

SWIFT AND BOLD: THE 60TH REGIMENT AND WARFARE IN NORTH AMERICA, 1755-1765

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ABSTRACT

The 60th Royal American Regiment was raised in an attempt to combine the qualities of a frontiersman and a trained soldier. This paper presents an in-depth look at the conditions which revealed a need to meet the challenges of frontier warfare. The specialized training, outfitting, and tactical education of this regiment, its performance in battle situations, and its ensuing impact on training and tactics throughout the army are all considered.

The primary focus of this paper is the Royal American Regiment's performance in North America in the battles of the Seven Year's War, and above all its decisive involvement in the Pontiac Rebellion. Discussion of these engagements presents the thesis that the Royal American Regiment was at the forefront of a movement in training reform that helped add a new dimension to the British Army.

R E S U M E

Le 60^e *Royal American Regiment* a été créé dans le but de combiner les qualités du soldat de métier et du pionnier. Cet article étudie en profondeur les conditions qui aboutirent à la nécessité de relever les défis de la guerre dans les colonies. L'entraînement, l'équipement et la formation tactique spécialisés du régiment, sa performance pendant les batailles et leurs répercussions sur l'entraînement et les tactiques de toute l'armée sont également examinés.

Cet article s'intéresse tout particulièrement aux exploits du *Royal American Regiment* en Amérique du Nord pendant les batailles de la Guerre de Sept ans et surtout à sa participation décisive au soulèvement de Pontiac. L'étude de ces deux événements permet de démontrer que le *Royal American Regiment* se situait à l'avant-garde d'un mouvement de réforme de l'entraînement qui a contribué à donner une nouvelle dimension à l'armée britannique.

PREFACE

The Seven Years' War was a war fought in the forests, forts, and fortresses of North America. At its outset the British Army was ignorant of the style of warfare which these locales demanded, and it became apparent that training reforms were needed if the war was to be won. The 60th Royal American Regiment was one of the products of this reform movement, and with its help the British Army was able to reinvent itself and within three years after Braddock's defeat to emerge victorious in two major engagements, the Louisbourg and Forbes campaigns.

The history of the 60th is a history of the war; its units fought in most of the major campaigns, and its troops showed the rest of the British Army how to cope with the forest while maintaining traditional Continental discipline and winning battles. The defeat of Pontiac's Rebellion was the culmination of the lessons learned through the experiment of the 60th. This paper is a study of that experiment, a regiment raised to confront the obstacles of an alien style of warfare and by its efforts to help win a war and reshape the thinking of the British Army.

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INTRODUCTION

Many historical writings of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, especially those of the War for American Independence, present the British Regular soldier in an unfavorable light. Colonial citizens serving in militias or provincial units are described as excellent soldiers fighting in a "free style"¹ considered superior to Regular tactics. In *The Last of the Mohicans*, James Fenimore Cooper refers to British Regulars as being out of place in the new style of warfare, and presents civilian frontiersmen as being better suited to fight the French and Indians. Such sources commonly depict the British Regular² as a stumbling incompetent, walking into certain death in straight, orderly lines of formation against a quick and flexible enemy. Two excerpts from Cooper's book stand out as indicative of this general attitude. The first excerpt addresses the perception that colonial soldiers were more adept at dealing with forest situations, particularly the myth that Braddock's campaign could have ended differently if Braddock had followed the advice of George Washington:

"...an army led by a chief who had been selected from a crowd of trained warriors, for his rare military endowments, disgracefully routed by a handful of French and Indians, and only saved from annihilation by the coolness and spirit of a Virginian boy (George Washington). . ."³

This portrayal of Braddock's campaign is not quite accurate, and the facts of the campaign itself are discussed later in this paper. But the opinion expressed in this quote is more well-known than the facts; and to this day the belief persists that in the 18th century the

¹For a detailed description of 'free style' or forest fighting and Regular or Continental tactics, refer to the section entitled "Tactics", found in Chapter II.

²"Regular" refers to a professional British soldier, paid by the British Crown, as opposed to a colonially-raised provincial soldier, paid by a specific colonial government.

³James Fenimore Cooper, *The Last of the Mohicans*, (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1992), pp. 3-4.

British Regular soldier was incapable of waging war in the forests of North America. The second excerpt deals specifically with the 60th. It reads:

"If we (characters within the book) lay among the white tents of the 60th, and in front of an enemy like the French, I could not ask for a better watchman," returned the scout; "but in the darkness and among the signs of the wilderness your judgment would be like the folly of a child, and your vigilance thrown away."⁴

This passage highlights the perception that in open fields the 60th would perform admirably against their French foes, but that in the forests it was like a child unable to defend itself against the superior tactics of the French and Indians. This idea was also perpetuated in later works of historical fiction, such as *Northwest Passage* a fictionalized account of Rogers' Rangers during the Seven Years' War, and in *Rabble in Arms*, a fictionalized account of the American invasion of Québec during the War for American Independence. These novels, both by Kenneth Roberts, present the image of the colonial soldier, superior in fighting ability to the stuffy British redcoat.

Especially notable in these writings is the apparent belief that not only is the British Regular unqualified to wage war in the style of a frontiersman, but also incapable of learning to do so. As we shall see, historical fact tells a different story. The British Army set out to avenge the Braddock debacle with a change in tactics, and recognition of this need for change is obvious in the goals of the 60th Regiment to combine the "frontier" fighting instincts of colonial settlers with the training and discipline of a British Regular. The result of this retraining was a British soldier of 1759 who was markedly different from his 1755 counterpart. Additionally, this slanted portrayal of the colonial soldier as superior to the British Regular fails to recognize the strengths of the latter and the corresponding weaknesses of the former, namely discipline and allegiance. For example, as will be discussed later, desertion among members of the provincial militias before and during battles created considerable problems, especially during campaigns in the south. It is also significant to note that George Washington, as general of the new Continental army

⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 148-49.

of 1775, chose to structure it along traditional European "Continental" or "Regular" lines, rather than adopting the innovations of the "minutemen" type of skirmisher.

The warfare of the Seven Years' War was a combination of forest or ambush tactics and traditional Continental fighting, such as that undertaken in the battles of Louisbourg and Quebec. The training methods used within the 60th regiment enabled them, at a moment's notice, to be used as either a regular fighting unit (as at Quebec), or as a skirmishing unit (as during the Forbes expedition against Fort Duquesne in 1758). During the Seven Year's War, the 60th was not the only unit formed to fight using this new style of warfare--by this time, the line regiments serving in North America were also adopting ambush tactics⁵--but it was one of the first and as such was unique and an important factor in the decisions to later raise or reform regiments such as the 55th, 80th and 90th, who would serve entirely as light infantry. The 60th was raised as a forest fighting unit and not a light infantry force, as the term would be construed at a later point. The 60th would form a single light infantry company, as other regiments did, but because of its particular training it was considered equally adaptable to the forest fighting style and to Regular tactics, and thus be employed in those fashions throughout the war. The 60th was further distinct from its contemporary counterparts, notably the Rangers, in one important respect: the Rangers⁶ were raised as independent companies, many of which served in certain theaters of the war independently of one another. The four battalions of the 60th were raised as battalions. While the various battalions served in different theaters of the war, they fought for the most part as whole battalion formations. There were a few exceptions, but even in these situations they were still commanded by a battalion commander.

⁵By 1758, most regular units had formed a "light infantry company". See Daniel Beattie, "The Adaptation of the British Army to Wilderness Warfare, 1755-1763," *Adapting to Conditions: War and Society in the Eighteenth Century*, Maarten Ultee, ed., (University, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1986) p. 72.

⁶The Rangers were further distinct from the 60th in their war time roles. They were intended to be used as skirmishers and reconnaissance troops for the proper army. The two famous ranger formations during the war were the seven companies of His Majesty's Independent Company of American Rangers, "Rogers' Rangers", who served mostly in the New York theater of operations, and the six companies of the Independent Companies of Rangers, "Gorham's Rangers." This last group was raised in 1747 in Halifax to counter French and Indian raiding in Nova Scotia, and would serve mostly in the Louisbourg and Québec campaigns.

This paper will deal with popular misconceptions of the structure and performance of the British Army during the Seven Years' War by examining the history and performance of the Royal American Regiment, 60th, during that war and the subsequent Pontiac Rebellion, in which the 1st Battalion played a central role in crushing the Indian uprising. The opening of the paper will present information on a variety of topics that are relevant to the style of warfare that predominated in North America up until the Seven Years' War and the formation of ranger-style units. Braddock's defeat will be considered in some detail as the impetus for a rethinking of British training tactics. The role of the British government in the formation of the new regiment will be discussed, principally the parliamentary debates about the raising of the regiment and the two acts that formed the legal basis for its formation. The creation of the four battalions and the difficulties of outfitting and raising them to proper strength will be analyzed, and the identities and backgrounds of the principal officers will be presented. The training tactics formulated principally of forest fighting developed by Lieutenant Colonel Bouquet, commander of the 1st Battalion, will be analyzed.

The main body of the paper will present the service record of the four battalions during the Seven Years' War, the disbandment of all but the 1st and 2nd Battalions in 1762, and its subsequent performance during the Pontiac Rebellion. In this context, the paper will compare some of the stereotypical perceptions and criticisms of the Regular British Army presented in contemporary and later writings with the performance of this very effective regiment.

CHAPTER I

WARFARE IN NORTH AMERICA, 1603-1754

The first French settlers arrived in North America before the end of the sixteenth century; English settlers established colonies in Virginia and New England in the early decades of the 1600s. The English colonies along the Atlantic coast were expanded considerably both in area and in population during the 1600s, while the French colonies of Quebec, Montreal and Acadia grew in size and population at a slower rate.⁷

Before very long, the French and various English colonial governments began to dispute over boundary issues, especially in sections of the present-day states of Maine and New York. By the 1680s, the French, in an attempt to monopolize the fur trade in North America,⁸ had penetrated down the St. Lawrence River as far as the Great Lakes region and the Ohio and Mississippi River valleys, and had set out to establish a permanent foothold in these sections by the installation of various forts.

By 1688, the English colonies had a population of around ninety thousand people, compared to the French colonies' population of approximately twelve thousand.⁹ In spite of this discrepancy, the French had several advantages over the English colonies. First, the French colonies were united under one man, the Governor of New France, unlike the English colonies, which had many different colonial governments. Because of this system, the Virginia colonists might not perceive a French and Indian raid into New England as a Virginian problem, while French colonists would perceive any such attack as a threat to the whole. (This thinking on the part of the English colonists would cause problems for

⁷Francis Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1898), Vol. II, pp. 54-62.

⁸Joseph Lister Rutledge, *Centurt of Conflict: The Struggle Between the French and British in Colonial America* (Toronto: Doubleday Canada Ltd., 1956), pp. 23-33.

⁹Douglas Edward Leach, *Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 1607-1763* (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1973), pp. 12-16

them during the initial phases of the Seven Years' War.) Second, the male population of New France were very often former soldiers who had been offered bounties of land and money by the King of France to remain in the colony following completion of their term of service. Many of the soldiers who did stay on became fur traders and thus more valuable, because in this occupation they were exposed to the fighting and tracking methods of the Indians. English settlers, by contrast, were generally farmers, without military experience or ambitions in the fur trade.¹⁰ (This is why the decision was made in 1755 to raise the 60th from "frontier" settlers rather than from regular farmers.¹¹) Finally, New France had a permanent establishment of Regular soldiers, while the majority of the defense in the English colonies was made up of colonial militia, with a sprinkling of veteran soldiers; and on only a few occasions were Regulars sent to North America.

The struggle for control of North America began in 1608 when the English Governor of Virginia sent an expedition to seize the French settlers at Port Royal in Acadia. Skirmishes of this type continued throughout the seventeenth century, but warfare between the English and French in North America intensified in 1689, when Count Frontenac became Governor of New France. Frontenac was an ex-soldier and had been Governor of New France previously; he had encouraged the opening up of the west years before. In 1689 he had plans drawn up for the advance down Lake Champlain to seize Albany and New York. These were not fully carried out, but a number English settlements in northern New York and New England were attacked. The company of Regulars stationed in Boston were caught in a mini-revolution following the fall of King James in England, and were unable to defend the English settlers from war parties of Indians and French Canadians.¹²

¹⁰Ian Kenneth Steele, *Guerillas and Grenadiers: The Struggle for Canada* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1969), pp. 34-45.

¹¹Lewis Butler, *The Annals of the King's Royal Rifle Corps* (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1913), Vol. I, p.23.

¹²*Ibid.*, pp. 250-52.

In 1690, the colonies of New York and New England decided it was their turn to attack New France; they asked for assistance from England, which was refused. Fifteen hundred colonial militia were raised and sent against Montréal, and a flotilla of thirty-two ships was sent against Québec. The land invasion against Montréal failed due to widespread desertion, dissension and general lack of discipline among the men. The naval expedition was successful against the French settlements in Acadia, but failed to take Québec. In 1691, a second expedition against Montréal was launched from New York, but it too failed, for the same reasons as the first. The British then decided to launch attacks against the French settlements, using Indians who were attached to the British Crown, a tactic which was shortly answered in kind by the French and their Indian allies. This raiding and counter-raiding continued sporadically over the next seventy years, with the French and their Indian allies having the greatest success.¹³

War resumed between England and France in Europe in 1702, and the frontier war in North America also began anew. The French, with Indian allies, once again struck at the frontiers of New England and New York, wreaking havoc. The unaffected colonies were unmoved by the sufferings of their besieged neighbors, however; Rhode Island and Connecticut only grudgingly gave ammunition to Massachusetts and New York.

In 1707, Massachusetts sent an expedition against Port Royal in Acadia, which failed due to the officers' lack of command skills and the militias' lack of discipline. In 1709, military officials in England decided to send a joint force of Regulars and colonials against Montréal and Québec. England planned to provide five Regular line regiments, and Rhode Island and Massachusetts were designated to raise twelve hundred men. These men, along with the troops from England, were to attack Québec, while the rest of the colonies, except New Jersey and Pennsylvania, provided fifteen hundred men for an expedition against Montréal. This expedition, up the Hudson River valley, was partly successful, namely in the establishment of two forts, Fort Edward and Fort Anne. The

¹³Steele, pp. 40-45.

expeditionary forces then halted to wait for reinforcements from Boston. However, British reverses in the European theater at Almanza prevented the Regulars from arriving in Boston, so the expedition could not be completed.¹⁴

In 1710 a small number of Royal Navy ships and a battalion of British Marines sailed forth with four regiments of New England militia (strengthened the previous year by the arrival of a number of British Regular veteran officers seconded to the militia) and succeeded in taking Port Royal. The captured port was renamed Annapolis Royal and the French rule in Acadia was at an end; but, however renamed, French settlements survived at Québec, Montréal, and along the western approach to the St. Lawrence River. Another expedition was sent against Québec in 1711, but this one failed due to the loss of transport along the St. Lawrence River.¹⁵

The Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 granted total control over Acadia and Newfoundland to the British. The French proceeded to build Fort Louisbourg on L'Ile Royale (Cape Breton), strategically located to block access to Québec and Montréal by guarding the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and also in a prime location to launch any future offensive actions against New England and New York. During the 1720s, the French also established forts at Niagara and Chambly, as well as Fort Frederic, a large fortification at Crown Point. This last fort was built in an area claimed by the colony of New York, but nothing was done immediately to force the French out of the area. New York's only response was to built a fort at Oswego on Lake Ontario in retaliation for the fort built at Niagara. While all this building was going on, incessant raiding along the frontier by both sides continued, still generally with results more favorable for the French side.¹⁶

The outbreak of war in Europe inevitably spilled over to hostilities in North America. The French garrison at Louisbourg was supplied with information about the

¹⁴Hon. J. W. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1899), Vol. II, pp. 254-55.

¹⁵Steele, pp. 45-50.

¹⁶Douglas Edward Leach, *Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 1607-1763* (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1973), pp. 55-62.

outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession in Europe before the English colonists; they moved quickly and were able to take Annapolis Royal and Canseau without much opposition. The English planned to retaliate by staging an invasion in 1745 of Louisbourg itself, and after much debate and coaxing, were able to raise four thousand men from New England. A small New England fleet was assembled and sailed for Louisbourg, and was met south of its goal by a small Royal Navy squadron. After a six-week siege, supported by Royal Navy guns, the fort fell. The colonists were left to garrison the fort, and plans were formed for future campaigns against Quebec.¹⁷

In April 1746, three British Regular regiments, the 29th, 30th, and 45th, arrived to relieve the colonial troops at Louisbourg. The British government had made plans for five more regiments to travel to North America to be sent, with support from the New England colonials, against Québec, while a second force moved up the Champlain to attack Montréal. Forty-three hundred men were raised by seven colonies for the second expedition, but the British regiments again failed to arrive due to demands in the European theater. News came of French reinforcements being sent to take back Louisbourg and burn Boston, but this fleet was destroyed by a storm off the coast of Acadia. A second fleet was defeated by a British squadron. The British sent three hundred Regulars to Annapolis Royal as garrison troops, but only one hundred fifty survived the journey. Throughout this war, the raiding along the frontier continued, with continued success on the French side.¹⁸

The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was signed in 1748, and with it went the French fort at Louisbourg, traded for the Port of Madras in India, to the chagrin of many New Englanders.¹⁹ The British government had learned some lessons about the situation in North America, however. When various regiments that had been raised early in the conflict were disbanded, officials followed the practice of the French and offered land and

¹⁷Steele, pp. 55-60.

¹⁸Steele, pp. 61-63.

¹⁹Fortescue, Vol. II, pp. 256-260.

money bounties to ex-soldiers to leave England and settle in what is now the Halifax region of Nova Scotia, anticipating that this new settlement would counter the strength of the French port at Louisbourg. In 1749, four thousand new settlers landed and established the port of Halifax. Two Regular battalions were earmarked for the defense of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland,²⁰ and the new citizens of Halifax formed three companies of “rangers” to fight in the skirmishing style of the surrounding Indians and French.

At about this time, British traders had succeeded in crossing the Allegheny mountains in the Ohio River valley, and in establishing trade relations with the Indian tribes in that region. A movement began in the colonies of Virginia and Pennsylvania to set up a company (Ohio Land Company, 1747) to capitalize on the trading and land prospects in that region.²¹ The French reacted nervously to this development, as they had established posts all along the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers in an effort to hem in the British. A French emissary was sent from Montréal to re-establish the links with the various Indian tribes in the area,²² but the outcome of this mission was not as successful as hoped.

The arrival Marquis of Duquesne, the new governor for New France, accelerated the pace of affairs to the point of all-out conflict. In the spring of 1753, Duquesne dispatched three thousand men down the St. Lawrence to the Great Lakes to build forts and lay further claim to the area of the Ohio River valley. The French built Fort Presque Isle (now Erie, Pennsylvania), and Fort Le Boeuf, situated at the headwaters of the Allegheny and Ohio Rivers. Garrisons were left at these two forts when the majority of the men returned to Montréal. The British fort at Venango was seized during this expedition, securing communications between the Ohio River Valley and Montréal.²³

Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia sent a Major²⁴ of the Virginia Militia, George Washington, to the French commanders of the new forts with a summons declaring that the

²⁰ Fortescue, p. 263.

²¹ Robin May, *Wolfe's Army* (London: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1990), pp. 4-5.

²² Fortescue, Vol. II, p. 264.

²³ Fortescue, Vol. II, pp. 264-265.

