

THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AND PEACEKEEPING:
An Analysis of the House of Commons Debates
Concerning Involvement in United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations

BY

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Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

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ABSTRACT

Canada has a long and outstanding history of commitment to United Nations peacekeeping operations. Much has changed in the world in the forty years since Canada's initial involvement, yet the machinery of government remains static. Although the executive has changed significantly with each new Prime Minister how has the parliamentary obligation to the House of Commons changed over this time?

By analysing the particulars of the Prime Ministers involved, variances in the decision-making process will be explained. Analysis of the House of Commons debates will reveal its role in the decision-making process and how contentious an issue peacekeeping has been - and has become.

Despite radical variations in government organization and decision-making style, each government chose to commit troops to peacekeeping operations. Debate within the House of Commons demonstrates that although the executive decision-making process changes from Prime Minister to Prime Minister, peacekeeping is a unifying issue which has warranted the abandonment of established formalized procedure.

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis will examine three decisions of the Canadian government to allow Canadian military personnel to be sent to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs). The three decisions to be analyzed are: the decision made in 1956 to commit troops to the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), the decision made in 1973 to participate in the second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II), and the decision made in 1992 to send troops for use in the United Nations Protection Force in Croatia (UNPROFOR).

These three decisions are particularly appropriate for such a study. First, all three relate to a classic form of peacekeeping as an operation in which the belligerent parties agree to be separated by a neutral U.N. force acting as a buffer while efforts are made to resolve the situation by peaceful negotiation. Second, all three were decisions involving a major peacekeeping commitment by Canada. Third, the decisions were taken by three different Canadian governments in three different decades. For these reasons these three decisions are thus particularly appropriate as a basis for a comparative study.

The Canadian government has, for the last forty years, been a strong supporter of UNPKOs. The manner in which each Prime Minister conducted their government may have affected the decision-making process regarding such issues. It is within the House of Commons that each government must defend their decision and the process through which it was derived.

Analysis of the debates concerning involvement in UNPKOs will illustrates areas of contention and agreement. Plotting the course of these debates in three cases, spanning thirty six years, will demonstrate how the issue of peacekeeping has changed and how the parliamentary requirements regarding participation have also changed.

The first chapter of the thesis will open with a brief description of the structure of Canadian government and the process through which Canadian foreign policy is made. This analysis represents an attempt to understand the political structure in which decisions regarding peacekeeping are made and how those individuals are held accountable. Attention will then be turned to the theoretical basis for the study.

This discussion will briefly review various contending theories of foreign policy decision-making, evaluating their appropriateness or inappropriateness for this study. This review will demonstrate that the individual decision maker is the most appropriate unit of analysis. The discussion will then proceed to elaborate the most important concepts to be utilized. Prominent among these will be the notion of decision-making, perceptions and values. Having discussed the meaning and relevance of these concepts, they will then be placed within a framework for the analysis of the decision-making process which will be applied to the case studies.

Each case study will constitute one chapter of the thesis and will have the same format. For each case study it is the Prime

Minister who ultimately bears the responsibility for choosing between alternatives. Understanding how the P.M. conducts himself in the decision-making process generally and specifically regarding foreign affairs will demonstrate the effect he has on the process. After providing background to the decision being considered, the decision will then be placed within the context of the House of Commons. It is here that competing values will be voiced and the decision-making process itself criticized.

Chapters two, three and four will concern themselves with the following respectively: the decision made by the St. Laurent government in 1956 to commit troops to UNEF I; the decision made by the Trudeau government in 1973 to participate in UNEF II; and the decision made by the Mulroney government in 1992 to send troops for use in UNPROFOR. In each case, information will be drawn from monographs, scholarly articles and the memoirs of those involved. The most important information will come from the public record in the form of the House of Commons debates.

The fifth and final chapter will provide a comparative analysis of the governments involved. The values, perceptions and motivations for their decision will be contrasted. The decision-making process itself will be analyzed and how the roles changed between governments. Finally, the nature of the debates within the House of Commons will be compared and contrasted to determine what has changed over the intervening years.

The Canadian Government and Foreign Policy

When considering the making of Canadian foreign policy there are a number questions concerning the nature and structure of the Canadian government which must be answered before beginning a detailed analysis. The first is where within the structure of the Canadian government are foreign policy decisions made? This will determine what the appropriate unit of analysis should be.

The second is, how is accountability promoted within the structure of the Canadian government? The third and final question is, given the structure of the Canadian government, what is the appropriate theoretical emphasis and analytical framework to properly understand and appreciate the decision-making process? Once such fundamental questions have been answered the discussion may then move on to analyze specific decisions concerning Canadian participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs).

As an analysis of Canadian foreign policy this study will limit itself to those individuals and organizations within the Canadian Government involved in the making of foreign policy decisions. These include the Prime Minister, Cabinet, and the Minister for External Affairs. The House of Commons and the official opposition are also important due to their special relationship to the executive. Each of these institutions plays a part in the creation of Canadian foreign policy so must be understood in order to determine their role in the decision-making process.

The structure of the Canadian government is important to the study of foreign policy decisions because it is within this framework that individuals and organizations alike must function.

As Hermann states,

it is important to establish how power is distributed among the participants. If there is an hierarchy in which one individual is dominant and all others subordinate to him, then the decision unit tends to be dominant in both crisis and non-crisis situations.¹

This analysis is an attempt to understand the political structure in which decisions are made to determine who makes decisions regarding peacekeeping and how they are held accountable.

Most analysts of the Canadian political system agree that, "the single most important institution of the Canadian federal government is the Cabinet, selected and presided over by the Prime Minister."² These two institutions are at the centre of the Canadian political system.³ They provide initiative and leadership on matters of national policy.⁴

It is often said that a Prime Minister is the first among equals, but this is untrue because he has no equals. The idea does contain some truth; it calls attention to one important aspect of this relationship, namely, that the other ministers are the colleagues of their chief and not his obedient and unquestioning subordinates.⁵

The powers of the Prime Minister (P.M.) spring from his position of primacy in the government reinforced by his leadership of the majority party, which usually owes its majority to his leadership during the last election.⁶ The most important decisions of foreign policy are either made or approved by the Cabinet.⁷

Each member of the Cabinet as an individual minister, is responsible for overseeing the administration of his/her particular department of government, and for promoting high morale and an informed perspective among its officials. Each swears the same oath of office and equally shares in the collective responsibility for coordinating the activities of its government's departments.⁸ On matters concerning specific policy areas, Cabinet members defer to those ministers holding the appropriate portfolio.⁹ In matters of foreign policy this would be the Minister for External Affairs.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs (like other ministers) has a vast administration under him, possessing expertise in all aspects of international relations. He receives direct information from groups in the field. This allows the minister to speak from an informed position which no other politician could hope to duplicate. As the responsible minister it is his task to bring matters of foreign affairs to the attention of Cabinet. The External Affairs minister must serve as the link between his department and Cabinet.¹⁰

Cabinet ministers spend most of their time worrying about the internal affairs of their particular departments. They are thus inclined to be interested in international relations only in matters that directly affect their department(s) or are of great importance. On many subjects of international policies, they must depend on the knowledge of the Secretary of State for External Affairs.¹¹

Although this implies a very passive role for the rest of the Cabinet in matters of foreign policy, the Prime Minister must remain active in the policy making process. Ultimate decision-making authority lies with the P.M. who must consult his Cabinet before making any major policy decisions. For those issues of foreign policy that are highly controversial in the country, the burden of compromise and final determination of policy falls heavily on the P.M..¹² As Farrell states,

The function of the Prime Minister is to choose that ground for foreign policy which in his estimation has the firmest foundation of national support and still is consistent with his conception of the national welfare.¹³

It is because the P.M. is leader of the Cabinet and the effective head of state of Canada, that it is difficult for him to avoid direct involvement in international relations even if this should be his inclination.¹⁴

Although the P.M. possesses chief executive authority he cannot act unilaterally.

The Prime Minister's power, is not like currency: it cannot be located spatially or spent conceptually. Power ought to be employed as a relational concept which links together two or more actors, with different political resources, in a situation involving multitude of influences, including severe losses for noncompliance.¹⁵

A better way to consider the P.M.'s power within Cabinet may be as the ability to influence others.

The Prime Minister's influence stems from an ability to command the maximum possible amount of information about the political environment and to use this resource in persuading

political actors to follow his policy initiatives.¹⁶ No P.M. may exercise personal power in government independent of the views of either his supporters or antagonists. Not even in Cabinet can the Prime Minister hope to be effective if he fails to anticipate the reactions of his closest colleagues.¹⁷ As Ward states,

A Prime Minister who tried to issue orders to his ministers or interfere persistently in their departmental work might find that before long he was out of office; for if at any time the ministers chose to rebel, their combined influence in the party and in the House could, and in all likelihood, would, bring about his speedy downfall.¹⁸

Such 'rebellions' are extremely rare. Cabinet solidarity and support for the wishes of the Prime Minister rest on a long tradition. There is generally a very strong sense of loyalty to the P.M. and personal friendships exist which make revolt unlikely. Thus, Cabinet normally acts as a team and accepts the leadership of the P.M. on matters of foreign policy.¹⁹

The P.M. cannot assume that members of Cabinet will automatically agree on every issue. Indeed, one value of the Cabinet is its capacity to consider a variety of views on the proper conduct of the nation's business. However, once the Cabinet has reached a decision on matters of policy it is expected that Cabinet members will acquiesce in that decision (at least in public). A minister who feels that he must oppose a decision of Cabinet must first resign (or expect to be removed).²⁰

Since Cabinet meetings are held in private, the public is not made aware of diverging opinions, and such opinions are not expressed outside of meetings. Ministers may speak with the utmost

candour during a meeting but generally accept the leadership of the Prime Minister in matters of foreign policy.²¹ This practice is meant to maintain the integrity of the government by presenting a unified front to the opposition within the House of Commons. Ultimately, all heads of departments agree on a common foreign policy, accept common responsibility for that policy, and defend it before Parliament and the electorate.²²

The ability to conceal the process of decision-making at this level of government has sustained the erroneous idea that the executive works in isolation from parliamentary influence and has contributed significantly to the impression that the government acts independently of public opinion.²³ This however could not be further from the truth. No P.M. can embark on a new policy direction without securing first the loyalty of his followers and anticipating obstacles in the House of Commons.²⁴

This leaves little opportunity for an analyst to assess with any degree of accuracy the degree to which conflicting opinions affected the executive. Instead of a diversity of views advocated by individual ministers, the government appears before the public as a unified whole, free of dissent. The task of revealing major flaws or problems with the chosen policy is placed within the hands of the House of Commons.

An assessment of the power of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet cannot be complete without an understanding of their relationship to the House of Commons.²⁵ Cabinet dominates the timetable and organization of the business of Parliament, as well

as generating the bulk of legislative initiatives. All money bills (i.e. all measures to spend or raise money) must be presented to the House of Commons by a Cabinet member and thus always originate in Cabinet.²⁶ Although anyone may defend government policies within the House of Commons, the strongest defence for important departmental policies come from the responsible Minister or the P.M..²⁷

What this means in terms of foreign policy is that no initiatives requiring the expenditure of funds (i.e. for UNPKOs) can be pursued without the support of the House of Commons. The individual primarily responsible for defending foreign policy decisions within the House is the Minister for External Affairs. Since Commons debates are generally, "well attended both by members of the House and by reporters in the press gallery...a minister who performs badly cannot hope to have his misfortune overlooked"²⁸ putting even more pressure upon the government and the ministers involved.

The Commons provides a forum for the discussion of public issues and problems to which the government must respond. Therefore the government must consider this public scrutiny of its decisions while formulating and delineating its policies. The elected nature of the House of Commons ensures that its members have a direct interest in promoting the concerns and demands of the mass public.²⁹ Those responsible for the criticism of government policy within the House are called the opposition.

It is the role of the opposition to expose the flaws in

government policies.³⁰ They are encouraged to criticize the specifics of government policy rather than develop comprehensive policy alternatives. The opposition usually represents an alternative source of leadership, not ideas.³¹

The constant struggle between government and opposition that results from the performance of the Commons functions ensures that a more or less continuous election campaign takes place throughout the life of Parliament. Each opposition party must not only cast doubt on the ability of the current Cabinet to govern but also provide evidence of its own ability to form a successful Cabinet after the next election.³²

On a general level, opposition members recognize the government's responsibility to carry on the business of governing and will often lend their support to that end, while at the same time retaining for themselves the right to adequately criticize government policy.

Conversely, the government recognizes the opposition's right to criticize but denies it the right to obstruct. All governments attempt to anticipate opposition criticism and to formulate their strategy and tactics on the basis of this evaluation.³³ The opposition ensures that sufficient thought has been given to the ramifications of certain policies and that the government pursues its goals with adequate efficiency.³⁴

In summary, only the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Prime Minister, and the Cabinet have the political responsibility for making Canadian foreign policy.³⁵ Major decisions are made within Cabinet, which is responsible for governing the country. Within that body it is the P.M. who is

directly responsible for choosing between alternatives. The Prime Minister, and the rest of Cabinet are informed on matters of foreign policy by the minister for External Affairs who is responsible for presenting alternatives. The Cabinet as a whole is accountable to the House of Commons but it is the Minister for External Affairs who is best qualified to defend the selected policy (or decision) within that forum.

The structure for decision-making within the Canadian government ensures that the Prime Minister is the primary decision maker on important matters of foreign policy. Although master of his department, in issues brought to the attention of Cabinet his role is determined by the P.M.. Any analysis of foreign policy decision-making within the Canadian government must, of necessity, emphasize the key individuals within the decision-making process.

The structure of the Canadian government promotes discretion in the executive decision-making process, but accountability is maintained through the House of Commons. Cabinet's responsibility to the Commons is ultimately a responsibility to the elected representatives of the people, and when the Cabinet is called to account by the House, it must not appear dishonest or ineffectual in its defense or it may lose the support of its voters in the next election.³⁶ Once a suitable theoretical framework is found to analyze the nature of each government involved, it is the nature of the House of Commons debates which will demonstrate how decision-making has changed regarding involvement in UNPKOs.

The Theoretical Basis for Emphasis on Individuals

Having examined the structure and processes of the Canadian government, it is now important to examine various theoretical constructs which are available to analyze foreign policy decisions. Each construct or 'model' represents a particular emphasis or perspective. The task, is to find a model appropriate to the structure of the Canadian government. The adopted model must allow for the delineation of the decision-making process including the involvement of the House of Commons. When considering foreign policy, it is easy to speak of states acting within the international community. This emphasis on states as unitary actors is called the state centric level of analysis. One of the major disadvantages of this model is that it treats countries as monolithic actors. Aspirations and traits normally associated with individuals are ascribed to states.³⁷ The problem is that only individuals have motives, expectations, and interests, and only they act or behave.³⁸ 'States' do not act, it is rather individuals within states that take action.

Another disadvantage of this emphasis is that elements of the decision making process within a country are not dealt with.³⁹ By over-simplifying the process of how foreign policy decisions are made, this model muddies rather than clarifies one's understanding of such processes.⁴⁰ There is no distinction between members of a country's government in the state centric model. The state is unified and there is no appreciation for the issues raised in sometimes highly controversial decisions.

Although the state centric level of analysis is valuable when examining the international arena as a whole it is too large and ungainly an emphasis when considering the issues involved in a particular country's foreign policy. For some purposes it is appropriate to focus on the collective actor. For others, it is necessary to direct attention to the decision makers as such.⁴¹

It is important to note that, the action, or inaction of an actor on the international scene results from decisions. These decisions are made by individuals, who may be termed 'decision-makers', who act and speak in the name of the collective entities they represent. When 'Canada' is said to act within the international arena it is not the totality which decides the course to take but rather representatives of the collective which do. It is the government, led by the executive, which determines the direction of Canadian foreign policy.

To adopt the state centric model would entail the oversimplification of the decision-making process. If one wishes to understand the interplay of competing ideas within the making of foreign policy, emphasis belongs on the units responsible for making decisions. Other models have attempted to identify and utilise more detailed units within the decision-making process.

A more precise level of analysis emphasizes the interaction of groups of individuals within a system as influencing decisions. The bureaucratic politics level of analysis considers the content of foreign policy not as a chosen solution to a problem but rather as the result from compromise, conflict and confusion of

organizations with diverse interests and unequal influence within the system. The advocates of this perspective -Morton H. Halperin & Graham T. Allison among them- assert that the process by which policy is made is not neutral, but responsive to pressures exerted from units involved within the process.⁴²

Cabinet Ministers are heads of often large organizations within the framework of government. As such there may be bureaucratic influence upon their behaviour. However, it is not the organization itself which causes the minister to act in a particular fashion. It is rather the perception of how an individual's actions affect their bureaucratic interests. Bureaucratic affiliations and loyalties in and of themselves are irrelevant until expressed or acted upon by the individual.

What the bureaucratic level of analysis neglects to consider is that decisions may be manifestations of personal characteristics of key decision maker(s) who are little affected by the pushing and hauling of bureaucratic politics.⁴³ As has been already shown, the Canadian foreign policy decision-making process is dominated by two key individuals within the structure of the Canadian government. Organizational interests and imperatives may be applicable but only in so far as they affect the decision maker's actions within the Cabinet.

Departments other than External Affairs that have an interest in decisions involving the potential use of troops, such as the Department of National Defence, would be included in Cabinet discussions. Cabinet secrecy ensures that such concerns are not

explicitly known to the public but an understanding of such departmental concerns may be inferred from the public record. Once again, the extent to which such organizational goals are pursued is dependent upon the individual.

The bureaucratic politics model does provide the analyst with insight into the system of competition within the House of Commons. Once a government decision reaches the House of Commons for approval there are a number of interests which the government must reconcile. The members of the opposition may strive for advantage by trying to embarrass the government or demonstrate flaws with their chosen course. This self-serving interest of the opposition must be considered when analysing the debate within the House of Commons.

Another type of analysis studies organizational processes to explain how organizational arrangements affect foreign policy.⁴⁴ Various organizational units are given tasks and limit the search for acceptable alternatives to the first available. This 'satisficing behaviour' attempts to solve problems immediately, rather than developing long term strategies.⁴⁵ People's participation in particular decisions varies according to their interests and their locations in organizational structures.⁴⁶ Within the Cabinet, it is the Prime Minister and the Minister of External Affairs who are at the centre of foreign policy decisions. The larger bureaucracy need not be involved in the process if the P.M. chooses to exclude them.

The only organizational processes which could affect such

decisions are those involving the functioning of Cabinet itself. The process by which Cabinet functions is largely dependent upon the desires and preferences of the Prime Minister. It is the P.M. who picks the Cabinet and such members are normally loyal to their leader. When the P.M. advances a proposal it is usually accepted.⁴⁷ Only in extreme cases involving minority governments or weak Prime Ministers is there likely to be conflict within the Cabinet.

This does not mean that there will not be differences. Divergent opinions are possible but, "if people are to work together in a group, there must be a certain unity in interests, objectives and purposes."⁴⁸ Having been chosen by the P.M. himself, most ministers will generally have shared goals and values. As Beach states,

most decisions are made in collaboration with other decision makers; that is, in groups of two or more persons. In each case, like the decision maker, these people hold images that in part are unique to them and that in part are shared with other members of the organization.⁴⁹

This implies and often necessitates that concurrence will be the rule rather than the exception. All such decisions are made by the Prime Minister - as informed by the Minister of External Affairs.

The manner in which government is organized will change from Prime Minister to Prime Minister. It is important to determine how each P.M. conducted the business of government especially in foreign affairs in order to understand the decision-making process. Once brought before the House of Commons there may be differences

in how the debate is to be conducted and the level of involvement the P.M. chooses to maintain. These organizational considerations are all of a highly personalized nature so it would appear that a greater emphasis on the individual is required than the organizational process model allows.

The alternative theoretical constructs do not allow one to adequately reconcile the two aspects of the Canadian decision-making system. The state, besides being too large an entity, does not possess motivation. Bureaucracies and organizational processes may exert some degree of influence but such influence is limited to the individuals who must give such interests voice. A better model would emphasize the fundamental decision unit.

