

THE POLITICS OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AIR TRAINING PLAN BASE SELECTION IN WESTERN CANADA

by

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
11 August 2000

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ABSTRACT

Between 1940 and 1945, Canada made one of its largest contributions to the Allied war effort by training 131,533 Commonwealth pilots and air crew under the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan (BCATP). Expanding the RCAF's aerodrome infrastructure to accommodate over one hundred training schools and their auxiliary fields was the most important task in making the BCATP a reality. Nevertheless, few historians have considered the site selection process. The two studies that mention this question in passing suggest that lobbying and voting Liberal gave communities a greater likelihood of being chosen. To verify these hypotheses, this thesis has consulted the RCAF and Department of Transport site investigation files, the minutes of Aerodrome Development Committee meetings, and the personal papers of the politicians involved in base selection. From these primary records – communities' lobbying letters, investigation reports, and final selection decisions – this thesis has reconstructed the BCATP selection process and concluded that partisan politics played no part. Experts from the Department of Transport and the RCAF evaluated and selected sites according to pre-determined, objective, and technical criteria that ensured the timely and economical development of aerodromes suitable for military air training.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Although the research and actual writing of a thesis ultimately must be done by the author, a work of such magnitude is never done alone. First, thanks must be extended to my supervisors Stephen Harris (Directorate of History and Heritage) and Duncan McDowall (Carleton University). Their patient and meticulous reading of my many drafts have strengthened the argumentation, analysis, and prose. John Taylor (Carleton University) helped during the early stages of research when this investigation began as my term paper for his undergraduate seminar 1997-1998. Much appreciation also goes to Joan White (Graduate Secretary, Department of History) who is always ready to answer questions, clarify guidelines, give a reassuring smile.

Securing access to both primary and secondary sources would have been impossible without the cooperation of many institutions. Service at Carleton University's Library and Inter-Library Loans was always accommodating, and the people at the National Archives of Canada, as well as George Henderson and Stuart Renfrew of Queen's University Archives, were extremely helpful.

My thanks to Timothy Dube (National Archives), Whitney Lackenbauer (University of Calgary), and Major Bill March (Canadian Forces) for offering to read my drafts, share their knowledge, and pass along their impressions. Your time is much appreciated. I must also thank Whitney Lackenbauer, Paul Ozorak (Canadian Aviation Historical Society), and Captain Beth Wakulczyk (Wing Heritage Officer, 8 Wing Trenton, Ontario) for sharing their personal research findings with me.

Over the past nine months, I have been given many opportunities to present my research in various academic forums. Consequently, I wish to express my appreciation to the organizers of the following events for providing me with these valuable, stimulating, and most enjoyable experiences: Canadian Aviation Historical Society (Ottawa Chapter), Carleton University Graduate Student Underhill Colloquium, Canadian Military History Conference 2000, 6th Annual Air Force Historical Conference, 11th Military History Colloquium.

The final sprint would not have been possible without the emotional support of so many friends and colleagues: Rebecca Adell, Carole Anders, Pastor George Covey and his wife Kaye Covey, Margaret Dixon, Mathias Joost, and Roy Laird. Your interest, encouragement, advice, and distractions are all greatly appreciated.

Finally, I must thank my parents, Mervin and Pauline Heide. Not only did they follow each step with interest, pride, and support, but they also kindly read the final version of each chapter to ensure the clarity of prose and argumentation. Now you know exactly what has been occupying my attention for so long.

The Saskatchewan Historical and Folklore Society (SHFS) provided a \$1000 grant to aid in the expenses incurred during research. I wish to thank the SHFS for their generosity and for supporting me a second time in my research of Saskatchewan.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Acceptance Form	ii
Abstract	iii
Acknowledgments	iv
Table of Contents	v
List of Tables	vi
List of Abbreviations Used	vii
List of Key Government and Military Officials	viii
 Chapter I: Introduction, Historiography, and Methodology	 1
 Chapter II: The Significance of the BCATP for Great Britain and Canada	 31
 Chapter III: The Evidence of Political Lobbying for BCATP Bases	 56
 Chapter IV: Technocracy at Work: Why Political Lobbying Failed	 93
 Chapter V: Conclusions and Historiographic Reflections	 141
 Notes on Appendices	 177
 Appendix A: BCATP Schools Established in Canada 1939-1945	 180
Appendix B: Federal Electoral Constituencies	184
Appendix C: Towns Involved in BCATP Base Selection 1939 - 1945	188
Appendix D: Communities that Lobbied	197
Appendix E: Lobbying Intensity	201
Appendix F: Lobbying Duration	204
Appendix G: Communities Receiving Requests from Government to Use Airports	207
Appendix H: Sites Considered But Not Selected	208
Appendix I: Chronology of Sites Selected	214
 Bibliography	 220

LIST OF TABLES

	Page
Table 1-1 BCATP Schools Under RCAF Control 1940 - 1945	1
Table 1-2 Nationality of BCATP Graduates 1940 - 1945	2
Table 3-1 Number of Letters Communities Wrote (September 1939 - May 1943)	89
Table 3-2 Duration of Communities' Lobbying Campaigns (September 1939 - May 1943)	90
Table 4-1 BCATP Selection Process	98
Table 4-2 Criteria Considered by ADC	100
Table 4-3 Time Required For Aerodrome Selection and Construction	106
Table 4-4 Questions Listed on Preliminary Investigation Reports	110
Table 5-1 Proportion of BCATP Schools and Political Representatives by Affiliation 1940 - 1945	143
Table 5-2 Federal Constituencies that Did Not Host a BCATP Aerodrome 1940-1945	146
Table 5-3 Comparison of Communities' First Lobbying Efforts and Government's First Consideration (September 1939 - May 1943)	149
Table 5-4 Percentage of All Communities Considered Potentially Prompting Their Investigation (September 1939 - May 1943)	150
Table 5-5 Selected Sites That Potentially Influenced Initial Investigation (September 1939 - May 1943)	150
Table 5-6 Percentage of Communities That Lobbied 1939 - 1945	159

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

ADC:	Aerodrome Development Committee
AFBR:	Air Firing and Bombing Range
ANS:	Air Navigation School
AOS:	Air Observer School
BCATP:	British Commonwealth Air Training Plan
BGS:	Bombing and Gunnery School
CCA:	Controller of Civil Aviation
DND:	Department of National Defence
DNDA:	Department of National Defence for Air
DoT:	Department of Transport
EFTS:	Elementary Flying Training School
FES:	Flying Engineers School
FIS:	Flying Instructors School
GRS:	General Reconnaissance School
IFS:	Instrument Flying School
ITS:	Initial Training School
NAGS:	Naval Air Gunner School
OTU:	Operational Training Unit
RAF:	Royal Air Force
RCAF:	Royal Canadian Air Force
RFC:	Royal Flying Corps
SA:	Superintendent of Airways
SFTS:	Service Flying Training School
WTS:	Wireless Training School

LIST OF KEY GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY OFFICIALS

Air Vice Marshal G.M. Croil:	Chief of Air Staff
S.L. de Carteret:	Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air
J.S. Duncan:	Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air
C.P. Edwards:	Deputy Minister of Transport
H.R.L. Henry	Private Secretary of Prime Minister
C.D. Howe:	Minister of Transport, Minister of Munitions and Supply
K.S. MacLachlan:	Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence – Naval and Air
A.D. McLean:	Superintendent of Airways (Department of Transport)
W.L.M. King:	Prime Minister, MP Prince Albert, Saskatchewan
C.G. Power:	Minister of National Defence for Air
N. Rogers:	Minister of National Defence
V.I. Smart:	Deputy Minister of Transport
J.A. Wilson:	Controller of Civil Aviation (Department of Transport)

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION, HISTORIOGRAPHY, AND METHODOLOGY

One prolific historian of Canada's past called the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan (BCATP) "the major Canadian military contribution to the Allied [Second World] War effort."¹ Given the low priority of military preparedness during the Depression, training over 130,000 Allied air force personnel, in less than five years, was a formidable feat. In order to accommodate the scope of the training plan agreed to by Canada, Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand on 17 December 1939, Canada had to expand its military aerodrome infrastructure. The RCAF's five permanent prewar bases, and six others under construction, were soon complemented by more than one hundred new aerodromes and emergency landing strips.²

Table 1-1
BCATP Schools Under RCAF Control 1940 - 1945

7 Initial Training Schools (ITS)
30 Elementary Flying Training Schools (EFTS)
29 Service Flying Training Schools (SFTS)
3 Flying Instructors Schools (FIS)
10 Air Observer Schools (AOS)
11 Bombing and Gunnery Schools (BGS)
5 Wireless Training Schools (WTS)
4 Air Navigation Schools (ANS)
1 Naval Air Gunner School (NAGS)
2 General Reconnaissance Schools (GRS)
1 Instrument Flying School (IFS)
1 Flight Engineers School (FES)
7 Operational Training Units (OTU)

Source: W.A.B. Douglas, *The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Volume II: The Creation of a National Air Force* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), maps facing p. 236.

¹ J.L. Granatstein, *Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government 1939-1945* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 43.

² W.A.B. Douglas, *The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Volume II: The Creation of a National Air Force* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), p. 220; See Appendix A "BCATP Schools Established in Canada 1939-1945."

Under the BCATP, the RCAF conducted training for all types of air crew: pilots, air observers, navigators, wireless operators, air gunners, bomb aimers, and flight engineers (commencing in early 1944). As agreed to in the December 1939 agreement, each month the RCAF would graduate 520 pilots from elementary training, 544 pilots from advanced training, 340 observers, and 580 wireless operator-air gunners.³ Ultimately, 131,553 air crew successfully completed training in Canada.⁴

Table 1-2
Nationality of BCATP Graduates 1940 - 1945

Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF):	72,835
Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF):	9606
Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF):	7002
Royal Air Force (RAF):	42,110
included	
448 Poles	
677 Norwegians	
800 Belgian/Dutch	
900 Czechs	
2600 Free French	
Naval Fleet Air Arm also trained at BCATP schools:	5296

Source: W.A.B. Douglas, *The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Volume II: The Creation of a National Air Force* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), p. 293; Ted Barris, *Behind the Glory* (Toronto: Macmillan Canada, 1992), p. 316.

Besides pledging to provide predetermined percentages of trainees, the four signatory nations also agreed to share the costs. Strapped for hard currency, the United Kingdom paid its portion by providing and transporting materials and equipment which Canada could not supply:

³ 17 December 1939 BCATP Agreement, RG 25 Volume 1858A File 72-T-38.

⁴ Douglas, *Op. Cit.*, p. 293.

aircraft, spare parts, airframes, and engines. Since all recruits received their initial and elementary training in their home nations, Canada paid the total cost of the ITSs and EFTSs established on Canadian soil. To cover the costs of advanced pilot and air crew training, Canada agreed to pay 80.64%, Australia 11.28%, and New Zealand 8.08%.⁵

When the BCATP drew to a close on 31 March 1945, the training plan had cost a total of \$2,231,129,039.06.⁶ The \$1.6 billion Canada paid into the BCATP, along with the \$14.9 billion spent on the war in total between March 1939 and March 1945, were unprecedented military expenditures for Canada.⁷ In October 1938, cabinet had allotted only \$29.4 million to the entire air force budget; in comparison, the BCATP, on average, used \$320 million each year.⁸ Despite the magnitude of construction, the number of graduates, and the staggering expenditures, the BCATP met all its commitments, often opening aerodromes ahead of schedule and actually producing more air crew than the Allied air forces could absorb. Training Allied pilots from Canada as well as Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Free France, Norway, and Poland earned Canada the title "aerodrome of democracy."⁹

⁵ 17 December 1939 BCATP Agreement, RG 25 Volume 1858A File 72-T-38.

⁶ 28 March 1946 *Dominion of Canada Official Report of Debates of House of Commons* (Ottawa: J.O. Patenaude, Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1946), p. 357.

⁷ *Ibid.*; "Canadian Government War Expenditures 1939-1950," C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men, and Government: The War Policies of Canada 1939-1945* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970), p. 522.

⁸ Roger Sarty, "Mr King and the Armed Forces" in *A Country of Limitations: Canada and the World in 1939*, eds Norman Hillmer, *et al.* (Ottawa: Canadian Committee for the History of the Second World War, 1996), p. 225.

⁹ F.J. Hatch, *Aerodrome of Democracy: Canada and the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan 1939-1945*, (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1983), p. iv; Spencer

Although literature on the BCATP began appearing before the training plan was fully operational, its historiography is neither extensive in quantity nor innovative in approach. The initial works, written during the war, aimed to boost morale and solicit more volunteers. As primary records became available to the public in the 1960s, historians attempted to discern how the BCATP shaped Canada's wartime coming-of-age. Taking advantage of the continual declassification of documents, historians have been able to explore, in more detail and with greater military focus, the functioning of the BCATP.

Aiming to foster public interest, pride, and morale, wartime publications on the BCATP were more propaganda-like than historical. In 1941, two small books – both entitled *The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan* – recounted the initial negotiations with the United Kingdom and described the various stages of training each recruit would undergo.¹⁰ Since the BCATP was still expanding and since the authors' overt aims were to advertise the BCATP, little more could be expected of the literature at this stage. Also writing during the war, journalist Leslie Roberts purposed to preserve the genesis of the BCATP for posterity, for according to him, the training plan was "the greatest single achievement of the Canadian people since our provinces came together in the Confederation that is Canada." Rather than simply stringing together lists of dry

Dunmore, *Wings for Victory: The Remarkable Story of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Incorporated, 1994), p. 283.

¹⁰ Norman I. Smith, *The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan* (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1941); *The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan* (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1941).

statistics characteristic of official government reports,¹¹ Roberts enthusiastically described both the negotiations with Great Britain and the air crew training process in his 1942 edition, later adding sections on the participation of Canada's aircraft industry and raw material sectors in the 1943 edition.¹²

In 1952, the official historians of the British government, having access to confidential primary documents, compiled a history of Second World War flying training.¹³ As this work enumerated the problems encountered during the war and consequent lessons learned, the BCATP received its first analytical treatment. Unlike wartime literature written in awe-struck admiration, this official history gave a dispassionate account of how manpower shortages in manufacturing plants delayed the production of aircraft and exacerbated shortages felt by both training and operational bases. The work also revealed how attempts to solve pilot shortages – by decreasing training periods – had to be revised to ensure that insufficient training did not contribute to the already high casualty rate of air crew. The analysis of production delays, pilot shortages, and course revisions was limited in its scholarly reflection, for the authors were not reconsidering policy from a post-war perspective, but instead were narrating wartime decisions and policy changes. Because of its confidential classification, however, the British Air

¹¹ Leslie Roberts, *Canada's War in the Air*, 1st ed. (Montreal: Alvah M. Beatty, 1942), pp. 10-11.

¹² Leslie Roberts, *Canada's War in the Air*, 3rd ed. (Montreal: Alvah M. Beatty, 1943).

¹³ British Air Ministry, *The Second World War 1939-1945: Flying Training – Policy and Planning* (Air Ministry [AHB], 1952).

Ministry's history was unavailable to the public until decades later.¹⁴

The gap between the romantic wartime narratives and the first fully referenced consideration of the BCATP in 1965 is indicative of the different purpose the BCATP served for Canada and Great Britain. For the British war effort, the training plan was only a scheme designed to produce a continuous source of replacement recruits. Hence, output statistics were readily available for writers taking this approach. The training plan, on the other hand, had wide political implications for Canada as a nation struggling for international respect and domestic unity. As a result, Canadian historians had to wait until documents describing Anglo-Canadian negotiations were declassified. After a twenty year delay, James Eayrs was the first to analyse the BCATP from Canada's perspective.¹⁵ To illustrate his general theme of Canadian rearmament in the 1930s, he used Anglo-Canadian air training negotiations beginning in 1936 and British Air Ministry aircraft orders from Canadian manufacturers.

Eayrs' story was subsequently followed in 1970 by C.P. Stacey's official history of Canadian war policies.¹⁶ In light of interwar defence budget cuts, this military historian argued that Britain's 1936 proposal to train RAF pilots in Canada was one means by which the British pressured Prime Minister W.L.M. King to increase defence spending in the Great Depression. In Stacey's work, the Anglo-Canadian air training negotiations illustrate King's perpetual

¹⁴ The copy at the Department of National Defence's Directorate of History and Heritage in Ottawa was declassified in 1984.

¹⁵ James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, Volume II: *Appeasement and Rearmament* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965).

¹⁶ C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men, and Government: The War Policies of Canada 1939-1945* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970).

manoeuvring to prevent any sacrifice of Canadian sovereignty and to avoid national disunity and automatic participation in European conflicts.

In 1975, historian J.L. Granatstein used the reluctance of King to accept Britain's 1936 air training proposal to introduce his monograph's theme: the politics of the King government during the Second World War.¹⁷ King's sensitivity to the political concerns of the day – Canadian sovereignty in the late 1930s, Canadian unity after the outbreak of the war – is clearly shown in the negotiation process. Because King believed that the British government was aiming to commit an unwilling Canada to any European war, he first rejected the training plan. Nevertheless, the prime minister would later embrace the plan when it provided a politically expedient means of entering the war. Other general works about Canada's military history¹⁸ use Anglo-Canadian BCATP negotiations as a token illustration of Canada's Second World War air effort.

In the 1980s, attempts to comprehend the actual functioning of the BCATP and the experience of recruits replaced writing about the Anglo-Canadian negotiations and their impact on Canada's development as a nation-state. Government historian F.J. Hatch, in 1983, wrote the first monograph dedicated solely to the BCATP since the Second World War public relations

¹⁷ J.L. Granatstein, *Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government 1939-1945* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975).

¹⁸ Desmond Morton, *Canada and War: A Military History of Canada* (Toronto: Butterworth and Co. Ltd, 1984); Desmond Morton, *A Military and Political History* (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers Ltd, 1990).

literature.¹⁹ Based on his 1969 PhD dissertation²⁰ – a thorough chronological narrative of the BCATP from 1939 to 1945 – Hatch described the initial negotiations, typical air crew training, recruitment of Americans, and how changes in training were influenced by progress in the Allied air war.

Naturally, the second volume of the *Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force* (RCAF), written in 1986, included over 100 pages about the BCATP,²¹ for the training plan played an important role in the maturing of the RCAF. From an organization with little defence capability – only 4000 men and 5 aerodromes²² – Canada's air force quickly expanded and was able to make an important international contribution. Building on Hatch's work, the official history put the BCATP into a larger perspective: the dynamics of Anglo-Canadian negotiations, difficulties faced in meeting deadlines and commitments, and changes in training policies were all part of the making of the RCAF and the RCAF's contribution to the Second World War.

Since 1986, most authors writing about the BCATP have targeted popular audiences and have usually built their narrative around first-person accounts.²³ An exception is Allan English's

¹⁹ F.J. Hatch, *Aerodrome of Democracy: Canada and the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, 1939-1945* (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1983).

²⁰ F.J. Hatch, *The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan 1939 to 1945* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa PhD Dissertation, 1969).

²¹ W.A.B. Douglas, *The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Volume II: The Creation of a National Air Force* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986).

²² *Ibid.*, p. 220.

²³ Ted Barris, *Behind the Glory* (Toronto: Macmillan Canada, 1992); Don Black, *Skies were Filled: A Pictorial Review of Saskatchewan and the BCATP 1939-1945* (Regina: Don Black, 1989); Spencer Dunmore, *Wings for Victory: The Remarkable Story of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Incorporated, 1994);

unique consideration of the psychological ramifications of wartime air combat.²⁴ Exploring the psychological and stress-related problems of seasoned bomber pilots, as well as the medical, educational, and psychological selection criteria used to assess potential RCAF recruits, he revealed the shift of selection criteria for BCATP recruits – a shift away from naively idealized personality traits toward more realistic aptitudes indicative of a recruit's ability to operate an aircraft in a wartime situation.

A handful of authors have examined the training plan's regional impact. In their 1981 article, Brereton Greenhous and Norman Hillmer studied how Saskatchewan citizens and air force personnel interacted in towns that hosted training bases.²⁵ Besides highlighting towns' hopes of using a training school to alleviate the hardships of the Depression, the article also discussed housing shortages, community efforts to welcome the trainees, and the friction between Canadian youths and the culturally disparate Commonwealth recruits stationed in Canada. Peter Conrad's masters thesis of 1987²⁶ and subsequent small publication about the

Murray Pedan, *A Thousand Shall Fall* (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Company, 1988); Arnold Warren, *You Have Control, Sir: My Years in the Commonwealth Air Training Plan (1940-1945)* (Toronto: Lugus Publications, 1998).

²⁴ Allan English, *The Cream of the Crop: Canadian Aircrew 1939-1945* (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996).

²⁵ B. Greenhous and N. Hillmer, "The Impact of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan on Western Canada: Some Saskatchewan Case Studies." *Journal of Canadian Studies* 16 (Fall-Winter 1981): 133-144.

²⁶ Peter Conrad, "Saskatchewan in War: The Social Impact of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan on Saskatchewan" (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Masters Thesis, 1987).

BCATP in Western Canada²⁷ narrated this theme more thoroughly, finding no evidence to contradict the Greenhous and Hillmer article. Included in the Alberta provincial museum's 1995 collection of articles about that province's Second World War experience are two essays pertaining to the BCATP; these concentrate on the initial negotiations and the training process before illustrating why the province was conducive to flying training.²⁸

The use of the 'pork barrel' to reward voters willing to give party support in return for trade-offs that would benefit themselves and their region is a familiar theme in Canadian political histories. Three of the regional studies on the BCATP claimed that the government used the training plan as one of these trade-offs, with the result that political lobbying and political loyalty determined which communities were selected to hosts BCATP bases. While focussing on how communities believed the financial benefits of a training school could revive local economies, Greenhous and Hillmer left readers with the impression that lobbying government officials was precisely what won training bases for communities. The article stated, quite correctly, that "municipal governments fought hard to bring the training plan to their communities," but then to illustrate this lobbying activity, Greenhous and Hillmer only used communities that actually received training bases.

While describing the anxiety felt by settlements during the selection process, Greenhous and Hillmer noted the following: "Upset that their name was not on the original list of

²⁷ Peter Conrad, *Training For Victory: The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan in the West* (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1989).

²⁸ Kenneth Tingley, ed., *For King and Country: Alberta in the Second World War* (Edmonton: Provincial Museum of Alberta, 1995).

participating communities, or that they could expect much less than they felt was their due, town councils [of Estevan, Yorkton, and Moose Jaw for example] passed resolutions and sent civic delegations to Ottawa. Local members of parliament were involved."²⁹ This statement not only implies that communities were able to change government decisions by lobbying officials, but it also fails to address many questions about the precise power of lobbying and about the site selection process itself. Did lobbying in fact influence site selection decisions? If it did, what sort of lobbying was most effective – pleas for financial assistance or threats of lost political support? What was the success rate of lobbying attempts for the province of Saskatchewan and for the whole of Western Canada? How many communities in each western province lobbied? What were the federal government's actual criteria for site selection? In an effort to demonstrate the intense ambitions that prospective communities had in the BCATP, Greenhous and Hillmer have left many unanswered questions and the unsupported inference that political action played a part in the building of the BCATP

Popular historian Peter Conrad's *Training for Victory* explicitly argued that political influence determined the selection of BCATP sites. Conrad first hinted that politics played a role when he stated that "Winnipeg, Prince Albert, Regina, Saskatoon, and Calgary had been given notification of the establishment of air training facilities as early as January before the federal election of March 1940."³⁰ The author later claimed that "most Liberal constituencies received a school early in the war, followed by constituencies that had a CCF member of Parliament,

²⁹ Greenhous and Hillmer, *Op. Cit.*, p. 134.

³⁰ Conrad, *Training for Victory*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 14.

especially those CCF constituencies that had previously been Liberal." With no supporting statistics as evidence, Conrad added that "few Conservative constituencies received facilities."³¹ From a survey of newspapers from Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba, Conrad found that Saskatchewan papers carried the most public agitation for training bases. Conrad also pointed to the fact that after the first phase of school openings in 1940, Saskatchewan had eleven schools while Alberta had six and Manitoba only had two. Linking these two findings, Conrad concluded that "lobbying appears to have had some effect."³²

Besides failing to address the many questions his statements raise, Conrad's methodology and source-base provide little empirical evidence, thus leaving his conjectures in a precarious position. Did the cities notified of selection by January 1940 re-elect Liberal representatives or change their traditional allegiance in March 1940 as a way of rewarding the King government? Did Liberal constituencies in other western provinces, besides Saskatchewan, receive the same alleged favouritism in the awarding of bases? How many Liberal constituencies lobbied and were still rejected? How many towns – of all political affiliations – were selected without lobbying at all? How many towns lobbied after the selection committee was already aware of the merits of the area or after the site had already been selected? If communities knew that political affiliation was the key to receiving a training school, why did three constituencies in Saskatchewan elect Conservative representatives in 1940 rather than Liberal MPs? Since there was only one Conservative riding when selection began in late 1939, and three after the 1940

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 17.

election, how can Conrad justify his claim that "few Conservative constituencies received training facilities"? What was the process and criteria for selecting sites, and how exactly did lobbying letters and visits of delegations routinely fit into the process so as to influence decisions? Conrad appears to have based his conclusions on the number of editorials that appeared in local newspapers. How did these editorials influence policies and decisions made thousands of miles away in Ottawa? What kind of correspondence was sent to the decision-makers? How much correspondence did lobbyists produce? How did those in charge of selecting sites respond?

Conrad's hypothesis of Liberal favouritism in BCATP base selection has even been transposed into the collection of essays pertaining to Alberta in the Second World War. Thus Alberta readers have also been left with the belief that "baser motives had a hand in determining who got what training bases."¹¹ This is unfortunate, for the files of the Department of Transport (DoT), Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), and Aerodrome Development Committee (ADC), as well as the personal papers of various politicians, seem to contradict both the inference of Greenhous and Hillmer and the assertion of Conrad. By employing the primary documents generated by those in charge of base selection, this thesis aims to uncover the selection process and the extent to which partisan politics played a role.

Research for this thesis could find no evidence in the historical record that BCATP site selection was used for patronage or that lobbying from hopeful communities influenced the decisions made. Consequently, this thesis suggests that the selection of BCATP aerodrome sites

¹¹ Tingley, *Op. Cit.*, p. 245.

was an example of the civilian government's giving a specific task to the military and then allowing the experts to execute their task uninhibited: quickly, economically, and efficiently building airports only at those sites suitable for selection. Politicians did not subvert this relationship between the government and its armed forces for baser political ends. Rather, this thesis contends that King's Liberals sacrificed the opportunity to provide patronage in the effort to achieve goals of greater political importance: entering the war without dividing a country through conscription and winning the conflict by aiding the Allied air war.

The assertion that partisan politics governed site selection cannot simply rest on anecdotal evidence, nor on newspaper editorials. Any study investigating the questions raised by Greenhous, Hillmer, and Conrad must use both the lobbying efforts directed to selection officials and the documentation generated by these officials while considering sites. Both the RCAF and Department of Transport maintained a file for each site investigated, and the contents of these files suggest a healthy civil-military relationship as well as a technocratic and objective selection process. These files, now located at the National Archives of Canada, contain lobbying letters, official responses, and all other correspondence between technical experts. Consequently, they provide valuable insight into what communities expected, how officials responded, and what criteria the experts applied in their assessments.

Although some of the DoT and RCAF file numbers referred to in correspondence cannot be found at the National Archives, the remaining files are presumably the complete record now available. Consequently, any list of towns lobbying for consideration and any list of areas investigated by officials without public prompting are as complete as the historical record will allow. Using these sources, the researcher can plausibly address the questions previously posed

in response to Greenhous, Hillmer, and Conrad. By consulting the contents of these files, this thesis has identified the towns considered and situated them within their constituencies, thus revealing the political affiliation of the ridings at the time of consideration.³⁴ Similarly, by looking at the dates on preliminary investigation reports or other official correspondence, the researcher can also determine whether or not the site was under investigation before or after the first lobbying efforts were made.³⁵ Because these files also contain written evaluations for each site, the researcher can discover what criteria the technical experts used to assess potential aerodromes. The minutes of ADC meetings, the body of RCAF officers given the authority to determine the air force's official recommendations to the Minister of National Defence for Air, will reveal why the committee members selected and rejected sites investigated by the Transport officials.

To ascertain whether or not a community lobbied, whether the lobbying potentially prompted a preliminary investigation, and whether the lobbying occurred after government officials were already interested in the area, the researcher must locate all correspondence sent to the government. For the most part, letters sent to C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air) were forwarded immediately to the appropriate DoT or RCAF file. A search of Power's personal papers, archived at Queen's University, revealed only two files containing lobbying correspondence, and these files pertain specifically to Prince Albert's Elementary Flying Training School and complementary Air Observer School. The papers of Norman Rogers (Minister of

³⁴ See Appendix B "Federal Electoral Constituencies" and Appendix C "Towns Involved in BCATP Base Selection 1939 - 1945."

³⁵ See Appendix D "Communities That Lobbied."

National Defence until July 1940), also archived at Queen's University, contain no consistent flow of lobbying correspondence, but research for this thesis, however, did come across the occasional letter addressed to Rogers scattered throughout the DoT and RCAF files. Located at the National Archives, the personal papers of C.D. Howe (Minister of Transport and later Minister of Munitions and Supply) contain four files of correspondence from communities wanting aerodromes built in their vicinity. One file holds letters from all across Canada while the other three files are divided according to region: one file each for letters from Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba. Not surprisingly, the personal papers of Prime Minister W.L.M. King (which are held at the National Archives) produced an abundance of lobbying letters. Although not exclusively, much of this lobbying originated in the city of Prince Albert, Saskatchewan – a community located in King's constituency.

The personal papers of J.A. Wilson (Controller Civil Aviation) and A.D. McLean (Superintendent of Airways), kept at the National Archives, are also relevant to this study, for not only did both men participate in interwar civil aerodrome construction, but they also played leading roles in BCATP base selection. Wilson's papers (which were carefully gleaned by Thomas McGrath for his history of Canadian airports) contain some lobbying letters and some articles, written by himself, about airport selection in general and about BCATP aerodrome construction in particular. The papers of McLean pertain mostly to the pre-Second World War period, hence, there are no lobbying letters, but an article on interwar aerodrome selection proved useful.

Surprisingly, the papers of some of the prairie's most prominent leaders yielded no evidence of their participation in the lobbying process. This thesis expected great activity by

western regional leaders for a number of reasons: the Canadian prairies received almost half of the bases established for the training scheme;³⁶ the prairies suffered the most during the depression and drought of the 1930s; and Saskatchewan in particular lobbied with great intensity. Investigation of the personal papers of T.A Crerar (former Progressive Party leader), Norman Lambert (Canadian Council of Agriculture Secretary, Liberal Party National Secretary), and Charles Dunning (Saskatchewan Premier in the 1920s, former federal Finance Minister) revealed no correspondence from communities wanting an aerodrome. Likewise, those leaders apparently did not act on their own initiatives and lobby the government for consideration of their regions. James Gardiner (former Saskatchewan Premier, federal Minister of Agriculture during the Second World War) forwarded constituents' letters to the Department of Transport and the RCAF with appropriate covering letters encouraging consideration.

Newspapers of hopeful towns published many editorials explaining why each community needed and deserved a training school. Similarly, minutes and resolutions of town council and board of trade meetings recorded the mentality and aspirations of expectant citizens. Nevertheless, this thesis did not consult these sources, for the simple reason that they do not hold the key to what potentially influenced selection officials. Because copies of editorials and minutes of meetings rarely appear in the investigation files, it is obvious that constituents did not forward this documentation to Ottawa; hence, it could not directly influence the people involved in decision making. There is also no record of selection officials and politicians travelling from town to town across Canada, attending local meetings, and hearing first-hand constituents'

³⁶ See Appendix A "BCATP Schools Established in Canada 1939-1945."

discussions. No mention is made in memoranda, nor in correspondence with citizens, of selection officials being present at local meetings. Letters from communities also indicate that the selection officials were in Ottawa at the time that the various meetings occurred.¹⁷

Newspaper publications and local discussions allowed communities to collectively decide what action they wanted to take. If a community's desire was strong enough, town councils and boards of trade contacted the government directly by forwarding the resolutions that their communities had passed and by sending personal delegations to Ottawa to meet with officials.¹⁸ The DoT and RCAF files contain what the government received as a result of editorials being written and resolutions being passed. The contents of these files are the key items that could have potentially influenced selection decisions.

This thesis initially intended to determine whether or not political patronage occurred in the selection of bases for Saskatchewan – a narrow focus aimed at testing the validity of Greenhous, Hillmer, and Conrad's hypotheses. Nevertheless, one prairie province should not be isolated from the others. Although Saskatchewan received the second largest number of bases, the three western provinces jointly hosted almost half the bases of the training plan. Consequently, all three prairie provinces must be studied as a whole to determine the reasons

¹⁷ 14 January 1941 letter from A.E McKay (Secretary Board of Trade Estevan, Sk) to Jesse P. Tripp (MP Oxbow, Sk); 12 April 1941 letter from G.J. Nielsen (Secretary Board of Trade Tisdale, Sk) to J.L. Ralston (Minister of National Defence), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports).

¹⁸ 21 August 1941 letter from W.A. Tucker (MP Rosthern, Sk) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports); 24 April 1942 letter from S.O. Sisler (Abitibi Power and Paper Co. Limited) to Department of National Defence, RG 24 Reel C5036 File 925-2-97 (Sault Ste Marie, On).

why government officials selected so many bases in one region. Although Saskatchewan was hit the hardest by the depression and drought of the 1930s, Manitoba and Alberta had also suffered. Just as Saskatchewan communities perceived the BCATP as a means of ameliorating their financial hardships, Manitoba and Alberta had equally powerful cases to make as well. Hence, consideration of the lobbying efforts of all three prairie provinces will reveal whether or not the entire region campaigned with the same mentality and intensity. Since Ontario hosted the largest number of training schools, this study has included the province as a non-western counter-example.

Although looking at BCATP base selection in all nine provinces and two territories would have been ideal, concentrating on the four provinces receiving the most bases can give an accurate reading of how political patronage was challenged by a selection process based on a scientific methodology. Despite being a large province, Quebec did not host many BCATP bases. The province was vulnerable to enemy attack, and its vast northern regions were unsuitable for air training. Because British Columbia, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island were coastal territories, they were also prone to enemy attack via the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. Consequently, the RCAF established operational Home War Establishment units in these regions for Canada's protection. Since sharing this air space with inexperienced pilots was impractical, the RCAF built few training schools in these areas. However, the air force placed six of Canada's seven Operational Training Units in the coastal regions since these pilots were the most advanced trainees, now being familiarized to operational situations and equipment before being sent overseas. As an added advantage, these pilots could be called upon

if necessary to defend the coasts (and simultaneously gain experience) in case of enemy attack.³⁹

Any attempt to prove a negative must be based on an exhaustive review of the complete archival record. Unfortunately, gaps have been encountered. On occasion, this research found that a handful of files were missing from a consecutive block of DoT file numbers. References in correspondence to missing file numbers further highlighted the absence of these records. Fortunately, when the companion RCAF file was available, not all trace of the site's investigation was lost. At the most, lobbying letters sent to the Minister of Transport were irretrievable, but technical evaluations still existed. Sometimes files were not actually missing if a block of files had simply been renumbered – either by archivists or by the Department of Transport itself.

Nevertheless, some files were lost – perhaps before reaching the National Archives – and the fact that other hopeful towns (in addition those included in the current files) lobbied for BCATP bases or received RCAF consideration may be lost from the historical record altogether. Although this produces some uncertainty about the specific numbers and percentages presented in this study,⁴⁰ the missing files are in fact few. The available evidence provides such an overwhelming consensus that, assuming these missing files contained contradictory evidence, the balance would not be tipped; only a slight change in statistics would occur.

The site investigation files do not record the arguments made orally by visiting

³⁹ Hatch, *The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, Op. Cit.*, pp. 392-3; J.A. Wilson, "Aerodrome Construction for the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan 1940" in *Development of Aviation in Canada 1879-1948* (Ottawa: Department of Transport, 1948), p. 30.

⁴⁰ i.e. a certain number of towns received investigation before the community lobbied, or a certain percentage of towns that received schools were of Conservative affiliation, etc.

delegations and the immediate response given by officials. Later correspondence often refers to previous visits of delegations and to the comments made during the interviews, but because selection officials kept no consistent record of oral communications, it can never be determined exactly how many lobbyists may have visited or telephoned Ottawa. Therefore, it can never be known definitively whether or not a community lobbied before or after a preliminary survey, or if they lobbied at all, for these efforts might have been oral rather than written. This is the reality of historical research, and although the researcher must acknowledge this limitation, the historian cannot be inhibited by what might hypothetically exist but is apparently missing.

The research for this thesis did not uncover any document stipulating that selection was to be based on political affiliation or on predetermined percentage quotas. Nevertheless, one cannot take the seeming non-existence of such a document for granted, for it could have been misfiled, lost, or intentionally destroyed. Government officials could have given such instructions verbally – either explicitly or merely implied. This study must demonstrate that no evidence supports the consequences of such instructions' hypothetical existence: there was no room for such a document in the rational, objective, technocratic process outlined in Privy Council Order 3710 of 17 November 1939 which authorized the RCAF to make the final selection decisions.⁴¹ This thesis will also contend that the criteria used by the Transport officials and the ADC when investigating and selecting sites further substantiates the claim that such instructions did not exist. Government officials created a process that would facilitate the selection of sites most suitable for the safe, economical, and timely fulfilment of the end goal:

⁴¹ 17 November 1939 Privy Council Order 3710, RG 12 Volume 624 File 11-6-9.

training pilots to win the war. According to this thesis, the selection process intentionally curbed partisan influence because politicians – those with potential political motivations – voluntarily delegated the final decisions away from themselves and into the purview of those with technical expertise.

At the heart of this thesis lies the realization that meritocracy has often been sacrificed by governments for the furtherance of patronage. This thesis generally defines *patronage* as the granting or deprivation of contracts, employment, benefits, or privileges with the intention of rewarding the politically faithful and punishing the politically disloyal. *Meritocracy* is the awarding of these same contracts, employment, benefits, or privileges to people who would best fill these roles by meeting predetermined technical criteria.

While arguing that, in the case of BCATP base selection, politicians legislated authority to technical experts, this thesis has not overlooked Canada's long tradition of political patronage. Despite the tendency of some to view patronage as "the pornography of politics, ... a practice seldom considered a fit subject for polite discussions,"⁴² various writers have argued that patronage played a functional role in the establishment of national parties and political stability. Journalist Jeffrey Simpson wrote that Sir John A. Macdonald's use of patronage "built a national party rooted in the constituencies, capable of integrating a widely scattered and heterogeneous population into a national and political whole."⁴³ Political parties avoided "unstable coalition governments" since patronage could benefit people in all regions of Canada, not exclusively

⁴² Jeffrey Simpson, *Spoils of Power: The Politics of Patronage* (Toronto: Collins Publishers, 1988), p. 6.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

those people belonging to "parties based on [a certain] race, religion, or region."⁴⁴ Political scientist Reginald Whitaker also asserted that prime ministers have used patronage as "the instrument of channelling energies and interests toward the national state."⁴⁵

Arguments supporting the functional role of patronage have not focussed solely on how patronage was necessary to build a unified nation from the diverse pockets of population spread across the continent. Writers have also stressed that incentives were necessary to build support for political parties. Historian Gordon Stewart claimed that patronage "enabled the [political] parties to flourish and maintain political stability."⁴⁶ According to Stewart, in the period prior to 1911, the limited numbers of jobs in the private sector (such as manufacturing) made federal contracts and public service positions more desirable. In exchange for political support, both Liberal and Conservative parties provided jobs, careers, and economic vitality.⁴⁷ The pervasive exertion of "extensive influence throughout society ... thus helped create a stable party system."⁴⁸ Happy clients were faithful clients – votes on which the patron parties could count.

In another work, Reginald Whitaker focussed on how the Liberal party organized itself to

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁴⁵ Reginald Whitaker, "Images of the State in Canada" in *The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power*, ed. Leo Panitch (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), p. 45.

⁴⁶ Gordon Stewart, "Political Patronage Under Macdonald and Laurier 1878-1911" in *Interpreting Canada's Past, Volume II: After Confederation*, ed. Jim Bumstead (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 45.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

link "the party-in-office in the legislature to the unorganized electorate."⁴⁹ Whitaker explored the reciprocal relationship between politicians awarding patronage and the voters receiving these benefits in return for political loyalty and support.⁵⁰ Once patronage is used to attract votes, "failure to give fair and sympathetic considerations to [voters'] representations endangers [the patron's] prestige and weakens his influence."⁵¹ Herein lies the motive to continue the patronage cycle.

Jeffrey Simpson highlighted another motivation for perceiving patronage as a necessary tool. Besides securing votes and long-term support for a political party, "patronage also finance[s] politics" – direct contributions could be made in return for favours before the age of public scrutiny – and "patronage induces discipline within parties," for rewards can be taken away from disloyal recipients.⁵² Patronage has thus been an integral and premeditated part of Canada's political tradition since before Confederation. Hence, the researcher must take its existence and precedent into consideration when examining government expenditures.

While political histories traditionally look at the functional role patronage has played in Canada's political system, this thesis offers a different approach. Historians have shown that the curtailment of patronage⁵³ coincided with the professionalization of the civil service and that the

⁴⁹ Reginald Whitaker, *The Government Party: Organizing and Financing the Liberal Party of Canada 1939-58* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), p. xvi.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. xviii.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. xxii.

⁵² Simpson, *Op. Cit.*, p. 16.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8; J.E. Hodgetts, *The Canadian Public Service: A Physiology of Government 1867-1970* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), pp., 12, 53.

outbreak of war accelerated this professionalization: large numbers of people were needed to carry out – efficiently and expertly – the workload involved in prosecuting the Second World War.⁵⁴ The federal government was increasingly dependent on technical expertise and merit during the Great Depression and the Second World War. This thesis argues that, in like manner, the selection of BCATP bases is an example of government departments depending on their cadre of professionals and technical experts.

RCAF and DoT departmental correspondence, the delegation of authority to the experts, and the decision-making process from which politicians voluntarily removed themselves all indicate strongly that patronage and winning political party support were subsumed by other issues. Consequently, BCATP base selection can serve as a case study in the civil-military relations of the time, in the new emphasis on technocracy and meritocracy, and in a resultant transparency and accountability that was *avant-garde* for its day. Besides suggesting that the government of the time wanted to ensure patronage did not play a role in BCATP base selection – hence breaking a long political tradition – the historical record also demonstrates the popular expectation of the electorate. Constituents assumed that political affiliation and participation would influence how the government chose bases. When one considers the long precedent of patronage, the constituents' assumption was only natural. Using the military to reward the politically faithful and ensure political party stability was a long established precedent pre-dating the 20th century.

As historian Stephen Harris has shown in his account of the early Canadian permanent

⁵⁴ Hodgetts, *Op. Cit.*, p. 51; Doug Owram, *The Government Generation: Canadian Intellectuals and the State 1900-1945* (Toronto: University Press, 1986), p. 256.

force coming to see itself as a professional body and striving to gain the respect of both the government and public alike, governments freely used this "national institution for political gain."⁵⁵ As early as 1883, military leaders protested the "blatant political jobbery [that] was playing a major part in the [officer] selection process."⁵⁶ Patronage eradicated all incentives for professional development, for politicians based promotions on political connections, not on merit; similarly, military leaders could cultivate little respect from the lower ranks when the opinions and advice of the general officer commanding were of minimal value in the eyes of the civilian minister. For the next thirty-five years, "patronage dominated the permanent force."⁵⁷

In the early 1900s, Minister of Militia Frederick Borden helped curtail the use of officer appointments in the permanent force as political rewards by basing them only on merit, ability, and knowledge, not influence-peddling.⁵⁸ Nonetheless, the appearance of Sam Hughes – a veteran citizen militia member – as minister of the Militia Department after 1911 soon eroded any gains made in giving meritocracy dominance over patronage in the military. By the end of 1912, "the minister was in complete control of his department." He ignored the advice of his regular force military advisers and used appointments in the permanent force to reward deserving

⁵⁵ Stephen J. Harris, *Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), p. 6.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 74, 80-1.

and politically loyal friends.⁵⁹ After Hughes' dismissal in November 1916,⁶⁰ Sir George Perley, the Minister of Overseas Military Forces of Canada, actively put a stop to patronage appointments because it was weakening Canada's fighting power.⁶¹ It had taken the realities and tragedies of actual warfare for politicians to realize and for "regulars, militiamen, and civilians under arms ... [to demand] that personnel selection [be] governed by merit and that field commanders be allowed to conduct operations as they saw fit."⁶²

One striking continuity between Harris' findings and the research conducted for this thesis is the precarious nature of civil-military relations in Canada. The amount of authority assumed by the civilian government and the amount of responsibilities entrusted to military leaders depends, ultimately, on the whims of the ministers in charge of defence. While Harris pointed out that ideally "cooperation and trust ... [are] essential for the existence of a healthy civil-military relationship," his research demonstrated that this level of trust fluctuated constantly. Civilian government leaders were not legally obligated to maintain any minimum of advisory dependence on the military leadership: "amateur soldier-politicians were reluctant to concede greater knowledge and expertise to the permanent force, and they had the power to ignore its advice and to thwart its every attempt to assert professional independence."⁶³

Even when Frederick Borden agreed that ability – not political and social connections –

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 87-9.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 124-6, 137.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 219.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

should determine appointments made to the permanent force, "there was nothing to prevent individual ministers from reviving the practice of political favouritism in appointments and promotions."⁶⁴ Within a year of Sam Hughes becoming the minister of militia and defence, he erased all progress made in this area,⁶⁵ and even Sir George Perley's decision to move "contrary to custom" and allow soldiers to promulgate "personnel policies based almost exclusively on merit" was his personal decision.⁶⁶

Memories of the Great War's casualty rates, manpower shortages, and political consequences of conscription may have been one reason why basing military appointments on merit did not revert to patronage in the interwar period. By the end of the 1930s, the army, navy, and air force were so respected that they were given direct access to the minister of defence, for Ian Mackenzie saw "the requirement for speedy and unimpeded communication during a crisis."⁶⁷ This thesis picks up where Harris left off in 1939, and although the Liberal government was under no obligation to refrain from using the military for political gain, this thesis posits that King's Liberals did not usurp the ideal, non-partisan relationship between the government and its military. This thesis, as explanation for this phenomenon, suggests that the ultimate goal of winning the war as quickly and as efficiently as possible prevented the government from reverting to the long precedent of sacrificing the integrity of the military for patronage opportunities.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9, 80.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 159.

Historians have shown that Canada has a long history of patronage pre-dating the Second World War, and they have also demonstrated that the growing trend toward professionalization and government dependence on experts accelerated in the 1930s.⁶⁸ This thesis will argue that in the midst of the tensions between patronage and professionalization, technocracy triumphed as the governing factor of BCATP site selection. Nevertheless, this study is not claiming that all forms of patronage were eradicated. Indeed, there were probably instances of episodic patronage: the awarding of construction contracts, the purchasing of utilities, and the supplying of food to bases are all possible areas where partisan politics could have determined who won the responsibilities. However, these areas are beyond the scope of this study: such instances mattered less, for rewarding political favourites in these instances did not jeopardize the safety of an aerodrome nor delay building schedules. This study is not dedicated to looking at the building and the maintenance of an airport *after* a site was approved.

This thesis does propose to demonstrate that, in the particular question of aerodrome site selection, partisan politics did not determine which communities received BCATP bases, for the non-partisan relationship between the government and military was not usurped. The civilian government, having to fulfil the commitments that Canada made to the United Kingdom in reference to winning the war, gave the RCAF the task of establishing air training schools and then let the experts execute their task without political interference. The RCAF, with the help of aviation experts in the Department of Transport, selected the sites systematically and according to predetermined criteria designed to build airports with access to the necessary amenities, air

⁶⁸ Hodgetts, *Op. Cit.*; Owram, *Op. Cit.*; Simpson, *Op. Cit.*; Stewart, *Op. Cit.*; Whitaker, *Op. Cit.*

space, runway lengths, and possibility of expansion. The government gave the aim of winning the war (and doing so without invoking national disunity over conscription) priority over gaining political votes or using aerodromes to solve Depression-related ills in certain communities.

To place the BCATP site selection process in context, this thesis will first discuss how the perceived importance of air power resulted in Great Britain's campaign to secure Canadian participation in air training. In conjunction with this, it is also important to note why the Liberal government initially hesitated to participate in air training and then finally acquiesced (Chapter II). The socio-economic climate in which communities found themselves at the end of the Great Depression leaves little doubt why citizens and their municipal, provincial, and federal representatives keenly lobbied the government in hopes of receiving BCATP schools. Analysis of these lobbying efforts not only demonstrates the electorate's expectations of the government, but it also shows which arguments lobbyists believed would be persuasive and how these arguments metamorphosed as the war situation changed and hope of winning a BCATP school faded (Chapter III). This thesis will then consider how dependence on technocrats and expertise had been on the rise during the interwar period and how the process of selecting BCATP sites was another example of politicians entrusting tasks to its technical experts (Chapter IV). An analysis of the political affiliation of communities that lobbied, as well as those that were investigated, selected, and rejected, aims to illustrate that sites were not chosen according to political affiliation nor the intensity of lobbying, but according to merit (Chapter V). Contrasting the reasons why communities felt they deserved a BCATP school and how technical experts actually made their choices will show there actually were no parochial politics in British Commonwealth Air Training Plan base selection.

