

NATIONALIZING CITIZENS, BORDERING IMMIGRANT WOMEN

GLOBALIZATION AND THE RACIALIZATION OF CITIZENSHIP IN LATE 20TH
CENTURY CANADA

by

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Abstract

In this dissertation, I examine the Immigration Policy Review and the Social Security Review initiated by the Canadian state in 1994, as well as the subsequent changes introduced in these policy areas in 1995. I analyze how the underlying social relations of race, class and gender which define membership in the Canadian nation and organize access to citizenship are expressed in the state's restructuring of these two major areas of public policy. Specifically, I define these two Reviews as exercises in the state's ongoing practices of nation-building.

Immigration policies played a central role in the European settlement of the lands of colonized Aboriginal societies and in the construction of the Canadian nation by the white settler state. These policies distinguished immigrants into *preferred races*, who, as *future citizens*, were to be nationalized into becoming *Canadians*, and the *non-preferred races*, who were to be ideologically bordered as *immigrants* and outsiders to the nation, although they lived in the same geographical national territory. Thus, the racialized conditions organizing the migration of various populations shaped their relation to the nation, as well as their claims to citizenship. The development of the welfare state in the post World War II period further incorporated this racialized distinction into social policy by defining social entitlements on the basis of this racialized citizenship. In particular, I examine how the ideological practices of the state have constructed 'immigrant women' as a particular burden, and threat, to the nation.

In this dissertation, I use Dorothy Smith's (1987, 1990) "relations of ruling" framework. Smith defines the social organization of knowledge through textual realities as central to processes of governing in advanced capitalism, and develops a feminist methodology which draws attention to the ideological practices which make the "everyday/ everynight" world problematic. Using her methodology, I engage in a textual analysis of the documents organizing the Social Security Review and the Immigration Policy Review. I demonstrate that both policy Reviews and the subsequent policy changes they legitimize are re-defining and strengthening the borders of the *Canadian* nation at both the

ideological and material levels into the 21st century.

Dedication

*for my father
who never stood a chance*

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This dissertation could not have been written without the love and care my daughter, Sitara, and my mother, Roshan, have given me. It is to them that I owe my heartfelt thanks. Sitara's generous love has helped to assuage the guilt I have felt every time I had to tell her, "Later, not now. I am busy writing." To my mother, every trial I have undergone during the last few years has been like her own. She has staunchly stood by me and supported me. My sisters, Munira and Karima, never far from my heart, have loved and believed in me at times when even I did not. As has my aunt, Laila. Without her help, I would not be in Canada, and not one day goes by without her praying for my success. This dissertation is as much the achievement of the inspiration I have received from my family as it is of my academic training.

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INTRODUCTION

Setting the Stage

Citizenship has become the chief signifier of membership in the nation state in advanced capitalist countries in the post World War II period. Whereas the category 'citizen' suggests a national community of individuals who enjoy equal status in their treatment by the state, and in society, Canadian 'citizens' have never been a homogenous group. Historically, the state has organized membership in the Canadian nation, and regulated access to citizenship, through ideological practices which express race, class and gender relations within the global capitalist system of relations. The very invention of the Canadian nation and Canadian citizenship was predicated upon the colonization of Aboriginal societies and the settlement of Europeans on Aboriginal lands. The state's colonization /racialization of Aboriginal peoples as being less than 'human' have underpinned the construction of *Canadian* national sovereignty and racialized Canadian citizenship.

With the colonization of Aboriginal societies, immigration policies became key to the 'production' of the *Canadian* nation's population. These policies were overtly racialized with the state organizing the integration/nationalization of *preferred race* immigrants into the white nation as *future citizens*, and the exclusion/bordering of *non-preferred race* immigrants as outsiders to the nation even as their labour was made available to the 'national' economy.¹ The state's ideological construction of *non-preferred races* subjected them to an unequal citizenship. In the period from 1876 to the 1960s, a period critical to Canadian nation-building, women of the *non-preferred* races

¹ The term 'nationalizing' refers to the conscious practices of the Canadian state to integrate European immigrants into becoming members of the Canadian nation. I have used this term in the sense defined by Etienne Balibar (1991). I use the 'bordering' to refer to the parallel and converse process of excluding third world immigrants from becoming part of the nation. These terms are discussed more fully in Part One of the dissertation.

were constructed as a particular threat to the 'whiteness' of the nation: keeping these women out was defined by the state as a solution to preserving the 'purity' of the nation. Until the 1960s, immigration policies overtly racialized both the nation and access to citizenship. Therefore, claims to Canadian citizenship were deeply connected to membership in the *Canadian* nation.

In this dissertation, I make the case that the citizenship of all non-Aboriginal populations in Canada has historically been, and *continues to be*, primarily regulated by the unequal conditions under which their migrations have been organized by the Canadian state. Immigration policy has been of central importance in the material and ideological processes through which the state has organized the production and reproduction of the Canadian nation, as well as the regulation of access to citizenship. Immigration policies directly regulated access to the right to live in Canada, and to thereby become eligible to make claims to citizenship. The ideological construction of the nation as 'white' effectively placed *immigrant* women outside the borders of the nation, even when they were physically present in the country, it organized their unequal access to citizenship rights.²

The development of the 'welfare' state in the post World War II period did not fundamentally transform the reproduction of the 'whiteness' of the nation and its citizenship as overtly racialized immigration policies remained in effect until the 1960s. Instead, the welfare state came to integrate and perpetuate processes of racialization by organizing social entitlements on the basis of this racialized citizenship, albeit in class and gender specific ways. Immigration policies organized access to formal citizenship in Canada, access which was the precondition for making claims upon social entitlements. Thus, overtly racialized immigration policies regulated access to the social entitlements of the welfare state. Furthermore, this 'welfare' state continued to reproduce colonial relations in Canada with the ongoing governing of Aboriginal peoples through

² Where the categories *Canadian* and *immigrant* are italicized, I am referring to the processes of racialization which give these categories their particular racialized meanings. For further explanation of my use of terminology, I refer the reader to the final section of this Introduction.

'welfare-colonialism.' As a result, the racialized *Indian Act* regulated Aboriginal women's social 'entitlements' within the welfare state.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the Canadian state made significant changes to immigration policy which became entrenched in the *Immigration Act, 1976-77*. This Act is currently in effect. The Act removed the overt use of 'race' as a basis for discrimination and introduced the point system. One consequence of these changes has been that annual immigration into Canada from third world countries has come to surpass that from European countries. The *Immigration Act 1976-77*, however, did not end the role of immigration policy in the racialized reproduction of the nation. Among the objectives of the Act is the strengthening of the bicultural and bilingual social character of the nation. This Act therefore, did not seek to in principle, nor did it in effect, transform the racialization of the nation. Instead, the Act represents a historical continuity in the state's nation-building practices by upholding the ideological distinguishing of immigrants into *future citizens* and *immigrants* on the basis of their cultural, linguistic and social affinity to the nation. The Act enabled processes of racialization to become articulated in the discourse of the cultural, linguistic and social diversity of *immigrants* from the nation, and not in their overt *non-preferred race* status. The Act therefore reflects the state's ongoing ideological construction of *the national character*, and national 'interest,' which it uses to subsume the actual divisions of race, class and gender which exist in Canada.

The *Immigration Act, 1976-77* organizes immigration under three major categories: the independent, family, and refugee categories.³ In addition to these categories, immigration is also organized for domestic workers separately, and for temporary workers under the Non-Immigrant Employment Program. As mentioned earlier, immigration from third world countries since the 1970s has been significantly higher than that from European countries, and immigration under the family category has been higher in the 1980s than under the independent category. The majority of the family category have been women

³ I will deal specifically with the independent and family categories in this dissertation. The refugee category lies outside the scope of my present inquiry.

and children.⁴

The independent category defines eligibility on the basis of the applicant's 'economic' contributions to the nation, while the family category defines eligibility on the basis of family relationships. By attributing the characteristics 'independent' and 'economic' to the independent category, the *Act* ideologically constructs it as a masculinized one. These characteristics are generally defined as constituting masculinity within patriarchal societies. Simultaneously, the *Act* feminizes the family category in its construction as a 'non-economic,' 'dependent' category. These are characteristics generally associated with femininity in patriarchal societies. The particular ideological construction of these two major categories makes invisible the economic contributions of the family category to the economy, and enables the state to represent it as a burden on the nation.

The ideological construction of the independent category valorizes it as one of *future citizens* who are 'economic' assets to the nation. Through these ideological practices, the state continues the distinguishing of immigrants into *future citizens* and *immigrants* on the basis of their social, linguistic and cultural identity, and on the basis of their 'economic' contribution to the nation. The *Act* therefore institutionalizes the intersection of race, class and gender relations by reinforcing the ideological construction of *immigrant* woman as both outsider to the nation, and a drain upon its resources. The consequence is that white immigrant women who enter under the family category are racialized/nationalized into becoming *Canadians* and joining the nation, while third world women become racialized/bordered as *immigrant* women who are a burden on the nation.

Furthermore, under the sponsorship regulations for the family category, sponsors are required to undertake financial responsibility for their

⁴ The family category includes family reunification as sponsored immigrants re-unite with sponsoring family members resident in the country, as well as family members who accompany immigrants under the independent category.

'dependents' for periods of up to ten years.⁵ The state's ideological construction of the family category as one of 'dependents' therefore comes to be imposed upon actuality as these regulations make sponsored immigrants dependent on their sponsors. Although immigrants legally become eligible to claim citizenship after a three year residency, the sponsored status of the family category, which makes sponsors financially responsible for sponsored immigrants, officially disentitles them from accessing social assistance programs - even after they legally become citizens - for the duration of the sponsorship period. In cases where sponsored immigrants have been allowed access to social assistance, this has been at the discretion of the social service agency where claims have been made, and only upon the claimant satisfying the agency of the breakdown of the sponsorship relation. The sponsorship agreements increase the policing of sponsored immigrants' access to social assistance programs. They are allowed such access not as an entitlement, but on discretionary terms and under severely controlled conditions. Therefore, sponsorship regulations further reinforce the outsider *immigrant* status of the family category by regulating their *de jure* unequal access to 'national' social security programs: becoming a legal citizen does not translate into full entitlement to citizenship rights for sponsored immigrant women. While both European and third world women might share the same legal status as sponsored immigrants, the ideological bordering of third world immigrant women as *immigrants* further compounds their unequal access to citizenship as they are constructed by the state as outsiders to the nation.

The sponsorship regulations also result in barring sponsors, who might themselves have legal entitlement to social assistance programs, from claiming them if they wish to sponsor family members. In undertaking financial responsibility for their 'dependents,' these sponsors have to demonstrate they can financially support themselves and their sponsored family members without recourse to public support.

⁵ The sponsorship regulations set the upper limit on the sponsorship period at ten years. Immigration officers could stipulate a shorter sponsorship period at their discretion, but rarely did so (Segal, 1986).

Immigration policy organizes unequal access to citizenship for domestic workers by not giving them landed immigrant status for the first two years of their residency in Canada. During this period, their immigration status is dependent upon their employment as domestic workers. Likewise, women who enter the country on temporary employment permits are dependent on these permits for their continued residence in the country. Therefore, the Act organizes unequal conditions for entry into the country for the family category, domestic workers and temporary workers, which create unequal claims to citizenship rights for the women who enter under these categories.

My central thesis is that the Canadian state has historically organized membership in the Canadian nation and access to citizenship through the racialized 'welfare-colonialism' imposed upon Aboriginal peoples, and through the racialized conditions of the immigration of all non-Aboriginal peoples. While the relative liberalization of immigration and citizenship policies in the 1970s eased the restrictions on the entry of third world women into Canada, and gave them increased access to citizenship, this period of relative liberalization has lasted for about three decades and is now coming to an end in late 20th century.

In 1994, the Canadian state organized Reviews of immigration policy and social security policy. Both reviews reproduced racialized definitions of the Canadian nation and naturalized the ongoing colonization of Aboriginal peoples. Through these reviews, and through the subsequent policy changes implemented, the state is restructuring immigration policy to reduce the immigration of third world women into Canada as permanent residents, consequently restricting their access to formal citizenship in the country. The state's concurrent restructuring of social security policy will also make it exceedingly difficult for sponsored immigrant women to gain equal access to social entitlements. While the trade liberalization policies being promoted by the Canadian state in the restructuring of the global economy in the 1990s seeks the free flow of capital and goods across national borders, through the two Reviews, the state is reinforcing the ideological and material borders of the nation against *immigrant* women.

In this dissertation, I use third world feminist theory to theorize the

intersection of race, class and gender relations in late 20th century Canada within the context of the political economy of globalization and migration. I do so by examining specifically the Social Security Review (SSR) and the Immigration Policy Review (IPR) organized by the state in 1994. Central to the process of restructuring Canadian society for the coming millennium, these Reviews are of great significance to the future reproduction of the nation and the regulation of access to citizenship. Whereas theories of citizenship take the membership of citizens in the nation for granted, I problematize both the category 'nation' and 'citizen' by examining their historical construction in Canada. Likewise, I problematize the category *immigrant* women by examining the processes which have ideologically constructed their 'outsider-to-the-nation' status despite their very material presence in the country. Working from the critical standpoint of *immigrant* women, I direct attention to the intersection of immigration and social policy in organizing membership in the *Canadian* nation and access to Canadian citizenship.

In my examination of the documents organizing the Social Security Review (SSR) and the Immigration Policy Review (IPR), I demonstrate that the textual realities produced by the state through these texts naturalized the racialized construction of the nation by making invisible the existence of Aboriginal peoples and their colonized/ racialized administration through 'welfare-colonialism.' The SSR made invisible the role of immigration policy in regulating access to citizenship, upon which social entitlements are based, by remaining silent on the racialized/gendered inequalities organized by the *Immigration Act*. The IPR constructed *immigrant* women as a threat to the nation and its institutions. Both Reviews therefore naturalized the ongoing colonization of Aboriginal peoples, as well as the role of immigration policy in organizing access to citizenship and social security entitlements. They also enabled the state to legitimize itself as the defender of the national interest, and to represent the restructuring of immigration policy and social security policy as being in the nation's interests.

I demonstrate that the textual reality produced through the Immigration Policy Review constructed *immigrant* women as the most urgent problem-in-common facing the nation-state. *Immigrant* women were made responsible for

precipitating the fiscal crisis of the state by allegedly overburdening social programs. They were also made responsible for the cultural, linguistic and social diversity which was presented as threatening the cohesiveness of the nation. Therefore, neither one of the two Reviews, nor the subsequent policy changes they legitimized, sought to transform the historical racialization of the nation and access to citizenship. Instead, both Reviews naturalized this racialization by seeking to nationalize *Canadians* as a racial/national homogenous group into a partnership with 'their' state for the coming millennium.

Subsequent to the two Reviews, the state implemented the following changes as 'solutions' to the 'problems' facing the nation-state: (i) an outright reduction in the number of immigrants to be allowed into the country, and a change in the composition of immigration categories to further reduce the family category; (ii) a re-introduction of the head tax on immigrants; (iii) further restrictions on eligibility criteria for sponsorship, including the creation of a sponsorship contract and the implementation of measures to enforce the fiscal obligations of sponsors; (iv) an increase in the surveillance and policing of *immigrant* women's use of social security programs; and (v) the introduction of the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) which provides unconditional block funding from the federal government to provincial governments for social assistance programs, ending the state's commitment to federal standards for these programs.

As the majority of immigrants entering Canada since the 1970s have come from third world source countries, and have entered under the family category, they will be the most impacted by these restrictions. The reduction of the family category and the introduction of the head tax will severely restrict the ability of third world women to enter Canada as landed immigrants, a status which subsequently makes them eligible to make legal claims to citizenship. Further, immigration policy ideologically constructs *immigrant* women as outsiders to the nation and limits the access of sponsored immigrant women to significant social assistance programs. The SSR further reinforced this ideological construction. The SSR did not address the official dis-entitling - through immigration regulations - of the access of the family category to

social assistance programs. Instead, the SSR naturalized this unequal entitlement by leaving it off the 'national' agenda in restructuring social security. Because the CHST ends federal standards for social assistance programs, any discretionary access sponsored immigrant women have acquired to social assistance programs at the provincial level cannot be extended across the country in the absence of these standards. Further, the federal government has reduced federal social spending in the CHST, which increases the incentive of provincial governments to cut their social spending by ending any discretionary provision of social security programs to sponsored immigrants. The federal government has also strengthened sponsorship enforcement by giving provincial governments powers to prosecute defaulting sponsors. The sponsors, in turn, now have greater incentive to ensure sponsored immigrant women do not attempt to access social assistance programs. Whilst low income people have always faced barriers to family sponsorship, the state's strengthening of sponsorship criteria by increasing the income levels necessary for sponsors to qualify for sponsorship further restricts their possibilities for family reunification.

By reducing immigration under the family category, it is unlikely the state intends to do away with the provision of third world women's labour to the economy. As a number of studies have demonstrated, the state is ensuring the supply of third world women's "cheapened" labour by developing a migrant worker program as a permanent feature of the economy (Sharma, 1997; Singh Bolaria, 1992; Stasiulis, 1997; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). This dissertation complements these studies by examining the changes to immigration policy which are designed to reduce the ability of third world women to enter the country as permanent residents, and thereby compel many would-be immigrant women to become migrant workers. Restricting access to permanent resident status, and denying them access to citizenship is an essential requirement for the maintenance of a migrant labour program on a permanent basis.

In addition to implementing the changes mentioned above, the Canadian state has also announced its intention to introduce amendments to the *Citizenship Act* in order to restrict the conditions under which citizenship will

be granted. The state is considering an amendment which will end the currently existing right of all children born in the country to automatically claim citizenship. If this change is legislated, it would present women in the country who do not have permanent resident status with a choice: either they can 'voluntarily' choose to repatriate or remain in Canada and give birth to children who may be denied citizenship. The state has begun to build the public support necessary for this significant change by constructing a 'problem' of women entering the country and giving birth solely for the purpose of acquiring Canadian citizenship. While no such widespread 'problem' has been demonstrated to exist, this amendment will ensure that women who are undocumented and migrant workers do not gain access to citizenship through their Canadian-born children.

Historically, the state has used immigration policy to provide the labour of *immigrant* women to the economy. Simultaneously, it has ideologically constructed these women as having the potential to overwhelm the whiteness of the nation by their presence in the country, and by reproducing future generations of *immigrants* with legal claims to citizenship. The Reviews (re)constructed *immigrant* women as outsiders to the nation, enabling the state to legitimize its 'partnership' with the nation by 'protecting' it from outsiders for the coming millennium. I demonstrate that the period of increased immigration of third world women into Canada, and their relatively increased access to claiming citizenship, has lasted for three decades - from the 1970s to the 1990s - and is coming to an end in the late 20th century.

This dissertation is my contribution to the contemporary literature on globalization. Much of this literature in Canada focuses on the current phase of globalization as resulting in the integration of national economies in the 1980s and 1990s. This literature rarely addresses the current phase of globalization as rooted in, and reproducing, the earlier phase of global integration in the form of colonization, except in the work of third world and Aboriginal theorists. The critical standpoint of *immigrant* women reveals that globalization can be dated back to the earliest beginnings of the capitalist system of relations which is rooted in colonialism. By using race as a central category of analysis, I examine the ongoing nature of this global integration

within the historical context of colonization. Although the state is currently pursuing policies to remove barriers to the flow of capital, goods and services through trade and investment liberalization, I demonstrate that it is simultaneously fortifying the borders of the nation through the ideological construction of *immigrant* women as a serious threat to the cohesion of the nation and its resources. My contribution to the literature on citizenship is to demonstrate that citizenship has never been a matter simply of the legal status of individuals. By ideologically constructing women of colour as *immigrants*, the Canadian state has organized their unequal access to citizenship even when women of colour have *de jure* citizen status. Conversely, by ideologically constructing white women as *Canadians*, the state organizes their membership in the nation even when they have *de jure* immigrant status. I demonstrate that the categories *Canadian* and *immigrant* are racialized categories which refer to much more than length of residence or legal status: immigrant women who are white have historically been integrated into the nation as *Canadians*, while women of colour have been constructed as *immigrants*, irrespective of the length of their residence in the country. This racialization was integrated into both the SSR and the IPR, and as such, continues to underpin the ongoing construction of the *Canadian* nation and access to citizenship.

Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation is organized into three parts. Part 1 sets out the overall theoretical and conceptual framework in Chapters One, Two and Three. Part Two deals with the earlier stages of Canadian-nation building in the 20th century in Chapters Four, Five and Six. These Chapters provide the historical context within which the Social Security Review and Immigration Policy Review were organized in 1994. The two Reviews, and a number of major policy changes implemented subsequently, are examined in Part Three. I end the dissertation with the Conclusion which outlines the findings of my study.

In Part One, I outline the theoretical and conceptual framework. In Chapter One, I define the research question, and outline the theoretical and methodological framework which guides this study. My research addresses the

relationship between the 1994 Immigration Policy Review and the Social Security Review in the restructuring of Canadian society. Using third world feminist theory, I theorize the intersection between race, class and gender relations within the context of the political economy of global migration. My use of third world feminist theory is complemented by Dorothy Smith's 'relations of ruling framework' which conceptualizes the social organization of knowledge as reproducing social relations in the everyday/everynight lives of women (Smith, 1987). The feminist methodology developed by Smith points to the production of objectified forms of knowledge within the texts that organize relations of ruling in advanced capitalist societies. These texts construct textual realities which organize and shape the actions of institutions and individuals, and in this way, become actionable in the world. In the form of these actions and institutional practices, textual realities are imposed onto our lived experiences, overriding the forms of knowledge gained in our lived experiences of the world. I use this methodology from the critical standpoint of *immigrant* women to analyze the textual realities produced by the state through the SSR and IPR texts, and conclude this chapter by identifying the specific IPR and SSR texts which I examine in this dissertation.

In Chapter Two, I review the contemporary literature on citizenship. I begin with a discussion of T. H. Marshall's theory of citizenship which defines the civil, political and social rights of citizenship as counteracting the inequalities generated within the economy. Marshall theorized the development of capitalist citizenship, and his theory continues to be the point of departure for contemporary discussions of citizenship. I examine a number of the major critiques of Marshall's theory which focus on the following: (i) his treatment of the economic and political spheres as independent from each other; (ii) his evolutionist approach to citizenship; (iii) his inadequate treatment of gender and race divisions; and finally, (iv) his naturalization of the nation by not making the distinction between formal and substantive rights. I then summarize the two major approaches in the current literature on citizenship: the first defines citizenship as a universal project which can be extended to encompass marginalized sectors of society; the second defines citizenship as essentially a mechanism for organizing the inclusion of citizens in the national

community while excluding 'outsiders.' I argue Marshall's theory is inadequate in explaining the development of citizenship in Canada because it takes both the nation and formal citizenship rights for granted. Examining this theory from the critical standpoint of *immigrant* women, I argue both assumptions are unwarranted.

In Chapter Three, I address Marxist and feminist theories of migration which have examined the political economy of labour migration. I argue that in examining migration, these theories have paid insufficient attention to the centrality of processes of racialization within the global economy. In the particular case of Canada, I argue that the migrations of both *future citizens* and *immigrant* women were/are rooted in the same set of socio-economic conditions within the global capitalist system. My contribution to this scholarship is to develop the concepts of **nationalization** and **bordering** in examining the nation-building practices of the Canadian state. It has been in the Canadian state's organization of unequal conditions of immigration which have constructed white immigrants as *future citizens* by **racializing** / **nationalizing** them into becoming *Canadians* as members of the nation, while third world women have been **racialized** / **bordered** as *immigrant* women and outsiders to the nation.

Part Two - which examines earlier stages of Canadian nation-building - begins with Chapter Four. In this Chapter I begin my analysis of nation-building and citizenship in Canada by placing it within the context of the colonial phase of the capitalist system of relations. I examine the causal relationship between the colonization of Aboriginal and third world societies within the British Empire and the expansion of citizenship rights for Europeans within this Empire. No 'natural' Canadian nation existed prior to European colonization. Instead, what we define today as the Canadian nation has been constructed through the migrations of various colonizing and colonized populations. The Canadian nation and citizenship, therefore, can only be adequately explained in the context of the global processes of colonization/ racialization within the capitalist system in the 19th and 20th centuries. Specifically, I direct attention to how the racialization of the nation and citizenship have been organized by the state through the *Indian Act* of 1876,

and through racialized immigration policies which bordered *non-preferred race* women.

In Chapter Five, I examine the impact of the 'welfare' state on the Canadian nation and citizenship. The 'welfare' state has been defined by Marshall as advancing citizenship rights through the development of social rights which signify the state's responsibility towards the welfare of its citizens. I argue that the 'welfare' state re-configured the state's nation-building practices: the welfare state sought to integrate/nationalize *Canadians* into a partnership with the state through the construction of 'national' programs and, in this way, to transcend the actual divisions of race, class and gender existing in Canada. Where Marxist and feminist theorists define the welfare state as a 'compromise' which perpetuated class and gender relations, I argue this class and gender 'compromise' was racialized as it maintained the racialized reproduction of the nation and the 'national' interest. The welfare state reconfigured processes of racialization in a number of ways: by organizing the ongoing governing of Aboriginal peoples under the racialized *Indian Act*; by using racialized immigration policies and a racialized *Citizenship Act (1947)* to regulate access to entitlements until the 1960s, during which critical period the welfare state was expanded and consolidated; and, by implementing a racialized vision of social policy which has not transformed, but reproduced, racialized inequalities within Canada.

In Chapter Six, I examine the major changes to immigration policy enshrined in the *Immigration Act 1976-77*, which removed overt references to 'race' and entrenched the point system. I demonstrate how these changes did not end the racialization of the nation. Instead, the *Act* sought to strengthen the bicultural and bilingual 'national' character produced by previous immigration policies. The ideological practices embedded in this *Act* continue to racially distinguish immigrants into *future citizens* and *immigrants* on the basis of their social, cultural and linguistic compatibility with the nation. The *Act* also distinguishes between the independent and family category of immigrants, gendering immigration into the country. The intersection of these processes of racialization and gendering construct *immigrant* women as both incompatible with the national character and 'non-economic' 'dependents.' As

a result of these changes, third world women have been able to enter the country under the family category in significant numbers, but have been subjected to unequal access to social entitlements. The racialization of third world immigrant women has been further exacerbated by the non-recognition of their academic and professional credentials, which results in deskilling them and leading to their downward class mobility.

Part Three - my analysis of the 1994 Reviews and subsequent policy changes - includes the last Chapters of this dissertation. In Chapters Seven and Eight, I examine the textual realities produced by the state through the 1994 Social Security Review and the Immigration Policy Review. The ideological practices of the state were incorporated into the production of these textual realities which took as their point of departure a homogenous, unified nation of *Canadians* who share the national interest with 'their' state. These textual realities reproduce the ideological construction of the nation by attempting to erase the divisions of race, class and gender which exist in actuality. The SSR constructed third world workers, 'Other' nations, the over-generosity of *Canadians* and the failures of social programs as threatening the future welfare and prosperity of both nation and state. The SSR, while constructing the state, industry and the nation as equally 'victim' to these 'threats,' kept both Aboriginal peoples and *immigrant* women off the national agenda, reproducing their racialized inequalities for the coming millennium. In this way, the SSR constructed a partnership between the state and nation, presenting the state as a benevolent, but stern, patriarch to the nation it sought to 'protect.'

The textual practices of the Immigration Policy Review, on the other hand, identified the family category and *immigrant* women as the biggest single 'threat' to the cohesiveness of the nation and to the future of national social security programs. The public consultations produced a 'world-in-common' shared by the state and 'Canadians.' The 'problems' in social security programs and the immigration program were constructed from the perspective of state, and the effect of the public consultations was to draw *Canadians* into entering the textual reality. The objectified forms of knowledge integrated into the textual realities were made actionable through the subsequent policy changes.

In Chapter Nine, I examine the specific changes to immigration and social security policy made by the state, namely: (i) a reduction in immigration levels and a shift in the composition of the immigration categories away from the family category; (ii) the strengthening of sponsorship regulations; (iii) the reintroduction of the head tax; and the replacement of the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) with the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST). I argue these changes will have the result of reducing the access of *immigrant* women to permanent resident status and to citizenship in Canada. I end the chapter by examining the state's proposal for an amendment to the *Citizenship Act* which, if implemented, will create the conditions for the repatriation of mothers of certain groups of Canadian-born children. This amendment, I argue, will support the maintaining of a migrant labour force as a permanent component of the labour force.

In my examination of the SSR and the IPR, I conclude that both Reviews represent the state's practices of nation-building in late 20th century Canada. The state has produced textual realities through these Reviews which legitimize the state's role as the 'protector' of the nation, and which seek to nationalize *Canadians* into the restructuring of Canadian society. Further, the policy changes implemented will strengthen the neo-conservative restructuring by shifting the responsibility for the erosion of social programs away from the state and onto *immigrant* women. Therefore, the policy changes implemented will not 'solve' the problems of deteriorating social programs, but will only further exacerbate them by shielding the state's role in eroding these programs. The textual realities produced by the state do not seek to transform the racialization of the nation and citizenship. Instead, they have helped create the conditions for closing the ranks of the nation against *immigrant* women into the 21st century.

Explaining the Terminology

Developing an adequate vocabulary to examine and describe processes of racialization without reinforcing racialized constructions of women of colour is a tremendous challenge. Therefore, in my use of the following terminology, I seek to draw attention to the processes of racialization which are expressed in

these terms.

In discussing pre-1960 immigration into Canada, I use the terms 'preferred races' and 'non-preferred races.' Race was a specific category used by the state to distinguish between potential immigrants, who were also classified as "preferred" and "non-preferred," as "desirables" and "undesirables" (Hawkins, 1988; Jakubowski, 1997). The terms *preferred races* and *non-preferred races* graphically and overtly capture the overt racialization of immigrants by the Canadian state. In using these terms, I seek to highlight the centrality accorded to 'race' by the state.

I use the term immigrant to refer to individuals who have immigrated into Canada, and have not yet acquired legal citizenship in Canada. However, Canadian state practices have ideologically distinguished immigrants into 'future citizens,' who were destined to join the nation, and 'immigrants,' who were to remain outsiders to the nation. When referring to this process of racialized distinguishing of immigrants who share the same legal status, my use of the terms *future citizens* and *immigrants* is italicized. The term *future citizens* I have taken from a speech made by McKenzie King in 1947. King used this term to refer to the 'preferred race' immigrants that the Canadian state sought to recruit (Jakubowski, 1997). The term *immigrants* is used in 'common sense' terms to refer to people of colour in Canada (Bannerji, 1993). Likewise, the category Canadian has come to represent both a legal citizenship status, and a racialized 'white' 'member-of-the-nation' status. When I use the term *Canadian* in this racialized sense, I italicize it.

Not all theorists who study immigrant women examine the racialization of this category of women. Therefore, when I use their studies, I do not italicize the term immigrant women. When theorists have self-consciously addressed the racialization of *immigrant* women, I italicize the term.

PART 1: THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

CHAPTER ONE

CONTEXTUALIZING THE DISSERTATION

Defining the Research

The Canadian state has undertaken a profound restructuring of the economy which is being driven by neo-conservative 'free market' principles (Brodie, 1995, 1996; Cohen, 1997; McBride & Shields, 1993; Pulkingham & Ternowetsky, 1996). At the heart of this restructuring is the dismantling of the welfare state and a redefinition, even termination, of some of the social entitlements of citizenship. Although immigration policy has received much less attention from social scientists, significant changes to the immigration program in the 1990s are restricting immigration into the country (CIC, 1994t). I argue these changes to immigration policy are also central to the restructuring of Canadian society. As the majority of the immigrants entering Canada since the 1970s have been from third world source countries under the family category (Abu-Laban, 1998; Boyd, 1987, 1991; Green & Green, 1997; Hawkins, 1989), those most affected by these restrictions will be third world women.

In 1994, the Canadian state launched separate reviews of Social Security and Immigration Policy as part of the process of restructuring these policy areas for the 21st century. Both sets of reviews were organized through extensive cross-country public consultations, with the state inviting *Canadians* to help identify the major 'problems' in these policy areas, and to help find the 'solutions' to them. As an *immigrant* woman who participated in both sets of consultations, I was fascinated by the consultation process which silenced women of colour, including myself. I was greatly disturbed by the significant policy changes which were subsequently enacted in both areas. Most feminists were quick to identify changes to social security programs as representing a serious setback for the rights of women; these changes were eroding the gains of the feminist movement in extending women's citizenship rights. However, only feminists of colour addressed the changes to immigration policy which

were equally significant in restricting *immigrant* women's access to citizenship.

The experiences of women of colour in Canada demonstrate that citizenship rights have never been a simple matter of one's legal status. Women of colour have been denied membership in the white *Canadian* nation through a myriad of racialized nation-building state practices key among which are immigration policy and social policy. As a result, we continue to be racialized as *immigrant* women, regardless of how many previous generations have lived in the country, and of our actual legal status. Therefore, the ideological processes which construct us as *immigrants* shape our (non)membership in the nation, as well as our unequal claims to citizenship.

Based on my experiences as a participant in both sets of policy Reviews, I address the following question in this dissertation: What is the relationship between the 1994 Social Security Review and Immigration Policy Review in organizing women's citizenship in Canada? In asking this question, I examine the historical and contemporary relationship between these two policy areas. I address their intersection in shaping women's citizenship, both in terms of the formal right to enter and live in Canada, and to access social entitlements. While feminists were addressing how the social entitlements of citizenship were being eroded in the SSR, it became clear to me as an *immigrant* woman that the state was restricting access to formal citizenship for *immigrant* women, an access which is the precondition for any claims to social entitlements.

Much of the contemporary feminist analysis on the impact of the restructuring on women treats women as a homogenous group. Very little work analyzes the impact of restructuring on women *and* processes of racialization in Canada. Such work would help highlight both the similarities *and* differences in the impact of restructuring on women. The historical development of Canadian society has been organized through the social relations of race, class and gender (Bannerji, 1993; Brand, 1993; Das Gupta, 1995; Maracle, 1993; Ng, 1988; 1993; Silvera, 1993; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). The development of an integrated social relations framework is a necessary undertaking in order to analyze adequately how the current phase of globalization is restructuring Canadian society. This dissertation examines and theorizes the intersection between race, gender, and class relations

through an examination of the relation between social policy and immigration policy in the construction of the nation and citizenship in Canada.

The Social Relations of Race, Class and Gender

Third world feminist theorists define the relations of race, class and gender as being central to the organization of capitalist relations and systems of exploitation, as well as to the imposition of western political hegemony (Mohanty, Russo & Torres, 1991). Foregrounding the historical experiences of colonization, imperialism and migration, third world feminist theorists have argued for a recognition of the relational nature of the social world. The term 'third world' represents the historical relation of domination between 'first world' and 'third world' populations in the imposition of western economic and political domination in the global system. Used in this political sense, the term 'third world' names a relation of domination, and foregrounds the resistance to this domination by third world women:

While the term *third world* is a much maligned and contested one, we use it deliberately, preferring it to *postcolonial* or *developing countries*. *Third world* refers to the colonized, neocolonized or decolonized countries (of Asia, Africa, and Latin America) whose economic and political structures have been deformed within the colonial process, and to black, Asian, Latino, and indigenous peoples in North America, Europe, and Australia. Thus, the term does not merely indicate a hierarchical cultural and economic relationship between "first" and "third world" countries; it intentionally foregrounds a history of colonization and contemporary relationships of structural dominance between first and third world peoples. In drawing on histories of antiracist, antiimperialist struggles around the world, the term *third world* is also a form of self-empowerment. However, the unproblematized use of a term such as *third world women* could suggest the equation of struggles and experiences of different groups of women, thus flattening and depoliticizing all internal hierarchies. The term could also suggest that "third world" cultures or "ethnicity" is the primary (or only) basis of the politics of third world women. We intend neither. (Mohanty, Russo & Torres, 1991: ix-x)

Third world feminists stress the political nature of the term "third world" and define a "political constituency" of third world women as a community of women whose "oppositional alliance" arises out of a common history of struggle

and resistance to western political and economic hegemony (Mohanty, 1991). This political community of resistance is shared between third world women who are geographically located both in third world and European countries. Recognizing the "internal" inequalities and different historical experiences of third world women, third world feminism represents a fluid, transformative and dynamic movement of oppositional forms of knowledge production and resistance. I use this theoretical framework which foregrounds the intersectionality of race, class and gender relations in the social relations underlying the global capitalist system. However, in order to highlight the centrality of the colonization of the Americas in the historical development of capitalism as a global system of relations, and to highlight the ongoing struggles of Aboriginal women against colonization and for title to their ancestral lands in Canada, I will refer specifically to Aboriginal/indigenous women. Third world immigrant women have no such prior relationship or claim to the land in Canada, and my specific reference to Aboriginal/indigenous women highlights this recognition. Additionally, while this theoretical tradition names the objective relation of third world women in having been colonized, third world women themselves have asserted and re-claimed their subjectivities by naming themselves Black feminists, women of colour, womanists, South Asian feminists, among various other names. I try and keep this self-defining in the picture by using these names when appropriate.

In their engagement with western feminism, Marxism, and male colonial/race theorists, third world and Aboriginal feminists have rejected their separation of race, class and gender as discrete, unconnected forms of exploitation. Rejecting the contention that the integration of race, class and gender relations has relevance only for third world women, third world and Aboriginal feminists define these social relations as central to the development of capitalist relations (Mohanty, 1991; Maracle, 1993). The intersectionality of race, class, and gender relations are grounded within the material conditions which organize the internationalization of economies, and in the international division of labour. Third world and Aboriginal feminists theorize social relations from the critical standpoint of third world and indigenous women,

arguing that working from this critical standpoint leads to a reconceptualization of existing forms of knowledge. Rejecting the 'add on' approach which seeks to 'include' women of colour into existing forms of knowledge, but leave these forms essentially untouched, third world and Aboriginal theorists integrate analysis of race, class and gender relations to shift the center of knowledge to develop a fuller understanding of the world we live in (Amos & Parmer, 1984; Bannerji, 1995; Brewer, 1993; Davis, 1983; Green, 1995; Hill Collins, 1991; hooks, 1988; Maracle, 1993; Mohanty, 1991; Razack, 1998).

Radical theories of class take as their point of departure Marx's analysis of capitalism defining class struggle as central to the organization of social life. Marx, in collaboration with Engels, ([1848] 1978) theorized the capitalist mode of production as being based on the central contradiction between capital and labour: the contradiction between the development of the forces of production and the social relations of production. Marx argued that the development of capitalism would lead to class polarization between the two major capitalist classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat:

Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive feature: it has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat. (Marx & Engels, [1848]1978:474)

The bourgeoisie, by virtue of its ownership and control of the means of production, is able to compel the proletariat to sell their human capacity to labour as wage labour. Having been historically dispossessed of access to the means of production, the proletariat is left with little option but to sell its labour power to the bourgeoisie, thus giving this class property rights in the commodified labour power of the proletariat.

Marx developed the labour theory of value upon his recognition of this relation between labour and capital. In the production process, the proletariat produces commodities, creating value which becomes embodied within these commodities. The value of the commodities at the end of the production cycle is greater than the costs of the means of production. This difference was defined by Marx as "surplus value." The wage relation enables the bourgeoisie

to appropriate this surplus value, which it realizes and transforms into capital by re-introducing it into another cycle of production. Thus, the very surplus value produced by the proletariat comes to control this class in the form of the capital which is concentrated in the hands of the bourgeoisie. This relation between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, allowing the bourgeoisie to appropriate surplus value and accumulate it in the form of capital, was defined by Marx as a relation of "exploitation."

The central features of Marx's theoretical framework are the following: (i) class relations are rooted within the material conditions of capitalist production; (ii) the power of the bourgeoisie is rooted in these material conditions; (iii) wage labour is *the* capitalist form of labour which, when engaged in productive labour, creates surplus value accumulated by the bourgeoisie in the form of capital; (iv) the exploitation of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie can only be ended through the transformation of the capitalist mode of production and the elimination of bourgeois relations of private property which allow the surplus value produced by the social labour of the proletariat to become the private property of the bourgeoisie (Marx & Engels, [1848] 1978).

Feminists have critiqued Marx's 'gender blindness,' arguing that relations of reproduction are critical to the capitalist system of relations. They have shown the gendered organization of both production and reproduction as fundamental to the patriarchal relations of male dominance within capitalist society (Al-Hibri, 1981; Davis, 1981; Harding, 1987; Hartmann, 1981; Sargent, 1981; Smith, 1992). As Dorothy Smith puts it, "There is no economic organization that is not also an organization of gender" (1992: 10).

Where Engels had argued that patriarchy was a pre-capitalist phenomenon destined to disappear with the development of capitalist relations, Marxist and Socialist feminists have demonstrated how patriarchal relations were integrated into capitalist organization of production and reproduction. It is at this point of intersection between the relations of production and reproduction that an adequate analysis of capitalist/patriarchy must begin.

Feminist critiques of Marxism have come from different theoretical traditions: Socialist and Marxist feminists examine the intersection between

gender and class relations, while radical feminists argue that men's control over women's bodies and sexuality lies at the core of patriarchal power relations (Al Hibri, 1981; Dworkin, 1987; MacKinnon, 1989). The various traditions of western feminism have theorized patriarchy and capitalism in significantly different ways. Briefly, I will focus on the feminist analysis which ground the specific forms of women's exploitation within the material conditions of capitalist/ patriarchal society.⁶

Marxist feminists and socialist feminists have revealed the patriarchal nature of capitalism in gendering the relations of production and reproduction, organizing women's labour within the family in the 'production' and reproduction of labour power (Hartmann, 1981; Jaggar, 1988; Mies, 1986; Sargent, 1981; Young, 1981).⁷ Women's domestic labour, unwaged and devalued in capitalist society, produces surplus value by literally 'producing' the next generation of labour. It also services the daily reproduction of the labour power of adult male workers who are at the centre of Marx's definition of the proletariat. The value produced by women within the family becomes appropriated by the bourgeoisie through the male proletariat who is paid a wage lower than the actual costs of his subsistence, which women's unpaid labour helps to subsidize. The unwaged, domestic labour of women, in effect, produces 'surplus' value which contributes directly to the accumulation of capital. Indeed, women's labour is the precondition for 'capitalist' production because it 'produces' workers. Within this patriarchal /capitalist system, women are exploited not only as wage workers when they enter the paid labour force, but also as women when they create surplus value through their unwaged labour. To define the "point of production" as the only site of class exploitation and class struggle, as many Marxists do, is to preclude women's experiences from being conceptualized or grasped as anything other than marginal to the "main business" of capital accumulation (Smith, 1992).

Another profound challenge to Marxist theory has come from the Black

⁶ See Jaggar, A. (1983) for a fuller discussion of the major philosophical and political perspectives among the different traditions within western feminism.

radical tradition which has argued that the 'universality' of class defined by Marx as being at the centre of capitalist social relations is lived out in the particularities of 'race' in the actual world. Marx's subsuming of race by giving primacy to class relations in theorizing the material organization of capitalism has been confronted by this tradition, which theorizes the intersection of race and class in the global capitalist system (Robinson, 1983). Rejecting the primacy of class over race, the sociologist W.E.B. Du Bois warned, ".....the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color line" (1969:xi). However, while drawing attention to the centrality of race in the international division of labour, Black radical theorists have overlooked the racial hierarchies within the capitalist system which cannot be neatly reduced to black/white relations. Racial hierarchies constructed by European colonizers placed third world peoples in hierarchical relations with each other, as well as with Europeans. Focusing on the racialization of Black people in the United States, the radical Black tradition has not adequately addressed, for example, the racialization and colonization of Aboriginal peoples in the Americas.

Significant differences exist in how various theoretical traditions define 'race', and what its relationship is to class and gender relations. Liberal theorists define racism as a form of discrimination and bias against certain groups of people within society. They tend to accept as natural the existence of differences, whether 'racial' or 'cultural,' which give rise to biases and prejudices and result in the discriminatory treatment of certain groups.

On the other hand, most Marxist and radical theorists of 'race' and racialization agree that it is a social category given concrete meaning in the organization of power relations within society, and not an inherent and unchanging biological trait of human beings (Balibar & Wallerstein, 1988; Bannerji, 1995; Fanon, 1963; Gilroy, 1991; Hill Collins, 1991; Maracle, 1993; Miles, 1993; Mohanty, 1991; Razack, 1998; Robinson, 1983; Sivanandan, 1990; Solomos & Back, 1996; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995).

Marxist theorists of race define racism as primarily an ideological

⁷ See Sargent (1981) for an excellent discussion of the key theoretical debates among socialist feminists and radical feminists in conceptualizing the relation between capitalism and patriarchy.

phenomenon which places certain groups of people in particular class relations as 'cheap' and surplus labour. Racism is used by the bourgeoisie to divide the working class: creating divisions between workers along the lines of race weakens the possibility of a revolutionary challenge from a unified proletariat. Marxists argue that racism primarily serves the bourgeoisie, ensuring the continued existence of capitalist relations and the use of 'cheap' third world labour to deflate the general level of wages (Bonacich & Cheng, 1985; Marable, 1983; Singh Bolaria & Li, 1985; Winston, 1977). Vic Satzewich, for example, has critiqued this 'structuralist' approach on two counts: firstly, it is teleological in assuming that "capitalist societies have certain needs, and that these needs then produce the required response"; and secondly, "racism in certain historical instances can be dysfunctional for capital" such as when "racist hostility disrupts the workplace" (1990: 257). Satzewich, along with a number of other Marxist theorists, argues that political economists should focus on examining the processes of racialization which articulate social relations between 'different' social groups through the signification of biological 'differences' as racial difference. The use of the category 'race' should be rejected (Miles, 1993; Satzewich, 1990). Rejecting the structuralist approach which defines racism as an ideology imposed 'from above' by the bourgeoisie, Satzewich advocates an 'agency' position which "examines racism not as a false ideology about the world, but as an ideology that comes from peoples' lived experiences" of the 'racial' categories which situate them in particular relations of production (Satzewich, 1990: 262-265). Robert Miles argues that racism needs to be addressed within the context of the rise of the nation-state, and he shifts the discussion away from focusing on the relations between capitalism and colonialism to the relation between capitalism and the nation-state. While Miles' contribution to developing the concept of racialization has been widely accepted in the literature, his contention that racism primarily expresses an ideological relation has been criticized for giving primacy to class and subsuming race. His contention that social movements organized on the basis of 'race' only dissipate class-based struggles remains controversial and has been rejected by a number of radical theorists (Gilroy, 1991; Solomos & Back, 1996).

Radical theorists challenge the Marxist definition of race as being only ideological, arguing instead that race is rooted in the material organization of capitalism. The historical development of capitalism was based on the colonization of indigenous peoples and on the enslavement and forced migrations of various populations (DuBois, 1969; Fanon, 1963; Robinson, 1983). Colonization and slavery enabled the plunder of the resources of the third world and the exploitation of Black labour by the colonizing powers, enabling the accomplishment of the "primitive" accumulation of capital which was used for the 'development' of the colonizing societies and for financing and fueling the industrial revolution (Du Bois, 1969; Fanon, 1963; Robinson, 1983; Sivanandan, 1990). This colonial exploitation became racialized as colonizers constructed colonized peoples as inferior, and even 'sub-human,' while constructing themselves as superior representatives of 'civilized' humanity. In this way, race became a central organizing principle of the international division of labour and of the exploitation of the resources of colonized societies. As Cedric Robinson explains:

The development, organization and expansion of capitalist society pursued essentially racial directions, so too did social ideology. As a material force, then, it could be expected that racialism would inevitably permeate the social structures emergent from capitalism. I have used the term 'racial capitalism' to refer to this development and to the subsequent structure as an historical agency. (Robinson, 1983: 2-3)

In his classic study of the history of Black radical tradition which emerged from the struggles for Black liberation from capitalist social relations, Robinson (1983) demonstrates that the capitalism which emerged from Europe was a "racial capitalism." He argues "racialism" was embedded within every aspect of the western civilization which shaped the development and the formation of 'capitalist' classes:

The creation of the Negro was obviously at the cost of immense expenditures of psychic and intellectual energies in the West. The exercise was obligatory. It was an effort commensurate with the importance Black labour power possessed for the world economy sculpted and dominated by the ruling and mercantile classes of Western Europe..... The African slave trade and the slavery of the New World were

integral to the modern world economy. Their relationship to capitalism was historical and organic rather than adventitious or synthetic...

Certainly slave labour was one of the bases for what Marx termed 'primitive accumulation'. But it would be an error to arrest the relationship there, assigning slave labour to some 'pre-capitalist' stage of history. For more than 300 hundred years slave labour persisted beyond the beginnings of modern capitalism, complementing wage labour, peonage, serfdom and other methods of labour coercion. Ultimately, this meant that the interpretation of history in terms of the dialectic of class struggles would prove inadequate, a mistake ordained by the preoccupation of Marxism with the industrial and manufacturing centres of capitalism; a mistake founded upon the presumptions that Europe itself has produced, that the motive and material forces which generated the capitalist system were to be wholly located in what was a fictive historical entity. From its very foundations capitalism had never been - any more than Europe - a 'closed system.' (Robinson, 1983: 4)

The most salient features of radical anti-racist theory are the following: (i) racialization as a material force was integrated into the historical development of capitalism which, from its earliest beginnings, was based upon a global integration of economies; (ii) both the bourgeoisie and working classes within this system were international in character and that class formation intersected with processes of racialization; and, (iii) one of the central organizing principles of this system was the racialization of various populations in the organization of labour and control over the global means of production (Robinson, 1983). Therefore, the political economy of colonialism and international migration represent the material grounding of processes of racialization within the global capitalist economy.

While I am in general agreement with this theoretical approach which underscores the materiality of race, this approach remains limited by its silence on the colonization of Aboriginal peoples in the Americas, which was the precondition for the development of capitalist relations within the global system. The Black radical tradition has also remained

silent on gender relations by focusing only on the intersection between class and race. In view of these limitations, third world feminist theory represents a major advance in its recognition of the racialized hierarchies between colonized and indigenous peoples, as well as in its insistence on addressing the intersectionality of race, class and gender relations.

A major contribution in the theorization of processes of racialization within capitalist society has been the work of Frantz Fanon (1963, 1986). In his theorizing of struggles for decolonization, Fanon examines the material basis for the colonizer/colonized relations, but also argues that the racialization of capitalist relations permeates every aspect of social existence and is reproduced in the everyday relations between colonizing and colonized populations. He argued that in becoming racialized, capitalist social relations led to the fundamental dehumanization of both the colonizer and the colonized: "For not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man" (1986: 110). Fanon's contention is that the 'whiteness' of the colonizer is as much a social construction as is the Blackness of the Africans who were colonized. He argued that as a revolutionary process of social transformation, decolonization can not be accomplished as long as racism shapes the relations between colonizing and colonized populations. In his classic study of this everyday racism, Fanon described his own experiences while living in France as follows:

"Look, a Negro!" It was an external stimulus that flicked over me as I passed by. I made a tight smile.
"Look, a Negro!" It was true. It amused me.
"Look, a Negro!" The circle was drawing a bit tighter. I made no secret of my amusement.
"Mama, see the Negro! I'm frightened!" Frightened!
Frightened! Now they were beginning to be afraid of me. I made up my mind to laugh myself to tears, but laughter had become impossible.
I could no longer laugh, because I already knew that there

were legends, stories, history and above all historicity which I had learned about..... I was responsible at the same time for my body, for my race, for my ancestors. I subjected myself to an objective examination. I discovered my blackness, my ethnic characteristics; and I was battered down by tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetichism, racial defects, slave-ships, and above all else, above all: "Sho' good eatin'." (Fanon, 1986:111-112).

Fanon describes the racialization of black skin as a uniform, a signifier of race which defies any attempt at concealment. In the Europe of today, this signification of race has no less currency. As A. Sivanandan, the Director of the London based Institute on Race Relations, writes, Black people "wear their passport on their faces" (Sivanandan, 1982).

Fanon demonstrates that processes of racialization go much deeper than the level of colonial administration and the bureaucratic operations of the state: they permeate everyday relations between colonized peoples and colonizers, as well as of colonized peoples with their own selves. This colonization/racialization is reproduced by inferiorizing, even erasing, the historical being and consciousness of colonized peoples, their cultures and languages, as well as their indigenous systems of knowledge and skills. My intention in quoting Fanon extensively is to use his insights regarding how racialization shapes the contours of power within everyday relations in society. Fanon drew attention racialization as a historical social process which shapes all aspects of social life, and he linked processes of racialization to both the violence of colonial conquest as well as to the cultural and linguistic domination imposed by colonizers. Constructed as *immigrant* women in Canada, women of colour are subjected to the everyday racism described by Fanon, as are Aboriginal women. Fanon underscored the centrality of the inferiorizing of the cultures and languages of colonized peoples to processes of racialization. This inferiorizing seeks to erase the historical experiences and forms of consciousness of colonized peoples as expressed in language and culture; indeed, it seeks to erase the very historical being of colonized peoples. The imposition of the cultural and historical 'superiority' of colonizing societies, as expressed through the imposition of their languages, mediates the relations of colonized peoples to the world around them. Colonized peoples are forced

into expressing their reality in the colonizer's language and cultural forms, forms which inferiorize colonized peoples. Fanon contends that this racialization can only be ended through revolutionary decolonization which fundamentally transforms, and humanizes, social relations. His insights on the definition of the languages and cultures of colonized peoples as 'inferior' are particularly salient in the Canadian context where cultural 'diversity' and proficiency in the national languages have been used by the state as criteria to evaluate the 'worthiness' of immigrants to claim citizenship rights.

Radical anti-racist theorists argue that a significant shift has occurred in how processes of racialization have been organized since the 1970s (Balibar, 1991; Barker, 1981; Gilroy, 1991, 1992; Razack, 1998; Solomos & Back, 1996). Paul Gilroy (1991) argues that the manner in which race is configured today, and the meanings it is ascribed, has changed in response to the struggles of people of colour who contest this relation. Processes of racialization became transformed as anti-racist struggles gained strength, so that a "new racism" took shape which identifies 'race' in the discourse of "cultural" and "national" identity. Martin Barker explains the theory underlying this "new racism" in the following manner:

It is a theory of human nature. Human nature is such that it is natural to form a bounded community, a nation, aware of its differences from other nations. They are no better or worse. But feelings of antagonism will be aroused if outsiders are admitted. And there grows up a connection between a nation and the place it lives...(1981: 20).

Barker argues this "new racism" of the "new right" further posits that "foreigners" also have their "natural homes." Whereas previously racism was expressed in the 'theory' which focused on the 'superiority' and 'inferiority' of races, in the "new racism" race became identified with nation and culture. Processes of racialization came to distinguish between those who have the right to "belong" to the nation on the basis of a shared "culture." Gilroy argues that citizenship became associated with the right of "belonging" to the nation as the 'scientific racism' of earlier periods became de-legitimized. The nation was no longer overtly defined on the basis of a shared racial supremacy, but on the basis of a shared "cultural" identity. Belonging to the nation became

synonymous with membership in a shared culture. This racism identifies Black people and 'immigrants' as outsiders, incapable of belonging to the nation by virtue of belonging to a different "culture." This substitution of 'race' for 'culture' has become the primary means for denying Black and Asian peoples membership in the nation, constructing them as outsiders and subjecting them to increased policing and racist violence even when they have legal citizenship in Britain (Gilroy, 1991, 1993).

Etienne Balibar (1991) likewise argues that racism in Europe in the post-World War II period has become reconfigured so that the category "immigrant" has come to "substitute for the notion of race." He describes this 'new' racism:

The new racism is a racism of the era of 'decolonization', of the reversal of population movements between the old colonies and the old metropolises, and the division of humanity within a single political space. Ideologically, current racism, which in France centres upon the immigration complex, fits into a framework of 'racism without races' which is already widely developed in other countries, particularly the Anglo-Saxon ones. It is a racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability of cultural differences, a racism which, at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others but 'only' the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers; the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions; in short, it is what P.A. Taguieff has rightly called a *differentialist racism*. (Balibar, 1991: 21)

The most important feature of this 'new' racism is that older processes of racialization which were articulated in the language of 'race' became transposed into the language of 'culture.' The 'new' racism stresses the distance of 'immigrants' from the 'national culture,' while simultaneously constructing an ideological unity of the 'nation' which works to incorporate the 'national' working classes into the 'nation' by defining a shared, identical 'national' interest for its members.

Foregrounding the colonial encounter and the ongoing internationalization of the division of labour, third world and Aboriginal feminists have pointed out that the racialization of the colonial encounter between western women and Other women (i.e., third world and indigenous women), resulted in their ideological construction as opposites. These colonial

relations constructed colonized women as 'uncivilized' women belonging to 'backward races,' enabling European women to define themselves as part of 'modern', 'enlightened', 'civilized' races and nations. Colonized women became constructed as 'trapped' in 'tradition bound' societies. As part of 'modern' western civilization, European women defined themselves as the subjects of their own history, and even while challenging the dominance of European men over European women, left unchallenged the racialized ordering of social relations. Indeed, many of them defended the colonial and imperial order, defining it as superior to the 'traditional' societies it displaced (Ahmad, 1992; Amos & Parmar, 1984; Davis, 1987; Hill Collins, 1990; Mohanty, 1991). As Mohanty has stated:

This average third world woman leads an essentially truncated life based on her feminine gender (read: sexually constrained) and her being "third world" (read: ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition-bound, domestic, family-oriented, victimized, etc.). This, I suggest is in contrast to the (implicit) self-representation of Western women as educated, as modern, as having control over their own bodies and sexualities, and the freedom to make their own decision. (Mohanty, 1991: 56)

The ideological processes which constructed colonized women as 'backward' were the same ones which constructed the daughters of the Empire as 'superior'. These ideological constructions drew the line between 'savage' and 'civilized', with European women falling on the 'civilized' side of the equation and colonized women on the 'savage' side of it.

In addition to racializing western women and third world and indigenous women as polar opposites, this racialization/colonization was a deeply gendered historical process which impacted men and women within colonized societies in unequal ways. Race and gender relations became deeply intertwined (Brah, 1993; Mani, 1989; Maracle, 1993; Mohanty, 1991; Sangari & Vaid, 1989; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). Recent feminist historiographies reveal the negative impact of European colonizers upon the various indigenous patriarchal systems and structures. Numerous studies reveal that while forms of patriarchal relations varied significantly in various colonized societies prior to colonization, these patriarchal relations became transformed and integrated into colonial relations so that 'old' and 'new' forms became integrated into

capitalist social relations (Ahmed, 1992; Davis, 1981; Fiske, 1995; Goodleaf, 1993; Maracle, 1993; Mies, 1986; Mohanty, 1991; Sangari & Vaid, 1989; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995; Steady, 1985). The intersection of race, class and gender relations meant colonized women were sexually exploited by European men as well as third world and indigenous men. The economic dependency of these women on both indigenous men and European men was increased, and in some cases created, as a result of the destruction of indigenous economic systems. And finally, the women were marginalized within the colonial power systems defined by western hegemony.⁸

The interesting feature of these studies is their unearthing of how colonized women became equated with 'culture' and 'tradition' by men from both colonizing and colonized societies. The colonial powers interpreted culture and tradition in strictly religious/patriarchal terms, and culture became the arena within which colonized women's rights and entitlements were framed. Colonial laws and administrative practices reconstituted patriarchal relations by legitimizing and integrating the most reactionary and conservative traditional/religious practices into the building of 'modern' capitalist relations, undermining the more egalitarian 'traditional' practices which had previously existed. In the 19th century, egalitarian gender relations were defined as a sign of 'primitiveness' by European colonizers, who took it upon themselves to 'civilize' third world women into their 'rightful' place. This prompted nationalist struggles against colonial rule likewise to inscribe their nationalism on 'their' women. Hence, third world women were made the site for contesting patriarchal definitions of 'culture' and 'nation' of both western

⁸An example of European colonial administrators' attitudes is provided in a book written by a Political Officer in the British Colonial Administration in Burma in 1887, advocating the benefits of increasing 'native' women's dependency on men:

With her power of independence will disappear her free will and her influence. When she is dependent on her husband she can no longer dictate to him. When he feeds her, she is no longer able to make her voice as loud as his. It is inevitable that she should retire....The nations who succeed are not feminine nations but the masculine. Women's influence is good provided it does not go too far. Yet it has done so here. It has been bad for the men, bad too for the woman. It has never been good for women to be too independent, it has robbed them of many virtues. It improves a man to have to work for his wife and family, it makes a man of him. It is demoralising for both if the women can keep herself and, if necessary, her husband too. (Mies, 1986: 93)

and third world men, who sought to maintain control over the labour and bodies of third world women (Ahmed, 1992; Brah, 1993; Mohanty, 1991).

Third world and Aboriginal feminists have called upon western feminists to incorporate an integration of race, class and gender relations into their praxis. Western feminists have developed theories of 'women's' exploitation and oppression from their own experiences. However, in not problematizing their racialization as white women, these feminists have constructed a universal 'woman' as the subject of feminism. This 'universal woman' is in reality based only on the historical experiences of particular western women of specific classes; this 'universal woman' silences and makes invisible the experiences of third world and Aboriginal women (Bannerji, 1995; Brand, 1993; Brewer, 1993; Davis, 1981; Hill Collins, 1991; Maracle, 1993; Mohanty, 1991; Razack, 1998).

Eschewing this universal woman, third world and indigenous feminists have demonstrated that racism shapes the role of women within the workforce as well as within the family. For instance, women of colour have historically worked as domestic workers for white families, and for them, there is no neat distinction between 'productive' wage labour and 'reproductive' unwaged labour. As domestic workers, third world women's labour has serviced white families, including white women, while their own families have been torn apart by state policies (Amos & Parmer, 1984; Arat-Koc, 1992; Davis, 1981; Hill Collins, 1991; Mama, 1984; Silvera, 1993; Razack, 1998). Another example of how western feminist theorization makes invisible the experiences of third world and indigenous women is the definition of the family as the primary site of women's exploitation and oppression. The family is both a site of oppression and resistance for third world and indigenous women, for whom the 'right' to have a family has been challenged by the state. The family is also a site of refuge from the racism to which third world and indigenous women are subjected (Amos & Parmar, 1984; Das Gupta, 1995; Davis, 1982; Hill Collins, 1991; Mama, 1984; Razack, 1998).

By not integrating race into their theorizing of class and gender relations, western feminism has not acknowledged the complicity of white women in the exploitation of third world and Aboriginal women (Amos &

Parmar, 1984; Bannerji, 1995; Carty & Brand, 1993; Davis, 1981; hooks, 1988; Mama, 1984; Maracle, 1993; Razack, 1998). The labour of third world and indigenous women has serviced white women and white men. Third world and Aboriginal women's labour has underwritten the standard of living of white families in the global economy. In the case of domestic workers, the labour of these *immigrant* women has enabled white women to 'escape' the home and to develop careers (Arat-Koc, 1992; Razack, 1998; Silvera, 1993). Therefore, if feminism is to meet the challenges of theorizing and ending the exploitation of women, the 'universal' woman constructed by western feminists needs to be abandoned. This universalism needs to be replaced with the recognition of the inequalities amongst women which have historically given white women power over third world and indigenous women.

I use, and expand upon, this third world feminist theoretical framework in my examination of the historical construction of Canadian citizenship. This theoretical framework's integration of race, class and gender as intersecting and mutually reinforcing relations of oppression and exploitation provides the most useful approach to examining how power relations are organized within capitalist society.

Relations of Ruling and the State

In examining the ongoing reproduction of social relations within capitalist society, Marxism, western feminism and third world and Aboriginal feminism have all identified the centrality of the role of the state in the organization and reproduction of these relations (Carty & Brand, 1993; Fiske, 1995; Gilroy, 1987; Green, 1995; Jaggar, 1988; MacKinnon, 1989; Mohanty, 1991; Ng, 1993; Omi & Winant, 1994; Panitch, 1977; Pateman, 1988; Robinson, 1983; Silvera, 1993; Smith, 1987, 1990; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995; Ursel, 1992).

In general terms, Marxist theories of the state define the role of the state as that of "managing the common affairs of the bourgeoisie" (Panitch, 1977). The major functions in this 'management' are maintaining the conditions under which the accumulation of capital can be accomplished in an ongoing manner; legitimizing the class rule of the bourgeoisie over other classes in society; and

using coercive force to maintain social order when necessary. Gramsci significantly developed the Marxist analysis of the capitalist state by examining its role in consolidating bourgeois hegemony over civil society through ideological processes which created as 'common sense' this class rule (Buci-Glucksmann, 1980; Gramsci, 1971). This expanded conception of the state stresses the convergence of ideological processes of legitimation with the material organization of labour to consolidate bourgeois rule. The state itself is defined as a site of the organization of class rule, and not merely a mechanistic 'tool' in the hands of the ruling class.

The role of the state in organizing the relations of colonial domination has also been defined as central to the historical development of capitalism (Gilroy, 1987; Green, 1995; Mohanty, 1991; Robinson, 1983). The colonial state actively structured processes of racialization, legislating and institutionalizing the 'non-human,' and later the 'non-citizen,' status of third world and Aboriginal peoples. For example, Omi & Winant (1994) have demonstrated that the "inherently racial state" is central to the organizing of "racial formation" in the United States. This state not only intervenes in racial conflicts within society, but is itself the 'preeminent site' of this conflict:

Through *policies* which are explicitly or implicitly racial, state institutions organize and reinforce the racial politics of everyday life..... They organize racial identities by means of education, family law, and the procedures for punishment, treatment, and surveillance of the criminal, deviant and ill. (Omi & Winant, 1994: 83)

The state's institutions and practices reflect and organize the underlying racialized relations embedded within the global economic system, and they construct the ideological processes which help to normalize these relations. "An unstable equilibrium" results from this interaction of the state's practices with social and economic conditions, as racialized conflicts within society become re-negotiated and re-defined by movements of resistance. The right to citizenship and the right to democratic participation become mediated in specifically racialized ways by the institutions and agencies of the state, giving 'race' its concrete meanings.

Western feminist theories of the state have ranged from liberal feminist

theories which call for the state to become gender sensitive and responsive to women's demands for democratic participation, to socialist and radical feminist theories which argue that the state is gendered in its organization of the conditions of the production and reproduction of capitalist/patriarchal relations (Brodie, 1995; Jaggar, 1988; MacKinnon, 1989; Pateman, 1988; Ursel, 1992). Radical feminists argue that social life is constructed from a male standpoint which becomes embedded within the institutions of the state. The 'male' state's values, norms and policies are patriarchal, and the content of its legislation assumes that the interests of men and women are the same. Rather than confronting women's inequalities, the state and its laws come to perpetuate these inequalities (MacKinnon, 1989). A number of feminists have adopted a more nuanced analysis of the state, pointing out that it does not always, and uniformly, act in the interests of men (Brodie, 1995; Hartmann, 1981; Ursel, 1992).

Third world feminists have pointed out that the patriarchal/ racialized relationship of third world women to white men has been mediated by the institutions of the state which have sanctioned the racial/sexual exploitation of third world women (Hill Collins, 1991; Mohanty, 1991). In other words, there is consensus among radical theorists about the central role of the state, its political, legal and ideological functions, in reproducing and sanctioning the social relations of race, class and gender.

An important advance in the theorization of the state has been the "relations of ruling" framework developed by the feminist sociologist, Dorothy Smith. Smith (1987, 1989, 1990) points out that social relations are reproduced and acquire their concrete meaning only in the real, lived experiences of people's lives in the everyday/everynight production and reproduction of the material conditions of existence. The underlying social relations which organize material existence shape the relations of ruling in society and are constantly reproduced at multiple sites in the everyday/everynight practices of the state, institutions and individuals:

"Relations of ruling" is a concept that grasps power, organization, direction, and regulation as more pervasively structured than can be expressed in traditional concepts provided by the discourse of power. I have come to see a specific interrelation between the

dynamic advance of the distinctive forms of organizing and ruling contemporary capitalist society and the patriarchal forms of our contemporary experience. When I write of "ruling" in this context, I am identifying a complex of organized practices, including government, law, business and financial management, professional organization and educational institutions as well as the discourses in texts that interpenetrate the multiple sites of power. (Smith, 1987: 3)

Smith's theoretical insights are useful in directing attention to the multiple sites at which 'ruling,' through the reproduction of social relations, takes place, as well as in identifying the complexities involved in this reproduction. The "main business" of ruling within advanced capitalist societies is to "facilitate the self-expanding dynamic of capital," but this does not have to be "constantly enforced by the ruling class" (Smith, 1989: 47). Instead, the organization of this "main business" is embedded within the texts which inform state practices, the functioning of institutions, and the activities of individuals. Therefore, relations of ruling are reproduced by daily actions and practices based on the taken for granted, everyday forms of knowledge of the world produced by these texts. As Smith puts it, "These are the institutions through which we are ruled and through which we, and I emphasize this we, participate in ruling" (Smith, 1987: 87). The relations of ruling framework, therefore, points to the agency of individuals in the reproduction, as well as challenging, of the relations of ruling in everyday/ everynight practices.

The underlying social relations which organize ruling in advanced capitalist societies remain hidden in the everyday/everynight world, they are not readily visible on the surfaces of the texts which organizing ruling. These texts use abstract, objectified forms of knowledge to produce "textual realities." Abstract categories, not the lived experiences of people, are used to produce objectified forms of knowledge about society. These objectified forms of knowledge are superimposed onto actuality: they come to stand in for peoples' lived knowledge of the world. These "virtual" textual realities "write over" peoples' lived experiences and, by informing the actions of individuals, they become inserted into actuality. Textual realities reproduce relations of ruling by embedding these relations into the objectified forms of knowledge which become the taken for granted, 'natural' order of things. The "apparatus of

ruling” which superimposes these textual realities are defined by Smith in the following way:

The phrase “relations and apparatuses of ruling” is used here to identify that extraordinary complex of relations and organization mediated by texts that govern, manage, administer, direct, organize, regulate, and control contemporary capitalist societies - at least those of the fully “developed” first world. (Smith, 1992:4)

Smith’s conceptualization of the relations of ruling focuses on the necessity of examining how the underlying social relations of class and gender are reproduced in the lived actualities of peoples’ lives through the textual practices of the state. Rather than treating class and gender as abstract categories, Smith’s framework enables us to understand these relations as lived out in the daily experiences of our lives. This framework enables us to identify the reproduction of these relations by active, human subjects, within the context of ongoing historical processes in social formations. Smith’s framework is a useful one for my dissertation because it enables me to examine the organization of the relations of ruling in Canadian society from the critical standpoint of *immigrant* women by grounding this analysis in *immigrant* women’s historical experiences.