For most foreign policy problems, some person or persons finally authorize a decision and they constitute for that issue the ultimate decision unit.⁵⁰ The structure and operation of the Canadian government compels one to concentrate on the individuals within the Cabinet to adequately understand their decisions. Since it is ultimately an individual, the Prime Minister of Canada who has the responsibility for making such decisions, this would appear to be the appropriate level of analysis.

A decision is simply a matter of choice.⁵¹ At the very least a decision maker has the choice of doing something or doing nothing. There are various elements which affect a decision maker's choice.

A sound understanding of the reasons for foreign policy behaviour is the bottom line for foreign policy decision-making research. We want to know or understand why an actor pursues one behaviour

as opposed to another.⁵²

This study will attempt to explain why Canadian decision makers have decided to offer troops to UNPKOs on three separate occasions. To accomplish this one must first understand the concept of decision-making as it pertains to foreign policy.

Foreign policy decision-making may be defined as the selection, among perceived alternatives, of one leading to a course of action in the international system.⁵³ A decision is an explicit act of choice, which can be located precisely in time and space.⁵⁴ Choices among the plausible interpretations and possible alternatives are the concern of central decision makers.⁵⁵ Within the Canadian government the predominant decision maker is the Prime Minister and any cabinet minister(s) he listens to. Understanding of the Prime Ministers involved and the issues their government faced within the House of Commons will allow one to better understand their choices and place them within a meaningful framework.

Foreign policy decision-making can be productively viewed as a process, whose outcome is influenced by several elements.⁵⁶ Elements affecting the decision maker include,

his official role, his personal predilections, his conception of the interests of his nation, his conception of the possible partisan advantage, his perception of the external situation, ideological concerns, the apparent gravity of the situation, rules and procedures relating to the decision-making organizational imperatives, estimates of the likely consequences of various alternative actions, pressures and previous commitments, the nature of the domestic environment, tradition, popular attitudes, the anticipated future behaviour of relevant actors, and

technological or economic considerations.⁵⁷

This analysis will examine the decision-making process as representative of the personal predilections or style of the Prime Minister. How and when a decision is made will be put in terms of the government as presided over by the P.M..

It is hoped that such an analysis will provide a better understanding of the Canadian decision-making process in terms of foreign policy and how it has changed from government to government. The first step in accomplishing this will be to delineate the personal preferences of the Prime Minister and the manner in which he conducted matters of foreign affairs generally. This should allow for an adequate understanding of their preferred manner of conducting foreign affairs to the extent that it may be typified.

Once determined, background to the particular situation under consideration will be provided. The analysis will then move on to delineate issues faced by the government within the House of Commons. The debates will be scrutinized in terms of content relevant to the policy process and various other concerns regarding peacekeeping. This aspect of the analysis will demonstrate any changes to the decision-making process. It will also be possible to track how perceptions regarding participation within UNPKOs have changed over time.

The simplicity of the theoretical model does not imply a lack of rigour in the concepts entailed. Instead it is meant to allow

greater applicability to the case studies. Any or all of the variables previously mentioned may or may not be present within a given situation. Of particular interest to this study are those variables relating to how the Prime Minister conducted the decision-making process. Paramount to such considerations are the perceptions and values individuals expressed throughout the process, particularly in the House of Commons.

The world exists outside of people. This is called the operational environment. The operational environment⁵⁸ or operational milieu⁵⁹ consists of everything within a given period of time. It is not limited in any way, consisting of everything humanity calls reality. Perception is, the process of obtaining information about the world through the senses.⁶⁰ Analysts have the luxury of being able to speak of past events with great clarity. Information is compiled, compared and readily available to anyone who cares to look for it. The problem comes when attempting to see the world through the eyes of the decision maker.⁶¹

Every individual must perceive the world and order his/her perceptions in a particular manner. Perceptions are the inputs which the human machine must work with.⁶² People however, are not infallible machines.

The human capacity for complex calculation and reasoned argument is constrained by basic cognitive struggles. Decision-makers process information, make inferences, examine alternatives and make choices through mechanisms that bear little resemblance to the ideal of 'homo sapiens'. Foreign policy decision makers are constrained not only by complex interdependence in their environment but also by unconscious mental processes and inadequate mental equipment. It

is biology and psychology that limit logic.⁶³

In orienting and judging our surroundings, people depend on their sensory systems; yet, as psychologists can so easily show, what is perceived is highly individualistic.⁶⁴ Everyone differs in their individual experience, knowledge and abilities, which provide unique mental predispositions from which each person views events.

Individuals perceive only a small portion of reality.⁶⁵ Their knowledge of the environment is so limited and so personal that instead of speaking of 'knowledge' it is better to speak of their psychological environment.⁶⁶ People perceive very selectively and according to the particular complex of interests and concerns which characterizes their individual mental set.⁶⁷ No matter how limited or different from the totality of the operational environment, these perceptions represent reality to the individuals involved.

It is conceptually important to understand that decisions are made within environments. The environment is the, "sum total of external conditions which have the potential to influence an organism."⁶⁸ In this case the organisms are the decision makers. The potential to influence is determined by the decision maker's perceptions of the environment. These perceptions will be received and structured within the decision maker's mind through cognition.

Cognition is defined as, any process which allows an organism to know and understand.⁶⁹ Each time a person perceives something it must be interpreted and understood. The world, in effect, is re-created as the decision maker perceives it.⁷⁰ Each decision maker must take received inputs and determine what they mean.

Often, an individual possesses cognitive predispositions in which they perceive similar things in a similar fashion.

Meaning may be ascribed to information in a fashion recognizable to an observer over the course of time. The process of perception and cognition may be recognized and analyzed if enough information is available. It is one thing to have a limited perceptual sense of the world, it is another to ascribe meaning to it. A decision maker's orientation to and interpretation of his/her psychological environment is mediated by their values.⁷¹

Values are an abstract concept which determines for a person or some social group the relative worth of various goals or ends.⁷² Whenever someone states that something is good or bad they are applying values. When a position is taken in regard to anything within the perceived world it is always based upon values. When a decision maker reacts to persons, objects, places, events and so on, in terms implying or employing an assessment of their worth, they are ascribing meaning to it with their values.⁷³

Individuals within particular contexts will also have common values.⁷⁴ For,

Values are the cognitive representation not only of individual needs but also of societal and institutional demands. They are the joint results of sociological as well as psychological forces... sociological because society and its institutions socialise the individual for the common good to internalise shared conceptions of the desirable; psychological because individual motivations require cognitive expression, justification, and indeed exhortation in socially desirable terms.⁷⁵

Often the values adopted by an individual or society, governing the

behaviour of members of that society, are often adopted without the conscious awareness of those involved.⁷⁶

Determination of which values are relevant to foreign policy is also a subjective process. National leaders, like all of us, formulate ideas about what the 'good' is, in relation to our own experiences and personal values.⁷⁷ Public officials, especially those democratically elected, will espouse public values. Constituents choose their leaders for the relative desirability of their perceptual systems, and the leaders process incoming information in such a way as to maintain the existing perceptual system of the constituents.⁷⁸ That is why there is likely to be a substantial degree of overlap in the values held by different decision makers from the same country.⁷⁹

Values of national leaders, although difficult to describe with certainty, are more susceptible to investigation than the values of society as a whole. Precisely because of their prominence, the speeches, books and correspondence of national leaders frequently become a part of the public record and therefore open to investigation.⁸⁰ Not only is it easier to access the expressed views of the leadership, but in a very real sense the values of world leaders help shape the values for the rest of their countries.⁸¹

When a leader gives voice to his/her values, it is often a reflection of values already present within society. Most citizens delegate, knowingly or otherwise, their voice in foreign affairs to those leaders who can effectively claim to speak for them.⁸² When

studying foreign policy decisions involving Canada, it is appropriate to focus on the values that have been articulated by the Prime Minister or any other individual's decisions and pronouncements which seem to be particularly prominent.⁸³ This would include the views expressed both within and beyond the confines of the House of Commons, by those responsible for speaking out on matters of foreign policy.

There is little need to undertake detailed investigations of decision makers' value systems to achieve an adequate explanation of policy choices.⁸⁴ What is vital is to have a clear understanding of the values the decision makers believed to be relevant to the situation they faced. These may be inferred from a general understanding of the individual and the situation; but more often than not the decision maker will voice his values relating to the issue publicly. In the case of Canadian decision makers this is especially true when one considers that each important decision must be defended within the House of Commons. Such a defence will contain reference to values either as individuals, a government, or a country as a whole.

If one questions the relevance of encompassing the values of decision makers into an analysis of their decisions it must be understood that people continue to judge states by human values. For only human beings create either states or values. States have no independent volition, and democratic theory, at least, requires states to reflect human, individual values.⁸⁵ However, critics are reluctant to rely exclusively on the values of decision makers as

the basis for evaluation,⁸⁶ even though decision makers themselves admit their prominence. As Barbara McDougall states,

We took the actions we did because of the values and interests we believed to be at stake, and with a clear recognition that we could influence the overall course of international events.⁸⁷

Values have an impact on the choices decision makers make. When evaluating this impact one deals with the impact of alternative values on choice. As Stein states,

Such an evaluation of subjective rationality is a minimal obligation for those who explain choice through subjective processes."⁸⁸

Perceptions and values are the two most important factors when considering possible motivations for actions. These concepts are unavoidably inter-related. Values can only be applied to one's perceptions of reality, and perceptions mean little without the application of values. At every stage of the process, the decision maker(s) must perceive reality and judge it according to their values. They do this when they ascribe meaning to the situation, consider their options and ultimately choose between alternatives. Within this framework it is important to note what values the decision maker(s) applied to the situation. These may be drawn or extrapolated from public statements but will invariably be delineated within the House of Commons.

The first step in analysing the decision is the determination of who has the authority and responsibility to make this particular decision. Such a determination is dependant upon many things. Most important is the Prime Minister's personal conception of his

role in the decision-making process generally and how this influenced the process during the situation being considered.

Before entering a situation requiring a specific decision, decision makers must formulate and establish their role within the foreign policy decision-making process. A role is defined as, the pattern of demands and expectations in social relationships as prescribed by others and conceived of by the individual.⁸⁹ The structure of the Canadian government imposes certain structural roles (i.e. Prime Minister, Minister of External Affairs, leader of the opposition, etc.) but individuals vary in the manner in which they conduct the business of state: especially foreign policy.

As the primary decision maker, the P.M. must remain involved in the foreign policy decision-making process, particularly when it is considered an important issue. Each Prime Minister will possess a personalized conception of their role in foreign affairs and this will affect the process by which decisions are made.⁹⁰ Conceptions include the ways in which individuals relate themselves to their own nation, other nations, the international system as a whole and to problems of foreign policy.⁹¹

This individualized conception of the P.M.'s role will be indicative of their image of foreign affairs generally and the degree to which they are aware and active in foreign commitments. Whether they prefer a passive role - delegating responsibility for foreign policy decisions or a highly active role - where they are constantly involved. This is a highly personal thing and will vary from P.M. to P.M.. Such a conception may be influenced by their

relationship to their Minister of External Affairs.

The degree to which the Prime Minister will use his colleagues to advise and assist him will depend on many factors. The professional relationship between the P.M. and his Minister of External Affairs is based upon personal qualities.⁹² If a P.M. holds a minister in high regard he may consult him on all matters of importance. Occasionally the Prime Minister may have a special colleague whose intimacy makes him a friend and almost a partner in the office.⁹³ One can see the implications this would have on the decision-making process.

The P.M. remains (of necessity) the key decision maker, but if a 'special relationship' exists it would mean an active role in the decision making process for the minister involved.

Special relationships are not common (or not revealed if they are), for the position of Prime Minister does not encourage intimacies and friendships. These are apt to create jealousies and antagonisms and may also expose the Prime Minister to exploitation by selfish interests, so that he finds his greatest protection lies in partial seclusion and a withdrawal from many normal human relationships.⁹⁴

The qualities of leadership which any Prime Minister worthy of the name is bound to possess and the opportunities for leadership which are an inescapable accompaniment of the office thus combine to exert a steady pressure towards autocratic methods and decisions.⁹⁵ In a sense, the individual becomes a manifestation of the role he plays.⁹⁶ The P.M. and Minister of External Affairs are the individuals responsible for defining the situation, and the manner in which they relate to each other will effect the foreign policy

decision-making process.⁹⁷

Although the Minister of External Affairs will usually be involved in the process this does not exclude the consideration of other key individuals the P.M. may choose to consult. Once again, the determination of who will be involved, and in what capacity is the responsibility of the Prime Minister. This will largely be determined prior to a decision being made either in the form of preferences or as structural adaptations to the decision-making process. Each situation and each decision must be analyzed independently to assess the nature of the process involved, yet each situation must fit within the larger decision-making context of the government involved.

The House of Commons is an integral part of the structure of Canadian government. It provides a forum for the discussion of how the government manages the decision-making process and the issues involved in significant decisions. Analysis of these debates should provide insight into the decision-making process and the role of the House of Commons in that process. Most importantly, analysis of these debates will demonstrate the acceptability of peacekeeping as a policy of various governments. Debates within the House of Commons often reflect the importance of re-election to the incumbent government. As Bremer states,

Decision-making elites have, as a major goal of their behaviour, the retention of their decision-making positions. The elites will endeavour to use the resources of the political and economic systems at their command to make their positions of command secure.⁹⁸

When issues such as involvement in UNPKOs reach the House of

Commons the opposition will raise issues in an attempt to unsettle the government's position.

Pronounced political divisions within a regime and the occurrence of strong political pressures threatening to remove the regime from power are likely to have a broad impact on foreign policy.⁹⁹ Political constraints on a government's conduct of foreign policy represent a blend of two decision making dynamics, controversy avoidance and consensus building.

At one level, the leadership is hindered from taking actions that it expects to be controversial. Politically 'risky' actions can provoke public debate over the leadership's policies and ability to lead the country. Foreign policy controversies can be particularly costly if they alienate important political support groups, and in the case of the very weak regime, such pressures can pose a threat to its very survival by upsetting tenuous inter-factional interparty balances and weakening slim legislative authorities. To the degree a regime is capable of pursuing a policy, it will carefully attempt to build a consensus among those political actors upon which it depends for the implementation of policy and/or its continuation in office.¹⁰⁰

How contentious an issue peacekeeping has been will demonstrate whether those involved in the debate believed that maintaining or achieving power domestically would be enhanced by the support for such a venture.¹⁰¹

As the primary decision maker, the perceptions, values and predilections of the Prime Minister must be understood to assess his/her influence on the process. Did his/her particular leadership style and preferred emphasis have an effect on the process? An adequate understanding of the process requires an

adequate understanding of the Prime Minister involved. The Prime Minister's personality and decision-making style must be understood especially in regards to international affairs. After the analysis of the individual is complete the analysis will move to the presentation of the chain of events which precipitated the debate. Through the analysis of the debates -whose main focus was potential participation in a UNPKO- issues regarding the government's handling of the decision-making process in such matters will be brought to light. Each case study will attempt to demonstrate how contentious an issue peacekeeping has been and how (if at all) the decision-making process has changed over time.

This will be accomplished through the analysis of three decisions. They are: the decision made in 1956 to commit troops to the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), the decision made in 1973 to participate in the second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II), and the decision made in 1992 to send troops for use in the United Nations Protection Force in Croatia (UNPROFOR). Each decision involved a government which enjoyed a long term in office. All of whom, left their mark on the workings of the Canadian decision-making process. By analysing each, in reference to involvement in a UNPKO, we will see how the Canadian policy and process regarding peacekeeping has evolved under their leadership.

St. Laurent

When St. Laurent first entered federal politics he was already sixty-five. He had a distinguished career behind him: successful lawyer, batonnier of the Quebec bar, President of the Canadian Bar Association, Minister of Justice and finally Minister of External Affairs. He was, as his colleague Brooke Claxton later wrote, "a strangely simple man...honest and humble, who felt no compulsion to pursue the highest political office".¹⁰² When the inevitable did happen and Mackenzie King retired, St. Laurent assumed the position of Prime Minister. After six months in office he called an election and won what was then the biggest majority in Canadian history--194 seats for the Liberals, to 41 for the Tories.¹⁰³

This lopsided victory was due in part to the capabilities of the Liberal government at the time which was extremely competent. It has also been attributed to the popularity of St. Laurent himself. Once convinced to enter politics he became everybody's favourite 'Uncle Louis'.¹⁰⁴ He brought to the office of Prime Minister an impeccable reputation as statesman and gentleman. As Donaldson states,

If few Canadians really thought of him as their 'Uncle Louis'--he was too distant for that press nickname--he was the kind of uncle everyone OUGHT to have had.¹⁰⁵

The high esteem St. Laurent garnered was due largely to his personality and the great skills he exercised while in office. St. Laurent was remarkably free of prejudice, political or racial from a very young age.¹⁰⁶ As Donaldson states,

If ever there was a balanced Canadian it was
he.¹⁰⁷

The previous Prime Minister, King wrote of St. Laurent,

The more I see of St. Laurent, the nobler
soul I believe him to be. One of God's
gentlemen if ever there was one.¹⁰⁸

Endowed with a clear and quick understanding, St. Laurent had an uncanny ability to grasp and epitomise the essence of an argument, an invaluable attribute in a period when Cabinet agendas were becoming longer and more complicated, and when the questions placed before Cabinet became increasingly technical.¹⁰⁹ He could assess a problem coldly, decide what should be done, and explain it crisply to Parliament.¹¹⁰

Canadian opinion on foreign policy during this period was remarkably coherent. A consensus had gradually been established that would last, without serious opposition, for the best part of the next decade.¹¹¹ Prime Minister St. Laurent, had every confidence in the strength of Canada's unity.¹¹² Quebec appeared to be in complete accord with the rest of Canada under the leadership of the St. Laurent government.¹¹³

Under St. Laurent's leadership, the government was determined to find an active role for Canada in the world. Fundamental to this goal was the belief in collective security. This was a primary objective in the foreign policy of Canada, which was to be pursued through the operations of the United Nations.¹¹⁴ The Canadian government attempted to make the U.N. an effective international organization.

St. Laurent was also strongly anti-communist. He spoke of

Canada as a, "dynamic counter-attraction of a free, prosperous and progressive society...opposed to the totalitarian and reactionary society of the Communist world".¹¹⁵ As Granatstein states,

To St. Laurent, Communism was an evil, the anti-Christ, and if it had to be stopped... so be it.¹¹⁶

This anti-communist role promoted the search for strong allies to combat Communism wherever it might appear.

St. Laurent's anti-communist views made a closer relationship with the United States unavoidable. Canada also had a long tradition of involvement with the United Kingdom. St. Laurent did not see this as an impediment but rather as an opportunity. As St. Laurent stated,

The special nature of our relationship to the United Kingdom and the United States complicates our responsibilities, though it also enlarges our opportunities for influencing developments.¹¹⁷

Canada was the 'linchpin' between these two powerful nations. They united against Communism and were determined to present a unified front with Canada acting as go-between.

This special relationship would not however directly affect Canada's vital interests or decision-making. As St. Laurent stated,

Canadian interests will often naturally be identical with those of the United Kingdom and the United States, we will continue to make our decisions objectively, in the light of our obligations to our own people and their interest in the welfare of the international community.¹¹⁸

The personal qualities St. Laurent possessed and brought to his government had a profound affect upon his government. Under his

leadership the Liberals remained in power for twelve years and exercised almost free reign over most policy areas, especially foreign relations.

Lester Pearson began his professional career as a young and vigorous, extremely skilful diplomat, who wanted Canada to have its proper place in the Allied councils of WWII.¹¹⁹ At the invitation of St. Laurent he moved from the public service into politics and became Secretary of State for External Affairs.¹²⁰ As such, and as a diplomat of distinction, Pearson was a definite asset to the St. Laurent government. The high esteem in which his fellow diplomats held him, and his consequent value to his country, are not open to question.¹²¹ St. Laurent obviously shared this opinion of Pearson, saying, "he had a first-class mind and obviously commanded respect."¹²²

Pearson was the master of the compromise phrase, the helpful fixer who could cajole two or three sides into reaching a mutual accommodation that might leave no one happy but all more or less satisfied. He had shown his skills at the United Nations in negotiations that led to a cease-fire in Korea, an action that angered some in the United States but that built lines of trust to India and even China. He was at the peak of his powers in 1956, a still tireless man who understood how men thought and how nations worked.¹²³

The dominant actor in the Pearson account of recent history was usually the United Nations. He maintained that support for the U.N. had been the most important element in Canadian foreign policy

during the post-war period, and like St. Laurent, remained convinced of the necessity for collective security.¹²⁴ Foreign policy was not merely the pursuit of Canadian goals but as Pearson stated,

Canadians will endeavour to shape our course in conformity with what we regard as our obligations under the Charter of and our membership in the United Nations.¹²⁵

Canada was to have a dynamic international role, and the St. Laurent government actively pursued one through the United Nations.

