

# **CANADA AND THE PERSIAN GULF WAR**

by

Robert Davis

A Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research  
through the Department of Political Science  
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for  
the Degree of Master of Arts at the  
University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada

1997

© 1997 Robert Davis



National Library  
of Canada

Acquisitions and  
Bibliographic Services

395 Wellington Street  
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4  
Canada

Bibliothèque nationale  
du Canada

Acquisitions et  
services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington  
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4  
Canada

*Your file Votre référence*

*Our file Notre référence*

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-30939-8

# **ABSTRACT**

## **CANADA AND THE PERSIAN GULF WAR**

by

Robert Davis

A Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research  
through the Department of Political Science  
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for  
the Degree of Master of Arts at the  
University of Windsor

This thesis examines Canada's decision to join Operation Desert Storm (the mission initiating the start of the 1991 Persian Gulf War) and the effects of the war and participation in it on Canada. To assist in the study's goal of presenting a clear, comprehensive picture of Canada's involvement in the war, three broad overarching questions are addressed: one, what factors most likely influenced Canada's decision to join Operation Desert Storm; two, what were the effects of Canadian participation in the operation; and three, what were the effects of the Persian Gulf War for Canada.

This thesis demonstrates that external and non-governmental domestic determinants mostly affected the Canadian decision-making process. The factors most important in Canada's decision to send troops to the Persian Gulf

region were external in nature. Specifically, the end of the Cold War, American expectations that Canada would join the operation, Canada's commitment to the UN, Arab acceptance of Western military involvement in the crisis, and Iraqi violations of international law contributed to the pro-participation decision adopted by the government.

Canada's decision to limit its level of participation, on the other hand, was influenced primarily by non-governmental domestic factors. Most importantly, Progressive Conservative political concerns over how participation would affect the party's re-election chances in Quebec, the economic relationship between Iraq and Canada, and only moderate national support for participation in the war worked to constrain the extent of Canada's participation.

This study also demonstrates that the war in general, as well as Canadian participation in it, had diplomatic, political, strategic, economic, and environmental consequences for Canada. The results, however, were surprisingly transitory and may therefore lessen the impact the Persian Gulf War has on future generations.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank Dr. E.D. Briggs, my thesis supervisor, for his intellectual advice and guidance over the last year and a half. His comments and suggestions were particularly useful and benefited me greatly. I also would like to recognize the assistance of my second reader, Dr. Martha Lee, for helping me to organize my thoughts and present my ideas in a clearer fashion. My third reader, Dr. Peter Burrell, should also be credited for his help in the development of this paper.

On a personal note, I would like to acknowledge and thank the assistance of Dr. T.A. Keenleyside. His strong work-ethic and sincere concern for others will be a lasting image from my time at the University of Windsor. My family also needs to be thanked for the strong support it has given me throughout my university career. Finally, a great deal of gratitude goes to my wife, Yumi. Her patience and understanding over the last two years has meant more to me than she realizes.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
LIST OF TABLES	viii
LIST OF FIGURES	viii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. BACKGROUND TO THE PERSIAN GULF WAR	24
Chronology of Events	25
Levels of Analysis Employed	37
Analytical Framework	39
3. CANADA'S DECISION-MAKING PROCESS	46
External Determinants	47
Non-Governmental Domestic Determinants	65
Governmental Institutions	78
Conclusion	87
4. CONSEQUENCES OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR AND CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR	93
Diplomatic Effects	93
Political Effects	111
Strategic Effects	117
Economic Effects	123
Environmental Effects	129
Conclusion	136
5. CONCLUSION	140
Variables Influencing Canada's Decision to Participate in Operation Desert Storm	141
Consequences of the War and Canadian Participation in the War	141
Relevance to Future Decision-Makers	143
BIBLIOGRAPHY	149



## **LIST OF TABLES**

<b>Table</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Page</b>
1.1	Arms Transfer Deliveries Worldwide and to the Developing World	99
2.1	Canadian Participation in UN Peacekeeping Missions	102
3.1	Canadian Political Preference	115
4.1	Department of National Defence Expenditures	122
5.1	Iraqi Imports from Group of Seven States and Australia, 1988 - 1995	125
5.2	Kuwaiti Imports from Group of Seven States and Australia, 1988 - 1995	126
5.3	Average Yearly Exports to Kuwait	128

## **LIST OF FIGURES**

<b>Figure</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Page</b>
3.1	Canadian Political Preferences	116
5.1	Percentage of Iraqi Imports from Group of Seven States and Australia, 1988-1995	124
5.2	Percentage of Kuwaiti Imports from Group of Seven States and Australia, 1988-1995	128

## Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION

The subject of this study is Canada's involvement in Operation Desert Storm, the United Nations sponsored military operation that marked the beginning of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Operation Desert Storm was a response to Iraq's August 2, 1990 invasion and subsequent annexation of Kuwait. The operation was based on UN Security Council Resolution 678, which authorized UN "Member states co-operating with the Government of Kuwait" to "use all necessary means" to force Iraq from Kuwait, if it had not left by January 15, 1991.<sup>1</sup>

In accordance with Resolution 678, thirty-three states chose to help the Government of Kuwait end the Iraqi occupation. This multinational coalition was organized by the United States, which besides providing 400,000 of the coalition's 650,000 troops, also supplied its commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf. The coalition's composition was truly multinational in that states from every region of the world participated in the operation. Moreover, while the majority of the coalition members were Western and Arab states, Operation Desert Storm also had the support of a number of former Warsaw Pact states and Third World countries.

Operation Desert Storm ended February 27, 1991, when Iraq accepted a cease-fire and agreed to an unconditional withdraw from Kuwait. Combat deaths and

---

<sup>1</sup> United Nations Security Council, Resolution 678, November 29, 1990.

injuries among coalition troops totaled 857, while among Iraqi troops there were between 60,000 and 100,000 soldiers who were either killed or injured in action.<sup>2</sup> Following the Iraqi withdrawal, Kuwait's legitimate government was restored. Iraq, on the other hand, would continue to have global economic sanctions applied against it until, in the opinion of the UN Security Council, it fully complied with the surrender terms contained in Resolution 686 and, later, Resolution 687.

This paper attempts to present a clear picture of Canada's role in the Persian Gulf War and the effects of the war for Canada. In doing so it will examine a range of external, non-governmental domestic, and governmental variables that may have influenced Canada's decision to join Operation Desert Storm and explore how the war and participation in it affected Canada domestically, bilaterally, and internationally.

The significance of this inquiry is found on two fronts. First, this war may affect future Canadian domestic and foreign policy decisions since decisions made by government officials tend to be influenced by their images of past events. Second, since some individuals have seen wars as "the principal mechanism of change throughout history"<sup>3</sup> studying them offers useful insights into the evolution of states, relations between states, and the international system.

---

<sup>2</sup> Ken Matthews, *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 315.

According to Robert Jervis, the past events that are mostly responsible for influencing decision-makers are wars. In a study on how history influences decision-makers, he states that the intensity of war is what makes them influential. According to Jervis,

Because of the dramatic and pervasive nature of a war and its consequences, the experiences associated with it -the diplomacy that preceded it, the methods of fighting it, the alliances that were formed, and the way the war was terminated- will deeply influence the perceptual predispositions of most citizens.<sup>4</sup>

Past wars can help one determine the best course of action in a crisis if the information pertaining to them is complete and highly specific. Having such detailed information enables a decision-maker to view "the conditions and circumstances under which the outcome [of past events] occurred."<sup>5</sup> Consequently, this information helps a decision-maker determine if the past event is similar enough to a current crisis to provide guidance. While two events may appear similar (for example, they might have similar causes) prevalent conditions and circumstances, such as changing technology or different methods of warfare, can make referring to the prior war a pointless task, and in some instances, a costly one.

To illustrate this point, one can look at a case involving US Admiral William Halsey, the commander of the US navy's Third Fleet during the Battle of Leyte

---

<sup>3</sup> Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, eds., *International Relations Theory* 2nd ed. (Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan, 1993), 59.

<sup>4</sup> Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 266.

Gulf in October 1944. During a Japanese attempt to capture the gulf, Halsey chose to disregard one enemy naval fleet composed primarily of battleships in favour of pursuing another that had aircraft carriers (all but one of which were small and had “trivial military value”). His reason for this was a military axiom, derived from past wars, that stated a naval fleet with aircraft carriers is stronger than one without aircraft carriers.<sup>6</sup> Halsey failed to realize, however, that technological advances in the Japanese navy made its battleships more potent than the small aircraft carriers he decided to chase. As a result of Halsey’s actions, the Japanese fleet broke through other US defenses guarding Leyte Gulf and came close to capturing it.<sup>7</sup>

This paper therefore intends to examine all aspects of Canada’s Gulf War experience. Particularly, this paper will examine: the factors influencing Canada’s decision to enter the war; the various levels of participation decided upon before and throughout the war; and the consequences of the war on Canada. Moreover, this information will hopefully provide decision-makers with enough knowledge of the Persian Gulf War to judge whether a future crisis relates to it and if applicable, apply its lessons to that conflict.

As noted, the second significant reason for engaging in this study is that because wars have often been a principal mechanism of change, studying them offers useful insights into the evolution of states, relations between states, and

---

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 230.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 231.

the international system. Understanding the changes that take place following a war gives individuals a better understanding of their state and its place in the world. Consequently, to locate change it will be necessary to examine the war's consequences within Canada, in the relations between it and other states, and in the global or systemic structures and relationships.<sup>8</sup>

Besides the Persian Gulf War, Canada has participated in four other twentieth century wars: the South African War, World War I, World War II, and the Korean War. For Canada, each of these wars had a number of domestic and international consequences. A brief analysis of some of the changes these wars produced demonstrates the impact wars have had on the development of Canada and helps justify this paper's search for change following the Persian Gulf War.

The South African War, which lasted from 1899 to 1902, was Canada's first twentieth century war and produced at least four areas of change: in French-English relations, in the importance of militias, in military structure during later wars, and in nation-building. While the South African War was not universally accepted in English Canada, support for Canadian participation was substantially higher there than in French Canada. Canadian participation in the war thus widened the cleavage between Quebec and the rest of the state and

---

<sup>7</sup> E.B. Potter, *Bull Halsey* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1985), 295-306.

<sup>8</sup> Matthews, 253.

“created a catalyst for both French- and English-Canadian nationalisms, which drew Canadians in different directions, not along the same path.”<sup>9</sup>

Canadian militias benefited greatly from the South African War and increased their prominence and perceived utility among the public and politicians. Since all Canadian troops in the war came from the militia, this group’s success relative to the professional standing army provided by Britain, convinced Canadians that a “trained citizenry” was preferable to a standing army.<sup>10</sup> Following the war, a reorganization of defense policy occurred. The government based the new policy on Canada’s success in the war and, in accordance with public sentiment, emphasized the importance of a “trained citizenry.” According to Carman Miller, Prime Minister Robert Borden’s,

decision to create a decentralized citizen army of sharpshooters, his attempts to secure a dependable Canadian supply of rifles and ammunition, his subsidization of rifle clubs and his encouragement of Cadet Corps, military training in the schools, and later Baden-Powell’s Boy Scouts, were all inspired by the “lessons” of the Boer War [South African War].<sup>11</sup>

Unfortunately, this policy change left the military unprepared for the First World War. To Canada’s detriment, the new policy hampered the ability of the military to quickly mobilize itself for this war and limited the number of qualified officers within the military.<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>9</sup> Carman Miller, *Painting the Map Red* (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993), 441.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 439.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 438.

<sup>12</sup> C.P. Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict*, Vol. 1, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 321-22.

Throughout the South African War the Canadian government maintained that its troops should fight together, under the leadership of a Canadian officer. The reasoning behind this position was that Canadian troops fought best when they were under their own organization and that the Canadian government could have more control over its troops if they were in one cohesive unit as opposed to being scattered about the coalition. Canada's subsequent success in keeping its troops together was a "small but nevertheless striking precedent" that was followed by Canadian governments participating in later wars.<sup>13</sup>

The South African War was seen by many as an important factor in helping Canadians develop a national consciousness. The successes of the Canadian troops led many Canadians to believe that the country could also function successfully in the world community. Speaking on the success of the Canadian troops in the Battle of Paardeberg, Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier said that it "revealed to the world that a new power had arisen in the West."<sup>14</sup> While Laurier's words may have overstated the case, the war certainly produced "a growing conscious spirit of nationality" and indicated "that Canadians were comfortable and not terribly interested in the [British] empire, beyond a pragmatic, cooperative imperialism."<sup>15</sup>

World War I lasted from 1914 to 1918 and was Canada's second war. One of the best known events of the war was the debate over whether to draft and send

---

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 70.

<sup>14</sup> Miller: *Painting the Map Red*, 440.

conscripts overseas to fight in the war. Even before Prime Minister Robert Borden's "Unionist" government (composed of Borden's Conservative party and pro-war Liberals) passed the Military Service Act, which authorized conscription, the Prime Minister realized the controversy it would cause within Quebec. Writing in his diary, Borden stated that his colleagues from Quebec "said they are prepared to stand by us but that it will kill them politically and the party for 25 years."<sup>16</sup> These observations were remarkably accurate as the passage of the Military Service Act was largely opposed in Quebec and contributed to the government winning only 3 seats in Quebec in the 1917 general election, compared to 62 for Wilfrid Laurier's Liberal party. Moreover, apart from the 1958 election where the victorious Progressive Conservative Party (today's version of the Conservative Party) won 50 seats in Quebec, the province's anti-Conservative bias lasted until the 1984 general election. As a result of these events, "For thirty years thereafter, the lessons of 1917 would weigh heavily in the foreign policy decision-making of the man who was also prime minister for most of the period, Mackenzie King."<sup>17</sup>

While participation in the South African War gave Canada a sense of national consciousness, WWI was the means through which Canada "entered the portal

---

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 439.

<sup>16</sup> Stacey: Vol. 1, 218.

<sup>17</sup> Kim Richard Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1989), 93.

of full nationhood.”<sup>18</sup> According to Borden “the valour, the endurance and the achievement of the Canadian Army in France and Belgium” were solely responsible for instilling Canadians “with a sense of nationhood never before experienced.”<sup>19</sup> Tangible evidence that Canada had indeed reached a higher international status came when it was permitted to attend the Paris Peace Conference at the end of the war, and was given the same status as small European states such as Belgium and Serbia.

World War II lasted from 1939-1945. As the war progressed, and allied losses mounted, it became apparent to most Canadians (politicians and public alike) that if Germany defeated Britain, Canada would certainly be at risk to a German invasion, an invasion it would not be able to withstand. As a result of this problem, Prime Minister King met United States President Franklin Roosevelt in Ogdensburg, New York in August 1940 and the two agreed to create a Permanent Joint Board on Defense which would coordinate the defense of “the Northern Half of the Western Hemisphere.” According to C.P. Stacey, as a result of this agreement

the ancient ties with Britain gradually became less important to Canada, and the developing relationship with the United States became more and more dominant. And if one had to indicate a moment from which these tendencies became fully evident, it would have to be August 1940.<sup>20</sup>

---

<sup>18</sup> Stacey: Vol. 1, 239.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> C.P. Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict*, Vol. 2, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 312.

Canada was thus brought into the American sphere of influence on military matters and the Hyde Park Declaration, which was signed in April 1941, solidified a Canadian-American economic relationship that had been developing since the pre-war years. This agreement helped correct Canada's trade deficit with the US by requiring the latter "to spend \$200-300 million more in Canada, largely for raw materials and aluminum."<sup>21</sup> The immediate importance of this economic agreement was that it allowed Canada to continue giving economic assistance to Britain without worrying about its own financial collapse.

WWII also eliminated the isolationist views many Canadians had held before the war and replaced them with a more internationalist perspective. Evidence of Canadian isolationism surfaced at the Imperial Conference of 1937, when King said, "opposition to participation in war, any war, is growing."<sup>22</sup> The reasons for this, according to King, were the beliefs that: the First World War was responsible for the Great Depression; continental Europe was unable to solve its own difficulties and was therefore always, unnecessarily going to war; and, the influence of the American isolationist movement on Canada. After WWII such views rarely surfaced. Instead, Canadians were much more concerned with international affairs; so much so that John Holmes noted that

---

<sup>21</sup> J.L. Granatstein, "Staring into the Abyss," in *Towards a New World*, J.L. Granatstein, ed., (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1992), 57.

<sup>22</sup> Stacey: Vol. 2, 205.

internationalism “was almost a religion in the decade after the Second World War.”<sup>23</sup>

The Korean War, which began in 1950 and lasted until an armistice was signed in 1953, was authorized by the United Nations Security Council. The major effect of this war, according to Denis Stairs, was that Canada, like its allies, became convinced that the western world was threatened militarily as well as politically by the Soviet Union and its “satellites.”<sup>24</sup> This perception lasted throughout the 1950s and 1960s and resulted in the Canadian government forgoing its traditional policy of dramatically cutting military acquisition spending following a war and instead, undergoing “a massive programme of rearmament in all three services.”<sup>25</sup>

These past four wars provide examples of how conflicts can result in domestic or bilateral change for Canada. While the Persian Gulf War was much shorter and produced far fewer casualties than previous Canadian wars, other short-lived and one-sided wars (for example, the Six-Day War) show that the scope of a conflict does not dictate whether change will occur following a war. Hence, whether the Persian Gulf War has produced various modes of change is still undetermined, but as these examples show, the potential for change is strong and, therefore, evidence of it should be sought.

---

<sup>23</sup> Nossal: *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 146.

<sup>24</sup> Denis Stairs, *The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 332.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

To assist in this study's goal of presenting a clear, comprehensive picture of Canada's involvement in the Persian Gulf War, three broad overarching questions are addressed: one, what factors most likely influenced Canada's decision to join Operation Desert Storm; two, what were the effects of Canadian participation in the operation; and three, what were the effects of the Persian Gulf War for Canada. A review of the existing literature on these three questions is a necessary first step for this study.

Canada's decision to escalate its level of involvement in the Persian Gulf crisis from a diplomatic to a military response is examined the most informative and comprehensive way by Ronnie Miller, Kim Richard Nossal, John Kirton, James Winter, Ann L. Hibbard, Reg Whitaker, Charlotte Gray, and James A. Graff.<sup>26</sup> These and other works cumulatively provide a wealth of information on Canada's decision-making process vis-à-vis Operation Desert Storm, but they have two main weaknesses. The first is that they are narrowly focused. Most studies use either external, non-governmental domestic, or governmental levels of analysis, rather than all of these, to explain Canada's decision to participate in

---

<sup>26</sup> Ronnie Miller, *Following the Americans to the Persian Gulf* (Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1994); Kim Richard Nossal, *Rain Dancing* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994); John Kirton, "Liberating Kuwait: Canada and the Persian Gulf War, 1990-91," in *Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases*, Don Munton and John Kirton, eds., (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1992), 382-393; James Winter, *Common Cents: Media Portrayal of the Gulf War and Other Events* (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1992); Ann L. Hibbard, *Canada and the Persian Gulf Crisis: the Press, Public Opinion and Policy* (Windsor: The University of Windsor, 1993); Reg Whitaker, "Prisoners of the American Dream: Canada, the Gulf, and the New World Order," *Studies in Political Economy* 35 (Summer 1991), 13-17; Charlotte Gray, "War Games," *Saturday Night* 106, no. 2 (March 1991), 10-14; Charlotte Gray, "Home Grown Skirmishes: Canada and the War," *Peace and Security* (Autumn 1991), 8-9; James Graff, "Canada and the Gulf War," in *Shaping the Gulf: In*

the war. The benefit of using three levels of analysis is that the scope of a study is broadened and a more complete explanation of a foreign policy decision can thus be given. Miller, for example, presents a fine study on how various external variables influenced the Canadian decision but fails to mention how most domestic and governmental variables affected the decision. The second shortcoming is that the authors of these studies often do not recognize and build on the work of their peers; instead, they produce studies which replicate, or even contradict, other studies. Consequently, while the amount of literature on the subject has continued to grow since the end of the war, little progress has been made in explaining why Canada participated in Operation Desert Storm.

Three of the works cited are particularly significant. The first of the three studies is by Kirton. He argues that Canada's decision to fight was a result of the government's belief that Iraq's actions threatened the international order. In coming to this conclusion he presents arguments as to why other external variables, such as the influence of the US or UN, did not play a large role in influencing the decision. Additionally, Kirton examines how various domestic forces affected the government's externally-motivated decision. His reason for including both levels of analysis in his study is that

in order to sustain domestically what the Mulroney government quickly concluded it must do internationally, it was necessary for the government to manage with extraordinary skill the

interpretations of the war and Canada's role offered by a suspicious media and public.<sup>27</sup>

The result of this domestic analysis was that while 58% of Canadians approved of Canadian troops being sent to the Persian Gulf "there were few domestic pressures pushing the government to deploy more force in general."<sup>28</sup>

The second significant study comes from Gray. Like Kirton, she examines a number of variables from different levels of analysis to help determine why Canada chose to participate in Operate Desert Storm. Gray's conclusions differ from Kirton's conclusions in that she assumes the US and UN were the predominant forces influencing Canada's decision to join Operation Desert Storm. Besides addressing various external variables, Gray also examines how the opinions of various domestic groups and governmental actors influenced Canada's decision to participate in the war. In this effort she finds that the "heterogeneous make-up" of Canada's peace movement prevented a unified voice of opposition to the war from being heard, and therefore did little to influence the decision.<sup>29</sup> As for the influence of governmental actors, Gray examines the Department of External Affairs and the Department of Defense. Their positions, she finds, were "obscured by self-interest" but on both fronts decided to support the war.<sup>30</sup>

---

<sup>27</sup> Kirton, 383.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Gray: *Home Grown Skirmishes*, 8.

<sup>30</sup> Gray: *War Games*, 14.

The third significant study comes from Nossal. Nossal argues that Canada originally joined the multinational coalition to help enforce sanctions against Iraq and deter Iraq from attacking Saudi Arabia. The primary reasons for this commitment were that Canada saw Iraq's invasion of Kuwait as a threat to the territorial integrity of smaller states; the invasion could hurt Canada's domestic economy and the international economy; and the end of the Cold War provided an excellent opportunity "to build up the UN as an effective means of channeling interstate conflicts and imposing a particular order on the state system."<sup>31</sup> Nossal contends that as the conflict progressed the Canadian government realized that the US, the coalition's de facto leader, was unwilling to allow economic sanctions to continue indefinitely and instead would militarily force Iraq from Kuwait. Further, even though Canada was not happy with "where the US was taking the coalition," it still co-sponsored Resolution 678, because the government wanted to be a "bit player" in Operation Desert Storm.<sup>32</sup> To broaden his level of analysis, Nossal also addresses domestic variables that influenced the government's decision. In this regard, he argues that the government's desire to have a small role in the upcoming operation led to criticism from domestic actors such as peace movement groups, church groups and leaders, and some members of the Arab-Canadian community. However, Nossal contends that had the government refused to participate in

---

<sup>31</sup> Nossal: *Rain Dancing*, 208.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 216.

Operation Desert Storm, many people (a number greater than the total number of anti-war activists) would have severely criticized it. Consequently, to minimize its exposure to criticism from pro- and anti-war activists but to maintain its desire to have a small role in the coalition, the government sought to make its Persian Gulf War actions “as invisible as possible.”<sup>33</sup>

These three studies present various ideas on why Canada chose to escalate its level of involvement from participating in the enforcement of sanctions against Iraq to participation in Operation Desert Storm. The main difficulty with these three analyses is that despite each using similar approaches (multiple levels of analysis) their explanations as to why Canada joined Operation Desert Storm differ. For example, while Kirton and Nossal state that the US had very little influence over Canada’s decision, Gray argues that it was an important determinant. Moreover, Kirton also states that the UN played no role in Canada’s decision-making process, while Gray argues the opposite, and Nossal states that the UN was an influential variable but only in the context that since the Cold War was over supporting the UN might enhance its future security role. Finally, the researchers also differ on the extent to which the personal relationship between Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and United States President George Bush affected the decision-making process. In this regard, Kirton and Gray argue that Mulroney’s friendship with Bush influenced him to such an extent that on occasion he personally made decisions regarding

---

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 215.

Canada's role in the Persian Gulf crisis without consulting Cabinet. Nossal, on the other hand, argues that the Mulroney-Bush relationship had no affect on Canada's decision-making process. On the contrary, Nossal states that Mulroney's friendship with Bush gave him the opportunity to influence Bush's view on the crisis.

The differences of opinion presented by Kirton, Gray, and Nossal may be a result of the recency of the Persian Gulf War. The authors all wrote their studies within a couple years of the conflict. In fact, Gray wrote one of her studies the month following the war's cease-fire. Further, when the broader range of studies addressing this issue is included, there is an array of opinions on why Canada participated in the war. Hence, one aim of this study is to eliminate the discrepancies found between the previous studies. This study's framework will therefore follow the approaches used by Kirton, Gray, and Nossal, all of whom attempt to explain Canada's decision according to external, non-governmental domestic, and governmental levels of analysis. To improve on the results of these studies, however, this paper will look at as many variables as possible within each level of analysis and draw on as much past research on this subject as possible.