CHAPTER II: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BCATP FOR GREAT BRITAIN AND CANADA

Because participation in the BCATP made Canada part of Britain's defence strategy, it is relevant to consider not only what Britain's air defence policy was in 1939 but also how that strategy evolved and why the British government insisted that Canada play a role. Although historians have recounted the Anglo-Canadian training plan negotiations numerous times, a consideration of these negotiations is relevant to this thesis' focus on community lobbying and patronage expectations: upon word that Canada might host an air training plan for Great Britain, communities – long before September 1939 – lobbied to have training aerodromes' economic benefits established in their vicinities.¹ Understanding why these two countries adopted an international training scheme is also imperative to appreciating the necessity of meeting commitments according to schedule. The genesis of the BCATP began years before Neville Chamberlain's September 1939 proposal. Experiences from the Great War demonstrated the bombing capacities of aircraft, and over the interwar period, the British Air Ministry and the British government increasingly emphasized strategic bombing capabilities. The Canadian government's participation in the training scheme also had roots in First World War legacies: trench warfare, high casualties, and conscription. Balancing national sovereignty and political unity with Commonwealth obligations and war commitments influenced the Liberal government's response to the various air training proposals.²

¹ 25 August 1938 letter from H.J. Fraser (Mayor) to H.R.L. Henry (Private Secretary Prime Minister), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 250 Reel C3733 pp. 213298-9; 1 August 1938 letter from J.P. Curror (Secretary Board of Trade) to Ian Mackenzie (Minister of National Defence) King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 257 Reel C3737 p. 219033.

² Douglas, *Op. Cit.*, p. 192; Uri Bialer, *The Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air Attack and British Politics 1932 - 1939* (London: Swift Printers Ltd, 1980), p. 3.

Germany's offensive use of aeroplanes and zeppelins against British cities in the First World War forced Great Britain to realize that it was no longer immune from enemy attack. This, in turn, shaped the growth of Britain's strategic air doctrine and defence preparations in the interwar period. The United Kingdom could no longer rely on naval superiority to protect itself because enemy aeroplanes could simply fly over the English channel and all of Britain's naval defences.¹ As early as 1917, studies like the Smuts Reports warned government officials that air power would change future conflict:

As far as can at present be foreseen, there is absolutely no limit to [air power's] independent war use. The day may not be far off when aerial operations with their devastation of enemy lands and destruction of industrial and populous centres on a vast scale may become the principal operations of war, to which the older forms of military and naval operations may become secondary and subordinate.⁴

The Air Ministry's strategic bombing doctrine was born out of this assumption. If bombing attacks had continued on London, or if air attacks on the city ever occurred again, officials believed that it would devastate morale, cause much material damage, dislocate the government, interrupt communications, and hamper the successful execution of the war.⁵ Accordingly, rather than wait for others to attack Britain, the Royal Air Force (RAF) adopted strategic bombing as the central aspect of its offensive plan for fighting the next war. According to its strategic bombing theory, the RAF should be capable of striking the first blow against belligerent rogue nations, consequently destroying the enemy's civilian morale, will to continue war, and economic capability to sustain war. Unlike the stalemates of trench warfare, conflicts

¹ Scot Robertson, *The Development of RAF Strategic Bombing Doctrine 1919 - 1939* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1985), p. xx; Bialer, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 1, 13.

⁴ Robertson, *Op. Cit.*, p. 17

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

might be decisive again, and air power could render ground troops irrelevant, for "aircraft [could] jump over the army which shields the enemy government, industry, and people, and so strike direct and immediately at the seat of the opposing will and policy." The RAF believed that the British government and people would welcome this alternative to raising ground troops, enduring trench warfare, and continually negotiating commitments with Continental allies: if this strategy truly diminished the need of ground forces, soldiers' lives might be spared, and governments would be able to reduce spending on army and navy budgets.⁶

Despite the contrary opinions of army, navy, and political officials,⁷ the British Air Ministry clung to its theory of gaining air supremacy with a 'knock-out blow.' This doctrine was driven by the belief that the RAF had to destroy the enemy's military aerodromes and aircraft factories before the enemy could do the same to Britain.⁸ With the enemy's defensive and offensive capabilities obliterated, the RAF could bomb enemy civilians until they compelled "their government ... to sue for peace in order to secure relief."⁹ Theoretically, the fear of such devastating aerial bombing should act as a deterrent on any enemy considering an attack on the United Kingdom or its allies. Furthermore, even if deterrence failed, air force officials assumed that the ensuing conflict would be short once the enemy's civilian morale was broken and their

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 43, 45, 53, 135; Michael S. Sherry, *The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), pp. 24 (quote), 34, 78.

⁷ H. Montgomery Hyde, *British Air Policy Between the Wars 1918-1939* (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1976), pp. 227, 337; Robertson, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 50-53.

⁸ Hyde, *Op. Cit.*, p. 137; Robertson, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 48-9; Sherry, *Op. Cit.*, p. 18.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

logistical war machine rendered impotent.¹⁰

While the RAF requested more money to finance its bomber force, repaying First World War debts shaped the British government's interwar attitudes toward military aviation.¹¹ Invoked in August 1919, the 'Ten Year Rule' enabled the British government to justify curtailing military appropriations. According to this rule, "it should be assumed for framing estimates that the British Empire will not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years."¹² This belief continued until 1932, by which time the failed disarmament negotiations with European neighbours, and the verification that Germany had significantly rearmed itself, forced the government to revoke the 'Ten Year Rule.'¹³ When the Defence Requirements Committee advised that Germany was the 'ultimate potential enemy,' "a new sense of urgency [was injected] into the planning process of all the services."¹⁴

In response to the growing threat of German aggression in the 1930s, the British government approved increases in military expenditures. No longer inhibited by financial shortages, the RAF was free to expand the size of its air force, which included training more pilots and air crew.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the British Isles' limited geographical space posed a problem for expanding the aerodrome infrastructure. Besides requiring training facilities for large

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 60, 103; Sherry, *Op. Cit.*, p. 26.

¹¹ Hyde, *Op. Cit.*, p. 490.

¹² Robertson, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 29, 159-60.

¹³ Bialer, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 3-4, 39, 100, 117; Hyde, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 59, 277, 326, 328, 335, 343, 492.

¹⁴ Bialer, *Op. Cit.*, p. 60; Robertson, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 143, 162.

¹⁵ Hyde, *Op. Cit.*, p. 360; Robertson, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 161-2.

numbers of new recruits, the RAF also needed more operational bases from which active squadrons could attack Germany and protect Great Britain. Training flights in this limited air space would interfere with war operations. In an effort to avoid congestion, protect recruits from enemy attack, and create a psychological weapon against the Germans – an air power source that could not be struck easily because of the distances involved – the British government looked to its Dominions for help.¹⁶

Because Canada hosted an air training scheme during the First World War for Britain's Royal Flying Corps (RFC),¹⁷ and because the RCAF had agreed to a 1935 proposal to train fifteen Canadians annually for service with the RAF,¹⁸ the British government hoped that Canada would be willing to expand these precedents. Arguing that limited British air space necessitated the request, the British Air Ministry proposed in September 1936 that the Canadian government allow RAF air training schools to open in Canada.¹⁹ After considering the implications of the proposal, the Department of External Affairs' E.A. Pickering informed King that it was inadvisable for Britain to build RAF schools on Canadian territory: it raised vexatious questions concerning imperialism and Canadian autonomy. Claiming that the RCAF planned to open its

¹⁶ British Air Ministry, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 74, 76, 87; Barris, *Op. Cit.*, p. 13.

¹⁷ Douglas, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 191, 203-4.

¹⁸ 22 April 1937 telegram from Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 6 May 1937 memorandum from Joint Staff Committee to Minister of National Defence, Documents 143 and 144 in John A. Munroe, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations / D'CER/* Volume VI (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1972), pp. 192-5; Douglas, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 194, 196.

¹⁹ 4 September 1936 letter from Ian Mackenzie (Minister of National Defence) to W.L.M. King (Prime Minister), King Papers MG 26 J1 Reel 3690 Volume 220 pp. 189790-1.

own air training schools, the Canadian government rejected the proposal to avoid competition for air fields, pilot recruits, and equipment.²⁰ Despite the RCAF's interest in cooperating with the RAF, Britain's air training proposal in 1937 was no more appealing or acceptable because of the Liberal government's constitutional concerns.²¹

Although King did not want Canadians training for the RAF on Canadian soil, the government did agree in early 1938 to send 120 Canadian recruits annually to Great Britain for RAF training and service.²² When the British High Commissioner, Sir Francis Floud, raised the training school issue again in May 1938, he sparked a lengthy debate between the British and Canadian governments. The British government was obliged to begin its own rearmament programmes since Germany was rearming faster than expected. Floud explained to King that the density of population and congested skies in Britain made air training there problematic. Canada, on the other hand, was an attractive training ground because it had neither problem, it had a climate suitable for air training, and it was closer to Great Britain than the other Commonwealth Dominions. Hence, the British government suggested building aerodromes in Canada. The RCAF would control and staff these schools, but the United Kingdom would fully fund them, and the majority of recruits would be Canadians destined for the RAF.²³

²⁰ Granatstein, *Op. Cit.*, p. 43; 11 September 1939 memorandum by E.A. Pickering (Department of External Affairs), Document 136 in *DCER VI*, pp. 175-6.

²¹ Eayrs, *Op. Cit.*, p. 92; 23 February 1939 House of Commons Debates, pp. 2049-50; 6 May 1937 memorandum by Joint Staff Committee to Minister of National Defence, Document 144 in *DCER VI*, pp. 193-5.

²² Douglas, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 196-7.

²³ 1 July 1938 House of Commons Debates, pp. 4523-4; 13 [sic 16] May 1938 memorandum from W.L.M. King (Prime Minister) to O.D. Skelton (Undersecretary of State for External

King refused for two reasons. First, because this proposal was reminiscent of Canadian recruits training for Britain's RFC in the Great War, King interpreted the new scheme as Britain's means of recreating an Imperial air force. Second, King believed that the British government was pressuring him to blindly commit Canada's participation in any future European conflict involving Great Britain. King would not make such commitments: only once war was declared would Parliament vote on Canada's neutral or belligerent status. Hoping to entice King with financial incentives, Floud pointed out that the proposed expenditure of British funds in Canada would benefit Canadian industries and reduce unemployment rates. King, on the other hand, felt the proposal to spend British funds on Canadian war projects threatened Canadian autonomy. Sensing that Canadians would not be favourable to British flying schools in Canada, King feared that forcing such a scheme on constituents would result in an isolationist backlash which might preclude providing assistance when it was really required. For the good of future cooperation, King hesitated to accept the training proposal.²⁴

L.C. Christie of the Department of External Affairs was of the same opinion, and in June 1938, he advised against allowing foreign military establishments on Canadian soil because they would subvert the domestic ownership, maintenance, and control of military stations that was essential to full national sovereignty. According to Christie, the British government's scheme was meant to secure Canadian recruits for the RAF. The constitutional questions raised

Affairs), 2 July 1938 memorandum from O.D. Skelton (Undersecretary of State for External Affairs) to W.L.M. King (Prime Minister), Documents 152 and 159 in *DCER VI*, pp. 206-8, 217-8.

²⁴ 13 [sic 16] May 1938 memorandum from W.L.M. King (Prime Minister) to O.D. Skelton (Undersecretary of State for External Affairs) Document 152 in *DCER VI*, pp. 206-8.

by supplying personnel for an Imperial air force were not the only drawbacks noted by the Department of External Affairs. When Canadians joined the RAF, Canada lost good recruits for its own air force, and when Canadians returned after serving their allotted time in the RAF, they often could not be employed in Canada because there were no jobs for their specialized training. Furthermore, allowing Canadians to serve in the RAF would virtually be a commitment to fight any European war. The proposal was unacceptable "on grounds of constitutional principle, of history, of patriotism, [and] of morality."²⁵

On 1 July 1938, Conservative leader R.B. Bennett demanded to know why Canada was refusing to help its "ancient partner" in time of need.²⁶ King explained that accepting the British proposal was not as simple as agreeing to aid a Commonwealth partner. Setting aside military aerodromes for RAF recruits alone meant that military stations were "owned, maintained, and operated by the Imperial government for Imperial purposes." The prime minister explained why this was unacceptable for the nation of Canada:

Long ago, Canadian governments finally settled the constitutional principle that in Canadian territory, there would be no military establishments unless they were owned, maintained, and controlled by the Canadian Government responsible to the Canadian Parliament and people. In the end, the imperial naval stations and army garrisons were withdrawn, and Canadian authority took over. A reversal of that principle and that historical process at this date is something the Canadian people would not for a moment entertain. Such domestic ownership, maintenance, and control of all military stations and personnel is one of the really indispensable hallmarks of national sovereign self-government.... No country pretending to sovereign self control could permit such a state of affairs or its implications and consequences.

Despite refusing to make a commitment "with respect to any war in which the United Kingdom may be engaged," King's government invited British pilots to attend Canadian air training

²⁵ 19 June 1938 memorandum by L.C. Christie (Department of External Affairs), Document 153 in *DCER VI*, pp. 209-10.

²⁶ 1 July 1938 House of Commons Debates, pp. 4523-4, 4528.

schools which were both owned and operated by the RCAF.²⁷

Attempting to define the acceptable parameters in which Canada could provide military aid did not mean that the prime minister and his government were opposed to aiding Great Britain. In his diary, King reiterated that he was "quite prepared to have [British] pilots come to Canada to train and to cooperate with them toward that end." According to this entry, he believed that aviation would be "all important" in the future and that "the real defence of Canada would be from the air." King believed that his attitude was reflected by his government's recent military aviation expenditures. While appropriations had been as low as \$3 million in 1935 and \$4 million in 1936, cabinet had approved over \$11 million for the RCAF's 1937 budget. Furthermore, as spending on the air force increased, the government was limiting expenditures on the land force and reserving the navy for coastal protection.²⁸

Despite King's fears that the electorate would not approve of an air training plan, some Canadians voiced their support for aiding the British rearmament programme. Imperialists like R.B. Bennett clearly wanted the British proposal to be accepted, and King perceived that people in the aviation sector also welcomed the training scheme for "commercial reasons."²⁹ The prime minister's refusal to allow RAF schools in Canada also elicited letters of discontent from citizens. One chartered accountant wrote King in July 1938, expressing his displeasure over the government's "political pussy-footing", condemning the obsession with autonomy, and declaring

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 4527-29.

²⁸ 28 May 1936 House of Commons Debates, p. 3182; Douglas, *Op. Cit.*, p. 133.

²⁹ 1 July 1938 House of Commons Debates, pp. 4523-4, 4528; 5 July 1938, King Diary MG 26 J13 Microfiche T123 p. 528.

that "a vote of Parliament cannot stop people from supporting Britain." He believed Canadians in general were of the same frame of mind: "[It is a] fair assumption that the great majority of our people would heartily and sincerely approve of RAF stations and training in Canada."³⁰ King felt those who perceived his government to be anti-British failed to understand that he was trying to reach a compromise. By offering the use of Canadian schools for British pilots, the government was still providing help, but simultaneously, it was forestalling any British plan to only train Canadians for the RAF.³¹

As the summer of 1938 progressed, the two previous training agreements between Canada and Great Britain entered the discussion.³² By August, British negotiators suggested that the 120 recruits travelling to England and the 15 being trained in Canada for the RAF attend these proposed training schools. In response to King's disapproval, Floud pointed out the absurdity of sending Canadians to Britain for training while simultaneously paying for British pilots to travel to Canada. Frustrated at the impasse, Floud queried, "what was the difference between training 120 Canadians in Canada or Britain [for the RAF]?"³³

Because King's aim was to "prevent what in reality they [the British government] want,

³⁰ 18 July 1938 letter from F. Lansdowne Belyea (Constituent) to W.L.M. King (Prime Minister), King Papers MG 26 J1 Reel C3731 Volume 245 pp. 210324-5.

³¹ 1 July 1938, King Diary MG 26 J13 Microfiche T123 p. 509.

³² 22 April 1937 telegram from Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 6 May 1937 memorandum from Joint Staff Committee to Minister of National Defence, Documents 143 and 144 in *DCER* 17, pp. 192-5; 6 September 1938 letter from W.L.M. King (Prime Minister) to Sir Francis Floud (British High Commissioner), RG 25 Volume 1858 File 72-T-38C. Douglas, *Op. Cit.*, p. 196.

³³ 11 August 1938 memorandum from O.D. Skelton (Undersecretary of State for External Affairs) to W.L.M. King (Prime Minister), Document 161 in *DCER* 17, pp. 219-21.

namely, the chance to begin recruiting Canadians for Imperial wars,"³⁴ he claimed the difference was in principle. When the 120 candidates went to Britain, the British government paid for all the costs of training. If these same pilots were trained in Canada, then the Canadian government became responsible for training, paying instructor salaries, maintaining aerodromes, and servicing all equipment. In King's mind, the Canadian government would be paying for Britain's military defence. He also feared that the British government would interpret the precedent of training Canadian pilots in peacetime for the RAF as a commitment to supplying recruits for the British military in time of war.³⁵

By December 1938, the two governments were still debating the same points. The British government had not altered its proposal substantially, for it still desired to combine the pre-existing agreements and have these 135 Canadian recruits training in Canada for the RAF. The issues of spending Canadian dollars on British military forces and of recruiting Canadians for the RAF were also unresolved. King believed that Canadian military expenditures should be dedicated to expanding domestic defences. By agreeing to train more Canadians for the RAF in Canada, the Dominion would be making "a direct annual financial contribution ... to the United Kingdom defence programme" - an estimated £1450 per student according to the British government. According to King, such contributions were not "consistent with the established policy of autonomy in defence or with the primary responsibility of each part of the

³⁴ 1 July 1938, King Diary MG 26 J13 Microfiche T123 p. 509.

³⁵ 24 June 1938 letter from W.L.M. King (Prime Minister) to Sir Francis Floud (British High Commissioner), King Papers MG 26 J1 Reel C3733 Volume 249 pp. 213159-54; 11 August 1938 memorandum from O.D. Skelton (Undersecretary of State for External Affairs) to W.L.M. King (Prime Minister), Document 161 in *DCER VI*, pp. 219-21.

Commonwealth for developing forces to meet its probable defence requirements." The prime minister would not adopt such a proposal, but he was still open to British pilots coming to Canada and training in RCAF schools controlled by the Department of National Defence.³⁶

King's intransigence shaped the agreement reached in April 1939. For a trial period of three years, Canadian schools would provide intermediate and advanced training to 126 pilots annually. Fifty of these pilots would be United Kingdom recruits, their costs being fully covered by the British government; the remaining seventy-six recruits would be Canadians training for the RCAF. While the previous training agreements would remain in effect, the first seventeen British pilots of the new accord were scheduled to arrive the last week of September 1939.³⁷

While the outbreak of war in September 1939 removed reservations about drifting into Britain's Imperialist sphere, the Canadian government now had to avoid putting itself on a course that would lead inevitably to conscription as it committed military forces to the war effort.³⁸ Memories of trench warfare, unprecedented casualty lists, and political disunity over conscription were deeply ingrained in the Liberal government's memory, and the King administration was also conscious of its promise in March 1939 to not enforce conscription again:

³⁶ 9 December 1938 letter from Gerald Campbell (British High Commissioner) to W.L.M. King (Prime Minister), Document 168 in *DC'ER VI*, pp. 227-8; 9 December 1938 memorandum from British Government, RG 25 Volume 1858 File 72-T-38C; 21 December 1938, King Diary MG 26 J13 Microfiche T129 p. 1031; 31 December 1938 letter from W.L.M. King (Prime Minister) to Gerald Campbell (British High Commissioner), Document 169 in *DC'ER VI*, pp. 230-2.

³⁷ Eayrs, *Op. Cit.*, p. 103; Stacey, *Op. Cit.*, p. 89; Douglas, *Op. Cit.*, p. 203; 1 May 1939 letter from Gerald Campbell (British High Commissioner) to Minister of National Defence, RG 25 Volume 1858 File 72-T-38C.

³⁸ Douglas, *Op. Cit.*, p. 203.

One political fact is ... clear: in a war to save the liberty of others, and thus our own, we should not sacrifice our own liberty or our own unity Men's lives and men's wills cannot be put on the same basis as goods and profits. The present government believes that conscription of men for overseas service would not be a necessary or an effective step. Let me say that as long as this government may be in power, no such measure will be enacted. We have full faith in the readiness of Canadian men and women to rally for the defence of their country and their liberties, and to resist aggression by any country seeking to dominate the world by force.³⁹

On 8 September 1939 – two days before Canada declared war on Germany – King reminded the House of Commons of this promise, reiterating the 30 March 1939 pledge word for word. Although the fate of the April 1939 training plan was uncertain, British government officials intimated to King on 6 September 1939 that training air crew would be "the best way in which Canada could assist" the RAF's manpower shortages.⁴⁰ In the same 8 September 1939 speech to the House of Commons, King shared his interpretation of the British's request: "The information we have obtained indicates that the most immediate and effective further means of cooperation would be a rapid expansion of air training, and of air and naval facilities, and the dispatch of trained personnel. These measures we propose to institute immediately."⁴¹

Throughout September, the British government struggled to determine the scope of their air crew needs. At first, the RAF suggested that Canada train 120 new pilots annually and loan existing RCAF pilots to the RAF. Later, the RCAF's Chief of the Air Staff heard rumours that "the British were likely to ask for a four-fold increase in the number of pilots to be trained."⁴² The details of an air training contribution took shape after 16 September when Vincent Massey

³⁹ 30 March 1939 House of Commons Debates, p. 2126.

⁴⁰ Brereton Greenhous, *et. al.*, *The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force*, Volume III: *The Crucible of War, 1939-1945* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), p. 18.

⁴¹ 8 September 1939 House of Commons Debates, p. 36; Douglas, *Op. Cit.*, p. 204.

⁴² Greenhous, *The Crucible of War*, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 18-19.

(High Commissioner of Canada in London) and Stanley Bruce (High Commissioner of Australia in London) suggested to the British government how the Dominions could "make a decisive contribution to the common war effort by training Commonwealth [Canadian, Australian, New Zealand] airmen" in Canada.⁴³ The idea appealed to the British government, and on 26 September 1939, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain officially requested that Canada annually provide intermediate and advanced training for 20,000 pilots and 30,000 other air crew. Because Britain could provide less than half of these numbers, most of the pilots would be from the Dominions.⁴⁴

Although the British government planned to set-up part of the training infrastructure in Great Britain, it anticipated needing a training organization that was "more than twice the entire capacity available in the United Kingdom, having regard to limited space, operational restrictions, and vulnerability to air attack." Consequently, establishing training schools in the various Dominions meant they were beyond the reach of enemy interference, but Canada provided special advantages: proximity to the United Kingdom, capacity to manufacture aircraft, and access to aircraft parts available on American markets. Chamberlain hoped that "the knowledge that a vast air potential was being built up in the Dominions where no German air activity could interfere with expansion might well have a psychological effect on the Germans equal to that produced by the intervention of the United States in the last war with its vast

⁴³ Vincent Massey, *What's Past is Prologue: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Vincent Massey* (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1963), pp. 303-41; Douglas, *Op. Cit.*, p. 207.

⁴⁴ 26 September 1939 telegram from Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs, RG 25 Volume 1858 File 72-T-38C; Greenhous, *The Crucible of War, Op. Cit.*, p. 20.

resources."⁴⁵

Now that the world was at war, King no longer portrayed Commonwealth air training as dangerous to Canadian independence. Instead, he embraced the proposal as a means of limiting and controlling Canada's war involvement. The day after receiving Chamberlain's request, King lamented the fact that he had not received the air proposal sooner, for it "would have saved us having anything to do with an expeditionary force at the start." By the time King received the air training proposal, his government had committed itself to sending the Canadian 1st Division.⁴⁶ When the Emergency Council of Cabinet met on 27 September 1939, it also came to a consensus that the training plan's importance would diminish the need to send large numbers of ground forces overseas. The words of Chamberlain's telegram – "the scheme ... is of first importance," "an all important field of war activity," "the matter should receive very urgent attention," "vital importance," "immense influence ... upon the whole course of the war," "decisive"⁴⁷ – overcame the King government's pre-war inhibitions.⁴⁸

Having recently renewed the promise that there would be no conscription, the government saw that using the air training plan as Canada's main contribution was a "political

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ 27 September 1939, King Diary MG 26 J13 Microfiche T140 p. 1089; Douglas, *Op. Cit.*, p. 206; J.W. Pickersgill, *The Mackenzie King Record Volume I 1939-1944* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), pp. 41-2; Massey, *Op. Cit.*, p. 305.

⁴⁷ 26 September 1939 telegram from Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs, RG 25 Volume 1858 File 72-T-38C.

⁴⁸ 28 September 1939 Minutes of Emergency Council of Cabinet, Document 689 in David R. Murray, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations [DCER]* Volume VII (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1974), pp. 552-55.

prize." Since volunteer RCAF airmen would be in Canada training Commonwealth recruits, the Canadian government could offer significant help to the Allies without dividing the country again.⁴⁹ Accepting the plan in principle on 28 September 1939,⁵⁰ King intended to delay sending more ground forces after the 1st Division arrived overseas, for he argued that air training was the most effective contribution that Canada could provide at the time. Because King wanted the British to acknowledge this intention, he insisted that the wording of the official BCATP announcement stress the great strategic contribution that Canada was making.⁵¹

Although the British government also "attached the highest priority" to the training scheme, it did not want to emphasize this priority publically "lest it should have an embarrassing effect on our relations with the French who are pressing us strongly to increase our effort on land."⁵² The King government did not see this as an inhibiting factor in relation to Canada's priorities: as long as the British government did not attach any priority to its own war contributions, both the Canadian and British governments should be free to announce Canada's prioritization of its commitments. Consequently, King insisted that "an essential factor in our acceptance of the air training scheme would be an indication by the United Kingdom government of its view that the proposed effort was the most essential military action that Canada could

⁴⁹ Douglas, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 191-2, 205; Conrad, *Training For Victory*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 4.

⁵⁰ 28 September 1939 telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary, Document 690 in *DCER VII*, pp. 556-7.

⁵¹ Douglas, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 206, 213.

⁵² 27 November 1939 telegram from Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Document 734 in *DCER VII*, pp. 622-3; Douglas, *Op. Cit.*, p. 212.

take."⁵³

Chamberlain would not object to publicizing the Canadian government's emphasis on air power as long as the British government could simultaneously indicate the importance it attached to having "Canadian land forces in the theatre of war at the earliest possible moment." With this in mind, Chamberlain suggested the following wording for Canada's official announcement:

The United Kingdom Government have informed us that, considering present and future requirements, they feel that participation in the Air Training Scheme would provide for more effective assistance towards our ultimate victory than any other form of cooperation which Canada can give. At the same time they would wish it to be clearly understood that they would welcome no less heartily the presence of Canadian land forces in the theatre of war.⁵⁴

King acquiesced to the wording with one small addition. In order to not "destroy altogether the significance of any statement as to priority in its relation to the air training scheme as providing the most effective assistance towards ultimate victory," King wanted the statement to end with "at the earliest possible moment."⁵⁵ In King's mind, rather than emphasizing large numbers of Canadian ground troops, this statement stressed the quick provision of land forces, and the pending arrival of Canada's 1st Division in England in mid-December would appear to be

⁵³ 28 November 1939 telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary, RG 25 Volume 1858 File 72-T-38C.

⁵⁴ 1 December 1939 telegram from Dominion Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs, RG 25 Volume 1858 File 72-T-38C.

⁵⁵ 1 December 1939 memorandum from W.L.M. King (Prime Minister) to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Document 741 in *DCER VII*, p. 638; 5 December 1939 telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary, RG 25 Volume 1858 File 72-T-38C.

a fulfilment of this obligation.⁵⁶ The British government did not oppose the change.⁵⁷ Having worked out the final details, representatives of Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand signed the BCATP agreement on 17 December 1939.⁵⁸ In this agreement, the Commonwealth participants decided on the percentage of trainees each country would send,⁵⁹ the percentage of the cost each would share,⁶⁰ the training schedule, and the aerodrome opening schedule, amongst other details. King's tenacious negotiations resulted in an air training plan that exemplified Canada's initial military position: willingness to provide manpower contributions, but not at the expense of national sovereignty nor national unity.

While the BCATP was of strategic importance to the British and political importance to the Canadian government, Canadian citizens, having just endured the Great Depression, tended to see the BCATP in economic terms. The financial crisis that affected the world in the 1930s had deeper roots than the stock market crash of 1929. First World War debt repayments and dependency on international trade were the underlying cause of the Depression's enduring legacy.

⁵⁶ Pickersgill, *Op. Cit.*, p. 39; Douglas, *Op. Cit.*, p. 217; Conrad, *Training For Victory*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 6

⁵⁷ 7 December 1939 telegram from Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs, RG 25 Volume 1858 File 72-T-38C.

⁵⁸ 17 December 1939 BCATP Agreement, RG 25 Volume 1858A File 72-T-38.

⁵⁹ Australia: 2/16 of SFTS pilots, 1/10 of observers, 1/10 of wireless operator-air gunners; New Zealand: 1/16 of SFTS pilots, 1/10 of observers, 1/10 of wireless operator-air gunners; Canada (less the 10% supplied by British government): 13/16 of SFTS pilots, 8/10 of observers, 8/10 of wireless operator-air gunners; 17 December 1939 BCATP Agreement, RG 25 Volume 1858A File 72-T-38.

⁶⁰ After United Kingdom's contribution in kind, Canada – 80.64%, Australia – 11.28%, New Zealand – 8.08%, 17 December 1939 BCATP Agreement, RG 25 Volume 1858A File 72-T-38.

When Germany stopped making its reparation payments, Great Britain and France suffered, for both countries lost the source of capital which they had been using to meet their own debt obligations. Because of hard currency shortages, Britain and France reduced their import purchases to levels they could afford. This, in turn, hurt countries that had grown dependent on exporting steady percentages to world markets.⁶¹

Canada exported 80% of its farm, mining, and forestry products to world markets. Consequently, declines in demand and prices hurt the Canadian economy deeply. In addition to European markets closing, the American government, in a move to protect its domestic products, increased tariffs on Canadian wheat, cattle, dairy, and poultry products. In 1928, Canada sent 38% of its exports to the United States and 22% to Great Britain. This rapidly fell, and by 1933, Canada's merchandise exports were only 45% of 1929 levels. Not only had the demand for Canada's goods declined sharply, but the prices had also fallen. By 1933, the average price for Canadian export products was only 62.6% of 1929 market prices.⁶²

The hardships experienced by prairie wheat farmers had a large effect on Canada, for wheat farming involved 31% of the country's population. By the late 1920s, prairie farmers exported 70% of the wheat they grew. While a bushel of No. 1 Northern Grade wheat had sold for \$1.03 in 1928, the price had fallen to \$0.29 by 1932. Wheat incomes earned by prairie

⁶¹ Michael Horn, *The Great Depression of the 1930s in Canada* (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association Historical Booklet No. 39, 1984), p. 4; S.A. Saunders, Eleanor Back, *The Rowell-Sirois Commission: Part I – A Summary of the Report* (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1940), p. 15; John Herd Thompson, *Canada 1922-1939: Decades of Discord* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1985), p. 195.

⁶² Horn, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 4-5; Thompson, *Op. Cit.*, p. 195; A.E. Safarian, *The Canadian Economy in the Great Depression* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1970), pp. 1, 3, 72, 74, 78.

farmers in 1932-3 had decreased by 94% in comparison to 1928-9 levels. Saskatchewan, plagued by drought and grasshoppers in addition to decreased exports, fared the worst of the prairie provinces. In 1933, Saskatchewan farmers received only 1.5% of the income they had received in 1928; additionally, the provincial income in 1933 was only one quarter of what it had been in 1928.⁶³

While European and American markets were no longer open to Canadian wheat, large crops from Europe, America, Argentina, Australia, and the Soviet Union saturated world markets, resulting in unsold wheat being carried into the supplies available for the next year. The average number of wheat bushels carried over in 1926 was 191 million, and this had risen to averages ranging from 434 million to 625 million in the years between 1928 and 1934. In 1933 and 1934, Canadian wheat accounted for one third of the world carry over.⁶⁴ Thus, new crops were not in high demand.

The decline of raw material exports had a ripple effect on Canada's domestic economy. Railway companies lost business as farmers shipped less grain for export. The decrease in traffic cut into these companies' earnings, and rolling stock purchases were consequently cancelled. Not only did manufacturers of box cars suffer, but farmer's purchases of tractors and automobiles also declined sharply, hurting both these manufacturers and their steel suppliers. In 1928, farmers purchased 17,000 tractors; in 1932, a mere 832 were sold. Similarly, 1929 had seen the sale of 250,000 vehicles; these sales had fallen to 64,000 in 1932.⁶⁵

⁶³ Horn, *Op. Cit.*, p. 5; Safarian, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 5, 84; Thompson, *Op. Cit.*, p. 195.

⁶⁴ Safarian, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 105, 195, 196; Thompson, *Op. Cit.*, p. 195.

⁶⁵ Horn, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 5-6; Thompson, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 195-6.

Because people relying on exports now had less income to spend, domestic retailers suffered as well, and in order to cope with decreased demand, manufacturers cut production as well as employment. While unemployment rates had been between 2.5% and 4.2% in 1929, they had escalated to 19.3% - 27.0% in 1933. Once savings were depleted, large numbers of unemployed people were forced to accept government relief in order to survive, which involved liquidating any luxuries such as cars, radios, or telephones. By May 1933, 15% of Canada's population - 1.5 million - depended on relief: 200,000 recipients were from Saskatchewan alone. For the next two years, the number of people on relief hovered around the 2 million mark, and by the end of the Depression, half the population of Saskatchewan had accepted government relief sometime during the decade.⁶⁶

Experiencing a decade of these hardships prompted communities to measure the potential of BCATP aerodromes in economic terms: construction jobs and civilian employment on the bases would both serve as a great reprieve for the devastated regions. From the early days of the war, towns saw that the training plan held economic promise, and as more schools opened, vague expectations were replaced with calls for concrete dividends.

Almost immediately, communities began campaigning for bases, using the old language of local preferment. The same day British Prime Minister Chamberlain suggested an air training plan to the Canadian government in September 1939, the president of Prince Albert, Saskatchewan's, Liberal Association requested that Prime Minister King consider the town for a training school: "It is only reasonable that the citizens of this City and district should feel that

⁶⁶ Conrad, *Saskatchewan in War*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 44; Horn, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 5-6; Safarian, *Op. Cit.*, p. 75; Saunders, *Op. Cit.*, p. 15; Thompson, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 196, 211, 214.

any benefits that might accrue from the emergency we are in should be distributed as far as possible throughout this country."⁶⁷ Writing only days before the BCATP agreement was signed in December 1939, the mayor of Weyburn, Saskatchewan, referred specifically to years of poor business and crop failures. The mayor hoped that Norman Rogers (Minister of National Defence) would agree that "the establishment of a training centre in the vicinity of Weyburn would no doubt be of considerable assistance to the businessmen."⁶⁸ Also writing on Weyburn's behalf, the South Saskatchewan War Assistance Committee argued that a BCATP aerodrome could turn the local economy around. After ten years of drought, and no crop again in 1939, "every businessman has had the greatest difficulty in maintaining himself It is, therefore, felt that consideration should rightly be given us."⁶⁹

After the spring of 1940, when the first sites were selected and construction had begun, communities could see first hand the concrete benefits that hosting an aerodrome held. As bases were being built, local companies expected to win contracts for labour, gravel, and lumber supplies, and this meant "expanded ... payrolls to meet the increased business."⁷⁰ While local

⁶⁷ 26 September 1939 letter from J.W. Sanderson (President Prince Albert Liberal Association) to H.R.L. Henry (Private Secretary Prime Minister), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 277 Reel C3748 pp. 234645-6.

⁶⁸ 11 December 1939 letter from J.K. Brimacombe (Mayor) to Norman Rogers (Minister of National Defence), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports).

⁶⁹ 12 December 1939 letter from A.S. Redford (Chairman South Saskatchewan War Assistance Committee) to C.P. Edwards (Director Air Services, Department of Transport), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports)..

⁷⁰ 18 July 1940 "City has Benefit of Large Payroll From Airport Job," *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix*, p. 3.

men hoped to be employed on construction crews, merchants anticipated that construction workers would spend their pay cheques on housing, food, clothing, and recreation: "the airdrome project at Saskatoon is pouring \$6000 each week directly into the hands of workers, most of whom live in the city."⁷¹

Construction alone was not the only economic benefit of BCATP aerodromes, for time demonstrated that large numbers of students, instructors, and their wives would patronize local merchants.⁷² Newspapers in Saskatoon noted how "Jarvis [Ontario], with a normal population of less than 600, has been transformed into a thriving town since preparations for the training centre [a bombing and gunnery school] began."⁷³ As Yorkton, Saskatchewan, waited for construction of its aerodrome to be completed, the local newspaper projected the SFTS to be manned "with personnel of one thousand with a monthly payroll of \$100,000."⁷⁴ In addition, the town estimated that "fifty percent of the officers will be married and will require furnished quarters."⁷⁵

⁷¹ 14 June 1940 "Big Projects Involved: \$3,000,000 to be Spent on Air Plan," *The Leader-Post* (Regina, Saskatchewan), p. 3.; quote from 18 July 1940 "City has Benefit of Large Payroll From Airport Job," *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix*, p. 3; 14 August 1941 "Prepare to Construct Training School Here," *The Estevan Mercury*, p. 1; 21 August 1941 "Royal Canadian Air Force Training Centre Will Be Located At Weyburn," *Weyburn Review*, p. 1; 4 September 1941 "SFTS Buildings to Cost Million: 700 men on the Job within Three Weeks," *The Estevan Mercury*, p. 1.

⁷² 14 August 1941 "Airport Important to Weyburn and District," *Weyburn Review*, p. 3.

⁷³ 14 August 1941, "Another Training School to Open," *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix*, p. 1.

⁷⁴ 27 February 1941 "Yorkton Air School Getting Underway: Flying Officers and Men Arriving To Man \$2,000,000 Training School," *The Yorkton Enterprise: Eastern Saskatchewan's Leading Newspaper*, p. 1.

⁷⁵ 16 January 1941 "Report on Airport Proves Interesting: A.A. Chapman and S.N. Wynn Outline What Constitutes the School Here," *The Yorkton Enterprise: Eastern Saskatchewan's Leading Newspaper*, p. 6.

The financial benefits anticipated did not rest solely on the presence and income of construction workers and airmen. For the duration of the war, electricity, water, natural gas, coal, and food would have to be supplied to the base regularly, and host-communities benefited when local companies secured these contracts. While the airport was in operation, many civilian positions needed to be filled, from clerical posts to aerodrome and aircraft maintenance.⁷⁶ Communities also looked to the future role an aerodrome could play in post-war civil aviation. Weyburn, Saskatchewan's, newspaper reflected the forward-looking thoughts of its citizens: "After this war, aviation ... will take a tremendous stride, and any place without such facilities will have to take a back seat. Coast to coast, air transportation will be in for a boost, requiring feeder lines to supply it with business, both passenger and freight, and for a community to be without an airport will be about as bad as being without railroad."⁷⁷ Hence, from the time the ground was first broken and for years after the war, training schools could provide steady stimulation to local economies.

After the outbreak of war in 1939, W.L.M. King ceased to perceive the training of pilots for Britain as a threat to national integrity. Instead, his government embraced it as a means of aiding British military planners without sacrificing Canada's national unity. Communities also welcomed the BCATP because it provided the opportunity to recover financial prosperity lost in the Depression and to advance into the promising future of post-war aviation. Consequently, many communities left nothing to chance. Wanting to ensure that an area was at least considered as a potential aerodrome site, citizens – through letters and personal delegations – highlighted the

⁷⁶ Conrad, *Saskatchewan in War, Op. Cit.*, pp. 55-8.

⁷⁷ 14 August 1941 "Airport Important to Weyburn and District," *Weyburn Review*, p. 3.

features they assumed made them suitable aerodrome locations.

Because lobbying communities expected their efforts to influence selection decisions, and because some historians have assumed that this lobbying played a decisive role, the pressures exerted on politicians, Transport officials, and RCAF officers must be examined. Analysis of the lobbying attempts will reveal the primary characteristics of communities' representations and whether or not lobbyists believed site selection would be governed by parochialism or higher objectives.

CHAPTER III: THE EVIDENCE OF POLITICAL LOBBYING FOR BCATP BASES

Patronage has played a central role in Canadian politics from the earliest days of the country's political system. Some scholars have focussed on parties' strategic use of patronage incentives to build political loyalty and national unity. Other researchers have analysed constituents' willingness to lobby for patronage: this was how the political game was played, and politicians often offered better career opportunities than the private sector.¹ Remembering how Sam Hughes intertwined patronage and Canada's First World War contribution,² Canadians in 1939 naturally assumed that BCATP base selection would be governed by patronage, and hence required lobbying efforts.

Between late 1939 and the end of 1943, 102 communities across the prairies and Ontario lobbied the government for the express purpose of increasing their chances of receiving a BCATP training school.³ To fully appreciate what this correspondence aimed to accomplish and what this correspondence reveals about the collective mentality of the communities, one must be aware of the chronology of aerodrome openings, who lobbying activists were, to whom they were lobbying, and the political process in which constituents assumed they were participating. Lobbyists in all four provinces of this study used similar themes to justify government consideration. While these reveal the mentality of constituents across the country, the varied intensity and duration of each community's lobbying campaign indicate how much faith lobbyists put in their efforts' actually making a difference.

¹ Simpson, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 7, 16; Stewart, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 39-40, 43, 45.

² Harris, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 87-9, 120.

³ 13 in Alberta, 34 in Saskatchewan, 12 in Manitoba, 43 in Ontario; See Appendix D "Communities That Lobbied."

From the beginning of aerodrome construction, the RCAF opened training schools in a sequence that accommodated the stages of air crew instruction. The training plan first needed schools that provided initial familiarization to recruits. Similarly, the RCAF required Elementary Flying Training Schools (EFTSs) before students graduated to the advanced pilot courses offered at Service Flying Training Schools (SFTSs). The British and Canadian governments and their military advisors meticulously planned the succession of openings and memorialized it in December 1939. According to the BCATP agreement, the training plan's first schools would be operating by May 1940: one Initial Flying School (ITS), one EFTS, one Air Observer School (AOS), and one Wireless Training School (WTS). Although three more EFTSs and five SFTSs were scheduled to open by December 1940, the agreement called for construction of most schools to occur between January and December 1941.⁴

Aerodrome completion dates confirm that this itinerary was followed. In the four provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario, the RCAF opened more than half of the EFTSs (twelve of twenty) by November 1940. Although some SFTSs were in operation in these provinces by late 1940, the majority were not ready for use until 1941. Across Canada, the air force opened fifteen EFTSs, nine SFTSs, four AOSs, and three Bombing and Gunnery Schools (BGSs) in 1940, while 1941 saw the opening of fewer EFTSs and more SFTSs, AOSs, and BGSs: seven EFTSs, thirteen SFTSs, six AOSs, and seven BGSs. Because the aerodrome infrastructure was nearly complete by the end of 1941, school openings declined sharply in 1942 (four EFTSs, two SFTSs) and 1943 (one EFTS, three SFTSs).⁵

⁴ 17 December 1939 BCATP Agreement, RG 25 Volume 1858A File 72-T-38 Table D.

⁵ See Appendix A "BCATP Schools Established in Canada 1939-1945."

With victory not yet in sight, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand began negotiating the extension of the BCATP well in advance of the 31 March 1943 expiration date. Effective until 31 March 1945, the new agreement signed on 5 June 1942 called for an increase in the number of training schools operating in Canada. In order to produce more air crew graduates, agreement signatories expanded the original three ITSs to a total of seven; instead of thirteen EFTSs, there would be twelve double-sized schools and four single-sized EFTSs (an equivalent of twenty-eight schools). SFTS numbers increased from sixteen to twenty, and the ten AOSs were replaced by the equivalent of nineteen bases (nine double-sized schools and one single-sized AOS).⁶ The Canadian government did not have the liberty of opening SFTSs – the largest and most lucrative schools – immediately in favourite ridings. To expedite opening dates, the RCAF built many EFTSs in communities that had pre-existing aerodromes which could be modified to meet the air force's standards.⁷ Military planning and careful calculation of expenditures by Great Britain not only determined the sequence of construction, but also the numbers of each aerodrome type.

Whether or not communities were aware of the aerodrome construction schedule to which Canada agreed in the December 1939 agreement,⁸ they seemed to believe that communities had

⁶ Reprints of 1939 and 1942 BCATP Agreements in Stacey, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 549, 569; 17 December 1939 BCATP Agreement, RG 25 Volume 1858A File 72-T-38; 5 June 1942 Revised BCATP Agreement, RG 2 Volume 20 File D-19-C-3.

⁷ See Appendix G "Communities Receiving Requests from Government to Use Airports."

⁸ No references were made to this schedule in letters from communities to selection officials, nor in letters from selection officials to communities. Furthermore, no letters referred to any announcement being published in newspapers, and no such announcement was found in the newspapers consulted for this thesis.

to bring their existence and attributes to the government's attention to ensure fair consideration. Residents of communities consciously orchestrated their efforts to do so. Sometimes, a lone individual with a vacant piece of land wrote the government, offering its use for an aerodrome.⁹ More often, residents formed a local consensus through newspaper editorials¹⁰ or meetings of town councils, boards of trade, or chambers of commerce.¹¹ Once a resolution was passed by the town, the mayor or another town representative would write or visit government officials.¹² Besides town representatives, local legions and lodges also participated in lobbying,¹³ as did Liberal Associations, members of parliament (MPs), and members of provincial parliament (MPPs).¹⁴ Overall, lobbying was a group effort, conducted on behalf of all the community's residents.

⁹ 23 October 1939 letter from Mrs Walter A. Ziegler (Landowner) to Norman Rogers (Minister of National Defence), RG 12 Volume 2369 File 5151-289 (Brockville, On).

¹⁰ 19 March 1940 "Seek Information City's Part In Air Training Scheme: Council Sends Telegram to Hon Norman Rogers – Anxious at Omission," *Moose Jaw Times-Herald*, p. 7.

¹¹ 26 June 1941 telegram from Town of Maple Creek, Chamber of Commerce, Canadian Legion, and Junior Chamber of Commerce to C.R. Evans (MP Maple Creek, Sk), RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 28 File 5168-C517 (Maple Creek, Sk).

¹² 14 January 1941 letter from A.E. McKay (Secretary Board of Trade Estevan, Sk) to Jesse P. Tripp (MP Oxbow, Sk), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports).

¹³ 3 September 1940 telegrams from Board of Trade Big River Sk, R.M. Bell (Secretary of Canadian Legion), Geo A. Anderson (Exalted Ruler Elks Lodge), Liberal Association to W.L.M. King (MP Prince Albert, Sk), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 283 Reel C4566 pp. 239579, 239582, 239585, 239591.

¹⁴ 26 August 1941 letter from A.T. Procter (Saskatchewan Minister of Highways) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), 23 March 1942 letter from W.A. Tucker (MP Rosthern, Sk) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports).

The participation of various political leaders and organizations is indicative of the collective belief that patronage would play some part in determining who received training schools. Two of the government's most prominent politicians, W.L.M. King (Prime Minister and MP Prince Albert, Saskatchewan) and J.G. Gardiner (federal Minister of Agriculture and King's senior western minister) attempted to inject political considerations into the selection process, despite the BCATP agreement's rigid construction and graduation schedules. Only Liberal Party associations lobbied on behalf of local residents. This suggests that non-Liberals believed their voices would be ignored because of their affiliation and that Liberal members assumed the government would automatically favour faithful supporters.

Lobbyists were not necessarily privy to the chain of command being followed by ministers of the Department of National Defence for Air (DNDA), the Department of Transport (DoT), and the Department of Munitions and Supply. Nevertheless, most Canadians were aware that aerodrome selection would be a joint effort of the RCAF and the Department of Transport.¹⁵ Before the BCATP agreement was signed in December 1939, RCAF officers and Transport inspectors and engineers had been visiting communities, actively looking for sites that could accommodate the needs of air training schools.¹⁶ Through Privy Council Order 3710 of 17

¹⁵ When C.D. Howe became Minister of Munitions and Supply on 9 April 1940 and ceased to be the Minister of Transport on 8 July 1940, both he and the Deputy Minister of Transport remained responsible for the BCATP by Privy Council Order 3149 (12 July 1940), RG 2 Microfilm Reel T-5123.

¹⁶ 3 November 1939 Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation of RCAF Airport Sites, RG 24 Reel C5036 File 925-2-8 (Edgely, On); 29 November 1939 Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation of RCAF Airport Sites, RG 12 Volume 2334 File 5168-816 Part 1 (Vanscoy, Sk).

November 1939,¹⁷ the government legislated that the Department of Transport would investigate sites and that the RCAF would select and approve the aerodrome set-ups. Afterward, newspapers freely spoke of the cooperation between the two departments.¹⁸ Also demonstrating that Canadians knew of this cooperation is the fact that officials from both departments readily explained to lobbyists how the Department of Transport was surveying sites while the RCAF made the final selection decisions.¹⁹

Lobbyists tended to assume that BCATP aerodrome construction would be like other government exercises in patronage: certain experts might be in charge of advising the government and executing the government's wishes, but politicians would most likely be making the final decisions based on what was potentially best for constituents and the governing party. Hence, constituents automatically contacted people in both the government and the civil service; usually, these were high profile figures whom lobbyists believed would be the most influential participants in the selection process. Besides calling upon the usual representatives such as MPs, MPPs, and the prime minister himself, lobbyists often wrote directly to C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air) and C.D. Howe (Minister of Transport and Minister of Munitions and

¹⁷ 17 November 1939 Privy Council Order 3710, RG 12 Volume 624 File 11-6-9.