Under Pearson's leadership Canada continued to do her duty within the international community. It was within the U.N. that all of Pearson's skills came to the fore. As John Holmes wrote of him,

His personal contribution to the acquisition of status by Canada in the United Nations was that he was more concerned with the job in hand than the status of the Canadian representatives, thereby doing far more to raise the latter than those more interested in form than substance.¹²⁶

By simply doing an effective and efficient job Pearson ensured an active and effective voice for Canada within the United Nations.

Some have described foreign policy decision making during this period as a 'closed approach' in which a small, tightly knit group of politicians and officials acted with a great deal of autonomy from civic influences to pursue their concept of the national interest. John Holmes described the St. Laurent government as a small cohort of Canadian foreign-policy makers who used their strong position, "to lead Canadian public opinion in the direction of new obligations".¹²⁷

St. Laurent's ministers had their politics and their

administration well under control.¹²⁸ There was surprising stability and continuity in the senior civil service during the post-war period.¹²⁹ St. Laurent's Cabinet was filled with capable ministers who were supported by a generation of loyal Liberal-minded civil servants.¹³⁰ Decisions were made subject only to his overall supervision.¹³¹

Although others might shine more brightly
in the House of Commons and on the hustings,
St. Laurent was master of his cabinet and
of the civil servant who appeared before him.¹³²

In St. Laurent's systematic and orderly government there were few surprises. The circulation of cabinet papers warned ministers of their colleagues' plans and saved tedious exposition.¹³³

The relationship between St. Laurent and Pearson appears to have been exceptionally harmonious and fruitful.

As one who had previously held the position of Secretary of State for External Affairs (from 1946 to 1948) St. Laurent had a sound appreciation of its importance.¹³⁴ Although St. Laurent retained an interest in external affairs he had every confidence in Pearson.¹³⁵ It was within the Department of External Affairs that Pearson and St. Laurent initially found they made a good team.¹³⁶ When St. Laurent succeeded as Prime Minister in 1948, Pearson was invited to enter politics as Secretary of State for External Affairs where their close cooperation continued.¹³⁷

They were each in positions which allowed them to act on their shared beliefs. Both were firm believers in collective security as imperative if peace was to be preserved.¹³⁸ Both were convinced that there was no satisfactory alternative for the security of

Canada. They were firmly supported in these views by their Cabinet colleagues and by a large segment of the Canadian people. Indeed, for the first time Canadian foreign policy became a truly national policy.¹³⁹

Unlike former P.M. King, St. Laurent could grasp a situation quickly, and where a decision was required it was not postponed. Moreover, St. Laurent believed in the delegation of authority, something that King had avoided wherever possible in foreign affairs.¹⁴⁰ Commenting on the operation of their relationship during the Suez crisis, Thomson states that,

the relations between St. Laurent and Pearson were a near-perfect example of team-work; they consulted by telephone several times a day, discussing each new development, and co-ordinating every move. No foreign minister ever had a more helpful and understanding prime minister; no government leader ever had a more loyal or zealous colleague. While St. Laurent continued to be impatient in his relations with the press, no shadow of disagreement marred his dealings with Pearson or hampered their joint actions.¹⁴¹

Pearson subsequently remarked, "Mr. St Laurent was more than a prime minister to me, he was always a very close friend. 'Don't Worry', he told me. 'Do what is best. Do the right thing, and I'll back you'." ¹⁴² Such a delegation of authority is indicative of the leadership style of St Laurent and the trust he shared with Pearson.

Concerning foreign policy decision-making, Pearson found it difficult to generalize about the Ottawa process. Decisions were often made in such haste that it was impossible to describe the process systematically. Nevertheless he offered a few tantalizing

impressions.

He thought the influence of senior bureaucrats was often overrated, except in highly specialized fields such as finance... The government usually must decide what to do in the face of rapidly developing circumstances, and then educate the public accordingly.¹⁴³

This need for immediate action followed by explanation left the St. Laurent government, and Pearson in particular, open to criticism. As Grafftey states,

[The Liberals] often misjudged the temper of the nation, not knowing our strength because they did not know our history. I always felt that Mike Pearson, despite his negotiating skills, far too often intellectualized our position.¹⁴⁴

This type of decision-making is understandable when one considers that the Liberals were in power for so long. The complexity and speed of international relations would also make it difficult to reconcile public passions with the necessity for swift action.

Background

The Middle East was one of the more contentious regions of the world both prior to and following the Second World War. The colonial powers (particularly Britain) were only able to disengage themselves from the region through the auspices of the United Nations. It was also through the U.N. that an armistice system was established with Palestine which was intended to stop the fighting for a limited time. There was no system in place to create a lasting peace. As Goodrich states,

The failure of the parties to reach a formal settlement invited violations. Tensions rose on both sides of the armistice lines culminating

in Israel's preemptive strike in Sinai of October 1956.¹⁴⁵

Many of the region's problems were legacies of European imperialism, but there were also conflicts dating back to the antecedent Ottoman Empire.¹⁴⁶

World attention became focused on the region with Colonel Nasser's sudden and unforeseen expropriation of the assets of the foreign-owned Suez Canal Company in July, 1956. The immediate effects on Canada were nominal. The news first reached Ottawa on the night of July 26. When Parliament met the following morning there were questions about flax, box-cars and the quality of food at an army camp, but none about Suez.¹⁴⁷

Such minor reaction to the events in Egypt was to be expected considering the great independence Canada had achieved after WWII. Even before the nationalization, Canada had agreed to sell wheat to the Egyptians at a time when Britain urged her not to do so.¹⁴⁸ In Vancouver, then Minister of National Defence Ralph Campney remarked that the Suez seizure was, "primarily a European matter...not a matter which particularly concerns Canada. We have no oil there. We don't use the Canal for shipping."¹⁴⁹ This summed up the official position of Canada which was in sharp contrast with the tension reported in London.¹⁵⁰

Reaction to the nationalization of the Canal within Britain and France was dramatic. Both powers immediately considered military intervention yet were unable to initiate such a move quickly. As Fraser states,

Military unreadiness made prompt intervention

impossible. It turned out, despite the huge amounts of money that the armed services consumed in both countries, that the French could not land forces in less than a month and the British would need at least six weeks.¹⁵¹

It is important to note that both countries, particularly England, had long standing interests in the region. Neither country could legitimately claim anywhere near the influence they possessed prior to WWII but the concerns of pride and influence were not easily dismissed.

Britain, which had been devastated during the war, had not yet completely realized that her power had waned. The Suez Canal was still seen as the lifeline of an Empire that was already in total dissolution.¹⁵² Even so, both nations were willing to commit armed forces to the region to reassert their influence. It was the perception of this threat that made the crisis all the more acute for those on the periphery.

Although the declared position of the Canadian government was indifference, St. Laurent and Pearson immediately perceived that the crisis had far wider implications than the Suez Canal itself.¹⁵³ Each realized the powder keg Suez represented and observed with anxiety the growing tension in the region.¹⁵⁴ As a Commonwealth country there remained many strong ties with Great Britain. This traditional position was advanced within the House of Commons by the Conservatives serving as the official opposition. External Affairs Critic Diefenbaker strongly criticized the general lack of support for Britain and compared Nasser to Hitler and Mussolini.¹⁵⁵

When Britain called for a meeting of the users of the Suez

Canal, Canada was not invited. Canada, however, was to be kept in the closest touch possible during the conference. Not having any direct interest in the Canal itself the government felt no misgivings at being left out.¹⁵⁶ The government was clearly sympathetic to the position of British Prime Minister Anthony Eden but strove to reduce the possibilities of conflict through involvement of the United Nations. The Liberals were also sensitive to Conservative charges that they were aggravating tensions in the Middle East by selling arms to both Israel and Egypt, particularly since a Canadian officer, General E. L. M. Burns, was in command of the U.N. force supervising the truce between them.¹⁵⁷

A note sent from Eden to St. Laurent on July 28 was the first intimation received in Ottawa that the use of force was being contemplated by England.¹⁵⁸ Although St. Laurent was sympathetic to Eden's position and saw Nasser as a potential threat,

he was convinced that to meet force with force, except under the aegis of the United Nations, would alienate the leaders of neutral nations such as India, and would give Soviet Russia a pretext to intervene still further in the Middle East.¹⁵⁹

The note from Eden sent to all the Commonwealth Prime Ministers requested support for any move made by England in the region. Both St. Laurent and Pearson were irritated by Eden's assumption that Canada would offer at least verbal support to action against Egypt's President Nasser.¹⁶⁰ Both realised that the days of colonial intervention were past and that in the current period of tension between the Superpowers such a provocative move could

potentially start a larger chain of events.

What made the Suez situation potentially world threatening was the impression it conveyed that two major European states, recently the leading imperial powers in the region, were trying to slow down the disengagement process or even bring it altogether to a halt.¹⁶¹ Such a move by western allies could weaken the already precarious balance between East and West. The involvement of extra-regional powers in such a dispute could escalate to the level of superpower conflict. Such an escalation could occur if it entailed an intra-Western debacle which could entice the Soviets to become even more provocative themselves.¹⁶² This was an inescapable dilemma in the expanding Cold War.¹⁶³

To better appreciate the feelings in Britain, Pearson made a quick tour of Europe in August. He came back very worried. "The British and the French haven't cooled down in the least," he said in a conversation just after his return. "The way they talk about Suez is enough to make your hair stand on end."¹⁶⁴ On August 3rd, Canadian military sources in London passed the word that, "it is not a question of whether military action will be taken but rather a matter of how and when."¹⁶⁵ Pearson feared a catastrophe. He believed British action could lead to the breakup or disruption of the UN.¹⁶⁶

Three days later, in a memorandum (quoted at length in Terence Robertson's book, Crisis) Pearson stated what the government believed to be at stake.

It is clear that every possible effort must be made to prevent a chain of developments which

would result in Anglo-French military force being exerted against Egypt in a way which would split the Commonwealth, weaken the Anglo-American alliance, and have general consequences that would benefit nobody but Moscow.¹⁶⁷

Canada's High Commissioner to the U.K., Norman Robertson, was well acquainted with the goals of the government. He was a friend of Pearson and was personally instructed by him to urge upon the United Kingdom the wisdom of proceeding in a manner designed to obtain the greatest amount of international support and emphasize the importance of bringing the U.N. into the question.¹⁶⁸

Britain, however seemed to be on a fixed path. In discussions with the British Foreign Minister Lord Home, Robertson was asked unequivocally, "If we have to use force, would we have the approval of Canada?" Robertson's answer was blunt: "In my opinion, no....we cannot support, nor even approve, any resort to force."¹⁶⁹ The British should have had no doubts about the Canadian attitude.

Even though the British knew there was no support for the use of force within Canada they proceeded to invade the canal zone. On October the 29th Israel invaded Egypt and the following evening Britain and France issued an ultimatum warning Egypt and Israel to withdraw ten miles from the Canal Zone. If they refused, Anglo-French troops would move in, "in whatever strength may be necessary to secure compliance."¹⁷⁰ Robertson had been informed of the British/French ultimatum just one hour before its issue to the belligerents.¹⁷¹

From the beginning, all the attackers, and particularly Britain, maintained that they had acted within the framework of

international law and the U.N. Charter. The British claimed that one of the purposes of the expedition was the protection of British nationals threatened by the Egyptian-Israeli conflict.¹⁷² Regarding the protection of the canal as an international facility, it had not been closed for a single hour until the British attacked to 'keep it open'.¹⁷³

Throughout the course of the crisis the Suez was a subject of heated and extensive debate in the U.N. Security Council.¹⁷⁴ This debate intensified with the invasions of both the Israeli and Anglo-French forces. Almost immediately a call for a cease-fire was proposed within the U.N. Security Council but was vetoed by both the British and the French. This was seen by many as sheer callousness in flouting the obligations of U.N. membership.¹⁷⁵ The British and French lost all legitimacy and their actions caused consternation throughout the international community.

In addition to its violation of major U.N. principles, the Suez invasion was a betrayal of the NATO allies.¹⁷⁶ The Americans, who had vacillated throughout the crisis, were not informed prior to the invasion itself. The secrecy aggravated the feelings of outrage both in Washington and Ottawa.¹⁷⁷ There existed, for the first time since the end of the war, the possibility of a substantial rift between Britain and the United States.

The Anglo-French action had been taken without the knowledge of the British Commonwealth governments, who had been engaged right up to the time of the attack in trying to arrange further negotiations.¹⁷⁸ In Ottawa there was incredulity, particularly on

behalf of the Prime Minister who learned of the invasion through a press release.¹⁷⁹

Pearson was not as upset by this, "After all," he said reasonably, "they couldn't have told us or the Americans what they were going to do, or we'd have stopped them."¹⁸⁰ To St. Laurent, who regarded candid consultation as a fundamental part of the relations among friendly countries, Eden's secrecy was a major betrayal which he never quite forgave.¹⁸¹

On the basis of available information, the Canadian government could not endorse the military actions of either Israel, the United Kingdom, or France. Canada suspended all shipments of arms to Israel, and would shape its course in conformity with its obligations under the United Nations Charter.¹⁸² The High Commissioner to the U.K. was told by Pearson to,

express to the United Kingdom Government our feeling of bewilderment and dismay at the decision which they have taken...decisions which came as a complete surprise to us and which had not been hinted at in any previous discussion...making cooperation extraordinarily difficult.¹⁸³

Communication was finally received from London in the form of a note from Anthony Eden. It repeated the declared reasons for the invasion, adding that Eden knew he could look for Canadian understanding. He even went so far as to look to Ottawa for support. There was scant prospect of that, for Ottawa was beginning to receive reports of the connivance between the Israelis and France. St. Laurent and Pearson knew that Eden's message was replete with falsehoods.¹⁸⁴

St. Laurent, still feeling betrayed by his fellow statesman, was infuriated with the implication that Canada should support so ill conceived an enterprise. Pearson was equally disturbed by the contents of the note, but remained calm. The two men agreed that each should prepare a draft reply, and that they would compare them before raising the matter at a Cabinet meeting later that day. St. Laurent went to work, setting down in words his feelings of indignation and his sense of having been betrayed; Pearson suggested some changes to make the tone somewhat softer, expressing more regret than indignation over the turn of events, and looking ahead for a possible way out of the critical situation.¹⁸⁵

The result was a response which explained frankly, and as an ally, the concern of the Canadian government over the tense situation.¹⁸⁶ Much was made of these exchanges of 'heated telegrams' by the press, yet examination of the contents of these notes reveals a tone surprisingly tame in comparison with the initial reaction. The feelings expressed by St. Laurent were absent and in their place calm reason. This may be attributed to the calming influence of Pearson in such matters.

There was still the matter of what Canada would do at the emergency meeting of the United Nations scheduled for November 1st. St. Laurent called a Cabinet meeting to decide the Canadian position. This meeting occurred forty eight hours after hostilities began in Suez. The sudden and irreversible move of the Anglo-French forces placed the Commonwealth, the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, the Anglo-American unwritten pact, and the United

Nations itself, in jeopardy.¹⁸⁷ St. Laurent called for the meeting and sent word to Pearson, who was by this stage splitting his time between Ottawa and the U.N., to fly from New York to attend.

The meeting occurred upon Pearson's return from the United Nations on October 31st. Already he had been formulating a plan which could potentially solve all the problems he currently faced. The previous evening he had telephoned London and Washington to see if the British and American governments could be persuaded to support a proposal for a United Nations force. Just Prior to the Cabinet meeting, word was received from both capitals that the two governments welcomed the proposal as an eventual or ultimate solution, but considered it too complicated to serve their respective interests in the immediate future.¹⁸⁸ Pearson entered the Cabinet meeting with only the vague outlines of a plan and no clear opportunity to implement it.

Due to the divergence of views within Cabinet, there was still significant sympathy for Britain, Pearson was careful not to ask for detailed and specific instructions from his colleagues; it was simply agreed that he should fly to New York immediately, and see what he could do to extricate the British and French from the impossible situation into which they were plunging deeper and deeper by the hour.¹⁸⁹ There was some discussion but St. Laurent did not allow it to continue for long.¹⁹⁰

It was further decided that Pearson would consult the Prime Minister by telephone if a decision had to be taken, and other ministers would be on hand if another Cabinet meeting was

required.¹⁹¹ As the meeting broke up, Pearson and St. Laurent chatted for a moment in the corner of the Council Chamber; "Do as you think best," Pearson was told. "I will support you here."¹⁹² St. Laurent gave Pearson wide liberty to do whatever possible to avoid catastrophe, and in promising him his full support, delegated decision-making authority to Pearson.¹⁹³

Pearson's actions at the United Nations resulted in the creation of the world's first peacekeeping force, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). Once the suggestion had been made to the General Assembly, events moved very quickly. An implementation plan was drafted within 48 hours and included a strong Canadian contingent. The government then drafted an Order In Council authorizing the sending of a battalion which was put on alert. The government had ten days to call for a debate on the matter. In that time, it was determined that a signal corps was more vitally needed in the force so the combat unit stood down while other troops went in their stead.

The Debate Over UNEF I

The debate within the House of Commons, continued for four days before a conclusion was reached. Throughout the course of the debate various points of view were advanced by both the government and the opposition. At times these perceptions were concurrent but more often than not they diverged greatly. It is important to first have a clear understanding of the process which prompted the debate and how it was perceived by the members of the House. From this basis, the discussion may then move on to consideration of

whether involvement in UNEF I was an issue in and of itself. Although an inauspicious beginning for the first Canadian peacekeepers, their inclusion in the force prompted serious debate within the House of Commons.

As Parliament was not in session at the time, St. Laurent called a special emergency session. In the Throne Speech opening the session, St. Laurent clearly laid out the role the House of Commons was to play within the decision-making process saying,

I think all hon. members will want to reach a point where a decision can be made as to whether or not the House is going to allow the government to carry out the decision implemented in the Order in Council that I have just tabled. We will see how things proceed. We do not intend to precipitate matters, and it will be our desire to proceed in a way that will meet what we apprehend is the wish of the country, that parliament do, after proper consideration, pronounce itself upon the conduct of the government.¹⁹⁴

Although the decision had already been made by Cabinet through the Order in Council¹⁹⁵ and partially implemented, the decision had to go through the House of Commons for approval before funds could be allocated. Any member of the House could voice their opinion and offer suggestions or criticisms. This last function was of particular importance to the opposition.

St. Laurent quickly laid out the role of government within the decision-making process.

The government has to take the responsibility of making a decision and then put itself in the hands of parliament so that parliament may determine whether it will provide the funds to implement that decision or whether it will refuse to provide the funds and get another government to carry out the policies

that parliament wants to have carried out. Just as soon as it was possible to make a concrete decision which we could submit to parliament we made that decision, and on the same day we recommended that His Excellency summon parliament.¹⁹⁶

He clearly believed that as Prime Minister, he had the authority to choose a course of action. St. Laurent then presented himself and his government to parliament to meet all parliamentary requirements. As to whether his decision was in the best interests and in keeping with the wishes of the country, that would be determined through the course of the debate.

Although Cabinet operated (as it always has) without any direct parliamentary input, there was still the recognition that its actions had to be approved. This recognition is fundamental to the workings of responsible government in Canada. It is a responsibility not only to parliament but to the people of Canada members of parliament represent. This lack of parliamentary influence was attacked by Opposition member Mr. D.M. Fleming saying,

All that the Prime Minister was saying in effect was that the government had to take the decision and then refer to parliament within ten days. But that is no reason for not calling parliament together in the days of a critical international situation, when surely there was need for an opportunity for the elected representatives of the people to meet and to deliberate.¹⁹⁷

Parliament was not in session at the time of the crisis and Fleming argued that it should have been called much sooner.

According to St. Laurent, holding the debate any earlier would have been senseless.

