants and civilians and the duty to spare the latter."<sup>92</sup>

When the United Nations takes actions to intervene in the internal conflicts of member nations, this distinction between combatants and non-combatants is clouded in ambiguity. One of the unanswered questions in Red Cross deliberations addressing this ambiguity is whether or not the United Nations should be considered one of the combatants? Furthermore, does the U.N fall within the scope of international humanitarian law? Antoine Bouvier, a member of the legal division of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), says that the ICRC is constantly insisting on

<sup>91</sup> Marion Harroff-Tavel, International Review of the Red Cross no 294, Internal Violence, May 1, 1993.

<sup>92</sup> *ibid.*

the applicability of humanitarian law to the United Nations.  
He states;

...the ICRC has systematically spoken up for the applicability of international humanitarian law whenever United Nations forces had to resort to force, the United Nations itself has constantly opposed such an interpretation. Indeed, it put forward various arguments against it, both legal (in particular, the fact that the international humanitarian law treaties made no provision for the participation of international organizations) political (the impossibility of classifying the United Nations as a "party to conflict" and practical (the extreme difficulty, if not impossibility for a non-State body to implement certain provisions of international humanitarian law, such as the rules on the role of Protecting Powers or on the prosecution and punishment of offenses).

In those discussions, the United Nations preferred to adopt a pragmatic position, declaring that the forces it deployed should observe the principles and spirit of the general international conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel.<sup>93</sup>

Dr. Umesh Palwankar, also a member of the Legal Division of the ICRC, says specifically;

the conclusion was reached that certain provisions of the Convention could not apply to or be applied by the UN (for example, those relating to occupation [Articles 27-28 of the Fourth Convention], to the repression of grave breaches [Articles 49/50/129/146 respectively of the four Conventions, Article 85(1) of Protocol 1, etc.]. Moreover, since there is no definition (or even mention) of "peace-keeping forces" in the instruments of IHL, these forces might appear as "combatants". It would also have to be determined whether the UN may, or may not, be considered a "Power" for purposes of acceding to the Conventions. Then there is the problem that might arise should the same force comprise troops from States party to Protocol I and States that are not

<sup>93</sup> Antoine Bouvier, International Review of the Red Cross no.309, Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel: Presentation and Analysis, November 1, 1995.

party to the Protocol<sup>94</sup>

Once again, one is drawn to the ambiguity in the application of International Humanitarian Law. Although there are lots of legal questions surrounding jurisdiction and definitional issues, the IHL is upheld 'mutatis-mutandis' by the UN and its agencies as well as other international organizations and security arrangements. Furthermore, the UN also noted that in situations where UN forces are deployed they will "observe the principles and spirit of the general international conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel."<sup>95</sup>

The programs and training courses by the ICRC were available to Canada during the pre-deployment phase for the Somalia mission. In fact these training programs were originally set up for the Canadian military as a result of a request from the Department of National Defence. The Canadian government has long recognized the expertise of the ICRC in international humanitarian aid missions and their experience with cultural diversities. Although it recognized the ICRC's abilities it never used them. In communications with the ICRC it was noted that Canada never asked for their programs, and the ICRC never had the opportunity, to deliver its wealth of knowledge to the people who needed and would use it the most<sup>96</sup>. In communications with the ICRC, it was questioned by

<sup>94</sup> Dr. Umesh Paiwankar, International Review of the Red Cross no 294, Applicability of international humanitarian law to United Nations peace-keeping forces, May 1, 1993.

<sup>95</sup> Antoine Bouvier, International Review of the Red Cross no 309, Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, November 1, 1995

<sup>96</sup> Personal communication with the Canadian mission of the International Committee for the Red Cross, February 1997

the author, why the Canadian Military never requested the implementation of the programs before leaving for Somalia. Unfortunately, the ICRC had no answer. This is also one of the questions the Somalia Inquiry was unable to answer.

## 2.9 Conclusion

The Canadian Forces had serious breaches in their training programs particularly within the Airborne Regiment. Since the Canadian Airborne Regiment was chosen as Canada's United Nations force, it follows that it "should have maintained a proficiency in both general purpose combat skills and generic peacekeeping skills (involving the nature of UN operations and the role of the peacekeeper, conflict resolution and negotiation, cross-cultural relations, restraint in application of force, and standard UN operations). However, the CAR received little or no ongoing generic peacekeeping training to prepare it for UN operations despite having been designated for many years as the UN standby unit."<sup>97</sup> This absence represents a serious flaw of the military leadership's and of the Government of Canada's ability to provide its Airborne Officers with the necessary training, materials and guidelines to successfully carry out an international mission.

The next chapter will provide an overview of the unstable and dangerous environment to which Canada's untrained Airborne was sent. It will describe the events

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<sup>97</sup> Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, July 1997, Vol.2



involving the Regiment while they were in Somalia and detail the crisis that resulted in the Airborne's disbandment.

### **3. Somalia, the U.N., and the Canadian Airborne Regiment**

In order to understand the complexity of the circumstances currently in Somalia, an overview of the history of conflict is required. This chapter will outline the history of the conflict in Somalia, and how conflict led to the intervention of the United Nations. It will review the history of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, its membership and officer corps, and its role in the Somalia mission. Finally, it will detail the events of the Somalia affair and its effect on the Canadian military and government. This background will provide insight into the environment within which the Canadian Airborne and other United Nations personnel operated.

#### **3.1 Somalia**

The Republic of Somalia is roughly comparable in size to France encompassing approximately 396,000 square kilometers.<sup>98</sup> Its population in 1991 was 4.5 million people. However, another one million Somalis lived in neighbouring countries. These people "inhabit another 125,000 square miles (200,000 kilometers). Because this population is

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<sup>98</sup> Christian P. Potholn, Four African Political Systems, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc.:1970)

linguistically, ethnically, and culturally part of the Somali nation, because their demands upon and supports for the central government are so pervasive, and because the present leadership of Somalia is so dedicated to their eventual inclusion in an enlarged Somali state, it is difficult not to consider them at least part of the Somali political system."<sup>99</sup>

On July 1st, 1960, Somalia finally achieved its independence when the former Somaliland colonies of Britain in the north and Italy in the south opted to merge into an independent unitary state. The stability in Somalia was superficial and did not last very long. Large Somali clans in Ethiopia and Kenya often engaged in war-like activities such as raids, crop burnings and village vandalisms with rival clans in Somalia.<sup>100</sup> The Somalis involved themselves in futile wars with Ethiopia over the Ogaden region in 1964 and time and again after that. Internal upheavals over the deteriorating domestic stability and the failure of the government to take control over Ethiopian territory ended, in 1969, when General Siad Barre seized power in a coup d'etat. He dissolved the National Assembly and indefinitely suspended the constitution.