²⁴ Washington's rank is given in other sources as Lieutenant Colonel and as Adjutant General.

forts were on Virginia territory and should thus be vacated. He was received graciously by the French Commander, Legardeur de St. Pierre, at Fort Le Boeuf, but was told that the letter would have to go to Montréal; the garrison would not move until it received orders to do so.²⁵ Governor Dinwiddie, in the meantime, was trying unsuccessfully to obtain funds from the Virginia Assembly to build forts in the region. In February 1754, after the Board of Ordinance in London had written a letter approving of the project, the Virginia Assembly agreed to grant a small amount of money. However, Dinwiddie's appeals to the other colonies for money and men did not receive an enthusiastic response, most of his counterparts clearly feeling that this was an issue for Virginia alone.²⁶ North Carolina did furnish money for the raising of three hundred men,²⁷ and Dinwiddie also received assistance from the Regular companies formed in New York by the British government. He sent these companies, along with Virginian troops, to Will's Creek to establish a base for any future operations. (The camp at Will's Creek was later expanded to become Fort Cumberland.)

In 1754, a small party of forty men were sent to the area of present-day Pittsburgh to begin construction of Fort Prince George.²⁸ On 17 April, a flotilla of five hundred French soldiers appeared, and the fort was forced to surrender. The French renamed the fort Duquesne, in honor of their governor. Governor Dinwiddie and Washington considered this attack an act of war, and Washington set out for Fort Duquesne, even though he still lacked the full complement of troops promised by the various colonies. Washington's small group of men reached the Monongahela on 27 May, where he came upon a small party of French soldiers. A short exchange took place, the first shots of the North American phase of the Seven Years War. Washington prepared a small fort at Great Meadows, named Fort Necessity, in anticipation of a French counter-attack, and he and his small group of

²⁵ May, pp. 5-6.

²⁶ Harrison Bird, *Battle for a Continent* (New York; Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 8-9.

²⁷ Douglas Edward Leach, *Roots of Conflict: British Armed Forces and Colonial Americans, 1677-1763* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), pp. 118-22.

²⁸ May, p. 6.

militiamen remained here for the month of June, employed in building roads out from Fort Necessity towards Fort Duquesne while waiting for reinforcements and relief from the other colonies. Late in June, one hundred soldiers from the Independent Company of South Carolina arrived. This was a Regular unit, with paid troops and officers from London. Their arrival, however, caused an issue, because Captain MacKay of the Independent Companies, as a Regular officer, was higher in rank than Washington, a militia officer. The officers resolved this by deciding that the Independent Companies would remain under MacKay's command, while the Virginians would remain under Washington's.²⁹

As the end of June approached, Washington and his three hundred men, as well as MacKay and his one hundred, were thirteen miles from Fort Necessity, clearing the area for a road. The other colonial and Independent Company reinforcements were far away, and Washington and MacKay decided it was best to retreat from their positions when they received intelligence that eight hundred French Regulars and Canadian militia, as well as four hundred Indians, were coming towards them from Fort Duquesne. The Virginians and Carolinians retreated towards Great Meadows, with the French marching on their heels. The French arrived on the outskirts of Fort Necessity in early July, and reconnaissance reports indicated that Washington had drawn his Virginians in ranks in the open plain before Necessity, while the Independents were amassed in trenches dug before the fort, in which swivel guns had been placed in the fort.³⁰

The battle commenced on 2 July 1754. The French moved into positions that overlooked the trenches, suffering numerous casualties *en route* from the accurate fire of the Independent Company. After nine hours of fighting, Washington surrendered to the French. The colonial troops were granted an honorable surrender, which allowed Washington's and MacKay's regiments to leave with their colours and one swivel gun.

²⁹Lawrence Gipson, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1946-1960), Vol. V, pp. 213-22.

³⁰Bird, pp. 17-19.

Other conditions were that the French prisoners taken in an earlier engagement be returned and that two British officers remain as hostages. (One of these officers, Captain Robert Stobo, would later play a pivotal role in the clashes at Duquesne and Quebec.) On 4 July, the colonials left Fort Necessity and marched back towards Virginia.³¹

Reaction to this defeat in London produced two results. In late July, ten thousand pounds and two thousand arms were shipped to North America for, respectively, the raising of more units and service with the militias. In September, orders were issued for the 44th and 48th Regiments from the Irish Establishment to be brought up to strength for service in North America.³² Each regiment was to be increased to three hundred and fifty men, later further increased to five hundred men (a difficult number to reach due to a high rate of desertion). The two regiments sailed from Cork, Ireland, with an extra two hundred muskets for each regiment, which would be given to new recruits enrolled in North America. The commander of these two Regular units (as well as the other colonial units attached to his expedition upon arrival in North America) was General Edward Braddock.³³

From the beginning of settlement in North America, warfare had been characterized by two systems. The first and most important (and devastating) was that of frontier warfare, the tactics of ambush and skirmish learned from the Indians. The French, mainly because of their economic base and military experience, had been better suited to learning this new style of warfare, whereas the English tended to use their Indian allies, chiefly the Iroquois, as an instrument of terror against their French foes. This style of warfare was in constant use, from the earliest skirmishes between sides up through the Seven Years' War, regardless of any peace treaty. The second system, chiefly employed by the English

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 19-21.

³² Regiments from the Irish Establishment were generally lower in numbers and quality of men than their English Establishment counterparts.

³³ Fortescue, Vol. II, pp. 268.

colonies, was that used in European-style battles such as those fought at Port Royal and Louisbourg.

Although the English had numerical superiority in civilians at the outset of the war, they lacked the French advantages of a large militarily-experienced and frontier-trained male population. The English colonial militias did not perform well in Continental-style battles, plagued as they often were by poor discipline and bad organization; only with aid from the Regulars in the form of training or troops were some of the campaigns successful. But England only used Regular troops in North America very sparingly, whereas French Regular units were present for all the campaigns of the 17th and 18th centuries. In addition, France's colonial (*Marine*) units were made up of ex-soldiers, an idea applied by the English to their establishment of Halifax.

BRADDOCK'S EXPEDITION

General Edward Braddock was given the task of removing the French presence along the Ohio River valley. His expedition was just one of four planned moves by the British; the other three thrusts were against Fort Niagara, Crown Point and Fort Beausejour, Acadia. This style of planning two or three thrusts against New France during a given campaign season would characterize operations during the war. Braddock's two Regular regiments, the 44th and 48th Foot, embarked from Cork in January 1755 for America. The British transports reached Virginia in March; from there, the troops with their transports were to proceed up the Potomac and establish a base at Alexandria. It was decided that Braddock, originating from Virginia, would continue down the road from Will's Creek in an offensive against Fort Duquesne. As was later proved by the Forbes Expedition of 1758, this maneuver was a strategic mistake. The more direct route in miles and navigable

terrain would have been from Philadelphia, which was the starting point of the Forbes expedition.³⁴

Braddock's plans to move were hindered by the lack of transport needed for the expedition. The local colonial administrations and merchants were not very supportive of providing the needed transport and stores, a problem that consistently plagued military operations in North America. One account that survives from the expedition was an orderly book which for the months of March and April 1755 mentions the lack of supplies and stores and notes only as late as 26 April acquisition of the required amount of transport to march from Alexandria to the next staging point.³⁵ By 10 May the expedition reached Will's Creek, where Fort Cumberland had been newly built.³⁶

The army stationed at Fort Cumberland was divided into two brigades. The first brigade, commanded by Lt. Col. Sir Peter Halkett, was comprised of the 44th Foot, now around seven hundred men strong after recruitment in Virginia, along with two hundred and thirty "rangers" from Virginia, Maryland, and New York. Halkett also had fifty carpenters attached to help in the expanding of the road to Fort Duquesne. The second brigade, commanded by Colonel Thomas Dunbar, comprised the 48th Foot, around six hundred and fifty men, along with two hundred and thirty "rangers" from Virginia and the Carolinas and an attachment of thirty-five carpenters. An Independent Company from New York was also attached to each brigade. Artillery support was as follows: four 12-pounders, six 6-pounders, four 8-inch howitzers and fifteen mortars, with one hundred men of the Royal Artillery as gunners.³⁷ Crew members of *H. M. S. Norwich* were commanded by Lt. Charles Spendlowe as attached support for the gunners.³⁸

³⁴Paul Kopperman, *Braddock at the Monongahela* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), pp. 22-31.

³⁵"Halkett's Orderly Book", *Braddock's Defeat*, Charles Hamilton, ed., (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959), pp. 78-84.

³⁶Fortescue, Vol. II, p. 271.

³⁷*Ibid.*

³⁸May, pp. 8-9.

Lack of wagons and supplies continued to cause delays at Fort Cumberland. Only by petitioning a variety of important colonial figures, such as Benjamin Franklin, did the army receive any supplies. Discipline of the troops also became an issue; commanding officers issued strict orders regulating drinking of alcohol and requiring morning parades in an effort to maintain an atmosphere of order. Court martials for various offenses were instituted, as well as corporal punishments such as whipping for less serious misdeeds. As returns for the various units given each day indicate, there appear to have been quite a few desertions, mostly from the colonial units.³⁹

On 10 June, Braddock decided to leave Fort Cumberland and push on towards Fort Duquesne; he had received intelligence that the French at Duquesne were getting reinforcements of around nine hundred men.⁴⁰ On 18 June, Braddock's force reached Little Meadows. As the advance up to this point had been painfully slow--averaging only about four miles a day⁴¹--Braddock decided to split his troops here. He selected twelve hundred men who he deemed the best of the force who, with ten guns, thirty wagons, and several pack horses, would advance under his command⁴² while the rest of the force followed as they could, commanded by Colonel Dunbar.⁴³ Braddock also decided to put a small advance guard forward of his unit, commanded by Lt. Col. Thomas Gage.

Over the course of the march, Braddock used rangers as a forward and flanking unit. This fact indicates that he was not later surprised by the French and their Indian allies, as is commonly believed. Men were lost to the constant sniping between the two adversaries as the army marched, but the French as yet offered no serious contest. Gage's and Braddock's units reached Fort Necessity on 25 June, and the Monongahela River on the 28th, which they crossed unopposed.⁴⁴

³⁹Halkett's Orderly Book, pp. 88-94.

⁴⁰Bird, pp. 50-51.

⁴¹May, p. 10.

⁴²Lee McCardell, *Ill-Starred General: Braddock of the Coldstream Guards* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958), pp. 45-49.

⁴³Gipson, Vol. VI, pp. 66-73.

⁴⁴"Journal of a British Officer", *Braddock's Defeat*, Charles Hamilton, ed. (Norman OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959), pp.42-47.

The French⁴⁵ at Fort Duquesne were outnumbered by the advancing British Army, as they apparently had only a few companies of Regulars,⁴⁶ along with around one hundred men from the Marine units of New France and two hundred French Canadian militiamen. Contemporary documents estimate that there were nine hundred French-allied Indians on hand as well.⁴⁷ The commander of Fort Duquesne sent Captain Beaujeur and a mixed force of seventy Regulars and one hundred forty French Canadian militia, along with six hundred and fifty Indians, to march out and meet the approaching British troops.⁴⁸

When the British forces reached the Monongahela River, just below Duquesne, Braddock decided to ford it twice in order to avoid the high cliffs on one side of the river. British-allied Indians had done reconnaissance on Fort Duquesne and reported the movements of Beaujeur's column.⁴⁹ By this time Braddock also had in his possession plans of the fort drawn by Captain Stobo, the officer who had been left at Duquesne as a hostage.⁵⁰

On 6 July, a large-scale skirmish occurred between the lead elements of the British force and a forward Indian group. In its structure, this engagement could be seen as a precursor to the coming battle. One officer's description of the attack talks of great

⁴⁵The French Army in North America during the conflict was structured as follows: eleven French regular regiments--*La Reine, Bearn, Languedoc, Guyenne, Artois, Bourgogne, Royal Roussillon, La Sarre, Berry, Cambise* and *Les Volontaires Etrangers*--which served throughout the campaigns. Each regiment was represented by one battalion, except for the *Berry, Royal Roussillon, La Sarre* and *Cambise*, which had two battalions each. There were twelve companies of infantry and one company of grenadiers in each battalion; each infantry company had four officers and forty men, and each grenadier company had three officers and forty-five men. The French also had two other bodies of soldiers from which to gather support: the French troops called *Marines*, and the Canadian militia units raised during the campaign season. While on the French Army establishment, *Marines* were under the command of the Minister of Marine and Colonies; they were formed into separate companies, much like the Independent Companies of the British, and their numbers fluctuated between thirty and forty companies over the course of the conflict. These companies consisted of sixty-five men, who were recruited both in France and in the colonies, for eight years' service. Numbers of Canadian militiamen available to provide support varied during the period of engagement. One example of support is the battle of Quebec, when many Canadian farmers came to help defend the city. See *Tradition* (London, 1978), Vol. 4, No. 24, pp. 4-9.

⁴⁶ Fortescue, Vol. II, p. 275.

⁴⁷ Bird, p. 53.

⁴⁸ Fortescue, Vol. II, p. 274.

⁴⁹ Journal of a British Officer, pp. 44-47.

⁵⁰ Stobo had managed to have the plans of the fort smuggled out to the British. See May, pp. 10-12.

confusion, that when the British returned fire they did not actually hit any Indians. The only casualties were British-allied Indians who were accidentally shot by British troops.⁵¹

By 8 July,⁵² Braddock's units were fording the Monongahela for the final time. Gage and his men had forded the river earlier and reported no opposition. The main force also crossed without opposition, much to the surprise of Braddock and his men. The path leading from the river bank was surrounded by thick forest, so once again, Braddock sent out scouts on his flanks and his forward sides. Gage and his units were still forward of Braddock and he, too, sent out scouts on all sides.⁵³ As the army moved forward, the troops continued to suffer from insufficient rations, as supply and transport problems persisted. One British officer's journal describes the small rations and the weakened condition of his men.⁵⁴

At around 12 o'clock noon on either the 8th⁵⁵ or 9th,⁵⁶ the British column was attacked. Gage's forward units were attacked first, about eight yards forward of the river bank. Braddock had expected such an attack, but had thought it would occur earlier in the morning, during the actual crossing of the Monongahela.⁵⁷ The Indians first attacked the left flank of the column. The British formed into lines and returned fire into the forest from where the first salvo had originated, from Indians and French troops hidden behind trees. The French and Indians had the advantage of being on higher ground at this point; they then attacked the right flank of the column, and again the British lines turned and fired.⁵⁸ The British formed a group of grenadiers into an *ad hoc* formation and rushed the French and Indians on the right, successfully dislodging them from their positions and killing the French Captain Beaujeur. Colonel Gage sent a messenger back to Braddock's formation

⁵¹Journal of a British Officer, p. 47.

⁵²"Journal of a British Officer" lists this day as the 9th.

⁵³Kopperman, pp. 61-66.

⁵⁴Journal of a British Officer, pp. 45-51.

⁵⁵Fortescue mentions this date as the battle; see Vol. II, p. 274.

⁵⁶Bird (p. 54) and "Journal of a British Officer" both list the date of battle as the 9th.

⁵⁷Fortescue, Vol. II, p. 274.

⁵⁸Journal of a British Officer, p. 50.

and asked for orders, and Braddock and his men rushed to the aid of the forward units. The third volley crashed hard into the British line, producing many casualties.⁵⁹ An artillery piece was brought forward and fired upon the French and Indian attackers; this action, however, made the artillery men themselves the target of constant sniping, and eventually forced them to take the gun out of action.

One British officer who was present during the attack tells how the French and Indians fired from one position and then ran to a new position, while the British line remained in close quarters and fired from left to right as volley after volley fell within its ranks. Some of the British colonial militia began to run for cover behind the trees in order to return fire; the officers were unable to control the situation as discipline amongst the colonial militia broke down. Confusion reigned as men were forced back into line by British Regular officers, not before many had been felled by so-called friendly fire as the Regulars shifted fire from left to right. The grenadiers were used in a variety of attacks, each time losing more men and accomplishing little. The groans of wounded men who fell into the hands of the Indians initially stiffened the British troops' resolve, but as the day went on it began to affect them adversely. After two hours the British began to retreat, still falling prey to fire from the high ground.⁶⁰

As the retreat progressed, cohesion and uniformity continued to break down. Units began to fall into huddled masses, returning fire wherever sound occurred. The British column fell back to the area where the baggage, along with units left behind to protect it, were held up. Shortly before this, after having five horses shot out from under him, General Braddock had been wounded. The British attempted to make another stand around the baggage and artillery pieces; volley after volley was exchanged with the French and Indians. Here again, however, the relentless sniper fire killed most of the British gunners.

⁵⁹Leach, *Roots of Conflict*, pp. 80-84.

⁶⁰Journal of a British Officer, pp. 50-51.

After four more hours the retreat resumed across the Monongahela; one officer describes the men's frenzied attempts to be first across the river to avoid capture and sure death. As the men crossed the river, they were shot at from the high ground; any stragglers were caught by the pursuing enemy, who were following closely on the heels of the column. As the column re-formed on the opposite bank they attempted to reorganize and hold their ground, but at this point panic amongst the troops was so great that commanding officers were forced to continue the retreat. The artillery, baggage and supply columns had to be left behind so as not to slow down the retreat; the fear of being cut off and cut to pieces was rampant amongst the troops.

General Braddock died on 15 July on the retreat; of the thirteen hundred and seventy-three NCOs and men, only four hundred and fifty-nine had not been wounded. Many of those who were had been left on the road and killed by the pursuing enemy.⁶¹ The survivors of the British column reached Fort Necessity around 17 July;⁶² the officer's journal does not list many wounded men or officers as being present at the fort, so one is left to assume that only a few were carried with the retreating column.⁶³ The French losses were estimated at three officers killed, four officers wounded and fewer than ten Regular and Canadian soldiers killed or wounded. It is difficult to estimate the numbers of Indian casualties, but the numbers range from twenty to one hundred Indians killed and twice that number wounded.⁶⁴

As Daniel Beattie observes in his article, the two armies had collided;⁶⁵ the engagement was not a French ambush, as it is frequently described by writers of today. Braddock had protected his flanks with scouts, and had trained his men in dealing with flanking deployments. Each soldier had a lighter amount of equipment than usual to

⁶¹ Fortescue, Vol. II pp. 279-81.

⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 52-55.

⁶³ *Journal of a British Officer*, pp. 55-60.

⁶⁴ May, p. 12.

⁶⁵ Beattie, p. 54.

carry, and a second Grenadier company had been added to each Regular battalion.⁶⁶ General Braddock and his force failed only after many hours of hard fighting, on terrain to which he and his army were not accustomed. The British units had a difficult time deploying in lines on the narrow road in order to give maximum fire power against a specific position. They were also surrounded on three sides and had the additional disadvantage of being on lower ground than their adversaries.

The manner in which Braddock deployed his men and in which they took commands was characteristic of an army that was more at home on the open battlefields of Fontenoy and Culloden. These men had no experience of fighting in this new style, and the deployment of colonial troops around trees was viewed as a "foreign" and undisciplined style of fighting. It was hoped that disciplined and maximum firing would eventually win the day on the field. It did take the French and Indians many hours to finally break the will of the British, and British counterattacks were at first successful. Many historians believe that any British general of this time would have been as unsuccessful in this expedition as Braddock.

One must note, as well, the other problems that hampered the expeditionary force. The actual laying of the road was over a terrain more difficult than most encountered by the British soldier, and this arduous work was made more difficult by the lack of adequate support from colonial government in providing supplies and men for the expedition. The men had marched over difficult terrain and were suffering from the effects of a shortage of rations when they forded the Monongahela the second time. The discipline and resolve of Braddock and his men showed in their ability to hold firm for as long as they did in an alien environment.⁶⁷

After news of the defeat reached London, Army officials decided to attempt to copy the French and Indian style of warfare and apply it in the training of regiments designated

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 59-62.

to be sent to North America. To win against the French, the British Army needed to overcome a variety of problems. The first was how to establish methods of adequately supplying future operations in the vast interior of North America.⁶⁸ The second was how to adapt British training tactics to the new style of warfare.