It would have been a pretty strange position for us to take to have invited members of parliament to come down here without having taken our responsibility, and having them taunt us with being afraid to take the proper responsibility and of trying to get an indication from them as to what that decision should be.¹⁹⁸

St. Laurent considered his primary responsibility to be to make the type of decision he was elected to make. Coupled with this was an understanding of, "what has always been the constitutional requirement and the constitutional practice."¹⁹⁹ St. Laurent did not have to call parliament until a decision was made. If he had, it would have been perceived as a sign of weakness or indecisiveness. St. Laurent was unwilling to abrogate his decision-making authority in this manner.

Other members of the House deferred to the decision-making authority of the government. Michner and Winch both voiced opinions concerning Canadian involvement in UNEF I, but conceded that the government had the authority and responsibility to act. As Winch stated,

The government has the responsibility and if it fails it will be charged in this house.²⁰⁰

Many members of parliament (M.P.s) demanded a more prominent role in the decision-making process. The acting leader of the Opposition, W.E. Rowe took exception to the timing of the debate saying,

it would have been preferable for the government to have secured the approval of parliament before the Canadian contingent left our shores for the Middle East.²⁰¹

The opposition would have preferred to be involved in the actual

decision-making process. Although the debate came after implementation had already begun, the opposition did not attack this point vigorously. This fact leads one to assume that they recognized the government's authority and felt little need to pursue this point.

Other M.P.s such as Social Credit leader S.E. Low, believed the debate was well timed, saying,

I think the Prime Minister did call parliament in time so we can give careful consideration to what the United Nations has asked of us, and so we can get all the information we require in order to make a solid decision.²⁰²

A 'solid' decision would, in effect, be a judgement of the government's actions. In making such a decision the issue of peacekeeping would inevitably be raised.

Although parliament played no role in the initial decision to send troops to participate, members like G.W. McLeod demanded a more prominent role in any subsequent decisions.

We [in parliament] would want to be further consulted; it should be the parliament of Canada that should make the decision with respect to any future change that might be deemed necessary.²⁰³

In this way, parliament could ensure that the government's actions would be in the best interests of all Canadians.

Pearson supported the sharing of information between government and parliament. Opposition members lamented that they were not involved in the process. To which Pearson responded,

I agree that in a time of emergency and crisis there should be the greatest possible exchange of information between the government and opposition leaders.²⁰⁴

The problem was that during the crisis, developments moved so fast that there was no time to inform let alone involve parliament. Pearson was splitting time between Ottawa and the United Nations, while St. Laurent was busy trying to manage his Cabinet. Pearson stated that the practice of informing opposition leaders before a debate was worth following but that it was impossible in this instance.

The potential involvement of parliament would seem to be counter to the decision-making style of St. Laurent and the manner in which he conducted his government. Although he would often consult Cabinet on important matters, St. Laurent reserved ultimate decision-making authority for himself. The great deal of trust he had in his Minister for External Affairs ensured Pearson a prominent place in the decision-making process. Parliament would have been a burden on an already hard pressed group of decision makers. There is no question that had parliament been allowed to convene, during the crisis, the decision-making process would have taken more time than was readily available.

However, St. Laurent did not merely discount parliament. He was a renowned parliamentarian and understood the duties and obligations of his government. Parliament played an important role within his conception of Canadian government. He stated in his closing remarks that,

it was necessary to have parliament meet...
to determine whether or not there would be
funds provided by parliament to implement
that decision, because I think that is the
test.²⁰⁵

St. Laurent understood that parliament was the place where all the divergent views could be considered. If it turned out that a majority did not support the actions of his government they would not allow his government to continue in office. The actual likelihood of that occurring with a majority government in power was small.

Throughout the course of the debate the opposition raised point after point questioning the motivations of the government's action. This may be considered being representative of the diverging views of the Canadian people themselves. The opposition certainly attempted to make it look this way. As G.W. McLeod stated,

There seems to be quite a difference of opinion in Canada, and I think the House of Commons is the sounding board upon which these opinions should be expressed and where definite decisions should be made so the people of this country may feel their best interests are being looked after.²⁰⁶

The fact is that Canadian participation within this the inaugural UNPKO was debated quite vigorously within the House of Commons. The opposition questioned the government's actions and did its level best to make the government appear inept and completely out of touch with the desires of the Canadian people. Although this plan centred around many different issues, particularly important to this study is the degree to which involvement in a UNPKO was an issue in and of itself.

Although half a world away, the involvement of Britain and France, in a situation which could potentially result in superpower

conflict, ensured that the Middle East crisis would be uppermost in the minds of Canadians. As acting leader of the opposition Rowe stated, "This is a vital issue which touches the heart of every Canadian."²⁰⁷ This position was reinforced by S.E. Low saying,

Although there are many vexatious domestic problems that face our Canadian people... yet uppermost in their minds is the Middle East problem.²⁰⁸

The involvement of Canada's two traditional allies ensured a great deal of interest in this crisis for the Canadian people.

The attitude which the government took regarding those powers throughout the crisis, was questioned by the opposition. In the his address Rowe delineated the areas which the opposition would criticize. This came in the form of a four point amendment to the Throne Speech. One concerned Hungary but the other three concerned the government's actions in the UNEF crisis. The opposition questioned the government's, "course of gratuitous condemnation of the U.K. and France; the meek following of American policies and accepting dictation from President Nasser."²⁰⁹ Each opposition member in turn attacked the government on these points.

The opposition maintained quite vehemently, that the government was out of touch with the strong feelings of the Canadian people in this matter. Rowe believed that the government had threatened the whole of the western alliance and were, "losing the confidence of our people at home."²¹⁰ H.C. Green attributed this to a government which had been too long in office. In his opinion, the government had no idea what was really going on.

Feelings on these questions raised by the

Suez crisis, Mr. Speaker, are running very deep in Canada, far deeper I believe than the government has the slightest conception. Listening to the Prime Minister I could not help but think he has been living in some other land altogether so far as public reaction to these issues is concerned.²¹¹

Other opposition members such as Michener and L. Balcer, supported this position and expressed dissatisfaction with the St. Laurent government.

The opposition did more than just attack the policies of the government. Scathing criticisms were made of St. Laurent and his attitude towards Britain and France. Few M.P.s touched upon the issue of peacekeeping itself, opting instead to attack the government for 'abandoning' her two traditional allies. It was felt that through the weakening of such alliances the position of Communists around the world was strengthened. Pearson, the individual most directly involved, received only cursory criticism, compared to those heaped upon the Prime Minister.

Such personal attacks may merely reflect the roles each played within the government. As head of the government, St. Laurent was the individual responsible for the policies his government followed. Pearson was considered a man who was very good at his job, while St. Laurent was painted as a man taking Canada into dangerous territory. It was also clear that the opposition saw St. Laurent as the more passionate of the two, and attempted to goad him into making a mistake. This policy eventually paid dividends for the Opposition.

While defending the position the government took in regard to

Britain and France, St. Laurent stated that he had been, "scandalized more than once by the attitude of the larger powers." He went on to say that,

the era when the supermen of Europe could govern the whole world had and is coming pretty close to an end.²¹²

This remark, made in the heat of the moment, added fuel to the opposition attacks and focused attention upon St. Laurent.

H.C. Green expressed the opinion that St. Laurent had betrayed the Commonwealth. He called the Suez crisis,

the most disgraceful period for Canada in the history of this nation. It is high time Canada had a government which will not knife Canada's best friends in the back.²¹³

According to D.M. Fleming this betrayal was a result of, "the government's own blindness and obstinacy."²¹⁴ He believed responsibility for this betrayal rested squarely on the shoulders of St. Laurent. He believed, "The Prime Minister ought to repent in sackcloth and ashes."²¹⁵

From the outset, many members of the House (including St. Laurent and Pearson) asked that the debate be conducted on a non-partisan basis. In his opening remarks, St. Laurent asked the House to, "rise above political partisanship in dealing with this question".²¹⁶ Pearson also considered the matter, "far too serious to be dealt with from a purely partisan point of view".²¹⁷ Low, Hamilton, McLeod, Knowles and Balcer, all made remarks to the effect that the debate should be non-partisan.

It was clear that the opposition had its own agenda. Rather than deal with the issue of whether Canada should or should not be

participating in the force, the opposition attempted to make the government appear aloof and uncaring about the Canadian people. These attacks upon the government and the Prime Minister in particular were not in keeping with the spirit of the debate. They appeared to be politically motivated. The worse the opposition could make St. Laurent appear to the Canadian people, the better their position would be. It was not until well into the third day of the debate that Winch re-introduced the basic question.

We have been dealing with these matters from Monday up to the present time, when they could have been settled in two hours. In my estimation the time since Monday has been spent by the official opposition for the purposes of a Conservative convention and an election next June.²¹⁸

This was a turning point in the debate. Until this moment, the opposition had set the course of the debate, practically ignoring the basic question of peacekeeping. Winch's statement focused the debate on the fundamental issue.

I hope that now we will stick strictly to the principle. Do we believe in the force?²¹⁹

It is interesting to note that the creation of such a force was introduced in Parliament months before the Suez crisis occurred. It was suggested by John Diefenbaker as a possible solution to the problems of the region. This fact was brought out by Rowe, in an attempt to make sure that credit for the idea went where it was due.

The idea put forward by the opposition through the hon. member for Prince Albert ten months ago in this house was hastily revived at last in the proposal to send an international emergency force to the danger

area, even though it was merely scoffed off ten months ago.²²⁰

At no time during the debate did the government deny this fact. In speaking about the force itself Pearson stated,

I hope it was valuable but it certainly was not novel; except in the sense that it was adopted, but in no other respect.²²¹

Pearson did not take credit for the idea of the force. Nor did he attempt to take credit for his efforts in having it adopted. That such a force was created at such a pivotal time was, and still is, accredited to the diplomatic skills and personal abilities of Mr. Pearson. Many members of the House recognized the position Pearson had made for Canada within the United Nations.²²²

We are very happy indeed that it was the Canadian representative in the person of our Secretary of State for External Affairs who proposed the establishment of the United Nations force. I think that is something about which every Canadian can indeed be proud and happy.²²³

At no time during the debate did any member of the House express concern over Canada's involvement in the UNPKO. Many members believed that the crisis could have developed into a global conflict and expressed support for the principles of the United Nations. Rowe himself stated,

There is no disagreement among us regarding the desirability of forming a UN police force to police the Suez canal area.²²⁴

And yet, the debate raged for another three days, with little or no mention of the force itself.

The opposition amendment represented a vote of non-confidence in the policies of the government and was defeated.²²⁵ It was not

until the incisive remarks by Winch that members began addressing the matter of the peacekeeping force itself. All members who spoke after Winch expressed strong support for the mission. McIvor summarised the feelings of the House saying,

I am sure the Secretary of State for External Affairs can go back tonight or tomorrow morning feeling that all sides of this house are backing him up in doing his duty in support of the United Nations.²²⁶

This return to the fundamentals of the debate provided Pearson with an opportunity to respond to the criticisms which were obviously directed towards the person of Prime Minister St. Laurent.

I would point out to my hon. friends opposite who have all, I think, without exception expressed themselves as being in favour of the idea of a United Nations force and even felt that it should have been in existence long before this crisis, that if the Canadian delegation had taken the action at the first meeting of the United Nations special assembly which some of them have suggested we should have taken, to support the United Kingdom and France in their efforts to prevent the consideration of this question at the United Nations assembly in that action, and if that support and that of other members of the assembly had been effective, there could have been no consideration of any United Nations force at this time, or possibly at any other time in the future.²²⁷

In essence, the support for the peacekeeping effort itself and the harsh criticism of the government's position regarding Britain and France were inconsistent. UNEF would not have been created had the government taken any other position.

The nature of this inaugural debate over UNEF was in keeping with the style of the St. Laurent government. The government acted

unilaterally throughout the crisis, following its well-established activist course in international affairs. Although St. Laurent retained ultimate decision-making authority at all times, the relationship he shared with his Minister of External Affairs allowed Pearson to act with almost a free hand. A fact which, although obvious to all observers received no criticism in the House of Commons.

Being so well-versed in the parliamentary requirements ensured that St. Laurent did what was necessary to keep Parliament involved in the process. If the course which he and Pearson had set for the country was not popular, then his government would have been removed. As this was not the case, the opposition took the opportunity to provoke St. Laurent into an emotional outburst regarding the earlier actions of Britain and France. Although this had no effect on Canadian participation in UNEF it does demonstrate the strong pro-British and pro-French sentiments of the time. That there was some degree of apprehension (if not dissension) in Cabinet over Pearson's ambiguous plan also suggests that feelings ran strong in support of Britain and France.

The Suez crisis with the swift escalation into hostilities and the potential for Superpower involvement was an international problem. The inability of any of the 'Great' powers to devise a solution presented a well renown and respected statesman like Pearson with an opportunity. An opportunity which he seized and forever changed the face of international affairs. It was important enough to warrant an emergency session of Parliament to

discuss Canada's role. After twelve years in office the creation of UNEF was the crowning achievement for the St. Laurent government. For his efforts, Pearson later received the Nobel Peace Prize.

Although the debate was long and involved issues that went well beyond the matter of sending troops to participate in UNEF, it did recognize the importance of becoming involved in such a mission. There was little doubt that peacekeeping was a role that was acceptable to the Canadian government and people. As Roland Michener noted at the time,

Let us hope that by having taken this action which is unusual and pathfinding in a way, it will have set a precedent.²²⁸

Little did Mr. Michener know, that participation in United Nations peacekeeping forces would become a policy upheld by every subsequent Canadian government.

The Conservative Diefenbaker government and then the Liberal Pearson government all followed the standard of peacekeeping established in 1956. The dynamic Canadian involvement in the creation and implementation of UNEF gave Canada a level of international prestige which by far exceeded its capabilities. It was not until Pierre Elliot Trudeau came to power in 1968 that Canada's role as a peacekeeper would be seriously questioned.

Prime Minister Trudeau

When Pierre Elliot Trudeau came to power, it marked a turning point in Canadian government. Trudeau brought with him a series of reforms which would forever change the way government decisions were made especially in the area of foreign affairs. When considering his influence on foreign policy decisions there are three elements to consider. The first is his personal philosophy encompassing how he regarded foreign policy issues as a whole. Second is the structural changes he made and how this reorganization affected the decision-making process. Finally the foreign policy review of 1970 delineated how the Trudeau government intended to conduct Canadian foreign policy. All three are salient features of the Trudeau government which would be brought to bear in the second case study.

Pierre Elliot Trudeau was a man of great intellectual achievement. He did not, however, have very much experience of government and admitted it. "The further we advance into the modern age," he said, "the less important experience will become. It's much more important to have the necessary adaptability with which to face and solve new problems."²²⁹ Not having had the experience of some of his predecessors it is perhaps more important to consider his ideas concerning foreign affairs generally to understand how foreign policy would be conducted during his term as Prime Minister.

Trudeau entered Federal politics with a very definite concept

of international affairs and of Canada's place in the world.²³⁰ He was determined to bring this series of abstractions and notions into practice.²³¹ As Zink states;

His political philosophy, shaped by the late Harold Laski's brand of Fabian socialism, was roughly that of the left-wing academic of the Western World: Abstract egalitarianism; unilateral disarmament regardless of the perils of the international situation; relativism of moral values; and boundless faith in elitist social engineering within an idealized concept of altruistic collectivism.²³²

Trudeau assumed that what looks good in theory must have good practical results. It was simply a matter of transforming his ideas into reality. To accomplish this Trudeau relied heavily on realism and the first area in which he attempted to apply his theories was foreign policy.²³³

Trudeau apparently had very clear and definite notions as to what values Canadians should promote abroad. In his own words,

Our history has not permitted us to relax in contentment, our climate has been a constant challenge, our population has never been monolithic in origin, and seldom have we taken ourselves too seriously. We are identifiable because of our moderation and our affability, our tolerance of others and our acceptance of change. We believe that our social institutions are of our choosing and for our benefit; we prefer, in this country, to lead lives in which courtesy and good humour and common sense are still regarded as desirable attributes.²³⁴

Canadian foreign policy would merely be the extension abroad of qualities Canadians already possessed. Canada's foreign policy would be determined by considering what would best promote the 'national interest'.

Trudeau believed that there was no secret involved in determining what course to take in foreign affairs. It should be determined by Canadian values. As Trudeau stated;

This is the aim of our foreign policy; to serve our national interest and express our national identity abroad so that other countries know us. They know what we stand for, they know what our interests are and what our values are, in the economic sphere, in the cultural sphere, in the social sphere, in the ideological sphere. This is what our foreign policy is all about.²³⁵

Canada's efforts internationally would promote the national interest not only through the betterment of Canada, but through bringing about of the kinds of situations which would be most favourable to the furtherance of Canadian interests and values.²³⁶ Trudeau was well aware of how small the modern world had become. Interdependence was the rule of the day and was carried over into the realm of foreign policy.²³⁷ As Trudeau stated,

These are the aims then of our foreign policy, to serve our national interests, and when I say national interests I am not thinking in any egotistical sense of just what's happening to Canadians. It's in our national interest to reduce the tensions in the world.²³⁸

How this concern for the national interest would affect foreign policy would be tempered by Trudeau's considerations of Canada's capabilities and need to pursue national interests abroad. He referred to Canada as a "smaller power", and even more, his remarks to the effect that, "we're more interested in what is good for Canada, ...we're not...trying to determine external events," reveal a scepticism about Canada's capacity to influence the external environment.²³⁹

That environment had changed dramatically in the time since Canada first entered the international arena as an independent player. Such changes demanded changes in the way Canadians considered the world at large. Trudeau believed that,

Foreign policy can be shaped and is shaped, mainly by the value judgements of the Government at any given time. But it is also shaped by the possibilities that are open to Canada at any given time - basically by the constraints or opportunities presented by the prevailing international situation. It is shaped too by domestic considerations, by the internal pressures exerted on the Government, by the amount of resources which the Government can afford to employ.²⁴⁰

What the government needed was a review which would consider Canada's capabilities and determine how best to apply them in an international setting.

Fundamental to this perspective was an emphasis on domestic matters. Before looking outward to the larger world one must first have matters at home under control. One need not look abroad for opportunities, risks and challenges. There were plenty of those at home. As Trudeau stated,

In a very real sense civilization and culture in North America are more menaced, more strongly menaced, more strongly threatened, by internal disorders than by external pressure.....in my scale of values I am perhaps less worried now about what might happen over the Berlin Wall than what might happen in Chicago, New York, and perhaps our own great cities in Canada.²⁴¹

Although Trudeau himself led the campaign to establish overseas contacts to balance U.S. influence, he generally avoided public involvement in international issues.²⁴² It seems clear that Trudeau

was interested in foreign affairs mainly to the extent that they could influence the internal problems closest to his heart.²⁴³ How this predisposition would affect the formulation and conduct of foreign affairs would be laid out in the government's review of 1970.

When Trudeau stated that, "Canada should not base its policy on reacting to world events by rushing around trying to be a helpful fixer", it sounded suspiciously like an outright rejection of twenty years of active and often successful intervention in international crises: which it was.²⁴⁴ Although he did not condemn the policies which had preceded his arrival, he was unwilling to endorse existing policy.²⁴⁵

Trudeau wanted to reshape major policies according to his view of the world.²⁴⁶ It would not be 'business as usual' in the Trudeau government. The review would define, if not re-define, what Canada, under Trudeau's leadership, was striving for in the field of external affairs. As Trudeau himself stated,

As members of a political party we should be thinking not only of the type of goals we wish to achieve in our society, but of their relative importance, and of the best means of achieving them within a reasonable time.²⁴⁷

The review endeavoured to define the philosophy and present the basic principles of his Government's concept of Canada's contribution to the maintenance of world peace.²⁴⁸

Existing policies would be reviewed and scrutinized according to their utility or cost-effectiveness. Trudeau summarized the review process as follows,

We are attempting to learn whether Canada, by assessing in a systematic fashion its own and the world situation, may play a more effective role in pursuing its objectives. We want to be sure that we are doing, so far as we are able, the right things in the right places. Canada's resources, both human and physical, are immense, but they are not limitless. We must establish priorities which will permit us to expend our energies in a fashion that will best further the values we cherish.²⁴⁹

Trudeau attempted to place Canada's external relations within a framework which represented a realistic view of the world. He believed that Canada should not exaggerate the extent of its influence upon the course of world events.²⁵⁰ Canada was to come to terms - realistically, and pragmatically - with a whole new set of international problems.²⁵¹ This did not mean that Canada, as a smaller nation, would be overwhelmed by the magnitude of challenges it faced internationally. There was still room to promote Canadian values. As Trudeau stated,

we do not further these values by withdrawing from the world, nor will this government ever suggest that we should. But neither do we further those values effectively by needlessly fragmenting our efforts, by doing things that others can and should do better. Above all, we accomplish nothing by refusing to recognize that in the past two decades there have been changes in the world and in Canada which demand fresh policies and adjusted viewpoints.²⁵²

In stating that foreign policy was the extension abroad of national policies, Trudeau seemed to say that self-interest should replace the strain of idealism which had run so strongly through Canada's relations with the world.²⁵³ The result was Foreign Policy For Canadians, and it would have dire consequences for some of the

traditional cornerstones of Canadian international relations.