¹⁸ 16 August 1940 "Service Flying School for North Battleford," *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix*, p. 4.

¹⁹ 22 January 1940 letter from V.I. Smart (Deputy Minister of Transport) to Mayor, RG 12 Volume 3105 File 5151-C134 Part 1 (North Battleford, Sk); 22 January 1940 letter from C.D. Howe (Minister of Transport) to Dr J. Gemmell (Constituent), RG 12 Volume 2310 File 5168-199 Part 1 (Assiniboia, Sk).

Supply).²⁰ Correspondence shows that lobbyists believed these two departmental heads would be making strong recommendations if not the final decisions.²¹ Aware that technical experts were also involved in the process, lobbyists contacted miscellaneous members of the RCAF,²² as well as Department of Transport inspectors and engineers, the Controller of Civil Aviation (CCA) J.A. Wilson, and the Superintendent of Airways (SA) A.D. McLean.²³

Besides the correspondence of selection officials, RCAF and DoT investigation files contain the lobbying letters sent by constituents. Because communities were competing against each other, rival localities did not cooperate or consult with one another. Nevertheless, lobbyists from the prairies and Ontario tended to justify their selection with similar arguments. Although many lobbyists voiced themes consistently used throughout the lobbying period – themes such as easing a community's socio-economic hardships or providing local military defence – some commonly used arguments changed as the war progressed.

²⁰ 1 December 1939 letter from S.W. Sanderson (President Liberal Association, Prince Albert, Sk) to W.L.M. King (MP Prince Albert, Sk), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 277 Reel C3748 p. 234634; 14 March 1941 letter from N.O. Hipel (Minister of Labour and Welfare) to C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air), RG 24 Reel C5036 File 925-2-68 (Preston, On); 17 February 1941 letter from J.G. Gardiner (Minister of Agriculture) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports).

²¹ 13 December 1941 letter from H. MacKay (Secretary Board of Trade Melville, Sk) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports).

²² 17 July 1940 letter from Duncan MacTavish (Lawyer) to Air Commodore G.O. Johnson (RCAF), RG 24 Reel C5036 File 925-2-108 (Vegreville, Ab).

²³ 27 March 1940 letter from C.W. Nicholl (Vice President Midwest Zone Canadian Flying Clubs Association) to J.A. Wilson (CCA), RG 12 Volume 3111 File 5151-C146 Part 13 (Winnipeg, Mb); 22 June 1943 letter from Mayor to A.D. McLean (SA), RG 12 Volume 3114 File 5151-C175-1 (Fort Frances, On).

In the early lobbying period (late 1939 to mid-1940), lobbying efforts were seemingly altruistic as they explained how building in a particular area would benefit the government's war effort. In the interim lobbying period, mid-1940 to mid-1941, communities grew increasingly self-serving in their focus: they argued either that they deserved a training base as a reward for what they had already contributed to the war effort, or they complained that residents had been unable to do their part because the government had failed to provide their region with war related-institutions. Starting in the interim period and running over into the late lobbying period (mid-1940 to mid-1942), constituents' arguments explicitly revealed their belief that patronage – and not technical merit alone – should play a prominent role in base selection. By the late lobbying period (mid-1941 to 1943), communities clearly lacking technical necessities for military aerodromes contacted the government with rationalizations as to why they should host a school anyway.

The lobbying themes reiterated throughout the selection process discussed issues ranging from past economic hardships to the future of modern aviation. Because many communities had not yet recovered from depressed incomes, unemployment, drought, and crop failures by late 1939, the BCATP appeared to be a natural remedy for inducing economic recovery. While lobbyists emphasized the devastation of crop failures and lost employment, their solution of letting aerodrome construction and operation revive their local economies had a vague Keynesian ring. Communities wanted government officials to purposely select the area so as to provide residents with construction employment and local businesses with the steady income of airmen's

pay cheques.²⁴

When writing the Deputy Minister of Transport, the mayor of Weyburn, Saskatchewan emphatically insisted that the district's difficult economic times should be the determining reason for giving the area a training school: "There is one feature I would like to lay particular stress upon, and that is the fact that business conditions in the City of Weyburn have been bad for a number of years owing to successive crop failures caused by drought. These conditions have their origin in the very reasons which would make this district ideal for the purposes of air training."²⁵ On behalf of Estevan, Saskatchewan, James Gardiner (Minister of Agriculture) argued that employment at a BCATP base would not only take able-bodied men off relief, but the income derived from an aerodrome would also help the farmers "after so many years of drought." Because of crop failures, Gardiner believed the unemployment rate was "probably higher in this district ... than any other part of the province."²⁶ Although crop failures had not hurt Wainwright,

²⁴ Undated pamphlet compiled by Souris and Glenwood Board of Trade, "Souris Presents its Case for Inclusion in Canada's War Effort," RG 12 Volume 2330 File 5168-763 Part 1 (Souris, Mb); 11 December 1939 letter from J.K. Brimacombe (Mayor) to C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport), RG 12 Volume 2326 File 5168-699 Part 1 (Weyburn, Sk); 11 January 1940 letter from P.J. Rawlinson (Secretary Treasurer) to J.G. Gardiner (Minister of Agriculture), RG 12 Volume 2332 File 5168-803 Part 1 (Mossbank, Sk); 7 September 1940 letter from J. Allison Glen (Constituent) to P.J.A. Cardin (Minister of Transport), MG 27 III B20 Volume 94 File 61-5-4 (C.D. Howe Papers – Manitoba Airports); 2 February 1941 letter from Philip H. Fader (Mayor) to J.A. Wilson (CCA), RG 12 Volume 2475 File 5151-0162 (Leamington, On); 7 February 1942 letter from Francis M. Ferg (Secretary Board of Trade Glenboro, Mb) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), MG 27 III B20 Volume 94 File 61-5-4 (C.D. Howe Papers – Manitoba Airports).

²⁵ 11 December 1939 letter from J.K. Brimacombe (Mayor) to C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport), RG 12 Volume 2326 File 5168-699 Part 1 (Weyburn, Sk).

²⁶ Quote from 6 December 1939 letter from J.G. Gardiner (Minister of Agriculture) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Transport), RG 12 Volume 2340 File 5168-867 Part 1 (Estevan, Sk); See also 13 September 1940 letter from J.G. Gardiner (Department of National War Services) to C.D.

Alberta, residents had been dependent on the income and employment generated by Buffalo National Park. One lobbyist wrote that in the past, the "town and district benefited greatly from the amounts spent by the touring public when visiting the Buffalo Park." Nevertheless, when the park closed in the 1930s, employees lost their jobs, and tourist dollars dried up. Wishing for a cash-generating aerodrome, Wainwright residents hoped officials would put the idle park "to some use which will prove of real benefit in the terrible struggle in which Canada is lined up side by side with the Mother country."²⁷

While some communities saw the BCATP as a means of escaping the problems of a grim and recent past, other communities wanted a training aerodrome to help propel them into the future of modern aviation. After the creation of Trans Canada Airways (TCA) in 1937²⁸ and the simultaneous construction of civil aerodromes across the country to accommodate the airline, constituents saw that freight and passenger air services would be profitable, and hence expanded, in the post-war period. Conscious of the cost involved in building airfields, lobbyists assumed that converting military aerodromes for civilian use was less labourious than building new aerodromes from scratch. As a result, communities felt that securing a BCATP training field would bring them one step closer to being made a part of Canada's civil aviation infrastructure. Lobbyists consequently linked post-war aerodrome expansion and BCATP school construction

Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), RG 12 Volume 2340 File 5168-867 Part 1 (Estevan, Sk).

²⁷ 20 January 1942 report by Wainwright residents forwarded from S.L. de Carteret (Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air) to C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport), RG 12 Volume 2325 File 5168-685 Part 1 (Wainwright, Ab).

²⁸ Shirley Render, *Double Cross: The Inside Story of James A. Richardson and Canadian Airways* (Vancouver/Toronto: Douglas and McIntyre, 1999), p. 4.

by arguing that their communities were situated on important air routes.²⁹

Since Assiniboia, Saskatchewan, was on a direct line with Prince Albert, Saskatchewan, and numerous American points, one town resident believed that the community would "very nicely fit in as a link in what is bound to become a fact, namely an international mail and passenger service." Because Sault Ste Marie, Michigan already had a landing field, the city council of its Canadian counterpart asserted that "no time should be lost in taking steps to see that this city is well equipped to keep step with modern travel, business, and commerce."³⁰ The Industrial Commissioner of Pembroke, Ontario, argued that the TCA needed an aerodrome along the 230 miles separating Ottawa and North Bay. Although there was an emergency landing field

²⁹ 2 October 1939 letter from J.J. Duffus (MP) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Transport), RG 12 Volume 3134 File 5151-0243-2 (Peterborough, On); 7 March 1940 letter from J. Fitzalien (Secretary-Treasurer Chamber of Commerce Vegreville, Ab) to Norman Rogers (Minister of National Defence), RG 24 Reel C5036 File 925-2-60 (Tofield, Ab); 6 May 1940 letter from C.A.C. Lips (City Clerk) to J.S. Duncan (Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence), RG 24 Reel C5036 File 925-2-69 (Winterbourne, On); 14 January 1941 letter from A.E. McKay (Secretary Board of Trade Estevan, Sk) to Jesse P. Tripp (MP Oxbow, Sk), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports); 29 March 1941 letter from W.S. Beaton (Mayor) to C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air), RG 12 Volume 2124 File 5151-0155 (Sudbury, On); 25 November 1941 letter from Ken Symon (Secretary-Treasurer Bruce Peninsula Resort Association) to D. Leo Dolan (Chief of Canadian Travel Bureau), RG 12 Volume 624 File 11-6-9; 2 February 1942 letter from E. Cecil Sanderson (Secretary Junior Chamber of Commerce Russell, Mb) to C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air), MG 27 III B20 Volume 94 File 61-5-4 (C.D. Howe Papers – Manitoba Airports); 23 June 1942 W.L.M. King (MP Prince Albert, Sk) to C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 331 Reel C6811 pp. 283079-81; 4 January 1943 letter from E.J. Currie (Caretaker of Strathburn Aerodrome) to S.L. de Carteret (Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air), RG 24 Reel C5036 File 925-2-229 (Strathburn, On).

³⁰ 16 January 1940 letter from Dr J. Gemmell (Constituent) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Transport), RG 12 Volume 2310 File 5168-199 Part 1 (Assiniboia, Sk); 12 January 1942 Resolution forwarded by Wilfred E. Ross (City Council), RG 24 Reel C5036 File 925-2-97 (Sault Ste Marie, On).

located at Killaloe, the Commissioner claimed that it "would be very inconvenient for passengers [to be] dumped ... there in the middle of winter with no hotel accommodation." Not only did the provincial government not plow these roads in the winter, but alternative transportation was virtually impossible for neither CN nor CP railroad services passed through Killaloe. The Commissioner pointed out that, on the other hand, Pembroke was in a direct line between Ottawa and North Bay (unlike Killaloe) and was serviced by both rail roads and Highway #17.³¹

Some arguments used by lobbyists throughout the selection period showed an appreciation of, and sensitivity to, the technical constraints and financial limitations faced by the government when building aerodromes. These technically-oriented discussions also show that Canadians sensed that merit played some role in the awarding of training schools. Communities might have hoped party loyalty would increase their chances of hosting a base, but rather than argue that political affiliations justified their selection, lobbyists emphasized how their area could meet imperative technical criteria. Traditional patronage channels were used (e.g. J.G. Gardiner), and constituents lobbied for consideration as they had previously, but Canadians were now dressing their appeals in the language of merit.

Perceptive towns realized that aerodromes needed such things as clear flight paths, utilities, highway connections, and calm weather in order to function properly. To enhance their bid, some lobbyists described particular sections of land, detailing the levelness, soil quality,

³¹ 13 January 1940 letter from Graham Curtis (Industrial Commissioner) to Air Vice Marshal G.M. Croil (Chief of Air Staff), RG 24 Reel C5036 File 925-2-75 (Missouri Church/Pembroke, On).

drainage, and obstacles.³² Communities highlighted the availability of water, sewage facilities, power, gravel for runway and road construction, and coal or natural gas for aerodrome heating. They indicated what main highways were in the vicinity, and if such roads were paved or gravelled. The presence of rail lines was noted, along with the frequency of stops in main centres. Towns did not forget that aerodromes needed some means of communicating information; hence, constituents described the telephone and telegraph services available.³³

Some localities used calm climatic conditions as another selling point; residents argued that flying and training would not be hampered by harsh winter storms, long periods of rain, or frequent fog.³⁴ These lobbyists judged the suitability of their area according to comments made by pilots, both civil and military, who had flown through the area,³⁵ or upon the fact that other

³² 10 August 1940 letter from John A. Mackay (Secretary Board of Trade Drumheller, Ab) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), 6 May 1942 letter from Geo H. Ross (MP Calgary East, Ab) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-2 (C.D. Howe Papers – Alberta Airports Folder 2).

³³ 26 December 1941 letter from J.G. Gardiner (Minister of Agriculture) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports).

³⁴ Undated Printed Pamphlet "Reasons why the Next Service Flying Training School Should be Located at Estevan, Sk," 18 October 1940 letter from Mayor to C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air), RG 12 Volume 2340 File 5168-867 Part 1 (Estevan, Sk); 12 March 1941 memorandum from Delegation (Board of Trade) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply) and C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air), RG 12 Volume 2310 File 5168-199 Part 1 (Assiniboia, Sk); 26 June 1941 letter from Acting Secretary (Board of Trade) to C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport), RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 28 File 5168-C476 (Shaunavon, Sk).

³⁵ 21 March 1942 petition from Town of Shaunavon to J.A. Wilson (CCA), RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 28 File 5168-C476 (Shaunavon, Sk).

training schools were already operating in similar climates.³⁶ The President of Kerrobert, Saskatchewan's, Board of Trade wrote the Deputy Minister of Transport and noted the problems some training schools were experiencing in Eastern Canada: due to spring break-up, "conditions are reported to be so bad in some schools that runways are virtually out of use." On the other hand, winter weather in the west "scarcely ever interferes with training schedules, and spring break-up is a relatively small factor in delaying the work." According to the Board of Trade, training would be more efficient if a school were located in their vicinity rather than in eastern Canada.³⁷

Writing James Gardiner, a constituent from Assiniboia, Saskatchewan, also claimed that the region had climatic conditions that were "the best of any place in this whole province."³⁸ In a later letter, members of the Board of Trade bragged that the area had the best climatic conditions in the entire country: "We probably have the maximum number of clear days and sunshine to be found in any district in the Dominion of Canada." The lobbyists then reported that, according to a commanding officer at another school in the vicinity, adverse weather conditions never affected

³⁶ 26 June 1941 letter from Acting Secretary (Board of Trade) to C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport), 26 June 1941 telegram from Shaunavon Board of Trade to C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport), RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 28 File 5168-C476 (Shaunavon, Sk).

³⁷ 8 April 1941 letter from J.E. Shields (President Board of Trade) to C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport), included newspaper clipping 5 May 1941 "More Schools in Prairies: Extension of Training Facilities Will be Made in West; Advantage of Open Spaces Recognized by Men in Charge," *Saskatoon Star*, RG 12 Accession 1985-86/173 Box 10 File 5151-C316 Part 1 (Kerrobert, Sk).

³⁸ 13 November 1939 letter from J.B. Smith (Constituent) to J.G. Gardiner (Minister of Agriculture), RG 12 Volume 2310 File 5168-199 Part 1 (Assiniboia, Sk).

flying for more than a couple of days.³⁹

Realizing that the cost of constructing an aerodrome was significant,⁴⁰ some lobbyists hoped selection officials would want to build in areas where they could save money. With this in mind, communities offered free gravel for runway construction, subsidized water and sewer extensions, cheap utilities, and donations of land.⁴¹ The mayor of Estevan, Saskatchewan, claimed, for example, that the RCAF should purchase land in that district since the price was

³⁹ 12 March 1941 memorandum from Delegation (Board of Trade) C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply) and C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air), RG 12 Volume 2310 File 5168-199 Part 1 (Assiniboia, Sk).

⁴⁰ Estimates submitted to Aerodrome Development Committee by the Department of Transport for an SFTS setup (Main aerodrome and two relief landing fields): Broadview, Sk \$792,721; Carlyle, Sk \$863,300; Assiniboia, Sk \$900,950; Weyburn, Sk \$917,550; 14 February 1941 letter from C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport) to S.L. de Carteret (Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air), RG 24 Reel C-5036 File 925-2-135 (Broadview, Sk).

⁴¹ Undated pamphlet compiled by Souris and Glenwood Board of Trade, "Souris Presents its Case for Inclusion in Canada's War Effort," RG 12 Volume 2330 File 5168-763 Part 1 (Souris, Mb); 11 December 1939 letter from J.K. Brimacombe (Mayor) to C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport), RG 12 Volume 2326 File 5168-699 Part 1 (Weyburn, Sk); 21 December 1939 letter from Norman C. Schneider (Kitchener-Waterloo Municipal Airport Commission) to S.S. Foley (District Inspector Southern Airways), RG 24 Reel C5036 File 925-2-69 (Winterbourne, On); 30 December 1939 letter from D.A. Gillies (Gillies Brothers Limited Lumber Manufacturers) to J.A. Wilson (CCA), RG 12 Volume 2314 File 5168-269-4 (Gillies, On); 24 September 1940 letter from J.E. Shields (President Board of Trade) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), RG 24 Reel C-5036 File 925-2-138 (Kerrobert, Sk); 23 May 1941 Resolution of Town Council, RG 24 Reel C-5036 File 925-2-201 (Lloydminster, Sk); 29 May 1941 Resolution of Town, RG 24 Reel C-5036 File 925-2-221 (Wilkie, Sk); 15 July 1941 letter from C. Stockdale (Town Clerk) to W.H. Irvine (District Inspector Central Airways), RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 28 File 5168-C517 (Maple Creek, Sk); 21 August 1941 letter from W.A. Tucker (MP Rosthern, Sk) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports); 25 November 1941 letter from W.C. Neison (Chairman Industrial Committee) to S.L. de Carteret (Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air), RG 24 Reel C5036 File 925-2-150 (Sarnia, On); 23 March 1942 letter from W.A. Tucker (MP Rosthern, Sk) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports).

only \$12.00 per acre. Elsewhere, the price was more than three times as high – \$40.00 per acre. The government would save additional money since Estevan could provide power ("at the lowest net energy cost ... in the province") without a capital advance, unlike the schools at Dauphin, Manitoba, and Dafoe, Saskatchewan. In both cases, the government had to grant over \$200,000 in loans so these communities could provide electricity to the schools. Adding up all the benefits Estevan had to offer, the town calculated that the government could save \$200,000 – "an enormous sum to the public."⁴²

Hoping to reduce both the time and cost of construction, private individuals and towns alike offered the use of existing buildings as housing or teaching facilities. One landowner in Jarvis, Ontario, invited the government to use his land which was free from trees, perfectly level, and had good drainage. Furthermore, the summer houses along Lake Erie could house seventy-five to one hundred personnel comfortably, having water, gas, sewer, and electricity. The owner's garage could also accommodate ten cars belonging to air force personnel.⁴³ According to the Minister of Labour and Welfare, the vicinity of Preston, Galt, and Hespeler, Ontario, had large buildings that the government could use in the BCATP. The province of Ontario had already offered the use of any provincial building or institution for war purposes, and this district had one such building – a girls' training school. Furthermore, the city of Galt had an eight-room stone public school building that could be used immediately and for the duration of the war. An auditorium in the City Hall was also available, and since it seated 400 to 500 people and was

⁴² 18 October 1940 letter from Mayor to C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air), RG 12 Volume 2340 File 5168-867 Part 1 (Estevan, Sk).

⁴³ 24 November 1939 letter from George E. Walker (Constituent) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Transport), RG 12 Volume 2317 File 5168-311-1 (Jarvis, On).

well-heated and well-lit, the Minister believed it was ideal for lecturing to air trainees.⁴⁴

Fearing enemy aerial attack, some remote communities wanted a training school to provide their region with emergency air defence protection.⁴⁵ Residents of two Ontario communities in particular, Sault Ste Marie and Sudbury, believed their mining and steel industries were vulnerable to such attack. The city council of Sault Ste Marie argued that its steel industry was "vital to the defence of the country and its war effort," yet the enemy could easily conduct aerial attacks on the city from the north. The iron ore, grain, and other commodities that were shipped through the locks and canals (a total tonnage that was greater than the amount sent through the Suez Canal, Panama Canal, and Welland Canal combined, according to these lobbyists) needed protection because of the importance to both Canadian and American industries.⁴⁶

Citizens in Sudbury, Ontario, had similar concerns for their nickel-copper industry since the area was not only "one of the most vulnerable centres of Canada, ... [but also] one of the most strategic centres in Canada and of the empire in the present war emergency." City residents feared that lightning attacks by enemy aircraft coming down from James Bay would jeopardize the 240,000,000 pounds of copper being supplied to the British government, the \$200,000,000

⁴⁴ 9 January 1940 letter from N.O. Hipel (Minister of Labour and Welfare) to Norman Rogers (Minister of National Defence), RG 24 Reel C5036 File 925-2-68 (Preston, On).

⁴⁵ 7 September 1940 letter from Hector MacKay (Secretary Board of Trade Melville, Sk) to J.G. Gardiner (Minister of Agriculture), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports).

⁴⁶ 12 January 1942 Resolution forwarded by Wilfred E. Ross (City Council), 23 February 1942 letter from F.A. Irwin (Chairman Industrial Committee) to C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air), RG 24 Reel C5036 File 925-2-97 (Sault Ste Marie, On).

that had been invested in mining and smelting operations, and nickel production that amounted to 90% of the world's supply. Lobbyists argued that any attack on these plants would cut off copper and nickel supplies for the war effort and financially cripple the district since the population of 60,000 was "almost wholly dependent on this great industry." A BCATP aerodrome "could serve as a training base, and also [as] a base for combat planes and patrols."⁴⁷

Resolving financial hardships, preparing for post-war aviation expansion, providing technical necessities, and securing defence against enemy aerial attacks were not the only ploys lobbyists used to justify base selection. As the aerodrome infrastructure commenced to take shape in 1939, accelerated in numbers during 1940 and 1941, and then neared completion in 1942, lobbyists voiced themes that increasingly abandoned technical emphases for old-style political threats, thus reflecting the diminishing hope that communities had in being selected according to technical merit

Early lobbying themes often stressed why building an aerodrome in a particular area would benefit the government and its war effort.⁴⁸ During this period, lobbyists attempted to impress government officials with declarations of support and pledges to contribute more to the war effort. For example, the Commissioner of Industries in Hamilton, Ontario, informed the

⁴⁷ 28 November 1939 petition from City of Sudbury to Norman Rogers (Minister of National Defence), RG 12 Volume 2124 File 5151-0155 (Sudbury, On); 10 June 1941 W.S. Beaton (Mayor Sudbury, On) to C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 331 Reel C6811 p. 283055.

⁴⁸ 21 December 1939 letter from Norman C. Schneider (Kitchener-Waterloo Municipal Airport Commission) to S.S. Foley (District Inspector Southern Airways), RG 24 Reel C5036 File 925-2-69 (Winterbourne, On); 4 April 1940 letter from P.F. Anten (Constituent) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Transport), RG 12 Volume 3122 File 5151-0136 (Oshawa, On); 10 June 1941 W.S. Beaton (Mayor Sudbury, On) to C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 331 Reel C6811 p. 283055.

Deputy Minister of Transport that "we feel we can contribute much to the cause if given an opportunity to fit into the scheme of things."⁴⁹ Besides bringing greater attention to the war and making it more relevant to communities far from the battlefield, constituents felt that an aerodrome would probably stimulate local recruiting efforts for the air force. According to the Chair of the Aviation Committee in Grande Prairie, Alberta, the district of 75,000 people logically contained large numbers of young men who would likely be interested in attending a training school if it were locally built.⁵⁰ The MP for Winterbourne, Ontario, hoped to attract the RCAF's interest by highlighting that "the counties of Wellington and Waterloo have quite a large population in the cities of Guelph, Galt, and Kitchener. One or more air training fields located in this section would be an asset from the standpoint of recruiting."⁵¹ The Secretary-Treasurer of Mossbank, Saskatchewan, believed that a training school would bolster national pride in the citizens of his town: "The work and presence amongst us of many members of the Air Force would give our people a new spirit, make them conscious they are directly interested in the successful issue of the war, stimulate recruiting, [and] arouse their national feelings."⁵²

Communities already possessing civilian airports naturally offered their use to the RCAF,

⁴⁹ 26 April 1940 letter from H.D. Fearman (Commissioner of Industries) to C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport), RG 12 Volume 1802 File 5151-287-2 (Hamilton, On).

⁵⁰ 24 June 1940 letter from P.J. Tooley (Chairman, Aviation Committee, Grand Prairie Board of Trade and Chamber of Commerce) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Transport), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-2 (C.D. Howe Papers – Alberta Airports Folder 2).

⁵¹ 30 January 1940 letter from R.W. Gladstone (MP Guelph, On) to K.S. MacLachlan (Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence - Naval and Air), RG 24 Reel C5036 File 925-2-69 (Winterbourne, On).

⁵² 11 January 1940 letter from P.J. Rawlinson (Secretary-Treasurer) to Norman Rogers (Minister of National Defence), RG 12 Volume 2332 File 5168-803 Part 1 (Mossbank, Sk).

but these arguments only appeared in the early lobbying period. As the training school infrastructure was just beginning to take shape, these communities assumed that established airports were either suitable or easily convertible to training regimes, and hence the government would save much time and money by selecting localities with pre-existing hangars and runways.⁵³ Additionally, some private flying clubs offered their own instructors to help with pilot training.⁵⁴ According to residents of Prince Albert, Saskatchewan, their local airport was equipped to provide instruction in preliminary flying and air engineer's work, and a local company – M&C Aviation – could also provide the equipment, machines, and staff necessary for aircraft repair; the company could also manufacture aeroplane skis and ski pedestals.⁵⁵

Early in the war, some lobbyists naively appealed to sentimentality by claiming that an area's historical importance made it suitable for an aerodrome. The Commissioner of Industries in Hamilton, Ontario, for example, claimed that the residents deserved an airport because the city had "pioneered and fostered aviation in Canada."⁵⁶ Maple Creek, Saskatchewan, had the "first

⁵³ 25 May 1940 letter from F.W. Turnbull (Barrister and Solicitor) to Editor *The Ottawa Journal*, King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 297 Reel C4576 pp. 252841-2.

⁵⁴ 22 April 1940 letter from P.F. Anten (Border Cities Aero Club) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Transport), RG 12 Volume 3122 File 5151-0136 (Oshawa, On).

⁵⁵ 25 September 1939 Memorandum re: Air Training Station at Prince Albert, Sk, from W.J. Turnbull (Private Secretary Prime Minister) to A.G. MacLachlan (Private Secretary Minister of National Defence) pp. 234340-1; 26 September 1939 letter from J.W. Sanderson (President Liberal Association Prince Albert, Sk) to H.R.L. Henry (Private Secretary Prime Minister) pp. 234625-6, King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 277 Reel C32748.

⁵⁶ 26 April 1940 letter from H.D. Fearman (Commissioner of Industries) to C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport), RG 12 Volume 1802 File 5151-287-2 (Hamilton, On).

Canadian member [of provincial parliament] in uniform,"⁵⁷ while Moosomin, Saskatchewan, believed that the government should give it an aerodrome because the town was the birthplace of Lieutenant-General A.G. McNaughton.⁵⁸ One landowner in Brockville, Ontario, offered a farm at which General Brock had spent the night in 1812.⁵⁹ Another landowner from Oshawa, Ontario, suggested the use of 800 acres on which "the 114th Battalion and 182nd Oshawa and 84th of Toronto drilled during the winter months of the [Great] war."⁶⁰

Saskatchewan was the only province to send letters suggesting that a region's ethnic make-up should play a decisive role in aerodrome selection. Two communities – Weyburn and Kelvington – argued that having a population that was mostly Canadian, British, and American was "more desirable than if such a population was foreign born."⁶¹ On the other hand, lobbyists in Melville and Mossbank were of the opinion that unifying diverse cultures with a common goal – hosting an aerodrome – would ensure the airport's efficiency for the good of the war effort.

⁵⁷ 23 August 1941 telegram from G.S. Herringer (Chamber of Commerce) to C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport), RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 28 File 5168-C517 (Maple Creek, Sk).

⁵⁸ 18 August 1941 letter from A.T. Procter (Saskatchewan Minister of Highways) to C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports).

⁵⁹ 23 October 1939 letter from Mrs Walter A. Ziegler (Landowner) to Norman Rogers (Minister of National Defence), RG 12 Volume 2369 File 5151-289 (Brockville, On).

⁶⁰ 24 January 1940 letter from J.H. Lindsay (Constituent) to Norman Rogers (Minister of National Defence), RG 12 Volume 3122 File 5151-0136 (Oshawa, On).

⁶¹ Quote from Undated "Brief of City of Weyburn for Presentation to Honourable C.D. Howe, Minister of Munitions and Transport", RG 12 Volume 2326, File 5168-699 Part 1 (Weyburn, Sk); See also 17 October 1941 letter from A.M. Millar (President Liberal Association Kelvington, Sk) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports).

According to Mossbank's Secretary-Treasurer, the presence of air force personnel would "weld together the various races in our midst into one United Canada and strong Commonwealth of Nations."⁶²

Following the first round of selections, lobbyists' argumentation became more negative in its focus, now placing blame on the government for hampering communities' war contributions. Lobbyists still claimed that using their areas could be beneficial to the government, but they added that they had been unable to contribute more generously to the war effort because the government had not given them an aerodrome. Lobbyists also wanted selection officials to rectify any uneven distribution of aerodromes, as well as the fact that some constituencies had no military presence of any kind.⁶³

While communities from all three prairie provinces and Ontario expressed displeasure over a perceived lack of war industries in their region, only communities from Saskatchewan protested when other localities were being considered. This plaintive lament is striking since Saskatchewan had traditionally been a region united with its geographical neighbours against

⁶² Quote from 11 January 1940 letter from P.J. Rawlinson (Secretary-Treasurer) to Norman Rogers (Minister of National Defence), RG 12 Volume 2332 File 5168-803 Part 1 (Mossbank, Sk); See also Undated "Brief on Melville Air Port Submitted by the Town of Melville and Melville and District Board of Trade," RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 21 File 5168-C150 Part 1 (Melville, Sk).

⁶³ 26 July 1941 letter from J. Ross Barrie (Constituent) to W.L.M. King (Prime Minister), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 300 Reel C4860 pp. 254246-7; 18 August 1941 letter from A.T. Procter (Saskatchewan Minister of Highways) to C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports); 7 February 1942 letter from Francis M. Ferg (Secretary Board of Trade Glenboro, Mb) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), MG 27 III B20 Volume 94 File 61-5-4 (C.D. Howe Papers – Manitoba Airports).

hinterland treatment by the east.⁶⁴ The wider sense of community broke down as individual towns vied for preference that would best benefit their own districts. Constituents complained that they were being ignored despite the better quality of their hospitals, schools, accommodations, and recreational facilities when compared to towns known to be seriously considered by the government.⁶⁵ Communities also resented some areas getting numerous aerodromes while they still waited for their first training school.⁶⁶ One resident of Wadena, Saskatchewan, was so incensed over the constituency of Yorkton being slated to get a second main aerodrome that he wrote the prime minister directly: if Kamsack were selected as an air training school,

⁶⁴ John F. Conway *The Recrudescence of Western Canadian Separatist Sentiment: Political and Economic Background* (London: Leeds University Printing Service, 1981), p. 15; Leo David Edward Courville, "The Saskatchewan Progressives" (Regina: University of Saskatchewan Masters Thesis, 1971), p. 36; Vernon C. Fowke, *Canadian Agricultural Policy: The Historical Pattern* (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1947), p. 262; William Irvine, *The Farmers in Politics*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1920, 1976), p. 204; William Paterson, "The Progressive Political Movement," 1921-1930 (Toronto: University of Toronto Masters Thesis, 1940), pp. 14, 86; Walter D. Young, *Democracy and Discontent: Progressivism, Socialism and Social Credit in the Canadian West* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1978), pp. 2, 3, 42

⁶⁵ 27 December 1939 letter from J.B. Smith (Constituent) to J.G. Gardiner (Minister of Agriculture), 18 January 1940 letter from T.F. Donelly (MP) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), RG 12 Volume 2310 File 5168-199 Part 1 (Assiniboia, Sk); 7 March 1940 letter from J. Fitzalien (Secretary-Treasurer Chamber of Commerce Vegreville, Ab) to Minister of National Defence, RG 24 Reel C5036 File 925-2-60 (Tofield, Ab); 27 June 1941 letter from Dumont Lepage (Town Clerk Vonda, Sk) to W.A. Tucker (MP Rosthern, Sk), 12 July 1941 letter from Frank Hopkins (Town Clerk Biggar, Sk) to Department of Transport, 26 August 1941 letter from A.T. Procter (Saskatchewan Minister of Highways) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers - Saskatchewan Airports).

⁶⁶ 27 April 1942 letter from W.S. Smith (President Board of Trade Liberty, Sk) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers - Saskatchewan Airports).

this would mean that the federal constituency of Yorkton would not only have the school now in operation near Yorkton and the emergency flying fields situated south and east of Yorkton, but would have the second one at Kamsack Surely the Mackenzie constituency is worthy of some consideration. There has been nothing given this constituency, although we have points admirably adapted to air training, and the residents feel that we have been and are being slighted.⁶⁷

Because Estevan and Weyburn, Saskatchewan, were in such competition with each other for an aerodrome, the Board of Trade of Estevan made sure the government was aware of Weyburn's water supply problems. Accusing Weyburn residents of minimizing their town's water shortage, the President of the Estevan Board of Trade sent the Superintendent of Airways the transcript of a meeting between Weyburn's mayor and the International Waterways Commission. At this meeting, Weyburn representatives had asked for permission to use the Souris River as a water source, and Weyburn's mayor had admitted that static water levels kept falling in the town's present wells and that the water shortage for the mental hospital in the city was "a very serious problem."⁶⁸ In the mind of Estevan representatives, Weyburn was hardly an ideal location for an airfield.

Weyburn residents later found a water source within 1.5 miles of the proposed aerodrome site; not only could it provide 100,000 gallons of water per day, but it was also independent of Weyburn's municipal water supply.⁶⁹ The President of Estevan's Board of Trade countered that the alleged new water source would not make the town a viable host. "If Weyburn

⁶⁷ 26 July 1941 letter from J. Ross Barrie (Constituent) to W.L.M. King (Prime Minister), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 300 Reel C4860 pp. 254246-7

⁶⁸ 24 June 1940 Statement of J.K. Brimacombe (Mayor Weyburn, Sk) to International Joint Commission, RG 12 Volume 2340 File 5168-867 Part 1 (Estevan, Sk).

⁶⁹ 2 August 1940 brief for presentation to C.D. Howe from J.K. Brimacombe (Mayor) to Group Captain L.F. Stevenson (RCAF), RG 12 Volume 2326 File 5168-699 Part 1 (Weyburn, Sk).

has discovered a source of water, it will be evident that every gallon of this supply is vitally required for the City's own needs, and it will have none to divert for any other purpose, let alone the 50,000 gallons daily required for an air field."⁷⁰ The gravity of Weyburn's problem and the town's inability to resolve it, in Estevan's mind, should have disqualified Weyburn from receiving an aerodrome, thus increasing Estevan's chances of being a host. Such was the bitter competition brought on by aspirations for a training base.

Some themes used in the interim lobbying period began to ring of old-style politics again, focussing less on technical merit and more on the credit an area deserved for war contributions. While some localities bemoaned that they had been unable to do much for the war effort, others declared that they deserved an aerodrome because residents had made outstanding contributions. These lobbyists claimed the government should reward high enlistment rates and large financial donations to war savings campaigns by granting their settlement a training base.⁷¹ Residents of some towns, such as Moosomin, Saskatchewan, made general assertions that they had "the record for the whole of Canada for percentage of enlistments in the military, air, and naval forces of the

⁷⁰ 13 September 1940 letter from W.J. Perkins (President Board of Trade) to A.D. McLean (SA), RG 12 Volume 2340 File 5168-867 Part 1 (Estevan, Sk).

⁷¹ 24 July 1940 letter from P.J. Tooley (Chairman, Aviation Committee of Board of Trade and Chamber of Commerce Grande Prairie, Ab) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-2 (C.D. Howe Papers – Alberta Airports Folder 2); 12 March 1941 Memorandum from Delegation (Board of Trade) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply) and C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air), RG 12 Volume 2310 File 5168-199 Part 1 (Assiniboia, Sk); 10 June 1941 W.S. Beaton (Mayor Sudbury, On) to C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 331 Reel C6811 p. 283055; 26 June 1941 telegram from Shaunavon Board of Trade to C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport), 8 July 1941 letter from President Board of Trade to C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport), 21 March 1942 petition from Shaunavon to J.A. Wilson (CCA), RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 28 File 5168-C476 (Shaunavon, Sk).

Dominion."⁷² Other towns enumerated how many men they had sent to war. Estevan wanted recognition for providing 1100 men to the armed forces,⁷³ while James Gardiner believed that Outlook, Saskatchewan, deserved credit for sending 20% of its population to war.⁷⁴ One constituent from Boissevain, Manitoba, enunciated the area's war contributions in great detail. Not only had residents collected \$3000 for the Red Cross, and double the allotment for Victory Loan and War Savings campaigns, but they had also raised \$125,000 for the Military Funds. Women were knitting and sewing, and residents had collected so much scrap iron that the rail road had asked the town to stop collecting until the backlog in shipping could be cleared. These facts, according to the lobbyist, showed that the district was "behind the war effort."⁷⁵

Expectations of reward for war contributions were not the sole throwback to old-style lobbying. From the interim lobbying period until the late stages of aerodrome selection, Saskatchewan communities explicitly resorted to references of political affiliation and election outcomes. Time was running out, and using merit-based themes had proved futile for these settlements. Some communities were concerned that they would not be justly considered

⁷² 18 August 1941 letter from A.T. Procter (Saskatchewan Minister of Highways) to C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports).

⁷³ 13 September 1940 letter from W.J. Perkins (President Board of Trade) to A.D. McLean (SA), RG 12 Volume 2340 File 5168-867 Part 1 (Estevan, Sk).

⁷⁴ 26 November 1941 letter from J.G. Gardiner (Minister Department of Agriculture) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports).

⁷⁵ 21 June 1942 letter from Geo McDonald (Constituent) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), MG 27 III B20 Volume 94 File 61-5-4 (C.D. Howe Papers – Manitoba Airports).

because they lacked adequate representation at the provincial or federal levels. The President of the Board of Trade in Liberty claimed that the town had "no representation at Ottawa" because their MP (John Diefenbaker) was not a Liberal but a Conservative.⁷⁶ The Chamber of Commerce in Maple Creek hoped that the area would received fair consideration despite the fact that they had no local provincial political influence: their MPP had enlisted and was overseas with the 1st Division.⁷⁷

The government's failure to select certain communities, despite MPs' efforts to influence the Department of Transport and RCAF, concerned many politicians and constituents alike. When lobbying for Melville, James Gardiner exclaimed, "I am quite sure that the people ... look upon the fact that nothing whatsoever is being done in the area I represent as an indication that I am not putting forth much of an effort to obtain anything for them."⁷⁸ In retrospect, this failure to obtain an aerodrome was not a reflection of Gardiner's efforts (he lobbied on Melville's behalf for over two years⁷⁹), but rather evidence that BCATP base selection could not be swayed by politicians' influence.

⁷⁶ 27 April 1942 letter from W.S. Smith (President Board of Trade) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports).

⁷⁷ 23 August 1941 telegram from G.S. Herringer (Chamber of Commerce) to C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport), RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 28 File 5168-C517 (Maple Creek, Sk).

⁷⁸ 7 August 1940 letter from J.G Gardiner (Minister of Agriculture) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports).

⁷⁹ August 1940 to September 1942; See correspondence in files MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports), RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 21 File 5168-C150 Part 1 (Melville, Sk), RG 24 Reel C-5036 File 925-2-251-1 (Melville, Sk).

Liberals in the town of Prince Albert, Saskatchewan, were similarly dismayed over their lack of consideration despite having elected the prime minister himself as their MP. One party supporter was "astounded beyond words" because the RCAF had reduced the proposed SFTS to a less prestigious and less lucrative EFTS. After reminding King that he had only narrowly won the riding in March 1940, the writer warned, "favourable consideration for this project by you, as our sitting member for Prince Albert, is expected by all constituents, and particularly the good Liberals who worked hard for your support."⁸⁰

Some Saskatchewan communities warned Ottawa that political consequences would result if selection officials did not give them favourable consideration. Kelvington's Liberal Association President highlighted the positive effect that granting an aerodrome would have: "the establishment of an airport in the constituency would strengthen the [Liberal] party's claim for support at the next election, and it would also assist considerably in getting a government supporter elected at the next provincial election."⁸¹ On a more ominous note, while lobbying on behalf of Moosomin, the provincial Minister of Highways warned that "if [the visiting delegation is] refused an opportunity to put their claims before the responsible people, ... not only will the Dominion candidates suffer, but it will be a very serious matter provincially."⁸² Because these

⁸⁰ 4 April 1940 letter from T.R. Stalker (Constituent) to W.L.M. King (MP Prince Albert, Sk), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 297 Reel C4575 pp. 252322-3.

⁸¹ 17 October 1941 letter from A.M. Millar (President Liberal Association Kelvington, Sk) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports).

⁸² 26 August 1941 letter from A.T. Procter (Saskatchewan Minister of Highways) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports).

communities despaired of ever being selected according to technical merit, and seeing as they had nothing to lose, they resorted to old-style patronage themes.

As expansion of the aerodrome infrastructure neared completion in late 1941 and early 1942, communities continued to stress their financial and defence needs, as well as the technical advantages they had to offer. Nevertheless, communities losing hope of being selected ceased to stress that their area held great practical benefit for the war effort or that the government had to enhance or reward the vicinity's war contributions. Instead, the persistent – but desperate – lobbyists rationalized that availability of social amenities should outweigh any local failure to satisfy technical criteria. Shaunavon, Saskatchewan, did not have level fields, and hence selection officials deemed that the large amounts of grading required were costly and prohibitive.⁸³ Nevertheless, in the face of these refusals, Shaunavon residents argued that recreational facilities such as theatres, dance halls, swimming pools, golf courses, tennis courts, baseball diamonds, skating and curling rinks – all of which Shaunavon had – should be considered equally important as finding level land for airfields.⁸⁴

A delegation from Boissevain, Manitoba, also believed that their town should be seriously considered because of the social amenities it had to offer airmen. Residents were proud that their town of 900 could offer a town hall for entertainment and dances, good stores, good garages, two modern hotels, a first class picture show, skating and curling rinks, facilities for

⁸³ 17 July 1941 letter from W.H. Irvine (District Inspector Central Airway) to J.A. Wilson (CCA), 31 July 1942 letter from H.A. McIntyre (Water Supply Engineer) to J.A. Wilson (CCA), RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 28 File 5168-C476 (Shaunavon, Sk).

⁸⁴ 21 March 1942 petition from Town of Shaunavon to J.A. Wilson (CCA), RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 28 File 5168-C476 (Shaunavon, Sk).

tennis and golf, and five churches. The town also had access to railroads, highways, buses, and an overnight mail service to and from Winnipeg.⁸⁵ Transport officials had investigated sites in the Boissevain district, but the district was not chosen: the training plan did not need another aerodrome in the area this late in the war (1942), and the sites found entailed the diversion of telephone wires and the removal of rocks and boulders from the soil.⁸⁶ Made in desperation, these arguments reflected lobbyists' underlying belief that technical merit was ultimately the determining factor. Although these localities did not satisfy the RCAF's criteria, the residents advertised what they could offer as technical merits they felt the government had overlooked.

Analysis of Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario's lobbying correspondence indicates that while some lobbying ploys appeared consistently from late 1939 until the end of selection in 1942-3, other themes appeared exclusively at different stages of aerodrome selection. Early in the war, communities sensed that patronage would be intertwined with merit; hence lobbyists aimed to attract selection officials with language that emphasized the benefits the government would enjoy from building in the area. Midway in the lobbying period, old-style politics began to reappear as communities focussed on the contributions they had been loyally making – or had been unable to make – to the war effort. As aerodrome construction neared completion and as chances to host an aerodrome simultaneously diminished, communities overtly stressed the political consequences of not being selected, and later rationalized why they

⁸⁵ 14 February 1942 letter from Eric B. Gowler (Delegation Member) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), MG 27 III B20 Volume 94 File 61-5-4 (C.D. Howe Papers – Manitoba Airports).

⁸⁶ 19 May 1942 Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation of RCAF Airport Sites (Boissevain, Fairburn, Minto), RG 24 Reel C5036 File 925-2-286 (Boissevain, Mb).

should host an aerodrome even if sites could not provide the technical necessities of a training base.

Lobbying efforts of individual towns did not always reflect this progression of themes. Instead of changing their lobbying tactics as time passed, towns often reiterated the same theme or group of themes throughout their lobbying attempts. Vegreville, Alberta, for example, concentrated on its access to gravel supplies.⁸⁷ Taber, Alberta, remained focussed on how the area could meet both the technical needs of an aerodrome and the social needs of airmen.⁸⁸ Lobbyists of Kerrobert, Saskatchewan, reiterated continually that a training base in the area would also be located on air routes important to post-war aviation.⁸⁹ All of Big River, Saskatchewan's, correspondence focussed on the suitability of the local airport for training

⁸⁷ 17 July 1940 letter from Duncan MacTavish (Lawyer) to Air Commodore G.O. Johnson (RCAF), 7 October 1940 memorandum from Isabel Gough (Private Secretary Minister of National Defence for Air) to Air Commodore G.O. Johnson (RCAF), 2 December 1940 letter from J.M. Dechene (MP Athabaska, Ab) to Air Commodore G.O. Johnson (RCAF), RG 24 Reel C5036 File 925-2-108 (Vegreville, Ab).

⁸⁸ 21 March 1941 memorandum by Wing Commander H.R. Stewart (RCAF), 4 February 1942 letter from Douglas Snilber (Mayor Vegreville, Ab) and R.C. Paterson (President Board of Trade) to John Blackmore (MP), 7 February 1942 letter from John Blackmore (MP) to N.R. Stewart (Air Secretary Department of National Defence for Air), RG 24 Reel C5036 File 925-2-182 (Taber, Ab).

⁸⁹ 12 December 1939 letter from J.E. Shields (President Chamber of Commerce) to J.G. Gardiner (Minister of Agriculture), 14 September 1940 letter from C.A. Henderson (MP Kindersly, Sk) to C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport), 7 April 1941 letter from Fred Johnston (MP) to C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport), 8 April 1941 letter from J.E. Shields (President Board of Trade) to C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport), RG 12 Accession 1985-86/173 Box 10 File 5151-C316 Part 1 (Kerrobert, Sk); 19 February 1941 letter from Fred Johnston (MP) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports).

regimes.⁹⁰ While constituents in Oshawa, Ontario, maintained that their area could meet technical criteria necessary for an aerodrome,⁹¹ residents of Sudbury, Ontario, consistently requested that the government protect their important war industries from enemy aerial attack.⁹²

Besides employing themes classified in this study as early, interim, or late lobbying tactics, towns concurrently used justifications that appeared throughout the lobbying period.

Lobbyists in Weyburn, Saskatchewan, stressed the importance of ethnicity in the early period and

⁹⁰ 31 January 1940 telegram from Big River Liberal Association to W.L.M. King (MP Prince Albert, Sk) pp. 239588-9, 3 September 1940 telegram from Board of Trade to W.L.M. King (MP Prince Albert, Sk) p. 239579, 3 September 1940 telegram from R.M. Bell (Secretary Canadian Legion) to W.L.M. King (MP Prince Albert, Sk) p. 239582, 3 September 1940 telegram from Geo A. Anderson (Exalted Ruler Elks Lodge) to W.L.M. King (MP Prince Albert, Sk) p. 239585, 3 September 1940 telegram from Big River Liberal Association to W.L.M. King (MP Prince Albert, Sk) p. 239591, King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 283 Reel C4566; 3 September 1940 telegram from Omer Demers (MLA Debden, Sk) to W.L.M. King (MP Prince Albert, Sk), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 286 Reel 4568 p. 242448; 1 February 1940 letter from J.W. Sanderson (President Liberal Association) to H.R.L. Henry (Private Secretary Prime Minister), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 294 Reel C4573 p. 248793; 7 March 1940 letter from J.W. Sanderson (President Liberal Association) to H.R.L. Henry (Private Secretary Prime Minister), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 295 Reel C4573 p. 249599.