One issue that was raised in analysis of the battle was the good discipline of the British Regulars, especially compared with the French Regulars, who wavered on numerous occasions, including an attempt at looting the baggage of the retreating British column. The need for a wilderness fighting force that was capable of maintaining discipline and could also be used in the Regular style of continental fighting was the impetus for the creation of the 60th Regiment of Foot. The British Army high command would need to work out many problems of logistics and training for wilderness fighting, but it was in the establishment of the 60th and later regiments that British generals invested their hopes for a successful war in North America.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, p. 62.

CHAPTER II

THE 60TH (62ND) IS RAISED

After the news of Braddock's defeat, there was a call in Parliament to raise a number of new regiments. After much debate, ten new regiments of infantry were approved; the 62nd, later the 60th, was different in a number of ways from the other nine regiments formed at the same time. A gentleman by the name of Colonel James Prevost had proposed to the Duke of Cumberland the idea of raising a special regiment composed primarily of German and Swiss frontiersmen in North America, plus British Regulars, and officered by a large number of foreign-born Protestant soldiers of fortune. (Colonel Prevost himself had been a captain in the Prince of Orange's Swiss Guards.) This regiment would be trained in the frontier style of warfare, but also drilled in the contemporary European manner. It was hoped that recruitment of the frontiersmen would give the English what the French already had: a militarily-trained citizenry skilled in tactics used in frontier warfare and in the right place to employ them. This plan also offset the legal problems involved with recruiting British subjects into the new Regular British regiments.

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There was some opposition from members of Parliament to the idea of foreigners fighting for the British. The honourable Pitt in particular vehemently opposed this idea, believing that only British men should fight in British wars. While these debates continued, the 62nd was taking form. The raising of the 62nd, Royal American Regiment was officially authorized by act 29th George II Cap. 5, in November 1755.⁷⁰ The regiment, as originally planned, was composed of four battalions, in contrast to other regiments,

⁶⁹"Memoirs of the Royal American Regiment," authenticated by Major Murray, London, National Army Museum Library, pp. 3-4.

⁷⁰Nesbit Willoughby Wallace, *A Regimental Chronicle and List of Officers of the 60th* (London: Harrison, 1879), p. 12.

which normally comprised one, or maybe two. Lord Loudon⁷¹ was proclaimed Colonel-in-Chief⁷² on 29 December 1755; meanwhile, debate continued about the inclusion of German and Swiss recruits. It was eventually decided that foreign-born Protestants of German or Swiss origin could not achieve a rank higher than Lieutenant Colonel;⁷³ Fortescue postulates that the bill finally passed unanimously because of a rumor that the French were making plans to enlist the same settlers in their own army.⁷⁴

The original plan was to recruit eighteen hundred men, principally of German and Swiss stock, from North America. An additional twelve hundred and two men, also principally German and Swiss, would be recruited in Europe. Two hundred men would be drafted from line regiments in England, and a further eight hundred would come from the Irish Establishment. Recruitment totals were expected to reach four thousand men.⁷⁵

The term of enlistment was established as three years, with service in North America only. There were grants of land given as signing bonuses: privates received fifty acres, non-commissioned officers two hundred, lieutenants and ensigns two thousand, captains three thousand, and field officers five thousand.⁷⁶ These grants served two important services: they hopefully increased the number of recruits in the short term, but, following the Halifax example, would also, in the future, establish an armed and capable fighting citizenry along the frontier.

By the end of February 1756, two-thirds of the officer positions had been filled, with a predominance of English and Scottish names among those enrolled. On 9 March, the final authorization was cleared for foreign Protestants to serve in the 62nd.⁷⁷ The final lists

⁷¹Commander-in-Chief of British forces in North America. Succeeded by General James Abercromby in 1758 and by Field Marshal Sir Jeffrey Amherst in 1759.

⁷²Later succeeded by General James Abercromby as Colonel-in-Chief in December 1757 and General Jeffrey Amherst in September 1758.

⁷³Murray, p. 4.

⁷⁴Fortescue, Vol. II, p. 289.

⁷⁵The numbers of men first recruited from each country are difficult to estimate, as there are no records for the battalions except those in North America. See Murray, pp. 6-7.

⁷⁶Butler, Vol. I, p. 23.

⁷⁷S. K. Stevens, Donald Kent, and Autumn Leonard, eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet* (Harrisburg: The Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1972), Vol. I, p. 3.

of officers were announced in the *London Gazette* of 16-20 March and 27-30 March.⁷⁸ Some of these officers had served in the French Army, and it was said that a few had even served with the French in North America and had thus been exposed to the tactics used in fighting in the woods. This background was a great help in instituting the training regime of the newly-formed regiment. The commanders decided on Pennsylvania as the training headquarters of the new regiment, with staff headquarters in Philadelphia, primarily because a large portion of the men were to be recruited from the frontier regions of this colony.⁷⁹

During the spring of 1756, a number of officers were sent over to start the process of raising the regiment, including Lieutenant Colonels Frederick Haldimand⁸⁰ and Henry

⁷⁸Colonel-in-Chief Major General Right Honourable John Earl of Loudon

Colonel Commandant

1st Bn. Col. John Stanwix 2nd Bn. Col. Joseph Dusseaux 3rd Bn. Col. Haviland 4th Bn. Col. James Prevost

Lieutenant Colonels

Henry Bouquet Frederick Haldimand Russell Chapman Sir John St. Clair

Majors

John Young James Robertson John Rutherford Augustine Prevost

Captains of Companies

John Tullikins Thomas Oswald Rudolf Faesch Frederick Porter Frederick Munster Walter Rutherford Gustavus Wetterstroom Harry Chartersi Alexander Harbord Walter Wettesteen
 Ralph Harding Ralph Chambrier Jeremiah Stanton Jeremiah Kneilling Richard Mather Paul Castleman Paul Steiner Abraham Bosomworth Francis Lander Francis Rollaz John Innis
 John Schrader Gavin Cochrane Joseph Prince Marcus Prevost Thomas Stanwix John Faesch

Captain Lieutenants

? Kunn John Dalrymple Stephen Gually Edward Cumberbach

Lieutenants

Andrew Nisbit George Macalam Charles Crookshanks Francis Pringle Robert Brigstoke
 Donald Campbell Newsham Piers ? Longdon Basil Dunbar Robert Drew Ebenezer Warren
 John Swift John Cooke Henry Symcocks Charles Wellington John Sealy James Campbell
 Simon Fraser George Fullerton William Stuart Alexander Campbell George Turnbull William Abercromby Ensign Brown Ensign Ray William Ballie

Adjutant

McAlpin Donald Forbes

Engineers

Henry Gordon Thomas Muslett

See *London Gazette*, January 10, 1756.

⁷⁹Murray, pp. 8-9.

⁸⁰Frederick Haldimand was born in Neufchatel, Switzerland in 1718. It has been rumored that he served in the Prussian Army but to date this has not been confirmed. He did serve in the Sardinian Army against the Spanish in Italy, and later served as Captain and Lt. Colonel of the Dutch Swiss Guards. On 4 January 1756 he was given a commission within the 62nd (60th) Royal American Regiment. See *Dictionary of National Biography*, 24 vols., London, 1908-27.

Bouquet,⁸¹ who landed at Philadelphia on 15 June. Lieutenant Colonel Bouquet would go on to command the 1st Battalion; Haldimand would be assigned to the 2nd, and later, to the 4th Battalion.⁸² Most of the primary material describing the history of the regiment can be found in the letters of these two men. Bouquet and Haldimand were especially interested in the fighting methods of the "Rogers' Rangers", and engaged in correspondence with Robert Rogers over the course of the war.⁸³ They studied the reports from Braddock's expeditions, and the methods of Robert Rogers and other Rangers. One of Bouquet's first recommendations upon taking command was that the men be outfitted in Indian dress, a suggestion which was rejected by the high command.⁸⁴

On 28 June, the Governor of Pennsylvania, Robert Hunter Morris, issued a warrant for recruiting men in Pennsylvania for the Royal American Regiment,⁸⁵ and the recruitment and training began in earnest. The last officers from England arrived, and commanders decided to expand the recruiting drive and allow English and Irish frontier settlers into the ranks. As the 1st and 2nd battalions were the first to be raised, Bouquet's and Haldimand's ideas of training would have a significant impact on the rest of the regiment as well, with emphasis placed on the forest style of fighting within the framework of discipline imposed on a Regular soldier.⁸⁶ By September 1756 both the 1st and 2nd battalions were listed as ready for action, although problems with desertion meant that they were not at full strength.⁸⁷ Orders were issued for the two battalions to go to Albany, New York and await further instructions.

⁸¹ Henry Bouquet was born in 1719 in Rolle, Switzerland. At the age of seventeen he enlisted in one of the professional Swiss regiments. Like his friend Haldimand, he also served with the Sardinian forces in Italy against the Spanish, and with the Dutch Swiss Guards, reaching the rank of Lt. Colonel. Both men were recommended for commissions in the new 62nd(60th) Royal American Regiment by the British Ambassador to the Hague, Sir Joseph Yorke. Bouquet received his commission on 3 January 1756. See *Dictionary of National Biography*.

⁸² Abercromby to Haldimand, 14/6/58, British Library Add. Mss. 21666.

⁸³ Major Robert Rogers, *Journals of Major Robert Rogers* (Albany: Joel Munsell's Sons, 1883), pp. 45-48.

⁸⁴ Bouquet to Webb, 29/8/57, British Library Add. Mss. 21631.

⁸⁵ *The Papers of Henry Bouquet*, S.K. Stevens, Donald Kent, and Autumn Leonard, eds. (Harrisburg: The Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1972), Vol. I, p. 7.

⁸⁶ See section on training in Chapter II.

⁸⁷ Bouquet to Loudon, 29/5/57, British Library Add. Mss. 21631.

The 1st and 2nd battalions were next given orders to build roads from Saratoga towards Fort Edward. Around Saratoga, Bouquet and Haldimand and their two battalions, along with various provincials from New Jersey and New York, built small forts in case of surprise attacks from the French. Bouquet on a few occasions refused to build forts at specific points due to poor drainage in the area; he would select a site that he and his engineers had decided was more appropriate. He was generally allowed such freedom of decision-making, although he always had to clearly state his intentions to his superiors.⁸⁸

There are numerous letters detailing the hardships of daily life in the 60th. Cold weather, for example, was very hard on the men; many became ill or died from the effects of sleeping outside on the ground, without any form of shelter, in order to get the roads built⁸⁹ There are also references in Bouquet's letters to the lack of discipline among both the provincial soldiers and his own men. In a letter to Loudon, he mentions that one of his officers has been court-martialed after striking a corporal while under the influence of alcohol. Within the same report are other listings of fights and similar breakdowns in discipline.⁹⁰ Desertion was also a problem, as noted in a letter from Loudon to Bouquet on 3 October. Loudon says: "Three battalions of the Royal American Regiment are still to be raised, desertion is beyond all bounds, I have at least thirty desertions of the Royal American Regiment since they came to Albany."⁹¹ The battalions were still receiving recruits from Pennsylvania, and the 3rd and 4th battalions were also to receive five hundred recruits from New England.⁹² In September, the decision was made to send all new recruits to the regimental depot in Philadelphia for proper training, which alleviated the problem of desertion to some degree.⁹³

⁸⁸Bouquet Papers, Vol. I, pp. 14-15.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 15-22.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 23-25.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

⁹²Stanwix to Haldimand, 6/8/56, British Library Add. Mss. 21666.

⁹³Rutherford to Haldimand, 23/9/56, British Library Add. Mss. 21666.

On 9 November, Bouquet and the 1st Battalion left Albany for winter quarters in Philadelphia, followed on 10 November by Haldimand and the 2nd Battalion. Upon their arrival, they faced a new set of problems. The need for accommodations for two arriving battalions, as well for two battalions forming up, created an acute housing shortage in the area, increased by the refusal of many Philadelphians to allow the soldiers to be billeted in their homes or lodges. Eventually, the Pennsylvania General Assembly grudgingly passed an ordinance forcing lodges, hospitals and other public buildings to open their doors to the Royal American Regiment.⁹⁴ Lord Loudon tried to relieve the situation by moving the 2nd Battalion back to New York for winter quarters, sending seven companies of the 3rd Battalion to Maryland, three remaining companies to the Lower Counties, and the 4th Battalion to New Jersey. Training continued throughout at a rigid pace.⁹⁵

The suffering of the ten companies of the 1st Battalion continued in Philadelphia. Smallpox broke out and spread among the troops; many of the men become ill and some died. The housing situation did not improve; Bouquet did a personal inspection and found that almost half of the men who were not ill were sleeping on the ground with a minimal amount of shelter, after proper billets had supposedly been provided for all troops. On 24 December he demanded adequate billeting from the Mayor of Philadelphia himself; things changed for the better after this, but only very slowly.⁹⁶

TACTICS

The tactics of the 60th Regiment can be broken down into two distinct spheres. The first was the standard Regular or Continental style which was already in common use. Then came Braddock's defeat, which prompted a movement towards training in a more

⁹⁴Bouquet Papers, Vol. I, pp. 35-36.

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 25-29.

⁹⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 30-45.

forest-oriented style of warfare. The Royal American Regiment was established to pioneer the second, newer tactical style.

There is only a small amount of documentation available today which describes these new tactics. Bouquet's papers highlight his ideas, and while his theories undoubtedly were part of the training regime of the 1st Battalion, it is a little more difficult to find documentation relating to the other three battalions. However, Bouquet was a close friend of Haldimand, and it is likely that his ideas were also implemented in the training of the 2nd and 4th Battalions, since both of these performed very well using the forest fighting style both early and later in the war, as will be seen from reports of various constituents of other regiments who served alongside the two battalions. Veterans of these two battalions were also part of the reformed battalions after the Seven Years' War which played a central role in Pontiac's Rebellion. The 3rd Battalion also fought well in both the Regular style and in forest fights in the course of their campaigns. In the absence of more conclusive information, the assumption can be made that since the 1st Battalion spent most of its time in the Pennsylvania region, and since this was the training depot for the regiment as a whole, that Bouquet's systems were implemented across the whole regiment, with regard to forest fighting styles.

The Continental or Regular style centered around a system of linear tactics, practiced widely by the European armies of the 18th century. The major system envisioned that the army in the field would deploy its forces in columns of men either two or three men deep. In this formation, the ability of an army's regiments to deploy quickly and in order was paramount,⁹⁷ for the units that deployed quickly had surprise on their side as well as the ability to choose the terrain on the battlefield from which they would defend or attack. Once deployed, the regiments⁹⁸ would split into ranks three men deep⁹⁹.

⁹⁷Jay Luvaas, ed. and trans., *Frederick the Great on the Art of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 200-212.

⁹⁸A British regiment was normally only a battalion in strength. There are numerous exceptions where regiments had two battalions (the 2nd Foot etc.) or as many as four, as in the case of the RAR. The overall number of men was supposed to be about one thousand, but in most cases the Battalion was never this size, due to desertions, battle casualties, or lack of suitable recruits. Before the innovation of the light infantry

The object of this formation was to have the army drawn up so as to concentrate the greatest amount of fire power within the frontage of the units. As will be described later, at Québec the ability to maintain cohesion and concentrated firepower was extremely important to the success of this maneuver.¹⁰⁰

The British regiments (battalions in size) were customarily formed into lines three men deep. Initially, in the early- to mid-18th century, British regiments were drawn into lines which were then divided into specific platoons. The nine line companies were divided into sixteen platoons; the platoon optimally comprised thirty men, who drew themselves into three-man deep lines. Each platoon was then further split into three firings. The grenadiers, the tenth company, were split in half and formed on the two flanks of each regiment. During most battles, a detachment of two six-pound artillery pieces was put in line between two regiments, to mark a dividing line as well as to add firepower.¹⁰¹

There was a specific firing sequence within the British system. The three lines were set up in a checkered order of firing,¹⁰² and one of three variations of the firing sequence would be used, depending upon the given circumstance. In the first option, a given platoon fired all at once. In the second, the first and third rows fired, then the second. In the last, a rolling shot of musketry ran down the lines of the enemy's army.¹⁰³

During battle, regiments could either move forward or stay in position. In moving forward, the sergeants and officers attempted to retain proper formation. It was especially

company in 1758, there were nine 'line' companies and one grenadier company; the light infantry company was drawn from one of the 'line' companies. Thus, in 1758 a battalion had two flank companies (light infantry and grenadier) and eight 'line' companies. Companies were supposed to have about one hundred men apiece, but the problems listed earlier kept many at only half that number. In addition, the common practice of keeping the flank companies at full strength stripped the line companies even further. Each company usually had a Captain, Lieutenant, Ensign, two sergeants, three corporals, and a drummer. The Regimental staff consisted of a Colonel, Lt. Colonel, Major, Adjutant, Chaplain, Surgeon and a pioneer squad.

⁹⁹Three men deep was the initial British practice; this was changed, as will be discussed later.

¹⁰⁰Anthony D. Darling, *Red Coat and Brown Bess* (Bloomfield, ON: Museum Restoration Service, 1993), pp. 10-11.

¹⁰¹Stuart Reid, *King George's Army 1740-93: (1) Infantry* (London: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1995), p. 22.

¹⁰²*Manual Exercise 1756*, London, National Army Museum Library; see Appendix A for a diagram of formation.

¹⁰³J. A. Houlding, *Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715-1795* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 318-319.

important that the units maintain cohesion as they progressed toward and closed with the enemy, because the first volley of musket¹⁰⁴ fire was very important. Because of the musket's inaccuracy, most musket fire was not damaging beyond fifty yards.¹⁰⁵ The army which was able to sustain proper configuration and discipline and thus to launch a coordinated volley was the most likely to inflict a devastating blow to its enemy. The more organized the line, the more men could fire effectively upon the enemy's ranks, while the enemy's ranks, thrown into disarray by a coordinated attack, might only be able to manage the fire of half as many men. When battle was commenced, discipline also had to be maintained in order to keep the rate of fire high. Since it usually slackened in the frenzy of battle, the importance of the first and second synchronized volleys became even more apparent. Even accuracy was not as important as was the rate of fire of a specific regiment.¹⁰⁶

In defense, it was also necessary for the regiments to maintain cohesion. They only moved if they were on the verge of being outflanked by the enemy. As will be seen later, the raising of light companies was utilized to offset the skirmishing tactics of the Canadians and the Indians. They were used at Québec in the hope of drawing out the British Regulars and forcing them to lose organization within their lines.

Each army in Europe differed in the numbers of men in the front row and the amount of lines within the regiment. Before the change in British tactics to alternate firing, the British lines were three men closed and locked up front. There were two hundred and sixty men in the front row, and the regiment would be drawn out, if the lines marched in

¹⁰⁴ The British musket of this period was the Long Land Pattern, commonly known as the Brown Bess. The Long Land Pattern had a barrel length of forty-six inches. Due to the constraints of the terrain in North America, the barrels used there were shortened to forty-two inches. The caliber was .75 in., firing a 1.25-ounce lead ball. The musket weighed 11.25 pounds, and had a socket bayonet which was seventeen inches long. (Some believe that the French musket was superior in quality, though lower in caliber; nevertheless, as will be discussed later, the more rapid fire of the British soldier, combined with the greater weight of shot, wreaked havoc in the French lines at Quebec.) See Darling pp. 15-26; Reid, pp. 22-23.

¹⁰⁵ Alan Guy, "The Army of the Georges", *The Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army*, David Chandler, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 98-103.