As for the issue of the effects of Canadian participation in Operation Desert Storm and the effects of the war for Canada, the existing literature on these topics is quite limited. In fact, an extensive search for studies that address these

issues has revealed no comprehensive monographs and few articles. Alternatively, the effects of the Persian Gulf War on states and groups of states other than Canada have been well documented. Among the books or studies outlining the consequences of Operation Desert Storm on various other states, for example, France, Australia, the United States, and the Soviet Union, are those by James J. Cooke, Michael McKinley, Viberto Selochon, John E. Mueller, Alex Roberto Hybel, and Alvin Rubinstein.<sup>34</sup>

Regarding the effects of the war for Canada, only the issues of weapons proliferation, peacekeeping, the UN, and the state of Canadian Forces are adequately addressed. Keith Krause examines the issue of weapons proliferation and evaluates the Persian Gulf War's role in the evolution of Canada's arms control policy.<sup>35</sup> He finds that the war was the impetus to a Canadian international proposal to curb the proliferation of weapons. Krause also finds that the proposal mostly failed because it was rejected by large arms producing states like the United States and Britain.

---

<sup>34</sup> James J. Cooke, *100 Miles from Baghdad: With the French in Desert Storm* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993); Michael McKinley, ed., *The Gulf War: Critical Perspectives* (Canberra: Australia National University Printery, 1994); Viberto Selochon, ed., *The Gulf War: Issues and Implications for Australia and Asia* (Nathan, Australia: Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, Griffith Australia, 1992); John E. Mueller, *Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Alex Roberto Hybel, *Power and Rationality: the Bush Administration in the Gulf Crisis* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of N.Y. Press, 1993); Alvin Rubinstein, "Moscow and the Gulf War: decisions and consequences," *International Journal* XLIX, no. 2 (Spring 1994), 301-327.

<sup>35</sup> Keith Krause, "Arms Transfers and International Security: the Evolution of Canadian Policy," in *Canada Among Nations 1992-93: A New World Order?*, Fen Osler Hampson and Christopher J. Maule, eds., (Ottawa Carleton University Press, 1992), 283-301.

Gregory Wirick presents a comprehensive analysis of the war's effects on Canadian peacekeeping and the future of the UN.<sup>36</sup> Wirick states that Canada's active participation in numerous peacekeeping missions following the Persian Gulf War proved wrong the fear of many that involvement in Operation Desert Storm would preclude Canada from participating in such missions. Wirick also argued that the war presented the UN an opportunity to play a more functional role in the maintenance of world peace but that structural changes to the organization (such as the revitalization of the Military Staff Committee) would need to occur before the UN could adopt this function.

Finally, James Allen examines the effect of the war on the Canadian Forces. Allen finds that the war demonstrated to military observers that the Forces were in dire need of equipment upgrades but due to the "superficial, human-interest" type stories the Canadian media reported on the war the public did not become aware of this problem and thus, largely opposed an expensive re-armament of the Canadian Forces.<sup>37</sup>

The benefit of these studies is that for the issues of weapons proliferation, peacekeeping, the UN, and the state of the Canadian Forces, they provide a base from which this paper can begin to examine the effects of the war for Canada. Moreover, faults or omissions within the studies point to areas where additional

---

<sup>36</sup> Gregory Wirick, "Canada, Peacekeeping and the United Nations," in *Canada Among Nations 1992-93: A New World Order?*, Fen Osler Hampson and Christopher J. Maule, eds., (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992), 94-114.

research is needed. For example, while Krause's study does much to explain how the war affected Canada's arms control policy it does not discuss how the proliferation of weapons enabled Iraq to threaten all its regional neighbours or examine the war's effect (if any) on the international arms trade. Also, while Wirick's discussion of the war's effect on the reshaping of the UN is quite comprehensive and will benefit this paper, it fails to consider the American role in any revamping of the UN.

Studies that focus on issues important to Canada, without directly referring to the state, also provide useful information on the Persian Gulf War's effects on Canada. Determining which issues are most important to Canada can be done by searching for government statements making references to Canada's interests. For example, on November 29, 1990, during debate in the House of Commons over Canada's role in the Persian Gulf crisis, Prime Minister Mulroney said,

No country has a greater interest than Canada in the rule of international law. The objective of that law, in part, is to ensure the security of smaller countries in the face of larger neighbours - and to provide the means to settle disputes peacefully.<sup>38</sup>

Consequently, one can assume the maintenance of international law is important to Canada and any study addressing how the war affected the issue of international law would be useful to this paper. Keeping this in mind, studies

---

<sup>37</sup> James H. Allan, "Canadian Defence Policy after the Gulf," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 21, no. 2 (October 1991), 20-24.

meeting the criteria outlined above and therefore proving useful to this paper in determining the effects of the war on Canada are those by Alexander George, Paul Fauteux, Peggy Mason, Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, Adam Roberts, Mark Kramer, and Bruce Russett and James S. Sutterlin.<sup>39</sup>

The lack of comprehensive studies addressing the effects of the war on Canada is disappointing in the sense that there is no point of reference on which to base this aspect of the paper. Moreover, it means the answer to this question will be more tentative than the question of why Canada chose to participate in Operation Desert Storm. Nevertheless, any attempt to clarify the effects of the Gulf War for Canada will still be useful due to the pool of information that it will provide for future researchers.

---

<sup>38</sup> Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 2nd Session, 34th Parliament, Vol. XII (November 29, 1990), 15958.

<sup>39</sup> Alexander George, "The Gulf War's Possible Impact on the International System," in *The Political Psychology of the Gulf War*, Stanley A. Renshon ed., (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1993), 293-315; Paul Fauteux, "The Use of the Environment as an Instrument of War in Occupied Kuwait," in *Verifying Obligations Respecting Control and the Environment: A Post Gulf War Assessment*, H. Bruno Schiefer, ed., (Regina: University of Saskatchewan, 1992), 35-79; Peggy Mason, "Arms Control and the Environment in the Post Gulf New World Order," in *Verifying Obligations Respecting Control and the Environment: A Post Gulf War Assessment*, H. Bruno Schiefer, ed., (Regina: University of Saskatchewan, 1992), 3-6; Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, "The United Nations after the Gulf War," *International Journal* XLIX, no. 2 (Spring 1994), 253-76; Adam Roberts, "The Laws of War," in *International Perspectives on the Gulf Conflict, 1990-91*, Alex Danchev and Dan Keohane, eds., (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 259-94; Mark Kramer, "The Global Arms Trade After the Persian Gulf War," in *The Persian Gulf War: Views from the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, Herbert H. Blumberg and Christopher C. French, eds., (New York: University Press of America, 1994), 265-310; Bruce Russett and James S. Sutterlin, "The U.N. in a new world order," in *The Persian Gulf War: Views from the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, Herbert H. Blumberg and Christopher C. French, eds., (New York: University Press of America, 1994), 539-50.

This paper has four chapters. Chapter one introduces the topic, outlines three guiding questions central to its analysis, demonstrates reasons for studying the topic, and reviews what some individuals have written about the topic.

Chapter Two begins by describing the events leading up to the initiation of Operation Desert Storm on January 16, 1991. Beginning with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, this section describes the initial Canadian response to the invasion (along with its other possible policy options), and chronologically summarizes the events throughout the period. The chapter further presents the theoretical framework that the paper uses to help determine the factors influencing Canada's decision to participate in the war.

Chapter Three attempts to explain Canada's decision-making process by using external, non-governmental domestic, and governmental levels of analysis. Each level examines the decision from a different perspective; thus when combined together a more detailed explanation of the decision can be gathered.

Chapter Four examines the consequences of the Persian Gulf War and participation in the war for Canada. To address this concern it analyses the results of the war according to its diplomatic, political, strategic, economic, and environmental effects for Canada.

Chapter Five is the paper's conclusion. It outlines the variables most influential in Canada's decision to participate in Operation Desert Storm as well

as the consequences of the war and participation in it for Canada. Further, the chapter examines the relevance of the war and Canada's participation in it on future Canadian decision-makers.

## **Chapter 2: BACKGROUND TO THE PERSIAN GULF WAR**

Canada's response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was "mid-range;" while Canada chose to oppose Iraq's actions by participating in Operation Desert Storm, its level of involvement was limited. For the most part, the only time the Canadian military saw action within the Iraqi or Kuwaiti theaters of operation was when its planes escorted US bombers to their targets. No Canadian infantry took part in the war, and the three ships Canada had in the Persian Gulf were not suited to offensive operations.

There were at least three other broadly-defined responses to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait that Canada could have taken. The first option was non-participation. The second was to participate offensively from the air and the sea, but not on the ground. The third response was to participate offensively, using infantry, planes, and ships. This was the most precarious since it would likely result in the most casualties.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first summarizes the events that occurred between Iraq's August 2, 1990 invasion of Kuwait and the end of Operation Desert Storm on February 27, 1991. The second section explains the reasons for using three levels of analysis. The third section is a summary of the individual variables that will be examined within each level of analysis and an explanation of how they can affect a state's decision-making process.

## CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait at 2:00 a.m. (Persian Gulf time) on August 2, 1990. The reason for Iraq's actions, according to the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council, was that a coup had occurred in Kuwait and the new provisional government had sought Iraqi intervention to prevent other states from challenging its actions. Iraqi officials also claimed that their troops would leave Kuwait when the situation had stabilized.

Canada and much of the rest of the international community immediately rejected Iraq's explanation and criticized the Iraqi invasion. Speaking on behalf of the Canadian government, Minister of External Affairs Joe Clark said Iraq's actions were "a totally unacceptable aggression."<sup>40</sup> Among the other international leaders who criticized Iraq were United States President George Bush who said the invasion was "naked aggression" and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher who said it was "intolerable."<sup>41</sup>

To prevent Iraq from gaining access to Kuwaiti assets within Canada, the Canadian government froze all such assets. Moreover, the Department of External Affairs (DEA) announced the following measures:

1. an embargo on imports of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil;
2. the placement of Iraq on the Areas Control List under the Exports and Import Permits Act which would allow Canadian exports to Iraq to be controlled;

---

<sup>40</sup> Ross Howard "Canada's reaction rhetorical," *Globe & Mail*, August 3, 1990, A10.

<sup>41</sup> R.W. Apple Jr., "Naked Aggression," *New York Times*, August 3, 1990, A1.

3. the suspension of the Canada-Iraq Agreement on Trade, Economic and Technical Cooperation and the termination of Most Favoured Nations Treatment;
4. the suspension of all trade and business promotion activity by the government of Canada on behalf of Canadian exports to Iraq;
5. instructions to the Export Development Cooperation to cease providing financial coverage for new business activities of Canadian companies in Iraq and Kuwait;
6. the suspension of the Canada-Iraq Memorandum of Understanding on Academic, Cultural and Sports Relations.<sup>42</sup>

Among Canada's allies, Britain, Germany, and Italy also froze Kuwaiti assets in their countries, while the United States, France, and Australia went even further and seized Iraqi assets as well. All these states also took steps to apply sanctions similar to the above against Iraq.<sup>43</sup>

Internationally, the UN Security Council met at the request of Kuwait on the day of the invasion and unanimously passed Resolution 660. Canada, incidentally, was serving as a Security Council member at the time and co-sponsored Resolution 660.<sup>44</sup> The resolution "condemn[ed] the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait" and "demand[ed] that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990."<sup>45</sup>

Arab reaction to the Iraqi invasion varied. In the days immediately following the invasion, King Hussein of Jordan and President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt attempted to mediate the crisis. Despite their traveling to a number of Middle

---

<sup>42</sup> Miller: *Following the Americans*, 72.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 77.

<sup>44</sup> The other co-sponsors were Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Malaysia, United Kingdom, and the US. Canada subsequently co-sponsored every other Security Council Resolution relating to the Gulf crisis until its term expired at the end of 1990.

Eastern capitals, Iraq's unwillingness to give up Kuwait and allow its leader Emir Jabir al-Ahmad to return to power prevented an "Arab" solution to the crisis. At an August 3 meeting of the Arab League Council in Tunis, a resolution condemning Iraq for its actions was passed. Support for the resolution, however, was not universal as six of the League's 21 members (Djibouti, Jordan, Mauritania, Sudan, Yemen, and the PLO) sympathized with Iraq's actions against its rich neighbour and opposed the resolution.<sup>46</sup>

The next major action taken by the Security Council was Resolution 661 on August 6. This resolution placed "mandatory economic sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait." Its intent was to pressure Iraq into leaving Kuwait and to protect Kuwait's domestic and international assets. As well, the resolution prohibited states from recognizing any regime that Iraq might have installed in the country. The effects of the resolution on Canada's relations with Iraq were as follows: 1) all Iraqi and Kuwaiti imports to Canada were prohibited as of August 6; 2) all exports from Canada to Iraq and Kuwait were prohibited, effective August 7; 3) all unused export credits would cease and the government would not issue further export credits for Iraq and Kuwait; and, effective immediately, no funds

---

<sup>45</sup> United Nations Security Council, Resolution 660, August 2, 1990.

<sup>46</sup> H.M. Amery, ed., *Shaping the Gulf: In Search of Order*, (London, ON: Canadian Institute for Policy Research and Analysis, 1992), 650.

could be transferred to Iraq or Kuwait and any assets or securities of the Iraqi and Kuwaiti governments or their agencies were frozen.<sup>47</sup>

By this point, Iraq had begun to seize nationals from “aggressive nations” (all Western states plus Japan) in Kuwait and move them to Iraq. American and British citizens were particularly targeted. Iraq’s intent was to use the hostages as bargaining chips in negotiations over the future of Kuwait and as human shields if outside forces attacked Iraq.

Further, on August 6, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia accepted the validity of American reports that Iraqi troop movements in southern Kuwait represented an “imminent threat” to the security of his country and formally asked the US for its protection.<sup>48</sup> In response the US announced it would send thousands of paratroopers, an armoured brigade and military aircraft to Saudi Arabia. This effort to protect Saudi Arabia was called Operation Desert Shield.<sup>49</sup>

August 8 marked a further escalation in the Gulf crisis as Iraq annexed Kuwait, making it the state’s “19th Province.”<sup>50</sup> Predictably, the UN Security Council passed a resolution stating that the annexation was “null and void.”<sup>51</sup>

---

<sup>47</sup> Department of External Affairs, Communiqué number 170, August 8, 1990; CanadaExport 8 no. 4, September 4, 1990.

<sup>48</sup> Joao Resende-Santos, “The Persian Gulf Crisis: A Chronology of Events” in *After the Storm: Lessons from the Gulf War*, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Roger K. Smith, eds., (New York: Aspen Institute, 1992), 305.

<sup>49</sup> The scope of Operation Desert Storm would eventually be expanded to include the enforcement of economic sanctions against Iraq.

<sup>50</sup> Resende-Santos, 307.

<sup>51</sup> United Nations Security Council, Resolution 662, August 8, 1990.

Iraq ignored this resolution and moved to consolidate its new acquisition by ordering all diplomatic missions in Kuwait to close by August 24.

The number of states committed to Operation Desert Shield became much larger on August 10. On this day, NATO foreign ministers met in Brussels and unanimously endorsed a US plan to send 200,000 troops to Saudi Arabia.<sup>52</sup> While the foreign ministers ruled out joint action by the members of NATO, they did not discount the possibility that individual states would participate in the blockade. Hence, following the meeting, Prime Minister Mulroney announced on national television that two Canadian destroyers and a supply ship would be sent to the Persian Gulf to help enforce the economic sanctions against Iraq.<sup>53</sup> Also on this date, the Arab League met in Cairo and, following a “chaotic” meeting that was attended by Iraqi and Kuwaiti (the government in power before August 2) delegates, agreed by a 12-9 margin to send an Arab military force to defend Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States possibly threatened by Iraq.<sup>54</sup>

On August 12, ten days after the Gulf crisis began, Iraq offered to leave Kuwait if: Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank; Syria withdrew from Lebanon; all Western forces left the Persian Gulf region; all sanctions and boycotts imposed against Iraq were dropped; and the status of

---

<sup>52</sup> Amery, 652.

<sup>53</sup> Kirton, 384.

<sup>54</sup> Resende-Santos, 308.

Kuwait was decided on the basis of Iraq's "historical rights" to it.<sup>55</sup> The US, Canada, and others opposed to Iraq's invasion rejected these linkages on the basis that Resolution 660 demanded an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.<sup>56</sup>

The day following the Iraqi peace proposal, the US and Britain unilaterally began a naval blockade of Iraq and Iraqi-held Kuwait. While Canada was in favour of the principle of using a naval blockade to help enforce the economic embargo against Iraq, it wanted the UN to specifically sanction the operation before it would join it. Security Council members France, the USSR, and Malaysia agreed with Canada and opposed their two fellow members' actions. Consequently, Canada re-affirmed its position that the three ships it had on route to the Persian Gulf would only monitor the naval blockade if the UN did not authorize the action.<sup>57</sup>

On August 17, Iraq ordered all Western citizens remaining in Kuwait to report to one of two Kuwait City hotels and await transit to Iraq. Two days later, however, Iraq offered to release the hostages if US troops left Saudi Arabia and the naval blockade ended. The United States also rejected this proposal.

Canada's wish to have the naval blockade of Iraq authorized by the UN was granted on August 25 when the UN Security Council passed Resolution 665. This resolution allowed states participating in the naval blockade "to use such

---

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 309.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary” to enforce the embargo against Iraq and Iraqi-held Kuwait.<sup>58</sup>

Canada’s refusal to obey Iraq’s demand to close its diplomatic mission in Kuwait by August 24 resulted in Iraqi troops surrounding the Canadian embassy and cutting off its water supply. Subsequently, on September 13, Iraqi troops entered the Canadian ambassador’s residence and seized, but later released, the Canadian and visiting American, British, and Irish consuls.<sup>59</sup>

On September 14, the Canadian government placed the two destroyers and one supply ship that had previously been dispatched to the Gulf, and were close to reaching their destination, on combat service. To help protect the sailors on the three ships and enforce the economic embargo against Iraq, the government announced that 18 CF-18 fighter aircraft would also be sent to the region.<sup>60</sup> Still later, in order to alleviate logistical problems arising from the growing size and complexity of Operation Desert Storm, in late October, Canada sent 250 communications and command specialists to the region.<sup>61</sup>

Throughout the crisis, in the back of all the decision-makers’ minds, was the question of what should be done if the economic embargo did not force Iraq to leave Kuwait. Such considerations became increasingly urgent as August turned to September and then to October without change in the Kuwaiti

---

<sup>57</sup> Kirton, 386.

<sup>58</sup> United Nations Security Council, Resolution 665, August 25, 1990.

<sup>59</sup> Resende-Santos, 316.

<sup>60</sup> Kirton, 386.

situation. Some countries, the United States and Britain in particular, had always been quite skeptical that sanctions by themselves would compel Iraq to leave Kuwait, and urged that the embargo be backed up by an explicit threat of force. On October 29, Douglas Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary, stated this view. He said that without the threat of immediate military action against Iraq, the multinational coalition was simply not credible. Other states, such as the Soviet Union, were anxious to avoid a military confrontation in the region (even if they were not themselves part of the coalition) and therefore argued that the UN should continue non-military pressure on Iraq. According to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, a military solution to the crisis was an “unacceptable” course of action for the Soviet Union.<sup>62</sup>

Despite the divergence of opinion between the two former Cold War rivals, the US continued to develop the means for a military solution to the crisis. On November 8, President Bush ordered 200,000 more US troops to the Persian Gulf region. When the last of these arrived in early 1991, the total number of US military personnel in the region was approximately 380,000.

The issue of Iraq’s nuclear weapon program was also a concern to the world community before and throughout the crisis. On November 25, both US Defense Secretary Richard Cheney and National Security Advisor Scowcroft

---

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Amery, 660.

stated that Iraq was possibly only one year away from being able to produce nuclear weapons.<sup>63</sup>

By the end of November the Soviet Union had accepted the possibility that force might be required to remove Iraq from Kuwait. Consequently, on November 29 the Security Council debated and passed Resolution 678. This resolution is commonly known as the “use of force” resolution and gave the multinational coalition in the Persian Gulf region the right to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait if they had not departed voluntarily by January 15, 1991.

Perhaps in an attempt to partially diffuse the crisis, or to undermine the solidarity of the coalition, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein announced on December 6 that Iraq would release all its hostages immediately. This was happily received by many countries but did nothing to change the coalition’s position. Indeed, in President Bush’s view, the release of the hostages merely “facilitat[ed] the tough decisions that might lie ahead.”<sup>64</sup>

A much more negative announcement came from Hussein on December 22, when he said that if the multinational coalition attacked Iraq, it would use chemical weapons to defend itself. Moreover, the following day he specified that Tel Aviv, Israel, would be Iraq’s first target if any state attacked it. In response, Israel warned that an attack on it would be “devastating” for Iraq.<sup>65</sup>

---

<sup>63</sup> Resende-Santos, 326.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 328.

<sup>65</sup> Amery, 665.

The new year saw Canada both prepare for war and make a last attempt to secure a diplomatic solution to the crisis. On January 1 a new crew for the Canadian supply ship *Protecteur* left Halifax, and on January 4 new crews for the destroyers *Athabaskan* and *Terra Nova* left Victoria. These crews were to replace those already in the Persian Gulf in case the war began and it lasted into the summer. Additionally, in response to Iraqi threats to use chemical weapons if war came, the government supplied its troops in the Persian Gulf region with a new nerve gas antidote and announced plans to provide Canadians civilians in the region with gas masks.<sup>66</sup>

On January 9, Minister of External Affairs Clark flew to New York to meet privately with UN Secretary-General Peres de Cuellar. De Cuellar was planning to go to Baghdad on January 13 to meet with Hussein in an attempt to find an “eleventh hour” solution to the crisis and Clark, therefore, wanted to suggest possible arguments that the Secretary-General might use in persuading the Iraqi leader.<sup>67</sup>

Also on January 9, American Secretary of State Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz met for six hours in Geneva in an attempt to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis. The meeting failed to resolve the crisis and

---

<sup>66</sup> Kirton, 390.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

perhaps intensified the animosity between the two belligerents when Aziz refused to deliver a letter from Bush to Hussein because he objected to its tone.<sup>68</sup>

On January 11, the Canadian government made additional preparations for war when it closed its embassy in Baghdad and sent six more CF-18s, a Boeing 707 in-flight refueller, and 130 support staff for its planes to the Gulf region. Further, Mulroney cancelled planned trips to Britain and West Germany and recalled Parliament so that it could debate Canada's role in the coming war.<sup>69</sup>

UN Secretary General de Cuellar traveled to Baghdad on January 13 and met with Hussein. The meeting, however, was unproductive and failed to result in an Iraqi commitment to withdraw from Kuwait. Consequently, de Cuellar left Baghdad and announced that "only God knows" if the coming war could be averted.<sup>70</sup>

Israel, after much US pressure, announced on January 13 that it would absorb a first-strike from Iraq as long as the attack was not chemical. This was good news for the coalition since its Arab members were reluctant to fight alongside Israel against fellow Arabs.

In Ottawa, Mulroney spent part of January 14 with James Baker. He reaffirmed Canada's commitment to the use of force to oust Iraq from Kuwait, but stressed to Baker the importance of finding a diplomatic solution to the crisis.

---

<sup>68</sup> Amery, 666-67.

<sup>69</sup> Kirton, 390.

On January 15, Defence Minister Bill McKnight announced that 150 medical and 350 support personnel would be sent to the Gulf, and Chief of Staff General Jean de Chastelain said 30 more soldiers would go to Qatar to act as security for the CF-18s. The same day, Mulroney instructed Parliament to debate whether it would "support the United Nations in ending the aggression by Iraq against Kuwait."<sup>71</sup> The ensuing debate, though, was largely symbolic since Canada had already voted in the Security Council for Resolution 678, the "use of force" resolution, and stated publicly and privately that it would participate in the coming war. Hence, even while the House was debating the situation, Cabinet formally authorized Canada's CF-18s in the Persian Gulf to perform "sweep and escort" missions for American aircraft on bombing runs over Iraq and Kuwait.<sup>72</sup>

Internationally, a final flurry of diplomatic efforts by France, Algeria, Yemen, Libya and the Secretary General of the UN occurred on January 14 and 15, but Iraq refused to leave Kuwait unconditionally. Instead, Saddam Hussein condemned King Fahd of Saudi Arabia for inviting foreign troops into the region and said that if war broke out it would be Saudi Arabia's fault. Also, in an open letter to Bush, Hussein predicted that the coming war would be long, would involve Israel, and might include chemical weapons. Nevertheless, at 6:30 p.m. (EST) on January 16, US and other coalition aircraft began bombing

---

<sup>70</sup> ACCESS and John Simpson, "Chronology of Events," in *The Persian Gulf War: Views from the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, Herbert H. Blumberg and Christopher C. French, eds., (New York: University Press of America, 1994), 35.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 391.

