

Will Parliament Decide?:
Peacekeeping Operations in the 1990s

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ABSTRACT

This study focused on Parliamentary oversight of international peacekeeping operations where Canadian Forces (CF) were represented in the 1990s. An examination of the activities of Parliament in relation to defence matters from Confederation to the effective end of the Cold War in 1989 sets the tone for the future dealings of Parliament in all defence-related issues including peacekeeping. This historical survey identified a number of constraints on the ability of Parliament to exercise effective oversight through debate, Question Period and committee. Many of these limitations also applied to Parliament's behaviour with respect to peacekeeping beginning in 1947.

Since the end of the Cold War there has been a marked increase in the number of United Nations (UN)-sanctioned peacekeeping operations. Many of these missions were larger, more dangerous, more costly and far more complex than those conducted previously. An examination of Parliamentary activity with regards to peacekeeping in the 1990s demonstrated that, in fact, it did increase during the period in question. However, this involvement appears to have been cosmetic at best. Reasons for this were explored.

As well as a general overview of Parliamentary oversight and peacekeeping in the 1990s, this paper dealt in detail with three major peacekeeping operations. These included the UN Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and the subsequent UN Task Force (UNITAF), also in Somalia, as well as the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).

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INTRODUCTION

The 1994 Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy indicated a need "to strengthen the role of Parliament in the scrutiny and development of defence policy".¹ The May 1996 Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons devoted a significant portion of its two peacekeeping Chapters to the issue of information to Parliament. The latter Report concluded that to the extent governments provided Parliament with information on peacekeeping operations, it was relevant, reliable and understandable. However, it was seldom complete and timely.² Finally, in June 1997, the Report of the Commission of Inquiry in the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia concurred with these previous studies suggesting that Canada's relationship with the CF "requires greater involvement by Members of Parliament and Canadians generally in the direction, supervision and control of the Canadian Forces".³ One common thread in these three reports is the minimal oversight by Parliament with respect to Canadian

¹ Canada, House of Commons and the Senate, Special Joint Committee on Defence Policy, "Security in a Changing World 1994," *Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy* (Ottawa: Publications Service, Parliamentary Publications Directorate, 1994), pp. 57-8.

² Canada, Auditor-General, "Peacekeeping," *Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons* Chapter 6, pp. 6-13, 6-15 and Chapter 7, p. 7-11 (Ottawa: Ministry of Public Works and Government Services Canada, May 1996). Information to Parliament has been the topic of Auditor General reports as early as 1985 and perhaps even earlier.

³ Canada, *Dishonoured Legacy: the Lessons of the Somalia Affair*, Report of the Commission of Inquiry in the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 1997), vol. 5.

participation in peacekeeping in the 1990s. There are few commentaries on this subject. This paper is intended to help fill this vacuum.

Peacekeeping missions in the 1990s have been very different from the traditional "Pearsonian" missions with which most Canadians are familiar. One marked difference has been the increased frequency of the missions. Over the last ten years the UN has authorized over thirty new peace operations as compared to seventeen operations during the preceding forty years. Some of these new operations have been considerably larger in size and more complex than previous missions, resulting in larger deployments from individual countries and greater costs that had to be absorbed by UN-Member nations. While the earlier traditional missions usually involved a minimum degree of risk, peacekeepers in the 1990s frequently have been exposed to dangerous situations such as hostage takings, snipers, fire fights and even full-scale war.

These high-risk operations became more prevalent when the UN started authorizing operations in places where there were no agreed cease-fires or the warring factions did not consent to the mission. Invariably, these missions have required peacekeepers to enter regions where they were unwanted or where there was simply no peace to keep. To compensate for this heightened danger to UN troops, the use of force has been upgraded, as reflected in the rules of engagement of the individual missions. In several instances, peacekeepers have been authorized to use offensive military action to enforce UN resolutions.

Considering the increased tempo of UN peace operations in the 1990s; the size and scope of peacekeeping missions have expanded dramatically; Canadian peacekeepers have been subjected to extremely dangerous conditions and the cost of the missions has skyrocketed, one might expect that Parliament would be exercising a greater oversight role than previously. However, an examination of Parliamentary involvement in Canadian defence policy since Confederation, including peacekeeping operations since 1947, suggests that this has not happened.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine Parliamentary oversight in relation to Canadian participation in peacekeeping operations with an emphasis on the 1990s. Parliament has certain responsibilities that are fundamental to the democratic political process. These include the representative, educative, legitimization, policy and oversight functions. While these functions are all important, this examination focuses specifically on Parliamentary oversight. In 1972, R. B. Byers defined Parliamentary surveillance as "the ability of the Legislature to criticize, scrutinize, publicize, and in some cases refine the policy proposals of the executive".⁴ This definition is used in this paper to describe Parliamentary oversight as it is conducted in the House of Commons through debate and Question Period, and in Parliamentary committees. A measure of Parliamentary oversight of peacekeeping operations is the degree to which debates on peacekeeping have been held in the Commons, questions on peacekeeping have been asked during

⁴ R.B. Byers, "Perceptions of Parliamentary Surveillance of the Executive: the Case of Canadian Defence Policy," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* vol. 5,

Question Period and enquiries related to peacekeeping have been undertaken and reported on by Parliamentary committees. This paper does not attempt to quantify the degree to which questions on peacekeeping have been raised or answered during Question Period.

The first Chapter provides an historical overview and analysis of Parliamentary involvement in defence policy between 1867 and 1989, the effective end of the Cold War. Chapter Two provides a general survey of Parliamentary activity in relation to peacekeeping from 1947 to 1997 with an emphasis on the 1990s. The third Chapter elaborates on themes and trends discussed in Chapter Two in relation to three specific peacekeeping operations of the 1990s: UNPROFOR, UNOSOM/UNITAF and UNMIH. The final Chapter summarizes the conclusions and offers some ideas as to what effective Parliamentary oversight might entail.

•ONE•

PARLIAMENTARY LEGACY

Members of the Canadian House of Commons and the Senate have been only marginally involved in matters of defence since Confederation. This Chapter provides both an overview and analysis of Parliament's lack of involvement in defence issues generally from 1867 to 1989.

Until 1931, Great Britain ultimately controlled Canada's foreign and defence policy. Although policy decisions usually were the result of a consultative process between the Canadian Cabinet and Whitehall, the role of the Canadian Parliament was limited primarily to appropriation of funds in furtherance of the adopted policies. During the South African War in 1899, the Commons and Senate were requested to appropriate funds for the war effort. In 1914, Parliament was summoned to ratify the deployment and again approve the funding of a Canadian contingent for the war in Europe. Parliamentarians unquestionably supported these wars and met whenever required to approve funding to sustain Canadian operations in that regard. However, from a policy decision perspective, Great Britain effectively determined the participation of Canada.

Even after Canada achieved control over its own foreign and defence policy in 1931, Parliament continued to play a limited role. When the Canadian militia was mobilized on August 28, 1939, Parliament was not informed of the decision until September 8th. During the ensuing war when secrecy was of the utmost importance for security reasons, Parliamentarians

continued to be excluded from the decision-making process relative to wartime policy. Even during the extended period of relative peace following the Second World War, Parliament seldom learned of major decisions affecting defence policy until after Cabinet had made them. Foreign and defence policy debates were rare occurrences and consideration of defence estimates and procurement were the primary focus of both Parliament and its committees.

HISTORY OF PARLIAMENT

Prior to the enactment of the Statute of Westminster in 1931, Canada had very little choice on matters of defence. The Canadian government did not have autonomy over foreign and defence policy as this was vested in Whitehall. Parliamentarians did meet periodically to deliberate foreign and defence issues placed before them by Cabinet and whenever necessary to approve funding appropriations. However, the opportunities to debate policy decisions invariably were limited to situations dictated by political expediency and usually occurred after the decisions had been made in London.

Frustrated Canadian Prime Ministers sought ways to prevent Britain from dragging Canada into military operations that were outside the fold of Canada's interests and that subordinated the country's military to British command. In 1922, in an attempt to resist Commonwealth petitions for Canadian participation in the Chanak crisis, Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King (1921-1931, 1935-1948) told London that before he could promise to send troops Parliament would have to be consulted---more

precisely, that "Parliament will decide".¹ This tactic, initially adopted by Prime Minister Wilfred Laurier in 1910 over Canada's naval policy, essentially allowed the Cabinet to "take refuge from uncomfortable foreign requests," which at the very least, would allow a delay in implementation of the "foreign request".²

It quickly became clear that governments had no intention of employing the term "Parliament will decide" as anything more than a stalling mechanism. In practice, there was some discussion, but no vote which, in effect, reduced Parliament's main function to that of legitimization. This particular tactic was popular among senior ministers in successive governments, both before and after 1931.

The involvement of Parliament in relation to foreign and defence policy after 1931 did not change materially. It was normal for Cabinets to provide Parliament with inadequate and untimely information. On several occasions senior ministers refused information to Parliament, explaining that Parliamentarians were not competent to decide certain matters, that the government could not risk relations with allies by apprising Parliamentarians of key issues, or that fragile international negotiations could be upset by a discussion in the House.³ When information was provided to the House, it was often received long after implementation of the decisions. This was evident

¹ For details about the Chanak Crisis see James Eayrs, *The Art of the Possible* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), p. 105.

² Kim Richard Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 3rd Canadian ed. (Toronto: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1997), p. 266.

³ Eayrs, *Art*, p.104; *House of Commons Debates (Debates)*, June 18, 1936, p. 3862.

during World War II. A member of the Cabinet war committee, C.G. Power, wrote, "Members were rarely consulted about policy or otherwise" and furthermore, that "Members learned of decisions...in many instances long after the action had been taken".⁴ In retrospect, it may be more appropriate to replace the phrase "Parliament will decide" with "Parliament will be told".

There were more foreign and defence policy debates held in the House of Commons between 1945 and 1989 than previously. But those that did occur were few and far between. Despite numerous critical changes to Canadian foreign and defence policy during the post-World War II period, including a shift from a Commonwealth-centred security system to one of collective defence, membership in the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and later the bi-lateral North American Aerospace Defence Agreement (NORAD) with the United States, Parliament usually was excluded from the decision-making process. There were those rare occasions when Parliament was asked either to deliberate or even vote on a defence issue. Yet, these opportunities ordinarily arose only when the particular issue in question was non-controversial and the government was confident that there would be popular support, when the government wanted to assess the popularity of a given issue, or when the matter at hand had an element of controversy attached to it and could not entirely be ignored. The greater part of Parliament's time during this period was spent examining the annual departmental estimates, in an attempt to ensure that the Department of

⁴ C.G. Power, "Career Politicians: The Changing Role of the MP," *Queen's Quarterly*, vol. LXII, no.4 (1957): p. 488.

National Defence (DND) was using public funds in an appropriate manner. Thus, most defence debates that were conducted tended to revolve around the issue of procurement.

Foreign and defence policy debates in the House of Commons between 1945 and 1968 lacked in both content and enthusiasm. Former Prime Minister, Lester B. Pearson, described the debates held during the 1950s and 1960s as "artificial, a kind of play acting...words were for the record, not uttered in the hope that they would change the mind of anyone...It often seemed that talk in the House was not relevant or important enough to be given priority over other graver business of government".⁵ I.D.M. Egener's account of Parliament and national defence between 1950 and 1969 confirms Pearson's statement as he suggests that while Parliament had "become accustomed to dealing with the minutiae of defence matters and the supply of funds" it "was not in a position or of a temperament serious [enough] to debate government policy in general".⁶ Two specific cases demonstrate how Parliament was largely removed from the decisions associated with defence policy during this period, namely, the establishment of NORAD and the unification of the CF.

⁵ John A. Munroe and Alex I. Inglis, eds., *Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson, Vol. 2: 1948-1957* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), p. 12 in Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, p. 274.

⁶ I.D.M. Egener, "Parliament and National Defence, 1950-1969: A Study of Some Issues of National Defence in the Canadian House of Commons," *Occasional Papers on Changing Patterns and Influences in Canadian Defence Policy, 1904-1970* (Royal Military College of Canada, 1971), p. 199.

The August 1, 1957 Order-in-Council that both appointed a deputy commander of the joint NORAD command and set his salary was Parliament's first indication that the Conservative government under Prime Minister John Diefenbaker (1957-1963) formally had agreed to and signed the NORAD agreement. No Order-in-Council was tabled in the House of Commons in respect of the NORAD agreement when it was signed in February 1957. Furthermore, Parliamentarians waited a whole ten months after the initial agreement had been signed before the issue was debated in the House. The joint command had been operational during the last nine of those ten months. Moreover, as Jon McLin notes, "it appears highly probable that John Diefenbaker took the decision after, at most, informal consultation with other ministers but without its formal consideration by the full Cabinet or the Cabinet defence committee".⁷

The 1964 decision to integrate and then unify the three services of the CF displays similar characteristics. In 1963, despite an inclination on the part of both the Liberal and Tory governments to resist the formation of such committees, a Special Committee on Defence was created and given specific powers to examine all aspects of defence policy.⁸ Concurrent to the ad hoc committee's review, DND conducted its own in-house review that involved

⁷ Jon B. McLin, *Canada's Changing Defence Policy, 1957-1963: The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 47.

⁸ McLin, p. 193. Despite the reluctance of governments to establish committees, there was a general growth in committees beginning in 1968. For a comprehensive and detailed account of Parliament see C.E.S. Franks, *The Parliament of Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987).

establishing a Royal Commission to examine the merits and disadvantages of unification. The Special Committee's Report was released on September 30, 1963, and provided most of the uncontroversial routine material for the March 1964 White Paper on defence. It did not examine the subject of unification. In his autobiography, Paul Hellyer, the Minister of National Defence during unification, wrote that he "borrowed input" from the Committees' Report "that was pretty bland, and not really controversial...When it came to sections involving major change [i.e. unification of the armed forces], however, I was on my own".⁹ In that regard, the Minister relied primarily on the recommendations of the Royal Commission.¹⁰ In essence, Hellyer did not allow Parliamentarians a voice in the unification debate.

Between 1968 and 1984, Parliament had few opportunities to debate foreign and defence matters. In 1968, as a result of a Parliamentary reform, the responsibility for defence estimates was transferred from the House of Commons to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND). The objective of this reform was to relieve MP's of their heavy workload. It may have achieved this goal, but it also caused foreign affairs debate in the House to fall off "sharply".¹¹ Between 1972 and 1984, only four full-scale debates were held; one in 1977 and three between 1980 and 1984.

⁹ Paul Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes: my fight to unify Canada's Armed Forces* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990), p. 33.

¹⁰ The Royal Commission on unification is more commonly recognized as the Glassco Commission.

¹¹ Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, p. 274.

During this time there were a number of very significant policy decisions made in the area of defence. Two examples in particular had long-lasting effects on future governments and their international dealings, namely, the reduction of Canada's NATO commitment and the subsequent alteration of defence priorities.

In May 1968, the Cabinet decided to instigate a departmental review of defence policy, with a particular focus on Canada's military commitment to NATO. Concurrent with an in-house review at DND was a review undertaken by a Special Task Force on Europe (STAFEUR). This Task Force was authorized by the Department of External Affairs. SCEAND also carried out its own investigation and presented its findings to the House the following March, recommending the maintenance of the status quo. Cabinet was meant to determine the government's policy by March 30, 1969, and the policy was to be announced by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau (1968-1979, 1980-1984) the following April 3rd. Trudeau announced the reduction of Canada's NATO commitment and the change in Canadian defence priorities on the assigned day, but did not follow the advice of DND much to the chagrin of most of his ministers who had opposed the reduction of Canada's commitment to NATO.¹² These decisions disregarded the work of Parliament, as evidenced by the resignation of the Vice-Chairperson of SCEAND on the grounds that the

¹² J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, *Prouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), pp. 12, 19, 21, 237.

government had ignored the Committee's recommendations,¹³ and in large measure, the opinions of both the Cabinet and DND bureaucrats.

The 1971 White Paper on defence codified changes from 1969, that in effect, altered the defence priorities from the 1964 White Paper. National sovereignty was given priority, while Canada's international commitments received less emphasis. In essence, the new White Paper was a reiteration of Trudeau's April 1969 speech and consequently Parliament was not involved in the process of producing the final Paper. The introduction of the Defence Structure Review (DSR) in 1974 rendered the White Paper meaningless as a guide to policy.¹⁴ This fact was effectively hidden from Parliament and the public as the Prime Minister continued to insist that the White Paper had not lost its relevancy.¹⁵

After the Liberal government's defeat in 1984, the new Conservative government seemed more inclined to discuss foreign and defence policy in the House and to utilize SCEAND to a greater degree. In 1985, the government established a Special Committee to review various aspects of defence policy, in particular the American Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). According to one strategic analyst, Nick Stethem, the government's reason for initiating the

¹³ W. M. Dobell, "Parliament's Foreign Policy Committees," *Parliament and Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. David Taras (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1985), p. 24.

¹⁴ In 1974, a committee comprising several senior political officials and the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) was created to reassess Canada's defence policy only three years after the release of the 1971 White Paper on Defence.

¹⁵ R.B. Byers, "Canadian Security and Defence: The Legacy and the Challenges," *Adelphi Papers* 214 (1986): p. 255.

review was "to spark debate both political and public so [the Canadian public] would have a basic understanding of the issues and factors involved" and the government could then "come forward with a White Paper with a constituency of support together with knowledge of those who are going to attack you anyway". In essence, the Cabinet was not offering Parliament an opportunity to affect policy, but instead was "testing the waters".¹⁶

This apparent trend of involving Parliament to a greater degree may have been an aberration. There was no Parliamentary review prior to the release of the 1987 White Paper "Challenge and Commitment". On the other hand, this should not be surprising since no White Paper had ever been preceded by a Parliamentary review.¹⁷ In any event, DND budget cuts contained in the 1989 budget effectively rendered the White Paper inoperative.