¹⁰⁶ Houlding, pp. 308-18.

formation, over eight hundred and ten feet.¹⁰⁷ The French army, on the other hand, had four ranks of firing lines, and the front row only had one hundred and sixty-two men, with the grenadier company placed on the right flank. Overall, if all four lines maintained cohesion, the French battalion only stretched out four hundred and eighty-six feet. Looking at these figures, one assumes that the British would always win since they had the larger frontage. This generally proved to be true, but it also caused problems for British commanders attempting to move such a large group over a battlefield of varying terrain without losing its configuration. The French system, while smaller and possibly easier to maneuver over terrain, also had its drawbacks. It had four lines which needed to maintain cohesion, while the British had only three. In addition, the actual firepower of its shorter line was less effective.¹⁰⁸

There was one last development of linear tactics which played a role in the Continental-style battles of the Seven Years' War in North America. James Wolfe, a leader in this new style when he commanded the 20th Foot, devised a new system in 1755. Officially adopted in the *1764 Regulations*,¹⁰⁹ this alternate style differed in many ways from the original method. Most importantly, the individual companies were now seen as one composite firing unit. The men within the company were divided into two platoons, and each platoon fired as one unit. In each platoon, the men were drawn up into three ranks; each rank was given a specific firing sequence. Each company (two platoons) fired, either one after the other, or as one whole regimental firing sequence.

The new system allowed for the firing of the regiment to shift its style. The sequence of unit firing could be started in the center, then fall outside, striking the enemy in different places. It could also be done the opposite way (from the outside to the inside). The grenadiers in this formation took up one position on the right flank, as was practiced in the French army; when it became the practice to raise light companies in North America,

¹⁰⁷*1755 Army Regulations*, London, National Army Museum Library.

¹⁰⁸Guy, p. 102.

¹⁰⁹*1758 Army Regulations, 1764 Army Regulations*, London, National Army Museum Library.

this formation allowed them to be placed on the left flank. Since this new system did not break up each company as the original did, it helped keep the lines properly formed; movement was easier, and morale within the companies improved as men fought with officers and men with whom they were familiar.¹¹⁰ One final alteration was instituted in the British regiments in North America in 1758, when Major-General Jeffrey Amherst decided to change the firing lines from three men to two men deep. This increased the amount of men within each line and the frontage of the British regiments as a whole, thus intensifying the force of the first disciplined volley of the regiments. This change played a central role in the Battle of Québec.¹¹¹

While this system of linear tactics (especially the new alternate style) served the British army well in the battles at Louisbourg and Québec, a system to fight effectively in the forests was still needed. Units such as the various ranger corps were expert forest fighters, but they fought only in small groups and usually operated in the role of reconnaissance. The 60th was specifically raised as a unit which could march through the forest and overcome any obstacle, while at the same time emerge from the forest and do battle in the Regular style, if need be, maintaining discipline and cohesion in both styles of warfare. Lieutenant Colonel Bouquet of the 1st Battalion had begun to devise possible systems to properly train Regulars to march through the forested frontier, and then to emerge and fight in a traditional Continental battle.

The Royal American Regiment, as already stated, was created to be a force of soldiers that combined the fighting qualities of a scout with the discipline of a Regular. At a moment's notice, they could switch from forest fighting to Regular-style warfare. Unlike the later regiments of the 55th and 80th, which were specifically raised as light infantry, the 60th was a Regular unit trained in forest fighting techniques. While most other Regular regiments were partly qualified to do the same by 1758-59, it was within the Royal

¹¹⁰Houlding, pp. 319-21.

¹¹¹Guy, p. 110.

American Regiment that the tactics were formulated to wage war in the forest, principally by Lieutenant Colonel Bouquet.

As Daniel Beattie notes in his article, "The Adaptation of the British Army to Wilderness Warfare," the major problems that had to be overcome in order to wage war in North America were establishment of an adequate supply network, provision supply from the respective colonial governments, and discipline of soldiers in the woods. Lieutenant Colonel Bouquet was the chief architect of the successful march against Fort Duquesne in 1758 with General Forbes. While problems of supplies from the Pennsylvania government would plague the Royal American Regiment throughout most of the war years as well as in Pontiac's Rebellion, Bouquet had planned out the tactics for the march and the establishment of forts along the road to keep lines of communication to his rear open. He had planned this order of march in March 1757, and as will be seen later it was quite successful and would be amended throughout the years until the final version was utilized at Bushy Run during the Pontiac Rebellion. While there is no specific mention of Bouquet's system of marching through wooded territory being adopted by other regiments, it most likely was, as the performance of the British Regulars in wooded warfare was superior in 1759, and Bouquet was personally congratulated for his service during the Forbes expedition by the British High command, including Major-General Jeffrey Amherst.

Bouquet formulated that an army needed to change its order of march if it were to be successful. As stated in his orders:

Order for ye March

200 Regulars and 500 provincials to march forward, each man carrying a tool, in order to make ye first intranched Camp.

The Rest to march ye following day.

The Artillerie after ye Van Guard.

Provisions & Bagages in ye Rear, disposed by Divisions, intermixed with platoons, & the whole covered by 200 men.

This Second Division is to incamp in the intranched Camp, and Shall finish the Works made by the ye First Division.

The Troops to march in to files;

The Van Guard must detach Small Parties a Mile forward, who shall march in great Silence, and visit carefully all Suspected Places, as Copses, itches, and Hallows, where ambuscades may be concealed.

There must be 3 flancking Parties upon each Flanck at an half a mile distance from each other, of four men, of 8 an of 10 with one Officer.

In case of attack, The men must fall on their Knees; That motion will prevent their running away, and in covering them from ye fire, Shall give time to reconoitre and to make ye necessary Dispositions.

The Forces being arrived at 20, or 30 miles distance from F.d.q. a good Post is to be chusen, and intranched; Then the Place is to invested by 1200 men; who will Seize all ye avenues, build Canoes to make bridges, to establish ye Communications between ye Quarters.

To make Small Redoubts round ye Place, beyond ye reach of ye Cannon, in order to prevent any thing going out, or in ye Fort; and Patrols will be send continually from one Redoute, to another. A good Post to be chosen out of ye reach of ye Cannon & retrenched; to incamp ye troops with convient covered Places for ammuniton, Provisions and ye Hospital.

In case it could be possible
to insult the Place

Two Scaling ladders Should be carryed to Serve as models, with necessary Irons to make upon ye spot So many others wanted.

To erect on ye opposite Side of ye Rivers-Batteries of Cannons, Mortars, Cohorns, and Stone mortars:

Facines must be cut to fill the Ditches, then marching ye troops near ye Fort, Keep a brisk & constant Fire upon the Rampart, and as soon as that ye Enemy Should cease the Scaling Ladders could be employe.

If this found impracticable, the siege is to be carryed on regularly.¹¹²

As noted in *Fit For Service*, the Royal American Regiment had a long period of training. By the time the major units of the 60th were engaged in major campaigns, they had had from one to two years of training, including extensive training in linear tactics, such as platoon firing, following their arrival in North America. As the war progressed, other elements were added. In the *Loudon Papers* there is specific mention of training the Royal American Regiment in a "forest fighting method":

to fire at Marks, and in order to qualify them for service of the Woods, they be taught to march in order, slow and fast in all sorts of Ground. They are frequently to pitch & fold up their tents, and to be accustomed to pack up and carry their necessaries in the most commodious manner.¹¹³

¹¹²Bouquet Papers, Vol. I, pp. 51-53.

¹¹³Beattie, pp. 71-72.

Lord Loudon had ordered the training of the Royal American Regiment in this manner. The 2nd and 3rd battalions, stationed in Halifax in 1758, were frequently put through advanced training centered around siege warfare, and throughout the summer months of 1758 the troops of the Royal American Regiment, as well as other regiments, were put through a serious training regime.¹¹⁴

During 1758, two innovations occurred. The first one, although minor, was possibly a sign of Bouquet's influence; instructions were given that henceforth regiments would march in order of two men while in the woods. The second was that each regiment was formally ordered to form a light company. The Royal American Regiment followed orders, indicating that it was still considered a Regular unit, not a light infantry unit as it is often incorrectly identified in Fuller and Butler. Some confusion does arise because Lord Loudon had asked the Royal American Regiment to have advanced training, but in the end three of the four battalions spent most of their time fighting in a Continental style, with some skirmishes, such as those at Québec and Fort Niagara.¹¹⁵

The Royal American Regiment spent the years of the Seven Years' War ready to fight in either style of warfare that might be asked of them. Their versatility and ability to fight well are highlighted in the Pontiac Rebellion at Bushy Run. While this battle will be discussed in more detail below, a general description of the circumstances gives a good example of the Royal American Regiment's special capabilities. Bouquet's letters highlight the order of march of the army. The composite battalion of the Royal American Regiment had many ex-members of other Royal American Regiment battalions in its ranks, as well as a number of new recruits. It also had Regulars from other regiments who had been assigned to the column for this maneuver. (See illustration for specific layout.) One additional change to those instituted earlier was the addition of a troop of light horse, although this was not in evidence at Bushy Run.

¹¹⁴John Knox, *A Historical Journal of the Campaigns in North America, 1757-1760* (New York, Books for Libraries Press, 1914-1916), pp. 34-41.

¹¹⁵Houlding, pp. 370-75.

Bouquet's letters also provide a little more insight into his plans for forest warfare. For example, the flanks were to be relieved every hour by men from the road. Flankers were also to keep at some distance from one another, but the last man was required to keep an eye on the column. (Anyone who has walked in the woods over difficult terrain knows how difficult it is to keep visual contact with others if you are moving in a parallel formation.) It was important to keep cohesion in the flank guards and to keep them within sight of the column. In addition, oxen and powder were to be placed in the center of the troops on the road. These troops would walk in lines two men deep.¹¹⁶ The two major items needed to ensure success in the woods were present in 1758 and at Bushy Run: the ability to protect one's supplies and the capacity to maintain discipline among the men during attacks. (Please refer to the chapter dealing with Pontiac's Rebellion to follow the sequence of events during the battle.)

The Royal American Regiment was a unit specifically raised to fight in the new style of North American warfare, created to bridge the gap between the frontier or forest fighter and the Regular, Continentally-trained soldier. Throughout its existence, the Royal American Regiment's soldiers were trained to perform both of these duties. The forest style of training was devised by the officers of the Royal American Regiment and drew upon their previous military experience. The Royal American Regiment went on to perform well in both styles of warfare, gaining battle honors and respect from both the British High Command and their French and Indian adversaries. The performance of the Royal American Regiment and other Regulars at Bushy Run highlights two important points: first, how far the British Army had come in adopting new fighting methods; and second, that they were not the bumbling incompetents portrayed in historical fiction, walking blindly in straight lines into certain death. The Royal American Regiment and British Army came a long way in a fairly short period to adapt to the difficulties of wilderness warfare.

¹¹⁶Henry Bouquet, "Disposition of March from Fort Ligonier", 15 July 1764, British Library, Add. Mss. 21653.

1757

The state of the regiment at the beginning of 1757 is clearly stated in a memorandum written by Bouquet on 25 February, in which he explains that the Royal American Regiment is not yet ready for great operations but could be used as garrison troops, listing specific companies which could be used as reinforcements to other forts or regiments. For most of 1757, this is how the Royal American Regiment was used;¹¹⁷ specific units were used as garrison troops, attached companies, reinforcements for forts, or general reserve troops. 1757 also marked the year in which the 62nd became the 60th Regiment of Foot.¹¹⁸

The 1st Battalion spent the winter of 1757 in Philadelphia, continuing both training and recruiting, as the ongoing small pox epidemic spread illness and death in its ranks. During this time Bouquet began to draw operational plans for another expedition against Fort Duquesne in the west; he felt that his battalion, whose troops had come primarily from the region and had been training in forest warfare technique, should be the one to be used in such an operation. He proposed the use of just one regiment of Regulars and a large number of provincials. The plan was a very drawnout affair, describing the provisional build up to any expedition. Within the memorandum were specific instructions of how a column of men should march in the wilderness and, if ambushed, how they should fight.¹¹⁹ He also discussed the need for fort building along the road and the actual plan of attack originating from the Philadelphia region, rather than from Virginia. He sent it to Lord Loudon for review, but the actual plan was not put into effect until the following spring (1758), in an operation later known as the Forbes Expedition.¹²⁰ Analysis of this plan provides insight into Bouquet's system of marching and fighting in the woods, a system

¹¹⁷Bouquet Papers, Vol. I, pp. 49-50.

¹¹⁸With the loss of Fort Oswego in August of 1756 and the disbanding of the 50th and 51st Regiments, all remaining regiments dropped two numbers and the 62nd Regiment became the 60th.

¹¹⁹For specific system, please refer to section on tactics.

¹²⁰Bouquet Papers, Vol. I, pp. 51-53.

which was most likely adopted over time by the other three battalions of the Royal American Regiment and possibly by other regiments serving alongside.

On 23 March, Bouquet was given orders to proceed to the Carolinas and organize their defense. He was to take five companies of the 1st Battalion, while the other five remained in Philadelphia with Colonel Stanwix. Bouquet was ordered to build forts around Charleston and up river to offset any moves by the French from the Mississippi River area. While in the Carolinas, he would receive aid from provincial troops from various colonies to help in building the forts and undertaking garrison duties. He was also given warrants to raise more replacement troops for his battalion and to fill out vacancies in the other battalions. Lastly, he was to help in the training of the locally recruited Carolina provincial corps.¹²¹ As one can imagine, this was quite a large task to complete, complicated once again by the problems of billeting all these troops, as noted in Bouquet's return queries to Loudon.¹²²

Bouquet and his men had not moved by the end of April due to problems acquiring transport. He was given his final orders before his transport, along with the lists of which reinforcements were to go to the Carolinas: four hundred men from Virginia, two hundred from Pennsylvania, two hundred from North Carolina and three King's Independent Companies from South Carolina itself. Bouquet was to be in command of the Southern Department, and as such he could engage in negotiations with any of the local Indian tribes (such as the Cherokee) in the name of the King.

Bouquet's orders also stated that the five companies that had been designated to stay in Philadelphia could now be shipped to Albany as reinforcements for the campaign season,¹²³ an order that was later rescinded in favor of sending the other five companies to Carlisle in Pennsylvania.¹²⁴ These companies would spend the spring and early summer

¹²¹Loudon to Bouquet, 9/4/57, British Library Add. Mss. 21631.

¹²²Bouquet Papers, Vol. I, pp. 65-66.

¹²³Loudon to Bouquet, 23/4/57, British Library Add. Mss. 21631.

¹²⁴Bouquet Papers, Vol. I, p156.

months training and being sent out in skirmishes against Indian villages. On 6 July, the five companies were at last sent to Albany for the expected attack upon the French Fort Carillon at Ticonderoga. These five companies, with elements of the 4th Battalion, were again used as skirmishers and as reconnaissance troops against Crown Point and Fort Carillon. With the large French Army gathering strength, the companies were shifted back towards Fort Edward to report the build up.¹²⁵

By late June the complications for Bouquet's agenda were starting to appear. In a letter to Loudon, Bouquet states that the expected Provincial reinforcements have not arrived, and that the only Provincials who are present are badly disciplined. Distemper had spread amongst the troops; the weather was very hot and the water supply was poor. Recruitment of the local provincial corps had not been successful,¹²⁶ nor had the building of small forts. The projected building up and repair of Forts Moore, Frederick, Prince George, Loudon, and Johnston had become difficult, mainly because the needed material, tools and money requested from the local colonial governments had not arrived. The artillery for these forts was also lacking and there had been no response from Albany. In an attempt to produce quick action, Littleton mentioned in a letter that the French at Fort Francois and in the Gulf of Mexico were very powerful, and that there had been rumors that they would move against Charleston, rather than Jamaica, as originally thought.¹²⁷

Letters have survived which give insight into recruiting instructions used in the Carolinas for the Royal American Regiment, many of which may have also been used earlier in Pennsylvania and other colonies. Each corporal, sergeant or drummer was to receive one dollar for every recruit raised. No recruit could be under five feet four inches, a Papist, a French deserter, or over thirty-five years of age, and must be healthy and of a good build. Anything could be used to entice them to join, including money or clothing!

¹²⁵Murray, pp. 6-7.

¹²⁶Bouquet to Loudon, 23/6/57, British Library Add. Mss. 21631.

¹²⁷Bouquet to Napier, 13/7/57, British Library Add. Mss. 21631.

When fifty men were recruited, they were to be sent into Charleston with a corporal as escort.¹²⁸

By August, issues in the Carolinas were being resolved. Recruits were coming in and the forts were being built and repaired, although artillery supplies were still short. Relations with the Cherokees were very good, and provincial troops were arriving and being sent out as necessary to the outlying forts.¹²⁹ Billeting of soldiers did prove to be as much of a problem in Charleston as it had been in Philadelphia. The local assemblies were stingy about building adequate barracks, and Bouquet refused to allow his men to sleep on the floors of houses. After many letters had been written describing the danger Charleston would be exposed to if the Regulars and provincials left,¹³⁰ the Assembly finally voted to build two-story barracks for the troops.

The five companies of the 1st Battalion and Bouquet spent the remainder of 1757 in the Carolinas. They were further reinforced in August by Montgomery's Highlanders,¹³¹ a unit that arrived from Great Britain after much delay. Bouquet's and Montgomery's men spent the fall months reinforcing outlying forts and building new forts in Georgia. Provincial troops were still being raised, but by year's end the Southern colonies were in a much more militarily stable position.¹³²

The 2nd Battalion spent the spring and early summer engaged in skirmishing along the frontier north of Albany. On 2 June they were given orders to proceed to Halifax for the planned operations against Louisbourg,¹³³ but were then sent back to New York when the operation was postponed. It is useful to mention that most of those sent to Halifax were ordered to remain there, while the 2nd Battalion returned to New York. Perhaps the specially-trained Royal American Regiment troops could be more usefully employed than

¹²⁸Bouquet, Recruiting Instructions, 15/7/57, British Library Add. Mss. 21631.

¹²⁹Bouquet to Webb, 29/8/57 British Library Add. Mss. 21631.

¹³⁰Bouquet Papers, Vol. I, pp. 146-48.

¹³¹Montgomery's Highlanders were raised the same day as Fraser's Highlanders, 4 January 1757. See Fortescue Vol. II, p. 300.

¹³²Bouquet Papers, Vol. I, pp. 167-193.

¹³³Wallace, p. 23.

in sitting idly in Halifax. A letter to Haldimand in September directs the 2nd Battalion to return to Carlisle, Pennsylvania,¹³⁴ and another dated 19 March 1758 orders them back to Halifax.¹³⁵ The only other returns for the 2nd Battalion for this year discuss the arrival of various recruits from England, whom Haldimand was to train properly and then distribute in companies through the frontier region.¹³⁶ Two companies each would be stationed in the towns of Lancaster and York,¹³⁷ with some extra recruits sent to Bouquet in the Carolinas.¹³⁸

The 3rd Battalion was to see more action in the year of 1757 than any other. On 3 May, they were sent to Forts Hunter and William Henry. By the end of July the French general Montcalm had assembled eight thousand French, Canadians, and Indians at nearby Fort Carillon, and from here on 31 July, two divisions of troops marched upon the British at Fort William Henry, surrounding the fort by 2 August and laying siege. Fort William Henry, which was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Munro, was made of logs and carried seventeen guns. The French were able to build an elaborate system of defenses with artillery positions, and battered the fort incessantly. The only hope for Fort William Henry was relief from Fort Edward, fourteen miles away,¹³⁹ where one hundred and twenty men from the 3rd Battalion were stationed.¹⁴⁰

The siege wore on for days with no British reinforcements. Small pox broke out inside the fort, and many soldiers and their wives fell ill. On the morning of the 9th, Lieutenant Colonel Munro sent Lt. Col. John Young of the 3rd Battalion¹⁴¹ to meet the French commanders and discuss an honourable surrender. The British were allowed to leave with their regimental colours, armed for their safety against Indian attack, and

¹³⁴Definison to Haldimand, 10/9/57, British Library Add. Mss. 21666.