Prime Minister Trudeau's world view had profound effects upon the conduct of Canadian foreign relations. Now that the national interest was to be pursued, one could look at the world from a more realistic historical perspective. As Trudeau stated,

Canada's position in the world is now very different from that of the post-war years. Then we were probably the largest of the small powers. Our currency was one of the strongest. We were the fourth or fifth trading nation and our economy was much stronger than the European economies. Ours were among the very strongest navy and air forces. But now Europe has regained its strength.²⁵⁴

The perceived strength of Europe, coupled with the realization that Canadian resources were at best limited, prompted a reassessment of Canada's role in the NATO alliance.

Considered by some as the preeminent consideration within Canadian defence policy, NATO was to be scrutinized in terms of Canada's new-found self-interest.

Membership in international organizations is not an end in itself and Canada's efforts at all times will be directed to ensuring that those organizations continue to serve a useful purpose.²⁵⁵

As a result the Canadian commitment to NATO was reduced from 10,000 to 5,000 men. It was a clear indication that the Trudeau government was willing to pursue their own foreign policy goals rather than merely follow a pre-established defence policy or military alliance.²⁵⁶

The review and subsequent decrease in the Canadian commitment to NATO implied that Trudeau was not afraid to revise what were

once considered untouchable areas of traditional Canadian involvement. Another historically prominent area of involvement was the United Nations and Canada's involvement in United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs).

Under Lester Pearson, Canada had stood in the forefront of creative leadership and contribution to UN forces. This commitment was expressed through the earmarking of a battalion in 1963, trained and equipped for the purpose of peacekeeping. This force would be placed at the disposal of the United Nations on short notice anywhere in the world.²⁵⁷ In stark contrast, Trudeau's approach to the traditional activities of the United Nations in this period could be best characterized as low key.²⁵⁸

Previously, Canada had contributed to peacekeeping forces from a genuine belief that such forces made strides towards the solution of such conflicts but this was a belief not shared by Prime Minister Trudeau.²⁵⁹ Government statements regarding peacekeeping were significantly devoid of the kind of rhetoric that accompanied past peacekeeping operations, reflecting a more sober, realistic approach.²⁶⁰

Despite the apparent downgrading of peace and security as a policy objective in Foreign Policy For Canadians, the Trudeau government remained responsive to appeals for forces to participate in peacekeeping operations.²⁶¹ Such a position was also based upon years of Canadian experience. Canada had supported every UNPKO and shared in their successes and frustrations. According to some observers, there existed in Canada a very real conviction on the

part of the general public that peacekeeping was a valuable activity.²⁶²

There were, however, marked changes in the manner in which the Trudeau government approached matters of peacekeeping. Once the earlier altruistic thrust ceased to predominate, Canadian offers to participate were proffered after more careful assessment.²⁶³ Guided by more sober and realistic goals and faced with a transformed and less effective organization, there was little scope for dashing Canadian initiatives.²⁶⁴

In keeping with the emphasis on realism, the government decided its efforts should be devoted, not to seeking new opportunities for Canadian participation but to ensuring that any new peacekeeping missions would stand a reasonable chance of success.²⁶⁵ As stated in the review,

There could be further international demands for Canadian participation in peacekeeping operations - especially in regional conflicts. The Government is determined that this special brand of Canadian expertise will not be dispersed or wasted on ill-conceived operations but employed judiciously where the peacekeeping operation and the Canadian contribution to it seem likely to improve the chances for lasting settlement.²⁶⁶

Any future decisions to participate in UNPKOs would have to meet certain criteria before the government chose to send forces.

The election of Pierre Elliot Trudeau marked a major change in some of the relationships of the Prime Minister in the conduct of foreign affairs. Not only did Trudeau lack any major governmental experience but his realist outlook put tension on his Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp. Their working

relationship was not nearly as close as that shared between St. Laurent and Pearson.²⁶⁷

The Trudeau review had a major organizational impact on the formulation and implementation of Canadian foreign policy.²⁶⁸ The Department of External Affairs was no longer to be an isolated bureaucracy detached from the direct involvement of the Prime Minister. Prime Minister Trudeau was determined to improve the methods by which the federal government formulated its policies and transacted its business.²⁶⁹ Prime Minister Trudeau voiced strong views on Canada's role in world affairs but they were not necessarily shared by some of the leading officers of the Department of External Affairs.²⁷⁰

His views concerning diplomacy were studded with misconceptions and were popularly held by many of the academics from whom the Prime Minister sought council.²⁷¹ Professor James Eayrs of the University of Toronto, often quoted by Trudeau aides, dismissed the whole Department of External Affairs with three sentences:

Most of its postings are expendable. Much of its work is redundant. Many of its officials are unnecessary.²⁷²

It is obvious that Trudeau accepted this assessment, since during the first two years of his time in office, the Department's views and recommendations were virtually ignored.²⁷³

Not all reacted well within the Department of External Affairs to what was considered an overly subservient role to the Prime Minister.²⁷⁴ The result was that bureaucrats within the department

who had been running the nation's foreign policy were brought sharply to heel.²⁷⁵ Trudeau's changes disrupted a long established pattern of decision-making once considered untouchable by Ottawa bureaucrats and politicians alike.²⁷⁶

The development of foreign policy was whisked out of the hands of the Department of External Affairs and deposited behind the green baize doors of the Prime Minister's Office (PMO).²⁷⁷ This was not merely an emphasis on financial policy decisions, which were long considered within the realm of the politician, but of the preparation of policy positions, from which final decisions are chosen. Opinions and recommendations were still accepted and most officials were of the opinion that the Department's duty was to develop the kind of policy framework that the Prime Minister was seeking.²⁷⁸

The fact of the matter is that the changes which the Trudeau government implemented were unlike anything which came before. Hartle summarized the changes, stating that, "under the Trudeau government, there seems to have been some shift in power from the bureaucracy to the Ministers, greatly increased formality in decision-making processes and procedure, and greater emphasis on longer range problems."²⁷⁹

The main purpose was not to replace the traditional bureaucracy but to provide the Prime Minister with alternative sources of information and ideas.²⁸⁰ This was in keeping with Trudeau's strong belief in participatory democracy.²⁸¹

The Prime Minister can be cautious to a fault,
but that does not prevent him keeping dire

options open until he wants them closed, nor does it inhibit his asking questions of the kind that, in a politician, seem provocative to the point of perversity. Just as he could ask a mining community looking to him for better housing if it had thought of the day when the ore body runs out, so he could ask his chiefs of staff if they had thought that NATO might be no longer necessary.²⁸²

The loss of prestige and influence by the Department of External Affairs was coupled with increases in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and Cabinet committees. The PMO staff jumped to 85, then 92.²⁸³ All the aides and officials were, however, influential advisers but not final decision-makers. The Cabinet remained the place where the advice had to be weighed and political choices made.²⁸⁴

The balance of power in a modern Cabinet depends to a great extent on how the Prime Minister wishes to run things. He can appoint strong or weak ministers, allow them more or less freedom of action in their portfolios, exercise his own authority or seek consensus. Trudeau was a consensus leader who appointed energetic ministers, encouraged them to be innovative, and insisted on full discussion of alternatives before decisions were made.²⁸⁵ Such discussions were not held within the House of Commons but within Cabinet and the accompanying committees.²⁸⁶ Prime Minister Trudeau's system tended to disperse power and responsibility, rather than concentrating it in a few hands.²⁸⁷ By setting up Cabinet committees he watered down the power of individual ministers.²⁸⁸ Under Trudeau's system, a minister's plan for his department was discussed and often amended in one or two committees

before going to the full Cabinet. They became in effect committee proposals, lessening the power of individual ministers and increasing the collective power.²⁸⁹

In every government, senior ministers, aides who have access to the Prime Minister, and top bureaucrats, have the power to influence decisions.²⁹⁰ One could easily assume that when Trudeau became Prime Minister he would continue to give the closest attention to advice from his friends. But this was a misunderstanding of Trudeau. He distrusted sentiment in decision-making and placed his confidence in elaborate systems of analysis.²⁹¹ By enlarging the staffs and reorganizing structures of control, Trudeau did not create an isolated clique, but rather the reverse: he set up checks and balances.²⁹² Unlike previous Prime Ministers, he allowed himself no cronies.²⁹³

Pierre Elliot Trudeau installed a more orderly system of decision-making. Cabinet was organized to reflect the essentials of rational policy-making - the efficient pursuit of predetermined goals.²⁹⁴ Ministers grumbled more about the length of time it took to get decisions through the Cabinet machine than they did about lack of discussion. Far from viewing Trudeau as a tyrant, some of them complained that he too often withheld his opinion by indulging in Socratic dialogues.²⁹⁵ Such lengthy, academic debates were in keeping with Trudeau's view of his role as Prime Minister. As he said,

I like to exchange ideas. I like to teach
but I like to be taught. I like to learn
things. I like to know what people think.
I like them to know what I think. I

especially want people to understand there is no great authority called Prime Minister who gets messages from God, you know-who makes great laws. Nor do I go around my office with a listening device, trying to take orders from Washington or Moscow or Rome or anything like that. The ideas that we come up with are basically the ideas of men who yesterday were merchants or lawyers or teachers and today happen to be the ministers of this government.²⁹⁶

Trudeau was a firm believer in participatory democracy. He gave leave to his ministers to forget about Cabinet solidarity and express their personal opinions to help stimulate debate.²⁹⁷ Such debates were held behind closed doors. Prime Minister Trudeau firmly insisted on Cabinet secrecy.²⁹⁸

Ultimately, decisions were made by the Prime Minister. In matters considered important to him, primarily domestic matters, he would be directly involved. In matters of little direct interest there was an orderly system of decision making in place which would consider even conflicting views. When speaking of his government Trudeau stated

We are men who are coming up with answers as best as we can and if they have better answers I'd like to know what they are. It's only in discussing with them that you can make them realize that many of their simplistic answers are just that, that they haven't really asked themselves all the difficult questions. And I find that if we come up with more ideas, it will only be accepted if the people are prepared for them, which means involving them, discussing with them, convincing them.²⁹⁹

Although the changes implemented by the Trudeau government created a more orderly decision making system and dispersed the ability to influence the Prime Minister directly, this did not

change the fact that Pierre Elliot Trudeau was the ultimate decision maker. All the influence and decision making authority rested firmly in the hands of the executive. One must wonder what role, if any, remained for the House of Commons. Particularly when one considers who Trudeau believed should participate in the decision-making process. As he stated,

there is a distinction between consultation and participation and decision-making. I think that in our democratic governments, which are essentially representative governments, parliamentary ones, I think the decision must always be taken by the representatives of the people. I am not a believer that foreign policy can be determined by masses or mobs.³⁰⁰

Trudeau believed that the government acted as the voice of the people. As long as he remained in power he would choose the best course for the country. If he chose incorrectly then the people were free to elect another government. Until such time the government was open to criticism but had the right to make decisions.

the government...makes what it believes is the best choice and then it's up to the citizens including young people to throw it out if the choices are not satisfactory.³⁰¹

One source of criticism would be the House of Commons. Analysis of the debate concerning the decision to participate in a UNPKO will show whether this attitude was prevalent in 1973.

Background

Canada had remained active in the Middle East through the United Nations since the creation of UNEF in 1956. It is safe to

say that the area was not one of extreme interest or concern during the early years of the Trudeau government. There were more than enough domestic issues to occupy the government. Unemployment insurance was under review, the government's labour and strikes policy was under attack, increased government spending and higher taxes all led to a deterioration of Canada's prestige abroad. The separatist movement was still a painful problem. There was substantial revision of the Criminal Code. Tough legislation was introduced to protect Canada's environment including the Arctic. There was also a spate of laws to protect the consumer.³⁰²

The Trudeau government had just been elected to a second term in office despite the fact that unemployment was raging at over seven percent, and inflation, which Trudeau had pronounced cured, was once again a growing problem.³⁰³ The election finals showed: Liberals, 109; Conservatives, 107; NDP, 31; Socred, 15; Independents, 2.³⁰⁴ It was a minority Liberal government which Trudeau led in 1972. The House of Commons was even more important since the government had to rely on third party M.P.s for support.

Canadian involvement in the United Nations, was less significant during the 1966-76 decade than during the preceding one. Government attention was focused on the constitutional and parliamentary issues of the day. There were the problems of inflation and unemployment, and on such international difficulties as France and Quebec in the context of 'La Francophonie'. There was also a growing tendency for the great-powers to settle disagreements outside the context of the UN. There was,

furthermore, a disillusionment with the United Nations generally and specifically with peacekeeping.³⁰⁵

In the fall of 1973, just seventeen years after the Pearson initiative in creating the UNEF, the crisis caused by the fourth Middle Eastern war showed that United Nations peacekeeping was by no means irrelevant to the control of conflict. As Buchan states:

its utility was clearly accepted by both the great and the local powers because escalation was still a real danger. The United States, which for nearly a decade had found only marginal utility in the United Nations and had evolved increasingly autonomous or unilateral means of dealing with crises, suddenly found great virtue in its existence.³⁰⁶

The great powers, which were supplying arms in increasing quantity to each side, fortunately realized that they were being drawn into a dangerous confrontation. The Soviet Union spoke of unilateral intervention on the scene, while the United States placed its own forces on an increased state of alert. It was at this crucial stage that the United Nations Security Council agreed to the establishment and dispatch of an emergency force to supervise a cease fire and separate efforts to prevent a recurrence of the fighting.³⁰⁷

The possibility of participation within a second UNPKO in the region was first brought up in the House of Commons on October 15th, 1973. As there was no specific request to participate, the government merely voiced its support for any such efforts. In a brief debate on the Arab/Israeli War on October 16th, Mitchell Sharp stated, "The present situation does not encourage us to envisage a Canadian initiative."³⁰⁸ The government obviously

believed the matter was well beyond Canada's area of influence.

The following week there were more questions and very few answers regarding exactly what was going on within the United Nations. On October 25th, 1973 the U.N. Security Council passed resolution 340 requesting a cease-fire and the creation of a force to separate the combatants. The following day there were questions concerning this resolution raised within the House of Commons. On October 29th Sharp stated that Canada had been officially asked for troops to contribute in such a force but there had not yet been an explicit request.³⁰⁹ The House was not called to debate the issue until more details were available.

On Tuesday October 30th Sharp announced that Canadian troops would participate within the operation but could not provide details as to their capacity or numbers.³¹⁰ There was increasing pressure upon the government to open up the decision-making process to include Parliament. Instead of calling for a debate immediately, the Minister held a meeting with the U.N. Secretary General on Friday November 2nd. As a result of this meeting the only substantive commitment made was the sending of an evaluation team to the scene to determine what the appropriate commitment should be.

Once the reports from the evaluation team arrived, perceived options changed. It was determined that the airborne regiment previously on alert was inappropriate for the tasks assigned to Canada in the Middle East. Therefore the Government decided to send a signal corps regiment to the Middle East. Sharp announced

this decision on Friday November 9th saying,

As Canada will shortly be dispatching a signals unit to the Middle East, I propose to bring forward in the House on Tuesday, November 13, the resolution seeking the approval of parliament for the government's decision to participate in UNEF.³¹¹

Apparently from the government's perspective the decision meant nothing until it was clarified, defined and substantive.

The Debate Over UNEF II

As in the first case study, the debate within the House of Commons came after a decision had been made in Cabinet and partially implemented. The major points of contention were the opposition's perception that the government tried too hard to participate in the force. The role assigned to Parliament in the decision-making process was also criticized. Finally it must be determined if peacekeeping itself was an issue for the government or the opposition. Analysis of these issues will illustrate how the decision-making process operated under Trudeau and if Canada's role as a peacekeeper changed as a result.

The first criticism of the government's actions came prior to the debate, on November 1st. The government had just expressed its acceptance (in principle) of a role in UNEF II. Exactly what that role would be, was to be further investigated. Andrew Brewin questioned the necessity for seeking Canadian participation.

We do not think that Canada should seek to take up the burden of participation in the peacekeeping force, but we do think that Canada should accept if sought.³¹²

As with the first UNEF, there were problems concerning the nature of the Canadian commitment. This lack of a clear role made the government appear to the opposition to be overly concerned about securing a role in UNEF II.

This point emerged again on November 5th when, at the start of the afternoon session, John Diefenbaker called for unanimous consent concerning the government's actions. His motion stated,

That this house views with concern the indecorous haste exhibited by the Canadian government in its anxiety to secure consent of objecting nations within the United Nations to having Canadians in the peace-keeping force for service in the Middle East.³¹³

This criticism attacked the government for trying too hard to participate in the force. The role described by the government was considered by Diefenbaker to be undignified or, "analogous to that of hewers of wood and drawers of water".³¹⁴ Another opposition member, Marcel Lambert, reinforced this position. He claimed that a combat unit being used as a supply unit was a waste of resources. "After all," he argued, "the RCMP can look after a parking lot as well."³¹⁵ There was no unanimous consent and the motion was not carried.

The opposition demanded to know exactly what the government was committed to at this point. Secretary of State for External Affairs Sharp responded that the only Canadian troops sent, were an evaluation team which would help clarify the situation and determine exactly what Canada's role should be. The opposition expressed not only concern over the implementation of the decision (made only in principle) but questioned whether the government

should be concerned over participation at all.

After a brief explanation that any role not involving combat was an appropriate role for a peacekeeping regiment, Sharp clarified the government's position.

Canada is the most experienced and best equipped group in the world outside of the great powers to undertake this kind of job, and I think it is a great tribute to Canada that the Secretary General called upon us to fulfil this function.³¹⁶

To which Diefenbaker replied,

A great tribute to Canada which the country does not want.³¹⁷

The opposition attempted to make the government look weak and vacillating. The fundamental question was whether Canada should be involved in every UNPKO at all. Although Prime Minister Trudeau was present in the House during these scathing attacks on his government's policy, only Sharp responded to them. This was fully in keeping with Trudeau's decision making style.

It has already been stated that Prime Minister Trudeau did not have a great interest in international affairs. He did, however, like to have all his policies well thought out before making any decision. Certainly the gathering of information rather than jumping into an ill conceived commitment was in keeping with his emphasis on realism. Having already conducted a review of foreign policy, he could be sure that his government's policies were well founded. It may be concluded that Sharp was best prepared to respond to such criticisms and Trudeau gave him his lead.

The opposition returned to this issue on November 9th, when

the government announced its intention to hold a debate. Claude Wagner expressed his intention to raise,

questions as to why our government pursued participation so vehemently and why the minister felt it necessary to ensure that Canada was part of the peace force.³¹⁸

The opposition M.P. questioned the government's decision-making process concerning involvement in UNPKOs saying:

That Canada should respond to international requests for assistance is beyond question; that Canada should insist on participating in every international peace force is truly open to question.³¹⁹

The opposition apparently believed in the principle of peacekeeping, but felt the government could just as readily pass on this mission as waste time looking for a role. During the debate Wagner stated that, "Canada has no business begging to serve."³²⁰ This was a sentiment which was shared by many opposition members. This questioning of the need to participate did not occur during the debate over involvement in UNEF I.

The government's position was defended by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Sharp, who maintained that the government was not seeking participation, but rather responding to an invitation.

We were asked at an early stage by the Secretary General of the United Nations to contribute in a vitally important role...It is unfortunate that the debate within the Security Council delayed the dispatch of logistical support units by a full week and threw some confusion on the Canadian role in UNEF.³²¹

The government laid the blame for the delays and confusion, on the

U.N. Security Council. However, this explanation did not explain the methods used by the government to determine whether such a commitment should be made in the first place.