Iraq and Kuwait. This action ended Operation Desert Shield and marked that beginning of Operation Desert Storm.

Following the beginning of hostilities Iraq began to fire Scud missiles at Israel, and later, Saudi Arabia. Israel, however, did not respond and no public signs of cleavage within the multinational coalition developed. Operation Desert Storm was mostly confined to the air until February 23, at which time a ground offensive began.

The majority of the action for the Canadian military was seen by its air force. Until February 19, Canadian CF-18s provided cover for US planes on bombing runs. The Cabinet escalated Canada's level of involvement in the war on February 20, when it gave the CF-18s permission to engage Iraqi targets. The targets were on the ground, since the multinational force had control of the skies over Iraq and Kuwait. Seven days following this decision by the government to authorize an offensive level of involvement for Canada, and four days following the start of the coalition ground offensive, US President Bush announced that Kuwait was "liberated" and declared a cease-fire.

## **LEVELS OF ANALYSIS EMPLOYED**

External, non-governmental domestic, and governmental determinants are useful tools in gaining insight into the role various actors play in the decision-

---

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

making process.<sup>73</sup> Arnold Wolfers advocated using differing levels of analysis in order to acquire a greater understanding of why states make particular decisions in all but extreme situations. According to Wolfers, states tend to make similar foreign policy decisions when they are “faced with extreme danger or opportunity, but that when environmental constraints are less severe there will be differences in behavior that must be explained at the decision-making level.”<sup>74</sup>

Each level of analysis has its usefulness but, as Robert Jervis noted, the “importance of each level may vary from one issue area to another.”<sup>75</sup> Thus, a specific level of analysis may best address a particular aspect of an event. Furthermore, the degree of specificity one requires about a decision may dictate the preference of one level of analysis over another. Hence, deciding upon the best level of analysis to employ is a question that “may be determined by how rich and detailed an answer we are seeking.”<sup>76</sup> In demonstrating this point, Jervis states that while external determinants alone can explain why World War I occurred, analysts need governmental and non-governmental domestic determinants to explain why the war occurred in August 1914.<sup>77</sup>

James Rosenau also supported the notion of employing different levels of analysis when examining the decision-making process. Rosenau argued that the characteristics of a state (governmental or non-governmental domestic

---

<sup>73</sup> This analytical framework is based on that developed by Dr. T.A. Keenleyside.

<sup>74</sup> Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), 13-14.

<sup>75</sup> Jervis, 17.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*

determinants) or the structure of the international system (external determinants) affect the decision-making process to varying degrees. Factors such as the size of a state, the personality of the leader, a state's degree of political and economic stability, and the severity of the issue at hand all play a role in determining the importance of one level of analysis over another.<sup>78</sup>

Consequently, this paper uses external, non-governmental domestic, and governmental determinants to study Canada's decision to support and participate in Operation Desert Storm. There are two primary reasons for the inclusion of all three levels of analysis. First, since participation in the war would not threaten the immediate or long-term existence of Canada it can be assumed that Operation Desert Storm represented no extreme danger to Canada, and therefore, a number of factors likely contributed to Canada's decision. Second, since this paper seeks to obtain as detailed an answer as possible regarding Canada's decision to join Operation Desert Storm it is useful to analyze as many variables as possible.

## **ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK**

### *EXTERNAL DETERMINANTS*

The external environment consists of individual variables, external to Canada, that influence the Canadian government's decision-making process. There are

---

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> James Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

seven distinct external variables this study analyses to gain insight into the factors that influenced Canada to participate in Operation Desert Storm.

The first variable is the Global Environment. International systems can be hegemonic, bipolar, or multipolar and the structure of the system can influence the policies governments formulate regarding issues. A hegemonic state, for example, has great leeway in conducting foreign policy because no other state is in a position to challenge it. In a bipolar system each pole must consider how the other pole will react to its foreign policy actions. In a multipolar system poles must also be aware of others in the system and sometimes even obtain the support of others poles.

Second is the Dominant Bilateral System. This variable analyses the relationship between Canada and the state with which it is most closely aligned (in terms of political, economic, military integration and/or convergence of interest). Canada's Dominant Bilateral Partner is, of course, the United States. The US position on a possible foreign policy issue, the current state of Canadian-American relations, and the likely reaction of the US to a particular foreign policy stance by Canada, interact to influence Canada's decision-making process.

The third variable is the Dominant Regional System. This is the subsystem within which Canada has the most interactions, and with which it best identifies. States tend to be influenced more by their Dominant Regional System than by other regional subsystems. Canada's Dominant Regional System is Western Europe. Despite the distance between the two regions, Canada identifies with this area due

to historical ties with it and a desire to build a North Atlantic community to counterbalance the gravitational pull of the United States.

The fourth variable is constituted by Other Bilateral Systems. It analyses the influences that states other than the Dominant Bilateral partner have on Canada's decision-making process. A particular state is analyzed within the Other Bilateral Systems variable when a Canadian policy will affect it. For this case study, Iraq and Kuwait are Canada's Other Bilateral Systems.

Other Regional Systems form the fifth variable and it operates much like the preceding variable. The only difference is that rather than a state being analyzed, a subsystem other than the Dominant Regional is analyzed. The Middle East is the subsystem examined in this case study.

International Institutions constitutes the sixth variable analyzed here. The opinions of institutions that Canada respects or wants to maintain are likely to influence Canada's foreign policy decision-making. Among the institutions that could be included within this category are governmental and non-governmental organizations such as the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the World Bank.

The final external variable that influences a state's decision-making process is International Law and Systemic Values. States going against the grain of acceptable international conduct often are subjected to political and economic sanctions, and therefore have an interest in acting within international law and

following systemic values. A democratic state not acting within expected international norms indicates the probable overwhelming influences of other variables affecting its decision-making process.

#### *NON-GOVERNMENTAL DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS*

Non-governmental domestic determinants are societal variables that influence the decision-making process. This case study examines seven such variables.

First, is the variable of History. It assumes that a state's foreign policy in a particular issue area is influenced by past foreign policy initiatives in the same issue area. Accordingly, sometimes a policy will fail if there are no historical experiences on which the government can structure its policy.

Political Culture is the second non-governmental domestic variable this case study examines. It represents the collective political attitudes, values, and beliefs of the individuals in a state and influences society's perceptions about the nature of foreign policy and the significance of any particular issue which arises.

The third variable is the Canadian Political Situation. This variable refers to the current state of politics in the state. For example, the popularity of the government, and the amount of time before or after an election are factors that influence the decision-making process.

The Economic Situation is the fourth variable. This variable attempts to determine how the current state of the economy affects a country's decision-

making process. Moreover, this variable also considers how a particular decision may affect the future health of the economy.

The fifth variable is Interest Groups. This variable is most effective when a foreign policy decision is in a functional area (for example, economic or environmental issues), as opposed to an area of “high politics.” The interest group variable has two components: self-interested, which is usually either economic or ethnic, and altruistic. Interest groups tend to affect the decision-making process by influencing Parliament through commission meetings, the media, and public opinion.

The sixth non-governmental domestic variable is Public Opinion; it has two sub-components: mass public opinion and elite public opinion. Public opinion polls generally reflect mass public opinion. Governments often use these polls to test the public’s reaction to a proposed policy or use them as parameters within which a policy can be implemented without great public protest. Elite public opinion is the public articulation of a smaller group of individual people within Canada. Generally, it consists of academic literature, newspaper editorials, letters to the editor, and newspaper features written by individuals not directly employed by the newspaper.

The final non-governmental domestic variable influencing government decision-making is the category of Relevant Extraneous Events. This variable refers to

events that appear to have no direct relevance to the issue at stake, but nevertheless influence it.

### *GOVERNMENTAL DETERMINANTS*

This level of analysis examines the influence of governmental sources on Canada's decision-making process. Within it there are four main variables, the first of which is Parliament. Parliament is the least influential of the four variables, but its impact will vary according to three circumstances: whether the government is a majority or minority one; whether the House and/or Senate is generally supportive of government initiatives at the particular time; and whether the government caucus is united or divided (especially with respect to leadership issues).

The Bureaucracy is the second governmental variable that influences the decision-making process. The bureaucracy refers to the government departments that are used to formulate and implement policy. As the bureaucracy is composed of many individuals, the manner in which these people perceive and react to events is important to consider. The secretive nature of the bureaucracy, however, makes it the most difficult variable to examine.

The Cabinet and the Prime Minister are the third and fourth variables. These two actors form the upper echelons of government and as a result are integral actors in Canada's foreign policy making. As with the bureaucracy, an important dimension of these two variables is perception. Decision-makers do not judge events or base their decisions on an objective reality; rather, they base decisions on

their perception of the international system, which is a manifestation of their subjective view of reality or, at least, the collective view of their advisors.

## **Chapter 3: Canada's Decision-Making Process**

The purpose of this chapter is to examine Canada's Persian Gulf War decision-making process. In this regard, it will seek to study the influences on Canada's decision to participate in Operation Desert Storm, and also the factors responsible for limiting that involvement.

This analysis will demonstrate that Canada's decision to participate in the operation came primarily from external determinants. Factors such as the end of the Cold War, Canada's ties to the UN and the US, and international law heavily influenced the government's decision. On the other hand, while the non-governmental domestic determinants played a role in the decision-making process they mostly only modified the decision that the external determinants encouraged. Political considerations by the government and public opinion ratings were non-governmental domestic factors that modified Canada's decision. The governmental determinants influenced both the previously discussed aspects of the decision-making process but did not appear to play as prominent a role as the external and non-governmental domestic determinants. Important among the governmental determinants were the Department of External Affairs' desire to join the operation and the early reluctance on the part of some Cabinet ministers to become overly involved in the crisis.

### **ANALYSIS OF DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN DESERT STORM**

## EXTERNAL DETERMINANTS

### *Global Environment*

At the time of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the USSR and the US no longer dominated the world. The Cold War was over and the Soviet Union was close to disintegrating. The end of the bipolar international system produced what many have termed the "New World Order" or NWO. It had a two-fold effect: first, it increased the level of regional entropy as the two former superpowers lessened their respective dominance over states they previously had in their spheres of influence; and second, unprecedented Soviet-Western cooperation in international affairs.

Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait was an example of regional conflict in the post-Cold War world. Had Iraq's invasion succeeded, however, the entire international system would have been affected. Iraq would have become a regional hegemon due to its increased economic power and added an additional pole to the international system's post-Cold War multipolar structure. Iraqi control of its own and Kuwaiti oil fields would have raised its proven oil reserves from 100.0 to 199.7 billion barrels and given it 19.7% of the world market.<sup>79</sup> Such a share of world oil reserves would have made Iraq the world's second largest holder of oil, next only to Saudi Arabia, which held 25.2% of world oil reserves.<sup>80</sup>

---

<sup>79</sup> George Joffé, "Oil, Wealth and Wealth Distribution," in *The Persian Gulf War: Views from the Social and Behavioral Science*, Herbert H. Blumberg and Christopher C. French, eds., (New York: University Press of America, 1994), 164.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

Iraq wanted higher oil prices for two reasons. First, it believed that Kuwait and the UAE had been selling more than their Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quotas allowed and therefore had lowered the price of oil. The effect of this was devastating for Iraq because every \$1 drop in the price of oil caused a \$1 billion drop in its annual revenues.<sup>81</sup> Second, the Iraqi economy was severely damaged due to its nine year war with Iran and needed substantial amounts of money to rebuild.

Canada does not import large supplies of Middle Eastern oil, but it would have suffered if there had been a rise in world oil prices. As the "Oil Shocks" of 1973-4 (following the Arab-Israeli war) and 1979-80 (following the Iranian Revolution) demonstrated, rapid increases in oil prices can lead to worldwide economic instability.<sup>82</sup> Since Canada is a trading state that exports one-third of the goods it produces, it needed a stable world economy consisting of states that are not protectionist and can afford to buy its goods. Consequently, the stability of the international economy was one motive for Canada to participate in Operation Desert Storm.

The means by which the international system affected Canada's decision-making process the most, however, likely lies within the second noted aspect of this variable. The end of the Cold War gave Canada and its allies greater flexibility

---

<sup>81</sup> Ann M. Lesch and Joe Stork, "Why War? Background to the Crisis," *Middle East Report* 6, no. 167 (November/December 1990), 18.

<sup>82</sup> Stephen Gill and David Law, *The Global Political Economy* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1988), 262-3.

in responding to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Throughout the Cold War, Canada most frequently responded to international events it opposed with verbal criticisms or condemnations, and sometimes by the application of political and/or economic sanctions. To do anything more than this risked an escalation in the Cold War. In the case of the Persian Gulf crisis, with Soviet cooperation, or at least acceptance of UN action against Iraq assured, Canada was able to react militarily to Iraq's aggression. Consequently, according to External Affairs Minister, Joe Clark, this new international environment allowed Canada to pursue its desire to promote "the defense and construction of a durable international order"<sup>83</sup> through whatever means it considered effective, without fear of systemic reverberations.

### *Dominant Bilateral System*

The United States represents Canada's Dominant Bilateral System as it is the state that has the most influence over Canada. There are two ways the US influenced Canada's decision-making process. First, because the US chose to forgo unilaterally opposing the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and instead build a coalition of states that would challenge Iraq, it was important for it to have the support of both its allies and the UN Security Council. Canada fell within both of these categories and, therefore, faced a large degree of American pressure to participate in Operation Desert Storm.

---

<sup>83</sup> "Why are we at war?," *Canadian Speeches/ISSUES* (February 1991), 8.

US governmental officials, including the President, Secretary of State, and Ambassador to the UN, repeatedly explained the US position to their Canadian counterparts and asked for Canadian support, but the most potent form of pressure against Canada was implicit. As James Graff stated, there almost certainly “would be ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in the US confrontation with Iraq, and that the ‘losers’ would be any state whose support the US wanted and which did not stand with the US.”<sup>84</sup> Throughout Operation Desert Shield the US was critical of its allies Germany and Japan, for not contributing enough to the multinational coalition. Moreover, it hinted that Yemen (a Persian Gulf state on the Security Council), and Jordan (a key Persian Gulf state due to its Iraqi contacts), would suffer financially for their unwillingness to support US initiatives. Had Canada not supported the American decision it is possible that Canada would have faced some form of American criticism or retaliation. According to James Graff, the retaliation might have been an American decision to exclude Canadian participation in US-Mexico reciprocity talks that were occurring at the time of the conflict, and in which Canada was actively seeking representation.<sup>85</sup>

Second, Canada’s decision to participate in Operation Desert Storm was also made to modify or constrain US behaviour in much the same way it did in the Korean War.<sup>86</sup> After Canada indicated early in the crisis that it was sending two destroyers and a supply ship to the Persian Gulf, the government was able to

---

<sup>84</sup> Graff, 419.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., 418.

communicate more forcefully to the US that its naval blockade ought to be authorized by the UN Security Council. Said Minister of External Affairs Clark,

In August and September, the United States was very seriously considering going alone. Canada argued consistently that the United States had to come in under the UN umbrella, that if there was to be any kind of action, it had to be in the context of the United Nations. That has happened.<sup>87</sup>

While Canada was able to voice its opinions and, in some instances, influence US actions throughout Operation Desert Shield, it would not have been able to do so during Operation Desert Storm if it did not participate in the military operation itself. According to Reg Whitaker,

by proving its “bona fides” as an ally and team player with military contributions (however symbolic), Canada would gain a voice in Washington allowing some measure of control over the conduct of the war and the formulation of war aims, which it would not have if it stayed offside.<sup>88</sup>

Thus, without a commitment to participate in Operation Desert Storm, Canada would have had no chance to influence US policy in this phase of the conflict.

### *Dominant Regional System*

Western Europe supported Operation Desert Storm in principle, but lacked “an internally coherent European policy in the crisis and one which provided consistent support for American action.”<sup>89</sup> The three key European states capable

---

<sup>86</sup> Whitaker, 17.

<sup>87</sup> Wirick, 96.

<sup>88</sup> Whitaker, 17.

<sup>89</sup> Matthews, 272.

of influencing Canada - Britain, France, and Germany - all had different approaches to participation in Operation Desert Storm. Britain supported the operation without hesitation, and among western states would eventually make the second largest military contribution to the multinational coalition. France also supported and fully participated in Operation Desert Storm, but according to President François Mitterrand, did so hesitantly due to its “long standing” friendship with Iraq.<sup>90</sup> France also sought to keep all its diplomatic and military options open throughout the crisis. This was particularly apparent when it undertook a last-minute diplomatic initiative to persuade Iraq to leave Kuwait without consulting either the US or its European allies. Finally, Germany did not participate militarily in Operation Desert Storm due to its preoccupation with reunification and its constitutional dilemma over the use of its military outside its borders, but in response to US pressure to help fund the operation it contributed \$6.572 billion to America’s military costs. Besides Britain, whose position towards Iraq was uncompromising, the only consistent feature among these and the other states within the European Community (now the European Union) was that before they would support or become involved in a war against Iraq, all possible diplomatic negotiations must have been attempted.<sup>91</sup>

The EC, in general, reacted strongly to the crisis on economic and diplomatic fronts. Following Iraq’s invasion the body imposed economic sanctions against

---

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., 84.

<sup>91</sup> Miller: *Following the Americans*, 110.

Iraq before the UN made them mandatory for all states. Also, the EC worked towards finding a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Throughout all of this, Canada was aware of the actions being taken by its European counterparts and once, in November 1990, Joe Clark went to Europe to discuss with various leaders possible diplomatic solutions. Hence, while there is no direct evidence indicating that Canada's actions were influenced by the EC it is likely that the their coincidence of interests made Canada's economic and diplomatic decisions easier to make.

Ultimately, the EC approved of Operation Desert Storm as a means to force Iraq from Kuwait. In addition to Britain and France, Italy contributed planes and ships to the coalition, and Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain also contributed ships.<sup>92</sup> Had these other states come to a uniform military response contrary to the American position, it would have created a dilemma for Canada. Conversely, had there been a unified EC response that matched America's, Canada would have had little freedom of decision-making at all. However, given the divergence of opinion within the EC, Canada was able to appear more independent, and also more loyal to principles of internationalism than would otherwise have been the case.

### *Other Bilateral Systems*

Iraq and Kuwait are states that bilaterally influenced Canada's decision-making process. Iraq's domestic and external actions influenced Canadian participation in

Operation Desert Storm. Besides its aggression against Kuwait, Iraq was believed to have committed human rights abuses, used chemical weapons against its Kurdish population, and initiated the developmental stages of nuclear weapon production. It was also known to have taken foreigners in Kuwait and Iraq as hostages to be used as “human shields” against the coalition forces.<sup>93</sup> Mulroney indicated the extent to which Iraqi actions had influenced Canada when he argued that if Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein were not stopped, Hussein and Iraq’s actions “would become an example for other potential bullies, making the world an even more dangerous place than it [was] already.”<sup>94</sup>

The Kuwaiti government fled its homeland shortly before Iraqi troops captured Kuwait City, but through the hiring of the US public relations firm Hill and Knowlton, it attempted to further erode Western public opinion of Iraq and increase sympathy for Kuwait, thereby pressuring foreign governments to participate in Operation Desert Storm. The theme of Hill and Knowlton’s argument was that Kuwait was a victim of aggression and that if Iraq’s actions remained unchecked, it would motivate other states to abandon the international system’s “rule of law.” The most publicized story disseminated by Hill and Knowlton was that Iraqi soldiers in Kuwait City unhooked 300 newborn infants from their incubators and left them on the floor to die in order to bring the

---

<sup>92</sup> Matthews, 314.

<sup>93</sup> Koch, 13.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

incubators back to Iraq.<sup>95</sup> There is no evidence that Kuwait and Hill and Knowlton's messages had any direct impact on Canada's decision-making process, however, the theme of its messages was consistent with that which the Canadian government was conveying as justification for joining Operation Desert Storm, and therefore likely made the government more comfortable with the position it had taken.<sup>96</sup> Consequently, the combination of Iraqi aggressiveness vis-à-vis Kuwait, its population, foreigners in Iraq and Kuwait, and its desire to acquire nuclear weapons, along with a Kuwaiti public relations campaign against Iraq contributed to Canada's decision to support and participate in Operation Desert Storm.

#### *Other Regional System: the Middle East*

The other relevant regional system in this case study is the Middle East. This variable presented reasons for and against participation in Operation Desert Storm.

One of the most important factors was that a majority of the governments in the Middle East region were not overtly opposed to Western, even American, intervention in the conflict.<sup>97</sup>

Calls for international intervention began with Kuwait on August 2 when, during its invasion by Iraqi troops, it asked Arab states, the Gulf Co-operation

---

<sup>95</sup> Winter, 25-26. This story proved to be false. The "unidentified" woman who told the story to the US Congress turned out to be the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the US and she was paid for her services.

<sup>96</sup> "Why are we at war?," 3-4.

<sup>97</sup> Resende-Santos, 308.

Council and the United Nations for military assistance.<sup>98</sup> By August 3, US Defence Secretary Richard Cheney was meeting with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and pressuring him to accept American military protection. Cheney told Fahd of US intelligence reports that 100,000 Iraqi troops were positioned south of Kuwait City and were nearing the border with Saudi Arabia.<sup>99</sup> Behind these troops were reinforcements coming both from inside Iraq and the Iran-Iraq border. On August 6, following additional meetings between the two men, Saudi Arabia requested the transfer of American troops to the state to protect it from a possible Iraqi invasion.<sup>100</sup> The granting of permission to the US to deploy troops to Saudi Arabia was extended to Britain and France on August 8, and eventually to all other interested states. This consequently represented the beginning of the multinational coalition opposed to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.<sup>101</sup>

Arab states originally pronounced a desire to deal independently with the Iraqi invasion. As early as August 3, one day after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Egypt's president, Hosni Mubarak, stated that "Arab leaders are capable of finding a solution to this problem without any foreign interference."<sup>102</sup> However, an August 10 emergency Arab League summit in Cairo, attended by both Iraqi and Kuwaiti delegations, revealed that an "Arab solution" to the crisis would be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. Attempts to persuade Iraq to leave Kuwait and allow its

---

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., 301-2

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., 304.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., 305.

<sup>101</sup> Amery, 651.

leader Emir Jabir al-Ahmad Al-Sabah to return to power, failed. Consequently, the Arab League voted on the issue and, by a margin of 12-9, agreed to join the American-led multinational coalition. Later, various League members sent troops to Saudi Arabia, as well as the other Gulf Co-operation Council states to help protect them from Iraq.<sup>103</sup>

This vote implied that the Arab League authorized the emergence of an Arab-Western alliance opposed to Iraq's aggression. Since most of the Middle Eastern population was uneasy or opposed to a Western military presence in the Persian Gulf area, the Arab League's decision made Canada more confident about sending its troops to the region. Without the explicit sanction of the Arab League, Arab popular opinion may have led governments to oppose the West's "interference" and changed the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict into an Arab-Western conflict.

An aspect of this variable that discouraged Canadian participation in Operation Desert Storm was the possibility of the Arab-Western alliance breaking down. Iran, Libya, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization strongly opposed the presence of Western troops in the Persian Gulf region, and Iraq, through its demand that the Arab-Israeli problem be tied to its withdrawal from Kuwait, attempted to draw Arab support away from the West. When the coalition rejected this and other previously mentioned conditions Iraq said that if it were attacked it

---

<sup>102</sup> Resende-Santos, 304.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, 308.

would bomb Israel. This threat aimed to draw Israel into the ensuing war and, out of an Arab unwillingness to be allied with Israel, break the Western-Arab alliance.

The second Iraqi threat was by far the most serious and possibly could have unravelled the anti-Iraq coalition. The fact, however, that Canada contributed troops to Operation Desert Storm suggests that the Arab world's willingness to join the American-led coalition had the greater influence on Ottawa decision-makers. Nevertheless, if Iraq's threats did play any role in influencing Canada's decision it is likely that they influenced Canada's decision not to contribute ground combat troops to the operation.

### *International Institutions*

While there are a number of institutions that command Canada's respect and which likely played a small role in influencing the state's decision to participate in Operation Desert Storm, a discussion of them all would go beyond the scope of this study. As a result, the unit of analysis within this variable is limited to the largest, and perhaps the most important international institution in the world, the UN.