¹³⁵Robertson to Haldimand, 19/3/58, British Library Add. Mss. 21666.

¹³⁶Stanwix to Haldimand, 22/9/57, British Library Add. Mss. 21666.

¹³⁷Definison to Haldimand, 10/9/57, British Library Add. Mss. 21666.

¹³⁸Stanwix to Haldimand, 22/12/57, British Library Add. Mss. 21666.

¹³⁹Fortescue, Vol. II, pp. 305-6.

¹⁴⁰Murray p. 10.

¹⁴¹Ian Kenneth Steele, *Betrayals: Fort William Henry and the Massacre* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 76-81.

escorted towards Fort Edward by a French regiment. They had to promise not to serve the North American continent again. Montcalm won the day and effectively destroyed the British presence on the south shore of Lake George.¹⁴²

As the British withdrew, their French escort over the next twenty-four hours dissipated, and French-allied Indian tribes such as the Abenaki began to skirmish with British troops. This escalated to an all-out attack on the British column, which was surrounded on all sides by the Canadians and Indians. The description of this attack in *The Last of the Mohicans* depicts the British soldiers as completely incapable of defending themselves from the Indian onslaught; the account describes British soldiers forming into lines and being mowed down by Indian snipers. This is partly true: about one hundred people were killed, but this is nothing like the massacre Cooper describes and was to be expected when the British party was being attacked in the forest by over three thousand enemy troops. For their part, the remaining soldiers of the 3rd Battalion performed well on this occasion; in their area, they repeatedly beat off Indian attacks. They were among the few that escaped capture on that horrible afternoon¹⁴³ and acquitted themselves well in the eyes of both their regiment and their enemy.¹⁴⁴

The 3rd Battalion lost eighty men during this siege and the subsequent attack. British troops reached Fort Edward and were grouped with the rest of the battalion already stationed there. In October the battalion was only at half strength due to losses from wounds, death and illness. It was given orders to proceed to Halifax in preparation for the winter and the campaign season of 1758. Recruits would be sent from Pennsylvania and from British regiments to bring the Regiment back to full strength.¹⁴⁵ This was accomplished, and by May of 1758 the battalion reported 35 officers and nine hundred and fifty-one soldiers present.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴²Gipson, Vol. VII, pp. 84-87.

¹⁴³Steele, *Betrayals*, pp. 121-22.

¹⁴⁴Butler, Vol. I, pp.44-45; also Knox, p.35.

¹⁴⁵Butler, Vol. I, pp. 46-47.

¹⁴⁶Murray p.10

There is little information regarding the 4th Battalion's activities during 1757, although we do know that it had problems filling out its ranks. As companies were filled and trained, they were sent to the New York area of operations. They are listed as taking part in various reconnaissance and skirmishing operations in and around Fort Carillon. They were split up into various companies and served alongside some of the "Rogers' Rangers." It is most likely that various of its companies were spread out to the various Forts in the New York region, awaiting the spring campaign season,¹⁴⁷ because the National Army Museum Library Regimental Lists shows the 4th Battalion in winter quarters at Albany.¹⁴⁸

Overall, the year 1757 was an important one in the development of the Royal American Regiment. While it saw limited action, the regiment was used in all areas of deployment as skirmishing units. It received a true baptism of fire at Fort William Henry, which showed the regiment's potential and ability to maintain discipline and continue to fight in the style in which it was trained, even in the midst of a most desperate situation. While some elements of the 3rd who were at the head of the column from Fort William Henry had run during the attack, most stood and fought, withdrawing to Fort Edward only when the situation proved utterly hopeless.

¹⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p.8.

¹⁴⁸*National Army Museum List of Locations of Regiments in North America 1755-1763*, p. 3, London, National Army Museum Library.

CHAPTER III

1758

1758 marked another significant year in the Royal American Regiment's development and participation in important campaigns. The 4th Battalion, along with six companies of the 1st Battalion, were involved in operations in New York, while the rest of the 1st Battalion under Bouquet's command were used in the Forbes Expedition against Fort Duquesne. The 2nd and 3rd battalions were used in the Battle of Louisbourg. In all these campaigns, the troops Royal American Regiment performed well in the roles they were designated to fill. In Louisbourg the two battalions were employed in traditional European siege warfare, while at Fort Carillon, and especially in the Forbes expedition, the 60th used their forest fighting talents.

The British high command, in coordinating these operations, wished to attack the French on three different fronts. These were the Eastern Field of operations, which targeted Louisbourg (and, eventually, Québec); the Western Field, against the French forts at Carillon and Crown Point, with an eventual advance on Montréal; and the western campaign in New York, against French posts at Oswego and Niagara, again with a planned advance on Montréal from the south west. The final British area of operations (southern), distinct from the others, was against Fort Duquesne and the frontier forts along the Ohio and Mississippi. The goal here was to cut off the French in the south from the key centers of Montréal and Québec.

TICONDEROGA (FORT CARILLON)

Surviving documentation indicates that orders were issued in 1757 for two companies of the Royal American Regiment to be reformed into light companies. The 2nd Battalion was stationed at Fort Edward during the winter and spring months of 1758, and specific companies of both the 2nd and 4th battalions were deployed with various ranger units in skirmishes and reconnaissance missions in and around the French positions at Fort Carillon.¹⁴⁹

During the month of February, the men of the Royal American Regiment¹⁵⁰ were ordered to prepare their equipment and weapons for the upcoming spring campaigns. Objects such as cartridge boxes or gun slings were to be replaced, and all equipment was required to be in proper order. Part of this general order specified that the men be provided with hatchets, as these were considered to be good weapons for close combat.¹⁵¹ There are also references to hatchets being provided to the 1st Battalion in the Forbes Expedition.

The 2nd Battalion was ordered to march to New York, and then to proceed to Halifax to participate in the Louisbourg campaign, with Haldimand attached. The orders were then amended and the battalion was sent to Philadelphia for transport to Halifax, sailing with the 35th Regiment.¹⁵² It is interesting to note that the records indicate that the men and NCOs of the battalion sailed free on the transports, but that the officers had to pay their own fares.¹⁵³

The four companies of the 1st Battalion, under the command of Bouquet, were to remain in the Carolinas until further orders, while the 4th Battalion and the remaining six companies of the 1st Battalion, under Colonel Stanwix, were to report to the New York

¹⁴⁹Gage to Haldimand, 22/1/58, British Library Add. Mss. 21662.

¹⁵⁰Five companies each from the 2nd and 4th Battalions.

¹⁵¹Rutherford to Haldimand, 8/2/58, British Library Add. Mss. 21666.

¹⁵²Robertson to Haldimand, 19/3/58, British Library Add. Mss. 21668.

¹⁵³Robertson to Haldimand, 20/3/58, British Library Add. Mss. 21668.

theater of operations. The 2nd and 3rd battalions were to be used in the Louisbourg campaign.¹⁵⁴ Lieutenant Colonel Haldimand was shipped out to Halifax, only to be returned to New York and given command of the 4th Battalion. He was requested to oversee repair of the works at Saratoga and then proceed to Fort Edward with replacement troops for the 4th Battalion.¹⁵⁵

The campaign season approached, with the French General Montcalm stationed at Fort Carillon with four thousand men. General Abercromby was gathering supplies and provincial support at Fort Edward, with seven thousand Regulars and nine thousand provincial troops. Abercromby, possibly influenced by the innovations of the rangers and the Royal American Regiment, decided to initiate reforms. He had the men cut the skirts off their coats, provided them haversacks full of food to enable them to operate independently of supply columns, had the metal sections of their muskets browned, and provided extra leggings to protect the men's legs from thorns and bushes. By the end of June, the whole of Abercromby's force was assembled at the southern end of Lake George.¹⁵⁶

The Regular regiments included in this operation were the 27th, 42nd, 54th, 46th, 44th, 55th, Gage's Light Infantry,¹⁵⁷ and the six companies of the 1st Battalion and 4th Battalion of the Royal American Regiment.¹⁵⁸ The whole force was to move up the lake on whale boats and canoes, supported by two whale boats outfitted with artillery. The troops sailed on the morning of 5 July, in a flotilla of three columns, with the provincial troops raised from New England and New York on either side of the Regulars. The center column consisted of the 55th, six companies of the 1st and 4th battalions, Royal American Regiment, 27th, 44th, 46th, 42nd, 54th and Gage's Light Infantry. The supply boats followed behind

¹⁵⁴Abercromby to Haldimand, 29/3/58, British Library Add. Mss. 21668.

¹⁵⁵Abercromby to Haldimand, 14/6/58, British Library Add. Mss. 21668.

¹⁵⁶Fortescue, Vol. II, pp. 320-25; also Parkman, pp. 432-33.

¹⁵⁷Gage's Light Infantry was numbered the 80th and was a 'ranger'-style unit of five companies raised with Gage's personal funds.

¹⁵⁸Butler, Vol. I, p. 55

the three columns. After 26 miles, the force laid up on shore to await the artillery and supply ships. By noon on 6 July, the flotilla had disembarked at the head of Lake George. Fort Carillon was at the end of the channel which connects Lake George and Lake Champlain.¹⁵⁹

The French at Fort Carillon were reinforced on 4 July by a contingent of four hundred Regular soldiers, and Montcalm had the outer defenses further reinforced. Trees were felled all along the fort's edge to serve as obstacles, and to open a good field of fire for the troops inside the fort. Fortifications inside the fort were also strengthened; the French had a week's supply of food and a limited amount of ammunition. French scouts were sent out from the fort to determine the route of march of the British columns.¹⁶⁰

The British decided to march on the left side of the river between the landing site and Lake Champlain, with the rangers and Gage's light infantry sent forward as reconnaissance and skirmishing units. The advance was tedious, and many units lost formation in the woods. The French scouting units also lost their cohesion and became dispersed in the woods, and the forward units of the center column, made up of rangers and Gages light infantry, smashed into the French.¹⁶¹ The skirmish was short, but costly; General Howe, the second-in-command of the expedition, was killed. Overall, the number of British soldiers killed was small, and they were able to force the French scouts into a killing ground between two lines of rangers and Regulars.¹⁶²

The advance of the British was halted for a few hours by this exchange. Captain John Bradstreet,¹⁶³ adjutant-general, was given the task of seizing the saw mill further up the river with a detachment of five companies of the 1st Battalion, Royal American Regiment, and a detachment of rangers. His attack was successful, and the British were now within


¹⁵⁹Fortescue, Vol. II, pp. 325-26.

¹⁶⁰May, pp. 21-22.

¹⁶¹Gipson, Vol. VII, pp. 221-25.

¹⁶²Bird, pp. 176-81.

¹⁶³Bradstreet was originally a captain in the 51st, and became a pioneering soldier in the field of amphibious warfare on lakes and rivers. He and his flotillas of ships were used in the advance up Lake George and in later attacks. After the disbanding of the 51st Regiment, he was commissioned a Captain in the 60th and will be referred to as such in the body of this paper.



Abercromby's attack on the French entrenchments erected near Fort Ticonderoga, 1757
 (From Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York)

two miles of Fort Carillon. A waterborne attack against the fort was ruled out, as rapids protected the back side of the fort, so the British main columns would have to advance up the western bank.¹⁶⁴ The French had constructed a larger trench position on the Height of Carillon, with a large area of felled trees in front. Any British attack would have to penetrate and take these heights before the fort itself could be attacked.¹⁶⁵

On 8 July, Abercromby and his force were stationed to the west of Fort Carillon, and he sent his engineers ahead to make a report on which assault strategy should be adopted. The British had enough artillery to bear down on the fort and sweep the French from one side to the other while an attack was put in, or they could lay siege and starve the French from their positions. Lieutenant Colonel Clark reported that the fort could be taken immediately with a direct attack, so the artillery was left behind the columns and by noon the first British attack had struck the outer pickets.

There were eight French Regular battalions¹⁶⁶ stationed inside the fort, as well as in the three lines of trenches recently built on the outside of the fort at Carillon.¹⁶⁷ Montcalm had decided to place seven of his eight Regular battalions on the Heights of Carillon to offset the numerical superiority of the British force.¹⁶⁸ After the initial provincial corps attack had faltered, due mostly to lack of discipline and poor training. Abercromby committed his Regulars. The center British column consisted of the 54th and 42nd Regiments, with the 4th Battalion, 60th, in support. Captain Bradstreet and two companies of the 1st Battalion, with rangers and Gage's Light Infantry, attacked on either side of the center column, targeting the outposts at Carillon. The attack began to lose cohesion as the men were forced to make their way through the fallen trees; as they progressed further forward, they were struck by a devastating bombardment from the artillery and musket

¹⁶⁴Butler, Vol. I, p. 56.

¹⁶⁵Parkman, pp. 438-39.

¹⁶⁶The *La Sarre, Languedoc, Berry, Royal Roussillon, La Reine, Bearn, Gudenne, and Chevalier de Levis* regiments.

¹⁶⁷Fortescue, Vol. II, pp. 328-29.

¹⁶⁸Parkman, p. 435.

fire of the French defenders in the trenches and the fort. Colonel Haldimand attacked to the right of Bradstreet with a detachment of grenadiers from the 4th Battalion. The group advanced to the edge of the breastwork but they too were caught by heavy fire and were forced to withdraw.¹⁶⁹ After an hour of receiving continuous fire, the British pulled back to their original lines; Bradstreet's attack also foundered and was forced to retreat. The 27th and 44th regiments were then ordered forward again, ran into a horrible hail of fire, and again were forced to retreat. By the third attack, any of the regiments which had been in reserve were being used in the frontal attacks. Survivors were pushed to the start line to rush the French positions six times between the hours of 1:00 and 6:00 PM. All of the attacks failed. The 42nd managed to get some men over the breastworks, only to have them killed.

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The final attack occurred before dusk. The 42nd and the 4th Battalion, Royal American Regiment, were used in an attack against trenches garrisoned by the Royal Roussillon Regiment. The officers of the two regiments had to restrain their men from rushing forward to attack again. This attack was finally called off after an hour of hard and brutal hand-to-hand combat. The French defenders were growing drastically short of ammunition and feared any more attacks. The British were becoming demoralized after losing so many men for no apparent gain, and Abercromby ordered a retreat. The British, so steadfast in attack, were so demoralized by the events of the day that the retreat rapidly became a mob scene. Regiments and provincial groups lost all discipline as men ran headlong to get to the landing beach.¹⁷¹

Captain Bradstreet and his remaining soldiers rushed to the landing site to hold the boats, and were faced with chaos as men attempted to seize any boat available and paddle back down Lake George. The men of the 4th Battalion were used in the rear to skirmish

¹⁶⁹Rogers, p. 120.

¹⁷⁰General Charles Lee, Letters, Manuscript, National Army Museum Library, London. At the time of the battle of Ticonderoga, General Lee was a captain in the 44th Regiment.

¹⁷¹Butler, Vol. I, pp. 56-59.

with any French or Indians who had followed from the fort. It appears that the Royal American Regiment was able to maintain discipline and cohesion during the retreat; it was later commended for its steadiness and pertinacity during the many attacks.¹⁷²

As the army landed at the southern end of Lake George, former site of Fort William Henry,¹⁷³ many of the men expressed their wish to retreat all the way to Albany. Abercromby managed to maintain control over the dispirited troops and marched them to Fort Edward, while the hundreds of wounded were sent overland to Albany. The soldiers who remained were stationed in Fort Edward and were assigned to reinforce the defenses of the fort in preparation for a possible French attack, which did not materialize.

The casualties for the battle were sixteen hundred Regulars and three hundred and thirty-four provincials killed.¹⁷⁴ The cost for the Royal American Regiment was high, but not as high as for others, principally the 42nd. The 1st Battalion's six companies lost twenty-one men killed, as well as Captain Lieutenant Forbes and Lieutenant Davis, while eleven officers and eighty-six men were wounded.¹⁷⁵ The 4th Battalion lost Major Rutherford and Lieutenant Hazelwood, plus twenty-five men killed. Eight officers and one hundred and twenty-six men were wounded, including Lieutenant Colonel Haldimand.¹⁷⁶ Abercromby was disgraced by this defeat, and was replaced later by Amherst as Commander-in-Chief.¹⁷⁷

The British expedition was not defeated by superior French tactics, or even by woodland tactics. A large percentage of responsibility for the defeat rests, sadly, with the decision to attack the fort immediately, in a frontal charge. It is easy enough to speculate in hindsight, but it seems that if the British had laid siege with artillery (with the army ready to oppose any counterattack in the woods around the fort), they could have

¹⁷²Murray, p. 10.

¹⁷³Fort William Henry was burned by Montcalm in 1757 after its capture.

¹⁷⁴May, p. 22.

¹⁷⁵Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, pp. 480-81.

¹⁷⁶Butler, Vol. I, p. 60.

¹⁷⁷Gipson, Vol. II, pp. 232-33; also Fortescue, Vol. II, p. 331.

properly supported their own infantry attacks, and eventually forced the defenders into a precarious position. The French tactics of woodland fighting were in evidence during the short skirmish along the advance, but this engagement was still unsuccessful, except for the death of Howe. Some skirmishing also occurred around the fort.¹⁷⁸

The troops of the 60th fought in two different formations during this engagement and acquitted themselves well in attack and discipline. The attack on the fort's outposts was similar to close hand-to-hand skirmishing in a wooded area, while the frontal attacks upon the fort itself were closer to the style of Continental warfare in use both before and after the Seven Years' War.

Captain Bradstreet, after successfully moving the retreating army back over Lake George, decided to move forward with his plan of attack against Fort Frontenac on Lake Ontario. This plan, which had been approved by Loudon the previous year, proposed to travel down the Mohawk and Onandaga Rivers with bateaux and whale boats onto Lake Ontario, by the site of the old Fort Oswego, and attack Fort Frontenac¹⁷⁹ with a force of around two thousand men. The majority of the men were to be provincial troops from Yonkers, the Hudson River Valley, Rhode Island, and Boston, along with a small number of Regulars and small detachments of Highlanders of the 42nd, artillery men from the Royal Artillery, and eight officers and one hundred and forty-six men from the Royal American Regiment. These last appear to have been drawn from the six companies of the 1st Battalion¹⁸⁰

Fort Frontenac was the main center for supply to French posts to the south and west. Its garrison numbered no more than a few hundred men, and also housed the material and stores used to ensure the loyalty of the Indian tribes in the region. The fort's commander, Payan de Noyan, had no reason to expect an attack on his fort after the French victory at Fort Carillon.

¹⁷⁸General consensus among Fortescue, Bird, Annals, and May.

¹⁷⁹Parkman, pp. 377-80.

¹⁸⁰Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, pp. 480-81.

Bradstreet and his force left the Onandaga river and struck out onto Lake Ontario on 22 August. The flotilla of British bateaux and whale boats arrived outside of Frontenac on the 25th,¹⁸¹ and by the 26th the troops began to dig in around the fort, with only occasional harassment by the French cannons. On the 27th, the British brought in artillery and began to bombard the fort and to engage the French vessels located on the lake.¹⁸² The British also attacked some of the vessels in a waterborne attack, seizing cargo of weapons and furs valued at an estimated thirty thousand pounds (a small sum compared to the booty later to be won within the fort).¹⁸³ The bombardment of the fort continued until late in the day, when the fort, vastly outnumbered and outgunned as it was, surrendered.¹⁸⁴

The fort was destroyed, seven of the nine French vessels were burned, and the two remaining were used to carry off the booty taken from the fort, effectively destroying the French naval presence on the lake. The British also seized sixty pieces of artillery and one hundred and forty prisoners.¹⁸⁵ The total value of the booty seized and the cost of the fort and ships destroyed has been estimated at around eight hundred thousand pounds sterling,¹⁸⁶ giving the British High Command a victory in the Western Field of Operations at little cost. Communications between Montréal and the French forts on the Great Lakes and Ohio had been cut off, and the commanders along the western frontier would have a long and hungry winter.¹⁸⁷

The loss of the fort was also a major loss of face for the French. Fort Frontenac had been a major base for gift-giving and negotiations with the Indians since 1672. Now the Indians had no fort with which to communicate with their French allies, and Fort Duquesne was isolated and alone.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸¹Gipson, Vol. VII, pp. 244-47.