However, even as I use Smith’s framework, I recognize that it needs to be further developed to integrate analysis of race and racialization. As I have discussed earlier in this Chapter, processes of racialization have been central to the organization of capitalism as a global system of relations. Making race central to my analysis, in addition to gender and class, allows for the examination of how the relations of ruling within capitalist societies are racialized. Integrating race as an analytical category also reveals how relations of ruling assume various forms in women’s lives, forms which include the use of overt violence as well as the textual relations Smith writes about. So, for example, integrating race allows for the recognition that ‘advanced capitalist societies’ can simultaneously also incorporate colonial relations, as in the case of Canada where the colonization of Aboriginal societies has remained ongoing. Likewise, incorporating race allows for the recognition that relations of ruling assumed the form of armed, paramilitary aggression against Aboriginal women, as they did during the Oka crisis, in ‘advanced capitalist society’ (Goodleaf,

1993). The 'ruling' of Aboriginal peoples remains organized by both textual practices and the use of racist violence in Canada. Where Smith's framework remains silent on the continued existence of overtly violent forms of 'ruling' in advanced capitalist societies, integrating analysis of 'race' draws attention to the various forms 'ruling' assumes in relation to Aboriginal and third world women. Integrating race as a category of analysis in my dissertation, I demonstrate that racialization is fundamental to the organization of relations of ruling in the global system. By integrating race as a central category, I contribute to developing Smith's theoretical framework in my study of how the relations of ruling are organized in Canada in late 20th century to reproduce processes of racialization. Rather than forcing a dichotomous either/or approach to examining the multiple social relations encompassed within these relations of ruling, Smith's framework allows for the incorporation of the intersectionality of race, class and gender relations as they actually exist in the world. This framework also enables us to move beyond the question of whether social relations are institutional, systemic, structural or personal by recognizing that social relations are reproduced at all these levels of social existence. In the following section, I outline the methodology developed by Smith in her examination of the social organization of knowledge. This is the methodology which I use in my research for this dissertation.

The Social Organization of Knowledge

Over the years, a number of social scientists have pointed to the patriarchal assumptions and biases within social sciences (Harding, 1987; Ladner, 1987; Smith, 1990; Thornton-Dill, 1987). Women of colour social scientists have drawn attention not only to the patriarchal biases of the social sciences, but also to the racist biases and the racialized nature of 'knowledge' produced (Bannerji, 1987; Ladner, 1987; Ng, 1993; Thornton Dill, 1987; Razack, 1998). These biases write out of social theory the experiences of women of colour and obscure how racial and patriarchal domination are socially constructed in everyday life. The claims of the social sciences to be engaged in the production of objective knowledge have been challenged by these theorists who have demonstrated that this 'objectivity' is deeply

implicated in upholding and perpetuating power relations which disenfranchise and marginalize women of colour (Bannerji, 1987; Ladner, 1987; Razack, 1998; Thornton-Dill, 1987).

In developing the relations of ruling framework, Smith (1987, 1989, 1990) critiques sociology for demanding that sociologists examine social 'problems' and produce knowledge from a position of objectivity. This 'objectivity' seeks to remove sociologists from the particularities of our localized experiences, and as such, it reflects a 'male' standpoint because it is men who are enabled through the gendered division of labour to live in the 'abstract' world. The standard of 'objectivity' hides the dominant male standpoint incorporated into sociology and its methodologies:

The whole method of thinking, how social science addressed the world, created a very peculiar relationship between women and their experience. Rather than beginning in their own actual situations and with their own good knowledge of the practicalities and organization of their everyday and everynight worlds social scientific methods of writing its texts created a standpoint from which the reader reflected on her life as if she stood outside it; taking up the relevancies and focus built into the conceptual structures of the discourse. She became an object to herself. Popularization made no difference; the conceptual structures were recursively present. As a practical problem, texts written in social science wouldn't do the kind of job to which we were committed, which was to expand women's knowledge of what was going on *from where they were* in real, as contrasted with textual, life. (Smith, 1992: 2)

Sociology's insistence on beginning with abstract, objectified concepts and categories which suppress lived experiences has the effect of removing the sociologist from the particularities of everyday/everynight experience and making sociology complicit in reproducing forms of knowledge which organize relations of ruling. Advanced capitalist societies are ruled through "abstract concepts and symbols" which, although defined as 'objective' are, in reality, defined from the perspective of ruling. Sociology plays a crucial role in reproducing relations of ruling by adopting these concepts and symbols in a "top-down" approach to examine and explain social life. By insisting that the knowledge produced from this perspective of ruling is 'objective,' sociologists obscure their own role in organizing relations of ruling. In other words,

sociology begins with abstract concepts and categories from the dominant perspective of ruling which it then imposes upon the actual world by making the world 'fit' into these concepts and categories.

As Smith explains, forms of objectified knowledge which arise from the suppression of lived experience as "a site of knowledge" reflect a "male social universe." Smith calls for a feminist sociological methodology which begins with the actualities of women's everyday/everynight lived experiences rather than with abstractions. Women are very immediately connected to, and located within, everyday/everynight life in our roles as caregivers. The gendered division of labour within society situates women outside the abstract, objectified "male social universe." Women's lived experiences in the home and in the world become a point of rupture with, and hence a critique of, the objectified forms of knowledge which attempt to suppress actual lived experience. It is at this point of rupture, of disjuncture, that women's experience "breaks away" from the objectified discourses "integral to the relations of ruling" and a "critical standpoint" emerges (Smith, 1990). In defining the "critical standpoint" of women, Smith draws attention to the social organization of women's lives within capitalist societies, which reflect gender and class relations.

Smith's methodological framework focuses only upon class and gender relations, and as such, this framework needs to be developed further to recognize that the critical standpoint of women which she refers to is a racialized standpoint. The racialization of social relations has meant that the critical standpoint of white women has taken for granted the 'whiteness' of their social existence. Because women of colour are subjected to racial domination, along with class and gender domination, their critical standpoint defies any such 'taking for granted' of the racialization of ruling relations. The critical standpoint which emerges from the historicity of the experiences of women of colour draws attention to the racialization of relations of ruling within capitalist societies.

As a woman of colour, an *immigrant* woman, working from the critical standpoint of *immigrant* women that I am situated in, I problematize the objectified forms of knowledge produced by the Canadian state which have

constituted *immigrant* women as a 'problem' for *Canadian* society. Rejecting the dominant perspective that *immigrant* women like myself are a 'problem' for Canadian society to resolve, whether this 'problem' is one of integration or of the 'difference' of language, culture, or simply that of 'too many' *immigrants*, I do not define *immigrant* women as the problem for examination in this dissertation. Instead, I problematize the relations of ruling which create the category '*immigrant woman*' as a distinct category of women who live, work, give birth, and die within the geographical borders of Canada, and yet are constructed as a 'problem' for *Canadian* society and the state. How is it that certain groups of women have been constructed as *immigrant* women, while others become constructed as *Canadian* women? What are the underlying social relations which find expression in this distinction?

Very little analysis of social relations in Canadian society has been undertaken from the critical standpoint of women of colour. When women of colour are given any academic attention, the tendency is to confine us to the domain of multiculturalism. Women of colour thus become situated outside the social and economic realm, outside the "main business" of society, and the issues which shape our lives become defined as distinct and separate from the issues which affect *Canadians*. Our lives become disconnected from the center of *Canadian* political, social and economic life, where 'real' *Canadians* live out their lives. Attempts to examine the lives of women of colour only from the perspective of 'cultures' within the realm of 'multiculturalism' reproduce a colonial Othering⁹ and mystify the material and ideological processes which organize the relations of ruling in *Canadian* society. The point is not to add-on *immigrant* women to the existing knowledge about *Canadian* society, but to use the critical standpoint of women of colour to examine what that standpoint

⁹ I use the term Other as defining a process through which colonized populations were constructed in the western imagination as being opposite to, and a threat to, the West and its subjects. See Said (1978) and Minh-ha (1989) for discussion of how this Othering has been historically organized.

reveals about how *Canadian* society is organized.¹⁰

To build social theory from the critical standpoint of women of colour requires a significant methodological shift. It requires a recognition of the relevance of women of colour as historical agents. It requires a recognition of the humanity of women of colour as women and as active human subjects. It requires an acknowledgment of the centrality of women of colour within the “main business” of capitalism. Once this methodological shift is made, attention can be directed to unearthing the social processes by which the marginality of women of colour is accomplished in *Canadian* society, and how our ‘irrelevance’ becomes constructed. This methodological shift allows us to problematize the social theory which erases the presence of women of colour, rather than problematizing women of colour’s relevance to the construction of social theory. Smith points out that Marx was able to theorize the relationship between labour and value because he was able to recognize “all labor as equal human labor” (Smith, 1990: 40). Likewise, our ability to grasp the relationship between citizenship, social policy and immigration policy in the lives of women in Canada is contingent upon our ability to conceptualize the equality of all women, and then to examine how it comes to be in the world that *immigrant* women are constructed as distinct from, and made unequal to, *Canadian* women.

¹⁰ As Smith herself well recognizes:

The problem isn’t to make third world women a topic within a feminist political economy, nor yet to invite third world women to speak in this zone of discourse. Of course they have already seized that initiative. The problem I am explicating is of a different kind; it is a problem of the concealed standpoint, the position in the relations of ruling that is taken for granted in how we speak and that bounds and constrains how a political economy of women can speak to women, let alone to third world women. It is a problem of the invisible centre that is concealed in the objectifications of discourse, seeming to speak of the world dispassionately, objectively, as it is. For third world women, nothing is gained by being entered as topics into the circumscriptions of white, male grounded, or of white female grounded, discourse. The theoretical expansions of political economy introduced by white women have merely rewritten the boundaries, the centre still remains, the standpoint within ruling is stably if invisibly present. Nothing will serve but the dissolution of objectified discourse, the decentring of standpoint and the discovery of another consciousness of society systematically developed from the standpoint of women of colour and exploring the relations of political economy or sociology from a ground in that experience. (Smith, 1992: 16)

The other shift which is required when building social theory from the critical standpoint of women of colour is to recognize that immigrant women are socially constructed as 'immigrant' women upon entry into Canada (Ng, 1988). A number of theorists have argued that all women of colour continue to be constructed as 'outsiders' regardless of their citizenship, or the length of their presence in the country (Bannerji, 1993, 1995; Brand, 1993; Razack, 1998). The category 'immigrant woman' has come to mean much more than a simple description of the experience of migration: immigrant women who are white have historically been integrated into *Canadian* society, whereas immigrant women who are third world women have not been allowed to enter the nation. The category 'immigrant woman' has been ideologically constructed to both reflect, and organize, the exclusion of women of colour from the *Canadian* society which white immigrant women have been allowed to enter. *Immigrant* women therefore have to be recognized as geographical 'insiders' who are politically and socially constructed as 'outsiders.' This construction of *immigrant* women as outsiders to the nation is a feature of *Canadian* society, it is not a feature inherent to third world women.

In working from the critical perspective of women of colour, one of the common problems encountered is the denial of the lived experience of racism of women of colour. When women of colour name the racism we experience and name the processes which racialize us, this lived experience meets a wall of denial from mainstream social theory (Bannerji, 1995; Brand, 1993; Razack, 1998; Yee, 1993). Women of colour are repeatedly asked to provide 'proof' that the lived reality of racism which we give voice to is valid. In describing her experiences in the classroom, Sherene Razack describes how "claims of innocence" enable the denial of the existence of racism in Canadian society:

Like most educators working in the area of issues of social justice, I experienced an increasingly predictable set of responses that inhibited the development of critical consciousness and blocked the actions necessary to change the world. These responses can be summed up as a denial of oppression. Thus, some of my white students would claim, for example, that there was no racism in Canada, that all immigrants had a hard time at first and later would enjoy better access to society's resources, or that Aboriginal people were killing each other before white men arrived. While some of these responses seemed simple enough to understand

(and relatively archaic), others indicated that apparently progressive ideas were in fact *enabling* people to deny violence and oppression and their complicity in it. (Razack, 1998: 16-17)

Speaking, and hearing, the lived experiences articulated by women of colour requires courage. This 'speaking' goes against the prevailing 'wisdom' of social theory, it challenges the core of what constitutes 'knowledge' by challenging its racialized foundations.

In this dissertation, I theorize this lived reality of women of colour in Canada who articulate the experience of being constructed as *immigrants*, as outsiders, to *Canadian* society. I examine the ideological processes through which the state has organized the social conditions within which women of colour experience these everyday/everynight realities in Canada. My research demonstrates this racialization exists not only in the minds of women of colour, but in the historical and contemporary practices of the Canadian state which construct women of colour as *immigrant* women and as outsiders to the nation.

In privileging the critical standpoint of *immigrant* women, I draw attention not only to the class and patriarchal forms of the relations of ruling, but also to their racialized form. Examining the relations of ruling and social ordering from this standpoint also makes it possible for us to understand more fully how *Canadian* women are racialized in opposition to *immigrant* women and to expose the junctures at which these identities are pieced together in what come to appear as seamless, 'natural' identities. The standpoint of women of colour reveals how the 'whiteness' of the relations of ruling in *Canadian* society relegate women of colour to its margins; it allows us to problematize the nation which places women of colour outside its ideological borders.

In this dissertation, I analyze the texts produced by the Canadian state in the restructuring of Social Security Policy and Immigration Policy for the coming millennium to examine how membership in the Canadian nation and access to citizenship are being organized by the state. Smith has demonstrated that our knowledge of the social world is mediated through texts, and that these texts construct textual realities which inform the actions and practices of individuals and institutions. Smith defines the relations of ruling in advanced capitalist societies as being organized and mediated through these texts:

A mode of ruling has become dominant that involves a continual transcription of the local and particular actualities of our lives into abstracted and generalized forms. It is an *extralocal* mode of ruling. Its characteristic modes of consciousness are objectified and impersonal; its relations are governed by organizational logics and exigencies. We are not ruled by powers that are essentially implicated in particularized ties of kinship, family and household and anchored in relationships to particular patches of ground. We are ruled by forms of organization vested in and mediated by texts and documents, and constituted externally to particular individuals and their personal and familial relationships. The practice of ruling involves the ongoing representation of the local actualities of our worlds in the standardized and general forms of knowledge that enter them into the relations of ruling. It involves the construction of the world as texts, whether on paper or in computer, and the creation of a world in texts as a site of action. Forms of consciousness are created that are properties of organization or discourse rather than of individual subjects. (Smith, 1987: 3)

In my analysis of the texts produced by the state in 1994 for the Social Security Review and the Immigration Policy Review, I identify the abstract, objectified categories with which the state constructed the textual realities within which major policy changes were to be implemented. These textual realities became imposed upon actuality and shape the lived experiences of individuals as the state uses these textual realities to play a mediating role between individuals and their knowledge of the world. As Smith has demonstrated, textual realities come to stand in for actuality as individuals are made to 'see' the world through the lens of the textual reality, which then shapes the actions of these individuals. The ideological forms of knowledge produced in textual realities become actionable in both the activities of the state and individuals. Even though these ideological forms of knowledge are divorced from the lived experiences of people, they become constituted as reality and become written over lived experiences. Ideology becomes "a kind of practice in thinking about society" which gives primacy to objectified categories and concepts over the lived actualities of people in the world (Smith, 1990:35).

The very production of these textual realities embodies the relations of ruling because they are constructed from the perspective of ruling. In this way, the texts both conceal and incorporate power relations from the perspective of ruling. These texts, which shape and reproduce the relations of ruling, include "newspapers; television; census and economic reports; policy documents; the

reports of commissions, task forces and ad hoc committees, and so forth...” and although they are constructed by ideological practices, they produce a virtual textual reality and become “concrete actions” in the actual world (Smith, 1990: 54-57).

The abstract, objectified categories and forms of knowledge used by the state in producing the textual realities within which the restructuring of Social Security policy and Immigration policy were organized are important to examine because they express how the underlying social relations are being organized in a period of rapid change in the global economy. Both reviews included public consultations through which the state organized the entry of participants into the textual realities being produced, and these textual realities came to mediate the participants’ experience of reality. The textual realities produced are significant because the state uses these to produce ‘knowledge’ about the Canadian nation, and about the ‘dangers’ presented to this nation by ‘outsiders,’ including *immigrant* women. The ‘knowledge’ produced in these Reviews legitimizes the policy changes made by the state subsequently, making actionable the textual realities. In order to extrapolate what can be learnt about the underlying social relations in late 20th century Canada, I identify the major ‘problems’ constructed by the textual realities, as well as the ‘solutions’ offered by the state to ‘resolve’ them. I analyze the significant changes to policy implemented by the state subsequent to the SSR and IPR reviews, and the insertion of the textual realities into actuality through these policy changes which express the nation-building practices of the Canadian state.

The actualities of the lives of individuals in the world are shaped by underlying social relations, and people ‘know’ this reality to some extent through the concepts they use to understand and express their experiences. Since the underlying social relations which shape these experiences are not readily visible on the surfaces of texts, the relation between the experience and the underlying social relations which shape it have to be “explicated.” Using the critical standpoint of *immigrant* women, my examination of the textual practices of the Canadian state explicates the social relations embodied in the

construction of the textual realities. The following texts are the specific subject of my analysis:

A - Legislation:

- * *The Canadian Citizenship Act 1946* : 1946. Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, Law Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty.
- * *The Immigration Act. 1976-77* :1985. Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada.
- * *Sponsorship Regulations of 1976*.

B - The documents organizing the 1994 Immigration Policy Review:

- * *Facts and Figures: Overview of Immigration*, CIC: 1994a. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services.
- * *Canada and Immigration: Facts and Issues*, CIC:1994b. Ottawa: CIC.
- * *Public Meetings: Summaries of Discussions*, CIC: 1994c. Ottawa: CIC.
- * *The Report of Working Group #2*: "What criteria should we set to achieve our social and economic objectives in determining who will come to Canada?" CIC: 1994d. Ottawa: CIC.
- * *The Report of Working Group #3*: "How do we meet our humanitarian obligations including the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees?" CIC: 1994e. Ottawa: CIC.
- **The Report of Working Group # 4*: "How do we achieve a coherent strategy within Canada and among nations to deal with international migration pressures?" CIC: 1994f. Ottawa: CIC.
- * *The Report of Working Group # 5*: "What are the key elements of a strategy for integrating newcomers into Canadian society ?" CIC: 1994g. Ottawa: CIC.
- * *The Report of Working Group # 6A*: "How do we integrate immigration

policy and program delivery with such areas as housing, health, education and training in order to better integrate immigrants into Canada and improve overall effectiveness of public programs? A. Labour Market access (training, accreditation)" CIC: 1994h. Ottawa: CIC.

* *The Report For Working Group #6B*: "How do we integrate immigration policy and program delivery with areas such as housing, health, education and training in order to better integrate immigrants into Canada and improve overall effectiveness of public and programs? B. Other services (education, social assistance, health, policing, housing, etc.)" CIC:1994i. Ottawa, CIC.

* *The Report of Working Group # 7*: "How do we establish a framework for enforcement in the immigration/refugee systems that meets public expectations and respects the integrity of the program?" CIC: 1994j.Ottawa: CIC.

* *The Report of Working Group # 8*: "How do we realize the benefits of immigration to Canada in areas such as regional impact, workforce skills, job creation and international competitiveness?" CIC: 1994k. Ottawa: CIC.

* *The Report of Working Group # 9*: "How do we build more effective partnerships with other levels of government in addressing a broad range of immigration issues?" CIC: 1994l. Ottawa: CIC.

* *The Report of Working Group # 10*: "How do we build a common data base on immigration to serve public policy and programme goals?" CIC: 1994m. Ottawa: CIC.

* *Report on the National Consultation on Family Class Immigration*, Hathaway. J. CIC: 1994n. Toronto: Centre for Refugee Studies.

* *Canada 2005: A Strategy for Citizenship and Immigration: Background*

Document, CIC:1994o, CIC: Ottawa

* *Canada 2005: A Strategy for Citizenship and Immigration, Conference Proceedings*, CIC: 1994p. Ottawa: CIC.

* *Immigration Consultations Report*, CIC: 1994q. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada.

* *Statement : Speaking Notes for the Honorable Sergio Marchi, P.C., M.P., Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Tabling of the Strategy and the Immigration and Citizenship Plan*, House of Commons: Nov.1,1994r. Ottawa: Government of Canada.

* *News Release: Minister Marchi Tables Long-term Immigration and Citizenship Strategy, and 1995-2000 Immigration and Citizenship Plan*, CIC: Nov. 1, 1994s. Ottawa: CIC.

* *A Broader Vision: Immigration And Citizenship Plan 1995-2000, Annual Report to Parliament*, CIC: 1994t. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada.

* *Into The 21st. Century: A Strategy for Immigration and Citizenship*, CIC:1994u. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada.

* *Strengthening Family Sponsorship*, CIC: 1995v. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada.

* *Employee Consultation Report*, CIC: 1995w.

C - Documents organizing the 1994 Social Security Review:

- *Agenda: Jobs and Growth: Improving Social Security in Canada. A Discussion Paper*, (The Green Paper) Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC): 1994. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada.

- **Agenda: Jobs and Growth: Improving Social Security in Canada. Discussion Paper Summary.* HRDC: 1994a. Ottawa: HRDC.
- * *Reforming the Canada Assistance Plan: A Supplementary Paper.* HRDC: 1994b. Ottawa: Government of Canada.
- * *A New Framework For Economic Policy: A Presentation by The Honourable Paul Martin, P.C., M.P.*. Finance: Oct.17. 1994c. Ottawa: Government of Canada.
- * *Creating a Healthy Fiscal Climate: A Presentation by The Honourable Paul Martin, P.C., M.P., To the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance.* Finance: Oct.18,1994d. Ottawa: Government of Canada.

Conclusion

In this first Chapter, I have defined the research question for my dissertation and elaborated upon the relations of ruling framework within which I conceptualize the race, class and gender relations embedded within the capitalist system. I have defined the third world feminist theoretical tradition which I work, and have expanded upon the definitions of the categories race, class and gender that I use by stressing the intersectionality and materiality of these social relations. Using Smith's 'relations of ruling' framework which highlights the role of the state in organizing the ongoing reproduction of these relations at multiple everyday/ everynight levels at which such reproduction takes place, I explained how I use the critical standpoint of *immigrant* women from which to examine the organization of the relations of ruling in Canada. I have also expanded upon the feminist methodology developed by Smith for examining the textual realities that organize the relations of ruling as the methodology which I use in my analysis. Finally, I listed the specific SSR and IPR texts which I analyze in this dissertation.

My dissertation will examine the restructuring of Social Security Policy and Immigration Policy from the critical standpoint of *immigrant women*. Very

little research in either one of these areas has been conducted from the critical standpoint of immigrant women. This oversight reflects, and further organizes, the marginalization of women of colour from the mainstream. My dissertation seeks to break through this marginalization by placing *immigrant* women at the centre, and analyzing *Canadian* society from this critical perspective. Working from the point of disjuncture between *immigrant* women's lived experiences and what the *Canadian* state purports to 'know' about these experiences, my dissertation challenges the notion that processes of race and racialization are marginal to the restructuring process. The critical standpoint of *immigrant* women reveals that processes of racialization are central to how the relations of ruling are being re-organized through the restructuring of access to citizenship in Canada for the coming millennium.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORIZING CITIZENSHIP

Introduction

The classical liberal concept of citizenship within capitalist societies embodies the notion of the equal rights of individuals and their equal treatment by the state. In its broadest sense, citizenship refers to the relations of individuals within society: their relations to the organized power of the state and to each other. The rights encapsulated within the term 'citizenship' are essentially about how power is organized in society and, in this respect, are of great significance to women because these rights determine the terms and conditions of membership in the social collective.

Canadian citizenship has historically expressed a relation of the colonial domination and inequality of Aboriginal peoples. This citizenship was developed by a settler state which recruited *preferred race* immigrants to produce and reproduce the Canadian nation and citizenship. In this Chapter, I examine the existing literature on citizenship. I begin by outlining T.H. Marshall's theory of citizenship which categorizes citizenship into civil, political and social rights and follow with several major critiques of Marshall's theory. Marshall's theory addresses the relation between economic inequality and social and political equality, and continues to serve as the point of departure for contemporary discussions of citizenship. As such, his work has had significant influence. The critiques I outline address the following features of Marshall's theory: (i) the separation of the economic and political spheres as independent of each other within the context of the global integration of economies; (ii) the evolutionist approach to citizenship and its lack of attention to the role of class struggles in extending citizenship rights; (iii) the inadequate differentiation of citizens by gender and race; and, (iv) the non-recognition of the distinction between the formal and substantive rights of citizenship, and problematizing the nation as a socially constructed entity.

In examining these critiques, I argue that the critical standpoint of

immigrant women reveals that citizenship has never been a question simply of one's legal status. Working from this critical standpoint reveals the racialized processes which have been central to the formation of nation-states, and to defining access to citizenship rights within these. *Immigrant women's* experiences bring into sharp focus the global integration of national economies which began with the process of colonization, and highlight the significance of global migrations within the capitalist system of relations. They also demonstrate that access to citizenship rights, both formal and social rights, are contested terrain for *immigrant* women.

Marshall's Theory of Citizenship

Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed.
(Marshall, 1992: 18)

T.H. Marshall's conceptualization of citizenship in the essay, *Citizenship and Social Class*, delivered at Cambridge in 1949, continues to remain the most influential work in the contemporary literature on citizenship within capitalist society (Allen, 1996; Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992; Bottomore, 1992; Gordon, 1994; Gordon & Fraser, 1992; Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; Lister, 1990; Mishra, 1977; 1994; O'Conner, 1993; Taylor, 1989; Turner, 1986, 1990; Ungerleider, 1992; Walby, 1994; Young, 1990). Marshall's conceptualization of citizenship is rooted in liberal political theory which defines society as an amalgamation of individuals with certain rights and argues that "the good society should allow each individual the maximum freedom from interference by others" to their exercise of these rights (Jaggard, 1983: 33). Marshall defines citizenship as encapsulating three distinct categories of individual rights: civil, political and social. Civil rights refer to individual freedoms such as the "liberty of person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice." Political rights refer to "the right to participate in the exercise of political power", including the right to belong to political parties, the right to run for political office, and the right to vote. Social rights define "the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare

and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society” (Marshall, 1992: 8). Social rights have been embodied within the welfare state and relate specifically to “social security in periods of unemployment, sickness and distress” (Turner, 1990: 192). Marshall’s theory belongs to that branch of liberalism that recognizes the enjoyment of individual freedoms to be contingent on the wealth and standard of living available to individuals. This liberal tradition has advocated for social rights to ensure that certain basic needs are met collectively, thereby creating the conditions within which the other rights of citizenship can be exercised.

Marshall’s theory explores the conflict between the egalitarian impetus underlying citizenship and the social inequalities of class created within the economy. Whereas the economy generates class inequalities, citizenship confers a status of political equality upon individuals. Marshall argues that citizenship has been evolving in a “continuous progress” for the last three centuries in the “modern drive” towards equality. Citizenship creates important bonds of social solidarity and posits a sense of shared community amongst individuals who come to be politically defined as equals.

In this historical march toward “progress,” the general trend of citizenship has been to extend rights beyond propertied males to those who had not previously enjoyed them, i.e., the working class and women. The trend has also been to expand these rights to include first civil, then political, and finally, social rights (Marshall, 1992). The liberal-democratic welfare state which institutionalized social rights would mitigate the inequalities of class and become the basis for the exercise of the civil and political rights of citizens. In Marshall’s schema, the eighteenth century represented the century of civil rights; the nineteenth century belonged to political rights; and the twentieth century was the century of social rights. Never under the illusion that social rights would create economic equality, his work remained secure in the belief of the welfare state’s capacity to mitigate the *social* inequalities of class. Marshall states that citizenship is the “foundation of equality on which the structure of inequality could be built” (Marshall, 1992).

Marshall readily acknowledges that these is a conflict between

capitalism and citizenship, and that social rights call for the intervention of the state in the workings of a free market. Citing the economist Alfred Marshall,¹¹ T.H. Marshall remained convinced that this conflict was not insurmountable, and that social programs such as universal public education would not pose a threat to the free market strong enough to jeopardize its essential workings. Alfred Marshall had earlier posed the question whether “the amelioration of the working classes” faced “limits beyond which it cannot pass,” and whether all men could become in “occupation” “gentlemen.” He argued that the distinguishing feature of the working class was its “heavy,” “excessive,” “deadening” and “soul-destroying” labour. With the development of technology, this labour could be significantly reduced, allowing all to share in both the benefits and duties of citizenship by becoming “gentlemen.” The quality of life for the working class could be vastly improved through publicly funded social programs, giving this class standards of “civilized” life and a share in the “social heritage.” T.H. Marshall adheres to the view that the historical march of modern societies towards “progress” would be greatly advanced in the acquisition of social rights by the working class. Some inequalities in status would continue to persist, he grants, but these would be mitigated by the social rights which would unite the population in a “single civilization” (Marshall, 1992).

Although Marshall’s theory is based on his analysis of the development of citizenship in Britain, he was more broadly theorizing citizenship within capitalist societies. Marshall’s theory has therefore had a major impact on theories of citizenship, although critiques of this theory have been forthcoming from several quarters. A number of theorists have faulted Marshall for failing to recognize the role of patriarchal relations in creating the unequal citizenship of women (Allen, 1996; Lister, 1990; Pateman, 1988; Walby, 1994); for

¹¹ Alfred Marshall, an economist committed to the free market system, explored the economic feasibility of publicly funded social programs. In his essay, T.H. Marshall defines A. Marshall as the economist who crossed over the boundary of economics into sociology in dealing with this question. T.H. Marshall defined himself as the sociologist who would meet A. Marshall at this crossing in order to harmonize the two disciplines on the question of the desirability and feasibility of expanding citizenship rights.

adopting an evolutionist approach to citizenship which did not recognize the role of class struggle in extending citizenship rights (Bottomore, 1992; Kratochwil, 1994; Mishra, 1977; Turner, 1986; Walby, 1994); and, for theorizing the economic and political spheres as operating in isolation one from the other (Taylor, 1989). In the sections which follow, I examine a number of these critiques from the standpoint of *immigrant* women.

In brief, the first critique I examine relates to the inter-relation between the political and economic spheres within the capitalist system of relations. Whereas Marshall conceptualized the political sphere as one of equality, and the economy as one which generates inequalities, critiques argue that class inequalities in the economic sphere translate into inequalities of power in the political sphere (Taylor, 1989). I agree with this position, and further argue that while Marshall defined the British economy as a 'closed,' national economy, numerous studies challenge this definition by demonstrating the global integration of 'national' economies which took place during the first phase of capitalist globalization -- the phase of colonization (Amin, 1974; Bello, 1992, 1994; Dutt, 1957; Fanon, 1963; Marable, 1983; Robinson, 1983; Rodney, 1972; Shiva, 1997). Immigrant women's experiences bring into sharp focus the ongoing nature of this global integration.

The second critique I address has been developed by theorists who argue that Marshall's theory was evolutionist: there was no 'natural' extension of citizenship rights within capitalist societies (Bottomore, 1992; Mann, 1987; Kratochwil, 1994; Mishra, 1977; Taylor, 1989; Turner, 1990). Instead, this extension has been the outcome of class struggles. Further, these critiques argue that the extension of citizenship has served to further integrate the working class into bourgeois domination. The critical standpoint of *immigrant* women reveals that important as these class struggles have been in extending citizenship rights, these class struggles have taken place within the context of the racialized/national interests constructed by the state.

The third critique I address has been developed by feminists who argue that Marshall's theory does not account for patriarchal relations which construct an unequal citizenship for women (Gordon, 1994; Lister, 1990; Okin, 1992; Pateman, 1988; Walby, 1994). While I agree with the feminist analysis

that social rights preserved the gendered division of labour, these theorists have paid scant attention to the racialization of women, and of women's access to citizenship. When these theorists have attempted to account for race, they tend to define race as a 'difference' which sets apart people of colour (Allen, 1996; Lister, 1990; Walby, 1994; Young, 1990). Therefore, I examine specifically Iris M. Young's (1990) proposal for a re-conceptualization of citizenship in order to accommodate 'differences.' In examining Young's theory, I demonstrate that 'difference' is an inadequate framework for conceptualizing race, which is one of the fundamental organizing principles of capitalist social relations. As such, reducing race to a question of 'difference' naturalizes processes of racialization.

The final critique I address comes from theorists who make a distinction between the formal and substantive rights of citizenship in the nation-state (Abu-Laban, 1998; Bottomore, 1992; Hall & Held, 1989; O'Conner, 1993; Yuval-Davis, 1991). This distinction is an extremely useful one because it draws attention to the principles which organize membership in the nation. In addressing this distinction, I draw upon the works of theorists who have rejected the definition of nations as 'natural' entities and have problematized the construction of nations (Anderson, 1996; Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992; Balibar & Wallerstein, 1991; Gilroy, 1987; Green, 1995; Robinson, 1983; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). The principles underlying the formation of the nation are key to organizing citizenship within nation-states, and *immigrant* women's experiences demonstrate that racialization has been central to the construction of nations within the capitalist system of relations. In examining these critiques, my argument is that Marshall's theory is unable to account for the construction of the Canadian nation, and of Canadian citizenship.

The Inter-Relation of the Economic and Political Spheres Within the Global Economy

Marshall's theory has been criticized for defining the economy and the polity as separate spheres. Marxists have argued that the economy does not function independently of the sphere of the polity; the structural power relations creating inequalities within the economy translate into political

inequalities (Smith, 1990; Taylor, 1989). Class inequalities rooted in the economy have frustrated attempts to “realize the liberal ideal of citizenship” whether in the “false collectivism of the welfare state” or in the “consumerist ‘democracy’ of the market” (Taylor, 1989). Conceptualizing the economy as separate from the political sphere sets up a false dichotomy which distorts an understanding of the power relations underpinning the institutions and practices of both the state and the market. Furthermore, Marshall’s separation of the economic and political spheres leaves the economy to continue generating inequalities, doing nothing to confront class inequalities on the ground within which they arise (Taylor, 1989).

While I agree with this view, the class reductionism of this approach is problematic. Race and gender divisions, like class divisions, are entrenched within the economy and translate into political inequalities. Further, the relation between the economic and political spheres can only be adequately theorized within the context of the global integration of ‘national’ economies within the capitalist system of relations. Marshall’s theory treats the economy of Britain as compact and self-contained, with the inequalities of class being generated internally within this economy. The notion that European countries developed a full blown capitalism within their ‘closed’ economies has been challenged from many quarters. Capitalism, although historically emerging from Europe, rapidly became a global system during the phase of colonialism through the economic integration of different countries, and indeed continents (Amin, 1974; Dutt, 1957; Fanon, 1963; Marable, 1983; Robinson, 1983; Rodney, 1972; Wright, 1993). As part of this global integration, a corresponding globalized labour market quickly emerged (Potts, 1990; Robinson, 1983; Sassen, 1990;). Capitalist production, the division of labour, and the realization and accumulation of capital were all organized on a global scale under relations of western domination and exploitation, and this resulted in a western political hegemony over colonized societies (Balibar, 1991; Mohanty, 1991; Robinson, 1983). In the particular case of Britain, the integration of the colonies into the Empire enabled the repatriation of wealth from the colonies to the ‘mother country’ and, in this way, the wealth from the

colonies underwrote the expansion of citizenship rights at the centre of the Empire:

There is a tacit convention of a kind of double book-keeping of the Empire; and the two sides of the ledger are never brought into contact. On the one side, the sentiments of universal philanthropy and benevolence, of liberal enlightenment and the march to freedom "within the mystic circle of the Crown," and of development and welfare, substantiated by the few niggardly crumbs thrown out from the vast profits of the monopolies. On the other side, the concrete realities of the giant colonial trusts and combines, plantation-owners, and 100 per cent profits; the mass poverty and exploitation, starvation wages, pestilential slums and peasant ruin; the colonial penal laws and repression; the concentration camps, terror and shooting, the troops, guns and bombing planes. (Dutt, 1957: 25)

The role of the colonies in 'developing' European economies within the global system has been extensively documented (Dutt, 1957; Galleano, 1973; Robinson, 1983; Rodney, 1972). Marshall's theory does not recognize the reality of this global system and instead treats the 'British' economy as a closed, 'national' economy. By so doing, the inter-connections between Britain and the colonies is made invisible and this supports the fiction that 'nations' are natural entities with their own clearly demarcated 'national' resources upon which the rights of their citizens are based. Considered in this light, citizenship, as Marshall defines it, institutionalizes the identities of workers in the advanced capitalist countries as 'citizens', and draws boundaries between them and the colonized 'subjects' of the British Empire within a globally integrated economy.

It is important to highlight the consequences of this global economic integration for the citizenship rights of the colonized and colonizing populations within the global system. This economic integration was achieved through the subjugation of colonized populations, through the suppression, and even destruction, of the political systems of these societies. The destruction of the rights and 'citizenship' of colonized peoples within self-governing social formations occurred at the same time as the extension of citizenship rights for peoples of European origins in a parallel process. Indeed, the two were inextricably linked. The enhancement of the rights of European men, and

subsequently, those of European women, went hand in hand with the simultaneous destruction of the rights of colonized women and men. These are two sides of the same coin of 'modern' capitalist development.

The surplus produced by labour in the colonies was exported to Britain, and it made possible the accumulation of capital which fueled further colonial expansion, as well as the industrial revolution (Potts, 1990; Robinson, 1983; Sassen, 1990).

European states contributed only a small share of the total needs of the colonial empires, and then only for selected areas. Britain, the dominant power, had the greatest need for labor. It could not have consolidated its empire without recourse to millions of workers from the Third World. (Sassen, 1988: 32-33)

Therefore, to treat the citizenship rights of the working class in Britain as somehow internally contained within a 'closed' British economy serves little purpose beyond mystifying the international division of labour and the racialized hierarchies which exist within the global labour force. The economic inequalities of class generated within this global system can only adequately be analyzed within a global, and not 'national,' context (Amin, 1974; Robinson, 1983; Rodney, 1972; Taylor, 1989). Marshall's British 'working class' needs to be situated within the context of the internationalization of production and the division of labour, as do the citizenship rights he theorizes.

Class Struggle and Citizenship

The liberalism which underlies Marshall's theory of citizenship does not recognize the centrality of class struggle within capitalism (Bottomore, 1992; Kratochwil, 1994; Mann, 1990; Mishra, 1977; Taylor, 1989). Marx's analysis of the capitalist mode of production identified class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie as a central contradiction giving rise to opposing class interests. Defining society as an aggregate of individual 'citizens' who are all equally 'free' to exercise individual rights mystifies the reality of class rule within capitalist society (Bottomore, 1992; Kratochwil, 1994; Taylor, 1989).

Tom Bottomore has criticized Marshall for addressing only "the impact of

citizenship on social classes” and not the “impact of social classes on the extension of citizenship” (1992:55). Had he considered the latter, Marshall would have to acknowledge that there is no natural or inevitable evolution of citizenship rights. Rather, various classes have historically struggled against other classes to expand, or to restrict, citizenship rights. The acquisition of civil rights can be credited to the ascendant bourgeoisie in its struggle against the power of the feudal aristocracy. Political rights were secured by the struggles of the working class, with the support of ‘middle-class reformers,’ against their domination by the bourgeoisie; social rights were secured by the working class and reformers from other classes in the post World War II period (Bottomore, 1992: 56). Instead of taking the form of a natural evolution, the extension of citizenship rights has been the outcome of class struggles (Bottomore, 1992; Mishra, 1977; Turner, 1986).

Ramesh Mishra has pointed out that Marshall’s theory does not explain how the specific contents of citizenship rights are decided, assuming there is consensus in society about the content of these rights. For example, Marshall’s theory does not specify what constitutes social rights. It does not specify how access to healthcare, or education, come to be construed as part of social rights. In ignoring class struggle, Marshall failed to recognize it is precisely these struggles which determine the specific content of social rights (1977). Marshall also reifies the notion of citizenship, creating a static definition of the rights which can be claimed by citizens. Citizenship is a set of “social practices” which are defined by “membership rules” in society (Kratowichil, 1994). Likewise, Marshall fails to recognize that citizenship rights do not remain constant once acquired: these rights can be extended or eroded, depending on the balance of power between different classes at given historical moments (Turner, 1986).

Michael Mann (1987) goes further in his critique of Marshall, defining citizenship in the liberal-democratic welfare state as a ‘ruling’ class strategy to more fully incorporate the working class into the domination of the ruling class. Mann has identified five different “ruling class strategies” for containing class conflict with different consequences for citizenship rights: (a) the reformist liberal welfare state in Britain which incorporated the working class

by a "meshing" of "private market" and "insurance schemes"; (b) the liberal strategy in the United States where social rights were not well developed; (c) the authoritarian monarchist strategy in Germany, Austria, Russia and Japan which initially opposed, but subsequently developed, citizenship rights; (d) the fascist strategy in Germany where full employment policies and social rights were based upon militarism and finally; (e) the authoritarian socialist strategy in the Soviet Union where social citizenship rights were well developed, but with the erosion of civil and political rights (1987). Mann argues that, instead of creating social equality between the classes, citizenship rights served to preserve class exploitation in each of these countries.

Bryan Turner (1990) disagrees with Mann's definition of the welfare state as a ruling class strategy. He argues that Mann's formulation is class reductionist and defines citizenship only as being "handed down from above" by the ruling class. As such, it precludes an understanding of citizenship as the result of the "struggles from below" of citizens who make claims upon the state. Defining citizenship rights as a "ruling class strategy," Mann treats citizens as little more than passive recipients of rights. Turner instead defines citizenship as the result of "struggles from below," a position which recognizes citizens as active agents making claims upon the state (Turner, 1990: 200). Mann is unable to "adequately appreciate the revolutionary implications of the oppositional character of rights" because he defines a passive form of citizenship in developing his theory of "ruling class strategy" (Turner, 1990: 199).

Turner's intervention is useful in pointing out the potential weaknesses in Mann's theorization of citizenship in the liberal welfare state, and I believe he is absolutely right in rejecting Mann's class reductionism. However, the either/or approach Turner himself adopts in defining citizenship as either passive or active is unnecessarily limiting. Instead of defining citizenship as either a "handing" down of rights "from above" or the result of "struggles from below," it is possible to theorize citizenship as a dialectic between the two. Struggles from below for certain citizenship rights can be conceded to by the ruling class, particularly if these rights are compatible with capital accumulation and can avert further radicalization of struggles from below.

Likewise, rights can be “handed down” by the ruling class in order to further capital accumulation. During the phase of colonization, the extension of citizenship rights for colonizing populations helped to consolidate colonial rule. In the case of Canada, access to Canadian citizenship for various European immigrants was central to the process of colonization and settlement. During this period, the interests of the ruling elites, as well as of the other sectors of colonizing societies, coincided.

A number of political theorists have defined the welfare state as essentially representing a compromise between labour and capital (Bottomore, 1992; Ginsberg, 1992; Mishra, 1977; Panitch, 1977, 1994; Ursel, 1984). This definition of social rights as a class “compromise” allows us to examine the points at which the interests of opposing classes sometimes coincide. In my examination of Canadian citizenship, I argue that the ‘national’ interest of opposing classes involved in colonization coincided vis-a-vis colonized Aboriginal peoples. Although the ruling elite and the proletariat had opposing class interests, they came to share a ‘national’ interest in consolidating European settlement.

The extension of citizenship rights ultimately depends upon the balance of oppositional forces within society, sometimes reflecting the victories of “struggles from below” and at other times reflecting “ruling class strategies” which serve to further consolidate class domination. I use this dialectical to theorize citizenship rights as the expression of the balance of forces between the “struggles from below” and the “ruling class strategies” that seek to contain them. In order to fully understand this dialectic, it is important to examine the historical specificity of the moment.

Gendering Citizenship

Western feminists have argued that Marshall’s theory of citizenship does not account for the gendered divisions within capitalist society as it remains silent on the unequal citizenship of women. These critiques charge that Marshall’s theory is inadequate because the historical experience upon which Marshall draws to demonstrate the evolution of citizenship rights is confined to the British male experience (Lister, 1990; Okin, 1992; Pateman, 1988; Walby,

1994).

The historical experiences of European women in Britain, the United States and Canada defy Marshall's theory of citizenship as having evolved in three separate stages with the acquisition of civil rights being sequentially followed by political and social rights. European women in these countries, indeed, as in most advanced capitalist countries, did not acquire civil or political rights at the same time as working class men, and when women did gain these rights, it was not in the sequence outlined by Marshall. Women's struggles for these three forms of citizenship rights were intrinsically linked: women's struggles for the vote were tied to their struggles for access to education, and for equality within the family, including the divorce and property rights (Clarke, Cochrane & Smart, 1992; Walby, 1994). White men, white women, and women of colour achieved citizenship at different historical moments (Allen, 1996; Pivan & Cloward, 1988; Walby, 1992). In the case of Canada, Euro-Canadian women won the right to vote federally in 1917-1919; women in Quebec won the federal franchise in the 1920s and the provincial franchise in 1940; Asian *immigrant* women won it in the late 1940s, and Aboriginal women only in the 1960s (Errington, 1993; Maracle, 1993; Ungerleider, 1992). Feminists also point out that even after achieving political rights, women remain underrepresented within political systems of governance and decision making (Errington, 1993; O'Connor, 1993). In addition to demonstrating the lack of a clear line of demarcation between the acquisition of civil and political rights, feminist scholars also reject Marshall's evolutionism, pointing out that women did not 'naturally' or inevitably acquire an extension of rights. Instead, women have to struggle for these rights, and are still struggling for access to citizenship which is equal to the access men have (Lister, 1990; Pateman, 1988; Yuval-Davis, 1993; Walby, 1994).

Feminists have also pointed out that access to social rights is based on the notion of the family wage and on the gendered division of labour in the family and paid workforce. The welfare state embodying social rights created a two-tier system within which social entitlements became organized into 'male' programs such as unemployment insurance, and 'female' programs such as social assistance, and access to social entitlements depends upon the status of

citizens in the gendered workforce (Gordon, 1994; Ursel, 1992; Walby, 1990, 1994). Contributory social insurance programs such as unemployment insurance have been more accessible to men because their participation within the paid workforce has enabled them to make contributions, whereas programs such as social assistance have been disproportionately accessed by women because of their unequal access to paid employment. Contributory social insurance programs have been less open to stigmatization, unlike the needs-tested social assistance programs which have become stigmatized as 'welfare' (Gordon, 1994; Gordon & Fraser, 1992). Social entitlements, therefore, do not value women's role as care-givers within the family, and social assistance programs are predicated upon women's dependence on men. Thus, in so far as they are gendered, social programs further institutionalize this dependency by giving women unequal access to social entitlements (Ginsberg, 1992; Gordon, 1994; Lister, 1990; Taylor, 1989; Ursel, 1992).

A more fundamental critique of Marshall's theory relates to the question raised by feminists who ask whether citizenship is a universal project which can be extended to women, or whether it is an inherently 'male' project which is unable to realize the full and equal participation of women in society. In answering this question, feminists have pointed to the separation between the public and private spheres whereby citizenship rights are placed within the public sphere, which, in effect 'naturalize' women's unequal citizenship. Marshall's theory reproduces the separation by focusing on the 'public' economic and political sphere, while remaining silent on the 'private' sphere of the family. Within this framework, women become situated within the private sphere of home and family, while men become situated within the public sphere as economic and political actors. If citizenship rights are located within the public sphere and women are located within the confines of the private, full access to citizenship cannot be realized by women without a transformation of the public/private divide (Allen, 1996; Lister, 1990; Okin, 1992; Pateman, 1988; Walby, 1994; Yuval-Davis, 1993).¹²

¹²Challenging the liberal contention that 'modern' capitalist society replaced the rule of patriarchy with the 'liberal democracy' of citizens, Pateman has demonstrated that

While these scholars challenge the inadequacy of Marshall's theory by privileging gender divisions in addition to class, my concern is that they do not examine the racialization of women and citizenship rights. Citizenship within capitalist society reflects and organizes the underlying processes of racialization, which have resulted in the unequal access to citizenship of third world and indigenous women, and white women. In the few instances where these theorists have attempted to address the question of race, they have done so by defining it as a factor which introduces 'difference' into society and call for a re-conception of citizenship which can account for this 'difference' (Lister, 1990; Walby, 1988; Young, 1990). In the following section, I explore this theorization of 'differentiated citizenship' as a resolution to the race question, arguing that it is an inadequate framework for dealing with the historical racialization of capitalist citizenship.

Unequal Citizenship as 'Difference'

One of the major problems identified within feminist and Marxist literature on citizenship is the continuing differential access to citizenship rights of various groups within society, and their differential access to the welfare state (Bottomore, 1992; Fraser & Gordon, 1992; Lister, 1990; O'Connor, 1993; Turner, 1986; Young, 1990; Walby, 1988). Arguing for a re-conceptualization of citizenship which addresses this differential access as a central problem, Young (1990) rejects the universal conceptualization of citizenship because it privileges dominant groups in society whose experience and aspirations come to be defined as "universal." Pointing out that the notion

'modern' citizenship is deeply gendered and dependent upon the exclusion of women from the public sphere. Social contract theory mystifies the reality that the 'private' sexual contract which gives men control over women underpins the 'public' 'social contract' which is the basis for citizenship rights. Men enter into sexual relations with women within the family and acquire a "conjugal sex right" over women through the sexual contract. It is this 'sex right' which is the basis of women's subjugation, and in defining this relation within the family as 'natural,' women's subjugation comes to be treated not as the political relation it is, but as a 'natural' relation. The social contract has transformed patriarchy from the rule of the 'father' as patriarch into a 'modern' 'fraternal' patriarchy of 'free men' where individual men exercise their power over individual women in their capacity as 'heads of households.' The 'civil freedom' of men became based upon women's 'sexual subjugation' (Pateman, 1988).

of rights is deeply connected to notions of justice in society. Young proposes that a re-definition of justice is integral to reconceptualizing citizenship.

Contemporary conceptions of justice are based on the “distributive paradigm” which equates social justice with the distribution of material things in society, and does not address the inequalities themselves. Marshall’s theorization of social rights is based on this “distributive paradigm” in assuming that social equality can be achieved by the redistribution of wealth through social programs. Young argues the “distributive paradigm” is problematic because it uses an “impartial” absolute standard for the treatment of every individual in every situation. This approach suppresses the differences which actually exist between groups, and gives rise to structures and institutions which maintain the oppression of “different” groups in upholding the dominant standpoint as the measure of impartiality.¹³ The standard of impartiality, therefore, mystifies the reality that the standpoint and experience of one particular group becomes “universal,” and sets the standard for other groups. In place of this “distributive paradigm,” Young proposes a re-conceptualization of justice which recognizes group differences, and in doing so, challenges the universalism which maintains the oppression of “different” groups. An affirmation of ‘difference’ would enable ‘different’ perspectives to enter the political space, making justice a commitment to meeting the needs of different groups. The democratic participation of these groups in decision-making would lead to the re-defining of citizenship rights, which would itself become differentiated. Young argues for the provision of public funds to minority groups to facilitate their political participation in the democratic process. This participation would result in group-differentiated policies committed to meeting the specific needs of each group (1990).

¹³ Young outlines five criteria for defining oppression: (i) *exploitation*, which results from the working class producing surplus value which is appropriated by capitalists; (ii) *marginalization* of people who are considered not necessary to the labour system; (iii) *powerlessness* of groups who lack authority and are not allowed into decision-making; (iv) *cultural imperialism* which enforces the dominant culture onto groups which have their own cultures by denying and suppressing these self-defined cultural forms, and; (v) *violence* which is used systematically against certain groups in society. (Young, 1990)

While Young's "differential access" approach to citizenship is an improvement on Marshall's theory, it has its own set of problems. It assumes that groups who have unequal access to citizenship somehow exist as 'different' prior to their entry into society and prior to their claims upon citizenship. It assumes that their "difference" is situated in some other realm, outside the social and political terrain within which they make their claims to citizenship. By taking the "difference" of groups for granted, these groups themselves come to be seen as pre-formed. Their "difference" is made natural, and not as the result of social relations which shape their access to citizenship *as part of the very process of creating their "difference."* The problem of citizenship is that a differentiated *unequal* citizenship already exists, and the "difference" referred to by Young is the expression of these inequalities. The underlying social relations of race, class and gender constitute groups as "different," according to them "different," i.e. unequal, rights. Young's proposition naturalizes gender and race inequalities as being the result of a "difference" inherent in oppressed groups, and it directs attention away from how inequalities are socially constructed as "difference." Himani Bannerji has argued that "difference" as a political concept needs to be problematized:

Where does such "difference" reside? Who are we "different" from? Upon reflection it becomes clear that the "difference" which is politically significant is not a benign cultural form. The "difference" which is making us "different" is not something inherent or intrinsic to us but is constructed on the basis of our divergence from the norm....

Our "difference" then is not simply a matter of "diversities," which are being suppressed arbitrarily, but a way of noting and muting at the same time fundamental social contradictions and antagonisms. (1995: 71-72)

Bannerji draws attention to the necessity of addressing the underlying "social contradictions and antagonisms." Young's approach instead naturalizes the 'difference' of race as an inherent, unchanging characteristic of groups, instead of treating race as an expression of social relations which acquire their concrete meaning in the organization of power in society. Ending racialized inequalities requires a transformation of the underlying social relations as part of the process of reconceptualizing citizenship. When the underlying social

relations are addressed, it becomes evident that a reconceptualization of citizenship cannot begin with a discussion of the content of the rights of this citizenship. Instead, it has to begin with an examination of how the category 'citizen' is constituted, how the membership of individuals is organized into 'different groups,' who is allowed membership in which group, and as a result, access the contents of citizenship. In the following section I discuss the work of theorists who make a distinction between the formal and substantive rights of citizenship.

Formal and Substantive Rights in the Nation-State

A number of theorists have attempted to develop Marshall's theory by introducing a distinction between the *formal* and *substantive* rights of citizenship. *Formal* rights are defined as the conditions which organize membership in the nation-state, which then allow for claims upon citizenship. *Substantive* rights refer to the civil, political, and social rights embodied within citizenship (Abu-Laban, 1998; Bottomore, 1992; Hall & Held, 1989; O'Connor, 1993). The formal right to citizenship does not necessarily translate into access to substantive rights which, in practice, have been denied on the basis of the race, class, and gender of the citizen. Marshall addressed only substantive rights, these theorists stress, ignoring the fact that formal rights of citizenship are not *sufficient* for enjoyment of substantive rights. Tom Bottomore argues that even after racial and ethnic minorities achieve formal citizenship rights, they do not necessarily enjoy access to the substantive rights of the welfare state. Furthermore, the formal right to citizenship itself has to be problematized, a number of theorists have argued further (Abu-Laban, 1998; Yuval-Davis, 1991). Most discussions of citizenship have not addressed this question, with the result that "formal citizenship has tended to be treated as a static legal category and at best an implicit backdrop to questions relating to substantive citizenship" (Abu-Laban, 1998: 3).

The introduction of the distinction between formal and substantive rights is an important advance in theorizing citizenship. Whereas Marshall takes for granted the membership of citizens in a 'national' community, problematizing this formal right to membership in the nation directs attention

to those sectors of the population denied membership in the nation in being cast as 'outsiders' with unequal access to citizenship. Specifically, this distinction broadens the horizon to include *immigrants* whose unequal citizenship status in advanced capitalist countries has not been adequately theorized in the existing literature. This distinction also directs attention to migrant workers who are denied formal claims to citizenship as a result of the temporary resident status assigned to them by states in receiving countries.

Marshall's theory takes for granted the assumption that nations have corresponding states within which citizens, as members of the nation-state, are able to access citizenship rights. A number of theorists have, however, rejected this assumption of 'nations' as naturally existing entities. These theorists have demonstrated that 'nations' are ideological constructions which are brought into being through nation-building practices organized by the state (Anderson, 1996; Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992; Balibar & Wallerstein, 1991; Gilroy, 1987; Green, 1995; Robinson, 1983; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). In the historical development of the capitalist system, these theorists point out, 'national' bourgeoisies consolidated their hegemony over particular 'national' territories and 'national' populations, ensuring their domination of the nation's resources (Anderson, 1996; Balibar, 1991; Robinson, 1983).

In his classic study on the historical emergence of nations, Benedict Anderson (1996) argues that nations are "imagined communities" which were brought "into historical being" at the end of the 18th century (1996: 4). Anderson challenges the view that nations had naturally corresponding states:

..the fundamental legitimacy of most of these [European] dynasties had nothing to do with nationalness. Romanovs ruled over Tartars and Letts, Germans and Armenians, Russians and Finns. Habsburgs were perched high over Magyars and Croats, Slovaks and Italians, Ukrainians and Austro-Germans. Hanoverians presided over Bengalis and Quebecois, as well as Scots and Irish, English and Welsh. On the continent, furthermore, members of the same dynastic families often ruled in different, sometimes rivalrous, states. What nationality should be assigned to Bourbons ruling in France and Spain, Hohenzollerns in Prussia and Rumania, Wittelsbachs in Bavaria and Greece? (Anderson, 1996: 83/84)

Anderson demonstrates that the historical emergence of nationalism was related to European colonization, locating its historical emergence within the Americas as a response to this colonization. Pointing out that “national borders” were a reflection of the administrative boundaries created by colonial administrators, Anderson identifies the emergence of print media as the medium which helped to consolidate the dominance of “national” languages in the elite’s shaping of a “national consciousness.” The print medium was critical in enabling the dominant class in the colonies to articulate a “national interest” in its struggles against continued rule by European states. Central to Anderson’s theory is the notion that nations were “imagined” and realized through the elite’s shaping of a national ‘unity’ and national ‘interest.’ These constructions of the ‘national’ interest served to transcend internal divisions within the nation in the face of domination by external powers. Further, Balibar argues there is a dialectical relation between the ‘national’ bourgeoisie and the state: even as the bourgeoisie consolidated its dominance over other classes through the nation-state, this dominance allowed the bourgeoisie itself to develop as a “state bourgeoisie.” This dialectical relation meant that the “dominant bourgeoisie and the bourgeois social formation formed one another reciprocally” in the historical context of the emergence of nation-states (1991: 90).

Problematizing how nations are “imagined,” and the conditions under which they are realized, is an important and necessary step in theorizing citizenship. Problematizing the ‘nation’ also directs attention to the conditions under which membership in the nation becomes organized, raising the organization of formal membership in the nation-state as a central question of citizenship. Formal rights are the precondition to membership in a nation-state, they determine the right to enter and to reside in a country (Abu-Laban, 1988; Yuval-Davis, 1991). This right of domicile is among the most fundamental of citizenship rights: it is a precondition for accessing the other rights which can only be taken for granted by those citizens for whom this right is uncontested. While Marshall’s theory naturalizes this right, it is one which has been a politically contested one for third world peoples within advanced capitalist countries.

In addition to the right of domicile, other basic formal rights of citizenship include the right to legal citizenship status and a passport; the right to family reunification; the right to seek paid employment within the country of one's residence, and finally; the right to pass citizenship on to one's children. These formal rights define the very basic conditions of membership in a social community, the basic signifiers of 'belonging' to society. In taking these rights for granted, most literature on citizenship does not address what should be the starting point for discussion: namely, the conditions under which membership in a 'nation' is organized, and the manner in which this membership shapes access to citizenship rights.

Marshall took for granted the formal right of citizenship within nation-states, an assumption that is particularly problematic in a white settler colony such as Canada. The nation-building practices of the Canadian state were dependent on the immigration of European settlers who could be fashioned into the 'national' population, as well as of immigrants from the third world to provide 'cheap' labour. The conditions under which these immigrants were allowed into Canada shaped their access to citizenship, and immigration and citizenship policies were therefore deeply inter-connected. Introducing formal rights into the equation of citizenship rights problematizes the conditions under which the membership of the 'citizen' and 'immigrant' in the nation is organized, as well as the relation of the state to the 'nation' and to 'immigrants.'

Conclusion

In this Chapter, I have examined Marshall's theory of citizenship which defines three categories of rights: civil, political and social rights. Marshall's theory was based on the proposition of the historical "progress" of modern, capitalist societies which construct citizenship rights as a political and social counter to the inequalities created in the economy. In examining Marshall's theory, I have problematized the category 'citizen' as well as the category 'nation' and made the case that the development of citizenship rights needs to be placed within the context of the global integration of economies within the capitalist system.

The contemporary literature uses two main approaches to theorizing

citizenship. The first of these argues that the ideal of citizenship is in essence universalist, and therefore, can be extended to encompass the various groups within society who presently have differentiated access to citizenship rights (Bottomore, 1992; Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; Lister, 1990; Marshall, 1992; Okin, 1992; Turner, 1986; Walby, 1994; Young, 1990). These theorists argue citizenship can be fully realized by addressing the exclusion of women and of racial and ethnic minorities. Access to citizenship for these groups can be extended by removing the barriers they currently encounter (Lister, 1990; Turner, 1986; Walby, 1994), and by accommodating their 'difference' (Young, 1990).

The second of these approaches to theorizing citizenship argues that citizenship is essentially an exclusionary mechanism which designates rights to members of national communities as citizens. Citizenship, and access to rights, specifically excludes all those who come to be defined as outsiders to the 'national' community (Abu-Laban, 1998; Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1989, 1992; Kratochwil, 1994; Taylor, 1989). In the following chapters, I use this second approach to citizenship which defines it as an active, relational, dynamic set of practices of inclusion and exclusion which interact with the underlying inequalities of race, class and gender. I examine citizenship from the perspective of *immigrant* women, whom the Canadian state has constructed as outsiders to national community by subjecting them to unequal claims to citizenship.

CHAPTER THREE

THEORIZING IMMIGRATION

Introduction

In Chapter Two I examined theories of citizenship, problematizing the category 'citizen' and its relation to the 'nation' and state. In this section, I problematize the category 'immigrant': there is nothing 'natural' about any group of people coming to be defined as 'immigrants.' The category 'immigrant' is constituted and given its specific meanings through ideological practices of the state which 'produce' individuals as 'immigrants.'

This Chapter examines Marxist and feminist theories of migration. Marxist theorists have studied migration within the framework of the political economy of the world labour market, arguing that migration is an essential feature of the global capitalist system of relations (Cheng & Bonacich, 1984; Cohen, 1987; Mazumdar, 1984; Potts, 1990; Sassen, 1988). The significance of this literature for my dissertation lies in its recognition that the conditions which give rise to migration within the capitalist system of relations are an historical and structural feature of the global economy. Also significant is its recognition of the vital economic role of immigrants in the 'national' economies of the receiving countries.

Feminist theorists have pointed out that migration is a gendered phenomenon. These theorists have sought to highlight the uneven impact of immigration policies on women's status and labour force participation in the receiving countries (Das Gupta, 1995; Morokvasic, 1983; Ng, 1988; Parr, 1987; Phizacklea, 1983; WING, 1985). Neither the Marxist nor the feminist literature has paid much attention to migration as part of the larger processes of

racialization within the global capitalist system. In Canada, much of the feminist literature has focused on the labour force participation of immigrant women. Immigration policies in Canada, however, have historically played a critical role in distinguishing immigrant women into *preferred races* and *non-preferred races*. Women of the *preferred races* were integrated into the nation as *Canadians*, while women of the *non-preferred races* were placed outside the nation as *immigrant* women. My contribution to this literature is to theorize the role of immigration policy as part of the process of racializing the nation and citizenship in Canada. I examine this process of racialization by developing the concepts of *nationalization* and *bordering*: the Canadian state organized the racialization of white immigrants through their **nationalization** into the nation as *Canadians*, while the racialization of third world immigrants was organized through their **bordering** as *immigrants* who were outsiders to the nation. This nationalization of European immigrant women, on the basis of their racialized 'unity' with the nation-state, has received little attention in the literature. Nor has the role of *immigrant* women as a racialized point of reference against which the 'national-ness' of *Canadians* has been organized by the state. In this Chapter, I therefore further advance my theorization of migration as part of the larger processes of racialization within the global system, which were shaped by, and remain rooted in, colonial relations.

Theories of Migration

The Marxist literature on migration focuses on the political economy of the labour market and identifies the movement of workers within the world labour market as an essential feature of the historical development of capitalism (Anderson, 1994; Cheng & Bonacich, 1984; Cohen, 1987; Mazumdar, 1984; Potts, 1990; Robinson, 1983; Sassen, 1988; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995; Stasiulis & Yuval-Davis, 1995; Strikwerda & Guerin-Gonzales,

1993). With the rise of the capitalist mode of production, European expansion depended upon drawing labour from “pre-capitalist” societies into the global system by organizing various forms of forced and voluntary migrations. Some of these migrations were internal and resulted in the movement of labour from one region of a particular country into another. Other migrations were international, with labour being moved from one country to another (Potts, 1990; Sassen, 1988).

Marxist theories of migration argue that capitalist development resulted in distortions within “pre-capitalist” economies with the European expansion which created world markets for capital, commodities and labour. By introducing capitalist relations into “pre-capitalist” societies, European expansion led to “traditional” sectors of the economy going into decline, displacing populations from this “traditional” economic base. Not all subsistence workers could be absorbed into the newly emerging capitalist sectors of the economy. Hence, a surplus population became available for migration, initially from rural areas into urban centres, and eventually from “undeveloped” countries into the “developed” ones (Cheng & Bonacich; 1984; Mazumdar, 1984; Potts, 1990; Sassen, 1988; Strikwerda & Guerin-Gonzales, 1993). This migration has been attributed to primarily material causes: increasing poverty, growing population levels, underemployment and economic stagnation all become key factors leading to out-migration.¹⁴ Since the

¹⁴ Mazumdar (1984) has studied the early migration of South Asians, mainly from the Punjab in India, into North America. She argues that land reforms introduced under British rule greatly increased the power of landholders by concentrating private ownership of land in their hands, thereby dispossessing the customary access of lower castes and classes. This concentration of land ownership in private hands led to an increase in cash crop production and with it, the decline of subsistence production and a sharp polarization of caste/classes, leaving displaced populations with very few options, except migration. Many of the early migrants were in debt to moneylenders, and their debts were sold to the agents who were recruiting migrant labour. These dispossessed castes/classes were recruited for migration and transported to different countries within the Empire. The development of capitalist production in India did not have the capacity to absorb all the displaced rural populations. The situation worsened with the British frustrating attempts by the nationalist Indian bourgeoisie to industrialize in order to prevent Indian industry from competing with British industry. Having no other economic opportunities, migration became the most hopeful, and in many cases the only, option for displaced populations.

displacement of these “surplus populations” posed a threat to the economic and social order of the “undeveloped” countries. “exporting” this population became an attractive option for the ruling elites.

These two factors, the displacement of populations in the “undeveloped” regions and the need for labor in the capitalist economy, emerged out of the very logic of capitalist development. Both resulted in increasing pressure upon workers to migrate to the “centres” of capitalist development from the “peripheries.” In other words, capitalist migration is not a product of discrete and unconnected factors in sending and receiving societies, nor is it the result of the individual characteristics of immigrants. Migration is driven by structural factors and is the result of historical relations within the capitalist system. In other words, migration is systemic.

Saskia Sassen (1988, 1990) has further developed this theory of migration by pointing out that while economic stagnation, poverty and overpopulation are important factors giving rise to migration, these factors alone are inadequate in explaining migration flows. Population density alone does not necessarily result in emigration: France, the Netherlands, and Denmark have some of the highest densities of populations in the world, but do not experience mass out-migrations. Likewise, economic stagnation alone does not ‘cause’ migration: currently, immigrants migrate from regions with high economic growth rates. Poverty likewise is not a factor which automatically ‘causes’ migration. Some of the major source countries were poor long before migration flows began to take place and not all countries with high poverty levels necessarily become sources of migration.

Sassen notes that these factors refer to conditions which are ‘internal’ to the source countries and might explain out-migration, but they do not take into account international factors. In particular, they do not account for the economic conditions within receiving countries. Migration patterns are also shaped by the activities of the states and corporations in receiving countries, particularly through their international activities which make them potential recipients of the out-migration. As an example, Sassen cites the international activities of U.S. corporations which disrupt subsistence production by organizing production for global markets and thereby create the conditions for

out-migration. The activities of corporations are accompanied by diplomatic relations between states. Foreign investment and the “cultural westernization,” which is promoted by the activities of U.S. corporations abroad, help to create “objective” and “ideological” “linkages” between sending and receiving countries. These linkages shape migration flows by making the U.S. a potential destination for the out-migration.¹⁵

Sassen (1988) also directs attention to the ongoing links between immigrants and their families in the source countries. These links play an important role in shaping subsequent migrations as families, and sometimes entire communities, are drawn into migration. These ongoing links between immigrants and communities in source countries create expectations among prospective immigrants of receiving assistance with employment and housing from earlier immigrants settled in the receiving countries. These linkages make some receiving countries more attractive to immigrants than others, as do immigration policies in receiving countries which allow family reunification.

The demand for labour in receiving countries also requires a more complex analysis than simply ascribing it to a scarcity of labour. Immigration levels can remain high even during periods of high unemployment when there is no labour ‘scarcity,’ so to speak. During such periods, less profitable and declining sectors of the economy come to depend more heavily on cheaper labour to survive. These sectors create the demand for immigrant labour because these workers are forced into accepting low wage jobs refused by the domestic workforce. The conditions under which migrations are organized by the state mean that while immigrant workers are ‘cheaper’ than citizens, migrant workers allowed entry for temporary employment are even more vulnerable. The labour of migrant workers can be ‘cheapened’ even further. The temporary status of migrant workers ensures that they are dependent on their employers for their continued presence in the receiving countries. They

¹⁵ Sassen (1990) argues that large scale U.S. foreign investment in both Haiti and the Dominican Republic created linkages which in turn gave rise to out-migration from these countries to the United States. The activities of U.S. corporations, the military and the state, all ‘create’ migration to the United States as an option for migrants from the countries where these activities take place.

can, therefore, be “super-exploited” by their employers (Gardezi, 1995; Sharma, 1997; Weintraub & Ross, 1982; Stasiulis, 1997).