Parliament was somewhat of a bystander between 1867 and 1989 with regards to Canada's foreign and defence policy. Parliamentary involvement did increase during the period, but, for the most part, Parliamentarians did not play an effective role in relation to foreign and defence policy. Why was

¹⁶ Nick Stethem, Strategic Analyst, Toronto, Ontario, personal interview, October 15, 1996.

¹⁷ There was a review of one aspect of the White Paper undertaken in 1988, one year after the 1987 White Paper was released. A Parliamentary committee met to consider the acquisition of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) for the Canadian Navy. However, the 65-page Report did not determine whether SSNs were useful or not nor did it contain even one recommendation. This Committee reported only six months before the program was canceled. Interestingly, a United States' Congressional Report was released around the same time which also examined the Canadian Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine Program. This 16-page Report set out the key issues and provided both opposing and supporting arguments on the matter.

Parliament's involvement so limited in this regard? The explanation is complex and involves a number of interactive factors.

LIMITATIONS ON PARLIAMENT

There is a general consensus among Canadian academics that the Canadian legislature was devoid of any historical tradition in the area of foreign and defence affairs. David Leyton-Brown, R.B. Byers, Joel J. Sokolsky, and Kim Richard Nossal all take the position that because Canada's foreign and defence policy was controlled by Great Britain from Confederation to 1931, there was little room for a legislative tradition to develop.¹⁸ After 1931, Parliament did have the constitutional tools necessary to perform an oversight function in this area, including the three basic forums for exercising oversight, namely, debate, Question Period and, commencing in the 1960s, committee. It also had the ability to vote down bills and force elections. However, in the absence of a legislative tradition, an executive tradition had been established with the Cabinet acquiring a virtual monopoly over policy-making in the area of foreign and defence policy.

The Canadian Parliamentary system is based on the British Westminster style of government that, in contrast to the American system,

¹⁸ David Leyton-Brown and R.B. Byers, *Parliament and Canadian Foreign Policy* An unpublished paper presented to the Legislative Studies in Canada Conference, York University, October 1977, p. 3 in Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, p. 285; D.W. Middlemiss and J.J. Sokolsky, *Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Canada, 1989), p. 95.

unites the legislative and executive bodies. This fusion of power has helped to establish the Cabinet as the dominant entity. The power to set the legislative agenda is vested in the Cabinet.¹⁹ Therefore, if the Cabinet does not wish to involve Parliament with any foreign or defence matter, Parliament can be excluded. Of course, in the case of a minority government, the ability of the Cabinet to control the legislative agenda is tempered by the need to marshal the support of non-government Members in order to enact legislation.

Cabinet's power to control and dictate defence policy has always been enhanced by the lack of legislative restrictions under the National Defence Act (NDA). There are only two scenarios under the NDA where Cabinet is required to obtain the approval of Parliament, namely, states of emergency and conscription. Prior to 1990, Cabinet declared a state of emergency on only one occasion during the 1970 FLQ crisis.²⁰ Even the deployment of the CF overseas does not require the approval of Parliament. The NDA only stipulates that if Parliament is in recess it must be recalled within ten days of the government tabling the Order-in-Council placing Canadian soldiers on active

¹⁹ Joel J. Sokolsky, *Overload and Marginality: Parliament and Defence Policy in the 1980s* An unpublished paper presented to The Biennial Meeting of the Association of Canadian Studies in the United States (San Francisco, 1989), p. 3.

²⁰ In 1970, the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) kidnapped two senior political officials. The Prime Minister of the day, Pierre Trudeau declared a state of emergency and invoked the War Measures Act effectively placing control of the military situation in the hands of the CF.

service. However, there is no requirement under the Act for a subsequent vote.²¹

The consistency of foreign and defence policy between 1945 and 1989 minimized the opportunity for Parliamentary debate.²² Canada's international commitments to NATO and NORAD provided the central criteria for planning throughout this period. These alliances "identified adversaries, allies, theatres of operations, and provided shared strategic analysis within which Canada procured equipment, force, and made operational plans".²³ Successive governments consistently accepted Canada's collective security policies with very few modifications as demonstrated by the defence White Papers beginning in 1964. As a result, there appeared, for the most part, to be very little room, or need, for Parliamentary oversight.

However, Members of opposition parties did not always concur with the governments' foreign and defence policy. Widely recognized as being anti-American, several Members of the New Democratic Party continuously voiced their opposition to NATO and NORAD as well as other matters relating to the United States. These protests had little, if any, influence since both Liberal and Conservative Members generally supported the governments' policy in this area.

²¹ *The National Defence Act*, R.S., 1985, c. N-5, updated to January 1991.

²² Sokolsky, *Overload and Marginality*, pp. 6-7.

²³ Douglas Bland, "A Strategy of Choice: Preparing the Canadian Armed Forces for the 21st Century," *Canadian Foreign Policy*, vol. 2, no. 1: p. 109.

A great deal of Parliament's leverage is derived from its power to approve or reject legislation. In order for a bill to become law both the House of Commons and the Senate must pass it. This gives Parliamentarians the opportunity to debate the issues, acquire knowledge, influence changes and occasionally vote down a government bill. This is particularly true in the case of minority governments. However, in the case of defence policy, Parliament was deprived of this leverage to a significant degree during the period from 1945 to 1989. As very little legislation was introduced in Parliament, there was little, if any, opportunity for MP's to affect policy.

Theoretically, Parliament should be able to influence defence policy through its control of DND's purse strings. Parliament has the power to approve or reject the appropriation of funds to DND. However, "given the reality of Cabinet government, neither the House of Commons nor the Senate have any real influence over defence spending".²⁴ The pressure placed upon Parliamentarians to adhere to party positions (ie. party discipline) severely restricted any criticism of the estimates by government Members. Opposition Members had virtually no influence except when dealing with a minority government. However, even when minority governments were elected they generally lasted only a short period of time. During the period from 1931 to 1989 there were only six minority governments that held power for a total of 125 months and one week.²⁵

²⁴ Byers, "Canadian Security and Defence": p. 59.

²⁵ Minority governments between 1931 and 1989 were as follows: June 10, 1957 to March 31, 1958 under Prime Minister John Diefenbaker; June 18,

Strong party discipline has always been a marked constraint on the activities of Parliament. The requirement of having to perpetually support policies and vote along partisan lines unquestionably has discouraged Parliamentarians, particularly government Members, from participating in debates on issues of foreign and defence policy. As government Members cannot openly challenge government policy, the responsibility for criticizing policies and interrogating ministers is left to opposition Members. Unfortunately, opposition Members tend to be more interested in finding ways to embarrass the government instead of voicing valid criticisms and attempting to offer realistic alternatives.²⁶

Rarely do opposition Members make a concerted effort to achieve a definitive goal. There was a notable instance in 1963 when, after what seemed to be a never-ending attack on the Conservative government over the question of Canada obtaining nuclear weapons, the Liberals were successful in defeating the Conservatives in the ensuing election. This marks the only time a Canadian government ever lost an election over a defence issue.

Party discipline is not unique to Canada. However, the degree to which it has been practiced is striking. In Great Britain and Australia, two other Parliamentary systems based on the Westminster tradition, government

1962 to April 8, 1963 also under Diefenbaker; April 8, 1962 to November 8, 1965 under Prime Minister Lester Pearson; November 8, 1965 to June 25, 1968 also under Pearson; October 30, 1972 to July 8, 1974 under Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and May 22, 1979 to February 18, 1990 under Prime Minister Joe Clark. See Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, pp. 332-45.

²⁶ Byers, "Canadian Security and Defence": p. 60.

backbenchers have been important sources of government criticism and it is quite common for individual Members to publicly challenge their governments' positions on defence policy issues.²⁷ The British and Australian Cabinets have not been able to curb opposition from their backbenchers to the same degree as Canadian governments. The latter have gone to great efforts to prevent backbenchers from publicly opposing defence policy positions adopted by Cabinet. With rare exception, government Members seldom criticize government policies "for fear of retribution, such as being overlooked for Cabinet appointments"²⁸ or even being expelled from their party.

The doctrine of ministerial responsibility contributes to the need for such strong party discipline in Canada.²⁹ Unlike in Britain, administrative and political responsibilities are not separated in Canada. In the British system, the permanent undersecretary in a ministry is the officer, rather than the Minister, accountable to Parliament on matters of administration. Thus, the Minister cannot be held accountable by the opposition for an administrative error. In Canada, because ministers can be held accountable for both

²⁷ Robert Sheppard and Michael Valpy note that "the British MP is a much freer spirit than his Canadian counterpart. British governments lose votes in Parliament all the time, deserted by their own backbenchers." See Robert Sheppard and Michael Valpy, *The National Deal: the fight for a Canadian Constitution* (Toronto: Fleet Books, 1982), p. 204 in ed. Taras, *Parliament and Canadian Foreign Policy*, p. 4.

²⁸ Sokolsky, *Overload and Marginality*, p. 6.

²⁹ Peter Kasurak, Principal, Auditor General's Office, Kingston, Ontario, personal interview, November 19, 1996.

administrative and political mistakes, they aim to restrict the risk of publicly embarrassing exchanges in Parliament by quieting government backbenchers.³⁰

Without a reasonable degree of expertise in defence matters, it is almost impossible for Parliament to execute its responsibility for oversight in this area. In order to achieve an acceptable level of expertise, Parliamentarians need reasonable experience, adequate information and personal interest in the policy area.³¹ Few Parliamentarians exhibited all, let alone any, of these qualities prior to 1989. The Canadian Parliament always has had a cadre of MP's with military experience who invariably had an interest in speaking to matters of defence. Although military experience undoubtedly was of assistance to Members endeavoring to understand and deal with defence issues, it was not essential. The military knowledge and expertise could be acquired from study. However, there was a high turnover rate of MP's with "the average Member serving fewer than five years in the House".³² Each general election usually resulted in forty to fifty percent of the House being first time Members.³³ This

³⁰ "Too many brilliant suggestions from the back benches may cause the front benches to look foolish by comparison, and are therefore discouraged." See Eayrs, *Art*, p. 114.

³¹ There are a number of indicators of expertise that could be explored. For a more detailed account of expertise of Parliamentarians see R.B. Byers who sets out three indicators of expertise: committee work, background of individual Parliamentarians, and attitudes towards a particular issue-area in terms of interest and personal expertise. See R.B. Byers, "Perceptions of Parliamentary Surveillance of the Executive": p. 237.

³² C.E.S. Franks, *Constraints on the Operations and Reform of Parliamentary Committees in Canada*. An unpublished paper prepared for the Conference on the Changing Roles of Parliamentary Committees (Budapest, June 1996), p. 6.

³³ According to Franks: "The causes of rapid turnover in membership of the

high turnover rate means there was little continuity of MP's with expertise in defence matters.

One obstacle that Parliamentarians always had to endure was the traditional reluctance of Canadian governments to share defence policy information with Parliament. This reluctance was often accompanied by an attitude, popular among most governments, that "defence was the business of government and the public had no business arguing it".³⁴ While Cabinets did have the legal right to withhold sensitive information in the interest of national security, it appears that information may have been withheld from time to time that should have been available to both Parliament and the public.³⁵ Undoubtedly, there were times when Parliamentarians needed more information than was being provided by government, but in many instances the

House are complex and not well understood. Close to twenty percent of MPs choose to leave and do not run again. This a higher percentage than leaves for all reasons - death, desire, or defeat - in Britain or the United States...At best twenty percent of the seats in the Canadian House could be considered "safe", meaning that a sitting MP, if she or he chooses to run again, is certain to be elected. This compares with eighty percent in Britain and the United States...Whatever the reasons, the Canadian Parliament does not have many experienced, competent Members who are secure in their seats, who want and expect to continue serving in the House..." Ibid., pp. 6-7.

³⁴ Nick Stethem, personal interview.

³⁵ *Hansard* contains a number of complaints of Members that they were not being provided with adequate and/or timely information. Examples include, *Debates*, November 26, 1957, p. 1523; *Debates*, March 13, 1964, p. 917; *Debates*, April 14, 1969, pp. 7449-50; *Debates*, October 30, 1973, p. 7344; *Debates*, December 4, 1985, pp. 9109-10 and *Debates*, January 20, 1986, pp. 9939-40 *inter alia*.

information was available from government upon request or could be obtained from other sources.³⁶

The two formal means by which MP's can obtain information from government on defence matters either are to submit a formal written question to the Minister of National Defence or to make an oral request during Question Period. Both methods are potentially problematic. In the first case, written responses are given in the order that the queries are received. The list of questions is often lengthy, and if a question is not reached by the end of the current session, it is placed at the bottom of the list of questions from the following session of Parliament. As a result, an MP can wait weeks or even months for a response. Members have a better chance of having their questions dealt with quickly when submitted during Question Period. However, even when an MP is given the opportunity to ask his or her question, the Minister is under no obligation to provide an answer. In any event, during the period under examination, MP's rarely made use of Question Period to obtain meaningful information on defence matters.³⁷

Parliamentarians must accept some responsibility for obtaining information. If they are unable to obtain satisfactory answers from the Minister of National Defence, they can turn to DND for assistance. As a general rule, DND is prepared to provide Parliamentarians with requested information

³⁶ Arthur Matthewson, former Chief of Policy Planning and John Anderson, former ADM(Pol), Ottawa, Ontario, personal interview, January 16, 1997; Senior government official, Ottawa, Ontario, personal interview, January 29, 1997.

³⁷ Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, p. 275.

subject to national security and Cabinet confidentiality considerations. According to John Anderson, a former Assistant Deputy Minister for Policy, DND, he could not recall ever having denied information to a Member of Parliament, although, occasionally, it had been necessary to withhold information of a security or confidential nature. Furthermore, it should be noted that DND scheduled defence briefings for MP's from time to time and it was not unusual to have few or no Parliamentarians show up.³⁸

Unfortunately, information provided to Parliamentarians by DND was often unsorted and of little value without considerable analysis.³⁹ The only Parliamentary institution capable of providing Members with data and analysis on defence matters was the Library of Parliament. The Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, a private body established in 1968, also offered its consulting skills to Parliament. However, these entities had very lean staffing and the Parliamentary Centre, in particular, focused what resources it had on providing information to committees rather than helping individual Members. Research support furnished by political parties which should have been providing MP's with partisan advice was largely ineffective.⁴⁰

In an effort to obtain better information and analysis support, some Parliamentarians looked to outside academics and think tanks. Although private institutions and individuals were not privy to classified information,

³⁸ Arthur Matthewson and John Anderson, personal interview.

³⁹ Middlemiss and Sokolsky, *Canadian Defence*, p. 3.

⁴⁰ Peter Kasurak, personal interview.

there were some advantages to using them. These people spent the time necessary to analyze the process; "they [were] informed about the effect, the cause, the right question, the people".⁴¹ They were able to provide Parliamentarians with formulated arguments on the issue in question. Moreover, they helped MP's to establish what the "right questions" were to ask of ministers or witnesses in committee hearings.

Many MP's did not realize the full potential of Canada's defence analysis community. In 1976, DND initiated a program to provide Canadians studying military and strategic studies with funding. Part of this program included establishing and funding chairs at a number of the larger, well-established Canadian universities. Over time, and with the assistance of taxpayers' money, Canada managed to acquire a relatively small, but well-informed defence community. However, for whatever reasons, Members did not take full advantage of this resource.

Non-government Members did not have the same access to information and research and analysis facilities as government Members. The latter had the benefit of information provided in caucus and usually could access ministers more easily. Also, non-government Members had less funds available for research and support staff. These constraints made it even more difficult for non-government Members to ask the "right questions".

⁴¹ R.G. Haycock, Professor of History and Dean of Graduate Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario, personal interview, January 8, 1997.

Most Parliamentarians did not display much interest in defence issues. Busy schedules and constituency matters meant that MP's could keep abreast of only one or two policy areas. As few Members had military experience, complex strategic and technical concepts associated with defence matters often discouraged MP's from participating in the area. However, probably the primary reason for Parliamentary uninterest was the lack of interest on the part of the Canadian voter.

Parliamentarians saw little or no political benefit in their becoming involved with defence matters. As James Eayrs noted in 1961, "in ninety-nine out of one hundred [cases]" the MP "went to Ottawa to speak for his own constituency and no other".⁴² Therefore, there was no reason for a Member to show any interest in defence matters unless a significant number of voters in his or her riding were dependent economically on defence policy or the Member was satisfying a genuine personal interest.⁴³

At least one scholar has suggested that the interest of MP's in foreign policy issues, including defence matters in some instances, increased during the late 1970s and early 1980s. He attributes this to the domestication of foreign policy through the "growth and influence of domestic interest groups" and increased media coverage which supposedly provided Parliamentarians

⁴² Eayrs, *Art*, p. 112.

⁴³ Liberal Senator Colin Kenny described in an interview his frustration with MPs who "won't stand up on their hind legs" even in caucus meetings to deal with pressing defence matters. However, at the same time Senator Kenny acknowledged that he chose to concentrate more on issues readily receptive to the public like anti-smoking legislation than on defence matters. See Colin Kenny, Liberal Senator, Ottawa, Ontario, personal interview, January 16, 1997.

with more information and awareness that elections could be directly affected by foreign and defence issues.⁴⁴ However, it seems that this heightened interest did not carry over in the area of defence to any significant degree. In any event, it had "little impact on formal relations between the executive and Parliament in Canada".⁴⁵

During most of the period from 1867 to 1989, the Canadian public had little or no interest in defence. Canadians did not perceive any direct military threat to Canadian territory. Except for the Fenian Raids in the mid-1800s, the last direct attacks on Canadian soil occurred during the War of 1812 when British regulars, with the assistance of the Canadian militia, fended off a series of attacks from the United States.

The Canadian public developed the notion that Canada did not need to prepare for war until war was imminent and that during peacetime armed forces personnel could be reduced and equipment allowed to become antiquated. Apparently, this idea also stemmed from the War of 1812. Many Canadians were under the misconception that the Canadian militia had successfully defended Canada from the United States' attacks with only minimal assistance from the British regulars.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ David Taras, "From Bystander to Participant," in ed. Taras, *Parliament and Canadian Foreign Policy*, pp. 7-9.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁴⁶ For a discussion of the national myth see Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky, *Canada and Collective Security: Odd Man Out* The Washington Papers/121 (Washington D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1986).