The UN influenced Canada's decision to participate in Operation Desert Storm in two ways. First, Canada's past involvement in the development of the UN and in UN operations created a strong precedent for the government to follow. Speaking in the House of Commons, Joe Clark argued that Canadians had a

responsibility to follow the tradition of past Canadians who supported and helped develop the UN. Said Clark:

Canadians historically have been at the cutting edge of the practical measures which have won respect for the United Nations. We helped draft the charter. Professor John Humphrey of McGill was a principle author of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Lester Pearson guided the ideal of peacekeeping, against Canadian critics who said it was an inappropriate use of the United Nations, and 83,000 Canadians wore and wear today the blue beret, with pride and with effect, to build peace and to maintain peace.<sup>104</sup>

Opinion ratings also showed that the public viewed the UN favourably. An opinion poll in early October 1990 indicated that 34% of Canadians felt they were gaining "respect for the United Nations organization" while only 22% felt they were losing respect for the UN; 33% of respondents felt their opinion of the UN had not changed over time.<sup>105</sup> These figures differ greatly from 1980 when only 18% of Canadians felt they were gaining respect for the UN, 42% felt they had decreasing respect, and 28% felt their level of respect had not changed. Further, the figures also differ greatly from 1972, when the opinion ratings were 20%, 25%, and 36%, respectively.<sup>106</sup>

As a result, Canada's support for the UN produced a great deal of pressure on policy makers to co-sponsor and actively support participation in Operation Desert Storm. According to Bernard Wood, Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, because Operation Desert Storm was

---

<sup>104</sup> Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 2nd Session, 34th Parliament. Vol. XII (November 28, 1990), 15801.

<sup>105</sup> *The Gallup Report*, October 11, 1990.

a UN-sanctioned mission “it would be inconceivable for Canada to stand aside from full participation in the [war].”<sup>107</sup> In describing how the UN influenced Canada’s Persian Gulf War decision, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney stated “The fundamental truth in this debate is that if we want peace we must defend these principles which are enshrined in the UN Charter.”<sup>108</sup>

Second, this variable also influenced Canada’s Persian Gulf War policy in that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was the first major crisis in the post-Cold War world and it was widely perceived that the role the UN played in the NWO would be influenced by its performance in this crisis. Both Mulroney and Clark recognized the importance of supporting the UN in its attempt to remove Iraq from Kuwait.

Said Mulroney,

With the end of the Cold War, the international community has the opportunity at last to transform the potential of the UN into performance. ... The UN was prevented by the Cold War from responding to other acts of aggression over the years. But that situation has now changed. With the end of the Cold War, the UN has the opportunity to act in defence of the security of its members.<sup>109</sup>

Had Canada, one of the UN’s most loyal supporters, failed to support it, the moral authority the UN stood to gain from conducting a successful resistance to the Iraqi invasion would have been lessened. Moreover, as the Prime Minister noted, if Canada did not involve itself in Operation Desert Storm, “a large part of the

---

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

<sup>107</sup> Hibbard, 17.

<sup>108</sup> George Koch, “When words fail,” *Western Report* (January 28, 1991), 12.

<sup>109</sup> Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 2nd Session, 34th Parliament, Vol. XII (November 29, 1990), 15958.

principles and objectives and efforts of 45 years of Canadian diplomacy would have been for nothing.”<sup>110</sup>

### *International Law and Systemic Values*

International law is important to Canada and thus influenced its Persian Gulf War decision. Its “most basic interest,” as Brian Mulroney stated during the Gulf crisis, lay “in the preservation of international law and order.”<sup>111</sup> Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and its actions afterwards violated many international norms and agreements that constitute international law. By the invasion, Iraq violated Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter, which requires that “All members [of the UN] shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”<sup>112</sup> Besides the UN Charter, Iraq’s invasion also violated Article 2 of the Pact of the Arab League. This document states:

The purpose of the League is to draw closer the relations between member states and co-ordinate their political activities with the aim of realizing a closed collaboration between them, to safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and to consider in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries.<sup>113</sup>

---

<sup>110</sup> “Why are we at war?,” 4.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>112</sup> United Nations Charter, Article 2 (4).

While there are exceptions to when force against another state can be employed, namely Article 51 and Chapter VII in the UN Charter, Iraq’s invasion did not fall within these categories.

<sup>113</sup> Pact of the League of Arab States, article 2, March 22, 1945.

Rather than working through the Arab League to solve its problems with Kuwait, Iraq used its military to force its demands on Kuwait. Additionally, Iraq's Kuwaiti invasion violated the 1928 Treaty of Paris (otherwise known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact) and a number of UN General Assembly Resolutions, such as the 1949 Essentials of Peace Resolution, the 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention, and the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration.

Before the invasion, Iraq stated it would not attack Kuwait. Its subsequent actions were therefore deceptive and, thus, another breach of international law. By not announcing its intentions to attack Kuwait, Iraq's actions violated the Third Hague Convention of 1907 that requires states to issue a warning before the "commencement" of hostilities. According to the Convention:

The contracting Powers recognize that hostilities must not commence without previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a declaration of war, giving reasons, or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war.<sup>114</sup>

Iraq's decision to make the approximately 11,000 foreign nationals in Iraq and Kuwait its "guests" and to keep some of them in areas considered potential military targets was clearly counter to international law. These individuals were obviously hostages and according to the 1979 Convention Against Hostage-Taking:

Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to ... continue to detain another person ... in order to compel a third party, namely, a state, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or judicial person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the

---

<sup>114</sup> Hague Convention, No. III, Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, article 1, October 18, 1907.

hostage commits the offence of taking of hostages within the meaning of this Convention.<sup>115</sup>

Additionally, the General Assembly recognized that Iraqi actions toward the population of Kuwait following the invasion violated both the UN Charter and the International Covenants on Human Rights. On December 18, 1990 the world body issued a resolution condemning Iraq for “serious violations of human rights against Kuwaiti people and third-state nations” by a margin of 144 to 1 with no abstentions. Predictably, Iraq was the one state to oppose the resolution.<sup>116</sup>

One final example of how Iraqi actions countered established international conventions and thus, violated international law was its order to all diplomatic missions in Kuwait to close and its use of force against some embassies to enforce this demand. This order was counter to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that was drafted in part to protect diplomats and allow missions to fully carry out their intended duties. This document required states to respect the independence of diplomatic missions and permit them to function at all times.<sup>117</sup> Iraq should not have required the Canadian, or any other, diplomatic mission to close since the UN ruled the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait was “null and void.”<sup>118</sup> Moreover, Iraq’s decision to send troops into the Canadian mission to help facilitate its closing was counter to the intentions of the Convention on Diplomatic Relations and against international diplomatic norms.

---

<sup>115</sup> United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 34/146.

<sup>116</sup> United Nations General Assembly, Resolution, 45/170.

<sup>117</sup> 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, articles 22, 25, 45.

Besides violating international conventions Iraq also broke a second source of international law, as recognized by the International Court of Justice, "international custom."<sup>119</sup> International custom, or customary law, in simplest terms is defined as "the actual practice of states."<sup>120</sup> In this regard, what states do and even what they do not do is evidence of customary law. Actions counter to such established norms of acceptable state conduct are violations of international law. Iraq's annexation of another UN member state was unprecedented and can arguably be viewed as a violation of international law. Also, its order following the annexation of Kuwait that all diplomatic missions there had to close, and subsequent intrusions into various diplomatic missions (Canada's embassy included), were further examples of actions not condoned by customary law.

In response to Iraq's actions Canadian policy makers stressed that such deviant actions could not be allowed to succeed out of fear that other states might also seek to employ them. According to Prime Minister Mulroney, the Persian Gulf crisis had to be solved.

Otherwise force will have been authorized by the world community and on behalf of the international institutions Canada has spent five decades to design and defend. Not to defend those institutions now, to abandon the unanimity and the consensus that has been found in the United Nations now, would be to abandon all hope for the rule of law in world affairs.<sup>121</sup>

---

<sup>118</sup> United Nations Security Council, Resolution 662, August 8, 1990.

<sup>119</sup> Statute of the International Court of Justice, article 38(1).

<sup>120</sup> Michael Akehurst, *A Modern Introduction to International Law*, 4th ed. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), 23.

<sup>121</sup> Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 2nd Session, 34th Parliament, Vol. XII (November 28, 1990), 15801.

Consequently, the most efficient way for Canada to protect its interests in the international system was to declare that aggressive states such as Iraq would not be allowed to flaunt international laws and norms and to support and participate in Operation Desert Storm.

## *NON-GOVERNMENTAL DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS*

### *History*

Canada's history influenced its participation in Operation Desert Storm, but also influenced established what response, from an historical perspective, would be an unacceptable level of commitment by the government.

Opposing aggression has been a constant feature of Canadian foreign policy since the end of the Second World War. As the state does not have the military or political capability to achieve this foreign policy goal unilaterally, it has relied on multilateral means. Consequently, when the opportunity came to join the multinational coalition to force Iraq from Kuwait, there was no historical barrier to doing so, and, indeed, a positive incentive to become part of it.

History, while establishing that Canadian participation in Operation Desert Storm was acceptable, also acted to limit the extent of Canada's participation. This aspect of the variable indicates that committing ground troops to Operation Desert Storm would have been an unacceptable option to pursue. Ground troops have in the past produced what John Kirton refers to as "painful memories" for the nation and "political traumas" for the governments in power. Hong Kong and Dieppe are

two examples of unsuccessful campaigns lingering in the memory of the military. Prior to the war some analysts predicted that forcing Iraq from Kuwait would be difficult since the Iraqi military had gained immense desert warfare experience from its eight-year war with Iran. One study predicted that liberating Kuwait would cost the multinational coalition 10 000 troops, the majority of whom would be ground forces.<sup>122</sup> While the Canadian Forces' limited military capabilities contributed to the government's decision to withhold ground troops from participating in Operation Desert Storm, the prospects of Canadian troops dying in a battle over Kuwait and "the absence of any new Iraqi atrocity abroad of sufficient magnitude to overwhelm the painful memories" casualties would cause also influenced its decision.<sup>123</sup>

Consequently, Canada's history of militarily opposing the aggression of another state when there is a coalition present for it to join facilitated its decision to participate in the war. Past military losses, however, were also a factor influencing limited participation in the war.

### *Political Culture*

Political Culture is comprised of the political attitudes, values, and belief of individuals in a state. In the months leading up to the Persian Gulf War, both anti- and pro-war activists attempted to use their conceptions of Canadian political

---

<sup>122</sup> Olivia Ward, "It's Not Too Late to Avert Showdown, Experts Maintain," *Toronto Star*, December 5, 1990, A14.

culture as justification for their positions. On the one hand, some individuals argued that Canada was a “peacekeeping nation.”<sup>124</sup> They felt that participation in the ensuing war would compromise the state’s image and most likely prevent it from participating in future peacekeeping missions. On the other hand, pro-war activists’ conception of Canadian political culture was that besides being a “peacekeeping nation” Canada was also a state that opposed aggression and believed in multilateral solutions to global problems. This second argument appeared to have had more influence on the government’s decision-making process since members of the government, including the Prime Minister, repeatedly claimed that participation would not harm Canada’s peacekeeping image. According to Mulroney:

Our military response to Iraqi aggression is fully compatible with our tradition as international peacekeepers. Canada has been amongst [the most] active of all countries in multilateral peacekeeping efforts over the last forty-five years. Canadians have served in more than twenty peacekeeping operations, from the Congo to the Sinai, from Indochina to Namibia. And we are all proud of that tradition. But our peacekeeping role neither excludes us nor excuses us from the call to resist aggression. The roles are complementary, as both serve the larger political purpose of preserving international order and are very much in Canada’s interest.<sup>125</sup>

The government perceived that participating in the war would be consistent with the founding principles of the UN and fears that participation would taint Canada’s image as a peacekeeping nation did not affect the government’s decision.

---

<sup>123</sup> Kirton, 389.

<sup>124</sup> “Why are we at war?,” 4.

<sup>125</sup> Miller: *Following the Americans*, 148.

### *Canadian Political Situation*

The Progressive Conservative (PC) government was widely unpopular during the months leading up to the decision to participate in Operation Desert Storm. Public opinion before Operation Desert Storm indicated the government only had the support of approximately 14% of the country<sup>126</sup> and there was concern among decision-makers that involvement in a protracted war could prevent the Mulroney government from improving its popular opinion rating or create additional antipathy towards the already unpopular government.<sup>127</sup>

Quebec was the area of the country that trusted the government the most. A November 1990 public opinion poll that asked Canadians if they approved or disapproved of the government's record since its November 1988 election victory found that 30% of Quebecers approved of the government's record while the national average was only 15%.<sup>128</sup> Additionally, popular opinion polls indicated the government's largest base of support was in Quebec. The number of Quebecers supporting the PCs was 5% to 9% higher than the national average of 14%.<sup>129</sup>

These figures clearly indicated that the people of Quebec were much more willing than citizens in other regions of the country to support the Tories in the next federal election. Having the support of Quebec was key to the PC's 1988

---

<sup>126</sup> *The Gallup Report*, June 20, 1991.

<sup>127</sup> Anthony Wilson-Smith and Bruce Wallace, "A Call To Arms," *Maclean's* (January 28, 1991), 34.

<sup>128</sup> *The Gallup Report*, November 5, 1990.

election victory. In that election the PC party won 63 of Quebec's 75 seats<sup>130</sup> and to win the next election a similar result would likely have to be achieved. As a result, to maintain its level of support in Quebec, the government had an impetus to keep its level of participation in Operation Desert Storm in line with what Quebecers would tolerate.

Quebecers' view on sending ships to the Persian Gulf to help police the economic embargo against Iraq were similar to the national average. Within Quebec, 54% of the people supported this idea while the national average was 58%. Conversely, 33% of Quebecers opposed the idea, compared to 32% nationally.<sup>131</sup> Whether the Canadian armed forces should go to war against Iraq was a more controversial issue within Quebec. Regarding this question, 72% of Quebecers opposed such action while the national rate of opposition was 55%.<sup>132</sup>

Consequently, the opinion polls indicating that Quebec was the government's last base of support in the country and a fear that too much of a Persian Gulf War commitment might turn Quebec against it in the next election<sup>133</sup> likely helped to counter the forces that strongly advocated full participation in the war and led to the decision that was made. A limited level of participation that would probably produce fewer casualties than those of states which participated fully.

---

<sup>129</sup> *The Gallup Report*, June 20, 1991.

<sup>130</sup> Frank Feigert, *Canada Votes: 1935-1988* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), 56.

<sup>131</sup> *The Gallup Report*, October 8, 1990.

<sup>132</sup> *The Gallup Report*, December 27, 1990.

*Canadian Economic Situation*

Before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Canada had a large trade surplus with Iraq. In 1989, Canadian exports to Iraq totaled approximately \$258 million, 95% of which were wheat and barley exports. On the other hand, Canadian imports from Iraq totalled just \$61 million, virtually all of them petroleum-related products.<sup>134</sup>

Canada's decision to leave wheat off its August 5 list of unilateral sanctions against Iraq was likely made to protect its trade interests in Iraq. By leaving grain off the list of unilateral sanctions, Canada could keep most of its trade relationship with Iraq, yet give the appearance that it was punishing Iraq for its actions. Likewise, Canada's decision to withhold ground troops that would participate offensively against Iraq might also have been partially linked to its trade surplus with Iraq. On August 6, the same day the Security Council voted to impose mandatory worldwide economic sanctions against Iraq, the Iraqi ambassador to France warned the state that its decision to support the sanctions would hurt its "huge interests" in Iraq.

While there were no reports that the Iraqi government made similar economic threats toward Canada, Iraq's Minister of Trade did strongly criticize Canada's decision to halt Iraqi wheat shipments following the Security Council's decision to impose economic sanctions. According to the Iraqi Minister, Canada violated the "norms of international trade cooperation" and had "a flagrant disregard of

---

<sup>133</sup> Nancy Wood, "The Isolationist Province," *Maclean's* (January 28, 1991), 35.

international norms and regulations” when it stopped wheat that was “of a humanitarian nature and represent[ed] vital food for the Iraqi people.”<sup>135</sup> Consequently, Canada’s economic interests in Iraq present the possibility that the Canadian government limited its involvement in the war as a precaution against losing its share of Iraq’s wheat market in the post-war period.

### *Promotional Interest Groups*

There was an array of interest groups with opinions on participation in Operation Desert Storm. Virtually all opposed sending ground troops to fight in the war while the majority of promotional interest groups even opposed the government’s decision to engage Canada in limited participation. Among the many interest groups that opposed using force to oust Iraq from Kuwait were labour unions, teacher associations, church groups, student associations, and feminist organizations.<sup>136</sup> Some of the more prominent groups were the World Federalists of Canada, Project Ploughshares, the Canadian Peace Alliance, the Canadian Council of Churches, and the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, and the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE).<sup>137</sup>

While most groups opposed participation, the opinions of the various promotional interest groups still differed greatly. For example, the Ontario

---

<sup>134</sup> Andrew Fenton Cooper et al., *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993), 122.

<sup>135</sup> Miller: *Following the Americans*, 79-80.

<sup>136</sup> Koch, 13.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

Federation of Labour and CUPE argued that Canadian troops should only be used in the Persian Gulf to enforce sanctions while the PSAC argued that the troops should completely leave the region and return to Canada. The Canadian Labour Congress, however, argued that the troops should only provide “humanitarian and logistical support” for the multinational coalition.<sup>138</sup> A group of doctors, Canadian Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, also opposed the use of force because the certain level of destruction the war would bring would be too much for doctors to cope with.<sup>139</sup> Finally, Project Ploughshares opposed Operation Desert Storm because it would not be a “Just War,” or in other words, a war designed to limit civilian death and destruction. According to Project Ploughshares member Ernie Regehr, “our conclusion was that, given the level of destruction that modern warfare produces, and the inability to distinguish between civilian and military targets, modern war as a deliberate chosen policy has become unacceptable.”<sup>140</sup>

Despite a large number of groups opposed to Operation Desert Storm the different agendas among the groups in the peace movement prevented it from being a cohesive force that could effectively influence government policy. Such a view was conveyed by a senior official at the Department of External Affairs when he stated that “the peace movement per se had little influence on ministers.”<sup>141</sup>

---

<sup>138</sup> Geoff Bickerton, “Labour and the Gulf War,” *Canadian Dimension* 28 (March 1991), 28.

<sup>139</sup> Gray: “Home Grown Skirmishes,” 8.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

### *Elite Public Opinion*

This study examines elite public opinion two ways: first, by analyzing the attitudes of various elite individuals; and second, by analyzing elite newspapers. Elite individuals had mixed attitudes to Canadian involvement in Operation Desert Storm. The lack of consensus among elites limited the influence this variable had over the government's decision-making.

To some extent, the divergence of elite opinion across political party lines made it easier for the government to endorse the controversial issue of participation because it made the issue non-partisan and one that could be supported by the public even if it largely was unsupportive of the government. Former prime minister John Turner broke Liberal Party ranks and supported the government's desire to participate in Operation Desert Storm. Turner, in a speech to parliament, stated:

At the very moment when the United Nations has moved itself to take a strong, unambiguous and collective stand against a brutal aggressor, Canada should not break solidarity with the nations that are standing united against Iraq. ... This is not an American adventure. It is a United Nations action in collective security, one of the greatest historic developments of our time. ... There are those who want to limit Canada's role to peacekeeping. The fact is peace must be established first and unilateral aggression repulsed before peacekeeping can be effective. ... This is a crucial test for the United Nations, and Canada must support it.<sup>142</sup>

Another individual who supported Canadian participation in Operation Desert Storm was Bernard Wood, Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Institute for

---

<sup>142</sup> "Why are we at war?," 10.

International Peace and Security. Wood asserted that Canada had no choice but to become involved in stopping Iraqi aggression. According to Wood:

If our decades of paralytic confrontations between the superpowers has led many Canadians to see themselves more as spectators and critics than as actors on the world stage, they had better recognize, for better or for worse, that the world has changed and we are once again called upon to act.<sup>143</sup>

Geoffrey Pearson, the executive director of the Canadian Institute for Peace and Security, was more critical of Canada's (and the coalition's) decision to force Iraq from Kuwait. Pearson did not oppose using force to remove Iraq from Kuwait, but in his opinion, the UN Security Council should have given sanctions more time to work. Responding to the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Pearson remarked, "I share with you a wonderment about why the processes and procedures of Chapter VII [of the UN Charter] were not allowed to take their course."<sup>144</sup>

Anne Hibbard's study of newspaper editorials in Canada's elite newspapers found that in the two weeks before Resolution 678, editorials were generally balanced in their opinion of Canada's role in the Persian Gulf. However, following Resolution 678, which authorized the "use of all necessary" means to force Iraq from Kuwait if it had not withdrawn by January 15, there was a steady decline in

---

<sup>143</sup> Bernard Wood, "The Gulf Crisis and The Future of World Order," *Canadian Defense Quarterly* 20, no. 5 (Spring 1991), 20.

<sup>144</sup> "Security and National Defense," Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs 5 (June 2, 1992), 29.

support for Canadian participation in Operation Desert Storm as the deadline approached.<sup>145</sup>

No studies or analyses have suggested that this facet of elite opinion influenced the government decision-making process directly. Hibbard's analysis, however, suggests that the media attempted to sway public opinion, and likely advanced both the pro- and anti-participation points of view.

### *Mass Public Opinion*

Mass public opinion played a large role in the government's decision-making process. It affected both the initial decision to become involved in the war and the manner in which future changes to Canada's military role were announced.

A November 1990 Gallup Poll regarding the initial decision to participate in Operation Desert Storm revealed that 58% of Canadians supported the armed forces being sent to the Persian Gulf area and 32% opposed such a measure. Soon after the passage of Resolution 678 on November 29, 36% of Canadians supported the idea of going to war with Iraq and 55% opposed the idea. This 22% drop showed the government that the majority of the Canadian public viewed this resolution as an escalation in the crisis and opposed participating in a war against Iraq.<sup>146</sup> A further Gallup Poll conducted in January before the January 15 deadline for Iraq to leave Kuwait revealed that public opinion on the issue remained

---

<sup>145</sup> Hibbard, 99-100.

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

virtually unchanged (37% in favour of participation and 56% opposed to participation).<sup>147</sup>

In the end, Canada chose to go against the tide of public opinion and participate in Operation Desert Storm. However, according to the previously mentioned senior DEA official, "public opinion polls had a significant impact" on cabinet ministers.<sup>148</sup> If this official's assessment is correct, it suggests that public opinion constrained the government's policy setting.

Advancing this argument one step further, public opinion may also have been responsible for the incremental manner by which the government defined Canada's role throughout the war. Before Operation Desert Storm began on January 15, Canadian CF-18s were providing protective air cover for Canada's three ships patrolling the Gulf. Only on the eve of Operation Desert Storm did the cabinet authorize and announce that Canada's CF-18s would perform "sweep and escort" missions for US planes on bombing runs. On February 20, after the Iraqi air force was destroyed or incapacitated and Iraqi radar no longer functioned, Canada moved from a defensive role to an offensive role in the war when it announced that its CF-18s had permission to engage Iraqi targets. These incremental steps of escalation in Canada's Persian Gulf War role may have been the result of a lack of planning by the government and military regarding the extent Canada would participate in Operation Desert Storm; however, it is also possible that the

---

<sup>147</sup> Ibid., 12.

<sup>148</sup> Gray: "Home Grown Skirmishes," 8.

government slowly escalated the country's level of engagement to an offensive role because it was unsure if the public would support such a move in the early stages of the war. At that point, offensive military action posed more of a risk to the coalition members than was the case when it was clear the war would be short and winnable.

*Relevant Extraneous Events: the Oka Crisis*

The Oka Crisis began March 11, 1990 when Mohawk Indians in Oka, Quebec, erected a barricade on a road leading to a local golf course. The government sent the military to Oka following a failed attempt by the Sureté du Quebec to storm the barricade. At the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Canada had 20% of its army in Oka; these troops remained there until September 22, seven weeks after Iraq's invasion.<sup>149</sup>

Oka affected the government's decision-making process in two ways. First, both the Oka Crisis and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait took place during Parliament's summer recess. According to Kim Richard Nossal, the government considered recalling Parliament following the Iraqi invasion to discuss Canada's role in the proposed multinational force, but did not do so, arguably to avoid opposition questions regarding its handling of the Oka Crisis.<sup>150</sup> The effect of not recalling Parliament was that the two destroyers and one supply ship Canada sent to the

---

<sup>149</sup> Gray: "War Games," 10.