The costs of the reproduction of immigrant and migrant labour are borne by the sending countries, which makes these forms of labour “attractive” to employers. Migrant workers who are compelled to leave family members behind in their countries of origin, can be paid even less as single workers. The “attractiveness” of migrant labour is organized by the state which “cheapens” their labour through its immigration policies:

Governments choose temporary worker programs in lieu of permanent immigration for only one reason: they want the foreigners to come, work, and then go home when not needed...Such programs are put into effect precisely to distinguish between first-class citizens or permanent residents and second-class workers. (Weintraub & Ross, 1982: 2-3)

The role of states in the receiving countries in regulating the supply of labour, and the conditions under which it is provided, is pivotal to shaping migration flows. State policies in the receiving countries have the effect of “cheapening” immigrant and migrant labour in relation to the domestic workforce (Cohen, 1985; Hawkins, 1989; Ng, 1988; Potts, 1990; Sharma, 1997; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). The systemic features which give rise to capitalist migration interact with the variable factors which shape the immigration policies in the receiving countries to create the specific experiences of immigrants and migrant workers.

Sassen (1988) has identified four distinct phases of migration in the historical development of capitalism.¹⁶ The first of these phases was the “old” migration of Europeans into the colonies; these immigrants displaced indigenous populations and consolidated their colonization. These colonizing migrations transformed colonized subsistence producers into both slaves and wage-laborers. Workers were imported from surrounding regions to work in mines and plantations, and capital accumulation took place in the

¹⁶ Sassen is careful to caution that these ‘instances’ are more conceptual than they are historical, and that different forms of labour supplies can exist within any one instance (Sassen, 1988).

international transfer of wealth into the metropolitan centers. This “capitalist penetration” of the colonies was accomplished through the violent subjugation of indigenous populations, and the forced migrations of slave and indentured labour from one “periphery” to another.

The second phase was that of “capital expansion” in the colonies with the wealth extracted facilitating the accumulation of capital in the “less-developed regions” instead of being transferred to the metropolitan centres. This capital was invested in “developing” the “less or un-developed” regions. The colonizing migrations to the United States and Canada are examples of how the capital accumulated, rather than being exported to Britain, was used for the further development of the economies of the United States and Canada. During this phase, Europeans as “colonists” were defined as a “valuable resource” who would settle the colonies. Various Western European populations were engaged in “colonial expansion” and “nation-building.” However, European emigrants alone could not supply the growing need for labour in these countries, and colonizing powers transferred millions of workers from one periphery into another.¹⁷

The third phase refers to the importing of labour into the centres during the phase of industrialization. Industrializing countries initially drew immigrants from their “immediate peripheries.” Britain, for example, drew upon Irish workers, but the demand for labour proved to be greater than was available in Europe. European countries, therefore, turned to third world countries. In this phase, the Caribbean, South America, Asia and Africa become major sources of out-migration.

The fourth phase resulted in the importing of labour into the “developed” countries in the post-1945 era, with immigration being used to assert the “dominance” of capital over labour. In this phase, migration has been used to increase profits in certain sectors of the economy by lowering labour costs. Particularly “attractive” to capital during this period has been migrant workers

¹⁷ West Africans were forcefully sent to the United States and the Caribbean, Chinese and Indians were sent to Ceylon, Malaya, and East Africa. For discussion of these historical migrations, see Potts, (1990); Robinson, (1983); Davis, (1966).

who have few political rights in receiving countries. Being particularly vulnerable, the migrant labour force has been easier to control, unlike the domestic workforce which has citizenship rights and many workers are unionized (Bolaria & Li, 1985; Weintraub & Ross, 1982).

Marxist theorists challenge popular notions that immigrants migrate to advanced capitalist countries with no prompting from the receiving countries. Similarly, these theorists challenge the notion that immigrants represent only a drain on the resources of receiving countries. In the particular case of Canada, the literature on immigration prior to the Second World War clearly acknowledges the role of the state in recruiting immigrants (Hawkins, 1988; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). However, contemporary migration is treated as a consequence only of the choices of individual immigrants (CIC, 1994q). This tendency to focus on the individual motives of immigrants has become particularly pronounced since the immigration of third world peoples has exceeded that of Europeans. In recent times, the Canadian state has deflected attention away from its trade liberalization policies which create the conditions for increased migration by further eroding subsistence production. Instead, the state has focused attention on the individual motives of immigrants as the only relevant factor in controlling migration (CIC, 1994t). In most advanced capitalist countries, there is an increasing tendency to define *immigrants* as only a burden on the public purse today (Balibar, 1991; CIC, 1994t; Ginsburg, 1992). This perception continues to be perpetuated despite studies demonstrating that immigrants make economic contributions to the receiving countries and represent a drain on the source countries which have borne the costs of their 'production' (Bonacich & Cheng, 1984; Potts, 1990; Sassen, 1988; Stasiulis, 1997; Weintraub & Ross, 1982).

The most important contribution of Marxist theories of migration is their definition of migration as an integral part of the global capitalist economy. Recognizing this systemic and structural nature of migration also makes apparent that contemporary migrations are shaped by the prevailing global conditions which are rooted in earlier periods of capitalist development.

However, while Marxist theorists address the political economy of labour migration by focusing on class relations, and sometimes on gender relations,

they rarely address migration as part of global processes of racialization. Sassen (1988) for example, does not refer to race as a significant factor in migration. While Lydia Potts acknowledges divisions within the colonies and European societies in organizing the world market for labour, she focuses on the class and gender relations which shape this world market. For example, she repeatedly refers to the “capitalist penetration” of “pre-capitalist” societies which draws labour into the world market from “structurally deformed” societies. Defining these societies as “pre-capitalist” assumes the only relevant point of reference against which these societies can be defined is capitalist Europe. This definition erases the historical being-for-themselves of these societies. The evolutionary tendency within Marxism identifying historical stages which modes of production were required to undergo before the conditions for socialism could come into existence is evident in this definition. Marxist theorists define “pre-capitalist” societies as if they were waiting in their “pre-capitalist” stage for capitalism to ‘happen.’ It treats these “pre-capitalist societies” as if their transformation into capitalist social relations was natural and inevitable. This evolutionary tendency within Marxism reflects a deeply racialized Eurocentric worldview (Robinson, 1983). As does defining these societies as “structurally deformed”: these “deformed” structures were shaped by the integration of these societies into the global economy under the western hegemony. As I have discussed in Chapter One, capitalist colonization organized the racialized exploitation of these societies, ranking their populations in a hierarchy of human ‘racial’ evolution. Defining colonized societies as “pre-capitalist” and “developing” sets up a similar economic hierarchy within which these societies come to be defined as ‘less’ than ‘developed’ European ones. Colonization sought to destroy various *developed* indigenous economic forms and integrate them into relations of exploitation and underdevelopment (Fanon, 1963; Robinson, 1983; Rodney, 1972). Within the context of racialized colonial relations, the migrations of various populations became racialized and the unequal conditions of the migrations became integrated into the larger global processes of racialization. To focus on migration only as labour migration privileges class analysis, while missing the point that these workers also became racialized as ‘less’ than domestic

workers. This focus also directs attention away from the gendering of migration, and the unequal conditions under which the 'family category' is organized by immigration policies. This gendering and racialization has consequences for all aspects of the social existence of *immigrant* women, including their labour force participation. Marxist theories have, therefore, not accounted for the ongoing racialization of immigrants, and the role of state policies in distinguishing various immigrants members of the nation as *future citizens* and *immigrants* in white settler colonies like Canada.

Feminist Theories of Migration

Potts (1990) has examined the unequal treatment of men and women within the world market for labour since the colonization of the Americas, arguing that migration became more "intense" for women with this market drawing upon women's labour in particularly gendered ways:

Women were thus more important to the world market for labour power as producers and reproducers of labour power than through their incorporation into capitalist commodity production. This in no way means that they were treated more considerately, for example by being exempted from hard physical labour, but meant above all that their specifically female capabilities were used in the interests of the users of labour power. (Potts, 1990: 215)

Women were part of the "coerced" migrations because they were necessary for the reproduction of future generations of labour, as well as to the daily reproduction of the male workers. Women were engaged in commodity production along with the men; however, women were used also to provide sexual and other services to immigrant men and to the men from the receiving societies. Potts argues that women were discriminated against in five major ways: "as women, as members of the working class, as migrant workers/foreigners, as members of another race/ethnic group, since they carry the oppression within themselves" (Potts, 1990: 216).

While Potts has raised the importance of addressing women's productive and reproductive labour in the world market, her analysis of the gendering of migration as a form of "discrimination" requires further

development. The underlying race, class and gender relations which shape migration impact the lives of immigrant women in much more profound ways than the term "discrimination" captures: immigrant women are not a pre-formed category standing outside the migration process which subjects these women to more discrimination than male immigrants. The race, class and gender relations which shape migration are central to the ideological construction of these women as *immigrant women* upon entering receiving countries. The category *immigrant woman* acquires its concrete meaning through state policies which construct this category in relation to, and as unequal to, the category of *citizen*. Within Canada, the construction of the category *immigrant women* has placed these women in particular racialized relations to *Canadian* and Aboriginal women. Directing attention only to the discrimination experienced by *immigrant women* takes this category for granted, as an identity inherent to the women which somehow explains their discriminatory treatment. The reality of international migration is such that it transforms specific groups of women into '*immigrant women*.' As Roxana Ng has pointed out:

Women who are considered to be immigrants in Canada have not always been so considered. They *become* immigrant women when they immigrate to Canada and enter certain positions in the labour market. Thus, when we call someone an "immigrant woman" we are in fact naming a process whereby this individual comes to be identified as an immigrant woman. (Ng, 1988: 15)

Therefore, the construction of immigrant women as a separate category from 'national' women reflects the features of the receiving nation-states, and not of the women themselves. Potts also makes no distinction between the experiences of women who were part of the colonizing migrations of Europeans and those women who were part of the migrations of colonized peoples. The migration of European women was central to the project of European settlement in the settler-colonies. In Canada, women were present on both sides of the *preferred race / non-preferred race* divide organized by the Canadian state, a divide which resulted in unequal consequences for the women who were thus defined by the state.

The literature on the migration of European women into Canada in

the pre- World War II period typically explains this migration in the following terms: "People move from an old to a new homeland because life in the old is too difficult or because of opportunities in the new homeland for improvement, or for both reasons" (Cowan, 1968: 3). Joy Parr, who examined the migration of approximately 700 British women hosiery workers employed by Penman's Company between 1907 and 1928, explains the reasons for this migration: "Emigration has offered a release from domestic tensions as well as an escape from economic deprivations. For skilled wage-earning women, anomalies in both the factory and the family circle, the recruiter's promise of a 'Golden Land' suggested new lives in more than a material sense" (1987: 532). These women were actively recruited in Britain by their employer with promises of "steady long-term employment." They were provided with assisted passages to emigrate, and, as Parr points out, were able to earn higher wages in Canada than they would have done had they remained in the same occupation in Britain. Likewise, Women's Emigration Societies which recruited British women to migrate to settler colonies within the British Empire stressed the economic opportunities available to these women in Canada (WMOAS, 1963). These societies worked actively with the settler states in recruiting women emigrants for a period of one hundred years, from 1862 to 1962.

While theorists studying the migration of European women have revealed the gendered nature of European migration to Canada (Cowan, 1968; Parr, 1987; WMOAS, 1963), they have not addressed the *preferred race* status of these immigrant women, a status upon which the recruitment of these women was organized and supported by the British and Canadian states. Instead, these studies have naturalized this racialized status by taking it for granted. The Canadian state's definition of the shared racialized status between European women and *Canadian* nation was the central factor in its organization of the immigration of these particular women. In the few instances where theorists have noted the racialized character of this migration, as does H. Cowan, she naturalizes this racialization by defining it as an inherent human "preference." She writes: "Immigration before Confederation was predominantly British because of the influence of the British government and the preference of human beings for surroundings congenial to their habits"

(1968: 3). She thus utilizes an alleged “preference of human beings” to naturalize British immigration. The “adventurous” came, as did the “unemployed” because “British North America offered work for settlers.” Cowan further argues (1968).

Examining the gender and class status of the women she studied, Parr likewise focuses her analysis on the skills of the British women recruited by Penman’s Company for immigration, making no mention of their racialized status. Undoubtedly the ambitions and skills of these women immigrants were very important factors. But no less important was the *preferred race* status given these women by the state which offered them the opportunities to “release” themselves from the “domestic tensions” and “economic deprivations.” These women migrated as white British women, and their ‘whiteness’ enabled them to gain access to membership in the Canadian nation and to Canadian citizenship.

Immigration, Class, Racism and Sexism

In the contemporary literature on immigrant women in Canada, a number of anti-racist feminists have sought to integrate race, class and gender relations in their analysis of state policies (Boyd, 1989, 1992; Calliste, 1996; Carty & Brand, 1993; Das Gupta, 1995; Ng, 1988; Silvera, 1993; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). By highlighting the labour force participation of immigrant women, these theorists have challenged the assumption that they are only ‘dependents’ of male immigrants. A number of studies have demonstrated that even when immigrant women are allowed into the country as ‘dependent’ family members, they nevertheless join the workforce in a relatively short period after their arrival (Boyd, 1992; Das Gupta, 1995; Ng, 1988;). In her classic study of a community service agency, Ng demonstrates how a number of intersecting state policies work to organize the provision of immigrant women’s labour to the economy as a specific category of labour (1988). State funding of community agencies involved in job placement services worked to socialize these women into particular occupations as ‘cheap’ ‘immigrant’ labour. Likewise, the literature on domestic workers has demonstrated that even when ‘immigrant’ women enter the country as ‘workers,’ immigration policy makes

their residency conditional upon their employment. Their vulnerable immigration status compounds the exploitation of domestic workers as part of the paid workforce (Arat-Koc, 1992; Brand, 1993; Calliste, 1996; Silvera, 1993).

While much of this literature has highlighted the significant contributions of third world women as immigrant women workers to the economic development of Canada, relatively little attention has been paid to the broader patriarchal relations which structure 'immigrant' women's lives, of which the labour market is only one aspect. When the gendered division of labour within the home, has been addressed, most discussions have focused on the barriers this creates to the labour force participation of the women (Boyd, 1989; Ng, 1988; Ng & Sprout, 1977). The racialization of immigrant women, and state's response to the role of *immigrant* women in the reproduction of *immigrant* communities in Canada remains a seriously under-theorized area. This issue is of importance because the reproduction of *immigrant* communities by *immigrant* women has long been defined by the Canadian state as a threat to the whiteness of the nation. The concern that the presence of *immigrant* women would undermine the nation played a major role in the state's control of their immigration in the pre-World War II period. With very few exceptions, the state sought to keep these women out of the country until the 1960s. Limiting the presence of *immigrant* women was a strategy used by the state to reproduce the whiteness of the nation.

In the 1990s, the state is again increasing restrictions on the family category, which has enabled immigrant women from the third world to enter Canada since the 1960s. By examining the specific targeting of the family category as a 'problem' in the 1990s, and the construction of *immigrant* women as a 'threat' to the nation, my contribution to the literature on immigration is to examine the role of immigration policy in nation-building in Canada in late 20th century.

The Canadian state's use of immigration policy to recruit immigrants as a source of labour has been well recognized (Brand, 1993; Calliste, 1996, DeVoretz, 1995; Ginsberg, 1992; Green & Green, 1997; Hawkins, 1989; Jabukowski, 1997; JRS, 1995; Mazumdar, 1985; Ng, 1993; Nipp, 1984; Sharma, 1997; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). Recent scholarship has begun to

call attention to the significance of immigration policy not only in organizing the supply of labour, but also in nation-building (Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995; Jabukowski, 1997). However, this scholarship deals with nation-building as a project which was organized by the state in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The contribution of my dissertation to this body of scholarship is in defining nation building as an ongoing process within Canada. As I demonstrate in this dissertation, nation-building has assumed an urgency in the restructuring of Canada in the 1990s. In this section, I develop the theorization of Canadian nation-building as a racialized process which **nationalized** *preferred race* immigrant women into the Canadian nation, while simultaneously **bordering** *non-preferred race* immigrant women as *immigrant women* who outsiders to the nation. My central argument is that the processes of racialization which were central to Canadian nation-building in earlier periods are no less relevant in the late 20th century. The ideological practices of the state continue to construct *immigrant* women in the 1990s as presenting a racialized 'threat' to the 'nation.' This 'threat' is then used to consolidate a 'national' interest and 'unity' which both hides the 'internal' divisions within the 'nation' and legitimizes the state as the 'defender' of the nation and its citizens against *immigrant* women.

Canadian Nation-Building

In Anderson's definition of nations as "imagined" communities, he makes a significant contribution in pointing to the importance of the principles which underlie the organization of membership within the nation, and once nations are brought into being, the principles which continue their ongoing reproduction. The process of nation building is not a static one; the nation does not come into being and continue to remain so in a mechanistic way. The reproduction of the nation must be ongoing. Anderson's work highlights the agency of both the state and members of the nation in the production, and reproduction, of "imagined" national communities.

Balibar argues that the ongoing existence of nations depends upon the processes of "nationalization" which socialize individuals into the "national community" so that the inequalities within the nation become subsumed in the

construction of a national "identity" and interest. In other words, individuals within various social formations have to be integrated into the nation through processes which ensure its reproduction:

In the case of national formations, the imaginary which inscribes itself in the real in this way is that of the 'people.' It is that of a community which recognizes itself in advance in the institution of the state, which recognizes that state as 'its own' in opposition to other states and, in particular, inscribes its political struggles within the horizon of that state - by, for example, formulating its aspirations for reform and social revolution as projects for the transformation of 'its national state'. Without this, there can be neither 'monopoly of organized violence' (Max Weber), nor 'national-popular will' (Gramsci). But such a people does not exist naturally, and even when it is tendentially constituted, it does not exist for all time. No modern nation possesses a given 'ethnic' basis, even when it arises out of a national independence struggle. And, moreover, no modern nation, however 'egalitarian' it may be, corresponds to the extinction of class conflicts. The fundamental problem therefore is to produce the people. More exactly, it is to make the people produce itself continually as national community. Or again, it is to produce the effect of unity by virtue of which the people will appear, in everyone's eye, 'as a people', that is, as the basis and origin of political power.(Balibar, 1991: 93-94)

The reproduction of the nation through the processes which Balibar calls nationalization depend upon the construction of a "fictive" shared "ethnic" "national" identity. This "fictive" identity is based upon claims of a common race and language which are defined as "immanent in the people" (Balibar, 1991: 96).¹⁸ Balibar's theorization supports radical scholars who argue that race has been central to the processes of nation building within the capitalist system of relations (Gilroy, 1987; Robinson, 1983; Fanon, 1963). Robert Miles (1992) points out that processes of nationalization in Europe have resulted in the current situation where "the idea of belonging to a nation is, for large numbers of people, part of the "natural order of things"" (1992:31). During the age of Empire, ideological constructions of racial superiority were integrated.

¹⁸ In the case of Britain, the society which was Marshall's field of study, the British nation was constructed from various races and ethnicities around 'English-ness,' and British nationhood is based upon the myth of a 'continuous line' of Anglo-Saxons with a 'unique claim' to Britain as its homeland (Anderson, 1996; Klug, 1989; Gilroy, 1987; Parekh, 1974).

and became central to the processes of nation-building and defining the national/racial identity. This national identity marked out members of the nation on the basis of their shared racialized identity, defining as outsiders those who were racialized as non-members, even though they lived in the same geographical territory. The nation-state organizes class domination, certainly; this domination, however, operates within the context of a shared racialized domination of those who are put outside the borders of the nation.¹⁹ I define this process of racialized Othering a process of **bordering immigrants**, a process which is simultaneous to, and the opposite of, the nationalizing of *Canadians* as members of the nation.

Floya Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1993) have noted that the reproduction of the nation cannot be accomplished without women becoming integrated into this project. Feminists have argued that women have been crucial to the construction and the reproduction of nations, physically reproducing the members of the nation. Women also socially, culturally and politically reproduce it through reproduction of the national languages, dress, food, and through the socializing of children (Mohanty, 1991; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995; Yuval-Davis, 1993). Within patriarchal societies, women have been made to represent the nation's "symbolic boundaries":

By dressing and behaving 'properly', and by giving birth to children within legitimate marriages, they both signify and reproduce the symbolic and legal boundaries of the collectivity. More than that, a female is often used as the actual symbolic figuration of the nation; *la patrie* was a figure of woman giving birth to the nation in the French revolution - the same revolution

¹⁹A number of theorists have rejected the use of the term 'nation' because of the 'racial' connotations of this term. Nira Yuval-Davis (1991) has pointed out that when theorists discard the use of the term 'nation' for this reason, they tend to replace 'nation' with the term 'community' which is defined as a more appropriate term. Replacing the term 'nation' with the term 'community' as signifying membership in a collective does nothing to challenge the basis upon which this 'community' is bound together, and instead accepts the 'community' as a natural entity. Yuval-Davis argues that theorists need to analyze how the 'nation' or 'community' are constructed by material and ideological processes. What is required, in other words, is the problematizing of the conditions through which the collective is constructed, whether called 'community' or 'nation.'

that limited its universal message to the *fraternité* - the brotherhood of men! (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992: 28)

Anthias and Yuval-Davis identify five major ways in which women participate in nation building: first, women are biological reproducers of the members of the nation; second, women reproduce the boundaries of national groups by reproducing “symbolic boundaries” in sexual relations with “their” men; third, women are central to the ideological reproduction of the nation as “transmitters of its culture”; fourth, women are used as signifiers of “national differences” by being used as symbols of nationhood; and finally, women participate in “national, economic, political and military struggles” (1989: 6-12). The reproduction of nations take place in gender specific ways, with women being central to this reproduction at the material, ideological and symbolic levels.

Canada, like other nations, was the outcome of specific nation building policies organized by the state. Indeed, there existed no ‘natural’ *Canadian* nation on the North American continent prior to European colonization. Aboriginal peoples on the North American continent have lived in various indigenous social formations with specific political and economic systems (Culhane, 1998; Dyck, 1991; Goodleaf, 1993; Green, 1995; Maracle, 1993; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995; Wright, 1992). What we have come to know today as the Canadian nation was the outcome of the historical, social and economic processes of British and French colonization. The *Canadian* nation was very self-consciously “imagined” by both the colonizing and colonial settler states as white. Racialized colonial land policies and racialized immigration policies were central to this nation building. In the following Chapters, I examine the specific nation-building practices of the Canadian state.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have examined Marxist and feminist theories of migration. These theories point out that international migration within the capitalist system is systemic. The world labour market organized the provision of labour at a global level from the beginnings of the capitalist system. Migration is a gendered process and women’s involvement in the world labour market has been significant, as has been their role in the reproduction of

'national' and 'immigrant' populations.

Feminist theories of migration have underscored the economic contribution of women to the receiving countries. I have identified as a major weakness of both Marxist and feminist theories their relative silence on the global processes of racialization organized through international migration. My contribution to this scholarship is in developing the concepts of **nationalization** and **bordering** to analyse how processes of racialization have been organized by the Canadian state in its nation-building practices. In Part Two of this dissertation I examine specifically the founding of the Canadian nation which was predicated upon the colonization/racialization of Aboriginal peoples. I examine specifically the role of the racialized *Indian Act* and racialized immigration policies in this nation-building.

PART 2: THE CANADIAN NATION, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

CHAPTER FOUR

FOUNDING THE CANADIAN NATION

Introduction

As I have discussed in Chapter Two, Marshall's theory identifies the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries as representing the historical 'progress' of citizenship rights within capitalist societies. However, colonized peoples who were being integrated into the British Empire during this period did not have the citizenship rights his theory was elaborating on. Indeed, during this very period, colonized populations were being brought into European hegemony. The self-determination of colonized peoples as expressed in indigenous economic and political systems was being attacked by colonizing power with horrifying consequences for colonized populations. The historical experiences of colonized peoples did not inform Marshall's theory. Indeed, it would not be too extreme a point to argue that Marshall's theory was essentially concerned with the extension of citizenship rights to the adult white male worker.

Whereas the literature on citizenship takes for granted the existence of nation-states within which citizens make claims, I have argued that the principles which underlie the "imagining" of the nation need to be problematized. Therefore, in this Chapter, I analyze Canadian nation-building and the development of Canadian citizenship by examining the racialized principles which underpinned the "imagining" of the nation by the state. Specifically, I analyze the construction of the nation and citizenship through the colonization of Aboriginal peoples as expressed in colonial land policies and the racialized *Indian Act*; the immigration policies which enabled the state to "produce" a national population; and the processes through which the state organized the nationalizing and bordering of various immigrant populations. There is consensus in the literature that the *Indian Act* expresses colonial power relations in Canada as a white settler colony (Culhane, 1998; Dyck, 1991; Fiske, 1995; Green, 1995). Consensus also exists in the assessment of Canada's immigration policies prior to the 1960s as having been overtly

racialized (Adhopia, 1993; Buchinani, Indra & Srivastava, 1985; Doman, 1984; Hawkins, 1989; Jakubowski, 1997; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). I draw upon specific examples from these historical studies in developing my analysis of the twin processes of nationalization and bordering which have shaped access to citizenship in Canada. As this Chapter is not meant to be a chronology of the period I am examining, my use of historical examples to demonstrate the recurrent themes of colonization and racialization is a selective one.

In my examination of the founding of the Canadian nation, I develop the following three points. Firstly, the colonization/racialization of self-determining Aboriginal societies was the basis upon which the Canadian nation and its citizenship were historically constructed. The ideological practices of the Canadian settler state sought to build the Canadian nation as white, and in this process, it racialized Canadian citizenship. I examine how the colonization/racialization of Aboriginal peoples and racialized land policies provided the territorial base of the Canadian 'nation.' Secondly, the development of capitalist citizenship in Canada did not represent a move towards equality for all populations within the national territory: this citizenship was predicated upon the state's disruption of the self-determination of Aboriginal peoples, and the erosion of customary and traditional rights. The settler state defined Aboriginal peoples as 'non-human' and therefore, 'non-citizens' while simultaneously extending citizenship to European immigrants by nationalizing them into becoming *Canadians*. Thus, capitalist citizenship came to express a racialized relationship between Canadian 'citizens' as members-of-the-nation and 'their' state, as well as between Canadians and Aboriginal peoples. Thirdly, the 'production' and reproduction of the state's 'national' population was accomplished through racialized immigration policies. I examine these immigration policies to demonstrate that the migrations of various non-Aboriginal populations were rooted in the same structural conditions within the global economy, the Canadian state's immigration policies distinguished between *future citizens* and *immigrants* on a racialized basis until the 1960s. These practices nationalized white immigrants by overtly defining them as *preferred races* who shared the national/racial character. The recruitment of these immigrants for settlement on this

racialized basis organized their nationalization as *future citizens*: their ideological construction as members of the 'founding races' enabled them to escape their immigrant status. Simultaneously, state practices bordered the immigrants it categorized as *non-preferred races* who were defined as not sharing the *Canadian* racial/national character. These *immigrants* were constructed as outsiders to the nation through their unequal citizenship. As a result of the Keep Canada White policies, the category *immigrant* came to express more than a particular legal status, that of 'new-comers' who would come to be integrated into the nation.

The ideological construction of the nation as white meant that the state distinguished these *immigrants*, and in particular, *immigrant* women, as a threat to the whiteness of the nation. Immigration policy therefore came to organize membership in the nation, as well as to regulate the access to citizenship of all non-Aboriginal peoples. The very identity of the nation-state, its *citizens* and *future citizens*, became rooted in their shared racialized identity as white, despite the very real divisions of class and gender within the nation.

Colonization and the Canadian Nation

Before Europeans came to the Americas, approximately 500 Aboriginal nations had lived in various social formations on the land which has come to be known as North America (Culhane, 1998: 42). Aboriginal societies exercised control over the lands upon which they lived, as well as over other economic resources within distinct economic, social and legal systems. The sovereignty of these societies was clearly recognized by the early Europeans who came to the North American continent. These Europeans sought to destroy Aboriginal sovereignty in the very centuries celebrated by Marshall for bringing civil and political rights to "modern" society. During the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, Aboriginal societies in the Americas were being forcefully dispossessed of their lands. This dispossession was an integral element of the settlement policies of the white settler states and represented a historical continuity with the earlier periods of genocidal violence against Aboriginal

peoples which European contact had brought.²⁰ European colonization turned the world “upside down” for Aboriginal societies all over the American continent.²¹ This first phase of globalization which took the form of the colonial integration of economies was a violent, bloody process:

Denying other cultures their rights on the basis of their difference from European culture was convenient for taking away their resources and wealth. The Church authorized European monarchs to attack, conquer, and subdue non-believers, to capture their goods and their territories, and to transfer their lands and properties. Five hundred years ago, Columbus carried this worldview to the New World. And millions of people and thousands of other living species lost their right to exist under the first wave of globalization. (Shiva, 1996: 106)

European colonizing powers, including Britain, were successful in destroying the institutions of self-government of various indigenous societies across the Americas, despite the intense resistance they encountered (Galeano, 1973; Green, 1995; Richardson, 1993; Robinson, 1993; Shiva, 1996; Wright, 1993; Zinn, 1980). The self appointed ‘right’ of discovery which the Europeans gave themselves over non-European territories translated into their ‘right’ of ownership over these ‘discovered’ territories:

The Papal Bull, the Columbus Charter, and patent granted by European Monarchs laid the juridical and moral foundations for the colonization and extermination of non-European peoples. In

²⁰ The scale of this genocide has been called “the most appalling holocaust in human history” by Richardson (1993: 3). Ronald Wright estimates the population of Native Americans was 100 million in 1492 (1993: 4). Howard Zinn estimates that the population in North America was 10 million prior to the coming of Columbus, and was brought down to less than one million (Zinn, 1980: 16). Eduardo Galeano estimates the population of the Americas at 70 million, which was reduced to 3.5 million within a century and a half (Galeano, 1973: 50). While the full impact of diseases brought by European on this depopulation is not fully known, the brutality of European conquest is not in doubt in the historical literature.

²¹ Felipe Waman Puma, an Inca contemporary of Shakespeare, referred to the post-conquest world in which he lived and wrote *mundo la reves*, “a world in reverse.” For him and his people, the invasion of America “turned the world upside down” (Wright, 1993: 8).

this way, piracy turned into law and 'Divine Will.' (Shiva, 1996: 2)²²

The Church, along with the legal systems and state structures of European colonizing powers, legitimated genocide as readily as the 'legal' European pronouncements of sovereignty over Aboriginal lands.

The colonization of Canada took place over many centuries. Beginning in what is now Newfoundland during the 16th century, colonization proceeded through Quebec and Ontario during the 17th and 18th centuries, the Prairies during the 18th and 19th centuries, British Columbia in the 19th century, Northern Canada in the 20th and in many areas in the post-World War II period. The initial contact between Europeans and Aboriginal peoples in Canada led to the development of the fur trade. In this trade, Europeans were more interested in acquiring furs for the European market than in permanent settlement. However, these traders were the "advance guard of colonialism": the fur trade was succeeded by European settlement (Vibert, 1996). During the fur trade, European males were a minority who engaged in relationships, and even marriages, with Aboriginal women. Their relations with Aboriginal women were critical to the survival of European men while they were in "Indian country" (Carter, 1996; Mitchell & Franklin, 1984; Van Kirk, 1978). With the women acting as liaisons and "peacemakers," such relationships enabled European men secure trade alliances with Aboriginal societies. The women taught European men how to adapt to life in the North where the traders were able to develop the economic and political relations with Aboriginal peoples. These relations later worked to the advantage of colonial powers.

"Indian country" was not considered a place for European women. Indeed, when European women did come, they were not considered to be of the "same calibre" as Aboriginal women (Trofimenkoff & Prentice, 1977). It was in the subsequent settlement that European women became defined as central to

²² This Papal 'Bull of Donation' was granted by Pope Alexander VI to Queen Isabelle of Castille and King Ferdinand of Aragon in 1493. The Bull gave all lands "discovered and to be discovered, one hundred leagues to the West and South of the Azores towards India" not owned by a Christian King to these two monarchs (Shiva, 1991: 1).

the project of European colonization. The Canadian settler state had been created under the auspices of the British state, and as Anderson has argued, the critical support of European states for 'their' settler states who shared ties with the 'mother' country demarcated European settlers from colonized peoples.²³

The colonization of Aboriginal societies in Canada was achieved largely through the "land theft" policies of the state. In British Columbia, for example, Aboriginal peoples did not enter into treaties with the British or Canadian states, they were not conquered by military force, nor did they sell the land (Culhane, 1998). As Dara Culhane explains:

Since 1871, when British Columbia joined Canadian Confederation, all successive governments of that province had taken the position that no Aboriginal rights recognizable by "civilized law" existed prior to Britain declaring sovereignty over the territory. And even if these rights had existed, the Province of British Columbia's argument continued, the simple act of assertion of sovereignty by a European power over those lands was sufficient to extinguish any pre-existing Aboriginal title and rights. Legally, the Province of B.C. told First Nations, you do not exist. This position provided the rationale for provincial governments' consistent refusals, until 1990, to participate in any discussions or negotiations with federal government and

²³Anderson explains the political consequences of these ties between European states and 'their' settlers:

Neither in North nor South America did the creoles have to fear physical extermination or reduction to servitude, as did so many other peoples who got in the way of the juggernaut of European imperialism. They were after all 'whites', Christians and Spanish- or English-speakers; they were also the intermediaries necessary to the metropolises if the economic wealth of the Western empires was to continue under Europe's control. Hence, they were the one significant extra-European group, subjected to Europe, that at the same time had no need to be desperately afraid of Europe. The revolutionary wars, bitter as they were, were still reassuring in that they were wars between kinsmen. This family link ensured that, after a certain period of acrimony had passed, close cultural, and sometimes political and economic ties could be reknit between the former metropolises and the new nations. (Anderson, 1996: 191-192)

Anderson defines the term 'creole' in its 'original meaning' as 'person(s) of pure (at least theoretically) European descent but born in the Americas (and, by later extension, anywhere outside Europe)' (Anderson, 1996: 191-192). Anderson's insight is relevant to the Canadian situation: the relationship between the British and Canadian states was also based on their shared 'whiteness.'

A simple "assertion of sovereignty" by the British state was deemed strong enough to erase Aboriginal title to ancestral lands within the legal systems of the settler state. The Canadian state and its institutions were based upon a number of concepts: (i) the myth of European 'discovery' of the American continent;²⁴ (ii) upon the concept of "Terra Nullius" which legitimated the notion that the American continent was a land "empty of people" before the coming of the Europeans, and; (iii) upon the practice of "Terra Incognita" which allowed that European sovereigns could "claim underlying title to unknown lands"²⁵ (Culhane, 1998; Green, 1995; Richardson, 1993; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995; Wright, 1992). The state planned to eliminate "culturally distinct populations of "Indians"" through their forced assimilation (Green, 1995: 92).

The relationship between the colonization of Aboriginal peoples and the settlement of the British and French²⁶ necessary to the establishing of a white settler society was a direct one. This white settlement brought tremendous political, social and economic upheaval to Aboriginal societies as they were displaced from their lands (Culhane, 1998; Dyck, 1991; Green, 1995; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). In a very immediate and material sense, European settlement was a process which was incompatible with Aboriginal sovereignty over 'Canadian' lands. European settlement demanded, indeed was predicated upon, the dispossession of Aboriginal title. The ideological construction of the

²⁴ Dehatkadons, Chief of the Onondaga Iroquois, stated "You cannot discover an inhabited land. Otherwise I could cross the Atlantic and 'discover' England" (Wright, 1992: 5).

²⁵ See Green (1995) for a fuller discussion of these "founding myths."

²⁶ The divisions between the British and French 'nations' have resulted in an uneasy, often fractious relationship in defining 'Canadian nationhood.' However, both 'nations' were constructed as 'white' in relation to Aboriginal Peoples and in relation to 'immigrants.' While I recognize these contending interests between the French and British within the 'Canadian nation/s,' I will not address this intra-white 'national' contestation.

nation as white by the state became dependent upon a very material subordination of self-determining Aboriginal societies.

The erosion of the political power of Aboriginal women was a necessary precondition for dispossessing Aboriginal peoples of their title to land (Carter, 1996; Fiske, 1995; Goodleaf, 1993; Maracle, 1993; McIvor, 1996; Mitchell & Franklin, 1984). For example, in the particular case of Haudenosaunee society, Donna Goodleaf points out:

Since Haudenosaunee women owned the land, to dispossess and expropriate Haudenosaunee lands, the colonizers had to eradicate the political power of the women. From the colonizer's perspective, undermining the political power of the women would then lead to the destabilization of the Clan systems and therefore of the government within Haudenosaunee communities. (1993: 227)

From its very inception, the Canadian nation was ideological in the sense defined by Smith (1990). The state sought to create, and superimpose, a white *preferred race* nation over the Aboriginal societies which existed in actuality. The prospective settlers who were to become integrated into the nation belonged to other 'nations' prior to coming into Canada and their nationalization as *Canadians* became organized around their 'race' status. The racialization of the nation as white placed Aboriginal peoples already in the 'national' territory outside its ideological borders, while including white immigrants who were from outside the national territory. The state's policies brought this ideological 'imagining' of the white nation into being and inserted it onto actuality in a manner which both reflected the underlying social relations within the global system, as well as organizing the reproduction of these relations. The state imposed the "imagined" nation onto the reality of Aboriginal existence, suppressing and transforming this actuality.

The creation of the nation and access to Canadian citizenship for European settlers was related, and in direct opposition, to the rights of Aboriginal peoples. The citizenship of rights of *Canadians* to enter the country, live and work in it, and settle the land acquired through the state's "land theft" policies was dependent upon the suppression of the rights and title of Aboriginal peoples. As the "imagined" nation was imposed upon actuality,

Aboriginal peoples were forced off these lands and onto reserves of low quality. At the same time, Europeans were encouraged to settle appropriated lands by acquiring individual property rights over them²⁷ (Carter, 1996; Dyck, 1991; Green, 1995). Colonial land policies were racialized, and land, of course, was the most basic condition of nationhood: a nation cannot come into existence without a 'national' territory. These racialized land policies became institutionalized in the state's structures and practices and as a result, racialization became systematized and incorporated into the state's institutions. The 'national' economy and the private property rights of members of the nation emerged from this racialization.

Hence, the first point in my analysis of the creation of the Canadian nation and citizenship is that colonization and the suppression of Aboriginal self-determination, as well as the appropriation of Aboriginal lands were the very basis for the creation of the Canadian nation and citizenship. Organizing the access of European immigrants, as 'citizens,' to settle the 'stolen' land was essential to nation building. Thus, the ideological practices of the state constructed a racialized nation and a racialized citizenship. While a number of theorists have defined the nation-building practices of the state as being racialized during this period in relation to Aboriginal societies (Dyck, 1991; Green, 1995; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995), and in relation to immigration (Jakubowski, 1997; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995; Stasiulis, 1997), I bring together these literatures to make the case that the beginning of the development of capitalist citizenship in Canada was integrally related to the building of the nation, and that both were racialized.

²⁷ For instance, after 1870 when the Hudsons Bay Company lands were turned over to the Dominion, the Canadian state helped clear Aboriginal peoples off the lands, initiating a program of "free homesteads in the West to facilitate European settlement" (Carter, 1996). Settlers were recruited by the Canadian state in England, with promises of 'free land and easy wealth as inducements to immigration'(Green, 1995). At this time, the Aboriginal and Metis populations in the West was greater than that of Euro-Canadians. For example, in the district of Alberta in 1885, Aboriginal and Metis peoples numbered around 9500, and the 'new' arrivals numbered 4900 (Carter, 1995: 32).

Citizenship as Inequality

In this section, I develop the point that citizenship did not represent a move towards equality for all populations within the 'national' territory. As I have mentioned previously, various forms of social and political systems had existed in Aboriginal societies prior to colonization. Historical evidence suggests some were matrilineal with descent and kinship relations being passed on through women, others practiced bilateral social relations with descent and kinship organized through a combination of matrilineal and patrilineal lines.²⁸ Even though the role and status of women in Aboriginal societies differed, their participation in politics and decision-making is well recorded. Women held authority and status and were active in trading. They could be shamans in some societies and could host potlatches (Goodleaf, 1993; Mitchell & Franklin, 1984; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995; Van Kirk, 1977). As colonization eroded the economic base of Aboriginal peoples, it consequently also undermined political systems and the traditional and customary rights within Aboriginal societies (Goodleaf, 1993).²⁹ Where treaties had been entered by Aboriginal peoples, they were made 'wards' of the Canadian state. As such, they did not have "full citizenship" and were subjected to a "wide variety of controls and regulations" in all aspects of their lives, including control over where they could reside (Carter, 1996: 32). Where treaties had not been entered by Aboriginal peoples, the state brought them under its control

²⁸ The extent of patriarchal relations in Aboriginal communities before colonization has been the source of considerable debate. There is evidence in British Columbia of patterns of matrilineal descent and kinship among the Haida, the Tsimshian and northern Kwagiulth. Among the Coast Salish, the Nootka, Bella Bella, Bella Coola and Southern Kwagiulth, bilateral forms of social organization have been recorded (Mitchell & Franklin, 1984).

²⁹ In tracing the development of intellectual property rights within the global system of relations, Vandana Shiva argues that indigenous communal property rights existed in colonized societies prior to colonization. Colonization introduced private property rights, which led to the destruction of many of these customary rights. These 'customary' rights had been developed by diverse societies, and were based in value systems different from, and in opposition to, private property rights. While the exact content of these customary rights varied across societies and require detailed historical

through its legal institutions (Culhane, 1998; Green, 1995). The erosion of Aboriginal self-determination had a particularly dramatic impact on the power and political participation of Aboriginal women, who became subjected to a “more devastating form of male domination” (Mitchell & Franklin, 1984). Whereas Aboriginal leaders have been defined as being “more democratic” and “more reasoned” in their relationships with their peoples, the same could not be said of the European leaders who negotiated Confederation (Abele, 1997).³⁰

The development of Canada as a self-governing territory with its own political institutions was based upon its close ties to Britain and to its privileged ‘white’ Dominion status (Clement, 1997; Green, 1995; Hawkins, 1988; Macdonald, 1997; Neufeld & Whitworth, 1997; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). As a white settler colony Canada was privileged by virtue of the ‘race’ of its ruling elite. This “privileged status” allowed the Canadian ruling elite to acquire from the British state:

the ‘gifts’ of liberal democratic government and relative political autonomy so that (Canada) might develop within a shared framework of civilization and moral and material standards. Hence, although Canada (and the other so-called ‘white dominions’) shared with the so-called ‘dependent colonies’ a peripheral position in the international political economy prior to the twentieth century, as a cultural, social and political entity, it was a chip off the metropolitan block. (Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995: 97)

Whereas Confederation further consolidated the colonization of Aboriginal peoples, it also resulted in the transfer of power into the hands of “businessmen-cum-elected members of the British-Canadian ruling class” and a smaller “French elite” (Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995:109). This ruling elite undertook the project of nation building by importing immigrants as settlers for the development of the economy and for the reproduction of British institutions

study, colonization greatly undermined these rights where not outright destroying them (1996).

³⁰ Abele argues that the Constitution of Canada was an “arrangement between elites” which defined the relation of government to government, not government to people. Aboriginal leaders, on the other hand, had relations with, and spoke for, their people (1997).

and social systems.

The participation of British and French immigrant women in nation building was critical: indeed, the reproduction of the nation could not have been achieved without the 'nationalization' of *preferred race* women. As Daiva Stasiulis & Radha Jhappan note, "the appearance of white women was coterminous with white settlement and brought both a sharp rise in racist sentiment and heightened class-consciousness within fur-trade society" (1995:103). With the coming of European women, European men abandoned their Aboriginal wives and children who now became obstacles to European settlement (Carter, 1996; Vibert, 1996). The presence of European women resulted in Aboriginal women becoming constructed as not fully "women" in the Canadian imagination.³¹ The settlers brought with them the colonial construction of colonized peoples as 'primitive' and 'less than human.' Although European women did not create the segregation between Aboriginal peoples and European settlers, they became party to this segregation by reproducing it. Indeed, the presence of European women was used to justify such segregation (Carter, 1996). The boundaries of the nation during this period of colonization/settlement were constructed in relation to Aboriginal women, who now became defined as a 'threat' to the nation. The abandoning of Aboriginal women by European men became a solution to the preservation of the 'purity' of the nation.

The colonization of Aboriginal peoples, and the abandoning of Aboriginal women, meant that the 'liberal democracy' of the Europeans was racialized from its very inception in Canada: Aboriginal peoples were granted no

³¹ For example, one Mary E. Inderwick, living in Alberta, wrote in 1884 to her family of her loneliness because she lived twenty two miles from the nearest 'woman.' 'The women who lived close to her, such as the 'squaw who is the nominal wife of a white man near us,' and her maid, both of whom she wrote about, did not qualify as 'women' (Carter, 1996:30).

'democratic' space or citizenship rights within Canadian political institutions.³² Instead, they were subjected to the racialized "coercive tutelage" by Canadian society which assumed the "form of arbitrary restraint or guardianship exercised by one power over another" (Dyck, 1991:3). The Canadian state consolidated various policies governing Aboriginal peoples into the racialized *Indian Act* of 1876. This *Act* separated the governing of Aboriginal peoples away from the governing of Canadian 'citizens' on the basis of their racial/colonial status. The *Act* has been described as representing the "Euro-Canadian government's apartheid system" (Goodleaf, 1993:226). Joyce Green (1995) summarizes the state's colonial practices which were institutionalized in the *Act*:

The way in which Aboriginal nations have been made Other is typical of colonial endeavours, and has served to both justify colonial actions and to deny the historical and contemporary completeness of aboriginal existence in Canada. Colonialism's project, in Michael Stevenson's words, "was, and still is, to lay waste a people and destroy their culture in order to undermine the integrity of their existence and appropriate their riches." It is pursued via "total war" legitimized not only through racist construction but through creation of language celebrating colonial identities while constructing the colonized as antithesis of human decency and development, thereby establishing a justification for their physical, historical and cultural annihilation. This language "becomes the basis for the forming of national identity and for providing the state with an organising ideology" whose racist, imperialist concepts 'become institutionalized as the "democratic nation-state" in which hatred of the Other is bureaucratized.

That is, racism becomes part of the structural base of the state, permeating the cultural life of the dominant society both by its exclusive narrative of dominant experience and mythology, and by its stereotypical rendering of the "Other" as peripheral and unidimensional.(Green, 1995: 88).

The *Indian Act* represented this "bureaucratized hatred," organizing the relations of ruling through the ideological transformation of Aboriginal peoples

³² At the time of Confederation, the legal status of 'Canadian citizens' was that of British subjects with domicile in Canada (Ward & Carty, 1986; Ungerleider, 1992). The 'Canadian' population was 60% British and 30% French (Kalbach, 1990:18). The ruling elite came from these two 'races.'

into 'Indians,' as well as entrenching unequal rights for 'Indian' men and women (Fiske, 1995; Green, 1995; Mitchell & Franklin, 1984; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). In institutionalizing the category 'Indian,'³³ the state took away the right of self-definition of Aboriginal peoples and erased in law the differences between the various Aboriginal societies.³⁴ Henceforth, the colonial settler state, through the *Indian Act* and the Department of Indian Affairs, was to decide who was an 'Indian' and who was not (Carter, 1996; Fiske, 1995; Green, 1995; Mitchell & Franklin, 1984).

The *Act* created a framework for the governing of "Indians" based on the "paternalistic" notion that they needed "protection" and could be "civilized" through assimilation (Fiske, 1995:192). It made the rights of Aboriginal women, indeed their very belonging to their community, directly dependent upon their relationships with men. Aboriginal women would lose Aboriginal status and the right to live on reserves upon marriage to non-Aboriginal men, or even to Aboriginal men from other communities. The children of these women were also to be disinherited. Marriage outside their community was to result in legal estrangement from their communities (Fiske, 1995; Mitchell & Franklin, 1984; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). Aboriginal men, on the other hand, were not to lose status by marrying outside their communities. Indeed, non-Aboriginal women would acquire Aboriginal status upon marrying these men, and the children from these marriages would not be disinherited. In this manner, the *Act* created "competing interests between women and men" (Fiske, 1995: 4).

The *Indian Act* also stated that Aboriginal women of "bad moral

³³Aboriginal societies referred to America as Great Island or Turtle Island (Wright, 1992). The use of the term 'Indian' to refer to Aboriginal peoples in the Americas was the result of Columbus' mistaken belief that he had landed in India. Until his death, Columbus continued to insist America was in Asia. The name 'America,' given to this land by Europeans, came from the name of Amerigo Vespucci, a European from Seville, whose descriptions of his voyages earned him much fame in Europe (Koning, 1976).

³⁴ In British Columbia alone, ten different ethnic groups spoke thirty different Aboriginal languages (Mitchell & Franklin, 1984).

character” were to lose rights to their husband’s estates. The power to judge the women’s “moral character” was placed in the hands of white male administrators (Carter. 1996). Colonial administration on reserves was organized through the imposition of male Band Councils. These Band councils ensured that the resources available to Aboriginal communities would be channeled through men, and the Canadian state institutionalized not only racialized, but also patriarchal, inequalities for Aboriginal peoples (Fiske, 1995).³⁵

The ideological practices of the Act reveal interesting insights into how the state constructed definitions of Aboriginal ‘race.’ Aboriginal women’s ‘race’ was to be lost upon marriage outside their immediate community, their ‘race’ was to be determined by the men whom they married. The Act thus created a severe disjuncture in the lived experiences of these women: while they would legally lose their ‘race,’ they continued to be ‘Aboriginal’ in their lived experiences. As the Aboriginal women who fought against this inequality demonstrated, these women did not stop ‘being’ Aboriginal in their lived experiences (Fiske, 1995; Maracle, 1993). However, the policies of the state created the conditions through which Band Councils could disown the Aboriginal status of the women. By giving the Band Councils a material stake in restricting Aboriginal women’s access to community resources, these state practices encouraged the further erosion of the status of women in Aboriginal communities.

This leads me to the second point in my analysis of Canadian citizenship. In the historical construction of the Canadian nation, citizenship in the nation-state did not represent a move towards equality for all peoples within the national territory. Whereas Aboriginal societies had developed

³⁵ The relative ‘freedom’ of Aboriginal women when compared to European women of the period became a ‘matter of considerable anxiety to European males and a prime target for the Christianizing drive of missionaries’ (Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995: 101). The introduction by the Canadian state of the band-council structure for the internal administration of Aboriginal peoples is part of the attempt to re/formulate indigenous patriarchies. Until 1951, Aboriginal women were ‘excluded from the band electorate’, as well as being ‘barred from public meetings’ (Fiske, 1995: 6).

political and social institutions, these were dealt a severe blow by colonization. The customary and traditional rights which had existed within Aboriginal societies were subordinated by the Canadian state. The suppression of Aboriginal political customary and traditional rights was necessary to, and simultaneous with, the development of citizenship rights for *Canadians* in the nation-state. In the development of citizenship rights for Europeans as Canadian 'citizens,' the state reduced Aboriginal peoples to non-citizen status. Capitalist citizenship came to express a relation not only between Canadian 'citizens' and 'their' state, but also between 'citizens-as-members-of-the-nation', the state and Aboriginal peoples as 'non' citizens.'

In institutionalizing the unequal rights of Aboriginal peoples, the state made the assimilation and acculturation of Aboriginal peoples into the dominant society the pre-condition for their enfranchisement. The loss of collective title to land and the surrendering of Aboriginal cultures through individual assimilation into 'Canadian' society became the cost of gaining citizenship rights within the Canadian legal system (Dyck, 1991). In other words, the Act sought to keep Aboriginal peoples colonized as social groups. Aboriginal peoples could claim the 'rights' of citizenship only as individuals by giving up their cultures, their ancestry, their claims to sovereignty and to title of the land upon which their very historical being and consciousness were based. Furthermore, even if Aboriginal peoples were to accept this negation of their historical being and accept these conditions by claiming 'citizenship, the construction of the Canadian nation as white would still preclude their full membership in it.

This is one of the central contradictions deeply rooted within the earliest stages of the development of citizenship in Canada: the citizenship and rights of Europeans as *Canadians* were based upon the colonization of Aboriginal peoples whose forced integration into capitalist relations ensured their loss of sovereignty. Instead of extending their 'rights' as 'citizens', capitalism undermined, and even destroyed, the political institutions and rights of colonized peoples, reducing them to a 'sub-human' status.

The dehumanization of colonized populations as 'less than human' within the British Empire meant they became ideologically constructed as less

than 'citizens' in the practices of colonial states.³⁶ The 'humanizing' of Europeans, and the extension of their citizenship within settler colonies, enabled their active participation in, and reproduction of, the colonial system. In short, European settlement in Canada and the development of capitalist citizenship could not have been accomplished without extending this citizenship to Europeans, while destroying Aboriginal rights and title. *Canadian* 'citizenship,' and in fact 'human' status itself, became organized around the colonizer/colonized status of the various populations in the white settler colony.

'Sifting' Settlers: Nationalizing / Bordering Immigrants

The preconditions for the creation of the Canadian nation were national territory and a national population. As discussed earlier, the land was acquired through colonial "land theft" policies of the state. For the national population, the state turned to the founding British 'race,' aggressively recruiting immigrants in the consolidation of colonization. These 'colonizing' migrations were intended to be a permanent affair in the white settler colonies, creating ruling elites who would govern the colonies in the interests of the 'mother country' (Anderson, 1996; Potts, 1990; Sassen, 1988). Immigration policies across the British Empire were intimately linked to the colonial goals of ensuring British supremacy.³⁷

The immigration organized by the British and Canadian states was likewise intended to be a permanent settlement (Dyck, 1991; Green, 1995;

³⁶ Colonized peoples, as 'non-humans' and 'sub-humans' were not considered deserving of 'citizen' status which was equal to that of Europeans. Within the colonial context, propertied European men became the 'measure of being human and having human rights' (Shiva, 1996: 106).

³⁷ The Empire Settlement Act of 1922 committed Britain to work with Dominion governments and private agencies to develop emigration and settlement programs (Carrothers, 1929; Hawkins, 1989; Peterson, 1975). Among other things, the Canadian government produced brochures and maps for distribution by recruiting agents and through the media to attract European settlers (Hawkins, 1989; Sifton, 1975; Troper, 1975).

Jabukowski, 1997; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). This settlement was required for the development of a national economy which would create the conditions for the ongoing accumulation of capital. It was also required for the state to build its national domain, and an aggressive recruitment of immigrants from Britain was initiated after Confederation. Immigration became essential to the production and reproduction of the national population, and immigrant policies came to organize access to Canadian citizenship. From 1867 until the late 1960s, Canada's immigration policies distinguished first British and French, and subsequently other Europeans, as *preferred race* immigrants. This period in Canadian history reveals interesting insights about how processes of racialization changed and evolved in response to changing conditions within the global economy. Whereas initially Britain, the United States and France, and "to a lesser extent" Northern and Western Europe had been the 'preferred' source countries, immigrants were subsequently accepted from among some of the previously 'non-preferred' groups, specifically the Ukrainians, Italians, Poles and Hutterites (Jakubowski, 1997: 11-12). The 'preferred' status was eventually extended to all 'white' immigrants in the 20th century. But, however much the borders of the nation shifted to include Europeans other than British and French, the state did not allow them to shift so far as to include third world peoples, who were distinguished as *non-preferred races*.

British settlers were recruited for immigration with offers of "free land and easy wealth as inducements" (Green, 1995). They were given significant social and financial supports after, and sometimes even prior to, their arrival in Canada. The incentives used to attract *preferred race* immigrants included access to 'cheap' land, financial grants, assisted passages, training, and other forms of assistance with settlement (Dyck, 1991; Hawkins, 1986; Parr, 1987; Sifton, 1975; Vibert, 1996). Certainly not all European immigrants had access to these "inducements," which were organized by gender and class specific relations, the key factor was the opening of the nation's borders to these immigrants who were constructed by the state as *future citizens*. As such, allowing formal citizenship rights to these immigrants was intrinsically linked to the state's organizing of their immigration, and their integration into the nation. The nationalization of various *preferred race* immigrants was organized

in the state's shaping of the material conditions for their permanent settlement. Practically, the nationalization of settlers was achieved by making "stolen" Aboriginal lands available to them for settlement, and for developing the national economy through the building of farms and railways, and through the extraction of natural resources for export.

Clifford Sifton, who developed the Immigration Branch in the Ministry of Interior during the government of Wilfred Laurier in the 1890s was not bashful in declaring his government's objectives:

In those days, settlers were sought from three sources: one was the United States. The American settlers did not need sifting; they were of the finest quality and the most desirable settlers. In Great Britain we confined our efforts very largely to the North of England and Scotland, and for the purpose of sifting the settlers we doubled the bonuses to the agents in the North of England and cut down as much as possible in the South. The result was that we got a fairly steady stream of people from the North of England and from Scotland and they were the very best settlers in the world.....

Our work was largely done in the North....Then came the continent where the great emigrating centre was Hamburg. Steamships got there to load up with people who are desirous of leaving Europe.....We made an arrangement with the booking agencies in Hamburg, under which they winnowed out this flood of people, picked out the agriculturalists and peasants and sent them to Canada, sending nobody else. We paid, I think, \$5,000 per head for the farmer and \$2,000 per head for the other members of the family. (Sifton, [1922]1975: 34)

Sifton took considerable pride in having made "a determined and successful effort" to "free" Aboriginal lands for "immediate settlement" (Hawkins, 1988). Despite Sifton's claims, the "sifting" of "American" settlers did in fact occur in his government's refusal to grant land to Black peoples from the United States. Black people had come to Canada in small numbers as slaves, Loyalists and pioneers since the 17th century.³⁸ Black settlers were considered allies in

³⁸ By 1759, there were over 1,000 Black slaves in new France and by 1767 there were 104 in Nova Scotia. In 1783, Loyalists brought 2,000 more Black slaves into the country (Bolaria & Li, 1985:166).

maintaining British interests against American expansion (Killian, 1978).³⁹ The state gave Black people access to land on the basis of “license of occupation,” but they were not given ownership of this land (Bolaria & Li, 1985:168). The refusal to grant them land during Sifton’s tenure sent a clear message to Black people: “American negroes were not welcome and were not encouraged to come; and, although no law was passed to exclude them, careful administrative procedures ensured that their applications would be rejected” (Palmer, 1975).⁴⁰

Sifton explained how the state’s policies to ensure the supply of labour and the creation of a ‘national’ market came together with its priorities for ‘white’ nation-building in policies which recruited settlers from particular European racialized/classes. The state sought out farmers and those “accustomed to pioneering life,” while leaving out “artisans, mechanics, labourers, small shopkeepers” (Hawkins, 1988). To be excluded from permanent settlement in Sifton’s campaigns were *all* non-Europeans, irrespective of their class. Sifton later served as the Minister of Indian Affairs, in which capacity he was to “champion a policy of transferring unused Indian reserve lands into the hands of Euro-Canadian land speculators who were

³⁹ Killian writes of Sir James Douglas, who became the Governor of British Columbia in 1851. His father was a Glasgow born merchant settled in British Guiana on his family’s sugar plantations, and his mother was a creole. In 1855 American prospectors began to enter British territory, and Douglas encouraged the migration of Black settlers to counter this American presence (1978).

⁴⁰ Although Black peoples in the United States were “too poor and disadvantaged to contemplate migration”, some did come to the Canadian Prairies during Sifton’s tenure, but without “the necessary reinforcements” their numbers did not increase (Hawkins, 1988). The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism noted the historical Black migration: “Negroes came to new France and to the Provinces of British North America in the 18th century chiefly as slaves. In the 19th century, they formed sizable settlements as freedmen and fugitives in the Maritimes, in southwestern Ontario, and in Victoria. Many returned to the United States in the 1860s, during and after the Civil War. The 1871 census figure of 21,500 for Canada probably represents a drop in the negro population from an earlier period. The 1881, 1901, and 1911 censuses record further declines” (Palmer, 1975).

“clambering” to acquire valuable reserve lands” (Dyck, 1991).⁴¹

The immigrants to be nationalized came from different sectors of European society. Britain was particularly keen to send the unemployed, the poor and ‘criminals’ (Peterson, 1975; Vibert, 1996). This aroused some ire in Canada⁴² where these particular immigrants were bitterly resented. Class divisions existed among these immigrants, as did divisions of gender which reproduced inequalities between men and women in the settler society, shaping women’s unequal access to economic resources. The ideal woman which Sifton’s campaigns sought to recruit was the wife of the good “quality” settler who would become the nation’s “backbone”: “I think a stalwart peasant in a sheep-skin coat, born on the soil, whose forefathers have been farmers for generations, with a stout wife and a half-a-dozen children is good quality” (Sifton, 1966: 35). The European women who were recruited in reality would have severely tested Sifton’s ideal. However, he expressed the state’s recognition of the importance of the role of women in nation-building.

While Sifton’s ideal underscores the patriarchal values informing his campaigns for recruiting immigrants, the nationalization of *preferred race* immigrant women was organized so that while their inequalities with European men were reproduced, this inequality became placed in the context of a shared racial/national interest between them. The state’s ideological construction of a shared ‘national’ identity and ‘national’ interest shared by men and women gained its specific content in relation to the disentanglement of Aboriginal peoples, and in relation to the *non-preferred races* whose immigration was to be strictly restricted. While underlying social relations created the actuality of

⁴¹The interests of non-Indians were paramount in the administration of Aboriginal peoples by the colonial state. In 1909, the Minister reported to parliament that 700,000 acres of reserve lands were acquired by the Crown and sold off for \$3.00 an acre. After the First World War, another 68,000 acres of land were redistributed in a soldier settlement scheme (Dyck, 1991).

⁴² In 1911, Stephen Leacock describes them in this way, “They are, in great measure, mere herds of the proletariat of Europe, the lowest classes of industrial society, without home and work, fit objects indeed for philanthropic pity, but indifferent material from which to build the commonwealth of the future” (Leacock, 1975: 48)

opposing gender and class interests among *preferred race* immigrants. the ideological construction of the 'nation' as white organized these divisions within the framework of a shared racialized interest.

As discussed earlier, women's participation was central to nation-building in Canada. In the years between 1862 and 1962, Women's Emigration Societies worked to increase the immigration of middle class and working class British women to the British colonies, including Canada. These Societies worked closely with government officials, organizing passages and lodgings for women immigrants, as well as finding employment for them (WMOAS, 1963). The women were sent out to work as governesses, teachers and domestic workers; many of the women married settlers.

The state periodically increased its own direct recruitment of European women. For example, the Ministry of Immigration and Colonization produced a pamphlet in 1928 to recruit British women as domestic workers (MIC, 1928). The pamphlet describes Canada as "a land of opportunity" and gives general information about the country, along with specific information about work opportunities, wage levels and working conditions. It lists Emigration Agents in Britain. The climate is described as "particularly suited to the white race," and British women are told they are "welcomed" by the "people" of Canada (3). Prospective immigrants are informed arrangements could be made for women to stay at the Canadian Women's Hostel⁴³ where they could get training before going into service. Assisted passages under the Empire Settlement Scheme⁴⁴ could be arranged, as could free medical examinations for the "right type" of applicant. Women officers appointed by the Director of Emigration and Conductresses employed by steamship companies would "assist" immigrant

⁴³ The hostels were located in major centres across the country. They were supported by the government to provide accommodation for women emigrants from the 'Mother Country'. See *The Houseworker In Canada: Opportunities For Success, Work And Wages, Where To Go And What To Take*, Ministry of Immigration And Colonization, Ottawa (1928).

⁴⁴ The British Government, the Canadian government and Steamship companies contributed funds under this scheme (MIC, 1928).

women.

Joy Parr (1987) has written about the direct recruitment of women hosiery workers between 1907 and 1928 by the Penman's Company. Her assessment of this migration is as follows : "Within the new regime, women's prospects in particular were better in Canada than in Britain." (535). Migration gave these women "better paying and more steady" work in Canada. The women were given tickets and "modest cash advances" by their employer to induce their migration. Among the women who did migrate were widows for whom "emigration was a way to keep the family solvent and together"(543), and for many women, "Emigration offered a resolution to domestic tensions which poverty, legality, and convention made otherwise unresolvable" (544). These examples demonstrate the actual ways in which particular groups of immigrant women became 'nationalized' into *Canadian* society.

Citizenship was key to this process of nationalization. The establishment of the Canadian nation gave formal rights of domicile in Canada to the British and French 'races' as citizens and future citizens, a right which they did not have prior to colonization and their immigration. Examining the development of Canadian citizenship, R. Carty and P. Ward point out that "most policies encouraging migration reflected the assumption that northwestern Europeans and Americans of like descent made the best prospective citizens" (1986: 68).

Canadian citizenship became **inclusive** in the experience of European immigrants: it organized their membership in the nation and gave them formal rights as *Canadians*. As such, citizenship rights would appear to be a progressive development in the experience of these immigrants. Yet, access to this citizenship was confined to certain populations within the Empire on the basis of their race, and therefore, it simultaneously became a mechanism of **exclusion**. Unequal access to citizenship simultaneously placed *non-preferred race* populations outside the ideological borders of the nation. Canadian citizenship, as part of the process of nationalization, organized formal membership in the 'national' community. Having access to these formal rights expressed a 'white' 'world-in-common' for members of the nation as the 'white' settler state 'produced' its 'white' national domain.

The Canadian state was committed to recreating British 'national' and cultural institutions and systems as the dominant, national forms (Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). However, this ambition of the state had to be somewhat modified in the 20th century as it became clear there were not enough British emigrants to meet the requirements of Canadian nation-building. The 'Britishness' of the nation became transformed into its 'whiteness' with the subsequent nationalization of Europeans other than British and French into the nation. The ideological borders of the 'nation' were fluid enough so that other European countries were selected for the recruitment of immigrants.⁴⁵ The inclusion of other European 'races' meant the nation could no longer be built simply around 'British-ness' but around the common 'whiteness' of Europeans.

Extremely useful to my analysis of Canadian nation-building is Anderson's (1991) formulation of the nation as being shaped by the ruling class in the form of the "official nationalism" expressed in state policy, as well as in the nationalism expressed by other classes in the form of "popular nationalism." The "official nationalism" of the state was expressed in racialized colonial land policies, the *Indian Act* and racialized immigration policies. The state welcomed, indeed courted, *preferred race* immigrants and helped organize their settlement in material ways. This "official nationalism" interacted with the "popular nationalism" of the members of the nation who actively reproduced the exclusion of Aboriginal peoples, as well as supported the exclusion of *immigrants* from the nation. The participation of *Canadian* women in nation building, as well as the hostility to *immigrants* from the trade union movement are examples of the "popular nationalism" of the period.

⁴⁵ The development of the global economy during the nineteenth century of aggressive Empire building meant there were simply not enough British emigrants to meet Canada's needs. In fact, not having enough labour for its own needs, Britain also was being compelled to 'import' labour into the heart of the Empire (Potts, 1990; Gilroy, 1991; Klug, 1989; Ginsberg, 1992). This shortage of British emigrants compelled Canada to turn to other European countries, and although these immigrants were accepted very reluctantly initially. The building of a white settler colony meant that the process of nation building could only be sustained by accepting immigrants from other European countries (Jakubowski, 1997; Hawkins, 1989; Stasiulis, 1997).

Canadian women's organization in the 19th and early 20th centuries shared the goal to 'Keep Canada White.' Their concerns about the quality of the race/nation shaped their advocacy for social programs and for the extension of citizenship rights to white women.⁴⁶ Even as these women fought against their gender based inequalities, most did so in the name of patriotism and stressed the importance of women within the family and nation. Upper and middle class women played a crucial role in nation building subsequent to settlement. In the 1870s, maternal feminists built organizations, both local and national, to work for the good of the 'family', the 'nation' and the 'state' (Strong-Boag, 1977; Valverde, 1992). The gains these women made in achieving access to universities and professions increased their stake in their work for the nation (Stong-Boag, 1977). Preserving and strengthening the family through moral reform for 'social purity' was central to their work and their "ideal of female moral superiority" was shared by church organizations and other social groups.⁴⁷

The elite status of many women activists meant that they were closely tied to men of the ruling class. The example of the National Council of Women demonstrates how close ties to the ruling elite strengthened the women's political organizing. The Governor-General's wife was solicited as the Council's first president, and Lady Thompson, wife of the Prime Minister, along with Madame Laurier, wife of the leader of the Opposition, became honorary members. The Council's growth demonstrated the women's "growing national self-confidence" and the association of "homes and nations," of the "family and state" was the "leitmotif" of the "feminist-nationalists" (Strong-Boag, 1977:

⁴⁶This is what has come to be known as the 'first wave' of Anglo-Canadian feminism. Strong-Boag writes about more radical feminist among this 'first wave' who, in order to mobilize broader support for their agenda of gaining political rights for women, worked with the less progressive reform-minded organizations (Strong-Boag, 1977).

⁴⁷ The Woman's Christian Temperance Union, the Young Women's Christian Association, the Girls Friendly Society, the Dominion Order of King's Daughters, Women's Missionary Societies, and other church organizations are some of the organizations established by women (Strong-Boag, 1977).

101). In establishing the Council across the country, its members defined a significant role for themselves in nation-building:

This Council is to bring us in touch with other parts of the Dominion, and we shall be the "Foremothers" of a great nation. (Strong-Boag, 1977: 102)

In their commitment to nation-building, the women were "little different" from their "male counterparts of the same era" (Trofimenkoff & Prentice, 1977). That maternal feminists valorized women's role as mothers is well recognized in the literature. What receives less attention is that they did so on a racialized basis: these women did not support the campaigns of third world immigrants for the state to allow the immigration of their 'mothers' into Canada. Instead, many *Canadian* women's organizations actively supported the state's restrictions to keep *immigrant* women out. For example, the National Council of Women voted to bar Asian women from entry, as did the Christian Ministerial Association who "feared" Canada would become a "hindu colony" (Doman, 1984).

Likewise, the trade union movements were very hostile to the presence of *non-preferred race* immigrants in Canada (Bolaria & Li, 1985; Buchignani, Indra & Srivastava, 1985). For example, white workers defined Chinese workers as a threat to them, and actively called upon the state to prevent their entry into the country. As Bolaria and Li have found, trades union campaigned against Chinese immigration, and used these campaigns to strengthen and consolidate their support, particularly in British Columbia (1985). In accepting and actively supporting the exclusion of *non-preferred races* from the nation, these men and women helped to reproduce the racialized nation at both at the ideological and material levels. Indeed, once nation building became a racially exclusive project, the 'national' interest of 'Canadian' women and men would be to reproduce this racialization in their own practices. The relations of ruling were reproduced by the state in official policies, while 'nationalized' *Canadians* reproduced them in the practices of the organizations they established.