Another contributing factor to Canadian complacency was the firm belief of most Canadians that Canada would be protected by other nations in the event of any attack on its territory. Certainly, Canada could and did expect protection from Great Britain up until the Second World War. Subsequently, Canadian participation in collective defence arrangements sustained this belief. Canadians were "content to rest under the protection of other nations" and "habitually considered themselves committed to other nations".⁴⁷ Traditionally, Canadians have viewed themselves as an "unmilitary people".⁴⁸

During the period 1963 to 1989, successive Canadian governments reduced the number of military personnel in the CF, terminated many traditional military units and closed a number of defence installations located in or near urban centres. Remaining personnel became increasingly concentrated in a handful of bases often located in lightly populated rural areas. Consequently, the interaction between the average Canadian and Canadian military was significantly reduced. To a large degree, the military disappeared as visible members of the Canadian mosaic. This loss of visibility of the armed forces from public view contributed to its loss of interest in military matters during the period in question.

The indifference of the average Canadian to his or her military goes right to the very roots of Canada's political and educational culture. In 1995,

⁴⁷ Douglas Bland, *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces* (Toronto: Brown Book Company Limited, 1995), p. vii.

⁴⁸ G.F.G. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers: the military history of an unmilitary people* (Toronto: MacMillan Co. of Canada, 1954).

Professor R.G. Haycock launched a study of Canadian universities to determine which of the secondary institutions offered "military" courses. By definition, this included only those courses that were directly related to warfare. He discovered that, with the exception of two or three universities, including the Royal Military College of Canada, military courses either were not available at all or were available only in the most minute sense.⁴⁹ Professor Desmond Morton confirmed Haycock's study when he concluded that "the ratios [of military to other courses were] small and reserved for the mature".⁵⁰

Canadian foreign and defence policy courses of both undergraduate and graduate levels have been offered by Political Science Departments at a number of Canadian universities. However, these subjects generally have not been attributed the same level of importance as other aspects of politics, for example, Canadian politics or international relations. Foreign and defence policy courses that are taught often emphasize the difference between the United States and Canada as being primarily one of military philosophy--- Americans are a "military" people and Canadians are an "unmilitary" people. As well, many Canadians never attend university. As a result, when one thinks of Canada, the military does not immediately come to mind.

⁴⁹ Ronald Haycock with Serge Bernier, *Teaching Military History: Clio and Mars* (Athabasca: Athabasca University, 1995), pp. 53-55. In this text, Haycock also provides an excellent essay on the historical and more recent dimensions of military history in which he addresses a number of environmental factors that have undoubtedly affected the role of Parliament in Canada. This bilingual account is one of the most thorough military history bibliographies in print.

⁵⁰ Desmond Morton, "Studying Canadian Military History," *Canadian Military*

PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES: 1968-1989

There was no committee specifically mandated to deal with defence matters until the 1968 Parliamentary reform when responsibility for dealing with defence estimates was transferred from the House to SCEAND. In 1980, a sub-committee of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs (SSCFA) was created and subsequently, in 1984, became the Special Senate Committee on National Defence (SSCND). From time to time, other committees with short-term specific mandates relative to defence have existed.

SCEAND was the principal committee with respect to matters of defence. In giving SCEAND responsibility for certain defence matters, an objective was to relieve the Commons from its heavy workload related to detailed work on specific issues so that it would have more time to debate broader policy issues on defence.⁵¹ Initially, SCEAND's principal responsibility in reference to defence was reviewing the annual estimates presented by DND. However, over the years SCEAND reviewed a number of other defence issues at the request of the government. These included hearings on several NORAD renewals, maritime forces in 1969-70, Armed Forces Reserves in 1981 and the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in 1982. During the period in question the Committee provided the main forum for elected representatives to express their views and to obtain information on defence matters. Concurrently, there was a marked reduction in activity on defence matters in the Commons.

Although there was more activity relative to defence matters in SCEAND than in the House, Members of the Committee were subject to constraints similar in many respects to those discussed in reference to the House of Commons, including party discipline, consistency of defence policy during the post-1945 period, scarcity of defence related legislation, lack of research and analysis support and a general lack of interest on the part of both MP's and the public. However, there were some subtle differences some of which are outlined below.

Party discipline extended to Members of SCEAND in the same manner as other committees. The composition of SCEAND was always in the same ratio as government MP's to opposition MP's in the Commons. This means that whenever there was a majority government a majority of the Members of SCEAND were government MP's.

Management of the selection and replacement process for committee membership enabled party whips to control which of their party Members sat on committees. SCEAND was one of the most prestigious committees and its membership was highly desired by MP's. Prior to 1983, the Committee had a membership of 30 MP's. As a general rule, any MP who wished to sit on the Committee was automatically given membership with both the remaining and casual vacancies being filled by appointees of the party whips. The 1983 Lefebvre Committee reforms limited committees to 15 Members and 15 alternates (appointed by party whips) and limited individual MP's to

⁵¹ Egenger, "Parliament and National Defence, 1950-1969," p. 235.

membership on only one committee.⁵² This increased the competitiveness for Committee membership with the result that in most instances MP's were selected on the basis of their seniority, loyalty and power within the party structure and regional and linguistic representativeness.⁵³ Ironically, SCEAND was viewed by many MP's as being prestigious, but once they became committee Members they tended to do very little.

The McGrath Committee reforms adopted in 1986, among other things, abolished the whip-controlled system of "alternate Members" and gave committee Members responsibility for finding their own replacements. It also removed Parliamentary Secretaries from committee membership, gave committees the power to determine their own agendas and adopted other recommendations intended to give committees greater autonomy and a more meaningful role in the Parliamentary system. On their face these reforms appeared to give committees more independence, but it is questionable whether these changes really reduced the effectiveness of party discipline on committee Members.

Throughout the period from 1968 to 1989, it was rare for government MP's serving on committees to "rock the boat". A combination of potential rewards and possible sanctions was an added impetus for Members of the Committee to observe in the course of their committee activities government policy positions. Committee Members were well aware of the opportunities for

⁵² Egner, "Parliament and National Defence: 1950-1969," p. 235.

⁵³ Don Page, "The Standing Committee on External Affairs, 1945-1983," ed. Taras, *Parliament and Canadian Foreign Policy*, p. 59.

promotion and perks if their committee work was beneficial to the government and of the censorship risks if they openly challenged government positions. An MP who failed to adhere to the party line or the committee process was “not good material” for promotion or reward.⁵⁴ Although “committees are somewhat freer from partisanship and party discipline”, those committee Members “who dissent in the House are often punished by being removed from their committees”.⁵⁵ As a result, on issues where the government’s position was clearly defined, government MP’s scrambled to ensure that Committee conclusions were consistent with the defined position or acceptable to the Minister. On matters where the government only provided guidelines, the tendency was to adhere to these as closely as possible.⁵⁶

As a general rule, Committee Members could not influence a change of policy and often experienced frustration when the government failed to acknowledge and recognize the Committee’s work as meaningful. Prior to the 1983 reforms, there was no requirement for government either to respond in writing or orally to recommendations or reports of SCEAND. These reforms imposed a requirement on government to respond to the Committee within 120 days, but there was no assurance that the government would adopt any part of the recommendations or reports.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 61.

⁵⁵ C.E.S. Franks, *Constraints*, p. 5.

⁵⁶ W.M. Dobell, “Foreign Policy in Parliament,” *International Perspectives* (1985): p. 10.

In all probability, Committee Members, in order to have a modicum of influence on policy, tended to promote conclusions consistent with the policy position of the government on the issue in question. As one academic notes, "enquiries directed against the government is the least likely to be adopted."⁵⁷ However, "if the ministry is looking for assistance to come out of a committee report, obviously those recommendations have a much better chance of survival and success". If the Minister was not interested, "the chances of those recommendations [regardless of their quality] ever seeing the light of day in Cabinet or at the Treasury Board is pretty remote".⁵⁸

During the period from 1968 to 1989, SCEAND's effectiveness suffered from the low level of interest in defence matters exhibited by many of its Members. Government Members had "a particularly difficult time in sustaining interest and this [was] reflected in their generally lack-lustre performance and poor attendance". Prior to 1983:

...Members who showed an interest in foreign affairs [or defence] in the caucus or asked for a position on the committee were normally regarded as automatic Members. Remaining vacancies were filled by whomever the whip decided upon. These conscripts were expected to attend only when required to do so. At any given time about one-third of the Members have been keenly interested, one-third somewhat interested in selective issues, and the remainder definitely uninterested...Those who were active at the beginning of their Parliamentary career remained so throughout but few joined their ranks along the way.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 10.

⁵⁸ Mr. Harquail, chairperson of committee in Brian MacDonald, ed., *Parliament and Defence Policy: Preparedness or Procrastination* (n.p.: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1982), p. 96.

⁵⁹ Page, "The Standing Committee on External Affairs: 1945-1983," pp. 59-61.

It is quite conceivable that the reduction of the Committee to 15 Members under the 1983 reforms actually had the effect of excluding some MP's who had a genuine interest in being Members of the Committee.

A significant constraint on SCEAND was the lack of importance that the Cabinet, Parliamentarians and civil servants attributed to Parliamentary committees in general. According to one source, the "work of committees is too often not taken seriously by ministers and the public service" and similarly, "Parliament itself does not accord adequate importance to the work of its committees".⁶⁰

The fact that there was no standing committee specifically mandated with defence until 1968 is indicative of the low priority that Parliamentarians placed on defence. Until the 1980s, the only responsibilities of SCEAND in reference to defence matters were to examine the annual estimates of DND and carry out specific enquiries referred to the Committee by the government. It was only after 1986 that the Committee was able to determine its own agenda.

Achieving the freedom to initiate autonomous enquiries introduced new problems for the Committee. It had difficulty in determining "the right agenda for work".⁶¹ This was aggravated by the removal of the Parliamentary Secretary

⁶⁰ Liason Committee of the House of Commons on Committee Effectiveness, "Committee Effectiveness Part I: Current Situation and Reassessment," *Parliamentary Government* 43 (1993): p. 3; Egner suggests that "Governments...have tended to resist the institution of defence committees because they resulted in a more informed attack of their defence programs." See Egner, "Parliament and National Defence: 1950-1969," p. 235.

⁶¹ Peter Dobell and Hon. John Reid P.C., "A Larger Role for the House of Commons," *Parliamentary Government* 40 (1992): p. 18.

for the Minister of National Defence from the Committee under the 1986 reforms, which effectively left the Committee "rudderless". The presence of the Parliamentary Secretary on the Committee often facilitated the Committee's work through definition of the government's mandate on matters under consideration. It is accepted that committees tend to be more effective when they operate within a defined framework.⁶² However, many Parliamentarians, particularly Committee Members, did consider that SCEAND had an important role "in eliciting information and providing a forum for promoting a public interest in international affairs [including defence]".⁶³ The Committee, unlike the House, "provided an open forum in which senior military and civilian officials have had to explain defence policy and provide information on the activities of the services".⁶⁴

With respect to the Senate, governments did not refer defence matters to the SSCFA until 1980 when its sub-committee for national defence was established. During the period 1980 to 1989, the sub-committee and its successor, the Special Senate Committee on National Defence (collectively SSCND), produced a number of reports on defence matters. These included reports on military manpower in January 1982, maritime forces in June 1983, and Air Command in September 1983.

⁶² Mathwin Davis, "Influence and Activities of Special and Standing Committees on National Defence," *Occasional Papers on Changing Patterns and Influences in Canadian Defence Policy, 1904-1970* (Royal Military College of Canada, 1971), p.123.

⁶³ Page, "The Standing Committee on External Affairs: 1945-1983," p. 60.

⁶⁴ Middlemiss and Sokolsky, *Canadian Defence*, p. 100.

The Senate Committee was not subject to the same constraints that sometimes hampered SCEAND. SSCND Members were excused from examining DND estimates; they were not subject to strict time limits; they were free from electoral accountability and were able to conduct follow-up investigations on past issues. The continuity and consistency of the Senate Committee membership gave its Members the opportunity to develop expertise in defence matters. In contrast, SCEAND Members were subject to time limits, constituent responsibilities, instability of membership and party discipline.⁶⁵

Despite its apparent advantages, the Senate Committee did not enjoy as much influence with government as SCEAND. For example, although the early 1980s reports were highly praised for their thorough and comprehensive treatment of the issues in question, the government proved unwilling to consider the recommendations because of the large amounts of money that the Senate suggested should be expended on national defence.⁶⁶

During the period from 1867 to 1989, Parliament played a minor role in defence matters. This was attributable in large measure to the fact that traditionally, in matters of defence, power had been vested in the Executive. For the most part, there was no legal requirement for Parliamentary approval of defence policy or decisions. After enactment of the Statute of Westminster in 1931, this power was enjoyed by the Cabinet which consistently maintained its

⁶⁵ Brian MacDonald, ed., *Parliament and Defence Policy: Preparedness or Procrastination*, pp. 85-7, 95.

⁶⁶ Liaison Committee of the House of Commons on Committee Effectiveness: p. 8.

dominant position in reference to defence policy and decisions throughout the period in question. As Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent (1948-1957) described in 1950 Cabinet's position of dominance in relation to Parliament, "the government announces to Parliament what its policy is, and asks Parliament for the ways and means to carry it out".⁶⁷

As discussed earlier in this Chapter, there were a number of interactive factors which fueled this dominance. These included the NDA, the consistent defence policy of collective security during the Cold War period, lack of legislation in the defence area, strong party discipline, limited expertise concerning defence matters among Parliamentarians, inadequate information and analysis and perhaps most importantly, the uninterest of both Parliamentarians and the public. As a result, debates on defence matters were rare and when they did occur they usually focused on the annual estimates and weapons procurement. After the 1968 Parliamentary reform which heightened the role of committees and transferred responsibility for the annual defence estimates to SCEAND, activity in the House of Commons was reduced significantly.

The utilization of committees did not materially improve the role of Parliament in defence matters. SCEAND was subject to many of the constraints which restricted Parliament's involvement in the defence area. Its effectiveness was further hampered by the lack of importance that Cabinet, MP's and DND civil servants attributed to SCEAND and until 1986 its inability

⁶⁷ Statement made in 1950 to the House of Commons. See *Debates*, September 8, 1950, p. 495.

to determine its own topics for enquiries. The Special Senate Committee provided some excellent reports on defence matters in the 1980s, but generally was ignored by government.

As peacekeeping falls within the defence area, the foregoing review and analysis is relevant background to examining Parliament's role with respect to peacekeeping in the next two chapters.

•TWO•

PARLIAMENT AND PEACEKEEPING

Parliamentary oversight of Canadian participation in UN peacekeeping operations has been characterized by its inconsistency. Parliament's involvement as regards implementation and continuance of peacekeeping missions has ranged all the way from no role whatsoever to full debate and pre-approval. This Chapter examines this inconsistency in relation to the House of Commons and Parliamentary committees during the period from the initiation of peacekeeping in 1947 up to the present with the emphasis on the 1990s.

The term "peacekeeping" first was used in reference to the 1956 Suez crisis. Since then, the word has been used as a general term to describe a "conglomerate of UN sponsored missions" starting in 1947.¹ Peacekeeping also has been used to identify those actions under Chapter VI of the UN Charter which promote the non-use of force in contrast to actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which authorize the use of force as an option.²

As used today, it appears that the term "peacekeeping" often extends to what the former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 Report, *Agenda for Peace*, refers to as preventive deployment, peacemaking, peace

¹ LCol Wilson, "The Changing Nature of Peacekeeping: A Canadian Foreign Policy Challenge," Course Paper (National Defence College of Canada, 1993), p. 6.

² *Charter of the United Nations* (New York: Sales Section, UN, 1978).

enforcement or peace building.³ It is somewhat ironic that the term peacekeeping still is used to describe operations that are characterized by such variance. However, "It is difficult to replace [peacekeeping] with another term that is any more precise."⁴ Thus, as used in this study, the term "peacekeeping" means all types of UN-sanctioned peace operations, (whether commanded or only authorized) including those under both Chapter VI (ie. non-force) and Chapter VII (ie. force as an option), and all participating UN troops in these peace operations are referred to as "peacekeepers".⁵

HISTORY OF PEACEKEEPING

Traditional Peacekeeping: 1947-1989

Although many Canadians undoubtedly believe that peacekeeping originated in 1956 during the Suez Crisis, in fact, Canada participated in five UN peacekeeping missions prior to that.⁶ These missions included the UN

³ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Agenda For Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1992).

⁴ See Canadian Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Meeting New Challenges: Canada's Response to a New Generation of Peacekeeping*, (Ottawa: February 1993), p. 6.

⁵ Victoria K. Holt, *Briefing Book on Peacekeeping: The U.S. Role in United Nations Peace Operations* (Washington D.C.: Council for a Livable World Education Fund, 1994). For additional sources on the definition of peacekeeping see Col. J.S. Bremner and Lt. Col. J.M. Snell, "The Changing Face of Peacekeeping," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, vol. 22, special issue 2, (1992), p. 6-11; Joseph T. Jockel, *Canada and International Peacekeeping* (Washington: The Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1994).

⁶ For a comparison of traditional and second generation peacekeeping operations

Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) during 1947 to 1948; the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East that was instigated in May of 1948 and is still running; the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) that started in January of 1949 and also is still operational; the UN Command Korea (UNCK) which began in July 1950 and ended in 1954 and finally the UN Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) that began in 1953 and is still running today.

There was virtually no mention of these operations in Parliament with the exception of the United Nations Command in Korea (UNCK).⁷ In June 1950, when fighting broke out between North and South Korea one MP asked how the government intended to keep Parliament informed of the matter during summer recess. The Foreign Minister, Lester B. Pearson, told the House that "if the situation should deteriorate to the point where that course would be advisable" the government would do so.⁸ When Parliament finally was summoned on August 29, 1950, it did not debate the government's decision to send troops specifically, but instead met to pass new government legislation to amend the NDA and the Defence Appropriation Act in order to increase the

see Appendices B and C.