¹⁸²Butler, Vol. I, p. 61.

¹⁸³Gipson, Vol. VII, pp. 240-45.

¹⁸⁴Fortescue, Vol. II, p. 332.

¹⁸⁵Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, pp. 480-81.

¹⁸⁶Gipson, Vol. VII, pp. 246-47.

¹⁸⁷Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, pp. 480-81.

¹⁸⁸Bird, p. 193.

Bradstreet's use of amphibious warfare was an important element in the overall defeat of the French. The ability to strike behind set lines of defense with trained soldiers was important, both tactically and psychologically. The British had successfully attacked the French behind their own lines, a tactic which the French had used for years to wreak havoc along the frontier of the two regions. The British had been able to match their French counterparts in ferocity; the psychological impact of this fact on the French-allied Indian tribes in the area was significant, inducing some to remain neutral and others to join the English cause.¹⁸⁹

LOUISBOURG

The fortress at Louisbourg was the first major obstacle to any British advance down the St. Lawrence against Québec City and Montréal, and it also had the potential to launch offensive action against the New England colonies. The campaign against Louisbourg was just the first part of a three-pronged attack against the French during the campaign season in North America; the attack against Fort Carillon was the second part and the later campaign against Fort Duquesne the last. As we have seen, the attack upon Fort Carillon was unsuccessful. The attack upon Louisbourg took place at the same time and was considered the most important campaign of the three. This was reflected in the numbers of Regulars sent against Louisbourg, which, commanded by General Jeffrey Amherst, numbered fourteen thousand Regular troops.¹⁹⁰

The British fleet, carrying many of the troops from England, arrived in Halifax on 9 May 1758. As mentioned earlier, the 3rd Battalion, Royal American Regiment, had spent the winter of 1757-58 in Halifax, receiving reinforcements and engaging in training for the

¹⁸⁹*Ibid.*, p. 195-200.

¹⁹⁰Fortescue, Vol. II, p. 314.

coming campaigns.¹⁹¹ The 2nd Battalion had been shipped to Halifax during March,¹⁹² and by 8 June the British fleet and invasion force were stationed opposite the French defenses around the fortress.¹⁹³

There are conflicting records naming the commanders of the two battalions and the actual numbers of men before the siege. In *A Brief History of The King's Royal Rifle Corps*, the commanders are listed as Lieutenant Colonel Young of the 2nd Battalion, and Major Augustine Prevost as commander of the 3rd Battalion.¹⁹⁴ *The Annals of the King's Royal Rifle Corps*, Vol. 1, does not specify whether Prevost or Young commanded the 3rd Battalion, and lists the 2nd's commander as Colonel Moncton,¹⁹⁵ a claim which is reiterated in the manuscript Journal of Lieutenant Gordon Augustine of the 40th Regiment.¹⁹⁶ The confusion regarding the commanders of each battalion may be resolved by two sources. In *The Journal of William Amherst*, William Amherst lists the commander of the 2nd Battalion as Moncton, and of the 3rd Battalion as Lawrence. Colonel Young is listed as a lieutenant colonel, and Major Prevost as a major, in the 3rd Battalion.¹⁹⁷ Colonel Moncton's papers were collected and published in the *Northcliffe Collection*. He lists himself as the commander of the 2nd Battalion, Royal American Regiment, at Louisbourg. However, the editor of this collection appears to have made a typographical error in listing the commander of the 3rd Battalion, because Colonel Lawrence is listed as commander of the 61st.¹⁹⁸

Totals of troops are also inconsistent from one source to another. The earliest returns listed in the Haldimand papers, the *Annals*, indicate that the 2nd Battalion had thirty-nine officers and nine hundred and eighty-nine men and NCOs.¹⁹⁹ The Gordon

¹⁹¹Muster reads 35 officers and 961 other ranks present as of 6/5/58. See Murray p.11.

¹⁹²Abercromby to Haldimand, 29/3/58, British Library Add. Mss. 21668.

¹⁹³Fortescue, Vol. II, p. 317.

¹⁹⁴*A Brief History of the Kings Royal Rifle Corps* (Winchester: Warren and Son, Ltd., 1912), pp. 4-5.

¹⁹⁵Butler, Vol. I, pp. 46-47.

¹⁹⁶Lt. Gordon Augustine, Manuscript Journal, National Army Museum Library, London.

¹⁹⁷William Amherst, *Journal of William Amherst in N. A., 1758-1760* (London: Butler and Tanner, 1928), p. 70.

¹⁹⁸The Moncton Papers, *The Northcliffe Collection* (Ottawa: F. A. Acland, 1926), p. 90.

¹⁹⁹Butler, Vol. I, p. 47.

Journal, however, lists the 2nd Battalion as having thirty-five officers and nine hundred and twenty-five men and NCOs, which is reiterated by the Moncton Papers.²⁰⁰ The 3rd Battalion is listed in the *Annals* as having thirty-five officers and eight hundred and sixty-six men and NCOs,²⁰¹ while in the Gordon Journal it is listed at thirty-two officers and eight hundred and fourteen men and NCOs.²⁰² The Moncton papers have their own figures for the 3rd Battalion; they provide a figure of seven hundred and ninety-eight men.²⁰³

For this expedition, the men were armed, as their counterparts had been in the Fort Carillon and Forbes Expeditions, with hatchets. This multi-purpose implement could be used in the felling of trees and was most importantly an excellent weapon for hand-to-hand combat. The men were also equipped with forty rounds of musket balls for each attack,²⁰⁴ orders given during the landings at Louisbourg instructed each man to put two musket balls into his musket.²⁰⁵

The fortress at Louisbourg was in a very well-fortified position, and had four defensive lines outside, three to the south-west of the fortress and one to the north-east. The defensive lines covered all of the beaches around the fortress, which was situated on a triangular peninsula, and the fort itself had four bastions: the Dauphin's, King's, Queen's, and Princess. It was equipped with two hundred and nineteen pieces of artillery and seventeen mortars, and estimates of French troops were between four thousand and four thousand five hundred. The French regiments, which fell under the command of the French Governor Chevalier Augustin de Drucour,²⁰⁶ were comprised of 2nd battalions of the following: *Volontaires Etrangers*, *Cambris*, *Artois*, and *Bourgogne*. There were also

²⁰⁰W. Amherst, pp. 72-73; also Moncton Papers, p. 90.

²⁰¹Butler, Vol. I, p. 47.

²⁰²W. Amherst, p. 73.

²⁰³Moncton Papers, p. 90.

²⁰⁴Knox, p. 35.

²⁰⁵Augustine Journal.

²⁰⁶Fairfax Davis Donney, *Louisbourg: Key to a Continent* (Englewood Cliffs N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1965), pp. 34-42.

twenty-one companies of French marines and a small number of Canadian and Indian provincials.²⁰⁷ The French Navy presence in the harbor consisted of five ships of the line and seven frigates.²⁰⁸

The British invasion force was divided up into three brigades. The Right Brigade, under the command of Brigadier Whitmore, consisted of the 1st and 3rd Battalions, Royal American Regiment, 1st Foot, 40th, 48th, and 22nd. The Center Brigade, under the command of Brigadier James Wolfe, consisted of the 17th, 47th, 2nd Battalion, Royal American Regiment, and 35th. The Left Brigade, under Brigadier Lawrence, consisted of the 28th, 58th, Fraser's Highlanders, 45th and 15th.²⁰⁹ Shortly before the landings, a special unit was formed, known as the Light Infantry. It consisted of five hundred and fifty marksmen drawn from all the regiments; the Royal American Regiment was represented by eighty men drawn from both battalions.²¹⁰

The Grenadier companies of the various regiments were also grouped into a distinct large unit, that, depending upon the task at hand, would be split up among the commanders. Since the Grenadier companies of the regiments tended to have the largest and tallest men of the regiment and were considered the elite within the regiment, it was decided to form all these men into one unit, as the storming of the beaches and later the fortress would be very demanding tasks. This formation meant that grenadiers from one regiment were assigned grenadiers from other regiments to command, instead of their own men. The 2nd Battalion gave a captain, three lieutenants, four sergeants, two drummers and one hundred men to this new formation. The 3rd Battalion loaned one captain, three lieutenants, four sergeants, two drummers and ninety men. The unit itself numbered one thousand two hundred and twenty grenadiers.²¹¹

²⁰⁷Moncton Papers, p. 98.

²⁰⁸*Ibid.*; also Bird, pp. 200-203.

²⁰⁹Maj. General James Wolfe, *Instructions to Young Officers* (London: J. Millan, 1768), p. 59-63; W. Amherst, p. 70.

²¹⁰Butler, Vol. I, p. 47.

²¹¹Augustine Journal.

The British fleet of one hundred and fifty-seven ships lay at anchor to the west of the fortress in Gabarus Bay. The fleet had twenty-three ships of the line; all of the others were frigates and transport ships. There were three possible landing sites for the army: Freshwater Cove, situated four miles west of the fortress; Flat Point, a mile closer; and White Point, only a mile from the fortress and inside the outer ramparts. An additional landing site, Lombrac, was situated to the east of the fortress.²¹² It was originally planned that all four positions would be attacked simultaneously, but after Wolfe's troops went in, the plan was revised and the other brigades were deployed to support Wolfe's attack.²¹³ Lawrence and his brigade were sent to attack White Point, Whitmore to Flat Point, and Wolfe's Brigade to form the main thrust of the attack against Freshwater Cove. One regiment would also be sent against Lombrac in the east.²¹⁴

Wolfe's attack went in on 8 June, during the early morning hours. The Royal Navy had begun to bombard the French positions at two in the morning, and the French had massed one thousand men in the trenches above the beach with eight swivel-mounted cannon which were able to cover the entire mile-long stretch of beach. The French commanders had decided that the main attack would fall at Freshwater Cove.²¹⁵ The first British wave consisted of five companies of grenadiers, a company of rangers, and five hundred and fifty men of the Light Infantry.²¹⁶ The second wave was made up of Fraser's Highlanders and eight companies of grenadiers, including the two grenadier companies of the Royal American Regiment.²¹⁷

As the first wave approached the beach, they were overwhelmed by musket and cannon fire; Wolfe ordered the attack to retreat, but then three boats of light infantry, one of

²¹²*Ibid.*; also Fortescue, Vol. II, p. 316; and Moncton, pp. 91-92.

²¹³Murray p. 12; also W. Amherst, p. 13.

²¹⁴Augustine Journal; also Fortescue, Vol. II, p. 316.

²¹⁵W. Amherst, p. 14.

²¹⁶John Stewart McClennan, *Louisbourg from its Foundation to its Fall, 1713-1758* (Halifax: Book Room, 1979), pp. 92-94.

²¹⁷Murray, p. 12.

which was led by Lieutenant Brown and Ensign Grant of the 60th,²¹⁸ landed on the right side of the beach, encountering little opposition. The French attempted a counterattack on these troops, but the light infantry were able to hold their position until Wolfe saw his opportunity and sent reinforcements from the main force. Other boats arrived, but most capsized or were sunk by cannon fire.²¹⁹ An eyewitness account by a member of Fraser's Highlanders describes the devastating bombardment:

One 24-pound shot did a great deal of mischief. It passed under my hams and killed Sergeant McKenzie who was sitting as close to my left as he could squeeze, and it carried away the basket of his broadsword which, along with the shot passed through Lt. Cuthbert, who was on McKenzie's left, tore his body into shivers, and cut off both legs of one of the fellows that held the tiller of the boat. . .No sooner had we left our flat bottomed boat than she sank to the gunnel, for the men had withdrawn their plaids from out of the shot holes into which they had thrust them whenever we were struck.²²⁰

Wolfe's grenadiers next were used to attack the trenches before them, succeeding in taking them after a number of attempts. Lawrence's brigade had now landed on the western side of the beach without any serious opposition, and had carried the western trenches. The French, seeing that they could be cut off, retreated in the woods behind their positions, moving towards the town with British troops in hot pursuit. Pursuit was halted when the British came to the open fields before the fortress and the French guns inside opened up on them. The British fell back into the forest seeking shelter and began to build roads to move their artillery and establish a British camp. Flat Point Cove, south of the British camp, was chosen as the main landing area for artillery and supplies for the siege; the British would spend two days felling trees to make a road from the camp to the cove.²²¹

British and French losses for the day were comparable, with each side losing about a hundred men. The British, however, had succeeded in capturing most of the French artillery in good condition, which meant that they would be able to use it against its former

²¹⁸Butler, Vol. I, p. 52.

²¹⁹Moncton Papers, p. 92.

²²⁰Colonel J. R. Harper, *78th Fighting Frasers in Canada* (Montreal: DEV-SCO Publications, Ltd., 1966), pp. 42-43.

²²¹Augustine Journal.

owners in the coming days.²²² The advantages of the British position gave Amherst the benefit of time to determine the best course of action in attacking the fort. He decided to surround the fortress with artillery on all sides and bombard it at will; unlike his counterpart Abercromby, Amherst ruled out the possibility of an all-out frontal attack against Louisbourg.²²³

On 12 June Wolfe was ordered to proceed northeast from the camp and seize Royal Battery, north of Louisbourg, and Lighthouse Point, opposite the fortress. These two positions covered the harbor to the rear of fortress, including its entrance. Wolfe's force was to consist of fifteen hundred men, most of whom came from the Light Infantry and the grenadiers.²²⁴ The Royal American Regiment was represented by one hundred and ninety men, both light infantry and grenadiers.²²⁵

Thanks to fog in the region, Wolfe's force was able to proceed north-east without being detected. The troops reached the Royal Battery by noon on 14 June, and found it deserted; they then moved on towards Lighthouse Point. The Royal Navy was positioned opposite the Point to bombard the battery; when Wolfe's force approached it, they were astonished to find the Point abandoned as well. This meant that two batteries were taken with no losses except for minor skirmishing during the advance. On the 20th, Wolfe opened up on the fort, using some of the artillery left behind by the French, and the French island battery fired upon the British battery at the point where it was being reinforced. The Royal Navy guns succeeded in silencing the island battery by the 25th, freeing the harbor for British ships to enter. By the 29th, six French ships had been sunk intentionally to blockade the entrance, which meant that by the end of June the fortress was effectively

²²²Knox, p. 85.

²²³Amherst, General Jeffrey, *A Journal of the Landing of His Majesty's Forces on the Island of Cape Breton and the Siege and Surrender of Louisbourg; Extracted from his letters*, Boston: Green and Russell, 1759, pp. 17-23; also Augustine Journal.

²²⁴Moncton Papers, p. 92; also Bird, p. 204-205.

²²⁵Murray, p. 12; also Butler, Vol. I, p. 90.

surrounded on all sides. The British completed preparation of artillery positions and began to bombard the fortress.²²⁶

The two sides began a series of skirmishing attacks all along the perimeter of the fort and in the harbor. Two French detachments crossed over to Lighthouse Point and engaged some of the British troops. As the British sappers mined towards the walls of the fortress, the French countermined in retaliation, producing more short skirmishes. On the night of 9 July, the French staged a major attack. Around seven hundred men slipped out of the fortress and raided the first line of British trenches. The attack upon the second line of trenches was not as successful; the British were awakened by the exchange of fire, and the French were forced to retreat. They managed to capture two British officers, with losses of around fifty killed and wounded for the French and only sixteen for the British.²²⁷

On 14 July, Wolfe's brigade carried out a night attack against the French trenches below the Dauphin's bastion. They succeeded in clearing the trenches and were moving their artillery into the position by the morning of the 15th. By the 18th, the trenches were coming together before the fortress. Orders listed for the 18th and 19th regarding the relief of grenadiers from the 2nd and 3rd battalions give some idea of the pressure on troops stationed in these trenches. The men went into the trenches on the 18th; they were to be relieved by the evening of the 19th, and sent back in by the 21st.²²⁸ Bombardments and counter-bombardments, mining, countermining, and skirmishing continued; by 21 July many of the French guns had been silenced by the continuous bombardment.²²⁹

On 26 July, Drucour made overtures regarding surrender. The following day grenadiers from the 1st Battalion, 1st Foot, entered the gates of the fortress. The transfer was quick and easy; there was to be no sacking of the fortress, for it was needed to guard the success of the campaign. The casualties for the British force numbered around five

²²⁶Augustine Journal; also W. Amherst, pp. 14-15.

²²⁷W. Amherst, pp. 21-22.

²²⁸Moncton Papers, p. 96.

²²⁹Augustine Journal.

hundred men killed, and a thousand men wounded, while losses for the French were estimated at double those of the British. The French surrendered five thousand six hundred and thirty-seven men, soldiers, and sailors, and a large quantity of guns and stores inside the fortress.²³⁰ The losses for the Royal American Regiment were as follows: in the 2nd Battalion, Lieutenant Hay and seven men killed, fourteen men wounded; in the 3rd Battalion, seventeen men killed and forty-three wounded.²³¹ The Battle of Louisbourg was the first Battle Honour awarded to the regiment.²³²

It was decided that a further advance against Québec would have to wait until the campaigning season of 1759, as the good weather was coming to an end. The 22nd, 28th, 40th and 45th were left to garrison and rebuild Louisbourg in case of a French counterattack, while Brigadier Wolfe and Colonels Rollo and Moncton were given the task of seizing the French settlements in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Colonel Moncton at this point commanded a detachment of the 2nd Battalion, Royal American Regiment, which would be sent against L'Ile St. Jean (Prince Edward Island), while elements of the 3rd Battalion marched against French settlements on the Gaspé under the command of Rollo. The Grenadier and light infantry Royal American Regiment detachments served with Wolfe in the area, and their task was completed by mid-September.²³³

The 2nd Battalion and eight companies of the 3rd Battalion spent the winter months of 1758-59 in Halifax as garrison troops. Two companies from the 3rd Battalion were sent to Louisbourg as reinforcements during the winter, and replacement troops for the two battalions were sent out from Pennsylvania during the fall of 1758. The 2nd Battalion was in need of two hundred and twenty-three replacement troops, and the 3rd Battalion needed one hundred and eighty-five.²³⁴ Training of the regiment for the coming

²³⁰Moncton Papers, p. 98.

²³¹Murray p. 13; W. Amherst, p. 31.

²³²Wallace, p. 12.

²³³Murray p. 14; also Moncton Papers, pp. 100-101.

²³⁴Jeffrey Amherst Papers, War Office Papers, Public Record Office, London; reel 34/41.

expedition against Québec was stepped up, subject to weather conditions in Halifax.²³⁵ The remaining 1st, 17th, 47th, 48th and Fraser's Highlanders sailed for Boston; they arrived in early October and were then marched overland to Albany to help reinforce the British positions after the defeat at Fort Carillon.²³⁶

The 60th performed well at the siege of Louisbourg. Its troops were charged with employing the tactics of amphibious warfare, to which they were somewhat unaccustomed. Once ashore, the troops of the Royal American Regiment carried home their attack against the French positions with zeal and courage. Throughout the siege the 60th performed well against the French counterattacks and skirmished with skill against their enemy counterparts. For the most part, the performance of the Royal American Regiment at Louisbourg indicates employment of Continental tactics; the siege was characteristic of typical Continental siege battles, with the occasional woodland skirmish. The 60th performed well in the Regular style of warfare and so was honored with a Battle Honour. The last major campaign of 1758, the Forbes Expedition, was a marked contrast to the Continental-style battles at Louisbourg, but the 1st Battalion would do as well there as its brethren had at Louisbourg.