Persian Gulf on August 10 were instructed to go at a pace that would result in a mid-September arrival and therefore give Parliament, scheduled to resume sitting on September 24, enough time "to debate and approve their role."<sup>151</sup>

Second, the large number of troops and the amount of equipment needed to deal with the Oka Crisis raised questions about the armed forces' ability to handle civil insurrection in different places at the same time. While the Prime Minister and other government members condemned Iraq's attack on Kuwait, External Affairs minister Joe Clark, on August 4, ruled out the prospect of Canada taking part in a military operation against Iraq, likely because at that time 20% of the Canadian army was in Oka. Military action by Canada was eventually publicly discussed August 6, but this was only after a private dinner between US President George Bush and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. One proponent of the view that Canada could not militarily address two crises at once comes from Charlotte Gray. According to her, "It appeared that [Canada] could deal with only one guts 'n' glory crisis at a time, and that was the week that one fifth of our army marched forth to deal with the Mohawk insurrection in Oka."<sup>152</sup>

## GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS

### *Parliament*

---

<sup>150</sup> Kim Richard Nossal, "Quantum Leaping: The Gulf Debate in Australia and Canada," in *The Gulf War: Critical Perspectives*, Michael McKinley, ed., (Canberra: Allen & Unwin, 1994), 57-8.

<sup>151</sup> Kirton, 384.

<sup>152</sup> Gray: "War Games," 10.

Before Operation Desert Storm began, the House of Commons was supportive of Canadian ships being used to enforce economic sanctions levied against Iraq but split on whether Canada should participate in Operation Desert Storm. The opposition Liberal and the New Democratic Parties were against Canadian participation in Operation Desert Storm, the Reform Party was supportive of participation, and the Bloc Quebecois had no official position on the issue.<sup>153</sup>

It is noteworthy that one member of the PC caucus, Robert Wenman, was publicly critical of the government's decision to participate in Operation Desert Storm.<sup>154</sup> On one occasion in the House of Commons, Wenman asked other MPs if they were "prepared to send sons or daughters to die a sandy death in the windblown deserts?"<sup>155</sup> While Wenman's stance was not indicative of PC party disunity over the Persian Gulf War issue, it was a potential embarrassment for the government in that while support for participation came from MPs in every party in the House, so too did opposition to participation.

There is no evidence to suggest that Wenman or any other MP's position on Canadian participation in Operation Desert Storm influenced the government's decision-making process. However, if there were additional PC caucus members who had feelings similar to Wenman's (and since opinion polls indicated a majority of Canadians were against participation,<sup>156</sup> there might have been)

---

<sup>153</sup> Koch, 15.

<sup>154</sup> Wilson-Smith and Wallace, 35.

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>156</sup> Hibbard, 12.

decision-makers may have opted to limit Canada's level of participation in the hopes of improving support for Canadian involvement in the war.

### *Bureaucracy*

Two bureaucratic agencies, the Department of National Defense and the Department of External Affairs, influenced the government's decision-making process.

The DND was supportive of Canadian participation in Operation Desert Storm. The feeling within the department was that military participation would demonstrate a need for the continued existence of the Canadian Forces, in its present form, in the post-Cold War era. Following the Cold War many government officials and citizens, much to the military's dismay, anticipated a "peace dividend," or decrease in military spending. Said one defence official:

It's so tough to convince the hanky-up-their-sleeve bureaucrats and know-it-all ministers' aides that there is still a threat out there. They're talking peace dividend, as though Canada didn't enjoy its peace dividend in the years we spent less than Italy on defence.<sup>157</sup>

Rather than losing military funding, defence officials wanted the government to spend more on the armed forces. The view of the Defense Department was that "Defense policy [was] in total chaos. Military hopes were raised by the 1987 White Paper, which set out a comprehensive modernization plan. But there was utter

---

<sup>157</sup> Gray: "War Games," 11.

despair when the government reneged on it.”<sup>158</sup> Estimates indicated that to maintain the armed forces’ current level of equipment, 30% of the annual defense budget needed to be committed to capital expenditures. In 1991, the year of the Persian Gulf War, the armed forces only committed 21.1% of the budget to capital expenditures; in 1990, the figure was 23.5%.<sup>159</sup> To press the need for increased funding, the DND hoped that Canadian participation in the Persian Gulf War would convince the government and the electorate of the military’s usefulness and the need for continued support.<sup>160</sup>

The DND pressured the government to contribute ground troops to Operation Desert Storm coalition by arguing that this commitment would give Canada more international influence because “it is soldiers on the ground, not ships or aircraft, that win wars and get you a seat at the table afterwards.”<sup>161</sup> The Defense Department’s pressure did not result in Canada sending ground troops to the Persian Gulf, but it was an option that the government never publicly ruled out. Canada had plans to send a 12 000 person mechanized brigade to the Gulf if it were considered necessary.<sup>162</sup>

The Department of External Affairs also supported Canadian involvement in Operation Desert Storm but for two different reasons. One reason, advanced by

---

<sup>158</sup> Ibid.

<sup>159</sup> Charles Thomas, “The Economics of Canadian Defense,” in *Peacekeeping, Peacemaking or War*, Alex Morrison, ed., (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1991), 68.

<sup>160</sup> Gray: “War Games,” 11.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid.

"Pearsonian" officials within the department, argued that Canada should participate in the war because it was an opportunity for the UN to act as a global police officer, a role its founders had envisioned.<sup>163</sup> Trade-oriented officials in the department supported participation for another reason. They asserted that Canada should be involved in Operation Desert Storm not for multilateral reasons, but for bilateral reasons. Canada's primary ally, the United States, was the leading force behind the coalition; hence, any refusal by Canada to participate would hurt bilateral relations with the US.<sup>164</sup>

The unified support in the DEA for Canadian participation in Operation Desert Storm mostly affected the government's decision-making process through Joe Clark who was then the External Affairs minister and a senior and influential member of the PC cabinet. Clark was not originally convinced that war was better than economic sanctions as a means of forcing Iraq from Kuwait, and he stated this both publicly and privately. Publicly, he re-iterated the view of peace activists when in November at the University of Western Ontario he stated that the use of force against Iraq might lead to Canadian casualties. Said Clark, "we should not rule out the possibility that young Canadian soldiers, men, and women, will not return to this country for celebrations but will stay there for burial."<sup>165</sup> Privately, Clark argued in September against sending CF-18 jets to the Persian Gulf and throughout

---

<sup>162</sup> "Letter from Vice-Chief of the Defense Staff C.M.Thomas to Chief of the Defense Staff, A.J.G.D. de Chastelain, and Reply," *Peacekeeping, Peacemaking or War*, Alex Morrison, ed., (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1991), 143-45.

<sup>163</sup> Gray, "War Games," 13.

the crisis asked the US to maintain diplomatic channels with Iraq and to make it clear to Saddam Hussein that his personal security was not being threatened so as to encourage him not to make the ensuing war “the mother of all battles.”<sup>166</sup>

As war became inevitable, however, Clark began to take his department’s view. In a letter written to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs at the end of December, he stated that Canada was prepared to go to war because the UN economic sanctions were only harming the Iraqi people and not moving troops out of Kuwait. Instead of liberating Kuwait, the sanctions were giving Iraqi soldiers more time to prepare defensive positions within the country.<sup>167</sup>

### *Cabinet*

Cabinet’s role in the government’s decision-making process is difficult to gauge because little public information is available about its proceedings. Various events and circumstances, however, make it possible to speculate that cabinet had minimal influence over the decision to participate in Operation Desert Storm but individual members might have influenced the government’s decision to limit its level of involvement in the operation. According to Hugh Winsor of the *Globe and Mail*, the decision-making process (at least early in the crisis) was dominated by the

---

<sup>164</sup> Ibid.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid., 14.

Prime Minister's Office, the Department of External Affairs, and the Department of Defence. Cabinet's role in the crisis was to authorize the decisions of these three bodies. Said Winsor, the decision to send ships to the Persian Gulf was "directed from a tightly controlled axis between the Prime Minister's office and the departments of Defence and External Affairs - almost all of it in secret by a few powerful officials with little involvement of the cabinet or the public."<sup>168</sup> While Winsor's comments were made early in the crisis, the increasing possibility that the crisis might lead to war likely worked to centralize the decision-making process.

Despite cabinet's suspected small role in deciding to join Operation Desert Storm, the Prime Minister relied upon its collective support and therefore the concerns of its members were likely to be more influential than that of other House members. As revealed earlier, negative public opinion toward participation in the war (57% against and 37% for) reduced support within Cabinet for a high level of Canadian involvement. This limited support therefore, may have influenced the Prime Minister to restrict the manner in which the Canadian Forces participated.

Further, for at least the first few months following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, there was "a split" within Cabinet over the best response. On the one side was Prime Minister Mulroney and on the other was Defence Minister Joe Clark.<sup>169</sup> Clark's original reluctance (by November he accepted the idea of using force to

---

<sup>167</sup> Letter written to John Bosley, MP, Chairman, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade from Joe Clark, MP, Secretary of State for External Affairs, December 28, 1990.

expel Iraq from Kuwait) to embrace a military solution to the crisis represented a wide cleavage that gave other ministers the ability to choose the pro- or anti-participation position without fear of being isolated.

In order to avoid conjecture, this study's author attempted to discuss the role of cabinet in the Persian Gulf War with Defence Minister Joe Clark, Environment Minister Barbara McDougall, and Finance Minister Michael Wilson. Clark and Wilson refused to return calls regarding this issue and McDougall, despite being a senior member of the cabinet, stated that she was not qualified to answer questions on Cabinet's role in the war. Consequently, based on the available information present, it appears that Cabinet did not have a large role in the decision to participate in Operation Desert Storm, but the government's decision not to send ground troops may have partly been a reflection of the division in Cabinet over participation.

### *The Prime Minister*

Analysts such as Charlotte Gray and Ronnie Miller believe that Mulroney himself was largely responsible for the actions Canada took in the Persian Gulf War. Mulroney enjoyed and was genuinely interested in international diplomacy. He had successfully chaired a UN conference on children and was rumoured to have been considering campaigning for the job of UN Secretary General. Strong

---

<sup>168</sup> Hugh Winsor, "Three ships sailing eastward with little sense of direction," *Globe & Mail* (August 24, 1990), A1.

Canadian support for Operation Desert Storm would have solidified Mulroney's commitment to the world body and internationalism.

To fully support the operation Mulroney would have needed to accept and follow the US lead in the crisis. This, according to Stephen Lewis, Canada's former ambassador to the UN, would have been easy for Mulroney since he and Bush were friends and "to an extraordinary degree, Canadian foreign policy [was] driven by the prime minister's friendships."<sup>170</sup> In the six years since Mulroney had become Prime Minister he had built strong relationships with US President Bush and past-president, Ronald Reagan. Moreover, Mulroney stated repeatedly after becoming the PC party leader that he would give the US the "benefit of the doubt" when it came to US foreign policy initiatives.<sup>171</sup> Some individuals therefore argued that Mulroney saw the Persian Gulf crisis through "American-coloured glasses."<sup>172</sup>

Critics of Canada's Persian Gulf War policy cite an announcement by Mulroney, following an August 6 dinner with Bush in Washington, as evidence that Canada's decision-making was dictated by Washington. As Gray said, "the government's tune changed after Washington ratcheted up the pressure (and Bush "explained" the situation to Prime Minister Mulroney at a private dinner on August 6)."<sup>173</sup> Additionally, Miller stated:

---

<sup>169</sup> Gray, "War Games," 14.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid., 13.

<sup>171</sup> Nossal: *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 32.

<sup>172</sup> Graff, 419.

<sup>173</sup> Gray: "War Games," 10.

Was Mulroney already committed to participation of Canadian troops in the multinational force after his private [August 6] conversation with Bush? Had he made unilateral decisions prior to any consultation with his colleagues in Ottawa? It soon became evident that Mulroney had done just that.

Mulroney's announcement, unbeknownst to his cabinet, was that Canada would support a US-proposed military blockade of Iraq and Iraqi-held Kuwait to enforce the UN-authorized economic embargo against the two states. Also, he stated that Canada would help protect Turkey with Canadian CF-18s based in Germany if that country were attacked by Iraq.

This criticism of Mulroney, however, was overstated. Considering the other variables this study has examined, there is enough evidence (for example, the desire of the DND and DEA to join Operation Desert Storm) to suggest that cabinet would have agreed to contribute two destroyers and a supply ship to the blockade and agreed to help Turkey, a fellow NATO member, if it were attacked by Iraq. Thus, if the August 6, Mulroney-Bush meeting in Washington influenced Canada's decision-making process in any way, it affected when Canada offered its support, rather than if it would offer support.

## CONCLUSION

There are many variables within this case study that influenced Canada's decision to participate in Operation Desert Storm. What is interesting about this analysis is the hierarchy that develops among the variables. Clearly some variables

led directly to the policy decision that took place whereas others simply acted as a constraint, or set parameters within which the government's action would take place. As is the case in "high politics" decisions, the external level of analysis determined the general policy (participation in Operation Desert Storm) that the government developed. The non-governmental domestic variables, on the other hand, largely worked to constrain or limit the government's policy. The governmental level of analysis had a dual role. One variable influenced the government's decision to join Operation Desert Storm while another worked to constrain the extent of Canadian participation in the war.

#### *Factors Contributing to Canada's Decision to Participate in Operation Desert Storm*

The end of the Cold War was an important factor in Canada's decision to join Operation Desert Storm. It allowed Canada to react militarily to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait without straining relations between the Soviet Union and the West.

Canada's historic commitment to the UN and belief that it had a prominent role to play in international relations also had a role in its decision to help force Iraq from Kuwait. Canada's commitment to the world body was evident when Prime Minister Brian Mulroney stated "The fundamental truth in this debate is that if we want peace we must defend these principles which are enshrined in the UN Charter."<sup>174</sup> Moreover, a successful performance by the UN in the Persian Gulf crisis might have given the world body extra credibility and influence in the post-

Cold War world. Canada supports a strong UN and for this reason felt it necessary to participate in the UN-sanctioned operation. According to the Prime Minister, if Canada avoided participating in Operation Desert Storm, "a large part of the principles and objectives and efforts of 45 years of Canadian diplomacy would have been for nothing."<sup>175</sup>

In order to keep Operation Desert Storm as much a UN mission as possible, the coalition leader, the US, would have had to be constrained. Canada felt participation in the operation would allow it to modify US behaviour in the crisis, much like it did in the Korean War. Additionally, it has been stated that there would be "winners" and "losers" in the US confrontation with Iraq, and that the losers would be those states that resisted the US desire for them to participate.<sup>176</sup> Canada is a long-time ally of the US and at the time of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, was a member of the Security Council. Canadian participation would give the US political support in its effort to build a diverse coalition. Canada likely realized that opposing American pressure to join the coalition might have had potential economic and political costs, whereas participation might have produced a benefit, such as participation in the ongoing Mexico-US free trade discussions.

The support the Arab states in the Middle East gave to Western intervention in the Persian Gulf crisis also contributed to Canada's decision to participate in the multinational coalition. Much of the civilian population within the Arab world

---

<sup>174</sup> Koch, 12.

<sup>175</sup> "Why are we at war?," 4.

was uneasy with or opposed a Western military presence in the region. The Arab League's decision to support American and other Western states' military involvement in the crisis, and the individual decision of many Arab states to participate themselves in the multinational coalition gave Canada confidence in sending troops to such a volatile region.

Iraq's flagrant violation of numerous international treaties and conventions and international customs gave Canada a legal and moral justification to become involved in Operation Desert Storm. According to Brian Mulroney, Canada's "most basic interest [lay] in the preservation of international law and order."<sup>177</sup> Iraq's decision to ignore international law would have been a dangerous precedent that other states might have followed had it not been challenged by Canada and other states.

The DEA also played an effective role in Canada's decision to participate in Operation Desert Storm. The "Pearsonian" faction of the department perceived the war to be a vehicle towards greater UN authority while the trade oriented faction saw the war as a "favour" to the US that could be used to Canada's advantage in the future. Joe Clark, the External Affairs minister and a senior member of Cabinet, did not originally take the pro-war position of the department but as time progressed he came to support the use of force against Iraq.

---

<sup>176</sup> Graff, 419.

<sup>177</sup> "Why are we at war?," 3.

### *Factors Working to Constrain the extent of Participation*

One of the variables most effective in constraining Canada's level of involvement in Operation Desert Storm was the view of Quebecers to the Gulf Crisis. While the majority of Canadians opposed participation in Operation Desert Storm before the start of hostilities, Quebecers were the most opposed to such action. Quebecers also were the government's main source of political support and would be important to the PC party in the next federal election. While the government could not avoid participation in the Persian Gulf War based on Quebec's opposition to it, the government could, and likely did, limit its level of participation so that it could maintain political support in Quebec following the war.

Iraq was one of Canada's most important grain export markets; 95% of its exports to the state were wheat and barley. This economic relationship influenced Canada's initial reaction early in the crisis. On August 5, Canada, in retaliation for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, placed unilateral economic sanctions against Iraq. The list of sanctions, however, was merely symbolic since it did not include grain. This, thus, raised the possibility that later in the crisis, when Canada was deciding whether to participate in Operation Desert Storm, Canada might have limited its level of participation to help prevent it from losing its position as Iraq's largest wheat supplier.

From the time Resolution 678 was passed until the start of Operation Desert Storm, mass public opinion was consistent in its opposition to Canadian participation in the war. While this opposition was not strong enough to override the influences of certain External variables, it was large enough to limit Canada's participation in Operation Desert Storm. The government did not raise its level of commitment until February 20, when public opposition to participation had subsided and there was little Iraqi danger to Canadian forces.

Early in the crisis, there was a split within Cabinet (largely fueled by public opinion) over whether Canada should participate in Operation Desert Storm. Joe Clark and Brian Mulroney represented the anti- and pro-participation positions, respectively. While the latter position won out it is reasonable to assume that in order to preserve cabinet unity it was decided that no offensive infantry troops would be deployed in the Persian Gulf.

## **Chapter 4: Consequences of the Persian Gulf War and Canadian Participation in the War**

This chapter examines the diplomatic, political, strategic, economic, and environmental effects of the war on Canada. To address the diplomatic effects of the war this chapter asks: what were the war's implications for weapons proliferation; how did the war affect future Canadian peacekeeping efforts; and, did it enhance the security role of the United Nations? Regarding the war's political effects, this chapter asks: did the war produce parliamentary unity; and, what were the implications for public support of the government? With respect to its strategic and economic effects, this paper examines the implications of the war for Canada's armed forces, and how the war affected Canadian trade in Iraq and Kuwait. Finally, this chapter asks: what were the war's implications for the environment?

### *DIPLOMATIC EFFECTS*

#### *Post-Gulf War Efforts to Curb Weapons Proliferation*

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait heightened awareness of the issue of weapons proliferation. The Middle East's long-standing cleavages between rich and poor Arabs, Sunni and Shiite Muslims, and Arabs and Israelis have made it a profitable market for arms producers. In fact, between 1983 and 1988, the five

year period before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, during which Iraq was in a war with Iran, two-thirds of all international arms sales went to the Middle East.<sup>178</sup>

Between 1981 and 1988, Iraq imported approximately \$46.7 billion in arms and military equipment, much of it from Western suppliers.<sup>179</sup> This made it into a regional power that was capable of threatening all its Middle Eastern neighbours after the Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988. Among the states most willing to supply Iraq with weapons were France, Britain, West Germany, and the United States. The French were Iraq's biggest supplier of weapons. They sold it Mirage fighter jets, Exocet missiles, and state-of-the-art 155 mm howitzers, which Iraq placed along the Saudi Arabia - Iraqi border and aimed toward coalition troop positions following its invasion of Kuwait. Britain also helped to arm Iraq by selling it billions of dollars worth of tanks, missile parts and artillery and West Germany acted as the main supplier for six Iraqi factories that produced nerve and mustard gases. Finally, while the US could not legally sell weapons to Iraq due to a Congressional arms embargo, the US aided Iraq by encouraging its European allies to sell it weapons (for example, the French sale of howitzers) and secretly selling Iraq weapons through third-state intermediaries.<sup>180</sup>

---

<sup>178</sup> Miller: *Following the Americans*, 73.

<sup>179</sup> Michael T. Klare, "How We Armed the Middle East," in *The Persian Gulf War: Views from the Social and Behavioral Science*, Herbert H. Blumberg and Christopher C. French, eds., (New York: University Press of America, 1994), 251.

<sup>180</sup> Murray Waas, "What Washington Gave Saddam for Christmas," in *The Gulf War Reader*, Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., (Toronto: Random House, 1991), 87-88.

While the issue of international arms proliferation played no role in shaping Canada's decision to participate in the Gulf War, Canadian officials believed that the public's support for participation in the war was contingent on the government taking more than a "single-track" approach to the crisis. According to Montigny Marchand, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, the government "recognized that Canadians' support for the war effort was in part conditional on the government doing everything in its power to make sure we would not find ourselves in a similar situation a few years down the road."<sup>181</sup>

Consequently, on February 8, 1991, Brian Mulroney and Joe Clark, in separate speeches, proposed a "world summit on the instruments of war and weapons of mass destruction."<sup>182</sup> The summit proposal was developed in the office of the Director-General of the Policy Planning Staff of External Affairs in co-ordination with the Assistant Deputy Minister for Political and International Security Affairs. It lacked specifics but was quite comprehensive. Among the summit's recommendations were:

- a "gathering of world leaders under United Nations auspices" to condemn the proliferation of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction and endorse a comprehensive program of action, to be followed by:
- individual negotiations in appropriate multilateral forums, and;
- a subsequent conference in 1995 to "celebrate completion of the comprehensive network of specific non-proliferation regimes."<sup>183</sup>

---

<sup>181</sup> Krause, 288.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid., 288.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid., 287.

These actions, based on the government's belief that it had to justify Canadian participation in the war by developing a proposal to limit weapon's proliferation, were unnecessary. The proposal had little effect on public opinion for two reasons. First, at the time of its announcement, the government already had widespread support for its Persian Gulf War actions. The war was going well for the Canadian military in that the coalition had won control of the skies over Kuwait and Iraq, and in doing so, no Canadian personnel had been killed or captured and no Canadian planes had been destroyed. In fact, a public opinion poll in the final days of January 1991 reported that "75 percent of the respondents back[ed] the Canadian decision to place a force in the Gulf region."<sup>184</sup>

Second, the timing of the announcement prevented the government's proposal from being widely heard. On February 8, the ground war had still not occurred; thus the media was mainly focusing on the fighting of the war instead of post-war issues. In the week following the announcement there was little evidence that the media and hence the public were even aware of the government's proposal. On February 9, the day following the Mulroney and Clark speeches, the *Globe and Mail* had an 18 paragraph article on the proposal while the *Toronto Star* had a 26 paragraph article. These articles were located on pages A13 and A12 respectively, and both were buried in sections of the papers

---

<sup>184</sup> Harold von Riekhoff, "Canada and Collective Security," in *Canada's International Security Policy*, David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown, eds., (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1995), 243.

exclusively devoted to the Gulf War. Neither the *Globe & Mail* nor the *Toronto Star* printed editorials on the proposal. The *Ottawa Citizen*, however, did comment on the Canadian initiative in an editorial, calling it “an idea of airy in consequence.”<sup>185</sup>

High level government officials nonetheless proclaimed Canada’s desire to limit the proliferation of weapons at a number of post-Gulf War international gatherings and forums. Publicly, the international response to Canada’s proposal was non-committal. US President Bush was, perhaps, the first world leader to publicly discuss Canada’s summit proposal on March 13.<sup>186</sup> Bush stated:

I’m not sure exactly what the proper structure [to greater arms control] is, but clearly that idea might have some merit ... it’s a little early ... I would like to talk to [Mulroney] before I commit ourselves further on it.”<sup>187</sup>

Some success was achieved in June, when the Organization of American States General Assembly passed a resolution calling for an end to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and for more care when transferring arms and related technology to other states, especially those in volatile regions.<sup>188</sup> Apart from this resolution DEA officials privately acknowledged that Canada’s idea

---

<sup>185</sup> Wirick, 99.

<sup>186</sup> Krause, 289.

<sup>187</sup> Text of joint press conference, United States Information Service, March 15, 1991.

<sup>188</sup> Krause, 289.

for a summit “wasn’t exactly a big hit” and within six months of its announcement the idea “had almost disappeared.”<sup>189</sup>

The only arms control agreement to emerge following the Persian Gulf War occurred as a result of two meetings, organized by the Americans, exclusively for the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. The meetings took place in June and October, 1991. They agreed to:

begin discussions on formal and informal measures to control the arms trade to the Middle East, ... establish common guidelines for arms exports, ... exchange an arms trade register and ... meet at least once a year to pursue these issues.<sup>190</sup>

Subsequently, in December 1991, an arms transfers register under UN auspices was authorized by the UN General Assembly.<sup>191</sup>

While the measures agreed to by the permanent members of the UN Security Council represented a start at arms control, with the exception of the proposed trade registry, all of them constituted components of past Canadian policy. None of the elements in this agreement, however, pertained to Canada’s February 8 proposal. Additionally, Alexander George questions whether the world’s major arms exporters can operationalize these “very general” measures that are “not lacking in ambiguity.”<sup>192</sup> For him, until further progress in the field of arms control is achieved, the proposal’s general guidelines “boil down to a rule of thumb that suggests it is all right to export conventional arms when it

---

<sup>189</sup> Ibid., 299.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid., 290.