For twenty-one years, General Barre governed Somalia as a dictatorship and for the majority of his reign allied his country with the Soviet Union. He maintained national unity by using a combination of military force and key patronage appointments to ensure peace between rival clans. Then, in  
<sup>99</sup> *ibid.*, p.8

<sup>100</sup> David D. Laitin & Said S. Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press: 1987)

1988 in response to guerrilla attacks, Barre's army killed tens of thousands of civilians in northern towns. The United States, an ally of Barre, froze its foreign aid, and the international community joined the people of Somalia in accusing Barre and his regime of genocide. Barre fled the country in 1991, leaving Somalia to plunge into an era of civil war. The people of Somalia turned to their traditional clan structure for protection and governance as they had for most of their history.

### **3.2 The importance of Kinship and Clans**

Loyalty and kinship in Somalia are the most important factors in understanding the environment that the UN and Canada was about to enter. Initially, in the formation of the Republic of Somalia, in 1960, the majority of clans supported the concept of statehood, the formation of political institutions and a formal decision making process. Ironically in the creation of Somali law an unlikely combination of Moslem Shari' code and Italian common law were used.<sup>101</sup>

Although there was a general feeling of unity amongst many Somalis, genealogical distinctions divided the clans. Loyalty and commitment to a clan often rose above the need for unity and the laws of the nation.

Somali clans are no small entity, in fact they are a formidable force in Somalia. Ranging in size from 10,000 to

<sup>101</sup> Christian P. Potholn, Four African Political Systems, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc.:1970) p. 189

100,000 persons, some clans can trace their ancestry back more than twenty generations. Feuds between rival clans are therefore inter generational and form part of the historic fabric of a clan.

Quite obviously kinship is of vital concern in placing an individual in society and providing him or her with an identity. Often the clash of these identities end up in blood wars, as the basic law for Somali clans is "an eye for an eye". With these qualifications, clans and kinship may well be viewed as the primary forces that both shape social and political life in Somalia and tear it apart.

In a nation of 4.5 million people, the vast majority belonging or associating with a clan, political stability is tenuous at best. Because the society lacks a formal method of inter clan relations or 'clan institutions', there was great concern from the United Nations as to who was in control and who would represent the nation. In a country where less than 14% of its population was urban, United Nations activities would be greatly dispersed and subject to frequent interaction with the many clans, heightening the potential for conflict.<sup>102</sup>

Drought and starvation plagued Somalia several times during Barré's reign, once in 1973 and twice in the 1980's. Famine swept through rural areas causing enormous strain on an already weak social and economic system. Inter-clan warfare was on the rise and the political stability in the country was once again beginning to falter. Barré attempted

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<sup>102</sup> *ibid.*, p.195

to use socialism as an organizing ideology to unify clans as well as an economic ideology. However, following an ill-judged and badly executed war between the government-backed Somali clans and Ethiopia over the Ogaden in 1977, he changed his philosophy and embraced capitalism and the American connection. Facing an invasion from Ethiopia, in 1982, Barré turned to the U.S. for help. The U.S. responded by providing 90 million dollars in aid for the defence of Somali clans. This aid clinched an American - Somali alliance.<sup>103</sup>

In 1990, Somalia faced mass starvation like never before, with more than 50% of the population (over 2 million people) suffering from malnutrition. The fighting continued and the widespread hostilities caused massive "death and destruction, forcing hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee their homes and causing a dire need for emergency humanitarian assistance."<sup>104</sup> The efforts by the United Nations, and the International Red Cross, to provide relief became more cumbersome and dangerous by the day. Death rates at aid camps, in Baidoa and Bardere, for instance, rose from ten per day up to 350 a day.<sup>105</sup> Anarchy grew, political order collapsed and government and government services essentially dissolved.

The government of General Barré fell in January 1991 and Ali Mahdi Mohamed was appointed the Interim President.

<sup>103</sup> David D. Laitin & Said S. Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press: 1987), p. 159

<sup>104</sup> *ibid*

<sup>105</sup> United Nations Blue Book Series, The U.N. and Somalia, 1992-1996, United Nations Department of Public Information, (New York: United Nations: 1996)

The clans then divided between the forces of General Mohamed Farah Aidid (who had significant support from sections of the Armed Forces) who was also the Chairman of the United Somali Congress, and those loyal to the Interim President Ali Mohamed. The intensity mounted throughout 1991 and the U.N. was forced to consider more drastic action. International non-governmental organizations (NGO's) estimated that more than 300,000 people were killed between 1991 and the beginning of the UN mission in 1993.<sup>106</sup>

The conditions in Somalia were dangerous. The short era of peace that Somalis had experienced could not break the traditions of inter-clan conflict that had existed since the fourteenth century. The modern armies of General Aidid and Ali Mohamed directly controlled over 50 000 militia that were well armed with Soviet tanks and heavy artillery as well as large quantities of light weapons and ammunition. Alliances amongst the clans were shifting constantly. There was no permanent government and the de facto authorities who claimed control refused humanitarian aid. Competition for power had already left many dead and over half the population were suffering from malnutrition. Pressing the international community into action were the 1.5 million people who were in immediate risk of dying.

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<sup>106</sup> United Nations, United Nations Operation in Somalia II Background Paper, United Nations Peacekeeping Series, Department of Public Information, (New York: United Nations: September 1996

### 3.3 The United Nations

The political chaos, and widespread thievery throughout Somalia made the delivery of humanitarian supplies a serious problem. As a result, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in conjunction with other NGO's and United Nations organizations made a plea to the United Nations Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, to increase the UN 's presence and secure an area in order to distribute emergency international aid. This request led the United Nations Secretary-General, in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States (LAS), and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), to become actively involved with the political aspects of the crisis and to press for a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

On December 27th, 1991, Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar informed the President of the Security Council that he intended to restore peace to Somalia. Incoming Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali continued this initiative and was able to forge a cease fire in February 1992. This facilitated the Security Council through resolution 751 in April, 1992, to establish a formal United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). The cease fire in the capital was to be monitored by 50 UN unarmed peacekeepers from member nations to function as observers to ensure the distribution of humanitarian supplies, and to escort these



deliveries from the city of Mogadishu to the more distant rural areas.

Unfortunately, even with the U.N. presence, the situation in Somalia did not improve. By August 1992, after a visit by the Secretary General, the Security Council had authorized an additional force of 3500 persons to be sent to Somalia to augment the security force already in existence. This increase in manpower, however, still did not curtail the massacres of entire clans, increasing starvation and a population beginning to flee to neighbouring countries for safety. The United Nations turned to Canada to participate in the Somalia mission. The Canadian government committed itself to sending a full battalion including military and civilian specialists. In total approximately 1200 persons made up the Canadian contingent that was to be sent in the summer of 1992 to join the American operation. Their mission would be to augment the forces in Somalia in upholding the conditions of the UNOSOM resolution.