FORBES EXPEDITION

The third and final campaign of 1758 was against Fort Duquesne, in western Pennsylvania. This expedition was the smallest in numbers of Regulars used, comprising only the four remaining companies of the 1st Battalion, as well as the Montgomery's Highland Battalion. The majority of the expedition was made up of provincial troops from Pennsylvania, Virginia and the Carolinas. The total force has been estimated at six thousand strong, of which Regulars numbered four to five hundred men from the 1st

²³⁵*Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, Vol. XIV, (London, 1935), pp. 235-38.

²³⁶Murray p. 14; also Butler, Vol. I, p. 100; Fortescue, Vol. II, p. 322; and Harper, pp. 45-46.

Battalion, Royal American Regiment, and eleven hundred men from Montgomery's Highlanders.²³⁷

Brigadier John Forbes was given command of the expedition, with Colonel Bouquet as second in command.²³⁸ Forbes had studied the previous campaign under Braddock and had decided that even if Braddock had taken Fort Duquesne, he would have had to retire for want of supplies. Forbes thus decided that the new expedition would have to be adequately supplied in all of its movements. As mentioned earlier, Bouquet had already drawn up a detailed plan for an attack against Fort Duquesne, major components of which were the slow advance of troops, fortification of a new road, and the need for a very good supply network. Fortescue gives credit for these ideas to Forbes, but Bouquet had initially submitted his plan in March of 1757, and resubmitted it in his role as second in command; perhaps his plan was part of the reason that Forbes included him in the expedition.²³⁹ Bouquet also recommended that a new road be started in Pennsylvania and that a shorter line of advance be employed than the one Braddock had used. This suggestion was approved by Forbes and incorporated into the plan, as was Bouquet's system of marching in the frontier, which was adopted by all troops used in the expedition. This system's main principle was the deployment of marching men in a column, two abreast, to enable them to deploy in formal lines within two minutes.²⁴⁰

The four companies of the 1st Battalion arrived at Sandy Hook, Pennsylvania on 19 April, and Bouquet and his men began the long process of gathering adequate stores and supplies for the expedition. The provincial troops were not all gathered as planned; the expedition had been planned to begin by mid-May, but was delayed due to lack of provincial support and supply problems.²⁴¹

²³⁷Fortescue, Vol. II, p. 333; also Bird, pp. 215-16.

²³⁸In March 1758, Haldimand, Bouquet and Montgomery of the Highland Regiment were made full colonels in North America. See Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, p. 308-9.

²³⁹Bouquet Papers, Vol. I, pp. 51-53.

²⁴⁰*Ibid.* (Also see more detail in chapter on training and in Fortescue, Vol. II, p. 334.)

²⁴¹Various letters, February to April 1758, Bouquet Papers, Vol. I, pp. 300-334.

A very interesting development took place in the Royal American Regiment during the month of May. Bouquet, while in New York in February, had requested a certain amount of fusils²⁴² to arm his men. On 6 May the four companies received sixteen fusils, which were fully equipped with ram rods and manuals. Bouquet favored the fusil over the regular Short Land New Pattern Musket because of one important feature: the fusil was smaller in size and therefore more maneuverable in the forest paths. Bouquet planned to give the first set of fusils to the best sixteen marksmen of the companies; on the 22nd, a second batch arrived, and Bouquet distributed them to his officers.²⁴³ The men of the four companies, as mentioned previously, were also supplied with new hatchets. While these were to be used primarily for tree felling along the road, a letter from Bouquet dated 28 May expresses his preference for hatchets over bayonets in forest warfare.²⁴⁴

The rest of May and early June were spent trying to assemble supplies and wagons for the expedition. Bouquet spent most of this period in Philadelphia, working out final details as a staff member of the expedition.²⁴⁵ The initial plans directed Bouquet and his men, with a detachment of other troops, to head out and begin work on the road, which would stretch three hundred and twenty-four miles,²⁴⁶ and also the construction of fortified positions. Forbes and the remaining troops would follow a few days later. Preparations were already well behind schedule, and the whole expeditionary force was having problems. The assembly and training of the provincial troops were proving difficult, and there were discipline problems among the men. Weapons and supplies for the expedition were slow in coming,²⁴⁷ and the situation became so critical that a Press

²⁴²A "fusil" is a grooved-barrel gun, predecessor to the rifle. While its range was better than that of a musket, both loading time and rate of fire were considerably slower.

²⁴³Bouquet Papers, Vol. I, p. 339; also pp. 350-52.

²⁴⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 354-56.

²⁴⁵Various letters, Bouquet Papers, Vol. I, pp. 379-85.

²⁴⁶Butler, Vol. I, pp. 65-66.

²⁴⁷Gipson, Vol. VII, pp. 256-67.

warrant was issued on 31 May, authorizing the pressing of wagons, carriages, and horses if the situation did not improve.²⁴⁸

The discipline problems among the provincial troops were noted in the General Orders for Fort Lyttleton on 7 June; in these, Bouquet stated that there would be no leave without orders, no firing of muskets within the fort, roll call three times a day, equipment inspection each morning, no firing upon Indians unless fired upon, and sentry changes every hour during the night. It appears that the same rules applied to the men of the 60th and indeed to all troops within the fort, although they are specifically directed at the provincials.²⁴⁹

An order originating on 19 June provides details of the plans for building and marching on the road to Fort Duquesne. At the front of the column were a corporal and six woodsmen (cutting down trees), a guide a half a mile ahead, one sergeant and another twelve woodsmen a quarter of a mile back, and the rest of the column an additional quarter-mile back. The first men were a lieutenant and a sergeant, with thirty men marching in Indian file (close order but on opposite sides of the road). A corps of hatchet men would follow behind them with a company of soldiers for protection, followed up immediately by an artillery unit. Two regiments were to follow the artillery, the men marching in two-man file close together. The baggage would follow the regiments, with thirty men to protect every two wagons. On all sides of the advance, including the front and back, were two-man detachments, acting as skirmishers, who were not to go out of sight of the main column.²⁵⁰ Orders changed slightly as the advance left the British areas of Pennsylvania; past this point, there would be two flank companies of men in the forward of the column.²⁵¹

²⁴⁸Bouquet to Ashton, 31/5/58, British Library Add. Mss. 21639.

²⁴⁹Forbes Memorandum, 1/6/58, British Library Add. Mss. 21640.

²⁵⁰Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, pp. 657-58.

²⁵¹*Ibid.*, p. 658.

When the forward elements of the expedition reached Raystown, the last post on the eastern side of the Alleghenies, they built their first fort and named it Fort Bedford.²⁵² Bouquet's force included the two Regular regiments as well as provincial troops from Virginia and Pennsylvania; an insight into the structure of the column comes from an order from Bouquet to all troops at Raystown on 24 June which orders the cattle to be marched to the outside of the fort and brought to pasture, accompanied by two sergeants and fifty men. The horses were to be sent to pasture as well, accompanied by fifty men. No trees near the fort were to be cut without orders unless they were dead and could be used as fuel, and fireplaces were to be constructed at least a hundred yards from the tents. All horses returned were to be tied inside the fort, and officers were to make copies of all orders issued and would be held accountable for having them on hand.²⁵³ Each company was to appoint a woodsman to accompany others to fell trees used in the construction of houses and the road, as well as two men to keep the camp clean. Extra men would be used to hunt game around the fort; a reveille would be held every morning; and pickets would be chosen each day for herding and guarding responsibilities. The column would spend the end of June and the first half of July building Fort Bedford and gathering reinforcements and supplies to head out towards Fort Duquesne.²⁵⁴


By 23 July, Bouquet had sent out forward units towards the frontier village of Carlisle, giving instructions that any Indians bearing a yellow riband or carrying yellow fillets were to be received as allies. The next fortified position was established at Loyalhannon Creek (Fort Ligonier) on the western side of the Allegheny River; the same procedures were applied for the building of this portion of the road and the new fort.²⁵⁵ Building the road through the rough terrain of the Alleghenies was an arduous task; the expedition had already been set back due to lack of colonial support, and now nature was

²⁵²Butler, Vol. I, p. 65; also Fortescue, Vol. II, p. 335.

²⁵³Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, pp. 658-59.

²⁵⁴Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, p. 659; also pp. 661-64.

²⁵⁵Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, pp. 667-70.



The Braddock and Forbes Roads.

delaying the expedition further.²⁵⁶ Brigadier Forbes and his detachment, meanwhile, were still further afield in Fort Loudon, and would not reach Fort Bedford until 15 September.²⁵⁷ Bouquet and the majority of men stayed at Raystown and carried out large-scale exercises; they held two battle exercises with the Royal American Regiment stationed on the left of the field and Montgomery's Highlanders positioned on the right of the provincial units. Bouquet stationed the Regulars on either side of the provincials as a stop gap measure to prevent deserting among the provincials from the field of battle.²⁵⁸ Each soldier was armed with twenty musket balls.²⁵⁹ On 14 August, Bouquet ordered two hundred men drawn from the Royal American Regiment and the Highlanders to proceed to Loyalhannon Creek to support troops already stationed in that position. The rest of the Royal American Regiment and Highlanders, along with the 2nd Pennsylvania Provincials, would follow on the 21st, and Bouquet would move out with the remaining provincial forces in late August. Loyalhannon was to be the last major fortified supply position before the final advance on Fort Duquesne. On 31 August, the men were given permission to fire once in the air to celebrate the news of the fall of Louisbourg.²⁶⁰

Bouquet and his column reached Loyalhannon on 6 September, where he set out to build a fort and reconnoiter along the road, pushing towards Fort Duquesne. Sick men from the column were returned to Raystown, and reinforcements of men and supplies reached Loyalhannon each day. The fort was in striking distance of the French at Fort Duquesne, and with both sides carrying out reconnaissance a large amount of skirmishing began.²⁶¹ On the 9th Bouquet authorized a major operation, with Major Grant of the Highlanders in command, to advance the column on Fort Duquesne and carry out

²⁵⁶Fortescue, Vol. II, pp. 334-35; also Bird, pp. 229-31.

²⁵⁷Forbes was delayed, due to the training of the provincial troops and to an illness that would later claim his life. Forbes would die in early March, 1759. It was noted in a letter from Bouquet to General Jeffrey Amherst on the 11th of March, 1759. *Amherst Papers*, War Office, 34/40 reel 32, London. See Fortescue, Vol. II, p. 334; also Burd to Bouquet, 28/8/58, British Library Add. Mss. 21643.

²⁵⁸Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, p. 670.

²⁵⁹*Ibid.*, 7/8/58.

²⁶⁰*Ibid.*, 14/8/58, 21/8/58, 31/8/58.

²⁶¹*Ibid.*, 3/9/58-13/9/58; also Butler, Vol. I, pp. 68-71.

reconnaissance. After establishing a small camp, the troops would engage in skirmishes with any defenders who were stationed on the outside of the fort. This harassment was intended to demoralize the French and their Indian allies, and to induce them to surrender.²⁶²

Grant's column comprised three hundred and fifty officers and men of the Highlanders, one hundred and eight officers and men of the Royal American Regiment,²⁶³ one hundred and three officers and men of the 1st Virginia Regiment, seventy-five of the Maryland provincials, and a hundred men of the 2nd Pennsylvania Provincials. The whole column set out on 9 September; by the 12th, after many close calls, they pitched camp within sight of Fort Duquesne. On the night of the 13th, a force of Highlanders and Royal Americans set out to attack the outer defenses. All of the troops lost themselves in the night and were forced to fall back to their original positions. On the morning of the 14th, Grant sent out four different parties of men towards the fort. One-fourth of the men were left on the hill to guard the baggage, with parties in an open plain drawing up a map of the fort and others skirmishing with Indians along the road. After a few hours, the French and Indians inside the fort rushed out and began to cut off certain parties; within minutes all of the men were surrounded. Panic struck many of the provincial troops; as Grant later stated: ". . . I hope I shall never see again such a Pannick among Troops."²⁶⁴ The firmness of the Royal American Regiment in falling back and forming strong ambush positions was noted within the letter. They were able to save most of the baggage and to escort it and many of the survivors back to Loyalhannon. Losses overall were very heavy: two hundred and seventy-eight officers and men were either killed or missing. The Royal American Regiment suffered accordingly; thirty-five men, and all of the officers, except for Captain

²⁶²Butler, Vol. I, p. 71; also Fortescue, Vol. II, p. 335; and Bird, pp. 220-23.

²⁶³Captain Launder, Lieutenant Billings, Lieutenant Bentinck, Lieutenant Ryder, Ensign Rhor, and Ensign Jenkins. See Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, pp. 508-509.

²⁶⁴Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, pp. 517-21.

Lauder and Lieutenant Bentinck, were either killed or missing. Losses were heavy among the Highlanders as well, including Major Grant, who was captured.²⁶⁵

This defeat put the British in a paradoxical situation: it had not been bad enough to force them to cancel the expedition, but it encouraged the French to mount an attack on the British positions in and around Fort Ligonier. The only consolation Grant's column received was news of Bradstreet's attack on Fort Frontenac, which meant that Fort Duquesne was now isolated and would not receive any more supplies or reinforcements from the north.

The French mustered four hundred and forty men and one hundred and fifty Indian allies for the attack on Loyalhannon. Their purpose was to destroy the morale of the British expedition and delay any attack on Fort Duquesne until after the winter of 1758-59. Their attack was unsuccessful; the British easily repulsed them, one of the last good things to happen for rest of the month. The new road was suffering from the constant rain and, later, snow in the hills. Bouquet and a small escort returned to Raystown to meet with Forbes; they decided to go ahead with the attack on Fort Duquesne, and Bouquet headed back to Loyalhannon to begin final preparations.²⁶⁶

Forbes and his column finally reached Fort Ligonier on 5 November. On the 11th it was decided to proceed as soon as possible towards Fort Duquesne, as intelligence reports indicated bad morale among the troops there. On the 18th, twenty-five hundred men set out towards Fort Duquesne, with the Royal American Regiment on the right flank of the column. The British column reached the former position of Grant's expedition on the night of the 24th, and at midnight the sky lit up as the French defenders blew up the fort, destroying all of the stores and barracks. The British advanced in the morning to find only blackened ruins; the French had withdrawn to the west to Venango. Forbes and Bouquet

²⁶⁵Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, pp. 508-509; also Fortescue, Vol. II, pp. 336-37; Bird, pp. 222-23; and Butler, Vol. I, p. 73.

²⁶⁶Fortescue, Vol. II, p. 336-37; also Butler, Vol. I, pp. 73-5; Bird, pp. 224-25; Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, pp. 547-85.

set out to rebuild the fort, and renamed it after William Pitt. The last major campaign of the year was complete and had resulted in another victory for the British.²⁶⁷

Bouquet and the Royal American Regiment had performed very well in this campaign. They had been able to overcome the previous defeat of Braddock with the use of Bouquet's superior training and tactics. The Royal American Regiment had been successful in road building, skirmishing, and ambush in the forest terrain throughout the expedition. Unlike the incompetents of popular fiction, the Regulars of both the Royal American Regiment and the Highlanders had not only fought frontiersmen and Indians in their own fashion, but had also defeated them. Their action outside of Fort Duquesne on 14 September was testimony to their ability to maintain discipline as panic ensued in the ranks of the other troops and turned a retreat into an all-out rout. Bouquet wrote a letter to Colonel Stanwix of the 1st Battalion in New York, in which he described the action of the four companies: "your (Stanwix being overall commander of the 1st) four companies have given me great satisfaction in the various events of this hard campaign."²⁶⁸ Bouquet himself was complimented in January 1759 by a newly-published edition of the army's training manual which listed many of Bouquet's innovations as official tactics.²⁶⁹

Bouquet and the four companies were sent back to the regimental depot in Philadelphia for winter quarters, while provincial troops were left at Fort Pitt and along the new road at Fort Ligonier and Fort Bedford. Montgomery's Highlanders were also sent to Philadelphia for the winter, with Carlisle as the depot for sick and wounded soldiers. As men were deemed fit for duty, they were sent on to Philadelphia.²⁷⁰ A surgeon stationed in Carlisle notes in his memoirs that several wounded officers were present who were armed with fusils, a circumstance that he found peculiar. He made inquiries of

²⁶⁷Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, pp. 599-611; also Fortescue, Vol. II pp. 337-39; Butler, Vol. I, pp. 75-77; and Bird, pp. 225-27.

²⁶⁸J. Amherst Papers, reel 34/40.

²⁶⁹Townsend to Bouquet, 26/1/59, British Library Add. Mss. 21634.

²⁷⁰Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, pp. 617-51; also Ourry to Bouquet, 16/12/58, British Library Add. Mss. 21642.

various men, and was told of how officers of the Royal American Regiment, as well as its best marksmen, were armed with the fusil.²⁷¹

The four companies of the 1st Battalion stationed in Pennsylvania were in need of recruits to replace troops lost in the recent campaign. Recruiting parties were sent out, with money provided as an incentive to join.²⁷² The rest of the 1st Battalion was stationed in New York, and had four companies sent to the south side of Lake George to the new fort built on the site of Fort William Henry. Another two companies of the First Battalion were stationed with the 4th Battalion at Fort Edward for the winter, and the remaining two companies were at Albany.²⁷³ The six companies of the 1st needed one hundred and twenty-six men to bring them back to strength, plus another one hundred and fifty for the four companies in Pennsylvania. The 4th needed two hundred and forty-eight men.²⁷⁴

1759

The campaign season of 1759 was divided into two main thrusts against New France, consisting of one attack on Québec and another up the Lake Champlain valley. Smaller advances were made against French posts on Lake Ontario (Fort Niagara) and northwestern forts outside of Fort Pitt (Venango and Presque Isle). All four battalions of the Royal American Regiment had a role to play in the campaigns of 1759: The 1st and 4th Battalions were used in the lake campaigns, and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions at Quebec.

As mentioned earlier, the four companies of the 1st were to make their winter quarters in Philadelphia. There was initially some indecision in this matter, as Fort Pitt seemed threatened by the French at Fort Venango, but it was ultimately decided that the provincials should stay at Fort Pitt, with the Regulars further down the road at

²⁷¹James MacLean (Surgeon to 1st Bn., Royal American Regiment), *Reward is Secondary: Life of a Political Adventurer and an Inquiry into the Mystery of Juniors* (London, 1855), p. 55.

²⁷²Tulleken to Bouquet, 16/12/58, British Library Add. Mss. 21643.

²⁷³Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, p. 605.

²⁷⁴J. Amherst Papers, reel 34/40.