⁹¹ 13 January letter from W.H. Gifford (Chairman Oshawa and Whitby Airport Committee) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), RG 12 Volume 2326 File 5169-701-1 (Whitby, On); 24 January 1940 letter from J.H. Lindsay (Constituent) to Norman Rogers (Minister of National Defence), 6 February 1940 letter from P.F. Anten (Assistant Instructor at Border Cities Aero Club) to Colonel D.G. Joy (RCAF), 4 April 1940 letter from P.F. Anten (Assistant Instructor at Border Cities Aero Club) C.D. Howe (Minister of Transport), 22 April 1940 letter from P.F. Anten (Assistant Instructor at Border Cities Aero Club) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Transport), RG 12 Volume 3122 File 5151-0136 (Oshawa, On).

⁹² 28 November 1939 petition from Sudbury to Norman Rogers (Minister of National Defence), 29 March 1941 letter from W.S. Beaton (Mayor) to C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air), RG 12 Volume 2124 File 5151-O155 (Sudbury, On); 10 June 1941 W.S. Beaton (Mayor Sudbury, On) to C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air) p. 283055, 22 September 1941 letter from W.S. Beaton (Mayor Sudbury, On) to C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air) p. 283053, 15 April 1942 letter from W.S. Beaton (Mayor Sudbury, On) to C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air) p. 283051, King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 331 Reel C6811.

complained about being overlooked in the interim lobbying stages. Nevertheless, these changing themes were accompanied by unwavering references to solving economic problems and saving the government money.⁹³ Melville, Saskatchewan's ethnicity perceptions, complaints about other regions being considered, and dismay over the lack of war-related industries were complemented by abiding themes not restricted to any particular lobbying phase: defence concerns and post-war aviation aspirations.⁹⁴ The lobbying tactics used are indicative of these constituents' understanding of the selection process. They knew selection was strongly governed by merit: hence the stress on meeting technical criteria and the reason for painting social amenities as technical necessities. Nevertheless, lobbyists could not escape the old bonds of patronage: not only did communities lobby from the beginning of aerodrome selection, but they also resorted to political threats when desperation set in.

⁹³ Undated "Brief of City of Weyburn for Presentation to Honourable C.D. Howe, Minister of Munitions and Transport", 11 December 1939 letter from J.K. Brimacombe (Mayor) to C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport), RG 12 Volume 2326, File 5168-699 Part 1 (Weyburn, Sk); 2 August 1940 Brief from City of Weyburn for C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply) forwarded by J.K. Brimacombe (Mayor Weyburn, Sk) to Group Captain L.F. Stevenson (RCAF), 13 August 1940 Resolution of Weyburn Liberal Association, MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports).

⁹⁴ Undated "Brief on Melville Air Port Submitted by the Town of Melville and Melville and District Board of Trade", RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 21 File 5168-C150 Part 1 (Melville, Sk); 7 August 1940 letter from J.G. Gardiner (Minister of Agriculture) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), 7 September 1940 letter from Hector MacKay (Secretary Board of Trade Melville, Sk) to J.G. Gardiner (Minister of Agriculture), 13 December 1941 letter from H. MacKay (Secretary Board of Trade Melville, Sk) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports).

Table 3-1
Number of Letters Communities Wrote (September 1939 - May 1943)
 (See Appendix E)

Total # Communities that Lobbied: Alberta – 13
 Saskatchewan – 34
 Manitoba – 12
 Ontario – 43
 Total – 102

<u># Letters</u>	<u>Alberta</u>	<u>Saskatchewan</u>	<u>Manitoba</u>	<u>Ontario</u>	<u>Total %</u>
1	6	12	5	22	44.1%
2-3	6	11	6	11	33.3%
4-6	1	3	1	8	12.7%
7-14	0	6	0	2	7.8%
15+	0	2	0	0	2.0%

The varying intensity and consistency with which communities carried out their lobbying campaigns also reveal the degree of faith lobbyists had that their efforts would make a difference. One cannot merely look at the number of settlements that lobbied: to gauge the level of community participation in the selection process, one must consider the number of letters each town wrote (see Table 3-1), as well as the duration of each lobbying campaign (see Table 3-2). Almost half the communities that lobbied (45 of 102) only wrote once. Slightly fewer took the time to write two or three letters (34/102), but the numbers substantially fall when considering those who wrote between four and six times. Only communities in Saskatchewan and Ontario wrote more than six letters; two of the former were persistent enough to correspond with the government over fifteen times.⁹⁵

⁹⁵ Appendix E "Lobbying Intensity."

Table 3-2
Duration of Communities' Lobbying Campaigns (September 1939 - May 1943)
 (See Appendix F)

Total # Communities that Lobbied: Alberta - 13
 Saskatchewan - 34
 Manitoba - 12
 Ontario - 43
 Total - 102

<u>Duration:</u>	<u>Alberta</u>	<u>Saskatchewan</u>	<u>Manitoba</u>	<u>Ontario</u>	<u>Total %</u>
1 time	6	12	5	22	44.1%
1-4 days	0	2	2	1	4.9%
1 month	0	0	0	2	2.0%
2-3 months	0	3	1	7	10.8%
4-6 months	1	2	3	5	10.8%
7-11 months	4	5	0	2	10.8%
12+ months	2	10	1	4	16.7%

Communities did organize themselves in order to lobby the government, for writers refer to meetings and resolutions of town councils, boards of trade, chambers of commerce, and political party associations.⁹⁶ Nonetheless, these orchestrated efforts, on the whole, did not persist for extended periods of time. As noted previously, 44% of communities only wrote once, and fewer than 11% wrote between four and six months. 16.7% of communities' lobbying efforts extended over a year, but these numbers are deceptive, for some communities took more than a year to write a handful of letters.⁹⁷

Considering all lobbying efforts collectively, it becomes apparent that fewer than half of all localities considered by selection officials launched a lobbying campaign. Government

⁹⁶ 14 January 1941 letter from A.E. McKay (Secretary Board of Trade Estevan, Sk) to Jesse P. Tripp (MP Oxbow, Sk), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers - Saskatchewan Airports).

⁹⁷ Appendix F "Lobbying Duration."

officials investigated seventy-nine separate communities in Alberta, but only thirteen (16.5%) of these contacted the government. Out of the 101 towns considered in Saskatchewan, thirty-four (33.6%) lobbied. In Manitoba, sixty-six localities were considered for site selection, but only twelve towns (18.2%) lobbied officials. Of the 149 potential aerodrome sites in Ontario, only forty-three (23.5%) contacted the government."⁸ Thus, the majority of communities considered did not see overt lobbying as a probable means of securing an aerodrome, and for the communities that did lobby, only a small minority persisted in their efforts over an extended period of time. Saskatchewan towns lobbied the most: more of them sent multiple letters; and more of them campaigned for longer than one year. Whether or not this has any links to Saskatchewan's economic devastation during the Depression deserves consideration in its own right.

A perplexing question is why so many towns put such little effort into lobbying. Perhaps the explanation lies in the extent to which constituents believed that the RCAF and Department of Transport were faithfully following a selection process based strictly on merit. There appears to have been a general acquiescence among the population to accept, without question, a technocratic process to select aerodromes. Although some communities hoped their efforts would pay off, others wasted little time writing letters that they clearly perceived would serve little purpose. Even the towns that lobbied sensed that old-style patronage arguments would have no bearing on the technocratic process, for communities usually couched their justifications for selection in the language of technical merit. While some communities eventually reverted to blatant patronage demands, these were only a handful of Saskatchewan towns despairing of their

⁸ Appendix C "Towns Involved in BCATP Base Selection 1939 - 1945."

chances to host a base. Overall, most localities did not bother to lobby, for they recognized that patronage would not be governing base selection.

This technical process, which communities tried to influence and which was designed to construct aerodromes according to the schedule set out in the BCATP agreement, must be examined for numerous reasons. A tradition of technocracy had developed in the government during the Depression as the civil service became professionalised. The Department of National Defence and the Department of Transport claimed that they were basing decisions only on merit. Furthermore, the correspondence created by RCAF and Transport officials contained only technical information, and the recommendations of the Aerodrome Development Committee stressed technical justification for every decision made. Besides the shift toward meritocracy in constituents' lobbying tactics, students of old-style Canadian political patronage will find that technical merit replaced parochial politics in the government's approach to BCATP base selection.

CHAPTER IV: TECHNOCRACY AT WORK: WHY POLITICAL LOBBYING FAILED

Historical studies by Jeffrey Simpson, Reginald Whitaker, and Gordon Stewart have clearly shown that governing political parties consciously used patronage to build party loyalty and national unity. In a similar vein, Stephen Harris has demonstrated how early 20th century governments used Canada's military forces as a bed for patronage. He also showed how government ministers, such as the notorious Sam Hughes, were loathe to entrust responsibility to and accept advice from military leaders.¹ In light of these historical precedents, any suggestion that the government's mores suddenly changed in 1939 and that military aerodrome selection was solely governed by technical merit would seem incredible. In fact, over the previous two decades, Canada's government had increasingly turned to professionals for expert advice. Consequently, the selection process outlined in Privy Council Order 3710,² and documented in RCAF and DoT files, was not a radical departure from past practice, but a logical and responsible choice by King's Liberal government. Specific examples of the RCAF's interactions with special interest groups, persistent communities, and the prime minister's riding will demonstrate that technical concerns alone were the basis of aerodrome selection.

It would not have been unprecedented for the governing Liberal party to delegate large government endeavours to a body of experts in 1939. After Sam Hughes' departure in 1916, professionalism replaced patronage in the Canadian Army. Sir George Perley, Minister of Overseas Military Forces of Canada, had "no doubts about the limits of his own military

¹ See Chapter I.

² 17 November 1939 Privy Council Order 3710, RG 12 Volume 624 File 11-6-9.

expertise." As a result, he "was prepared to offer the army professional independence so that it could fulfil its professional responsibilities."³ Perley also actively extinguished the practice of patronage appointments since this was not in keeping with promotion by merit.⁴

After the war, other areas of the government were also becoming increasingly professionalised. The Civil Service Act of 1918 aimed at "preventing the unfit from gaining admission to the public service." Although patronage was purposely "eliminated by imposing a rigorous mechanism of control" on people accepted into the civil service, government officials did not intentionally turn to experts *en masse* until the Depression crisis defined the country's need to do so.⁵ Faced with unprecedented economic problems, both the Conservative government of R.B. Bennett and the Liberal government of W.L.M. King increasingly relied on professionally trained individuals from academic circles. Turning to university intellectuals advocating social reform, Depression governments tasked them with forming early national welfare policy.⁶

Historically, both members of parliament and the public were reluctant in the early 20th century to abandon *laissez-faire* philosophies for ideas of state intervention, as often suggested by intellectuals in the academic community.⁷ The Progressive age had made minimal progress in

³ Harris, *Op. Cit.*, p. 125.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 126, 219.

⁵ Hodgetts, *Op. Cit.*, p. 53.

⁶ Doug Owsam, *The Government Generation: Canadian Intellectuals and the State 1900-1945* (Toronto: University Press, 1986), p. xiii.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

cultivating public support for state intervention, railway regulation being one of the few such examples from this era.⁸ Governments since the end of the Great War had been filling the ranks of the military and the civil service with qualified experts, but the 1920s did not provide these people with the opportunity to influence national policies.⁹ Nevertheless, when traditional economic approaches failed to bring the Depression of the 1930s to a swift end, the Conservative government hesitantly began experimenting with some interventionist policies that required the technocratic expertise of professionally trained economists. After winning the election of 1935, King's Liberals built on this precedent and cautiously aimed to manage the economy and recreate stable employment.¹⁰ The government hired an increasing number of academics, social scientists, and professional economists to shape and oversee Canada's new policies of social security and planned economies.¹¹ Transforming the state into a technocratic and "mechanistic agency" resulted in the government hiring two thousand civil servants by the end of the Depression.¹² This was the beginning of the mandarin age.

Doug Owram's research also demonstrates how the government's growing dependence on professionally-trained experts did not cease with the end of the 1930s. As in the Depression, the increase in the state's war responsibilities necessitated an increase in public servants. Over

⁸ Ken Cruikshank, *Close Ties: Railways, Government, and the Board of Railway Commissioners 1851-1933* (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991).

⁹ Harris, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 126, 219-220; Hodgetts, *Op. Cit.*, p. 53.

¹⁰ Owram, *Op. Cit.*, p. 334.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 256, 263, 332, 333.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 189, 256.

the course of the war, total employment in the civil service rose from 46,000 in 1939, to 67,000 in 1941, to 104,000 in 1943, and finally to 115,000 by 1945 – a total increase of 69,000 employees.¹³ The social, economic, and political events in the first four decades of the 20th century thus "brought about a fundamental reorientation in the way in which man ... approached problems."¹⁴ During the Second World War, this new technocratic approach continued to be used by the government as it simultaneously gained public acceptance.¹⁵

After 1917, a changing mentality about the meaning of governance emerged as governments increasingly relied on experts to provide advice and form national policy. The Liberal dependence on experts to select training bases reflects the fact that the BCATP was a part of this new technocratic approach. This faith in technical merit is evident in both the delegation of power legislated to the RCAF and Department of Transport and in the process followed by these experts when selecting sites.

When Great Britain first proposed training 50,000 Allied air crew annually in Canada,¹⁶ the RCAF only had five airports, although six others were under construction.¹⁷ Both the RCAF and Department of Transport realized this infrastructure would not be large enough to accommodate expanded training responsibilities for the air war. Officials from the Department

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 256, 258.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 331.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 263.

¹⁶ 28 September 1939 telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary, Document 690 in *DCER VII*, pp. 556-7.

¹⁷ J.A. Wilson, "Aerodrome Construction for the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan" in *The Engineering Journal*, November 1940: 1.

of Transport approached the RCAF, intimating that the department "would be happy to place its organization and experience in airport selection and construction at the disposal of the Air Force."¹⁸ Consequently, members of the Defence and Transport departments met on 3 October 1939 to discuss such cooperation. The Department of National Defence recognized that the Department of Transport had "a wide experience in the development of aerodromes, and a staff which is thoroughly conversant with this work." Hence, Defence officials agreed that the Department of Transport should make the initial selection of aerodromes, survey these sites, and ultimately construct the landing fields once layout plans were approved by the RCAF.¹⁹

Upon joint recommendation of Defence Minister Norman Rogers and Transport Minister Clarence Howe, this memorandum of agreement was turned into a cabinet-sanctioned Privy Council Order on 17 November 1939. The Department of Transport was now responsible for choosing sites suitable for aerodrome construction, for surveying these sites to determine if development could be done economically, for preparing development plans of how the airport should be situated on each specific site, for acquiring the properties on behalf of the RCAF, and for building the aerodromes. Final authority, however, rested with the RCAF since the Privy Council order stipulated that "selection of suitable aerodrome sites [and] preparation of

¹⁸ 9 October 1945, Department of Transport, "The Selection and Development of Airports for the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan," article in RG 12 Volume 2293 File 5-50-10 Part 1, p. 1.

¹⁹ 13 October 1939 memorandum, 14 October 1939 memorandum from Air Vice Marshal G.M. Croil (Chief of Air Staff) to K.S. Maclachlan (Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence – Naval and Air), RG 24 Volume 4775 File HQ 103-74/68 Part 1; 7 June 1940 "Selection and Development of Aerodromes for the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan", memorandum by Air Commodore G.O. Johnson (RCAF), C.G. Power Collection 2150 IId File D1064 Box 61.

development plans and specifications [are] subject to the approval of the technical officers of the Department of National Defence."²⁰ Within two months of war being declared, the government surrendered a prerogative to experts in aerodrome selection.

Table 4-1
BCATP Selection Process

1. Department of Transport officials study topographical maps.
2. Air Reconnaissance of list compiled from topographical maps.
3. On-foot examination of sites by field party.
4. Preliminary Investigation Reports forwarded to Aerodrome Development Committee (ADC).
5. ADC approves detailed surveys for promising sites.
6. Department of Transport or provincial highway departments conduct detailed surveys.
7. Department of Transport engineers prepare layout plans and calculate construction estimates.
8. Plans and Estimates submitted to Deputy Minister of Transport for approval.
9. If satisfactory, forwarded to Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air.
10. Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air forwards estimates and layout plans to ADC for consideration.
11. ADC accepts, requests adjustments to plans and estimates, or rejects proposals.
12. ADC recommends suitable set-ups to Minister of National Defence for Air.
13. Minister of National Defence for Air approves ADC recommendations.
14. Cabinet approves recommendations in Privy Council Order.
15. Financial Encumbrance made available to Department of Transport.

The resulting selection process involved many steps and much consultation between the Department of Transport and the RCAF (see Table 4-1). Transport survey parties first studied topographical maps of Canada, looking for any area that appeared to be approximately one square mile of level land. These sites were then investigated by aerial survey during which Transport inspectors noted the approaches for landings and take-offs, the accessibility of road connections and rail lines, and any drainage problems. These air reconnaissances immediately eliminated swampy land from investigation lists and revealed other potential sites not seen on topographical maps. Field parties comprising a Department of Transport inspector, a Department

²⁰ 17 November 1940 Privy Council Order 3710, RG 12 Volume 624 File 11-6-9.

of Transport engineer, and an RCAF officer would then investigate each site on foot, fill out a preliminary report, decide if the site was suitable for development, and if so, for what type of school it was best suited. This preliminary report was subsequently considered by the Aerodrome Development Committee (ADC), a body of RCAF officers. If these officers believed the site held promise, they approved the Department of Transport's recommendation for a detailed survey. Once surveying teams – drawn from either the Department of Transport or from provincial highway departments – had conducted contour surveys of a site, Transport engineers would then prepare runway and hangar layout plans and calculate the estimated costs of construction. If the Deputy Minister of Transport approved these plans and estimates, he would forward them to the Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air.²¹

The ADC was responsible for studying the plans and estimates and for determining which set-ups were most suitable. Members of the ADC included the Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air, the Chief of the Air Staff, and four other RCAF officers: the Air Member for Organization and Training²², the Director of Training, the Director of Air Organization, and an officer to serve as the secretary. Individuals from the Department of Transport – the Superintendent of Airways, district engineers, and district inspectors – also attended ADC

²¹ 1 November 1939 memorandum from A.D. McLean (SA) to Airways Inspectors and Engineers, RG 24 Volume 4775 File HQ 103-74/68 Part 1; 9 October 1945, Department of Transport, "The Selection and Development of Airports for the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan," article in RG 12 Volume 2293 File 5-50-10 Part 1, pp. 2, 5; Wilson, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 2, 4.

²² In 1942, the RCAF replaced the position of Air Member for Organization and Training with an Air Member for Training and an Air Member for Organization. Douglas, *Op. Cit.*, p. 625.

meetings to answer questions and provide technical advice.²³

Table 4-2
Criteria Considered by ADC

1. Distribution of aerodromes as equitably as possible between Eastern and Western Canada and amongst the Provinces.
2. Cost of development (minimum necessary for efficient operation).
3. Location's usefulness after the war.
4. Proximity of flying hazards and nature of surrounding country.
5. Proximity to a centre of population.
6. Proximity to transportation by rail and road.
7. Availability of communication by telephone and telegraph.
8. Nature of soil.
9. Complete development by the date on which the school in question is scheduled to open

Source: 13 January 1940 Memorandum by Air Vice Marshal G.M. Croil, 6 March 1940 letter from Air Vice Marshal G.M. Croil to Norman Rogers, RG 24 Volume 4775 File HQ 103-74/68 Part 3.

ADC members compared the merits of each Department of Transport proposal, weighing and balancing the urgency of completion dates with future use and construction costs (see Table 4-2). The ADC would then approve the most suitable sites, request adjustments to estimates for promising sites, and reject sites that were comparatively less technically desirable or too expensive for the few advantages they offered.²⁴ Afterward, the ADC passed its final recommendations to the Minister of National Defence for Air. If approved by C.G. Power, the

²³ J.A. Wilson, "Aerodrome Construction for the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan 1940" in *Development of Aviation in Canada 1879-1948* (Ottawa: Department of Transport, 1948), p. 28; 9 January 1940 letter from Air Commodore L.S. Breadner (RCAF) to Air Vice Marshal G.M. Croil (Chief of Air Staff), 13 January 1940 memorandum from Air Vice Marshal G.M. Croil (Chief of Air Staff), 6 March 1940 letter from Air Vice Marshal G.M. Croil (Chief of Air Staff) to Norman Rogers (Minister of National Defence), RG 24 Volume 4775 File HQ 103-74/68 Part 3.

²⁴ 28 May 1940, 6 June 1940, 14 June 1940, ADC Meeting Minutes, RG 12 Volume 368 File 1223-6 Part 1.

recommendation was turned into a Privy Council Order, and the necessary funds were made available to the Department of Transport so they could begin purchasing land, letting contracts, and constructing the aerodromes.²⁵

Although in theory C.G. Power gave final authority to any site selected,²⁶ in reality, the final decision rested with the RCAF's ADC. Apart from the Minister and Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air occasionally requesting that plans be modified to lower costs,²⁷ the RCAF, DoT, and ADC files never record an instance where Power declined to approve ADC recommendations and forward them to the Privy Council. Thus, the Minister of National Defence for Air and cabinet merely 'rubber-stamped' the final decisions of the RCAF.

Because this arm's-length relationship had pre-war roots, the government could confidently delegate such a level of authority to the RCAF and Department of Transport: both groups of experts involved in the selection process brought considerable pre-war experience with them. Between the two world wars, the RCAF had been training pilots;²⁸ hence, the air force possessed practical experience in the needs of training aerodromes. Participating in the training of three thousand airmen in Canada for the Royal Flying Corps during the First World War had

²⁵ Wilson, *Development of Aviation in Canada, Op. Cit.*, p. 28; 4 March 1941 Privy Council Order 1556, RG 12 Volume 2341 File 5168-878 Part 1 (Woodhouse, Ab).

²⁶ When C.G. Power became Minister of National Defence for Air, he asserted the authority of the civilian government over the military by relegating the various RCAF bodies (e.g. ADC, Air Council) to the role of only recommending – not dictating – actions to be taken. English, *Op. Cit.*, p. 117.

²⁷ 15 May 1940 ADC Meeting Minutes, RG 12 Volume 368 File 1223-6 Part 1.

²⁸ 28 September 1939 Minutes of Emergency Council of Cabinet, Document 689 in *DCER VII*, pp. 552-5.

served as the first Canadian precedent for military air training.²⁹ Peacetime training of air crew commenced in 1920 when the School of Special Flying opened at Camp Borden, Ontario; here, veterans taught flying, engine and aircraft repairs, wireless telegraphy, photography, gunnery, and navigation.³⁰ In 1922, the syllabus was expanded to include practical flying as well as theory of flight, basic aeronautical engineering, air pilotage, map reading, aerial photography, and meteorology.³¹

During the 1920s, the RCAF had been allowing a small number of civilians to attend the primary flying course held at Camp Borden – the only such course offered in the country at the time.³² Between 1927 and 1931, training pilots for civil flying operations became the RCAF's main focus.³³ As the 1930s drew to a close, Canadian schools emulated the specialties taught in Great Britain's RAF schools: flying instruction, armament, inter-service cooperation with the army, instrument flying, explosives, signals, navigation, seaplane flying, photography, and engineering.³⁴ By 1938, the school at Trenton, Ontario, could accommodate 80 to 100 pupils in each flying training course, 120 people in the technical training courses, and 70 trainees in wireless training courses.³⁵ Over two decades of air training experience thus gave Ottawa faith in

²⁹ Douglas, *Op. Cit.*, p. 193.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 92-3.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 75.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 148.

its military aviation experts.

In like manner, the government entrusted locating and surveying potential sites to the Department of Transport because of its interwar aerodrome construction experience. These officials had gained first-hand awareness of what geographical areas of Canada were most conducive to flying and what topographical conditions would result in exorbitant costs.³⁶ Although the Trans Canada Airlines (TCA) commenced operations in 1937,³⁷ the government had begun surveying the country for potential aerodromes as early as 1928. Over the course of the 1930s, engineers and inspectors of the Department of Railways and Canals (the predecessor to the Department of Transport which was created in 1936) constructed aerodromes for TCA, its feeder lines, and the inter-city air mail services.³⁸

Searching for the most efficient routes over the Rocky Mountains and Northern Ontario gave these officers much experience in selecting sites according to rational criteria. In the Rocky Mountains, survey teams chose the route through Crow's Nest Pass because it was shorter, the climate was more conducive to flying, and it would service more population centres than alternate routes through Yellowhead Pass or Kicking Horse Pass. Similarly, in Northern Ontario, officials chose a route that ensured a better chance of safe forced landings, offered a more stable

³⁶ 13 October 1939 memorandum by Air Vice Marshal G.M. Croil (Chief of Air Staff), RG 24 Volume 4775 File HQ 103-74/68 Part 1; 7 June 1940 "Selection and Development of Aerodromes for the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan", memorandum by Air Commodore G.O. Johnson (RCAF), C.G. Power Collection 2150 IId File D1064 Box 61.

³⁷ Render, *Op. Cit.*, p. 4.

³⁸ Wilson, *Development of Aviation in Canada, Op. Cit.*, pp. 19-20.

and predictable climate, and served mining districts in northern Ontario and Quebec.³⁹ By the end of the Depression, the Department of Transport was responsible for 153 sites which were either developed or ready for development.⁴⁰ From the airports the Department of Transport had constructed in the interwar period, twenty-four were immediately available to accommodate fourteen EFTSs, twelve SFTSs, six AOSs, two BGSs, two relief landing fields, and one ANS.⁴¹

Prominent Transport officials involved in BCATP aerodrome selection had played an important part in Depression aerodrome construction as well. A.D. McLean, Superintendent of Airways, had been a pilot in the First World War and had participated in prairie aerodrome selection during 1929 and 1930.⁴² F.C. Jewett, Superintending Engineer, helped build Newfoundland's airport ("one of the largest in the world"), and A.B. Holand, Assistant Superintending Engineer, was not only experienced in airport construction, but had formerly been the Assistant Chief Engineer in the Airways Section.⁴³

While building airports in the interwar period, the Department of Transport had devised a standard list of criteria to guide planning and construction of civilian aerodromes. This included necessities such as access to urban centres, all-weather roads, communication facilities, utilities,

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ The Department of Transport had already developed some of these sites, but the exact number is unknown since J.A. Wilson's article combines developed and undeveloped fields together in the same total number of 153.

⁴¹ Wilson, *The Engineering Journal*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 3.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁴³ Wilson, *Development of Aviation in Canada*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 29.

freedom from obstructions, drainage capacity, and future expansion.⁴⁴ By November 1939, the Department of Transport had compiled a revised list of technical criteria for evaluating potential BCATP sites,⁴⁵ and the RCAF had established the specific requirements for each type of BCATP school.⁴⁶ Although each aerodrome layout was adjusted for specific sites,⁴⁷ standard blueprints were used, thus simplifying both construction and the purchase of supplies.⁴⁸ Because of this experience and a ready-list of technical criteria, the government could be reassured that aerodrome selection would neither be haphazard nor conducted by trial and error.

The training and construction schedule to which the Canadian government agreed in December 1939 further necessitated the speedy execution of aerodrome selection. In this agreement, the government had committed itself to opening four aerodromes by May 1940, and eighteen more by the end of the year. Once the training bases were opened, the RCAF was obligated to graduate, on a monthly basis, 520 pilots with elementary training, 544 pilots with

⁴⁴ A.D. McLean, "Airport Planning and Construction," A.D. McLean Papers MG 30 E243 Volume 17 Microfilm Reel C10789.

⁴⁵ 3 November 1939 memorandum and blank "Preliminary Investigation Report" from A.D. McLean (SA) to Airways Inspectors and Airways Engineers, RG 24 Volume 4775 File HQ 103-74/68 Part 1.

⁴⁶ 21 November 1939 memorandum re: "Requirements for Air Firing and Bombing Range"; the lists of requirements were later expanded: 25 January 1940 memorandum re "Requirements for SFTS, AOS, BGS" and 6 May 1940 memorandum re: "Requirements for SFTS, AOS, EFTS, BGS, ANS," RG 12 Volume 368 File 1223-6 Part 1.

⁴⁷ 26 July 1940 letter from V.I. Smart (Deputy Minister of Transport) to J.S. Duncan (Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air), RG 24 Reel C5036 File 925-2-108 (Vegreville, Ab).

⁴⁸ 15 May 1942 letter from C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport) to S.L. de Carteret (Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air), RG 24 Volume 5388 File 55-1-9.

advanced training, 340 observers, and 580 wireless operator-air gunners.⁴⁹ Because the RAF's air campaigns depended on these graduates, international pressure was placed on the BCATP base selection process.

Table 4-3
Time Required For Aerodrome Selection and Construction

- | | |
|----|---|
| 1. | Detailed survey, preliminary plans, and rough estimates: 4 weeks |
| 2. | Awaiting plans of taxiways and building area from the RCAF
(no drainage plans can be made until the location of the taxiways is known): 3 weeks |
| 3. | Preparation of detailed plans and specifications for the calling of tenders and/or awarding contract: 2 weeks |
| 4. | Awarding contract: 1 week |
| 5. | Development (depending on location): 12 to 20 weeks |

Source: 30 June 1941 letter from C.P. Edwards to S.L. de Carteret, RG 12 Volume 624 File 11-6-9.

In order for the first aerodromes to be operating by May 1940, construction had to commence as soon as the ground thawed in the spring of 1940. Consequently, the designing of aerodrome layouts, the compiling of construction estimates, the selection of the most suitable sites, and the tenders for contracts all had to be finished by the end of the winter (see Table 4-3). Hence, the Department of Transport had to complete preliminary investigation reports and detailed surveys of potential sites while fall weather permitted.⁵⁰ Site selection began as early as

⁴⁹ 17 December 1939 BCATP Agreement, RG 25 Volume 1858A File 72-T-38; only Canadians attended EFTSs, but SFTSs trained recruits from Britain, Australia, and New Zealand (who had already received their EFTS training in their home countries).

⁵⁰ 30 June 1941 letter from C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport) to S.L. de Carteret (Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air), RG 12 Volume 624 File 11-6-9; 9 October 1945, Department of Transport, "The Selection and Development of Airports for the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan," article in RG 12 Volume 2293 File 5-50-10 Part 1, p. 1.; Wilson, *Development of Aviation in Canada, Op. Cit.*, p. 31.

October 1939⁵¹ – weeks before the BCATP Agreement was actually finalized – with investigation teams using the list of standardized criteria. While determining what areas of the country would be investigated and what specific sites would be most suitable for training purposes, these criteria were tailor-made to accommodate the exigencies of war and the needs of suitable aerodromes.

Both the realities of war and the needs of aerodromes in general immediately disqualified certain parts of the country from aerodrome selection. Selection officials avoided areas of dense population for safety reasons. Not only did training exercises need uninhabited areas for dropping practice-bombs, but training accidents or forced landings could also endanger local civilian residents. Nevertheless, not all uninhabited areas were well-suited for training. The Rocky Mountains of British Columbia and Alberta were deemed dangerous flying obstacles and threatened safe forced landings. Because importing construction materials and aerodrome supplies would be costly, selection officials rejected sites and existing aerodromes in remote areas.⁵²

Many potential sites within five miles of the American border were disqualified for diplomatic reasons. Because the United States was neutral until 1941 and Canada was a belligerent nation, the Department of National Defence did not want lost trainees flying into

⁵¹ 31 October 1939 Memorandum of Preliminary Survey of Airports, RG 24 Reel C5036 File 925-2-19 (Chippewa, On).

⁵² Wilson, *Development of Aviation in Canada, Op. Cit.*, p. 30; Leslie Roberts, *There Shall Be Wings: A History of the Royal Canadian Air Force* (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, and Company Limited, 1959), p. 125.

neutral air space and creating diplomatic complications.⁵³ In November 1939, the Chief of the Air Staff (Air Vice Marshal G.M. Croil) issued a memorandum explaining that "the objection to establishing flying training schools so close to the international boundary in time of war is that in the event of a forced landing in a neutral country, the aircraft and occupants would be interned for the duration of the war. As belligerents, we are not allowed to fly over the territory of a neutral state."⁵⁴

Strategic reasons also precluded the Atlantic and Pacific regions of Canada from receiving many BCATP training bases. Because of the possibility of enemy attacks, selection officials did not want to endanger the lives of trainees nor interrupt the flow of graduates. The Department of National Defence did use the two coasts for Operational Training Units – where BCATP graduates made the transition from training exercises to simulating operational conditions – and for Home War Establishment bases which protected Canadian shores. Adding an influx of BCATP bases would have caused undesirable air congestion.⁵⁵

As field parties investigated sites on foot, they had to keep the general characteristics of RCAF aerodromes in mind. All aerodromes required runways to be a minimum of three thousand feet long. For every vertical foot a plane descended in landing, there had to be fifty horizontal feet clear of obstructions around the landing strips; similarly, two thirds of the

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ 15 November 1939 memorandum from Air Vice Marshal G.M. Croil (Chief of Air Staff) to Military Secretary, RG 24 Volume 4775 File HQ 103-74/68 Part 1.

⁵⁵ Wilson, *Development of Aviation in Canada*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 31; Roberts, *Op. Cit.*, p. 125.

aerodrome's perimeter had to be clear of obstacles.⁵⁶ Sites had to meet minimum daily water requirements as well: 8000 gallons for an EFTS; 40,000 gallons for a SFTS; 12,000 gallons for an AOS; 40,000 gallons for an ANS; and 45,000 gallons for a BGS. If an EFTS and AOS were combined on the same airfield, the set-up required a daily minimum of 20,000 gallons to be guaranteed.⁵⁷ Based on these general necessities, field parties assessed each potential site in a Preliminary Investigation Report (see Table 4-4)⁵⁸ – the list of technical criteria based on Department of Transport civil aerodrome investigation reports.⁵⁹

The surface conditions of a specific site and its surrounding area affected aerodrome safety and construction costs and time. Level sites with few potholes or depressions required minimal amounts of grading. Although trees and bush areas could be cleared off aerodrome sites – with a consequent increase in time and costs – heavy timber areas surrounding an aerodrome posed a danger to pilots attempting emergency landings. Rough, rolling, or remote localities could also prove dangerous in the event of a crash landing.⁶⁰ Selection officials, for instance,

⁵⁶ 6 May 1940 memorandum re: "Requirements for SFTS, AOS, EFTS, BGS, ANS," RG 12 Volume 368 File 1223-6 Part 1.

⁵⁷ 18 June 1940 memorandum re: "Water Requirements," RG 12 Volume 368 File 1223-6 Part 1.

⁵⁸ 3 November 1939 memorandum and blank "Preliminary Investigation Report" from A.D. McLean (SA) to Airways Inspectors and Airways Engineers, RG 24 Volume 4775 File HQ 103-74/68 Part 1.

⁵⁹ 14 July 1939 Memorandum of Preliminary Survey of Airports, RG 12 Accession 1993-94 Box 28 File 5168-C666 (Melfort, Sk).

⁶⁰ 9 October 1945, Department of Transport, "The Selection and Development of Airports for the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan," article in RG 12 Volume 2293 File 5-50-10 Part 1, pp. 3-4.

Table 4-4
Questions Listed On Preliminary Investigation Reports

1. Site (local name)
2. Nearest town or city: population: special advantages to training school
3. Province
4. County
5. Description by land survey system or metes and bounds
6. Nearest post office
7. Altitude, latitude, longitude
8. Maximum dimensions (present, future)
9. Dimensions of cleared area
10. Area to be cleared
11. Nature of clearing (heavy timber, light scrub)
12. Estimated value of land (cost per acre)
13. Proposed building area
14. Proposed water supply
15. Proposed sewage disposal
16. Nature of surrounding area
17. Surface conditions (describe)
18. Apparent nature of soil and subsoil
19. Apparent drainage requirements
20. Nearest location of acceptable crushed rock or gravel and sand supplies
21. Obstructions
22. Electricity (source of supply, voltage, frequency, phase, and distance from site)
23. Distance to telephone and type of service
24. Telegraph or radio (location of nearest)
25. Local land marks (day and night)
26. Surface transportation (nearest railway station or shipping point: roads, describe fully)
27. Meteorological remarks (prevailing wind, fog, snow, etc)
28. Advantages
29. Disadvantages
30. General remarks
31. Recommendations

rejected building an aerodrome in the Vermilion, Alberta, area because even the most promising site required appreciable amounts of grading and the removal of large boulders.⁶¹ Similarly, heavy timber and bush precluded the Porquis Junction-Ramore region in Ontario from hosting an

⁶¹ 23 October 1943 memorandum from W.F. Hilchie (Assistant District Inspector Western Airways) to District Inspector Western Airways, RG 24 Reel C5036 File 925-2-226 (Vermilion, Ab).

aerodrome. Forced landings in such bush would result in "poor salvage value if aircraft is located," and student pilots could easily get lost since there were no landmarks to aid in navigation: according to the Transport inspector, "one tree top looks the same as another."⁶²

The type and extent of obstructions in an airfield's vicinity also determined the site's potential. Buildings, telephone poles, and wires often had to be moved, and the value of buildings, height of poles, and number of wires determined the costs of removal. Some obstructions, such as chimneys, radio transmitters, bridges, or water towers, could not be removed from the area, and hence, selection officials had to reject localities that contained such hazards to flying.⁶³ While comparing sites for a relief landing field near Assiniboia, Saskatchewan, RCAF officials could not approve the Mazenod site because six silos on the property would obstruct the flight path.⁶⁴ On the other hand, after investigating a site in the vicinity of Lethburn, Saskatchewan, the field party advised that re-routing a two-wire telephone line was not unreasonable.⁶⁵

Soil quality was another important element in aerodrome development. Soil had to be porous to allow good drainage, but it also had to be fertile. A robust sod was needed to prevent

⁶² 29 January 1943 letter from S.S. Foley (District Inspector Southern Airways) to J.A. Wilson (CCA), RG 12 Volume 2322 File 5168-520 (Ramore, On).

⁶³ 9 October 1945, Department of Transport, "The Selection and Development of Airports for the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan," article in RG 12 Volume 2293 File 5-50-10 Part 1, pp. 3-4; Wilson, *Development of Aviation in Canada, Op. Cit.*, p. 30.

⁶⁴ 3 March 1942 letter from S.L. de Carteret (Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air) to C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport), RG 12 Volume 2344 File 5168-911 (Lethburn, Sk).

⁶⁵ 6 March 1942 Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation for RCAF Airport Sites, RG 12 Volume 2344 File 5168-911 (Lethburn, Sk).

erosion and to endure the landings and take-offs of small aircraft. Selection officials also considered the slope of a site, for if land naturally drained, expensive drainage systems and digging deep ditches would not be necessary.⁶⁶ Transport inspectors rejected a potential site at Vivian, Manitoba, because of soil and slope deficiencies. The heavy gumbo earth made seeding and grading difficult, and wet weather would saturate the ground and runways, thus bringing flying operations to a halt. Since the relief landing fields had no slope at all, they would not drain properly, and water would pool on the runways.⁶⁷

The availability of utilities and construction supplies was also a key factor in keeping construction costs low. If water mains, sewage facilities, and electrical supplies had to be extended great distances from local towns, development costs rose. When town water and sewer were unavailable, wells had to be located and sewage disposal had to be created. Gravel and sand supplies were imperative for aerodrome and runway construction, and if these were not available locally, transportation costs could be prohibitive.⁶⁸ Preliminary investigation of Maple Creek, Saskatchewan, determined that gravel was not available within economical distance, "for it had to be hauled from the closest pit over ten miles of dirt roads or over three miles of dirt road

⁶⁶ 9 October 1945, Department of Transport, "The Selection and Development of Airports for the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan," article in RG 12 Volume 2293 File 5-50-10 Part 1, pp. 3-4; Wilson, *Development of Aviation in Canada, Op. Cit.*, p. 30.

⁶⁷ 22 March 1941 memorandum from W.H. Irvine (District Inspector Central Airways) and L. Millidge (for District Airway Engineer) to J.A. Wilson (CCA), RG 12 Volume 2325 File 5168-683 Part 2 (Vivian, Mb).

⁶⁸ 9 October 1945, Department of Transport, "The Selection and Development of Airports for the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan," article in RG 12 Volume 2293 File 5-50-10 Part 1, pp. 3-4; Wilson, *Development of Aviation in Canada, Op. Cit.*, p. 30.

and then thirteen miles of gravelled highway."⁶⁹ In order to provide the necessary quantities of electricity for an aerodrome at Kerrobert, Saskatchewan, the RCAF would have to arrange for the closest power plant to be tripled in size. Alternatively, fifteen miles of power lines would have to be erected to access the nearest source with sufficient capacity.⁷⁰

When conducting preliminary investigations, selection officials noted the availability of telephone and telegraph facilities and the distance these services would have to be extended. Investigators, for instance, found that a line to the local telephone exchange passed the potential emergency landing field at Willows, Saskatchewan,⁷¹ while building in the Maple Creek, Saskatchewan, area required the erection of telephone poles and extension of wires for two and one half miles.⁷² Once in operation, aerodromes needed rail service to deliver equipment, supplies, and personnel to the aerodrome. Rail lines conveniently served some sites investigated. In the case of Melville, Saskatchewan, a spur line could be run into the aerodrome by simply laying one half mile of track off the main line.⁷³ The local CPR actually passed over one corner

⁶⁹ 17 July 1941 Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation for RCAF Airport Sites, RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 28 File 5168-C517 (Maple Creek, Sk).

⁷⁰ 18 July 1941 Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation for RCAF Airport Sites, RG 24 Reel C-5036 File 925-2-138 (Kerrobert, Sk).

⁷¹ 16 August 1940 Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation for RCAF Airport sites, RG 12 Volume 2310 File 5168-199 Part 1 (Assiniboia, Sk).

⁷² 17 July 1941 Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation for RCAF Airport Sites, RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 28 File 5168-C517 (Maple Creek, Sk).

⁷³ 6 December 1941 Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation for RCAF Airport Sites, RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 21 File 5168-C150 Part 1 (Melville, Sk).

of the site at Kerrobert, Saskatchewan.⁷⁴ Field parties reported whether or not roads were paved, gravelled, dirt, or passable in all weather conditions, and they also noted the distance roads would have to be improved or created. This road construction increased the cost of development.⁷⁵

Because flying schedules and flying safety depended on climatic conditions, site inspectors had to research the prevailing winds of an area, the amount and frequency of rain and snow, as well as the average number of foggy days. The ADC thus ruled that the set-up at Shaunavon, Saskatchewan, was unacceptable because of the strong prevailing winds.⁷⁶ Since fog was infrequent in the Rhein, Saskatchewan, area, air force officials did not have to worry about the interruption of flying at this relief landing field for the SFTS at Yorkton.⁷⁷

Social conveniences also entered selection consideration. To keep trainees' morale high, the RCAF preferred to build its aerodromes within a reasonable distance of local communities so that airmen had access to taxis, buses, stores, restaurants, recreation facilities, and other social amenities.⁷⁸ Concerning the site near Benbough, Saskatchewan, inspectors noted that the small

⁷⁴ 18 July 1941 Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation for RCAF Airport Sites, RG 12 Accession 1985-86/173 Box 10 File 5151-C316 Part 1 (Kerrobert, Sk).

⁷⁵ 9 October 1945, Department of Transport, "The Selection and Development of Airports for the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan," article in RG 12 Volume 2293 File 5-50-10 Part 1, pp. 3-4; Wilson, *Development of Aviation in Canada, Op. Cit.*, p. 30.

⁷⁶ 31 July 1942 memorandum from H.A. McIntyre (Water Supply Engineer), RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 28 File 5168-C476 (Shaunavon, Sk).

⁷⁷ 13 May 1940 Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation for RCAF Airport Sites, RG 12 Volume 2338 File 5168-848 Part 1 (Rhein, Sk).

⁷⁸ 9 October 1945, Department of Transport, "The Selection and Development of Airports for the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan," article in RG 12 Volume 2293 File 5-50-10 Part

town was "remote from any large centre" and that trainees would also have difficulties travelling to other cities during wet seasons because roads became impassable.⁷⁹

Nevertheless, selection officials did choose remote areas if advantages outweighed the disadvantages. Because bombing and gunnery schools (BGS) needed a bombing range in addition to the aerodrome site, suitable set-ups were scarce. Hence, the ADC approved a BGS at Dafoe, Saskatchewan – despite the site being twelve miles away from the nearest town – because a local lake could serve as the necessary bombing range: "in view of the urgent requirements for a BGS in the western provinces and the great difficulty experienced in locating sites for BGSs with satisfactory ranges, the Committee concurred in the development plans and estimated costs."⁸⁰ To compensate for this isolation, the RCAF built a swimming pool on the base.⁸¹ Weighing this myriad of criteria, field parties had to develop a keen sense of pragmatism.

After field parties submitted their preliminary investigation reports, engineers had to weigh the potentials of each site against the requirements of specific aerodromes. Because specifications were unique to each type of aerodrome, the nature of a piece of land and its surrounding area often dictated what sort of school could be developed. Training regimes at EFTSs had trainee-pilots using turf landing strips in lieu of paved runways. Areas already

1, pp. 3-4; Conrad, *Training For Victory, Op. Cit.*, p. 14; Wilson, *Development of Aviation in Canada, Op. Cit.*, p. 30.

⁷⁹ 28 May 1942 Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation for RCAF Airport Sites, RG 24 Reel C-5036 File 925-2-293 (Benbough, Sk).

⁸⁰ 6 June 1940 ADC Meeting Minutes, RG 12 Volume 368 File 1223-6 Part 1; 7 June 1940 ADC Minute No. 54, RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 11 File 5168-C113 Part 1 (Dafoe, Sk).

⁸¹ Conrad, *Training For Victory, Op. Cit.*, p. 43.

possessing a durable sod allowed flying to begin almost immediately, once the aerodrome was built. If sod had to be seeded, then the aerodrome was unserviceable until the grass had grown. The DNDA believed the best use of Prince Albert, Saskatchewan, would be an EFTS because "this aerodrome has a very fine grass ... surface, [it is] easy to keep in good condition, [and it is] excellent for elementary types of aircraft."⁸²

SFTSs required two emergency landing fields that were no closer than five miles and no farther than 25 miles from each other or the main aerodrome. Hence, for every SFTS, search parties had to find clusters of three aerodrome sites all satisfying the same technical specifications.⁸³ Although Broadview, Saskatchewan, had already been developed as a Department of Transport aerodrome, the ADC would not approve the SFTS proposal because one of the relief landing fields was over 30 miles away from the main aerodrome site.⁸⁴

Bombing and gunnery schools were the most difficult to place because of the large operational area they required: over 100 square miles. Each BGS had to have an Air Firing and Bombing Range (AFBR) located between five and twenty-five miles away from the main aerodrome, and the range had to be accessible by roads in all seasons. In order to protect the civilian population, the RCAF cut off civilian access to this area approximately sixteen miles long and seven miles wide. Hence, it was preferable if no residents lived in the area to begin

⁸² 8 August 1942 letter from C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air) to W.L.M. King (MP Prince Albert, Sk), King Papers, MG 26 J1 Volume 331 Reel C6811 pp. 283096-8.

⁸³ 6 May 1940 Memorandum re: "Requirements of SFTS," RG 12 Volume 368 File 1223-6 Part 1.

⁸⁴ 18 October 1940 ADC Meeting Minutes, RG 12 Volume 368 File 1223-6 Part 1.

with.⁸⁵ To facilitate BGS selection, the ADC approved sites near large bodies of water which could serve as bombing ranges. Both Dafoe and Mossbank, Saskatchewan, were developed as BGSs because they were near alkali (hence environmentally dead) lakes: Quill Lake and Johnston Lake respectively.⁸⁶ The BGS at Jarvis, Ontario, used Lake Erie as a bombing range.⁸⁷

Selection officials also kept future BCATP expansion in mind when approving sites. The ADC approved Gimli, Manitoba, as an SFTS because it met the technical requirements, the runways could be developed beyond five thousand feet, and an AFBR was available on Lake Winnipeg. The site's suitability for an Operational Training Unit (OTU) was emphasized most in ADC deliberations. If more OTUs were required in the future, an SFTS at Gimli could easily be converted, thus saving time and money.⁸⁸

Case studies of the RCAF's response to lobbying attempts will further illustrate that selection officials judged sites solely according to technical criteria. This disciplined technocratic focus is repeatedly evident not only in the RCAF's response to special interest groups shunning aerodrome selection, or in the reasons why numerous Saskatchewan towns were rejected, but also in the DNDA's confrontation with lobbyists from the prime minister's

⁸⁵ Conrad, *Saskatchewan In War, Op. Cit.*, p. 44; 25 January 1940 Memorandum re: "Requirements of BGS," RG 12 Volume 368 File 1223-6 Part 1.

⁸⁶ 19 March 1940 ADC Minute No. 18, 6 June 1940 ADC Meeting Minutes, RG 12 Volume 368 File 1223-6 Part 1; 7 June 1940 ADC Minute No. 54, RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 11 File 5168-C113 Part 1 (Dafoe, Sk).

⁸⁷ 13 November 1939 Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation for RCAF Airport Sites, RG 12 Volume 2317 File 5168-311-1 (Jarvis, On); 8 March 1940 ADC Minute No. 4, RG 12 Volume 368 File 1223-6 Part 1.

⁸⁸ 6 January 1942 ADC Meeting Minutes, RG 12 Volume 370 File 1223-6 Part 5, 30 April 1942 ADC Submission No. 620, RG 12 Volume 370 File 1223-6 Part 6.

constituency.