The media also took interest and began to highlight the Somalia story and the U.N.'s intervention. "The world's attention turned to the beaches outside Mogadishu on December 9, 1992, when American forces - dressed, camouflaged, and armed for battle - waded ashore to be greeted not by an opposing army, but an array of television cameras, lights and reporters.<sup>107</sup> Images of starving and dying people had made a profound impression on politicians in the western world, and

<sup>107</sup> Nancy Gordon, Beyond Peacekeeping: Somalia, the United Nations and the Canadian Experience, cited in: Maureen Appel Molot and Harald von Riekhoff, *Canada Among Nations 1994, A Part of The Peace*. (Ottawa: Carleton University Press: 1994)

the response was seemingly unanimous; someone needed to do something.

Pressured by the international community to resolve the situation, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, on November 29th 1992, asked the Security Council in desperation "What can the United Nations legitimately undertake to stop an intrastate conflict or major humanitarian catastrophe when traditional peacekeeping is not enough?"<sup>108</sup> To answer his own question he presented five possibilities: The first three would have altered the basic nature of the UN mission; a larger force, a withdrawal, or a show of force in Mogadishu. Options four and five were looked upon with more favour by the Security Council: a country-wide enforcement action undertaken by a group of member states authorized by the Security Council, or a country-wide enforcement action under direct United Nations command and control.<sup>109</sup>

In order to effectively enforce a ceasefire and to secure the distribution of humanitarian aid, on December 3rd 1992, only days before the Canadian contingents were to depart for Somalia, the UN Security Council implemented the fourth option and changed the nature of the Somali mission. This new mission was instructed "to facilitate an immediate cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of a ceasefire, to promote political settlement and to provide urgent

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<sup>108</sup> UN Document S/24868, November 29, 1992

<sup>109</sup> *ibid.*

humanitarian assistance."<sup>110</sup> In 1992, outgoing American President, George Bush, felt that an operation like "Desert Storm", was what was needed to bring peace and order to the Somali people. To that end, he committed a minimum contingent of a division of soldiers and marines (nearly 10,000 all ranks) as well as extensive air and naval support. The Security Council agreed. Noting the success of the Gulf War, operation Cordon (UNOSOM) was killed and Operation Deliverance, a Chapter VII peace-enforcement mission was established. UNOSOM was disbanded and UNITAF, the United Task Force under the leadership of the United States was created with an authorized total force of 28,000 persons. Canada was once again asked to send troops to support this effort. The Prime Minister, noting that peacekeeping was popular among Canadians agreed, and a new set of Rules-of-Engagement (ROE) were hastily assembled and redistributed to the Airborne. With no changes in their preparation for the new mission, the Canadians were sent to Somalia.

The original mission for which the Canadians had been trained was to assist and provide security for relief agencies involved in humanitarian aid distribution. This new mission, however, took a more aggressive position. The Canadians had not been trained in the new Rules-of-Engagement, yet they were required to disarm and engage the contending Somali forces that had every reason to dispute their presence. Using these Rules of Engagement, the UN, specifically the Canadians, would become a powerful combatant

<sup>110</sup> Chisholm, Ceri, United Nations Handbook, published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, (Wellington, New Zealand: Wright and Carman Ltd.: 1993), p. 72

in their region.

The Rules of Engagement (ROE's) are the parameters established by senior officers and bureaucrats at the Department of National Defence within which the Canadian Forces will conduct their activities. They will determine the procedures for entering hostile environments and the use of deadly force. Once these rules have been established, they are given to the commanding officer who will then forward them down the chain of command. Eventually, every soldier will be provided with a copy of the ROE's. In the case of the Airborne, all members were not given the same ROE's and these were not clearly communicated nor properly defined with the soldiers.

The commanding officer and his staff have the authority to narrow the scope of the Rules of Engagement by implementing greater restrictions in their application. However, he does not have the authority to make them more lax or general in their application. For situations not accounted for, the officer is expected to consult with his superiors for advice or instruction (time and circumstance permitting).

The following illustration (figure 3.1) shows the Rules of Engagement that each individual soldier was given prior to departure from Canada. The information was condensed and placed on two cards (1) *Threat Response Card* , (2) *Field Aide Memoire of Deliverance* , to be used by the soldier for reference to required action in a variety of situations. As may be obvious, many of the terms are left undefined or to individual interpretation. Without experience in using these

new rules Airborne members exercised tremendous ambiguity in their application.

Figure 3.1 Threat Response Card / Field Aide Memoire of Deliverance<sup>111</sup>

**(1) Threat / Response**

**A. Threat = Unarmed Harassment or threat  
(Should first take the following procedures)**

Response

- i) Verbal Warning,
  - ii) Show of Force,
  - iii) Warning Shot,
  - iv) Deadly Force (use as last resort)
- Note: Riot control agents may be used before deadly force if approved by commander....

**Detention of Personnel** = Personnel who commit a hostile act or demonstrate hostile intent, interfere with the mission, may be detained when ordered by the commander....

**(2) Field Aide Memoire of Deliverance**

**Right of Self Defence** = Every soldier has the right to take all necessary and appropriate actions for self defence.

**Minimum Force** = Only the minimum degree of force required to deal with the situations shall be used....

**Definitions**

**Hostile Forces** = Any individual force or terrorist group whether civilian, paramilitary or military that has committed a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.

**Use of Deadly Force permitted for:**

- A.) Self Defence,

<sup>111</sup> Department of National Defence, individual soldier's Rule of Engagement for the Somalia mission, *Threat Response Card & Field Aide Memoire of Deliverance*, 1992

- B.) Defence of Coalition members,
- C.) Defence of Relief personnel and supplies
- D.) Defence of non-combatants.

The bulk of the Canadian contingent was an elite special service force. They were commandos, considered by many to be the epitome of exceptional soldiering. Of the 1200 personnel sent to Somalia, 900 came from the elite Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (CARBG), from Canadian Forces Base Petawawa, Ontario.

Somalia had become the focus of the world's attention and it required an international resolve. Although Somalia appeared to be in a state of anarchy, the systems governance and internal structures of the clans were intact. This was the starting point for the UN Secretary-General in the creation of a ceasefire. Once in place, the UN had the window of opportunity to implement a humanitarian aid mission. Canada, having a proven track record for its participation in such missions, began preparations for an operation to Somalia and the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group was chosen to represent the Canadian contingent in UNOSOM.