<sup>191</sup> United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 46/36, December 9, 1991.

contributes to stability in the Middle East or other regions but not when it would be destabilizing.”<sup>193</sup>

If this is an accurate assessment, the agreement is fatally flawed. What is stabilizing or destabilizing will always be a matter of interpretation. For example, in the recent Bosnian civil war, many in the US Congress argued that America should have sold weapons to the Bosnian government to maintain a balance of power between it and the Bosnian-Serb army, and thus create stability in Bosnia. It is unlikely, however, that other states like Serbia and even Russia would have seen such an action as stabilizing. They likely would have countered such US actions by selling weapons to the Bosnian-Serb army, thereby producing a regional arms race.

Despite Canada’s failed effort to use the Persian Gulf War as a catalyst in achieving a comprehensive arms control agreement, weapons proliferation has

YEAR	DELIVERIES- WORLD	DELIVERIES- DEVELOPING
1987	62.5	43.6
1988	58.9	40.6
1989	53.2	34.7
1990	48.8	33.3
1991	34.6	21.7
1992	28.5	17.7
1993	28.0	15.1
1994	22.2	12.9

**TABLE 1.1 Arms Transfer Deliveries Worldwide and to the Developing World (In Billions of \$US)<sup>194</sup>**

<sup>192</sup> George, 308.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid.

<sup>194</sup> “Arms Transfer Deliveries and Agreements, 1984-1994,” *US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency*, Daniel Gallik, ed., ([www.acda.gov/initial.html](http://www.acda.gov/initial.html)).

declined. In fact, since 1987, when worldwide arms deliveries totalled \$62.5 billion, yearly arms exports have declined steadily. Even the 1991 Persian Gulf War failed to increase the amount of weapons sold. That year, worldwide weapon exports totalled \$48.8 billion, a decrease from the \$53.2 billion that was delivered in 1990 and the \$58.9 billion that was delivered in 1988.<sup>195</sup> As table 2.1 indicates, since the Persian Gulf War, weapon deliveries have continued to decline. A likely explanation for this trend comes from Mark Kramer who argues that the end of the Cold War and the indebtedness of Third World states (the largest arms buyers) are largely responsible for the decline in international arms trading.<sup>196</sup>

Consequently, while Canada's effort to achieve a comprehensive arms control agreement failed, its objective of decreasing the level of arms proliferation may yet be realized through changes in the international system and the domestic circumstances of Third World States. If so, then, Canada's desire to prevent future crises, similar to that of the Persian Gulf War, may also be achieved.

### *Implications for Canada's Peacekeeping Role*

Peacekeeping is an activity that Canada is functionally suited to undertake and it has been a cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy in the post-World War

---

<sup>195</sup> Ibid.

<sup>196</sup> Kramer, 266.

II era. For the government, the Persian Gulf War represented a dilemma in that many groups and individuals felt participation in the war would weaken Canada's image as a peacekeeping nation. As Harold von Riekhoff wrote in 1995:

The generation of Canadians who had grown up after the Korean War had become unused to war; moreover, in that period Canadians had developed an admirable expertise and pride in peace-keeping. It was feared that her eligibility as a peacekeeper in a post-Gulf War environment might be jeopardized if she exchanged the familiar and popular Blue Helmet for a warrior's outfit.<sup>197</sup>

Additionally, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali made it known that coalition members would be prohibited from participating in any post-war peacekeeping operations in Iraq. The government, however, repeatedly denied that its image would be compromised by joining the UN coalition and "lobbied strongly for a possible Gulf peacekeeping role for Canada even prior to the outbreak of hostilities."<sup>198</sup>

Canada's peacekeeping image did not, however, suffer as a result of participation in the Persian Gulf War, and its association with Operation Desert Storm did not entail the costs some people anticipated. Indeed, following the Security Council's cease-fire resolution to end Operation Desert Storm, "the Canadian government was informally approached by the UN Secretariat about

---

<sup>197</sup> von Riekhoff, 243.

<sup>198</sup> Ibid.

participating in the follow-up peacekeeping operation.”<sup>199</sup> In April 1991, Canada agreed to participate in the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) and contributed 301 field engineers to the 34 country, 1,440 member force. Following this, in July 1991, Canada accepted a UN request to participate in the UN Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO). Canada’s contribution to this force was 740 soldiers, its largest contribution to a peacekeeping mission since Cyprus in 1964.<sup>200</sup>

YEAR	NUMBER OF MISSIONS	NUMBER OF TROOPS	AVERAGE NUMBER OF TROOPS PER MISSION
1947-49	2	29	14.5
1950-59	4	10 016	2527
1960-69	6	1709	285
1970-79	3	1492	497
1980-89	4	1006	252
1990-96	12	3859	321

Note: The median number of troops per mission is 103. Of Canada’s ten missions since the Persian Gulf War, four have had more troops than the median, while five have had fewer troops. The one remaining mission had 103 troops.

**TABLE 2.1 Canadian Participation in UN Peacekeeping Missions<sup>201</sup>**

Since the Persian Gulf War in 1991, Canada has participated in a total of ten peacekeeping missions in a total of at least ten countries.<sup>202</sup> When compared to the 21 missions that Canada took part in between 1947<sup>203</sup> and the end of

<sup>199</sup> Ibid.

<sup>200</sup> *Maclean's*, (February 4, 1991), 4.

<sup>201</sup> Alex Morrison, “Canada and Peacekeeping: A Time for Reanalysis?,” in *Canada’s International Security Policy*, David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown, eds., (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1995), 217-220.

<sup>202</sup> Canadians were also the commanders of three of these post-Gulf War peacekeeping operations.

<sup>203</sup> The UN recognized the UN Truce Supervisory Organization, which was established on June 11, 1948 as the first peacekeeping operation. The terms “peacekeeping” was not used, however,

Operation Desert Storm, this figure suggests that Canada's Gulf War participation has not hurt the country's peacekeeping reputation.

Besides the relatively high number of missions Canada has taken part in since the end of the Gulf War, its troop commitments have also been consistent with past peacekeeping missions. Of Canada's ten missions since the Gulf War, four had more troops than the median, whereas five had fewer troops. The one remaining mission represented the median with 103 troops.<sup>204</sup> The Persian Gulf War has not denied Canada the opportunity to participate in peacekeeping missions; neither has it prevented Canada from committing comparable numbers of personnel to these missions.

#### *Enhancing the Security Role of the United Nations*

The unprecedented cooperation between the East and West following the end of the Cold War contributed to the UN's ability to oppose the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Canada's historical support for UN initiatives was one reason why the government participated in Operation Desert Storm. Canada also believed that if the multinational coalition were successful in this mission, the UN would benefit. According to Joe Clark, "If we succeed here, the United Nations will send a clear and unambiguous signal to others that the world is now different - that it will not tolerate aggression and that international law is to be obeyed and

---

until 1956 when the UN Emergency Force (UNEF 1) was formed in response to the Suez Canal crisis.

not ignored.”<sup>205</sup> Such change would make the world safer for small and middle powers and, therefore, benefit Canada.

Operation Desert Storm did force Iraq from Kuwait. Out of this victory came the belief that the UN would now become a forum where states could gather and successfully solve international disputes and organize collective responses to disputes that were previously diplomatically unsolvable. Looking to the future, Gregory Wirick, an associate of the Parliamentary Center for Foreign Affairs in Ottawa, optimistically stated at the time of the war that “the events in the Persian Gulf may yet come to represent a watershed in the history of the world organization.”<sup>206</sup>

It is unlikely, however, that the perceived success of Operation Desert Storm will help the United Nations to enhance its international security role. According to Ken Matthews, a number of factors helped the coalition develop, stay together, and achieve its objective of forcing Iraq from Kuwait.<sup>207</sup> However, due to the complexity of coalition building and coalition management the chances of such factors occurring again are not strong.<sup>208</sup>

Perhaps the most important factor in organizing a collective security response to aggression is a militarily and diplomatically powerful state to galvanize

---

<sup>204</sup> Ibid.

<sup>205</sup> Gray: “War Games,” 12.

<sup>206</sup> Wirick, 95.

<sup>207</sup> Matthews, 89.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid., 58.

support.<sup>209</sup> The state that acted, and perhaps the only state that could have acted, as the “galvanizer” in the Persian Gulf War was the US. The US was suited for this role because it had a strong armed forces, many allies (including Canada) that it could call on for support, the ability to persuade or even coerce other states to participate, and experience in leading coalitions through its involvement in NATO. One example of America’s ability to pressure other states to support Operation Desert Storm occurred when Yemen, a non-permanent member in the Security Council during the time of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, voted against Security Council Resolution 678. An American official informed the Yemenis ambassador to the UN that its vote would be the most expensive “no vote” it ever made. Shortly after this, the US suspended \$750 million in annual aid to the state.<sup>210</sup> This had the effect of persuading Third World states, like Jordan, that received or wanted to acquire US aid, not to be overly critical of the coalition.

Second, for the UN to organize a collective response to aggression it is beneficial to have a situation where the aggressor’s actions are clearly in violation of international law.<sup>211</sup> The Persian Gulf crisis had a clearly defined issue to consider. Regardless of the status of Iraq’s claims against Kuwait, its invasion, annexation, and seizure of many Kuwaiti citizens and foreign citizens

---

<sup>209</sup> Ibid.

<sup>210</sup> Graff, 415.

<sup>211</sup> Matthews, 89.

clearly contravened various international laws and made it difficult for most states to justify opposing a collective security response to the crisis.

Third, to mount an effective and legitimate collective response to an act of aggression it is important to have tangible support from states closely related - diplomatically, geographically, or militarily - to the crisis.<sup>212</sup> Significant military contributions to Operation Desert Storm by Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia (all prominent Arab states geographically close to Iraq) helped slightly to show that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was opposed not just by America and its allies but also by some of Iraq's neighbours.<sup>213</sup>

Finally, the Security Council must agree upon a specific course of action if a UN-sanctioned collective response to aggression is to develop.<sup>214</sup> To gain such an agreement the five permanent members -the United States, Russia, Great Britain, the People's Republic of China, and France- all must agree (or abstain from voting) on an appropriate level of response to aggression. The US and Britain were the most supportive Security Council permanent members in the formation of a UN-sanctioned multinational coalition to forcefully challenge Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. France, in the words of President Mitterrand had a "long standing" friendship with Iraq and openly supported a diplomatic end to the Persian Gulf crisis.<sup>215</sup> However, it also was committed to ending the

---

<sup>212</sup> *Ibid.*, 60-1.

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid.*, 63.

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*, 78-86.

<sup>215</sup> *Ibid.*, 84.

occupation of Kuwait and willingly played an important role in Operation Desert Storm. One of the most important aspects in the formation of the coalition was also the support of the Soviet Union. While the Soviets initially resisted the use of force to remove Iraq from Kuwait, the end of the Cold War and its much improved relations with the US contributed significantly to Soviet support for the operation. The remaining member, China, abstained from voting on Resolution 678. While China's natural voting tendency in the Security Council has been to oppose the US, its desire to improve relations with the West following the People's Liberation Army's 1989 killing of demonstrators in Beijing's Tiananmen Square likely led it to accept the use of force in removing Iraq from Kuwait by abstaining in voting on Resolution 678.<sup>216</sup>

The ability of the UN to enhance its security role through the use of collective security in the future partly depends on whether these conditions will be met the next time an act of aggression occurs. Unfortunately, these conditions are not easily met and, therefore, the type of UN-sponsored collective security that developed out of the Persian Gulf crisis is unlikely to repeat itself. There are four major reasons why this is so. First, assuming the US is the only state currently capable of acting as a galvanizer, the chances of future UN collective security taking place are not good. As was seen in the early stages of the Yugoslav civil war, Americans are not always willing to spearhead international efforts to stop aggression. In fact, a survey following the Persian Gulf War

---

<sup>216</sup> Ibid., 83.

indicated that 51% of Americans opposed taking “the lead military role where there are problems in the world requiring a military response.”<sup>217</sup> Additionally, 78% of Americans believed that they “can’t afford to defend so many nations.”<sup>218</sup>

Second, cases of aggression will not always be as clearly defined as they were in the Persian Gulf crisis. Often states’ interests prevent collective responses to cases of aggression. Said Ken Matthews, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was “the most unambiguous act of brutal aggression since 1945, it was still very difficult to manage the United Nations system in order to get a challenging response and to maintain and escalate that response.”<sup>219</sup>

Third, due to the absence of UN control over Operation Desert Storm, some states, like India, were critical of the manner in which the operation was carried out.<sup>220</sup> Moreover, comments by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali may also lead to more states developing similar views. He said: “The victory of the allied, or coalition countries over Iraq [was] not at all a victory for the UN, because the war was not its war. It was not a UN war. General Schwarzkopf was not wearing a blue helmet.”<sup>221</sup> Hence, the next collective security response endorsed by the UN Security Council may not be supported by other states if the

---

<sup>217</sup> George, 300.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid.

<sup>219</sup> Matthews, 90.

<sup>220</sup> von Riekhoff, 241.

<sup>221</sup> Lloyd Axworthy, *Canada and the Newly Developing Democracies* (Toronto: International Relations Society / Trinity College, University of Toronto, November 20, 1991), 4.

US acts as its galvanizer. This, however, creates an inherent difficulty in coalition building if there are no other states equipped (like the US presently is) to act as a galvanizer.

Fourth, while the US, Britain, and France obtained the support of the Soviet Union and China's abstention in this crisis, similar responses by the latter two may not occur and should not be expected. While it does not appear that the Cold War will re-occur, its revival would not only divide the Security Council but place much of the rest of the world into the camps of the world's great powers. Hence if an aggressor state were allied with a great power (presumably one of the Security Council's permanent members) any attempt to enact a UN-sanctioned response to the state's aggression would most likely be vetoed. Further, even if the aggressor were not allied to one of the great powers, the mistrust between the opposing Security Council states might prevent a collective security agreement from being reached. On another front, if the Security Council were to expand in its size to include regional representation this would also increase the number of differing opinions within the Council and could impede its decision-making process further.

Assuming that a multinational coalition that the UN would sanction but not control could not be formed, the only other way the UN could help to protect international security would be for it to invoke Article 43 of the UN Charter and directly respond to a state's aggression. Article 43 is designed to instruct states

to supply the UN with troops when the Security Council requests them.

According to this article:

All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.<sup>222</sup>

Article 43 has never been invoked because no states have made “special agreements” with the Security Council to provide it with troops. The reason for the delay is that states do not want to, or can not for constitutional reasons, commit even a portion of their militaries to the Security Council. Many states, for example, the United States and Russia, have said that regardless of the content of Article 43 they would not allow the Security Council to deploy their troops without the approval of their national legislatures.<sup>223</sup>

Nevertheless, even if some states were to make arrangements to lend troops to the Security Council when they were needed, problems with this approach to collective security might still arise. First, the states that donated the largest contingents to a UN force might oppose the Security Council controlling their use and want to exert some control over them. Second, the sharing of encryption techniques, necessary for secure communication by the coalition forces, would be a politically sensitive issue for some of the participatory states. Third, the financing of such UN missions would be a contentious issue. The

---

<sup>222</sup> United Nations Charter, Article 43 (1).

more money states had to pay for a mission, the more control they might expect. However, if all states were expected to share the costs equally, many Third World states might be unable to pay. While these problems and others could be solved if addressed, they are good examples of the problems inherent in a UN attempt to promote collective security.<sup>224</sup>

Thus, while Canada's decision to join and participate in Operation Desert Storm helped the coalition force Iraq from Kuwait, the long-term benefits that Canada and others envisioned the operation would produce have not, and likely will not, occur.

## *POLITICAL EFFECTS*

### *Implications for Parliamentary Unity*

On January 15, one day before Operation Desert Storm started, the House of Commons began debate on whether to support the government's resolution reading "That this House reaffirms its support of the United Nations in ending the aggression by Iraq against Kuwait."<sup>225</sup> Both the Liberal Party and the New Democratic Party (NDP) proposed amendments to the resolution that would have constrained the military's ability to participate in the war. The Liberals amendment added an additional phrase to the end of the government's

---

<sup>223</sup> Russet and Sutterlin, 546.

<sup>224</sup> *Ibid.*, 547-8.

<sup>225</sup> Canada, *House of Commons Debates, 2nd Session, 34th Parliament*, Vol. XIII (January 15, 1991), 16984.

resolution: “through the continued use of economic sanctions, such to exclude offensive military action by Canada at this time.”<sup>226</sup> Additionally, the Liberals recommended that if war began in the Persian Gulf, Canada should withdraw its troops in the region immediately. The NDP offered a sub-amendment to the one presented by the Liberal Party. It deleted all the words after “economic sanctions” and instead added: “through the continued use of economic sanctions, such support to exclude the involvement by Canada in a military attack on Iraq or Iraqi forces in Kuwait.”<sup>227</sup> The government defeated both amendments in the House the following day, January 16, before the war began.

The initiation of Operation Desert Storm mostly affected the Liberals. While debating the government’s resolution on January 15, Chretien stated that his, and the Liberal Party’s view was that economic sanctions needed more time to work. Moreover, he noted that: “If faced with an act of war, we say on this side of the House that it is premature and that our troops should not be involved in a war at this moment - and our troops should be called back if there is a war...”<sup>228</sup> Once the war began, however, Chretien and the rest of his party changed positions. Speaking to the House shortly after Operation Desert Storm began, Chretien said:

We regret that our request that a search be made for a peaceful solution has fallen on deaf ears but, at the same time, we will

---

<sup>226</sup> Wirick, 96-7.

<sup>227</sup> Ibid.

<sup>228</sup> Canada, *House of Commons Debates, 2nd Session, 34th Parliament*, Vol. XIII (January 16, 1991), 17165.

support the efforts of our men and women in the Persian Gulf. ... We are all Canadians and we must support our brothers and sisters fighting for peace. I rise tonight to say that all Canadians have an obligation to stand united under such circumstances.<sup>229</sup>

The NDP, on the other hand, still opposed Canadian participation in the war. NDP leader Audrey MacLaughlin, speaking on behalf of all NDP caucus members stated that their "hearts" were with the Canadian troops in the region. Also she said that the Party would "support those troops by making sure that they [were] employed in actions that will truly show that Canada, as a compassionate nation, is prepared to participate not within the theatre of war, but rather in a compassionate and humanitarian role for both civilians and non-civilians."<sup>230</sup> The Reform Party's lone MP, Deborah Grey, supported the motion and the Bloc Quebecois, while it had no official position on the matter, almost unanimously supported it.<sup>231</sup>

Debate over the government's resolution lasted until January 22. In the end, the House approved the government's resolution by a vote of 217 - 47. The motion passed with overwhelming support due to the Liberals' decision to change their official position on the matter, once the war had started. The NDP, however, refused to change its position, thus denying the government the support of all the political parties represented in the House.<sup>232</sup> Besides the NDP opposing the Persian Gulf War resolution, four Liberals, three Bloc Quebecois,

---

<sup>229</sup> Ibid.

<sup>230</sup> Ibid., 17166.

<sup>231</sup> Koch, 15.

and one independent MP opposed the motion. The fact that no PC caucus member voted against the resolution was a success for the government, since Robert Wenman had publicly stated he was strongly opposed to Canadian participation in a war with Iraq.<sup>233</sup>

The strong support in the House for the government's resolution helped portray the decision to participate in Operation Desert Storm as non-partisan and allowed the government to avoid potentially embarrassing questions within the House of Commons during Question Period. It might also have allowed the government to escape blame, or at least share it with all those who supported the war effort, if Canadian troops were killed or injured in the war.

#### *Implications for Public Support of the Government*

A foreign war often has the potential to affect a state's domestic political environment. The Persian Gulf War had this effect in the US, where on the war's conclusion, the approval rating of President Bush rose to over 70%. Following the war, Prime Minister Mulroney, in fact, joked with President Bush that he hoped "to receive a jump in popularity similar to that recently experienced by the American leader."<sup>234</sup>

The Canadian government did not, however, receive the same boost in public opinion that the American government received; its participation in Operation

---

<sup>232</sup> Wirick, 97.

<sup>233</sup> Wilson-Smith and Wallace, 35.

Desert Storm did not, therefore, yield any political benefits. An analysis of public opinion polling data indicates that public approval of the PCs only slightly increased over the span of the Persian Gulf War and fell to pre-war levels soon after the end of Operation Desert Storm. When the operation began in January 1991, the Progressive Conservative party had the support of 12% of the population. The Persian Gulf War ended the second last day of February and in March the government had the support of 16% of the public, a rise of 4% from the beginning of the war.<sup>235</sup>

The Liberals were "the primary beneficiaries of the Gulf War in terms of Canadian domestic politics."<sup>236</sup> The Party's pre-war level of popular support

	P.C.	LIB.	NDP	REFORM	BQ	OTHER
June / 91	15%	35%	23%	16%	8%	2%
May / 91	14	34	28	13	9	2
April / 91	14	32	26	16	10	2
Mar/ 91	16	39	30	7	7	1
Feb. / 91	16	35	34	8	5	2
Jan. / 91	12	31	41	9	5	2
Dec. / 90	14	32	36	8	8	2
Nov. / 90	14	35	36	8	6	2
Oct. / 90	15	31	38	9	4	3
Sept. / 90	15	39	32	7	4	3
Aug. / 90	20	46	22	6	5	1
July / 90	19	49	23	7	-	3
June / 90	17	50	23	7	-	3
May / 90	18	47	24	7	-	4

Note: Numbers represent percentage of popular support when asked "If a federal election were held today, which party's candidate do you think you would favor?"

TABLE 3.1 Canadian Political Preference<sup>237</sup>

<sup>234</sup> *The Gallup Report*, March 21, 1991.

<sup>235</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>236</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>237</sup> *The Gallup Report*, June 20, 1991.

was 31% while its post-war level stood at 39%, a jump of 8%, which was double that of the PC party. The NDP suffered the most as a result of the Persian Gulf War. Its pre-war level of support was 41%, but by the end of the war, it had dropped to 30%. The large decline in the NDP's support can be linked to its negative stand on participation in the Persian Gulf War. It has been noted that "People who had earlier backed the NDP but who perhaps were averse to that party's stance concerning the war ... parked their support with the Liberals."<sup>238</sup> Popular support for the country's two regionally based parties, Reform and the Bloc Quebecois were statistically unaffected by the Persian Gulf War.




FIGURE 3.1 Canadian Political Preferences<sup>239</sup>

<sup>238</sup> Ibid.

<sup>239</sup> Ibid.

The most likely reason why the PCs did not reap the same benefits as George Bush in Washington, and why some NDP supporters transferred their support to the Liberals instead of the PCs, was that the popularity of the PC party and its leader was low for a variety of reasons unrelated to the Persian Gulf War. Even participation in the successful Operation Desert Storm operation could not significantly lift the government's popularity.

According to a report written following the war, the public's "disapproval of Mr. Mulroney and his government is so deeply ingrained ... that the Tories have not gained markedly in popularity despite their perceived able handling of Canada's recent military initiatives in the Middle East."<sup>240</sup> While it is impossible to tell if the failure of the Persian Gulf War to revitalize the PC party affected the party's policies and administration it is noteworthy that Brian Mulroney resigned as leader of the party before the government's mandate expired, and the PCs went on to lose the next general election to the Liberals. In short, participation in Operation Desert Storm did not yield the political benefit Mulroney and the PC party hoped it might.

## STRATEGIC EFFECTS

### *Implications for the Canadian Armed Forces*

---

<sup>240</sup> *The Gallup Report*, March 21, 1991. *The Gallup Report's* contention that the public believed the government ably handled the Gulf War is supported in a June 28 1991, *Gallup Poll*.

The 1987 White Paper on Defence recognized that the poor operational readiness of the Canadian Forces weakened the country's "security and sovereignty" and "sent to our allies and potential opponents ... mixed signals about our reliability as a NATO partner." As a result, the review concluded that Canada was "not able to meet [its defence] commitments fully and effectively."<sup>241</sup>

In response to what the White Paper perceived as a "commitment-credibility gap" within the Canadian Forces, the government announced, in 1987, funding for new main battle tanks, nuclear-powered attack submarines, more long-range patrol and fighter jets, and additional new weapons and vehicles that could be sent to central Europe in a time of crisis.<sup>242</sup> By 1989, however, the lessening of the Cold War made Ottawa re-consider its decision to upgrade Canada's defence capabilities, and in the April 1989 federal budget the government eliminated or suspended most of the military's planned expansion.<sup>243</sup>

Most of the people associated with the Department of National Defense hoped that the Persian Gulf War would demonstrate the need for and value of a functional armed forces. For them, the war was an opportunity to show to the government and public their idea that the end of the Cold War presented

---

<sup>241</sup> Allan, 21.