Only on two occasions, in the three prairie provinces and Ontario, did special interest groups try to halt the selection of a specific site. In both instances, because of Canada's distinctive ethnic composition, the RCAF attempted to be sensitive to the government's delicate relations with natives and French Canadians. Nevertheless, the RCAF was not prepared to cater to the demands of special interest groups if this meant delaying aerodrome construction. In November 1939, field parties located a suitable relief aerodrome site on the Six Nations Indian Reserve near Brantford, Ontario. According to the inspectors, this site had "excellent drainage [and] no obstructions for two miles." Although the land could not be bought outright, the RCAF was prepared to lease the site,⁸⁹ and by mid-March 1940, the ADC recommended its selection to C.G. Power.⁹⁰

Leasing negotiations came to an impasse when the members of the reserve's council voted against allowing the RCAF to lease the site. Landowners feared the government would never return the land to the reserve owners.⁹¹ Selection officials seriously considered expropriating the land and were advised by a solicitor that the government had "ample statutory

⁸⁹ 18 November 1939 Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation for RCAF Airport Sites, RG 12 Volume 2328 File 5168-753-1 (Burtch, On).

⁹⁰ 14 March 1940 ADC Minute No. 19, RG 12 Volume 2328 File 5168-753-1 (Burtch, On); 31 March 1940 ADC Meeting Minutes, RG 12 Volume 368 File 1223-6 Part 1.

⁹¹ 14 March 1940 memorandum from R.J. Waterous (attended meeting of Six Nations Council) to H.W. McGill (Director Indian Affairs Branch Department Mines and Resources), 9 April 1940 letter from H.W. McGill (Director Indian Affairs Branch) to V.I. Smart (Deputy Minister of Transport), 29 April 1940 letter from E.P. Randle (Indian Superintendent) to H.W. McGill (Director Indian Affairs Branch), RG 12 Volume 2328 File 5168-753-1 (Burtch, On).

authority to take over the area desired for war purposes." This authority rested in the Indian Act, the Dominion Expropriation Act, and the War Measures Act.⁹² Despite this option, members of the Department of Transport feared exacerbating an already "hostile attitude" by expropriating the land in question.⁹³ As a precaution, field parties scoured the vicinity again and found another potential site where development costs were comparable to the reserve site.⁹⁴

After some reserve members challenged the Six Nations Council's lack of cooperation,⁹⁵ Council members reconsidered their vote and decided to lease the 800 acres in question "for the duration of the war and three years later."⁹⁶ Although the natives finally acquiesced to the relief aerodrome proposal, the RCAF abandoned the reserve site seeing as the new site had better soil conditions and more uniform surface contours. According to engineers, these advantages facilitated construction and reduced development costs by approximately \$7400. The purchase

⁹² 20 April 1940 letter from D. Cory (Solicitor) to H.W. McGill (Director Indian Affairs Branch), 3 May 1940 letter from C.P. Edwards (Chief of Air Services) to Mr Matthews, RG 12 Volume 2328 File 5168-753-1 (Burtch, On).

⁹³ 3 May 1940 letter from C.P. Edwards (Chief of Air Services) to Mr Matthews, 3 May 1940 letter from C.P. Edwards (Chief of Air Services) to H.W. McGill (Director of Indian Branch), 9 May 1940 telegram from A.D. McLean (SA) to J.A. Wilson (CCA), quote from 14 May 1940 letter from V.I. Smart (Deputy Minister of Transport) to J.S. Duncan (Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air), RG 12 Volume 2328 File 5168-753-1 (Burtch, On).

⁹⁴ 5 May 1940 Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation for RCAF Airport Sites, 14 May 1940 letter from V.I. Smart (Deputy Minister of Transport) to J.S. Duncan (Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air), RG 12 Volume 2328 File 5168-753-1 (Burtch, On).

⁹⁵ 8 May 1940 letter from Nettie V. Doctor (Resident of Reserve), 30 May 1940 letter from Issac Doctor (Resident of Reserve) to C.G. Powers (Minister of National Defence for Air), RG 12 Volume 2328 File 5168-753-1 (Burtch, On).

⁹⁶ 20 June 1940 Resolution at meeting of Six Nations Council, RG 12 Volume 2328 File 5168-753-1 (Burtch, On).

price of the land was \$35,000, while leasing the reserve site would have only cost \$12,000, but the ADC determined this was offset by "the [alternative] property ... [having] considerable resale value after the war."⁹⁷ The RCAF thus did not have to resort to expropriation as contemplated since an alternative was found with more suitable technical qualifications. Even when the natives requested that their land be used, technical merit determined the outcome.

When residents of the Franco-Ontarian settlement of St Joseph, Ontario, requested that their parish not be used as a relief aerodrome, the final response of the ADC was again based solely on the needs of the BCATP. In September 1940, Transport inspectors sought relief aerodromes for an SFTS set-up at Centralia, Ontario. The site, which inspectors located within the St Joseph parish, had good soil and drainage, ample room for expansion, little bush to be cleared away, and suitable water. In addition, the surrounding country afforded safe forced landings.⁹⁸ In September 1941, however, parish residents brought their concerns to the attention of the Special Assistant to the Minister of National Defence for Air. These citizens argued that depriving farmers in the community of their land and income would jeopardize the settlement's school and church, both of which were financed by parishioners' donations. Because the community was an historic settlement and the only French Canadian parish in the area, residents

⁹⁷ 28 June 1940 letter from V.I. Smart (Deputy Minister of Transport) to J.S. Duncan (Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air); 4 July 1940 ADC Meeting Minutes, 8 July 1940 ADC Minute No. 59, RG 12 Volume 2328 File 5168-753-1 (Burtch, On).

⁹⁸ 20 September 1940 Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation for RCAF Airport Sites, RG 12 Volume 2342 File 5168-883-1 (St Joseph, On).

wanted the RCAF to find an alternative location for the landing field.⁹⁹

The RCAF was willing to look for alternative sites, but a "definite decision regarding the selection of St Joseph will depend upon the extent to which development is affected." The DNDA would grant the wishes of the parish only if an equivalent site could be found quickly and be developed without an unreasonable delay.¹⁰⁰ Because "the entire area was completely covered during preliminary investigations," the District Inspector and Engineer advised the Deputy Minister that no suitable alternative sites existed.¹⁰¹ The issue came to a close by the end of September 1941 when the Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air informed the Deputy Minister of Transport that St Joseph would be used as planned: "In view of the urgency of providing the RAF Service Flying Training School with full relief landing ground facilities, it has been decided to develop the site at St Joseph as [a relief aerodrome] to [the] Centralia SFTS You are, therefore, authorized to proceed with development immediately."¹⁰²

The primacy of training and the maintenance of construction schedules thus determined site selection results, not the economic and cultural situations of minority communities under

⁹⁹ 1 September 1941 Extract of ADC Meeting Minutes, 12 September 1941 letter from Special Assistant (to the Minister of National Defence for Air) to Air Vice Marshal G.O. Johnson (RCAF) and A.D. McLean (SA), 12 September 1941 letter from W.H. Golding (MP Seaforth, On) to A.D. McLean (SA), C.H. Edgett, H.A. Palmer (Right of Way Agent), RG 12 Volume 2342 File 5168-883-1 (St Joseph, On).

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ 5 September 1941 letter from C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport) to S.L. de Carteret (Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air), RG 12 Volume 2342 File 5168-883-1 (St Joseph, On).

¹⁰² 27 September 1941 letter from S.L. de Carteret (Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air) to C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport), RG 12 Volume 2342 File 5168-883-1 (St Joseph, On).

consideration. Just as the ADC's response to lobbying against selection was informed by technical necessities, so too was the response to communities requesting that their area be selected. By way of example, the unsuccessful efforts of three Saskatchewan towns – Big River, Shaunavon, and Melville – and the eventual success of Estevan, Saskatchewan, illustrate how selection officials resolutely based their decisions solely on meeting minimum technical criteria necessary for satisfactory aerodromes.

In January 1940, lobbyists of Big River wrote their MP, W.L.M. King, suggesting that the RCAF could use their local airport in the BCATP, thus saving the air force from having to build a new aerodrome from scratch.¹⁰³ Nonetheless, Transport officials responded that this abandoned airport would not be used because Big River was too remote for a training school, and the town's infrastructure could not accommodate an institution as large as a training school.¹⁰⁴ Lobbyists raised the issue again nine months later when the local Board of Trade, the Canadian Legion, the local Liberal Association, and the Elks Lodge simultaneously wrote the prime minister. While reiterating the supposed ideal nature of Big River's airport, lobbyists highlighted the fact that the province was willing to turn the property over to the federal government.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ 31 January 1940 telegram from Big River Liberal Association to W.L.M. King (MP Prince Albert, Sk), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 283 Reel C4566 pp. 239588-9.

¹⁰⁴ 15 February 1940 letter from W.J. Bennett (Private Secretary Minister of Transport) to H.R.L. Henry (Private Secretary Prime Minister), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 289 Reel 4570 p. 244388.

¹⁰⁵ 3 September 1940 telegrams from Board of Trade, R.M. Bell (Secretary of Canadian Legion), Geo A. Anderson (Exalted Ruler Elks Lodge), Liberal Association to W.L.M. King (MP Prince Albert, Sk), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 283 Reel C4566 pp. 239579, 239582, 239585, 239591.

The technical officers would not reconsider their decision, for Big River was too remote, and the town did not have the housing and commercial capacity needed to serve the population of a training base. The private secretary of the prime minister consequently informed the lobbyists that King could no longer make representations on their behalf due to the policy set out by the Minister of National Defence for Air on 13 June 1940: "I beg that the public generally ... will refrain from making further representations. Those representations should not have and will not have the effect of changing the decisions arrived at by the technical officers."¹⁰⁶ As a result, the secretary wrote, "it would be quite impossible for him [King] to make direct representations on behalf of any particular site after a decision in that matter had once been made by the technical officers concerned."¹⁰⁷ According to the historical record, neither King nor Big River lobbyists raised the issue of the abandoned airport again. Despite lobbying influence from the highest office in the country, the selection process withstood the test and did not stray from its mandate.

While technical officials immediately surmised that the town of Big River was unsuitable for an aerodrome, Shaunavon, Saskatchewan, initially appeared to show more promise. Nevertheless, investigation also revealed that this area did not meet the necessary technical criteria. In June 1941, the Board of Trade informed the Deputy Minister of Transport that its district had suitable weather for air training seeing as it shared the same climatic conditions as

239585, 239591.

¹⁰⁶ 4 September 1940 letter from H.R.L. Henry (Private Secretary Prime Minister) to Board Trade, Canadian Legion, Elks Lodge, and Liberal Association, King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 283 Reel C4566 pp. 239580-1, 239583-4 239586-7, 239592-3.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

training schools already built in southern Saskatchewan and Alberta.¹⁰⁸ These lobbyists also highlighted the town's large financial contributions to the war effort, this in spite of numerous crop failures.¹⁰⁹

Preliminary investigation in mid-July 1941 determined that large amounts of grading were necessary; hence, even the most promising sites in the area were not worth developing.¹¹⁰ Another inspection in 1942 again showed that much grading was required, gravel costs were high, and the top soil was poor. When the ADC considered Shaunavon's potentials, the Committee rejected the site as an EFTS because the prevailing high winds prohibited elementary flying and because importing gravel twenty-six miles by train – and an additional two and a half miles by truck – was too expensive.¹¹¹ Shaunavon lobbyists' aspirations for an aerodrome ended in August 1942 when the Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air announced that the RCAF would be expanding existing aerodromes, not building new aerodromes, to accommodate the

¹⁰⁸ 26 June 1941 letter from Acting Secretary (Shaunavon Board of Trade) to C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport), 26 June 1941 telegram from Shaunavon Board of Trade to C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport), RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 28 File 5168-C476 (Shaunavon, Sk).

¹⁰⁹ 26 June 1941 telegram from Shaunavon Board of Trade to C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport), 8 July 1941 letter from President Shaunavon Board of Trade to C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport), RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 28 File 5168-C476 (Shaunavon, Sk).

¹¹⁰ 17 July 1941 Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation for RCAF Airport Sites, RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 28 File 5168-C476 (Shaunavon, Sk).

¹¹¹ 17 July 1941 letter from W.H. Irvine (District Inspector Central Airways) to J.A. Wilson (CCA), 31 July 1942 letter from H.A. McIntyre (Water Supply Engineer) to J.A. Wilson (CCA), RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 28 File 5168-C476 (Shaunavon, SK).

training plan's increased enrollment.¹¹² In Shaunavon's case, the selection officials were not hasty in their decisions, for they had investigated the area numerous times.

Similarly, the fact that the many sites suggested by Melville residents were rejected by technical officials demonstrates that persistent lobbying did not change decisions made according to technical criteria. In mid-December 1939, the Melville area interested the RCAF because an aerodrome in that part of Saskatchewan would provide a more even provincial distribution of schools, as well as facilitate administration and personnel movement.¹¹³ Nevertheless technical experts found that no sites were "suitable for cheap and quick development."¹¹⁴ Over the summer months of 1940, town officials surveyed the district and suggested numerous sites that could take advantage of Melville's affordable water, cheap gravel, and local rail lines.¹¹⁵ The Board of Trade also hoped the DNDA would see the advantages of using a BCATP school to stimulate increased enlistments and financial donations, unite a diverse population in a common endeavour, and provide an airport for post-war aviation.¹¹⁶ Department of Transport officials

¹¹² 5 August 1942 letter from S.L. de Carteret (Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air) to C. R. Evans (MP Maple Creek, Sk), RG 24 Reel C-5036 File 925-2-212 (Shaunavon, Sk).

¹¹³ 15 December 1939 letter from A.D McLean (SA) to District Inspector Central Airways and District Inspector Western Airways, RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 21 File 5168-C150 Part 1 (Melville, Sk).

¹¹⁴ 4 January 1940 telegram District Inspector to J.A. Wilson (CCA), RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 21 File 5168-C150 Part 1 (Melville, Sk).

¹¹⁵ 31 August 1940 letter from H. Mackay (Secretary Board of Trade) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 21 File 5168-C150 Part 1 (Melville, Sk).

¹¹⁶ Undated "Brief on Melville Air Port Submitted by the Town of Melville and Melville and District Board of Trade", RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 21 File 5168-C150 Part 1 (Melville, Sk).

inspected the lobbyists' suggestions, only to report, after "two aerial inspections and exhaustive ground surveys," that none of the sites were suitable.¹¹⁷ Besides the rolling nature of the area's topography, "tremendous amounts of dirt movement" would be required because all the fields contained numerous potholes. Levelling hills ten feet high was unfeasible, and taking a year to develop the most suitable site in the area was too long to satisfy the training schedule.¹¹⁸

In 1941, technical officers considered more sites suggested by Melville residents, but they also failed to meet the necessary criteria.¹¹⁹ When the ADC considered the Department of Transport's findings in July 1942, it concluded that the Melville set-up could not meet the criteria of an SFTS because there were no emergency landing fields within the necessary five to twenty-five mile radius of the main aerodrome. Although able to accommodate an EFTS, the site was not approved because the cost of levelling the land was extremely high for an EFTS.¹²⁰ In September, the ADC ruled that the Melville site was unsuitable for all other possibilities. Just as an SFTS could not be built because suitable sites for the necessary adjacent emergency landing fields could not be located, the locale did not meet the requirements of an Operational Training

¹¹⁷ 8 September 1940 telegram from W.H. Irvine (District Inspector Central Airways) to J.A. Wilson (CCA), RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 21 File 5168-C150 Part 1 (Melville, Sk).

¹¹⁸ 9 September 1940 letter from W.H. Irvine (District Inspector Central Airways) to J.A. Wilson (CCA), RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 21 File 5168-C150 Part 1 (Melville, Sk).

¹¹⁹ 26 September 1941 letter from J.G. Gardiner (Minister of Agriculture) to C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport), 8 November 1941 letter from W.H. Irvine (District Inspector Central Airways) to J.A. Wilson (CCA), 22 April 1942 letter from J.G. Gardiner (Minister of Agriculture) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 21 File 5168-C150 Part 1 (Melville, Sk); 6 May 1942 memorandum from A.D. McLean (SA) to District Airways Inspectors and District Airways Engineers, RG 12 Volume 370 File 1223-6 Part 6.

¹²⁰ 21 July 1942 ADC Meeting Minutes, RG 12 Volume 371 File 1223-6 Part 7.

Unit: neither emergency landing fields nor an air firing and bombing range were available.¹²¹

The RCAF considered Melville one last time when the BCATP needed an SFTS for use in early 1944, but these new inspections again found that the site was unusable. The rolling nature of the district made forced landings dangerous, and the amount of grading necessary to make level emergency landing fields would be expensive and precluded construction from meeting the deadline. This site was abandoned when the ADC selected a superior set-up at Morden, Manitoba.¹²² Once again, failure to meet technical criteria disposed of sites proposed by persistent communities.

Estevan's lobbying efforts appear to be an example of vigorous representations reversing a decision, for the community eventually hosted a BCATP base. Nonetheless, careful examination shows that it was not Estevan's Liberal affiliation, financial blackmail, or persistent lobbying that secured the town a base. Rather, once the only technical obstacle to selection was removed, selection experts quickly took advantage of Estevan's suitability for an aerodrome. In December 1939, James Gardiner, federal Minister of Agriculture, argued that building a training school in Estevan would not only relieve the hardships of unemployment, but that its close

¹²¹ 15 September 1942 ADC Meeting Minutes, RG 12 Volume 371 File 1223-6 Part 7.

¹²² 20 February 1943 letter from S.L. de Carteret (Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air), 19 May 1943 letter from Air Commodore T.A. Lawrence (RCAF) to Secretary of National Defence for Air, RG 24 Reel C-5036 File 925-2-251-1 (Melville, Sk); 6 July 1943 letter from C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport) to K.S. MacLachlan (Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence – Naval and Air), RG 24 Reel C-5036 File 925-2-251-2 (Melville, Sk); 6 July 1943 ADC Meeting Minutes, RG 12 Volume 373 File 1223-6 Part 11.

proximity to the American border would be an asset to post-war international aviation.¹²³ The preliminary investigation of September 1940 found suitable fields and abundant water, power, gravel, and road connections.¹²⁴ Nevertheless, because of the policy prohibiting aerodromes within five miles of the American border to minimize the chances of lost trainees entering neutral air space,¹²⁵ the RCAF could not develop the site: Estevan was only four miles from the United States.¹²⁶

According to Estevan's mayor, local landmarks could solve the problem of pilots getting lost and flying into American skies. Two local river valleys were excellent lines of demarcation for navigating, and because the climate was generally clear in the area, lost pilots could easily find these valleys, reorient themselves, and return to Canadian airspace without incident.¹²⁷ When President Roosevelt publicly announced, in January 1941, America's willingness to provide "all aid to Britain short of an expeditionary force," aerodrome proponents argued that the obstacle to Estevan's being selected had been removed.¹²⁸ Nevertheless, lobbyists felt that their

¹²³ 6 December 1939 letter from J.G. Gardiner (Minister of Agriculture) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Transport), RG 12 Volume 2340 File 5168-867 Part 1 (Estevan, Sk).

¹²⁴ 1 September 1940 Preliminary Investigation for RCAF Airport Sites, RG 12 Volume 2340 File 5168-867 Part 1 (Estevan, Sk).

¹²⁵ 15 November 1939 memorandum from Air Vice Marshal G.M. Croil (Chief of Air Staff) to Military Secretary, RG 24 Volume 4775 File HQ 103-74/68 Part 1.

¹²⁶ 6 September 1940 letter from A.D. McLean (SA) to District Inspector Central Airways, RG 12 Volume 2340 File 5168-867 Part 1 (Estevan, Sk).

¹²⁷ 18 October 1940 letter from Mayor to C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air), RG 12 Volume 2340 File 5168-867 Part 1 (Estevan, Sk).

¹²⁸ 9 January 1941 "Roosevelt and Estevan," *The Estevan Mercury*, p. 3a.

area would have been suitable for an aerodrome even without Roosevelt's announcement.

According to the Board of Trade, the RCAF had built other aerodromes just as close to the border as Estevan was, and using railway lines in the vicinity could easily serve as navigational aids. Furthermore, all reports indicated that mayors of towns in North Dakota, and the American federal government itself, supported an aerodrome at Estevan. Hence, it appeared as though trainees need not worry about landing on American soil.¹²⁹

Uncertain if the change in American diplomatic attitudes was enough to reverse the RCAF's decision, the Board of Trade offered an additional incentive – veiled blackmail intertwining the town's past financial problems and present war contributions:

Unless some effective effort is made by the Federal Government to re-establish the financial balance of this community, further contributions to Red Cross, War Loan Bonds, and War Savings Certificates will greatly suffer. This town and vicinity has a most enviable record for assistance to all Government enterprises when called upon There will be a great falling off in contributions if there is not something done very quickly in order to restore confidence and offset our losses All of us are anxious that no such slump be allowed to develop as once the incentive to give is discouraged, it is a long and difficult uphill struggle to again establish the attitude which gives generously.¹³⁰

Because the change in the American government's policies removed the only impediment to building an aerodrome at Estevan, the threat was unnecessary. In February 1941, Department of Transport officials were directed to make a detailed survey of the Estevan sites since the ADC concluded that "present international relations" would allow a training school within four miles of the American border. By July, the ADC finally approved Estevan as an SFTS for the RAF.¹³¹

¹²⁹ 14 January 1941 letter from A.E. McKay (Secretary Board of Trade) to Jesse P. Tripp (MP Oxbow, Sk), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports) and RG 12 Volume 2340 File 5168-867 Part 1 (Estevan, Sk).

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ 17 February 1941 Extract of ADC Meeting Minutes, RG 12 Volume 2340 File 5168-867 Part 1 (Estevan, Sk); 18 July 1941 ADC Submission No. 219, RG 12 Volume 369 File 1223-6

Supposing old-style politics played a critical role in aerodrome selection, one would assume that the prime minister's riding received special consideration, especially since W.L.M. King actively lobbied on behalf of his constituents.¹³² Prince Albert, Saskatchewan, demanded preferential treatment on three occasions: in 1938-9, to secure a BCATP base; in 1940-1, to demand a larger school; and in 1942, to protest the closing of one of its schools. Besides revealing that Prince Albert constituents did not feel that they received the consideration they deserved, the exchanges between the DNDA and Prince Albert lobbyists also demonstrate that the RCAF determined the city's fate in a strictly technocratic manner.

Once publicly known in 1938 that Ottawa was considering Britain's air training proposal,¹³³ residents of Prince Albert began advertising why the community was ideal for a training school. According to lobbyists, the area was remote from enemy coastal attack and had facilities for both landplanes and seaplanes. The district boasted good railway and highway connections, suitable weather, and clear land around the already existing civilian airport. The varied topography of the vicinity – grain fields, forests, lakes, and streams – provided excellent opportunities for navigation and map-reading. In addition, local aircraft and engine repair shops

Part 3.

¹³² See correspondence in W.L.M. King Papers pertaining to Big River, Sk, MG 26 J1 Volume 283 Reel C4566, Volume 286 Reel C4568, Volume 289 Reel C4570, Volume 294 Reel C4573, Volume 295 Reel C4573; and Prince Albert, Sk, MG 26 J1 Volume 250 Reel C3733, Volume 257 Reel C3737, Volume 277 Reel C3748, Volume 294 Reel C4573, Volume 323 Reel C6805, Volume 331 Reel C6811, Volume 333 Reel C6812; MG 26 J4 Volume 237 (W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda, and Notes 1940-1950).

¹³³ 1 July 1938 House of Commons Debates, pp. 4527-29.

offered their services, as did a plant which manufactured aeroplane ski pedestals.¹³⁴ Because Prince Albert had been involved in commercial flying for fifteen years, lobbyists argued that "a large number of recruits of the proper stamp would be available" from among the air-minded residents of the city.¹³⁵

When Canada agreed in September 1939 to conduct Commonwealth air training,¹³⁶ lobbyists from Prince Albert intensified their efforts. Immediately, they brought the perceived merits of their civilian aerodrome to the government's attention again.¹³⁷ In doing so, constituents revealed their true political expectations: "it is reasonable that the citizens of this city and district feel that any benefits that might accrue from the emergency ... should be distributed as far as possible throughout the country." Because Regina, Saskatoon, Moose-Jaw, and Weyburn were reportedly getting aviation centres, Prince Albert residents felt slighted, for

¹³⁴ 1 August 1938 letter from J.P. Curror (Secretary Board of Trade) to Ian Mackenzie (Minister of National Defence) King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 257 Reel C3737 p. 219033; 25 August 1938 letter from H.J. Fraser (Mayor) to H.R.L. Henry (Private Secretary Prime Minister), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 250 Reel C3733 pp. 213298-9.

¹³⁵ 1 August 1938 letter from J.P. Curror (Secretary Board of Trade) to Ian Mackenzie (Minister of National Defence), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 257 Reel C3737 p. 219033.

¹³⁶ 26 September 1939 letter from Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs, King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 264 Reel C3741 pp. 224798-800; 26 September 1939 telegram from High Commissioner for Canada in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs, King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 274 Reel C3747 pp.232221-2; 28 September 1939 memorandum from K.S. MacLachlan (Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence – Naval and Air) to O.D. Skelton (Undersecretary of State for External Affairs), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 273 Reel C3746 pp. 230735-6.

¹³⁷ 25 September 1939 letter from W.J. Turnbull (Private Secretary Prime Minister) to A.G. MacLachlan (Private Secretary Minister of National Defence), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 277 Reel C3748 pp. 234340-1.

their facilities had not been inspected yet.¹³⁸

At this point, it was too early for the RCAF to have made any BCATP selection decisions. The air force had not decided on aerodrome criteria yet, nor had the British and Canadian governments determined the specific needs of the training plan. The only air force expansion at this time was the formation of twelve Auxiliary Active Air Force Squadrons. According to the Department of National Defence, these squadrons were distributed to areas that satisfied four criteria: strategic requirements, provincial population distribution, the presence of flying clubs, and the presence of nearby industrial centres from which mechanics could be drawn. The Department of National Defence refused to abandon its set policy simply to appease the political agenda of constituents, even if they belonged to the prime minister's riding. According to Defence officials, forming a squadron at Prince Albert "would involve a major alteration of the present policy in respect to the organization of the RCAF."¹³⁹

Although Prince Albert had a training school in operation by July 1940,¹⁴⁰ residents were not content with its size and consequently lobbied for a larger establishment. This second phase of lobbying demonstrates how constituents expected favouritism, how meeting technical criteria continued to determine decisions, and how selection officials would ultimately not change their

¹³⁸ 26 September 1939 letter from J.W. Sanderson (President Prince Albert Liberal Association) to H.R.L. Henry (Private Secretary Prime Minister), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 277 Reel C3748 pp. 234625-6.

¹³⁹ 29 September 1939 letter from A.G. MacLachlan (Private Secretary Minister of National Defence) to W.J. Turnbull (Private Secretary Prime Minister), King Papers, MG 26 J1 Volume 277 Reel C3748 p. 234352.

¹⁴⁰ Hatch, *Aerodrome of Democracy, Op. Cit.*, p. 210.

decisions despite demands from the prime minister's riding. In January 1940, the Department of Transport wrote the mayor of Prince Albert – as well as fifteen other city mayors¹⁴¹ – requesting permission to use the city's civilian aerodrome for training purposes.¹⁴² Once the city gladly granted this wish,¹⁴³ the RCAF established an EFTS and an AOS at Prince Albert's airport. Despite being given two schools, residents complained that the schools' combined population was substantially smaller than the number of trainees stationed at an SFTS – the type of base for which the city was originally investigated. Jealousy that others towns – Saskatoon in particular – would have large numbers of air force personnel patronizing their businesses prompted these protests.¹⁴⁴

Some lobbyists suggested the situation must be rectified to ensure that Prime Minister King did not lose his seat in the next election. According to the President of the Board of Trade, giving Prince Albert a larger school "will create a more favourable atmosphere around this

¹⁴¹ 22 January letter from V.I. Smart (Deputy Minister of Transport) to K.S. MacLachlan (Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence – Naval and Air), 24 January letter from V.I. Smart (Deputy Minister of Transport) to K.S. MacLachlan (Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence – Naval and Air), RG 24 Volume 4775 File HQ 103-74/68 Part 1.

¹⁴² 22 January 1940 letter from V.I. Smart (Deputy Minister of Transport) to Mayor, RG 12 Volume 3106 File 5151-C135 Part 1 (Prince Albert, Sk).

¹⁴³ 24 January 1940 letter from George Brock (Mayor) to V.I. Smart (Deputy Minister of Transport), RG 12 Volume 3106 File 5151-C135 Part 1 (Prince Albert, Sk).

¹⁴⁴ 12 April 1940 letter from R. Mayson (President Board of Trade) to W.L.M. King (MP Prince Albert, Sk), King Papers, MG 26 J1 Volume 294 Reel C4573 pp. 248757-8; 20 September 1940 letter from J.P. Curror (Secretary Board of Trade) to H.R.L. Henry (Private Secretary Prime Minister), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 294 Reel C4573 pp. 248784-5.

city."¹⁴⁵ Another constituent wrote the prime minister, asserting that forcing a change in the size of the school was "expected by all constituents, and particularly the good Liberals who worked so hard for [King's] support."¹⁴⁶ The rhetoric of partisan politics was rampant in Prince Albert's expectations.

The RCAF had not built an SFTS in the city because the area failed to meet the necessary technical criteria. SFTSs needed two emergency landing fields within five and twenty-five miles of each other and the main aerodrome. Because selection officials could not find two suitable relief fields within the specified distance, the RCAF put the already existing aerodrome to maximum usage by establishing an EFTS and an AOS.¹⁴⁷ Despite requests by constituents, the DNDA would not double the size of the EFTS to increase the base's population.¹⁴⁸ To avoid unnecessary congestion, delays in training, and increased danger of collisions, it was policy to not build double-EFTSs if another school was also using the aerodrome.¹⁴⁹ Again, these

¹⁴⁵ 2 April 1940 letter from R. Mayson (President Board of Trade) to W.L.M. King (MP Prince Albert, Sk), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 294 Reel C4573 pp. 248757-8.

¹⁴⁶ 4 April 1940 letter from T.R. Stalker (Constituent) to W.L.M. King (MP Prince Albert, Sk), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 297 Reel C4575 pp. 252322-3.

¹⁴⁷ 11 April 1940 letter from Lieutenant-Colonel W.S. Fenton (Department of National Defence) to Assistant Deputy Minister of National Defence - Naval and Air, King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 294 Reel C4573 p. 249401; 17 April 1940 memorandum by Air Commodore G.O. Johnson (RCAF), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 294 Reel C4573 p. 248760.

¹⁴⁸ 8 August 1940 letter from J.P. Curror (Secretary Board of Trade) to H.R.L. Henry (Private Secretary Prime Minister), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 294 Reel C4573 p. 248780; 20 September 1940 letter from J.P. Curror (Secretary Board of Trade) to H.R.L. Henry (Private Secretary Prime Minister), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 294 Reel C4573 pp. 248784-5.

¹⁴⁹ 3 October 1940 letter from James A. Sharpe (Secretary Minister of National Defence for Air) to H.R.L. Henry (Private Secretary Prime Minister), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 294 Reel C4573 p. 248721.

technically-oriented decisions show that selection officials were concerned with building the safest and most efficient aerodromes, not keeping voters happy.

When expanding the BCATP in 1942, the RCAF ignited protest again with its decision to disband Prince Albert's AOS and double the EFTS. This final wave of lobbying demonstrates numerous things: the prime minister himself was unable to alter decisions; the authority of technical experts was not usurped; and the RCAF based its site decisions on predetermined criteria. In the end, technocracy won out over partisanship. To accommodate the increase in air crew output, the RCAF planned to add the equivalent of nine new AOSs, giving Canada a total number of nineteen such schools. Two ANSs were combined into the equivalent of two AOSs, eight existing AOSs were doubled, and one AOS remained a single school.¹⁵⁰ Having one AOS surplus to requirements, the DNDA decided to close Prince Albert since it had a record of poor aircraft serviceability, low flying times, and hence less training per graduate.¹⁵¹ Consequently, two schools were no longer sharing one aerodrome, and the RCAF was therefore free to double the Prince Albert EFTS.¹⁵²

Lobbyists immediately countered that their AOS would not have been the least efficient in the BCATP if the runways had been hard surfaced from the school's beginning. Hard surfaced

¹⁵⁰ 25 June 1942 memorandum from Air Vice Marshal Robert Leckie (RCAF) to C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air), C.G. Power Collection 2150 IId File D-1064 Box 61.

¹⁵¹ 1 June 1942 memorandum from Air Vice Marshal Robert Leckie to J.L. Apedaile (Financial Advisor Civil Flying Schools), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 331 Reel C6811 p. 283068.

¹⁵² 5 June 1942 letter from Squadron Leader James A. Sharpe (RCAF) to H.R.L. Henry (Private Secretary Prime Minister), C.G. Power Collection 2150 IId File D-1074 Box 62.

runways would have reduced operating costs, and bad weather would not have affected runway serviceability and flying time.¹⁵³ In light of the RCAF's new policy of paving AOS runways to accommodate the large planes being used, lobbyists claimed that Prince Albert had lost "all chance of securing a modern airport comparable with that secured by every other city in this province."¹⁵⁴ The situation was further exacerbated by the RCAF's decision to use Davidson, Saskatchewan's, vacant EFTS for a new AOS. The only justification conceivable to Prince Albert representatives was that the government was silencing Conservative MP John Diefenbaker's criticisms of the training plan by placing a BCATP base "in the heart of his constituency."¹⁵⁵

The need to meet technical criteria – not political considerations – dominated every letter C.G. Power sent in response to King's perpetual protests. Because beginner pilots found it difficult to land on and stay on narrow-looking runways, the air force used sod landing strips at EFTSs. This gave trainee pilots the latitude to land from any direction and to land anywhere on the field. It was this policy that had precluded the Prince Albert EFTS-AOS combination from receiving hard surfaced runways.¹⁵⁶ Despite the assumption of Prince Albert residents, Davidson

¹⁵³ Undated Memorandum re: "Prince Albert Air Observers School," C.G. Power Collection 2150 IId File D-1064 Box 61; 23 June 1942 letter from W.L.M. King (MP Prince Albert) to C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air), C.G. Power Collection 2150 IId File D-1064 Box 62.

¹⁵⁴ 15 June 1942 letter from P.W. Mahon (Constituent) to Justice T.C. Davis (Department National War Services), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 323 Reel C6805 pp. 274032-2c.

¹⁵⁵ Undated Memorandum Prince Albert Air Observers School, C.G. Power Collection 2150 IId File D-1064 Box 61.

¹⁵⁶ 29 June 1942 letter from C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air) to W.L.M. King (MP Prince Albert, Sk), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 331 Reel C6811 pp. 283085-7.

was not getting the AOS from Prince Albert, but rather from Chatham, New Brunswick. The RCAF wanted to take advantage of Chatham's easy conversion to an Operational Training Unit (OTU). Not only did the Chatham AOS have runways five thousand feet long, but it was also strategically located for defensive and offensive use. Instead of spending \$3,000,000 on a new OTU site,¹⁵⁷ the Department of Transport estimated conversion of the Chatham AOS aerodrome to cost only \$620,000.¹⁵⁸ The DNDA chose Davidson for the displaced Chatham AOS because it was unoccupied, already complete, and had paved runways (an undertaking paid for by the British Air Ministry when Davidson was an RAF station).¹⁵⁹

Keeping the EFTS at Prince Albert and opening the AOS at Davidson was thus in the best interest of efficiency and training. If the AOS remained at Prince Albert, the RCAF would have to pave the sod runways, which "would have been a serious interruption to the flying training."¹⁶⁰ No costs or interruptions to flying would occur by opening the AOS where hard surfaced runways were already available and by doubling the EFTS where excellent sod runways existed.¹⁶¹ Despite pressure from the prime minister, the decision to double the Prince Albert EFTS and close the AOS stood firm. The prime minister was not comforted by the fact that the

¹⁵⁷ 25 June 1942 memorandum from Air Vice Marshal Robert Leckie (RCAF) to C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air), C.G. Power Collection 2150 IId File D-1064 Box 61.

¹⁵⁸ 4 February 1943 ADC Submission No. 1071 RG 12 Volume 372 File 1223-6 Part 9.

¹⁵⁹ 7 July 1942 letter from C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air) to W.L.M. King (MP Prince Albert, Sk), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 331 Reel C6811 pp. 283090-1.

¹⁶⁰ 25 June 1942 memorandum from Air Vice Marshal Robert Leckie (RCAF) to C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air), C.G. Power Collection 2150 IId File D-1064 Box 61.

¹⁶¹ 8 August 1942 letter from C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air) to W.L.M. King (MP Prince Albert, SK), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 331 Reel C6811.

air force made these difficult decisions according to technical merit and that the Chatham AOS never moved to Davidson because the Chatham OTU never materialized. Davidson, a "mere village" had hard surfaced runways while Prince Albert, "a large community [and] ... a natural focus of civilian flying," was still without modern facilities.¹⁶² Nonetheless, the prime minister's political desires never dictated the outcome in Prince Albert: the RCAF's decisions – made with the best interest of training in mind – were never thwarted by political whims.

The multitude of decisions made by the RCAF and Department of Transport in aerodrome investigation provides no evidence that selection was driven by politics. The decisions demonstrate explicitly that the process was technocratic. Despite communities' varied approaches to convince the government that they each deserved a base, the selection officials responded with concrete, objective, and technical reasons for selecting or rejecting a site. Lobbyists contacted people at all levels of the selection hierarchy – from district inspectors and engineers to the Chief of the Air Staff and the Minister of National Defence for Air.¹⁶³ Nevertheless, the ADC only considered preliminary investigations reports when recommending

¹⁶² 23 June 1942 letter from W.L.M. King (MP Prince Albert, Sk) to C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air), C.G. Power Collection 2150 IId File D1074 Box 62; 23 July 1942 letter from W.L.M. King (MP Prince Albert, Sk) to C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air), King Papers MG 26 J1 Volume 331 Reel C6811 pp. 283093-5.

¹⁶³ 21 August 1941 letter from W.A. Tucker (MP Rosthern, Sk) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports); 14 March 1941 letter from N.O. Hipel (Minister of Labour and Welfare) to C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air), RG 24 Reel C5036 File 925-2-68 (Preston, Ontario); 17 February 1941 letter from J.G. Gardiner (Minister of Agriculture) to C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports); 9 March 1941 letter from Jean I. Bell (Constituent) to Air Vice Marshal L.S. Breadner (Chief of Air Staff), RG 24 Reel C5036 File 925-2-163 (Carleton Place, On).

sites for detailed surveys and aerodrome plans and estimates when making the final selection decisions.¹⁶⁴ There is no record that an area's economic hardships, patriotic contributions, or political affiliation were the subject of discussion at ADC meetings.

In retrospect, the selection process reconstructed from DoT, RCAF, and ADC files thus confirms C.G. Power's claim of 13 June 1940. After being bombarded, since late 1939, with personal delegations and letters from constituents and colleagues alike, the Minister of National Defence for Air reminded the House of Commons that site selection was driven by merit alone:

I fully realize that it is not only possible but very highly probable that certain localities will not receive the favourable consideration they may have desired and expected, but having regard to the decisions of the technical officers and the reasons on which they are based, I beg that the public generally – boards of trade, municipal councils, all interested persons – will refrain from making further representations. Those representations should not have, and may I say with all respect, will not have the effect of changing the decisions arrived at by the technical officers.... I say, with full responsibility for my statement, to the public generally and to my colleagues, that over-energetic representations made in the interest of particular localities can serve only to retard progress and to divert from their duties officers already completely engrossed in work of primary and essential importance.¹⁶⁵

The case-by-case examination of the primary records shows that RCAF officers made the selection decisions and elected politicians merely 'rubber-stamped' the recommendations. There is no evidence that patronage swayed the process – not by cronyism, parochialism, or pork-barrelling. These records also show that selection officials based their decisions on technical criteria necessary for the swift and economical construction of usable aerodromes. Hence, it can be asserted that technical considerations were undoubtedly the basis of site selection. Nevertheless, before asserting in all finality that old-style politics played no role in BCATP base

¹⁶⁴ Wilson, *Op. Cit.*, p. 28; 23 March 1940 ADC Minute No. 14, RG 12 Volume 368 File 1223-6 Part 1.

¹⁶⁵ 13 June 1940, *House of Commons Debates, Op. Cit.*, p. 740.

selection, the specific political affiliation of sites selected and rejected must be considered.

Then, the historiographic contributions of this study to literature on politics, professional management, regionalism, aerodrome selection, and civil-military relations can be evaluated.

CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS AND HISTORIOGRAPHIC REFLECTIONS

Of all the published accounts about the BCATP, only two have considered the determining forces behind BCATP base selection. Although the writers only dealt with the issue in passing, they have left a lasting impression about Canada's political system and civil-military relations. Greenhous and Hillmer suggested that communities won their training schools by lobbying government officials,¹ while Conrad later concluded that Liberal constituencies were favoured in site selection and that Conservative ridings were deliberately neglected.² This thesis has shown, nonetheless, that these conclusions, despite reflecting a traditional belief in the power of partisan politics, are wrong.

When addressing how sites may have been selected, Greenhous, Hillmer, and Conrad did not look at the site selection process from the government's point of view. Accordingly, they failed to consider not only the delegation of authority from the purview of cabinet members to the RCAF and Department of Transport,³ but also the detailed technocratic process through which the selection officials evaluated each site.⁴ Implicit in the selection process itself was the stringent curtailment of political influence and patronage. Additionally, the site selection reports, final selection decisions, and reasons for rejection clearly portray that meeting technical criteria was foremost in selection officials' minds. Nonetheless, Greenhous, Hillmer, and Conrad did not discuss or confront this evidence. Instead, their footnotes show a reliance on primary sources –

¹ Greenhous and Hillmer, *Op. Cit.*, p. 134.

² Conrad, *Training For Victory*, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 14, 16.

³ 17 November 1939 Privy Council Order 3710, RG 12 Volume 624 File 11-6-9.

⁴ See Chapter IV.

city archives and newspapers – that documented active lobbying, but neither its impact nor results. Consequently, these historians drew conclusions to which these sources pointed, but again, the wrong evidence led to the wrong conclusions.

As demonstrated in this thesis, there was indeed a detailed and objective technocratic process for selecting BCATP training schools, and this process left little room for lobbyists' influence, despite the claims of Greenhous and Hillmer. Analysis of the political affiliation of provincial ridings, sites selected, and communities rejected will show that Conrad's claims are just as unsupportable. At this point, this thesis will be free to conclude that there were no parochial politics in BCATP base selection.

The fact that the majority of BCATP bases in the prairies and Ontario were established in Liberal ridings⁵ is not evidence that Liberal affiliation increased communities' chances of being selected. Most constituencies in Canada were in fact represented by Liberal MPs. After the election of March 1940, the Liberals held an unprecedented 184 of 245 seats – "the greatest majority given to any Canadian Government up to that time."⁶ Fourteen of Manitoba's seventeen ridings were Liberal, as were twelve of Saskatchewan's twenty-one ridings, and fifty-five of Ontario's eighty-two constituencies.⁷ Logically, more sites would have been selected in Liberal ridings because there was not an abundance of non-Liberal areas from which to chose.

⁵ Saskatchewan: 14 of 20 schools; Manitoba: 13 of 14 schools; Ontario: 20 of 36 schools; See Appendix A "BCATP Schools Established in Canada 1939-1945" and Appendix B "Federal Electoral Constituencies"

⁶ Pickersgill, *Op. Cit.*, p. 73.

⁷ See Appendix B "Federal Electoral Constituencies."

With this preponderance of Liberal ridings, it would not have been unreasonable for the proportion of sites selected in Liberal ridings to be equivalent to 57.1% in Saskatchewan, 82.4% in Manitoba, and 67.1% in Ontario (the percentage of seats in each province that were Liberal).

Table 5-1
Proportion of BCATP Schools and Political Representatives by Affiliation 1940 - 1945
 (See Appendix B)

Province	% of Ridings by Affiliation	% of Bases of Each Affiliation
Alberta	58.8% ND 41.2% L	52.9% ND 47.1% L
Saskatchewan	57.1% L 14.3% C 23.8% CCF	70.0% L 15.0% C 15.0% CCF
Manitoba	82.4% L 5.9% C	93.8% L 7.1% C
Ontario	67.1% L 30.4% C	55.6% L 44.4% C

Abbreviations:

C	Conservative
CCF	Cooperative Commonwealth Federation
L	Liberal
ND	New Democracy (party name used by Social Credit candidates in 1940 election)

Nevertheless, there is no overarching correlation between the proportion of schools placed in Liberal, Conservative, or CCF ridings and the percentage of constituencies these parties held in each province (see Table 5-1). In both Saskatchewan and Manitoba, Liberal constituencies were over-represented while the number of schools built in Conservative ridings was almost equal to the party's percentage of seats held. In Saskatchewan, the CCF party was under-represented in the number of schools built in its constituencies. Ontario had a different pattern: Liberal ridings' percentage of schools was under the provincial proportion of MPs, while the Conservative party was over-represented by almost 15%. These percentages can be used neither to suggest selection was according to political representation nor to assert that Liberal communities were favoured; Conservative settlements, for example, received their fair share – and sometimes more.

Geography can account for why some ridings did not host even one aerodrome. Because

the northern regions of the prairies were remote, inaccessible, and neither clear nor flat, they were not conducive to air training. This included communities in Alberta's Athabaska, Edmonton-East, Jasper-Edson, Peace River, and Vegreville ridings. The northern constituencies of Melfort and North Battleford in Saskatchewan failed to receive training schools, as did Manitoba's Churchill riding. In three instances, aerodromes were established in northern ridings – Prince Albert (Saskatchewan), The Battlefords (Saskatchewan), and Edmonton-East (Alberta), but these successful northern communities all had civilian aerodromes of which the RCAF took advantage.⁸ Communities in middle and southern regions of the prairie provinces were preferred by the RCAF, but even such geographical location did not guarantee that sites could meet the specific technical criteria.⁹

Because of the Liberal party's overwhelming success in the March 1940 election, the number of schools in Liberal ridings cannot be used as evidence that sites were intentionally awarded to Liberal communities at the expense of those of other affiliations. To support the claim that Liberal ridings were deliberately favoured, one would have to demonstrate that the majority of sites rejected were of non-Liberal affiliation. Nonetheless, the historical record shows that this was not the case.¹⁰

Potential aerodrome sites could be rejected at three different stages: they were either not considered by Transport officials, not forwarded to the ADC by the Department of Transport, or

⁸ *Federal Electoral District Maps: The Representation Act 1933* (National Archives holding G1116.F7C3 1933).

⁹ See Appendix B "Federal Electoral Constituencies."

¹⁰ See Appendix H "Sites Considered But Not Selected."

rejected upon ADC evaluation. Despite lobbying, a community did not receive a preliminary investigation if it were readily obvious – without the expense of a search party and detailed survey – that the area was immediately disqualified by such problems as remote location, lack of infrastructure, or dangerous topography.¹¹ After topographical map consultation, air reconnaissances, or word of mouth, the field parties would conduct a preliminary investigation of promising sites. If this report concluded the site did not meet the minimum technical criteria necessary, the Department of Transport would not pursue the site any further, thus saving the time and expense of preparing detailed surveys, plans, and estimates.¹² The names of these sites were not forwarded to the ADC. The final stage of consideration rested with the ADC. By examining the Department of Transport's proposals, plans, and estimates, the RCAF officers compared similar proposals, and these set-ups were either accepted or rejected. Often, the ADC compared formerly rejected sites at later dates, but sites with serious drawbacks were never accepted.¹³

In Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario, the majority of sites rejected, at all three stages, were in fact located in Liberal ridings. Of the sixty-seven rejected sites in Saskatchewan, thirty-nine were Liberal. Twenty-nine of the forty-one sites rejected in Manitoba were Liberal, as were seventy-three of the ninety-seven sites not selected in Ontario. The most promising sites were

¹¹ Big River, Porquis Junction; See Chapter IV.

¹² 17 August 1942 letter from S.L. de Carteret (Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air) to C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport), RG 24 Reel C5036 File 925-2-226 (Vermilion, Ab).

¹³ Shaunavon, Melville; See Chapter IV.

those considered by the ADC, and the majority of these technically plausible – but not selected – sites were Liberal: Saskatchewan 11/14, Manitoba 5/6, Ontario 18/23.¹⁴ The same pattern of Liberal affiliation dominating the rejection list is found amongst the Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario constituencies that were not given an aerodrome (see Table 5-2).

Table 5-2
Federal Constituencies that Did Not Host a BCATP Aerodrome 1940 - 1945
(See Appendix B)

Province	Total # Ridings	# Ridings With No Aerodrome
Alberta	17	11 – 7 ND, 4 L
Saskatchewan	21	9 – 4 L, 3 CCF, 1 C, 1 Unity
Manitoba	17	6 – 5 L, 1 LP
Ontario	82	48 – 35 L, 11 C, 2 LL

Abbreviations:

C:	Conservative
CCF:	Cooperative Commonwealth Federation
L:	Liberal
LL:	Liberal-Labour
LP:	Liberal-Progressive
ND:	New Democracy (party name used by Social Candidates in 1940 election)

It also cannot be said that non-Liberal ridings were slighted.¹⁵ Nearly half of Saskatchewan's nine non-Liberal constituencies received training bases: two CCF and two Conservative. In Manitoba, only one non-Liberal riding did not host an aerodrome. Approximately half of Ontario's non-Liberal ridings had the benefit of at least one training

¹⁴ See Appendix H "Sites Considered But Not Selected."