The resulting shared racialized identity between state and nation is clearly reflected in Freda Hawkins' (1988) assessment of the resistance of

"Canadians" to the immigration of *non-preferred races* in first half of the 20th century:

Undisputed ownership of these territories of continental size was felt to be confirmed forever, not only by the fact of possession, but by the hardships and dangers endured by the early explorers and settlersThe idea that other peoples, who had taken no part in these pioneering efforts, might simply arrive in large numbers to exploit important local resources, or to take advantage of these earlier settlement efforts, was anathema. (Hawkins, 1988: 22-23)

The 'national' founding myth which Hawkins writes about attributes previous generations with the same 'national' motives and interests as subsequent generations, who became defined as having a direct link with the early colonizers as their rightful heirs. This direct relation established with "early explorers and settlers" is comprehensible only within the context of the shared national/racial identity of the nation. The ideological construction of a 'national' line of descent makes contemporary generations of "Canadians," irrespective of their 'internal' gender and class divisions, as repositories, as well as preservers, of the 'national' interest with legitimate claims to 'national' resources. Such a construction simultaneously makes invisible the colonization which in actuality brought more "hardships" and "dangers" to Aboriginal peoples than it did to the "early explorers and settlers."

The founding myth naturalizes the privileged position of the "pioneers" as colonizers who were encouraged to "explore" and "settle" North America, and also makes invisible the labour of the *non-preferred races* in the development of Canada. Although relatively small in numbers as a result of racialized immigration policies, people of colour worked in the most critical projects which built the physical infrastructure necessary to build the 'nation.' They built the railway and the agricultural and resource extraction sectors of the 'national' economy by working as fruit pickers, labourers in logging camps, lumber yards and saw mills, in mining, fishing, canning as well as in the steel plants (Adhopia, 1993; Bolaria & Li, 1985; Buchignani, Indra & Srivastava, 1985; Calliste, 1996; Mazumdar, 1984;). These sectors were the very basis for 'national' development.

Even as the state recruited European immigrants, it used racialized

policies to strictly restrict the immigration of *non-preferred races* from Confederation to the 1960s and 1970s. The *Chinese Immigration Act* of 1885; the *Exclusion Act of 1923*; the *Continuous Passage Requirement* of 1908; the institutionalization of race as a category for denying immigration in the 1910 *Immigration Act* are some examples of these racialized immigration policies. The populations of Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean, who were part of the British Empire, had the legal status of British subjects. However, they were denied the same mobility rights as 'white' British subjects through immigration policies which controlled their entry into the 'centres' from the 'peripheries' (Gordon, 1985; Mazumdar, 1984; Potts, 1990; WING, 1985). In Canada, the state ideologically constructed them as a threat to the 'whiteness' of the nation, severely restricting their immigration by defining them as *non-preferred races* (Bolaria & Li, 1985; Hawkins, 1988; Jakubowski, 1997; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995; Ungerleider, 1992). Therefore, in a parallel but converse relation to the building of the shared white 'racial/national' identity, immigration policies bordered *non-preferred races* as outsiders to the nation by structuring their unequal access to citizenship. The diversity amongst third world peoples from Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean - the entire world outside Europe - was reduced in this category to a common *non-preferred race* status, later translated into a shared *immigrant* status. The diversity of language, culture, ethnicity, historical experiences, consciousness and being of third world peoples were all reduced to a *non-preferred race*, an *immigrant*, status by the Canadian state.

The state had to balance the contending interests: on the one hand, the 'cheap' labour of third world workers was attractive to employers; on the other hand, the state was attempting to build the nation as 'white' (Calliste, 1996; Das Gupta, 1995; Jakubowski, 1997; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). Although the state sought to restrict the entry of *non-preferred races*, it recognized the value of their 'cheap' labour. Employers shared this recognition and a network of recruiting agents and transportation agencies was in operation in the late 19th Century to provide the labour of these workers (Adhopia, 1993; Adilman, 1984; Hawkins, 1989; Mazumdar, 1984; Peterson, 1975). The various interests in this 'cheap' labour included: the railway companies (McClaren, 1990; Mazumdar, 1984; Peterson, 1975); the shipping

companies who profited from transporting immigrants across the seas; recruiting agents, and; other employers who hired *immigrant* labour at cheaper rates than *Canadian* labour. Indeed, the state itself required this 'cheap' labour for its nation building to succeed, and it sought to discourage the permanent residence of *non-preferred races* by allowing in only single men from China and South Asia, single men from the Caribbean to work in the steel and coal mines⁴⁸, and single women from the Caribbean to work as domestic workers (Adilman, 1984; Adhopia, 1993; Calliste, 1996; Doman, 1984; Hawkins, 1989; Nipp, 1986).

The competing interests became negotiated through the ideological practices of the state in the bordering of third world workers as *immigrants*. This negotiation allowed the labour of *immigrants* to be put to 'national' service, while keeping *immigrants* out of the nation. The treatment of Chinese workers serves as a useful example of this process of **bordering**. Chinese workers were recruited to build the railway, which was a central plank in the National Economic Policy. The building of the railway enabled the transportation of goods and populations, and made possible the settlement of the West. Chinese, and later South Asian, men were recruited to build the railway (Hawkins, 1989; Mazumdar, 1984). The Chinese workers were allowed to entry into the country as long as their labour was considered necessary.⁴⁹ However, as soon as their labour was not required, they were defined as a 'threat' to society and "virtually every evil was blamed upon them" (Bolaria & Li, 1985: 86). Without this labour, the building of the railways would have been "indefinitely postponed" (Porter, 1966).

As soon as the railway was built, however, the *Chinese Immigration Act of 1885* imposed a head tax on Chinese immigrants to reduce their entry.

⁴⁸ Workers were recruited from the Caribbean between 1900 and 1932: single men went to work in the steel mills and coal mines in Nova Scotia; single women went to work as domestic workers in Quebec, Ontario and the Maritimes (Calliste, 1996).

⁴⁹ Railway construction resulted in 17,000 Chinese workers being recruited between 1876 and 1884 (Adilman, 1984: 55).

This head tax was initially set at ten dollars and steadily increased over the years: to fifty dollars between 1896 and 1900; to one hundred dollars for the next three years, and; to five hundred dollars from 1904 to 1923 (Adilman, 1984, Bolaria & Li, 1985; Hawkins, 1988; JRS, 1997, Ungerleider, 1992;). The *Exclusion Act* in 1923 sought to prevent all immigration from China. As a result, less than 50 Chinese immigrants were permitted to enter the country between 1923 and 1947 (Hawkins, 1988; Ungerleider, 1992). As B. Singh Bolaria and Peter S. Li point out:

The head tax was a compromise over a basic dilemma which involved a desire to maintain the convenience of Chinese labour on the one hand, and an unwillingness to recognize the rights of Chinese on the other. It was a means to ensure that the supply of Chinese labour would not be completely severed, while at the same time, to officially endorse the second-class entrance status of the Chinese. Such an endorsement helped to sustain the marginal participation of the Chinese in the Canadian economy. (1985:90)

In addition to reducing the immigration of the Chinese, the head tax was also a source of revenue for the state. Between 1886 and 1924, special registrations required of Chinese immigrants and the head tax brought in revenue amounting to \$22.5 million (Bolaria & Li, 1985: 90).

Similar legislation was also enacted to curtail South Asian and Japanese immigration. One such measure was the *Continuous Passage* requirement introduced in 1908. This legislation required immigrants to travel to Canada from their country of origin in an uninterrupted journey. At that time, only one steamship company offered continuous passage to Canada, and this company was persuaded by the state to discontinue sale of tickets to Canada (Adhopia, 1993; Bolaria & Li, 1985; Buchignani, Indra & Srivastava, 1985; Mazumdar, 1984; Ungerleider, 1992). Tickets were not sold even to South Asians who were settled in Canada and had returned to visit their country of origin. The effects of this legislation were immediate. In the year preceding the introduction of the *Continuous Passage* requirement, 2,500 immigrants from India entered Canada; in the year after, only 6 South Asian immigrants entered the country (Ungerleider, 1992: 9). In 1910, a \$200 head tax on South Asians was introduced.

As a number of theorists have argued, controls on the immigration of “free” South Asians in the Dominions took two major forms. The first was through controls on the volume of migration by the imposition of quotas, language and medical tests. The second was through a very precarious domicile which denied them full political citizenship status (Bolaria & Li, 1985; Buchignani, Indra & Srivastava, 1985). The result was that South Asians “consequently lived under the constant threat of deportation” (Bolaria & Li, 1985: 143).

The 1910 *Immigration Act* legislated prohibitions on the entry of immigrants on the grounds of race and became the “principal instrument” for the “Keep Canada White” policies. This *Act* remained in effect for the next fifty years (Hawkins, 1989; Jakubowski, 1997). During the period that these restrictions were imposed on Black and Asian migration, immigration from Europe was expanding rapidly; indeed, in the first ten years of the 20th century, immigration accounted for 44% of the growth in population level (Ungerleider, 1992: 9).

Despite state attempts to restrict their presence, third world immigrants did keep coming to Canada. The numerous barriers to their entry and permanent residence, however, ensured their numbers were relatively small. During this period, for example, Asian immigrants were recruited as ‘cheap’ labour by employers such as the Canadian Pacific Railway. But the prevailing racist ideology of the period projected motives onto Asians who were defined as waiting only to ‘swamp’ and ‘invade’ British Columbia.⁵⁰ The ideological construction of the nation as white, therefore, rendered invisible the

⁵⁰ See Hawkins (1989), Adhopia (1996) and Adilman (1984) who discuss the widespread fears of Chinese waiting to ‘overpower’ and ‘outnumber’ white Canadians. Adilman describes the environment of ‘hysteria’ which prevailed as fears of Asians planning to “invade” British Columbia were whipped up by politicians. The 1907 Royal Commission, however, concluded that immigration from India was an organized phenomenon. It identified three main reasons for this immigration between the years 1904 - 1906 : (1) Commission agents for shipping companies were promoting migration to Canada for their business, (2) Information about economic opportunities in Canada and the U.S.A. was being widely distributed in the rural areas of Punjab and Bengal in a bid to recruit migrants, and (3) Individual agents were running lucrative businesses bringing immigrants over, securing them employment and aiding their settlement. None of these activities were illegal, but they were defined as “unpatriotic to the Empire” by MacKenzie King (Adhopia, 1993).

actuality that the labour of third world workers made significant and critical contributions to the 'national' economy. The case of the railway provides a very useful example to illustrate this point. The importance of the labour of Chinese men in building the railway was recognized by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (1970) which observed that. "It has been said that a Chinese is buried beneath every mile of track of the railway through the mountains of British Columbia" (Palmer, 1975). The Royal Commission's observation is amply supported by studies of the role of Chinese labour in nation-building (Bolaria & Li, 1985; Hawkins, 1989; Stasiulis, 1997; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). Once the railway was built, however, these men were considered no longer necessary and both the CPR and the federal government disclaimed any responsibility towards them (Jabukowski, 1997; RCBB, 1975). The labour of these workers literally built the infrastructure for the 'national' economy, but the workers themselves were not allowed membership in the nation. This example demonstrates another instance of how the ideological practices of the state created and imposed a textual reality - the non 'national' identity of these workers - onto the actuality that these workers built one of the critical material foundations of the nation.

Racialized immigration policies specifically distinguished between women and men of the *non-preferred races*. Whereas the labour of Chinese men and South Asian men was, at times, recognized as necessary to certain industries, few women from China and South Asia were allowed to immigrate prior to the 1960s (Adhopia, 1993; Adilman, 1984; Bolaria & Li, 1985; Buchignani, Indra & Srivastava, 1985; Doman, 1984; Hawkins, 1988). The state equated the immigration of these women with the permanent settlement of their communities, deeming this a threat to the whiteness of the nation.⁵¹ Limiting, or eliminating entirely, immigration of third world women was considered necessary if these *immigrants* were to be prevented from putting down roots in the country. In this way, male workers would be encouraged to

⁵¹ Adilman points out that the 1871 Census records there were thirty-five women for every thousand Chinese men in the country (Adilman, 1984: 56).

return home when their labour was no longer necessary. Thus, while women of the *preferred races* were defined by the state as playing a key role in reproducing the nation and national institutions, women of the *non-preferred races* became constructed as 'dependents' and a threat to the nation.

Immigrant women became defined primarily by their reproductive functions which threatened to 'swamp' the nation (Adilman, 1984; Adhopia, 1993; Van Dieren, 1984). Where these women were allowed to enter the country as wage workers, as in the case of domestic workers from the Caribbean, they were only allowed entry as single adults. Poverty in the Caribbean forced many women to claim they were indeed 'single,' leaving their children in the care of other family members. Unlike European domestic workers who married settlers, Caribbean women were defined as "immoral" and likely to become single parents, "unfit mothers," or "public charges."⁵²

In addition to this gendering of migration, class differences within *immigrant* communities were exacerbated by state policies. While Chinese and South Asian working class men were not permitted to enter with their family, merchants were allowed to do so. Furthermore, the merchants and their families were exempted them from paying the head tax (Adilman, 1984; Adhopia, 1993). Class differentiation meant that working class *immigrants* were denied family life whereas merchants were allowed to immigrate with their families (Adilman, 1984; Van Dieren, 1984).⁵³

⁵² Calliste describes the case of one woman who was fired from her job because her employer thought she spent 'too much time' on her new-born baby. Some women were deported when they had 'illegitimate' children, or became ill with tuberculosis or insanity (Calliste, 1996: 82).

⁵³ Chinese merchants, clergymen, their wives and families were exempt from paying the head tax. This allowed them to bring women 'relatives' whom they "offered" to working men. Many of the women and young girls bought by these merchants were from very poor families, and at least 100 to 200 of them came to Canada every year between 1887 and early 1900s (Adilman, 1984: 57). Some merchant's wives bought girls in China, and brought them over as their daughters (Van Dieren 1984). Likewise, South Asian entrepreneurs were sometimes allowed to bring their family. A South Asian agent, Devichand, is reported to have lived in Canada with his wife and child at a time when the workers he recruited were not allowed to bring their families (Adhopia, 1993).

These immigration restrictions had specifically gendered consequences. For example, the head tax became the “most important constraint” on the immigration of Chinese women. Men were willing to lend money to other men in the expectation of repayment, whereas very few women could be expected to repay this money. Immigration policies made women’s immigration much more difficult as a result of their unequal access to financial resources, but they did not stop the migration of Chinese and South Asian women. Where the women were successful, they came to disproportionately male-dominated communities (Adilman, 1984). So, for example, there were 2790 Chinese men for every 100 Chinese women in the country in 1911; 1533 men for 100 women in 1921; 1241 men for every 100 women in 1931; and 785 men for every 100 women in 1941 (Bolaria & Li, 1985: 91). Many of the men were forced to become “married bachelors,” leaving wives and children in China (Bolaria & Li, 1985). For South Asian immigrants, only eighteen women are recorded as being in the country until 1920. While 5,000 South Asian men immigrated before the Second World War, only 400 women and 423 children immigrated (1985:147). Although small in numbers, the economic contributions of these women were critical to the survival of their communities in the country. And the racialized/gendered effects of immigration policies created the conditions for the women to be subjected to enhanced male domination as ‘dependents.’

The ideological construction of the reproductive capacities of *immigrant* women was in sharp contrast to the state’s treatment of white women. While the former were defined as having the potential to overwhelm the nation, the latter were being actively recruited to reproduce the nation. *Immigrant* women were not only placed outside the ideological borders of the nation, but they came to personify and to embody the borders against which the nation had to be protected. Constructing ‘immigrant’ women as a threat to the ‘nation’ made them a literal point of reference against whom a ‘national’ unity could be consolidated. This ideological bordering meant that *immigrant* and *Canadian* women came to represent opposing racial/national interests. The categories *immigrant* and *Canadian* women came to define the former as ‘threats’ to the nation, and the latter as ‘mothers’ of the nation. The category

immigrant woman became constituted as not only different from the category *Canadian woman*, but its polar opposite.

Hence, the third point of my argument is that immigration policies regulated access to citizenship in Canada. These policies, central to the project of nation-building, were racialized, and as a result, they racialized the access of all non-Aboriginal people to citizenship in Canada.

Racialized state practices meant that the immigrants constructed as the *preferred races* would experience their 'nationality' as being based upon their shared racialized identity with the nation. These practices institutionalized and systematized racism, and in this context, the racialization of individual members of the nation as white was made the basis for their claims to membership. This national 'whiteness' became superimposed upon the everyday relations between the 'members' of the 'nation,' the state, and *immigrants*. Likewise, citizen status, as part and parcel of the national identity, was shaped as a racialized status. The state *socially produced* members of the nation as 'citizens' whose experience of their identity as 'nationals' and 'citizens' became a racialized one in specific ways.

Even when Asian immigrants were allowed into the country, racialized legislation applied to Asians whether *they were naturalized citizens or not* (Bolaria & Li, 1985; Buchignani, Indra & Srivastava, 1985). So, for example, the 1923 *Immigration Act* required all Chinese in Canada to register and obtain a certificate from the state, whatever their legal status. Naturalization was made very difficult for Chinese immigrants so that between 1915 and 1930, only 349 Chinese immigrants were naturalized. An Order-in-Council was passed in 1931 which required all Chinese applying for citizenship to get consent from the Minister of the Interior in China (Bolaria & Li, 1985: 87-88). Chinese immigrants, *as a race*, were not allowed to acquire Crown lands, hand logger's licenses, or liquor licenses. South Asians were subject to the same treatment: they were denied the franchise and therefore kept as "alien residents" subject to deportation.

The example of the state's treatment of Japanese-Canadians provides a very interesting case to examine the experiences of those Asian immigrants who were allowed "free immigration" between 1877 and 1907 as a result of the

Canadian state's support for the alliance between the British and Japanese states. The example of Japanese-Canadians is also significant because the immigration of Japanese women was greater than that of other Asian women. As a result of the "free immigration" which enabled Japanese men to immigrate to Canada, Japanese women were allowed to come to Canada as "picture brides" for the men who had immigrated between 1888 and 1907 (Ujimoto, 1985). However, as Victor Ujimoto argues, as Japanese-Canadians became "economically competitive," restrictive measures began to be imposed by the state as they were disenfranchised in British Columbia in 1886 and the federal state took steps to restrict further Japanese immigration. Immigration from Japan became subject to a "Gentlemen's Agreement" after 1908, with only returning Japanese immigrants and their families, along with their employees, being allowed to enter the country. Therefore, between 1908 and 1929, the immigration of Japanese women exceeded that of men as they came to marry Japanese-Canadian men. As the Japanese-Canadian community continued to remain "economically competitive" and in 1942, the state suspended their citizenship rights on the basis of their 'race.'

In 1942, twenty-two thousand Japanese-Canadian women, men and children in British Columbia were given twenty-four hours to vacate their homes. Their businesses, houses and other belongings were confiscated by the state. The proceeds of the sale of their property were used to pay the costs of interning these men, women and children, who became branded 'enemy aliens.' Seventy-five percent of these twenty-two thousand people had been born in Canada and were 'citizens' by birth and domicile. This status was not sufficient enough to prevent four thousand of them from being deported to Japan.⁵⁴ Their internment was justified on the basis of their Japanese 'race,' and the incident used by the state to justify this suspension of their citizenship rights was the bombing of Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941. The choice

⁵⁴ Order in Council PC 1486 gave authority to the RCMP to remove "persons of Japanese racial origin", to conduct searches without warrants, along with the power to enforce a curfew, and to impound their cars, radios, cameras and firearms (Miki & Kobayashi, 1991; Davis & Krauter, 1971).

given to Japanese-Canadians was between internment and dispersal from British Columbia and repatriation to Japan. The suspension of the citizenship rights of this community destroyed an economically thriving community, and separated family members. The suspension was to remain in effect for seven years. As the experience of Japanese-Canadians demonstrates, the race status of *non-preferred races* was more significant in their treatment by the state than their 'citizen' status.

Conclusion

In this Chapter, I have demonstrated that the Canadian nation was an ideological construction organized by racialized state policies, specifically the *Indian Act* and racialized immigration policies. The creation of Canadian citizenship was predicated upon the colonization of Aboriginal peoples and did not represent a move towards equality for all peoples in the 'national' territory, most specifically, for Aboriginal peoples. Instead, the destruction of the self-determination of Aboriginal peoples became a precondition for creation of Canadian citizenship.

In the construction of the 'national' population, racialized immigration policies introduced distinctions between *future citizens* who were nationalized and *immigrants* who came to be bordered as 'outsiders'. Immigration policies came to regulate the access of all non-Aboriginal peoples to citizenship in Canada.

The racialized *Indian Act*, racialized immigration policies which regulated unequal access to citizenship, and the treatment of Japanese-Canadian citizens as 'enemies' of the nation on the basis of their 'race' all demonstrate the very deep and integral connections between the membership in the nation and citizenship in Canada. The racialization of the nation could not but produce a racialized citizenship in the nation-state. Ideological state practices which "imagined" the nation as white resulted in the creation of a citizenship which, as an expression of the national identity, likewise became racialized.

Whatever divisions of class, ethnicity and gender existed within the Canadian nation, these actual divisions were placed in the context of the

ideologically produced 'unity' of the nation. The particular gender/race nexus of social relations came together in the construction of *immigrant* women as a threat to the nation.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE WELFARE STATE AND NATION BUILDING

Introduction

In the period following World War II, the building of social programs rapidly escalated in most of the advanced capitalist countries, including Canada, transforming the 'laissez faire' capitalist state into the 'welfare' state (Brodie, 1995; Clarke, Cochrane & Smart, 1992; Finkel, 1977; Fraser & Gordon, 1992; Ginsburg, 1992; Gordon, 1994; Law, 1996; Mishra, 1977; Panitch, 1977; Resnick, 1994; Ursel, 1992;). In Chapter Two, I discussed Marshall's theorization of social rights as an extension of citizenship rights. Marshall argued that social rights would allow citizens a measure of security, bringing about greater social equality. These rights would counter class inequalities, enabling citizens to exercise the other rights of citizenship (Marshall, 1992).

In this Chapter, I examine the Canadian 'welfare' state by making race and racialization central to my analysis, in addition to gender and class. In previous chapters, I have demonstrated the manner in which both the Canadian nation and access to citizenship were racialized through state practices. Here, I argue that the transformation to the 'welfare' state in the post World War II period incorporated processes of racialization. I will make the following four major points to argue the case. First, contemporary literature on the welfare state focuses on the social legislation developed in the late 19th and 20th centuries as the starting point for analyzing 'social' supports organized by the state. However, I argue that an analysis of the social supports organized by the Canadian state must begin with the various forms of social supports provided to immigrants of the *preferred races* in the facilitation of their settlement, and their reproduction of the nation. These supports were overtly racialized, and immigration policies were intimately linked to the provision of these forms of social assistance.

Second, the provision of social 'assistance' to Aboriginal peoples under

the *Indian Act* was incorporated into the 'welfare' state to reproduce the dependency of Aboriginal peoples on the Canadian state. The governing of Aboriginal peoples was organized in the form of 'welfare colonialism' (Dyck, 1991; Fiske, 1995); access to social 'assistance' expressed a relation of racialized colonization, not one of social equality. The welfare state institutionalized social entitlements for the 'nation' separately from the social 'assistance' provided to Aboriginal peoples.

Third, for almost three decades following the end of World War II, during which period social programs were greatly expanded, racialized immigration policies strictly controlled the immigration of *non-preferred races* while promoting the immigration of *preferred races*. These racialized immigration policies therefore regulated access to citizenship. The 1947 *Citizenship Act* also organized this racialized citizenship by creating a two-tier citizenship and specifying unequal criteria for citizenship eligibility. In basing social rights upon this racialized citizenship, the welfare state's social policies likewise incorporated the racialized distinctions organized initially through immigration policy.

Finally, the social policy developed in the 'welfare' state reflected a 'white' historical experience because it did not confront the racialization of power relations and inequalities within Canadian society. Instead, social policy maintained and reproduced these racialized inequalities. "Immigrant" communities made a very conscious and direct link between racialized immigration policies and their 'welfare' as evidenced by their support for members of their communities and their struggles against racialized immigration policies. The social policy of the 'welfare' state did not incorporate their vision. Instead, the welfare state mystified the intersection of immigration policy and social policy, naturalizing the social entitlements of members of the nation. The welfare state obscured the actual integration of the national economy in the global system by developing social rights within a national context which more deeply integrated 'citizens' into the nation.

In their assessment of the welfare state, Marxists argue that the welfare state represents a class compromise between labour and capital to stabilize the process of capital accumulation. Instead of representing a move towards

equality, the welfare state has further entrenched bourgeois domination (Finkel, 1977; Ginsburg, 1992; Mishra, 1977; Panitch, 1977; Resnick, 1994:). Likewise, feminists have argued the welfare state maintains the gendered division of labour within society by institutionalizing the unequal citizenship of women. The welfare state transformed 'private patriarchy' into 'public patriarchy,' even as it provided women with vital social supports (Brodie, 1995; Gordon, 1994; Ursel, 1992; Walby, 1994).

My contribution to the literature on the welfare state is to demonstrate how the class and gender compromises expressed in the 'welfare' state have been organized in the context of a shared racial/national 'interest' between men and women of various classes defined as *Canadian*, and the state. The 'welfare' state reproduced the nationalization of 'citizens' into the nation-welfare state partnership. Once 'race' is introduced into the equation, it becomes evident that the welfare state ideologically *produced* 'citizens' as 'white' by racializing their access to the entitlements of the welfare state.

Theorizing the Welfare State

While the impact of the welfare state on the relations of class and gender has generated considerable debate, little attention has been paid to examining the impact of the welfare state on processes of racialization. In her examination of the historical development of social policy in the United States, Gordon (1994) demonstrates that social policies have been shaped by the racialized vision of the white men and women who developed them. Social policy incorporated this 'white' experience because it did not challenge the racialized domination of Black people, and therefore, it helped to reproduce this domination. In Britain, a number of theorists have examined the unequal access of Black peoples to social programs, demonstrating that the welfare state has institutionalized racism within British society. In Britain, as in Sweden, Germany and the United States, the social rights of citizenship have structured the exclusion of people of colour as 'foreigners' and 'outsiders' by giving them unequal access to social entitlements (Ahmed & Husband, 1993; Ginsburg, 1992; Gordon, 1985; Gordon, 1994; Mama, 1989). As these theorists point out, this exclusion is not an aberration. It is inherent in

citizenship as a mechanism of socially including 'citizens' while excluding 'outsiders.'

With the exception of studies on Aboriginal rights, the literature on the welfare state in Canada has paid very little attention to the impact of social policy on processes of racialization. The literature on Aboriginal rights demonstrates that the colonial administration of Aboriginal peoples has been organized in the form of "welfare colonialism." This "welfare-colonialism" perpetuates the ongoing dependency of Aboriginal communities on the Canadian state through programs instituted under the *Indian Act* (Dyck, 1991; Fiske, 1995).

In the literature on immigration policy and social policy, very few attempts have been made to theorize the intersection of these policy areas in the Canadian state's ongoing practices of nation-building. Much of the literature on social policy takes for granted the 'naturalness' of the nation and the citizenship of women in Canada, as well as their access to social entitlements, albeit in class-specific terms. The under-theorization of processes of racialization in this literature has served to mystify the intersection of immigration policy and social policy in organizing nation-building and access to citizenship, making invisible the reality that the welfare state has never been quite as 'universal' as has generally been presumed.

The Welfare State as Compromise

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, a group of 'New Liberals' in Britain began defining liberalism to meet the challenges of changing political, economic and social conditions. The two issues concerning them were the growth of socialist and social-democratic parties which posed a political challenge to liberal parties; and the growing poverty and destitution within

society.⁵⁵

The economic upheavals created by the Great Depression of the 1930s and the two World Wars helped the 'new' liberalism to garner the support of the ruling elites, liberals and conservatives alike. They came to accept the necessity of state intervention in the economy if the capitalist system was to survive through the stabilization of economic cycles (Clarke, Cochrane & Smart, 1987; Finkel, 1977; Ginsburg, 1992; Mishra, 1977; Ursel, 1992). The cyclical nature of capitalist growth had become devastatingly clear in the great depression. The World Wars I and II also underscored the necessity of maintaining a healthy 'national' population which could be drafted into the service of the state and the ruling elite. Trade union and feminist organizing for the redistribution of wealth in society and for women's equality had gained increased support and momentum. During World War II, the trade union movement and women had contributed to the 'national' 'war effort,' and both demanded gains for their constituencies. The political pragmatism of the ruling elite in containing these struggles and stabilizing the capitalist system helped shape the consensus which developed in support of the welfare state (Clarke, et al., 1987; Finkel, 1977; Panitch, 1977; Ursel, 1992). Both Keynes and Beveridge were among the 'New Liberals': the economic policies of the former and the social policies of the latter became the basis of the welfare state. 'New Liberalism' recognized the state's obligations to protect citizens from the sometimes catastrophic outcomes of economic conditions over which they had no control, such as unemployment during the Great Depression.

Alvin Finkel points out social legislation in Canada prior to the 1930s was "minimal" (1977: 346). Most theorists of the Canadian welfare state identify the social legislation introduced in the early 20th century as

⁵⁵ In theorizing the welfare state, Clarke, Cochrane and Smart (1987) have identified four major ideologies of welfare in Britain during the late nineteenth century: (i) *laissez faire* individualism, which opposed state intervention in the free market; (ii) Fabianism, which supported state intervention to solve social problems by delivering social services based upon 'professional expertise'; (iii) socialism, whose support for social programs was ambiguous because of the impact of these in reducing the potential for socialist revolution; (iii) and finally feminism, which sought to empower women and reduce their inequalities through their access to social programs (Clarke, Cochrane Smart, 1987).

representing the beginnings of the welfare state. The rapid escalation of welfare legislation after World War II resulted in the expansion of the welfare state into the 1970s. Finkel concludes that the driving force behind the creation of the welfare state was the need for the state to “stabilize destabilized economies,” and not the redistribution of wealth (1977: 348). In examining the support of the ruling elites for social programs during the period 1930 to 1945, Finkel argues that the leadership of the Conservative Party recognized “that repression alone might not be sufficient to preserve the existing system against the threat of socialism” (1977: 351). The President of the Bank of Montreal likewise committed his support for unemployment and social insurance in a letter to the government in 1934, stating, “May I suggest to you that *for our general self-preservation* some such arrangement will have to be worked out in Canada and that if it can be done soon so much the better” (1977: 349).⁵⁶ As had been the case in Britain, the momentum for change had intensified with the enfranchisement of the working class in Canada and the formation in the 1930s of the CCF which advocated working-class and farm interests. By 1945, a social consensus emerged between labour and capital for the state to support the social security of citizens in stabilizing the conditions for the ongoing accumulation of capital (Finkel, 1977; Ursel, 1992).

A number of theorists argue that the welfare state represents a compromise between labour and capital which has further integrated the working class into bourgeois rule. Rather than placing limits on capital, the welfare state supports capitalism in two significant ways: structurally, it

⁵⁶ Finkel cites the 1939 Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations which expressed the reasoning for the growing support among conservatives for social programs:

Since the Great War, the Great Depression has been the chief stimulus to labour legislation and social insurance. The note sounded has not been so much the ideal of social justice as political and economic financial expediency. For instance, the shorter working week was favoured in unexpected quarters not because it would give the workers more leisure and possibilities for a fuller life but because it would spread work; and the current singling out of unemployment insurance for governmental attention in many countries is dictated by the appalling costs of direct relief and the hope that unemployment insurance benefits will give some protection to public treasuries in future depressions and will, by sustaining purchasing power, tend to mitigate these depressions. (1977: 348)

created favorable conditions for capital accumulation by reducing the costs to capital of the reproduction of the work force and by stabilizing consumption patterns through income supports, and; politically, it legitimizes the functions of the state as representing the interests of all citizens in the ongoing reproduction of the capitalist system (Finkel, 1977; Ginsburg, 1992; Mishra, 1977; Ursel, 1992; Young, 1990).

The social programs of the welfare state have been collectively funded through the taxes paid by the working class. The welfare state has resulted not in a 'vertical' re-distribution of wealth between classes, but in a 'horizontal' re-distribution (Finkel, 1977; Ginsburg, 1992; Mishra, 1977). The welfare state has also provided 'welfare' to ruling elites in the forms of tax relief, corporate grants and tax loopholes. The public sector has provided the social infrastructure necessary for economic growth. These 'welfare' programs which benefit capital have remained largely invisible while programs like social assistance have been given high visibility, stigmatizing the recipients (Fraser & Gordon, 1992; Gordon, 1994; Mishra, 1977; McQuaig, 1993).

Social security programs do create a "floor on the standard of living of working people" and signify the responsibility of the state to its citizens (Finkel, 1977: 345). Social rights express in very tangible terms what 'belonging' to the social collective means and social entitlements define concretely the stake of citizens in the well-being of the community. However, this very stake which the working class has been given has also become a means through which their social control has been organized by the state. Social integration, or more appropriately social control, which is a major function of the bourgeois state requires the maintenance of order and the reduction of social conflict. This means reducing the hostility of workers towards the capitalist regime and thereby dissipating class conflict. Welfare has become a means through which the working class acquires a sense of belonging to the "national community." Laissez faire capitalism introduced the cash nexus and undermined the bonds of "community" life. By "recreating community-like conditions," the welfare has achieved the "social integration" of the working class. Social rights have increased the legitimacy of the state by providing material benefits to citizens, weakening class conflict and class

solidarity in the process (Mishra, 1977).

Like demands for change from the trade union movement for worker's rights, women's organizations also advocated for social policies to mitigate women's inequalities. Women's organizations argued that women's poverty was directly related to women's economic dependence on men, and to their responsibility for providing care to children and other family members (Clarke et al, 1987; Ginsberg, 1992; Gordon, 1994; Lister, 1991; Ursel, 1992). However, although women's organizations supported the creation of social programs, most did not essentially call into question women's role within the sphere of reproduction. Maternal feminists stressed the role of mothers in the well being of families and, most importantly, of children. These feminists equated the well-being of the family with the well-being of the nation (Gordon, 1994; Strong Boag, 1977; Valverde, 1992).

A number of theorists argue that the welfare state has integrated, and reproduced, the gendered division of labour within capitalist society (Brodie, 1996; Ginsburg, 1992; Gordon, 1994; Ursel, 1992). Social programs have been organized in support of maintaining the wage system, and although these programs provide support for women's reproductive labour, they have also ensured the reproduction of women's inequalities (Davies, 1984; Lister, 1991; Walby, 1994; Ursel, 1992). Therefore, although social programs provided critical social supports for women, they did not seek to transform the gendered division of labour.

In her examination of the historical development of public policy in Canada, Jane Ursel argues that the state developed public policies to support the reproduction of the patriarchal nuclear family by socializing the costs of its reproduction through social programs.⁵⁷ Whereas the wage labour system

⁵⁷Ursel identifies three major periods in the development of these public policies. In the first period, from 1884-1913, the crisis of the wage labour system resulted in increasing poverty and led to the beginning of state intervention in 'welfare' by developing legislation to protect women and children such as the 1884 Factories Act, the 1885 Wages Act; the 1888 Shops Act and other legislation pertaining to child custody and women's property rights. In the second period, from 1919-1939, the state proactively supported private welfare institutions and introduced labour legislation to support the wage system. This included the 1914 Employment Agencies Act, the 1915 Workmen's Compensation Insurance Act, Minimum Wages Acts as well as Maintenance Acts for women and children. In the third period, from 1940-1968, the state developed a

privatized the costs of reproduction onto families during laissez-faire capitalism, the welfare state allocated both income and services to families through social supports. This provided support to families and, at the same time, also made women's labour available for waged work. Economic expansion in the post World War II period meant that women's labour was needed outside the home, and social programs provided income support to families while making it possible for capital to access women's labour at lower wages. Public policy met the needs of both capital and families in the compromise which the welfare state came to represent. However, this compromise resulted in women working the double day with their labour being assigned to both production and reproduction. Furthermore, the wage gap continued to maintain women's economic dependency on men (Ursel, 1992). Ursel's analysis does not acknowledge the role of the women's movement in the creation of the welfare state, but a number of feminist theorists share her conclusion that the welfare state preserved the inequalities of the wage system (Gordon, 1994; Lister, 1991; Walby, 1994).

Linda Gordon (1994) has argued that social programs are themselves gendered. She draws a distinction between 'male' and 'female' tracks of social programs incorporated into the welfare system. The first track includes contributory social insurance which "replace wages temporarily or permanently lost through illness, injury, unemployment, or retirement"(145)⁵⁸; while the second track includes means-tested public assistance programs. Gordon describes the first track as 'male' because men have been able to access contributory programs as a result of their disproportionate participation in full time waged work. The second track became 'female' because women's unequal access to waged work, and their economic dependency on men, make them

national welfare system which socialized the costs of the reproduction of families through various federal welfare legislation (Ursel, 1992).

⁵⁸ These programs were based on the need to address the 'interruptions' in wages during periods of sickness, unemployment and old age. Workers could not be held responsible for these 'interruptions,' and creating social programs which recognized this would not only protect workers during these 'interruptions,' but would also contribute to stabilizing the economy. These social insurance programs were to be funded by contributions from the workers, their employers and the state (Gordon, 1994).

disproportionately dependent on social assistance programs. In this way, the welfare system incorporated, and further institutionalized, gendered divisions within the economy and in waged work. 'Male' social insurance programs became defined as entitlements for "deserving" claimants who make contributions to them, while 'female' ones became stigmatized as 'welfare' for the "undeserving" (Gordon, 1994). Nevertheless, Gordon maintains that the welfare state has provided women with "a measure of economic insulation against total dependence on men" and promoted a "feeling of entitlement" which has empowered women as citizens (Gordon, 1994: 287). This "feeling of entitlement" promotes women's claims to equal citizenship.

Both Marxist and feminist theorists conclude that the development of the welfare state has transformed anti-capitalist working class and feminist struggles into struggles over the distribution of material goods, leaving unchallenged the underlying power structure which creates this unequal distribution. In Canada, this literature has paid no attention to the racialization of inequalities in society. It has remained silent on the intersection of immigration policy with social policy, and on the role of immigration policy in regulating access to citizenship. The result is that, wittingly or otherwise, theorists naturalize the non-membership of immigrants in the nation and make invisible their unequal access to social entitlements. In the following sections, I explore some of the ways in which the racialization of social entitlements have been organized by the 'welfare' state in Canada until the 1970s.

The Welfare State, Race And Nation

The welfare state did not challenge the racialization of the nation, or of the 'nation-state' relationship. Indeed, the preservation of the nation by the state was a significant factor in the transition of the 'laissez faire' state into the 'welfare' state. The preservation of the 'quality' and 'unity' of the nation were paramount considerations in creation of the welfare state in the advanced capitalist countries in the post World War II period. Keynesian economic policies, and the Beveridge Report - dubbed the 'blueprint' for the welfare state - had significant impact on shaping the welfare states in Canada (Davies, 1984;

Finkel, 1977; Ursel, 1992), the United States (Gordon, 1992) and Australia (Pettman, 1996). As I will argue, the imperative to protect the 'quality' of the nation and its 'national' interest, which was central to the creation of the welfare state in Britain, was no less critical in the Canadian case.

The transition to the welfare state in Britain had as much to do with the state's ambitions to maintain British supremacy within the global system, by strengthening the nation and 'race,' as it had to do with liberal ideals of expanding citizenship rights. The declining birth rate, the health and welfare of the members of the nation, and preserving the 'quality' of the race all had consequences for maintaining Britain's competitiveness. Britain's position within the global system was under considerable challenge, both in military and economic terms, as national independence movements in colonized countries were forcing the dismantling of the Empire. The welfare of citizens was an "imperialist" concern (Klug, 1989), and ensuring the well-being of the 'race' has been defined as a key consideration in the transition to the welfare state (Clarke et al., 1987; Ginsburg, 1992; Klug, 1989; Lewis, 1986; Nasir, 1996). In Canada, similar concerns have been documented by a number of theorists (McLaren, 1990; Valverde, 1993; Strong Boag, 1977). In his study of the Eugenics movement in Canada between 1885 and 1945, Angus McLaren demonstrates that eugenic concerns about the "quality" of the race were no less significant in Canada. Indeed, these concerns were shared in quarters as wide ranging as the Toronto League for Race Betterment, various medical associations, as well as by the socialist leader Tommy Douglas, and the feminists Nellie McClung and Agnes MacPhail. The values of "race betterment" informed immigration policies, as well as public health and welfare policies. Eugenic values enjoyed widespread support among Canadians who sought increased reproduction of the right "quality" of Canadians, while restricting the reproduction of the "degenerate." Mariana Valverde has studied the "racist strategies" utilized by the "first-wave" feminist movement, arguing that these stratifies were integral to the politics of this movement.

.....at the turn of the century the reproduction was generally seen, by feminists as well as anti-feminists, as inextricable from racial and imperial politics. Women did not merely have babies: they reproduced 'the race.' Women did not merely have just

enough babies or too much sex: through their childbearing they either helped or hindered the forward march of (Anglo-Saxon) civilization. (1992: 4)

Maternal feminists' struggles for women's rights were closely linked to their "duty" as "mothers of the race" by the first-wave feminists. Therefore, the support for pro-natalist social policies incorporated into the welfare state were designed to support women's role as mothers of the "imperial nation," and in this, the policies equated support for the 'family' with support for the 'nation' (Ginsberg, 1992: 165-166). Indeed, the Beveridge Report of 1943 was forthright in its concern for the strengthening the nation. It called for recognition of, and support for, the role of British women as mothers of the race and nation (Clarke, et al., 1987; Klug, 1989). This was the global political climate within which the transition to the welfare state occurred, and the "blueprint" of the welfare state emerged in the advanced capitalist countries. The Beveridge Report linked the well being of the race as nation to the well being of women and the family, valorizing the role of women in the family as a form of "national service" (Clarke, et al., 1987).

Rivalry among various European countries gained increased significance with the dismantling of the British Empire as each sought to enhance their power within the changing global system. The ruling classes in these countries attempted to nationalize 'their' working classes, to further incorporate them into the bourgeois social order through social reform (Mishra, 1977). European states defined their citizens as indispensable to securing a favourable position in the global order. In such a competitive environment, the doctrine of the survival of the fittest applied also to the survival of the nation:

No nation could hope to survive in the coming struggle for existence, taught this new doctrine, unless it improved its racial stock physically and mentally and breached those deep cleavages within its body politic which set one class apart from the other. (Mishra, 1977: 73)

With these considerations, state intervention in the economy became a necessity for international reasons as well as for domestic stability. The post World War II became a turning point for the advanced capitalist countries, leading to the consolidation of the welfare state in Britain, the United States

and Canada.

I have argued in Chapters Two and Four that the integration of the global system was a feature of capitalist relations since its earliest phase of colonialism. It is important to underscore that the global system was predicated no less upon the continued inequalities of third world peoples in the age of the 'welfare' state than it had been in the earlier phase of global integration (Bello, 1994; Shiva, 1997). Viewed in this international context, the extension of citizenship rights through the 'national' welfare state to 'citizens' in advanced capitalist countries took place within the context of the ongoing integration of these 'national' economies in the global economic system. In the post-World War II period, as colonialism was forced to give way to independence movements in many colonies - and was transformed into neo-colonialism in parts of Asia, Africa and South America - citizenship in the advanced capitalist countries represented the dividing line between third world peoples and first world citizens. Colonialism had created a racialized citizenship, and this racialization became institutionalized within the 'national' welfare states in the advanced capitalist countries.

In Britain, while social policy helped to ensure the "quality" of British 'citizens', immigration policies which creates unequal claims to citizenship were used to regulate the entry of "aliens" recruited from the colonies to provide labour (Gordon, 1985; Klug, 1989; WING, 1985). As the Women Immigration and Nationality Group's ⁵⁹ report points out, immigration into Britain from its Black and Asian colonies was significant in providing the labour necessary for economic expansion during the first half of the 20th century. However, the Royal Commission on Population in the 1950s rejected the idea that the British nation could be replenished through such immigration. The Commission's Report argued that "British traditions, manners and ideas" were very important and would suffer from immigration which would "reduce the proportion of

⁵⁹ The Women, Immigration and Nationality Group was formed out of a conference organized in Britain in 1982. The conference brought together women who were campaigning against the racism and sexism in Britain's immigration and nationality laws. Seven members of this group researched the history of British nationality and immigration laws (WING, 1985).

home-bred stock in the population” (WING, 1985: 4). Immigration and nationality legislation were used to regulate the entry of people of colour, and in this way, the state defined as ‘citizens’ only those who were defined as belonging to the ‘nation’ (Ahmad & Husband, 1993; Gilroy, 1991; Gordon, 1985; WING, 1985). The result, as Ahmad & Husband point out, was that “citizenship is not merely a legal status; it is a vehicle for nationalism and a focus for defining national identity” (1993: 219). Claims to citizenship as organized in the British welfare state actively fostered a racialized self-definition of ‘citizens’ as members of the nation.

Similarly, immigration policies in Canada not only regulated the entry of people of colour into the country, but were central to the very production and reproduction of the nation. Canadian ‘citizens’ - as members of this nation - acquired the extension of citizenship rights in the form of the social entitlements incorporated into the welfare state. The transition from the ‘laissez faire’ state to the ‘welfare’ state did not end the racialization of the Canadian nation, nor did it transform the racialization of citizenship. The ‘welfare’ state perpetuated this racialization in the following four significant ways: the Canadian state had provided social supports as incentives to the immigration of *preferred race* immigrants as part of its nation-building practices and the ‘welfare’ state extended social rights to this racialized nation; the colonization of Aboriginal peoples was reproduced by the ‘welfare’ state; racialized immigration policies regulated access to the ‘welfare’ state; and the ‘welfare’ state reflected a ‘white’ vision of social policy based upon maintaining racialized inequalities in Canada.

Assisting ‘preferred races’

The literature on the welfare state in Canada dates the beginnings of state sponsored social supports to the first half of the twentieth century (Davies, 1984; Finkel, 1977; Mishra, 1977; Panitch, 1977; Resnick, 1994; Ursel, 1992). However, this period is not an appropriate beginning point for analyzing the provision of social supports to citizens by the Canadian state. The provision of various forms of social ‘assistance’ provided by the state to *preferred race* immigrants in order to induce their immigration can be dated to

a much earlier period. These supports were vital in the very establishment and reproduction of the Canadian nation.

Various forms of supports provided by both the British and Canadian states in the actual migration and settlement of European immigrants have been recorded in the 18th and 19th centuries. In Chapter Four, I described the various forms of support provided by the state as incentives to the recruitment and settlement of Europeans. These supports included the following: subsidizing the transportation costs of immigrants through assisted passages; providing lodgings, employment counseling and contacts for newly arrived British women immigrants; providing cash grants and plots of land for settlement; and providing training in farming methods as well as in the use of new technologies (Carrothers, 1929; Cowan, 1968; Dyck, 1991; Hawkins, 1988; MIC, 1928; WMOAS, 1963). Some of these supports were provided prior to *preferred race* immigrants achieving domicile and citizenship in Canada, such as the assisted passages provided under the Empire Settlement scheme. Other forms of support were provided after the immigrants arrived in Canada, but before they would have acquired domicile, such as providing access to lands and training in various farming and domestic technologies.

As discussed in Chapter Four, the provision of these forms of supports to *preferred race* immigrants sought to nationalize these immigrants into becoming Canadians. Immigration policy which recruited these *preferred race* immigrants was integrally linked to the provision of these social supports. Dating the provision of state sponsored social supports to the 20th century - as most of the literature on the welfare state does - takes for granted the existence of the nation and its 'citizens.' Such an account serves to naturalize the nation, rendering invisible the actuality that it was through various forms of social supports that the immigration of the 'national' population was historically organized. It also obscures the reality that these social supports were used as incentives for the promotion of the immigration and settlement of *preferred races*, and hence, were racialized. Access to these earlier forms of state support were certainly not provided to all *preferred race* immigrants. But both the British and Canadian states clearly recognized that the production

and reproduction of the Canadian nation would, in all likelihood, have been impossible without this state assistance.

The Colonialism of the Welfare State

The second way in which the transition to the 'welfare' state incorporated racialization was in its ongoing reproduction of the colonization of Aboriginal peoples. The development of the welfare state in Canada did not end the colonization of Aboriginal peoples, nor did it fundamentally transform the racialized/patriarchal character of the *Indian Act* under which the administration of Aboriginal peoples was organized by the state. The 'welfare-colonialism' incorporated into the *Indian Act* continued to separate Aboriginal peoples from 'citizens' of the 'welfare' state on a racialized basis. The impact of the *Indian Act* has been discussed in Chapter Four. In this section, I argue that the welfare state did not resolve the claims of Aboriginal peoples to self-determination, but maintained their colonization.

The Canadian state's policy of "protecting" Aboriginal peoples on reserves and encouraging their assimilation by "convincing" them of the benefits of leaving these reserves did not change in the practices of the welfare state:

The above policy [of "protecting" Aboriginal peoples] was pursued until the 1950s, when a new 'democratic' ideology emerged in government that acknowledged cultural pluralism as a structural condition of Canadian society; Indian people were not going to disappear. However, the perspective and ideology of assimilation of Indians has, over the past two centuries, become so entrenched in government that it has been extremely difficult for the Department of Indian Affairs to embark upon a new direction. For example, in 1947 the Parliamentary Joint Committee publicly announced its policy of assimilation and elimination of Indian status. The federal government has consistently acted on this policy notwithstanding their rhetoric of equality and full participation in Canadian society. This policy was most forcefully noted recently in the 1969 White Paper, which explicitly rejected any special status for Indians. (Frideres, 1990:99)

Like its predecessor - the 'laissez faire' state - the 'welfare' state also made the assimilation of Aboriginal peoples contingent upon their integration *as individuals* into *Canadian* society. This individualist assimilation was reflected

in the enfranchisement of Aboriginal women in the 1960s. Even with Aboriginal women gaining the right to vote in *Canadian* political institutions, they continued to live under colonial domination. As I have discussed in Chapter Four, Aboriginal women's 'race' status, and their access to community resources, were made dependent upon their relationships to Aboriginal men, with women losing status and access to resources upon marriage outside their immediate community. Lee Maracle has further argued that enfranchisement of Aboriginal women was not the result of any liberatory impulse of the Canadian state. She argues: "It was not because anyone seriously considered us people entitled to full citizenship that changed things but the threat of a mass movement of Natives" (1993: 150).

The issue of the 'citizenship' and 'welfare' of Aboriginal peoples is fraught with contention, as many Aboriginal feminists have argued. While Aboriginal women living off-reserves were given access to social programs as individuals, the situation of Aboriginal women on reserves continued to be regulated through the *Indian Act*. The Native Women's Association of Canada has summarized the experiences of Aboriginal women with the 'welfare' state: "With colonization, attempts at assimilation, and with the creation of the Canadian welfare state, aboriginal social security nets were stripped away. The result was an almost total reliance on Canadian society: its political and economic structures, and its fickle social security system" (McIvor, 1997: 101). Jo-Anne Fiske argues that as a result of the "welfare-colonialism", life on Aboriginal reserves has generally been characterized by "unemployment' and underdevelopment" (1995: 8). My key point is that the transition to the 'welfare' state did not end the racialized/colonial administration of Aboriginal peoples under the *Indian Act*; the welfare state continued to maintain the status of Aboriginal peoples as 'non-citizens.'

The first Canadian *Citizenship Act*, introduced in 1947 when the transition to the welfare state was taking place, only underscored this racialization. Indeed, Prime Minister MacKenzie King paid tribute to those *Canadians* who had made this 'citizenship' possible:

The vision and courage of men and women have transformed our country, almost within living memory, from small and virtually

unknown regions of forest and farm into one of the great industrial nations of the world. (1947)⁶⁰

The Prime Minister's comments denied the fact that "our" country was 'stolen' from Aboriginal peoples, erasing the existence of Aboriginal societies on these "virtually unknown regions." The creation of 'modern' citizenship in the welfare state did not remedy or transform the colonized status of Aboriginal peoples; it reinforced and consolidated the white settler society and the reproduction of colonial relations.

Racialized Citizenship, Racialized Social Rights

The third way in which the 'welfare' state incorporated and reproduced the racialization of the Canadian nation and social entitlements was through the use of overtly racialized immigration policies. The Canadian welfare state was developed during a period when racialized immigration policies distinguished between the immigration of *preferred races* as *future citizens* and *non-preferred races* as *immigrants*. As discussed in previous Chapters, both categories were ideologically constructed; the state's practices imposed these ideological categories onto actuality through nationalizing citizens and bordering *immigrants*. For close to three decades after World War II, a critical period during which the welfare state was developed and expanded, racialized immigration policies were in effect. These policies sought to strictly limit the access of *non-preferred races* to Canadian citizenship. In other words, race was an accepted basis for denying immigration and citizenship until the introduction of the point system in 1962, further modified and entrenched in the *Immigration Act* of 1976-77, made significant changes to immigration policy. Therefore, in the critical period of the expansion of the welfare state, immigration policies regulated access to membership in the nation and to citizenship on the basis of the 'race' of all non-Aboriginal peoples.

In organizing the social entitlements of the welfare state on the basis

⁶⁰ King, M. (P.M.) "Text of the Prime Minister's Speech", in The Ottawa Citizen, Jan. 4, 1947.

of citizenship, the ideological practices of the state incorporated the racialized construction of the nation and 'citizens' into the social policies defining these entitlements. Organizing social entitlements as the 'rights' of citizenship strengthened citizenship as a signifier of belonging to the nation. Social rights therefore became part of the state practices of nationalizing citizens and 'future citizens' into the nation under the welfare-state regime.

As I pointed out in Chapter Four, the actual legal status of Canadian 'citizens' in the early 20th century was that of British subjects with domicile in Canada (Carty & Ward, 1986; Ungerleider, 1992). This situation changed in 1947 with the introduction of the first *Citizenship Act*. The Act recognized Canada's historical ties to Britain and the Commonwealth but sought to respond to a "growing sense of a separate Canadian national identity" and to foster a "greater sense of national unity" (Demirjian, Gray & Wright, 1996). The dismantling of the British Empire under way during this period made somewhat urgent the creation of a political identity independent from the British. The Act created three classes of citizens:

- (i) natural-born citizens, including children born outside the country with Canadian fathers and children born out of 'wedlock' to Canadian mothers (CCA, 1947, Sections 4 and 5).
- (ii) naturalized citizens: British subjects with Canadian domicile, 'domicile' being defined as five years residence; women married to Canadian citizens; British subjects admitted into Canada for permanent residence (CCA, 1947, Section 9).
- (iii) citizens granted a citizenship Certificate by the Minister by virtue of the following: coming of age at 18 years and filing an intention to become citizens; spouses of, and resident with, Canadian citizens or British subjects. In order to acquire this certificate, applicants had to meet the following conditions: prove they were lawfully admitted for permanent residence; prove their residency in Canada for four of the previous six years, including the year immediately prior to the application; demonstrate their good character; demonstrate adequate knowledge of English or French, and if unable to do so, demonstrate they had been resident in Canada for a period of twenty years; demonstrate they intended to reside permanently in Canada or intended to enter the public service. (CCA, 1947, Section 10)

The Act specified the grounds for the removal of citizenship and the deportation of certain groups of 'citizens,' including "disloyalty" and "treason."

21 (1) The Governor in Council may order that any person other than a natural-born Canadian citizen shall cease to be a Canadian citizen if, upon a report from the Minister, he is satisfied that the said person either has

- (a) has, during any war in which Canada is or has been engaged, unlawfully traded or communicated with the enemy or with a subject of an enemy state or has been engaged in or associated with any business which to his knowledge is carried on in such manner as to assist the enemy in such war;
- (d) if out of Canada, has shown himself by act or speech to be disaffected or disloyal to His Majesty, or, if in Canada, has been convicted of treason or sedition by a court of competent jurisdiction. (CCA, 1947, Section 21)

The deportation clause, however, was not applicable to "natural-born Canadian citizens." A number of Members of Parliament pointed out that "natural-born Canadian citizens" were also likely to commit treason. However, Paul Martin, Sr., who had been instrumental in the development of the Act, rejected attempts to remove this exemption on the basis that it could make "natural-born citizens" stateless (Demirjian, et al, 1996). This first Canadian *Citizenship Act* contained provisions for the repatriation of certain groups of 'citizens,' whose citizenship was to be a conditional one.⁶¹

The Act therefore introduced a two-tier citizenship, the citizenship of the "natural-born" citizen was not subject to withdrawal under any circumstances, regardless of their "character" or their loyalty to the state. These first-class 'citizens' were overwhelmingly white: in 1946, 80% of the population was of French and British ancestry (Porter, 1966). While not all of these citizens would have been born in Canada, the first-class citizenship status created by the Act would privilege those who were, as well as their Canadian-born children. The second class citizenship status of "naturalized"

⁶¹ See Roberts (1988) who has examined deportations from Canada between the years 1900-1935. Roberts argues that deportation was carried out on an arbitrary basis, and practiced by immigration officials in clandestine, 'misrepresenting' and 'concealing' their activities. She demonstrates that deportations of the 'economically' unfit, of political activists and of 'migrant' workers were widespread during this period (Roberts, 1988).

citizens meant that the threat of deportation and loss of citizenship status was enshrined in legislation.

The Act allowed independent access to citizenship of 'Canadian' women by stipulating that they would not lose this status upon marriage to a non citizen. The Act also allowed women who were not citizens to become eligible through marriage to a Canadian citizen, and in this way, expanded the access of immigrant women to citizenship. However, given the racialized immigration policies of the period, few women of the *non preferred races* would have been able to benefit from this expanded access to citizenship.

Section 10 of the *Citizenship Act*, which allowed the Minister to grant a certificate of citizenship, further stipulated a two-tier eligibility criteria for domicile. For applicants who spoke English and/or French, domicile was defined as a period of five years. For those applicants who spoke neither of these languages, domicile was defined as a period of twenty years. Then, as is the case now, third world peoples would have been the least likely to have fluency in French or English. As *non-preferred races*, these immigrants faced the most barriers to entering and residing in the country. The Act stipulated that they were now required to meet the longest residency requirement before becoming eligible for citizenship, and for claiming social entitlements. For many Chinese women who did not speak English or French, the *Citizenship Act* allowed them to claim pensions after they met the twenty year residency and became naturalized citizens:

Many Chinese women had little opportunity to learn English or French because they had to raise large families and help in family-run businesses. This proved detrimental to them as knowledge of either language was an eligibility requirement for naturalization papers. Further, naturalization was required in order to qualify for pensions. (Demirjianm Gray & Wright, 1996:18)

South Asian women likewise had very restricted access to learning English or French (Buchignani, Indra & Srivastava, 1985; Doman, 1985). The *Citizenship Act*, upon which social entitlements were contingent, became racialized in its creation of a two-tier citizenship, and its stipulation of a two-tier criteria for eligibility. The ideological construction of the nation as 'white' naturalized the

English and French languages of the 'white' founding races as the national languages. superimposing them upon indigenous Aboriginal languages. The *Citizenship Act* institutionalized access to citizenship rights on the basis of these racial/national languages. Access to social entitlements on the basis of fluency in the 'national' languages further reinforced the association of citizenship rights with 'belonging' to the nation. Language and culture are inextricably inter-linked in people's lived experiences and unequal access on the basis of 'language' translated very readily into unequal access on the basis of culture.

Likewise, the *Act's* requirement that applicants prove their legal admittance into the country for permanent residence placed a disproportionately difficult requirement on the *non-preferred race* immigrants. It was, after all, these immigrants that the state sought to exclude from permanent residency in the country. Restrictive immigration policies such as the head tax, the *Chinese Exclusion Act*, and the *Continuous Passage* requirement made it extremely difficult for these immigrants to prove that they had legally been permitted permanent residence in Canada. The 1914 case of the *Komagata Maru* demonstrates the extreme measures taken by the state to restrict the entry of South Asians into Canada. In defiance of the 1908 *Continuous Passage* requirement, a group of 367 South Asians, most of them Sikhs, chartered the ship *Komagata Maru* to travel to Canada in a continuous journey. Although these passengers fulfilled all legal requirements for entry into Canada for permanent residence, they were not permitted to do so because of their *non-preferred race* status. The ship remained in Vancouver harbour for three months during which time the passengers and the South Asian community in Vancouver attempted to negotiate with the state. Finally, the ship and its passengers were forced to depart after Immigration officials deprived the passengers of food and water supplies (Adhopia, 1993; Buchignani, Indra & Srivastava, 1985; Mazumdar, 1984).

Nor was the *Komagata Maru* the only case of its kind. A few years earlier, a small group of South Asians from Fiji challenged the *Continuous Passage* requirement. These Fijians of South Asian origin sailed directly from Fiji to Canada in 1908. Immigration officials prevented their entry by

interpreting the *Continuous Passage* requirement as applicable to "one's country of *ultimate origin*" (Buchignani, Indra & Srivastava, 1985: 24). Although these would-be immigrants were from Fiji, and had traveled on a *Continuous Passage* from that country, they were denied entry into Canada for permanent residence. For the *Citizenship Act* to demand from *non-preferred race* immigrants - whose entry for permanent residence was prevented by the state's enactment of specific policies - to prove they had been admitted for permanent residency would have been an onerous requirement indeed. It would have only further reinforced the status of *non-preferred races* as not belonging to the nation.

Few studies have focused specifically on the access of *immigrant* women to social programs in the period before the 1960s. However, the literature on immigration demonstrates that the state sought to strictly limit the entry of women of the *non-preferred races* into the country, and therefore the access of third world women to the formal rights of citizenship in Canada was severely restricted. This formal access was the precondition for access to the substantive rights of citizenship, which included social rights after the creation of the welfare state. The access of *immigrant* women to substantive rights, even after they gained formal rights, would be likewise unequal on the following counts. In the first instance, their access to legal citizenship status was extremely limited even after they entered the country. For example, the 1931 Order in Council which required that Chinese immigrants applying for citizenship had to get permission from the Minister of the Interior in China (Bolaria & Li, 1985) would have made access to Canadian citizenship for Chinese women extremely difficult. Likewise, the language requirement stipulated for citizenship in the 1947 *Citizenship Act*, which remained in effect until 1977, disproportionately impacted women in immigrant communities. Secondly, the deportation clause in the *Citizenship Act* continued to make the legal status of *immigrants* vulnerable even after they acquired legal citizenship. This deportation clause was routinely used to repatriate immigrants who were unemployed and who made claims to public assistance in the early 20th century (Roberts, 1988). In reinforcing the deportation clause, the *Citizenship Act* allowed the possibility of using the deportation clause against the claims of

immigrants to public assistance. Thus, access to formal citizenship was extremely restricted for immigrants of the *non preferred races*. Even after these immigrants acquired *de jure* citizenship, they continued to be ideologically constructed as *immigrants*. This status would have inevitably shaped perceptions of 'citizens' and service providers that these *immigrants* did not share membership in the nation.

A number of British studies demonstrate that even when black peoples are legally entitled to claim social services, the fear that their claims will lead to a reassessment of their immigration status works as a powerful disincentive to making such claims⁶² (Ahmad & Husband, 1993; Ginsburg, 1992; Law, 1996; Mama, 1989). While comparative Canadian studies have not been conducted, the Canadian state itself defined *non-preferred races* as not wanted, as not belonging to the nation, and organized their unequal access to social entitlements.

The experience of Japanese-Canadians during the period when the *Citizenship Act* was introduced further demonstrates the state's reluctance to treat all citizens equally. Still in effect during the time of the Act's introduction was the suspension of the citizenship of Japanese-Canadian. The impact of the Act on the internment of members of this community was specifically raised by Members of Parliament from British Columbia. These legislators expressed the hope that the Act did not mean that Japanese-Canadians could return to British Columbia. In reassessing them, Paul Martin, Sr. agreed to an amendment upholding the Order-in-Council relating to the internment (Demirjian et al, 1997). The state, therefore, made no pretense that the *Citizenship Act* was intended to, or would in effect, establish the equality of

⁶² Ginsburg (1992) has identified the following ways in which racism affects the provision of social services in Britain: the stereotyping of all black peoples and the non-recognition of their specific needs; the non-recognition of black peoples as legitimate claimants; and the racist pressures put upon service providers from the larger society which results in service providers giving black claimants a lesser access to entitlements. These forms of racism create a "lesser welfare citizenship" for Black people. In the Canadian situation, I have demonstrated how the state itself constructed *non preferred races* as outsiders to the nation and undeserving of sharing the nation's resources.

citizens.

The *Citizenship Act* was intended to bridge the divisions which existed between the different European ethnicities in Canada. As such, it became an important piece of legislation which organized the transition from the 'British-ness' of the nation into its 'Canadian-ness.' In introducing the *Act*, Paul Martin, Sr., noted that it was important "for the national unity of Canada" and that "No matter where we come from or what our origins, French, English, Scandinavian, Scottish, Ukrainian, Irish or whatever else, one thing at least we can all be, and that is Canadians" (Demirjian, Gray & Wright, 1996). Notable by its absence is any reference to 'Canadians' of non-European ancestry. If there were any doubts that the *Act* would transform the racialized character of the nation, MacKenzie King put them to rest:

With regard to the selection of immigrants.....I wish to make it quite clear that Canada is perfectly within her rights in selecting persons who we regard as desirable future citizens. It is not a "fundamental human right" of any alien to enter Canada. It is a privilege. It is a matter of domestic policy. There will, I am sure, be general agreement with the view that the people of Canada do not wish, as a result of mass migration, to make a fundamental alteration in the character of our population. Large-scale migration from the Orient would change the fundamental composition of the Canadian population. (Jakubowski, 1997:17)

This statement was made in the House in May 1947, less than one month *after* the tabling of the *Citizenship Act*.

Immigration policies continued to play a central role in regulating access to Canadian citizenship, and its social entitlements, after the introduction of the *Act*. For the first three decades after the transition into the 'welfare' state, the state used the alleged danger of the 'Yellow Peril' in designing immigration policies to 'Keep Canada White.'

Those immigrants who were to be nationalized as *future citizens* would not experience immigration policy as restricting their access to citizenship: they would not experience immigration policies as a barrier to citizenship, but as enabling their access to citizenship in Canada. Thus, access of 'citizens' and 'future citizens' to social entitlements could appear to be organized only by social policy, for in their experience, immigration policy

would remain invisible in regulating their citizenship. In developing social entitlements on the basis of a racialized nation and citizenship, the welfare state incorporated the racialized distinctions between *future citizens* and *immigrants*, distinctions introduced in an earlier instance through immigration policy. Social policy, in this way, further organized the nationalizing of 'citizens.' Therefore, while in actuality immigration policies *as well as* social policies regulated access to citizenship rights, it would be only those *immigrants* subjected to unequal citizenship through immigration restrictions who would come to experience immigration policies as restrictive.

Resisting Racialization

The welfare state incorporated processes of racialization in a fourth way. The citizenship of the welfare state perpetuated the racialization of inequalities within Canadian society; it did not confront them. As a result, the practices of the welfare state organized a 'white' historical experience and naturalized the racialized privileges of its 'citizens.' In her study of the historical development of social policy in the United States, Gordon (1994) demonstrates that these policies reflected a 'white' vision based on the experience of the white men and women who developed them. Reflecting this 'white' experience, social policy did not challenge the racial domination central to the inequalities experienced by Black people. Black women, on the other hand, developed a significantly different vision for welfare provision in their communities. They defined racial domination as a key factor in women's poverty: "Race issues were poverty issues, and women's issues were race issues" is how Gordon summarizes the analysis of Black women⁶³

⁶³ Gordon points out that like the white women who helped shape social policy, Black women building 'welfare' institutions in their communities were committed to supporting black women's role in mothering (Gordon, 1994). The effects of slavery had been devastating on black families, undermining the role of black women in mothering, and an urgent concern for black women was the mothering of black children. Black women were committed to the "upliftment" of their 'race' (Gordon, 1994; Hill Collins, 1991). Gordon argues that the concerns with 'race' of white feminists and black feminists from the 1890s to 1935 sprang from very different reasons and had different consequences. While white women shared the same concerns as white men in ensuring continued 'racial' domination to maintain white supremacy within the global capitalist

(Gordon, 1994: 132). Whereas 'white' vision did not challenge the 'racial' ordering of U.S. society, and incorporated it into social policy, Black feminists confronted racism as central in the welfare institutions they built.

Using Gordon's insights, it is possible to identify similarly distinct visions of 'welfare' which underpinned the struggles of Aboriginal peoples and of *immigrant* communities, visions which placed ending racialized domination at the centre of their welfare. In the case of Aboriginal peoples, the most obvious examples, of course, are the ongoing struggles for land rights and for self-determination. These struggles define the racialized/colonized status of Aboriginal peoples as the most significant factor in the inequalities experienced by Aboriginal peoples, and the most significant barrier to their 'welfare' and 'social security' (Goodleaf, 1993; Maracle, 1993; McIvor, 1996).

In the case of third world immigrants in Canada, little research has been conducted on specific activities in building 'welfare' institutions in their respective communities. However, enough historical evidence exists to suggest that the communities made a clear link between racialized immigration policies and the other forms of racism they experienced as obstacles to their 'welfare' in Canada. For these immigrants constructed as *non-preferred races* by the state, struggles against racialized immigration policies were central to the forms of resistance they developed in order to establish communities. The 'welfare' activities developed by these communities were critical to their survival in the face of the deep hostility organized against them by the state. Community members both pooled their resources to provide assistance to each other, as well as campaigned against restrictive immigration policies.

Many examples of community activism and support networks in these communities have been recorded. For example, South Asian and Chinese communities campaigned for immigration policies to allow the reunification of their families. Among some of the earliest South Asian community organizations were those which campaigned against racist immigration laws and lobbied the state for illegal immigrants to be allowed to

system, black women's concerns for the 'upliftment' of their 'race' were based on oppositional politics which challenged the 'racial' supremacy of whites.

remain in Canada (Adhopia, 1993; Buchignani, Indra & Srivastava, 1985).⁶⁴ South Asians campaigned against the \$200.00 head tax until it was finally lifted in 1924. They organized campaigns for acquiring citizenship and for the right to vote. Activists in British Columbia had links with activists in the United States and India, working together at the international level to end British rule in India. By the 1920s, a network of Sikh *gurdwaras* existed in Vancouver, New Westminster, Victoria, Nanaimo, Golden, Abbotsford, Fraser Mills and Paldi. These *gurdwaras* were accessible to all South Asians. They were meeting places for community members, as well as centres for organizing campaigns against racialized immigration policies. Members of the community provided support to each other so that "From 1909 on, South Asians rarely applied for any sort of public relief. A thousand South Asians were out of work during the winter of 1909, but even hostile government observers were forced to admit that they were well provided for" (Buchignani, Indra & Srivastava, 1985: 34).