This questioning of the fundamentals of the government's policy was handled readily by Sharp. He related the decision to the realist approach the Liberal government had pursued since the election of Prime Minister Trudeau. According to Sharp the government took, "careful consideration"³²² of what its role in UNEF should be. This consideration included the sending of the evaluation team but also represented the factors which went into making the decision in principle.

All decisions were subject to harsh scrutiny, in which the basic elements would be considered. This was in keeping with the realistic framework Trudeau attempted to instil in his government. The review of Canada's foreign policy included peacekeeping. Sharp first presented the government's new position to the United Nations in a speech given September 25, 1973. Regarding future Canadian roles in UNPKOs he stated that, "from now on its contribution to peacekeeping operations would be governed by some criteria"³²³. It was the application of this criteria which resulted in the decision.

In his address, Mitchell Sharp laid out some of the criteria applied to this decision. These included, the presence of a cease-fire, the potential threat to international peace, linkage to a political solution, a clear and enforceable mandate, the acceptance of all parties involved, and equitable financing. All

these elements had to be in place before troops would be committed. Sharp also compared this commitment to the initial UNEF, Viet Nam and Cyprus. He made it clear that elements missing from past operations were present in this one.

The Canadian government, in accepting to contribute its part to the UN peace effort, is not taking on this commitment in a spirit of blind optimism.³²⁴

By placing this decision within a realistic framework, supported with the experience gained from past operations, Mr. Sharp felt assured that this decision was well founded. There was to be no wishful thinking on the part of the Trudeau government.

This fundamental stability established in the review of foreign policy, ensured that Sharp could easily defend the government's decision. As Secretary of State for External Affairs, Sharp could speak to the topic better than the Prime Minister himself. In fact, the Prime Minister himself felt no need to be present for the debate. Instead, he kept to his pre-arranged schedule and went on a diplomatic trip to China. Once again it is apparent how different the decision-making style and debate was in 1973 compared to 1956.

When the decision in principle was announced on October 30th, the Opposition immediately demanded a role within the decision making process. As Gerard stated:

In certain circumstances, of course, the minister has to make important commitments and he has to do so on behalf of the government; if he has to get in touch with opposition or government members, I feel that the opposition should have something to say in the process of decision making, or at

least should have the possibility of making its position recognized on the part Canada is going to play in respect of the cease-fire in the Middle-East. I feel that the opposition has something important to say in this decision taking, because the opposition also represents our country.³²⁵

Even though he recognized that Canada had only made a decision in principle, he asked that the government hold a debate immediately. In this way the government could hear the views of all of Canada's representatives before determining what its role would be. The Opposition and all M.P.s would then be involved in the decision making process.

Opposition members such as Mattes wanted to ensure that the government's actions, "reflect the opinion of the whole". The Opposition clearly stated its position on the decision making process involving UNPKOs. Brewin spoke to the matter on November 1st.

we have made it clear in the past that decisions such as the decision to participate in peacekeeping operations are of such importance that they should be referred to parliament for approval.... we in Canada should make it crystal clear that although the initial decision and the negotiation of details rest with the government, the ultimate decision on major issues of foreign policy must be retained by parliament representing the people as a whole. This is essential to the working of parliamentary democracy.³²⁶

Guay reiterated this position during the debate saying, "we were asking...to participate in the decision before troops are sent on the scene of the cease-fire." The government chose to deny this request.

Many members expressed their concern that the commitment had

been made prior to the debate. Members such as Guay felt left out of the decision-making process saying,

This House is invited not to give advice or contribute to a decision, but to approve a decision of the government.³²⁷

Just as in 1956, troops were already on the way when the debate was held.

Members such as Rowland conceded, "that the minister had the right to assume...that there was agreement in principle", but still regretted being left out of the process. He expressed his discontent saying,

today's debate maintains the form if not the substance of the obligation...for government to consult parliament before sending troops abroad on active service...³²⁸

Another opposition member, Allard, stated that the government should always consult with the opposition before taking decisions with such important consequences.³²⁹ Brewin took a similar position stating that it is only through involvement in the decision-making process that parliamentary supremacy could be maintained.³³⁰

Perhaps the most outspoken member, John Diefenbaker, related the issue to the working of representative democracy. He understood the role of Parliament and how such important decisions were to represent the will of all Canadian people. To him, holding a debate, after the fact and under existing conditions made a mockery of representative democracy. He reflected on this asking,

how many members are in this House, how many members of cabinet-four! The Prime Minister is absent at a time when parliament is being asked to support the action decided upon by the government, as was its responsibility.

However, even before parliament makes a decision some forces are abroad.³³¹

Although he recognized the government's responsibility to make a decision, the debate was not substantive if forces were already committed and sent abroad. The fact that only four members of the Cabinet were present for the debate makes the claim of accountability seem empty, especially since the Prime Minister himself was conspicuously absent.

Demands for a more prominent role in the decision-making process were answered by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Pierre De Bané. He made reference to the, "many precedents of government management"³³² regarding such matters. The first was the sending of troops to Korea in 1950. In making that commitment, the St. Laurent government stated that Parliament was to express the will of the Canadian people and if the decision was not in keeping with their wishes a new government would be chosen. The same defence was used by St. Laurent during the debate regarding UNEF I.

De Bané also referred to past government actions during other similar situations. These included UNEF I in 1956, the Congo in 1960 and Cyprus in 1964. The Congo example was particularly poignant since it was a Conservative government, headed by then Prime Minister Diefenbaker, that made that decision. In that instance the government made the decision and asked Parliament to approve it, after troops had already been sent. According to De Bané, the government was merely following established precedent in dealing with its responsibility to Parliament. Precedents which

were not only followed by the Liberals but by the Conservatives as well. As a result, any attack of the government's current position would appear hypocritical.

Although government members did not respond to concerns over the lack of Cabinet ministers and the absence of the Prime Minister himself from this debate, it easy to see that this was in keeping with the style of the Trudeau government. Prime Minister Trudeau gave leave for Cabinet Ministers to appear in Parliament on a rotation of three days a week so that they might better handle important other business. Members were welcome to appear when matters of particular interest were to be discussed but were otherwise excused.

The manner in which Trudeau handled his Cabinet, reserved ultimate decision-making authority for himself in matters which were of vital interest. The fact of the matter was that the Prime Minister did not consider the matter important enough to warrant his presence. Since the Department of External Affairs had already undergone a fundamental review of its policies, he could be sure it was following a realistic policy. One could well imagine that Trudeau considered participation in any UNPKO to be such a non-issue that he did not have to be present for such a debate. Certainly Trudeau's ambivalence towards earlier opposition attacks towards these policies would seem to support this position.

It is clear from Sharp's statements that support for peacekeeping had not diminished under the Trudeau government. The new criteria to be applied to peacekeeping commitments were a

reflection of the realist emphasis of Trudeau himself. As Sharp stated:

we have a responsibility to the world community and to all the people of the Middle East to do what we can...In putting forward this resolution, therefore, I am asking the House to agree that Canada should do its international duty.³³³

Canada contributed to the force, not just for Canadians, but for the good of all citizens of the world. Especially those in the Middle East.

This emphasis on the pursuit of realistic goals was reiterated by other members of Parliament. Rowland summarized these sentiments saying,

it is in the interest of the world and in our own self-interest that we go...It is an acceptance of our responsibilities as a member of the world community and a concrete expression of our commitment to the concept of collective security under the UN. Our self-interest, if nothing else, dictates that we take every opportunity proffered which has some prospect of strengthening the UN.³³⁴

No member of the house questioned the intrinsic good of sending peacekeeping forces abroad.

James Richardson, the Minister for National Defence, voiced his unequivocal support for the notion of peacekeeping. He referred to the depth of Canadian experience in the field and how it is only through such forces that peace may be maintained.

We should not be discouraged by the failures of peacekeeping...Above all, we should keep our sights on the long-term hope for mankind that peacekeeping makes possible.³³⁵

Even though the notion of peacekeeping had evolved to reflect a

greater emphasis on achieving realistic goals, it was still considered a vitally important role for the Canadian military.

Diefenbaker himself stated that, "the contribution that Canadians can make is not the issue".³³⁶ There was also no disagreement over the pride in Canada's reputation. Peacekeeping and Canada's role in it was a non-issue. What did concern Diefenbaker were the particulars of the government's actions which, in his opinion, were caused by its ineptitude.

There are some remarkable similarities when this decision is compared to the one made in 1956. The mandate of each force was the same, and the area of concern was the same, there was a time lag between creation of the force in principle and the actual commitment being made. There was also some confusion in the early stages as to what type of troops would be used. Each case had the potential for Superpower involvement and escalation into a global conflict. Both forces were authorized by an Order in Council and each government was Liberal and had been in office for some time.

However, the debate conducted by the Trudeau government stands in marked contrast to the one held by the St. Laurent government. The emergency debate in 1956 lasted four days and garnered active participation from numerous M.P.s. The 1973 debate lasted only one day and saw limited participation from M.P.s on both sides of the House. The review conducted by Trudeau allowed Sharp's defence to be well thought out in advance. Whereas the decision made in 1956 was the first of its kind in Canadian history, the Trudeau government had the benefit of seventeen years of peacekeeping

experience from which to draw in its defence of its decision.

Both debates saw Parliament demand a more active role in the decision-making process. It is important to note that even with a minority government, Trudeau did not feel the need to include Parliament in the decision-making process although he did keep the House of Commons involved at every stage. An important change was the questioning of peacekeeping as a course worth pursuing. Although seventeen years of experience (if limited success) saw Canadians participate in every UNPKO the opposition asked if Canada needed to participate in a second UNEF. This was a legitimate concern since no political solution seemed eminent. The foreign policy review made the defence of the Canadian policy easy since it met the criteria laid out by the government.

Apparently the Trudeau government was unwilling to disregard the outstanding contributions Canada had made in the past to the United Nations. They were willing to set down criteria in an attempt to make future commitment as realistically as possible and the leadership style of Trudeau meant that Parliament would retain a secondary role in the decision-making process. The review initiated by Trudeau meant that Mr. Sharp and the other government M.P.s in attendance could readily defend the government's decision even in a minority government situation. The next case study considers a radically different government - a Conservative government and a leader whose style was unlike any Prime Minister before him.

Mulroney

There has been much discussion concerning prominent aspects of Brian Mulroney's background and their effects on the manner in which he conducted his government. One reason for the interest is the high value Mulroney himself placed on certain aspects of his personal history. These include; his credibility in Quebec which made the Conservative party a home to French Canadians; his Baie Comeau background which gave him a sense of social compassion; finally, his experience as a labour lawyer and company president which inclined him to emphasize the merits of the free enterprise system.³³⁷ All these elements affected Mulroney's rise to power and the manner in which he conducted his government.

Before entering politics Brian Mulroney was a slick, successful Montreal labour lawyer, adept at the nuts and bolts of back room politics.³³⁸ As one biography states,

His job at the Iron Ore Company of Canada, a Canadian subsidiary of Cleveland-based Hanna Mining, gave him an entrée to where the real continental power lay and an

unparalleled education in the relationship between economic power and politics.³³⁹

Mulroney was on the front lines, successfully running a large corporation, meeting a payroll and producing a return on investment for his share-holders.³⁴⁰ He brought this specialized training and experience in the management of relations among business, labour, government and the public to the Progressive Conservative Party.³⁴¹

It is no exaggeration to say that Brian Mulroney had a lot of powerful and influential friends, whose good will he actively promoted. These connections brought him a considerable degree of success based not on intellectual breadth or policy depth but on personality and drive.³⁴² Mulroney himself suggested that a political party is defined not by policy but as a group of friends.³⁴³ The avoidance of clear policy stands was a political necessity for Mulroney in the beginning, but later, it became standard practice.

Prior to Mulroney's accession to party Leadership, the Conservative party was being racked by policy debates. Too many people could not agree on what was good for the country. Interests were too diverse and policy lines too divergent to allow a cohesive whole to present itself to the Canadian people. Brian Mulroney provided a clear centre for the Conservative party to rally around. As one Conservative analyst states,

Quite simply, Brian Mulroney believed that precise policy positions were the bane of the party...early in the 1976 leadership race, Mulroney said that one of the criteria for a successful leader was to avoid being specific on policy. What the Tories needed ...was a winner, not a policy debate.³⁴⁴

Mulroney appeared, for all intents and purposes, to be the personification of success which the free enterprise system rewards those who have the ability and drive to reach the top.³⁴⁵ He did not need clear policies to be successful and did not present any.

By avoiding hard policy stands, Mulroney was able to be all things to all factions of the splintered Conservative Party. He made himself appear as a representative of the new Quebec and at the same time, the champion of the Francophobic Anglo right wing. Above all, he won the undivided support of what passes for Canada's business and economic elite.³⁴⁶ As Prime Minister, Mulroney led a federal government that, for the first time since the early Trudeau years, enjoyed broad support in both Quebec and English Canada.³⁴⁷

Mulroney was a true believer in the free-enterprise system, and he brought this outlook to the Conservative party. He made it clear that this emphasis would be applied to a Conservative government saying,

I am a Conservative, but one does not need to wear a label to believe that governments should balance budgets; that industry, being the motor of the country, must be kept turning; that initiative should be rewarded; that relations between labour and management should be civil; that research and development are the keys to our national well-being; that the essence of federalism, or any system of administration, is cooperation and consensus.³⁴⁸

According to Mulroney, the Trudeau government was leading Canada away from these principles and Canadians were suffering for it. The results were unemployment, high interest rates and galloping inflation.³⁴⁹ Mulroney sold himself as a more desirable

alternative.

Mulroney had a distaste for confrontation and brought this to his government. Above all else, he wanted to be seen as a great manager, bringing people together and motivating things to happen.³⁵⁰ Desbarats suggested that,

without the intellectual gifts of men such as Mr. Trudeau, Mr. Mulroney had to use his talents aggressively. It was his ability to synthesize issues, to understand personalities, and know when to unlimber the steel behind the Irish-Canadian charm, that made Mr. Mulroney such an effective negotiator.³⁵¹

Mulroney didn't like the deficits, the conflicts, the extremes, or the arrogant airs, which were the trademarks of the Trudeau government.³⁵²

Mulroney had few intellectual airs, graces or aspirations.³⁵³ More than with most of his contemporaries, what you saw was what you got.³⁵⁴ There was nothing anti-intellectual about him. He simply saw the running of government as a matter of problem solving rather than an ideological crusade.³⁵⁵ Mulroney placed himself in stark contrast to Trudeau.

The Prime Minister of Canada is no place for a philosopher. If you're going to philosophize, then you should do that in the sanctity of one of our finer universities.³⁵⁶

Mulroney was not interested in being innovative or re-thinking the system of government. He was fundamentally a pragmatist.³⁵⁷

Professor Charles McMillan had the best understanding of Mulroney's attitude. "It's fine to have ideas", McMillan used to say, "but don't waste his time with ideas that have no practical application in the real world".³⁵⁸ As Mulroney stated,

I like to listen to people. I get the best advice I can and then act in the interests of the Canadian people. I think that's the only way to function properly.³⁵⁹

Unlike Trudeau, Mulroney never attempted to inject a personal program into the political system.³⁶⁰ He was not interested in theoretical debates over policy, he wanted to get the job done.

Mulroney saw the Prime Minister essentially as a power broker whose function was to make deals with other power brokers.³⁶¹ In Mulroney's experience, those with power had money and represented private interests. As Prime Minister he acted as an intermediary between the private sector and government. In this regard he was almost an instrument of the various interests who backed, supported, and voted for him.³⁶² According to Clarkson:

Brian Mulroney was...a man who succeeded not from self-generated objectives but as an agent doing a job dictated by those who employed him and those who could fire him.³⁶³

Those 'employers' could be considered the Canadian people but Mulroney considered them to be his powerful 'friends'.

The Progressive Conservatives brought with them an ideology that was, while far from diametrically opposed to the ideology of other postwar Canadian governments, at least different in emphasis.³⁶⁴ Of overwhelming importance to the Mulroney government was economic renewal.³⁶⁵ The Conservative government's position was that what was good for the continental economy was good for Canada.³⁶⁶

This was radically different from Trudeau's federal strategy, which excluded the business community from most policy decisions.

Mulroney wanted to put Trudeau's 'bad blood' behind him and invited business back inside the circumference of federal policy making.³⁶⁷ He placed himself in stark contrast to Trudeau saying,

The process of reconciliation requires leadership from the top. The one thing that Trudeau has shown us clearly is that he cannot lead Canadians and bring them together into a consensus.³⁶⁸

Business and government were considered partners in the national economy.³⁶⁹ Under the Mulroney government they would get on like never before.

Mulroney intended to encourage private initiative and social responsibility within the business community. He strove to create an atmosphere of civility and negotiation within and among the various interest groups that make up Canada.³⁷⁰ In describing the government, Chodos, Murphy and Hamovitch explain that,

its basic ideology...was based on the idea, more solidly entrenched under Mulroney than in any previous government, that the government is a business and business is government.³⁷¹

The federal government's role was to intervene in the economy and promote business.³⁷² This meant research and development, manpower and training, management-labour relations, and investment policy, all of which could enhance Canada's competitive position.³⁷³

Federalism was an integral part of Mulroney's economic program of recovery for Canada.³⁷⁴ It was not like the federalism of Pierre Elliot Trudeau which saw government leading the private sector.³⁷⁵ Mulroney himself refuted that saying that,

Because of the increasing amounts required by the various levels, governments appear to believe that they are better equipped to

spend our money than we are. This is a philosophy of state-directed planning which is profoundly paternalistic and inherently erroneous and which, in my opinion, will be rebuffed here as it has been elsewhere.³⁷⁶

Privatization of key functions of the government would allow the country to regain lost productivity. Under Mulroney, the country would not work harder but work smarter.³⁷⁷

The problem with the Mulroney program was determining who reaped the rewards from its implementation. The government was tough when it came to demanding sacrifices from ordinary Canadians, but it appeared to treat the rich with gentleness and kindness.³⁷⁸ This preferential treatment was a direct result of Mulroney's personal belief in the free enterprise system and faith in the business community. As McQuaig points out, there was a downside:

For all its flaws, government is, after all, the closest thing to the expression of the popular will. To some extent, in a democracy the government is accountable to the people, imperfect as that method of accounting often is. The desire of segments of the business community to place limits on the power of government was really a move to wrest power from the public and place it in the hands of private interests, which were not obliged to go to the polls every few years.³⁷⁹

Mulroney's friends in the business community, it was believed, could do a better job than the government itself to revive the Canadian economy. So long as Mulroney was able to sell his view to the Canadian people, his government survived.

As a negotiator, Mulroney was an outsider who always had to impose himself on situations, creating consensus by understanding and reconciling competing points of view.³⁸⁰ Once in a position of

authority Mulroney demonstrated an insatiable desire for admiration and public love.³⁸¹ As one observer describes it,

His need for praise did not diminish with his ten years in Ottawa; he demanded it from his cabinet colleagues and senior mandarins as much as he wanted it from the press.³⁸²

This need for constant affirmation had a serious impact on the Mulroney government and the manner in which business was conducted under Brian Mulroney.

Those who worked near Mulroney were expected to follow his example. If he was worried, everybody had to worry. If he was happy, everybody was happy.³⁸³ If someone were to argue against the prevailing opinion it was held against them.³⁸⁴ As Cameron describes it,

Toadyism became the fashion for those dealing with him on a regular basis.³⁸⁵

In-fighting for influence was a daily occurrence. People who should have been working to achieve similar goals were actually spending a lot of time trying to destroy each other.³⁸⁶ Anybody close to the Prime Minister who did not follow his example became a non-person.³⁸⁷

This control and influence over those around him was a prominent aspect of Mulroney's personality. He was the leader of the government and his will was supreme. As one person present later described it,

He was humble about his failings, he grieved over his mistakes, he waxed righteous over the fallen sinners, he acknowledged the problems. Then he would set all that aside, tell the troops how well they were doing, what great developments were in the works,

how feeble was the opposition, how much he loved them all. It was a masterful performance, one that renewed their spirits and refreshed their souls. By noon, when the meetings ended, Mulroney would emerge surrounded by a cheerful and feisty band of believers.³⁸⁸

His was an essentially manipulative style. Mulroney achieved his position more by pleasing, stroking and persuading than by wielding actual power. He convinced those around him that they were doing good work. Those who did not agree were left by the wayside. As a result, Mulroney went through staff members very quickly. Once a person had served their purpose, they were gone.³⁸⁹ Very few veterans stayed on for the long haul. Many government positions (including the Ministry of External Affairs) were a veritable revolving door. Mulroney was quite reactive: as soon as something was not working, he would try something else. His sensitivity to the public made him quick and eager to please.