¹⁵ See Appendix B "Federal Electoral Constituencies."

school (13/25). Voting Liberal in the past did not guarantee winning a coveted BCATP base.¹⁶ After the 1940 election in Saskatchewan, three Liberal ridings, two CCF ridings, and 1 Unity riding were rejected although they all voted Liberal in the 1935 election. All five of the Liberal ridings rejected in Manitoba had also elected Liberal candidates in 1935. Of the forty-eight constituencies in Ontario that did not receive an aerodrome after the 1940 election, thirty Liberal, five Conservative and two Liberal-Labour ridings had voted for the Liberal party in the previous election.

Alberta contradicts the trends found amongst the other three provinces: most of the sites rejected at all stages of consideration and most of the ridings that did not receive an aerodrome were not of Liberal colour. Nevertheless, the majority of the MPs representing Alberta were non-Liberal, and most of the aerodromes were not built in Liberal ridings, as had been the trend in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario.¹⁷ The relatively equal proportion of seats held by New Democracy (the new name of Social Credit candidates¹⁸) and Liberal candidates (58.8% and 41.2% respectively) is reflected in the affiliation of ridings hosting schools: three New Democracy and three Liberal. Of the seventeen BCATP schools built in Alberta, nine were in New Democracy towns while eight were in Liberal areas. The fact that the number of schools in Liberal communities almost matched the number in New Democracy towns should neither be surprising nor considered Liberal favouritism. The number of Liberal representatives almost

¹⁶ See Appendix B "Federal Electoral Constituencies."

¹⁷ See Appendix B "Federal Electoral Constituencies."

¹⁸ Bob Hesketh, *Major Douglas and Alberta Social Credit* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), p. 195.

equalled the number of successful New Democracy candidates in the 1940 election: ten New Democracy versus seven Liberal.

Therefore, links between aerodrome selection and political affiliation across the prairies and Ontario cannot soundly be made. Although the majority of sites selected were in Liberal communities, the majority of sites rejected were also of Liberal affiliation. The fact that the majority of constituencies across Canada were Liberal after the 1940 election explains both phenomena. The percentage of ridings in a province of a certain political colour did not correspond to the proportion of schools built in communities of the same political affiliation. Hence, there is no evidence that sites were selected according to quotas. Furthermore, these percentages cannot be interpreted as showing Liberal favouritism, for other political parties were sometimes over-represented. Statistical analysis thus discounts Conrad's assertion that Liberal ridings were favoured and non-Liberal ridings were neglected.

Although there is no statistical evidence that political affiliation dictated aerodrome selection, or even played a secondary role, the lobbying attempts of communities cannot be completely dismissed. Non-technical themes justifying selection – such as contributions to the war effort, historical importance, and political consequences – were of little interest to selection officials concerned with meeting technical criteria. Nevertheless, not all lobbyists dwelt on irrelevant themes; communities did bring potential technical merits to the government's attention: climatic conditions, utilities available, level land for sale.¹⁹ Because some lobbyists did raise relevant points, their letters might have precipitated a preliminary investigation that may not

¹⁹ See Chapter III.

have otherwise occurred. If a community lobbied before the Department of Transport or the RCAF made enquiries about the area, these letters may have brought the locality's potential to the attention of the selection officials. Without such lobbying, these settlements may have been overlooked. To determine to what extent lobbying might have influenced the selection process, one must compare the number of communities that lobbied before the government showed interest with the number of towns that lobbied after the government had already considered the area (see Table 5-3).²⁰

Table 5-3
Comparison of Communities' First Lobbying Efforts and Government's First
Consideration (September 1939 - May 1943)
 (See Appendix D)

Province	Total # Lobbied	# Towns Lobbying Before Consideration	# Towns Lobbying After Consideration	# Towns Not Investigated
Alberta	13	6 (46.2%)	5 (38.5%)	2 (15.4%)
Saskatchewan	34	11 (32.4%)	16 (47.1%)	7 (20.6%)
Manitoba	12	2 (16.7%)	6 (50.0%)	4 (33.3%)
Ontario	43	11 (25.6%)	24 (55.8%)	8 (18.6%)

Only in Alberta did more towns lobby before government consideration than after, but the difference of one is negligible. In each province, less than half the communities that lobbied might have precipitated an investigation. (Alberta 6/13, Saskatchewan 11/34, Manitoba 2/12, Ontario 11/43). On average, only 29.4% (30/102) might have initiated the consideration they received.

²⁰ See Appendix D "Communities that Lobbied."

Table 5-4
Percentage of All Communities Considered Potentially Prompting Their Investigation
(September 1939 - May 1940)
 (See Appendix D)

Province	# Considered	# Lobbied Before	% Initiated Investigation
Alberta	79	6	7.6%
Saskatchewan	101	11	10.9%
Manitoba	66	2	3.0%
Ontario	149	11	7.4%

Besides less than half the lobbying communities potentially prompting their own consideration, only a small fraction of all the towns investigated may have influenced the selection process (see Table 5-4). In all four provinces, in no case did the number of towns potentially initiating a preliminary investigation exceed 11%, and overall, the average percentage of towns that might have influenced the government was 7.6% (30/395).

Table 5-5
Selected Sites That Potentially Influenced Initial Investigation
(September 1939 - May 1943)
 (See Appendices A, C, and D)

Province	# Communities Selected	# Lobbied	Before	After
Alberta	11	4	2 (18.2%)	2 (18.2%)
Saskatchewan	14	10	6 (42.9%)	4 (28.6%)
Manitoba	11	3	1 (9.1%)	2 (18.2%)
Ontario	28	10	2 (7.1%)	8 (28.6%)

Also worth consideration is whether or not there is a correlation between the number of communities that lobbied and the number that actually received aerodromes (see Table 5-5).²¹

²¹ These were the most lucrative aerodromes since recruits lived on these bases and mingled with the community; relief aerodromes were only used for practising landings and take-offs, as well as for emergencies.

In Alberta, Manitoba, and Ontario, less than half the selected districts had lobbied, and in all four provinces, the number of localities that won a base and might have influenced their initial investigation through lobbying was less than 50%. On average, only 17.2% (11/64) of selected communities potentially influenced the government by lobbying before being considered. The number of areas that did not lobby but were still investigated exceed the number of areas that potentially influenced the government through lobbying.

Neither the primary record nor statistical analysis thus yield evidence that BCATP base selection was patronage-driven. Selection officials considered and selected ridings of all affiliations, and the proportions of schools built in ridings across the political spectrum do not support suggestions of meeting hidden quotas or favouring Liberal communities. Furthermore, the expectation that most rejected sites would be non-Liberal was not fulfilled; the majority of sites not selected were Liberal communities. Overall, lobbying efforts were ineffective, and the majority of Canadian citizens seemed to have realized this. Of the 395 communities mentioned in the primary records, only 102 lobbied. Even the lobbyists from these 102 communities seemed to have sensed the futility of trying to interrupt the technocratic selection process: 51% (52/102) did not campaign any longer than a month for their region;²² forty-five communities (44%) only wrote once.²³

This weak and ineffectual lobbying effort, as well as the rational explanation for the Liberal affiliation of most sites, further verifies the supremacy of the objective criteria-driven

²² See Appendix F "Lobbying Duration."

²³ See Appendix E "Lobbying Intensity."

selection process traced in the ADC, RCAF, and DoT files. Hence, one can conclude that BCATP base selection was indeed governed by technical merit; patronage and lobbying did not have a role to play. Not only is there no statistical evidence that sites were selected according to quotas, no document was found in the historical record stipulating selection according to any kind of quota. Selection officials did consciously distribute BCATP aerodromes amongst the four regional training commands into which Canada was divided. Nevertheless, this cannot be interpreted as implying a hidden quota-system. Because each command was supposed to be self-sufficient, each command consequently required schools for each stage of training.²⁴ The selection process reconstructed from the primary documents reveals why quota instructions cannot be found: the process was based on merit, not political affiliation.

Politicians and selection officials never hid the fact that final decisions rested with the RCAF and its technical experts. From as early as November 1939, the Minister of Transport explained to lobbyists the division of labour and delegation of authority in the selection process:

This Department [of Transport] will undertake a survey of existing airport facilities and proposed sites. When these surveys are complete, our officers will advise the Royal Canadian Air Force of the exact position of existing facilities and will recommend certain localities as being suitable for airport development.... The sites having been selected, this Department will be required to proceed with the development and construction.

C.D. Howe went on to add that "the final decision as to the location of new sites will rest with the Royal Canadian Air Force.... This Department has not the last word with regard to the selection of sites for air training encampments."²⁵ Other Transport officials made similar claims

²⁴ Hatch, *Aerodrome of Democracy*, *Op. Cit.*, pp.41-2.

²⁵ 16 November 1939 C.D. Howe (Minister of Transport) to Arthur G. Slaght (MP Parry Sound, On), RG 12 Volume 2314 File 5168-241 (Emsdale, On).

when corresponding with lobbyists as late as December 1941.²⁶

On 13 June 1940, C.G. Power explained to the House of Commons both the selection process and the DNDA's policy concerning lobbying. Because lobbying "divert[ed] from their duties officers already completely engrossed in work of primary importance," Power requested that lobbying cease. Decisions were being made by technical experts according to merit. Hence, "these representations should not have, and ... will not have the effect of changing the decisions arrived at by the technical officers."²⁷

Post-war recollections of aerodrome selection also stressed the technocratic nature of the process and the futility of lobbying. In October 1945, the Department of Transport officials

²⁶ 4 January 1940 letter from J.A. Wilson (CCA) to J.W. Colwell (Secretary Board of Trade), RG 12 Volume 2119 File 5168-381 Part 1 (Macleod, Ab); 1 February 1940 letter from C.D. Howe (Minister of Transport) to Elie O. Bertrand (MP L'Orignal, On), RG 12 Volume 2323 File 5168-594-2 (St Eugene, On); 2 February 1940 letter from V.I. Smart (Deputy Minister of Transport) to J.O. Apps (General Assistant, CPR), RG 12 Volume 624 File 11-6-9; 15 February 1940 letter from V.I. Smart (Deputy Minister of Transport) to G.M. Roberts (County Clerk, Goderich, On), RG 12 Volume 3118 File 5151-O115-2 (Goderich, On); 8 April 1940 letter from C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport) to S.L. de Carteret (Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air), RG 24 Reel C5036 File 925-2-182 (Taber, Ab); 24 May 1940 letter from J.S. Duncan (Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air) to C.A.C. Lips (City Clerk Kitchener, On), RG 24 Reel C5036 File 925-2-69 (Winterbourne, On); 27 May 1940 letter from A.D. McLean (SA) to M.H. Fisher (Secretary Treasurer Ardill, Sk), RG 12 Volume 2332 File 5168-803 Part 1 (Mossbank, Sk); 22 August 1940 letter from J.A. Wilson (CAA) to Charles J. Lee (Town Clerk), RG 12 Volume 2310 File 5168-199 Part 1 (Assiniboia, Sk); 27 December 1940 letter from W.J. Bennett (Private Secretary Minister of Transport) to J. Ward (MP), MG 27 III B20 Volume 94 File 61-5-4 (C.D. Howe Papers – Manitoba Airports); 17 September 1941 letter from C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport) to G.S. Herring (Secretary Chamber of Commerce) RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 28 File 516.8-C517 (Maple Creek, Sk); 2 December 1941 letter from C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply) to J.G. Gardiner (Minister of Agriculture), MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports); 1 January 1942 letter from A.D. McLean (SA) to A.G. McLean, RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 File 5168-C364 (Kamsack, Sk).

²⁷ 13 June 1940 House of Commons Debates, p. 740.

reflected on the futility of lobbying:

The Department was flooded with letters from property owners demanding that certain property in their possession be examined with a view to using the sites for airport purposes. The writers of these letters rarely had the faintest idea of what airport requirements for the Air Training Plan were; and the net result was a considerable loss of time in looking at properties that in all but an infinitesimal percentage of cases had no potential value as airport sites. A considerable amount of time of senior officials in Ottawa was taken up also with delegations from municipalities all across Canada requesting that an airport be constructed within the community they represented.... In a large number of these cases, the delegates represented communities that, for geographical reasons, were ill suited to the construction of airports that could be used in the joint training plan. Again, the net result was a considerable loss of time and effort.²⁸

Two decades after the war, C.G. Power recollected in his memoirs that "aerodrome sites were chosen by a committee ... [which] sought out and endeavoured to obtain the best sites available, irrespective of the pressure brought to bear upon them by the members of parliament, boards of trade or other important citizens."²⁹ Although Power had purposely reinforced the military's subordination to the civilian government and relegated its officers to a mere advisory role during the war, the minister later admitted that the ADC selected – not suggested – BCATP sites.³⁰

Because the selection process documented in the primary records confirms these claims, statements by politicians and other government employees cannot be dismissed as words merely expedient for the moment. Further confirmation that patronage had no place in the selection process is demonstrated by the impotence of two powerful members of the Liberal government – J.G. Gardiner and W.L.M. King – in trying to sway its outcomes. Despite being King's

²⁸ 9 October 1945, Department of Transport, "The Selection and Development of Airports for the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan," article in RG 12 Volume 2293 File 5-50-10 Part I, p.6.

²⁹ Charles G. Power, *A Party Politician: The Memoirs of Chubby Power* (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1966), p. 212.

³⁰ English, *Op. Cit.*, p. 117.

patronage minister for western Canada, Gardiner's lobbying efforts continually failed to produce results. To no avail, he campaigned on behalf of Melville, Saskatchewan, from August 1940 until September 1942,³¹ but the ADC did not change its decision, nor was it forced by cabinet members to decide in favour of Melville. Gardiner also lobbied on behalf of Estevan, Saskatchewan – a locality that the RCAF considered suitable except for the town's proximity to the American border. Nevertheless, the RCAF would not reverse its decision until American neutrality ended. That Gardiner's pleadings remained unheeded emphatically attests to the absence of patronage considerations in base selection. As noted by historians Norman Ward and David Smith, Gardiner became increasingly frustrated because "the score of RCAF airfields which came to dot the prairies after 1940 appeared without Gardiner being given notice as to location, contractors, or suppliers." As a politician well-versed in partisan patronage, Gardiner had a problem with the "appearance almost overnight of an autonomous structure immune and often insensitive to the effect of its policies on intricate and mature party relations."³²

W.L.M. King – the prime minister – also campaigned to change decisions but was equally unsuccessful. King brought Big River, Saskatchewan, a small community in his riding, to the attention of the Department of Transport and the RCAF, but no school materialized. King also failed to change the fate of the AOS in his constituency. Opposing the RCAF's decision to close the AOS at Prince Albert, Saskatchewan, King vigorously challenged C.G. Power's support

³¹ See correspondence in files MG 27 III B20 Volume 93 File 61-5-3 (C.D. Howe Papers – Saskatchewan Airports), RG 12 Accession 1993-94/110 Box 21 File 5168-C150 Part 1 (Melville, Sk), RG 24 Reel C-5036 File 925-2-251-1 (Melville, Sk).

³² Norman Ward and David Smith, *Jimmy Gardiner: Relentless Liberal* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), p. 281.

of the decision. Nevertheless, the AOS at Prince Albert was disbanded as planned, and no compensation was given to reconcile the constituents or their federal representative. If there had been room for political influence or patronage in the selection process, the prime minister – more than anyone else – should have been able to set policy and reverse decisions as he so desired. According to the primary evidence, this was not the case. King's lobbying received no special attention: his efforts were as futile as those of other lobbyists – politicians and constituents alike. Because the Minister of National Defence for Air never bowed to public pressure, nor catered to party whims by reversing ADC recommendations, powerful politicians were unable to change ADC decisions. While substantiating the conclusion that selection was by technical merit, this implacability on Power's part further demonstrates that ADC decisions were respected.

BCATP base selection was designed from the beginning to be a merit-based decision-making process conducted by technical experts. Within days of the Liberal government's acceptance of the proposed air training plan in principle,³³ the RCAF and Department of Transport knew they would be called upon to expand Canada's military aerodrome infrastructure. Hence, in early October 1939, they made arrangements to cooperate and divide the labour.³⁴ A full month before the final details of the BCATP project were decided, the government approved Privy Council Order 3710, which delegated the training plan's construction to the technical experts – the RCAF and the Department of Transport – and gave final selection authority to the

³³ 28 September 1939 telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary, Document 690 in *DCEP VII*, pp. 556-7.

³⁴ 13 October 1939 memorandum, 14 October 1939 memorandum from Air Vice Marshal G.M. Croil (Chief of Air Staff) to K.S. MacLachlan (Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence – Naval and Air), RG 24 Volume 4775 File HQ 103-74/68 Part 1.

RCAF.³⁵ The government clearly intended that technical requirements and criteria would determine BCATP selection, and the investigation files and ADC meeting minutes confirm that selection indeed was according to merit alone: there were no parochial politics in the process.

The primary purpose of this thesis was to determine the extent to which partisan politics influenced the BCATP selection process. In concluding that selection was not governed by political loyalty, much stress has been placed on how selection officials judged the merits of sites against objective and technical criteria. Nevertheless, in determining the absence of patronage, this thesis cannot deny that BCATP base selection was replete with political activity. Members of federal and provincial political parties were not the sole advocates of placing aerodromes in specific regions. Individual voters and community leaders lobbied vigorously, and in doing so, they injected themselves into the Canadian political process. This grassroots participation reveals a dimension of Canada's political system not always visible when studying specific political leaders and official party platforms.

By using the lobbying letters of ordinary citizens who tried to engage the political process, this thesis has been able to identify how constituents conceived the selection process, to whom they believed they had to lobby, what arguments they assumed would best attract the government's attention, and how strongly they believed decisions were being made solely according to technical merit. Although some constituents were unable to free themselves from the assumption that old-fashioned political lobbying was necessary, most Canadians understood that site selection was fundamentally determined by merit. The majority of areas investigated as

³⁵ 17 November 1939 Privy Council Order 3710, RG 12 Volume 624 File 11-6-9.

aerodrome sites did not bother to lobby. Of the communities that did lobby, many emphasized their suitability in terms of technical criteria such as climate, utilities, and social amenities. In a handful of Saskatchewan towns, old-style political lobbying – using political promises and threats – reemerged near the end of the selection period, for these lobbyists had lost hope of being selected by a technocratic process. Nevertheless, most of the communities that did lobby gave up relatively quickly and easily. Lobbying letters reveal that constituents knew site selection would be administered according to technical criteria. The majority of people did not question this, and those who did challenge the process only did so half-heartedly and in a language that addressed the technical requirements of military aerodromes.

Building on early precedents such as Wilfrid Laurier's railway commissions and Frederick Borden's pre-First World War military promotions based on merit, governments increasingly relied on technical experts to make bureaucratic decisions and manage the state during the Depression.³⁶ By focussing on the civil servants who carried out base selection, and on the technocratic nature of the selection process, this thesis provides a specific example of professional management being exercised by the civil service. Doug Owrarn traced the rise of civil service professionalization in *The Government Generation*. The ailing 1930s' economy necessitated the hiring of experts to implement new policies which were dependent on quantitative and social science methodologies. Civil servants needed to be trained experts, not merely friends of politicians or people of the correct political colour. By reconstructing the selection process used to established BCATP aerodromes, this thesis affirms Owrarn's work by

³⁶ Cruikshank, *Op. Cit.*; Harris, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 74, 80-1.

providing a specific example whereby the government was dependent on experts and entrusted large responsibilities to their care.

Having focussed mainly on the three prairie provinces, this thesis is also a study in regional history, through which some intriguing questions about the regional identity of the three provinces have come to light. Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba endured similar Depression hardships and all could provide equally flat, open areas for aerodromes. To avoid isolating the province of initial interest – Saskatchewan – from its geographical neighbours, the parameters of this thesis were broadened to include all the prairie provinces. Despite this conscious effort to study these provinces as a unit, research has shown that Saskatchewan's experience was in fact not shared by Manitoba nor Alberta.

Table 5-6
Percentage of Communities That Lobbied 1939 - 1945
(See Appendix C)

Province	# Considered	# Lobbied	%
Alberta	79	13	16.5%
Saskatchewan	101	34	33.7%
Manitoba	66	12	18.2%
Ontario	149	43	28.9%

Of the four provinces examined in this study, Saskatchewan communities lobbied the most persistently (see Table 5-6). Although the lobbying rate of Saskatchewan towns is not much higher than the percentage of communities that lobbied in Ontario, the difference amongst the prairie provinces is significant (15.5%) and warrants explanation. That lobbying occurred is not surprising – all of Canada was attempting to recover from the Great Depression. That Saskatchewan lobbied the most is not surprising either, seeing as this province suffered the worst

during the 1930s. What is surprising is that communities in Alberta and Manitoba did not lobby with the same vigour. Discontent in the west has never been merely the dissatisfaction of one prairie province, but rather of all three. Doug Owsram describes a growing sense of grievance and regionalism in the 1880s; during this discontent, the entire region considered secession, for all three provinces felt as though they were "less than full partners in Confederation."¹⁷ After the turn of the century, the west still perceived itself as being exploited by eastern interests through high tariffs on farm implement imports and low prices on the Winnipeg Grain Exchange.¹⁸ Because the western region believed eastern interests controlled the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties, residents of the prairies attempted to create a political alternative in the Progressive Party of the 1920s. Although this party failed to gain a national – let alone a regional – consensus, many participants successfully revived the idea of an alternative political party through the founding of Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in 1932.¹⁹

During all of this unrest, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba let their voices be heard. Why, during the Second World War, did two of the prairie provinces fall silent when pressing Ottawa for BCATP consideration? Why was one voice so much louder? The three prairie provinces had all suffered in the Depression, and all three could equally reap benefits by hosting BCATP schools. Might the fact that Saskatchewan had not strayed from mainstream political

¹⁷ Doug Owsram, *The Promise of Eden: The Canadian Expansionist Movement and the Idea of the West 1856-1900* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), p. 177.

¹⁸ Conway, *Op. Cit.*, p. 15; Courville, *Op. Cit.*, p. 36; Fowke, *Op. Cit.*, p. 262; Irvine, *Op. Cit.*, p. 204; Paterson, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 14, 86; Young, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 2, 3, 42.

¹⁹ Courville, *Op. Cit.*, p. 189; Paterson, *Op. Cit.*, p. 186; Young, *Op. Cit.*, p. 6.

parties in provincial elections, unlike the other provinces, have any impact on this regional schism? Alberta and Manitoba constituents despaired at the corruption and indifference of traditional mainstream political parties. Consequently, these voters created their own provincial parties (United Farmers of Manitoba, United Farmers of Alberta, Social Credit) that were supposed to address constituents' needs, not the politicians' wants; Manitoba constituents built a tradition of coalition governments, which was unfamiliar to the rest of Canada. These phenomena did not occur in Saskatchewan: the provincial Liberal party was never defeated by farmers' parties, for these Liberal leaders were in tune with their voters' demands.⁴⁰ Did Saskatchewan communities feel comfortable lobbying the federal Liberal government because they had never severed their ties with mainstream political parties? Did Saskatchewan have more links to politicians in Ottawa because their provincial leaders had not isolated themselves from traditional politics? This possibility could reveal an important consequence of the rise of 'Third Party Politics' in Canada.

Also worth noting are the various lobbying ploys that were used only by Saskatchewan communities. While no other province raised the issue of ethnic identity, Saskatchewan communities argued either that a community free from foreigners was the best environment for a BCATP base or that an aerodrome would unite a diverse group of immigrants in a common

⁴⁰ Courville, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 8, 116, 118, 121, 144, 148, 149; George Melnyk, *Beyond Alienation: Political Essays on the West* (Calgary: Detselig Enterprises Ltd, 1993), p. 21; Paterson, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 126, 188; Paul F. Sharp, *The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada: A Survey Showing American Parallels* (University of Minnesota, 1948; New York: Octagon Books, 1971), p. 60; Simpson, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 259, 276.

goal.⁴¹ Were there tense relations between Anglo-Saxons and immigrants from continental-Europe that consequently precipitated these declarations of nativism or pleas for unity? Why was Saskatchewan the only province to vocalize these concerns?

The reversion to old-style political tactics was also unique to Saskatchewan. Toward the end of the selection period, Saskatchewan towns used threats of political consequences as a means of securing the aerodromes they wanted. That communities would return to such argumentation is not surprising. Governments in the past had traditionally used patronage to reward and attract votes; threats of denied support were meant to force politicians into giving something in return for support and loyalty. Why did the other prairie provinces – and Ontario as well – not resort to old-style lobbying? What circumstances in Manitoba, Alberta, and Ontario forestalled the use of political threats? What circumstances in Saskatchewan bred this revival?

According to the myriad of letters in the primary records used for this thesis, Saskatchewan also was the only province where particular communities openly competed with the rest of the province for aerodromes. Only in Saskatchewan did communities complain when selection officials investigated other districts, and only in Saskatchewan did communities initiate lobbying campaigns against other areas being selected. Lobbyists in Estevan, for instance, made sure that the government was informed of Weyburn's water shortage problems in hopes of diminishing the town's chances of winning an aerodrome.⁴² Having been traditionally united with its geographic neighbours against hinterland treatment by eastern provinces, why did

⁴¹ Kelvington, Melville, Mossbank, and Weyburn, Saskatchewan; See Chapter III.

⁴² See Chapter III.

Saskatchewan cease to see itself as a unified whole, needing bases for the good of the province, and why did communities in the other prairie provinces not resort to plaintive competition?

Although this thesis does not deal with battles, casualties, and troop movements on front lines, it is still a military history in that it addresses a crucial logistical need of the war effort – training aerodromes. Literature on military aerodromes and aerodrome selection in the early twentieth century is sparse. Numerous works about aerodromes in Great Britain have been published, but these are unanalytical encyclopaedic collections describing the specifications of every aerodrome built.⁴³ No works have been written in Canada about military aerodrome selection, although a recent thesis has looked into the politics of building military installations in Calgary, Alberta. Research found only two analyses of military aerodrome selection in other countries, one concentrating on the American experience and the other on British aerodrome construction.

P.W. Lackenbauer investigated the pre-Second World War establishment of three different military facilities in Calgary, Alberta. In all three cases – securing use of the Sarcee Indian Reserve, acquiring a site for the Mewata Armoury, and negotiating municipal support for the construction of Currie Barracks⁴⁴ – the residents of Calgary did not favour military establishments. Hence, the military had to lobby for government and local support as if it were merely another special interest group. The aim of Lackenbauer's thesis was to uncover the power

⁴³ Jonathan Falconer, *RAF Bomber Airfields of World War Two* (Shepperton, Surrey: Ian Allan Ltd, 1992); Jonathan Falconer, *RAF Fighter Airfields of World War Two* (Shepperton, Surrey: Ian Allan Ltd, 1993).

⁴⁴ P.W. Lackenbauer, "The Politics of Contested Space" (Calgary: University of Calgary Masters Thesis 1999), pp. 90-91.

each player (the federal government, the municipal government, and the military) possessed in determining where, or if, a military base was established. In all three examples, the power of the respective players differed, but the results were always the same. It was the government that ultimately decided whether or not a military project would go forward. Local constituents could oppose the decision or decide to make negotiations difficult, but in the end, the government decision always stood firm. The military was the party with the least amount of leverage in the process. Not only did it have to get government approval for all projects, but the military also had to campaign for local support and permission, and a local federal politician usually had to carry out the negotiations with the public.⁴⁵

The findings of Lackenbauer's thesis and this study differ in numerous ways. For Lackenbauer, local lobbying became a factor after the government decided to go ahead with the military project. In the case of Currie Barracks, this lobbying was not in support of the military establishment; rather, constituents were protesting the decision and suggesting better uses for the money. Peace and pacifist sentiments also influenced this lack of local support.⁴⁶ In this study on the BCATP, the public had an entirely different view; once hostilities had erupted, communities wanted to contribute to the war effort, for it was too late then to prevent war by abstaining from military expenditures. Instead, the war had to be successfully prosecuted as fast as possible by putting forth the greatest effort. The Canadian public lobbied because it wanted BCATP bases, not because it opposed the government and military's project. Although the

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 89-91.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-9.

military was subordinated to the civilian government in both studies, Lackenbauer's thesis describes an armed forces that was totally dependent on government help to get its projects underway and completed. In the case of the BCATP, once the government had signed the training agreement in December 1939, the RCAF had the autonomous authority to establish all the aerodromes. The air force did not have to lobby for local support, for all the communities wanted to participate. Furthermore, if land negotiations met an impasse, the RCAF could simply expropriate the land and commence building.⁴⁷ Although the civilian government was in control, the RCAF had the freedom to do whatever was necessary within the boundaries of its powers.

The ultimate difference between these two studies is the period in which the events took place. In Lackenbauer's study, the period was between the two wars, when peace sentiments were strong and economic problems were large. Citizens and politicians alike were more concerned with improving standards of living than accumulating a large number of military institutions in peace time. These institutions did not even bring significant employment opportunities with them. In this study of the BCATP, war had broken out, and Canada had made a commitment to the Allies. Furthermore, by 1939, the worst effects of the Depression had been experienced, and communities wanted the economic benefits stemming from aerodrome construction and the presence of military personnel.⁴⁸

Jerold Brown's study of United States Army airfields also focussed on the pre-Second

⁴⁷ 5 October 1942 letter from C.P. Edwards (Deputy Minister of Transport) to S.L. de Carteret (Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air), RG 24 Volume 4831 File 101-H28 (Hawkesbury, On); 17 July 1943 Notice of Expropriation of Land Ottawa Registry Office Instrument #39285, RG 24 Volume 4850 File 101-O12 (Uplands, On).

⁴⁸ See Chapter II.

World War period: from 1910 until America entered the war in late 1941. Before the Great War, the civilian government was generally unsympathetic to military desires, and because of isolationism, it spent a minimal amount of money on military installations.⁴⁹ After the First World War, public sentiment toward military aerodromes changed somewhat, for the economic benefits became obvious, and during the Depression, aerodrome construction was seen by the government as a means of providing economic relief.⁵⁰

With this context in mind, Brown argued that political considerations played a large role in aerodrome selection during the interwar period. Political representatives all wanted aerodromes for their districts, and lobbyists assailed the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps with requests and suggestions for aerodrome sites.⁵¹ To avoid granting aerodromes solely by political patronage, the House Committee on Military Affairs "established a policy of dividing funds ... between nine corps areas and each branch of the Army."⁵² Although the military sought sites that would provide the necessary technical criteria, the purpose of this interwar aerodrome construction "was to assist the unemployed across the nation." Consequently, Brown claims that "political considerations ... could not be ignored."⁵³ Brown further discovered that standardization was not brought into aerodrome construction and selection until after America

⁴⁹ Jerold Brown, *Where Eagles Land: Planning and Development of US Army Airfields 1910-1941* (Westpoint, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1990), pp.1-3.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 70, 93, 122, 130.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 75.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

entered the war. Often lack of foresight resulted in miscalculations such as not realizing that newer, heavier transport planes used a flatter glide angle to land and hence needed a larger area clear of obstacles. In another instance, "after several months of construction work [on a bombardment station], engineers learned that the main runway could be extended beyond 3400 feet only by expensive dredgement and fill operations in Lake Ponchartrain or by removing an entire section of the Southern Railroad Line."⁵⁴ Once war pressures increased, the air force officials faced a shortage of aerodrome sites, for training facilities were competing with operational aerodromes for the best locations.⁵⁵

Although this thesis and Brown's study focus on the construction of military aerodromes, the difference in time period precludes broad comparisons. Brown's study focussed mainly on the interwar period, when there were no international pressures to build aerodromes quickly, and when the government was looking for a means of supplying relief to Depression stricken communities. Brown discovered that the military was dependent on securing local support: "War Department and Air Corps leaders generally welcomed or even solicited local support when Congress was otherwise unable or unwilling to approve appropriations In many cases, it was the only way military leaders could secure the facilities they deemed essential to accomplish their missions."⁵⁶ In the case of the BCATP, Canada was at war, and hence, international pressures made the government realize the importance of its air force. The RCAF did not have to lobby for

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

the BCATP responsibility. Once negotiations with Great Britain concluded to Prime Minister King's satisfaction, the government gave the RCAF the task of expanding the aerodrome infrastructure as well as training the recruits. Comparison cannot be made concerning the use of aerodromes as Depression relief projects, for BCATP aerodromes in Canada were not set up with the express purpose of providing economic relief. Conclusions cannot be drawn about the amounts of political influence in the selection process. Peacetime America had the liberty of using aerodrome construction to reward and attract loyal voters. Because Canada had made manpower commitments to the Allies, partisanship was deliberately avoided to get the BCATP into operation as quickly and as efficiently as possible. This American study of interwar patronage and relief projects would best be compared to Canada's development of civil aerodromes during the 1930s.

Even the use of technical criteria cannot be soundly compared. Brown discovered that although technical criteria were important in aerodrome selection, it was not until 1941 that aerodrome designs, selection boards, and selection instructions were standardized.⁵⁷ From the beginning of BCATP aerodrome construction, the criteria sought after and the chain of authority overseeing their implementation were established, standardized, and consistent. The RCAF had the advantage of moving forward from the Department of Transport's interwar experience. Presumably, building on their own interwar experience, construction of American military aerodromes after 1941 would also have moved forward quickly, efficiently, and in a technocratic fashion.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 129-132.

Robin Higham's study of building British military airfields between 1914 and 1945 dwelt neither on local lobbying for bases nor on the government's selection of sites according to political expediency. Instead, Higham concentrated on the evolution of the aerodrome selection process in Great Britain, an evolution often hampered by technicalities and problems. During the interwar years, the RAF did not foresee that aerodromes housing modern fighter and bomber aircraft would require much planning: these aerodromes and airfields had to be serviceable in all seasons, would have to accommodate heavy aircraft, and needed strategic placement to provide protection against enemy aerial attack.⁵⁸

Higham found that Britain's air bases were built in an *ad hoc* fashion: "more forethought and concentration on the sinews of war would have resulted in a more economical and efficient use of resources, finances, and manpower." Once war erupted, the RAF was barely able to "muddl[e] through victory."⁵⁹ During the interwar period, RAF officials failed to consider the changing characteristics of modern aircraft when building aerodromes. Consequently, Higham's research found that "fighters [were] required to operate from existing grass airfields even though [fighter] characteristics changed quite remarkably between biplanes of 1934 and monoplanes of 1940."⁶⁰ When war started, all forty-three of the RAF's fighter aerodromes had grass landing strips reminiscent of the First World War, and only nine RAF stations had been built with

⁵⁸ Robin Higham, *Bases for Air Strategy: Building Airfields for the RAF 1914-1945* (Shrewsbury, England: Airlife Publishing Ltd, 1998), pp. 17, 23, 25, 56, 61, 62.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 19, 25.

concrete runways.⁶¹ It was attempts to use modern operational aircraft on grass airfields that forced the RAF to devise standardized criteria and layouts. British aerodrome selection also had to contend with operational, defence, training, decoy, and United States Army Air Force (USAAF) airfields vying for the same limited space.⁶²

Once again, comparison between Higham's research and this thesis are limited because the interwar pressures on British aerodrome construction were very different from the pressures on the BCATP. Higham's study focussed on the trial and error period of the 1930s, while this thesis describes a process that incorporated the lessons the Department of Transport learned in the interwar period. Consequently, the Canadian effort was systematized from the beginning: standard investigation reports, selection committees, and aerodrome layout plans were in place before the spring of 1940. Aerodromes in Britain were built in an *ad hoc* fashion because modern aviation was just emerging, and the military and civilians alike had to learn how to build proper aerodromes. Nevertheless, the Canadian BCATP base selection process naturally progressed from the RAF's interwar experience. Because the RAF had been perfecting the use of Great War technology rather than keeping up with the advances in modern aviation, war imposed the realization that modern aerodromes involved a greater sophistication than grass landing strips offered. The fact that Great Britain had limited air space and limited aerodrome space, along with the fact that aerodromes were vulnerable to attack, precipitated the need of the BCATP. If built overseas, training aerodromes would no longer be competing for construction

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 43, 235-6.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 88.

space with RAF and USAAF operational aerodromes; this growing pool of air crew would be safe from annihilation by Axis powers; and the training programme and equipment would be free from destruction and interruption. The RAF's struggle with standardization demonstrated to the RCAF why construction had to be standardized. In an effort to get air crew trained and overseas as soon as possible, there was no longer the luxury of time to prepare. Due to the exigencies of war, military aerodrome construction in Canada was therefore standardized, for the Allied war effort could not afford to have aerodrome selection hampered by patronage and partisan politics.

Academics have taken various approaches when addressing the relationships between civilian governments and their military. Social scientists, such as Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, and Bengt Abrahamsson engage civil-military relations from a theoretical standpoint. Beginning with the assumption that in a democracy the military is subordinated to the civilian government,⁶³ these authors then debate what it means for the military to be a professional body, and how the armed forces – as a professional institution – should theoretically relate to the civilian government in charge.⁶⁴ Historians such as Stephen Harris use case studies to identify how governments and their military leaders interacted with each other. This thesis also serves as a case study of civil-military relations on the home front between 1939 and 1945.

⁶³ Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications Inc, 1972); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory of Politics and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1967); Morris Janowitz and Stephen D. Wesbrook, eds., *The Political Education of Soldiers* (Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications Inc., 1983); Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: The Free Press, 1960); Michel Louis Martin and Ellen Stern McCrate, *The Military, Militarism, and the Polity: Essays in Honor of Morris Janowitz* (New York: The Free Press, 1984).

⁶⁴ Abrahamsson, *Op. Cit.*, p. 125; Huntington, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 16, 84.

According to Huntington – the first to write on the theory of civil-military relations – a military officer cannot be a professional if he steps outside his area of military expertise and enters the political arena. As an expert adviser, the military officer has three responsibilities to his superiors: to inform the government what is needed in order to provide a minimum level of military security; to analyse potential strategic plans and explain their military implications to the government; and to carry out state decisions concerning military security and military action.⁶⁵ If a military officer ceases to be an adviser and enters politics and policy-making, he has moved outside the area of competence: "participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism, [thus] curtailing their professional competence, dividing the profession against itself, and substituting extraneous values for professional values." In order to keep military judgement sound, it must remain unshackled from political expediency: "the military officer must remain neutral politically."⁶⁶

While Huntington believed military officers should not enter the political arena under any circumstance, Janowitz and Abrahamsson argued otherwise. Because of the vast size of the military and its large number of needs, elected members of the government have been forced to delegate some decision-making powers to military officers.⁶⁷ Furthermore, with governments consistently decreasing defence budgets, these military leaders must devise ways of persuading the elected politicians to maintain the military's allocation of resources. Military leaders want the

⁶⁵ Huntington, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 72, 95.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

⁶⁷ Abrahamsson, *Op. Cit.*, p. 125.

best armed forces they can put together, and "larger appropriations mean more weapons and material, higher salaries, [and] better promotion opportunities."⁶⁸ With many groups vying for the limited dollars of the government, military leaders have had to balance requests between what civilian governments might approve and what is the necessary minimum to maintain a certain predetermined level of security.⁶⁹ In other words, military leaders have been obliged to become subtle, yet active, participants in public policy-making. The military is a professional body, but "professionalization creates experts, [which in turn] gives them resources, corporate interests, and objectives to pursue."⁷⁰

In contrast with these theoretical frameworks, specific case studies of civil-military relations can go beyond discussing the activities of the military alone. The researcher can reveal much about a government's attitudes toward its military by examining specific historical examples. How, for instance, has the government viewed its military leadership? Has it treated this institution with disdain or respect? What responsibilities has it assigned to the armed forces? To what extent have the military's decisions and expertise been respected? As Stephen Harris' *Canadian Brass* traced the rise of a professional identity in Canada's military, he also highlighted the precarious nature of civil-military relations during the first half of the 20th century. The amount of trust placed in, and responsibility given to, military leaders depended solely upon the whims and agenda of the minister in charge, not on any piece of legislation establishing

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 160-163.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

minimum cooperation. Frederick Borden was willing to place an increasing amount of trust in his military forces, but Sam Hughes subsequently refused to acknowledge that a professional soldier might be able to advise him.⁷¹

The next war would provide a starkly different outcome, as illustrated in this study on the BCATP. When King agreed to Britain's air training proposal in September 1939, and then later signed the BCATP Agreement in December, the civilian government had exercised its authority and determined what broad course of national policy would be in the best interest of Canada's domestic politics, international relations, and war commitments. The King government then assigned the narrower tasks of aerodrome expansion and air crew training to its military with no strings attached. Privy Council Order 3710 legislated this authority, and the selection process that was then followed confirmed the faith the government had in its air force. In the end, individual whims and political agendas did not overturn any decision. Only by looking at such an historical example and examining the civilian government's respect for the military's decisions can one identify the exact nature of civil-military relations at any period of time. In BCATP base selection, the government gave the responsibility to the military and then stepped back, letting the RCAF attend to its tasks without interference and second-guessing. The RCAF did not have to play politics because the government respected its expertise and did not tamper with its decisions.

This study of BCATP aerodrome selection not only elucidates what the civil-military relationship was in Canada between 1939 and 1945, but it also offers an explanation for the

⁷¹ Harris, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 74, 80-1, 87-9.

radical divergence from early 20th century precedents. During peacetime, efficiency, merit, and expertise can easily be sacrificed – with minimal consequences – for other political priorities. Nevertheless, the consequences of such sacrifices are far less tolerable in times of war, when the lives of military personnel and the future political balance of a continent are at stake. Disasters in Canada's First World War effort showed the civilian government that it could not run a war without the expertise of its military. Hence, Canada's aspirations to be on the winning side of the war necessitated that the government trust and respect the military's advice, training, and expertise.⁷² Memories of First World War disasters and the benefits accruing from government service professionalization in the 1930s resulted in a deep level of respect for, and trust in, Canada's military by 1939. When the world was at war, time was of the essence. The Canadian government had committed itself to providing a fixed number of air crew, according to a fixed schedule, for the Allied air war. To maintain this schedule, and later to increase the quantity of graduates, the government had to depend on the expertise of the military to produce the most efficient outcome possible. To ensure that commitments were met, that air crew quality was high, and that the best possible effort was made at winning the war, it was in the best interest of the government to fully entrust the BCATP to the RCAF.

Achieving the ultimate goal of an Allied victory dictated the Liberal government's decisions. In comparison to winning the war and sparing as many lives as possible, rewarding party loyalty and attracting new votes seemed of small relevance to both the government and the citizens of Canada. Because of the uncertainty of victory, Canada had to get the recruits trained

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 103, 118-121.

and overseas as soon as possible. The RCAF was not entrusted with the BCATP project to win Liberal support in each locality hosting a school, but for the greater good of international peace: defeating the Axis powers. Militarily, the BCATP was thus an unprecedented accomplishment: in less than five years, 131,553 air crew were trained for the war effort, often ahead of schedule. In another unprecedented move, partisan politics were entirely brushed aside in lieu of meritocracy. In the end, political pay-offs might come later, when constituents could judge the government according to its overall conduct of the war. Because any parochial policies that invited military disaster would have ensured a government was unseated in the next election, politics played no part in BCATP base selection. Instead, aerodrome selection between 1939 and 1945 is an example of a successful expenditure of public funds for a goal higher than the short-term returns of prolonging the public life of politicians. It is also a successful example of efficiently assigning responsibility and authority to military and other experts. Perhaps both achievements are worthy of emulation even in peace time. Besides Canada being the "aerodrome of democracy,"⁷¹ Canadians can take pride in each of the BCATP training schools being aerodromes of technocracy and meritocracy.

⁷¹ Hatch, *Aerodrome of Democracy*, *Op. Cit.*, p. iv.

NOTES ON APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: BCATP SCHOOLS ESTABLISHED IN CANADA 1939-1945

This appendix lists all the main aerodromes opened for the BCATP. It includes the dates on which aerodromes were opened, and the appendix also notes when some bases were moved to other locations.

APPENDIX B: FEDERAL ELECTORAL CONSTITUENCIES

This appendix not only lists all the federal electoral ridings for the four provinces used in this study, but it also tallies the number of communities investigated in each riding. The number of main bases established in a riding is also listed.

Key to Abbreviations

C:	Conservative
CCF:	Cooperative Commonwealth Federation
L:	Liberal
LL:	Liberal-Labour
LP:	Liberal-Progressive
ND:	New Democracy (party name used by Social Credit candidates in 1940 election)
SC:	Social Credit
UR:	United Reform

APPENDIX C: TOWNS INVOLVED IN BCATP BASE SELECTION 1939 - 1945:

This chart correlates every community mentioned in the primary records used for this study. With each community name, the charts lists the riding in which it was situated, whether or not constituents lobbied, how the riding voted in 1935 and 1940 elections, when the site was considered by the government, and what the site's political affiliation was at the time of initial investigation.

Key to Abbreviations

C:	Conservative
CCF:	Cooperative Commonwealth Federation
L:	Liberal
LL:	Liberal-Labour
LP:	Liberal-Progressive
ND:	New Democracy (party name used by Social Credit candidates in 1940 election)
SC:	Social Credit
UR:	United Reform

APPENDIX D: COMMUNITIES THAT LOBBIED

While listing all the communities that lobbied, this appendix notes whether or not the community campaigned before or after the government first considered the site. The dates of initial government consideration have been drawn from ADC decisions, preliminary reports, and lists of potential sites to be investigated. The lobbying date is the earliest constituents' correspondence found in the file.

Key to Abbreviations

C:	Conservative
CCF:	Cooperative Commonwealth Federation
L:	Liberal
LL:	Liberal-Labour
LP:	Liberal-Progressive
ND:	New Democracy (party name used by Social Credit candidates in 1940 election)
SC:	Social Credit
UR:	United Reform
a:	community lobbied after government was already aware of the area
b:	community lobbied before government consideration

APPENDIX E: LOBBYING INTENSITY

This appendix lists the number of letters each lobbying community sent.

Key to Abbreviations

C:	Conservative
CCF:	Cooperative Commonwealth Federation
L:	Liberal
LL:	Liberal-Labour
LP:	Liberal-Progressive
ND:	New Democracy (party name used by Social Credit candidates in 1940 election)
SC:	Social Credit
UR:	United Reform

APPENDIX F: LOBBYING DURATION

This appendix records how many months each community's lobbying campaign lasted.

Key to Abbreviations

C:	Conservative
CCF:	Cooperative Commonwealth Federation
L:	Liberal
LL:	Liberal-Labour
LP:	Liberal-Progressive
ND:	New Democracy (party name used by Social Credit candidates in 1940 election)
SC:	Social Credit
UR:	United Reform

APPENDIX G: COMMUNITIES RECEIVING REQUESTS FROM GOVERNMENT TO USE AIRPORTS

On 22 January 1940, the Department of Transport sent letters to sixteen communities, requesting the use of the local civilian aerodromes for BCATP training. Fourteen of these communities were located in Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. This appendix lists the communities contacted, as well as what schools were opened in these cities.

Key to Abbreviations

C:	Conservative
CCF:	Cooperative Commonwealth Federation
L:	Liberal
LL:	Liberal-Labour
LP:	Liberal-Progressive
ND:	New Democracy (party name used by Social Credit candidates in 1940 election)
SC:	Social Credit
UR:	United Reform
EFTS:	Elementary Flying Training School
SFTS:	Service Flying Training School
AOS:	Air Observer School

APPENDIX H: SITES CONSIDERED BUT NOT SELECTED

This appendix not only lists all sites that were not selected, but is also notes at what stage they were rejected: eliminated immediately and hence never investigated; found unsuitable after investigation; proposal turned down by ADC.

Key to Abbreviations

C:	Conservative
CCF:	Cooperative Commonwealth Federation
L:	Liberal
LL:	Liberal-Labour
LP:	Liberal-Progressive
ND:	New Democracy (party name used by Social Credit candidates in 1940 election)
SC:	Social Credit
UR:	United Reform
n/c:	field parties never considered the area although community lobbied the government
n/f:	Transport officials found site unsuitable after investigation; not forwarded to ADC
#:	the number of times the area was considered in ADC meetings

APPENDIX I: CHRONOLOGY OF SITES SELECTED

Based on the minutes of ADC meetings, this appendix lists the month in which RCAF officers approved the development of the various BCATP aerodromes. The chart also notes the communities' ridings and their party affiliation after the 1935 and 1940 elections.

Key to Abbreviations

C:	Conservative
CCF:	Cooperative Commonwealth Federation
L:	Liberal
LL:	Liberal-Labour
LP:	Liberal-Progressive
ND:	New Democracy (party name used by Social Credit candidates in 1940 election)
SC:	Social Credit
UR:	United Reform

APPENDIX A

BCATP SCHOOLS ESTABLISHED IN CANADA 1939-1945¹

<u>Province:</u>	<u>Base:</u>	<u>Date Opened:</u>
Alberta	# 4 ITS Edmonton	
	# 5 EFTS Lethbridge ²	1940 07 22
	#16 EFTS Edmonton	1940 11 11
	#31 EFTS DeWinton	1941 06 18
	#32 EFTS Bowden	1941 07 12
	#36 EFTS Pearce	1942 03 30
	# 3 SFTS Calgary	1940 10 28
	# 7 SFTS MacLeod	1940 12 09
	#15 SFTS Claresholm	1941 06 09
	#19 SFTS Vulcan	1943 05 03
	#34 SFTS Medicine Hat	1941 04 08
	#36 SFTS Penhold	1941 09 28
	#37 SFTS Calgary	1941 10 22
	# 8 BGS Lethbridge	1941 10 13
	# 2 AOS Edmonton	1940 08 05
	# 2 WTS Calgary	1940 09 16
	# 2 FIS Vulcan ³	1942 08 03
British Columbia	# 8 EFTS Vancouver ⁴	1940 07 22
	#18 EFTS Boundary Bay	1941 04 10
	#24 EFTS Abbotsford	1943 09 06
	# 3 OTU Patricia Bay	1942 11 09
	# 5 OTU Boundary Bay ⁵	1944 04 01
	# 6 OTU Comox ⁶	1944 06 01
	#32 OTU Patricia Bay ⁷	1941 10 13

¹ WAB Douglas and SF Wise, *The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Volume II: The Creation of a National Air Force* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), maps facing p. 236; FJ Hatch, *Aerodrome of Democracy: Canada and the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan 1939-1945* (Ottawa: Directorate of History, 1983), pp. 207-211.