Members of the Chinese-Canadian community likewise campaigned against the head tax and the *Exclusion Act*. The Chinese Labour Association of Vancouver fought against the *Exclusion Act*, arguing that family members of those settled in Canada should be allowed to join them (Adilman, 1984). Funds were raised from within communities, and services were provided by volunteers (Adhopia, 1993; Buchignani, Indra & Srivastava, 1985; CCNC, 1992; Miki & Kobayashi, 1991; Ng & Sprout, 1977). Japanese-Canadians fought against their internment and later campaigned for redress for the injustices to which they were subjected. Community organizations formed a vital network of support, providing financial support to newcomers, as well as assisting them in securing employment and housing.⁶⁵ People of colour created their own support networks so that those who were employed provided support for the

⁶⁴ In 1939, South Asian community leaders went to Ottawa to lobby the government to allow a 'small number' of illegal immigrants to stay in Canada (Adhopia, 1993).

⁶⁵ Buchignani et al. (1985) have written extensively about the experience of this internal support system in the South Asian community.

sick and the unemployed.⁶⁶

From their earliest presence in Canada, *immigrant* women were actively engaged in these community struggles. For instance, South Asian women were involved in the challenge to the discriminatory *Continuous Passage* requirement. Some of the passengers of the Komagata Maru were women, and South Asian women in Vancouver were active in providing vital support to the passengers on the boat while it was in Vancouver harbour (Adhopia, 1993). Likewise, Japanese-Canadian women fought against the internment of their community, as well as for redress from the Canadian government after the internment ended (Miki & Kobayashi, 1991). In the campaigns organized by Chinese-Canadians, a woman named Mrs. J. has been identified as a delegate to a meeting of community leaders with the federal government to lobby for repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act.⁶⁷

The links that people of colour made between immigration policies and the other forms of racism they experienced in Canada are evident in the historical record available. There is, no doubt, need for much more historical research in order to establish a more complete picture of the myriad 'welfare' services organized by people of colour. However, enough evidence exists to make the case these *immigrants* challenged their racialization as being key to the 'welfare' of their communities. Contemporary research conducted on

⁶⁶ An important issue for South Asian 'immigrants' in the early 20th century was access to housing. The intense racism and xenophobia these 'immigrants' lived with meant they were socially isolated and excluded from mainstream society. Access to housing was such a severe problem that many South Asian men lived in makeshift tents and cooked on the pavements. They lived in overcrowded conditions when fortunate enough to find housing. It was only by providing economic and 'psychological' support for each other that they were able to survive (Adhopia, 1993).

⁶⁷ See Nipp, *Ibid.* In a subsequent film made by Nipp, 'Under the Willow Tree', she explains that the woman who was part of the Chinese delegation was included as a 'token', but ended up speaking for the community because she was seated at the side of the Prime Minister who had to turn to her because he could not hear otherwise. See Wong, R. In "Willows bend but don't break: Review of Dora Nipp's Under the Willow Tree", in *Kinesis*, p.21, July/Aug. 1997. However, her presence even as a 'token' woman speaks to the pressures the men must have encountered, and which resulted in her inclusion in the delegation.

determining the impact of the provision of 'welfare' and social services in people of colour communities supports my contention that community organizations continue to define the link between systemic racism, immigration policies and unequal access to mainstream social services as key barriers to the equality of women of colour.⁶⁸ Whereas people of colour organized resistance to their racialization and linked it specifically to the immigration policies which gave them unequal citizenship rights, the vision which became expressed in the social policies of the Canadian welfare state did not confront, but perpetuated, the racialized domination of people of colour.

White Settler State as 'Welfare' State

In the four significant ways discussed above, the transition of the 'laissez faire' state into the 'welfare' state maintained a racialized nation and citizenship in Canada. Mishra (1977) and Young (1990) have both argued that the organization of social programs in the welfare state defines 'citizens' primarily as "client-consumers" of these programs. This is a valuable insight which I believe needs to be further developed. Not only does the welfare state define citizens as "client-consumers," but it defines the 'needs' which are to be fulfilled by the welfare state. In effect, then, the welfare state socially 'produces' citizens as "client-consumers" with very specific 'needs.' In this way, citizenship shapes citizens as much as citizens struggle to shape the content of citizenship.

⁶⁸ I refer the reader to the following studies: the study *Towards Equal Access: A Handbook for Service Providers* commissioned by the Immigrant & Visible Minority Women Against Abuse, edited by Rafiq, F. (1991); *The Need For Community Services: A Study of the South Asian Community in Metropolitan Toronto*, commissioned by the Coalition of Agencies Serving South Asians (CASSA) (1994); and *Violence Against Immigrant, Refugee and Racial Minority Women*, commissioned by the National Organization of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women of Canada (June, 1993). Patricia Daenzer, in her study of the self-organization of a group of Black women in Toronto for separate social service provision, concludes that her study "showed the similarities between the nineteenth-century struggles of Black Canadian women and the post-1970s movements. Both the earlier movements and the more recent struggles focused on improving the welfare, and thus social locations, of Black families in Canada; racism served as the organizing focal point in both periods" (1998:284).

Using the above insight, and in making race central to my analysis, I argue that in racializing the nation and its 'citizens' during the period of the expansion and consolidation of the welfare state, the Canadian state *socially produced* racialized 'citizens' as 'white,' whose 'needs' it institutionalized in social programs. The basis of the relation between the welfare state and its 'citizens-as-members-of-the-nation' was this shared race status. The class and gender compromises identified by Marxists and feminists in the social consensus which emerged among *Canadians* on the welfare state were made in the context of this racialized 'unity' of the nation and its welfare state. In other words, the stabilizing of the economic system depended upon the stabilizing of the nation. Consequently, the welfare state became a means for the nationalization of 'citizens' into the 'welfare' state through the extension of social rights to them.

The nationalization of the *preferred races* created the conditions so that as 'citizens' and 'future citizens' of the nation, they would experience social rights as a progressive measure. They would also experience the benevolent face of the state, which assumed some measure of responsibility, however minimal, for their welfare. These 'citizens' would come to gain a stake in preserving social programs for 'citizens,' the benefits of which assumed very concrete and tangible forms. Gordon has stressed the importance of the "feeling of entitlement" which the welfare system created, even as she points out that this system "solidified" the inequalities of citizenship (1994: 293). The welfare state in Canada likewise "solidified" the racialized Canadian citizenship in organizing social entitlements for the racialized nation. It is important to underscore that in their ideological construction as *preferred races*, 'citizens' were not 'deceived' into supporting the welfare state. The ideological practices of the state created a racialized national interest, superimposing it onto reality in the form of social entitlements for racialized 'citizens.' These ideological practices *materially* integrated 'citizens' into the nation-welfare state relationship as they came to acquire a very concrete, material stake in the welfare state. The experience of *preferred races* as 'citizens' in 'their' welfare state became based on their access to material entitlements; their nationalization would create a 'national' interest in protecting these

entitlements from 'outsiders.' This lived, material *experience* of access to very concrete social benefits has shaped the very complex relationship of *preferred races* as 'citizens' to the welfare state, as well as to *immigrants* as 'outsiders.'

The state's ideological practices of seeking to unite the nation through the integration of citizens into the welfare state simultaneously placed *immigrants* outside the nation. If these *immigrants* were 'naturally' outsiders to the nation, which is how the welfare state's immigration policies socially constructed them until the 1970s, then it would appear 'natural' in the practical, lived experiences of 'citizens' that *they* should not have the same rights as *us* in *our* welfare state. The state's ideological practices of bordering *immigrants* would mean that even those among them who acquired *de jure* citizenship would continue to be ideologically constructed as outsiders on the basis of their race: *immigrant* citizens would continue to be racially equated with 'newly arrived' *immigrants*, whatever their legal status in the country, the length of their residence, or even whether they were Canadian-born citizens. Furthermore, racialized immigration policies constructed them as a threat to the nation and its resources as embodied in the 'national' welfare state.

As Sivanandan (1982) has pointed out, Black peoples in Britain wear their "passport" on their "faces". The ideological practices of the Canadian state in racializing the nation and its citizens likewise stamped the passport of *immigrants* on our faces. This racialized *non-preferred race* status was reproduced into the 1960s, despite the lived experiences of *immigrants* working in the 'national' economy and paying taxes into the 'national' revenues which funded the welfare state. Racialization became the prism through which the access of *immigrants* to entitlements would be ideologically constructed, irrespective of the claims to which they might, in reality, have been entitled.

Moreover, the ideological construction of *immigrants* as outsiders to the welfare-state reinforced the notion they did not contribute to the 'building' of Canada. Their historical experiences were ideologically erased, their experiences made invisible, their voices silenced. Their outsider status to the 'national community' has become naturalized; indeed, much of the literature on the Canadian welfare state does not even 'see' *immigrants*. Therefore, even though these *immigrants* created wealth, paid taxes, and in very material and

concrete ways contributed to the resources funding the welfare state, their racialization enabled these material contributions to become invisible. The welfare state was based on the principle that Canadians, as taxpayers, collectively funded social programs. Hence these social programs were entitlements, not charity. Yet *immigrants*, who, as taxpayers, also made contributions to 'national' revenues continued to be defined outsiders. In the transition to the 'welfare' state, *immigrants* were given no legitimate equal entitlement because they were defined as not having been part of the 'founding nations.' These *immigrants* therefore, came to be defined as 'newcomers' who wanted to enjoy the benefits of the welfare state without having contributed to its historical creation. The welfare state rendered invisible their historical record of contributions to the national economy. Instead, it made *immigrants* themselves visible, literally constructing the category 'visible minorities.' The bordering of *immigrants* through institutionalized state practices, which became deeply entrenched in the welfare state, remained invisible, unlike the presence of 'visible minorities.'

Members of the *preferred races*, as citizens, would experience in their lived realities, the state to be a 'liberal-democratic welfare' state. This state, in incorporating social rights and assuming a measure of responsibility for their welfare, would be experienced as more benevolent than the 'laissez-faire' form. At the same time, Aboriginal peoples would experience this very same state as a colonizing power which reproduced their dispossession from their lands and other economic resources, while maintaining their dependency in the form of 'welfare-colonialism.' At the same time, members of the *non-preferred races*, as *immigrants*, in their lived experiences would encounter the state as one which racialized the conditions of their entry into the country, their access to citizenship and their claims to social entitlements within the context of a globally integrated economy which fostered the conditions for their migration. Their experiences of the 'welfare' state would be of a state hostile to their welfare and social security, indeed, a state which sanctioned and promoted racist hostility to their very presence. These lived experiences in the everyday/everynight world of these various groups rested upon the

racialized/colonized power relations which underpinned the very construction and reproduction of the 'Canadian' nation.

Conclusion

In the transition to the 'welfare' which became necessary for the stabilization of the capitalist system, the Canadian state sought also to stabilize the nation by containing the challenges of feminist and working class struggles. It did so by constructing a 'national interest' which would allow the ongoing accumulation of capital and also legitimize the state as representing all sectors of the nation. In other words, for the survival of the capitalist system of relations, the state had to stabilize its 'national' domain. If it was to maintain its legitimacy as representative of the interest of its citizens, the state had to represent itself as the defender of a 'national' interest which reflected the interests of the various sectors of the nation. Social policy, and the transition into the 'welfare' state, achieved these goals in the post World War II period.

As I have demonstrated in this Chapter, the Canadian welfare state incorporated the processes of racialization into social policy by basing social entitlements of the historically racialized nation on a likewise historically racialized citizenship. During the three decades of the expansion and consolidation of the welfare state, this racialization was further reinforced by the state's continued use of overtly racialized immigration policies to reproduce the nation and to regulate access to formal citizenship. The compromise between labour/ capital/ family/ state in the transition to the welfare state was a racialized compromise, at the heart of which lay the 'whiteness' of the various sectors of the nation.

CHAPTER SIX

LIBERALIZING IMMIGRATION POLICY

Introduction

Whereas Canadian immigration policies overtly distinguished between *preferred* and *non-preferred races* in establishing and reproducing the whiteness of the nation, these policies underwent significant changes in the 1960s and 1970s. The Immigration Regulations of 1962 moved policy towards 'non-discriminatory' entrance criteria by placing emphasis on the skills of applicants. In 1967, the point system was introduced and it became entrenched in the *Immigration Act* of 1976-77 which removed 'race' as an explicit category for organizing immigration, as well as enshrining the point system. This *Immigration Act* represents a significant shift in Canadian immigration policies, which had previously been overtly racialized. The *Act* is currently in effect, and therefore, represents an important piece of legislation which regulates the access of immigrants to membership in the nation and to citizenship. In previous Chapters, I argued that immigration policies have been central to nation-building in Canada. Examination of this *Act* is therefore important for my dissertation because it represents a change in the organization of immigration into the country, which has set the stage for the restructuring of the immigration program in the 1990s.

In this Chapter, I examine the *Immigration Act* of 1976 -77. I make the case that although the *Act* removed overt references to race, it has not ended the racialization of the Canadian nation or access to citizenship. As long as the underlying social relations remained unchallenged, the removal of overt references to 'race' did not transform processes of racialization. The *Act* certainly represents a period of liberalization of immigration policies for certain categories of immigrants, and it has enabled a significant shift in immigration patterns into Canada so that immigration from third world countries has outpaced that from European source countries.

The liberalization of immigration policy was accompanied with the liberalization of the *Citizenship Act* in 1977. As I have discussed in the previous Chapter, the 1947 *Citizenship Act* stipulated a two-tier eligibility criteria for citizenship which required immigrants who did not speak English or French to have been resident in Canada for twenty years before they could become eligible to apply for citizenship. This requirement was removed in 1977, and a three year residency was required. In this Chapter, I argue that while the changes to immigration and citizenship policy expanded access to citizenship for third world immigrants, their ideological construction as *immigrants*, as outsiders to the nation, was not ended by this liberalization. The liberalization of immigration and citizenship policy was not extended to domestic workers and migrant workers, who continue to enter the country on temporary work permits. After working as domestic workers for two years, this category of women can qualify for landed status. Migrant workers, however, enter the country on temporary work permits, and not as immigrants.

In this Chapter, I demonstrate that the *Immigration Act* did not seek in principle to transform the racialization of the nation, nor has it done so in effect. Even as the *Act* contains a clause prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, its stated objective is to strengthen the bicultural and bilingual character of the nation. In this, the *Act* states its commitment to preserving the whiteness of the nation created by previous immigration policies. The *Act* therefore helps to naturalize the historical national/racial character of *Canadians*. In committing itself to preserving this national character, the *Act* continues to distinguish immigrants into those who are compatible with this bilingual and bicultural character of the nation, and those who are constructed as incompatible with this character. The former become ideologically constructed as *future citizens*, and the latter as *immigrants*. Therefore, the *Act* represents a transformation in how the processes of racialization have come to be organized during a period when increased immigration from the third world became necessary to provide the 'cheap' labour needed for economic expansion. Instead of distinguishing between *preferred races* and *non-preferred races*, as previous immigration policies did, this *Act* distinguishes immigrants on the basis of their social, cultural and linguistic characteristics.

The Act organizes immigration into Canada under three main categories: the independent category, the family category, and the refugee category.⁶⁹ The Act distinguishes between the independent category as one which makes economic contributions and the family category which is based on family relations. In this Chapter, I argue this distinction masculinizes the independent category as an independent, economically productive category, while feminizing the family category in its construction as a category of 'non-economic' 'dependents' who must be sponsored. The Act's construction of this category makes invisible the economic contributions of sponsored immigrants, the majority of whom are women and their children.

Sponsorship regulations also require sponsors of immigrants under the family category to undertake financial responsibility for their 'dependents.' This regulation prohibits sponsored immigrants from making claims to social assistance for ten years, although these immigrants qualify for citizenship after three years in the country. I argue this unequal entitlement to social programs further reinforces the ideological construction of *immigrant* women as outsiders to the nation by subjecting them to unequal citizenship rights. Thus, in addition to distinguishing immigrants on the basis of their affinity to the nation, the Act also genders immigrants, so that *immigrant* women come to be constructed as an economic burden to the nation.

Further, while the independent category is assessed on the basis of the education and skills of the applicants, once these immigrants enter the country, third world immigrants are deskilled, and experience downward class mobility, through non-recognition of their education and professional skills by economic and social institutions. Although their educational and professional skills are the basis for their immigration, this reality becomes erased by their racialized deskilling within the labour force. In this way, the ideological practices of the state interact with underlying social relations to 'produce' *immigrant* labour as low-skill, low-wage labour. Conversely, immigrants from

⁶⁹ I will not examine the refugee category as it remains outside the scope of my present study.

European societies whose education and skills are recognized as compatible with Canadian levels in the 'national' economy are further nationalized as *future citizens*: they become integrated into the economy as part of the 'national' labour force, and not as *immigrant* labour.

The *Immigration Act* continues to organize the racialized nationalization of white immigrants on the basis of their cultural and social affinities to the nation, their fluency in the 'national' languages, and their 'contributions' to the nation through the recognition of their skills and education. On the other hand, the racialized bordering of third world *immigrant* women is organized on the basis of their social and cultural diversity, their linguistic diversity, the non-recognition of their contributions to the nation, and in the deskilling of their labour as *immigrant* labour. Racialized inequalities since the 1970s have been expressed in the state's focus on the cultural, social and linguistic 'diversity' of *immigrants* to set them apart from *Canadians*, as well as to make invisible the actual diversity which does exist among immigrant women by homogenizing them as *immigrant* women. These processes of racialization intersect with the gendering and classing of immigration categories to construct *immigrant* women in particular as an economic 'burden' to the nation, and as a 'threat' to the nation's social and cultural cohesiveness. The ideological practices institutionalized in the *Act* have meant that even when citizens, future citizens and *immigrants* share the same legal status, the state's racialized nation-building practices continues to distinguish amongst them.

Like its predecessors, the *Immigration Act* of 1976-77 continues to balance contending interests in Canada: it ensures the provision of *immigrant* women's labour to the economy *and* the reproduction of the whiteness of the nation. The *Act*, thus, organizes the borders of the nation at the socio-political, as well as at the geographical, levels. My analysis of this *Act* is important for setting the stage for the 1994 Social Security Review and Immigration Policy Reviews, which are the subject of the rest of this dissertation. In this Chapter, I demonstrate that the ideological construction of *immigrant* women organized by the *Immigration Act* 1976-1977 reproduced their racialized Othering, which

enabled the targeting of this particular group of women as a threat to the nation in the 1990s.

The Immigration Act, 1976-77

A greatly changed international order was one of the major outcomes of the Second World War. After the Great Depression and World War II, Canada entered a period of economic expansion with the post-war economic boom increasing international trade. The *preferred race* source countries in Europe could not provide the scale of immigration needed in Canada; these countries were themselves experiencing economic growth. Consequently, migration within the global economy was increasing from the countries of the 'margin' to the 'centers' (Hawkins, 1989; Green & Green, 1997; Jakubowski, 1997; Stasiulis, 1997). There was a major change in immigration patterns into Canada during this time. Although the state continued to encourage European immigration, the number of such immigrants was declining, and immigration from other source countries was increasing (Hawkins, 1989; Jakubowski, 1997; Boyd, 1991). Therefore, while 97% of all foreign born women immigrating into Canada before 1951 were from Britain, other countries in Europe, and the United States (Boyd, 1991: 7), this pattern began to change during the 1960s. While 90% of all immigrants who entered Canada prior to 1961 were European-born, they represented only 25% of all immigrants between 1981 and 1991. During this decade, six out of the ten highest source countries for immigrants have been Asian countries (Stasiulis, 1997: 142).

The changed conditions within the global economy led to a re-examination of immigration policies as Canada lifted previous restrictions on immigrants from third world countries (Hawkins, 1989; Green & Green, 1997; Jakubowski, 1997; JRS, 1995; Boyd, 1987, 1991). The Immigration Regulations of 1962 introduced changes which emphasized labour market needs by focusing on education and skill levels, changes which became institutionalized in the *Immigration Act* of 1976-77.

In her study of Canadian immigration policy, Freda Hawkins (1989) argues that these changes were motivated by the recognition among senior

government officials of the potentially damaging effects of international perceptions. For example, Canada's participation in the United Nations and the Commonwealth would be seriously damaged if public policy continued to be overtly based on racial categories. Canada's international interests would be much better served by eliminating explicitly racial categories, as would its relations with the newly independent states in Africa, Asia and Latin America. African and Asian leaders emerged out of national independence movements which had denounced the racial/colonial subjugation of their populations. The formation of the Commonwealth resulted in previously colonized 'races' taking their place at the table as independent countries. The Director of the Institute Of Race Relations in Britain points to a similar pragmatism among the European statesmen:

Improving race relations was a way of improving business opportunities in newly-independent countries which would no longer accept British overlordship. So if you were going to work with the comprador classes in the newly-independent countries, you had to stop saying that they were inferior to you, that their cultures were inferior to yours and declare that we were all brothers under the same capitalist skin. (Sivanandan, 1990: 11)

In addition to this pragmatism, the Nazi's racialized genocide of Jewish communities in the Holocaust made the continued use of overtly racial policies extremely difficult to justify (Solomos & Back, 1996; McLaren, 1990). Scientific theories of racial superiority which had previously enjoyed much popularity in Europe and the settler colonies became increasingly difficult to defend publicly.

Hawkins argues that changes to immigration policies were not the result of "parliamentary or popular demand," but the result of the recognition among bureaucrats that "Canada could not operate effectively with the United Nations, or in a multiracial Commonwealth, with the millstone of a racially discriminatory policy round her neck" (Hawkins, 1989). Here, I believe that Hawkins does a disservice to people of colour inside Canada who had campaigned against racist immigration policies in the 20th century (Adhopia, 1993; CCNC, 1992; Buchignani, Indra & Srivastava, 1985; Brand, 1996; Yee, 1996; Bannerji, 1996; Ng, 1995). Likewise, the Civil Rights movement in the United States had a major impact on drawing attention to the pervasive racism which denied Black peoples basic civil rights (Omi & Winant, 1994). Anti-racist

struggles in advanced capitalist countries and anti-colonial independence movements contributed to a political climate within which overt use of racial categories in public policies became more difficult than had been the case previously. Changes to Canadian immigration policy were, therefore, the result of the state's pragmatism which prompted the need for changes 'from above' as well as of anti-racist struggles 'from below' of peoples of colour globally.

The *Immigration Act* bases selection criteria on the skills and qualifications of applicants, as well as on their family relations, and contains a specific non-discrimination clause on the following grounds:

to ensure that any person who seeks admission to Canada on either a permanent or temporary basis is subject to standards of admission that do not discriminate on the grounds of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion or sex (Immigration Act, 1976-77, Section 3(f)).

The *Act* organizes immigration into the following three categories:

(i) the family class, based upon the reunification of immediate family members of citizens and landed immigrants; and assisted relatives who did not have enough points to qualify under the independent category, but who were nominated by a relative in Canada for sponsorship;

(ii) independent applicants whose eligibility was to be decided through the point system, with points being allocated on the basis of their skills (this class included assisted relatives), and

(iii) refugees, who fear persecution and meet the United Nations definition of 'convention refugees' (Immigration Act, 1976-77).

Immigration Regulations (1978) outline how independent applicants were to be assessed: points are allocated for education and training; personal assessment; occupational demand; occupational skill; age, arranged employment or designated occupation; knowledge of English and French; relatives willing to assist the applicant; and employment opportunities in area of destination (Schedule 1).

The family category allows citizens and landed immigrants to sponsor

specific relatives as 'dependents.' This category includes both relatives who join sponsors already resident in Canada for family reunification, as well as family members who accompany independent applicants. The sponsorship regulations for the family category stipulate that sponsors have to assume financial responsibility for their sponsored 'dependents':

...family class applicants are not assessed under the point system; but they must meet the basic standards of good health and character. As well, before an immigrant visa can be issued to such applicants, the sponsoring relative in Canada is required to sign an undertaking of support. In this statement, the sponsor promises to provide for the lodging, care, and maintenance of the applicant and accompanying dependents for a period of up to ten years. (EIC, 1983: 10-11)

The family members allowed entry under the family category include spouses, unmarried and dependent children, fiance(e)s, dependent parents under 60 years of age, parents and grandparents over the age of 60 and their dependents, and unmarried dependent orphaned siblings, grandchildren and nieces and nephews. Sponsors with no other relatives in Canada can identify any one family member for sponsorship (EIC, 1983).

In addition to sponsored family members, the *Act* also allows independent applicants who do not have enough points to qualify under the point system to enter the country as 'assisted' relatives, as long as they have a sponsor to undertake responsibility for supporting them. Immigration regulations specify the following conditions for the sponsorship of assisted relatives:

Every person nominating a relative for admission to Canada for permanent residence shall

- (a) undertake to provide for a period of five years any necessary care and maintenance from his own resources for the nominated relative and his immediate family in accordance with standards prescribed by the Minister;
- (b) have carried out the responsibilities with respect to any previous application for the admission to Canada of any person for permanent residence;
- (c) be willing and able to undertake to advise, counsel and assist the nominated relative in fulfilling his responsibilities as a resident of Canada; and make the nomination in the form prescribed by the Minister. (Immigration Regulations, 1978:43(5))

Sponsors therefore have to undertake financial responsibility for sponsored family members for periods up to ten years, and for a period of five years for assisted relatives.

Prohibitions are also contained in the *Act* which allow immigration officers to prohibit the immigration of persons who might become public charges. The *Act* specifies conditions under which landed status can be revoked, including conviction for offenses punishable by imprisonment, subversion by force, and in cases where an immigrant:

willfully fails to support himself or any dependent member of his family in Canada; (Immigration Act, 1976-77, Section 27 (f)).⁷⁰

The *Act* also requires the Immigration Minister to table Annual Reports in Parliament which establish immigration levels for the coming year.

Additional categories under which immigration has been organized are the Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP), introduced in 1973, and the domestic worker category. The NIEP allows workers to enter the country on temporary work permits (Sharma, 1997; Singh Bolaria, 1992; Stasiulis, 1997). Domestic workers were allowed into the country as temporary workers between 1973 and 1981. Prior to 1973, domestic workers were allowed to enter as landed immigrants. However, this enabled many of them to find work in other occupations because of the low wages and unfavourable working conditions in domestic work. Since 1981, domestic workers are allowed to apply for landed status after having worked in Canada as domestic workers for two years (Arat-Koc, 1992; Bakan, 1987; Silvera, 1993). These two categories have been made 'invisible' by the textual practices of the state which rarely refer to these categories in discussions of the immigration program.

In 1986, another category of immigrants was created, that of the

⁷⁰ Very little information is available about the extent to which the state has monitored this stipulation in the 1970s and 1980s. As I will demonstrate in Chapters Eight and Nine, the state has committed itself in the 1990s to closely monitor this stipulation by working in closer co-operation with provincial levels of government.

"business immigrant", or the 'entrepreneur' category. Applicants under this category were required to have a "personal net worth of at least \$500,000." and invest an amount in the range of \$150,000 to \$500,000 in order to qualify (Wong & Netting, 1992).

The changes introduced by the *Immigration Act* have resulted in a significant shift in immigration patterns so that through the 1980s and 1990s, immigration of third world peoples has been significantly greater than that of Europeans. Immigration patterns for the 1980s also demonstrate that immigration under the family category has been significantly greater than under the independent category, and while women represent over half of all immigrants, they are more likely to enter under the family category than the independent one (Boyd, 1987).⁷¹ The increased immigration of women from the third world represents a significant shift from earlier periods when immigration policies resulted in the disproportionately greater immigration of men from third world countries into Canada, as I have discussed in Chapter Four.

That the most notable changes introduced by the *Immigration Act* 1976-77 were the introduction of the point system and the non-discrimination clause is agreed upon in the literature (Abu-Laban, 1998; Boyd, 1989, 1991; Das Gupta, 1995; Green & Green, 1997; Hawkins, 1989; Jakubowski, 1997; Ng & Sprout, 1977). However, there is considerably less agreement regarding the impact of these changes on racial and sexist discriminatory practices in the immigration program.

⁷¹The majority of immigrant women enter Canada under the family category, so that between 1981 and 1986, 50.1% of all women entered under the family category, compared to 39.4% of all men. 12.6% of women entered under the refugee category, 9% as assisted relatives, 2.2 as retirees, 5.8% under the business category; and 20.4 under a category called Other. 37.4% of the women entered under the 'independent' category, but these included assisted relatives who were nominated by relatives, as well as women who were retired (Boyd, 1987: 56). In the year 1983, for example, "almost three times as many immigrant women were dependent immigrants as were admitted as independents" (Ng & Estable, 1987: 30). In 1988, the majority of the family category immigrants were women, accounting for 59%, and most male immigrants under this category were likely to be children and retired parents (Ng, 1998: 17).

A number of scholars have defined these changes as reflecting a period of innovation in immigration policy, and argue that the point system introduced a neutral, non-discriminatory immigration policy. According to these scholars, the *Act* effectively ended the earlier 'Keep Canada White' immigration policies (Green and Green, 1997; Hawkins, 1989).

On the other hand, a number of scholars dispute the claim that the point system ended the racial and sexist discrimination within immigration. These scholars note that while the *Act* made a commitment, in principle, to ending discrimination, it did not end discrimination in effect. Specifically, these scholars point out two main ways in which the *Act* continues to have a discriminatory impact: firstly, through the unequal allocation of resources for immigration recruitment and processing; and, secondly, in giving discretionary powers to immigration officers to allocate points through subjective assessments of the personal suitability of independent applicants (Abu-Laban, 1998; Das Gupta, 1995; Jakubowski, 1997; Ng, 1998; Ng & Sprout, 1977). Resource allocation for the selection and processing of immigrants is clearly an important factor in determining immigration levels from particular countries: more immigrants will be recruited from those countries which are allocated more resources for this work. These resources are overwhelmingly allocated to recruitment from 'developed' countries where immigration offices are disproportionately concentrated.⁷² Thus, even though overt references to race were removed by the *Act*, the unequal allocation of resources results in the disproportionate recruitment of immigrants from 'developed', i.e., 'white' countries (Abu-Laban, 1998; Das Gupta, 1995; Jakubowski, 1997).

The *Act* also allows immigration officers to grant points for the personal suitability of applicants, as well as giving them powers to override the point system entirely in certain cases. These powers allow the personal racist and sexist prejudices of officers to be exercised in their allocation of points to

⁷² Between 1951-1957, 91.39% of recruitment expenses went to 'developed' countries, and between 1962-1969, 78.2%. Likewise, there were 5 Immigration offices in the United Kingdom and 10 in the United States in 1981, compared to 1 in India and 5 for the entire continent of Africa (Jakubowski, 1997: 18-20).

prospective immigrants (Abu-Laban, 1998; Jakubowski, 1997; Ng, 1998; Ng & Sprout, 1977).⁷³ Immigration officers process the application of the majority of women immigrants under the family category when the women accompany male family members, even when the women apply under the independent category. Men, on the other hand, are more likely to be processed under the independent category as heads of household (Boyd, 1989, 1991; Das Gupta, 1995; Ng & Sprout, 1977; RCSW, 1973).

The family category has also brought the entire immigrant family directly under state control through its power to define which family members are eligible for entry, and as such, which familial relations are 'legitimate' (Basran, 1993; Das Gupta, 1995; Estable, 1986). The nuclear family form is defined as the norm in Canada; this family form is a specifically European one. In many third world countries, the extended family form is more prevalent. In imposing the heterosexual/nuclear family structure on *immigrants*, state policy 're-constitutes' these families upon entry into Canada into the 'legitimate' nuclear family norm. An element of instability is also introduced as family members who are left behind for long periods are finally re-united, only to find their status and role within the family has changed significantly during the period of separation (Das Gupta, 1995).

The sponsorship regulations for the family category make sponsored relatives, most of whom are women and their children, dependent upon their sponsors for periods of up to ten years. These sponsorship regulations therefore objectively create the conditions to increase the vulnerability of sponsored immigrant women, and to increase the control which can be asserted by their sponsors, within the family (Abu-Laban, 1998; Boyd, 1989, 1991; Das Gupta, 1995; IMA, 1995; Ng, 1998; Ng & Sprout, 1977).

I am in general agreement with these theorists who conclude that

⁷³ In the 1970s, then immigration lawyer and current Attorney General of British Columbia, Ujjal Dosanjh, identified precisely these discretionary powers as one of the major factors in the discriminatory treatment of 'visible minorities.' At a workshop for service providers held in 1977, Mr. Dosanjh pointed out that "visible minorities" are disproportionately detained and investigated by immigration officials (Ng & Sprout, 1977).

changes introduced by the point system allowed the racist and sexist discriminatory treatment of immigrants. However, I argue that the *Act* does more than simply allow racist and sexist biases of immigration officers to be exercised, and increase the dependency of sponsored immigrant women. The ideological practices of the *Immigration Act* have a much more profound effect in organizing the racialization and gendering of immigrants. The textual practices of the *Act* construct the category *immigrant* women as a distinct category of women in Canada who do not make any contributions to the nation.

Reproducing the Nation

In this section, I argue that the *Immigration Act 1976-77* did not seek in principle, nor did it in practice, to end the racialization of the nation which had been the specific objective of previous immigration policies. In the *Act's* stated objective of preserving the national character, it continues to support the ideological reproduction of the 'nation' as white, and as such, it continues to express underlying social relations. The reproduction of the bilingual and bicultural character of the nation was articulated as one of the objectives of the *Immigration Act*:

...to promote the domestic and international interests of Canada recognizing the need (a) to support the attainment of such demographic goals as may be established by the Government of Canada in respect of the size, rate of growth, structure and geographic distribution of the Canadian population; to enrich and strengthen the cultural and social fabric of Canada, taking into account the federal and bilingual character of Canada (Immigration Act, 1976-77,(3(a) & (b)).

The *Act's* objective, therefore, was not to transform but to **strengthen** the "cultural and social fabric" and the "bilingual character of Canada." With this objective, the *Act* continues the racialized distinguishing between immigrants into *future citizens*, who are compatible with the national character, and *immigrants* who are not compatible with this character.

The *Act* eased overtly racialized restrictions on the immigration of the previously *non-preferred races* **after** the whiteness of the 'nation' and its 'citizens' had been consolidated by state practices. As Hawkins recognizes in

her extensive historical study of immigration policy, the point system was introduced in the 1960s and 1970s because Canada was not "prepared to even think about a universal, non-discriminatory immigration policy until full national independence, a reasonably well developed political system, adequate citizenship legislation, and really encouraging economic prospects and the confidence which goes with them, had been achieved" (1989: 258). In other words, the point system only became a possibility once racial/national institutions had been established and consolidated.

When the point system was introduced, the white nation had also been further defined, strengthened and institutionalized by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism appointed in 1963. The increasing confrontations between 'Francophone' and 'English' Canada in the 1960s, and growing support for Quebec sovereignty had led to the appointment of this Royal Commission with a mandate to "to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of equal participation between the two founding races, taking into account the contribution made by other ethnic groups" (Hawkins, 1989). The Royal Commission's Report reinforced the "equality" of the two "charter groups," and called for a recognition of the contribution of various "ethnic" groups (Hawkins, 1989; Palmer, 1975). In reinforcing the "equality" of the two "founding nations," The Royal Commission reinforced the colonial/racial composition of the nation by reaffirming the languages and cultures of the two colonizing 'founding' races as the national languages and cultures. Whereas the English and French had previously been referred to as the founding races, the Royal Commission referred to them as the founding 'nations,' replacing the discourse of 'race' with that of 'culture' and 'language.' The 'Keep Canada White' policies which relied on overtly racialized immigration policies were changed once the 'whiteness' of the 'nation' and its identity had been secured precisely *because these changes would not fundamentally challenge the established racial order of the nation*. Therefore, ending the use of overtly racialized policies could hardly be expected to transform the deeply entrenched racialization of the 'nation' and its citizenship.

The Act allows racialization as an organizing principle of the *Canadian* nation to remain intact, and enabled this racialization to find

expression in a changed manner. It is in the equation of *non-preferred races* with their cultural and linguistic 'difference' from the nation that the racialized social relations found their mode of expression. The category immigrant, meaning literally a geographical 'outsider' in the first instance, continues to be ideologically defined by the *Act* as a 'social and cultural' 'outsider' to the 'nation.' The racialized category *immigrant* draws upon the historical status of *non-preferred races* as outsiders, and re-codifies it as *immigrants* who remain 'outsiders.' The insider/outsider status of the *preferred races/non-preferred races* organized by previous immigration policies came to be organized by this *Act* in its distinguishing of immigrants into *future citizens* and *immigrants* on the basis of their 'social and cultural' identity. Defining *immigrants* as outsiders to the nation on the basis of their cultural and linguistic characteristics meant that all people of colour would continue to be ideologically constructed as *immigrants* on the basis of their cultural and linguistic 'diversity' from the nation. I have discussed in Chapter Four how state policies entrenched unequal treatment of people of colour on the basis of their 'race,' and with disregard for their legal status in the country. For example, the rights of all Japanese-Canadians were suspended during their internment on the basis of their race, even though many of them were Canadian-born citizens. In a similar vein, the *Immigration Act's* ideological practices construct all people of colour as outsiders to the nation, on the basis of their social, cultural and linguistic characteristics.

Along with the changes to immigration policy, the state also made significant changes to the *Citizenship Act* in 1977. Specifically, the *Citizenship Act* reduced the residency requirement for eligibility to citizenship down to three years (Demirjian, Gray & Wright, 1996). The twenty year residency requirement for applicants who did not speak English or French was removed. This change greatly increased access to citizenship, including to social entitlements, of *immigrants*. The changes to both immigration and citizenship policy in the 1970s thus represent a period of liberalization, and of relatively increased access to citizenship, of people of colour. Immigration statistics demonstrate that after the 1970s, immigration from third world countries fast outpaced that from European source countries (Boyd, 1987; Hawkins, 1989).

However, even though access to citizenship for third world peoples increased as a result of the liberalization of these policies, the state's practices of ideologically defining people of colour as outsiders to the nation, as *immigrants*, did not end as a consequence of its reaffirmation of the "bicultural and bilingual" national character.

The important point here is that the conscious historical, and contemporary, definition of the Canadian nation as white, as bilingual and bicultural, remains institutionalized and systematized in the state's practices. This definition reproduces the ideological distinction between *Canadians* and *immigrants* on a racialized/nationalized basis.

Gendering Immigration

By organizing immigration into the independent and family categories, and in specifying unequal conditions for each, the *Immigration Act* in effect genders immigration. The ideological construction of the independent category - indeed, its very naming - organizes it as a masculinized category. In western patriarchal terms, men are defined as independent economic agents, as heads of households in their own right *as men*, whereas women are largely defined as non-economic dependents of men (Cohen, 1985; MacDonald, 1996; Mies, 1986; Williams, 1993). The *Act* reinforces this patriarchal definition, and constructs male immigrants as 'future citizens' who make economic contributions to the nation. It also constitutes the family category, in opposition, as a feminized category. The naming of this category organizes it as a feminized class, a construction which is further reinforced in its designation as a category of 'dependents.' Examining these two categories in relation to each other, it becomes apparent that the family category is defined in terms which are opposite to the 'maleness' of the independent category. The *Act* associates the family category with everything which is not 'masculine': the family category is constructed as not 'independent' or 'economic.' Where men are defined as independent economic agents, women and children are defined by their relation to these 'independent' male actors as their '*dependent*' family. These textual practices deny women autonomy and an independent status

once they enter the country. It denies them independent access to domicile. In this way, the ideological category 'dependent' is made actionable and imposed upon *immigrant* women. Whereas earlier immigration policies sought to keep women of the *non-preferred races* out of the country, the *Immigration Act* allows them entry, but increases their dependency on sponsors.

These ideological practices also mean that men who enter under the family category are able to escape their 'dependent' status *as men*. Men are defined in the economy as workers and economic actors, and are socially defined as heads of households. This 'maleness' of immigrant men who are sponsored under the family category allows them to overcome their 'dependent' status once they are in the country. For sponsored women, on the other hand, their actual status as women reinforces their 'dependent' status.

The ideological practices of the *Act* which nationalize white immigrants as *future citizens* on the basis of their social, cultural and linguistic compatibility with the nation mean that white immigrant women are not ideologically constructed as a burden on the nation's resources, or as a threat to the nation's character. The racialized status of these women as members of the nation mean that they are distinguished by the *Act* from *immigrant* women even when both groups enter the country under the same category. Therefore, it is *immigrant* women who have come to be most strongly associated with the family category: indeed, *immigrant* women have come to personify this category.

The distinction made by the state between the two main categories of immigration also reinforces class distinctions between immigrants by making educational levels and professional expertise a criteria for distinguishing 'independent' from 'dependent' immigrants. As a number of theorists point out, men are more likely than women to be processed under the independent category and immigrants from other advanced capitalist countries which have comparable levels of skills and education among the population are also more likely to be processed under the independent rather than the family category (Boyd, 1991; Das Gupta, 1995). Third world immigrants, and in particular third world women, who have significantly lesser access to education and training programs, are less likely to qualify under the independent category as a result of the race/gender/class nexus. Tania Das Gupta notes that "women

from the working classes and from racial minority groups would never qualify to immigrate on the basis of such criteria as they lack access to the required training” (1995:166). Boyd finds that “foreign born women age 15 and older are twice as likely as foreign born men *not* to speak English and/or French well enough to carry on a conversation” (1991:7). Therefore, in addition to privileging immigrants from European source countries by the additional points granted for fluency in the ‘national’ languages and for their ‘personal suitability,’ the independent category also has class-specific consequences in defining ‘dependent’ status.

In separating the independent and family categories on the basis of their ‘economic’ contribution, a ranking of the worth of each of these categories became institutionalized, indeed was made inevitable, by the Act. This categorization ensures that in the ranking of ‘value’ of these categories to the nation, the family category would come up short in the capitalist terms which define individuals by their financial and ‘economic’ worth. Quite literally, applicants under the independent category ‘score’ points for the skills and experience they possess. Applicants under the family category, according to this classificatory system, have no skills or experiences worth scoring. The Act devalues the ‘economic’ contributions of women, as well as marginalizes their participation in the paid workforce. This classification obscures the reality that most sponsored immigrant women enter the paid labour-force relatively soon after their arrival into the country, as a number of studies have demonstrated (Boyd, 1992; Buchignani, Indra & Srivastava, 1985; Das Gupta, 1995; Ng, 1988; Ng & Estable, 1987; RCSW, 1970; Samuel, 1986). For example, the participation of immigrant women in the labour force has been “consistently higher than that of Canadian-born women,” making “an essential contribution to the Canadian economy” (Ng & Estable, 1987: 29).⁷⁴ These

⁷⁴ Immigrant women who immigrated to Canada before 1961 had a labourforce participation rate of 60.5%; women who immigrated between 1961-1971 had a labour force participation rate of 52.1% in 1971, compared with 39.8% for Canadian-born women; women who immigrated between 1971-1976 had a labourforce participation rate of 54% compared to Canadian-born women at 45%; and in 1985, the labour force participation rate of immigrant women was 55.6% compared with 52.1% for Canadian-born women (Ng & Estable, 1987: 30).

findings are echoed in a study by the Chief of Demographic Policy for Employment and Immigration Canada who found "Although the primary goal of Family Class immigration is social, the majority of such immigrants sooner or later participate in the economic activity of the country" (Samuel, 1986: 2). Boyd likewise found that the labour force participation of foreign born women is higher than that of Canadian born women (1987).⁷⁵

The categorization of sponsored immigrant women as 'dependents' makes invisible the economic contributions of these women. The actuality of these women's participation in the labourforce represents a disjuncture with their ideological construction as 'dependents' by the state. And although their participation in paid work could give the women a measure of financial independence, this independence is undermined by the sponsorship regulations which give the sponsors increased control over the women within the family. In addition, the unpaid labour of immigrant women which reproduces *immigrant* families, including future generations of workers for the 'national' economy, is likewise not recognized as a contribution to the nation. Although sponsored immigrant women make very tangible contributions through their paid and unpaid labour, immigration categories make this reality invisible.

Sponsored Inequality

The ideological construction of sponsored immigrant women as 'dependents' in the *Act* is made actionable in the sponsorship regulations which make sponsored immigrants dependent on their sponsors for their presence in the country. The regulations also require sponsors to assume financial responsibility for 'dependents' for up to ten years (Abu-Laban, 1998; Boyd,

⁷⁵ While these studies do not specifically examine the category under which the immigrant women enter the country, the immigration statistics I quoted earlier demonstrate that the majority of immigrant women enter the country under the family category. It would therefore be safe to deduce that the immigrant women these studies refer to would include significant numbers of women who entered under the family category.

1987, 1991; EIC, 1983; Ng, 1998). These two factors make sponsored immigrant women in reality dependent upon their sponsors: the regulations impose the Act's ideological construction of these women as 'dependents' onto their lived reality. The state thus *produces* women as dependent immigrant women, creating the objective conditions under which these women can become easily isolated and more vulnerable to violence and abuse (Boyd, 1987; IMA, 1994; Ng, 1988). The sponsorship agreement has the direct effect of intensifying patriarchal relations within *immigrant* families by firmly tying 'dependent' women to their sponsors. The sponsorship regulations also institutionalize the unequal access of sponsored immigrant women to social entitlements such as social assistance and housing, as well as job training programs. Although sponsored immigrants become legally eligible to claim citizenship after a three year residency under the new *Citizenship Act*, the sponsorship regulations remain in effect for ten years. Therefore, immigration policy continues to organize an unequal citizenship for sponsored immigrant women, and their sponsors, even after they become *de jure* citizens. Like the sponsored immigrants, the sponsor themselves are discouraged from making claims to social assistance programs even if they are legally entitled to do so. In order to qualify as sponsors, these citizens and landed immigrants have to demonstrate they will be financially self-supporting, as well as undertake financial responsibility for their sponsored relatives (EIC, 1983). Therefore, in addition to sponsored immigrants being *de jure* disentitled from making claims to social assistance, the sponsors themselves are expected not to make such claims. Both sponsored immigrants, and their sponsors, therefore, are subject to a lesser citizenship through the sponsorship agreement. As the majority of immigration since the introduction of this *Act* has been from third world countries, and the majority of this immigration has been organized under the family category, it is third world women and their children who make up the majority of the family category. These regulations therefore further reinforce the ideological construction of *immigrant* women as 'lesser' than *Canadians* by institutionalizing their 'lesser' entitlement.

The sponsorship regulations mean that the state assumes no obligations to provide social assistance, language training or job training

services to sponsored immigrants. Such services would greatly increase their economic mobility. As Boyd argues:

The practice of sponsorship reflects the view that while family reunification is desirable on social grounds, integration related matters are the responsibility of the family and costs are not to be borne by the state. Sponsors agree to provide or assist with lodgings and to provide food, clothing, incidental living needs, and counselling to the sponsored immigrants(s) during the specified period of settlement. They also agree to provide financial assistance so that the sponsored immigrants(s) shall not require financial maintenance support from federal or provincial assistance programs described in the regulations pertaining to the 1976 Immigration Act (schedule VI of the current regulations). Thus, sponsorship is viewed by the federal and provincial governments as a commitment that the designated immigrants will not require economic assistance. (1991:6)

Thus, sponsored immigrant women are given no *de jure* access to social assistance and integration programs for ten years by the state, and this helps to slot them into the bottom of the labour hierarchy. Boyd concludes that “there exists no overall settlement/integration policy for immigrants in general, and for immigrant women in particular” (1987: 14). Roxana Ng argues that the work patterns of immigrant women become entrenched in the decade during which the sponsorship agreement remains in effect. These patterns, therefore, become much harder to break out of once the sponsorship period ends (Ng, 1987).

Although the sponsorship agreement requires the sponsor to make financial provisions for dependents, the reality in most cases is that sponsored immigrant women have to find work to support the family. Although *immigrant* men, like women, have a higher labour force participation than Canadian born men (Estable, 1986), they tend to earn lower wages and are denied opportunities for economic advancement enjoyed by their white counterparts (Estable, 1986; Khosla, 1993).⁷⁶ The dependence of *immigrant* families on

⁷⁶ A study examining the earnings of Black men estimated that they are paid 15% less on average than their white counterparts. *The Vancouver Sun*, Canadian Press (Feb. 10, 1997).

male wages is therefore more limited than that of *Canadian* families.

While little research has focused specifically on the access of sponsored immigrant women to social security programs, the unequal access of these women is legislated by the state. The sponsorship regulations state emphatically that sponsors must undertake financial responsibility for sponsored immigrants, and can be deported if they fail to provide for them. As the following examples demonstrate, when sponsored immigrants have attempted to access social assistance programs, they encounter a number of obstacles directly related to their sponsored status.

A series of workshops conducted in Vancouver in 1977 revealed great uncertainty among service providers about the level of access immigrants had to social assistance programs (Ng & Strout, 1977).⁷⁷ A study of South Asian women in British Columbia conducted by the India Mahila Association (IMA) identified the lack of independent access to financial support as a key factor which trapped the women into living in violent and abusive relationships (IMA, 1994).⁷⁸ In her study of the claims of immigrants to welfare programs in British Columbia in 1989, Susanna Lui-Gurr found that sponsored immigrants

⁷⁷ In one case a 66 year old sponsored male immigrant, with a wife with a disability and four children, applied for unemployment insurance and was refused. He went to an agency which was unsuccessful in helping him claim UIC and CPP, and referred him to welfare. The agency was not sure if he could in fact claim welfare assistance. In the case of a sponsored immigrant woman in her eighties went to an agency after she was thrown out of her son's home, the agency was told she could not claim social assistance because she had been sponsored. The agency finally found free lodging for the woman through emergency services, but received a call from the Immigration Department two days later saying the department did not want to be responsible for these expenses. Such cases demonstrate that the situation regarding the access of sponsored immigrants to social security programs remained unclear to service providers who were engaged in front line work (Ng & Strout, 1978).

⁷⁸The IMA study found : "One of the major barriers identified by the women was their dependency on their husbands which was determined from the outset of their relationship. All except one of the women came to Canada as sponsored immigrants and while five were sponsored by a close relative, nine out of the fourteen were sponsored directly by their husbands. In these cases, the husbands abandoned their responsibilities of sponsorship support to help settle their wives in Canada. Instead, they transformed the sponsorship into a form of new power over their wives. The result created nearly insurmountable inequity in their relationship and made the women socially, psychologically and financially dependent on their husbands." (IMA, 1994).

who attempted to claim social assistance were required to prove that their sponsorship had broken down irretrievably (1995).⁷⁹ Therefore, in cases where sponsored immigrant women have been allowed access to social assistance programs, this has been at the discretion of the particular provincial and municipal jurisdictions to which they make the claims. Boyd's research comes to a similar conclusion:

...sponsorship is viewed by the federal and provincial governments as a commitment that the designated immigrants will not require economic assistance. This can be the basis for denying access to welfare assistance programs. Depending on the interpretation of provincial and municipal regulations, immigrant women who experience marital violence and breakdown and who need to find alternative housing and income, can be denied immediate access to legal aid, publicly subsidized housing, or income assistance until the issuing authorities are satisfied that the sponsorship relation is broken. Thus, a sponsored entry status can enhance the tendency of women to remain in an abusive setting because it reduces access to social assistance programs.(Boyd, 1991: 7)

The legal position remains that sponsored dependents are not entitled to access social assistance programs, and if they do, their sponsors can be deported. As Ng (1998) and Boyd (1991) point out, deportation remains rare in such cases. However, both also point out that the threat of male family members being deported keeps many sponsored immigrant women trapped in abusive relationships. I argue that because sponsored immigrant women are officially not entitled to make these claims, if, and when such assistance is given, it strengthens the state's ideological construction of *immigrant* women as a burden on 'national' resources.

Immigration classification of sponsored immigrant women as 'dependents' means that their access to language and job training programs is also severely restricted because the women are not officially defined as potential employees. In the instances where sponsored immigrant women

⁷⁹ Lui-Gurr does not specify exactly what kind of 'proof' is needed. In examining the access of immigrant families to welfare programs, she defines immigrants as all non-Canadian born individuals. Many of the 'immigrants' she refers to would, in their legal status, be citizens.

have been given access to training programs, their legal dependent status bars them from receiving income assistance or training allowances. Lack of access to these language training programs and to skills upgrading courses limit the employment opportunities available to immigrant women (Abdo, 1998; Boyd, 1987, 1991; Estable, 1986). For example, basic training allowances under the Canadian Job Strategy Program, funded by Employment and Immigration Canada in the 1980s, were not accessible to sponsored immigrants. Nor were living and travel allowances (Boyd, 1991: 7). In this way, the women most likely to need language training programs are denied access as a direct result of their immigration categorization.

And while sponsorship regulations increase *immigrant* women's dependency upon their sponsor within the family, the family is also a source of refuge from the racist hostility *immigrant* women experience within Canadian society. The state's organization of immigration reinforces a conflictual relationship of *immigrant* women to their families: on the one hand, patriarchal structures are strengthened as a direct result of state policy; on the other hand, families often become the only sites of refuge against racism (Basran, 1993; Das Gupta, 1995). Black feminists have pointed to a similar conflicting relation of Black women to the family in the United States (Davis, 1983; Hill Collins, 1990), and Black and Asian women in Britain (Amos & Parmer, 1984; Mama, 1984, 1989). The experience of racism in Canada results in a similar experience for *immigrant* women. The situation is further compounded as, in many cases, women are not informed of their status before their arrival in Canada. As a result, many are unprepared for their increased dependency on the family in Canada. Similarly, many are not prepared for the discrimination in the Canadian labour market (Estable, 1986; RCSW, 1970). Even fewer are prepared for the forms of racism with which they come to live. Numerous studies demonstrate that immigrant women who enter the country under the family category join the paid work force relatively quickly after their arrival (Boyd, 1991; Estable, 1977; Samuel, 1986). Therefore, the increased dependency of sponsored immigrant women on their sponsors might be countered by the women's labour force participation, and their ability to earn an income. As this is an area in which very little research has been conducted,

my study highlights this as an area for future research.

As I have discussed earlier, the independent category has ideologically been constructed to signify a status of *future citizen* by the state's recognition of this category's contribution to the national economy. However, the racialization of immigrants on the basis of their social, cultural and linguistic affinity with the nation means that third world immigrants who enter under the independent category become bordered as *immigrants*. The class position of third world immigrants with high education and professional skills enables them to enter under the independent category, but this relatively privileged class status exists alongside their racialized status as outsiders to the nation on the basis of their cultural and social 'diversity.'

The family category, in being defined as a category of 'dependents' has been ideologically constructed as a drain on 'national' resources. This category is made subject to unequal access to social entitlements, even after sponsored immigrants legally become eligible for citizenship. The sponsorship regulations, in this way, further signify the 'outsider' status of sponsored *immigrant* women to the welfare state. The racialization of the nation and *immigrants* means that all women of colour becoming ideologically constructed as 'outsiders,' while sponsored white immigrant women become integrated into the nation. Therefore, the conditions under which the sponsorship of the family category is organized actually come to 'produce' sponsored *immigrant* women, the majority of whom are from third world countries, as 'outsiders' whose 'welfare' is not tied to that of the nation. And whereas Canadian-born women of colour have *de jure* equal entitlement to social programs, their racialization as 'outsiders' to the nation on the basis of their cultural and social diversity associates them with immigrant women of colour. Therefore, although the actual legal status of Canadian-born women of colour is different from that of immigrant women of colour, both are ideologically constructed as sharing the same 'outsider-to-the-nation' status. The *Immigration Act* therefore accomplishes much more than allowing sexist biases and prejudices to be exercised against *immigrant* women. The race/gender/class nexus embedded in it constructs *immigrant* women in particular as outsiders to the 'nation' and a burden on its resources.

Producing Immigrant Women's LabourError! Bookmark not defined.

In the previous sections, I have discussed how the race/gender/class nexus is embedded within ideological practices of the *Immigration Act*. It distinguishes between the independent and family categories, and produces *immigrant* women as a dependent category by making invisible their 'economic' contributions to the nation. In this section, I address how the *Act* works in tandem with underlying social relations in producing the labour of both 'dependent' and 'independent' *immigrant* women as low-wage, low-status labour, unlike the labour of *Canadians* and *future citizens*, within the 'national' economy.

As discussed earlier, independent immigrants are allowed into the country on the basis of their education and skills. Once they are in Canada, however, the immigrants from third world countries are subjected to a racialized process of deskilling and downward class mobility. The 'foreign' education and skills of immigrants from third world countries are generally not recognized by employers and professional associations in Canada (Abdo, 1998; Bakan, 1987; Boyd, 1991; Buchignani, Indra & Srivastava, 1985; JRS, 1997; Ng, 1988; Ng & Estable, 1977; Samuel, 1986). Although these skills are the basis for the selection of immigrants under the independent category, and third world immigrants do enter Canada under this category, the subsequent non-recognition of their education and skills in the national economy results in these workers being employed in occupations well below their skill levels. This non-recognition of credentials is part of the process of racializing/bordering *immigrants* by deskilling them and reconstructing their labour as low-wage, low-skill *immigrant* labour. *Immigrants* are forced to re-train in Canada, if they

can afford to do so, in order to retain their earlier qualifications.⁸⁰

This deskilling, along with non-recognition by the state of immigrant women as 'workers' mean that they become a "captive" labour force who earn less than Canadian women and are more vulnerable to unemployment and underemployment (Estable, 1986; Ng & Estable, 1987).

'Immigrant' women who do not speak the national languages experience even more obstacles and are forced to work in "language ghettos" where workers all speak the same languages, often in the small enterprises of "ethnic entrepreneurs" (Ng & Estable, 1987: 31).⁸¹

The result is that 'immigrant' women work in "less desirable work conditions than do Canadian born women," they are "more likely than native born women to work for a non-government employer or in their own business rather than for a municipal, provincial or federal government, and they are less likely to be employed at a firm where a union exists" and also "more likely than Canadian born women to be paid by the hour rather than by salary" (Boyd, 1987: 11-12).

There may be an expectation that the immigrant women who enter Canada under the independent category fare better than those who enter under the family category as a result of their higher education and skill levels. Alma Estable argues that this expectation is not borne out in reality. These women's labour force participation patterns are similar to that of 'immigrant' women as a whole. The race/sex segregation in the labour force results in placing the

⁸⁰ Murthy has shown that Undergraduate level degrees are downgraded to Canadian Grade 13 Diploma level, Masters Degrees to the equivalent of only 2 years of Canadian university education (Ng & Estable, 1977). In her study of West Indian women workers in Ontario, Bakan demonstrates through individual case studies that immigration to Canada means "accumulated years of education, training and experience can be effectively eliminated with the crossing of a border" as well as "eliminating options of the attainment of new skills" (1987: 74-76).

⁸¹ In their study of the labour force participation of immigrant women, Ng & Estable draw the following conclusions :

While there are regional, sectoral, and urban-rural differences, the general trend is for immigrant women to experience downward mobility after immigration. This occurs regardless of educational level and previous work experience. The only exceptions to this rule are, again, women from the United States and Britain. (1987: 31)

independent category of immigrant women in similar occupations as the family category of immigrant women (1986).

The racialized deskilling separates *immigrant* women workers from immigrants who, as *future citizens*, are not subjected to this deskilling by the acceptance of their education and skills as equivalent to 'national' standards. Ideologically, this deskilling reinforces the social construction of *immigrant* women as unskilled and uneducated, with little to offer to the nation, while their labour becomes integrated into the economy at the lower end of the labour hierarchy (Das Gupta, 1995).

Immigrant labour is also *socially produced* by state practices in other ways. In her classic study of a community agency originally established to advocate on behalf of immigrant women, Ng demonstrates how the agency became transformed. As a result of its interactions with the state and employers, the agency came to "produce" "immigrant women" as a distinctive category of low wage labour (1987). The agency provided employment counseling and job placement services to immigrant women. Upon acquiring state funding for this work, the agency was required to demonstrate positive "results" as a condition for future funding. As such, it became subjected to increased pressure to "produce" these women as a particular category of "immigrant labour" to meet the specifications of prospective employers. The agency did this by organizing the skills of the women in a manner which would be attractive to employers, by screening potential employees for the employers, and by socializing the women into the workplace by teaching them the "rules" of the labour market.⁸² The agency was thus made accountable to the state through the funding relationship. This change forced the agency to constantly mediate the contradictory roles of, on the one hand, being an advocate for the women, with, on the other hand, its practices of placing these women in low-paid, low-status work in service industries and in manufacturing. State funding co-opted the self organization of women as the agency came to further

⁸² These activities included teaching women how to write resumes, how to present themselves to employers during job interviews, and how to get better jobs (Ng, 1988).

the 'production' of immigrant women's labour.

Another instance of state policy organizing *immigrant* women's labour as low-wage, low-status labour is in the immigration policy's treatment of domestic workers. Although domestic workers enter the country **as workers**, the conditions of their entry are organized very differently from that of the independent category. Since the 1970s, domestic workers have been allowed to enter the country under temporary employment visas, and most of them have been Black and Asian women (Arat-Koc, 1995; Brand, 1993; Silvera, 1993; Stasiulis, 1997). The state was forced to reconsider the temporary status of these women in 1981, as a result of the campaigns organized by the women to mobilize public support in their favour. Since then, domestic workers resident in Canada for two years are allowed to apply for landed status, as they can under the current "Live In Care Giver Program." The state withholds landed status from these women for two years, during which time the women are dependent on their employers for their stay in Canada. The conditions under which these women work has been defined as a form of indentureship by a number of theorists (Arat-Koc, 1992; Brand, 1993; INTERCEDE, 1993; Silvera, 1993; Stasiulis, 1997). Women who come into Canada as domestic workers, and under the Non-Immigrant Employment Program, are made vulnerable to increased harassment and exploitation as a direct consequence of their immigration status (Silvera, 1993; Sharma, 1997). Domestic workers are allowed to enter the country only as single adult independents, and many women claim to be single even when they have children. The economic and political conditions under which these women live in their countries of origin compel women to leave their children behind. Once the women acquire landed immigrant status, many have to fight immigration authorities when they seek to sponsor their children (Arat Koc, 1992; Bakan, 1987; Calliste, 1996; Silvera, 1993). Domestic workers therefore do not have landed status for two years, and remain extremely vulnerable during that period.

Temporary workers who enter the country under the Non-Immigrant Employment Program cannot qualify for citizenship, and many "would-be" immigrants have been converted into temporary workers by this program (Sharma, 1997; Singh Bolaria, 1992). Almost no research has been conducted

on gender specific impact of the NIEAP. However, the existence of this program and the temporary status it allows to migrant workers suggests that women who enter under this category have a much more vulnerable immigration status than the women who enter under other categories. Even among the racialized category *immigrant* women, the unequal conditions of entry create significantly unequal levels of access to citizenship for *immigrant* women, domestic workers, and temporary migrant workers.

The labourforce participation patterns of *immigrant* women have severe consequences for their access to old age security programs. As Boyd has demonstrated, immigrant women are “the most vulnerable to poverty in old age” (Boyd, 1992: 51). Access to old age security programs is based on labour force participation, as well as on the length of residence in Canada. As a consequence of their participation in low paid, gender segregated work, immigrant women often do not qualify for maximum benefits in the ‘male’ contributory social insurance programs like the Canada Pension Plan. While access to Old Age Security and the Guaranteed Income Supplement are income security programs, immigrant women’s access to these programs is reduced because eligibility requires a ten year residency in the country. As a result of these two factors of labour force participation and residency requirements, Boyd found in her study that “foreign-born women aged 67 and older who arrived after 1975 received no OAS or GIS benefits” (Boyd, 1992: 51). Most of these women immigrated from countries other than the United States, Britain and Europe, and as Boyd concludes, “foreign-born elderly women are less likely than their Canadian-born female or foreign-born male counterparts to be receiving pension or income security benefits” (Boyd, 1992: 51). The racialized/gender consequences of immigration policies, access to job-training programs and social security programs help to shape, and further compound, the inequalities *immigrant* women experience within the ‘national’ economy. These inequities reinforce the ideological borders of the ‘nation’ and have very material consequences for the women.

While immigration policy exempts sponsored immigrant women from access to social security programs, the state does not exempt them from paying the taxes which fund these programs. The welfare state’s underlying principle

that members of a society, as tax-payers, have a legitimate right to access programs collectively funded by their taxes, does not apply to these women. The taxes paid by *immigrant* women into 'national' revenues is yet another form of their economic contribution to the welfare of 'citizens' who have greater access to these programs. Likewise, the reproductive labour of immigrant women is made invisible by their designation as 'dependents.' The point, therefore, is not so much that *immigrant* women are not integrated into the 'national' economy. It is that they are integrated in a manner which continues to reproduce their greater exploitation as *immigrant* women. The ideological practices of the state result in defining the 'economic,' and social and cultural, contributions to the nation by the race and gender of the contributor, rather than the actual economic activities of the individuals.

The underlying social relations within the global system, and the organization of the relations of ruling by the Canadian state construct *immigrant* women's labour as a category apart from the labour of 'citizens' and 'future citizens' across a myriad of state policies. The labour of women who are domestic workers and migrant workers is further "cheapened" and exploited by their employers (Sharma, 1997; Stasiulis, 1997). The consequences are that class divisions among *immigrant* women within Canada are exacerbated by the organization of the unequal conditions of immigration among them, even as their racialized status gives them a shared status as outsiders to the nation.

Conclusion

The introduction of the point system has enabled a major shift in immigration patterns so that by the 1980s, the major source countries for immigration into Canada were no longer European countries or the United States, but third world countries. While the "volume" of immigration has been lower through the 1980s compared to earlier decades of the 20th century, the majority of this immigration has been under the family and refugee categories (Boyd, 1987).

The introduction of the *Immigration Act* 1976-77 did not transform the racialized reproduction of the Canadian nation. In making one of its objectives the preserving and enhancing of the national character, the *Act* represents a

continuity in the state's ideological practices of racially distinguishing immigrants into *future citizens* and *immigrants*. The Act continues to organize the nationalizing of immigrants who are defined as sharing the social, cultural and linguistic characteristics of the nation, while bordering *immigrants* who are defined as incompatible with these characteristics.

The Act institutionalizes processes of racialization, which intersect with gender and class relations to construct the category *immigrant* women. The outcome of the state practices discussed in this Chapter border all *immigrants*, and women in particular, as outsiders to the nation. The feminization of sponsored immigrants means that *immigrant* women have been denied both membership in the nation and recognition of their economic contributions to the national economy. The *Immigration Act* works to organize social relations in Canada in a manner which harnesses the labour of *immigrant* women in the service of the national economy, yet bars their membership in the nation.

A number of writers have noted that the intersection of race and gender mean that women of colour who are Canadian-born come to be associated with, and have similar experiences to, women of colour who are immigrants (Bannerji, 1993; Boyd, 1987; Ng & Estable, 1987).⁸³ The racism women of colour experience in the workplace, indeed in all of society, does not distinguish between the legal status of women of colour, or between their country of birth. My examination of the ideological practices of the state in constructing women of colour as 'outsiders' to the nation provides the theoretical framework within which we can understand *how* Canadian-born women of colour are given the same outsider status as immigrant women of colour.

My examination of the textual practices of the *Immigration Act*, 1976-1977 sets the stage for the last section of this dissertation. The conditions of immigration organized by this *Act* for the different categories of immigrants

⁸³ The result is that immigrant women are concentrated in the "service, production and materials handling occupations" where they are found in the "lower strata of the service industries" and the "lower echelons of the manufacturing industries" (Ng & Estable, 1987: 30).

provides the context within which the state identified the 'problems' facing the nation in the 1990s. How these 'problems' were constructed, as well as the 'solutions' defined by the state, are the subject of the following three Chapters.

PART 3: NATION BUILDING IN LATE 20th CENTURY

But, as I was saying I cannot write poems anymore because I don't know what language, what words, what metaphors or myths I could use to describe the world around me or express what I feel or think about it. And I am not sure that there should be any more of these metaphors around, or myths, or signs and symbols, or whatever they call them. In fact never more than now have I felt, things have been ever more of themselves. They are what they are. They are fully un-covered. All the bricks, barbed wires, concrete, chrome, glass, gasses, bombs, helicopters, dogs and Wallstreet Journals are there for us to see. If we who are not white, and also women, have not yet seen that here we live in a prison, that we are doing time, then we are fools, playing unenjoyable games with ourselves. I won't go so far, however, as to say that we deserve what we get.

Himani Bannerji, *Doing Time*.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE SOCIAL SECURITY REVIEW

Introduction

In previous chapters, I examined the historical racialization of the Canadian 'nation' and citizenship as organized through various state practices. I argued that the transformation of the 'laissez-faire' state into the 'welfare' state incorporated this racialization, as did the *Immigration Act* of 1976-77. Whereas the *Act* enabled the increased immigration of third world peoples into Canada, its ideological practices constructed *immigrant* women as an 'economic' burden to the nation and structured the unequal access of these women, and their sponsors, to social entitlements. I defined the racialization organized by the state as a process which nationalizes *Canadians* and *future citizens* into the nation-state while bordering *immigrant* women as outsiders to the nation.

In Part Three, I examine the contemporary nation-building practices of the state as organized in the Social Security Review and the Immigration Policy Review of 1994. The state organized these Reviews to restructure Social Security policy and Immigration policy for the 21st century. As such, the consequences of these Reviews will be far-reaching. Immigration policy has historically been key to organizing membership in the nation and to regulating access to citizenship for all non-Aboriginal peoples. Since the transition to the 'welfare' state, access to social security entitlements as part of the rights of citizenship have further signified membership in the nation. Therefore, the organization of both Reviews, and the policy changes the state implemented subsequently, will be of great significance for the reproduction of the nation and citizenship for the 21st century. In this Chapter, I examine the Social Security Review (SSR), and follow with examination of the Immigration Policy Review (IPR) in Chapter Eight. In Chapter Nine, I examine the specific policy changes legitimized by the Reviews.