The ability to create a consensus which brought him to power in the Conservative party served Mulroney well as Prime Minister. He enjoyed a reputation for being successful at mediating caucus divisions.³⁹⁰ This was not an easy job considering that the Mulroney Cabinet was the largest in Canadian history. Mulroney wanted every part of Canada to be represented, so he named a forty-member Cabinet.³⁹¹ With such a large number of views to reconcile, Mulroney needed all his conciliatory skills but he could afford to be tough with his dissidents. The caucus respected a leader who was a winner, and Mulroney certainly was one.³⁹² To those within the Ottawa bureaucracy he was just another Prime Minister and their respect would not be so easily won.

The election of the first majority Conservative party in over twenty years was a momentous achievement. Once in power, the Conservatives began the work of making their mark on Canadian politics. Many Conservatives believed that the very machinery of government, the bureaucracy, had been thoroughly politicized by the Trudeau regime.³⁹³ Mulroney himself felt that many members of the public service were against him and that key members of the media were on a campaign to disrupt the Tory government.³⁹⁴

Mulroney knew from the start that he would have to make at least a symbolic shakeup in the public and diplomatic service by firing enough senior officials identified with the Liberal regime to let people know that he was in charge. However, it was not his style to conduct a massive purge. As always, he preferred to win the public officials over.³⁹⁵ Although not particularly fascinated by the actual machinery of government, Mulroney was interested in how it worked.³⁹⁶ He was determined to have control over those working under him. As Whittington and Williams explain,

Perhaps understandable mistrust of a bureaucracy that had had such long and close relations with their Liberal rivals, led the Mulroney Tories to emphasize a more 'political' approach to the relations between ministers and their senior bureaucrats.³⁹⁷

The result was the creation of a new rank of highly-paid bureaucrats: 'chiefs of staff'.³⁹⁸ These were political appointments intended to offer the ministers a political arm in dealing with their departments.³⁹⁹ Within months of their creation, nearly forty chiefs of staff were in conflict with the top levels of the bureaucracy.⁴⁰⁰

Senior bureaucrats were not happy with this innovation. There were numerous complaints about inexperience and a general lack of understanding of the technical details of departmental work.⁴⁰¹ The people who filled these positions were not the best people for the job. Rewarding old buddies with high paying positions did not help Mulroney's relations with the bureaucracy.⁴⁰²

Mulroney drew more attention from this aspect of his government than any other. The hints of corruption and ministerial incompetence contributed to 'the sleaze factor' that dogged the first half of his term in office.⁴⁰³ There were numerous reasons for these appointments and as Chodos, Murphy, and Hamovitch point out that,

there was never any doubt of his determination to get control of the government apparatus and to centralize all political power in his hands. In this connection, his appointment of friends was not simply a matter of rewards and division of the spoils...but also reflective of the political direction he intended to take and the ideological thrust of the new government.⁴⁰⁴

The politicizing of the bureaucracy was a function of the political agenda of the Progressive Conservative Party and the ideological thrust of its leadership. Rather than being out of control, Brian Mulroney skilfully used his patronage powers to gain control of all areas of the government.⁴⁰⁵

Bureaucrats have the knowledge and experience to point out the pitfalls and traps that politicians have not considered.⁴⁰⁶ The importance of the bureaucracy was downplayed by the Mulroney government. As Whittington and Williams explain,

[There were strong] Tory suspicions that bureaucrats could use their superior command of information to blunt or undermine the policy directions the ruling party was seeking to impose. To reduce this risk and to stamp their own imprint on the process as firmly as possible, the Tories took to discouraging departments from presenting the kind of detailed policy option papers that the Trudeau government had encouraged.⁴⁰⁷

Bureaucrats usually pride themselves on keeping their political masters out of trouble, but persistent snubbing of their efforts created an adversarial situation. Many senior bureaucrats who worked with Mulroney felt that their professionalism was being questioned. Morale suffered as a consequence.⁴⁰⁸

Mulroney wanted to know everything that was going on, yet he couldn't trust the bureaucracy to provide him with relevant information. He understood that a man's power depended largely on the amount and quality of the information he had about the world around him.⁴⁰⁹ Reading briefs was not one of Mulroney's strong points. Instead, he depended on news reports to inform him about issues.⁴¹⁰ When dealing with senior officials Mulroney would open cabinet meetings with a twenty-or thirty-minute discussion of the day's press coverage. He was preoccupied with the press and his personal media coverage.⁴¹¹ Those within the bureaucracy who intended to get down to serious policy discussions were often frustrated.⁴¹² Senior bureaucrats in the Privy Council Office (PCO) tried many techniques to draw the P.M.'s attention to important issues but,

no one could devise a way to interest him in reading his briefs. Finally two bureaucrats resorted to illustration. They used cartoon

figures to represent a series of choices and -fearing they were off the dial and might insult the prime minister- completed the presentation with two possible options for his consideration. One option had a big 'X' marked across it to show this was not the recommended choice. Mulroney's reaction? "He loved it," said one official.⁴¹³

This pandering to his personal style reflects the great impact Mulroney had on the Canadian government. The fact remains that, even after ten years in office, Mulroney found it impossible to win the hearts and minds of most of the senior public servants who worked under him.⁴¹⁴

Mulroney was unusually inexperienced in international affairs.⁴¹⁵ This was understandable, since he had read very little on the subject and travelled little. Mulroney showed few signs of interest in the great global issues of his age during his previous careers.⁴¹⁶ He was fundamentally a continentalist.⁴¹⁷ The larger world, had nothing practical to offer him so was of less importance than the North American continent.

Immediately after his election, Mulroney made it clear that Canadian-American relations were to be his primary concern. As Mulroney himself explained,

Good relations, super relations with the United States will be the cornerstone of our foreign policy.⁴¹⁸

This was in stark contrast to the traditional Liberal concern for the wider world in foreign affairs. Pearson and St. Laurent were internationalists, and were ambivalent towards U.S. relations. Trudeau never got along well with the United States, and never felt the need to improve their relations. Mulroney made changes that

would forever affect Canada's relations with the U.S..

The improvement in Canadian-American relations was a direct result of Mulroney's ideology.⁴¹⁹ His emphasis on capitalism and the free market system left Mulroney with an affinity for the largest model of the free enterprise system in the world, the United States. As MacDonald explains,

He had read Lawrence Martin's book, The Presidents and the Prime Ministers, and he had been struck by the history of misunderstandings and missed signals across the border.⁴²⁰

Instead of conflict and nationalistic competition, Mulroney saw Canada in a firm lockstep with the United States.⁴²¹

For the first time in decades, U.S. - Canadian relations underwent a radical shift toward ideological and political convergence. Both countries showed remarkable accommodation on a wide range of divisive issues.⁴²² This compatibility extended to the national leaders as well.⁴²³ Within five minutes of meeting one another, Mulroney and Reagan were addressing each other as Brian and Ron.⁴²⁴

Brian Mulroney and Ronald Reagan shared many traits. Both were great orators who believed that business values were the key to righting their economies.⁴²⁵ The President and the P.M. were both of Irish origin, and Reagan had telephoned Mulroney when he won the party leadership in 1983 to say that, "it was nice to see another Irishman in there."⁴²⁶ This compatibility resulted in a number of Shamrock Summits in which the two shared views and discussed issues of mutual interest.

Mulroney ensured that America dominated Canadian foreign

policy by making subtle but important structural changes in the Cabinet system. As Clarkson described it,

The Department of External Affairs lost its central agency role as dominant manager of the government's relations with the outside world. The Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA) also lost his cabinet committee on foreign and defence policy in which the SSEA was chair and the minister of national defence a mere member. The envelope for External Affairs, development assistance and national defence, once under the SSEA's control, was taken over by the Priorities and Planning Committee chaired by the prime minister.⁴²⁷

The wild card in the Cabinet constellation was the role to be played by the Prime Minister himself,⁴²⁸ a man who had little interest in foreign affairs.

The first of many Ministers for External Affairs under Mulroney, Joe Clark, was made well aware of just who the boss was. In very public ways, Mulroney stipulated that foreign policy generally and Canadian-American relations specifically were ultimately a prime ministerial responsibility.⁴²⁹ Canada's international effectiveness was to be secondary to good relations with the United States.

The P.M. repeatedly affirmed that he would give American foreign policy the benefit of the doubt, even in such a grave matters as a Caribbean invasion.⁴³⁰ Mulroney also supported the U.S. during the Gulf War. Many felt that Canada's participation in the Gulf War could jeopardize its hard-won status as the preeminent supporter of United Nations peacekeeping.⁴³¹ This was not the case since within days of the end of the war, Canada was called on to supply troops for a UN force on the Iraq-Kuwait border.⁴³²

The strong ideological convergence and personal relationship between Mulroney and Reagan made Canada more of a friend and partner to the United States than ever before.⁴³³ The unarticulated assumption justifying Canada's deferential role in its old special relationship was that, by supporting the United States on multilateral issues and giving the U.S. access to its markets and raw materials, Canada would benefit from special treatment that would meet its own needs.⁴³⁴ As Mulroney stated,

There's a price to be paid for good relations on both sides...The Americans have to pay a price for having such a tremendous country and people such as Canada as their neighbour ...Things like auto pacts and fishing treaties ...[are] a small price to have such a wonderful country like Canada sitting on your doorstep.⁴³⁵

Though it is quite easy to see how Canada could respond to American desires, it is more difficult to envisage why the United States would be likely to comply with Canadian needs.⁴³⁶

Mulroney could not forever avoid the larger multilateral context for his bilateral dealings with the United States.⁴³⁷ Canada's role in international affairs was certainly complex before Mulroney came to office and continued to be so.⁴³⁸ Although early signs indicated that Mulroney did not feel comfortable with playing an active role in international summitry, he eventually came to terms with Canada's relations with the rest of the world.⁴³⁹

As much as Mulroney had in common with Ronald Reagan, American economic, social, and defence policies were not necessarily the best ones for Canada.⁴⁴⁰ As one observer states,

Canada's position, in other words, was very close to that it had taken during the Korean

War: a staunch ally willing to carry its small share of the burden, but very interested in seeing the world community, and not solely the United States, involved in decision-making.⁴⁴¹

Under the Mulroney government, Canada continued to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems as long as they did not threaten good relations with the U.S..⁴⁴² Canada's role in major international institutions, if not promoted was maintained by Mulroney. "He's interested," prominent Canadian author McMillan said, "in educating Americans to the fact that there are middle-power roles."⁴⁴³

This came more from a recognition of Canada's role in the international arena than from any change in policy emphasis. As a 1989 report stated:

...Canada often relies on multilateral institutions to make its contribution to the national management of world order. 'Going it alone' is never ruled out, but is usually less productive for a country in Canada's circumstances.⁴⁴⁴

Mulroney strove to create a stable international trade and payments system in order to ensure access to markets worldwide. Through multilateral institutions such as the Economic Summits, GATT, OECD and IMF, Canada promoted itself internationally.⁴⁴⁵ Mulroney's policies, although different in emphasis continued the long standing Canadian tradition of promoting international peace and stability.

Reports such as "Independence and Internationalism", which was the first comprehensive review of Canadian foreign policy in fifteen years, reflected the ideological emphasis of the Mulroney

government. It came to the broad conclusion that Canada had considerable capabilities enabling it to sustain a substantial involvement in international affairs and shoulder a considerable degree of responsibility for finding solutions to many international problems. This report was closely in tune with the Canadian public's views.⁴⁴⁶ Hesitant to take any provocative moves on the international front, Mulroney was able to balance Canada's international role with close American ties. Traditional areas of concern were maintained, but Canada did not play as dynamic a role as it had under previous governments.

Background

The situation in Yugoslavia had been building for some time prior to the debate within the House of Commons. The Canadian government had been watching the events unfold within the former Yugoslavia. It was considered by some to be a test case for newly independent states which had emerged after the end of the Cold War.

In March of 1991, an all-party delegation was authorized by the Speaker of the House of Commons to study the situation in-depth. There was genuine concern that the rise of nationalism in the region could quickly escalate into violence. To show support for the return of democracy to the region, Canadians were sent to monitor Croatia's first democratic election in half a century. Soon after the elections took place nationalistic hostilities broke out in both Slovenia and Croatia.

With the escalation of hostilities the Secretary of State for External Affairs in June, refused to issue licences to export arms

or other military goods to Yugoslavia.⁴⁴⁷ Canada also offered to join the European nations that formed the cease-fire monitoring mission in Yugoslavia. The mission was organized to see whether it was possible to avoid an all out war, and if not, to see whether the conflict could be controlled, and if that were not the case, to see whether innocent civilians could be protected from the more violent effects of combat.⁴⁴⁸ The offer was accepted September 5th and a group of nine Canadians from the Department of National Defence were deployed in Croatia.⁴⁴⁹

The Canadian government had not yet recognized the independence of Slovenia or Croatia for fear of complicating the situation. There were numerous calls for action within the House of Commons. The Liberals kept calling for a debate on Yugoslavia but were repeatedly denied (October 9, October 24 & November 5). Liberals such as foreign affairs critic Lloyd Axworthy called for a debate under Parliamentary Standing Order 52.

This standing order adjourns the House of Commons, "to discuss a specific and important matter requiring urgent consideration."⁴⁵⁰ Such discussions are not intended to be censures or non-confidence votes of government action. The matter must be so pressing that the public interest demands immediate attention be given to it.⁴⁵¹ The matter to be considered in this case was the situation in Yugoslavia and the debate did not take place until it was called by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Barbara McDougall on November 18th, 1991.

The Debate Over Yugoslavia

The situation in Yugoslavia was different from Canada's experience in both UNEFs, in that the potential involvement of the superpowers was not an important issue. There was never the perception that this conflict could result in a world war. There was however, the fear that the current instability could spread to neighbouring states.⁴⁵² The government, as represented by the Minister for External Affairs Barbara McDougall, recognized this saying,

Our view is that the Yugoslav crisis poses not only a human tragedy of enormous proportions but also a direct threat to international peace and security in the area.⁴⁵³

The situation was getting out of hand when the European community admitted that it could not prevent the crisis and referred it to the United Nations.⁴⁵⁴

The problems in Yugoslavia were considered a direct challenge to European security and stability.⁴⁵⁵ The end of the Cold War meant that there was no immediate threat of nuclear power intervention or escalation. However, even those with legitimate aspirations, were using force as a political argument. The gratuitous use of violence was seen, by some, as an international problem.⁴⁵⁶ As Bill Kempling stated,

For decades, law and practice in the United Nations have argued against any action which could be seen as intervention in the internal affairs of members states, and there are very good reasons for this. But where do we draw the line? How much bloodshed, brutality, oppression and destruction is required before the international community can intervene?⁴⁵⁷

The government's position was stated by Friesen saying,

Even though we are far away our government has seen the civil war in Yugoslavia as an issue of great importance to its foreign policy.⁴⁵⁸

One of the most significant differences in this case study is that even though the war in Yugoslavia was seen as a potential threat to the surrounding nations, it was first and foremost a humanitarian issue. Thousands of innocents were suffering needlessly for the political aspirations of their leaders. Many Canadians were unwilling to sit by and be spectators. The Mulroney government was unwilling to rush in and choose sides. They were however willing to discuss the matter publicly and determine an appropriate course of action.

It is clear that from the outset, Prime Minister Mulroney felt that Canadians had an interest in the affairs of Yugoslavia.⁴⁵⁹ To many observers it provided a tragic reminder of what could potentially happen to Canada. Speaking to the matter on May 15th, 1991, Mulroney drew this parallel.

The tragedy of Yugoslavia sends a very real message to Canada. It is hard to believe that even the most nationalistic Quebecers cannot understand the consequences of dissociation, or separating. Quite simply it means the disintegration of Canada as we know it. I do not want to see my country break apart the way we are watching it happen right now in Yugoslavia.⁴⁶⁰

Alex Kindy reiterated the P.M.'s remarks drawing the same parallel. Mulroney strongly believed in the indivisibility of Canada and worked throughout his time in office to keep the country together.⁴⁶¹

During the debate itself, there was little need to remind M.P.s of the parallels. Guarnieri took the position that these parallels were to blame for the lack of any international response to the problem. In her view,

Nations looked first to the implications that a Yugoslav war would have on ethnic nationalist aspirations at home. Britain has to be concerned about the impact on Northern Ireland. Spain nervously watches over the Basques. Even Canadians have looked for parallels.⁴⁶²

The Opposition foreign affairs critic, Lloyd Axworthy, believed that double standards were being applied as to whom, where, when and how the international community responded to such crises.⁴⁶³

This criticism was reiterated by many M.P.s, who contrasted the Yugoslav situation with the Gulf War.⁴⁶⁴ Keyes stated that,

Canada's voice should have been heard long ago on this matter, but we are stuck with a government which is nothing more than a surrogate voice for the United States...Are we so morally superior that we can race to the Persian Gulf but not to Vukovar?⁴⁶⁵

The government spent more than six hundred million dollars on the Gulf War but had not shown the same type of commitment to Yugoslavia.

Criticisms of this nature directly challenged the Prime Minister's policy of giving the United States a wide berth in foreign affairs. David Stupich put it in more realistic terms,

Does anyone believe that if there was oil in Croatia that there would not be a war on right now, that the United Nations would not be involved and that the Americans would not be in there? Of course they would if it was

important to them. It is not important to them, so they are not.⁴⁶⁶

There was obviously no desire on behalf of the Americans to become involved in the Yugoslav crisis. The Mulroney government had a long history of, if not following American positions, not contradicting them. Critics saw the Mulroney government's position as simply an echo of American policy.⁴⁶⁷

Canada, under the Mulroney government, was not in the forefront of the issue demanding action from the international community. The government maintained a 'wait and see' approach to the crisis. Certainly the lack of immediate action demonstrated their apprehension. This cautious attitude was expressed by the Minister for External Affairs, Barbara McDougall. In response to the comments of Axworthy, she stated,

I am sure that the member knows and remembers that one of the benefits in government is having the opportunity to change things for the better. But he also knows that one of the frustrations of being in government is recognizing a problem and being unable to solve it alone.⁴⁶⁸

This recognition of the small amount of decisive power Canada possessed internationally was in keeping with Mulroney's low key approach to international affairs generally. The Canadian public was not so willing to wait and took their concerns to parliament.

The debate itself was the result of a large public demand for the government to do something regarding the Yugoslav war. The fact that the conflict had been building for months allowed the Canadian public to become especially aware of what was going on. Canadians were being bombarded with a barrage of images direct from

the scene as every national news broadcast had the latest attacks, victims and scenes of destruction. M.P.s such as Lloyd Axworthy recognized this saying,

The hard reality of it is not just a question of the human suffering because there is a fundamental stake for all Canadians, even if they do not turn on their TV sets, even if they are not wrenched by the kind of catastrophe going on.⁴⁶⁹

International peace was considered a worthy goal for Canada to pursue, but the government had not yet been able to determine an appropriate response. One which could be reconciled with the continuing friendship with the U.S. and a definite need for public support.

A large number of speakers expressed concern and anguish for their constituents - especially those of Yugoslavian descent. Many M.P.s had large numbers of Croatian Canadians in their ridings, who were vocal in their calls for action.⁴⁷⁰ For those people, the events in the former Yugoslavia affected the lives of family and friends.⁴⁷¹ Even the Prime Minister's wife, Mila Mulroney, was originally from Yugoslavia.⁴⁷² Barbara McDougall stated that, "we must comfort and support the Canadians here at home who have families and friends in the area."⁴⁷³

Those more directly affected by the conflict had plenty of time to organise and bring their concerns to their M.P.s. As Clifford stated,

I think the Canadian Croatians have done admirable work in bringing this cause forward.⁴⁷⁴

The impetus for the debate did not originate from the Mulroney

government but rather from M.P.s whose constituents felt, "a sense of betrayal".⁴⁷⁵

Unlike previous cases, the debate on Yugoslavia took place months before any forces were offered or even requested. This represented a radical change in the decision-making process regarding participation in UNPKOs. Parliament was actually leading the government. Members of the House of Commons were demanding, on behalf of their constituents, that the government take action. As Gaffney stated during the debate,

Thousands of Canadians claim Yugoslavia as their homeland. They and all Canadians want this government to live up to its commitment to advocate peace in the strongest of terms.⁴⁷⁶

The Mulroney government had not acted swiftly nor decisively in regards to Yugoslavia. There was no clear policy and no hope for one at the time of the debate.