² Moved to High River, AB 1941 06 28.

³ Moved to Pearce, AB 1943 05 03.

⁴ Moved to Boundary Bay, BC 1941 12 10.

⁵ Moved to Abbotsford, BC 1944 08 15.

⁶ Moved from Patricia Bay, BC 1944 06 01; later moved to Greenwood, NS 1945 01 15.

⁷ Moved to Comox, BC 1944 06 01.

<u>Province:</u>	<u>Base:</u>	<u>Date Opened:</u>
Manitoba	#14 EFTS Portage la Prairie	1940 10 28
	#19 EFTS Virden	1941 05 16
	#26/35 EFTS Neepawa ⁸	1942 03 30
	#10 SFTS Dauphin	1941 03 05
	#12 SFTS Brandon	1941 05 16
	#17 SFTS Souris	1943 03 08
	#18 SFTS Gimli	1943 09 06
	#33 SFTS Carberry	1940 12 26
	# 3 BGS Macdonald	1941 03 10
	# 7 BGS Paulson	1941 06 23
	# 5 AOS Winnipeg	1941 01 06
	# 7 AOS Portage la Prairie	1941 04 28
	# 1 ANS Rivers ⁹	1940 11 23
	# 3 WTS Winnipeg	1941 02 17
New Brunswick	#21 EFTS Chatham	1941 07 03
	# 8 SFTS Moncton ¹⁰	1940 12 23
	#10 AOS Chatham	1941 07 21
	# 2 ANS Pennfield Ridge ¹¹	1941 07 21
	#34 OTU Pennfield Ridge	1942 06 01
Nova Scotia	#17 EFTS Stanley	1941 03 17
	# 1 NAGS Yarmouth	1943 01 01
	# 7/31 OTU Debert ¹²	1941 06 03
	# 8/36 OTU Greenwood ¹³	1942 05 11
Ontario	# 1 ITS Toronto	
	# 5 ITS Belleville	
	# 6 ITS Toronto	
	# 1 EFTS Malton	1940 06 24
	# 2 EFTS Fort William	1940 06 24
	# 3 EFTS London	1940 06 24
	# 7 EFTS Windsor	1940 07 22
	# 9 EFTS St Catharines	1940 10 14
	#10 EFTS Mount Hope ¹⁴	1940 10 14

⁸ #35 EFTS redesignated as #26 EFTS 1944 01 30.

⁹ #1 ANS moved from Trenton, ON 1940 11 23.

¹⁰ Moved to Weyburn, SK 1944 01 24.

¹¹ Closed 1942 04 30; later reopened at Charlottetown, PEI 1944 02 21.

¹² #31 OTU redesignated as #7 OTU 1944 07 01.

¹³ #36 OTU redesignated as #8 OTU 1944 07 01.

¹⁴ Moved to Pendleton, ON 1942 08 31.

<u>Province:</u>	<u>Base:</u>	<u>Date Opened:</u>
	#12 EFTS Goderich	1940 10 14
	#13 EFTS St Eugene	1940 10 28
	#20 EFTS Oshawa	1941 06 21
	# 1 SFTS Camp Borden	1939 11 01
	# 2 SFTS Ottawa	1940 08 05
	# 5 SFTS Brantford	1940 11 11
	# 6 SFTS Dunnville	1940 11 25
	# 9 SFTS Centralia ¹⁵	1942 07 08
	#14 SFTS Aylmer ¹⁶	1941 07 03
	#16 SFTS Hagersville	1941 08 08
	#31 SFTS Kingston	1940 10 07
	# 1 BGS Jarvis	1940 08 19
	# 4 BGS Fingal	1940 11 25
	# 6 BGS Mountain View	1941 06 23
	#31 BGS Picton	1941 04 28
	# 1 AOS Malton	1940 05 27
	# 4 AOS London	1940 11 25
	# 1 ANS Trenton ¹⁷	1940 02 01
	#31 ANS Port Albert	1940 11 18
	#33 ANS Mount Hope	1940 06 09
	# 1 IFS Mohawk/Descaronto	1943 04 02
	# 1 WTS Mount Hope ¹⁸	1944 09 14
	# 4 WTS Guelph	1941 07 07
	# 1 FIS Trenton	1942 08 03
	# 3 FIS Amprior	1942 08 03
	FES Aylmer	1944 07 01
	CFS Trenton	1940 02 01
Prince Edward Island	# 9 SFTS Summerside ¹⁹	1941 01 06
	#10 BGS Mount Pleasant	1943 09 20
	# 1 GRE Summerside	1942 06 07
	#31 GRE Charlottetown	1941 01 20
	# 2 ANS Charlottetown ²⁰	1944 02 21
	#32 ANS Charlottetown	1941 08 18

¹⁵ Moved from Summerside, PEI 1942 07 08.

¹⁶ Moved to Kingston, ON 1944 08 15.

¹⁷ Moved to Rivers, MB 1940 11 23.

¹⁸ Moved from Montreal, PQ 1944 09 14.

¹⁹ Moved to Centralia, ON 1942 07 08.

²⁰ Moved from Pennfield Ridge, NB 1944 02 21.

<u>Province:</u>	<u>Base:</u>	<u>Date Opened:</u>
Quebec	# 3 ITS Victoriaville	
	# 4 EFTS Windsor Mills	1940 06 24
	#11 EFTS Cap de la Madeleine	1940 10 14
	#13 SFTS St Hubert ²¹	1941 09 01
	# 9 BGS Mont Joli	1941 12 15
	# 8 AOS Quebec	1941 09 29
	# 9 AOS St Jean	1941 07 07
	# 1 WTS Montreal ²²	1940 02 16
	# 1 OTU Bagotville	1942 07 20
Saskatchewan	# 2 ITS Regina	
	# 7 ITS Saskatoon	
	# 6 EFTS Prince Albert	1940 07 22
	#15 EFTS Regina	1940 11 11
	#23 EFTS Davidson ²³	1942 11 09
	#25/34 EFTS Assiniboia ²⁴	1942 02 11
	#33 EFTS Caron	1942 01 05
	# 4 SFTS Saskatoon	1940 09 16
	# 8 SFTS Weyburn ²⁵	1944 01 24
	#11 SFTS Yorkton	1941 04 10
	#13 SFTS North Battleford ²⁶	1944 02 25
	#32 SFTS Moose Jaw	1940 12 09
	#35 SFTS North Battleford	1941 09 04
	#38 SFTS Estevan	1942 04 27
	#39 SFTS Swift Current	1941 12 15
	#41 SFTS Weyburn	1942 01 05
	# 2 BGS Mossbank	1940 10 28
	# 5 BGS Dafoe	1941 05 26
	# 3 AOS Regina ²⁷	1940 09 16
	# 6 AOS Prince Albert	1941 03 17

²¹ Moved to North Battleford, SK 1944 02 25.

²² Moved to Mount Hope, ON 1944 09 14.

²³ Moved to Yorkton, SK 1945 01 29.

²⁴ #34 EFTS redesignated #25 EFTS 1944 01 30.

²⁵ Moved from Moncton, NB 1944 01 24.

²⁶ Moved from St Hubert, PQ 1944 02 25.

²⁷ Moved to Pearce, AB 1942 09 12.

APPENDIX B

FEDERAL ELECTORAL CONSTITUENCIES

(1935/1940 Affiliation and Schools Received)

ALBERTA

<u>Constituency</u>	<u>Affiliation 1935</u>	<u>Affiliation 1940</u>	<u># Towns Considered</u>	<u># Main Bases</u>
Acadia	Social Credit	New Democracy	2	0
Athabaska	Social Credit	Liberal	0	0
Battle River	Social Credit	New Democracy	6	0
Bow River	Social Credit	New Democracy	5	0
Calgary East	Social Credit	Liberal	2	4
Calgary West	Conservative	Liberal	3	0
Camrose	Social Credit	New Democracy	1	0
Edmonton East	Social Credit	Liberal	1	3
Edmonton West	Liberal	Liberal	1	0
Jasper-Edson	Social Credit	New Democracy	6	0
Lethbridge	Social Credit	New Democracy	8	4 ²⁸
Macleod	Social Credit	New Democracy	18	5 ²⁹
Medicine Hat	Social Credit	Liberal	9	1
Peace River	Social Credit	Liberal	3	0
Red Deer	Social Credit	New Democracy	8	2
Vegreville	Social Credit	New Democracy	4	0
Wetaskiwin	Social Credit	New Democracy	2	0

MANITOBA

<u>Constituency</u>	<u>Affiliation 1935</u>	<u>Affiliation 1940</u>	<u># Towns Considered</u>	<u># Main Bases</u>
Brandon	Conservative	Liberal	8	3
Churchill	Liberal	Liberal	2	0
Dauphin	Liberal	Liberal	5	2
Lisgar	Liberal	Liberal	4	0
Macdonald	Liberal-Progressive	Liberal-Progressive	7	0
Marquette	Liberal	Liberal	3	0
Neebawa	Liberal	Liberal	9	2
Portage la Prairie	Liberal	Liberal	7	3
Provencher	Liberal	Liberal	0	0
St Boniface	Liberal	Liberal	5	0
Selkirk	Liberal-Progressive	Liberal	5	1
Souris	Liberal	Conservative	9	1
Springfield	Liberal	Liberal	1	0
Winnipeg (4 seats)	2 CCF/2 Liberal	1 CCF/3 Liberal	1	2
North	CCF	Liberal		
North Centre	CCF	CCF		
South	Liberal	Liberal		
South Centre	Liberal	Liberal		

²⁸ 1 school moved from Macleod riding: 1 school moved to Macleod riding.

²⁹ 1 school moved from Lethbridge riding: 1 school moved to Lethbridge riding.

ONTARIO

<u>Constituency</u>	<u>Affiliation 1935</u>	<u>Affiliation 1940</u>	<u># Towns Considered</u>	<u># Main Bases</u>
Algoma East	Liberal	Liberal	1	0
Algoma West	Liberal	Liberal	2	0
Brant	Liberal	Liberal	3	0
Brantford City	Liberal	Liberal	1	1
Bruce	Liberal	Liberal	2	0
Carleton	Conservative	Conservative	4	0
Cochrane	Liberal-Labour	Liberal	5	0
Dufferin-Simcoe	Conservative	Conservative	3	1
Durham	Liberal	Liberal	0	0
Elgin	Liberal	Liberal	6	3 ¹⁰
Essex East	Liberal	Liberal	0	0
Essex South	Liberal	Liberal	1	0
Essex West	Liberal	Liberal	1	1
Fort William	Liberal	Liberal	3	1
Frontenac-Addington	Liberal	Conservative	1	0
Glengary	Liberal	Liberal	0	0
Grenville-Dundas	Conservative	Conservative	0	0
Grey-Bruce	UFO-Labour	Liberal	0	0
Grey North	Liberal	Liberal	2	0
Haldimand	Conservative	Conservative	6	2
Halton	Liberal	Liberal	1	0
Hamilton (2 seats)	2 Conservative	2 Liberal	2	3 ¹¹
East	Conservative	Liberal		
West	Conservative	Liberal		
Hastings-Peterborough	Liberal	Conservative	0	2
Hastings South	Liberal	Conservative	4	4
Huron North	Liberal	Conservative	3	2
Huron-Perth	Liberal	Liberal	1	0
Kenora-Rainy River	Liberal	Liberal	1	0
Kent	Liberal	Conservative	2	0
Kingston City	Liberal	Liberal	1	1 ¹²
Lambton-Kent	Liberal	Liberal-Progressive	0	0
Lambton West	Liberal	Liberal	4	0
Lanark	Conservative	Liberal	5	0
Leeds	Conservative	Liberal	5	0
Lincoln	Conservative	Conservative	3	1
London	Conservative	Liberal	1	2
Middlesex East	Liberal	Liberal	1	0
Middlesex West	Liberal	Liberal	1	1
Muskoka-Ontario	Liberal	Liberal-Progressive	4	0
Nipissing	Liberal	Liberal	2	0

¹⁰ 1 school moved to Kingston City riding; 1 school moved from Renfrew South riding.

¹¹ 1 school moved to Prescott riding.

¹² 1 school moved from Elgin riding.

<u>Constituency</u>	<u>Affiliation 1935</u>	<u>Affiliation 1940</u>	<u># Towns Considered</u>	<u># Main Bases</u>
Norfolk	Liberal	Liberal	2	1
Northumberland	Liberal	Liberal	0	0
Ontario	Liberal	Liberal	3	1
Ottawa (2 seats)	2 Liberal	2 Liberal	2	1
East	Liberal	Liberal		
West	Liberal	Liberal		
Oxford	Liberal	Liberal	2	0
Parry Sound	Liberal	Liberal	4	0
Peel	Conservative	Conservative	0	0
Perth	Liberal	Liberal	2	0
Peterborough West	Liberal	Conservative	5	0
Port Arthur	Liberal	Liberal	2	0
Prescott	Liberal	Liberal	4	2 ³³
Prince Edward-Lennox	Conservative	Conservative	5	1
Renfrew North	Liberal	Liberal	1	1
Renfrew South	Liberal	Liberal	2	2 ³⁴
Russell	Liberal	Liberal	2	1
Simcoe East	Liberal	Liberal	0	0
Simcoe North	Liberal	Liberal	1	0
Stormont	Liberal	Liberal	1	0
Timiskaming	Liberal	Liberal	1	0
Toronto (11 seats)	9 Con/2 Lib	8 Con/3 Lib	1	4
Broadview	Conservative	Conservative		
Danforth	Conservative	Conservative		
Davenport	Conservative	Conservative		
Eglinton	Conservative	Liberal		
Greenwood	Conservative	Conservative		
High Park	Conservative	Conservative		
Parkdale	Conservative	Conservative		
Rosedale	Conservative	Conservative		
St Paul's	Conservative	Conservative		
Spadina	Liberal	Liberal		
Trinity	Liberal	Liberal		
Victoria	Liberal	Liberal	4	0
Waterloo North	Liberal	Liberal	3	0
Waterloo South	Conservative	Conservative	3	1
Welland	Liberal	Liberal	4	0
Wellington North	Liberal	Liberal	6	0
Wellington South	Liberal	Liberal	0	0
Wentworth	Conservative	Liberal	4	0
York East	Conservative	Conservative	0	0
York North	Liberal	Liberal	2	0
York South	Conservative	Conservative	0	0
York West	Liberal	Conservative	0	0

³³ 1 school moved from Hamilton riding.

³⁴ 1 school moved to Elgin riding.

SASKATCHEWAN

<u>Constituency</u>	<u>Affiliation 1935</u>	<u>Affiliation 1940</u>	<u># Towns Considered</u>	<u># Main Bases</u>
Assiniboia	Liberal	Liberal	8	1
Humboldt	Liberal	Liberal	3	1
Kindersley	Social Credit	Liberal	2	0
Lake Centre	Liberal	Conservative	9	1 ³⁵
Mackenzie	Liberal	CCF	3	0
Maple Creek	Liberal	Liberal	7	0
Melfort	Liberal	CCF	4	0
Melville	Liberal	Liberal	7	0
Moose Jaw	Liberal	Liberal	4	2
North Battleford	Liberal	Unity	0	0
Prince Albert	Liberal	Liberal	3	2
Qu'Appelle	Conservative	Conservative	5	0
Regina City	Liberal	Liberal	1	3
Rosetown-Biggar	CCF	CCF	6	0
Rosthern	Liberal	Liberal	5	0
Saskatoon City	Liberal	United Reform - Conservative	2	2
Swift Current	Liberal	Liberal	2	1
The Battlefords	Social Credit	Liberal	6	2
Weyburn	CCF	CCF	7	2
Wood Mountain	Liberal	Liberal	12	2
Yorkton	Liberal	CCF	5	2 ³⁶

³⁵ 1 school moved to Yorkton riding.

³⁶ 1 school moved from Lake Centre riding.

APPENDIX C

TOWNS INVOLVED IN BCATP BASE SELECTION 1939 - 1945

ALBERTA

<u>Town:</u>	<u>Riding:</u>	<u>Lobbied:</u>	<u>1935:</u>	<u>1940:</u>	<u>Investigated/Affiliation</u>	
Airdrie	Bow River	no	SC	ND	1940 01 09	SC
Barnswell	Lethbridge	no	SC	ND	1942 04 30	ND
Barons	Macleod	no	SC	ND	1940 08 10	ND
Barradaile	Battle River	no	SC	ND	1942 06 29	ND
Beaverhill Lake	Vegreville	no	SC	ND	1939 12 06	SC
Big Lake	Jasper-Edson	no	SC	ND	1941 04 28	ND
Blackfalds	Red Deer	no	SC	ND	1942 02 13	ND
Bowden	Red Deer	no	SC	ND	1940 08 07	ND
Bow Island	Medicine Hat	no	SC	L	1941 04 22	L
Calgary	Calgary East	no	SC	L	1939 11 04	SC
Champion	Macleod	yes	SC	ND	1940 07 18	ND
Chin	Lethbridge	no	SC	ND	1942 03 17	ND
Clairmont	Peace River	no	SC	L	1941 05 03	L
Claresholm	Macleod	no	SC	ND	1940 09 19	ND
Claymore	Battle River	no	SC	ND	1942 06 29	ND
Coaldale	Lethbridge	no	SC	ND	1942 03 17	ND
Cochrane	Calgary West	no	C	L	1939 12 19	C
Cooking Lake	Wetaskiwin	no	SC	ND	1940 08 14	ND
Coronation	Acadia	yes	SC	ND	not investigated	
Cowley	Macleod	no	SC	ND	1939 11 04	SC
Dalemead	Bow River	no	SC	ND	1941 12 20	ND
DeWinton	Calgary East	no	SC	L	1940 08 10	L
Drumheller	Acadia	yes	SC	ND	not investigated	
Edmonton	Edmonton East	yes	SC	L	1939 11 04	SC
Ellerslie	Wetaskiwin	no	SC	ND	1941 12 15	ND
Ensign	Macleod	no	SC	ND	1940 08 13	ND
Fort Saskatchewan	Edmonton West	no	L	L	1942 06 27	L
Frank Lake	Macleod	no	SC	ND	1940 11 06	ND
Gladys Ridge	Macleod	no	SC	ND	1941 10 03	ND
Glenbow	Calgary West	no	C	L	1941 12 20	L
Glenbow Lake	Calgary West	no	C	L	1941 12 20	L
Grand Prairie	Peace River	yes	SC	L	1941 03 12	L
Grassy Lake	Medicine Hat	no	SC	L	1939 11 04	L
Gratum	Macleod	no	SC	ND	1939 11 22	SC
High River	Macleod	no	SC	ND	1940 06 05	ND
Holsom	Medicine Hat	no	SC	L	1939 11 15	SC
Innisfail	Red Deer	no	SC	ND	1940 07 21	ND
Inverlake	Bow River	no	SC	ND	1940 08 10	ND
Irricana	Bow River	no	SC	ND	1942 08 28	ND
Jasper	Jasper-Edson	no	SC	ND	1942 11 05	ND
Kirkcaldy	Macleod	no	SC	ND	1939 11 04	SC
Kitscoty	Battle River	no	SC	ND	1943 04 13	ND
Lawbell	Jasper-Edson	no	SC	ND	1941 09 23	ND
Lethbridge	Lethbridge	yes	SC	ND	1939 12 06	SC

<u>Town:</u>	<u>Riding:</u>	<u>Lobbied:</u>	<u>1935:</u>	<u>1940:</u>	<u>Investigated/Affiliation</u>	
Lloydminster	Battle River	no	SC	ND	1941 03 15	ND
Macleod	Macleod	yes	SC	ND	1939 11 04	SC
Medicine Hat	Medicine Hat	yes	SC	L	1939 11 22	SC
Monarch	Lethbridge	yes	SC	ND	1940 04 22	ND
Morinville	Jasper-Edson	no	SC	ND	1941 12 16	ND
Namao	Jasper-Edson	no	SC	ND	1941 04 08	ND
Netook	Red Deer	no	SC	ND	1941 07 04	ND
Nobleford	Lethbridge	no	SC	ND	1940 08 10	ND
Peace River	Peace River	no	SC	L	1941 03 15	L
Pearce	Macleod	no	SC	ND	1939 11 22	SC
Penhold	Red Deer	no	SC	ND	1939 11 04	SC
Prentiss	Red Deer	no	SC	ND	1940 07 23	ND
Pultney	Macleod	no	SC	ND	1940 08 23	ND
Redcliff	Medicine Hat	no	SC	L	1941 04 22	L
Red Deer	Red Deer	no	SC	ND	1941 12 10	ND
Red Willow	Camrose	no	SC	ND	1939 12 19	SC
Scotford	Vegreville	no	SC	ND	1942 06 29	ND
Shepard	Bow River	no	SC	ND	1940 08 10	ND
Stand Off	Macleod	no	SC	ND	1940 07 24	ND
Stavely	Macleod	no	SC	ND	1942 02 25	ND
Suffield	Medicine Hat	no	SC	L	1941 02 21	L
Taber	Lethbridge	yes	SC	ND	1941 04 14	ND
Threchills Creek	Red Deer	no	SC	ND	1941 01 06	ND
Tilley	Medicine Hat	no	SC	L	1939 12 19	SC
Tofield	Vegreville	no	SC	ND	1939 12 15	SC
Turnip Hill	Lethbridge	no	SC	ND	1941 10 24	ND
Vauxhall	Medicine Hat	no	SC	L	1939 12 19	SC
Vegreville	Vegreville	yes	SC	ND	1940 02 27	SC
Vermillion	Battle River	yes	SC	ND	1941 09 15	ND
Vulcan	Macleod	no	SC	ND	1942 01 27	ND
Wainwright	Battle River	yes	SC	ND	1940 11 07	ND
West Stand Off	Macleod	no	SC	ND	1941 11 26	ND
Whitecourt	Jasper-Edson	no	SC	ND	1943 10 12	ND
Whitla	Medicine Hat	no	SC	L	1939 11 15	SC
Woodhouse	Macleod	no	SC	ND	1940 09 26	ND

MANITOBA

<u>Town:</u>	<u>Riding:</u>	<u>Lobbied:</u>	<u>1935:</u>	<u>1940:</u>	<u>Investigated/Affiliation</u>	
Arden	Neepawa	no	L	L	1941 05 03	L
Bede	Souris	no	L	C	1942 05 19	C
Beverley	Brandon	no	C	L	1939 12 04	C
Boissevain	Souris	yes	L	C	1942 05 19	C
Brandon	Brandon	no	C	L	1939 11 27	C
Carberry	Neepawa	yes	L	L	1939 11 25	L
Carman	Macdonald	yes	LP	LP	1941 11 01	LP
Chater	Brandon	no	C	L	1940 09 21	L
Crystal City	Lisgar	yes	L	L	not investigated	
Dauphin/Edwards Creek	Dauphin	no	L	L	1940 06 26	L
Douglas	Neepawa	no	L	L	1940 05 09	L
Eden	Neepawa	no	L	L	1941 09 19	L
Elgin	Souris	no	L	C	1941 06 24	C
Elva	Souris	no	L	C	1942 05 19	C
Fairburn	Souris	yes	L	C	1942 05 19	C
Fort Churchill	Churchill	no	L	L	1942 07 10	L
Foxwarren	Marquette	yes	L	L	not investigated	
Genest	Portage la Prairie	no	L	L	1939 11 27	L
Gilbert Plains	Dauphin	no	L	L	1940 06 26	L
Gimli	Selkirk	no	LP	L	1941 11 01	L
Gladstone	Neepawa	no	L	L	1940 01 02	L
Glenboro	Macdonald	yes	LP	LP	not investigated	
Glencross	Lisgar	no	L	L	1942 05 19	L
Graham	Macdonald	no	LP	LP	1939 10 25	LP
Hargrave	Brandon	no	C	L	1941 04 26	L
Hartney	Souris	no	L	C	1939 12 04	L
High Bluff	Portage la Prairie	no	L	L	1940 01 12	L
Lenore	Brandon	no	C	L	1942 10 31	L
Macdonald	Portage la Prairie	no	L	L	1940 06 14	L
Marquette	Portage la Prairie	yes	L	L	1940 08 10	L
Matlock	Selkirk	no	LP	L	1941 06 17	L
Melita	Souris	no	L	C	1941 11 01	C
Miami	Macdonald	no	LP	LP	1942 02 11	LP
Millbrook	St Boniface	no	L	L	1940 03 28	L
Minto	Souris	yes	L	C	1942 05 19	C
Morden	Lisgar	no	L	L	1943 04 24	L
Napinka	Souris	no	L	C	1941 11 01	C
Netley Lake	Selkirk	no	LP	L	1942 05 05	L
Neepawa	Neepawa	yes	L	L	1940 11 26	L
North Junction	Dauphin	no	L	L	1939 11 09	L
Oberon	Neepawa	no	L	L	1939 11 24	L
Paulson	Dauphin	no	L	L	1939 11 10	L
Petersfield	Selkirk	no	LP	L	1941 11 01	L
Petrel	Neepawa	no	L	L	1939 11 25	L
Popular Point	Portage la Prairie	no	L	L	1939 11 17	L
Portage la Prairie	Portage la Prairie	no	L	L	1939 11 27	L
Rivers	Brandon	no	C	L	1939 11 27	L
Roland	Macdonald	no	LP	LP	1942 02 11	LP

<u>Town:</u>	<u>Riding:</u>	<u>Lobbied:</u>	<u>1935:</u>	<u>1940:</u>	<u>Investigated/Affiliation</u>	
Rosebank	Macdonald	yes	LP	LP	1943 04 02	LP
Russell	Marquette	yes	L	L	not investigated	
St Anne	St Boniface	no	L	L	1940 01 12	L
St Boniface	St Boniface	no	L	L	1939 12 15	L
St Lazare	Marquette	yes	L	L	1940 09 16	L
Shilo	Neebawa	no	L	L	1940 09 18	L
Souris	Brandon	yes	C	L	1939 12 04	C
The Pas	Churchill	no	L	L	1940 02 15	L
Transcona	St Boniface	no	L	L	1939 12 07	L
Treherne	Macdonald	no	LP	LP	1939 12 19	LP
Valley River	Dauphin	no	L	L	1940 06 24	L
Virden	Brandon	no	C	L	1939 11 27	C
Vivian	St Boniface	no	L	L	1939 11 23	L
Westbourne	Portage la Prairie	no	L	L	1940 04 22	L
Winkler	Lisgar	no	L	L	1942 05 19	L
Winnipeg	Winnipeg(4)	no	2CCF/2L	1CCF/3L	1939 12 06	2CCF/2L
Winnipeg Beach	Selkirk	no	LP	L	1939 12 06	LP
Whittemouth	Springfield	no	L	L	1941 05 03	L

SASKATCHEWAN

<u>Town:</u>	<u>Riding:</u>	<u>Lobbied:</u>	<u>1935:</u>	<u>1940:</u>	<u>Investigated/Affiliation</u>	
Abernethy	Melville	yes	L	L	1941 11 08	L
Arcola	Assiniboia	no	L	L	1940 08 24	L
Ardill	Moose Jaw	yes	L	L	1940 01 08	L
Assiniboia	Wood Mountain	yes	L	L	1940 08 12	L
Benbough	Wood Mountain	no	L	L	1942 05 23	L
Biggar	Rosetown-Biggar	yes	CCF	CCF	1941 11 01	CCF
Big River/Ladder Lake	Prince Albert	yes	L	L	not investigated	
Boharm	Wood Mountain	no	L	L	1939 11 29	L
Brada	The Battlefords	no	SC	L	1940 07 24	L
Brewer	Melville	yes	L	L	1942 05 11	L
Broadview	Qu'Appelle	yes	C	C	1940 07 15	C
Brora	Lake Centre	no	L	C	1942 11 03	C
Burdick	Wood Mountain	no	L	L	1942 10 21	L
Burr	Humboldt	no	L	L	1942 06 07	L
Buttress	Moose Jaw	no	L	L	1939 93 28	L
Caron	Wood Mountain	no	L	L	1941 04 04	L
Carlyle	Assiniboia	no	L	L	1939 12 18	L
Chandler	Weyburn	no	CCF	CCF	1941 07 21	CCF
Clarkboro	Rosthern	no	L	L	1941 07 02	L
Congress	Wood Mountain	yes	L	L	1940 08 16	L
Coppen	Wood Mountain	no	L	L	1940 08 02	L
Cory	Saskatoon City	no	L	UR ->C	1939 11 29	L
Dafoc/Quill Lake	Humboldt	no	L	L	1939 12 06	L
Davidson	Lake Centre	yes	L	C	1939 11 04	C
Dingley	Qu'Appelle	no	C	C	1939 12 01	C
Dunblane	Rosetown-Biggar	no	CCF	CCF	1939 12 19	CCF
Estevan	Assiniboia	yes	L	L	1940 09 01	L
Foam Lake	Yorkton	yes	L	CCF	not investigated	

<u>Town:</u>	<u>Riding:</u>	<u>Lobbied:</u>	<u>1935:</u>	<u>1940:</u>	<u>Investigated/Affiliation</u>	
Finnie	Melville	yes	L	L	1941 11 07	L
Girvin	Lake Centre	no	L	C	1941 07 02	L
Glenside	Lake Centre	yes	L	C	1942 06 04	C
Gravelbourg	Wood Mountain	yes	L	L	1940 08 02	L
Halbrite	Weyburn	no	CCF	CCF	1940 07 30	CCF
Hagen	Prince Albert	no	L	L	1941 11 14	L
Hamlin	The Battlefords	yes	SC	L	1940 07 24	L
Hitchcock	Assiniboia	no	L	L	1941 03 12 ³⁷	L
Humboldt	Humboldt	no	L	L	1941 11 01	L
Imperial	Lake Centre	no	L	C	1940 05 15	C
Indian Head	Qu'Appelle	no	C	C	1939 12 01	C
Kamsack	Yorkton	yes	L	CCF	1940 08 01	CCF
Kelvington	Mackenzie	yes	L	CCF	not investigated	
Kerrobert	Kindersley	yes	SC	L	1940 12 23	L
Ketepwe	Melville	no	L	L	1939 12 01	L
Kindersley	Kindersley	yes	SC	L	not investigated	
Kipling	Assiniboia	no	L	L	1940 09 16	L
Leitchville	Maple Creek	yes	L	L	1942 04 17	L
Lemburg	Melville	yes	L	L	1942 04 18	L
Lethburn	Wood Mountain	yes	L	L	1940 08 16	L
Liberty	Lake Centre	yes	L	C	not investigated	
Lipsett	Melfort	no	L	CCF	1942 06 07	CCF
Lloydminster	The Battlefords	yes	SC	L	1941 03 12	L
Lorlie	Melville	yes	L	L	1941 11 07	L
Maple Creek	Maple Creek	yes	L	L	1941 04 04	L
Mazenod	Wood Mountain	no	L	L	1941 08 22	L
Melfort	Melfort	yes	L	CCF	1940 02 24	L
Melville	Melville	yes	L	L	1939 12 15	L
Moose Jaw	Moose Jaw	yes	L	L	1939 11 04	L
Moosomin	Qu'Appelle	yes	C	C	1941 11 17	C
Mossbank	Moose Jaw	yes	L	L	1939 11 04	L
Nokomis	Lake Centre	yes	L	C	1939 12 15	L
Nipawin	Melfort	no	L	CCF	1939 12 19	CCF
North Battleford	The Battlefords	yes	SC	L	1930 11 04	SC
Osler	Rosthern	no	L	L	1939 11 29	L
Outlook	Rosetown-Biggar	yes	CCF	CCF	1941 11 01	CCF
Outlook South	Rosetown-Biggar	yes	CCF	CCF	1941 11 01	CCF
Outram	Weyburn	no	CCF	CCF	1941 06 22	CCF
Prince Albert	Prince Albert	yes	L	L	1939 11 04	L
Ralph	Weyburn	yes	CCF	CCF	1939 12 04	CCF
Regina	Regina City	yes	L	L	1939 12 06	C
Rhein	Yorkton	no	L	CCF	1940 05 13	CCF
Rocanville	Qu'Appelle	no	C	C	1941 11 17	C
Rosetown	Rosetown-Biggar	no	CCF	CCF	1941 11 01	CCF
Rosthern	Rosthern	no	L	L	1942 05 15	L
St Aldwyn	Swift Current	no	L	L	1940 07 24	L
Saskatoon	Saskatoon City	yes	L	UR-> C	1939 11 04	L

³⁷ Preliminary investigation was done before this date, which is date Hitchcock was Considered by ADC.

<u>Town:</u>	<u>Riding:</u>	<u>Lobbied:</u>	<u>1935:</u>	<u>1940:</u>	<u>Investigated/Affiliation</u>	
Scott	The Battlefords	no	SC	L	1941 06 22	L
Shand	Assiniboia	yes	L	L	1940 09 01	L
Shaunavon	Maple Creek	yes	L	L	1941 07 17	L
Shaunavon-Leitchville	Maple Creek	yes	L	L	1942 04 16	L
Shaunavon North	Maple Creek	yes	L	L	1942 04 16	L
Shaunavon-Rock Creek	Maple Creek	yes	L	L	1942 04 16	L
Sturdee	Yorkton	no	L	CCF	1940 08 07	CCF
Swift Current	Swift Current	yes	L	L	1939 12 06	L
Tatagwa Lake	Weyburn	yes	CCF	CCF	1939 12 04	CCF
Tisdale	Melfort	yes	L	CCF	not investigated	
Tribune	Weyburn	yes	CCF	CCF	1939 12 08	CCF
Una	Wood Mountain	no	L	L	1942 05 28	L
Venn	Lake Centre	no	L	C	1941 07 17	C
Verigin	Mackenzie	no	L	CCF	1942 06 08	CCF
Vanscoy	Rosetown-Biggar	no	CCF	CCF	1939 11 29	CCF
Vonda	Rosthern	yes	L	L	1940 03 23	L
Wadena	Mackenzie	yes	L	CCF	not investigated	
Warman	Rosthern	no	L	L	1939 11 29	L
Watrous	Lake Centre	no	L	C	1941 07 17	C
Weyburn	Weyburn	yes	CCF	CCF	1939 12 04	CCF
Wilkie	The Battlefords	yes	SC	L	1941 05 03	L
Willows	Wood Mountain	yes	L	L	1940 08 16	L
Wolseley	Assiniboia	yes	L	L	1940 07 31	L
Woodsworth	Assiniboia	no	L	L	1940 09 16	L
Wymark	Maple Creek	no	L	L	1940 07 24	L
Yorkton	Yorkton	no	L	CCF	1940 08 07	CCF

ONTARIO

<u>Town:</u>	<u>Riding:</u>	<u>Lobbied:</u>	<u>1935:</u>	<u>1940:</u>	<u>Investigated/Affiliation</u>	
Alliston	Dufferin-Simcoe	no	C	C	1939 11 27	C
Almonte	Lanark	no	C	L	1940 01 09	C
Amberley	Bruce	no	L	L	1941 10 11	L
Ancaster	Wentworth	no	C	L	1941 02 06	L
Appleton	Lanark	no	C	L	1940 01 09	C
Arnprior	Renfrew South	no	L	L	1941 02 24	L
Arthur	Wellington North	no	L	L	1942 08 18	L
Arthur North	Wellington North	no	L	L	1942 08 18	L
Aylmer	Elgin	no	L	L	1939 12 11	L
Beamsville	Lincoln	no	C	C	1942 02 27	C
Beaverton	Muskoka-Ontario	no	L	LP	1939 12 19	L
Belleville	Hastings South	no	L	C	1941 07 10	C
Binbrook	Wentworth	no	C	L	1942 10 08	L
Blenheim	Kent	no	L	C	1941 05 03	C
Bracebridge	Muskoka-Ontario	no	L	LP	1939 12 19	L
Bradford	Dufferin-Simcoe	no	C	C	1939 12 21	C
Brantford	Brantford City	no	L	L	1939 11 27	L
Brockville	Leeds	yes	C	L	1939 11 25	C
Burford	Brant	no	L	L	1940 03 29	L
Burtch	Norfolk	yes	L	L	1939 11 18	L

<u>Town:</u>	<u>Riding:</u>	<u>Lobbied:</u>	<u>1935:</u>	<u>1940:</u>	<u>Investigated/Affiliation</u>
Burwell	Elgin	no	L	L	1940 11 12 L
Camp Borden	Dufferin-Simcoe	no	C	C	1939 11 27 C
Callander	Parry Sound	yes	L	L	not investigated
Cameron	Victoria	no	L	L	1939 12 19 L
Carleton Place	Lanark	yes	C	L	1940 01 09 C
Carp	Carleton	no	C	C	1942 05 15 C
Cayuga	Haldimand	no	C	C	1942 05 15 C
Cathcart	Brant	no	L	L	1939 12 05 L
Centralia	Middlesex West	no	L	L	1941 03 12 L
Chartrand	Russell	no	L	L	1939 12 22 L
Chippewa	Welland	yes	L	L	1939 10 26 L
Collins Bay	Frontenac-Addington	no	L	C	1939 12 28 L
Cornwall	Stormont	no	L	L	1939 12 28 L
Deseronto Camp Rathburn	Hastings South	no	L	C	1940 03 05 L
Dufferin	Haldimand	no	C	C	1941 10 21 C
Dunnville	Haldimand	yes	C	C	1939 11 18 C
Edenvale	Simcoe North	no	L	L	1939 11 27 L
Edgely	York North	no	L	L	1939 11 03 L
Edwards	Carleton	no	C	C	1939 12 15 L
Elfrida	Wentworth	no	C	L	1943 04 06 L
Elmira	Waterloo North	no	L	L	1941 11 05 L
Emsdale	Parry Sound	yes	L	L	1939 11 22 L
Ennismore	Peterborough West	yes	L	C	1939 11 15 L
Fingal	Elgin	yes	L	L	1939 12 11 L
Fenelon Falls	Victoria	no	L	L	1939 12 21 L
Fort Frances	Kenora-Rainy River	yes	L	L	1941 02 13 L
Fort William	Fort William	yes	L	L	1939 10 14 L
Gananoque	Leeds	no	C	L	1941 03 12 L
Gillies	Timiskaming	yes	L	L	not investigated
Goderich	Huron North	yes	L	C	1939 11 18 L
Goderich South	Huron North	no	L	C	1942 05 07 C
Goldstone	Wellington North	no	L	L	1942 08 18 L
Graham	Fort William	no	L	L	1939 10 25 L
Grand Bend	Lambton West	no	L	L	1940 09 20 L
Gravenhurst	Muskoka-Ontario	no	L	LP	1941 01 03
Guelph	Waterloo South	no	C	C	1940 12 24 C
Hagersville	Haldimand	yes	C	C	1939 11 27 C
Hamilton	Hamilton E+W	yes	2C	2L	1939 12 11 2L
Hamilton Bay	Hamilton E+W	yes	2C	2L	not investigated
Harmony	Perth	yes	L	L	1940 01 11 L
Harriston	Wellington North	no	L	L	1941 07 14 L
Hawkesbury	Prescott	no	L	L	1940 11 01 L
Hillsburg	Wellington North	no	L	L	1939 12 19 L
Hornby	Halton	no	L	L	1939 11 11 L
Jarvis	Norfolk	yes	L	L	1939 10 31 L
Kapuskasing	Cochrane	no	LL	L	1941 02 21 L
Killaloe	Renfrew South	no	L	L	1940 04 24 L
Kinburn	Carleton	no	C	C	1943 06 24 C
Kingston	Kingston City	yes	L	L	1939 12 11 L
Kohler	Haldimand	no	C	C	1939 11 16 C

<u>Town:</u>	<u>Riding:</u>	<u>Lobbied:</u>	<u>1935:</u>	<u>1940:</u>	<u>Investigated/Affiliation</u>	
Leamington	Essex South	yes	L	L	1940 10 05	L
Limoges	Russell	no	L	L	1942 05 06	L
Lindsay	Victoria	no	L	L	1940 03 28	L
Little Current	Algoma East	yes	L	L	not investigated	
London	London	yes	C	L	1939 11 27	C
L'Orignal	Prescott	no	L	L	1940 11 15	L
Lyn	Leeds	yes	C	L	1939 11 20	C
MacLennan	Algoma West	no	L	L	1941 06 15	L
Meaford	Grey North	no	L	L	1939 12 28	L
Merlin	Kent	no	L	C	1941 03 26	C
Milverton	Perth	yes	L	L	not investigated	
Mohawk	Hasting South	no	L	C	1940 02 13	L
Mooretown	Lambton West	no	L	L	1939 12 19	L
Mountain View	Renfrew North	no	L	L	1940 01 05	L
Mount Hope	Wentworth	no	C	L	1939 11 27	C
Muskoka	Muskoka-Ontario	no	L	LP	1940 03 06	L
Napanee	Prince Edward-Lennox	no	C	C	1941 07 01	C
Niagara Peninsula	Welland	no	L	L	1939 12 21	L
Night Hawk Lake	Cochrane	no	LL	L	1941 02 19	L
North Bay	Parry Sound	no	L	L	1941 03 05	L
North Monaghan	Peterborough West	yes	L	C	1939 11 14	L
Norwich	Oxford	no	L	L	1942 03 27	L
Oshawa	Ontario	yes	L	L	1940 03 14	L
Ottawa/Uplands	Ottawa E+W	no	2L	2L	1940 03 11	2L
Owen Sound	Grey North	yes	L	L	1939 12 28	L
Palmerston	Wellington North	no	L	L	1941 07 14	L
Paris	Brant	no	L	L	1941 12 02	L
Pembroke Missouri Church	Renfrew North	yes	L	L	1939 12 18	L
Pendleton	Prescott	no	L	L	1939 12 19	L
Perth	Lanark	no	C	L	1939 12 23	C
Peterborough	Peterborough West	yes	L	C	1939 11 06	L
Peterborough Airport	Peterborough West	yes	L	C	1941 03 04	C
Picton	Prince Edward-Lennox	no	C	C	1940 05 31	C
Pikington	Waterloo South	yes	C	C	1940 02 12	C
Point Peter	Prince Edward-Lennox	yes	C	C	not investigated	
Porquis Junction	Cochrane	no	LL	L	1941 01 23	L
Port Albert	Huron North	no	L	C	1939 12 16	L
Port Arthur	Port Arthur	yes	L	L	not investigated	
Port Burwell	Elgin	no	L	L	1939 12 16	L
Port Edward	Lambton West	no	L	L	1940 04 09	L
Port Whitby	Ontario	no	L	L	1940 09 06	L
Preston	Waterloo South	yes	C	C	1939 12 22	C
Racora	Victoria	yes	L	L	1940 01 06	L
Ramore	Cochrane	no	LL	L	1943 01 29	L
Rockcliffe	Ottawa E+W	no	2L	2L	1940 03 11	2L
St Catharines	Lincoln	no	C	C	1940 01 22	C
St Eugene	Prescott	yes	L	L	1939 12 19	L
St Joseph	Huron-Perth	no	L	L	1940 09 20	L
St Thomas	Elgin	no	L	L	1939 11 27	L

<u>Town:</u>	<u>Riding:</u>	<u>Lobbied:</u>	<u>1935:</u>	<u>1940:</u>	<u>Investigated/Affiliation</u>	
Sandhurst	Prince Edward Lennox	no	C	C	1940 01 02	C
Sarnia	Lambton West	yes	L	L	1940 09 16	L
Sault Ste Marie	Algoma West	yes	L	L	1940 01 02	L
Shellington	Cochrane	no	LL	L	1943 02 01	L
Shirley Bay	Carleton	no	C	C	1939 12 26	C
Simcoe	Haldimand	no	C	C	1939 11 27	C
Slate River	Fort William	no	L	L	1940 09 25	L
Smith Falls	Lanark	no	C	L	1939 12 23	C
South River	Parry Sound	no	L	L	1941 06 23	L
Strathburn	Elgin	yes	L	L	1941 09 27	L
Sturgeon Lake	Nipissing	no	L	L	1939 12 21	L
Sudbury	Nipissing	yes	L	L	1939 12 21	L
Sutton	York North	no	L	L	1941 03 12	L
Taylor	Leeds	yes	C	L	1940 01 13	C
Thorndale	Middlesex East	no	L	L	1942 02 11	L
Thorold	Welland	no	L	L	1941 12 12	L
Tillsonburg	Oxford	no	L	L	1942 04 30	L
Tincap	Leeds	yes	C	L	1939 11 20	C
Toronto/Malton	Toronto (11)	yes	9C, 2L	8C, 3L	1939 10 11	9C, 2L
Trenton	Hastings South	no	L	C	1940 02 13	L
Wagaming	Port Arthur	no	L	L	1940 04 09	L
Waterloo Wellington Kitchener	Waterloo North	yes	L	L	1940 06 12	L
Welland	Welland	no	L	L	1939 11 27	L
Wellington	Prince Edward-Lennox	yes	C	C	not investigated	
Whitby	Ontario	yes	L	L	1940 02 07	L
Warton	Bruce	yes	L	L	1939 12 21	L
Windsor	Essex West	yes	L	L	1939 12 11	L
Willoughby	Lincoln	no	C	C	1942 07 07	C
Wilson's Farm	Peterborough West	yes	L	C	1939 11 14	L
Winterbourne	Waterloo-North	yes	L	L	1939 12 22	L

APPENDIX D COMMUNITIES THAT LOBBIED

(Determination Whether Lobbying came Before or After Government Consideration)

MANITOBA

<u>Community</u>	<u>Constituency</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>Date Lobbied</u>	<u>Date Considered</u>	<u>B/A</u>
Boissevain	Souris	L	C	1942 02 14	1939 11 27	a
Carberry	Neepawa	L	L	1940 06 11	1939 11 25	a
Carman	Macdonald	LP	LP	1941 12 17	1941 11 01	a
Crystal City	Lisgar	L	L	1939 12 18	not considered	n/c
Foxwarren	Marquette	L	L	1940 10 07	not considered	n/c
Glenboro	Macdonald	LP	LP	1942 02 07	not considered	n/c
Marquette	Portage la Prairie	L	L	1940 09 07	1940 08 10	a
Neepawa	Neepawa	L	L	1940 09 30	1940 11 26	b
Russell	Marquette	L	L	1942 02 02	not considered	n/c
Rosebank	Macdonald	LP	LP	1943 05 18	1943 04 02	a
St Lazare	Marquette	L	L	1940 09 07	1940 09 16	b
Souris	Souris	L	C	1941 05 05	1939 12 04	a

ALBERTA

<u>Community</u>	<u>Constituency</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>Date Lobbied</u>	<u>Date Considered</u>	<u>B/A</u>
Champion	Macleod	SC	ND	1940 04 08	1940 07 18	b
Coronation	Acadia	SC	ND	1940 06 14	not considered	n/c
Drumheller	Acadia	SC	ND	1940 01 02 ³⁸	not considered	n/c
Edmonton	Edmonton East	SC	L	1941 10 06	1939 11 04	a
Grand Prairie	Peace River	SC	L	1940 07 24	1941 03 12	b
Lethbridge	Lethbridge	SC	ND	1939 10 11	1939 12 06	b
Macleod	Macleod	SC	ND	1939 10 20	1939 11 04	b
Medicine Hat	Medicine Hat	SC	L	1940 10 22	1939 11 22	a
Monarch	Lethbridge	SC	ND	1941 11 10	1940 04 22	a
Taber	Lethbridge	SC	ND	1941 03 21 ³⁹	1941 04 14	b
Vegreville	Vegreville	SC	ND	1940 07 17	1940 02 27	a
Vermillion	Battle River	SC	ND	1942 03 23	1941 09 15	a
Wainwright	Battle River	SC	ND	1940 09 10	1940 11 07	b

³⁸ File mentions that a delegation met W.L.M. King before Christmas 1939.

³⁹ Letter refers to lobbying in previous year.