In 1994, the Canadian state organized country-wide public consultations

on Social Security Review. The SSR identified three major program areas for review: Work, Learning and Security. Through the SSR texts, the state identified the major 'problems' to be 'solved' through subsequent policy changes. Once the Review was underway, the Finance Department defined the Economic Framework within which the restructuring of programs was to take place. Engaging in a textual analysis of the documents produced by the state for the SSR and the Economic Framework, I examine specifically the construction of the textual reality within which the subsequent restructuring was to take place.⁸⁴ The textual reality was produced through objectified forms of knowledge, and it came to embody the relations of ruling in defining the 'problems' with social security from the state's perspective of ruling. This textual reality was made to stand in as representing actuality, and it was imposed on reality in being made actionable through the subsequent policy changes.

I argue that the SSR was organized as a nation-building exercise which sought to legitimize the state's restructuring of social security programs by nationalizing 'citizens' into this project. The SSR sought to construct a partnership between the nation and 'its' state on the basis of a historically shared racialized/national identity. In reproducing the racialization of the 'nation' and its 'citizens,' the state sought to construct an ideological 'national' interest in the restructuring which would override the actual divisions of race, class and gender within the population.

The objectified categories which the SSR texts take as their starting point take for granted the 'nation' of 'citizens' as a homogenous group, erasing the actuality of the divisions of class, race and gender among the various populations in the country. The texts make no mention of the ongoing colonization of Aboriginal peoples, or of the racialized administering of their 'social security' under the welfare-colonialism of the *Indian Act*. The textual reality under production begins with making invisible the actual relationship between the ongoing colonization of Aboriginal peoples and the social security

⁸⁴ The specific documents have been listed in Chapter One of this dissertation.

of the 'nation.' Likewise, the textual reality makes no recognition of *immigrant* women, placing them outside the 'national' interest. The reality that immigration policy regulates access to social entitlements, as well as to membership in the nation, becomes erased. The textual reality constructs both Aboriginal peoples and *immigrants* as being outside the nation, breaking the links which exist in actuality between the *Indian Act*, immigration policy and social policy in the organization of the nation, its 'citizens,' and their 'social security.'

The textual reality defines the major 'threats' to the social security and the prosperity of the nation and its 'citizens.' I demonstrate that the textual reality being produced by the state constructs the 'threats' to the nation by directing attention away from the state's neo-conservative economic policies which have eroded the social security system. The textual reality instead identifies the major threats to the prosperity and social security of 'Canadians' as coming from Other 'nations' and third world workers. The text defines globalization as a recent phenomenon, and the "entry" of third world peoples into the global economy as a threat to Canada's future prosperity. As such, the textual reality makes invisible the actuality that the very coming into being of the Canadian nation was the result of the earlier phase of global integration through colonization. By erasing the reality of earlier periods of global integration, the textual reality both hides the actuality of the colonization of Aboriginal peoples which underpins the nation, as well as naturalizes the existence of the nation. Further, the textual reality seeks to 'unite' the state and its 'citizens' by constructing both as equally under threat from 'outsiders' and 'their' nations.

In addition to these 'external' threats, the textual reality constructs the deficit crises as a 'problem,' defining it as the outcome of the over-generosity of *Canadians* and 'their' state. The textual reality also constructs social programs as having "failed" the nation by eroding the work incentive and by leaving '*Canadians*' ill-equipped to acquire the skills necessary for the highly competitive global economy. The textual reality constructs *Canadians*, 'their' industries and enterprises, and 'their' state as victims of social programs which have saddled the nation-state with the debt crises. The textual practices of the

state further equate the interests of 'Canadians-as-members-of-the-nation' with those of 'national' industries and corporations, while presenting the state as the defender of this shared 'national' interest.

The organization of ruling relations entered the organization of the textual reality as it defined the 'problems' facing the nation from the perspective of the state, from the perspective of ruling. In equating the interests of industry and enterprise with those of all *Canadians*, the textual reality produces the interests of the industry and the corporate sector as the nation's interest.

Through the public consultations, the state invited *Canadians*, as members of the nation, to enter into this textual reality. In entering the textual reality, the consultations sought to make *Canadians* partners with the state in 'solving' these problems. Through participation in the consultations, and entering the textual reality, the state sought to integrate *Canadians* into the restructuring project by sharing a 'world-in-common' with the state. Therefore, the public consultations sought to both legitimize the state in the nation-state relation, and to enable the state to nationalize 'citizens' into the process of restructuring social security.

The textual reality placed Aboriginal peoples and *immigrants* outside the nation: these groups were not allowed entry into the textual reality from the perspective of their lived experience of the *Indian Act* and immigration policy, respectively, shaping their 'social security.' They were given no authority to speak within the textual reality from their lived experiences, which were made irrelevant to the social security of the 'nation' and its 'citizens.' The textual reality literally placed Aboriginal peoples and people of colour off the 'national' agenda. In incorporating the underlying social relations into the textual reality, but simultaneously making them invisible, the textual reality made it impossible to challenge these social relations from within the shared 'world-in-common' produced by the state for its 'nation.' In this way, the SSR worked towards the ongoing reproduction of these social relations for the 21st century.

The Context of the Social Security Review

We are in something comparable to the Industrial Revolution. We are in something that is going to change lives and the work we do, and no one has solutions.

Sally Lerner, University of Waterloo environmentalist.⁸⁵

Some are lucky, some are unlucky. That's life.

Prime Minister Chretien, in response to a question on his government's plans to end unemployment.⁸⁶

A number of theorists have argued that the third phase of the globalization of the economy since the 1970s represent continuities in the western domination of the global economy in the processes of capital accumulation (Bello, 1990, 1994; Mitter, 1986; Shiva, 1993, 1997; Sivanandan, 1982, 1990). These theorists define colonialism as the first phase of the global integration of economies; the period between 1945 and 1970s as the second phase which integrated the newly independent ex-colonies into neo-colonial domination; and, the third phase which is currently increasing the global integration of economies by drawing into capitalist production those sectors of the economy which were previously unevenly integrated. The current neo-conservative globalization is resulting in a re-colonization of third world countries by the imposition of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) through the international financial institutions of the International Monetary Fund

⁸⁵ The Globe and Mail carried a series on the impact of the globalization on work. This particular quote is from *The Globe and Mail*, 'World of Work Changing Orbit,' Dec. 28, 1996.

⁸⁶ CBC Television Town Hall, Ottawa, December 1996.

(IMF) and the World Bank (WB).⁸⁷ These SAPs and international trade agreements central to trade liberalization are destroying the gains that third world countries had made in achieving political independence from colonial rulers. SAPs are resulting in undermining these gains and further trapping these countries into the debt cycle which increases their control by international financial institutions.⁸⁸

Swasti Mitter (1986) has argued that the international division of labour was changing in the 1970s so that women of colour in the advanced capitalist countries and in the third world were being organized into a "flexible" global workforce as capital attempted to reduce the costs of production. The welfare state raised the general levels of wages as a result of the social entitlement which the welfare state provided to the working class. Capital sought to enlist third world women as 'cheap' labour to increase profits and to reverse the gains of the 'core' workforce of privileged, white male workers at the centre. This strategy of capital to integrate third world women who were previously marginalized in the paid workforce into low wage work resulted in the shifting of production to the third world. In the advanced capitalist countries, production increasingly shifted into the informal sector, drawing upon women of colour as a casual and flexible workforce in home based production. The racism in advanced capitalist countries, and in trade union

⁸⁷ Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) have been imposed on eighty-nine countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia, writes Bello (1994). The term refers to a package of 'reforms' which are a condition for receiving aid packages from the IMF and WB. These reforms are typically : a devaluation of the local currency, strict control over the supply of money and expansion of credit, reductions in government spending, trade liberalization by removing trade and exchange controls, privatization of public sector enterprises, and indiscriminate export promotion (Bello, 1994; ECEJ, 1990).

⁸⁸ The definition of 'globalization' as a process of recolonization has been echoed by theorists in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The Conference on the Impact of IMF and World Bank Policies on the People of Africa defines SAP as "a new imperialism for the recolonization of Africa"; in Latin America, SAPs have been defined in the Declaracion de Campinas statement of the Latin American and Caribbean Trade Union Conference on external Debt as leading to "the loss of sovereignty (and) the recolonization of our countries"; and the Philippine Freedom from Debt Coalition condemns SAPs for "the violation of sovereignty by the IMF and WB" (ECEJ, 1990).

movements, made these women particularly attractive to capital as workers. As production shifted to parts of the third world and into the informal economy in advanced capitalist countries, transnational corporations organized the 'knowledge' intensive jobs at the centre while shifting 'labour' intensive jobs to the peripheries. The result was a reduction in high paid, full time jobs at the centre, and an increase in part time and casual employment across the OECD countries. Capital's control over the production process was greatly strengthened at the global level, and race and gender were key factors in organizing this flexible workforce at the global level. This relocation of jobs from advanced capitalist countries to export-oriented sectors of the third world opened employment opportunities for third world women, although, as Mitter delicately puts it, "they were not the best jobs" (Mitter, 1996: 127).

Mitter's main point is that the capitalist strategy in the era of the welfare state was to 'contain' the power of white male workers by turning to third world women as 'cheaper' workers. 'Immigrant' women in the advanced capitalist countries were particularly vulnerable, being drawn into this 'flexible' workforce: "Trapped between the racism of the host community and the sexism of their own, women of the ethnic minorities offer the advantage of Third World labour in the middle of the First" (1986:123).

In the case of Canada, the changes made to immigration policy by the introduction of the point system resulted in increasing immigration from the third world, organizing the provision of *immigrant* women's labour to the economy as 'cheaper' labour. These women's racialized status as *immigrants* made them particularly vulnerable to increased forms of exploitation which 'citizens' could escape. Aboriginal women likewise could be drawn upon in the informal sector as they sought to preserve their traditional lifestyles while also participating in the wage economy. The capitalist strategy of drawing upon colonized Aboriginal workers, as well as 'cheapened' *immigrant* women workers requires much more research in order to fully examine how this strategy was organized in Canada in the 1970s and 1980s. However, the provision of *immigrant* women workers under the family category escalated in Canada in the 1970s, in a manner similar to that described by Mitter.

It is in the context of these changing conditions within the global

economy that the restructuring of social security was organized by the state in the 1990s. In the post-war period, the welfare state had become a key feature of Canadian society (Brodie, 1995; Finkel, 1977; Panitch, 1977; Pulkingham & Ternowetsky, 1996; Resnick, 1994). The introduction of the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) in 1966 supported the expansion of the 'female' track of social programs through the expansion of social assistance programs. CAP was a cost-sharing program between the federal and provincial levels of government for social assistance programs. Federal funding was made conditional upon federal standards for social assistance programs across the country, replacing the patchwork provision of social assistance by provincial governments. Social assistance programs have been defined as representing the 'female' track of social programs, with women disproportionately accessing these programs as a consequence of the gendered division of labour in society. CAP funded programs for providing necessities such as "food, shelter, clothing, fuel, utilities, household supplies and personal requirements" (Day & Brodsky: 1998: 15). The social assistance programs funded by CAP extended the access of women who were citizens to social entitlements (Scott, 1998; Day & Brodsky, 1998). Sponsored immigrant women, as I have discussed in Chapter Six, do not have *de jure* access to the CAP funded programs for the duration of their sponsorship, except at the discretion of provincial governments. Therefore, while CAP expanded the social entitlements for most citizens, in the 1980s and 1990s, successive governments implemented a series of measures which greatly undermined the fiscal basis of social programs. Economic recessions increased pressures on social spending during this period. Chief among the measures implemented by the state were the erosion of federal funding for social programs and a dramatic reduction in corporate taxation levels which led to a major reduction in state revenues (Brodie, 1995; McQuaig, 1995; Ralph, 1996; Scott, 1998; Skillington, 1996).

The consensus which had existed on the welfare state in advanced capitalist countries since the end of World War II broke down in the 1990s as social policy became an area of major conflict (Clarke, Cochrane & Smart, 1992; Brodie, 1995; Johnson, McBride & Smith, 1994; Ginsburg, 1992; Pulkingham & Ternowetsky, 1996; Battle & Torjman, 1996). The literature on

this breakdown in consensus points to three main reasons: (i) the prolonged recessions and high unemployment levels of the 1970s undermined the Keynesian economic policies underpinning the welfare state; (ii) the recessions of the 1970s put increased pressures on social security programs, pressures which the welfare state sought to deal with by reducing social spending, and; (iii) a concerted attack from the right which advocated a return to 'laissez-faire' free trade policies and a minimalist state. The right in the advanced capitalist countries used technological innovations and increased international trade to argue for greater trade liberalization at international level and a restructuring of the public sector at the 'national' level (Brodie, 1996, Cohen, 1991, 1997; McBride & Shields, 1993). The Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of the 150 top 'Canadian' corporations came together in the Business Council on National Issues (BCNI) to bring "structural adjustment to Canada" by first getting the state to adopt fiscal policies which escalated the debt crises, and subsequently using this crises to call for a dismantling of social programs (Ralph, 1996: 290).

Whereas the state had greatly undermined the basis of the welfare state 'by stealth'⁸⁹ in the 1980s by reducing funding for social programs, it was in the 1990s that the state launched a full restructuring of the welfare state (Brodie, 1995; Pulkingham & Ternowetsky, 1996; Battle & Torjman, 1996). The election of the liberal government in 1993 became a "watershed" which ended the post-war consensus shared by the major political parties who had all supported the necessity for the welfare state, "arguing only about how much welfare or how much government intervention in the economy was appropriate" (Brodie, 1995:12). The Social Security Review was launched in 1994 in the process of restructuring the welfare state.

Organizing the Social Security Review

The Social Security Review was organized through a number of texts produced by the state, chief among which was the document *Agenda: Jobs and Growth, Improving Social Security in Canada*, also known as the Green Paper.

⁸⁹ Ken Battle of the Caledon Institute is credited with coining this term.

Although the Green Paper was tabled in Parliament on October 5, 1994, the state had announced its intention to initiate a thorough restructuring of Social Security in the Speech from the Throne of January 18, 1994 (Jennissen, 1996; Pulkingham & Ternowetsky, 1996). With the launching of the SSR, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC) was mandated to organize public consultations to enable 'Canadians' to participate in defining specific policy recommendations. A Ministerial Task Force was also appointed to work with the Minister of HRDC (Jennissen, 1996; Pulkingham & Ternowetsky, 1996; Battle & Torjman, 1996).⁹⁰

After the tabling of the Green Paper, the Finance Minister presented the Economic Framework to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance on October, 1994. In this presentation, the Minister outlined the economic framework within which the restructuring was to be conducted. The texts, *A New Framework for Economic Policy* and *Creating a Healthy Fiscal Climate*, outlined this framework. Following the Finance Minister's presentation of these texts, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance organized pre-budget consultations across the country. Between October 1994 and January 1995, the state released eight supplementary papers to provide more information to 'Canadians' on the specific issues to be covered by the SSR.⁹¹ In addition, the state urged 'Canadians' to contact Members of Parliament with contributions and to participate in the public consultations and seminars. 'Canadians' were also urged to return workbooks distributed by HRDC to individuals for their input.

⁹⁰ Therese Jennissen (1996) has extensively documented all stages of the Social Security Review.

⁹¹ These Supplementary Papers were: *Persons With Disabilities: A Supplementary Paper* (Oct.94); *From Unemployment Insurance to Employment Insurance: A Supplementary Paper* (Oct.94); *Income Security for Children: A Supplementary Paper* (Oct.94); *Child Care and Development: A Supplementary Paper* (Oct.94); *Reforming the Canada Assistance Plan: A Supplementary Paper* (Dec.94); *Employment Development Services: A Supplementary Paper* (Dec.94); *The Context of Reform: A Supplementary Paper* (Dec.94); and *Federal Support to Post-Secondary Education: A Supplementary Paper* (Jan.95). See Jennissen, (1996).

A number of non-governmental organizations and associations also organized consultations with their constituencies. The National Action Committee on the Status of Women organized a Consultation of Women's organizations in Ottawa, meeting with the Members of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on HRDC and the Ministers of HRDC and Finance to present their recommendations. Over eighty women's organizations sent representatives to this Conference. Likewise, the Seventh Conference on Social Welfare Policy representing "academe, the public sector, First Nations, social workers, community groups and the voluntary sector" was organized as an "alternative venue to the "official" consultation process" (Pulkingham & Ternowetsky, 1996: 14). This Conference solicited proposals for policy reform options from participants to address existing inequalities in social programs. The organizers sought to feed these proposals into the Review process.⁹²

The main avenues for the state's consultations with 'Canadians' were to be the Parliamentary Standing Committees, which were to summarize and synthesize contributions into specific policy recommendations. This work of the Committees would be followed by "further public debate and negotiations with the provinces" and lead to the tabling of legislation for policy reforms (HRDC, GP, 1994: 82). The Social Security Review "constituted one of the most thorough and comprehensive Parliamentary reviews ever undertaken on Canadian social programs" (Pulkingham & Ternowetsky, 1996: 13). These public consultations resulted in soliciting approximately 1400 submissions from organizations and individuals; in 200 Members of Parliament organizing town hall meetings with their constituencies; and, in the return of 25,000 workbooks which had been distributed (Pulkingham & Ternowetsky, 1996: 3-4).

The SSR was organized into three major policy areas: Working, Learning and Security. The first, Working, referred to programs such as Unemployment Insurance, job training programs, employment services and

⁹² The presentations and proposal made during the Seventh Conference on Social Welfare Policy are published in Pulkingham & Ternowetsky (1996).

childcare. The second, Learning, referred to education programs such as the Canada Student Loans and transfers to provinces for education. And the third, Security, referred specifically to social assistance programs. The principles underlying the SSR as stated by the texts were: creating opportunity in a rapidly changing global economy; investing in people; building mutual responsibility; preventing future problems; putting people first; greater fairness; and affordability (HRDC, 1994a).

My examination of the Social Security Review will focus specifically on the conceptual framework which organizes the textual reality being produced. This conceptual framework sets the grounds for the construction of the world-in-common into which the state sought to incorporate *Canadians*. The construction of this world-in-common was from the state's perspective of ruling, and as such, it embedded the relations of ruling which would define the 'problems' to which the consultations were to help find solutions. In examining the texts, I focus on the taken-for-granted assumptions upon which the texts construct the 'nation' and the relations of 'citizens' to the state. I examine how the texts constructed the major 'problems' requiring the restructuring of social security, and the 'solutions' proposed by the state to these 'problems.' In my examination, I pay specific attention to the third policy area, Social Security, as this area is related most directly to my present study of citizenship and nation-building. Social security programs define the most basic entitlements to the welfare state and signify belonging to the social collective. These programs also represent the 'female' track of the welfare state's social programs and access to social assistance has been specifically denied to sponsored immigrant women by immigration policy. My focus on this particular area is to analyse the impact of the restructuring on the unequal access of sponsored immigrant women to social assistance entitlements. I approach the text's construction of the discussion on social security from the perspective of *immigrant* women and explore how the intersection of social policy with immigration policy which exists in reality is presented in the textual reality produced by the state. A number of theorists have written extensively about the SSR (Pulkingham & Ternowetsky, 1996), addressing its impact on class and gender relations (Battle & Torjman, 1996; Geller & Joel, 1996;

Jennissen. 1996; Pulkingham & Ternowetsky. 1996; Shillington. 1996; Vosko. 1996; Day & Brodsky. 1998; Scott. 1998). My contribution to this growing body of literature is to make race a central category of analysis. In incorporating analysis of the processes of racialization into my analysis, I demonstrate that the SSR texts of HRDC and the Economic Framework texts of the Finance Department reveal a unified racialized approach in the state's construction of the major 'problems' with social security, as well as in their construction of the relationship between the state, the nation and 'citizens.'

Reproducing the Nation

The textual reality produced in the SSR begins by defining social security as a distinctive 'national' value shared by the state and every 'Canadian':

Canada's social security system is a hallmark of our nation. Through it, we have defined ourselves as a country that aspires to give our children the best possible start in life, to enable all Canadians to meet their basic needs, and their families to live in dignity. It is a system dedicated to supporting the most vulnerable in our society, while creating opportunity for all Canadians to improve their lives. Social security embodies the values of justice, tolerance and compassion that mark our country. (HRDC, GP, 1994: 7)

The texts place this 'national' value at the very core of the identity of the state and of the 'Canadians-as-members-of-the-nation' who have built the welfare state jointly:

Undeniably, the "social safety net" we built over the past several decades helped make Canada one of the world's most successful countries, rich in prosperity and opportunity. Programs such as unemployment insurance, social assistance and social services, child benefits, universal pensions and a national network of widely accessible colleges and universities have made our nation a beacon of civilized values. Those values of compassion, ensuring the basic necessities of food and shelter for all, and sharing opportunity are at the heart of the social security system we've inherited. As we undertake the job of redesigning and modernizing it, we must preserve those values. (HRDC, GP, 1994: 9)

The state sets out to appeal to 'Canadians' as 'citizens' with social entitlements based on their shared national values, on their shared national inheritance.

In defining these values “civilized,” the text operates at a racialized level. It does so by appealing to a shared ‘national’ past which ‘we’ have built. This shared past is a past of colonial/racial domination. In defining the nation as “civilized,” the text defines as ‘uncivilized’ those societies which do not have a ‘welfare state’ form, the majority of which are third world and Aboriginal societies. The text here draws upon older colonial constructs of third world and Aboriginal peoples as ‘uncivilized.’

In constructing the social safety net as having been “built” by “us,” the text erases the colonization of Aboriginal peoples upon which the prosperity of ‘Canadians’ has been made possible. The role of the *Indian Act* in organizing the ‘social security’ of Aboriginal peoples through welfare-colonialism is made invisible. The reality that the ‘social security’ of the ‘nation’ is based upon the continuing colonization of Aboriginal peoples and a denial of their sovereignty is erased in the textual reality.

Likewise, the textual reality erases the global integration of the ‘national’ economy which has been the precondition for the very coming into being of the Canadian nation, and the very basis for the ‘national’ economy. The claim that ‘we,’ as ‘members-of-the-nation’ have built the welfare system denies the reality of the contributions of those who are ideologically constructed as outsiders to the nation, i.e. *immigrants*, to the welfare state. The claim that ‘we’ have built ‘our’ national welfare state denies the reality of the globally integrated economy under western hegemony, and naturalizes the notion that ‘our’ nation and its resources are a closed system.

While building the ‘unity’ of ‘Canadians’ and ‘our’ state, the textual reality places *immigrants* outside the nation in two ways: firstly, the use of the term “civilized” carries a historical meaning which racializes these ‘immigrants’ as not ‘civilized’ like ‘us,’ and; secondly, in referring to the programs which ‘we’ have built and are accessible to ‘us,’ the texts make no attempt to account for the unequal access of sponsored immigrant women to programs like social assistance, social housing and old age security.

The textual reality defines ‘Canadians’ as having collectively built this welfare system which equally benefits all of ‘us’ in ‘our’ society. In this way, the texts begin at a point which seeks to ‘nationalize’ ‘Canadians’ into the coming

restructuring of the welfare state by constructing this welfare state as the 'inheritance' of a 'national' shared past which needs restructuring for a shared, 'national' future. The text goes on to further integrate 'Canadians' into the 'national' project of restructuring by pointing to not only the national shared values, but also to the collective 'benefits' which all 'Canadians' share from 'our' national inheritance:

Canada's social security programs are envied throughout the world. They have helped make life better for generations of Canadians. (HRDC, 1994a: 5)

Our social programs have always been based on compassion, and caring for those in need. (HRDC, 1994a: 5)

In the text's construction of social security as a national benefit which provides "care" for "those in need," the reality that immigration policy regulates the access of 'future citizens' and 'immigrants' to the social security by distinguishing their conditions of entry is made invisible. The actuality that the access of all *Canadians* to social security programs has historically been organized through the nation-building immigration policies is erased. The textual reality breaks the link between immigration policy and social policy, and the role of immigration policy in placing 'immigrants' outside the nation is made invisible. The text also makes invisible the reality that the racialization of *Canadians* and *immigrants* has profound consequences for their 'social security.'

The texts construct an insider status for *Canadians-as-members-of-the-nation* by defining of 'our' social security programs as central to how 'we' define 'ourselves' as a 'nation.' The texts' treatment of social security programs as fulfilling 'our' basic needs defines those who do not have access to social security as not part of 'us.' 'We' *all* share these programs, the texts' state, and therefore, they construct those who do not share 'our' national institutions as not belonging to 'our' nation. 'They' are not the nation's concern, becomes the message of the texts which are defining the concerns of the nation. 'Their' lived experiences are not 'ours', and the texts' unspoken message becomes that the social security of Aboriginal peoples and *immigrants*

does not concern 'us.' 'Their' experiences are not linked to 'our' social security, and therefore, 'they' belong to 'other' policy areas.

Whereas Canadians are divided by the relations of race, class and gender, among others, in actuality, the textual reality being produced seeks to override these divisions through the ideological construction of the nation as a homogenous entity within which *Canadians* are appealed to on a racialized basis as having the same interest and an equal stake in the Review.

A number of theorists have argued that the SSR did not incorporate a gender sensitive analysis, it did not pay attention to gender inequalities (Day & Brodsky, 1998; Geller & Joel, 1996; Jennissen, 1996; Pulkingham & Ternowetsky, 1996; Scott, 1998; Vosko, 1996).

Data that point to the relative status of Canadian women in the workplace, the home, the family and the community are readily available and clearly indicate that, in general, the majority of women occupy a status subordinate to men. Moreover, there are data available that speak to the differential impact that various social policies have on women (including the impact on specific categories of women) in relation to men. The designers of the framework for the social security review, however, did not take this into account and instead focused on non-gendered categories such as "the family," "the household," and "the labour force" - terms which effectively obfuscate the unequal status of women relative to men in Canadian society. (Jennissen, 1996: 239)

Vosko draws attention to the gender specific consequences of social programs like unemployment insurance. She argues the changes proposed in the SSR would strengthen the creation of a two-tiered system which would privilege the access of "regular" full time workers while compounding the inequalities of "irregular" women workers who are disproportionately employed in "non-standard" work (1996). Geller & Joel argued that the restructuring of the welfare state represented a "war on equality" and was forcing women "to see ourselves, not as citizens, but as economic man" (1996: 303).

I believe it is safe to argue that the state is not unaware of the gender-specific consequences of its restructuring of social security programs. However, the state sought to transcend these gendered inequalities by appealing to a national/racial unity which is expressed in the discourse of the nation's 'unified' interest. It is from this racialized perspective that the textual

reality repeatedly defines all 'Canadians-as-members-of-the-nation.' It is from this perspective that the texts defined all *Canadians* as having made equal contributions to building the social security system, and as having an equal stake in its restructuring. The texts' erasure of the 'internal' divisions takes place within the context of its construction of a unified national interest.

Having defined the SSR as a national interest, the texts begin the process of nationalizing 'Canadians' into the restructuring by specifying who the state is committed to including in the Review, who it is the state wants to consult with. The inclusion of 'Canadians' as 'members-of-the-nation' is very clearly specified in the following way:

First, we must hold a vigorous debate around the nation. (HRDC, GP, 1994: 11)

The Minister very clearly states:

My commitment is to listen to and work with all Canadians, different governments, groups and organizations so that we can develop in partnership a social framework that makes sense, is effective and is founded on the basic Canadian values of compassion and justice. (HRDC, GP, 1994: 5)

By repeatedly identifying the 'Canadians' the state wants to 'listen' to as those who belong to nation, the texts reconstruct racialized definitions of the 'Canadians' who belong to the bicultural and bilingual nation. As many anti-racist theorists have demonstrated, and as I have discussed in previous chapters, references to the nation operate as a racial code which refers to 'white' members of the nation (Gilroy, 1991; Solomos & Back, 1996; Balibar, 1991). It is to these 'Canadians-as members-of-the-nation' that the state considers itself to be accountable:

While governments can and must provide leadership, they must answer to the people. All Canadians must share in finding the solutions we need to the problems of working, learning and security in the 1990s and beyond. This is an essential task to complete, if we are to preserve a social security system worthy of Canadians and equal to the times. (HRDC, GP, 1994: 11)

The textual reality constructs here a partnership between the state and its 'nation,' giving the state legitimacy as representing the 'nation' and as

accountable to 'Canadians-as-members-of-the-nation.' The textual reality establishes the relationship between the state and its nation as a cooperative one. Having constructed the nation as a homogenous community, the texts underscore that the state is equally concerned with, and accountable to, every member of this community. The state is concerned to hear from, and be accountable to, every *Canadian* becomes the message. The textual reality in this way produces a partnership between the state and *Canadians*, erasing the actuality that it is the state which has 'produced' and governed over the nation both materially and ideologically through a myriad of state policies. It erases the reality of the severe compromises the state has made to the 'prosperity' of 'Canadians' in its neo-conservative policies. Instead, the restructuring of social security is made into a joint project of the state and *Canadians*. The state will only act on the wishes of *Canadians*, to whom it is accountable to, is the position developed in the textual reality. This joint project of the state and its 'citizens' is developed further by the texts:

Overall, our social security system has been a success of pride in being Canadian. Together, Canadians have built and sustained a system that is envied in much of the world. It has helped make life better for generations of our citizens. Now it is our task to make sure that it continues to help our children as they grow, to protect those in need, and to offer hope and opportunity for the future. (HRDC, GP, 1994: 7)

The social security system is presented as a cooperative, joint nation-state project, it is presented as a commitment made by 'us' to ensure 'we' protect each other. The textual reality constructs this partnership as having been a very important one in the past which has made 'us' the "envy of the world," and as an important one for the future in which 'we' will continue to look out for each other. The textual reality being produced gives every *Canadian* a stake in the restructuring, a stake which 'our' state shares with 'us,' and which 'we' share with 'our' children.

Having constructed a 'national' line of descent between previous and future generations of the nation, the texts go on to stress the state's commitment to protecting the most vulnerable members of this nation:

Our social security system must protect those most in need - people who can't work. low-income families struggling to get by. people who face barriers due to disability or chronic illness, especially children. (HRDC, 1994a: 20)

While the textual reality urges a collective responsibility for the most vulnerable 'Canadians,' it assumes no such collective responsibility for 'immigrants.' As I will demonstrate in the following Chapter, *immigrants* who are unable to provide for themselves, who are in need and whose health needs require medical resources are constructed in the Immigration Policy Review only as a drain on the social security system and should be kept out of the country.

The texts reiterate the national values of "compassion" and "justice" even though neither the "compassion" nor the "justice" of the social security system extends to ending the colonization of Aboriginal peoples, or to ending the equal access of *immigrant* women to this social security system. Where the social security system is defined as "dedicated to supporting the most vulnerable in society" (HRDC, GP, 1994:7), the reality is that immigration policy increases the "vulnerability" of *immigrant* women by organizing unequal conditions for their immigration, and social policy upholds and perpetuates this "vulnerability." The textual reality therefore gives no authority to speak to *immigrant* women who experience this intersection of immigration and social policy in their lived experiences.

Both the SSR and the Economic Framework texts bring into currency the same racialized construct of the nation and of *Canadians*, and both likewise share the definition of the restructuring as a 'national' project. Echoing the SSR texts, the Economic Framework texts stress the partnership between the nation and its state: "a national dialogue lies ahead," the Economic Framework texts stress, reiterating the state's commitment to working with 'Canadians' by having "made a commitment to Canadians to permanently open up the budget process" (Finance, 1994c:1). As the Economic Framework texts put it:

There are times in the life of nations when extraordinary opportunities and challenges demand extraordinary responses. We are living in such a time. (Finance, 1994c: 5)

The restructuring presents "extraordinary opportunities," which can be realized through the nation-state partnership, the text promises. The public consultations represent the state's commitment, it is now up to 'Canadians' to engage in the process and live up to their side of the bargain. In this way, both sets of texts construct a textual reality which begins at the point of (re)defining the nation and proceed to integrate/nationalize 'Canadians-as-members-of-the-nation' in the state's project of restructuring the welfare state.

The textual reality produced by the SSR texts and the Economic Framework texts define the specific challenges and 'problems' facing the nation as those from Other nations and third world workers, from the deficit crises and the 'failures' of social programs. These 'problems' are presented as responsible for making the restructuring of social security programs necessary.

'Foreign' Threats to the Nation

The textual reality being produced constructs a significant 'threat' to the prosperity of *Canadians* coming from other 'nations' within the global system. These other nations are presented as vying for Canada's "place" in the global economy:

Our place in the world economy is being challenged. Around the globe, other nations are charging forward, helping well-educated, highly-skilled workers use new technologies. Rapid change means every Canadian must keep updating existing skills and acquiring new ones. (HRDC, 1994a: 17)

The 'problem' constructed is that other nations are making 'their' workers more educated and technologically advanced than 'Canadians.' Whereas this identification of other nations as threatening the Canadian nation appears to refer to every other nation in the world economy, the texts identify more specifically which 'nations' present the greatest threats to the prosperity of 'Canadians,' and to impress further upon 'Canadians' just how serious this 'threat' is, the Economic Framework texts state:

....literally billions of people in what we once called 'The Third World' are now joining the global economy, almost always on free market principles. (Finance, 1994c: 2)

Markets never sleep. There are no islands anymore. And like it or not, there is no place to hide; and information technology is 'unstoppable.' (Finance, 1994c:2/3)

The text specifically links other 'nations' who pose the most serious threat to the prosperity of 'Canadians' with 'billions' of "Third World" people. The significance of the above statement lies in not only pointing to the 'nations' of these 'billions' of "Third World" peoples as threatening the social security of 'Canadians' who have "no place to hide," but also in its treatment of these "Third World" peoples as only recently "joining the global economy." 'Other nations' of "Third World" people who are 'newcomers' to the global economy want 'our' position, is the specific 'problem' constructed here. Simultaneously, the textual reality naturalizes the national economy and the prosperity of 'Canadians' as being the result only of the 'internal' resources of the 'nation.' If these Third World nation are only now "joining" the global economy, how can 'we' have benefited from 'them'? The benefits derived by Canada's integration into the global economy in a position of privilege stemming from the period of British imperial supremacy becomes hidden. I have already critiqued this construction of the national economy as a closed entity in previous chapters. here I point out that the Social Security Review reproduces for the 21st century this ideological construction of the national economy as separate and apart from the global economy.

The textual reality identifies every *Canadian* as facing the threats from Other nations which are equipping their workers with education and technological skills. *Canadians* are reassured by the text's construction of the state as the defender of every *Canadian's* interest in restructuring the social security system to serve them better. In the references to Third World workers being educated by their nations, the textual reality speaks specifically to *Canadian* workers, presenting the state as the champion of *Canadian* workers whom it will help educate and re-skill. The nation must pull together with the state, the text urges, in order to successfully fight together these threats from outside.

In the statement "there is no place to hide," the texts sounds a warning to *Canadians*: if *Canadians* do not recommit themselves to their

membership in the nation, if they do not accept the prescriptions of the state, and its protection. *Canadians* stand alone in the face of literally “billions” of third world peoples. The textual reality completely reverses the reality that it is the majority of third world and Aboriginal peoples who have underwritten the ‘prosperity’ of the advanced capitalist countries within the global system, and who face increased threats from the trade liberalization and free trade policies aggressively pursued by the Canadian state at the international level. The textual reality reverses the actuality that as a member of the G7 countries, and of the OECD, it is the Canadian state which is able to affect the welfare of third world peoples. Instead, the textual reality constructs “billions” of third world peoples as having the power to impoverish *Canadians* and to harm their social security. The textual reality also makes the reproduction of the international relations of western hegemony a necessary condition for the prosperity of *Canadians* in the future. The ‘national’ interest is constructed as lying in the reproduction of the historical divide between advanced capitalist countries and the third world.

In dealing with this threat from Other nations, the texts urge *Canadians* to learn to deal with ‘them’ in a more effective manner:

Thus, as a new century beckons, we again must push our nation’s learning yardsticks further out - much further. In the balance is our ability to preserve our position as one of the world’s most prosperous societies. If our standard of living is to be secure, one of our urgent tasks must be to strengthen our learning and training system. As a trading nation, for example, Canadians will need to sharpen their language skills and knowledge of other cultures, in order to reach out successfully to our trading partners. Our collective mission must be to recapture the post-war expectation of expanding prosperity and opportunity for all, with each generation better off than the last. An indispensable ingredient is better learning. (HRDC, GP, 1994: 58)

The textual reality reinforces the common interests of *Canadians* as a “trading nation” and identifies a number of steps through which these interests can be furthered, chief among which are “sharpening” **our** “language skills and knowledge of other cultures.” The textual reality operates by placing those Canadian citizens who speak other languages and who have the lived experiences of other cultures outside the nation. Although these citizens,

ideologically constructed as *immigrants*, would have “sharp” language skills and cultural knowledge which are defined as necessary for *Canadian* prosperity, the textual reality erases their “sharp” skills by making invisible ‘their’ presence among ‘us.’ ‘We’ must learn more about ‘them’ is the message to *Canadians*. While the text urges *Canadians* ‘we’ must “sharpen” our knowledge of the languages and cultures of Other ‘nations,’ it makes no attempt to recognize the many *immigrants* who have these skills as a ‘national’ asset. As I will discuss in the following Chapter on the concurrent Immigration Policy Review, the state recommends that *immigrants* who have these skills, but do not speak the national languages, i.e., English and French, should be kept out of Canada. The textual reality defines language and cross-cultural skills as a valuable asset for *Canadians* to possess, so long as these Other languages and cultural skills remain *outside the nation, so long as they remain foreign*, and do not become part of what the text constructs as ‘us.’

In defining the ‘threat’ to the prosperity of *Canadians* from third world workers and ‘their’ nations, the texts propose as a solution to protecting the interests of *Canadians* a strengthening of the relationship between the state, the nation and the corporate sector:

In the past 15 years, mounting worldwide competition and technological change have hurt the big manufacturing plants and resources-based industries that for decades paid the high-wages that allowed many Canadians to enjoy prosperity. (HRDC, GP, 1994: 9)

Manufacturing and resource industries maintained the “prosperity” of *Canadians*, but can no longer do so because of “worldwide competitions and technological change,” the text points out. The textual reality names worldwide competition from Other nations as undermining industry’s commitment to the prosperity of *Canadians*. This directs attention away from state practices which have de-regulated and liberalized investment and trade policy. The textual reality also directs attention away from corporate practices of downsizing and shedding jobs even while making huge profits in a ‘jobless recovery.’ Instead, the textual reality constructs industries as also the ‘victims’ of the competition from Other nations and technological changes. It

presents these enterprises as having no responsibility in contributing to the erosion of the prosperity of *Canadians*. The textual reality equates the interests of *Canadian* industries and workers as being identical, and both as being equally under threat from Other nations.

Increasingly our competitors are not the enterprises and workers down the street or in the next province, or even across the border, but those across the ocean, in the Pacific Rim or Europe. (HRDC, GP, 1994: 10)

The text defines 'us' as the state, manufacturing and resource industries, and workers. It defines 'our' competitors as being all over the globe, threatening 'our' interests. The actuality that state practices are making easier the flow of capital and commodities across borders, in the Pacific Rim and Europe, is erased. Instead, the texts construct the state as the protector of 'our' national interests against these global competitors, and the solution requires a pulling together of nation and state as 'we' did in an earlier period:

This generation must use its ingenuity to rebuild our social programs for a new era, just as an earlier generation after the Second World War forged solutions to meet the social needs of the post-war world. (HRDC, GP, 1994: 9)

The text goes on:

Notwithstanding the fluctuations of the business cycle, in the long haul unskilled and labour-intensive manufacturing is declining here as Third World producers expand. (HRDC, GP, 1994: 15)

Third world 'producers' are defined as 'expanding,' and not the multinational corporations, not the *Canadian* corporations, which the Canadian state is in actuality helping to expand abroad through trade liberalization policies. Multinational corporations are increasing their activities in the third world, and in the process, exploiting third world workers of whom women are a growing number and are amongst the most exploited sectors of the global workforce (Mitter, 1986). The texts reverse the reality that these third world 'producers' are exploited by multinationals based mainly in the G7 countries, of which Canada is a member.

The changes sweeping through society are being driven by a fundamental re-shaping of the economy in Canada and around the world. At the root of this reshaping, technological innovation is transforming the way we work and do business. (HRDC. GP. 1994: 15)

The text here defines the reshaping of the economy as affecting all *Canadians* in how 'we' work and how 'we' do business. The actuality of class divisions between those who 'work' and those who 'do business' is erased by the texts, which imposes instead a textual reality that all 'Canadians' collectively "work" and "do business."

In defining the "work" and "business" of the nation as that of manufacturing and resource industries, the texts make invisible the unpaid labour of women, which is not included in 'our' 'work' or 'business.' The texts take for granted the gendered division of labour within society, and in this, integrate this gendered division of labour into the restructuring of social security.

The Deficit Crisis

The texts construct the deficit crisis as another significant 'problem' threatening the prosperity of the nation, a problem which requires nothing less than the restructuring of the entire social security system as 'solution':

As a nation we have overspent in recent decades, building up debt. (HRDC, 1994a: 6)

The textual reality constructs the deficit crises as a collective, 'national' problem, arguing that 'we' have all overspent, and 'we' are all therefore equally responsible. The texts direct attention away from the practices of the state which have resulted in the 'crisis' and hide the reality that the debt crisis has brought benefits to certain sectors of Canadian society in the form of a reduced tax burden for corporations and high interest payments on the debt to bondholders (Skillington, 1996; Ralph, 1996). Instead, the texts construct the deficit crises as a collective problem of the nation, which all *Canadians* are equally responsible for creating. 'We' have "overspent" and 'we' have created the debt becomes the starting point for the discussion of how to 'solve' this

problem. Having established this collective 'national' responsibility, the texts inform *Canadians* that the restructuring of the social security system has to result in the reduced social spending which the deficit crisis makes necessary:

Reform of social security cannot be contemplated in isolation from the fiscal realities facing governments in Canada. Until the fiscal situation of governments improves, there will be no new money for new programs, including social programs. And existing expenditures must be brought under control and in some cases reduced. (HRDC, GP, 1994: 23)

One of the biggest challenges we face today is the affordability of our programs. (HRDC, GP, 1994: 8)

Our challenge therefore is to bring our social programs into line with current realities, including fiscal realities. (HRDC, GP, 1994: 23)

The 'need' for the nation to reduce social spending is reiterated throughout the texts, and is presented as a given. On this point, the texts allow no room for discussion. Cutting costs is the bottom line, and policy changes are to be made in this context.

The Economic Framework texts go much further than the SSR texts in attributing responsibility to every *Canadian* for the deficit crises. These texts underscore the point several times: "The debt is money we owe" and "That is a burden we all bear" (Finance, 1994d: 4). "We have created the deficit and debt problem ourselves. The wound is self-inflicted. It must be healed"(Finance, 1994c: 9); "The debt is much more than an issue for bankers on Bay Street" (Finance, 1994c: 9). These texts calculate precisely how much responsibility each 'Canadian' has for the debt:

For three entire decades, after the Second World War, all we knew was high growth, high productivity, high income growth, and low unemployment. We had it easy for too long and we missed the signals that times were changing....

.....And as we were missing those signals, what did we do? We borrowed to paper over the problem - borrowing first from ourselves, then from foreigners - and always from the future. It is compelling to note that the last overall public sector surplus

recorded in Canada was two decades ago. From 1981 until this year - a mere thirteen years - federal and provincial government debt increased six-fold to almost \$700 billion - now more that \$24,000 for each and every Canadian. For two decades now, we have spent more than we saved. (Finance, 1994c: 3)

The textual reality holds every *Canadian* as being implicated in, and equally responsible for, the deficit crisis. Every *Canadian* has benefited and 'we' are all responsible, every one of 'us,' to the tune of \$24,000 each. The texts present this amount as fact. Further, the collective extravagance of *Canadians* is defined as now hindering the state's ability to ensure the future welfare of the *Canadians* who have "overspent":

It is an issue for unemployed Canadians when high interest rates keep the investment away that would mean new jobs. It is an issue for every Canadian when deficits and the debt prevent government from doing so many of the productive things a modern, caring and competitive society needs. And it is an issue when in building up a debt we are bankrupting our children.(Finance, 1994c: 9)

The nation is now paying the price for its past extravagance with higher unemployment and slow economic growth, the textual reality argues. Cutting social spending will benefit all 'Canadians' by creating more jobs and greater economic growth, the texts promise. The nation has overspent and the state seeks to bring it back on track, as the Finance Minister unequivocally states:

Let me be clear. What we seek is jobs and growth. To get there, we must stop the growth of the debt. Our ultimate goal is a balanced budget. (Finance, 1994d: 4)

The textual reality argues deficit reduction is a priority for the state only because it is committed to the prosperity of all 'Canadians' and wants only the creation of more jobs for 'Canadians.' Whereas arguably the deficit crisis was part of the ruling class strategy to create a low wage economy (NAPO, 1995), and that unfair taxation policies and high interest rates resulted in significantly reduced state revenues (Skillington, 1996), the texts reverse this reality and make every *Canadian* personally accountable for the deficit. In other words, the textual reality being produced shifts attention away from the state's policies which have resulted in the deficit crisis and the high debt load,

and seeks to harness the anxieties about high unemployment levels and to direct these anxieties against Other nations and 'foreigners' who are named by the texts as the only direct beneficiaries of the deficit crisis and debt burden of *Canadians*:

There aren't enough savings in Canada to satisfy all the borrowing needs of government, the private sector and Canadians. So we go abroad - becoming more and more in debt to foreigners. In fact, 5 per cent of our national income is draining abroad each and every year to pay interest on our borrowing. Our level of foreign debt as a country is also the highest in the G-7. Therefore, we are subject to every whim, every sentiment of international markets. And our economic sovereignty is at risk. (Finance, 1994d: 3)

The texts construct 'foreigners' as benefiting from the indebtedness of *Canadians*. These 'foreigners' threaten the continued existence of social security programs for the nation, they control international markets, and even threaten 'our' economic sovereignty. By virtue of controlling 'our' debt, "foreigners" control all of 'us,' the texts state. The state's policies which have allowed this 'foreign' debt ownership is shielded from scrutiny by the texts, as is the reality that the state has aggressively resisted the imposition of controls on international capital flows.

The textual reality also achieves a complete reversal of the actuality in Canada by defining 'our' economic sovereignty as being threatened. The actuality that 'our' economic sovereignty rests on the colonial subjugation of the "economic sovereignty" of Aboriginal peoples is made invisible. Instead, the texts construct a reality wherein 'our' 'economic sovereignty' is under threaten, not that 'we' are threatening the sovereignty of Aboriginal peoples.

While shielding the practices of corporations, international financial institutions, and indeed even of the Canadian state, the textual reality constructs the debt burden of *Canadians* as threatening the future of the entire nation:

It is simply unsustainable and must be addressed. Facing up to the debt challenge is the keystone of responsible economic policy. If we fail at that, we will fail at everything else. It is not a question of focusing on jobs or the debt. It is a question of focusing on both. The debt stands in the way of the growth we seek; in a very real way, it limits our economy's ability to create jobs. The fact is

that we will not get the quality of growth we need to generate the jobs we want until we gain control of the debt, until we have broken the back of the deficit. (Finance, 1994d: 2)

Having defined the debt crisis as a collective 'nation-state' responsibility, the texts then call for a collective response from *Canadians* and 'our' state to find the 'solution':

We must improve our skills. We must do better at innovation. We must provide a welcoming climate for investment. We must remove disincentives we have created for both business and individuals - disincentives that encourage dependence and stand in the way of opportunity. Finally, we must get our fiscal house in order. (Finance, 1994c: 5)

In proposing the pulling together of the nation and state, the textual reality accomplishes a complete denial of existing ruling relations: of the power of the ruling elite; of the ruling relations the state and *Canadians*; between employers and employees; between investment brokers and the unemployed; between men and women; between *Canadians* and Aboriginal peoples and *immigrants*; and between paid and unpaid labour. The relations of ruling which exist in actuality, which are embedded in, and further organized, through the textual reality being produced are made invisible on the surface of the texts. The ideological national community which the textual reality is producing is invoked repeatedly to build the state's relationship to *Canadians*.

Canadians want to work, and place a high value on the dignity, independence and self-respect that work brings. The federal government is committed to building an economy and a future where more jobs are available. Part of that commitment is ensuring that we invest in people, in order to reduce the skills deficit that limits opportunities for growth, and adds to this country's fiscal deficit. (HRDC, GP, 1994: 29)

A 'national' interest is created in the textual reality which defines as identical the interests of 'Canadians,' which also dovetail with those of the state. The restructuring of social security will meet those interests by creating work, "dignity", "self-respect," "independence" and prosperity for the nation. The reality that third world immigrants are actually de-skilled by non-accreditation is not allowed to enter the textual reality when the texts discuss 'our' problems.

The text also does not acknowledge the reality that having the 'right' skills does not necessarily lead to getting a job. The textual reality continues to the present the restructuring of social security as the only way to get *Canadians* 'working' :

The best form of social security comes from having a job. That's why the centre-piece of this reform must be helping people to prepare themselves for work in a changing world. How can we substantially improve Canada's investment in helping people get and keep jobs? (HRDC, GP, 1994: 29)

The texts present the state as concerned only with the interests of all *Canadians* during a period in which the state has aggressively pursued the interests of the ruling elite. The textual reality organizes the process of nationalizing *Canadians* into the restructuring of social security and the welfare state during a period in which the deficit crisis was being used to actually increase divisions within society. As Diana Ralph notes:

The deficit also was used to pit groups of working class people against one another: people with jobs versus those using U.I. "occasionally," versus "frequent" users, versus "welfare cheats"; poor children versus poor adults (including the parents of the children); working aged people versus seniors; Canadian citizens versus immigrants (and all visible minority people). (Ralph, 1996: 292)

While in actuality the divisions between Canadians were increasing as a result of the state's adoption of right-wing, neo-conservative policies of privatization of the public sector, the SSR sought to recreate a 'united' 'national' interest, and to construct a partnership between the state and its *Canadians* on the basis of a shared national interest in this restructuring. The textual reality countered the reality of state policies leading to increased divisions within the country by allowing the state to regain legitimacy as representing more than the interests of the ruling elite in these policies, which it had adopted with increasing vigour in the 1990s.

The 'Failures' of Social Programs

Although the texts define *Canadians* as responsible for the deficit crisis and the increased debt burden, the textual practices do so by constructing this fiscal crisis as a result of the generosity of 'Canadians' and 'their' state. Both nation and state were motivated only by "compassionate" "national values," the texts explain, and consequently their blame, if any, lies in this over-generosity in "caring" for each other. Furthermore, the texts argue that 'Canadians' and the state have been 'failed' by the very social programs which 'we' so generously funded. This over-generosity has now tied the hands of the state which can no longer continue spending on social security programs, the texts stress:

Today's social security system doesn't deliver enough of what Canadians need, and spends too much money in the wrong places. (HRDC, GP, 1994: 10)

As examples, the texts point to how social security programs do not serve 'Canadians' well:

Too many young people leave school unprepared for the world of work. Too many people on social assistance or in low-wage jobs can't afford - or are not allowed by the system - to upgrade their skills. (HRDC, GP, 1994: 22)

...more Canadians who lose their jobs find it hard to get new ones, because their skills are not up-to-date. (HRDC, 1994a: 8)

Specific attention is directed to the role of social assistance in 'failing' Canadians:

Many people spend years on social assistance - even though, with the right kind of employment and training support, they could find work. One problem is, CAP rules prevent the use of federal funding to provide the support they need. As a result, the system doesn't help people prepare for work. In many cases, it does just the opposite. (HRDC, 1994a: 20)

The texts define the Canada Assistance Plan, which was designed by the state in an earlier period to provide social assistance, as having failed 'Canadians' by *causing* unemployment and dependency:

Many Canadians rely on social assistance during temporary misfortune, and for them the system works the way it should. But too many recipients spend many years on social assistance even though, with the right sort of employment and training support, they could successfully make the transition from welfare to work, from dependency to self-sufficiency. (HRDC, GP, 1994: 72)

The social security system seems to keep people on a treadmill, instead of helping to solve their problems. People who want to get off welfare and provide better lives for their children often find the rules stacked against them. We need a system that works for people- a system that supports their efforts to regain self-sufficiency, and works better at reducing child poverty. (HRDC, 1994a: 8)

The social assistance programs funded under CAP are part of the 'female' social assistance track of social programs in the welfare state. As I have discussed earlier, claims to these programs are disproportionately made by women.⁹³ The texts construct these social assistance programs as another significant 'problem' which traps *Canadians* into dependency and takes away the incentive to work.

While the texts construct "dependency" on social security programs as a 'problem,' they are careful not to define *Canadians* as the problem. The work ethic is presented as a 'national' value, which social programs erode by creating 'dependency.' *Canadians* are constructed as all 'wanting' to work, and it is the 'failures' of social programs which are alleged to hold them back. Throughout the texts, *Canadians* are presented as victims of these programs, as is the state. If *Canadians* are 'blamed' for anything in the texts, it is for being overgenerous. As I demonstrate in the following Chapter, the treatment of *Canadians* in the SSR is significantly at odds with the treatment of

⁹³ In 1994, women represented 54% of adult social assistance recipients (Scott, 1998:5).

immigrants in the Immigration Policy Review which constructs *immigrants* as responsible for taking advantage of the generosity of *Canadians* by overburdening and abusing social security programs. Whereas the Immigration Policy Review blames *immigrants* for the crisis in social services, the Social Security Review faults *Canadians* only for their excessive generosity.

The texts are careful to emphasize that even when 'Canadians' claim social assistance, they are not personally at fault:

In recent years, increasing numbers of Canadians who cannot find jobs have turned to social assistance.(HRDC, GP, 1994: 19)⁹⁴

Yet don't we as a society have a stake in doing more, in helping people who suddenly find their job skills inadequate and out-of-date to retool themselves for the good jobs in today's economy? (HRDC, GP, 1994: 8)

The SSR texts acknowledge that *Canadians* claim social assistance because they cannot find employment, and need access to training. The texts continuously reinforce the point that *Canadians* are pushed onto social assistance by circumstances which are beyond their control. Unemployed *Canadians* are defined as "the victims of structural unemployment" (HRDC, GP, 1994: 17) and as suffering from a "skills deficit" (HRDC, GP, 1994: 10). Repeatedly, the texts point out that *Canadians* are not to blame, structural unemployment, skills deficit and over-generous social programs are to blame. The Economic Framework texts go further than the SSR texts in pointing out how social programs have become "dead ends of dependence rather than roads to recovery" for *Canadians* (Finance, 1994c: 4). While this dependency is treated as a problem, the dependency is not constructed as something inherent in *Canadians*. It is defined as a failing of social programs, and not of individual members of the nation, and it is used in the textual reality to undercut support for existing social programs.

⁹⁴ The SSR texts note that social assistance claimants doubled from 1982 to 1993 to 3 million people (HRDC, 1994a: 20).

As I will demonstrate in the next Chapter, *immigrants* are extended no such acknowledgment by the state. The Immigration Policy Review texts define social assistance claims made by *immigrants* as proof of their inherent unworthiness to be allowed entry into the country and to become 'citizens.' In contrast, the SSR texts point to the 'failures' of social security programs: no group of *Canadians* is 'blamed' in these texts which very carefully construct the partnership between the state and its nation, defining *Canadians* as deserving citizens. The Immigration Policy Review defines as undeserving all *immigrants* who make claims on social security programs. The nationalization of *Canadians* being organized in the SSR can be effective only through the successful construction of the partnership between 'Canadians-as-members-of-the-nation' and the state. This explains the reluctance of the SSR to 'blame' *Canadian*' whereas the Immigration Policy misses no opportunity to 'blame' *immigrants* for overburdening social security programs as **a personal failing**.

Having defined the 'problem' as social programs which have 'failed' by preventing job creation and economic growth, the 'solution' proposed by the texts is to restructure social security programs in order to save the nation from its own virtue of generosity. The SSR texts point to CAP as particularly 'problematic':

CAP is geared primarily to alleviating the crises - helping people after the fact, or on the verge of a serious problem - not stepping in to remove the cause of a potential problem. As a result, few provincial initiatives to offer innovative programs geared to prevention for disadvantaged families, from self-help or parenting supports, to parent pre-school resource centres and enriched pre-school programs, are being cost-shared under CAP. (HRDC, GP, 1994: 73)

One problem is that CAP's restrictive provisions prevent federal funding from being used to support innovative provincial measures aimed at helping people make the transition from welfare to greater self-reliance. (HRDC, GP, 1994: 72)

CAP is presented as tying the hands of both federal and provincial governments who want to do more to support social assistance recipients. The actuality that CAP entrenched federal standards for social assistance provision which required provincial governments to provide this assistance to 'citizens' across

the country is made invisible in the textual reality being produced. The rights of recipients legislated by CAP were likewise made invisible in the textual reality. These rights included the right to an adequate amount of income assistance when in need; the right to appeal the decision if denied social assistance; the right not to be forced onto workfare as a condition of receiving assistance; and the prohibition of residency requirements (NAPO, 1995). As I have already discussed, immigration regulations prohibit sponsored immigrants from accessing these programs for up to ten years. Instead of proposing the strengthening of federal standards to make the social security system more fair and equitable - by including sponsored immigrants, for example - the texts define as a 'problem' the federal standards legislated by CAP, and call for its abolishment in order to save *Canadians* from the "welfare trap" (HRDC, 1994a: 20).

The proposal to abolish the CAP is made by arguing that this will increase the "flexibility" of provincial governments to meet the needs of claimants. The specific 'solution' proposed is to replace CAP with a federal block fund to the provinces which would increase flexibility because it would not be bound by the standards contained in CAP. This change would also end the cost-sharing agreement between the federal and provincial levels of government for social assistance programs, the consequences of which are not addressed. In the name of increasing provincial 'flexibility', the texts propose the ending of federal standards for social assistance programs. While the texts construct this as an option which will increase the 'flexibility' of provincial governments, the question at stake is not simply one of increased 'flexibility' but of a fundamental shift in the responsibility for social assistance provision away from the federal government to the provincial level.

Participatory Citizenry, Responsive State

The SSR texts call on *Canadians* to make sure 'their' state lives up to its responsibility to protect the nation because "governments have lost a clear sense of economic leadership - a vision of what their role must be in the modern economy - and where they should leave action to others" (Finance, 1994c: 4). In cutting social spending, the texts state, the state is actually

taking a lesson from *Canadians*: "Canadians live within their means. Government should live within its means too" (Finance, 1994d: 7). In urging *Canadians* to ensure 'their' state acts, the texts reiterate the state's commitment to hearing from its participatory citizenship: "Government by necessity has the final word. We think it is important to give Canadians the first say" (HRDC, 1994d: 7).

Both the SSR texts and the Economic Framework texts construct the state as a benevolent patriarch, concerned only with the prosperity of the nation, even if *Canadians* do not recognize the necessity for a fundamental restructuring of the social security system. Whereas the SSR texts seek to appeal to *Canadians* by convincing them of the necessity for the restructuring, the Economic Framework texts demonstrate a sterner face of the state as benevolent patriarch who is forced to save *Canadians* from themselves. In the interests of the future prosperity and social security of the nation, these texts define as the responsibility of the state to act to save *Canadians* from themselves:

Most of us did not choose to enter public life because of a burning desire to dismantle government programs. We came into government to help build a better Canada - a Canada of jobs and growth. That is our only goal. And it is because of that - not in spite of that - that we must act decisively on the debt challenge today. (HRDC, 1994d: 12)

For those *Canadians* who opposed the spending cuts implemented by the state, the Finance Minister had a specific message for the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance for dealing with them:

And if people come before you and say that now is not the time to cut, ask them to describe the morality and the justice of letting the debt continue to run wild, unchecked, ruining the future of our children. (HRDC, 1994d: 11)

Although the state was committed to working with *Canadians* the texts state, it was also prepared to take the tough action necessary on behalf of the nation. The texts construct the national interest as an objective, collective interest, against which the individual, subjective opposition of *Canadians* who did not

support the restructuring is made to appear as immoral and irresponsible. Many Canadians did in fact oppose the restructuring of social security programs but the textual reality produced in the SSR allowed them no space from within the SSR to voice their opposition by challenging the textual reality being constructed. Instead, these people who opposed the restructuring were forced to organize demonstrations and even disruptions of the public consultations to demonstrate their opposition. However, these demonstrations remained 'outside' the SSR process, they were not allowed into the space carefully being created within the SSR to nationalize *Canadians* into a partnership with 'their' state.

Making Immigrant Women Invisible

The only reference made by the SSR texts to *immigrants* is in pointing out how the non-accreditation of the education and skills of immigrants result in a loss to the national economy. A specific recommendation is made to remedy this situation:

Immigrants to Canada face special barriers to the portability of learning credentials. At present, immigrants face serious complications in seeking to establish their learning status in Canada. Some provinces have taken steps to help individuals gain recognition of foreign credentials. The federal government is interested in working with the provinces, employers and unions, and voluntary groups to develop a Canada-wide system of credits recognition to assist immigrants to find and keep meaningful employment, commensurate with their skills and knowledge. (HRDC, GP, 1994: 67)

This single reference to immigrants is made in the context where Canada's immigration policy has been shifting to increase the recruitment of highly skilled and professional immigrants. Canada is competing for these immigrants with the other countries like the United States, Australia, and European countries. The concurrent Immigration Policy Review texts warn that accreditation is a significant factor in keeping highly skilled independent immigrants, and their partners, from choosing to immigrate to Canada. The IPR texts argue that accreditation of their qualifications would give Canada an advantage in attracting highly qualified immigrants from third world countries.

Although *immigrant* communities in Canada have lobbied the state for decades to ensure the accreditation of their education and skills, the SSR texts and the IPR texts make this recommendation with a view towards attracting future professional immigrants.

While accreditation would undoubtedly bring about a significant change in the racialized deskilling of the labour of *immigrants*, the state's concern is clearly related to future immigration. The other ways in which the labour of immigrants is devalued and 'cheapened' by the conditions of their entry, as in the case of sponsored immigrants who are officially not recognized as 'workers,' and domestic workers and temporary migrant workers who are given temporary immigration status, will not be addressed by accreditation alone. Therefore, accreditation will disproportionately favour highly skilled and professional immigrants, while continuing the processes of devaluing the labour of the family category, of whom the majority are women.

The silence in the SSR and Economic Framework texts regarding the relation between immigration policy and social policy in organizing membership in the nation, and in defining access to citizenship and social entitlements, means that the racialization which underpins these policies is not a 'problem' the restructuring seeks to 'solve' in the near future, so far as the state is concerned. The non-membership of *immigrant* women in the nation is not even merited a mention in these texts. The unequal access to social security programs of sponsored immigrants, their sponsors, domestic workers and migrant workers is not identified as a 'problem' which should concern the nation. Nor is the racism of state practices which ideologically construct as *immigrant* women all women of colour, even when they are legally citizens, presented as a 'problem.' The aim of the SSR is stated as being the restructuring of social security policy for the 21st century on the principles of fairness and justice. However, these principles are not applied to allow *immigrant* women to enter into the textual reality.

The role of *immigrant* women in the building of the social security system by contributing to the 'national' economy and to 'national' revenues through taxation is erased in the textual reality. Quite simple, 'they' lie outside the borders of 'our' nation and the textual reality gives no stake to 'them' in the

restructuring of 'our' social security system. The racialized construction of *Canadians-as-members-of-the-nation* simultaneously places *immigrant* women outside the national agenda for social security reform. The separation between the SSR and the IPR further reinforces the ideological distance between *Canadians-as-members-of-the-nation* and *immigrant* women: the SSR is presented as dealing with 'our' issues and the IPR as dealing with 'their' issues.

Conclusion

The textual reality produced in the SSR and Economic Framework texts analyzed in this Chapter reproduces ideological definitions of the nation and *Canadians* in racialized terms. It also constructs a 'national' interest, and presents the future prosperity of every *Canadian* as depending upon the restructuring of the social security system. This textual reality constructs *Canadians* and 'their' state as 'victims' of Other 'nations' and third world workers, of the deficit crisis and of the 'failures' of social programs. Likewise, the textual reality constructs a seamless unity of interests between *Canadians*, 'their' state and 'their' industry.

The textual reality constructs the state as a benevolent, but stern, patriarch, looking after interests of the nation, even when individual *Canadians* are reluctant to support the tough choices necessary. The textual reality organizes a world-in-common through which the state sought to build a 'national' consensus for the policy choices which were to follow. *Canadians-as-members-of-the-nation* were invited to enter this textual reality through the SSR, and to come to own the 'problems' constructed by the state as their 'problems.'

In constructing the restructuring of social security as a national interest, the state sought to 'nationalize' *Canadians* into supporting this restructuring on the basis that it would benefit the nation, and its prosperity.

for the 21st century. The texts continued to affirm the state's commitment to the well-being of 'its' nation, seeking to gain legitimacy for the state as representing, and defending, the interests of the nation. The textual practices producing the textual reality did not allow the actuality of the ongoing colonization of Aboriginal peoples - which is the basis for the historical and contemporary 'national prosperity' - to enter this reality. Nor did the texts allow the reality of the intersection of immigration policy and social policy in regulating access to citizenship to enter the textual reality. As such, the texts incorporated the underlying social relations into the textual reality, and simultaneously hid them from visibility by reproducing an ideological, unified 'national' interest. This ideological construction of the national interest by the state was made actionable, and thus imposed upon actuality, in the policy changes enacted subsequently.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE IMMIGRATION POLICY REVIEW

Introduction

In the previous Chapter, I examined the Social Security Review (SSR) organized by the Canadian state in 1994. I argued the SSR sought the nationalization of *Canadians* into the state's restructuring of social security programs. In this Chapter, I examine the concurrent Immigration Policy Review (IPR) organized by the state which resulted in the tabling of a Strategic Plan for immigration into the 21st century. In Chapter Nine, I will discuss the specific policy changes enacted as a result of both the Social Security Review and Immigration Policy Review.

In my examination of the IPR I begin by analyzing the consultation document's organization of the conceptual framework for the public consultations. Ten issues were identified for discussion. While the public consultations appeared to be a democratic process where *Canadians* were urged to raise their 'concerns,' the prior identification of these ten issues for discussion meant the state constructed the specific 'problems' which the nation should be concerned about. The framing of these issues, and the specific questions produced for public discussion, shaped the subsequent responses and policy changes recommended as 'solutions' to these 'problems.'

The contributions made in the public consultations on each of the ten issues for discussion were selectively recorded in the Interim and Final Reports. The reports than end by identifying "key messages" that the state "heard." These "messages" I group under the following four major themes which emerge as future concerns for the immigration program: preservation of the 'national' vision, character and values; the impact of the 'quality' of *immigrants* on the nation; the appropriate balance between the independent and family categories and the need to reduce costs; and, the 'threats' to the security of *Canadians* and national institutions by immigration.

The first theme, the Vision for Canada, defines the 'national'

character in direct relation to *immigrants* and calls for its preservation to be a key goal of future immigration policy. The textual reality constructs *immigrants* as a threat to this national character and national values by bringing *their* cultural and social diversity into the country. This diversity is constructed not only as being the opposite of *Canadian* values, but also as threatening to erode the cohesiveness of the nation. The textual reality being produced reconstructs racialized definitions of *immigrants* as those who are culturally and socially diverse from *Canadians*, preserving the racialized distinguishing of immigrants into *future citizens* and *immigrants*. As a result of this racialization, people of colour become defined as *immigrants*, as outsiders to the nation, regardless of their actual legal status primarily on the basis of their cultural, linguistic and social 'diversity.'

The second theme deals with the impact of immigration on the nation and constructs *immigrants* in general, and *immigrant* women in particular, as threatening to overwhelm the nation's resources through overpopulation. The textual reality draws on the racialized/gendered construction of third world women and argues they threaten the nation both by their own numbers, and by their allegedly boundless fecundity. The first theme racialized the 'quality' of immigrants, and this second theme specifically genders the 'problem' of quality by constructing *immigrant* women as threatening to erode the nation culturally and socially, as well as with their fertility.

The third theme relates to the appropriate balance between the independent and family categories. The textual reality being produced defines the independent category as the one making 'economic' contributions. Therefore, the family category is made responsible for the 'costs' of immigration which have created a 'crisis' in the social security system by over burdening it. The texts construct the independent category as allowing the immigration of self-reliant immigrants, stressing their economic contributions to the nation. This category becomes constructed as one of *future citizens*: it is not associated with social, cultural and linguistic diversity, nor is it associated with any costs to the nation. Therefore, the ideological practices of the state construct this category by racializing/nationalizing it, and by masculinizing it, underscoring its compatibility with the national interest. Simultaneously, the textual reality

constructs *immigrant* women and the family category as responsible for 'lowering' the 'quality' of immigrants. It is *immigrant* women who become constructed as the biggest 'problem' for 'management' by the state.

The fourth theme identifies the 'threats' to *Canadians* and national institutions by *immigrants* who become defined as engaged in widespread criminal activities and abuse of social services. Every *Canadian*, as honest and hardworking taxpayer, becomes defined as being taken advantage of by *immigrants*.

Throughout these four themes, the construction of *immigrant* women as presenting various forms of 'threats' to the nation, to citizens and to the state remains constant. As does the construction of the state as the defender of the interests of citizens against *immigrants* in general, and *immigrant* women in particular. The textual reality presents the state as an entity committed only to 'protecting' the nation, and the public consultations become defined as demonstrating this commitment to the state's partnership with an active 'citizenry' to resolve their 'problems.'

In defining a national vision and a national character, the state sought through the public consultations to nationalize *Canadians* into the restructuring of the immigration program. The textual reality shifts attention away from the state's overt adoption of the ruling elite's neo-conservative policies by blaming *immigrants* for the economic and social conditions problems of the nation. The IPR enabled the state to present itself as the protector of the nation by constructing *immigrants* as the 'problem-in-common' for the state and *Canadians*. The ideological construction of *immigrant* women as a problem-in-common shapes the political climate for a closing of the ranks against them by *Canadians* and 'their' state in the subsequent recommendations to severely limit the entry of *immigrant* women into the country. The textual reality legitimizes the subsequent policy changes as being what *Canadians* have recommended and support. Reducing the access of third world women to formal citizenship in Canada, as well as increasing the surveillance of the access of all *immigrant* women to social security programs

was made not only feasible, but absolutely necessary, by the textual reality in order to protect *Canadians* and 'their' national institutions.