### **3.4 The Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (CARBG)**

The Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (CARBG ) has a unique history of successes, traditions and controversies. Following the success of specialized parachute squadrons during the second world war, the Canadian Army created a Canadian Special Air Service Company of infantry personnel. The unit, as a result of Canada's close relation to England

at the time, resembled the elite British Special Air Service (SAS). Originally it was three battalions in strength or approximately 2500 men. By 1948, this force had established itself as the Mobile Strike Force (MSF). The Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI ) became the first Canadian battalion to begin parachute jump training. However, throughout the 1950's, the military resources of the Canadian government were heavily strained. As a result of the mobilization for the Korean war and commitments to NATO, the concept and continuance of the MSF was placed on the back burner of the military's priorities.

By 1958, the down graded MSF airborne unit was much smaller in strength than originally conceived, and was renamed the Defence of Canada Force. Between 1958 and 1968, this unit was the sole representation of special Airborne Forces in the Canadian Army.

In 1966, the Canadian government considered the concept of unified forces called the Canadian Armed Forces. The commander of Mobile Command, Lieutenant General Jean Allard, also wanted to revisit the concept of a commando unit trained in special tactics like the British SAS. This unit would be Canada's rapid deployment force in the event of domestic and foreign crisis, such as terrorism. The government agreed and a commando regiment was formally activated and named, in 1968, the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR).

The original structure for this unit was to have a non-permanent membership. Rather, Allard wanted every officer and non-commissioned officer (Master Corporal or above) to do a

two to three year term in the airborne before they could be eligible for promotion.<sup>112</sup> Their training would then be disseminated in their home units upon their return. The scope of duties for this new force was determined by Lt. General Anderson, Commander of Mobile Command. The CAR was to be organized and equipped to perform a variety of tasks including:

- a. The defence of Canada;
- b. The standby role in response to the UN;
- c. Peacekeeping operations;
- d. Missions in connection with national disaster;
- e. "Special Air Service (SAS)" type missions;
- f. Coup de Main tasks in a general war setting, and
- g. Responsibility for parachute training in the Canadian Forces.<sup>113</sup>

Originally, the Regiment was stationed in a compound beside Canadian Forces Base(CFB) Wainwright. In 1977 its membership totaled 878 (all ranks), and of these men, 556 were infantry personnel split between two commando units. In the same year, a third commando unit was added and to the surprise and discontent of many, the entire Regiment was moved to CFB Petawawa where it was integrated with other Army units and reduced in size to 750 (all ranks).

The Regiment at Petawawa was stationed quite a distance from the air crews and aircraft it had previously worked so closely with. The Regiment also had to participate in the regular taskings and activities of other military units, which further decreased the time in specialized training

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<sup>112</sup> Lt.-Gen. W.A.B. Anderson's memorandum, "Formation of the Canadian Airborne Regiment - Activation and Terms of Reference," May 15, 1967

<sup>113</sup> *ibid.*



programs. The unit felt constrained, and unlike Wainwright, their new home was not conducive to the training requirements of an elite force. As well, the Commanding Officer (CO) now had to work under the authority of a brigade commander and had the tedious task of dealing with a cumbersome army bureaucracy. The Regiment experienced tensions it had never had to deal with before.

The ideal of the airborne soldier is one of "exemplary professionalism, the epitome of discipline and a specialist in the skills of soldering as well as an example of military prowess and physical fitness."<sup>114</sup> The men in this unit were generally young and aggressive. Discipline, however, was not one of their shining characteristics. Even before their move to Petawawa, a number of troops exhibited elements of gang behaviour. Tattooing for example became commonplace. By the 1980's many of the individuals going into or returning from the Airborne had been 'misfits' in other infantry units in the Army. By far one of the greatest influences among airborne soldiers was the "Rambo" mentality of the American 82nd Airborne Regiment with whom the CAR trained regularly. Many Canadians adopted the American anti-discipline and anti-social behaviour.<sup>115</sup> The Best-of-the-Best ideal quickly grew into the Worst-of-the-Worst reality.

As time passed, the problems in the Regiment grew exponentially. Theft, vandalism, assaults, and an inability

in the leadership to control subordinates resulted in a

<sup>114</sup> Hector J. Massey, *The Canadian Military, A Profile*, (The Copp Clark Publishing Company: Canada), 1972.

<sup>115</sup> David Bercuson, Significant Incident, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc.:1996).

series of events which challenged the chain of command. Such events included setting officer's cars on fire and disgusting hazing rituals. In response to these manifestations, Major General Conrad Hewson (ret'd), Chief of Intelligence and Security, was requested by Army Commander Lieutenant General Charles Belzile to submit a report following his investigation into the growing problems plaguing the Airborne.<sup>116</sup> Hewson's report suggested that the change of environments from Wainwright to Petawawa was one of the major reasons for the Airborne's problems. As well, he noted that the Regiment was "lacking effective leadership from junior officers and NCO's (non-commissioned officer's). The majority of officers must turn to something else. Many look to the informal leaders amongst themselves; unfortunately, some of these informal leaders cannot cope with the challenge in a responsible manner and problems can occur."<sup>117</sup> In particular, he noted, that the 2nd Commando unit was the cause of a number of problems within the Regiment. This clearly manifested itself when the Regiment landed in Somalia.<sup>118</sup>

Two years after the CAR was formed it was sent into its first operation in Montreal during the October Crisis. A few years later, 1 Commando was sent to the unstable environment of Cyprus. The Regiment functioned as an ad hoc short-notice response unit. It never really had time to establish its own regimental purpose and specializations. Perhaps this

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<sup>116</sup> *ibid.*, p.208

<sup>117</sup> Hewson Report submitted to the Somalia Inquiry, October 3, 1995.

<sup>118</sup> *ibid.*

contributed to its rapid breakdown in discipline so soon after its creation.

### 3.5 The Canadian situation and the readiness of the CAR

In the Summer of 1992 when the Canadian government was asked to participate in UNOSOM, a number of factors arose in choosing the Airborne Regiment to fulfill this commitment. In the senior ranks of the military, many felt that the government had overextended its military resources and that the UNOSOM mission would put undue strain on a structure unable to satisfy the needs of its current commitments. After reviewing the rotations of duty for regular force battalions committed to international engagements, the Canadian Airborne Regiment was found to be the only regiment which had not recently been in a combat theatre. It was their turn, so the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) sent our elite force into a peacekeeping operation.

From the beginning the Regiment was ill prepared for this mission. Its leadership was weak and non-responsive, hazing rituals were out of control, violence and vandalism against those in positions of authority went unchallenged, and respect for the military structure and chain of command was quickly deteriorating. Fortunately these characteristics were not common in all of the Regiment's Commando units. In fact, while the problems of leadership and authority extended throughout the Regiment, all of the worst troublemakers

seemed to be confined to one unit; 2 Commando.<sup>119</sup>

The Regiment began its training routine for the Somalia mission in the late summer and early fall of 1992. During this training, 2 Commando continued its acts of insubordination by burning the car of one of the unit's sergeants. In response, Lt. Col. Morneault punished the entire unit by sending them into the field for five days with very little supplies. However, for a unit that is trained to stay in the field for up to two weeks by living "off the land", five days punishment might have seemed like a holiday from their daily training routine. This punishment achieved no corrective results and their training for the U.N. mission continued unaltered.