SASKATCHEWAN

<u>Community</u>	<u>Constituency</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>Date Lobbied</u>	<u>Date Considered</u>	<u>B/A</u>
Assiniboia	Wood Mountain	L	L	1939 11 13	1940 08 12	b
Biggar	Rosetown-Biggar	CCF	CCF	1941 07 12	1941 11 01	b
Big River Ladder Lake	Prince Albert	L	L	1940 01 31	not considered	n/c
Broadview	Qu'Appelle	C	C	1940 08 08	1940 07 15	a
Davidson	Lake Centre	L	C	1941 05 09	1939 11 04	a
Estevan	Assiniboia	L	L	1939 12 06	1940 09 01	b
Foam Lake	Yorkton	L	CCF	1941 01 21	not considered	n/c
Gravelbourg	Wood Mountain	L	L	1941 02 05	1940 08 02	a
Kamsack	Yorkton	L	CCF	1941 07 29	1940 08 01	a
Kelvington	Mackenzie	L	CCF	1941 11 17	not considered	n/c
Kerrobert	Kindersley	SC	L	1939 12 12	1940 12 23	b
Kindersley	Kindersley	SC	L	1940 10 15	not considered	n/c
Liberty	Lake Centre	L	C	1942 04 27	not considered	n/c
Lloydminster	The Battlefords	SC	L	1941 05 23	1941 03 12	a
Maple Creek	Maple Creek	L	L	1941 06 26	1941 04 04	a
Melfort	Melfort	L	CCF	1941 02 03	1940 02 24	a
Melville	Melville	L	L	1939 11 24	1939 12 15	b
Moose Jaw	Moose Jaw	L	L	1939 10 20	1939 11 04	b
Moosomin	Qu'Appelle	C	C	1941 08 18 ⁴⁰	1941 11 17	b
Mossbank	Moose Jaw	L	L	1940 01 11	1939 11 04	a
Nokomis	Lake Centre	L	C	1939 12 19	1939 12 15	a
Outlook	Rosetown-Biggar	CCF	CCF	1941 11 26	1941 11 01	a
Prince Albert	Prince Albert	L	L	1939 09 25 ⁴¹	1939 11 04	b
Regina	Regina City	L	L	1940 05 23	1939 12 06	a
Saskatoon	Saskatoon City	L	C ⁴²	1939 10 04	1939 11 04	b
Shand	Assiniboia	L	L	1941 10 27	1940 09 01	a
Shaunavon	Maple Creek	L	L	1941 06 25	1941 07 17	b
Swift Current	Swift Current	L	L	1939 11 04	1939 12 06	b
Tisdale	Melfort	L	CCF	1941 04 12	not considered	n/c
Vonda	Rosthern	L	L	1941 06 27	1940 03 23	a
Wadena	Mackenzie	L	CCF	1940 07 26	not considered	n/c
Weyburn	Weyburn	CCF	CCF	1939 12 11	1939 12 04	a
Wilkie	The Battlefords	SC	L	1941 05 29	1941 05 03	a
Wolseley	Assiniboia	L	L	1940 08 08	1940 07 31	a

⁴⁰ Letter refers to correspondence prior to this date.

⁴¹ Some correspondence from 1938.

⁴² Was originally United Reform until a later by-election.

ONTARIO

<u>Community</u>	<u>Constituency</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>Date Lobbied</u>	<u>Date Considered</u>	<u>B/A</u>
Brockville	Leeds	C	L	1939 10 23	1939 11 25	b
Burch	Norfolk	L	L	1940 05 08	1939 11 18	a
Callander	Parry Sound	L	L	1939 11 06 ⁴³	not considered	n/c
Carleton Place	Lanark	C	L	1941 03 09	1940 01 09	a
Chippewa	Welland	L	L	1939 Oct	1939 10 26	b
Dunnville	Haldimand	C	C	1939 11 23	1939 11 18	a
Emsdale	Parry Sound	L	L	1939 11 15	1939 11 22	b
Fingal	Elgin	L	L	1940 03 08 ⁴⁴	1939 12 11	a
Fort Frances	Kenora-Rainy River	L	L	1940 11 02	1941 02 13	b
Fort William	Fort William	L	L	1939 10 09 ⁴⁵	1939 10 14	b
Gillies	Timiskaming	L	L	1939 12 20	not considered	n/c
Goderich	Huron North	L	C	1939 08 25	1939 11 18	b
Hagersville	Haldimand	C	C	1939 11 06	1939 11 27	b
Hamilton	Hamilton (E+W)	2C	2L	1940 01 04	1939 12 11	a
Hamilton Bay	Hamilton (E+W)	2C	2L	1939 09 27	not considered	n/c
Harmony	Perth	L	L	1941 06 14 ⁴⁶	1940 01 11	a
Jarvis	Norfolk	L	L	1939 11 24	1939 10 31	a
Kingston	Kingston City	L	L	1939 09 20	1939 12 11	a
Leamington	Essex South	L	L	1941 02 20	1940 10 05	a
Little Current	Algoma East	L	L	1940 11 27	not considered	n/c
London	London	C	L	1940 05 23	1939 11 27	a
Milverton	Perth	L	L	1940 09 13	not considered	n/c
Oshawa	Ontario	L	L	1940 01 24 ⁴⁷	1940 03 14	a
Owen Sound	Grey North	L	L	1939 11 03	1939 12 28	b
Pembroke	Renfrew North	L	L	1940 01 13	1939 12 18	a
Peterborough	Peterborough West	L	C	1939 10 02	1939 11 06	a
Pilkington	Waterloo South	C	C	1940 01 30	1940 02 12	b
Point Peter	Prince Edward-Lennox	C	C	1939 11 16 ⁴⁸	not considered	n/c
Port Arthur	Port Arthur	L	L	1939 09 21	not considered	n/c
Preston	Waterloo North	L	L	1940 01 09	1939 12 22	a
Racora	Victoria	L	L	1940 02 06	1940 01 06	a
St Eugene	Prescott	L	L	1940 01 29	1939 12 19	a
Sarnia	Lambton West	L	L	1941 11 25	1940 09 16	a
Sault Ste Marie	Algoma West	L	L	1942 01 12	1940 01 02	a
Strathburn	Elgin	L	L	1943 01 09	1941 09 27	a

⁴³ Lobbying letter was before this date, which is government's response to city.

⁴⁴ Lobbying letter was before this date, which is government's response to city.

⁴⁵ Reference to correspondence dated 1939 09 21.

⁴⁶ Lobbying letter was before this date, which is government's response to city..

⁴⁷ Reference to correspondence in previous year.

⁴⁸ Lobbying letter was before this date, which is government's response to city.

<u>Community</u>	<u>Constituency</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>Date Lobbied</u>	<u>Date Considered</u>	<u>B/A</u>
Sudbury	Nipissing	L	L	1939 11 28	1939 12 21	b
Taylor	Leeds	C	L	1940 01 23	1940 01 13	a
Toronto	Toronto (11)	9C. 2L	8C. 3L	1939 12 19	1939 10 11	a
Warton	Bruce	L	L	1940 11 25	1939 12 21	a
Waterloo ¹⁹	Waterloo North	L	L	1940 02 02	1940 06 12	b
Wellington	Prince Edward-Lennox	C	C	1941 05 15	not considered	n/c
Whitby	Ontario	L	L	1939 12 09	1940 02 07	a
Winterbourne	Waterloo North	L	L	1939 12 21	1939 12 22	a

¹⁹ Also included cities Wellington and Kitchener.

APPENDIX E LOBBYING INTENSITY

ALBERTA

<u>Community</u>	<u>Constituency</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>Number of Letters</u>
Champion	Macleod	SC	ND	2
Coronation	Acadia	SC	ND	1
Drumheller	Acadia	SC	ND	3
Edmonton	Edmonton East	SC	L	1
Grand Prairie	Peace River	SC	L	1
Lethbridge	Lethbridge	SC	ND	2
Macleod	Macleod	SC	ND	3
Medicine Hat	Medicine Hat	SC	L	1
Monarch	Lethbridge	SC	ND	1
Taber	Lethbridge	SC	ND	3
Vegreville	Vegreville	SC	ND	5
Vermillion	Battle River	SC	ND	1
Wainwright	Battle River	SC	ND	3

MANITOBA

<u>Community</u>	<u>Constituency</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>Number of Letters</u>
Boissevain	Souris	L	C	2
Carberry	Neebawa	L	L	1
Carman	Macdonald	LP	LP	1
Crystal City	Lisgar	L	L	1
Foxwarren	Marquette	L	L	1
Glenboro	Macdonald	LP	LP	2
Marquette	Portage la Prairie	L	L	2
Neebawa	Neebawa	L	L	1
Russell	Marquette	L	L	2
Rosebank	Macdonald	LP	LP	3
St Lazare	Marquette	L	L	2
Souris	Souris	L	C	5

SASKATCHEWAN

<u>Community</u>	<u>Constituency</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>Number of Letters</u>
Assiniboia	Wood Mountain	L	L	9
Biggar	Rosetown-Biggar	CCF	CCF	1
Big River/Ladder Lake	Prince Albert	L	L	8
Broadview	Qu'Appelle	C	C	1
Davidson	Lake Centre	L	C	1
Estevan	Assiniboia	L	L	9
Foam Lake	Yorkton	L	CCF	2
Gravelbourg	Wood Mountain	L	L	3
Kamsack	Yorkton	L	CCF	2
Kelvington	Mackenzie	L	CCF	1
Kerrobert	Kindersley	SC	L	10
Kindersley	Kindersley	SC	L	1
Liberty	Lake Centre	L	C	1
Lloydminster	The Battlefords	SC	L	1
Maple Creek	Maple Creek	L	L	5
Melfort	Melfort	L	CCF	5
Melville	Melville	L	L	18
Moose Jaw	Moose Jaw	L	L	2
Moosomin	Qu'Appelle	C	C	3
Mossbank	Moose Jaw	L	L	2
Nokomis	Lake Centre	L	C	3
Outlook	Rosetown-Biggar	CCF	CCF	1
Prince Albert	Prince Albert	L	L	37
Regina	Regina City	L	L	1
Saskatoon	Saskatoon City	L	C ⁴⁰	2
Shand	Assiniboia	L	L	1
Shaunavon	Maple Creek	L	L	11
Swift Current	Swift Current	L	L	3
Tisdale	Melfort	L	CCF	1
Vonda	Rosthern	L	L	3
Wadena	Mackenzie	L	CCF	4
Weyburn	Weyburn	CCF	CCF	12
Wilkie	The Battlefords	SC	L	1
Wolseley	Assiniboia	L	L	3

⁴⁰ Was originally United Reform until a later by-election.

ONTARIO				
<u>Community</u>	<u>Constituency</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>Number of Letters</u>
Brockville	Leeds	C	L	1
Burch	Norfolk	L	L	4
Callander	Parry Sound	L	L	1
Carleton Place	Lanark	C	L	1
Chippewa	Welland	L	L	2
Dunnville	Haldimand	C	C	1
Emsdale	Parry Sound	L	L	1
Fingal	Elgin	L	L	1
Fort Frances	Kenora-Rainy River	L	L	2
Fort William	Fort William	L	L	2
Gillies	Timiskaming	L	L	3
Goderich	Huron North	L	C	5
Hagersville	Haldimand	C	C	1
Hamilton	Hamilton (E+W)	2C	2L	3
Hamilton Bay	Hamilton (E+W)	2C	2L	1
Harmony	Perth	L	L	1
Jarvis	Norfolk	L	L	1
Kingston	Kingston City	L	L	1
Leamington	Essex South	L	L	1
Little Current	Algoma East	L	L	1
London	London	C	L	2
Milverton	Perth	L	L	1
Oshawa	Ontario	L	L	6
Owen Sound	Grey North	L	L	1
Pembroke	Renfrew North	L	L	4
Peterborough	Peterborough West	L	C	5
Pilkington	Waterloo South	C	C	1
Point Peter	Prince Edward-Lennox	C	C	1
Preston	Waterloo North	L	L	4
Port Arthur	Port Arthur	L	L	1
Racora	Victoria	L	L	2
St Eugene	Prescott	L	L	2
Sarnia	Lambton West	L	L	2
Sault Ste Marie	Algoma West	L	L	8
Strathburn	Elgin	L	L	1
Sudbury	Nipissing	L	L	8
Taylor	Leeds	C	L	1
Toronto	Toronto (11)	9C, 2L	8C, 3L	1
Warton	Bruce	L	L	3
Waterloo Wellington Kitchener	Waterloo North	L	L	2
Wellington	Prince Edward-Lennox	C	C	1
Whitby	Ontario	L	L	6
Winterbourne	Waterloo North	L	L	4

APPENDIX F LOBBYING DURATION

ALBERTA

<u>Community</u>	<u>Constituency</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>Number of Months</u>
Champion	Macleod	SC	ND	26
Coronation	Acadia	SC	ND	1 time
Drumheller	Acadia	SC	ND	8
Edmonton	Edmonton East	SC	L	1 time
Grand Prairie	Peace River	SC	L	1 time
Lethbridge	Lethbridge	SC	ND	4
Macleod	Macleod	SC	ND	7
Medicine Hat	Medicine Hat	SC	L	1 time
Monarch	Lethbridge	SC	ND	1 time
Taber	Lethbridge	SC	ND	11
Vegreville	Vegreville	SC	ND	10
Vermillion	Battle River	SC	ND	1 time
Wainwright	Battle River	SC	ND	26

MANITOBA

<u>Community</u>	<u>Constituency</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>Number of Months</u>
Boissevain	Souris	L	C	5
Carberry	Neepawa	L	L	1 time
Carman	Macdonald	LP	LP	1 time
Crystal City	Lisgar	L	L	1 time
Foxwarren	Marquette	L	L	1 time
Glenboro	Macdonald	LP	LP	12 ⁵¹
Marquette	Portage la Prairie	L	L	4
Neepawa	Neepawa	L	L	1 time
Russell	Marquette	L	L	2 weeks
Rosebank	Macdonald	LP	LP	2
St Lazare	Marquette	L	L	6
Souris	Souris	L	C	1 week

⁵¹ One lobbyist referred to correspondence in previous year.

SASKATCHEWAN

<u>Community</u>	<u>Constituency</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>Number of Months</u>
Assiniboia	Wood Mountain	L	L	16
Biggar	Rosetown-Biggar	CCF	CCF	1 time
Big River/Ladder Lake	Prince Albert	L	L	9
Broadview	Qu'Appelle	C	C	1 time
Davidson	Lake Centre	L	C	1 time
Estevan	Assiniboia	L	L	22
Foam Lake	Yorkton	L	CCF	3
Gravelbourg	Wood Mountain	L	L	16
Kamsack	Yorkton	L	CCF	6
Kelvington	Mackenzie	L	CCF	1 time
Kerrobert	Kindersley	SC	L	20
Kindersley	Kindersley	SC	L	1 time
Liberty	Lake Centre	L	C	1 time
Lloydminster	The Battlefords	SC	L	1 time
Maple Creek	Maple Creek	L	L	4
Melfort	Melfort	L	CCF	14
Melville	Melville	L	L	34
Moose Jaw	Moose Jaw	L	L	7
Moosomin	Qu'Appelle	C	C	2 weeks
Mossbank	Moose Jaw	L	L	1 day
Nokomis	Lake Centre	L	C	19
Outlook	Rosetown-Biggar	CCF	CCF	1 time
Prince Albert	Prince Albert	L	L	25+ ⁵²
Regina	Regina City	L	L	1 time
Saskatoon	Saskatoon City	L	C ⁵³	3
Shand	Assiniboia	L	L	1 time
Shaunavon	Maple Creek	L	L	14
Swift Current	Swift Current	L	L	2
Tisdale	Melfort	L	CCF	1 time
Vonda	Rosthern	L	L	9
Wadena	Mackenzie	L	CCF	14
Weyburn	Weyburn	CCF	CCF	9
Wilkie	The Battlefords	SC	L	1 time
Wolseley	Assiniboia	L	L	9

⁵² Had lobbied in August 1938.

⁵³ Was originally United Reform until a later by-election.

ONTARIO

<u>Community</u>	<u>Constituency</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>Number of Months</u>
Brockville	Leeds	C	L	1 time
Burch	Norfolk	L	L	2
Callander	Parry Sound	L	L	1 time
Carleton Place	Lanark	C	L	1 time
Chippewa	Welland	L	L	2
Dunnville	Haldimand	C	C	1 time
Emsdale	Parry Sound	L	L	1 time
Fingal	Elgin	L	L	1 time
Fort Frances	Kenora-Rainy River	L	L	31
Fort William	Fort William	L	L	1
Gillies	Timiskaming	L	L	9
Goderich	Huron North	L	C	6
Hagersville	Haldimand	C	C	1 time
Hamilton	Hamilton (E+W)	2C	2L	4
Hamilton Bay	Hamilton (E+W)	2C	2L	1 time
Harmony	Perth	L	L	1 time
Jarvis	Norfolk	L	L	1 time
Kingston	Kingston City	L	L	1 time
Leamington	Essex South	L	L	1 time
Little Current	Algoma East	L	L	1 time
London	London	C	L	4
Milverton	Perth	L	L	1 time
Oshawa	Ontario	L	L	5
Owen Sound	Grey North	L	L	1 time
Pembroke	Renfrew North	L	L	1
Peterborough	Peterborough West	L	C	25
Pikington	Waterloo South	C	C	1 time
Point Peter	Prince Edward-Lennox	C	C	1 time
Port Arthur	Port Arthur	L	L	1 time
Preston	Waterloo North	L	L	15
Racora	Victoria	L	L	3
St Eugene	Prescott	L	L	10
Sarnia	Lambton West	L	L	2
Sault Ste Marie	Algoma West	L	L	2
Strathburn	Elgin	L	L	1 time
Sudbury	Nipissing	L	L	30
Taylor	Leeds	C	L	1 time
Toronto	Toronto (11)	9C, 2L	8C, 3L	1 time
Warton	Bruce	L	L	2 weeks
Waterloo Wellington Kitchener	Waterloo North	L	L	2
Wellington	Prince Edward-Lennox	C	C	1 time
Whitby	Ontario	L	L	3
Winterbourne	Waterloo North	L	L	5

APPENDIX G

COMMUNITIES RECEIVING REQUESTS FROM GOVERNMENT TO USE AIRPORTS

Letters from V.I. Smart (Deputy Minister of Transport) to Mayors, 22 January 1940

<u>Town:</u>	<u>1935:</u>	<u>1940:</u>	<u>Date Opened:</u>
Calgary, Ab	SC	L	EFTS 1941 10 22, SFTS 1940 10 22
Edmonton, Ab	SC	L	EFTS 1940 11 11, AOS 1940 08 05
Fort William, On	L	L	EFTS 1940 06 24
Lethbridge, Ab	SC	ND	EFTS 1940 07 22
London, On	C	L	EFTS 1940 06 24, AOS 1940 11 25
Medicine Hat, Ab	SC	L	SFTS 1941 04 08
North Battleford, Sk	SC	L	SFTS 1941 09 04
Prince Albert, Sk	L	L	EFTS 1940 07 22, AOS 1941 03 17
Regina, Sk	L	L	EFTS 1940 11 11
St Catharines, On	C	C	EFTS 1940 07 22
Saskatoon, Sk	L	UR->C	SFTS 1940 09 16
Toronto/Malton, On	9C/2L	8C/3L	EFTS 1940 06 24, AOS 1940 05 27
Windsor, On	L	L	EFTS 1940 07 22
Winnipeg, Mb	2CCF/2L	1CCF/3L	AOS 1941 01 06

Observations

	# Ridings (of 27)	# Cities (of 14)
Changed voted to Liberal in 1940:	7 (25.9%)	5 (35.7%)
Remained Liberal in 1940:	8 (29.6%)	4 (28.6%)
Liberal after got base:	15 (55.5%)	10 (71.4%)
Changed to non-Liberal in 1940:	1 (3.7%)	1 (7.4%)
Remained non-Liberal in 1940:	11 (40.7%)	3 (21.4%)
Non-Liberal after got base:	12 (44.4%)	4 (28.6%)

APPENDIX H

SITES CONSIDERED BUT NOT SELECTED

<u>Province:</u>	<u>Site:</u>	<u>Riding:</u>	<u>1935:</u>	<u>1940:</u>	<u>Times Discussed:</u>
Alberta	Barnswell	Lethbridge	SC	ND	n/f
	Barons	Macleod	SC	ND	1
	Barradaile	Battle River	SC	ND	n/f
	Beaverhill Lake	Vegreville	SC	ND	n/f
	Big Lake	Jasper-Edson	SC	ND	1
	Bow Island	Medicine Hat	SC	L	1
	Chin	Lethbridge	SC	ND	n/f
	Clairmont	Peace River	SC	L	n/f
	Claymore	Battle River	SC	ND	n/f
	Coaldale	Lethbridge	SC	ND	n/f
	Cochrane	Calgary West	C	L	n/f
	Cooking Lake	Wetaskiwin	SC	ND	n/f
	Coronation	Acadia	SC	ND	n/c
	Cowley	Macleod	SC	ND	n/f
	Dalemead	Bow River	SC	ND	n/f
	Drumheller	Acadia	SC	ND	n/c
	Ellerslie	Wetaskiwin	SC	ND	n/f
	Fort Saskatchewan	Edmonton West	L	L	n/f
	Glenbow	Calgary West	C	L	n/f
	Glenbow Lake	Calgary West	C	L	n/f
	Grande Prairie	Peace River	SC	L	6
	Grassy Lake	Medicine Hat	SC	L	1
	Irricana	Bow River	SC	ND	1
	Jasper	Jasper-Edson	SC	ND	n/f
	Kitscoty	Battle River	SC	ND	n/f
	Lawbell	Jasper-Edson	SC	ND	n/f
	Lloydminster	Battle River	SC	ND	n/f
	Morinville	Jasper-Edson	SC	ND	n/f
	Namao	Jasper-Edson	SC	ND	2
	Nobleford	Lethbridge	SC	ND	1
	Peace River	Peace River	SC	L	1
	Prentis	Red Deer	SC	ND	n/f
	Redcliff	Medicine Hat	SC	L	n/f
	Red Deer	Red Deer	SC	ND	n/f
	Red Willow	Camrose	SC	ND	n/f
	Scotford	Vegreville	SC	ND	n/f
	Staveley	Macleod	SC	ND	1
	Suffield	Medicine Hat	SC	L	n/f
	Taber	Lethbridge	SC	ND	1
	Threehills Creek	Red Deer	SC	ND	n/f
	Tilley	Medicine Hat	SC	L	n/f
	Tofield	Vegreville	SC	ND	2
	Turnip Hill	Lethbridge	SC	ND	n/f
	Vauxhall	Medicine Hat	SC	L	n/f
	Vegreville	Vegreville	SC	ND	9
	Vermillion	Battle River	SC	ND	3

<u>Province:</u>	<u>Site:</u>	<u>Riding:</u>	<u>1935:</u>	<u>1940:</u>	<u>Times Discussed:</u>
	West Stand Off	Macleod	SC	ND	1
	Wainwright	Battle River	SC	ND	n/f
	Whitecourt	Jasper-Edson	SC	ND	n/f
Saskatchewan	Abernethy	Melville	L	L	n/f
	Arcola	Assiniboia	L	L	n/f
	Ardill	Moose Jaw	L	L	n/f
	Benbough	Wood Mountain	L	L	n/f
	Biggar	Rosetown-Biggar	CCF	CCF	n/c
	Big River/Ladder Lake	Prince Albert	L	L	n/c
	Brewer	Melville	L	L	n/f
	Broadview	Qu'Appelle	C	C	2
	Burr	Humboldt	L	L	n/f
	Caryle	Assiniboia	L	L	n/f
	Clarkboro	Rosthern	L	L	n/f
	Congress	Wood Mountain	L	L	n/f
	Coppen	Wood Mountain	L	L	n/f
	Cory	Saskatoon City	L	UR -> C	n/f
	Dingley	Qu'Appelle	C	C	n/f
	Dunblane	Rosetown Biggar	CCF	CCF	n/f
	Foam Lake	Yorkton	L	CCF	n/c
	Finnie	Melville	L	L	n/f
	Girvin	Lake Centre	L	C	n/f
	Glenside	Lake Centre	L	C	n/f
	Gravelbourg	Wood Mountain	L	L	1
	Hitchcock	Assiniboia	L	L	2
	Humboldt	Humboldt	L	L	n/f
	Imperial	Lake Centre	L	C	n/f
	Indian Head	Qu'Appelle	C	C	n/f
	Kamsack	Yorkton	L	CCF	n/f
	Kelvington	Mackenzie	L	CCF	n/c
	Kerrobot	Kindersley	SC	L	2
	Ketepwe	Melville	L	L	n/f
	Kindersley	Kindersley	SC	L	n/c
	Kipling	Assiniboia	L	L	n/f
	Leitchville	Maple Creek	L	L	n/f
	Lemberg	Melville	L	L	1
	Liberty	Lake Centre	L	C	n/c
	Lipsett	Melfort	L	CCF	n/f
	Lloydminster	The Battlefords	SC	L	7
	Lorlie	Melville	L	L	n/f
	Maple Creek	Maple Creek	L	L	1
	Mazenod	Wood Mountain	L	L	1
	Melfort	Melfort	L	CCF	1
	Melville	Melville	L	L	5
	Moosomin	Qu'Appelle	C	C	n/f
	Nokomis	Qu'Appelle	C	C	n/c
	Nipawin	Melfort	L	CCF	n/f
	Outlook	Rosetown-Biggar	CCF	CCF	2
	Rocanville	Qu'Appelle	C	C	n/f

<u>Province:</u>	<u>Site:</u>	<u>Riding:</u>	<u>1935:</u>	<u>1940:</u>	<u>Times Discussed:</u>
	Rosetown	Rosetown-Biggar	CCF	CCF	n/f
	Rosthern	Rosthern	L	L	n/f
	Scott	The Battlefords	SC	L	n/f
	Shaunavon	Maple Creek	L	L	1
	Shaunavon-Leitchville	Maple Creek	L	L	n/f
	Shaunavon North	Maple Creek	L	L	n/f
	Shaunavon-Rock Creek	Maple Creek	L	L	n/f
	Tatagwa Lake	Weyburn	CCF	CCF	n/f
	Tisdale	Melfort	L	CCF	n/c
	Tribune	Weyburn	CCF	CCF	n/f
	Una	Wood Mountain	L	L	n/f
	Venn	Lake Centre	L	C	n/f
	Verigin	Mackenzie	L	CCF	n/f
	Vonda	Rosthern	L	L	n/f
	Wadena	Mackenzie	L	CCF	n/c
	Warman	Rosthern	L	L	2
	Watrous	Lake Centre	L	C	n/f
	Wilkie	The Battlefords	SC	L	2
	Willows	Wood Mountain	L	L	n/f
	Wolseley	Assiniboia	L	L	n/f
	Woodsworth	Assiniboia	L	L	n/f
Manitoba	Arden	Neebawa	L	L	1
	Bede	Neebawa	L	L	n/f
	Beverley	Brandon	C	L	n/f
	Boissevain	Souris	L	C	n/f
	Carman	Macdonald	LP	LP	2
	Crystal City	Lisgar	L	L	n/c
	Elva	Souris	L	C	n/f
	Fairburn	Souris	L	C	n/f
	Fort Churchill	Churchill	L	L	n/f
	Foxwarren	Marquette	L	L	n/c
	Genest	Portage la Prairie	L	L	n/f
	Gilbert Plains	Dauphin	L	L	n/f
	Gladstone	Neebawa	L	L	n/f
	Glenboro	Macdonald	LP	LP	n/c
	Glencross	Lisgar	L	L	n/f
	Graham	Macdonald	LP	LP	n/f
	High Bluff	Portage la Prairie	L	L	n/f
	Marquette	Portage la Prairie	L	L	n/f
	Matlock	Selkirk	LP	L	n/f
	Melita	Souris	L	C	n/f
	Miami	Macdonald	LP	LP	n/f
	Millbrook	St Boniface	L	L	n/f
	Minto	Souris	L	C	n/f
	Napinka	Souris	L	C	n/f
	Petersfield	Selkirk	LP	L	n/f
	Poplar Point	Portage la Prairie	L	L	n/f
	Roland	Brandon	C	L	n/f
	Rosebank	Macdonald	LP	LP	n/f

<u>Province:</u>	<u>Site:</u>	<u>Riding:</u>	<u>1935:</u>	<u>1940:</u>	<u>Times Discussed:</u>
	Russell	Marquette	L	L	n/c
	St Anne	St Boniface	L	L	n/f
	St Boniface	St Boniface	L	L	n/f
	St Lazare	Marquette	L	L	2
	Shilo	Necpawa	L	L	2
	The Pas	Churchill	L	L	1
	Transcona	St Boniface	L	L	n/f
	Treherne	St Boniface	L	L	n/f
	Vivian	St Boniface	L	L	3
	Westbourne	Portage la Prairie	L	L	n/f
	Winkler	Lisgar	L	L	n/f
	Winnipeg Beach	Selkirk	LP	L	3
	Whitemouth	Springfield	L	L	n/f
Ontario	Almonte	Lanark	C	L	n/f
	Amberley	Bruce	L	L	n/f
	Ancaster	Wentworth	C	L	n/f
	Appleton	Lanark	C	L	n/f
	Arthur	Wellington North	L	L	n/f
	Arthur North	Wellington North	L	L	n/f
	Beamsville	Lincoln	C	C	2
	Beaverton	Muskoka-Ontario	L	LP	n/f
	Belleville	Hastings South	L	C	2
	Blenheim	Kent	L	C	n/f
	Bracebridge	Muskoka-Ontario	L	LP	n/f
	Bradford	Dufferin-Simcoe	C	C	n/f
	Brockville	Leeds	C	L	n/f
	Burford	Brant	L	L	2
	Burwell	Elgin	L	L	n/f
	Callander	Parry Sound	L	L	n/c
	Cameron	Victoria	L	L	n/f
	Carleton Place	Lanark	C	L	1
	Cathcart	Brant	L	L	n/f
	Chartrand	Russell	L	L	n/f
	Chippawa	Welland	L	L	1
	Cornwall	Stormont	L	L	n/f
	Deseronto	Hastings South	L	C	n/f
	Edgely	York North	L	L	n/f
	Elfrida	Wentworth	C	L	n/f
	Elmira	Waterloo North	L	L	n/f
	Emsdale	Parry Sound	L	L	3
	Ennismore	Peterborough West	L	C	n/f
	Fenelon Falls	Victoria	L	L	n/f
	Fort Frances	Kenora-Rainy River	L	L	n/f
	Gillies	Timiskaming	L	L	n/c
	Goldstone	Wellington North	L	L	n/f
	Graham	Fort William	L	L	n/f
	Gravenhurst	Muskoka-Ontario	L	LP	1
	Hamilton Bay	Hamilton E+W	2C	2L	n/c
	Harmony	Perth	L	L	n/f

<u>Province:</u>	<u>Site:</u>	<u>Riding:</u>	<u>1935:</u>	<u>1940:</u>	<u>Times Discussed:</u>
	Harriston	Wellington North	L	L	1
	Hillsburg	Wellington North	L	L	n/f
	Hornby	Halton	L	L	n/f
	Kapaskasing	Cochrane	LL	L	n/f
	Killaloe	Renfrew South	L	L	1
	Kinburn	Carleton	C	C	n/f
	Leamington	Essex South	L	L	n/f
	Lindsay	Victoria	L	L	n/f
	Little Current	Algoma East	L	L	n/c
	L'Orignal	Prescott	L	L	n/f
	Lyn	Leeds	C	L	n/f
	MacLennan	Algoma West	L	L	n/f
	Meaford	Grey North	L	L	n/f
	Merlin	Kent	L	C	n/f
	Milverton	Perth	L	L	n/c
	Mooretown	Lambton West	L	L	n/f
	Muskoka	Muskoka-Ontario	L	LP	2
	Napance	Prince Edward-Lennox	C	C	n/f
	Niagara Peninsula	Welland	L	L	n/f
	Night Hawk Lake	Cochrane	LL	L	n/f
	North Bay	Parry Sound	L	L	3
	North Monaghan	Peterborough West	L	C	n/f
	Norwich	Oxford	L	L	n/f
	Owen Sound	Grey North	L	L	n/f
	Palmerston	Wellington North	L	L	1
	Paris	Brant	L	L	1
	Pembroke	Renfrew West	L	L	n/f
	Perth	Lanark	C	L	n/f
	Peterborough	Peterborough West	L	C	n/f
	Peterborough Airport	Peterborough West	L	C	n/f
	Pilkington	Waterloo South	C	C	n/f
	Point Peter	Prince Edward-Lennox	C	C	n/c
	Porquis Junction	Cochrane	LL	L	2
	Port Arthur	Port Arthur	L	L	n/f
	Port Edward	Lambton West	L	L	n/f
	Port Whitby	Ontario	L	L	n/f
	Preston	Waterloo South	C	C	1
	Raebora	Victoria	L	L	n/f
	Ramore	Cochrane	LL	L	n/f
	Rockcliffe	Ottawa E+W	2L	2L	1
	Sarnia	Lambton West	L	L	n/f
	Sault Ste Marie	Algoma West	L	L	3
	Shillington	Cochrane	LL	L	1
	Shirley Bay	Carleton	C	C	n/f
	Simcoe	Haldimand	C	C	n/f
	Slate River	Fort William	L	L	n/f
	Smith Falls	Lanark	C	L	n/f
	South River	Parry Sound	L	L	n/f
	Strathburn	Elgin	L	L	2
	Sturgeon Lake	Nipissing	L	L	n/f

<u>Province:</u>	<u>Site:</u>	<u>Riding:</u>	<u>1935:</u>	<u>1940:</u>	<u>Times Discussed:</u>
	Sudbury	Nipissing	L	L	n/f
	Sutton	York North	L	L	2
	Thorndale	Middlesex East	L	L	1
	Tincap	Leeds	C	L	n/f
	Wagaming	Port Arthur	L	L	1
	Waterloo	Waterloo North	L	L	n/f
	Wellington	Prince Edward-Lennox	C	C	1
	Warton	Bruce	L	L	n/c
	Wilson's Farm	Peterborough West	L	C	n/f
	Winterbourne	Waterloo North	L	L	2

APPENDIX I

CHRONOLOGY OF SITES SELECTED

(Based on Minutes of Aerodrome Development Committee Meetings)

<u>Month:</u>	<u>Site:</u>	<u>Type:</u>	<u>Riding:</u>	<u>1935:</u>	<u>1940:</u>
February 1940	Tofield, Ab	BGS	Vegreville	SC	ND
March 1940	Airdrie, Ab	R2 Calgary (CB)	Bow River	SC	ND
	Alliston, On	R2 Borden	Dufferin-Simcoe	C	C
	Brantford, On	SFTS	Brantford City	L	L
	Burch, On	R2 Brantford	Norfolk	L	L
	Calgary, Ab (CB)	SFTS	Calgary East	SC	L
	Calgary, Ab (mun)	R1 Calgary (CB)	Calgary East	SC	L
	Edmonton, Ab	EFTS, AOS	Edmonton East	SC	L
	Fort William, On	EFTS	Fort William	L	L
	Hagersville, On	R1 Brantford	Haldimand	C	C
	Jarvis, On	BGS	Norfolk	L	L
	Lethbridge, Ab	EFTS	Lethbridge	SC	ND
	London, On	EFTS	London	C	L
	Malton, On	EFTS, AOS	Toronto (11)	9C/2L	8C/3L
	Mossbank, Sk	BGS	Moose Jaw	L	L
	Osler, Sk	R2 Saskatoon	Rosthern	L	L
	Ottawa, On	SFTS	Ottawa (2)	2L	2L
	Penhold, Ab	EFTS	Red Deer	SC	ND
	Prince Albert, Sk	EFTS, AOS	Prince Albert	L	L
	Regina, Sk	EFTS, AOS	Regina City	L	L
	Saskatoon, Sk	SFTS	Saskatoon City	L	UR-C
	Vanscoy, Sk	R1 Saskatoon	Rosetown-Biggar	CCF	CCF
	Welland, On	R2 Dunnville	Welland	L	L
	Windsor, On	EFTS	Essex West	L	L
	Winnipeg, Mb	AOS	Winnipeg (4)	2CCF/2L	1CCF/3L
April 1940	Carberry, Mb	SFTS	Neepawa	L	L
	Dunnville, On	SFTS	Haldimand	C	C
	Edwards, On	R2 Ottawa	Carleton	C	C
	Fingal, On	BGS	Elgin	L	L
	Granum, Ab	R1 Macleod	Macleod	SC	ND
	Macleod, Ab	SFTS	Macleod	SC	ND
	Mount Hope/Hamilton, On	EFTS, AOS	Hamilton (2)	2L	2L
	Oberon, Mb	R2 Carberry	Neepawa	L	L
	Pearce, Ab	R2 Macleod	Macleod	SC	ND
	Pendleton, On	R1 Ottawa	Prescott	L	L
	Petrel, Mb	R1 Carberry	Neepawa	L	L
	Rivers, Mb	ANS	Brandon	C	L

Month:	Site:	Type:	Riding:	1935:	1940:
May 1940	Boharm, Sk	R2 Moose Jaw	Moose Jaw	L	L
	Brandon, Mb	EFTS	Brandon	L	L
	Buttress, Sk	R1 Moose Jaw	Moose Jaw	L	L
	Camp Borden, On	SFTS	Dufferin-Simcoe	C	C
	Edenvale, On	R1 Borden	Simcoe North	L	L
	Goderich, On	EFTS	Huron North	L	C
	Holsom, Ab	R1 Medicine Hat	Medicine Hat	SC	L
	Kingston/Collins Bay, On	SFTS	Frontenac-Addington	L	C
	Medicine Hat, Ab	SFTS	Medicine Hat	SC	L
	Moose Jaw, Sk	SFTS	Moose Jaw	L	L
	Picton, On	BGS	Prince Edward-Lennox	C	C
	Port Albert, On	ANS	Huron North	L	C
	St Catharines, On	EFTS	Lincoln	C	C
	Sandhurst, On	R2 Kingston	Prince Edward-Lennox	C	C
	Swift Current, Sk	EFTS	Swift Current	L	L
	Taylor, On	R1 Kingston	Lecds	C	L
	Whitla, Ab	R2 Medicine Hat	Medicine Hat	SC	L
June 1940	Dafoc, Sk	BGS	Humboldt	L	L
	Dauphin, Mb	SFTS	Dauphin	L	L
	Dauphin, Mb	R1 Dauphin	Dauphin	L	L
	Dauphin, Mb	BGS, R2 Dauphin	Dauphin	L	L
	Macdonald, Mb	BGS	Portage la Prairie	L	L
	Mountain View, On	BGS	Renfrew North	L	L
	North Battleford, Sk	EFTS	The Battlefords	SC	L
	Oshawa, On	EFTS	Ontario	L	L
	Portage la Prairie, Mb	EFTS, AOS	Portage la Prairie	L	L
	St Eugene, On	EFTS	Prescott	L	L
July 1940	Airdrie, Ab	R1 Calgary (mun)	Bow River	SC	ND
	Brandon, Mb	SFTS	Brandon	C	L
	Calgary, Ab (mun)	SFTS	Calgary East	SC	L
	Granum, Ab	R1 Macleod	Macleod	SC	ND
	High River, Ab	EFTS	Macleod	SC	ND
	Mohawk, On	R1 Trenton	Hastings South	L	C
	North Battleford, Sk	SFTS	The Battlefords	SC	L
	Paulson, Mb	BGS	Dauphin	L	L
	Penhold, Ab	SFTS	Red Deer	SC	ND
	Swift Current, Sk	SFTS	Swift Current	L	L
	Virden, Mb	EFTS	Brandon	C	L
August 1940	Aylmer, On	SFTS	Elgin	L	L
	Lethbridge, Ab	BGS	Lethbridge	SC	ND
	Oshawa, On	EFTS-double	Ontario	L	L
	Rhein, Sk	R2 Yorkton	Yorkton	L	CCF
	Sturdee, Sk	R1 Yorkton	Yorkton	L	CCF
	Yorkton, Sk	SFTS	Yorkton	L	CCF

Month:	Site:	Type:	Riding:	1935:	1940:
September 1940	Brada, Sk	R2 North Battleford	The Battlefords	SC	L
	Claresholm, Ab	SFTS	Macleod	SC	ND
	Hamlin, Sk	R1 North Battleford	The Battlefords	SC	L
	St Aldwyn, Sk	R1 Swift Current	Swift Current	L	L
	Valley River, Mb	R2 Dauphin	Dauphin	L	L
	Wymark, Sk	R2 Swift Current	Maple Creek	L	L
October 1940	DeWinton, Ab	R2 Calgary (CB)	Calgary East	SC	L
	Inverlake, Ab	R2 Calgary (mun)	Bow River	SC	ND
	Shepard, Ab	R1 Calgary (CB)	Bow River	SC	ND
November 1940	Port Burwell, On	R2 Aylmer	Elgin	L	L
	St Thomas, On	R1 Aylmer	Elgin	L	L
	Whitby, On	R1 Oshawa	Ontario	L	L
December 1940	Bowden, Ab	R2 Penhold	Red Deer	SC	ND
	Chater, Mb	R1 Brandon	Brandon	C	L
	Douglas, Mb	R2 Brandon	Neebawa	L	L
	Innisfail, Ab	R1 Penhold	Red Deer	SC	ND
	Pultney, Ab	R2 Claresholm	Macleod	SC	ND
	Woodhouse, Ab	R1 Claresholm	Macleod	SC	ND
March 1941	Airdrie, Ab	R1 Calgary (mun)	Bow River	SC	ND
	Burtch, On	R1 Brantford	Norfolk	L	L
	Buttress, Sk	R1 Moose Jaw	Moose Jaw	L	L
	Calgary, Ab	SFTS (Mun)	Calgary East	SC	L
	Carberry, Mb	SFTS	Neebawa	L	L
	Frank Lake, Ab	R1 High River	Macleod	SC	ND
	Gananoque, On	R1 Kingston	Leeds	C	L
	Guelph, On	WTS	Waterloo South	C	C
	Hagersville, On	R1 Kohler	Haldimand	C	C
	Hagersville, On	WTS Guelph	Haldimand	C	C
	Hamlin, Sk	R1 North Battleford	The Battlefords	SC	L
	Holsom, Ab	R1 Medicine Hat	Medicine Hat	SC	L
	Innisfail, Ab	R1 Penhold	Red Deer	SC	ND
	Kingston, On	SFTS	Kingston City	L	L
	Kohler, On	SFTS	Haldimand	C	C
	Medicine Hat, Ab	SFTS	Medicine Hat	SC	L
	Moose Jaw, Sk	SFTS	Moose Jaw	L	L
	North Battleford, Sk	SFTS	The Battlefords	SC	L
	Penhold, Ab	SFTS	Red Deer	SC	ND
	Petrel, Mb	R1 Carberry	Neebawa	L	L
	St Aldwyn, Sk	R1 Swift Current	Swift Current	L	L
	Shepard, Ab	R1 Calgary (CB)	Bow River	SC	ND
	Swift Current, Sk	SFTS	Swift Current	L	L
	Welland, On	R1 Dunnville	Welland	L	L

Month:	Site:	Type:	Riding:	1935:	1940:
April 1941	Bowden, Ab	EFTS	Red Deer	SC	ND
	Burtch, On	WTS, R1 Brantford	Norfolk	L	L
	DeWinton, Ab	EFTS	Calgary East	SC	L
	Hagersville, On	SFTS	Haldimand	C	C
	Kohler, On	R1 Hagersville	Haldimand	C	C
	Welland, On	R1 Dunnville	Welland	L	L
May 1941	Burtch, On	WTS, R1 Brantford	Norfolk	L	L
July 1941	Arnprior, On	EFTS double	Renfrew South	L	L
	Assiniboia, Sk	EFTS double	Wood Mountain	L	L
	Caron, Sk	EFTS double	Wood Mountain	L	L
	Centralia, On	SFTS	Middlesex West	L	L
	Champion, Ab	R1 Kirkcaldy	Macleod	SC	ND
	Edenvale, On	R1 Borden	Simcoe North	L	L
	Ensign, Ab	R2 Kirkcaldy	Macleod	SC	ND
	Estevan, Sk	SFTS	Assiniboia	L	L
	Gananoque, On	R1 Kingston	Leeds	C	L
	Grand Bend, On	R1 Centralia	Lambton West	L	L
	Halbrite, Sk	R1 Weyburn	Weyburn	CCF	CCF
	Hargrave, Mb	R1 Virden	Brandon	C	L
	Innisfail, Ab	R1 Penhold	Red Deer	SC	ND
	Kirkcaldy, Ab	SFTS	Macleod	SC	ND
	Kohler, On	R1 Hagersville	Haldimand	C	C
	Netook, Ab	R1 Bowden	Red Deer	SC	ND
	Pearce, Ab	EFTS double	Macleod	SC	ND
	Petrel, Mb	R1 Carberry	Neepawa	L	L
	Ralph, Sk	R2 Weyburn	Weyburn	CCF	CCF
	St Aldwyn, Sk	R1 Swift Current	Swift Current	L	L
	St Joseph, On	R2 Centralia	Huron-Perth	L	L
	St Thomas, On	R1 Aylmer	Elgin	L	L
	Shand, Sk	R1 Estevan	Assiniboia	L	L
	Shepard, Ab	R1 Calgary (CB)	Bow River	SC	ND
	Welland, On	R1 Dunnville	Welland	L	L
	Weyburn, Sk	SFTS	Weyburn	CCF	CCF
August 1941	Davidson, Sk	EFTS double	Lake Centre	L	C
	Douglas, Mb	R2 Brandon	Neepawa	L	L
	Elgin, Mb	R2 Souris	Souris	L	C
	Hartney, Mb	R1 Souris	Souris	L	C
	Mohawk, On	R1 Trenton	Hastings South	L	C
	Neepawa, Mb	EFTS double	Neepawa	L	L
	Souris, Mb	SFTS	Brandon	C	L

<u>Month:</u>	<u>Site:</u>	<u>Type:</u>	<u>Riding:</u>	<u>1935:</u>	<u>1940:</u>
September 1941	Outram, Sk Sturdee, Sk	R2 Estevan R1 Yorkton	Weyburn Yorkton	CCF L	CCF CCF
October 1941	Halbrite, Sk Vanscoy, Sk	R1 Weyburn R1 Saskatoon	Weyburn Rosetown-Biggar	CCF CCF	CCF CCF
December 1941	Hamlin, Sk Outram, Sk	R1 North Battleford R1 Estevan	The Battlefords Weyburn	SC CCF	L CCF
January 1942	Chandler, Sk Eden, Mb Pendleton, On	R2 Estevan R1 Neepawa EFTS double	Weyburn Neepawa Prescott	CCF L L	CCF L L
February 1942	Monarch, Ab	R1 Pearce	Lethbridge	SC	ND
March 1942	Carp, On Ensign, Ab Frank Lake, Ab Gladys Ridge, Ab Inverlake, Ab Lethburn, Sk	R1 Ottawa R1 Vulcan R1 High River R1 DeWinton R2 Calgary (Mun) R1 Assiniboia	Carleton Macleod Macleod Macleod Bow River Wood Mountain	C SC SC SC SC L	C ND ND ND ND L
April 1942	Gimli, Mb Lethburn, Sk Tillsonburg, On	SFTS R1 Assiniboia R2 Aylmer	Selkirk Wood Mountain Oxford	LP L L	L L L
May 1942	Gimli, Mb Goderich South, On Hagen Netley Lake, Mb Stand Off, Ab Vulcan, Ab	SFTS R1 Goderich R1 Prince Albert R1 Gimli R2 Macleod FIS	Selkirk Huron-Perth Prince Albert Selkirk Macleod Macleod	LP L L LP SC SC	L L L L ND ND
June 1942	Assiniboia, Sk Davidson, Sk Dufferin, On Neepawa, Mb Thorold, On Winnipeg, Mb	EFTS (move) AOS (move) R2 Hagersville EFTS (move) R1 St Catharines AOS (move)	Wood Mountain Lake Centre Haldimand Neepawa Welland Winnipeg (4)	L L C L L 2CCF/2L	L C C L L 1CCF/3L
July 1942	Champion, Ab Hawkesbury, On	R2 Claresholm R1 St Eugene	Macleod Prescott	SC L	ND L
August 1942	Limoges, On	R1 Pendleton	Russell	L	L
September 1942	Burdick, Sk Frank Lake/Lake Bottom, Ab	R2 Moose Jaw R1 High River	Wood Mountain Macleod	L SC	L ND

<u>Month:</u>	<u>Site:</u>	<u>Type:</u>	<u>Riding:</u>	<u>1935:</u>	<u>1940:</u>
October 1942	Binbrook, On	R2 Dunnville	Wentworth	C	L
	Cayuga, On	R1 Hagersville	Haldimand	C	C
	Welland, On	R1 Dunnville	Welland	L	L
February 1943	Blackfalds, Ab	R2 Penhold	Red Deer	SC	ND
March 1943	Willoughby, On	R1 St Catharines	Lincoln	C	C
April 1943	Morden, Mb	SFTS	Lisgar	L	L
May 1943	Lenore, Mb	R1 Virden	Brandon	C	L
June 1943	Brora, Sk	R1 Regina	Lake Centre	L	C
	Davidson West, Sk	R1 Davidson	Lake Centre	L	C
	Edwards, On	R1 Pendleton	Carleton	C	C
July 1943	Morden, Mb	SFTS	Lisgar	L	L
January 1944	North Junction, Mb	R1 Dauphin	Dauphin	L	L
	Tillsonburg, On	R2 Brantford	Oxford	L	L

Number of Decisions Made

<u>1940:</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>1941:</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>1942:</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>1943:</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>1944:</u>	<u>2</u>
February:	1	March:	24	January:	3	February:	1	January:	2
March:	24	April:	6	February:	1	March:	1		
April:	12	May:	1	March:	6	April:	1		
May:	17	July:	26	April:	3	May:	1		
June:	10	August:	7	May:	6	June:	3		
July:	11	September:	2	June:	6	July:	1		
August:	6	October:	2	July:	2				
September:	6	December:	2	August:	1				
October:	3			September:	2				
November:	3			October:	3				
December:	6								

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 RG 12 Volume 2338 File 5168-853 (Hamlin, SK)
 RG 12 Volume 2339 File 5168-854 (St Aldwyn, SK)
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