⁷ The one UN mission that Canada did not participate in before 1956 was the UN Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) which ran from 1947 to 1951. For more information on these missions see Alistair Taylor, and others, *Peacekeeping: International Challenges and Canadian Response* (n.p.: The Canadian Institute for International Affairs, 1968), p. 102.

⁸ *Debates*, June 29, 1950, p. 4391.

defence budget. This increase was meant to facilitate an expansion of the Canadian armed forces as a whole as well as to increase the number of Canadian personnel involved in Korea.⁹

The first debate that dealt specifically with peacekeeping occurred in November 1956. The House authorized sending Canadian soldiers as part of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) to help mediate in the Suez Canal conflict. Debates subsequently were held relative to the deployment of forces for the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 1960, the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964 and the UNEF II mission in 1973. These four missions were the only ones where initial deployment was debated out of the sixteen missions to which Canada committed peacekeepers up to 1978.

No new peacekeeping operations were initiated by the UN until 1988. From 1988 to 1997, there was a significant increase in peacekeeping operations with over thirty initiated by the UN. Canada participated in five of the six UN missions undertaken during the period 1988 to 1989 inclusive.¹⁰ Three of these were small, relatively low-risk, observer-type operations which received little attention in Parliament. The UN Transition Assistance Group in

⁹ Michael Rossignol, *International Conflicts: Parliament, The National Defence Act, and the Decision to Participate* (n.p.: Research Branch, Library of Parliament, 1992), p. 9.

¹⁰ Canada did not participate in the UN Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I).

Namibia (UNTAG) and the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) were larger operations and their deployments were debated.¹¹

As a general rule, prior to the 1990s consulting or updating Parliament when a mandate was renewed or altered, troops added, forces removed, or when the safety of soldiers was in question does not appear to have been a priority of governments. In fact, it was unusual for governments to update Parliament on missions at all. For example, during the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) eight Canadian officers were dispatched as part of the observer group in 1949 followed by an additional nine persons along with a Caribou Aircraft in the mid-1960s. Canada's contribution was the largest single national component, yet the matter was raised only once in the House and "scarcely a word was heard thereafter".¹² Similarly, apart from one opposition-initiated debate held five months after the initial deployment, on August 10, 1964, UNFICYP received scant attention in the House during the thirty-two years between the initial debate on deployment of

¹¹ As regards UNTAG, the government issued an Order-in-Council on April 6, 1989 and the mission was debated six days later, although the initial commitment had already been made a full month earlier. See Rossignol, *International Conflicts*, p. 20. In the case of UNIIMOG, an Order-in-Council was tabled on August 18, 1988 followed by a debate on August 24, 1988 on a motion to support Canadian participation in the operation. This motion was passed with the unanimous consent of the House.

¹² Taylor and others, *Peacekeeping: International Challenges and Canadian Response*, p. 102.

Canadian Forces to Cyprus and the announcement of their withdrawal in 1992.¹³

Peacekeeping in the 1990s

During the 1990s, House of Commons activity in reference to initial deployments and updates increased to reflect the greater tempo of peacekeeping operations and an apparent effort on the part of governments to provide Parliament with more information and involvement on peacekeeping. Concurrently, there was a substantial increase in Parliamentary committee activity on peacekeeping matters. The only previous enquiry and report on peacekeeping by a Parliamentary committee was in 1969.¹⁴

Parliamentarians have had more exposure to peacekeeping during the 1990s than previously. During the Conservative Government tenure, seven debates were held dealing with specific peacekeeping issues. Five debates were initiated by the government and two by the opposition. The government-initiated debates included one held in September 1990 on the deployment of Canadian military resources to the Gulf War in the preceding August; one held in January 1991 to reaffirm the support for UN actions taken to end aggression

¹³ The August 10, 1964 debate was held on the grounds that the opposition felt the government was being too circumspect in its answers to its questions. *Debates*, August 10, 1964, pp. 6600-21.

¹⁴ Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on Peacekeeping, *Eighth Report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence Respecting United Nations and Peacekeeping* (Ottawa: DND, 1969).

and two on the Balkan situation held in January and in November 1991 approximately three months before Canadian peacekeepers were deployed to that region. A further two debates were held on the Somalia mission, the first was an emergency debate held in the evening of December 7, 1992 concerning the deployment of troops under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and following the tabling by the government earlier the same day of an Order-in-Council committing CF to the mission.

The second Somalia debate was part of a larger debate on general defence policy issues initiated by the opposition. It was held in April 1993 and related primarily to the March 1993 incidents in Somalia involving members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment. The final debate also was initiated by the opposition under the Special Economic Measures Act. This debate held in December 1992 questioned the effectiveness of economic sanctions in Haiti. Although this debate was not directly related to peacekeeping, it was really a prelude to the UN authorized peacekeeping mission in Haiti in June 1993.

The Conservative government showed more of an inclination than previous governments "to use the House of Commons to announce and discuss foreign policy [and defence] matters".¹⁵ The government issued statements in the House notifying MP's of Namibian independence in March 1990 and of the withdrawal of peacekeepers from Cyprus in December of 1992. On the other hand, it neglected to consult with Parliament before committing Canadian

¹⁵ Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, pp. 275-7.

soldiers to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in March 1992, UNPROFOR I in February 1992, UNOSOM I in April 1992 and UNMIH in September 1993.¹⁶

The Conservative government also utilized Parliamentary committees in relation to peacekeeping in the early 1990s. In 1993, two peacekeeping reports were released, the first in early February by the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the second report in June by the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran's Affairs (SCONDVA).¹⁷

Two other Parliamentary committees dealt with peacekeeping matters during this period. The Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade held two meetings in 1992 and four in 1993 to review the ongoing deterioration of conditions in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia, but no reports were issued.¹⁸ In addition, a combined National Defence/External Affairs Special Committee was established to oversee, on a daily basis, events as they unfolded relative to the Gulf War peacekeeping mission. According to a senior government official, the use of the committee in this situation was

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Canada, Senate, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Meeting New Challenges: Canada's Response to a New Generation of Peacekeeping* (Ottawa: February 1993); Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran's Affairs, *The Dilemmas of a Committed Peacekeeper: Canada and the Renewal of Peacekeeping* (Ottawa: June 1993).

¹⁸ Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee for External Affairs and International Trade, 34th Parliament, 3rd session, issue 64, September 15, 1992, issue 48, December 8, 1992, issue 56, March 9, 1993, issue 64, May 6, 1993, issue 66, May 11, 1993, and issue 67, May 12, 1993.

possible because of the high public profile attached to the operation.¹⁹ This was the first and only occasion when a committee has met daily to discuss Canada's role in a peacekeeping operation. However, again no reports were published.

The Liberal Party's "Red Book" for the 1993 election campaign promised to democratize every major foreign policy decision affecting Canada's international role, including peacekeeping.²⁰ After assuming power in October 1993, the Liberal government did initiate several debates related to major decisions with respect to ongoing peacekeeping operations.

In February 1994, MP Fred Mifflin, then Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence, told the House that within the first one hundred days of government the Liberals had initiated two Parliamentary debates on peacekeeping and one on general defence issues (including peacekeeping).²¹ All three debates were held between January 25, 1994 and February 17, 1994 and included discussion of the question as to whether or not Canada should renew its commitment in the former Yugoslavia. Most of the other matters dealt with were of a general defence or peacekeeping nature.

¹⁹ Senior government official, Ottawa, Ontario, personal interview, January 29, 1997.

²⁰ For a detailed account of the Liberal Party's foreign policy electoral pledges see The Liberal Party of Canada, *Creating Opportunity: The Liberal Red Book* (Ottawa: Liberal Party of Canada, 1993).

²¹ *Debates*, February 17, 1994, p. 1483.

During the period from April 1994 to February 1996 inclusive, there were at least eight additional debates relating to specific peacekeeping operations. All were initiated by the government except for an opposition debate held in March 1995 concerning the mission in the former Yugoslavia. Six government-initiated debates also related to operations in the former Yugoslavia. These included a special debate held in April 1994 to discuss the use of NATO airstrikes in the region, another debate held on March 29, 1995 on the renewal of the mandate scheduled to end on the ensuing March 31st and an emergency debate held in May 1995 on the deteriorating situation in the former Yugoslavia to consider the possible withdrawal of Canadian troops. The last two debates called by the government were a mini-debate held in October 1995 on the UN decision to reduce the mission in the former Yugoslavia and a special debate held in December 1995 on the deployment of the Implementation Force (IFOR) which succeeded UNPROFOR.

Another special debate was held in September 1994 to consider the current and future international peacekeeping commitments in the former Yugoslavia, Haiti and Rwanda. Finally, an emergency debate was held on February 28, 1996 to consider the takeover of military command of the entire UN force in Haiti.

Two special joint committees were established to study the country's foreign and defence policies (including peacekeeping) in 1994. Their reports were intended to assist the government in its task of drawing up a new White

Paper,²² marking the first time that a government has ever directly linked a Parliamentary review to a White Paper. Interestingly, the White Paper was released in December 1994 only one month after the two Committees completed their Reports. However, the proceedings of both Committees were monitored closely by government Members. Since 1994, there have been no policy reviews undertaken by Parliament.

INCONSISTENCY OF PARLIAMENTARY ACTIVITY

It is clear that there has been considerable variance as to the nature and degree of involvement of Parliament with different peacekeeping operations throughout the period from 1947 to the present. An examination of the missions undertaken during this period suggests that the level of involvement of Parliament in peacekeeping matters has been determined by certain definitive factors. These appear to have influenced whether or not Cabinet has held a debate on a particular mission.

Cabinet debated the deployment phase of some peacekeeping operations. These missions invariably exhibited several common elements.

²² Canada, House of Commons and Senate, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Defence Policy, *Security in a Changing World 1994*, Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy (Ottawa: Publications Service, Parliamentary Publications Directorate, 1994); Canada, House of Commons and Senate, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, *Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future*, Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Reviewing Foreign Policy (Ottawa: Canadian Commissions Group, 1994).

The most influential factor was the perception that the operation was important and of concern to the Canadian public as evidenced by media attention, activity in Question Period and caucus and opinion expressed by constituents. The size of the mission was also relevant. Where Canada was deploying a significant number of troops, the mission was usually the subject of a Commons debate. The numbers of Canadian peacekeepers deployed on missions debated in the Commons ranged from about 300 to 1400 with most of these missions involving more than 750 peacekeepers.²³ Also, a Commons debate usually was held where a mission involved exposing peacekeepers to high risks.

There were several peacekeeping operations which had these characteristics, but where deployment was not subject to debate by Parliament.²⁴ These included UNCK where almost 27,000 Canadian military personnel participated in what was in reality a full-scale war, UNPROFOR where over 2400 peacekeepers were deployed to the former-Yugoslavia and UNMIH which involved approximately 750 peacekeepers. The abortive operation undertaken from November to December 1996 in Eastern Zaire also falls into this category. In this instance, Prime Minister Chretien appears to have been prepared to commit Canada to "one of its largest and potentially

²³ UNEF I: 1,007; ONUC: 421; UNFICYP: 1,126; UNEF II: 1,145; UNIIMOG: 525; UNTAG: 301; Operation Friction in the Persian Gulf: 2,700; UNITAF 1,410; and UNSMIH: 752. Canada, Department of Foreign and Affairs and International Trade, *Background: Documentation* December 1996.

²⁴ UNCK; UNPROFOR and UNMIH.

riskiest, overseas operations since the Second World War, with no debate in the Commons about its dangers, or about the \$100 million it would have cost".²⁵ Although UNCK, UNPROFOR and UNMIH were not debated in connection with deployment, debates were conducted either prior to deployment or in respect of issues that arose during the mission. Generally, in most cases where such matters were debated in the Commons, the same common elements were present.

On the other hand, a majority of missions were not debated in the Commons at all. Instead, they were undertaken on the authority of Cabinet with little or no consultation with Parliament. In most instances, these were low-risk, observer or humanitarian-type operations which attracted little public or media interest and involved the deployment of less than 50 Canadian peacekeepers.²⁶ Normally, these missions were authorized by the issuance and tabling of an Order-in-Council, but in a few cases, this was not done.²⁷ There was virtually no Parliamentary involvement relative to these missions except in

²⁵ David Pugliese, "Nobel Fever," *Saturday Night*, vol. 112, no. 4, (1997): p.54.

²⁶ These missions include: UNTSO; UNMOGIP; UN Security force in West New Guinea (UNSF); UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNMOGAP); UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) and UNOSOM I.

²⁷ The Cabinet did not issue or table Orders-in Council for the following operations: UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNCTOK); UNMOGIP; UNTSO; UN Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL); UN Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM); UN India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM); Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan (OSGAP); Observateurs des Nations Unies pour la verification des elections en Haiti (ONUVEH); UNAVEM II.

rare instances, for instance, the tabling of information in the Commons or an isolated question in Question Period.

Where missions have been debated in the House of Commons, there appears to have been no standards or customs established as to when debates should be held or how much notice should be given to MP's. As regards deployment, the norm has been for Cabinet to make the decision and table an Order-in-Council prior to any debate.

In the case of UNEF I, the Cabinet decision to send CF to Suez was made at least one month prior to the debate. On November 2, 1956, Foreign Minister Lester B. Pearson, announced to the UN that Canada was ready to participate in an UN force to police the withdrawal of the invading forces. This offer was reaffirmed by Prime Minister St. Laurent in a radio and television address on November 4, 1956.²⁸ On November 20, 1956, an Order-in-Council was approved authorizing the deployment of 2500 troops to Suez. This Order-in-Council was tabled at a Special Session of Parliament convened on November 26, 1956. This was followed by a debate which resulted in the unanimous approval of the mission on November 29, 1956.

This trend persisted into the 1990s as illustrated by the Cabinet decision on August 10, 1991 to deploy warships to the Persian Gulf in order to ensure the effectiveness of UN economic sanctions against Iraq. On September 15, 1991 an Order-in-Council was issued approving this deployment.

²⁸ Taylor and others, *Peacekeeping: International Challenges and Canadian Response*, p. 125.

Subsequently, Parliament was convened on September 24, 1991, at which time the Order-in-Council was tabled and followed by debate on the issue of deployment.

The only exception of note was the ONUC mission in 1960 where the Commons debated and approved the deployment of troops prior to the tabling of the authorizing Order-in Council. In this case, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker told the Commons on July 30, 1960, that subject to the approval of Parliament, the government had authorized the sending of a maximum of 500 armed forces personnel, including up to 200 signalers, to the Congo. The issue was debated and passed unanimously on August 1, 1960 following which the Order-in-Council was tabled in the Commons on August 6, 1960.²⁹ This is the only time the approval of Parliament for deployment of peacekeepers has been obtained before the tabling of the implementing Order-in Council. However, it is quite feasible that this debate took place in this manner because Diefenbaker was not thrilled with the concept of peacekeeping.

As regards virtually all post-deployment issues, Cabinet appears to have dealt with these matters prior to the 1990s without any debate in Parliament. In furtherance of its promised democratization of foreign policy decisions, the Liberal Government did hold a number of debates in 1994 through 1996 dealing primarily with general peacekeeping or follow-up issues relating to the continuing operations in the former Yugoslavia as described above. However,

²⁹ *Debates*, August 1, 1960, pp. 7327-49.

where post-deployment matters requiring decisions were debated, the decisions invariably previously had been made by Cabinet. Furthermore, this "democratization" did not extend uniformly to all post-deployment issues. Cabinet unilaterally renewed the Bosnian mandate in December 1993 without consulting Parliament. Similarly, in March 1995, Cabinet renewed the mandate for a further six months.

It appears that another relatively common practice in the 1990s has been to hold debates at the last possible moment before Canada has to commit on various peacekeeping matters. In one instance, the debate was held on March 29, 1995 concerning the extension of the Bosnian and Croatian mandates that ended March 31, 1995.³⁰ In the same way, the evening debate held on February 28, 1996, dealt with the transfer of command of the entire UN force in Haiti from the United States to Canada that was to take place on March 1, 1996. Canada had to advise the UN of its decision the following day.³¹

The notice given to MP's prior to debates has been erratic and on occasion almost non-existent. The three weeks' notice given by Prime Minister Chretien of the Commons debate subsequently held on January 25, 1994, could be considered reasonable notice.³² The fact that this notice was given by

³⁰ *Debates*, March 29, 1995 pp. 11225-54.

³¹ *Debates*, February 28, 1996, <http://www.parl.gc.ca/cgi-bin/webg>.

³² Prime Minister Chretien "says Canada is seriously thinking about pulling its peacekeeping troops out of Bosnia" Canada promised UN to keep 2000 peacekeepers there until April but whether they stay beyond then, says Chretien, will be decided only after a full Parliamentary debate next month

a statement made to the media by the Prime Minister on January 4, 1994, does not take away from its effectiveness.

At the other extreme are the notices given for the Cyprus and Bosnia debates held on March 13, 1964 and October 5, 1995 respectively. In the case of Cyprus, Prime Minister Pearson rose during the day session in Parliament and asked that "the House consider a resolution approving Canadian participation in the peacekeeping operation" that very evening.³³ The mini-debate on the UN decision to reduce the mission in Bosnia was held on very short notice. The ministerial statement notifying Parliament of this decision was issued to the House only fifteen minutes before the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Andre Ouellet, offered the opposition an opportunity to debate the issue.³⁴

With few exceptions, the attendance at peacekeeping debates over the years has been low.³⁵ Normally, the participants have been restricted to the Minister of National Defence, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, foreign policy and defence critics from recognized opposition parties and

about the future of peacekeeping in Bosnia. See *Globe and Mail*, January 5, 1994, p. A1.

³³ *Debates*, March 13, 1964, p. 992.