The CAR's Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel Morneault left Canada with his senior officers around October 14 for a reconnaissance mission to Somalia. During his absence his Regiment was tested in a four day exercise, called Exercise Stalwart Providence, to ensure that the CAR was properly trained for the UN mission. The exercise was conducted under the supervision and assessment of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, another infantry regiment.

According to testimony at the Somalia Inquiry by the Commanding Officer of the Dragoons, the exercise was a disaster. He noted that "The Dragoons found that the Airborne's security procedures were lax; it was weak on intelligence gathering; its soldiers were not yet proficient in the operation of their vehicles; its chain of command did

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<sup>119</sup> David Bercuson, Significant Incident, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc.:1996), p. 214 - 215

not function properly, especially when passing information about operational procedures to the lowest ranks. There was still much work to do, especially in the areas of professionalism at all times; leadership at all levels; safety; and the execution of proper battle procedure."<sup>120</sup> These were serious accusations, since they pointed directly to the training programs of the Airborne. The failing in the execution of proper battle procedure, the most basic and important function of the Airborne, represented a serious crisis for Brigadier General Beno, the senior Commanding Officer for Special Service Forces. He had warned Major General Lewis MacKenzie, Commander of the Land Forces in the Central Area (primarily Ontario), that the Canadian Airborne Regiment was having serious problems, and he informed the General of his lack of confidence in the Regiment's ability to perform and complete its mission, its chain of command and its leadership. Lt. Col. Morneault knew the problems facing the Regiment and at one point suggested to General Beno that No. 2 Commando be left behind when the Regiment departed.<sup>121</sup> This, however, was not an acceptable solution to the General.

In an unprecedented move, on October 21st, 1992, three days following the completion of the training exercise, and on the return of Lt. Col. Morneault, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie approved Brigadier General Beno's request to relieve Lt. Col. Morneault of his command. Beno stressed to Morneault the failures of the Regiment to meet the standards

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<sup>120</sup> Testimony of Colonel W.M. Holmes to the Somalia Inquiry, October 10, 1995

<sup>121</sup> Testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Paul Morneault to the Somalia Inquiry, January 22-25, 1996

necessary for the operation. As well, he noted the continuing problem of leadership.<sup>122</sup> Five days later on October 26th, Lt. Col. Carol Mathieu, a former Airborne member, took command.

Lt.Col. Mathieu was given the near impossible task of solving the problems that existed in the Airborne between the 26th of October and their departure date of December 14th. In total, he had 49 days to correct years of compounded and neglected problems in the Regiment. In a press release on November 13th, 1992, National Defence Headquarters declared that on the basis of an assessment conducted by General Beno, the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group was ready for deployment to Somalia.<sup>123</sup> The basis for the General's new assessment ten days after the dismissal of the previous commanding officer for seriously failing to prepare the Regiment for active duty is unknown.

To add to the ambiguity of the mission and further compound the problems facing the Canadian Airborne Regiment, the United Nations changed the mandate of its mission on the 3rd of December. The mission of UNOSOM was replaced with the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). Code-named Operation Deliverance, it was governed under the auspices of Chapter VII, peace enforcement, of the UN Charter. Since there was no functioning government in Somalia, the resolution passed unchallenged. In this mission under U.S. leadership, UNITAF was to engage and suppress any force that was preventing the

<sup>122</sup> Testimony of Brigadier General Ernest B. Beno to the Somalia Inquiry, January 29-31, 1996.

<sup>123</sup> Statement of the Department of Public Affairs, Department of National Defence, NDHQ, 1st November 1992.

distribution of humanitarian aid and bring political stability to the country.

The Canadian Airborne Regiment had not been trained in the Rules of Engagement for this type of mission. Because of the authorized use of deadly force, the Regiment's training required greater emphasis on discipline and self restraint. For the Airborne Commander, the lack of this type of training presented an explosive and dangerous situation. The objectives of the Canadian contingent were to take possession and secure the city and surrounding areas of Belet Huen (Belet Weyne). To that end, on the 14th of December Colonel Labbé arrived with the first elements of the Canadian force and began a mission that would lead to the disbandment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment and the disgrace of the Canadian military.

The complete force was in place by January 1993. The Canadians were well equipped and well armed for their mission: a mission to secure peace, to ensure humanitarian aid, and a mission that included, for this Regiment, torture and murder.

Belet Huen (Belet Weyne), in South-Western Somalia, (fig 3.2) was the focus of the Canadian military's activity for the duration of the UNITAF mission. At the Canadian compound, it was the responsibility of the No. 2 Commando, the least disciplined unit, to ensure local security and to look after any prisoners caught entering or attempting to enter the protected camp. No.2 Commando was the most out-of-control unit in the Airborne and the decision to give them

such responsibility further substantiated the accusation of of weak and untrained leadership and their indifference toward the lack of discipline in the airborne particularly toward No. 2 commando. Initially, there were a number of small thefts and repeated penetrations of the camp by individuals and small groups of Somalis. Rebel groups of Somalis were increasingly challenging the authority of the UN by setting up road blockades at night and raiding the convoys of humanitarian aid.<sup>124</sup> The continual stealing of important items began to threaten the security of the Canadian force. Such items included personal articles, weapons, ammunition, parachutes, radio antennas, and at one point only one out of three helicopter refueling pumps remained, thereby seriously jeopardizing the availability of air support. The troops were becoming very disgruntled at their apparent lack of effectiveness in bringing order to Belet Weyne. As a result, the morale of the Regiment quickly depleted and boredom and drunkenness became commonplace.<sup>125</sup>

The discipline problems in the CAR can be directly attributed to the Regiment's lack of readiness for the Somalia mission. This problem, however, was nothing new. As early as 1985, fifteen years after CAR's creation, an incident occurred causing the establishment of the Hewson Report. This incident involved one of the airborne members in Petawawa becoming involved in a brawl and brutally killing one of the local civilians with a machete.<sup>126</sup>

<sup>124</sup> David Bercuson, Significant Incident, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc.:1996). p. 233

<sup>125</sup> *ibid.*, p. 235


<sup>126</sup> *ibid.*, p.208



The Hewson report confirmed a higher rate of violent crimes and assaults in the unit compared to other regular force units. Evidence has also shown that CAR failed in its attempts to attract the best-of-the-best in the Canadian Forces. Testimony to the Somalia Inquiry actually notes that "battalions would actually avoid sending their better candidates to the CAR."<sup>127</sup>

The Regiment was not ready for deployment. Problems in discipline and adherence to regulations existed not only at the unit levels but at the most senior levels of the military as they failed in correcting the Regiment's internal problems or preventing them from leaving Canada.