Context of the Immigration Policy Review

The source countries for immigration into Canada had changed dramatically by the 1990s: Hong Kong, India, Philippines, China and Sri Lanka emerged as the top five source countries, with two thirds of all immigrants coming from these countries (Hawkins, 1989; Jakubowski, 1997). In 1993, 51.08% of all immigrants came from Asia and the Pacific, 14.31% came from Africa and the middle East, 13.28% came from South and Central America. Only 3.14% came from the United States and 18.19% from Europe (CIC, 1994a: 5). The domination of European immigration, which had begun to decline in the 1970s, was well and truly over by the 1990s. International migration was increasing globally, and the majority of this migration was from third world countries into the advanced capitalist countries (CIC, 1994a; Jakubowski, 1997; SOPEMI, 1995).

Another significant development in Canadian immigration policy since the 1970s was the expansion of the temporary non-immigrant program, the Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Program. The expansion of this particular program resulted in more workers entering the country as temporary workers, and not as landed immigrants (Sharma, 1997; Singh Bolaria, 1992).⁹⁵ In 1992 a total of 230,000 temporary employment visas were issued (SOPEMI, 1994:75). The OECD's Annual Report for the year 1994 notes this increasing

⁹⁵ Singh Bolaria has concluded that the Temporary Employment Visas are issued to both professional workers and low-paid workers. He defines entrepreneurs, managerial, professional and technical personnel as the professional category and seasonal farm workers, domestic and textile workers as part of the low-paid workforce. While professional workers accounted for over half of these temporary workers in 1980 at 57.78%, this ratio declined by 1988 so that professional workers accounted for only 35.47% of temporary workers (Singh Bolaria, 1992: 217-218). Sharma demonstrates that while temporary workers represented 43% of all workers entering the country in 1973, they accounted for 70% of all workers entering the country by 1993. This definition of 'workers' includes all landed immigrants who indicate they are going to join the labourforce, irrespective of the category under which they enter the country and temporary workers (Sharma, 1995: 54).

“preference” for temporary migration in its member states (SOPEMI, 1994: 13).

In her study of immigration policy, Hawkins (1988) identified a number of issues as being of major concern to the Immigration Department for the future. Among these concerns were: managing the program effectively to stop its “exploitation” by “criminal” and “irresponsible elements”; controlling illegal immigrants “without harassing them in a manner unacceptable to the public”; and ensuring harmonious “race relations” (Hawkins, 1989). These ‘problems’ have become a major concern for the Canadian state as immigration from the third world has outpaced that from European source countries.

The *Immigration Act 1976-77* remained in effect into the 1990s, and was amended by *Bill C-86* in 1992. This *Bill* was introduced by the state to “support family reunification”; improve immigrant selection to better meet labourforce needs; to prevent “abuse” of the immigration program; and to streamline the refugee program (Jakubowski, 1997). *Bill C-86* has been examined by Lisa Jakubowski, who argues that, “...an economic argument formed the foundation upon which *Bill C-86* was built and sold to Canadians. The immigrant was socially constructed to be one who was abusive to, and a burden on, Canada and its resources”(1997: 64). Having constructed the immigrant as a burden on social services, Jakubowski argues the state used this “economic” argument to justify restrictive measures. In the political climate of the 1990s with Canadians feeling “vulnerable economically,” the *Bill* argued that more effective “management” of immigrants was necessary. Its introduction made it easier for more independent category immigrants to be admitted into the country, as well as allowing the state to impose conditions regarding which particular regions of the country these immigrants could reside in. Jakubowski’s study points to an increasingly restrictive approach taken towards the family category by the state. She argues that the family category dropped from representing 49.6% of immigrants in 1984 to 40% in 1992 (78). *Bill C-86* adopted the nuclear family as the norm for the family category, and it increased the state’s power to reduce the immigration of extended family members. Jakubowski also examines public opinion polls, which she argues reflect an increasing tendency to equate immigrants with abuse of the welfare system. It was within this context that the extensive

cross country public consultations on the Review of Immigration Policy were organized by the state to result in a major restructuring of the immigration program for the 21st Century.

Launching the Public Consultation

Immigration is about deciding who we are as a nation and who we want to become in the 21st century. We need a clear and practical vision of the kind of nation we want to build. And Canadians need to help shape that vision. It is important - now, more than ever - for all Canadians to engage in an open, honest discussion about immigration and our future. (CIC, 1994o: 1)

In February, 1994, then Immigration Minister Sergio Marchi launched cross-country public consultation. Whereas the state organized annual consultations on immigration since the 1970s,⁹⁶ the 1994 consultation was unlike these in two significant ways. First, the mandate of the 1994 Consultation was to develop a strategy for immigration policy for the 21st century. Also, as the Department of Immigration and Citizenship stated, the 1994 public Consultation was intended to reach out to as many *Canadians* as possible. This Consultation was intended by the state to be the most intensive since the *Green Paper on Canadian Immigration and Population Study* of 1975 which had resulted in the *Immigration Act of 1976-77*. The intensive Review was stated as having become necessary as a result of changing global conditions which presented “challenges” to the “effective management” of the immigration program:

⁹⁶ The Immigration Act 1976-77 requires the following: “The Minister, after consultation with the provinces concerning regional demographic needs and labour market considerations and after consultation with such other persons, organizations and institutions as he deems appropriate, shall cause to be laid before Parliament, not later than the sixtieth day before the commencement of each calendar year or, if Parliament is not then sitting, not later than the fifteenth day next thereafter that either House of Parliament is sitting, a report specifying the number of immigrants that the Government of Canada deems it appropriate to admit during any specified period of time; and the manner in which demographic considerations have been taken into account in determining that number (The Immigration Act 1976-77, c. 52, s.7). This report is presented every year, and is known as the Annual Plan.

As the world changes in very significant and complex ways, the challenges facing the effective management of Canada's immigration program are considerable. Thus, it was recognized that the effective management of the immigration program can only be achieved within the context of a long-term purpose and strategy. It was also recognized that there is tremendous public interest in immigration issues, and that Canadians need and want to participate in making the choices and decisions that impact their communities and their country. (CIC, 1994o: 1)

The objectives outlined for the Consultation were twofold: first, "to engage Canadians in an informed, constructive and positive discussion" on the subject, and; second, to engage a "broader spectrum" of *Canadians* in the process, not just the "traditional stakeholders" (CIC, 1994q: 1-2).

The Minister's repeatedly stated commitment to "include" *Canadians* in "making choices and decisions that impact their communities and their country" notwithstanding, the consultation process began with a private meeting in Montebello of a group of thirty individuals in March, 1994. This meeting was organized by the Public Policy Forum, drawing participants from the three levels of government,⁹⁷ from "international and social organizations, business, labour, academic institutions, and media representatives," and "public safety and service agencies" (CIC, 1994o: 2). Organizations representing *immigrants* and *immigrant* women are not recorded as having participated in this meeting. The ten key issues for discussion in the public consultations were decided upon at this meeting, as were the "elements of an approach to consultation which would lead to the most productive discussion of these issues" (CIC, 1994q: 2). In other words, the issues which were to be discussed in the public consultations, as well as how these issues were to be framed, were decided upon by these thirty participants.

Once the ten issues were defined, ten Working Groups of between ten to twenty 'experts' were appointed. The Working Groups were assigned one issue each to examine in consultation with their colleagues and other associations. They were to submit a report with specific policy

⁹⁷ The Minister and senior bureaucrats from the Department of Citizenship and Immigration were present at this meeting.

recommendations. The groups were assigned issues #2 to #9. Issue # 6 was assigned to two Groups: Working Group #6A was to address the integration of immigration policy with labour market policies; and Working Group # 6B was to address the integration of immigration policies with other public policies such as housing, policing, health, education and municipal affairs. The Working Groups were to each decide upon their structure and process, meeting between two to three times over a period of six weeks. In addition to submitting the written report, the co-convenors of the Groups met with the Minister to make their respective recommendations in person. Issue #1, which was to address 'A Vision of Canada,' was assigned to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration. A National Consultation on Family Class Immigration was also convened to deal specifically with this category.

In addition to the Working Groups, Federal immigration officials organized consultations with provincial governments during May, 1994. Deputy Ministers at the federal/provincial/territorial levels of government met to make their recommendations in July and October, 1994. *Canadians* were invited to participate in public meetings, as well as in direct written submissions to the Consultations Task Force. A kit was made available which included basic information on the immigration program, the ten issues for discussion, an organizer's guide to hosting meetings, a Tabloid version of the discussion document, and a reporting form. 13,000 kits were distributed in total, as were another 130,000 copies of the Tabloid. Seven "town hall type" public meetings⁹⁸ were co-hosted by organizations specifically solicited by the department, with over 1,600 participants in total. The Minister was present at four of these meetings and his Parliamentary secretary participated in the other three. Many Members of Parliament organized public meetings in their ridings.

A non-profit organization, the Democracy Education Network

⁹⁸ The public meetings were organized in Montreal, Halifax, Toronto, Vancouver, Winnipeg, Edmonton and Hamilton between June and August, 1994, and over 1600 individuals participated in these.

organized sixty study circles in six cities, with over 1,100 participants. School boards across the country were also asked to engage students in the discussion. The Minister met with several organizations such as the Canadian Council of Refugees, the Canadian Ethnocultural Council, the Canadian Bar Association and the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, among others. The Minister also participated in open-line talk shows on radio and television stations across the country, and met with editorial boards of daily newspapers in the communities he visited.

The staff of Citizenship and Immigration, both in Canada and at overseas posts, were asked to participate, and a series of focus groups were also organized by *Insight Research Canada*. Finally, a two-day National Conference was organized at the Government Conference Centre in Ottawa, with over two hundred participants. In total, over 10,000 people are estimated by the Department as having directly participated in the consultations between February and September, 1994.

The Conceptual Framework for the Consultations

In this section, I analyze the conceptual framework established for the public consultations by examining the texts which produced by the state which outline the issues for discussion in the Review. In my analysis of the conceptual framework, I refer primarily to the document, *Canada and Immigration: Facts and Issues*, as this text identifies the ten issues for discussion and provides background information for each. Organized in the form of a popular tabloid, this document was the most widely circulated text for the public consultations. A full list of all the texts I examine in this Chapter has been provided in Chapter One.

The first issue identified for discussion seeks to develop a "Vision of Canada," asking questions on the impact of immigration on the population, on 'cultural' diversity, and on the economy. The background information states:

In 1991, the Economic Council of Canada found that immigration has a small but positive impact on our economy. (CIC, 1994b: 3)

This is an extraordinary starting point for a discussion on immigration policy in a settler colony which has been established and populated by immigrants. The statement makes sense only if the reader accepts that 'recent' immigration of predominantly third world peoples has no connection to the pre-1970s immigration, which was predominantly that of European immigrants. This particular reading of Canadian history, and the defining of immigration as making a "small but positive impact on our economy" rests upon a racialized reading wherein, 'we', as *Canadians*, are constructed as not having been immigrants. This starting point for the textual reality being produced removes the earlier European immigration from the terrain of immigration, naturalizing the nation. 'Canadians-as-members-of-the-nation' are separated from *immigrants*, they are not defined as also having been immigrants. This racialized use of the category 'immigrant' accomplishes the identification of all people of colour as being *part of the same problem* which the 'immigrants' under discussion represent.

Immigrants make a contribution to 'our' economy, the text informs *Canadians*. 'Our' economy is constructed as belonging equally to all of 'us,' and although *immigrants* make a contribution by working and living in this same economy, it is not 'their' economy. The textual reality being produced begins by drawing racialized lines between 'us', i.e., 'Canadians-as-members-of-the-nation' and 'them,' i.e., *immigrants*.

Two of the three questions which frame this part of the discussion specifically draw attention to 'cultural diversity.' "What role should immigration play in fostering the development of Canada's economy?"; "How does immigration affect the social and cultural life of Canada?"; and "What are the benefits of cultural diversity?" the text asks (CIC, 1994b: 3). The text separates the economic development of Canada from its "social and cultural" life, setting the stage for the weighing of the 'economic' benefits of immigration in opposition to its 'social' and 'cultural' benefits.

In linking questions of 'social' and 'cultural' diversity to immigration, the text comes to construct *Canadians* as socially and culturally homogenous. As I have discussed in earlier chapters, 'cultural' diversity has come to stand in for 'racial' diversity within the textual practices of the state in the post World

War II period. By asking what the benefits of 'cultural' diversity are, the text makes it clear that the *immigrants* whose 'benefits' are to be evaluated are those who are 'culturally' and 'socially' 'diverse.' The texts invite *Canadians. as a culturally and socially homogenous group,* to work with the state in assessing the impact of 'socially and culturally' diverse *immigrants* on the nation. In this very first issue, the text places Canadians who are 'culturally' and 'socially diverse' outside this partnership with the state, silencing them as 'non-Canadians' on the grounds of their social and cultural diversity. These textual practices give no authority to people of colour who are Canadians to speak within this textual reality. In defining *immigrants* as inherently different 'culturally' and 'socially,' all people of colour are silenced in the defining of the national interest.

The background information provided to frame the second issue directs attention to two categories of immigration: the independent category - also referred to as the 'economic' category - and the family category. The text informs the reader that the criteria for admission of the independent category is based upon the education, skills and occupation of the applicants. The text points out that this category is easily managed by adjusting the allocation of points to ensure that "new immigration priorities" are met. The independent category becomes constructed as not presenting problems of management, and as making an "economic" contribution to the nation. The textual practices racialize this category as one of *future citizens* by not linking this category with 'social' or 'cultural' diversity, nor is this category associated with any costs to the nation.

The presentation of the family category, however, stands in stark contrast. The text makes no reference to the economic contributions of the family category: this category becomes re-defined as making no contribution to the nation. The text states applicants under this category are allowed entry so long as they meet "standards for good health and character" (CIC, 1994b: 3). It does not specify that sponsors have to meet specific requirements under the sponsorship regulations, nor does it point out this category is controlled

through expanding and restricting the categories of relatives admitted.⁹⁹ The Annual Plans tabled by the Immigration Minister sets numerical levels for the family category, as they do for the independent category. The text hides the reality that the family category is also subject to control and management, presenting it instead as potentially allowing limitless and uncontrolled immigration.

Having thus constructed the family and independent categories, when the text asks "Should immigration be managed according to business cycles or long-term social goals?" (CIC, 1994b: 3), the choice being presented is one between opposing economic and social goals. When the text asks "How much importance should the principle of family reunification be given?" (CIC, 1994b: 3), it is specifically calling into question the **principle** underlying this category. As such, the text questions the continued existence of the family category, in addition to the levels of this category. When considered in light of the first issue which defines *immigrants* as responsible for bringing 'cultural' diversity into *Canadian* society, the family category becomes presented as *not* making any economic contribution *and* the source of 'cultural and social' diversity *and* allowing potentially limitless entry into the country. The text reasserts the 'economic' worth of the independent category, constructing the family category as *the* problem of "effective management" which the public consultations are to help resolve.¹⁰⁰

In the framing of these first two issues which refer to the Vision for Canada and the criteria for future immigration, the text problematizes the

⁹⁹ For example, in June 1989, immigration policy allowed sponsorship of single, adult children of sponsors. Adult children were previously not defined as eligible for family sponsorship. With this change attracting more applicants than the Department had anticipated, changes were introduced in April 1992 to reduce the eligibility of adult offspring. (CIC, 1994t: 8)

¹⁰⁰ The text also raises the 'problem' of controlling the refugee program, but it does so within the context of reiterating Canada's international obligations to accept refugees. Therefore, the text does not bring into question *whether* Canada should continue accepting refugees. By asking 'how much importance should be given to **principle** of family reunion,' the text questions the existence of the family category itself.

'cultural' and 'social' diversity of *immigrants*, and the continued existence of the 'non-economic' family category. Six of the ten issues raise specific questions about the costs of immigration, linking "increased" demands on social programs with *immigrants*.¹⁰¹ "Have recent immigration and economic trends created needs which current programming and resources cannot meet?" "Should newcomers receive materials explaining the rights and responsibilities of consuming public services?" "How far are Canadians prepared to go to ensure their generosity and openness are not abused?" "What are the groups, institutions and programs which need to be protected?" "What factors should we consider in shaping our immigration programs to increase economic benefits at low cost?" "How do we build partnerships among all levels of government" in order to "improve the detection of abuse?" "How do we build a common database on immigration to serve public policy and program goals?" (CIC, 1994b: 3-6) These questions all direct attention to the range of fiscal, social and political 'problems' which result from immigration, and the need to 'protect' existing programs from *immigrants*.¹⁰²

As discussed earlier, the independent category is constructed as an easily controlled and economically productive category. This category is not made responsible for the various 'costs' of immigration, economic or otherwise. The family category is made responsible for all these costs in being a category which makes no 'economic' contributions and therefore represents a burden on the nation. The textual practices, in this way, target this category for the cost control measures necessary to preserve 'national' institutions.

Even as the text links *immigrants* in general, and the family category in

¹⁰¹ Issue Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. (CIC, 1994b) In the background to the first issue, there is a reference to 'immigrants' being less likely to claim welfare and other benefits than 'Canadians', and that 'immigrants' contribute more in taxes than consume in social services. But this information is not used to inform the framing of the questions for discussion, and the rest of the document, apart from this one instance, re-iterates the view that 'immigrants' represent a burden on social services.

¹⁰²The range of institutions across which the 'problems' of immigration have to be managed are specified for Working Groups #6A and 6B as including housing, health, education, social assistance and policing.

particular, with economic costs and “abusing” the “generosity of Canadians.” it constructs all *Canadians* as citizen-taxpayers who are equally in danger of being taken advantage of by the potentially abusive *immigrant* woman who, whether legitimately or otherwise, over-burdens social programs. The text constructs for *Canadians*, as taxpayers, an-interest-in-common in restricting the access of *immigrant* women to social programs by restricting their further immigration. The textual practices give *Canadians* a direct stake in controlling immigration, inviting *Canadians* on this basis into a partnership with the state to protect the nation and its institutions from *immigrant* women. Three out of the ten issues directly construct *immigrants* as presenting a threat to national institutions by being engaged in the “abuse” of social services.¹⁰³ The text’s linking of *immigrants* with criminality and abuse of social services sets up every *Canadian*, and the state, as in danger of being taken advantage of by *immigrants*.

The text erases the reality that the sponsorship regulations expressly forbid the family category from accessing social security programs such as social housing and social assistance (EIC, 1983). Further, the text’s linking of *immigrants* with increased demands on social services provides the motive for the direct involvement of all *Canadians* in the subsequent restructuring of the immigration program. It gives every *Canadian* a direct investment in protecting themselves individually, as well as their fellow ‘citizens,’ from being taken advantage of by *immigrants*.

The text makes no mention of the inequalities *immigrants* are subjected to in Canada, nor does it address the deeply entrenched racism within Canadian society which results in the abuse of *immigrants*. The only exception is one question which raises the problem of accreditation and the non-recognition of the ‘foreign’ educational and professional credentials of *immigrants* (CIC, 1994b: 5). The text does not mention the reality that sponsored *immigrants* are made into second class citizens by the sponsorship

¹⁰³ Issue Nos. 7, 9 and 10. (CIC, 1994b).

regulations which give them unequal access to social entitlements. Nor does it mention that sponsors who are citizens and landed immigrants themselves have to forfeit their own claims to social assistance in order to sponsor family members. Throughout the document, it is *immigrants* who are presented as a 'problem,' not the various agencies of the state which reproduce the racialized inequalities of *immigrants*. Nor are *Canadians* and the racism they help to reproduce against *immigrants* raised as a problem.

Not one of the ten issues refers to the unequal treatment of the workers who enter the country under the Live-in Care Giver Program or the Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Program which have both resulted in increasing numbers of workers entering the country with temporary work permits (Arat Koc, 1992; Sharma, 1997; Singh Bolaria, 1992). This significant development in Canada's immigration policy of separating off 'deserving' workers who are allowed into the country under the independent category for permanent residence and 'undeserving' workers who are allowed in as migrant workers is left off the 'national' agenda. The existence of a program which in actuality supplies significant numbers of workers to the economy on a temporary and precarious immigration status, a status has been defined as a form of indentureship (Sharma, 1997), is made invisible in the textual reality.

The launching of the Immigration Review, the subsequent public meetings and study circles all conveyed the appearance of an open process where *Canadians* could raise their concerns, an appearance which was enhanced by the Minister repeatedly stating his government's commitment to listen to *Canadians*. In reality, however, it was the Montebello meeting which defined the ten issues which 'Canadians-as-members-of-the-nation' were to be concerned about. The content and the framing of the discussions were decided upon by a small, elite group, and it was through the public consultations that the 'problems' drawn up by this small group were made into *the* major concerns of all *Canadians*. The public consultation thus became an exercise to draw *Canadians* into a pre-set agenda and to popularize this agenda by giving participants a stake in the restructuring of the immigration program. The consultation process sought to nationalize *Canadians* into the restructuring by organizing the conditions whereby they could come to *own* the

subsequent policy changes as being in the nation's interest.

Hawkins (1988) has described how then Minister of Manpower and Immigration, Robert Andras, initiated a national discussion on Immigration Policy in the 1970s in the Green Paper. Hawkins argues the major problems with that process were the following: (i) very little research was available on immigration; (ii) the Green Paper and the national discussion were "seen much less as a way of seeking information and guidance from the Canadian public on immigration policy, than as a means of *educating* the provinces and public on the critical decisions in immigration and population which would have to be made in Canada in the very near future"; and, (iii) one of the major changes being considered by the Minister and the Department, the merging of the Department of Manpower and Immigration with the Unemployment Commission was "never put to the public at all." Hawkins argues the Minister did not want the public debate to reach the "average Canadian" because "the Minister and Cabinet did not trust the average Canadian to respond in a positive way on this issue" (1988: 630).

The 1994 Consultations re-produced a similar process to the one described by Hawkins. Like the Green Paper consultations, the 1994 Consultations used the public consultation to "educate" Canadians to the dangers presented by *immigrants*. The state did want to draw *Canadians* into the 1994 IPR consultations in order to build a political consensus around the policy changes which were to follow, as well as to legitimize the state as the nation's defender and partner. Through the consultation texts, the state produced immigration as a problem-in-common for the state and nation, and defined the state-nation partnership from the state's perspective of ruling.

The questions for public discussion framed the textual reality which was being produced, and participants entered into the process by being drawn into 'knowing-in-common' the 'problems' of immigration from the perspective of the point of ruling of the state. Consultation participants were intended to become 'knowers' of these particular 'problems' in their shared world-in-common with the state. In producing the conceptual framework, through the specific questions for discussion and the assumptions underpinning them, the state imposed an ideological 'knowledge' of the 'problems' onto the lived experiences

of participants, and in this way, mediated the relations of participants with this reality through the lens of these 'problems' known-in-common.

As Smith (1987, 1990) has pointed out, entering this textual reality is to enter a circularity, wherein the textual reality becomes a 'revelation' of actuality, and is imposed upon this actuality by becoming actionable, in this particular case, in the form of the subsequent policy changes. Where this textual reality is in conflict with the lived experiences of individuals, the state compels individuals to articulate their lived experience through the lens of this virtual reality produced by the texts. The articulation of their lived reality appears as a subjective, individual experience, whereas the textual reality comes to represent an objective, collective 'national' experience. Thus, if the individual experiences of participants contradict the texts' construction of the 'problems,' these individualized experiences are juxtaposed by the consultation texts with the problems of the 'nation' as identified by the state. Therefore, once the conceptual framework for the textual reality is produced and entered, individual participants can only challenge this virtual reality within its own terms of reference. Their lived 'knowledge' of 'problems' becomes awed by the 'knowledge' of the 'problems' confronting the nation.

In the consultation documents, the state constructed a textual reality **through** which participants were to view reality, and in this, the conceptual framework became the lens through which participants, as *Canadians*, were asked to relate to *immigrants*. Through the public consultations, the state invited *Canadians* to enter this reality, and in the process, to enter into a partnership with the state. The public consultations therefore worked to nationalize *Canadians* into this partnership with the state **through** the reinforcement of the ideological bordering of *immigrants* as a 'problem' for the nation.

What the State Heard

An interim report, the *Background Document*, was published based upon the submissions made during the consultation until mid-August, 1994. This report was presented as summarizing the views and recommendations of *Canadians* which were to be further discussed at the National Conference held

in September, 1994. After this Conference, as final report, the *Immigration Consultations Report*, was published. The final report is virtually identical to the interim one, with a few changes incorporating contributions from the National Conference. Both reports summarize participant responses to the ten issues and include specific policy recommendations.

Of the opinions and recommendations included in the reports, the submissions of individuals are not distinguished from those of organizations. Nor are the contributions of individual written submissions distinguished from those which emerged as consensus or majority views of the Working Groups and public meetings. The reports state that equal weight was given to all the submissions. Indeed, the reports even include views which they define as “based on contentious or perhaps, even inaccurate assumptions” because they “reflected strongly held opinions” (CIC, 1994q: 15). However, as I demonstrate in this section, equal weight was not given to all contributions. Those contribution made by the Working Groups which raised the question of the unequal treatment of *immigrants* and made specific recommendations to rectify this were given no space in the reports, while recommendations based on inaccurate information were given ample space. The consequence of including recommendations based upon inaccurate assumptions meant that the state treated them as a legitimate basis for developing future immigration policy.

Defining a Vision for the Nation

In answer to the question “Should we have immigration?,” the views of the majority of the participants are summarized as being in cautious agreement with continuing immigration. Some participants called for an end to immigration altogether, and others for a reduction in the numbers:

Some people call for a “*moratorium on immigration*” or gradually reducing immigration until the “*doors are closed....*” (CIC, 1994q: 16)

The reasons given for restricting immigration range from Canada’s need to:

successfully absorb people currently on welfare/social program;
to:

Many people advocate a reduction in immigration levels as they feel Canada, "...can no longer absorb the numbers that are being admitted," and they are concerned about increased economic and racial tensions

to:

A policy which high-pressures immigration and is insensitive to ...social, community-level implications will, more and more, increase popular resistance and inflame intolerance..." (CIC, 1994q: 16-17)

Support for continuing immigration is expressed because it "promotes economic growth" and makes Canada "internationally competitive," and will "sustain our population" (CIC, 1994q: 16). Even as these "economic" and demographic benefits are acknowledged, the text immediately and repeatedly stresses the concerns which include the following: immigration levels being set too high, the high level of unemployment; the impact of the "increasing diversity" which "inflame(s) intolerance"; Canada's inability to absorb the numbers being admitted; the 'social' integration of *immigrants* and the dangers of "increased economic and racial tensions" (CIC, 1994q: 17). Whereas the texts record support for continued immigration, they immediately counter this support by repeatedly raising the 'problems' with immigration. The benefits of immigration are presented as "economic," and the 'problems' are presented as social, cultural, racial, and are economic only as regards the "costs" of immigration.¹⁰⁴ The major 'problems' constructed by the texts are of increased "racial tensions and intolerance," and the textual practices make *immigrants* responsible for the problem, not the racism which *immigrants* experience.

The cautious support presented for continuing immigration is made conditional upon recognizing the potential dangers of racial diversity:

Diversity is one of Canada's enormous strengths, but the importance of the whole must be emphasized. We must be a choir, not a cacophony. (CIC, 1994q: 19)

¹⁰⁴ Although concerns expressed by participants regarding high levels of unemployment are recorded, high unemployment levels are not made into an issue in the texts. The texts' discussion of the "costs" of immigration very clearly focus on social spending which is defined as a "burden" on the Canadian taxpayer.

Diversityis a strength so long as it is not force-fed and micro-managed.... (CIC, 1994q: 19)

ethnic diversity has no benefits, it only creates tension. (CIC, 1994q: 19)

Many assert that Canada should be, "...celebrating what its citizens have in common instead of their differences". (CIC, 1994q: 19)

There are also concerns that Canada is becoming a country made up of special interest groups, whose own goals take precedence over the national interests of the country. Although many agree that immigrants to Canada should be able to retain their religion and cultural practices, they feel that these should not take precedence over "*Canadian traditions*." (CIC, 1994q: 19)

The text's construction of "diversity" as the characteristic only of *immigrants*, and a divisive and fractious one at that, is achieved through its repeated voicing of the 'concerns' of *Canadians*:

No other country in the world expects its tax payers to finance the practice of ethnic diversity. Whatever behavior immigrants wish to adopt should be left to the choice of the individuals. State support to ethnic diversity sows the seeds of conflict and should be avoided. (CIC, 1994q: 20)

Having defined the 'divisive' effects of diversity, the texts proceed to construct a 'vision' of Canada by defining the 'national' values shared by all *Canadians*:

Paramount were the importance of freedom, democracy and the rule of law. Central also were the principles of justice, fairness, tolerance, and respect for our fellow citizens. Equality was essential(CIC, 1994q: 21)

This focus on 'Canadian' values is said to have been echoed in submission after submission, including those of Working Group #2, of the staff of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in Canada, as well as from overseas posts. One overseas staff submission is singled out for special mention as "capturing" the *Canadian* character:

Canadians value honesty and fairness. They respect hard work and people with integrity. And they are willing to give people a second or even third chance. But Canadians also expect their

fellow Canadians to respect the system that is in place, and to not take advantage of their generosity. (CIC, 1994q: 20)

The values, identity and vision of this *Canadian* character are further defined:

Focus group participants state that “*accepting differences*,” “*ethnically diverse*,” “*tolerant*,” “*humane*,” and “*proud*” are among the specific values to which they attribute Canadian identity. (CIC, 1994q: 20)

.....continue the vision of our country as home to ordinary people living ordinary lives, working, paying fair taxes, supporting policies for the good of all, taking an interest in the government of our towns, provinces and the country, helping our neighbours no matter where they or their fathers come from, making their neighbourhoods and communities good and safe places to live and raise families. (CIC, 1994q: 20-21)

The text’s constant defining of the “Canadian identity,” the “Canadian character” and “core Canadian values” construct a self-image, a national character, which all *Canadians* are reported as having defined. The textual practice simultaneously defines this national character, presenting it as having been defined by *Canadians*, and invites *Canadians* to claim as this national character as their own. The ideological construction of this national character as committed to “tolerance,” as “accepting of differences,” and as being “humane” stands in contrast to the actual recommendations of many of these *Canadians* to end immigration altogether, to go back to immigration only from European source countries, and to contain, and even eliminate, ‘cultural’ diversity. The frequent recommendations made to “close the doors” on *immigrants* are not allowed to interfere with the text’s construction of *Canadians* as “fair” and “just.”

The text’s practice of attributing specific values to the “Canadian character” and “Canadian identity” hides the actuality that the population in Canada is divided by the social relations of race, class and gender. The significance of the textual reality in producing a unified national character lies in its countering at the ideological level of the increasing polarization taking place at the material level within Canada economic restructuring increasing dramatically the divisions of race, class and gender. This growing polarization

in the 1990s has been demonstrated in a number of studies (Brodie, 1995; Khosla, 1993; Ralph, 1996). yet nowhere is this polarization in interests of Canadians allowed to enter into the textual reality. The construction of the national character in the textual reality creates a united, common, national purpose through which the state seeks to transcend the 'internal' polarization among Canadians. The construction of this national character is key to the nationalizing of *Canadians* into a partnership with the state.

This national character is defined by the texts in direct opposition to *immigrants* who are constructed as not sharing it:

Throughout the consultation process, Canadians have expressed concern that their Canada is disappearing; that "...its values and lifestyle are being eroded and degraded". (CIC, 1994q: 22)

(The current immigration policy) ignores the fragile present condition of the Canadian identity, at a time when the future of the country is uncertain. Immigration policy must not introduce even more uncertainty and ignorance about Canadian and heritage values. (CIC, 1994q: 22)

Many hold the view that : "...a primary goal of immigration policy must be the preservation and enhancement of Canada's existing cultural and religious make-up and democratic institutions." (CIC, 1994q: 23).

The Department of Immigration and Citizenship are recorded in the Employment Consultation Summary as asking that immigration not place "our future at risk":

Yet, a number of thoughts were expressed with respect to Canada's character. A list of the elements of the country's basic belief system should look something like this : non-violence, justice, democracy, equality, honesty, acceptance, and fairness. There is no doubt that Departmental personnel want these core values to be retained and strengthened by immigration, not threatened. (CIC, 1994w: 1)

The problem constructed in the texts is not so much that *immigrants* do not share the national character and values, but that they "erode" and "degrade" these values. The values of *immigrants* become constructed as being the opposite of *Canadian* values, their presence threatening the erosion and

degradation of these national values. The texts accomplish their construction of the national character by defining it, and the national interest to preserve it, in direct opposition to *immigrants*. *Immigrants* are used by the texts as the reference against which the national interest comes to be defined: *immigrants* are made to represent the ideological borders of the nation.

The alleged threat to national values and the national character from *immigrants* remains a dominant theme with the *immigrant* character being constructed embodying everything the *Canadian* character does not. Where *Canadians* are defined as respecting "the rule of law," "honest," "hard-working," and "fair," *immigrants* are defined as "abusers." Participants are said to want:

... a government which takes effective action against abuse of our systems instead of allowing chronic abusers of our immigration and welfare systems to go unchecked. (CIC, 1994o: 42)

A common opinion expressed both in written submissions and during other consultation activities is that prospective immigrants must be informed about Canadian law and values. (CIC, 1994o: 40)

Careful screening overseas, to protect the public from criminal activity and health risks is strongly called for. It is argued that the rigorous implementation of the rules and control procedures will prevent abuse of the system and ensure the fair treatment of all applicants. Global cooperation is also a recurring theme in terms of our screening activities. One group suggests that, "our government seek to build bridges with nations from which people are emigrating to Canada in order to prevent abuse of Canada's immigration system, and that Canada impose sanctions against countries who fail to cooperate in providing records and information concerning immigrant applicants or refugees." (CIC, 1994q: 55)

In order to conduct proper screening, one contributor suggests the creation of, "one common database" incorporating criminal, security and immigration information that is accessible to both overseas and domestic personnel. (CIC, 1994q: 55)

State officials are reported as frustrated by working in a system where they are unable to deal quickly and efficiently with fraud and abuse. They are disturbed by the fact that some people arrive at 'our' borders with "instructions on how to use the system to their advantage" (CIC, 1994w: 6). *Immigrants* who use the

“system” to “their advantage” become a source of frustration and this using of the system to one’s advantage is equated with “fraud” and “abuse.” The texts present *immigrants* who know how to use the system a ‘problem.’ and those who don’t know how ‘our’ system works are also a problem because they don’t ‘know’ democracy and the ‘rule of law’! Not surprisingly then, the staff consultation summary states there are too many “appeal mechanisms” in the system (CIC, 1994w: 6). This summary calls for increasing state control over *immigrants* by increased cooperation between immigration and law enforcement agencies, and by removing existing protections:

Increased information sharing among enforcement agencies and greater access to a comprehensive criminal database that is international in scope is suggested by many. Some recommend having one file for each person containing all government held information for that person. While some proposals related to information technology may be contrary to federal and provincial privacy and access to information legislation, several are of the view that this is one area where the protection of society as a whole takes precedence over individual rights. (CIC, 1994w: 8)

In the name of “the protection of society,” the report of the staff consultations proposes doing away with appeals and access to information laws, even as it simultaneously defines *Canadian* society as one which respects the rule of law.

Given the extensive elaboration on the ‘problems’ associated with immigration within the textual reality being produced, recommendations to curb the entry of *immigrants* to protect the nation on various grounds are proposed as ‘solutions’ by many contributors:

There was consensus that Canada could be more clever in the disincentives it employs to minimise use of its immigration programmes. One suggestion was to target “vulnerable groups” much in the way they are targeted by unscrupulous immigration consultants and lawyers. Reaching out to these groups, in their home countries, to properly inform them of laws and conditions in Canada is required. (CIC, 1994j: 6-7)

If these messages fail to dissuade *immigrants* from coming to Canada, increasing deportations is recommended to underscore these messages:

It could be preferable to send a message that Canada is concentrating on deporting certain categories. However, some

believed that beyond defined refugee and humanitarian entitlements, Canada could not afford to allow any one deportable group to remain. It was suggested that the legislation try to capture all individual deportable situations. There would be a mechanism for prioritising these situations for removals. However, resources would be used to effect removals "across the board", resulting in "equitable, generalised removals." (CIC, 1994j: 6)

The Final report states in its closing pages:

Similarly, many Canadians are troubled by what are viewed as threats to the integrity of the nation's health care and social assistance programs, as well as the integrity of the immigration program itself. In particular, they are concerned that the generosity of the Canadian people has been taken advantage of. As a result of a few recent and unfortunate incidents related to immigration, many Canadians worry that the immigration systems are not working as they should, particularly as they pertain to the entry of undesirable persons and the removal of those who violate our laws. They, in effect, express a loss in confidence in the ability of immigration to provide protection from those who pose a risk to the safety of Canadians and/or Canadian institutions. (CIC, 1994q: 80)

The text utilizes "a few" "unfortunate incidents" to bring into question the integrity of the entire immigration program, questioning its ability to "provide protection" "to Canadians and/or Canadian institutions." These "few" incidents are used to construct an alleged threat to the "safety" of all *Canadians* and 'their' institutions.

A number of contributions were made by some of the Working Groups and at the National Conference which challenge the racialized construction of *immigrants* by *Canadians*:

....people speak of the "immigrant problem" and the "refugee problem," and believe that immigrants "live off the fat of the taxpayer". She said these perceptions would not be prevalent if all immigrants looked like her, that is, white. (CIC, 1994p: 6)

However, this particular contribution is not integrated into the final report, it is not used to challenge the racialization of *immigrants* in the textual reality being produced. Nor are the contributions made by the Working Groups which challenged the construction of *Canadians* and *immigrants* as committed to

opposing sets of values. These challenges came from Working Groups #5, #6A and #6B. Working Group #5 pointed out:

Canada is a nation made up of indigenous peoples, descendants from generations of immigrants, and recent immigrants. (CIC, 1994g: 23)

Working Group #6B stated:

The concentration of a large number of people from one immigrant community who arrive within the space of five years is a new and big problem to some, while for others it is simply Canadian history repeating itself for the umpteenth time. (CIC, 1994i: 1)

These contributions rejecting the separation of recent immigration from the 'old' immigration, as well as rejecting the separation of *Canadians* and *immigrants* as opposites are not included in either the interim or final reports. The textual practices of the state did not allow these oppositional views to enter the textual reality under construction, giving no authority to these contributors to 'speak' in the final reports and challenge the textual reality. These contributions would have disrupted the textual reality by challenging its fundamental assumptions and exposing its ideological construction of the nation, and of *immigrants* and *Canadians*. These contributions were silenced in being denied entry into the final reports. Instead, the reports end with a re-iteration of the numerous 'threats' *immigrants* present to the health and safety of *Canadians* and 'their' national institutions. The *immigrant* character is defined again and again as representing criminality, disease, laziness, and ignorance of democratic values and the rule of law, when not openly flaunting these laws. This practice of the texts in constantly and specifically linking immigrants with disease, crime and the abuse of social programs is overwhelming. As is the texts repeated re-iteration of the state's commitment to protecting the nation, the national character and national values, in partnership with *Canadians*. The text's construction of *immigrants* constantly refers to the 'quality' of 'new' immigrants.

The 'Quality' of Immigrants

The texts constantly refer to the 'quality' of *immigrants* as presenting a problem to the nation. This 'problem' of 'quality' was defined as being 'lesser' than, and a threat to, the national 'character.' The 'problem' of 'quality' was given further substance in the textual reality by defining the 'threat' is presented to the national population and on the national 'way of life.'

The interim and final reports both elaborate extensively upon the impact of continued immigration on population levels in Canada. The following statement is offered as one which "reflects the views of many":

Growth as an ever increasing and self-sustaining way of life, leading to increased consumption, has been our North American way of life. All of these treasured ideas and much of what we call 'our way of life' is now ending. (CIC, 1994q: 17)

Immigration is constructed as responsible for "ending" "our way of life." The texts' defining of "our" "treasured" "North American way of life" having led to "increased consumption" negates the reality of Aboriginal existence whose experience of "our" way of life took the form of colonization. The actuality that "our" "North American way of life" increased "consumption" only for some sectors of the population at the expense of the exploitation of the resources of Aboriginal peoples is made invisible in the textual reality under production.

The 'dangers' of overpopulation are presented as a particular "concern" wide-spread among *Canadians*:

While a few feel that Canada has already surpassed its ideal population, many think that Canada's population should be stabilized at its current level. Still others propose that a population of 34-35 million would be about as much as Canada could sustain due to its "...*climatic conditions, geography and ecology...*" (CIC, 1994q: 18)

It must be realized that Canada is not an empty country waiting to be filled up. We have a fragile ecology. (CIC, 1994q: 18)

Using geographical and climatic conditions to justify curtailing immigration from third world countries is a familiar theme in the history of Canadian immigration policy. Arguments that Asian and African immigrants were

incapable of adapting to the climate in Canada were used to restrict their immigration in the 19th and 20th centuries. The texts give new currency to these older racialized rationales and sum up the 'dangers' of population growth through immigration:

The effect that population growth will have on our environment and quality of life, seems to be of primary concern. Environmental deterioration, air and water pollution, traffic congestion, increased crime rates, over burdened social services, garbage disposal problems and shortages in housing, food and energy, are some of the problems that people identify with over-population. They are concerned as Canada's population grows, these problems will increase in severity. (CIC, 1994q: 18)

What makes the paragraph quoted above even more notable is that the words are not presented as a specific contribution from any particular participant. Instead, it is a composite of 'concerns' which is put together by the framers of the interim and final reports, who construct this 'problem' in this particular manner. *Nowhere does the text point out how unfounded 'concerns' regarding overpopulation are, by the state's own reckoning.* Hawkins has argued that the state clearly recognized in the 1980s the need for continuing to maintain immigration levels in order to avert the decline of population levels (1989).

The text here begins by referring to "population growth" which it then immediately *equates* with "over-population." *Immigrants* become constructed as responsible for "environmental deterioration," for "pollution," "increased crime," "over burdened social services," food and housing "shortages" etc., etc. The complexities of these wide ranging problems become reduced by the texts to the presence of *immigrants*. As *immigrants* are made the cause of these various problems, the text directs attention away from the responsibility of state policies and corporate practices for deteriorating environmental conditions and reduction in social services (Barlow, 1995). Shielding the state from scrutiny, the textual reality instead blames *immigrants* as responsible for these problems. The textual reality reverses actually existing social relations: *immigrants* come to be attributed with power enough to devastate and overwhelm the entire *Canadian* nation. Although population levels in Canada actually face decline in the year 2010 without continued immigration (CIC,

1994b: 3), the texts incorporate the unfounded fear of overpopulation without challenge.¹⁰⁵

The discussion regarding the dangers of 'overpopulation' does not treat the growth of all populations as a problem. Indeed, the texts forward a proposal for *increasing* population growth by giving *Canadians* incentives to reproduce more. The text recommends:

...the government develop programs to encourage population growth within the country. For example, the government could provide financial incentives to encourage Canadians to have children. (CIC, 1994q: 18)

The text signals the population growth of *Canadians* is not the 'problem,' it is specifically the 'population growth of *immigrants* which is the cause for concern. In blaming *immigrants* for overpopulating and listing the specific problems associated with this overpopulation, the texts link *immigrants* with the 'problems' third world peoples have historically been associated with in the western imagination, problems such as increased crime, disease, pollution, excessive breeding, and excessive demands on resources (Ahmed, 1992; Mies, 1986; Said, 1978). Indeed, one would be hard-pressed to find a more racially charged representation of *immigrants* than the one constructed by the state in the texts' discussion of overpopulation. In contrast, the texts construct *Canadian* society as "dedicated to the preservation of a healthy environment" (CIC, 1994q: 21).

¹⁰⁵ Freda Hawkins writes that Immigration officials and politicians anticipated in the 1980s that immigration would remain an important policy area as a result of the low population level and the declining birthrate in the country. Canada faces "the prospect of future population decline" and Hawkins quotes the American demographer, Leon Bouvier, who argues that fertility levels in developed countries since 1970 were very low: "as of 1984, the rate in most developed countries shows no evidence of climbing back to the point where population growth, or at least population replacement, can be assured over the long run" (Hawkins, 1989: 269). A background paper tabled with the Annual report to Parliament in 1984 predicted that even if the annual net immigration remained at 50,000, the fertility rate of 1.7 would ensure that Canada's population would begin to decline in the year 2021. To maintain current levels of population would require annual immigration levels of at least 125, 000 in the long run (Hawkins, 1989: 270).

The gendered consequences of the textual practices linking *immigrants* with overpopulation are unmistakable. It is women, after all, who 'populate.' and it is third world women in particular, who have been associated with 'overpopulating'.¹⁰⁶ Contemporary debates on population issues draw upon Malthusian theories which have defined population growth in third world countries as a 'population explosion' which endangers the very survival of the human species. 'High' population levels are blamed for causing everything from economic stagnation, environmental depletion and poverty. Overpopulation has created excessive demands on scarce resources, the dominant argument goes, and population control is forwarded as the only solution to this 'problem' (Barroso & Bruschini, 1991; Corra, 1994; Hartmann, 1987). Indeed, the 'excessive' fertility of third world women has long served in the *Canadian* imagination as presenting a threat strong enough to overwhelm the nation by 'polluting' its whiteness. In earlier chapters, I have discussed how the state constructed this 'threat' and 'contained' it through racialized immigration policies which sought to explicitly prevent the entry of Asian women into the country. The texts' discussion of the dangers of overpopulation has the racialized/gendered historical undertones of previous immigration policies. The text uses these 'concerns' to rally *Canadians* against the menace of the abundant fecundity of *immigrant* women, a fecundity defined as potent enough to destroy communities and cities, to pollute the environments *Canadians* live in. *Immigrant* women are attributed in the textual reality as having the power to literally reproduce "garbage" in quantities

¹⁰⁶ Third World women have been the target of population control programs in the countries of the South such as India, Bangladesh, Brazil, as well as in the advanced capitalist countries such as the United States and Britain. See Corra, S. *Population and Reproductive Rights : Feminist Perspectives from the South*, Kali for Women, New Delhi (1994); Mintzes, B et al. (eds.) *Norplant: Under Her Skin*, Eburon, The Netherlands (1993); Barroso, C, & Bruschini, C, "Building Politics From Personal Lives: Discussions on Sexuality among Poor Women In Brazil," in Mohanty, C.T. et al. (eds.) *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington (1991); Amos, V. & Parmar, P. "Challenging Imperial Feminism" in *Feminist Review*, London, (Autumn, 1984); Barbee, E. & Little, M. "Health, Social Class and African-American Women" in James, S. et al (ed.) *Theorizing Black Feminisms : The Visionary Pragmatism of Black Women*, Routledge, London (1994).

enough to overwhelm the nation. *Immigrant* women themselves, and their fertility, come to be equated with “garbage” and “pollution” by the writers of the texts.

The Report of Working Group # 4, which specifically dealt with the question of environmental degradation, argued that environmental degradation in source countries was one of the *causes* of increased migration (CIC, 1994f: ii). The interim and final reports reverse this relation so that *immigrants* are presented as *causing* environmental degradation in Canada. The Working Group’s report, however, also reinforced the racialized ‘dangers’ of overpopulation by referring to “massive” and “enormous” flows of *immigrants*. The report points to “rapid population growth” in “poor countries” and calls on the Canadian state to work towards “population stabilization by any means acceptable to the societies concerned”(CIC, 1994f: 4-5). The means have included the forced sterilization of women and men in India, Bangladesh, Peru and Brazil, these means being “acceptable” to the ruling elites (Corra, 1994; Barroso & Bruschini, 1991; Mintzes, 1993). These means have also been “acceptable” to the ruling elites in Britain, the United States and Canada which have all practiced the forced sterilization of certain groups of women in the not too distant past (Amos & Parmar, 1984; McLaren, 1990; Wilson, 1978). This particular recommendation is extraordinary in calling for Canada’s support of such measures as a way of *stopping increased immigration into Canada*. It calls for subjecting women in “poor” countries to population control measures *even before these women become ‘immigrants’ or attempt to enter Canada*.

That the ‘problem’ of overpopulation is not so much about the general impact of immigration as it is about the ‘quality’ of *immigrants* becomes even clearer in subsequent sections of the text, which make repeated recommendations for aggressively increasing the recruitment of the independent category, as well as for recruiting more immigrants who speak English and French (CIC, 1994q: 26,65). Very explicitly, the text states that the problem is one of the ‘quality’ of *immigrants*, not their quantity:

Canadians told us that they are deeply concerned that the system and processes of the immigration program are not working as they

should. More specifically, they are concerned that the focus has become one of quantity rather than quality....(CIC, 1994o: 61)

The reports record the recommendations for the immigration program to consider returning to the original European source countries in order to attract immigrants who are compatible with the nation:

Some people commented on the racial mixture of immigration. They feel that Canada should be selecting immigrants from countries having the most in common with Canada and call for a return to the pre-1960 source countries. This, they feel, would reduce costs associated with integration and ease racial tensions. (CIC, 1994q: 26)

Fluency in English and French are repeatedly recommended as the criteria by which the 'quality' of potential immigrants should be evaluated. These criteria would of course privilege Europeans because they would be most likely to meet this language criterion, as well as being the 'quality' most compatible with the nation. The 'problem' of overpopulation likewise referred to the 'quality' of population growth. It operated at two levels so that the presence of *immigrant* women *and* their fertility become part of the 'problem.' The 'concerns' regarding both the 'quantity' and 'quality' of *immigrants* became very specifically and literally inscribed on the bodies of *immigrant* women.

Balancing the Independent and Family Categories

In my earlier discussion of the conceptual framework for the public consultation, I argued the family category was singled out and problematized as making no 'economic' contributions and allowing potentially limitless immigration. This category was also made responsible for overburdening social programs and for introducing the cultural and social diversity leading to increased racial tensions. The independent category in contrast was identified as an economic category and easily manageable. This framing of the two categories shaped the responses from participants so that with very few exceptions, most responses likewise reproduced the state's ideological constructions of the family and independent categories. In response to the

question, "What criteria should we set for selecting immigrants in order to achieve our social and economic objectives?" (CIC, 1994b: 3), the participants are recorded as responding in the following way.

Many people involved in the various consultation activities expressed concern with our diminishing capacity to afford immigrants who can neither support themselves nor be supported by their families, especially given the current state of our economy. (CIC, 1994o: 16)

Some participants of the national conference also argue that the proportion of family class immigrants should be reduced and that "*the government should consider possible (additional) restrictions on the sponsoring of family class members.*" (CIC, 1994q: 29)

The staff of Citizenship and Immigration Canada recommended:

Weight must be given to official language ability, education levels and potential to contribute to Canada.....Potential to contribute to Canada must be viewed in terms of (a) ability to demonstrate willingness to integrate socially and culturally; and (b) proven ability and demonstrated willingness to be productive economically. (CIC, 1994q: 26)

Given that the starting point for the public consultation was the construction of the family category as not "economically" productive, the state's recommendations for increasing the 'economic' benefits of immigration inevitably translated into recommendations for reducing the family category. In addition to the ideological construction of the family category as not productive, the texts directed hostility towards this category by repeatedly focusing on its economic "costs." The report of the staff of Immigration and Citizenship Canada recommended:

The predominant view with respect to social services, especially health care, is that immigrants (not including refugees) should not have unlimited access to services immediately upon their arrival. (CIC, 1994w: 6)

The final report states:

Another common view is that "*a few communities bear a disproportionate cost of integration.*" As an example, many submissions argue that due to the overwhelming needs of both immigrant children and adults for language training, the

education system is “*under siege*”. A number also argue that as a result of this burden to the school systems, many Canadian-born children must forego their regular school curriculum. (CIC, 1994q: 52)

An Alberta school district submission is quoted as echoing this view:

...immigrant children, particularly refugee children, have needs beyond learning English....These children and their families need support beyond what local boards can provide given present financial realities. (CIC, 1994q: 46)

In the above statement, the texts erase the distinction between refugee children, whom Canada has international obligations to accept and provide for, and *immigrant* children. Both are presented as over-burdening social programs.

After repeatedly re-enforcing the construction of the family category as over-burdening social services, the texts recommend both reducing its numbers, as well as increasing internal controls to limit the access of sponsored immigrants to social programs. Increasing the surveillance of *immigrants* is recommended as a measure to reduce social spending. The report of the staff of Immigration and Citizenship supports this position:

...many employees agree that all levels of government, as well as the agencies and organizations involved in the provision of social services, must share information more readily and to a greater extent. This would not only result in more effective and focused service delivery, but also reduce the opportunity for abuse. (CIC, 1994w: 6)

In addition, the staff report calls for a “different mix” of *immigrants* as well as requiring them to pay for the costs of settlement services themselves:

The majority agree that, if a primary objective of immigration is economic benefit for Canada, then we need to select a different mix of immigrants, concentrating on raising the levels of the independent and business categories. (CIC, 1994w: 7)

As to who should be responsible to bear the costs of integration, many feel that independent, sponsored and business immigrants should fund their own settlement needs. Some advocate a prepayment program. (CIC, 1994w: 4)

The reports quote Working Group #8 as stating:

There is increasing concern that immigrants are not respecting these responsibilities (of sponsorship), thus placing demands on already over-burdened social support programs, funded by Canadian taxpayers.(CIC, 1994k: 10-11)

The recommendation of this group is to require “immigrant communities” resident in Canada to fund the settlement services for future *immigrants*:

Immigrant communities can play an important role in the integration of new arrivals. They should be encouraged in this respect, to provide language and settlement services to other immigrants, particularly where existing delivery mechanisms are underfunded or overburdened and if possible to provide Canadian job experience as a transition into the broader labour market (perhaps through a form of sponsorship). These measures will help raise the economic contribution of immigrants while reducing the costs of traditional settlement delivery mechanisms. (CIC, 1994k: 11)

This extraordinary recommendation constructs all people of colour as “immigrant communities”, regardless of their citizenship status, and makes them responsible for ‘their’ own kind. The reality that “immigrant communities” as taxpayers fund “our” social programs is made invisible by this recommendation, as well as asking ‘they’ be required to fund ‘their’ own programs.

The National Consultation on Family Class Immigration called for increased enforcement of sponsorship agreements, including making it easier for provinces to take sponsors to court in order to enforce sponsorship agreements:

The jurisdictional concerns said to stymie regular litigation by provinces to recover social welfare payments to sponsorees from their sponsors in accordance with their undertakings could be easily resolved by the routine assignment of sponsorship undertakings by the federal government to the province of reception. (CIC, 1994n: 6)

Other measures recommended by the text to reduce the costs of immigration include the introduction of a sponsorship bond:

The sponsor might be required to post a significant bond as a condition of the admission of a family member, which deposit would be forfeited in the event of sponsorship breakdown. If no mechanism can be devised to enforce sponsorship obligations, then social accountability might best be secured by limiting overall exposure by a numerical ceiling on the number of sponsorships which any one sponsor can make. (CIC, 1994n: 6)

One specific recommendation for the establishing of a sponsorship bond proposed this bond be set at a rate of \$20,000.00 (DeVoretz, 1994: 8). Another recommendation, made by Working Group #8, called for raising the income levels sponsors need to have in order to qualify for sponsorship (CIC, 1994k: 11).

Exceptions to the contributions which defined the family category as primarily a burden on social services were the reports of Working Groups #6A and #6B. These two Working Groups were specifically mandated to address the integration of immigration policy with other areas of public policy. Both Groups underscored the importance of the family category, and emphasized its contributions. Working Group #6A stressed:

Family members are admitted without being assessed on their labour market skills. But the group wished to emphasize that spouses and other family members who can work would likely enter the labour market shortly after their arrival. Immigrant families, like most other Canadian families, need at least two incomes. Settlement, training and other immigration policies and programs should consider this reality of family life in Canada. Whether they come to Canada as sponsored family members, refugees or selected independents, immigrants want the chance to work, and to have meaningful work. They want to use the skills and knowledge which they have brought with them to Canada. (CIC, 1994h: 2-3)

Working Group #6B argued that the family category makes the process of adjustment much easier for immigrants and demonstrates a long-term commitment to Canada from immigrants. This category is also defined as reducing the problems and costs of integration:

More emphasis should be placed on family reunification as this facilitates early adjustment and creates long term commitment to Canada. It should be recognized that the process of settlement and integration is made considerably easier for refugees, family or independent immigrants who have family members in Canada

when they arrive or whose relatives join them at some point after arrival. As such, family reunification offers a considerable cost saving in terms of integration services. (CIC, 1994i: 6)

Both Working Groups rejected the notion that the family category class represents only an economic cost by underlining the contribution of this category to the labour market, as well as to reducing integration costs. Whereas the unpaid, reproductive labour of sponsored immigrant women has been made invisible by the categorization of sponsored immigrants as a 'non-economic' category, the Working Groups pointed to this labour as reducing the overall costs of immigration. Both Groups also pointed to racism in Canadian society and the unequal access to social programs of sponsored immigrants as the most significant barriers to their integration. They specifically recommended increasing the access of *all* immigrants to social programs. The recommendations of Working Group #6A in examining labour market programs stated:

The entire settlement process should be based on the principles of access and equity. The federal government should take a leadership role in the area of anti-racism education. All federal funding for training programs should be granted on the basis of the adherence to equity principles as a criterion for funding.

Obtaining meaningful employment is an integral part of the settlement process. Immigrants should be recognized as a target group which needs appropriate training opportunities. (CIC, 1994h: 1)

Working Group #6B which examined the impact of immigration policies on social programs recommended universal access to social programs for *all* immigrants. Their reasoning for this recommendation is as follows:

When discussing public services, it is important to recognize who 'the public' is. The group felt that it was important to recognize that the public was in fact everybody in Canada. Immigrants, refugees and minorities are not a group separate from 'the public'. They have equal rights to available services.....

Recognizing that issues of jurisdiction and reform of social policy are topical these days, the group felt that the federal government should maintain a leadership or co-ordinating role in ensuring equal access to public services by all sectors of the public

including new immigrants. This is particularly important for the provision of services to assist in the integration of immigrants. (CIC, 1994i: 4-5)

The recommendations of these two Working Groups which challenge the fundamental assumptions of the textual reality being produced by the state were not allowed entry into the textual reality by not being included in either the interim or final reports. These two Working Groups were given no authority to speak, or to contribute towards the social construction of knowledge about *immigrants* which the state was engaged in producing. Instead, the textual practices of the state specifically made invisible these contributions in the following way:

Emerging out of all the study circles was the sense that the Department has lost control of immigration and that immigration levels must be set in accordance with some proof that the Department can coordinate the process, including integration. (CIC, 1994q: 52) (Emphasis in original)

The final report firmly countered the specific recommendations calling for increasing the access of sponsored immigrants to social programs by stressing the need for stronger management and increased control of this category. The contributions which challenged the underlying assumptions of the textual reality being produced were thus given no authority to speak. As Smith (1987, 1990) argues, the very construction of the textual reality puts individuals who challenge the underlying assumptions of this virtual reality outside the discourse. In this case, the contributors who sought to bring their 'knowledge' of the underlying social relations into the textual reality were left outside the 'national' debate. Textual practices allowed no voice for the lived experiences of *immigrants* to have the authority to speak in the consultations. Indeed, the 'knowledge-in-common' being produced by the state was based on the silencing of this lived actuality. In this way, the textual practices gave authority to speak to those participants whose contributions reaffirmed the textual reality. As Smith has pointed out, once the textual reality is entered, only questions of accuracy can be raised about certain issues from within this 'reality'. But these questions do not essentially rupture the textual reality constructed. The questions which do rupture this reality are not allowed entry.

The textual reality being produced in the consultation allows both right-wing anti-immigrant views and more liberal views to come to the same conclusion. If it is accepted that *immigrants* are engaged in massive abuse of social services, as the right-wing claims, then the 'solution' to cutting costs becomes restricting immigration. A more liberal view would reject this wholesale stereotyping and instead define *immigrants* who claim assistance as victims of economic and social conditions beyond their control, and as such, unwittingly precipitate a crisis in social services. The 'solution' to reducing costs in this liberal view would also be to reduce immigration levels, even if only as a temporary measure. The 'problem' constructed in the textual reality is such that there is only one 'solution' to it from within this reality. The state's ideological construction of *immigrants* as outsiders to the nation makes their unequal treatment by the Canadian state politically acceptable.

The important point here is not whether *immigrants* do or do not use social services. After all, the very basis for the creation of social programs, especially social assistance, is the recognition that individuals are not responsible for the labour market conditions which create unemployment and poverty, and that they need protection from economic cycles by having access to social programs. The point here is that defining *immigrants* as outsiders to the nation legitimizes their unequal rights. The point is not whether *immigrants* make claims to social programs, or whether they break sponsorship agreements, as the state claims they do.¹⁰⁷ The important point here is the state's *legitimization* and *normalization* of unequal rights and entitlements for *immigrants* through its ideological practices: the textual reality being produced makes it appear completely normal, completely natural, that 'they' should not

¹⁰⁷ The government claims the social assistance costs resulting from breakdown in sponsorships amounts to between \$600 and \$700 million annually. See CIC, (1994) *Into the 21st Century: A Strategy for Immigration and Citizenship*, p.39 Minister of Supply and Services, Canada. This document also states that 14% of family class claim social assistance, which is a lower rate than the 16% of Canadians who claim social services. Any claims made by the family category, of course, rely upon the discretion of provincial and municipal jurisdictions within which such claims are made. The sponsorship regulations, as I have discussed in Chapter Six, require that sponsored immigrants will be financially supported by their sponsor ((EIC, 1983)

have the same rights as 'us.'

While the text recommends a number of measures to restrict the numbers of the family category and its access to social programs, it simultaneously calls for increasing and easing the entry of the independent category. The texts recommend "aggressive" recruitment and "promotion" of this category, even specifically calling for increasing the numbers of the "economic" immigrants by correspondingly decreasing the family category so that overall immigration levels do not have to be increased. The texts construct the independent category as self-supporting, educated, highly qualified, hardworking, respectable, industrious, and therefore, deserving of citizenship in Canada.

Increasing the Control of Immigrant Women

After defining the family category as a costly, uncontrollable class, a proposal for introducing a "contextualized" system is offered in the final report. This "contextualized" system would evaluate applicants not only on the basis of their family relation to the sponsor, but also on the basis of the "actual emotional and material dependency or interdependency" between the sponsor and sponsored immigrant (CIC, 1994q: 28). The recommendation was made in the report of the Working Group mandated to examine the family category. The report states:

In recognition that the interests being served in family class immigration are both private and public, it was agreed that the predominant policy rationale for facilitating the immigration of family members to Canada should be to optimize the position of the sponsor within Canadian society by recognizing those relationships which are fundamental to sustained emotional and economic sharing, care, and support. If the policy rationale for admitting family members is to optimize the position of the sponsor in Canadian society, then family class immigration policy should accurately identify as family members those persons most able to contribute to the sponsor's functioning within Canadian society. (CIC, 1994n: 2)

This Group argued that sponsored immigrants support the integration of the sponsor. As such, the Group defined the value of the family category as being primarily in its contribution to the well-being of the sponsor. Therefore, the

Group proposed a “contextualized” definition of the family be used so that the sponsor can identify which family members will be most able to contribute to their well-being. The Group argued a “contextualized” system would also allow for family forms other than the nuclear one to become eligible. This proposal specifically recognized the extended family form and same-sex couple families. In this recognition, the proposal represents a progressive step. However, the manner in which this “contextualization” is proposed would greatly enhance the power of the sponsor, and of the state, over sponsored family members.

The *Immigration Act 1976-77* allows for the immigration of specific family members under the family category. These relations are not specifically tied to the sponsor’s interests, it is the family relation *per se* which makes family members eligible for sponsorship, not their particular servicing of the sponsor’s well-being. In defining “contextualization” as a means to “optimize the position of the sponsor,” and in urging recognition of only “those relationships which are fundamental to sustained emotional and economic sharing, care and support,” the recommendation increases the power of the sponsor to determine which family members are most able to serve them. The potential created here for the sponsor’s abuse of sponsored family members is tremendous.

The recommendation does not treat the family relations of *immigrants*, or the needs of all family members, as legitimate and valid in themselves. The only value of family members becomes defined in their contribution to the well-being of the sponsor. The proposal would greatly increase the power male sponsors already have over *immigrant* women and their children by allowing sponsors to determine what enhances their well-being, eroding further any power women might have in non-western family forms.

This particular recommendation also opens the door to sponsored family members having to prove to the state, and to the sponsor, their “commitment” to the sponsor. It opens up the most personal relationships between *immigrant* family members to scrutiny, testing and judgment. Increasing the state’s power to do this was specifically recommendation in the Report:

....officials would be called upon to make an holistic assessment of the authenticity of the family relationship based not upon categorical definitions, but upon flexible guidelines... (CIC, 1994n: 5)

The state would make the final decision on the sponsored immigrant's "commitment" to the sponsor, and here, the state's extended control over the *immigrant* families would become inevitable. This recommendation therefore, would result in increased regulation and surveillance of sponsored family members to prove to the state their "emotional" and "economic interdependency" with the sponsor.

The "contextualized" family form recommendation leaves it up to immigration officials to use their discretion through "flexible" guidelines to judge both the acceptable forms, and levels, of emotional commitment *immigrants* would be required to demonstrate. The recommendation to increase the internal controls of sponsored family members by giving them "conditional entry" which could be reassessed after a certain period of stay in the country.¹⁰⁸ Constructing *immigrant* families as less real and legitimate than *Canadian* families relies upon colonial stereotypes of "inferior" third world peoples who do not have 'real' family bonds. This recommendation brings to mind British immigration officers who, in the 1970s and 1980s, demanded that sponsored Asian women undergo virginity tests at airports to "prove" their "commitment" to their sponsoring fiances (Amos & Parmer, 1984; Wilson, 1978; WING, 1985). Black couples have also been questioned by immigration officers about "whether they had enjoyed their honeymoon and whether they normally slept together" (WING, 1985: 56), and their letters have been read to assess whether they demonstrate adequate "affection" for each other.

In examining the treatment of the family category, I was struck with the tremendous sense of power the participants seem to have felt over *immigrant* families. The family relations of *immigrants* are not defined as legitimate and valid in themselves. These relations gain legitimacy only by

¹⁰⁸ The basis upon which this re-assessment would take place was not specified in the report of the National Consultation.

proving to *Canadians* and 'their' state agencies that the commitment of *immigrant* family members to each other is valid. In other words, it is not enough that *immigrants* are family members, they would also have to provide proof that their family bonds are real. In this recommendation, as in all the others, the power of the state is claimed by the *Canadians* who experienced this state power as *their own power over immigrant families*.

Some of the submissions recommended the outright ending of family sponsorship for low income immigrants, as Working Group #8 did:

The income level for sponsorship must be high enough to provide adequately for those who are sponsored. Consideration should also be given to additional criteria to be met by the sponsor, to support the long run nature of the sponsorship - the initiative of the sponsor, employability and language skills. The Working Group was concerned that allowing individuals on welfare to sponsor members of their family added to economic costs and should be prohibited. By removing this privilege there would be an added incentive for the immigrant to find employment and integrate quickly. (CIC, 1994k: 11)

This recommendation shifts the responsibility for unemployment onto the sponsor's lack of incentive, and it penalizes *immigrants* who might claim welfare by requiring them to give up their families in exchange. An *immigrant's* very right to have a family should be contingent upon their financial worth, recommend far too many of the submissions made in the public consultations. The final report recommends:

...many feel that sponsored parents are often too aged to work and place a strain on the social and medical systems. In addition, many people feel that being separated from one's family is a choice that every immigrant must make when deciding to come to Canada.' (CIC, 1994q: 28)

What is striking about these words is that the *immigrant* who must make this "choice" is defined as someone who will remain an *immigrant*, having to live with this "choice" presumably even after becoming a *de jure* citizen.

Conclusion

Appealing to *Canadian* 'citizens' in overtly racialized ways, the state sought to nationalize them through the public consultations into defending the nation for the 21st century. The IPR process enabled the state to claim to be the legitimate defender of the 'national' interest against *immigrants* in general, and *immigrant* women in particular. Further, the IPR enabled the state to claim a partnership between nation and state on the basis of "shared goals" and "shared responsibilities" between "government and its citizens" (CIC, 1994q:1).

In the textual reality produced by the state, whether 'economic,' 'social' and 'cultural,' or linguistic criteria are used for immigrant selection, the family category is placed in a no-win situation. It would come up short on 'economic' criteria in having been ideologically constructed as making no 'economic' contribution to the nation and representing instead a burden on the nation's resources. The family category would likewise come up short on the 'social' and 'cultural' criteria in having been ideologically constructed as 'culturally' and 'socially' diverse, and as such, undermining the national character as well as increasing racial 'tensions.'

Once the textual reality produced by this review is entered, the only way to maximize the 'economic' contributions of the immigration program lies in reducing the family category. The text's construction of this particular 'problem' leaves no other option, the logic in the textual reality becomes such as to rule out any other possibility, unless of course, the textual reality itself is rejected. In the same way, once it is accepted that the costs of immigration need to be cut back, the only option left is for *immigrants* to pay for these services themselves. In other words, the construction of the 'problems' with the family category can only lead to the 'solutions' proposed in the texts unless the entire conceptual framework, and its underlying assumptions, are fundamentally re-conceived. The contributions of a number of Working Groups which attempted to rupture the textual reality being produced by the state by challenging some of these assumptions were silenced in the final reports. These attempts to critique the objectified 'knowledge' organized by the textual practices from an oppositional position were made invisible: they were

given no authority to 'speak' within the textual reality. In this way, the textual reality produced organizes the nationalizing of *Canadians* to close the ranks of the nation against *immigrants* in general, and *immigrant* women in particular. This reality constructed by the state points to *immigrant* women and the family category as responsible for the most significant 'problems' of immigration facing the nation and its state for the 21st Century. The ideological (re)construction of *immigrant* women as outsiders to the nation enabled the state to build the political support necessary for the subsequent restructuring of the immigration program, and for legitimizing the state-nation partnership in this endeavor.

The Immigration Policy Review ended with the tabling in Parliament by then Minister of Immigration and Citizenship, Sergio Marchi, of the Annual Report to Parliament for the years 1995-2000, *A Broader Vision: Immigration and Citizenship*, and of the long term strategy for immigration. *Into the 21st Century: A Strategy for Immigration and Citizenship*, on November 1, 1994. The Strategy Plan has been defined by the state as the basis for immigration policy into the 21st Century. As such, it is an extremely significant document, and a number of the recommendations contained within it were implemented in 1995. In implementing these policy changes, the state claimed to be acting only on the wishes expressed by *Canadians* during the consultations: "Today we are making the decisions that Canadians expect of us and participants in the consultations asked us to make," the Immigration Minister stated (CIC, 1994r: 2). These policy changes will be examined in the next Chapter.