Members of Parliament have the responsibility to act in the best interests of their constituents. If any M.P. was seen as being non-responsive to the needs and desires of their constituents they would not retain their seat. In regard to potential involvement in any UNPKO in Yugoslavia, M.P.s attempted to induce the government to act. Even M.P.s from the government side of the House expressed the hope that the government would act soon. This was in keeping with the decision making style of the Mulroney government which allowed M.P.s to speak their minds freely. As Mr. Geoff Scott stated at the beginning of the Thirty Fourth Parliamentary session,

This is the government which is allowing

members of Parliament the freedom and independence to speak out even if it happens to embarrass or even go against the government. I never noticed that happening in previous governments....I think that is something to be applauded. [we have] total freedom to speak out...on behalf of our constituents.⁴⁷⁷

This freedom of discourse was in keeping with Mulroney's decision making style and had a profound affect on the manner in which the decision-making process operated.

As a consensus leader, Mulroney was unwilling to take a position contrary to the United States without assurances that such a decision would be popular at home. His emphasis and concern for the press, ensured that he would be informed about the crisis and would be sensitive to the growing demand for action. The intention of the debate was to send a clear message to the government that action was needed. As Axworthy stated,

We would like to see very clearly that the voices in this Parliament tonight speak out to give some new resolve to the government, to give some new will and determination.⁴⁷⁸

By expressing its desire for action, Parliament was to lead the government on a path desired by Canadians. Axworthy considered this a vital function of Parliament saying,

Our obligation as parliamentarians is to recognize that we must in the absence of leadership from this government provide leadership on behalf of the people that we have the honour to represent.⁴⁷⁹

It was hoped that by presenting a unified position, Canada could promote an international response to the crisis. The debate was an attempt to lead the country in that direction. As Clifford stated,

This is no time for partisan politics. This is a time when this House should act together and responsibly to keep the pressure and the facts clearly before this government and let other parliaments of the world know that we as a group of parliamentarians want action.⁴⁸⁰

The call for a non-partisan debate was one that was heard during previous debates concerning participation in UNPKOs. In this instance however there was very little rhetoric. The degree of human suffering made Yugoslavia a situation in which few were willing to make political capital out of the lack of substantial response. Instead, action was called for and involvement within a UNPKO was considered by many appropriate.

Barbara McDougall stated the government's position regarding potential involvement in a peacekeeping operation saying,

We have called for the establishment of a peacekeeping mission and have indicated that we are ready to contribute resources to such a mission.⁴⁸¹

There were no criticisms whatsoever, concerning this aspect of the government's policy.

Many members were willing to show their support for this chosen course of action. In fact, the only negative remarks concerned the close American ties. Friesen⁴⁸², Edwards⁴⁸³ and Kempling, all recognized the government's position in their remarks. Kempling went so far as to say:

I am proud of the way the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for external Affairs have managed Canada's response to the Yugoslav crisis. Though Canada is far from being a powerful force in central and eastern Europe, we have been at the forefront of international action to support efforts for peace and to provide assistance to the innocent victims of

this conflict.⁴⁸⁴

The problem was that the majority of the actions taken since the outbreak of hostilities came from the private sector. There was little action taken by the government in response to the vast amount of human suffering going on.

The cautious position taken by the Mulroney government was in keeping with the Mulroney record in foreign affairs. The crisis was more a European concern and the Americans were unwilling to become involved. Canadian parliamentarians were unwilling to follow that same course. Canada could still act independently in the international community but the amount of power and influence Canada could bring to bear was limited. If action (particularly the creation of a UNPKO) was to be taken, it would have to involve numerous countries to be effective. John Brewin recognized that, "peacekeeping operations have become more complex", and that, "a peacekeeping mission in itself cannot solve the Yugoslav crisis."⁴⁸⁵

This debate provided the government with an opportunity to present to parliament its goals in seeking participation in a UNPKO. This came in the form of presenting the various roles such a force would have in the former Yugoslavia. These included; the supervision of a cease-fire, protection for minority groups, assistance in the distribution of humanitarian aid, the general monitoring of the activities of the Yugoslav army, the reconfirmation of existing borders, assistance in the reopening of crucial road and rail networks, and finally, the establishment of

confidence building measures at the grass roots level between the rival factions.⁴⁸⁶ It was not clear what role the Canadian government preferred. What was clear was that they were unwilling to act unilaterally.

The debate ended without a concrete course of action being decided upon, but members did take the opportunity to demand a more active role for Canada. It was not until the first of many U.N. sponsored cease-fires took effect in January of 1992 that the European Community recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. Canada quickly followed suit. When the U.N. Security Council approved the plan for UNPROFOR in February, Canada was soon asked to contribute to the force. As with the previous case-studies, an Order in Council⁴⁸⁷ authorized the sending of troops. There was no debate concerning this commitment and no subsequent comment within the House of Commons.

It is clear to see the effect a Prime Minister like Brian Mulroney had on the decision-making process in this situation. There was no financial incentive, no risk to Canadian vital interests just a conflict which nobody seemed able to resolve. Instead of striving for a dynamic third party role, the Canadian government followed in the footsteps of the western allies and stuck to the sidelines. The matter would not have even been discussed if opposition members did not demand an opportunity to voice their concerns.

Instead of leading the nation on a course of dynamic participation in international affairs Brian Mulroney left Canada

out of it. The matter did not even warrant his participation in the debate on Yugoslavia. The official government position put forward by Barbara McDougall was one of support for a UNPKO in whatever form it would take. Such a lack of clear direction or enthusiasm for such an eventuality were indicative of Mulroney's lack of interest in international affairs. Instead of choosing a definite course of action and bringing that decision to Parliament, Parliament assumed the leading role and demanded action.

This reversal of roles is easily understood when one considers Mulroney's consensus style of leadership. Once assured that there was support domestically for participation in such a force Canada joined it once it was created. The lack of debate concerning Canadian participation is understandable since the House of Commons had already discussed the matter. The government expressed its intentions at that time and merely followed through with them once the opportunity presented itself. Peacekeeping was no longer a role to be argued against. Instead, it was seen as a constructive measure which the Canadian public was willing to encourage.

CONCLUSIONS

The differences between the three governments are as varied as they are marked. Each Prime Minister brought with him a highly individualised personal conception of their role, policy emphasis and decision-making style. The structural changes each government introduced reflected, not only the personal predilections of the leaders, but an evolution of the Canadian government system. The content of the House of Commons debates reflect not only the differences and changes each government brought to the situations they faced, but demonstrate the consistency of involvement in United Nations peacekeeping operations in Canada since 1956.

Although fundamentally similar in structure, the governments of St. Laurent, Trudeau and Mulroney were radically different in orientation, policy emphasis and decision-making style. Each government had its own way of conducting the business of government and made adaptations to the machinery of government to accommodate itself. As diverse and radical as the differences are, each

government chose to become involved in a UNPKO at three very different periods in history. By understanding the differences and similarities of each leader and his government one may better understand why the choice was made to become involved in a UNPKO.

The active internationalism of the St. Laurent government has never been repeated. Nor has there ever been a closer or longer relationship between a Prime Minister and his Secretary of State for External Affairs. Each brought a dignity and respect to their respective roles which resulted in their partnership being considered the 'Golden Age' of Canadian diplomacy. The decision to become involved in the inaugural UNPKO was representative of the values shared by these two individuals.

The conduct of the decision-making process reflected the close ties between Pearson and St. Laurent. Although they kept in close contact throughout the crisis, St. Laurent knew Pearson's capabilities and let him do what he thought was right. The fact of the matter is that only Pearson could reconcile the varied interests at the United Nations, devise a plan which would not make a bad situation worse and offer it at the moment when it was needed most. The initiative he showed at the United Nations forever changed Canada's role internationally.

Since the crisis involved two of Canada's historic allies, St. Laurent and Pearson felt great pressure to become involved. Superpower involvement and the potential of a major conflict breaking out provided incentive for Pearson to devise a plan of

action which could extricate the British and the French from a potentially disastrous situation. The desire to see the U.N. become an effective institution also factored into the decision.

For the nation that suggested that such a force be created, it was a very simple matter to accept an invitation to participate. It was the crowning glory for a government which acted with impunity in international affairs, for none could come close to matching the abilities of Pearson and his Department of External Affairs. Although in complete control of the executive and bureaucracy, St. Laurent understood his responsibility to Parliament. He called an emergency session of Parliament to ensure that the Canadian people had their voices heard. Although largely a formality, this debate set the precedent to be followed in subsequent peacekeeping situations.

The Trudeau government was another Liberal government which (18 years later) enjoyed a long term in office, but this is where the similarities end. Trudeau was an intellectual who, in dealing with a new set of domestic and international realities, attempted to bring order to the Canadian government's formulation of policy. In doing so, he refuted the idealistic internationalism of past Liberal governments, opting instead for realism. Foreign affairs were of secondary importance to Trudeau but whenever they found their way to the forefront, his government's policies promoted realism.

When the second UNEF was created the Liberals had a minority government and could ill-afford to have a contentious issue rock

the fragile stability. Trudeau conducted the decision-making process as if it was business as usual. Foreign policy had been reviewed and criteria laid down to determine whether Canada would participate in a UNPKO. Although the situation warranted global attention -with both superpowers involved- it was familiar territory. Times had changed since 1956 but peacekeeping still provided a means for preventing escalation of the dispute which had remained an area of active Canadian involvement. Trudeau incorporated it into his 'realistic' vision of the world. So although the emphasis had changed (realism instead of active internationalism) the resulting decision was the same.

Nineteen years later, Brian Mulroney (the longest serving Conservative Prime Minister since John A. Macdonald) also faced a decision regarding involvement in a UNPKO. His emphasis on the free enterprise system, integrated business values into Canadian government. He was a pragmatist, willing to do whatever it took to get the job done. Consideration of American policy dominated foreign affairs during his government but it was the pressing domestic problems the country faced (particularly the debt and Quebec separation) which held Mulroney's interest. Although Canada maintained a commitment to multilateral institutions, they were not a major area of concern.

Mulroney's conduct of the decision-making process reflected his particular style in which consensus was sought at all times. Dissension was not allowed and there were to be no dynamic initiatives which did not first have the Prime Minister's approval.

Economics dominated the Mulroney political agenda. When the war in Yugoslavia broke out, Mulroney voiced his concern and did little else. There was no threat of global annihilation, no Canadian lives at stake, and most importantly no interest on the part of the Americans. It was not until the opposition demanded a debate that the issue was discussed by the government. Even then, the initiative was left to the United Nations. The choice was a reaction by the government to the growing public demands for action.

Understanding the nature of the Prime Ministers involved allows for a better understanding of the Canadian decision-making process. Each government brought with them changes in emphasis which affected the operation of government. St. Laurent 'Liberalized' the bureaucracy and promoted a strong, dynamic foreign policy with Pearson. Trudeau conducted his review, which allowed many of Canada's traditional interests to be brought up to date. Mulroney politicized the bureaucracy and ensured he was involved in all aspects of governing.

Each of these changes reaffirms one thing - that ultimate decision-making authority rests with the P.M.. As Westell states,

There are some authorities who argue that Cabinet government has now become Prime Ministerial government. Certainly, Prime Ministers have become more important in the scheme of things in this century. Where once they were said to be 'first among equals' in a Cabinet, they are now seen to dominate their Cabinets and to exercise enormous personal power.⁴⁸⁸

As the case studies have illustrated, each P.M. set the tone for

the style and policies of the Government.⁴⁸⁹

There are usually a handful of policies that a Prime Minister believes require his ongoing attention, because he views them as essential.⁴⁹⁰ During the St. Laurent government this included the pursuit of an active internationalist role for Canada in world affairs. During the Trudeau government the emphasis was on domestic matters but did not deter the government from finding meaningful roles internationally. The Mulroney government was fixated on American policies but maintained support for multilateral institutions. Each P.M. made his mark on the executive decision-making process, but none could alter his parliamentary obligations.

The role of the House of Commons is to promote accountability by the executive to the electorate. Matters of policy direction and emphasis are decided upon by the executive as presided over by the P.M.. The executive operates in private, and is accountable, if at all, only after the exercise of its authority.⁴⁹¹ As Whittington and Williams state,

The opposition in Parliament, because it is not in control of the parliamentary agenda, cannot insist that significant public issues be addressed on the floor of the Commons before the government takes any action. Many important policy decisions are taken by Order-in-Council without the benefit of parliamentary debate.⁴⁹²

Although this point is generally true, analysis of the three debates demonstrates that certain parliamentary requirements regarding involvement in UNPKOs have changed.

In all three case studies, an Order in Council was passed

authorizing the use of Canadian troops in a UNPKO. However, the timing and length of the debates concerning involvement in a UNPKO varied dramatically between case studies. The debate over the first UNEF was called directly after the Order in Council was passed. It raged for five days and in that time opposition members aggressively attacked the government, not concerning the desirability of participating in such a force, but regarding the attitude of the St. Laurent government towards England and France. The attacks were personal and meant to disrupt St. Laurent who had strong feelings on the matter.

The debate over UNEF II came swiftly after an Order in Council was passed committing troops to the force. The opposition once again agreed with the principles of peacekeeping but attacked the government's perceived need to participate in the force. The debate was a one day affair and opposition arguments had little credibility. Trudeau did not even attend and many members did not feel the need to participate in the debate. The Trudeau review made the decision appear simple and well considered.

It is in the final case study that one can see the most marked change in parliamentary practice. In 1992 the debate came about not as the result of government action but as the result of government inaction. Standing Order 52 was invoked as the result of a public outcry concerning the tragedy in the former Yugoslavia. At that time potential involvement in an UNPKO was discussed. It could hardly be called a debate since there was so little disagreement that a Canadian role was positive and desirable. As

this was the case, when an Order in Council was passed committing Canadians to the force no debate was held. Neither the government nor the opposition felt the committing of some 5000 Canadian troops warranted a debate. It would appear that the pursuit of accountability regarding involvement in UNPKOs has changed dramatically over the years.

The opposition is supposed to provide alternatives to the current government's program and ensure that the country is governed in an efficient manner. This has not historically been the case. As Westell states,

the opposition's major role is to discredit the government, both the ministers individually and their policies collectively. Rather than participating in government, the Opposition seeks to prevent the Cabinet from governing effectively.⁴⁹³

In Parliament, the government explains and justifies its action (or inaction) not to a sympathetic audience anxious to offer assistance, but to an organized, institutionalized opposition bent on demonstrating the inappropriateness and inefficiencies of government policy.⁴⁹⁴

The structure and distribution of responsibility in the Canadian government has not changed significantly from case study to case study. One of the trends revealed is a steady increase in Cabinet size over the years. Cabinets grew from sixteen during the St. Laurent government to 28 in Trudeau's after the 1968 election. This tendency reached an all time record of 40 ministers in Mulroney's Cabinet of 1988.⁴⁹⁵ Although the number of players has increased, the House of Commons has remained the forum for the

presentation of competing views.

The opposition is charged with ensuring that the responsibility of the government to the House of Commons is more than a formality.⁴⁹⁶

However, as the first two case studies illustrate, opposition parties appear to have been convinced that the resources at their disposal were to be used for short-term partisan gain. Involvement in UNPKOs was seen as another opportunity to make the government look bad.⁴⁹⁷

During the debate over the first UNEF, the opposition went to great lengths to embarrass the government. They attempted to portray the government as supporting actions that could have resulted in the Middle East becoming subjugated by the Communists and destroying the western alliance. In the second case study, the opposition attacked the government's position by claiming that the Canadian people deserved better than to be forced into participation in a UNPKO, even though there was no disagreement with the force in principle.

One must seriously question the quality and persuasiveness of such criticism from the opposition. Regardless of their true beliefs, opposition parties are expected to oppose. This understanding is fundamental to the entire edifice of adversarial politics. Many Canadians appear to have lost patience with the idea that good government requires constant criticism on the part of the opposition.

They wonder whether it is best to organize a political system on the assumption that there exists nothing but conflicting interests. If Parliament is a deliberative assembly, why

are there so few public examples of consensus and agreement?⁴⁹⁸

It is in the third case study, the debate concerning Yugoslavia, where the first real signs of consensus and agreement can be seen.

Perhaps it is due to the fact that there had not yet been a commitment, or perhaps the nature of the statute under which the debate was convened did not allow outright criticism, that allowed the debate to be conducted in such congenial fashion. The fact remains that even though the principle of peacekeeping was never questioned in previous debates, 1992 saw the only debate in which a consensus was recognized and built upon with the intention of precipitating government action.

It may be argued that the debate was merely a reflection of the personal decision-making style of Mulroney himself, and there would be some truth to that. As a consensus leader, overly sensitive to potentially negative responses from the United States, Mulroney would want to be assured of a favourable public response to involvement in a UNPKO in the former Yugoslavia before making such a commitment. This reliance on public acceptance was Mulroney's trademark.

Each government had a particular view concerning the Canadian public which it brought to government. In speaking about executive decision-making, Pearson stated:

Public opinion had rarely influenced Canada's international policy...The government usually must decide what to do in the face of rapidly developing circumstances and then educate the public accordingly.⁴⁹⁹

Trudeau's outspoken leadership style left little doubt as to where

the public belonged.

I have the strongest disapproval for people who think that by pressure, by making enough noise or raising enough signs, they can make the decisions. I think they should influence the decisions. I think their input should be received. But I think they are wrong when they say, 'Well, the government has not listened to us because it has not done what everyone wants it to do'.⁵⁰⁰

These two positions were in keeping with the decision-making styles demonstrated by each government in the case studies and stand in marked contrast to the style of the Mulroney government. The fact that the debate within the House of Commons preceded the formation of a UNPKO may be attributed to the influence public opinion had on Prime Minister Mulroney. He was willing to discuss the matter prior to making any commitment to ensure that such a chosen course of action had the support of the Canadian people. Once such an opportunity became available, the government did not hesitate to participate.

However, that does not explain why there was no debate once the decision was announced in the Order in Council some three months later. Although understandable in the context of personality of the P.M., the parliamentary requirement would still be present. The government must, of necessity, meet its Parliamentary obligations. If it does not, the opposition is there to ensure that it does.

Apparently the parliamentary requirement of holding a debate concerning the sending of troops to a UNPKO has changed dramatically. In the final case study the Mulroney government,

having debated the issue once under Standing Order 52, felt no need to debate the matter a second time. This was an acceptable position to the opposition as well since there were no calls for a debate once the commitment was announced.

Every Canadian government considered in this study has found no resistance within the House of Commons to the principles of peacekeeping. Although oppositions have historically striven for partisan advantage during such debates, peacekeeping is a relatively uniting issue in an otherwise divisive political landscape. St. Laurent and Pearson created a position for Canada within the international community which Canadians have been loathe to dismiss. As Leach states,

Peace-keeping appeals to Canadians because it satisfies an urge for the assumption of a leading constructive role in world affairs.⁵⁰¹

The fact that we feel peacekeeping is a good thing, and persuade ourselves to support it, creates just as much of a reality as an objective, sober, highly qualified assessment of the substance of peacekeeping.⁵⁰²

What has been demonstrated by the case studies is that debates concerning potential involvement in UNPKOs have changed dramatically over time. There no longer appears to be a parliamentary imperative to debate involvement in UNPKOs. The decreasing amount of political advantage gained by the opposition in each debate made them shorter and less substantive. In fact, it would appear that despite radical differences in personality, decision-making style and historical context, support for UNPKO has been

favourable. Public support has apparently grown to such an extent that the government need not debate decisions to participate in UNPKOs any longer. This represents not only a recognition of the perceived merits of peacekeeping but an institutional adjustment to that same perception.

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