Figure 3.2 Canadian contingents in Somalia (UNITAF)



<sup>127</sup> Report of the Somalia Commission Inquiry, June 1997

### 3.6 The Somalia Events and the Torture of Shidane Arone

The Canadian Airborne Regiment stationed in Somalia ignored the conventions against torture and inhumane treatment of people and the Geneva conventions as shown in their conduct. This was never more evident than when members of the Airborne urinated in a water bottle and gave it to a dehydrated child, when they shot a Somali in the back and then ended his life with an execution shot to the back of the head,<sup>128</sup> with the order to capture and abuse Somalis, and finally with the beating, torture, humiliation and murder of Shidane Arone. The regiment violated, without exception, every provision of the sections designed to preserve and protect the life, dignity and humanity of civilians in a combat zone.

The murder of Shidane Arone is probably the most gruesome act of non-combat violence ever conducted and reported in the Canadian military. It occurred in a Regiment without leadership and discipline, and it occurred under the orders of a commanding officer.

The Regiment in Somalia, as mentioned previously, faced dangerous levels of thievery. Lt. Col. Mathieu addressed the problem of thievery by increasing security measures and on January 28th he told his officers that "anyone touching the fence around the compound should be shot."<sup>129</sup> The problem,

<sup>128</sup> The Regina Leader Post, "Doctor defends murder theory", March 15th, 1997

<sup>129</sup> The Regina Leader Post, Friday, October 11, 1996

however, never subsided. By the beginning of March, the media reported that shooting incidents between Somali rebels and UN forces had increased and were becoming a routine action of UNITAF soldiers. In fact, more than fifty incidents had been officially recorded by ten different national contingents between January and March.<sup>130</sup>

By mid March the situation had escalated and Airborne members were detaining prisoners on a nightly basis. Infiltration into the Canadian compound had reached unacceptable proportions.<sup>131</sup> The Rules of Engagement, however, "did not give clear direction on how to deal with thieves."<sup>132</sup> As a result of the ambiguity of these Rules and the increasing thievery, on March 16, 1993, Major Anthony Seward, the officer in command of No.2 Commando, informed his platoon leaders that he had had enough. Tension in the camp was mounting and he had decided to take action

Seward called a meeting with his junior officers and platoon leaders. During this meeting he allegedly ordered Captain Sox's 4 Platoon to set up a trap and catch an intruder then make an example of him. He told his men "they could abuse prisoners."<sup>133</sup> At this point Captain Sox had the option by virtue of his responsibility to command, to refuse the order under the authority of both the military's Queen's

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<sup>130</sup> United Nations Blue Book Series, The U.N. and Somalia, 1992-1996, United Nations Department of Public Information, (New York: United Nations: 1996)

<sup>131</sup> Canadian Press, Ottawa, cited in the Regina Leader Post, Friday October 11, 1996.

<sup>132</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>133</sup> John Ward, Canadian Press, cited in the Winnipeg Free Press, may 28, 1996

Regulations and Orders (QR&O's) as well as the Geneva conventions. These were designed so that individuals could never justify murder, torture or any other war crime by claiming they were just following orders. Captain Sox chose to ignore this option and instead called together his sergeants and began planning the trap.<sup>134</sup>

At approximately 9:00 p.m. sixteen year old Shidane Abukar Arone entered the Canadian compound at Belet Weyne. The No. 2 Commandos chased and caught him hiding and scared in a portable toilet. Arone had not taken anything, nor had he made any attempt to take anything.

Arone was bound in plastic handcuffs and taken to the No. 2 Commando's command post and then transferred to a holding bunker. Apparently, during routine questioning, Arone claimed that he entered through the opened gates to look for a lost child. After the interrogation his ankles were bound with plastic cuffs. A police baton was stuffed behind his back and he was secured to a post in the middle of the bunker and left with Master Corporal Clayton Matchee.

Matchee was relieved by Sgt. Boland shortly after 9:00 pm and headed for the tent of his friend, Corporal Kyle Brown. Between 9:00 and 10:00 pm Matchee and Brown consumed an abundance of beer becoming quite drunk by the time Brown had relieved Sgt. Boland to guard Arone. When Boland left at the end of his watch, Matchee and Brown began assaulting the prisoner, who was officially under Brown's supervision. The most damaging evidence of this included a video and some very

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<sup>134</sup> David Pugliese, cited in the Ottawa Citizen, March 2nd, 1996

explicit pictures displaying the tortured youth that were presented over Canadian national media. Brown began burning the soles of Arone's feet with cigarettes and Matchee placed a food ration pack on the prisoner and beat it with a police baton until the pack burst.<sup>135</sup> It was estimated that at 11:00 pm Matchee began to smash Arone in the face and chin with an iron bar. Arone at this point, was fading in and out of consciousness, but the beating never stopped. Ironically, because of their abusive and undisciplined behaviour demonstrated during pre-deployment exercises in Canada, the Warrant Officer in charge had recommended that Master Corporal Matchee and Corporal Brown be left behind in Canada.<sup>136</sup>

By midnight, another sergeant in the unit, Sgt. Hillier, stopped by the bunker and saw Arone's desperate state of suffering. He left and returned minutes later with Sgt. Skipton to check for a pulse. They found none. Captain Sox was immediately informed, and he ordered the body to be moved to the military field hospital where, after examination, Arone was declared dead at approximately 12:15 am. After 3 1/4 hours of torture the Airborne members had triumphantly killed a defenseless 16 year old boy.

In an article published by the Toronto Star, Lt. Col. Carol Mathieu allegedly said in a meeting on February 26th, 1993, "Kill the bastards and we'll cover for you."<sup>137</sup> Major

<sup>135</sup> David Bercuson, Significant Incident, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc.:1996). p.1-14

<sup>136</sup> ibid., p. 10

<sup>137</sup> Alan Thompson, Ottawa Bureau of the Toronto Star. July 13, 1996, section A1.

Seward, following this meeting with Lt.Col. Mathieu, gave the authority for Captain Sox to instruct his men to " abuse prisoners the night that his soldiers beat and tortured Arone"<sup>138</sup> .

Headquarters in Mogadishu and Ottawa were immediately informed of the situation. However, as a result of Defence Minister Kim Campbell's leadership candidacy for the Conservative party, and the military's hoping to avoid a public scandal, the situation was downplayed to the Canadian media, to protect the integrity of the Canadian Forces and the Minister's chances at becoming Prime Minister. Retired public affairs officer Colonel Geoff Haswell stated that "there was a great deal of concern at very high levels in the department that nothing be done to interfere with that [Kim Campbell's] leadership"<sup>139</sup> campaign. Kim Campbell has denied these allegations of political interference and corruption. However, since the Somalia Inquiry was forced to cut short its investigation, neither she nor other members of her government were able to provide their side of the story. Therefore, the author was unable to verify this opinion.