³⁴ *Debates*, October 5, 1995, <http://www.parl.gc.ca/cgi-bin/webg>.

³⁵ Jack Frazer, MP Reform Party, Ottawa, Ontario, personal interview, March 17, 1997. "A bare quorum of twenty Members attend most debates in the House of Commons". See Peter Dobell and Hon. John Reid, P.C. "A Larger Role for the House of Commons Part I", *Parliamentary Government* 40 (1992): p. 18.

a few Members with past military experience or with personal or constituent interests.

The UNEF I Special Session debates in November 1956 attracted much higher attendance and participation because of the "highly emotional" feelings of many MP's and the public regarding the Liberal's "gratuitous condemnation of the British and the French".³⁶ A couple of the debates held during the 1990s on the former Yugoslavia also had much better attendance and participation by MP's.³⁷ Undoubtedly, this was attributable to the substantial media coverage and public interest, particularly on the part of Canada's Serbian and Croatian communities, relative to the atrocities which were occurring in the region at that time.

Members have questioned the adequacy and timeliness of information provided to Parliament by government on peacekeeping operations periodically since the inception of peacekeeping in 1947.³⁸ It is clear from the May 1996 Report of the Auditor General that this continued to be an issue in the 1990s.

The Auditor General's office conducted interviews with MP's from all major parties who sat on the Standing Committee on National Defence and

³⁶ *Debates*, November 29, 1956, pp. 142-3.

³⁷ I.e. Former Yugoslavia in January and November 1991 and the Gulf War in January 1991.

³⁸ For examples prior to 1989 refer to footnote 32 in Chapter One. After 1989 some examples include: *Debates*, December 7, 1992, pp. 14775-6; May 5, 1993 p. 18940; May 6, 1993, pp. 19047-49; May 7, 1993, p. 19104; April 20, 1993, February 28, 1996, <http://www.parl.gc.ca/cgi-bin/webg>; December 4, 1995, <http://www.parl.gc.ca/cgi-bin/webg>.

Veterans Affairs (SCONDDVA). When asked for their opinions about the quality and timeliness of information they had received from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and DND, most MP's responded that the information was "generally relevant, reliable and understandable, taking into account that it was very often incomplete". Some interviewees suggested that without security clearance, MP's are unable to obtain complete information, while others noted that departments are far more likely to provide information when specifically asked. Finally, most MP's agreed that information was not provided on a timely basis, "especially for the House debates on troop contributions."³⁹

During the 1990s, governments have provided periodic briefings from the military to MP's on peacekeeping matters. If a Member wishes a briefing, he or she can obtain it. However, these briefings usually provide only a broad overview of the matter in question. Some MP's are concerned that these briefings do not always provide an honest appraisal of the situation and would prefer to have military witnesses appear before a committee where there is some obligation on them to answer appropriate questions.⁴⁰

Members increasingly have become skeptical during the 1990s as to the credibility and timeliness of information provided to Parliament by the military. This was caused in part by several revelations pertaining to the peacekeeping

³⁹ Canada, Auditor-General, "Peacekeeping," *Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons*, p. 7-11.

⁴⁰ Jack Frazer, personal interview.

missions in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia, which indicated that the military establishment might be covering up equipment inadequacies and illegal activities of CF.

A typical incident, which fueled this growing distrust, arose as a result of statements made by the CDS to the effect that the Canadian peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia were adequately equipped. To quote a then Member of SCNDVA, "Well [the equipment] wasn't adequate. And Lew Mackenzie said it wasn't adequate. We went and visited, and the troops sure as hell didn't think it was adequate".⁴¹

The credibility of the Minister of National Defence, DND and military were further undermined by their collective failure to provide Parliament with meaningful information on a timely basis following news media disclosures of the alleged murder of a Somalian boy in mid-March 1993 by members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment. This situation gave the appearance of a possible cover up on the part of the government and military.

Canada's Love of Peacekeeping

Ever since the Suez Crisis in 1956, when Lester B. Pearson played a major role in establishing an UN-sanctioned international force to police the withdrawal of British, French and Israeli forces from Suez, "Canadians have cherished their role as peacekeepers. Here was something we could do on the

⁴¹ Ibid.

world stage that the Americans couldn't..."⁴² Traditionally, Canadian governments have considered peacekeeping an appealing foreign policy initiative as it was relatively low cost; took place on foreign soil; supposedly provided Canada with a seat at the international table and was politically attractive domestically. It held a revered place in the hearts of the majority of Canadians.⁴³ Media reports have served to fuel this attitude over the years.⁴⁴

As a result, Canadian participation in peacekeeping operations has been politically uncontroversial for the most part. Generally, debates have taken place on virtually a non-partisan basis with unanimous votes in favour of Canada's involvement in peacekeeping missions. This custom, in conjunction with the perceived public support for peacekeeping, appears to have been used as a justification for governments' eliminating or deferring Parliamentary debates from time to time. This was made clear in a statement issued in March 1995 by Andre Ouellet, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, with respect to a mandate renewal in Bosnia. He announced that the government was not committed to holding another Parliamentary debate on

⁴² David Pugliese, "Nobel Fever," p. 55.

⁴³ Martin Shadwick in David Pugliese, "Nobel Fever," p. 55.

⁴⁴ "Peacekeeping has been a Canadian trademark, a rare source of national pride and a valuable part of Canada's foreign policy since Lester Pearson invented it in the Suez Crisis of 1956," *Ottawa Sun*, December 9, 1993: p. A14 *inter alia*.

this matter because in the past there had been "overwhelming support in favour of peacekeeping missions".⁴⁵

The popularity of peacekeeping has prevailed relatively uninterrupted into the 1990s, but there are signs that this situation may be changing.⁴⁶ An Angus Reid Poll released in January 1994 indicated that Canadians were becoming disenchanted with peacekeeping.⁴⁷ Undoubtedly, the incident in Somalia with its accompanying adverse publicity for the military was a major contributor to this change in attitude.

The non-partisan approach of Parliament to peacekeeping started to deteriorate in April 1994 in connection with the "unanimous" approval of NATO air strikes and the placement of Canadian troops in safe areas while air strikes were performed. Although approved by both the Bloq Quebecois (BQ) and Reform Parties' defence critics, the Reform Party was divided on the issue with some Members objecting to the air strikes out of concern for the safety of Canadian peacekeepers.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Dianne Rinehart, "Decisions on peacekeepers within 2 weeks: Ouellet," *The Montreal Gazette* March 15, 1995: p. A7. It worth noting that although Ouellet did not allow Parliament to debate the mandate renewal, the government did canvass the Members of SCFAIT.

⁴⁶ Canadians went through a brief period of disillusionment with peacekeeping following the unilateral expulsion of Canadian peacekeepers from Egypt by President Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1967.

⁴⁷ *Ottawa Citizen*, January 25, 1994: p. A1.

⁴⁸ *Debates*, April 21, 1994, pp. 3348-77.

In late 1994, the Reform Party adopted a hard position against continued involvement of Canadian peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia. Following 55 Canadian peacekeepers being taken hostage by Serbians in November 1994, Reform MP's began to demand the immediate withdrawal of CF troops serving in the region.⁴⁹ There was growing concern for the safety of CF abroad and the adequacy of their equipment. Domestic opposition to Canadian participation in the UN force also was increasing.⁵⁰ This was given considerable media attention. Reform Members continued throughout 1995 to demand the immediate withdrawal of the CF from the region and to question the adequacy of their equipment and the cost of the mission. The BQ joined Reform in these attacks on the government in May 1995.

Notwithstanding the ongoing efforts of the Reform and BQ to challenge the government's peacekeeping policy, the two parties have failed to establish themselves as a credible opposition in the eyes of the Canadian media, and subsequently, the Canadian public. This attitude can be attributed, in part, to the fact that both parties were new in the 1990s. However, most of the negative publicity aimed at Reform and BQ unquestionably has been a consequence of their regionally based agendas and political philosophies.⁵¹

⁴⁹ *Debates*, November 30, 1994, pp. 8578-9.

⁵⁰ Jeff Sallot, *Globe and Mail*, January 13, 1995: p. A1.

⁵¹ The Reform Party's right-leaning platform has gained them the reputation of being racist, anti-semitic and lacking compassion. Reform, in particular, has a "red neck" image, while elites support peacekeeping.

Although both parties hold national party status, their policies have not always reflected Canada's interests as a whole. Without the confidence of the Canadian populace, it has been very difficult for the two parties to establish themselves as a credible opposition on defence.

As outlined earlier in this paper, there has been a significant increase in the number of committees dealing with peacekeeping matters in the 1990s. The 1990s did not bring any material relief from the constraints, which hindered the effectiveness of Parliamentary committees previously.

In fact, inconsistency of the membership of standing and joint committees worsened after the October 1993 election.⁵² This resulted primarily from the high turnover rate of MP's in this election. Seventy percent of the seats had new Members.⁵³ Undoubtedly, this lack of consistency reduced the level of expertise of the committees.

Since 1947, Parliamentary oversight of Canadian participation in peacekeeping operations has been inconsistent. This trend persisted in the 1990s despite the increased tempo of missions after 1989. Of the sixteen peacekeeping missions that Canada partook in prior to 1988 only five Parliamentary debates occurred. After 1988, at least seventeen House of Commons debates have taken place as compared to the twenty-seven UN-sanctioned missions to which Canada contributed peacekeepers. The use of

⁵² Len Hopkins, Liberal MP, Ottawa, Ontario, personal interview, March 17, 1997.

⁵³ Franks, *Constraints*, p. 6.

Parliamentary committees increased markedly in the 1990s. For the first time, during the Conservative government, a Special Committee was established to monitor a peace operation on a day-to-day basis.

Peacekeeping missions that were debated in the House have been characterized by several common elements. With the exception of Operation Assurance in Zaire, all operations that involved more than 300 Canadian military personnel, represented a higher level of risk and/or were perceived to be important and of concern to the Canadian public were debated in the House of Commons at one stage or another. It is this same perceived importance that has affected MP's' attendance at peacekeeping debates. However, there were other operations that received little or no attention in Parliament. Several of these did not even warrant an Order-in-Council placing the CF on active service.

There have been other inconsistencies associated with debate including timing, attendance and participation, information to Parliament, and Canada's love for peacekeeping. These elements of debate all speak to the quality of Parliamentary oversight and peacekeeping. The latter themes are discussed in much greater detail in the context of three specific peacekeeping operations: UNPROFOR, UNOSOM/UNITAF and UNMIH.

•THREE•

CASE STUDIES

As discussed in Chapter One, decision-making in reference to foreign and defence matters has been vested in the Executive in one form or another since Confederation. This has been perpetuated under the NDA which, since its enactment in 1922, has permitted Cabinet to authorize the deployment of troops by Order-in-Council without consulting Parliament. During the Cold War, there was little or no room for oversight of defence related matters by Parliament as the role of Canada's military was dictated primarily by its membership in NORAD and NATO. As a result, Parliamentary oversight of defence matters, including peace operations, could be considered as perfunctory, for the most part, during this period.

Since 1989, the UN has authorized over thirty peacekeeping operations, many being larger, more complex and dangerous than earlier missions. Canada has participated in virtually every one of these operations. This significantly increased involvement has placed considerable strain on the personnel, equipment, finances and other resources of CF. Given this situation, it might be reasonable to expect that Parliament would have given increased scrutiny to Canada's involvement in these peace missions.

As outlined in Chapter Two, this does not appear to have been the case. Although the increase in the number of peace operations since 1989 has resulted in a corresponding increase in the time devoted to peacekeeping matters by Parliament, there has been no real change in the quality of

oversight. The historical pattern has continued during the 1990s for all practical purposes. Parliament's ability to oversee Canada's peace operations and influence the decisions of Government in that regard remains largely ineffective.

In this Chapter, the manner in which this historical pattern of ineffective Parliamentary involvement has been perpetuated during the 1990s is demonstrated by examination of three major peace operations, UNPROFOR, UNOSOM/UNITAF and UNMIH. This examination also provides an insight as to why this pattern has continued.

CASE ONE: UNPROFOR

The UN first became involved in the 1991-1995 Balkan civil war in September 1991 when the Security Council passed a resolution demanding that an embargo be placed on weapons sales to Yugoslavia. Meetings were conducted with Croatian and Serbian leaders to negotiate agreements, both to end hostilities and to establish a UN peace operation.¹ Consequently,

¹ The conflict in the former Yugoslavia has deep historical roots dating back to the eleventh century, when the Balkan Christians separated into two contingents: Catholic Croats and Orthodox Eastern Serbs. Ethnic conflict remained in place for centuries, often involving exhibitions of violence. In 1945, after a brutal war, Josip Broz Tito was elected president. During Tito's 35 years in office Yugoslavia was divided into four provinces and two autonomous regions, and the president successfully managed to keep ethnic tensions repressed until his death in 1980. Over the next decade hostilities resurfaced and in 1990 the Yugoslav Communist Party collapsed unleashing conflicts "whose ferocity has shocked those who imagined that Europe was immune to such horrors." See Karen A. Mingst and Margaret P. Karns, *The*

UNPROFOR in Croatia was established on February 21, 1992 to ensure the demilitarization of the UN Protected Areas, protect civilians, repatriate refugees and provide civilian agencies with humanitarian support. The situation continued to deteriorate in other regions of the former Yugoslavia. After months of trying to secure a cease-fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the mandate was enlarged in June 1992 under an agreement with the Serbians, which enabled UNPROFOR to seize control of the Sarajevo airport and reopen it for humanitarian purposes. In December 1992, UNPROFOR's mandate was again expanded to include a preventative deployment to Macedonia, raising the number of UN troops serving in the former Yugoslavia to over 23,000 peacekeepers.

The Canadian government first expressed concern publicly regarding the ethnic conflict in January 1991. On September 19, 1991, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney announced that Canada had asked for an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to consider intervention in the Yugoslavian crisis and that the government was willing to make peacekeeping forces available if necessary.² This declaration was bolstered six days later when the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Barbara MacDougall, pledged Canadian participation

United Nations in the Post Cold-War Era: Dilemmas in World Politics (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1995), p. 95.

² Brian Mulroney, "Prime Minister calls for United Nations Security Council meeting on the crisis in Yugoslavia," Press Release 2p (Ottawa: Office of the Prime Minister. September 19, 1991); Paul Koring, "Tanks moving toward Croatia," *Globe and Mail*, September 20, 1991: p. A8.

if the UN decided to mount a peace operation, whether with or without the consent of warring parties (ie. Chapter VI or Chapter VII).³ Five months later in February 1992, Canada formally committed 1200 troops with an additional 1200 the following June, bringing the total Canadian contribution to 2400 peacekeepers.

The UNPROFOR mandate was extended in February 1993 following the expiration of the original twelve-month mandate. Three months later, in response to the continued deterioration in region, the rules of engagement were adjusted to accommodate an upgraded use of force. Despite these efforts, the situation proceeded to decline. In December 1993, Canada pulled out of Srebrenica, a decision which "underscored the degree to which successive Canadian governments [had] overstretched the Canadian army."⁴

Ironically, at the same time, drunken Serbs extended the Bosnian mission for another six months despite the capture and mock execution of eleven Canadian peacekeepers. This incident, however, did lead officials to question whether the risk was too great for continued participation of CF. In January 1994, Chretien suggested that Canada should consider pulling out of the former Yugoslavia altogether, but CF actually remained in the area for almost two more years until UNPROFOR was terminated in November 1995, following the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords.

³ Canadian Press, "UN urged to help end bloodletting," *Globe and Mail*, September 26, 1991: p. A8.

⁴ *Globe and Mail*, December 10, 1991: p. A1.

Parliamentary involvement related to UNPROFOR was significantly greater than that in respect of previous missions. For the first time, Parliament was provided with periodic updates on the operation by government. In addition, as discussed in Chapter Two, Parliament held two pre-deployment debates in 1991 and five debates dealing with post-deployment matters during 1994-96.

The 1991 debates were largely the result of public outcry through the media and petitions submitted to MP's demanding that the government take action to halt atrocities of the civil war in Yugoslavia. Considerable pressure was exerted on both government and opposition Members for Canada to intervene in the war with the result that the issue was being raised in Question Period on virtually a daily basis. Clearly, political expediency dictated that the government hold these two debates

In contrast, when the government officially committed troops to UNPROFOR in February 1992, there was "scant discussion and no argument" in Parliament. When this commitment was satisfied by the deployment of twelve hundred troops one month later to western Slovenia, "one of the areas of heaviest fighting and some of the worst atrocities of war," the matter still had not been debated in the Commons. Moreover, the government waited a full three months before reporting to the House on the dangerous nature of the mission.⁵ The deployment of 1,200 more troops in September 1992 similarly

⁵ Paul Koring, "Canadians to patrol hot spot: Croatian destination for peacekeepers site of fierce battles," *Globe and Mail*, March 12, 1992: p. A5.

was undertaken without consultation with Parliament. Finally, the February 1993 decision to re-deploy the 1,200 troops who had returned from the region only three months earlier was taken in silence. Evidently, the government decided to waive the one year "in country" requirement which could have been problematical.⁶

The five post-deployment debates on UNPROFOR were products of the Liberal Red Book policy to "democratize" major decisions relating to peace operations through a debate in the House of Commons. Examination of the circumstances relating to these debates suggests that this "democratization" process was cosmetic at best. As discussed in Chapter Two, these debates were held only after the operative decision had been made by Cabinet and often on very short notice or at the last minute before the government had to extend a mandate. As the Cabinet had already made the decisions or effectively imposed on it by extraneous factors, the debates had little or no influence on the matters in issue. Reform MP and former air force colonel, Jack Frazer, summed up Parliament's predicament in May 1995 when he told the House that:

The problem with the opposition parties is that the debates are a foregone conclusion. The decisions have already been taken. Yes, we are debating so we are able to say something, but we are not impacting or affecting the decisions that are taken.⁷

⁶ The Canadian Forces ordinarily require that troops do not serve back to back missions. One is meant to spend at least one year at home in between each tour of duty.