<sup>242</sup> Donald A. Neill, "Back to the Basics: Defence Interest and a Defence Policy in Canada," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 21, no. 3 (December 1991), 41.

<sup>243</sup> *Ibid.*

Canada with a “peace dividend” was unrealistic, given the poor functional state of the military and the unstable state of world affairs.

While Operation Desert Storm successfully forced Iraq from Kuwait, Canada’s role in the war confirmed what many military analysts already believed: that the Canadian Forces were not functionally equipped to fight an external conflict. According to retired-colonel James H. Allan, the ships and planes Canada had in the Persian Gulf region were not equipped to fight a modern war and the country’s troops avoided “another Hong Kong” military defeat only because of the shortness of the war and the fact that Iraq did not attack the Canadians with any sophisticated weapons.<sup>244</sup>

The Canadian public, on the whole, did not realize the vulnerability of the troops the government had sent to the Persian Gulf region. This misunderstanding was facilitated by the media and its paid military consultants.

Said Allan:

With rare exceptions the performance of the Canadian media in the reporting the Canadian part in the Gulf War was poor and did nothing to assist the public in making informed decisions on the Canadian involvement. Television stories were of superficial, human-interest variety, and failed to detect the flaws in preparedness of Canadian Forces. The television pundits were not helped by the retired senior officers acting as their paid military analysts. These gentlemen mostly failed to rise above the self-evident, and neglected the critical issue of unsatisfactory readiness of Canadian committed forces.<sup>245</sup>

---

<sup>244</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>245</sup> Ibid., 22-23.

Consequently, it is not surprising that the Persian Gulf War did not lead Canadians to support increased military spending levels. Surveys taken following the war indicate that the public was divided on the level of funding the military should receive. A July 1991 public opinion poll indicated that 33% of the public felt defence spending was too high, while 23% found it too low; 36% felt it was adequate, and 9% had no opinion on the subject.<sup>246</sup> These results are similar to a 1989 survey where 31% believed the government spent too much, 23% found spending too low, and 31% felt it was adequate.<sup>247</sup>

Like public opinion, or perhaps as a result of public opinion, the government did not change its position regarding additional funding for the military. In May 1991, the government made cuts to the defence budget totaling more than \$530,000, a move that resulted in “significant staff reductions” to the defense ministry. Twelve percent of military and civilian staff, totalling nearly 1000 people, lost their jobs. Among the purchases cancelled were northern patrol vehicles, ammunition, rifles and automatic weapons, and shoulder-launched anti-tank missiles. The reason the government gave for the reductions was that the Cold War was over and, as a result, the world was more peaceful.<sup>248</sup>

Moreover, in September 1991, the government also revealed a new post-Cold War/Gulf War defence policy. The document was presented in the form of a small seven page brochure and, as in past defence statements or White Papers, it

---

<sup>246</sup> *The Gallup Report*, August 15, 1991.

<sup>247</sup> *Ibid.*

stated that the armed forces' focus would be: first, protecting Canada; second, maintaining its collective defence arrangements; and third, contributing to international peace and security.<sup>249</sup> However, in order to lower costs, the paper stated that the government would: cut the number of soldiers in the armed forces by 9.5% to a new total of approximately 76,000; withdraw the 1st Canadian Division in Germany in 1994 and gradually withdraw the Canadian Air Division over the next three years; and close the Canadian military bases in Baden-Sollagen, Germany in 1994 and Cahr, Germany in 1995 and form a Ministerial Advisory Group on Defence Infrastructure to study and recommend which military bases in Canada should close.<sup>250</sup>

In the years following the new policy paper, defence expenditures as a percentage of total government expenditures fluctuated. For the 1990/1991 Persian Gulf War fiscal year defence expenditures represented 8.90% of total government expenditures. By 1991/1992, the year of the new policy change, this figure dropped to 8.42%. Over the next two fiscal years defence expenditures remained at 8.43%. In 1993-1994, government defence expenditures rose dramatically to 8.78%. However, in the next fiscal year spending fell to 8.15%, one of the lowest levels ever.<sup>251</sup>

---

<sup>248</sup> Ibid.

<sup>249</sup> Allen, 23.

<sup>250</sup> Ibid.

<sup>251</sup> Canada, *Public Accounts, Vol. II, Details of Expenditures & Revenue, 1990/91 - 1994/5*.

YEAR	DEFENSE EXP.	TOTAL EXP.	DEFENSE AS % OF TOTAL EXP.
1994/95	11 800 974	144 748 027	8.15
1993/94	12 032 460	136 969 539	8.78
1992/93	11 914 490	141 256 115	8.43
1991/92	11 751 078	139 604 702	8.42
1990/91	12 289 689	138 065 412	8.90
1989/90	11 582 850	131 945 022	8.78
1988/89	11 168 220	122 063 716	9.15
1987/88	10 650 421	115 110 518	9.25

**TABLE 4.1 Department of National Defence Expenditures (In Thousands of CDN Dollars)<sup>252</sup>**

Consequently, while many military analysts were concerned with the quality of the equipment the government was ordering to the Persian Gulf region for Operation Desert Storm, there was hope that Canada's inability to play more than a minimal role in the war would demonstrate to the public and government at home that the equipment of the Canadian Forces was in dire need of upgrading. Unexpectedly, however, the media coverage of the Canadian military in the region was mostly positive. Thus, as Colonel K.T. Eddy said, "the praise heaped on Canadian Forces after the Gulf War was all out of proportion to the effort, and contributed to concealing the real deficiencies which had to be overcome in preparing, deploying and sustaining those forces."<sup>253</sup>

<sup>252</sup> Canada, *Public Accounts, Vol. II, Details of Expenditures & Revenue, 1987/88 - 1994/5*.

<sup>253</sup> K.T. Eddy, "The Canadian Forces and the Operational Level of War," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 21, no. 5 (April 1992), 22.

## ECONOMIC EFFECTS

### *Implications for Canadian Trade with Iraq and Kuwait*

Canada's trade relationship with both Iraq and Kuwait played no role in shaping the government's decision to join Operation Desert Storm, nor did it represent any kind of objective in participating in the coalition force. This aside, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Persian Gulf War did affect Canada's trading relationship with those states.

In 1989, 10% of 1989 Canadian wheat exports went to Iraq. Additionally, Iraq was a large market for Canadian barley. Together these two commodities represented \$245 million or 95% of Canada's 1989 exports to Iraq.<sup>254</sup> As a result of Iraq's invasion the UN passed Resolution 661 and imposed mandatory economic sanctions against Iraq. This resolution ordered all states to prevent the importation of all Iraqi goods originating in Iraq or Kuwait and the exportation of all goods to the two states, except for medical supplies or foodstuffs for humanitarian purposes. Additionally, the resolution called upon all states to hold within their countries all funds belonging to or intending to be transferred to the Governments of Iraq or Kuwait and any "commercial, industrial, or public utility" within the two states.<sup>255</sup>

Since the economic sanctions of Resolution 661 were a consequence of Iraq's refusal to follow Resolution 660, which demanded that "Iraq withdraw

---

<sup>254</sup> Canada, *Canadian Trade Statistics*, 1990.

<sup>255</sup> United Nations Security Council, Resolution 661, August 6, 1990.

immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990,"<sup>256</sup> it stood to reason that when Iraq complied with that order the UN would lift the economic sanctions. Following Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, however, this did not occur. Instead, the Security Council issued Resolution 687, which stated Iraq would still not be able to buy products, except for medicine and health supplies, until the Council decided that Iraq had implemented every resolution that pertained to the Persian Gulf crisis. However, Iraq would be able to purchase any kind of foodstuff, so long as no Council member opposed the purchase.<sup>257</sup>




FIGURE 5.1 Percentage of Iraqi Imports from Group of Seven States and Australia (Millions of \$US), 1988- 1995<sup>258</sup>

<sup>256</sup> United Nations Security Council, Resolution 660, August 1, 1990.

<sup>257</sup> United Nations Security Council, Resolution 687, April 3, 1991.

<sup>258</sup> IMF, *Direction of Trade Statistics*, 1996 Yearbook.

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Canada	156	296	166	*	3	1	*	*
US	1146	1174	640	*	*	4	1	*
Japan	406	489	271	*	*	1	1	*
UK	732	738	563	8	61	18	15	8
France	445	477	520	19	21	*	*	*
Germ.	884	1169	796	13	7	42	12	12
Italy	206	372	275	*	*	3	2	*
Austral	174	250	171	16	26	17	52	5

Note: Data derived from exporting country.

\* represents a figure under \$1 million dollars.

**TABLE 5.1 Iraqi Imports from Group of Seven States and Australia (Millions of \$US), 1988-1995<sup>259</sup>**

As a result of this change, Canada could, theoretically, begin selling its wheat and barley to Iraq. But, since the Resolution 687 also prevented Iraq from exporting any goods until it agreed to: give up all its chemical and biological weapons and its ballistic weapons with a range of more than 150 km; pledge not to use, develop or acquire such weapons in the future; reaffirm its acceptance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons; agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or material to be used in the manufacture of such weapons; identify and give up all its nuclear material; and, permit international inspectors to conduct on-site inspections so as to verify its compliance of these requirements, the amount of money Iraq had to buy foreign food was minimal.<sup>260</sup>

<sup>259</sup> IMF, *Direction of Trade Statistics, 1996 Yearbook*.

<sup>260</sup> United Nations Security Council, Resolution 687, April 3, 1991.

Due to these post-Gulf War conditions imposed on Iraq, Canadian exports to the country have made little recovery since the end of the war. The loss of this market represented a substantial cost to Canadian farmers and forced them to find new markets for their wheat and barley. It is uncertain when Canadian exports to Iraq will increase to pre-war levels since the destruction of the Iraqi economy has lowered its ability to import all essential food commodities. Hence, these conditions have forced Canada to compete with other wheat exporters for the now much smaller Iraqi market. Thus far Canada is losing this battle to Australia, a country whose pre-war wheat exports to Iraq represented 96% of its total exports to the country and rivalled Canada as Iraq's largest wheat supplier.<sup>261</sup> Between 1992 and 1995, Australia exported approximately \$100 million to Iraq whereas Canada's total was approximately \$4 million.<sup>262</sup>

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Canada	26	22	31	305	21	25	25	45
US	691	855	401	1228	1327	1009	1175	1416
Japan	731	668	418	437	766	974	680	623
UK	422	374	308	310	457	468	478	869
France	192	211	130	110	415	804	424	762
Germ.	410	458	329	273	556	537	502	504
Italy	323	334	231	153**	345	383	330	404
Austral.	64	64	25	17	59	60	60	61

Note: Data derived from exporting country. \*\*Data derived from Kuwaiti sources.

**TABLE 5.2 Kuwaiti Imports from Group of Seven States and Australia (Millions of \$US), 1988-1995<sup>263</sup>**

<sup>261</sup> Cooper et al., 193.

<sup>262</sup> IMF, *Direction of Trade Statistics, 1995 Yearbook*.

<sup>263</sup> IMF, *Direction of Trade Statistics, 1996 Yearbook*.

Canada also lost exports to Kuwait when Iraq invaded it in 1989. This market, however, was recovered by 1991, following Operation Desert Storm. In a speech to the House of Commons following a post-war trip to the Persian Gulf, Joe Clark said that the Emir of Kuwait gave him “clear assurances that the expertise of Canadian companies [would] enjoy opportunities commensurate with the important role Canada played in liberating Kuwait.”<sup>264</sup>

An analysis of the trade data with Kuwait indicates that this assurance became a reality and that Canada benefited commercially in its relations with Kuwait as a result of its participation in Operation Desert Storm. Largely due to a \$304 million sale of aircraft to Kuwait in 1991,<sup>265</sup> Canada’s average annual post-war exports to Kuwait, through 1995, were US\$84.2 million. By comparison, pre-war Canadian exports to Kuwait from 1988 to 1990 averaged US\$26.3 million per annum. Canada thus experienced the highest relative growth in exports to Kuwait of the Group of Seven states. Further, it was dramatically higher than Australia, whose annual export average rose only 0.1%.<sup>266</sup> This discrepancy is significant because Australia’s role in the Persian Gulf War was very similar to Canada’s role.

---

<sup>264</sup> Joe Clark, *Statement*, March 15, 1991.

<sup>265</sup> Canada, *Exports: Merchandise Trade*, 1991.

<sup>266</sup> IMF, *Direction of Trade Statistics*, 1996 Yearbook.




FIGURE 5.2 Percentage of Kuwaiti Imports from Group of Seven States and Australia (Millions of \$US), 1988-1995 <sup>267</sup>

	1988-1990	1991- 1995	% CHANGE
Canada	26.3	84.2	+ 220.15
France	177.7	503.0	+ 183.06
United States	649.0	1231.0	+ 89.68
United Kingdom	368.0	516.4	+ 40.33
Germany	399.0	474.4	+ 18.90
Japan	605.0	696.0	+ 15.04
Italy	296.0	323.0	+ 9.12
Australia	51.0	51.4	+ 0.01

FIGURE 5.3 Average Yearly Exports to Kuwait (Millions of \$US)<sup>268</sup>

In sum, Canada clearly benefited by increased exports to Kuwait following the war, but the increase was insufficient to replace the lost Iraqi market which in dollar amounts was clearly much more valuable to Canada.

<sup>267</sup> Ibid.

## ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS

### *Implications for the Environment*

The protection of the environment was a priority for the Mulroney government before the Persian Gulf War. Environmental issues such as acid rain, the protection of the ozone layer and toxic waste disposal sometimes played a role in shaping government policy.<sup>269</sup> However, concern for the environment played no role in the government's decision to participate in Operation Desert Storm.

Iraq frequently threatened that if there were a war between it and the multinational coalition the environment would suffer. As early as September 1990, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein stated that Iraq would burn and destroy the oil fields in the Middle East if it were attacked by the multinational coalition.<sup>270</sup> This theme was reiterated three months later when Hussein, in a response to a speech by US Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, said "Cheney and his aides will see how the land will burn under their feet not only in Iraq but ... also in Eastern Saudi Arabia, where the Saudi fighters will feel the land burn."<sup>271</sup> Clearly, Hussein was attempting to demonstrate that the environment would be a huge cost the multinational force would have to incur if it attempted to militarily force Iraq from Kuwait.

---

<sup>268</sup> Ibid.

<sup>269</sup> Andrew Cohen, "Canada's Foreign Policy: The Outlook for the Second Mulroney Mandate," *Behind the Headlines* 46 (Summer 1989), 8.

<sup>270</sup> Roberts, 280.

<sup>271</sup> Ibid., 280-1.

A number of groups and individuals recognized Iraq's environmental threats, but the Canadian government said little about them. While a group of scientists gathered in London two weeks before the start of Operation Desert Storm and announced that war in the Persian Gulf could produce "10 to 100 times" the amount of oil spilled in the Exxon Valdez disaster,<sup>272</sup> the Canadian government, like many other world governments, remained silent. Despite its explicit warnings to Iraq that it would not tolerate the use of chemical and biological weapons in the ensuing war, the coalition appeared prepared to accept Iraq's threat to destroy the environment. Evidently, for the Canadian government, the possibility that the environment could be harmed was a potential cost it was willing to incur in exchange for the potential benefits of removing Iraq from Kuwait.

The beginning of Operation Desert Storm did result in Iraqi attempts to damage the environment: it blew up a number of oil wells,<sup>273</sup> and it reportedly allowed oil to flow into the Persian Gulf.<sup>274</sup>

Iraq destroyed the oil wells by packing 15 to 50 kg of explosives into 858 Kuwaiti well heads and detonating the massive bombs during Operation Desert Storm. Between 732 and 749 oil wells were damaged by the explosions. Of this number, between 610 and 650 of them caught fire while the rest leaked enough

---

<sup>272</sup> Ibid., 281.

<sup>273</sup> David B. Russel, "The Kuwait Oil Fires and Their Environmental Effects," in *Verifying Obligations Respecting Arms Control and the Environment: A Post Gulf War Assessment*, H. Bruno Schiefer, ed., (Regina: University of Saskatchewan, 1992), 85.

oil to produce huge oil basins around the wells. In total, approximately 90 million barrels of oil burned or spilled onto the land as a result of the explosions.<sup>275</sup>

Two major environmental concerns arose as a result of the damage the oil well explosions caused. First, it was thought that the burning oil wells might take up to two years to extinguish, and as a result, the unparalleled amount of smoke coming from the oil fires would harmfully alter local (Kuwait), regional (Middle East), and global environments.<sup>276</sup> Second, some of the basins of oil that formed around the wells were up 5 km long and 1.5 meters deep.<sup>277</sup> This produced speculation that these huge lakes of oil would alter and contaminate the desert landscape for many years to come.

In the end, the burning oil wells had severe local effects, moderate regional effects and inconsequential global effects. The area in the immediate vicinity of the oil fires suffered from high gas readings and residue from oil particles that together contributed to the destruction of many animals, vegetation and crops. The surface temperature beneath the smoke's plume was up to 20 degrees Celsius lower than normal in the months following the Persian Gulf War.<sup>278</sup>

---

<sup>274</sup> Fauteux, 35.

<sup>275</sup> Russel, 85.

<sup>276</sup> It actually took eight and a half months to extinguish all the fires.

<sup>277</sup> Russel, 85.

<sup>278</sup> *Ibid.*, 88.

The regional environmental effects, while noticeable, were “marginal in terms of environmental damage.”<sup>279</sup> Unlike the extreme drop in temperature immediately under the plume, the surface temperature beneath the smoke 200 km away from the oil fires was up to 10 degrees Celsius lower. Further, rain observed in Saudi Arabia had up to ten times more acid than normal but it “was fairly benign compared with acid rain episodes in parts of central Europe and the USA” and was “not expected to cause any problems.”<sup>280</sup> Likewise, peak concentrations of carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and ozone in the smoke plume 130 km from the fires were “less than the US national ambient air quality standards, with the exception of sulfur dioxide, which occasionally exceeded the standards.”<sup>281</sup>

The oil fires had little effect on the global environment since the smoke did not enter the stratosphere and therefore could not be dispersed around the globe. For the oil fires’ smoke to be spread around the earth, the smoke would have needed to rise 13,000m. Instead, it rose to a maximum height of only 6000m and generally rose to only the 4000m level. Consequently, the oil fires did not directly affect Canada.

The oil basins around the damaged oil wells are likely to cause the most long-term environment damage. Throughout 1991, tens of millions of barrels of oil flowed out of the wells and produced oil lakes which “swallowed plants,

---

<sup>279</sup> Ibid., 90.

<sup>280</sup> Ibid., 89.

lizards, geckos, insects and small mammals. Tens of thousands of migrating birds, particularly cormorants, mistook the oil for water, especially in low light and drowned in the pools.”<sup>282</sup> Scientists also fear that the ground beneath the lakes of oil may remain toxic for many generations. If true, animals such as sheep, goats and camels grazing on the land will accumulate these metals and possibly affect the human population. Additionally, ground water may become contaminated, requiring that new sources of water be found.<sup>283</sup> Again however, these problems are generally localized and represent a minimal cost to Canada unless the long-term damage to the area requires a massive international effort to combat it.

Operation Desert Storm also led to oil being spilled into the Persian Gulf. Experts estimate that 6 to 8 million barrels of oil flowed from a Kuwaiti oil pumping station and six Iraqi oil tankers into the Persian Gulf over a ten-day period during the war. Like other oil spills, the main concern with this one was that the oil released into the Gulf would severely damage the immediate ocean and coastline ecosystem.<sup>284</sup>

The ten-day period of the oil spill was January 19 to 28. By February 4, an oil slick that was approximately 100 km long and 30 km wide had formed and was drifting southwards along the coast of Saudi Arabia. The actual damage to the

---

<sup>281</sup> Ibid.

<sup>282</sup> Ibid., 91.

<sup>283</sup> Ibid.

<sup>284</sup> Fauteux, 36.

Persian Gulf varied according to the area studied; however, eighty days after the oil spill occurred, 45% of the oil had:

hit the coastal region between Al-Ahmadi [Kuwait] and Ras Abu Ali [Saudi Arabia], 32% [had] evaporated, 15% was suspended in the water column or [had sunk] to the seabed, and 7% remained on the sea surface. A small fraction of the oil, about 1%, [had] dissolved in the water and may have a significant effect on the environment.<sup>285</sup>

As with the effects of the oil fires and lakes of oil, damage appears to have been local only. Since nearly half of the oil came to rest on the Kuwaiti and Saudi coasts, it was here that most of the environmental damage occurred. Oil severely damaged the marine environment in this area and its rehabilitation may take decades to complete.<sup>286</sup> The oil along the coastal regions also put 2 million migratory birds of 52 species at risk. Over 20,000 birds were found to have died during the clean-up of the oil slick. On the other hand, however, the area was partly preserved as “no apparent significant decline was observed in the abundance of the major fauna and flora groups.”<sup>287</sup>

Environmental damage to the Persian Gulf away from the Kuwaiti and Saudi coastline was again limited. By August 1991, the sea surface appeared to be clear of iridescent oil film and there was no evidence of coral contamination.<sup>288</sup>

---

<sup>285</sup> Amin Meshal, “The Oil-Spill in the Gulf and its Impact on the Mariene Environment,” in *Verifying Obligations Respecting Arms Control and the Environment: A Post Gulf War Assessment*, H. Bruno Schiefer, ed., (Regina: University of Saskatchewan, 1992), 111.

<sup>286</sup> Ibid.

<sup>287</sup> Ibid., 112.

<sup>288</sup> Ibid.

Indeed, studies have indicated that the number of algae, birds and fish in the Persian Gulf outnumber measurements taken in 1986.

Environmental degradation was one of the largest potential costs to Canada when it committed itself to the Persian Gulf War. Had Iraq's use of the environment in the war produced the catastrophic results suggested by some, it is quite possible that the coalition members would have had to accept some of the blame. Canada, as well as other states in the coalition, may well have been accused of paying too high a price in driving Iraq out of Kuwait and of resorting to war too quickly rather than relying upon economic sanctions to achieve ultimately the same end. As has been seen, however, Iraq's tactics in the Persian Gulf War did not produce the dire environmental results that some expected. While damage occurred (especially to Kuwait and northern Saudi Arabia) it may not be enough to enable critics of Operation Desert Storm to accuse the coalition members of sacrificing the environment in pursuit of other interests.

Looking at the environmental dimension from a different perspective, it can be argued that the Persian Gulf War "has served to sensitize world awareness concerning the global implications of regional disputes."<sup>289</sup> One implication, as demonstrated by Iraq in the war, is the use of the environment as an instrument of war. Additionally, the Persian Gulf War demonstrated the weakness of international law in this area. Documents like the Environment Modification Convention (ENMOD), which are intended to prevent environmental warfare,

have, as Iraq's actions in the Persian Gulf War demonstrated, proven insufficient. Currently, nothing substantial has been accomplished regarding new international agreements. If in the future, however, some new, stronger agreement is negotiated, then a small, unanticipated benefit may arise from the environmental degradation the Persian Gulf War produced.

## CONCLUSION

Canadian participation in Operation Desert Storm, and the Persian Gulf War in general, had direct and indirect effects for Canada. In searching for these effects this chapter has examined the diplomatic, political, strategic, economic, and environmental consequences of the war and of Canadian participation in the war.

The term diplomatic effects refers to the war's implications for weapons proliferation, the effect of the war on future Canadian peacekeeping efforts, and the war's impact on the security role of the United Nations. In terms of weapons proliferation, the Persian Gulf War raised the level of awareness of this issue two ways. First, Iraq's ability to build up one of the largest militaries in the world and then use it to invade and annex one of its neighbours was largely the result of unrestricted arms sales to the state. Second, the Persian Gulf War led many people to believe that states would become more fearful for their sovereignty and weapons proliferation would increase following the war. In Canada, the

---

<sup>289</sup> Mason, 5.

government developed a proposal designed to restrict the sale of military arms and tried to promote it during and after the war. The proposal failed and a much less comprehensive arms control agreement was signed by the UN General Assembly in December 1991.

As for peacekeeping, one of Canada's main concerns before Operation Desert Storm was whether the war would affect Canada's status as a "peacekeeping" state. Since following the Persian Gulf War Canada has acted in numerous peacekeeping missions and contributed comparable numbers of troops to missions as before the war this concern appears to have been unjustified.

Canada's desire for Operation Desert Storm to enhance the security role of the UN was also not realized. Rather than the operation being an example of how the UN could help enforce collective security, it was an example of how difficult it can be to organize such missions and lessened hopes that such a mission could be repeated in the future.