In the end, the federal government was forced to establish the Somalia Commission Inquiry to find out why the Somalia situation occurred and why the military and federal government seemed to cover it up. This was prompted after a series of damning videos released to the Canadian media

portrayed hazing rituals of the Airborne where members were

<sup>138</sup> John Ward, Canadian Press in Ottawa, cited in the Winnipeg Free Press, May 28, 1996, Section B1

<sup>139</sup> Ottawa Citizen, September 17, 1996, p. A-10

required to "eat vomit and excrement and utter racist epithets."<sup>140</sup>

As a result of the Inquiry's investigations, Canadians learned about a massive cover-up by numerous senior members of the military. The cover-up reached the highest levels in the force.<sup>141</sup> In fact, Gen. Jean Boyle, after stating that he had no knowledge of the incident, was contradicted by a number of different witnesses who insisted that he played an active role in the Somalia affair. Soon after, he was forced to resign.

One of the long-held customs of military leadership is to share the credit and shoulder the blame. For an individual, such as Boyle, to be appointed to the most senior and most respected position of the military, and to conduct himself in such a manner, was intolerable and unacceptable to the rank and file in the Canadian military. His testimony shook the confidence of those under his command and tainted the military's code of honour.<sup>142</sup> Lt.Gen. Roy tried to defend his boss and maintain trust in the chain of command when he stated that "we have to be patient and remain loyal to the (Chief of Defence Staff General Boyle)" <sup>143</sup> . This attempt was to no avail and Boyle's removal from that position was the required remedy to begin the long process of rebuilding confidence in the leadership of the Canadian Armed Forces.

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<sup>140</sup> The Globe and Mail, April 2nd, 1996, p. A-20

<sup>141</sup> Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, July 1997, Vol.5

<sup>142</sup> Toronto Star, Buck Passes, August 27th, 1996.

<sup>143</sup> Lieutenant General Roy cited in ; David Pugliese, The Ottawa Citizen, May 16, 1996, section A3

However, he was not the only casualty of this ill-fated mission by the Canadian Airborne Regiment. The Canadian Airborne Regiment was itself disbanded and removed from the Canadian Forces.

The Somali affair has uncovered a series of serious breaches of conduct by a number of its members, particularly in the officer corps. Negligent performance of duty, while a very serious charge in the military, has become a common term in civilian coffee shop discussions. In many ways, military scandals are becoming an unsurprising element of everyday Canadian politics.

### 3.7 Conclusions

There are several observations that can be made at this point. First, the environment that the Canadian Forces and the UN had entered in Somalia was unlike anything they had previously experienced. Somalia was unstable but the fighting did not occur between two rival parties. Rather, there were many opposing factions, some directly opposing the intervention of the UN. Secondly, the UN transferred authority over this mission to the United States with a mandate to not only ensure distribution of humanitarian aid but also peace enforcement. The United States did not, however, establish joint forces rules of conduct with participating nations. This left the Canadian government to hastily create a new set of Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the new mission.



Although the entire mission had changed, months of pre-deployment training and mission-specific training had already taken place under previous ROE's and the Canadian Forces Chief of Defence Staff did not change the deployment date to Somalia to allow its members to readjust and retrain. Had this been done perhaps many of the crises could have been avoided. However, as a result, the ROE's which lacked clarity and definition and were not clearly communicated to the soldiers, were not followed. There were enormous deficiencies in the general application of the ROE's and in their mission-specific training. There was a lack of discipline in observing the new ROE's by many members of the Airborne (pre-deployment and in-theatre) that was never addressed or corrected. "The ROE's themselves were substantively weak and incomplete. They failed, among other things, to address the crucial distinction between a hostile act and a hostile intent."<sup>144</sup> It should have been clear to the Senior Officers in command that as a result of these noted deficiencies and the time factor required to fix them, the Airborne Regiment was not ready and not combat-capable to go to Somalia.

When certain members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment beat, tortured and killed 16 year-old Shidane Arone in the spring of 1993, they not only violated every element of conduct in the four Geneva Conventions and its two Protocols, but also the Convention against torture, which Canada had signed barely five years earlier. These actions reflected not only on the Airborne Regiment but on the entire

<sup>144</sup> Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, July 1997, Rules of Engagement

Canadian military for failing to properly train its soldiers for combat environments.

The Government of Canada also felt the effects of the Somalia affair. The violations of conduct by Airborne members suggest a serious breach by the national government in maintaining its commitments to these international conventions. It also failed to ensure that these provisions were followed in operational theatres as shown in the conduct of the members of the Airborne. It was further embarrassed by having to answer specific questions by the UN committee on the Convention against Torture. To make matters worse, Canada was a member of the committee to ensure international adherence to the convention at the time of the Somalia incidents. Moreover, these breaches reflect a serious absence of ethics and codes of conduct instruction by the Federal Government in the Canadian Forces.

#### 4. Conclusion

This thesis has provided an investigation into one of the potential causes of the Somalia affair by studying the Canadian military's training as one possible factor. It studied the training programs that the military's officers received prior to 1993 and correlated this training to the tragic events that transpired during the Somalia mission. It also illustrated the dismal state of the Airborne prior to its departure to provide insight and background into the unconventional socialization process and the lack of leadership that occurred in the regiment.

There are a number of other possible causes for the Somalia affair, such as the lack of cultural diversity or gender equality within the Airborne. These factors are elements for future inquiry into this matter and as a result were not considered in this thesis's investigation.

This thesis asserts that the occurrences in Somalia, particularly the beating and torture of Shidane Arone, were, in part, a result of the serious breaches and failures in the internal and external training programs of the military. Possibly, the absence of ethical and moral development and in the ambiguities that seemingly existed in the instruction and application of the laws of war and the Geneva conventions. This failure to provide the proper instruction is a result of

military indifference and political negligence to uphold Canada's commitments to the international Laws of War.

It was also demonstrated how unprepared and improperly trained the Airborne was before beginning its mission to Somalia. The Airborne had originally been established to provide the Canadian military with a highly skilled and specialized combat unit. By the 1990's this intent had been lost and the Airborne had become home to some of the most undisciplined and aggressive members of the Canadian Forces. Units and regiments from all over Canada were no longer sending their best members to the Airborne; they were sending their worst and most difficult.

The situation in the Airborne was made worse by a weak and poorly trained officer corps unable to provide proper leadership and maintain regimental cohesion. Members of the regiment, particularly of the second platoon, regularly exhibited insubordination and were known by the officers to have violent and dangerous tendencies. Officer's cars were burned in defiance of authority, hazing rituals existed unchallenged and a general lack of respect for and confidence in the chain of command indicated a regiment out of control. The instability of the Airborne and the instability in Somalia proved to be a deadly combination, especially for sixteen year-old Shidane Arone.