⁷ *Debates*, March 23, 1995, p. 10866; Frazer also said, "debates are a facade.

In April 1994, the government held a full Parliamentary debate to consider the use of air strikes against Serbian belligerents. Clearly, this was a case where a Parliamentary debate was moot. The fact is that the decision to use air strikes had already been made by NATO. Even if Parliament had voted against the decision, Canada could not have changed it. Canada simply had no effective influence on NATO policy relating to UNPROFOR; it was not even part of the five-member Contact Group involved in the ongoing peace process. As it was, this did not give rise to any problem since the general consensus among MP's was to support the use of air strikes, notwithstanding that they undoubtedly would place Canadian peacekeepers in danger.

This illustrates how the freedom of the Canadian government, and in turn Parliament, to make its own policies and decisions can be constrained simply by the participation of Canada in a collective peace operation. Canadian governments seem to believe that through actively participating in the various UN peace missions, Canada is able to exert more effective influence on UN decisions while still retaining the unfettered ability to make its own policies and decisions. However, in practice, this has proven to be precisely the opposite. In fact, once Canada commits troops to a mission, it has essentially written off its right to act independently in that regard and has become just one of a group of UN Members working on a collective basis under a common policy

We are not genuinely debating whether we should be involved. This has not happened once in this Parliament". Jack Frazer, personal interview.

adopted or authorized by the UN. In essence, Canada becomes "locked in" with the result that any Parliamentary involvement is largely redundant.

Chretien's decision to remain in the former Yugoslavia in January 1994 is another example of this phenomenon. After announcing that Canada was seriously thinking about pulling its troops out of Bosnia and that Parliament would decide the fate of Canadian peacekeepers in the region,⁸ Chretien did not wait for a debate before declaring his decision. Instead, the Prime Minister stated that Canada would maintain its presence in the former Yugoslavia as long as the other NATO partners remained. In this case, it appears that the Liberal government had a genuine interest in withdrawing the CF troops, but could not do so because a unilateral pullout by Canada might damage its relationship with its NATO partners and the UN.

The debates on the Balkan situation sometimes appeared superficial and failed to address the issues realistically. One analyst attributed this to what he describes as "the Canadian disease". Nick Stethem suggests that Canadians adopted certain illusions of grandeur during the 1960s⁹, which gave them a greatly exaggerated perspective as to Canada's importance in the world. More specifically, the popular belief was that Canada, despite being only a middle power, could retain a seat at the international table and better influence the international community by maintaining membership and actively participating

⁸ Chretien told Major, "If I come out with a decision, it won't be a debate". *Globe and Mail*, January 14, 1994.

⁹ Nick Stethem, personal interview.

in international organizations like the UN. This same notion has led Canadian governments to believe that by deploying troops on UN missions, Canada gains greater influence over UN policies and decisions.

This proposition may well have been valid during the post-World War II period, but as the world has evolved subsequently, Canada's importance internationally has diminished significantly. However, the illusion has proven to be quite durable. It has persevered into the 1990s requiring successive governments to battle constantly to sustain a Canadian self-image of importance that has moved further and further from reality. Continued adherence to this false premise by many MP's and government officials contributed to the superficiality of the Balkans debates and reduced the ability of Parliament to scrutinize and monitor the UNPROFOR mission.¹⁰

Another factor, which limited the ability of Parliament to deal realistically with the situation in the former Yugoslavia, was the failure of both the Conservative and Liberal governments to fully disclose the serious risks

¹⁰ Charles-Philippe David and Stéphane Roussel address the issue of Canada's middle power role in the post-Cold War period. David and Roussel recognize that Canada's international influence may appear to have increased in the 1990s. Issues of "human rights, environmental protection, peacekeeping, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution" have all found a place on the nation's agenda. However, "the changes in the international system...represent *obstacles* and not *opportunities* for a country that wishes to maintain a Middle Power policy". Despite the constraints imposed on Canada, a number of individuals affiliated with Canadian government continue to believe that the post-Cold War world essentially has introduced a golden era for Middle Powers such as Canada. Charles-Philippe David and Stéphane Roussel, *Middle Power Blues: Canadian Policy and International Security After the Cold War*, A Paper presented at the biennial conference of the Association for Canadian Studies in the United States, Seattle, November 18, 1995.

attached to the mission. It was three months after the initial deployment before Parliament and the public learned that the CF contingent had been sent into one of the most dangerous areas in the former Yugoslavia.

Subsequent to the UN resolution of February 19, 1993, which called for all UN troops in the region to be armed for their own protection, Opposition MP's began to raise questions as to the capability of Canadian peacekeepers to adequately protect themselves and carry out their responsibilities under the current mandate.¹¹ At least one Liberal MP suggested that Canada's peacekeepers might not have the numbers or equipment to do this. The Minister of State and Leader of the Government in the House of Commons, Hon. Harvie Andre, responded defiantly by demanding that the Member provide proof of these accusations and finished by stating emphatically, "If the Canadian forces are attacked, they are the most experienced in the world. They are aware and capable of protecting themselves."¹² The CF in the region did not entirely concur and later events were to show that the CDS had understated the probable risks significantly.

After the Liberal government came to power, several hostage-taking incidents occurred in 1993 and 1994, which demonstrated the real risk exposure for Canadian peacekeepers. However, the government downplayed

¹¹ *Debates*, March 25, 1993, p. 17576; *Debates*, April 22, 1993, pp. 18312-3.

¹² *Debates*, April 23, 1993, p. 18375. A UN senior military officer said, "They are trying to pull the peacekeeping umbrella over something that is entirely different" (in Cambodia, Somalia and Bosnia). See Hilary Mackenzie, "Stepping into the Fray," *MacLean's*, April 20, 1992: p. 18.

the seriousness of these occurrences, including the seizure of 370 UN peacekeepers, including 10 Canadians, by Serbian soldiers in November 1994 which resulted in Canadian hostages being used as human shields against NATO air-strikes. The Prime Minister declined any public comment and the Minister of National Defence, David Collenette, who was busy at that time campaigning for the Ontario Liberals, treated the matter somewhat nonchalantly stating that these incidents would have no effect on policy.¹³

The most blatant case of government suppression of information concerning the risks to which Canadian peacekeepers were exposed in the region related to the biggest battle fought by CF troops since the Korean War. In this fire fight four Canadian and seven French soldiers, under Canadian command, were wounded. This event occurred in 1993, but neither Parliament nor the public knew about it until October 1996. An article in the *Toronto Star* suggested "this omission of history" was partially due "to the absence of any Canadian media in that part of the former Yugoslavia at the time." However, it attributes the main blame to the "publicity-shy Department of National Defence

¹³ *MacLean's* wrote, "Canadian officials seemed determined to downplay the significance of the latest events in Bosnia". *MacLean's* June 5, 1995: p. 40. Collenette said "One or two incidents are not going to shake our resolve." In fact, this was the third incident of this kind: in December 1993 drunken Serbian soldiers captured eleven peacekeepers and carried out mock executions; in April 1994, 50 UN observers and 16 peacekeepers belonging to the 12e Régiment blindé du Canada from Valcartier were taken hostage by Serbian forces; and in November 1994, a further ten Canadian peacekeepers were taken hostage and used as human shields.

that had turned inward because of the events six months earlier in Africa, when Canadian peacekeepers killed several Somalis."¹⁴

The apparent propensity of government to conceal or downplay the risks for CF peacekeepers inherent in this operation deprived both Parliament and the public of information vital to any realistic assessment of the situation in the region. Not only did the absence of this information significantly reduce the value of debate and the ability of Parliament to have any influence on policy, it may have placed the safety of CF troops in the region in greater jeopardy.

In conclusion, although there was much more Parliamentary activity relative to UNPROFOR as compared to previous missions, this increased activity did not translate into more or better oversight. The inconsistencies prevalent up to 1989 continued in the 1990s in so far as Parliamentary oversight of UNPROFOR was concerned.

CASE TWO: UNISOM and UNITAF

The widespread famine and suffering in Somalia first attracted international attention in 1991, within months of rebels having ousted Somali president, Mohamed Siad Barre.¹⁵ In January 1992, one year after fighting

¹⁴ "Honour for our troops in Canada's secret battle," *The Toronto Star*, October 15, 1996: pp. A1, A13.

¹⁵ Consequent to Barre's forced resignation in January 1991, fighting broke out in Mogadishu, the capital, between several clan-based factions, leading to the exodus of almost one million Somalis to neighbouring countries in search of shelter and food. Within eighteen months of the dictator's downfall, famine

erupted, the UNSC authorized a complete embargo on military goods to Somalia, and two months later a monitoring mission arrived in Mogadishu to negotiate a cease-fire. On April 24, 1992, the UNSC established the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) to monitor the cease fire and provide protection and security for humanitarian workers so as to better enable them to deliver food to the starving. By September 1992, there were 50 observers and 3500 UN security forces in the region.

It soon became apparent that the UN troops were unable to carry out their responsibilities effectively due to incessant looting of humanitarian supplies and attacks by heavily armed gangs. This led to the UNSC authorizing an U.S. commanded mission (ie. UNITAF) which was given permission to use force as necessary in order to resolve the delivery problems. UNITAF was the first UN mission ever authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The UNITAF force, Operation "Restore Hope", was deployed to Somalia in December 1992, and over the next five months helped to establish a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian supplies. In May 1993, the UNITAF force turned over the military command to the UN and UNOSOM II. However, as it proved impossible to maintain a secure environment and UNOSOM II forces were suffering high costs in lives and resources, the UNOSOM II mission was terminated in March 1995.

The Canadian government agreed to contribute both humanitarian and military resources to UNOSOM. In September 1992, Canada joined the United

and disease had taken the lives of nearly 300,000 civilians.

States, Germany, France and Belgium in a massive airlift to bring emergency aid to hunger-stricken Somalians,¹⁶ and shortly after, announced its intention to send 750 troops to help protect the distribution of relief in the war-torn country. Just as the main body of this contingent was preparing to leave in December 1992, UNITAF was created, effectively canceling the original UNPROFOR mission. Within days, however, Canada had agreed to commit up to 900 troops to UNITAF, but insisted that Canada would not participate in any subsequent peace operations in the area.¹⁷

In early January 1993, the Canadian contingent, comprised chiefly of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, arrived in Belet Huen to assume its mandate of protecting humanitarian operations in the surrounding area. The Canadians enjoyed considerable success in carrying out this mandate, but this success was significantly diminished in April 1993, after the Canadian media released the details of the death of a Somali teenager who had been detained after sneaking into the CF compound and brutally killed by Canadian Airborne personnel. In July 1993, the Canadian military presence in Somalia resigned its responsibilities to another UN component and all CF troops returned home

¹⁶ The effort was scheduled to last ninety days and included 70 airmen, cargo handlers, and technicians. Its actual period of operation ran from September 12, 1992 to February 28, 1993.

¹⁷ Nancy Gordon, "Beyond Peacekeeping: Somalia, the United Nations and the Canadian Experience," *Canada Among Nations 1994: A Part of the Peace* eds. Maureen Appel Molot and Harald von Reikhsch (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1994), p. 292.

except for seven Canadians who continued serving at the UNOSOM headquarters in Mogadishu until March 1995.

Unfortunately, the successes of CF troops who served in Somalia have been almost eclipsed by media focus on the brutal beating death of Shidane Abukar Arone by members of the Canadian Airborne, on the night of March 16, 1993. In the course of subsequent investigations and inquiries into this episode and other inappropriate occurrences in Somalia involving the Canadian Airborne, it became evident that this unit had disciplinary, behavioral and personnel problems which made its "fitness" for the deployment questionable. In retrospect, if these problems had been resolved by the military before the deployment, it is likely that these unfortunate incidents might have been prevented. The question, however, remains as to whether these incidents might have avoided by more effective oversight by Parliament

Until news of the Somali incidents reached the Canadian media in April 1993, Parliamentary involvement with the UNOSOM and UNITAF operations had been almost non-existent. The commitment of military observers in March 1992 and the subsequent decision to deploy Canadian peacekeepers to UNOSOM the following September was decided by Cabinet without a word to Parliament. Similarly, the government's decision to support UNITAF in December 1992 was announced prior to Parliamentary debate. Before the UNSC even passed the resolution authorizing the US-led mission, Prime Minister Mulroney had declared the government's intention to support the operation, telling the House that he would be happy to discuss any questions

"once troops have been over there."¹⁸ The Order-in-Council was tabled in the Commons on December 7, 1993 immediately preceding an evening emergency debate to consider the question of sending troops to the region. As it turned out, the debate did not address the material issues because it was monopolized for the most part by Opposition Members expressing their objections to Parliament's insignificant role in the decision-making process.¹⁹

The UNITAF mission was not raised in the Commons again until April 2, 1993, when the Canadian media released stories on the mid-March Somalia incidents. The Opposition immediately mounted a vigorous attack on the government accusing it of deliberately withholding information about the murders of Somalis by Canadian Airborne troops. Questions and allegations surrounding the events in Somalia consumed a large part of Opposition time throughout April, May and June, with MP's constantly charging the government with needless secrecy, and often directing their attacks at the competency and credibility of the Minister of National Defence, Kim Campbell, and DND. These attacks and the whole Somalia fiasco received large-scale media coverage in Canada during the last months of the Campbell-led Conservative government and the ensuing election campaign.

After the new Liberal government convened Parliament in January 1994, opposition Members concentrated their questions on the pending inquiry into

¹⁸ *Debates*, December 1, 1992, p. 14357.

¹⁹ *Debates*, December 7, 1992, pp. 14787, 14794, 14795, 14799.

the Somalia incidents. The government had established a Royal Commission to conduct an investigation of the matter and some opposition Members thought a Parliamentary committee should have been appointed instead. It is worth noting that this was the first time ever that a peace operation was undergoing evaluation after the fact. However, the mandate of the Commission was narrowly focused and more importantly, the forum was not Parliament. Opposition MP's continued to ask questions about the inquiry periodically over the next two years, but completely ignored the continuing Canadian involvement with UNOSOM II during that period.

Clearly, Parliamentarians became far more interested in the UNOSOM and UNITAF missions in the months following media disclosure of the March incidents and pressed the government for answers on a daily basis. However, until this disclosure, it is highly improbable that Members of either the government or the opposition had any knowledge of the disciplinary, behavioral and personnel problems plaguing the Canadian Airborne. It is almost certain that they believed without reservation that the army's decision to send the Canadian Airborne was based on sound judgment. There was no reason to think that an unfit unit would be deployed to a region in order to carry out a very difficult and dangerous mandate.²⁰ In fact, the information regarding the Airborne's problems only came to light on a piecemeal basis in the course of

²⁰ Perhaps even more curious is whether the Minister of National Defence and the Cabinet were aware of the unsuitability of the unit. The answer to this question will likely never be known.

the subsequent court marshals, trials and Royal Commission hearings.

Without this information, it was very difficult, if not impossible, for MP's to ask the "right" questions of the government. In the circumstances, MP's resorted to using the known information to attack the competence, integrity and credibility of the government in an effort to embarrass it.

Although government should ultimately be responsible for providing Parliament with adequate information to enable it to carry out its oversight function effectively, this is a situation where DND and the military leadership must be held accountable as well. "Unlike their civilian counterparts, military commanders have a responsibility to the Forces under their command that is independent of their responsibility to Parliament." It is this autonomy that theoretically should allow the military freedom to adhere to strictly military considerations when faced with decisions like who and where to send forces.²¹ Parliamentarians, whether belonging to the government or opposition parties, should be able to rely upon the military to ensure that any CF personnel deployed on a peace operation are fit in all respects for carrying out their mandate or, if there are known or suspected problems, to advise DND and the Minister of National Defence accordingly.

²¹ David Bercuson, *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1996), p. 74. Bercuson writes that the military's "view's should be based purely on military considerations and nothing else. It is up to the government to add the social, political, and economic factors into the defence and military-policy equation".

There is no doubt that the army leadership was fully aware of the discipline, behavioral and personnel problems of the Canadian Airborne and had been struggling to remedy them for some time. At the same time, it should not be surprising that the army did not tell Parliament about the problems associated with the Airborne, let alone the Cabinet if that was indeed the case. For years the army had fought cutbacks in personnel and resources so when the tempo of peacekeeping operations increased after 1989 the army once again found itself in demand. Peace operations had become the army's *raison d'être* in the 1990s especially after Canada's armored brigade serving in Europe was removed in February 1992. It should also be noted that in terms of Parliament and the military there is no formal mechanism or legal requirement in place for the CDS to inform Parliament of the military's activities

Despite the army's knowledge of the Airborne's problems, the unit was chosen for the deployment to UNITAF. In the circumstances, the question is "why the Airborne". According to Joseph Jockel writing in 1994, it appears "that the Canadian army, squeezed by its personnel shortage, felt compelled to send to Somalia a unit of the Canadian Airborne Regiment whose fitness for deployment was doubtful."²² The personnel squeeze rationale may be accurate. In late 1992, the CDS, General John A.G. de Chastelain was so concerned about the personnel shortage that he "very briefly floated the idea of establishing a special Canadian peacekeeping force that would have consisted

²² Joseph T. Jockel, *Canada and International Peacekeeping* (Washington D.C.: the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), p. 33.

of volunteers who could only be sent on peacekeeping assignments".²³.

However, when the Airborne Regiment was selected, the military leadership had a viable alternative, the Royal Canadian Regiment in Petawawa, that was available for deployment.

After further investigation, it seems that the personnel squeeze explanation may not be the whole story. It has been suggested that the Airborne was sent as a matter of "fairness". Because the Airborne had been prepped for two prior missions that were canceled before deployment, it would have been unfair not to send them.²⁴ The fact that UNTAF required a mechanized infantry battalion and the Airborne was not mechanized is enough to make this a valid possibility. Regardless of the reasons for the selection of the Airborne, the fact remains that the military leadership knew that the unit had problems which might render it unfit for the mission and should be held accountable in that regard.