CHAPTER NINE
FORTIFYING THE NATION AND CITIZENSHIP

Our citizenship is not just a right. It is a privilege respected around the world. Whether acquired by birth or by choice, our citizenship offers equality, participation and inclusion, and also the responsibility to contribute to our nation-building.

Minister Marchi, (CIC, 1994s: 2)

Introduction

In Chapters Seven and Eight I discussed textual realities produced by the ideological practices of the state in the Social Security Review and the Immigration Policy Review. Both reviews identified the major 'problems' in both policy areas from the state's perspective of ruling, and as such, incorporated the relations of ruling into the realities under construction. These textual realities were made actionable through a number of significant policy changes introduced in 1995: the policy changes imposed the textual realities produced onto actuality. In this Chapter I examine these policy changes, specifically: the reduction of immigration levels and the shift in the composition of immigration to increase the independent category and reduce the family category; the strengthening of sponsorship regulations and the mechanisms for enforcement; the (re)introduction of the head tax; the replacing of the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) with the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST), and; the proposed amendment to the Citizenship Act to end the right of children born in Canada to automatically become eligible for citizenship.

I argue these changes will significantly reduce the access of third world women to formal citizenship in Canada and reproduce the unequal access of sponsored *immigrant* women to social entitlements. The reduction in the overall immigration levels and the further reduction to the family category, the reintroduction of the head tax and the strengthening of sponsorship regulations will have a disproportionate impact on *immigrant* women by greatly reduce their ability to enter Canada as permanent residents. Restricting the

presence and rights of *immigrant* women will strengthen the reproduction of the 'whiteness' of the *Canadian* nation.

Further, while immigration policy regulates the access of the independent and family categories to social security programs, the introduction of the CHST will erode the discretionary access sponsored immigrants have been able to gain to social assistance programs at the provincial level. The CHST ended federal standards for social assistance programs, devolving power to the provincial government for the social security system. Consequently, the possibility of sponsored immigrants being able to gain access to these programs across the country has been made near impossible with this ending of federal standards. Increasing enforcement of sponsorship agreements by provincial governments being given the powers to prosecute defaulting sponsors will increase the incentive of sponsors to increase control over their sponsored relatives: sponsors will face the threat of prosecution in cases of sponsorship breakdown. The specific measures for exchange of information between the federal and provincial governments in tracking sponsorship enforcement will result in provincial social security systems being used by the federal Immigration Department for the surveillance of sponsored *immigrants'* access to social security programs.

Finally, the state announced its intention to amend the *Citizenship Act* so that all children born in Canada will not automatically become eligible for Canadian citizenship. Instead, the state proposes to make eligibility for citizenship contingent upon the legal status of parents. This amendment, if implemented, will work as a policy of repatriation for mothers of specific Canadian-born children. Women who do not have permanent residency in Canada will be forced to either leave the country or give birth to children who will be unable to claim citizenship, and potentially be made stateless. Although this change has not yet been implemented, the state has begun the process to build the political climate to implement it by constructing this as a 'problem' for *Canadians*. I argue this amendment is a necessary one if a migrant labour force is to be maintained as a permanent feature of the Canadian economy for the 21st century. I end this Chapter with a brief discussion of the Report, *Not Just Numbers: A Canadian Framework for Future Immigration*, commissioned by

the state in 1997. This Report reiterates many of the recommendations made in the Immigration Policy Review, and as such, represents a continuity with the IPR. The *Report's* contribution to the state's *Strategic Plan* lies in its specific proposal for a new Immigration and Citizenship Act. The Report is currently under consideration by the federal government, and I argue it shares the IPR's conceptual framework, and many of the IPR's recommendations.

The policy changes implemented by the state since 1995, as well as those currently under consideration, represent a fortification of the ideological borders of the nation against *immigrant* women. These changes aim to significantly reduce the family category, and as such, to reduce the entry of third world women into Canada as permanent residents, a status which enables them to make claims to citizenship in Canada. My major argument in this Chapter is that the relative liberalization of Immigration and Citizenship policy introduced in the 1970s has come to an end in the 1990s as the state is moving to, once again, significantly restrict immigration from the third world.

Reducing The Numbers: Transforming 'Quantity' Into 'Quality'

The days when Canada required a large pool of unskilled labour are long gone. Today, the country needs people who are entrepreneurial, have good language skills and are able to adjust to a rapidly changing labour market. The criteria used to select immigrants must reflect this change.

(CIC, 1994t: 14)

Whereas the Liberal Party had promised immigration levels of 1% of the population in the Red Book, their election platform of 1993, the Immigration Review was used to justify setting lower immigration levels for the next five years. The 1% pledge would have set the annual level at 300,000 immigrants. Instead, the Minister announced that immigration levels for 1995 would be in the range of 190,000 to 215,000 immigrants. As the government estimated that out-migration from Canada in that year would be in the range of 50,000, the net immigration level in reality would be lower at around 140,000-165,000 immigrants (CIC, 1994t). The net level would therefore be closer to half of one percent of the population. Where the textual reality produced in the

Immigration Policy Review defined the 'quantity' of immigrants as a 'problem.' the five year plan reduces immigration levels for the five year period from 1995 to 2000.

The five year plan also announced a further reduction in the family category, which had accounted for 111,000 immigrants in the 1994 plan. The 1995 plan reduced this figure to between 86,000-90,000, setting the level at 21,000-25,000 lower than the previous year. The independent category was to be reduced from 30,700 to 24,000-26,000 in 1995; and the dependents of independent applicants were to be reduced from 43,000 in 1994 to 32,000-35,000 in 1995.¹⁰⁹ Business entrepreneurs would also be reduced, as would the dependents of these entrepreneurs (CIC, 1994t). This reduction in levels for the independent category validate the IPR texts which noted that Canada is competing with many other countries for highly skilled independent applicants.

While both the independent and family categories were reduced in 1995, the five year Plan outlined not only a reduction in overall immigration levels, but also a significant shift in the balance between the independent and family categories. Referring to the independent category as the "economic" category, the Plan projected that in the five year period between 1995 and 2000, the "economic" category was to be increased from representing 43% of all immigration to 53% ,¹¹⁰ while the family category was to be reduced from representing 51% of total immigration to 44% (CIC, 1994t: 13).¹¹¹ Therefore,

¹⁰⁹ The family members accompanying the independent category are listed separately. Therefore the level quoted for the family category would be primarily for family reunification.

¹¹⁰ In his speech, the Minister says the economic immigrants will increase to 55 percent on p.3 of his Speaking Notes. I will use the 53 percent figure, however, as that is the figure released in the Tables for the 5-year Plan.

¹¹¹ In listing these percentages, the Plan includes in the family category both family reunification and family members accompanying independent immigrants. Under the 'Economic' category, it includes both the independent and business categories. A miscellaneous category, called 'other', is to be reduced from 6% of the total to 3% (CIC, 1994t: 13).

while overall immigration levels were to be reduced, the “economic” category was to be increased by a full 10% during this five year period, and the family category was to be reduced by 7%. This change would represent a significant shift in the composition of immigration. Increasing the ‘economic’ category would give greater priority to family members accompanying these ‘economic’ immigrants than to family reunification for sponsors who are already in the country. The Strategy document announced that quotas were to be introduced in immigration levels so that shortfalls in any one category could not be made up in any one year by increases to the other categories: “Management tools, including numerical limits, will be introduced where needed to maintain the relative shares of the various categories” (CIC, 1994u: xv).

The processing of entrepreneurs was to be expedited and the recruitment of entrepreneurs would focus on attracting applicants with strong business backgrounds. Overall, the strategic Plan states that ‘economic’ immigration is to be strengthened and “integrated into government’s economic agenda and with foreign relations plans for particular countries, regions and emerging export markets” (CIC, 1994u: xi). The Plan links the recruitment of the independent category to the trade liberalization agenda of the state, announcing that “foreign relations plans” are to be drawn up with particular countries. The recruitment of the independent category has been “passive” in the past, the Plan argues, and a more “active recruitment and promotional strategy” to “attract highly-skilled, well-educated independent immigrants and business people” is needed (CIC, 1994u: 35). The five year Plan notes that ‘economic’ immigration applications have decreased since 1992, and that many other countries in North America, Europe and Asia are also competing for the same pool of skilled, highly educated workers (CIC, 1994t: 7).

The Strategic Plan announced that the point system is to undergo changes in order to “improve selection.” The objective of this “improved selection” is to ensure that “a greater share of immigrants who can participate fully in Canadian society will be selected,” thereby reducing the ‘costs’ of immigration. ‘Independent’ immigrants are to be selected on the basis of their “potential for success” which is to be determined by criteria such as “language, age, education and employability” (CIC, 1994u: 19). Whereas the point system

assessed independent applicants on the basis of their education, skills and occupation, the new "economic" immigrants will be selected with stronger emphasis on their "potential for success":

Selection will no longer focus on an applicant's intended occupation. Revised criteria will emphasize a person's potential for long-term success, based on education, experience, language skills, age, employability and adaptability to the changing labour market. While the current "point system" takes these criteria into account, there is a need to identify and emphasize those qualities which signal the greatest potential for success. (CIC, 1994u: 29)

The changes to the selection process will favour those immigrants identified as being most compatible with the nation. The racialization/nationalization of European immigrants as 'future citizens' helps them succeed in becoming members of the nation. These immigrants will continue to be considered more likely to succeed on the basis of their "adaptability" to *Canadian* life, their sharing of the social and cultural character of the nation, and their fluency in the national languages. However, the shortage of European immigrants means that Canada will have to look to third world countries for highly skilled immigrants. The changes announced in the Plan will allow the state the flexibility to recruit the professional and educational elites from third world countries into Canada. However, the ideological racialized (re)construction of the national character which was deeply integrated into defining the immigration priorities for the future - as I have discussed in Chapter Eight - mean these third world immigrants will have to negotiate their relatively privileged class position as highly skilled workers with their racialized status as 'culturally' and 'socially' diverse from the nation.

The Plan announced that costs of integration services such as language programs and other settlement programs will be shifted from "taxpayers to those who benefit directly from these services" (CIC, 1994u: 25). In addition to proposing the use of language criteria for immigrant selection, the state plans to select only those immigrants who can afford to finance their own settlement costs. Women will be disproportionately affected by these selection criteria as a result of their unequal access to financial resources, and sponsored *immigrant* women will have no access to these programs unless their sponsors undertake

the financial responsibility for them to do so.

The immigration program is also to "further centralize" the overseas medical assessments of immigrants. As third world countries currently receive a lower share of immigration department resources (Jakubowski, 1997; Abu-Laban, 1998; Das Gupta, 1995), it would be a fair assessment to suggest this "centralization" will further erode the access of applicants to medical tests in these countries. Additionally, the state will increase the use of intelligence, security and transportation agencies to "identify criminal and security threats" (CIC, 1994u: xii). The policing function of transportation agencies will receive greater emphasis, which can be anticipated to increase the racialized harassment of *immigrants* at the borders.

Where the textual reality produced through the IPR constructs the 'quality' of immigrants as a threat to the nation, eroding the national character and responsible for the 'social' and 'cultural' diversity which would create "racial tensions," the strategic plan acted to significantly reduce the family category. The dominance of the family category over the independent category was one of the results of the *Immigration Act* of 1976-77. Prior to the introduction of the *Act*, the immigration of women from third world countries was minuscule. As I argued in Chapter Six, the domination of the family category over the independent category allowed the provision of the cheapened labour of *immigrant* women to the economy. Since the 1970s, however, the expansion of the temporary employment program means that the provision of the cheapened labour of migrant workers can be provided on an expanded basis (Singh-Bolara, 1992; Sharma, 1995). Reducing the family category will not end the provision of cheapened third world labour to the economy: this labour will be provided by migrant workers, many of whom are likely to be women, instead of *immigrant* women. Indeed, the Immigration Department plans to streamline the processing of temporary foreign workers to expedite their entry to meet specific labour requirements of employers, the Strategic Plan stated.

The Canadian state is shaping immigration policy in a manner which ensures historical continuities in this policy in racializing the *Canadian* nation. The changes planned are both quantitative, as well as qualitative. They seek to

improve the 'quality' of immigrants by introducing restrictions which are planned to reduce the permanent residence of *immigrant* women in Canada. In reducing the family category, third world women's access to formal citizenship in Canada is being significantly reduced. The changes which increase restrictions on the immigration of third world women into Canada "will help build our nation," the five year plan states. The changes are "shaping the nation's future" (CIC, 1994t: ii). The state plans to strengthen the reproduction of the 'whiteness' of the nation by continuing to ideologically distinguish between *future citizens* and *immigrants* and by reducing the entry of third world women for permanent residency.

Strengthening Sponsorship

The textual reality produced through the Immigration Policy Review constructs the family category as presenting the greatest challenge to the integrity, management and cost effectiveness of the immigration program. The Strategic Plan announced changes to the sponsorship regulations for this category in order to "ensure sponsorship is respected as a serious commitment and that sponsors are willing and capable of meeting their obligations" (CIC, 1994u: 37). These changes will include: "new financial standards" for sponsorship; a "new sponsorship agreement" which will be easier to enforce; a financial guarantee, and; greater federal provincial cooperation to track and act upon sponsorship breakdown (CIC, 1994u: 39-41). New regulations will also be drawn up to define "excessive demand" to protect health and social services (CIC, 1994u: xiv). "Excessive demand" will become "ground for disqualification for visitors and immigrants seeking to come into Canada or already in the country, when it can be reasonably expected that their demands on health and social services would exceed the average *per capita* cost" (CIC, Annex 1, 1994u: 3).

Further, the Plan states that the family category is to be made more flexible: "Consideration will be given to allow Canadians to choose who they will sponsor" (CIC, 1994u: 42). To increase the flexibility of the family category, sponsors will be allowed to choose which relatives are to be included in the family category. As I have discussed in the previous chapter, while this change

will allow the sponsoring of same-sex partners, it will also will strengthen the power of sponsors and increase the vulnerability and dependency of sponsored *immigrants*. The family category will also be changed so that family members other than spouses and dependent children will be put in a separate category (CIC, 1994u: 43). This particular change will strengthen the definition of the 'family' as the 'nuclear family' by ending the eligibility of extended family members to immigrate under this category.

Following the tabling of the Strategic Plan, a number of changes to sponsorship regulations were introduced in 1995. These changes were outlined in the document, *Strengthening Sponsorship*. The new regulations are introduced with the acknowledgment that while the "majority of sponsors fulfill their responsibilities, a significant number do not" (CIC, 1995v:1).¹¹² The changes introduced, however, were to apply to *all* sponsorship agreements. Where the textual reality produced through the Immigration Policy Review constructed the family category as responsible for over-burdening social services, these new sponsorship regulations use this "increased burden" as justification for introducing the following three-part strategy focusing on strengthening eligibility criteria, tracking sponsorship agreements and greater sanctions for sponsorship breakdown to ensure enforcement of the sponsorship agreements.

Strengthening Eligibility Criteria:

The first part of the strategy introduces new criteria for assessing the eligibility of sponsors to ensure they have adequate financial resources for sponsorship. The new criteria requires sponsors to demonstrate they have not claimed any form of social assistance or income support programs, including subsidized housing, in the twelve months immediately prior to making the sponsorship application. If the prospective sponsor has defaulted on any financial debt, or on a previous sponsorship agreement, they become ineligible

¹¹² As noted in the previous Chapter, the Immigration Review documents had stated that sponsorship breakdowns cost between \$600 and \$700 million annually (CIC, 1994u: 39).

for sponsorship. Whereas the sponsor was required to undertake financial responsibility for their sponsored family members, the assessment of the sponsor's financial status will now be based on the incomes of both the sponsor and their spouse. Sponsorship will be allowed only if their combined income, less their financial obligations, is considered enough to cover the minimal expenses of the sponsored immigrant.

Further, the sponsorship agreement will be rewritten to stress more clearly the obligations of the sponsor and to point out that the sponsor and the sponsored immigrant are both responsible for meeting the needs of the family. The regulations state that the new sponsorship agreement is required to "explain that the sponsored immigrant is not eligible for support through federal, provincial or municipal social assistance programs" (CIC, 1995v: 6). This new agreement will be a contract signed by both the sponsor and the sponsored immigrant, and should the sponsor be married, the sponsor's spouse will also be required to sign it. The contract will be binding for ten years. It will be made available to the provincial and municipal levels of government for enforcement.

Tracking Sponsorship Agreements:

The second part of the strategy relates to the tracking of sponsorship agreements to ensure that default does not occur, and that sponsored immigrants do not make claims upon social assistance programs. In those cases where the sponsor defaults on the agreement, the federal government will take steps to "encourage" the sponsor to resume their financial obligations.

The federal government will work with the provincial and municipal levels of government to prevent sponsored immigrants making claims to social assistance programs by developing effective means of exchanging information, and by involving the provincial and municipal governments in the enforcement of the sponsorship contract. Provincial and municipal governments will increase their assessment of social assistance applicants. If these applicants are found to be sponsored immigrants, provincial and municipal agencies will

inform the federal government. In exchange, the federal government provide information to provinces and municipalities so they can stop the access of sponsored immigrants to social assistance and recoup any expenses they might have incurred from the sponsors. Further, the federal government will help to improve information exchange with the other levels of government by using improved technology, as well as by setting up more pilot projects¹¹³ with other levels of government in order to deter sponsorship default. The Strategic Plan announced:

CIC is redesigning systems to link processes in a continuum from immigration application to citizenship acquisition to passport issuance (in cooperation with Foreign Affairs) in order to improve service, protect system integrity and facilitate cooperation across government. (CIC, 1994u: xiv)

The sponsorship regulations outline how this tracking will be organized through the establishment of effective information exchange networks between the different levels of government. The Strategic Plan announced that a similar tracking of immigrants was to be pursued at the international level in order to “enhance control and enforcement activities” of the immigration program (CIC, 1994u: xiv).

Sanctions for Sponsorship Breakdown:

Whereas the state will take a number of steps to “encourage” sponsors to live up to their obligations, the third part of the strategy outlined in the sponsorship regulations is to improve enforcement of sponsorship agreements by introducing stronger sanctions when sponsors default on their contracts. The federal government will introduce the legislative changes necessary to allow the following sanctions to be imposed: garnishing the sponsor’s wages;

¹¹³ The Plan makes reference to the Peel pilot project in existence at the time these changes are introduced. This pilot project was designed to “encourage” defaulting sponsors to resume their obligations by writing them letters, followed with interviews with both the sponsor and sponsored immigrants. In this project, the immigration office continues to check with the local welfare authorities whether the sponsored immigrants continue to receive social assistance.

collecting support payments through the sponsor's income tax returns; and referring default cases to collection agencies. The federal government will also consider the option of withholding passports or denying citizenship to defaulting sponsors as appropriate forms of sanction in the future. The federal government will also make the changes necessary to enable provincial governments to prosecute sponsors.

The sponsorship regulations mention there will be exceptions to these sanctions in cases of "legitimate" sponsorship breakdown:

These sanctions may not be appropriate in cases of legitimate sponsorship default, for example, spousal abuse. The government and the provinces will establish administrative guidelines to deal with cases of legitimate breakdown. This will ensure that no one is denied essential support and that enforcement of sponsorship obligation does not worsen any situation of abuse or hardship.(CIC, 1995v: 8-9)

In defining "spousal abuse" as a "legitimate" cause for sponsorship breakdown, sponsored *immigrant* women have to be abused, and be able to prove this to the state, for the state to consider as legitimate these women's access to the social security system. Given that even *Canadian* women have not been able to get state agencies to treat seriously charges of spousal abuse (Lakeman, 1993), to expect that the state to treat as serious and legitimate the abuse of *immigrant* women is a highly optimistic expectation.

The other exception to be defined as a "legitimate" case of sponsorship breakdown is the case of the sponsor who might "lose employment through no fault" (CIC, 1995v: 8-9). However, the regulations do not specify how "legitimate" cases will be assessed, nor do they indicate that these exceptions will be incorporated into the contract to be signed by the sponsor and the sponsored immigrant.

The 1995 *Sponsorship Regulations* state that in addition to introducing the new measures, the federal government does not rule out the introduction of a financial guarantee in the form of a sponsorship bond for the future. The Strategic Plan includes this as an option under consideration:

Discussions with provinces, non-governmental organizations, the public and financial institutions, sponsors will begin on the

possible introduction of a financial guarantee or 'sponsorship bond.' (CIC, 1994u: 40)¹¹⁴

The changes introduced in 1995, as well as those which have been identified for future action, will further reduce immigration under the family category, in addition to redefining it as the nuclear family. Strengthening the sponsorship agreement and its enforcement will result in financially secure sponsors being allowed to sponsor family members. Low income and unemployed sponsors, who faced difficulties in sponsoring family members prior to the introduction of these regulations, will now encounter even more obstacles by the new regulations. The impact of the new regulations will be class specific and take immigration policies back to the early 20th century policies when the merchants and other businessmen of the 'non-preferred races' could bring their family members with them, but not workers. Should the sponsorship bond become implemented, its effect will clearly be class specific. The changes already introduced by the *Sponsorship Regulations*, and those under consideration for the future, mean that the right of *immigrants* to live with their family will be decided on the basis of their financial status.

Giving the provinces power to prosecute defaulting sponsors will work to increase the sponsor's incentive to control sponsored immigrants even more closely. The stakes are made very high for sponsors who will be threatened with prosecution, and with the other sanctions currently under consideration. The sponsor's control of the sponsored immigrant in order to restrict them from making claims to social assistance becomes even more significant. These regulations give sponsors increased motivation to ensure the sponsored immigrant's dependency upon the sponsor does not end. The changes also mean that sponsors who are citizens, and who might themselves have access to social security programs, will be denied access to these programs if they want to sponsor family members. Requiring the sponsor's

¹¹⁴ As mentioned in the previous Chapter, a proposal made by Don DeVoretz to the Immigration Department is that the sponsorship bond be set at \$20,000. DeVoretz states that this proposal has been 'recently accepted for consideration by the minister of immigration' (DeVoretz, 1994: 7-8).

spouse to be a party to the sponsorship contract means spouses will also be contractually obligated to maintain sponsored family members, or face prosecution by the provinces. In cases of the marital breakdown of sponsors, spouses could be held liable for living up to the sponsorship agreement even if they separate from the sponsor.

The changes proposed to ensure sponsorship enforcement will result in the entire social security system at the provincial and municipal levels becoming involved in the surveillance and policing of sponsored immigrants for the federal government.¹¹⁵ As a result of the racialization of the category of *immigrant*, all women of colour can be anticipated to be subjected to increased scrutiny and to bear the onus of proving they are eligible to claim entitlements which they might have legal rights to. Given the systemic and structural nature of racism in Canadian society, this increased surveillance and policing will affect all people of colour, whatever their actual legal status. The increased surveillance will work as a further deterrence to all people of colour from claiming social entitlements.

A significant consequence of stronger communications and information exchange networks between the different levels of government will be to strengthen the partnership between the federal, provincial, and municipal levels of government. The restructuring of the welfare state has resulted in an increasing devolution of powers over social programs to the provincial level, weakening the federal/provincial relationship. The federal government is using the area of immigration policy to strengthen federal/provincial relations. The

¹¹⁵ In Britain, the Women Immigration and Nationality Group, concluded its study of immigration and nationality legislation and anti-racist campaigns organized by activists to conclude: "It has become increasingly common for authorities other than immigration officers to question the immigration status of black and Third World people living in Britain. This occurs not only in connection with employment, but with access to education, health and welfare benefits. Many black people, even if they have lived here for most of their lives, now expect to be asked for their passports or to prove their status in many different circumstances - indeed, this has almost become routine" (WING, 1985: 142). WING notes that the staff of the Department of Health and Social Security have been given an internal manual which tell them to 'ask 'people who appear to have come from abroad' for passports' though it gives no guidance on how to recognize these people' (WING, 1985: 143).

federal government is using the controlling of the access of immigrants to social assistance programs to build a common cause with provincial governments.

Increased surveillance by the federal government will inevitably erode whatever discretionary access *immigrant* women have been able to gain to social assistance programs at the provincial level. While control over the provision of social assistance programs is being provincialized through changes to social policy, the power to deny sponsored *immigrant* women access is being centralized by the Immigration Department. The role of immigration policy in regulating access to social security programs is being strengthened and more effectively enforced for the 21st century.

Reintroducing the Head Tax

The head tax imposed on immigrants to stop the migration of the *non-preferred races* in the late 19th and early 20th centuries has already been discussed in earlier chapters. The head tax imposed upon Chinese immigrants has been defined as the single most important factor in limiting the immigration of Chinese women into Canada. It has also been credited with causing many Chinese immigrants living in Canada to return to China because the head tax made it impossible for family members to join them in Canada (Adilman, 1984). The state re-introduced this head tax on immigrants in the 1995 Federal Budget, setting it at the sum of \$975.00.¹¹⁶

An immigration fee and sponsorship financial guarantees will be used to promote self-reliance among newcomers to Canada, reduce costs to taxpayers, and shift more responsibility to those who directly benefit from the management of Canada's immigration programs (Finance, 1995:33).

The textual reality produced through the Immigration Policy Review repeatedly directed attention to the 'economic costs' of immigration which *Canadian*

¹¹⁶ The official state name for this new head tax is the Right of Landing Fee. However, immigrant organizations and feminist organizations have defined this as a head tax on immigrants. I will use the definition of these organizations, and not the state term, in referring to this fee as the head tax.

taxpayers were responsible for. The strategic plan took these 'costs' as the rationale for putting forward a number of options to generate more revenues:

Australia has moved in this direction by introducing an "English Education Charge" which is used to offset the cost of language training for adult migrants. Another option for Canada would be to charge all immigrants a fee to cover settlement service costs. A third option would be to charge a fee to individual immigrants for the services they use. The government could provide services only to refugees and let others obtain services on their own, or use funds generated by the business immigration program to finance settlement services. (CIC, 1994u: 25)

Both the Strategic Plan and the Budget Plan state that the costs of settlement services be paid for by immigrants themselves through the collection of a specific "fee" from every immigrant. The state argues the costs of settlement services should not be borne collectively by all taxpayers, but directly through this tax on immigration. The significance of presenting the head tax in this way serves to hide the reality that *immigrants* are also taxpayers once they enter the country and find employment, and that *immigrants* contribute to the revenues which fund social programs for *Canadians*. The head tax requires immigrants to fund 'their' settlement costs and *then* also fund 'our' social programs. The distance between the nation and *immigrants* is ideologically increased as the state legitimizes the position that *Canadians* pay taxes for 'our' social programs, and 'immigrants' pay the head tax for 'their' settlement programs. This ideological practice reinforces the *immigrants* as being outside the social collective that is the *Canadian* nation.

The head tax will, as it is intended to, reduce legal immigration from third world countries. It will particularly reduce the legal immigration of third world women as a result of their unequal access to financial resources. While the head tax applies to all immigrants, its impact will be racialized in addition to being gendered because it will disproportionately increase the costs of migration for immigrants from third world countries which have lower per capita incomes than do the European countries.

One year after the introduction of the head tax, the Canadian Council for Refugees conducted a study in order to assess what the impact of the head tax has been. The Council began with the following assumptions:

Three types of effects can be envisaged:

(1) Some people who might otherwise have immigrated to Canada (under the family class or in one of the categories of independent immigrants or as refugees) do not come because the Right of Landing Fee together with processing fees was prohibitive. This is likely to be the case predominantly with economically disadvantaged classes of people and those from parts of the world with income levels markedly inferior to Canadian levels.

(2) Some new permanent residents begin their lives in Canada with a significant debt burden as a result of borrowing money to cover the ROLF. This debt burden may affect their integration into Canadian society.

(3) Some people, notably persons determined to be refugees in Canada, delay their applications for permanent residence or are unable to apply because they cannot gather the money for the ROLF. This will in turn delay or prevent family reunification with spouses and/or children who remain overseas.(CCR,1997) ¹¹⁷

The Council's Report examined case studies of refugees, concluding many are experiencing significant hardships as a result of being required to pay the head tax. Many refugees are delaying their applications to become landed immigrants. The Report points out that refugees are using social assistance benefits to pay the tax, instead of using these benefits for their basic necessities. Single mothers with children are particularly affected, and many refugees are being forced into low wage work to pay the tax. Borrowing money at high interest levels and leaving family members behind in their countries of origin are some of the "choices" these refugees have to make. "People are complaining of not sleeping, not eating, depression, paranoia, and inability to concentrate because of their preoccupation with raising the necessary money," the Report concludes (CCR, 1997: 6). Although the Report is specifically concerned with refugees, the Report compares family category applications for the years 1994 and 1996, arguing that at least one significant factor which accounts for the reduction in applicants under this category is the burden

¹¹⁷ The Canadian Council for Refugees uses the state's term for the head tax, which is the Right of Landing Fee. The Report summarizes the findings of interviews with counselors at Refugee and Immigrant service agencies as well as surveys on the impact of this Fee conducted in the summer of 1996.

imposed by the head tax (CCR, 1997). The head tax, tried and tested by the Canadian state in the earlier part of this century, has again become a part of the state's repertoire to control immigration for the 21st century.

The Canada Health and Social Transfer

The Social Security Review process was cut short by the Federal Budget of 1995, which introduced the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) to replace the CAP and the Established Program Funding (which provided federal funding for health and education programs). The CHST came into effect on April 1st, 1996 (Finance, 1995:52). The shift from the CAP to the CHST represented a fundamental transformation in federal/provincial funding relationship for social assistance programs. Most importantly, this change replaced federal standards which were previously attached to federal transfers with unconditional block funding, as well as reducing federal funding by \$4.5 billion in the three years following the introduction of the CHST (NAPO, 1995). The CHST brought an end to all federal standards for social assistance programs, with the exception that provinces could not impose a residency requirement in the provision of social assistance (Finance, 1995; Pulkingham & Ternowetsky, 1996; Battle & Torjman, 1996; Jennissen, 1996).

The Canada Assistance Plan was a cost-sharing plan between the federal and provincial governments in providing social assistance services across the country. Prior to the introduction of CAP in 1966, the federal government cost shared with the provinces services for certain sectors of the population, such as welfare programs for the elderly and for people with disabilities. CAP changed the ad-hoc nature of these services in a funding agreement whereby the federal government paid up to fifty per cent of social assistance costs. These services were to be co-funded and delivered by the provinces. As the Social Security Review pointed out, CAP helped "fund the development and maturation of the modern provincial social services systems we have today" (HRDC, GR, 1994: 71). The range of services covered by CAP included basic necessities such as food, shelter, clothing, household supplies, as well as special needs such as wheelchairs, prosthetics, home care, non-insured health services and other welfare services such as counseling and

assessment, child welfare and adoption, subsidized day care, etc. (HRDC, GP, 1994).

In exchange for the federal cost-sharing, social assistance programs were bound in principle by five federal standards: the right of recipients to income when in need; the right to an amount which meets basic requirements; the right to appeal denial of welfare; the right to income when in need regardless of province of residency, and; the right not to be forced to work for welfare (NAPO, 1995). These five standards were the most significant aspects of CAP. The CHST ended these federal standards and will be the “undoing of the welfare state” by creating “a patchwork of diverse provincial programs” (Pulkingham & Ternowetsky, 1996: 3). The programs funded under CAP were primarily the ‘female’ track of social assistance programs, serving more women than men. With the end of CAP, women will be more disproportionately affected by the CHST in the following ways: lesser funding will be available for these social assistance programs; cuts in the social service programs mean that women, who have had higher levels of employment in this area, will experience significant job losses, and; women have to provide the care which social services previously provided (Jennissen, 1996).

I have already demonstrated in earlier chapters that sponsored immigrants were denied entitlement to the social assistance programs funded under CAP through immigration regulations. Sponsored immigrants have been able to access these programs only at the discretion of provincial social assistance agencies, and only by proving to the state their sponsorship had irretrievably broken down. The introduction of the CHST means this discretionary access cannot be extended to the federal level with the ending of federal standards for social assistance programs. Additionally, the federal government’s reduction of federal transfer payments will increase pressure on provincial governments to end this discretionary access at the provincial level. Whereas the principles for the Social Security Reform was to create opportunity, to invest in people, and bring greater fairness in social security programs (HRDC, 1994a), the result of the restructuring has to reduce the access of all women to social assistance programs, as well as making it extremely difficult for sponsored *immigrant* women to acquire legal entitlement

to these programs.

The CHST will result in the reduced social rights for all 'citizens,' many of whom will be pushed into low wage work which was previously done by *immigrant* women. As Jane Pulkingham and Gordon Ternowetsky put it, "In the end, it is the ordinary people across this nation that will be most affected as the state continues to downsize its commitments and responsibilities for their collective well-being" (1996: vii). *Immigrant* women were not included in the state's "responsibility" for "collective well-being." They are now even further away from gaining equitable access to social entitlements. Instead, their very presence in the country as permanent residents is being severely restricted.

The CHST ensures that *immigrant* women's access to social security programs will be regulated through immigration policy, and will be policed by the Immigration Department in partnership with the social security machinery. It can be anticipated that as social assistance benefits are reduced with the reduction in federal transfers, racism against *immigrant* women, who have been ideologically constructed by the state as responsible for over-burdening social services, will increase.

While the CHST will weaken the role of the federal government with provinces gaining more control over social policy in the absence of federal standards, the federal government's role in policing access to provincial social security programs will be increased with the strengthening of the sponsorship contract. The restructuring of the welfare state is leading the federal government to give up its power in certain policy areas, while simultaneously increasing these powers in other policy areas, specifically in the area of immigration.

Amending the Citizenship Act

The Strategy Plan announced that in addition to implementing changes to immigration policy, the state was considering future changes to the *Citizenship Act*

The Plan renews our commitment to develop a new Citizenship Act designed to create a common bond between Canadians by birth and by choice. An increased emphasis on responsibilities,

apart from rights, will underline the value of citizenship for all Canadians. (CIC, 1994u: 4)

The legislative changes to be made will be to ensure the following:

A Citizenship Act must not only articulate, but reflect Canadian values. The new Act would ensure fairness and integrity. It would remove certain discriminatory aspects of current legislation, ensure that people receive equal treatment, eliminate inconsistencies in the granting of Canadian citizenship and improve the process of acquiring citizenship. A number of changes would be enacted to enhance the value of Canadian citizenship. (CIC, 1994u: 18)

While the Plan does not specify exactly what the specific changes to the *Citizenship Act* will be, it points out the direction of these changes will be to “widen the conditions under which granting citizenship will be prohibited” (CIC, 1994u: 59). The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration had studied the *Citizenship Act*, and in its Report of June, 1994, the Committee made specific recommendations for its amendment. The Report pointed out the *Citizenship Act* currently allows all children born in the country to become citizens. This, the Committee pointed out, is a ‘problem’ with the *Act*.

Recently, some have questioned this automatic right to citizenship by birth because of concerns that the provision may be subject to abuse. In particular, it appears that some women may be coming to Canada as visitors solely for the purpose of having their babies on Canadian soil, thereby ensuring Canadian citizenship for their children. (House of Commons, C&I, 1994: 17)

Although the Committee's Report “recognizes this does not appear to be a major problem” (House of Commons, C&I, 1994:17), the recognition does not stop the Committee from recommending amendments to the *Act* to ‘solve’ this problem. The Report does not specify who has “questioned” this right, nor does it cite any evidence that “abuse” of this right does indeed take place, or how extensive this abuse might be. The Immigration Review Consultations organized across the country certainly record no widespread ‘problem’ requiring attention. Speculation and innuendo are used by the Report to construct a

'problem' within the Citizenship Act, and to recommend the following change as a 'solution':

Children born in Canada should be Canadian citizens only if one or both of their parents is a permanent resident or Canadian citizen. Provision should be made to ensure that the rule need not apply if its application would cause the person born in Canada to be stateless. (House of Commons, C&I, 1994: 17)

The change being recommended would allow continued eligibility for citizenship for children born to citizens and permanent residents. The significant point in this recommendation is the transformation of eligibility for citizenship by virtue of birth in the country into citizenship by virtue of the legal status of parents. The inclusion of children of permanent residents as well as of citizens reduces the likelihood of resistance to the change. However, once this change is made, future changes to further restrict eligibility will become easier to introduce. Once the shift in principle is made and politically accepted, future changes might extend or restrict the grounds for exclusion from legal citizenship. But the principle of not allowing all children born in Canada to claim legal citizenship will have been legislated.

This change, if legislated, will make children born to women who are not permanent residents, for example, women who are visitors or, on temporary work permits and undocumented workers, ineligible for citizenship. There is very little information available on undocumented workers in Canada. However, in her study of the Long Term Illegal Migrant program initiated by the federal government between 1983 and 1985, Monica Boyd found that women represented half of the undocumented migrants who applied to the program for permanent residency (1987:7).¹¹⁸ In the past, therefore, women have been equally represented among undocumented workers, most of whom were from third world countries. As Boyd then pointed out, "the economic and political conditions which underlie South-North characteristics of the undocumented female migrant flow has not abated in recent years" (1987: 7). Although Boyd's

¹¹⁸ The applicants under this program had either overstayed the periods they were granted entry for, or had entered the country illegally.

study is now over a decade old, there is no reason to anticipate that the “South-North flow” of undocumented migrant workers she referred to, and the presence of women in this “flow” has changed much.

This proposed amendment to the *Citizenship Act* will have an uneven impact on the mothers of the children denied citizenship as a result of the gendered division of labour in society which puts the primary responsibility for child rearing onto women. Mothers who are undocumented or migrant workers will be faced with the option of leaving the country in order to prevent their children being born stateless, in which case this change will work as a policy of repatriation. Or the mothers of these children will have the option of continuing to live in Canada, but at the cost of making their children ineligible for citizenship in Canada. A number of theorists have argued that the Canadian state is creating a migrant labourforce as a permanent feature of the economy (Sharma, 1997; Singh Bolaria, 1992). The amendment to the *Citizenship Act* will ensure that women migrant workers do not escape their vulnerable status through their children’s citizenship.

In October, 1996, the results of an Angus Reid poll commissioned by the Immigration Department were released. The poll asked respondents whether children born in Canada should be granted citizenship “automatically.” The poll reported 57% of the respondents did not support the granting of citizenship to every child born in Canada.¹¹⁹ The commissioning of this poll by Immigration Department was part of the process by which the state is constructing a ‘problem’ in the *Citizenship Act* for *Canadians*. In commissioning the poll, this ‘problem’ was extended beyond being a concern of the state to being a concern for the nation.

The question of the repatriation of *immigrants* has become a politically volatile issue in a number of European countries, including Britain. In his study of racism and immigration policy in Britain, Bhikhu Parekh draws attention to the long history of repatriation in British state policy. He points

¹¹⁹ See Bronskill, J. ‘Automatic citizenship opposed’ in *The Vancouver Sun*, Oct. 16, 1996.

out the notion of repatriation is “clearly so bizarre” that it is not taken seriously by most theorists (Parekh 1974: 223). However, repatriation has re-emerged as a policy option for the British state in dealing with Black peoples since the 1970s (Parekh, 1974; Sivanandan, 1982). The Director of the Institute of Race Relations London argued that in the 1970s, the public debate on immigration and ‘race relations’ shifted from “immigration control to induced repatriation” (Sivanandan, 1982: 132). During this period of economic recession, the ‘problem’ of ‘race relations’ in Britain became constructed as “fewer blacks make for better race relations.” The media sensationalization of a few cases went a long way to create a “climate of opinion” which significantly increased public support for “induced repatriation” (Sivanandan, 1982: 36-139). In considering this particular amendment to the *Citizenship Act*, the Canadian state is signaling a willingness to adopt this strategy of “induced repatriation” into the 21st century.

The deportation of Canadians of Japanese origin solely on the basis of their ‘racial ancestry’ during World War II points to a history of racialized repatriation in Canada. The introduction of the head tax on Chinese immigrants resulted in the repatriation of those Chinese-Canadians who had settled in Canada, but decided to return to China upon being unable to bring their families to join them (Adilman, 1984). The historical precedent for state sanctioned repatriation exists in Canada. As Barbara Roberts has argued in her study of deportations from Canada between the years 1900 - 1935, the Canadian state deported various sectors of the population for a number of reasons:

Deportation helped to relieve employers, municipalities, and the state from the burdens of poverty, unemployment, and political unrest. Deportation helped the municipalities to “shovel out” some of their poor in much the same way as emigration had helped English parishes in the early nineteenth century, and reduced relief and other maintenance costs. Deportation removed workers when they became useless, surplus or obstreperous. It helped the state to reduce maintenance costs for some of its non-producing members, by deferring these costs to the economies of the sending countries. It also served some function of social and political control by eliminating social protesters. Deportation was a necessary part of immigration, the equivalent of the sewage system of cities. It was the drain through which our immigration refuse was directed, in order to assure that “the river of our

national life” would not be polluted by the turbid streams” of the immigrant unfit, unemployed, and unprofitable. (Roberts, 1988: 3)

The deportations studied by Roberts were not restricted to people of colour and were conducted for the wide-ranging reasons listed above, including for the reduction of welfare costs. The textual reality produced through the Immigration Policy Review went to great lengths to construct *immigrant* women as responsible for over-burdening social security programs, creating a favourable political climate for ‘solutions’ to this ‘problem’ which would relieve *Canadian* tax-payers of this “burden.” In constructing undocumented women as engaged in widespread “abuse” of the *Citizenship Act*, the state can draw upon this textual reality to now encompass this particular ‘problem.’

The deportation of immigrants and naturalized citizens who are convicted for criminal activity is established practice today, as is the deportation of refugees who are denied landed status. The proposal to amend the *Citizenship Act* demonstrates that the Canadian state is currently considering the repatriation of women in Canada on temporary and undocumented status, who have not been convicted of criminal activity, but who give birth on Canadian soil without themselves being citizens or permanent residents. Once this significant change in policy becomes politically acceptable, then the question which remains is that of who else, and under what conditions, should be repatriated. The question no longer remains *whether* they should be repatriated. Should this legislative change become implemented, half the battle of transforming state policy from immigration control to induced repatriation will have been won, setting the stage for expanding the conditions under which repatriation will be allowed in the 21st century.

Not Just Numbers

In 1997, a Report commissioned by the state, *Not Just Numbers: A Canadian Framework for Future Immigration*, was released. The Report was written by a group of independent consultants, and they incorporate many of the recommendations made in the Immigration Policy Review (Trempe, Kunin &

Davis, 1997). The recommendations of the Report are currently under consideration by the state, and in this section, I briefly discuss one of these recommendations, that of introducing a new Act relating to immigration and citizenship. I argue that the conceptual framework of this Report is the same as the one organized in the IPR, indeed, this Report operates within the textual reality produced by the state in the IPR.

Like the IPR, the Report re-iterates the racialized definition of the nation and 'national' values. It likewise links *immigrants* with over-burdening social services and increased crime. Many of the 172 recommendations made in the Report are the same as those made in the IPR, among which are the following: making "formal standardized language testing" in English and French a criteria for immigrant selection; further reinforce the ideological construction of the independent category as a 'self-supporting' class and focus on the 'human' capital of 'economic' immigrants; require the family category to demonstrate emotional and/or financial dependency on the sponsor; require immigrants to pay the costs of settlement services; require the sponsor to undertake financial responsibility for their 'dependents'; and end the assisted relative category.

One of the significant advances made by this Report on the Strategy Plan is its recommendation for a clear separation between the immigration and refugee components of the current immigration program. The Report recommends the creation of a separate Protection Act to cover refugees (Recommendation # 2) and the creation of a new Act which would combine legislation relating to immigration and citizenship (Recommendation #1). The Report recommends that the Act should include "explicit recognition of active participation in Canadian society as requisite for citizenship" (1997: 13). The criteria for demonstrating this "active participation" would be the following: employment; study in schools, colleges and universities; voluntary community service; and full-time care for dependent relatives (40). Applicants for citizenship would have to meet two of these four criteria.

If this proposal is accepted, access to citizenship for landed immigrants will be further restricted by the introduction of these additional criteria. Ideologically, the proposal serves to increase the distance between

Canadian society and *immigrants*. In making this recommendation, the *Report* reflects very clearly the direction set out in the Strategy Plan to amend the *Citizenship Act* in order to increase the grounds upon which Canadian citizenship can be denied.

Conclusion

In this Chapter, I discussed a number of major policy changes implemented by the state subsequent to the Immigration Policy Review and the Social Security Review. The Immigration Policy Review constructed *immigrant* women as a major 'problem' for the state to control and manage. The policy changes implemented will decrease the access of third world women to formal citizenship in Canada by restricting the conditions under which *immigrant* women can gain permanent residency. Changes to social policy will impose further restrictions on the access of all *immigrant* women to social assistance programs, as well as put social security agencies at the provincial level in the service of the federal Immigration Department to police sponsored immigrant women's claims to social assistance. The head tax will further reduce the numbers of third world immigrants who will be disproportionately impacted by this tax given the lower per capita income levels in third world countries.

The amendment to the *Citizenship Act* currently under consideration by the state will increase the grounds upon which the repatriation of certain groups of women and Canadian their children will be allowed. This amendment will strengthen the temporary employment program by denying women migrant workers access to permanent residency and citizenship through their children should they give birth while in Canada. Whereas the overall impact of these policy changes will be to reduce the number of *immigrant* women who can enter Canada as permanent residents, and become legally eligible for citizenship, the development of the temporary employment program will ensure the provision of the cheapened labour of third world women to the national economy.

CONCLUSION

I find myself suddenly in the world and I recognize that I have one right alone: That of demanding human behaviour from the other.

Frantz Fanon (1967: 229)

In Canada, nation-building is an activity carried on in the present, not just in the past. (CIC, 1994t:ii)

Citizenship in Canada has been created through the colonization/ racialization of Aboriginal peoples. This colonization has been ongoing: the transformation into the 'welfare' state in the Post World War II period, or indeed in the current phase of 'globalization,' has not transformed this fundamental reality. De-colonization in the settler state remains a goal for the future, it is not an accomplishment of the past.

Immigration policies have been central to the process of 'building' the Canadian nation from various migrating populations. These policies, therefore, came to regulate membership in the nation, and access to Canadian citizenship. Immigration policies were overtly racialized until the 1960s and 1970s, when a period of relative liberalization was ushered in as the *Immigration Act 1976, 1977* resulted in immigration from the third world outpacing that from European societies. That period of liberalization lasted for three decades only: it is coming to the end in late 20th century Canada.

Nation-building in Canada has historically been organized by the state's ideological practices of nationalizing white immigrants as *future citizens* into becoming *Canadians*. While the membership of these *Canadians* and

future Canadians has been organized in class and gender specific ways. this organization has taken place on a racialized basis in relation to Aboriginal peoples, *non-preferred* races and *immigrants*. Racialized nation-building has resulted in access to citizenship within the nation-state reflecting, and further reproducing, processes of racialization. The state's ideological practices, institutionalized in immigration and citizenship policies, have placed *immigrant* women outside the borders of the 'nation' even as these women have been physically present within the geographical borders of the 'nation' in actuality. Their ideologically constructed 'outsider' status has been materially imposed through their unequal access to citizenship. My examination of the Canadian state's organization of the reviews of Social Security Policy and Immigration Policy in 1994 leads me to conclude that the state's ongoing racialized reproduction of the nation, and regulation of access to citizenship in this nation-state, will continue to distinguish *future citizens* from *immigrants* on the basis of their social, cultural and linguistic characteristics. Social security policy will continue to reflect this racialization in organizing unequal access for certain groups of 'citizens,' further re-inforcing their non-membership in the nation.

The question I set out to examine in this dissertation was the relationship between the 1994 Immigration Policy Review and the Social Security Review in organizing the nation and citizenship in Canada. My conclusion is that immigration policies have regulated access to citizenship in Canada, and membership in the nation, while social security policies specify some of the content of citizenship rights. The textual realities produced by the state in the two Reviews, and made actionable in the subsequent policy changes, fortifies the ideological and geographical boundaries of the 'nation' against *immigrant* women. In both Reviews, the state sought to nationalize

Canadians into the neo-conservative restructuring of social security and immigration.

The textual realities produced allowed the state to construct the major 'problems' facing the nation in the 21st century as coming from Other nations, third world workers, and *immigrants* in general, and *immigrant* women, in particular. While these Others were constructed as threatening the prosperity of the nation and its institutions, the state presented itself as the protector of the national interest. The Social Security Review constructed the nation as being under siege externally from "billions" of third world people, and the Immigration Policy Review constructed the nation as being threatened from within its geographical borders by *immigrant* women. Once these textual realities are entered, the only 'solution' becomes **how** to border the nation against these Others - Other nations, third world workers, and *immigrant* women - most effectively, not **whether** the nation should be bordered.

Nation-Building In Late 20th century

During the first half of the 20th century, the nation was initially "imagined" by the state as a nation of British and French 'races,' and subsequently as a bicultural, bilingual nation. This nation was ideological from its inception: the Aboriginal nations existing in actuality in Canada from time immemorial were colonized and racialized as outsiders to the *Canadian* nation built on their ancestral lands. Instead, the state imposed the white nation onto actuality by turning to European immigrants to become the 'national' population. Therefore, even as the state's immigration policies recruited immigrants of the *preferred races*, these policies sought to strictly limit the permanent residence of the *non-preferred races*. *Preferred races* were nationalized into the nation by their access to citizenship rights in their

permanent settlement. This citizenship reflected class and gender divisions, but in relation to Aboriginal peoples and *non-preferred races*, this citizenship was racialized. The process of ideologically bordering *non-preferred races* as outsiders to the nation legitimized their unequal access to citizenship.

The transition to the 'welfare' state in the post-1945 period did not bring an end to racialized nation-building. Overtly racialized immigration policies continued to remain in effect until the 1960s and 1970s, and the first Canadian *Citizenship Act* of 1947 created a two-tiered citizenship, as well as stipulating two-tiered eligibility criteria. In the state's organization of access to social entitlements of the welfare state on the basis of a racialized citizenship, the welfare-state incorporated processes of racialization into social policy: the 'welfare' state reproduced the colonization of Aboriginal peoples as well as used overtly racialized immigration policies into the 1960s and 1970s.

Changed conditions within the global economy resulted in a relative liberalization of both immigration and citizenship policies in the 1970s, and enabled the increased immigration of women from third world countries. However, the *Immigration Act* 1976-77 continued to ideologically distinguish immigrants into *future citizens* and *immigrants* on the basis of their social, cultural and linguistic affinity to the nation, as well as on the basis of their 'economic' contribution to the nation. Unequal citizenship rights have been organized since the *Act's* introduction through the sponsorship regulations, as well as through the domestic workers program and the Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Program. Therefore, the ideological construction of *immigrant* women as outsiders to the nation during this period was concretized in a lesser citizenship for them.

My examination of the Social Security Review and the Immigration Policy Review, and the subsequent restructuring of these programs in 1994,

leads me to the conclusion that the period of the relative liberalizing of immigration and citizenship policy in the 1970s which enabled more third world women to access citizenship, albeit an unequal one, is coming to an end in the 1990s. Through the two Reviews, the state (re) constructed the 'national' character, its values and interests, directly in opposition to Other nations, third world workers and *immigrant* women. The SSR constructed 'threats' from Other nation and third world workers to define the 'unity' of the nation. In the IPR, the 'national' character was given its concrete meaning in direct opposition to the *immigrant* character: *immigrants* become the point of reference against which the 'national' identity of Canadians as a unified, homogenous one, was constructed. The textual practices constructed the *immigrant* character as not only being the opposite of everything national, but as a threat, to everything *Canadian*.

The state's construction of a common national 'vision' and national interest between *Canadians* and the state in the IPR consultation was in no small measure based upon the sense of power the state's textual practices enabled many *Canadians* to claim over the lives of *immigrants*. Recommendations for a temporary, sometimes permanent, stop to immigration, as well as recommendations for the state to design the apparatus necessary to police the presence of *immigrants* all enabled *Canadians* to claim an interest-in-common among themselves, and in partnership with the state, against *immigrants* in general, and *immigrant* women in particular.

The textual reality constructed the power of *Canadians* over *immigrants* as being equal to that of the power of the state, allowing the state to gain legitimacy in introducing restrictive measures by claiming this to be the 'wish' of the nation. The actuality of the state's power over the nation was reversed by the textual reality. Instead, the textual reality enabled the state to

present itself as depending upon *Canadians* to offer 'solutions' for the 'problems' of managing and controlling *immigrants*. The IPR consultation process allowed the state to portray its power as being based within its citizenry, and to present subsequent policy changes as the will of the 'nation.' The state very consciously cultivated the appearance of the IPR consultations as leading to a renewal in "participatory citizenship" by repeatedly defining *Canadians* as "the source" of the "strengths" and "credibility" of the immigration Strategy Plan (CIC, 1994u: viii). The IPR consultations allowed the state to claim itself to be a "government which listens to its citizens" (CIC, 1994u:2), stressing that the government "has adopted a new approach to governing, an open approach which stresses listening to and working more creatively with Canadians" (CIC, 1994u: 5).

The value of the IPR consultations in allowing the state to legitimize itself and to claim the allegiance of *Canadians* on an agenda of controlling *immigrants* cannot be discounted. In the 1990s, the state has been increasingly under attack as representing only the interests of the corporate sector and the ruling elites in the current phase of globalization (Barlow & Campbell, 1993; McQuaig, 1993; NAPO, 1995). The immigration review, in particular, became central to the state's equation of the interests of the state with those of the *nation*.

Therefore, while the actual changes to immigration policy increased the state's control of the geographical borders of the nation against third world women, the consultation process itself increased its control over the ideological borders of the *nation*. In constructing the 'problem' of immigration as eroding and destroying the 'national' character and 'national' values at the ideological level, the state effectively translated these 'problems' into 'problems' for the nation and every *Canadian*, giving the nation a stake in the state's increased

control of its territorial, geographical borders.

The consultation process therefore served to both legitimize the state as being committed to a partnership with *Canadians-as-members-of-the-nation* through a 'democratic process,' and to create a political climate wherein the policy changes would be owned by the nation as being what *Canadians* wanted. Drawing *Canadians-as-members-of-the-nation* into the consultation process, the state sought to convince them they had a direct stake in controlling immigration, and hence, in the policy changes that followed.

In addition to the state reinforcing the racialization of the nation in relation to *immigrants*, the textual realities also reinforced the colonized status of Aboriginal peoples in the late 20th century. No attempts were made in either policy reviews to address the struggles of Aboriginal peoples for self-determination and resolving land claims. The Social Security Review did not even include as a problem for 'national' consideration the racialized nature of the welfare-colonial administration of Aboriginal peoples through the Department of Indian Affairs, nor did the Immigration Review allow Aboriginal peoples to have any stake in immigration policy.

One consequence of this exclusion of Aboriginal peoples from the process is that Aboriginal perspectives and demands are silenced in the immigrant debate, creating the conditions for *immigrants* to be set up as antagonists to Aboriginal claims. The silencing of Aboriginal peoples in the immigration debate, even as *immigrants* enter Canada and become party to the ongoing colonial subjugation of Aboriginal peoples, can only increase tensions between Aboriginal peoples and *immigrants*, although both are racialized in particular ways in relation to the *Canadian* nation.

Bordering Immigrant Women

Historically, the bordering of third world women was organized in the Canadian state's construction of these women as *non-preferred* races. In the pre-1960 period, these women were constituted in the *Canadian* imagination as a threat to the 'whiteness' of the nation. While men of the *non-preferred* races were allowed entry in order to provide their labour to the national economy, albeit under restrictive conditions, the immigration of women was curtailed even further. Keeping the women out was defined as part of the answer to 'Keep Canada White': the exclusion of women would encourage the men to return to their countries of origin and would curtail the reproduction of future generations of *non-preferred* races within the geographical borders of the nation.

The post-1945 economic boom resulted in the need for increased labour, which the liberalization of immigration and citizenship policies in the 1970s allowed to be met through the increased immigration of third world women. The race/class/gender nexus organized the provision of the labour of these women in the form of 'cheap' *immigrant* labour. However, the ideological construction of *immigrant* women as socially, culturally and linguistically 'diverse' from the nation, and as representing a burden on its resources, legitimized their outsider status and unequal access to citizenship.

When I began examining the texts of the 1994 Immigration Policy Review, my aim had been to analyze how the texts dealt with the family category and sponsorship regulations. Once I began analyzing the texts, it became evident to me that almost the entire consultation was directed against this particular category of immigration. It was the only category of *immigrants* which was problematized as costly, unmanageable, potentially limitless,

responsible for increasing cultural, linguistic and social divisions in the country, as well as for 'inflaming' racial intolerance. The textual reality produced repeatedly treated this category as the biggest 'problem' the confronting the 'nation' and its state. In contrast, the textual reality reinforced the 'economic' contributions of the independent category - specifically referring to it as the economic one - and by stressing the benefits of this category to the nation.

The Immigration Policy Review put the 'blame' for the fiscal crisis of the state, and for the deteriorating social and economic conditions in the country, largely onto the family category. The Social Security Review made no reference to the unequal access of the family category to social assistance requirements, naturalizing this inequality, and the subsequent policy changes will further restrict the access of *immigrant* women to these 'national' resources. Having constructed *immigrant* women and the family category as one of the most potent threats to the nation, a closing of the nation's ranks against *immigrant* women became the only rational, and more to the point, 'economically' viable, policy option. The family category, and *immigrant* women in particular, have been constructed in the textual reality as the greatest 'threat' to the nation and its institutions, not the state's policies, not the ruling elite.

Throughout the IPR, the textual reality constructed a racialized anti-immigrant agenda to mobilize and shape a political climate of support for the state's neo-conservative policies. Although these neo-conservative policies stress the definition of the citizen-as-taxpayer, the actuality that *immigrant* women of the family category join the labour force relatively quickly after they arrive, and pay taxes which help fund the national institutions, was made invisible by the state.

The construction of the national character in the textual realities can be

anticipated to intensify the racialization of *immigrants* as a threat to the nation. The state's racialized construction of *immigrant* women reinforces the racialization of all women of colour in Canada as part of the same 'problem' of *immigrant* on the basis of their shared cultural, linguistic and social 'diversity.' All women of colour, regardless of their actual legal status, were associated by the textual practices of the state with overburdening social services, and with 'taking advantage' of *Canadians*. This ongoing racialization continues historical processes of bordering *immigrant* women as deserving of a lesser citizenship than that of *Canadians*. The IPR demonstrates that the ideological construction by the state of *immigrants* as distinct from *Canadians* shows no signs of abatement.

The increased surveillance and policing of sponsored *immigrant* women's access to social security programs can also likewise be anticipated to become applicable to all women of colour as a result of the shared racialized construction of both groups. This racialization, embedded in the textual reality produced by the state, places all women of colour under suspicion in their claims to social security programs, even if they are entitled in actuality to do so. The increased surveillance at the provincial level -- as provincial social security agencies identify claimants who are sponsored immigrants on behalf of the federal immigration department -- will put the onus on all women of colour to 'prove' their entitlement. This increased surveillance will increase the distance between *immigrant* women and 'citizens' at the ideological borders of the nations. The Canadian state has repeatedly demonstrated it is particularly adept at manipulating 'national/anti-immigrant' sentiment to draw attention away from its policies in gaining the support of its 'citizens.' The textual reality produced through the IPR review demonstrates there is no reason to believe the state has abandoned the use of this strategy in the late 20th

century.

Subsequent to the IPR, the state used the 'myths' it was instrumental in constructing and promoting as a basis for reducing immigration levels. In tabling the Annual immigration plan for 1997, Immigration Minister Lucienne Robillard announced that immigration levels would not be increased because, "Right now, the Canadian population is divided, according to the last poll we had" (Globe & Mail, Oct. 30, 1996). The poll the Minister referred to found that 51 percent of 'Canadians' believe immigration increases unemployment. Although the actual number of immigrants allowed into Canada in 1996 were lower than the target level, the Minister argued that Canada's capacity for immigrant absorption would "remain compromised so long as Canadians do not support increased levels of immigration." The position being articulated by the Minister that immigration levels for 1997 were determined on the basis of the myths which created a backlash against 'immigrants' were, so to speak, an inevitable outcome of the textual reality produced by the state through the IPR.

Strengthening the Neo-Conservative Agenda

The textual realities produced in the SSR and IPR constructed Other nations, third world workers, and *immigrants* as presenting 'threats' to the nation's future. In this, they shifted attention away from the state's neo-conservative economic and social policies which are increasing economic and social inequalities in the country. Therefore, the 'solutions' proposed in the form of the restructuring of the immigration program and social security programs will not, in actuality, 'solve' the economic and social problems which are rooted in the underlying social relations within the global economy. If anything, the textual realities produced further entrench these social relations: the textual realities further the reproduction of these social relations. So, for

example, the scape-goating of *immigrants* which is accomplished in the IPR will not 'solve' the problems of unemployment or deteriorating social programs. The policy changes introduced will not challenge, but reinforce, the neo-conservative economic and social policies of the state.

In addition, the SSR and IPR enabled the state to harness anxieties about the erosion of social programs, and to direct those anxieties against Other nations, third world workers, and *immigrants* respectively. The declining economic conditions in the 1990s have left many Canadians feeling powerless. Jakubowski has argued (1997). I have demonstrated how the textual realities produced in the SSR and IPR shielded the state's responsibility for these deteriorating economic and social conditions of the majority of the population. The IPR enabled the state to produce a shared, common future interest for the nation and state in maintaining the power of the nation and state over *immigrants*. The IPR consultations allowed the state to create a political space where it defined *Canadians* as being in control of, and responsible for, setting the state's agenda. The IPR translated the sense of "powerlessness" Jakubowski describes into a sense of power over *immigrants* for many of the participants, as is reflected in the recommendations I described in Chapter Eight.

The Immigration Review also provided a very public platform, allowing extremist right wing groups to increase calls for an end to third world immigration. Many of the demands of these extreme right wing groups were placed on par with more liberal recommendations. The textual reality being produced did not isolate or counter extremist, right wing positions by disabusing myths and stereotypes about the immigration program. Instead, the state's textual practices allowed these positions into the textual reality, validating and legitimizing these views as those of *Canadians*. So, for example,

at a number of the public consultations in Toronto and Vancouver, calls were made by right wing extremist groups for a complete halt to immigration. The IPR enabled these extremist groups to bring their recommendations into mainstream politics. Their recommendations attributed increased crime and social problems as a result of the presence of *immigrants*. In incorporating these views into the final reports, the IPR sanctioned these views, reproducing images of *immigrants* as engaged in widespread fraud in the immigration system, and also in the social security system. In this way, the range of the contributions incorporated into the textual reality worked to shape a 'public' response and political hostility against *immigrants* by the state's endorsement of right wing views. Having incorporated these views to help produce the textual reality, the state then stepped in to 'balance' the 'concerns' of the right-wing anti-immigrant constituency with that of more liberal views. In this way, the state allowed the stakes against *immigrants* to be raised higher by right wing extremism by their incorporation into the textual reality. The state then able to portray itself as taking the middle ground between right wing extremism and more liberal positions, treating each as equally legitimate, to build its own legitimacy in 'balancing' these 'conflicting' recommendations of *Canadians*.

While the democratic process can hardly be defined as having been well served in the state basing public policy upon myths and a backlash against *immigrants*, the appearance of democratic participation was created by the public consultation process. The state was able to construct itself as the neutral mediator between conflicting interests, when in reality, the state used the public consultations to help shape a 'national' political consensus around the neo-conservative restructuring of Canada.

Future Directions

Smith (1987, 1990) has pointed out that governing, and the relations of ruling, are organized largely through the social organization of knowledge produced in the form of textual realities which are then imposed upon the lived actuality of our lives. It is at the point where lived actuality conflicts with the textual reality that women's critical standpoint emerges. This critical standpoint is also the point at which resistance against the relations of ruling organized through objectified forms of knowledge also emerges. It is from this point of the lived actuality of *immigrant* women's lives that directions for the future have to be set if we are to work for the transformation of the underlying social relations.

While there is general consensus among theorists examining the dismantling of the welfare state that the neo-conservative right has re-defined the meaning of citizenship towards economic 'self-reliance' and away from the notion of entitlement, what much of this literature has avoided is addressing the racialized construction of the 'citizen.' An urgent re-examination of the concept of citizenship is presently required, focusing upon its exclusionary aspects and its role in organizing the underlying social relations within the global capitalist system of relations. What is needed at the end of the 20th century is a recognition that citizenship, in its contemporary form, is an essentially capitalist form and works to organize the reproduction of capitalist social relations. The citizenship which emerged in capitalist countries assumed a specifically capitalist character, despite attempts to 'universalize' it. The very location of citizenship within the political structures of 'nation'-states in a globally integrated economy makes this citizenship exclusionary and a mechanism for organizing inequalities. A re-examination of citizenship has to

begin with a recognition of the integration of the global capitalist system which allows capital, goods and services to flow freely across border, but not populations because they do not have the 'right' citizenship. Internationally, citizenship in the advanced capitalist countries has become the dividing line between first world 'citizens' and third world 'non-citizens' within a globally integrated economy. This global economic integration has to be acknowledged if the underlying social relations, expressed in the North / South divide, and which have shaped international migration, are to be transformed.

The second urgent requirement in reconceptualizing citizenship is the questioning of the principles which organize membership in the *Canadian* nation, and of the social relations which underlie the state's processes of nation-building. Colonial relations between Aboriginal peoples and the *Canadian* nation have remained ongoing into the late 20th century. Any reconceptualization of citizenship, and attempts to transform the racialized nature of the nation, has to be based on a resolution of the claims for self-determination of Aboriginal peoples. As long as Canada remains a white settler colony, the nation will continue to remain racialized.

An examination of how nation-building has been organized in Canada demonstrates that although the specific content of the national interest has changed over time, what has not changed is the composition of the nation and the state's definition of who belongs to it. The non-membership of women of colour in the *Canadian* nation has remained historically consistent. For as long as the Canadian 'nation' is defined by racialized 'cultural,' linguistic and 'social' characteristics, women of colour will continue to be defined as undermining the 'unity' of the nation.

As I have demonstrated, immigration policy has regulated access to citizenship and membership in the nation by distinguishing between *future*

citizens and *immigrants*. As long as immigration policy continues this distinction and patrols the borders of the nation against 'outsiders,' the unequal treatment of *immigrants* from *Canadians* will be inevitable. There never has been a period in Canada when consensus has been expressed that *immigrants* should have the same rights and claims to citizenship as *Canadians* upon entry into country. As long as the differentiation between *Canadians* and outsiders is socially and politically sanctioned, as long as the conditions of entry into the country for immigrants are unequal, the subsequent reproduction of these inequalities will become inevitable.

The current phase of globalization has made increased international migration an inevitability as a result of the growing polarization, environmental devastation and destitution which are the resulting from neo-conservative policies. And it is the very people who are forced to migrate as a result of these policies that Canadian immigration policy seeks to keep from entering Canada as permanent residents. The role of immigration policy in organizing the relations of race, class and gender within Canada, as well as within the global system, needs urgent addressing. Immigration restrictions which construct the labour of *immigrants* and migrant workers as 'cheaper' labour' have to be transformed, along with the gendering of immigrant women as 'dependents.' As long as immigration policy is designed to control borders and to organize the unequal treatment of 'citizens' and 'non-citizens', it cannot but organize and regulate inequalities between the two. Once we accept that there should be unequal treatment of 'citizens' and 'non-citizens,' then the only question which remains is how unequal this treatment should be. What my dissertation argues for is problematizing the naturalizing of this inequality, for questioning the continued reproduction of this inequality as 'natural', or as acceptable. Only such a questioning can challenge the underlying relations of race, class

and gender which shape citizenship rights in advanced capitalist countries. In his studies of Black history, the renowned Black sociologist, W.E.B. Du Bois (1969) pointed out that slavery was an international institution, drawing upon the support of European states and their social and economic institutions, as well as of large sectors of their populations. Today, a strikingly similar convergence of support can be identified regarding migration from third world countries into the advanced capitalist countries. There is almost unanimous consensus amongst advanced capitalist states, and their social and political institutions, that these *immigrants* should have unequal rights from 'citizens.' It is this consensus which needs to be challenged, and transformed.

Immigrant women, by the very nature of their trans-border, and trans-'national' experiences, raise questions about the international conditions which shape the global economy. The conditions which give rise to migration cannot be transformed without a transformation of relations within countries, and also between countries. *Immigrant* women raise questions about 'national' relations, and also about international ones. In Canada, their experiences raise fundamental questions about what constitutes democracy. So for example, the Immigration Policy Review was defined by the state as enabling 'citizens' to work with the state in a democratic partnership. Analyzed from the critical standpoint of *immigrant* women, I have demonstrated how the IPR process itself reproduced relations of ruling. The experiences of *immigrant* women push definitions of democracy to the limits because they challenge the very construction of the 'citizen' who is allowed this 'democratic' participation as a process of exclusion. *Immigrant* women's experiences raise questions far more profound than those of biases or discrimination against them: they raise questions about the very nature of the structures and processes of democratic participation and equality in *Canadian* society. Therefore, transforming the

inequalities imposed upon *immigrant* women has profound implications for all 'citizens', for the 'nation' and the state. The inequalities of *immigrant* women challenges the very basis of what constitutes 'democracy' in Canada in late 20th century.

The post-World War II class and gender compromises represented by the welfare state is over. While the restructuring of Canada is increasing polarization in the country, this restructuring has created an opportunity for a radical questioning of the organization of Canadian society, and of the global order. As long as the post-War compromise lasted, organized labour in the advanced capitalist countries took the possibility of a radical transformation of the capitalist system off the table, fighting instead to improve its side of the bargain with capital within the 'national' economy. Capital, on the other hand, worked to improve its side of the bargain. Whereas this organized labour did not 'go international,' capital did. Globalization today reveals as much capital's success in having 'gone global' as it points to organized labour's inability to have done so. Processes of racialization, and unequal citizenship in the welfare state, have played no insignificant role in this inability of organized labour to 'go global.'

The first phase of globalization was successful because of the level of consensus which existed within *Canadian* society in support of colonization and establishing the white 'nation'. The second phase allowed the containment of challenges from feminist, anti-racist and working class struggles in the form of the 'national' welfare state. The current phase offers possibilities for both further 'national' compromises and more radical transformations of social relations. The critical standpoint of women of colour makes such a 'national' compromise unacceptable because this 'national' compromise is predicated upon bordering them as outsiders. Immigrant

women's experiences challenge these very borders and the state's nation-building practices.

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





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IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3)



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