To understand the actions of the Airborne and its officers, this thesis investigated the training programs of officers and non-commissioned officers. It found that the training was based on the teachings of two contradictory philosophers, Immanuel Kant and John Locke. By combining

their works the Canadian military established a set of leadership principles to guide officers in their decision making process. To augment these findings, the Somalia Inquiry noted several deficiencies in the training of Canadian Forces. It states the following,

In preparing its forces for peace support missions, the CF relied almost exclusively on general purpose combat training, supplemented by mission-specific training during the pre-deployment phase. This traditional approach to training was not adequate to provide military personnel with either a full range of skills or the appropriate orientation necessary to meet the diverse and complex challenges presented in post-Cold War peace support missions. There was a failure to incorporate the required generic peacekeeping training, both in the individual training system and in the regular operational training schedule.<sup>145</sup>

Ambiguity was prevalent throughout many sections of the training programs. This was especially true in the application of the Code of Service Discipline, in the Rules of Engagement, in the teaching of ethical and moral conduct, and in the application of the Laws of War and Geneva Conventions. Vague instruction on how a soldier should act during combat is a serious problem for any commander. Combined with a poorly disciplined regiment, a serious situation is inevitable. Furthermore, specifically in the Airborne, "the absence of CF peacekeeping training doctrine, together with a lack of guidelines for the development of training plans for UN deployments or a standard package of precedents and lessons learned from previous missions, placed an undue burden on the CAR's junior staff in the initial

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<sup>145</sup> Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, July 1997, Vol.2

stages of designing a training plan."<sup>146</sup>

This thesis also reviews the international agreements committed to by Canada on conduct during war. It also reviewed the International Committee of the Red Cross, its commitment to human rights instruction and its frustration in applying human rights to the United Nations and its missions. The Geneva conventions are the most important agreements detailing conduct of soldiers and government during war. It is clear that during the Somalia mission, the Canadian military continuously violated the terms and conditions set out in the Geneva Conventions as well as the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. As a result of the inaction taken by the Canadian government and the military to deal with these violations early in the Somalia mission, the violations increased in severity culminating with the torture and murder of Arone. As noted by the final report of the Somalia Commission:

The training plan...did not adequately provide for sufficient and appropriate training in relation to several non-combat skills that are essential for peacekeeping, including the nature of UN peacekeeping and the role of the peacekeeper; the Law of Armed Conflict, including arrest and detention procedures; training in use of force policies, including mission-specific rules of engagement; conflict resolution and negotiation skills development; inter-cultural relations and the culture, history and politics of the environment; and psychological preparation and stress management. The failure of the training plan to provide adequately for these non-combat skills arose primarily from the lack of any doctrine recognizing the need for such training, and the lack of supporting training materials and

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<sup>146</sup> ibid

standards.<sup>147</sup>

This thesis investigated the relationship between the training of Canadian officers and the Somalia affair. It found that violations of military discipline before the Airborne left Canada, went unchallenged. As a result, by the time the Airborne had completed its mission to Somalia, it had seriously breached the Geneva Conventions and International law. These events placed the military in contempt with the Canadian public and forced the government to disband the Airborne Regiment. The Somalia Commission noted in its conclusions "that professional soldiers wearing the flag of Canada on their uniforms were sent to Somalia not properly prepared for their mission. They were unprepared in good part because of key deficiencies in their training."<sup>148</sup>

There are three conclusions that can be drawn as a result of the investigation in this thesis:

1) That the general training programs of officers and NCO's was weak and deficient for a peace enforcement and humanitarian aid distribution mission to Somalia.

2) That specific and specialized training was weak for a UN mission.

3) That non-combat training was weak to non-existent, particularly in the areas of ethical and

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<sup>147</sup> ibid

<sup>148</sup> ibid

moral development, and in the knowledge of military conduct, in other words, the Laws of War.

Four years have passed since the tragic events occurred in Somalia. Since then, the Department of National Defence has implemented a number of seminars to address the lack of ethical and moral development in training programs of Canadian officers. However, no significant change has occurred to address the ambiguities that this thesis has found to exist in these training programs. It is the author's hope that the issues this thesis presents will assist the Canadian military in developing programs to preserve the dignity and humanity in people, and to prevent the tragedies that occurred to Shidane Arone from ever happening again.



## 5. Chronology

The following is a chronology of events leading up to, and including, the torture and murder of Shidane Arone.

- July 1st, 1960 Somalia achieves independence under the leadership of General Siad Barré.
- 1960's Somalia forges an alliance with the Soviet Union
- 1973 Plague and Starvation affect large portions of Somalia
- 1977 Somalia breaks its alliance with the Soviet Union and asks for help and protection from the United States.
- 1980's Plague and Starvation affect Somalia twice in this decade.
- 1990 Unprecedented mass starvation. 50% of population suffers from malnutrition.
- 1991 Barré's government collapses. Ali Mahadi Mohamed appointed new President.
- 1991 Civil War ravages Somalia
- 1991 - 1993 300 000 + Somali's killed in inter-clan warfare.

- Dec. 27th, 1991 UN Secretary General seeks to restore peace.
- Feb. 1992 UN facilitates a cease fire amongst the warring clans.
- April 1992 UN resolution 751 establishes a peacekeeping mission called UNOSOM. Authorized strength of 50.
- Fall 1992 UN decides to increase its presence. Canada is requested to participate.
- Nov. 13th, 1992 Canadian Airborne Regiment is considered fit for combat in a press release from NDHQ.
- Nov.29th, 1992 1.5 million people in Somalia in immediate risk of dying. UN seeks desperate action to help. A massive humanitarian and relief mission is decided upon.
- Dec.3rd 1992 UN mission changes from UNOSOM to UNITAF and becomes a peacemaking mission. U.S.A. commits a full division of marines and soldiers. Authorized strength of UNITAF is 28000.
- Dec.9th 1992 First U.S. led troops land on the beaches of Mogadishu and face a barrage of media personnel.
- Dec.14th 1992 The Canadian Airborne Regiment arrives in Somalia and begins setting up its camp in Belet Huen.
- Jan-Mar 1993 Thievery seriously hinders the Canadian mission and frustration sets in amongst the troops.

- Mar. 16th 1993 Canadian Major Seward decides to take action against the thieves.
- Mar.16th 1993 2100 hrs. (9:00 pm) Shidane Arone is captured entering the Canadian Compound and held prisoner.
- Mar.16th 1993 2300-2400hrs. (11:00pm-12:00pm) Shidane Arone is viciously tortured and murdered by Canadian Airborne members.
- June 1993 UNITAF mission to Somalia ends.

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





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