The absence of the Minister of National Defence and the Secretary of State for External Affairs from the House of Commons during critical periods of debate and Question Period is illustrative of the chasm between Parliamentary

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Major Roy Thomas, Peace Support Training Centre, Kingston, Ontario, telephone interview, May 23, 1997. According to Major Thomas various members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment began training in the spring of 1991 for the 1992 Western Sahara mission. The tasking was canceled after it was determined that it would remain an observer operation. They again were prepared to deploy to Somalia as part of UNOSOM in the fall of 1992, but this too was put on hold.

oversight and policy. The Minister of National Defence, Kim Campbell, was absent from the UNITAF debate on December 7, 1992 and, apart from one day, for all of April 1993. Opposition Members concerned about inadequate equipment, training, low morale, and the overall safety of the troops, asked questions daily throughout April without the presence of either of the Ministers. After nearly a month of questioning "stand-ins," Parliamentarians began to ask both where Kim Campbell was and whether she recognized the seriousness of the events.²⁵ When an opposition debate was held at the end of the month neither the Minister of National Defence nor the Secretary of State of External Affairs were present. This blatant disregard of Parliament by the Ministers during crucial stages of public debate completely frustrated the ability of Opposition Members to obtain any accounting from the Ministers and, as regards the Somalia incidents, created an appearance that the government, and particularly Kim Campbell, was incompetent and deliberately "stonewalling" both Parliament and the Canadian public. This public perception undoubtedly contributed to the ultimate demise of the Campbell-led Conservatives in the October 1993 election.

Parliament had no influence on policy during Somalia and even if there had been more oversight it is unlikely that the events of March 1993 could have been avoided. The important decisions were taken without Parliamentary discussion, and Parliamentarians obtained insufficient operational information

²⁵ *Debates*, April 23, 1993, pp. 18375-6.

from both the government and the military. In the event that the army did feel compelled to deploy an unfit unit to Somalia the chances of Parliament knowing about it were slim and as a result, there was not a great deal Parliament could have done about it. In addition, the absence of the minister of national defence, the secretary of state and associate ministers at such a crucial time positively indicates a detachment between oversight and policy. Ultimately, one need only recall the Bosnian example to see that more oversight does not necessarily correspond with more influence.

CASE THREE: UNMIH

After monitoring the election in early 1991 of the first democratically elected president of Haiti since 1804, the UN left the country alone to deal with a shattered economy and fragile democracy. On September 30, 1991, Lt. General Raoul Cedras forced the new president, Jean Bertrand Aristide, into exile only seven months after he came to power. The international community took action. The legitimacy of Cedras and his flagrant human rights violations were denounced and both UN-backed and U.S. unilateral sanctions were instituted, aimed at returning Aristide to power. In June 1993, an accord was signed between the displaced president and Cedras that was intended to restore the former to power. Subsequently, the UNSC authorized the establishment of a joint constabulary/military peacekeeping force "who would provide training and guidance to all levels of the Haitian police and participate

with the army in the construction projects."²⁶ Before troops could be deployed the de facto regime reneged on the restoration agreement and, in response, the UN called for a naval blockade of Haiti to support an embargo of oil and arms shipments. By May, 1994, the blockade had been rendered ineffective and in the following September the U.S. entered Haiti under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and shortly thereafter reinstated Aristide as leader. Military command was transferred to a multinational peacekeeping force on October 3, 1994, whose mandate was to maintain a secure and stable environment and assist Haiti in a peace-building capacity. The UNMIH mission ended in June 1996, but the military/constabulary presence continues under the new UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH).

Inside two days after the Cedras coup, Canada announced its intention to cut off all aid to Haiti and on October 8, 1991, the Organization of American States (OAS), of which Canada was a member, voted unanimously to bring sanctions against the Haitian dictatorship. Over the next few months the Canadian government made it very clear that military intervention was not under consideration, despite murmurings in the media that such an approach was being considered by the United States State Department.²⁷ Canada did pledge troops to the UNMIH mission in September 1993, and when this

²⁶ United States, White House, *A Time for Peace Promoting Peace: The Policy of the United States* (Washington D.C.: February, 1995), p. 38.

²⁷ Linda Diebel, "Canada may face a decision on force in Haiti," *Toronto Star*, January 31, 1992.

resolution was suspended, the government did not hesitate to provide three warships to assist in the naval blockade. During the next year the government adhered to the notion that the UN threat of sanctions would work, while the Americans pressed Canada to support an U.S.-led military mission that would reinstate the president. Finally, in August 1994, Canada modified its position and gave its supported to the U.S.-led mission, but refused to participate militarily in the invasion. Canada continued to resist personal involvement in such an operation despite intense pressure from the U.S.²⁸ Canada did, however, partake in the multi-national force (MNF) that succeeded the invasion and in February 1996, the government agreed to lead and pay for Canada's operational costs when the mandate expired on February 29, 1996.

Parliamentary oversight during the UN mission in Haiti was both minimal and had no influence on the government's peacekeeping policy. During the Haiti mission a small number of Parliamentarians complained that the government did not adhere to a set of criteria when deciding to commit its forces, and for the first time in the history of Canadian peacekeeping, there was no consensus among the major parties as to whether Canadian forces should actually participate in the peace operation.²⁹ The government, however, continued to disregard the MP's suggestions that they should be more selective when deploying troops on peace operations. Thus, despite Parliamentarians'

²⁸ Graham Fraser, "U.S. presses Canada over Haiti," *Globe and Mail*, September 3, 1994: p. A1.

²⁹ This was also the case during UNPROFOR after May 1995.

appeals for selectivity and self-serving criteria in peace operations they do not appear to have had any effect on government policy.

From September 1993 until June 1996 Parliament was disengaged from the principal peacekeeping decisions made by Cabinet. Over the three years three debates were held: two initiated by the government and one opposition debate allowed under the Special Economic Measures Act.³⁰ Before September 1994, there was no debate in the House and very few questions were asked regarding the use of sanctions. During this time the government committed troops to serve with the UNMIH, and one month later agreed to join in the naval blockade, within one day of being asked to participate.³¹ Moreover, both of these decisions were taken during Parliaments' six-month absence from the House, between June 1993 and January 1994.

Another major policy decision was made in early August 1994 in the middle of summer recess. After a full year of refusing to support the use of military intervention to forcibly install the ousted president, Prime Minister Chretien announced that Canada would support an American invasion, but Canada's troops would not be present.³² This "represent[ed] a dramatic change

³⁰ The Special Economic Measures Act was passed in 1990 as a way of ensuring that Parliament has an opportunity to examine how economic sanctions affect various countries.

³¹ Mike Shahin, "Canada joins Haitian blockade," *Ottawa Citizen*, October 17, 1993: p. A3.

³² During May 1994 Ouellet told the House of Commons that that Canada was not considering military intervention and the Minister of National Defence, David Collenette, said that Canada would consider sending peacekeeping

in policy."³³ The decision to support the U.S. invasion was debated when Parliament reconvened in late September 1994, more than a month after the final decision had been made.

There is no question that the most comprehensive decision that the government was faced with was whether to assume military command of the entire UN force after the mandate ended February 29, 1996. Canada not only agreed to lead the mission, but also to pour more Canadian troops into Haiti at its own cost. There was at the time a domestic constituency in Quebec, which supported this decision wholeheartedly.³⁴ Leading up to this decision, Parliament was not sitting as the House had been prorogued February 2, but the decision had evidently been made long before a debate could be held. In late January a senior diplomatic source told a Toronto paper, "You can bet there will be a Canadian general on the ground in Haiti in one month."³⁵ One day later the *Ottawa Citizen* reported that "Canada has tentatively agreed to

forces to Haiti "should such a need arise" but only after democracy was restored. See Canadian Press, "Canada won't commit troops, Ouellet says," *Ottawa Citizen*, May 11, 1994: p. F8; Dave Todd, "Canada urged to join peacekeepers," *Ottawa Citizen*, May 18, 1994: p. A10.

³³ Andrew Bilski, "The Siege of Haiti: Facing a U.S.-led invasion, a pariah," *MacLean's* August 15, 1994, pp. 16-17.

³⁴ A bi-election in a Haitian district of Montreal admitted Pierre Pettigrew as its new representative.

³⁵ Linda Diebel, "Canada to shoulder Haiti peacekeeping," *Toronto Star*, January 25, 1996: p. A19.

resume the leadership role..."³⁶ And that same day another media source stated that the new role still "needs Cabinet approval but warning orders have already been sent to military units earmarked to go to Haiti."³⁷ A full Parliamentary debate was eventually held on the night before Canada was to give the UN its final decision. Quite obviously, the decision had already been taken, leaving no room for Parliament to impose any of its ideas on the matter at hand.³⁸ The issue of criteria is now discussed.

Parliament has been calling for peacekeeping criteria for years, and to no avail. This has not changed in the 1990s. During the September 21, 1994 Parliamentary debate on Haiti, Reform MP and foreign affairs critic, Bob Mills, suggested that before going into Haiti, or any other area Canada should consider a range of mostly self-serving criteria. He cited five criterion, three of which included "Canada's economic ties" with the country in question, its geographical proximity and the "conflict's impact on the state of international stability." By these standards, Mills asserted that Canada should not be in Haiti or Rwanda.³⁹ The Reform Party flatly disapproved of Canada's involvement in UNMIH, believing that it was outside the realm of Canada's

³⁶ Julian Beltrame, "Haiti wants Canada to accept peace duty," *Ottawa Citizen*, January 26, 1996: p. A6.

³⁷ Paul Koring, "Canadian forces to take over from U.S. in Haiti," *Globe and Mail* January 26, 1996: p. A19.

³⁸ *Debates*, February 28, 1996, <http://www.parl.gc.ca/cgi-bin/webg>.

³⁹ *Debates*, September 21, 1994, p. 5960.

immediate interest.⁴⁰ Canada's actions following this debate is in itself evidence that Parliamentary discussion had no impact on the outcome of policy.

This attack on criteria likely had two purposes. On the one hand, in a time of squeezed personnel and resources it should not be surprising that Parliamentarians felt Canada should be more selective as to which peace operations it participates in. On the other hand, it was irrefutably an attempt by Parliament to establish an aspect of peace operations that is not a motherhood issue; the opposition was trying to find controversy in an issue that should be controversial. However, because peacekeeping has been so popular domestically, there are very few MP's who are willing to openly challenge the government in this area. Aside from this unwillingness, it is almost impossible for one to successfully criticize the application of Canadian peacekeeping. Those who have attempted to do so rapidly were labeled as dissolute, immoral "yahoos" by the Canadian media and consequently, by the Canadian public. It is this type of news coverage that prevents MP's from raising often legitimate questions in the House; calling Parliamentarians "yahoos" is bound to reduce their incentive to question the government's peacekeeping policy.

In many ways, peace operations have become morality missions rather than security missions in the eyes of Canadians. This is clear when one

⁴⁰ T.W.S., "Peacekeeping Strains," *MacLean's*, October 3, 1994: p. 25.

considers that Canada's criteria for participating in a peace operation includes "genuine threats to international peace and security (as, for example, in the Gulf or the former Yugoslavia) or emerging humanitarian tragedies (such as the situations in Somalia and Rwanda)."⁴¹ These criterions have been stretched in a way that has allowed them to be applied to just about any situation. In most cases, MP's have not stopped to query the government as to the genuineness of these "so-called" threats to international security. This contrasts with American legislators who do question the soundness of individual peace operations and have created a criteria that does not appear to stress morality over security. For instance, the eminent professor of political science at Harvard University, Samuel P. Huntington, wrote, "It is morally unjustifiable and politically indefensible that Americans should be killed in order to prevent Serbs and Bosnians from killing each other."⁴²

Canadians would not likely go so far as this, but there have been a few Parliamentarians prepared to inquire as to how real specific threats are to international security and to raise legitimate questions about the safety of the troops in various regions. Rather than simply accept the government's threat assessment, MP's, on more than one occasion, have asked for proof that such a threat, in fact, does exist. However, despite their efforts, these MP's have met

⁴¹ Canada, *1994 Defence White Paper* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1994), p. 28.

⁴² Samuel P. Huntington, "Keynote: Non-Traditional Roles for the U.S. Military," *Non-Combat Roles for the U.S. Military in the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. James R. Graham (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1993),

with substantial public criticism. It undoubtedly is the view of a majority of Canadians that one who questions the usefulness and importance of peacekeeping essentially is being "un-Canadian". As a result, when people like Jack Frazer have challenged the government on peacekeeping matters, they very quickly lose any respect they may have once had among the Canadian public.

What it comes down to is that there is no constituency in Parliament for defence. Parliamentarians have never been champions of the armed forces. It is unique to find MP's who will stand up in the House, or even in caucus meetings, and sing the praises of the military. On the other hand, it has been rare for Parliamentarians to criticize the government's defence policies on peace operations or otherwise. Members have not been interested in the details of missions, despite the fact that peacekeeping decisions in the 1990s, unlike those previously, really have a life and death. However, Canada's peacekeeping policy has had the good fortune of being both consistent and domestically popular for over forty years. These two factors have made it very difficult for anyone to challenge the concept without receiving negative feedback and at the same time has made it very easy for Parliamentarians to just sit back and let the Cabinet make all of the major decisions that would likely be made even if Parliament were more involved. Ultimately, these conditions conceivably serve to subdue any interest there might be among MP's.

In summary, Parliamentary oversight did not affect Canada's Haitian peacekeeping policy. As in the Bosnian and Somalian examples, Parliament was largely excluded from the key decisions. As far as the Reform Party's calls for criteria are concerned, it is debatable whether this was done out of a genuine interest in foreign policy or as a method of trying to oppose or embarrass the government. Ultimately, because Canada remained in Haiti after criticisms based on criteria, and later made a commitment that would keep at least constabulary forces in Haiti for years to come is evidence alone that Parliamentary oversight did not influence the government's peacekeeping policy.

CONCLUSIONS

It is clear from this examination that although each operation discussed was a major deployment and exhibited higher degrees of danger than earlier missions, Parliament did not have any major influence on policy. It is not altogether surprising that this was the case since Parliamentarians have never had a major impact on NATO and NORAD policies. As a result, there is little reason to expect that peacekeeping would be any different. If anything, one could argue that based on the domestic popularity of peacekeeping, Parliament would be even less prone to have any significant degree of influence over Canada's policy. Parliament's absence from peacekeeping can also be attributed to the government's belief that the avenue to influencing UN policy is through the deployment of Canadian peacekeepers. Instead, such actions have

reduced the government's ability to control its own foreign and defence policy. subsequently limiting the impact that Parliament might have on policy.

•FOUR•

CONCLUSIONS

Preliminary to drawing conclusions from the foregoing examination of Parliamentary oversight, it may be helpful to take a brief look at the spectrum of current thinking as to what constitutes effective oversight. The 1994 Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy, the May 1996 Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons and the 1997 Report of the Commission of Inquiry in the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia all suggest that Parliamentary oversight in the 1990s has been inadequate. Each Report subsequently supports the notion that Parliament should be fulfilling a greater oversight role. Where these Reports differ is in their expectations of what effective oversight actually entails. These expectations are reflected in their recommendations.

There are varying schools of thought on what comprises effective oversight relative to peacekeeping. One extreme involves the control and management of Cabinet and the armed forces by Parliament. Proponents of this approach advocate that Parliament be involved in all stages of decision-making. In 1994, Reform MP, Chuck Strahl, introduced a private bill in the House (C-295) designed to give the ultimate control to Parliament. Mr. Strahl proposed amending the NDA to provide for a vote in Parliament before committing Canada to any overseas operation. He further suggested that:

Once the objectives, maximum expenditure or time limit for the mission had been reached, the government would have to come back to Parliament to renew the authority for the mission. The issue would

receive a full hearing again, and if Parliament didn't re-approve it, the troops would be withdrawn.¹

Mr. Strahl's proposes powers for Parliament that very closely resemble the powers that the United States Congress possesses under United States War Powers Act. The 1994 Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy declared that "defence policy cannot be made in private and the results simply announced". It recommended "full Parliamentary debate before any deployment of CF abroad".²

The 1997 Report of the Commission of Inquiry in the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia suggested creating a Special Committee to deal with matters related to peacekeeping. The Committee's most important function would be "overseeing the preparations and operations of the CF on international security operations". It proposed that in situations involving an unusual level of risk special hearings would be held to discuss "the nature and quality of mission planning and evaluation, including whether the CF has had reasonable time to prepare and train for the mission, and whether the CDS is prepared to declare the force operationally ready for employment". Finally, the committee "should interview the commander of each CF contingent of an international security operation involved in the deployment."³

¹ *Debates*, December 7, 1994, <http://www.parl.gc.ca/hansard/previous/13994-12-07/139TOCE.html>.

² Canada, *Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy*, p. 58.

³ Canada, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry in the Deployment of Canadian*

At the other end of the spectrum reside those who envision Parliament playing a much smaller role in peacekeeping operations. Advocates of this school believe that Parliament is neither there to manage the military nor to decide whether or not the CF should participate in an operation. In an interview, Liberal Senator Colin Kenny supported this approach stating:

We have an elected government, they are responsible. Let them make the decision, let them do it in a timely way, and then we will review how they did it after the fact...I think you should give them all the rope they need...⁴

When asked how much information Parliament should be given prior to deployment Mr. Kenny responded,

Not much. Doesn't matter much. I don't think it matters at all. Are you really going to have a Parliamentary committee sitting down and trying to second guess the deployment of people who have to be somewhere in a hurry?...What you want is a group of ordinary Canadians taking a look after the fact and saying whether or not this was handled well or not.

There will always be varying opinions on what constitutes effective Parliamentary oversight, but the concepts outlined above do share at least one common component - ultimate accountability. It is Parliament's responsibility to hold government accountable for all decisions related to peacekeeping. Whether Parliament holds government accountable before CF are deployed or

Forces to Somalia, p. 1456.