The Persian Gulf War also had political effects for Canada. First, in terms of the war's impact on Parliamentary unity, opinions within the House of Commons on whether Canada should participate in Operation Desert Storm were divided between the PC and Reform and the Liberals and NDP, with the BQ largely avoiding the debate. After the start of Operation Desert Storm partisanship eroded and most Liberal and BQ members chose to support participation in the war. This development led to greater Parliamentary unity

and allowed the government to avoid potentially embarrassing questions during Question Period. Moreover, the Liberal and Reform parties', along with most Bloc Quebecois MP's, support for participation in Operation Desert Storm might have prevented Canadians from solely blaming the PC government if Canadian military personnel in the Persian Gulf were killed or injured.

Second, while US President Bush's public opinion rating rose to 91% support following the Persian Gulf War, the governing PC party did not receive the same boost. The Canadian public generally approved of the government's handling of the war, however, the "disapproval of Mr. Mulroney and his government [was] so deeply ingrained"<sup>290</sup> in Canadians that it prevented the PCs from gaining public support following the war. Instead, the Liberals increased their level of support mostly at the expense of the NDP, whose anti-war position was unfavourable with much of the public.

The strategic effects of the Persian Gulf War are defined here as the implications of the war for the Canadian Forces. While the DND had hoped that the war would persuade the government and public that equipment upgrades were needed to allow the military to function effectively, this did not occur. Rather, as a result of the media's positive portrayal of the Canadian Forces in the war and the Forces ability to avoid casualties and injuries there was no impetus for the public and government to support increased military funding.

---

<sup>290</sup> *The Gallup Report*, March 21, 1991.

The Persian Gulf War affected Canadian trade with Iraq and Kuwait. Despite Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, Resolution 687 extended the ban on Iraq's ability to sell products abroad and therefore, prevented it from buying the vast supplies of Canadian wheat that it did before the Persian Gulf crisis. As for Kuwait, the Emir's assurances that Canadian participation in Operation Desert Storm would benefit Canadian companies came true. In 1991, the year of the Persian Gulf War, Canadian exports to Kuwait increased 10-fold from its pre-war level. However, even this increase in exports did not offset Canada's loss in exports to Iraq.

The final category this chapter examined was the environmental effects of the Persian Gulf War. In deciding to join Operation Desert Storm, the government ignored the possibility that the war might have severe environmental costs. The start of the war resulted in Iraq setting oil wells on fire and leaking oil into the Persian Gulf. While these acts affected the environment in the immediate vicinity of the war zone the regional and global effects were fortunately negligible.

## **Chapter 5: CONCLUSION**

This study sought to present a clear picture of Canada's role in the Persian Gulf War and the effects of the war and Canadian involvement in it for the country. An increased understanding of Canada, the war, and its consequences may help future government officials make more informed foreign policy decisions.

This study has shown that a number of external, non-governmental domestic, and governmental variables influenced both Canada's decision to join Operation Desert Storm and its level of involvement. Also, it has revealed that the war and Canadian participation in it had diplomatic, political, strategic, economic and environmental consequences for the country. None of the changes were, however, permanent.

### **OVERVIEW OF STUDY**

To assist in this study's goal of presenting a clear, comprehensive picture of Canada's involvement in the Persian Gulf War, three broad overarching questions were addressed: one, what factors most likely influenced Canada's decision to join Operation Desert Storm; two, what were the effects of Canadian participation in the operation; and three, what were the effects of the Persian Gulf War for Canada.

### *Variables Influencing Canada's Decision to Participate in Operation Desert Storm*

In answering these three questions this study has shown that Canada joined Operation Desert Storm primarily due to external determinants. The end of the Cold War, American expectations that Canada would join the operation, Canada's commitment to the UN, Arab acceptance of Western military involvement in the crisis, and Iraqi violations of international law particularly influenced the government's decision. Non-governmental domestic determinants, on the other hand, mostly worked to constrain the government's decision to participate. Progressive Conservative political concerns over how participation would affect the party's re-election chances in Quebec, the economic relationship between Iraq and Canada, and limited nation-wide support (before the start of Operation Desert Storm) for participation in the war were important forces that limited Canada's level of involvement. Governmental determinants did not have much direct influence in the decision-making process. Noteworthy variables within this level of analysis, however, were the DEA's strong desire to participate in Operation Desert Storm, in spite of External Affairs minister Joe Clark's original hesitation to support the use of force against Iraq, and the apparent reluctance of some Cabinet ministers to support a large Canadian role in the war.

### *Consequences of the War and Canadian Participation in the War*

This study has shown that the war and Canadian participation in it affected the country along diplomatic, political, strategic, economic, and environmental lines. As for the diplomatic effects, while the war did not motivate the rest of the world to accept Canada's proposal to curb weapons proliferation through a stronger arms control agreement, neither did it lead to more weapons proliferation, as some feared it would. Additionally, the ability of Canada to participate in future peacekeeping efforts was unaffected by Canadian participation in the war. Finally, the success of the multinational coalition in forcing Iraq from Kuwait did not improve the security function of the United Nations.

The government's decision to participate in the war was not unanimously supported in the House of Commons but it did have the support of the majority of members in all parties except the NDP. Also, while the public approved the government's handling of the war, the government's high level of unpopularity allowed the Liberal Party to gain public support lost by the NDP as a result of its anti-war stance.

The war did not convince the public that the Canadian Forces required more funding, and thus enabled the government to avoid an expensive new re-armament program for the military. As for the economic effects of the war, Canada lost Iraq as a market for its wheat exports and gained a short-term increase in exports to Kuwait. With respect to environmental concerns, the war

did not affect Canada directly. Only the area in the immediate vicinity of the oil well fires, oil lakes, and oil slicks was affected.

## **RELEVANCE TO FUTURE DECISION-MAKERS**

The Persian Gulf War provides a number of lessons which may be of value to future decision-makers. The first lesson is that this war, like all other wars, is unique and thus predictions from it about future crises are hazardous. While it is possible, for instance, that a small state may be invaded and annexed by a larger neighbour again in the future, it is unlikely that the conditions and circumstances will be very similar to those which existed in the Persian Gulf crisis. The invasion of Kuwait constituted, for example, a uniquely clear instance of aggression which made possible near universal condemnation of Iraq's action. Canadian officials cannot expect such an easy decision-making situation to occur often, but they may also take some comfort from the fact that there are at least some circumstances in which the world can unite to defend principles of international law and civilized behaviour.

This said, it is also possible to draw slightly more specific lessons from the war. First, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, clearly indicates once more that today's friend may well be tomorrow's enemy. It is necessary not only to take a long-term view, but to try to visualize the unimaginable. Throughout the 1980s, it was Iran which both the West and Arab world regarded with apprehension, to the extent that they armed and tacitly supported Iraq in its war against its

neighbour. The unintended consequences of that, however, were two fold: the creation of economic hardship in Iraq which created an incentive for the Kuwaiti invasion and annexation, and the bolstering of Iraq's military capabilities to the point where temptation could, with some stretch of rationality, be indulged. This points out both the dangers of weapons proliferation in general and the inherent, and frequently only half realized, complexities of relationships in volatile areas such as the Middle East.

The conduct of the war also reveals lessons. First, Iraq's use of the environment as an instrument of war by igniting oil wells and leaking oil into the Persian Gulf serves as a bad precedent to future warring states that are facing certain defeat. Fortunately, this was a cost that did not prove to be nearly as high as environmental experts suggested it might. In the future, however, the effects of environmental warfare may not be as favourable. To prevent states from using similar tactics, the world community must spell out the consequences of such action (for example, prosecution as war criminals for those engaged in environmental warfare). In the Persian Gulf War, the US threatened Iraq with severe retaliation, perhaps an attack using tactical nuclear weapons, if its armed forces used chemical weapons in the war. Iraq refrained from using chemical weapons in the war, perhaps as a result of knowing the cost of their use. Hence, one wonders whether Iraq would have used the environment as an instrument of war if the costs associated with its use had been conveyed to it.

Second, while the government did not send infantry troops to participate in the war, domestic instabilities at home would have prevented it from sending Canadian based troops in any case. The large number of military personnel and equipment used during the Oka crisis in the summer of 1990 underlined the limited ability of the military to handle a domestic insurrection and fight a foreign war simultaneously. This suggests that unless substantial capital upgrades are made to the armed forces, the likelihood of Canada making a sizable contribution to a future Operation Desert Storm-type mission and still having enough nationally based troops to address a domestic crisis is limited.

The domestic response to the Persian Gulf War also reveals lessons. First, on the eve of the war most Canadians opposed participation in the conflict. The Canadian Forces, nevertheless, took part in the war, and by the beginning of February the majority of Canadians supported the military's actions in the Persian Gulf. While the public may have supported the troops in the Persian Gulf for morale purposes it is also possible that this wide change in public opinion was the result of the war going so well for the coalition that the public felt confident it would end successfully. If the latter explanation is correct, it suggests that future governments may have more leeway in their decision-making than public opinion polls seem to indicate so long as governments are certain the action they are contemplating will succeed.

Second, it has been suggested that involvement in foreign wars can benefit an unpopular domestic government (for example, following Britain's Falkland Island War with Argentina British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's popularity rose and the Conservative party won the subsequent general election). The Persian Gulf War presented an excellent opportunity to test this theory in regards to a Canadian government. In the months before Operation Desert Storm, the governing PC party had the support of 12% to 15% of Canadians, far behind the Liberal Party and the NDP. The Persian Gulf War was successful for Canada in the sense that the multinational coalition forced Iraq from Kuwait and no Canadian military personnel died or were injured. The impact of the war on the PC party, however, was insignificant as support only rose to 16%. Moreover, this small increase in support was short-lived, as it sunk to 14% in April and May. Hence, in this case the theory that governments benefit from foreign wars was disproved. Additionally, it suggests that unpopular governments hoping a successful foreign war will raise their level of domestic support should consider whether such an endeavour can even make people forget or disregard the things that made them so unpopular.

Finally, lessons regarding the attainment of international peace and security are also apparent. Many individuals saw the war as a new beginning for the UN; it was its first opportunity to play the role that its founders envisioned. Instead, the war brought to light the challenges facing the UN in the post-Cold

War era. It demonstrated that unless states give up a small degree of sovereignty and commit troops to the UN Security Council the UN will not have the power to maintain international peace and security. Enabling the Security Council to control a permanently standing multinational force would allow it to directly enforce collective security and prevent states from depending on the creation of ad hoc coalitions.

Assuming that the UN develops no military capabilities of its own, any attempt to repeat this operation in the future would likely require the participation of a great power which could act as the operation's galvanizer, or, in other words, form and maintain the operation. The Persian Gulf War underscored that the only state militarily and diplomatically powerful enough to act as a galvanizer is the United States and if Canada wants to embrace the form of collective security that the Persian Gulf War practiced it will have to rely on the assistance of the US. Moreover, this likely means that Canada will have to maintain good relations with the US and be prepared to accept its leadership in future collective security endeavours. Opposing American leadership might be risky in itself. During the Persian Gulf crisis the US announced cuts in foreign aid to Yemen (a Security Council member) and reduced them to Jordan (a key Persian Gulf state due to its Iraqi contacts) because of their pro-Iraqi positions in the crisis, and publicly criticized its allies Germany and Japan for not contributing enough to the multinational coalition.

In summation, this study has sought to present Canada's involvement in the Persian Gulf War in a clearer light. It is, however, only a preliminary analysis of Canada and the Persian Gulf War. More complete explanations as to the motivations behind Canada's decision to join Operation Desert Storm, the effects of the war on Canada, and the effects of Canadian involvement in the war may come with the passage of time, further study, and the eventual availability of confidential government documents. However, based on the current evidence, it appears Canada's decision-making process was influenced by a number of competing variables and the effects of the war and Canadian involvement in it were surprisingly transitory.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ACCESS and John Simpson. "Chronology of Events." In *The Persian Gulf War: Views from the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 27-41. Herbert H. Blumberg and Christopher C. French, eds. New York: University Press of America, 1994.
- Akehurst, Michael. *A Modern Introduction to International Law*, 4th ed. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982.
- Allan, James H. "Canadian Defence Policy after the Gulf." *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 21, no. 2 (October 1991), 20-24.
- Amery, H.M. "Chronology of the Crisis, 1990-1991." In *Shaping the Gulf: In Search of Order*, 649-673. H.M. Amery, ed. London, ON: Canadian Institute for Policy Research and Analysis, 1992.
- Apple Jr., R.W. "Naked Aggression." *New York Times*, August 3, 1990, A1.
- "Arms Transfer Deliveries and Agreements, 1984-1994." In *US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency*, Daniel Gallik, ed. ([www.acda.gov/initial.html](http://www.acda.gov/initial.html)).
- Axworthy, Lloyd. *Canada and the Newly Developing Democracies*. (Toronto: International Relations Society/Trinity College, University of Toronto, November 20, 1991).
- Bickerton, Geogg. "Labour and the Gulf War." *Canadian Dimension* 28 (March 1991), 28.
- Canada. *Canadian Trade Statistics*, 1990.
- . *Exports: Merchandise Trade*, 1989-1991.
- . *Public Accounts, Vol. II, Details of Expenditures & Revenue*, 1987/88-1994/5.
- . *House of Commons Debates*, 2nd Session, 34th Parliament, Vol. XII (November 29, 1990).
- . *House of Commons Debates*. 2nd Session, 34th Parliament, Vol. XIII. (January 15, 1991).
- CanadaExport* 8 no. 4. September 4, 1990.

Clark, Joe. Letter to the Honourable John Bosley, Chairman, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, December 28, 1990.

----- . *Statement*, March 15, 1991.

Cohen, Andrew. "Canada's Foreign Policy: The Outlook for the Second Mulroney Mandate." *Behind the Headlines* 46 (Summer 1989), 1-15.

Cooke, James J. *100 Miles from Baghdad: With the French in Desert Storm*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993.

Cooper, Andrew, Fenton et al. *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993.

Department of External Affairs. Communiqué number 170. August 8, 1990.

Dewitt, David B. and John J. Kirton. *Canada as a Principal Power*. Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 1983.

Eddy, K.T. "The Canadian Forces and the Operational Level of War." *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 21, no. 5 (April 1992).

Fauteux, Paul. "The Use of the Environment as an Instrument of War in Occupied Kuwait." In *Verifying Obligations Respecting Arms Control and the Environment: A Post Gulf War Assessment*, 35-79. H. Bruno Schiefer, ed. Regina: University of Saskatchewan, 1992.

Feigert, Frank. *Canada Votes: 1935-1988*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1989.

*The Gallup Report*. March 21, 1991.

----- . June 20, 1991.

----- . August 15, 1991.

----- . October 8, 1990.

----- . October 11, 1990.

----- . November 5, 1990.

----- . December 27, 1990.

- George, Alexander. "The Gulf War's Possible Impact on the International System," In *The Political Psychology of the Gulf War*, 293-315. Stanley A. Renshon ed. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1993.
- Gill, Stephen and David Law. *The Global Political Economy*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1988.
- Goetze, Bernard. "The Future of Peacekeeping: A Military View." In *Peacekeeping, Peacemaking or War*, 30-38. Alex Morrison, ed. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1991.
- Graff, James, "Canada and the Gulf War." In *Shaping the Gulf: In Search of Order*, 415- 422. H.M. Amery, ed. London, ON: Canadian Institute for Policy Research and Analysis, 1992.
- . "Canada and the War Against Iraq." In *It Was, It Was Not*, 217-232. Mordecai Briemberg, ed. Vancouver: New Star Books, 1992.
- Granatstein, J.L. "Staring into the Abyss." In *Towards a New World*, 47-63. J.L. Granatstein, ed. Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1992.
- Gray, Charlotte. "Home Grown Skirmishes: Canada and the War." *Peace & Security* (Autumn 1991), 8-9.
- . "War Games." *Saturday Night* 106, no. 2 (March 1991), 10-14.
- Hague Convention. October 18, 1907.
- Hibbard, Ann L. *Canada and the Persian Gulf Crisis: The Press, Public Opinion and Policy*. Windsor: University of Windsor, 1993.
- and T.A. Keenleyside. "The Press and the Persian Gulf Crisis: The Canadian Angle." *Canadian Journal of Communications* 20 (1995), 255-266.
- Howard, Ross. "Canada's reaction rhetorical." *Globe & Mail*, August 3, 1990, A10.
- Hybel, Alex Roberto. *Power and Rationality: the Bush Administration in the Gulf Crisis*. Albany, N.Y.: State University of N.Y. Press, 1993.
- IMF. *Direction of Trade Statistics, 1996 Yearbook*.

Jervis, Robert. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Joffé, George. "Oil, Wealth and Wealth Distribution." In *The Persian Gulf War: Views from the Social and Behavioral Science*, 163-70. Herbert H. Blumberg and Christopher C. French, eds. New York: University Press of America, 1994.

Keating, Tom. *Canada and World Order*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1993.

Kirton, John. "Liberating Kuwait: Canada and the Persian Gulf War, 1990-91." In *Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases*, 382-393. Don Munton and John Kirton, eds. Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1992.

Klare, Michael T. "How We Armed the Middle East." In *The Persian Gulf War: Views from the Social and Behavioral Science*, 251-64. Herbert H. Blumberg and Christopher C. French, ed. New York: University Press of America, 1994.

Koch, George. "When words fail." *Western Report* (January 28, 1991) , 12-17.

Kramer, Mark. "The Global Arms Trade After the Persian Gulf War." In *The Persian Gulf War: Views from the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 256-310. Herbert H. Blumberg and Christopher C. French, eds. New York: University Press of America, 1994.

Krause, Keith. "Arms Transfers and International Security: The Evolution of Canadian Policy." In *Canada Among Nations 1992-93: A New World Order?*, 283-301. Fen Osler Hampson and Christopher J Maule, eds. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992.

Lesch, Anne M. and Joe Stork. "Why War? Background to the Crisis." *Middle East Report* 6, no. 167 (November/December 1990), 11-18.

"Letter from Vice-Chief of the Defense Staff C.M. Thomas to Chief of the Defense Staff, A.J.G.D. de Chastelain, and Reply." *Peacekeeping, Peacemaking or War*, 142-151. Alex Morrison, ed. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1991.

Lewis, Stephen. "A promise betrayed." In *The Persian Gulf War: Views from the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 551-560. Herbert H. Blumberg and Christopher C. French, eds. New York: University Press of America, 1994.

*Maclean's*. February 4, 1991.

Mason, Peggy. "Arms Control and the Environment in the Post Gulf New World Order, In *Verifying Obligations Respecting Arms Control and the Environment: A Post Gulf War Assessment*, 3-6. H. Bruno Schiefer, ed. Regina: University of Saskatchewan, 1992.

Matthews, Ken. *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations*. New York: Routledge, 1993.

McKinley, Michael, ed., *The Gulf War: Critical Perspectives*. Canberra: Australia National University Printery, 1994.

Meshal, Amin. "The Oil-Spill in the Gulf and its Impact on the Mariene Environment," In *Verifying Obligations Respecting Arms Control and the Environment: A Post Gulf War Assessment*, 107-135. H. Bruno Schiefer, ed. Regina: University of Saskatchewan, 1992.

Miller, Carman. *Painting the Map Red*. Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993.

Miller, Ronnie. *Following the Americans to the Persian Gulf*. Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1994.

Moore, John Norton. *Crisis in the Gulf: Enforcing the Rule of Law*. New York: Oceana Publications, 1992.

Morrison, Alex. "Canada and Peacekeeping: A Time for Reanalysis?," In *Canada's International Security Policy*, 199-226. David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown eds. Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1995.

Mueller, John E. *Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

Neill, Donald A. "Back to the Basics: Defence Interest and a Defence Policy in Canada." *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 21, no. 3 (December 1991).

1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

Nossal, Kim Richard. "Analyzing the domestic sources of Canadian foreign policy." *International Journal* (Winter 1983/84), 1-22.

- . *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*. 2nd ed. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1989.
- . "Quantum Leaping: The Gulf Debate in Australia and Canada," in *The Gulf War: Critical Perspectives*. Michael McKinley, ed. Canberra: Allen & Unwin, 1994.
- . *Rain Dancing*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994.
- Pact of the League of Arab States. March 22, 1945.
- Potter, E.B. *Bull Halsey*. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1985.
- Resende-Santos, Joao. "The Persian Gulf Crisis: A Chronology of Events." In *After the Storm: Lessons from the Gulf War*, 295-355. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Roger K. Smith, eds. New York: Aspen Institute, 1992.
- Riddell-Dixon, Elizabeth. "The United Nations after the Gulf War." *International Journal* XLIX, no. 2 (Spring 1994), 253-76.
- Roberts, Adam. "The Laws of War." In *International Perspectives on the Gulf Conflict, 1990-91*. Alex Danchev and Dan Keohane, eds. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.
- Rosenau, James. *Turbulence in World Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
- Rubinstein, Alvin. "Moscow and the Gulf War: decisions and consequences." *International Journal* XLIX, no. 2 (Spring 1994), 301-327.
- Russel, David B., "The Kuwait Oil Fires and Their Environmental Effects." In *Verifying Obligations Respecting Arms Control and the Environment: A Post Gulf War Assessment*, 85-96. H. Bruno Schiefer, ed. Regina: University of Saskatchewan, 1992.
- Russet, Bruce and James S. Sutterlin. "The U.N. in a new world order." In *The Persian Gulf War: Views from the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 539-50. Herbert H. Blumberg and Christopher C. French, eds. New York: University Press of America, 1994.
- "Security and National Defense." Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs no. 5 (June 2, 1992), 1-38.

Selochon, Viberto, ed. *The Gulf War: Issues and Implications for Australia and Asia*. Nathan, Australia: Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, Griffith Australia, 1992.

Stacey, C.P. *Canada and the Age of Conflict*, Vol. 1. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984.

----- *Canada and the Age of Conflict*, Vol. 2. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981

Stairs, Denis. *The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974.

Statute of the International Court of Justice.

Text of Joint Press Conference. United States Information Service. March 15, 1991.

Thomas, Charles. "The Economics of Canadian Defense." *Peacekeeping, Peacemaking or War*, 63-70. Alex Morrison, ed. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1991.

United Nations Charter.

United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 34/146.

----- Resolution, 45/170.

----- Resolution 46/36.

United Nations Security Council. Resolution 660. August 2, 1990.

----- Resolution 661. August 6, 1990.

----- Resolution 662. August 8, 1990.

----- Resolution 678. November 29, 1990.

----- Resolution 687. April 3, 1991.






von Riekhoff, Harold. "Canada and Collective Security." In *Canada's International Security Policy*, 227-250. David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown eds. Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1995.

- Viotti, Paul R. and Mark V. Kauppi, eds. *International Relations Theory*. 2nd ed. Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan, 1993.
- Waas, Murray. "What Washington Gave Saddam for Christmas." In *The Gulf War Reader*, 85-99. Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds. Toronto: Random House, 1991.
- Ward, Olivia. "It's Not Too Late to Avert Showdown, Experts Maintain." *Toronto Star*, December 5, 1990, A14.
- Whitaker, Reg. "Prisoners of the American Dream: Canada, the Gulf, and the New World Order." *Studies in Political Economy* 35 (Summer 1991), 13-27.
- "Why are we at war?" *Canadian Speeches/ISSUES* (February 1991), 3-17.
- Wilson-Smith, Anthony and Bruce Wallace. "A Call To Arms." *Maclean's* (January 28, 1991), 34-35.
- Winter, Jaimes. *Common Cents: Media Portrayal of the Gulf War and Other Events*. Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1992.
- Wirick, Gregory. "Canada, Peacekeeping and the United Nations." In *Canada Among Nations 1992-93: A New World Order?*, 94-114. Red Osler Hampson and Christopher J. Maule, eds. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992.
- Winsor, Hugh. "Three ships sailing eastward with little sense of direction." *Globe & Mail* (August 24, 1990), A1.
- Wolfers Arnold. *Discord and Collaboration*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962.
- Wood, Bernard. "From The Director." *Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security* (Spring 1991), 24.
- . "The Gulf Crisis and The Future of World Order." *Canadian Defense Quarterly* 20, no. 5 (Spring 1991), 20-24.
- Wood, Nancy. "The Isolationist Province." *Maclean's* (January 28, 1991), 35.

### **VITA AUCTORIS**

Robert Davis was born in 1971 in St. Mary's, Ontario. He graduated from LaSalle Secondary School in Sudbury, Ontario in 1990. Following this he spent two years at both, Wilfrid Laurier University and Laurentian University. In 1994, Robert graduated from Laurentian with a B.A. in Political science. Upon graduation, he moved to Japan to work for one year. Robert returned to Canada in 1995 and is now a candidate for the Master's degree in Political Science. He hopes to graduate in Fall 1997.

# IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3)



APPLIED IMAGE, Inc.  
1653 East Main Street  
Rochester, NY 14609 USA  
Phone: 716/482-0300  
Fax: 716/288-5989

© 1993, Applied Image, inc., All Rights Reserved