⁴ Colin Kenny, personal interview. Mr. Kenny went on to say that holding a debate before an operation "is more a political device than anything else to smoke out criticism in advance and say after the fact that you had a chance to complain then. I would gladly not have the debate. We've never had it in the Senate. They've only had it in the House. I don't feel that have missed anything by not having that debate because you are not going to have any of

after the mission is completed is not at issue here, but accountability is an essential element of oversight.

Before Parliament can hold government accountable for its actions in respect of any peacekeeping mission, the House of Commons or a Parliamentary committee must be provided with reliable, relevant, understandable and complete information on the mission together with the opportunity to debate the issues on a timely basis. In order for Members to participate in a meaningful debate concerning any deployment of Canadian peacekeepers, the information must be given to them before the debate. Ideally, this information should include, at the very least, the mandate terms and objectives, risk factors, number of Canadian troops to be employed, duration, cost, other participants and Canada's interest in the region in question.

In addition, Parliament requires this information in order to enable its Members to carry out its other oversight functions, including to scrutinize, criticize, publicize and at times offer alternatives to government policy on peacekeeping operations. This information also is needed for Parliament to fulfill its other responsibilities to Canadians on peacekeeping matters, namely, lending legitimacy to government decisions and educating other Parliamentarians and Canadians.

This examination of Parliamentary oversight in relation to Canadian participation in UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operations from 1947 to 1997

the useful facts".

shows that there has been a significant increase in Parliamentary involvement in this area during the 1990s. During the period 1947 to 1989 inclusive, Canada participated in twenty-one missions, which were subject to a total of seven debates in the House of Commons relating to six missions. Since 1989, at least fifteen House of Commons debates have been held in reference to the twenty-one missions to which Canada contributed peacekeepers. These included a number of post-deployment debates, which the Liberal government held under its professed "democratization" of peacekeeping. This increase in debate activity did not translate into more effective oversight.

Consistent with past procedure, governments held deployment debates for only those peacekeeping missions that they considered "major" which, in the 1990s, was limited to seven operations, Operation Friction, UNPROFOR, UNOSOM, UNTAF, UNAMIR, UNMIH and UNSMIH. The remaining fourteen operations were not debated in Parliament and, in some cases, did not even warrant Orders-in-Council. It is noteworthy that the Liberal government did not hold any debate on the abortive Operation Assurance in 1996, which was to be one of Canada's largest and costliest missions. Where debates were held on deployment and post-deployment matters, Cabinet always had made the decisions before the debates. In many cases, the debates were held after completion of the deployments and sometimes on unreasonably short notice. A lack of adequate and timely information made it very difficult, if not impossible, for Members to participate in debates constructively with the result that the

debates usually were superficial and considered as shams by some opposition MP's.

Prior to the 1990s, only one committee report was produced dealing specifically with peacekeeping. The use of Parliamentary committees increased markedly in the early 1990s with at least five committees being engaged with peacekeeping matters. Significantly, these included a Special Committee established to monitor the Gulf War peace operation. Theoretically, the latter Committee should have provided improved oversight, but as no reports were produced it is impossible to say with any certainty. The failure to produce reports was typical of other committees as well and reduced their educative value. A further limitation from an oversight perspective was that the committees usually dealt with peacekeeping in a general sense rather than monitoring and evaluating specific missions. Accordingly, the oversight contribution of these committees was minimal at best.

Another indicator of potentially better oversight arose out of the election of the Reform and BQ regionally based opposition parties in the October 1993 election. In 1994, for the first time, opposition parties would not automatically endorse Canadian participation in peacekeeping operations. Previously, both government and opposition Members on a non-partisan basis normally supported participation in peace operations. From 1994 onwards, Reform and to a lesser extent BQ, was continuously questioning the government concerning its peacekeeping operations, particularly as to the adequacy of equipment, cost of missions and the safety of Canadian peacekeepers. Reform

Members wanted the government to adopt firm criteria for Canadian participation in peacekeeping missions, which would reflect Canada's national interests and suggested a list of criteria to this end.

The efforts of Reform and BQ to deal with peacekeeping issues on a rational basis have not received general acceptance by the Canadian media and public. This is attributable, in part, to the Canadian public's continuing love affair with peacekeeping. The Canadian media and public considered it sacrilege for opposition Members to suggest any limiting of Canada's peacekeeping role. This lack of acceptance also reflects the fact that neither the BQ nor Reform holds much credibility with the Canadian media, which has consistently attacked their advocates of new policies for peacekeeping.

One might have expected that the end of the Cold War would have led to improved oversight by Parliament as the policy and decision-making constraints of Canada's collective security arrangements under NATO and NORAD were relaxed. However, the reality is that similar constraints were imposed on Canada and, in turn, Parliament by the collective security arrangements and policies adopted by the UN for peacekeeping operations. As illustrated in the Bosnian case study, once Canada commits peacekeepers to a mission it becomes bound by the UN-authorized policies and command structure, thereby significantly reducing any opportunity that Parliament might have had to influence policy. Theoretically, assuming Parliament is provided with the proper information, it still should be able to scrutinize, criticize and publicize a mission.

Despite the increased involvement of Parliament in the 1990s, the Executive has maintained its decision-making dominance on peacekeeping matters. In large measure, this is attributable to the continuance in the 1990s of many of the same constraints as previously restricted effective Parliamentary oversight in respect of defence matters generally. These include the inconsistency of interest on the part of both MP's and the public, lack of expertise on defence and peacekeeping in the House, insufficiency of information available to MP's and the public, imposition of party discipline and the absence of law requiring the involvement of Parliament in the commitment of Canada and CF to peacekeeping operations.

There is little to suggest that there was any change in the level of interest of Members in peacekeeping in the 1990s as compared to earlier years. Attendance and participation levels were much higher when Parliament was dealing with the atrocity issues in the former Yugoslavia in 1991 and the Somalian incidents in 1993. However, this enhanced interest does not appear to have been initiated by Parliament. In the case of the atrocities, the interest was fostered by a combination of media and constituent demand for Canada to intervene in the region for humanitarian reasons. With the Somalian incidents, Members were unaware of the events until disclosure by the media. In both instances, it was politically expedient for Members to become "interested". In the Somalian case, opposition Members through vigorous criticism and questioning of government were able to marshal continuing media support and effectively publicize the "scandalous" affair. This probably was a contributing

factor to the eventual defeat of the Campbell-led Conservative in the October 1993 election and might be considered an example of ultimate accountability. It should also be noted that Members generally displayed much less interest when the issues involved the more mundane deployment and post-deployment matters.

Although there have been no significant changes in 1990s in the other constraints on Parliamentary oversight, it is worth noting that one of the most influential limitations remains the lack of any legal requirement to enable the House of Commons or its committees to obtain the proper information from government or the military. The amendments to the NDA recommended in the 1997 Report of the Commission of Inquiry in the Deployment of Canadian Forces in Somalia have some merit in this regard.

This paper in no way suggests that effective oversight derives from Parliament's control or management of Cabinet. Rather, the key to effective oversight is the provision of proper information to Parliament. A recent suggestion to this end involves a regular report to Parliament, prepared by the CDS, on the state of the CF.⁵ This will better enable Parliament to scrutinize, criticize, and perhaps most importantly, publicize the important issues surrounding peacekeeping and related defence matters. Only by educating and improving the interest of the Canadian media and public can effective oversight of Canadian participation in peacekeeping be achieved. Enhancing public

⁵ David A. Charters and J. Brent Wilson eds., *The Soldier and the Canadian State: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations?* Proceedings of the Second Annual

awareness of peacekeeping through debate, Question Period and committees will help to increase the interest among Canadians in the armed forces and defence policy. Canadians should be interested in Canada's defence: national defence is a function of Canadian sovereignty; Canada's international reputation is either upheld or disgraced by the CF and it is Canadian tax dollars that pay for defence. The better-informed Canadians are about peacekeeping and other defence matters, the more likely that Parliamentarians will be interested. The more interested Parliamentarians are the greater the possibility that defence will take on a level of importance closer to what it requires. With an educated populace who displays concern for defence matters, Parliamentary oversight can only become more effective.

GLOSSARY

BQ	Bloc Quebecois
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff
CF	Canadian Forces
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DND	Department of National Defence
DSR	Defence Structure Review
FLQ	Front de liberation du Quebec
IFOR	Implementation Force
MNF	Multinational Force
MP	Member of Parliament (refers to both the House of Commons and the Senate)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Alliance
NDA	National Defence Act
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defence Agreement
ONUC	UN Operation in the Congo
ONUVEH	Observateurs des Nations Unies pour la verification des elections en Haiti
OSGAP	Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan
RCR	Royal Canadian Regiment
SCEAND	Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence
SCONDVA	Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran's Affairs

SDI	Strategic Defence Initiative
SSCFAIT	Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade
STAFEUR	Special Task Force on Europe
UN	United Nations
UNAVEM	UN Angola Verification Mission (I, II and III)
UNCK	UN Command in Korea
UNCTOK	UN Temporary Mission on Korea
UNEF	UN Emergency Force (I and II)
UNFICYP	UN Force in Cyprus
UMIIMOG	UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group
UNIKOM	UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
UNITAF	UN Implementation Task Force (in Somalia)
UNMIH	UN Mission in Haiti
UNMOGAP	UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
UNMOGIP	UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOGIL	UN Observer Group in Lebanon
UNOSOM	UN Operation in Somalia (I and II)
UNPROFOR	UN Protection Force (I and II in the former Yugoslavia)
UNSC	UN Security Council
UNSCOM	UN Special Commission (in the Persian Gulf)
UNSCR	UN Security Council Resolution

UNSF	UN Security Force in West New Guinea
UNSMIH	UN Support Mission in Haiti
UNTAC	UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAG	UN Transitional Assistance Group (Namibia)
UNTSO	UN Truce Supervision Organization Palestine
UNYOM	UN Yemen Observer Mission

APPENDIX A

Peacekeeping Operations over the Years and Canada's Contribution					
Country or Area	Short Form or Mission Name	Duration	Size of Mission (number of personnel)	Maximum Canadian Contribution	Name of Operation and Mandate
Balkans	UNSCOB	1947-1951	Not available	0	United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans. Observe whether Greece, Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia are complying with UN recommendations.
Korea	UNTCOK	1947-1948	30	2	United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. Supervise elections in South Korea.
Middle East	UNTSO	1948-present	572	22	UN Truce Supervision Organization. Supervise 1948 cease-fire and subsequent armistice and peace.
India, Pakistan (Kashmir)	UNMOGIP	1949-present	102	27	UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (Kashmir). Supervise cease-fire between India and Pakistan.
Korea	UNCK	1950-1954	Not available	27,000	UN Command in Korea. UN police action after invasion of ROK by DRK.
Korea	UNCMAC	1953-present	Not available	1	UN Command Military Armistice Commission. Supervise 1953 armistice.
Egypt	UNEF	1956-1967	6,073	1,007	United Nations Emergency Force. Supervise withdrawal of French, British and Israeli forces from Sinai.
Lebanon	UNOGIL	1958	590	77	UN Observer Group in Lebanon. Ensure safety of Lebanese borders.

Peacekeeping Operations over the Years and Canada's Contribution					
Country or Area	Short Form or Mission Name	Duration	Size of Mission (number of personnel)	Maximum Canadian Contribution	Name of Operation and Mandate
Congo	ONUC	1960-1964	19,828	421	UN Operation in the Congo. Maintain law and order.
West New Guinea	UNSF	1962-1963	1,500	13	UN Security Force in West New Guinea (West Iran). Maintain peace and security for UN Temporary Executive Authority.
Yemen	UNYOM	1963-1965	190	36	UN Yemen Observation Mission. Monitor cessation of Saudi Arabian support and withdrawal of Egyptian forces.
Cyprus	UNFICYP	1964-present	6,410	1,126	UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. Maintain law and order.
Dominican Republic	DOMREP	1965-1966	3	1	Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General. Observe cease-fire and withdrawal of OAS forces.
India, Pakistan	UNIPOM	1965-1966	160	112	UN India-Pakistan Observer Mission. Supervise cease-fire.
Egypt, Israel	UNEF II	1973-1979	6,973	1,145	UN Emergency Force II. Supervise deployment of Israeli and Egyptian forces.
Syria (Golan)	UNDOF	1974-present	1,340	230	UN Disengagement Observer Force. Supervise cease-fire and redeployment of Israeli and Syrian forces.
Lebanon	UNIFIL	1978-present	5,900	117	UN Interim Force in Lebanon. Confirm withdrawal of Israeli forces.

Peacekeeping Operations over the Years and Canada's Contribution					
Country or Area	Short Form or Mission Name	Duration	Size of Mission (number of personnel)	Maximum Canadian Contribution	Name of Operation and Mandate
Afghanistan	UNGOMAP	1988-1990	50	5	UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Confirm withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.
Iran, Iraq	UNIIMOG	1988-1991	845	525	UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group. Supervise cease-fire and force withdrawal.
Angola	UNAVEM	1989-1991	70	0	UN Angola Verification Mission. Monitor Cuban troop withdrawal.
Namibia	UNTAG	1989-1990	4,500	301	UN Transition Assistance Group, Namibia. Assist in transition to independence.
Nicaragua	ONUSUN	1989	Not available	5	UN Observer Mission for the Verification of the Electoral Process in Nicaragua.
Central America	ONUCA	1989-1992	1,100	174	UN Observer Group in Central America. Verify compliance to Esquipulas Agreement.
Afghanistan, Pakistan	OSGAP	1990-1993	10	1	Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Provide military advisory unit.
Haiti	ONUSUH	1990-1991	65	11	UN Observers for the Verification of Elections in Haiti. Monitor 1990 elections.
Oman, Iraq		1990-1991	Not available	2,700	Op Friction 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War
Iraq, Kuwait	UNIKOM	1991-present	1,440	301	UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission. Monitor demilitarized zone.

Peacekeeping Operations over the Years and Canada's Contribution					
Country or Area	Short Form or Mission Name	Duration	Size of Mission (number of personnel)	Maximum Canadian Contribution	Name of Operation and Mandate
Iraq	UNSCOM	1991-present	175	9	UN Special Commission. Inspect and, if necessary, destroy Iraq's biological and chemical weapons.
Angola	UNAVEM II	1991-1994	350	15	UN Angola Verification Mission. Monitor cease-fire.
Western Sahara	MINURSO	1991-present	375	34	UN Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara. Monitor cease-fire.
El Salvador	ONUSAL	1991-1995	622	55	UN Observer Mission in El Salvador. Monitor human rights, progress toward military reform, peace.
Cambodia	UNAMIC	1991-1992	Not available	103	UN Advance Mission in Cambodia. Monitor cease-fire and establish mine awareness.
Cambodia	UNTAC	1992-1993	19,200	240	UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia. Provide communications and logistical support, establish mine awareness, and monitor disarmament.
Cambodia	CMAC	1992-present	1,600	12	Cambodian Mine Action Centre
South Africa	UNOMSA	1992	60	0	UN Observer Mission in South Africa. Observe pre-election period (staffed by UN personnel only).
Former Yugoslavia	SFOR (non-UN)	1996-	Not available	Not available	Not available
	IFOR (non-UN)	1996	60,000	1,035	NATO's Peace Implementation Force in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
	UNPRDEP	1995-present			UN Preventive Deployment Force


Peacekeeping Operations over the Years and Canada's Contribution					
Country or Area	Short Form or Mission Name	Duration	Size of Mission (number of personnel)	Maximum Canadian Contribution	Name of Operation and Mandate
	UNMIBH	1996-present			UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina
	UNMOP	1996-present			UN Observer Mission in Prevlaka
	UNPF	1992-1996	24,000	2,400	UN Peace Force
Mozambique	ONUMOZ	1992-1995	7,500	15	UN Operation in Mozambique. Provide security, monitor de-mining and cease-fires.
Somalia	UNOSOM	1992-1993	Not available	12	UN Operation in Somalia. Provide headquarters personnel.
Somalia	UNITAF	1992-1993	30,800	1410	Unified Task Force, Somalia. Distribute relief supplies.
Somalia	UNOSOM II	1993-1995	Not available	9	UN Operations in Somalia. Distribute relief supplies.
Haiti	UNMIH	1993-1996	6,800	750	UN Mission in Haiti. Implementation of the Governors Island Agreement.
Haiti	UNSMIH	1996-present	1,300	750	UN Support Mission in Haiti.
Georgia	UNOMIG	1993-present	135	0	UN Observer Mission in Georgia. Monitor cease-fire and investigate violations.
Liberia	UNOMIL	1993-present	303	0	UN Observer Mission in Liberia. Monitor implementation of peace agreement.
Rwanda, Uganda	UNOMUR	1993-1994	100	3	UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda. Verify that military supplies do not cross border into Rwanda.

Peacekeeping Operations over the Years and Canada's Contribution					
Country or Area	Short Form or Mission Name	Duration	Size of Mission (number of personnel)	Maximum Canadian Contribution	Name of Operation and Mandate
Rwanda	UNAMIR	1993-1996	100	430	UN Assistance Mission, Rwanda. Assist interim government with transition measures leading to elections.
Chad	UNASOG	1994	Not available	0	UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group. Monitor withdrawal of Libyan administration.
Tadjikistan	UNMOT	1994	17	0	UN Mission in Tadjikistan. Assist implementation of cease-fire.
Guatemala	MINUGUA	1994-1996	339	2	UN Human Rights Verification Mission in Guatemala. Verify implementation of human rights agreements and help strengthen human rights institutions.
Uganda, Rwanda, Zaïre	None	1996			Op Assurance. Abortive Canadian-led relief mission to Zaïre

• Compiled from Canada, *Dishonoured Legacy*, vol. 1, chapter 10, pp. 203-9; A Comprehensive List of UN Peace-keeping Operations, <http://www.fib.ethz.ch/fib/pko/allops.html>.


APPENDIX B

CHARACTERISTICS OF TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING



APPENDIX C

CHARACTERISTICS OF SECOND-GENERATION PEACE OPERATIONS



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