Philadelphia where they could recruit and train for the coming spring.²⁷⁵ Bouquet decided to send a small detachment of Regulars (twenty Royal American Regiment and seventy Highlanders) to Fort Pitt as reinforcements for the continuing skirmishing outside the fort. He hoped that sending Regulars would stiffen the resolve of the provincial troops. This detachment reached Fort Pitt on 23 January;²⁷⁶ the Royal American Regiment troops at Fort Pitt suffered from illness during the month of February, but as the weather improved in March, so did the men's health.²⁷⁷ (It appears that another small detachment also remained at Fort Ligonier during the winter months.²⁷⁸)

The six companies of the 1st Battalion who were stationed in New York were to be sent to Pennsylvania,²⁷⁹ although Amherst wished to have them remain and be joined by the four companies stationed in Philadelphia in order to fight at Fort Carillon again, this time as a full battalion. The same order from Amherst directed all units at Ligonier and Fort Pitt to proceed to York, Pennsylvania and form up with the other men of their battalion, and then wait for transport to bring them to New York.²⁸⁰ However, due to the constant skirmishing going on around Fort Pitt, the war office amended their order and sent the six companies of the 1st Battalion from Albany to Pennsylvania instead, to serve as reinforcements and march on from there against the French forts at Venango and Presque Isle.²⁸¹

The new campaign season gave rise once again to the ongoing problem of raising enough supplies and wagons for the troops. Another Press Warrant was issued to gather enough wagons; meanwhile, the 1st Battalion spent most of the month of April training and regrouping the battalion as the other companies arrived from New York. Orders were

²⁷⁵Armstrong to Bouquet 6/1/59; Forbes to Bouquet 8/1/59; Bouquet to Forbes 13/1/59; Forbes to Bouquet 14/1/59; British Library Add. Mss. 21652.

²⁷⁶Bouquet to Forbes, 16/1/59 and 23/1/59, Bouquet Papers, Vol. III.

²⁷⁷Mercer (Commander at Pitt) to Bouquet 7/2/59; Blaine to Bouquet 2/3/59; Bouquet Papers, Vol. III.

²⁷⁸Blaine to Bouquet 2/3/59; Lloyd to Bouquet 19/2/59; Bouquet Papers, Vol. III.

²⁷⁹Tullenken to Bouquet 20/1/59, Bouquet Papers, Vol. III.

²⁸⁰Amherst to Bouquet 16/3/59, British Library Add. Mss. 21634; also Bouquet to Lloyd, 18/3/59, British Library Add. Mss. 21652.

²⁸¹Lloyd to Bouquet, 21/4/59, Bouquet Papers, Vol. III.

issued for the 1st Battalion to move out to the frontier as soon as sufficient provisions were gathered, as French pressure against Fort Pitt was increasing.²⁸²

Four companies were sent from Lancaster towards Fort Bedford on 31 May, reinforcing and strengthening posts along the new road as they went, a process that would take over a month to complete. Stanwix and Bouquet wanted to clear the road of any ambushing parties to keep all communications with Philadelphia and Fort Pitt open.²⁸³ Only small units of Royal American Regiment were sent forward to Fort Pitt; the majority stayed behind at Fort Ligonier and Fort Bedford.

During the month of July, there were many skirmishes on the road between Fort Pitt and Fort Ligonier. The men of the 1st Battalion were used as escorts for supply columns to and from the two forts; Ligonier and Pitt were endlessly reinforced with new redoubts and artillery. More and more men from the 1st Battalion began to arrive at Fort Ligonier and pushed on to Fort Pitt as the planned attacks on Fort Venango got underway;²⁸⁴ reports came into Fort Pitt that the French were retreating from Fort Venango and Fort Presque Isle after the fall of Fort Niagara.²⁸⁵ Two hundred men from the 1st were ordered to march out and sortie the two forts,²⁸⁶ and it was decided after reconnaissance had been completed that the men of the 1st should return to Fort Pitt and await provincial troops, who would be sent up to those forts.

Five companies of the 1st Battalion were left at Fort Pitt for winter quarters, and four others companies were sent to Lancaster. One company was sent to the depot in Philadelphia as a recruiting company.²⁸⁷ For the first time since its establishment as a battalion, the 1st was being used as a cohesive unit. It reestablished communication along the road built by the four companies and secured the west for the British. It performed

²⁸²Various returns for April and State of Southern Dept., 11/5/59, British Library Add. Mss. 21652.

²⁸³Bouquet to Burd, 31/5/59; Stanwix Orders for Communication, 31/5/59; Bouquet to Shippen 19/59; Bouquet Papers, Vol. III.

²⁸⁴Tulleken to Stanwix, 12/7/59; Tulleken to Bouquet 14/7/59; Bouquet Papers, Vol. III.

²⁸⁵Fortescue, Vol. II, pp. 368-69.

²⁸⁶Bouquet to Mercer, 23/7/59; Stanwix to Mercer, 2/8/59; Bouquet Papers, Vol. III.

²⁸⁷Butler, Vol. I, pp. 99-100.

well in the endless campaign of skirmish and counter skirmish along the road. The 1st Battalion would serve along this road and in the western field of operations for the remaining years of the war with France, and go on to serve with distinction in the Pontiac War.

NIAGARA

The first reference to the 4th Battalion during the winter of 1758-59 was when four of its companies were deployed to Schenectady, New York, while its other six companies were stationed at Fort Edward. There was constant skirmishing and reconnaissance going on in the area of Lake George,²⁸⁸ and Haldimand and Colonel Gage (of Gage's Light Infantry, 80th Foot) were searching for possible ways of skirmishing successfully against the Indians. Colonel Gage believed that the pursuit of Indian raiding parties in the woods was not successful; he recommended instead a mobile force that would be able, upon contact, to sweep around the Indian raiders and cut off their line of advance or retreat, and Haldimand agreed that the light infantry company of his regiment should be specifically tasked with this.²⁸⁹ The 4th Battalion provided the light infantry company and other men to Robert Rogers' expedition to scout around Fort Carillon. Ninety Rangers, fifty-two Iroquois, forty-seven men of the 2nd Battalion, 1st Foot, and one hundred and sixty-nine men of the Royal American Regiment marched towards Fort Carillon on 3 March 1759. Lt. Diedrich Breehm of the 60th escorted the party as an engineer, with plans to draw extensive details of the fort for Amherst's staff officers.²⁹⁰ This column also planned to raid the outer perimeter, gathering information, destroying military stores, and if possible, capturing prisoners for interrogation. The expedition was successful; Lieutenant Breehm succeeded

²⁸⁸Abercromby to Haldimand, 15/1/59, British Library Add. Mss. 21652.

²⁸⁹Gage to Haldimand, 20/2/59, British Library Add. Mss. 21652.

²⁹⁰Rogers, p. 128. (An interesting note is that this lieutenant served in the 2nd Battalion RAR under Haldimand and may have been posted to the 4th after Haldimand was given command.)

in drawing a very detailed map of the French positions, and the column was able to capture five French soldiers. They were pursued by the French forces twice, and lost two men. The Royal American Regiment performed well in skirmishes in the woods against their French and Indian foes.²⁹¹

By April, replacements for the companies of the 4th Battalion were starting to arrive in Albany. From there, they were escorted to Schenectady to meet up with the four companies stationed there and move north to Fort Edward to regroup with the other six companies. The light company was also brought back from Lake George to Fort Edward to form up with the rest of the battalion. The 44th Foot was also sent to Fort Edward as preparations for the campaign season went into high gear.²⁹²

The 4th Battalion, Royal American Regiment, 44th Foot, 46th Foot, and twenty-five hundred provincial troops were sent west to rebuild the old British fort at Oswego and proceed from there to lay siege to the French fort at Niagara. The attack on Fort Niagara was to coincide with the expedition against Fort Venango and Fort Presque Isle, and victory at these three points would ensure that most of the western areas were safely under British control. Fort Niagara was also intended to be a jumping-off point for a northeastern advance up Lake Ontario towards Montréal.

The fort at Niagara was in disrepair, and the French decided to send a reinforcement of a few companies of Marine units with an engineer to rebuild the redoubts. By early spring the forward British units were at Oswego, rebuilding the old fort; the French commander at Fort Niagara, Captain Pouchot, awaited the inevitable advance of which reconnaissance from his Indian allies had warned.²⁹³

By the end of May the forward companies of the 44th, 46th and 4th Battalion, Royal American Regiment, had begun the march towards Oswego. The column reached the fort around 11 June. Haldimand was responsible for the rebuilding of the fort and the

²⁹¹ Beattie, pp. 74-76.

²⁹² General Orders for the 4th Bn., 3/4/59, 9/4/59, and 27/4/59, British Library Add. Mss. 21662.

²⁹³ Gipson, Vol. VII, pp. 346-49.

installation of new redoubts and artillery points.²⁹⁴ On 30 June, a French attack party estimated at one thousand strong approached Oswego from the woods. The British column repulsed them easily, with French losses estimated at one hundred killed. The Royal American Regiment lost two men killed and eleven men wounded.²⁹⁵

Brigadier Prideux, overall commander of expedition, left Oswego with two companies of the 4th Battalion, the 44th, 46th and other provincial troops to besiege Fort Niagara. Colonel Haldimand, with the remaining eight companies²⁹⁶ of the 4th Battalion and the 2nd New York Provincials, remained at Oswego to cover any possible retreat of Prideaux's force. Prideaux and his men were ferried by naval forces on Lake Ontario; they reached the fort on 7 July, with the French still in the midst of making repairs. The British immediately laid siege and began to dig trenches, while skirmishing on both sides was undertaken with ferocity.²⁹⁷ Both sides worked hurriedly to build trenches and place artillery. By 16 July the British had succeeded in covering access routes into the fort from the east and south (the French were hoping for reinforcements from the south at Fort Venango and Fort Presque Isle), and both sides were battering each other with all artillery available, resulting in one notable casualty: Brigadier Prideaux, who was killed accidentally by one of his own mortar batteries. Sir William Johnson, Indian Agent, "Colonel of the Six Nations" took over command of the siege, and the bombardment and counter-bombardment continued, with British success in breaking the foundation of the walls.²⁹⁸


²⁹⁴Orders for Haldimand, 15/6/59, British Library Add. Mss. 21728.

²⁹⁵W. Amherst, pp. 43-44; also Butler, Vol. I, p. 99.

²⁹⁶There is some discrepancy in accounts of the number of companies of the 4th Bn. which were sent to Niagara. Modern historians put the number at five companies, but the list in *The Papers of Sir William Johnson* includes only two. Since Sir William Johnson was present at the siege and listed the numbers of RAR each day as two companies' worth, his account can legitimately be considered the more accurate. The discrepancy may arise from a letter sent by Johnson to Haldimand later in the siege which requests three additional companies of reinforcements; however, the siege ended before any of these companies reached Niagara. See Sir William Johnson, *The Papers of Sir William Johnson* (Albany: The University of the State of New York, 1921), Vol. III, pp. 65-79; also W. Amherst, p. 53.

²⁹⁷Johnson, Vol. III, pp. 60-65; also Fortescue, Vol. II, pp. 369-70.

²⁹⁸Bird, p. 276; also Fortescue, Vol. II, p. 369.



PLAN

OF NIAGARA

WITH THE BATTERIES & TOWNSHIP

DESCRIBED

TO THE ENLIGHTENED

AND THE COMPASS

OF ST. WILLIAM JOHNSON BARON

BY THE CAPTAIN J. H. COLEMAN

- A THE FORT
- B THE BATTERY
- C THE BATTERY
- D THE BATTERY
- E THE BATTERY
- F THE BATTERY
- G THE BATTERY
- H THE BATTERY
- I THE BATTERY
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- M THE BATTERY
- N THE BATTERY
- O THE BATTERY
- P THE BATTERY
- Q THE BATTERY
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- S THE BATTERY
- T THE BATTERY
- U THE BATTERY
- V THE BATTERY
- W THE BATTERY

Military operations against Fort Niagara, 1759.

(From Sir William Johnson Papers.)

The British force before Fort Niagara was split into three corps, which themselves were composed of equal numbers of men. The first group was used as trench builders, the second group as skirmishers and guards of prisoners, and the final group as a mobile reserve unit to be used against any French counterattack.²⁹⁹ Johnson requested reinforcements of three companies of the 4th Battalion from Oswego as the siege wore on.³⁰⁰

On 24 July, eight hundred French and Indian reinforcements arrived to the south of the British siege works.³⁰¹ After successfully seizing British water patrols on the Niagara River, they were observed; a sharp but quick battle of close quarter fighting ensued between the mobile units and the French attackers. The British prevailed, and the French relief force was forced to retreat. On the 25th, the French inside the fort sent out a foray of a hundred and fifty men, only to lose them in the well-defended British trenches. The French units retreated to Fort Presque Isle and Fort Venango and burned the forts there, on the way to their final destination of Fort Detroit. On 26 July the French garrison formally surrendered to the British forces, signaling the end of the French presence on the upper Ohio.³⁰²

The 4th Battalion spent the summer and early fall months at Fort Oswego. General Gage was sent as the new commander of the British forces on Lake Ontario, and the Royal American Regiment was split up during the late fall to protect the advances of the summer. Various companies were sent to the posts along Lake Ontario and to the Onandaga Falls region. Gage compliments the performance of the 60th in one of his orders: “. . .as the fort is embarked to such good hands it will be always prepared to repel all attempts by the enemy.”³⁰³ As of 6 November 1759, the battalion stood as follows: two field officers, five captains, nineteen lieutenants, twenty-two sergeants, twelve drummers,

²⁹⁹Johnson, Vol. III, pp. 65-71; Butler, Vol. I, pp. 100-101.

³⁰⁰Rutherford to Haldimand, 14/7/59, British Library Add. Mss. 21728.

³⁰¹W. Amherst, p. 52.

³⁰²Butler, Vol. I pp. 101-103; also Bird, pp. 283-85; and Fortescue, Vol. II, p.370.

³⁰³Orders, 6/11/59, British Library Add. Mss. 21662.

five hundred and eighty-seven soldiers. Forty-one men were sick, seventy-six were wounded, and another seventy-six were discharged.³⁰⁴

The 4th Battalion was engaged in two different types of warfare during the Niagara campaign. They were used as forest fighting troops during the advance to Oswego and Niagara, and in the subsequent defense of the British positions at the two forts. They were also engaged in the Continental style of siege warfare, as were their brother soldiers of the 2nd and 3rd battalions at Louisbourg and Québec. Their performance during this difficult campaign was commended in the quote from General Gage listed above. The 4th Battalion spent the winter at Oswego and at various small outposts along Lake Ontario,³⁰⁵ preparing itself for the coming campaign season against Montréal.

QUEBEC

The 2nd and 3rd battalions spent the winter months of 1759 in garrison duty in Halifax and Louisbourg, training for the upcoming campaign against Québec. While in Louisbourg, the 60th recruited new troops to help fill their ranks, among them Germans from the captured French units being held there. Wolfe was put in command of the Québec operation; he gathered his forces in the ports of Halifax and Louisbourg and by the end of May was ready to sail.³⁰⁶

General Wolfe divided his force into three major brigades, with smaller units in support. The 2nd Battalion was part of Brigadier George Townshend's brigade with the 47th foot, 78th³⁰⁷ and 28th foot. The 3rd Battalion was part of Brigadier George Murray's brigade, which also had the 35th and 48th foots attached. The final brigade was

³⁰⁴Return of 4th Bn., Fort Ontario, 6/11/59, British Library Add. Mss. 21662.

³⁰⁵"National Army Museum List of Locations of Regiments in North America, 1755-1763", National Army Museum Library, London.

³⁰⁶Parkman, pp. 419-24 ; also Christopher Hibbert, *Wolfe at Quebec* (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1959), pp. 38-44.

³⁰⁷Accounts of the position of the 78th differ. Knox and the Moncton Papers position the 78th with Townshend's brigades, while Fortescue does not mention them and Murray lists them as part of Moncton's brigade.

commanded by Brigadier Robert Moncton and included the 15th, 43rd, and 58th Regiments of Foot.³⁰⁸ Wolfe also had at his disposal two battalions of light infantry, one group of rangers and two battalions of grenadiers³⁰⁹ and he decided to form the light infantry and grenadiers into composite units. The expedition also had three companies of artillery, which would be augmented by three ships of the line and numerous smaller vessels.³¹⁰

The 2nd and 3rd Battalions, Royal American Regiment, left Louisbourg with their respective brigades around 1 June. The 2nd Battalion was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel St. Clair and numbered twenty-seven officers, thirty-four NCOs, and five hundred and twenty men. The reasoning behind these numbers was twofold; first, two companies each from the 2nd and 3rd battalions had been left behind to garrison Halifax and Louisbourg; and second, the grenadier and light infantry companies of the two battalions had been detached to form composite groups. The 3rd Battalion was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Young and numbered twenty-nine officers, thirty-four NCOs and five hundred and forty-four men.³¹¹

³⁰⁸Knox, p. 116.

³⁰⁹There are some discrepancies in accounts of the two composite units of grenadiers, particularly the unit designated the "Louisbourg" grenadiers. Reading the Regiments' histories leads one to believe that the "Louisbourg" was an elite unit who had received an honorary "colonial" title, but the Louisbourg name disappears from the records after the Battle of Quebec. Additionally, according to regimental histories, the two grenadier companies of the 60th were part of this unit, but contemporary materials indicate otherwise. For example, Knox does not list the 60th among the regiments that formed the Louisbourg unit, and papers in *The Northcliffe Collection* which detail specific orders for placement in the transports show the 60th grenadier companies listed separately from the "Louisbourg" grenadiers.

These conflicting accounts provoke questions. Were the "Louisbourg" grenadiers an extra elite? Grenadiers as a group were considered to be the elite of each regiment. Was the title special recognition of the performance of a specific group of grenadier companies during the siege? The grenadiers of the 60th served at Louisbourg. It appears that the honorary title conferred the status of an especially elite group, since the regimental histories attempt to claim a share of it. While the grenadiers of the 60th must have performed their duties well, since there is no mention of them doing otherwise, they may not have attained the level of achievement reached by the regiments that were listed. Had they wanted to be part of the "Louisbourg" grenadier unit and been unable to be? It is possible that the unit was formed from the regiments who spent the winter months at Louisbourg, not at Halifax, where the 60th performed duties. If the answer to any of these questions is 'yes', it explains why the 60th would want to be associated with the "Louisbourg" grenadier unit; but it seems clear that, contrary to regimental histories, this was not the case.

³¹⁰Moncton Papers, 137-140; also May, pp. 33-34.

³¹¹Murray, p. 4; also Butler, pp. 73-74.

The French were aware of the impending attack. The French High command in North America, General Montcalm (the military commander) and Governor Vaudreuil decided to hasten all available troops in North America to Québec to join the five Regular regiments already stationed there in defending the city.³¹² Various companies of Marines were also hastened to the city, along with the Canadian militia and around fifteen hundred allied Indians. The total force gathered was around fifteen to sixteen thousand men, with one hundred and six artillery pieces placed along the walls of the city itself. It was decided that the majority of the men would be placed to the northeast of the city along the Beauport Shore; a long line of trenches would be built between the St. Charles River, in the south, and the Montmorency River, in the northeast. Two major French artillery batteries would be placed along the trenches, which were built up from the riverbank and offered a good field of fire against any attack. The French Regular regiments were placed in the center of these lines, with the militia of Québec, with a scattering of Marines, to the northeast, and the militia of Montréal, again with a stiffening of Marines, was placed to the southwest. Inside the city were around two thousand men. While the British had only mustered around eight thousand men, their force was mostly Regulars, whereas the French defenders were mostly militia. This force of militia, stiffened by the presence of Regulars, would acquit themselves well in defense of the trenches, but in the open they would fare poorly.³¹³

By 21 June the British fleet could be seen from Québec, and troops landed on the Isle d'Orléans on the 26th without resistance, an island directly opposite the main French positions and parallel with the city itself. Wolfe ordered Moncton's brigade to seize Point Levy due west of Orléans; these heights were opposite the city and gave a good field of fire for the British artillery. Moncton's brigade was able to seize the heights without difficulty,

³¹²These five were *La Sarre, Bearn, Guienne, Royal Roussillon, and Languedoc.*

³¹³Parkman, pp. 422-23; also Fortescue, Vol. II pp. 362-63; and Butler, p. 74.

and his men, under artillery fire from Québec, began to build trenches and battery emplacements. By 12 July the first British salvos were raining down on the city.³¹⁴

Wolfe next ordered Townshend's and Murray's brigades to sail across to L'Ange Gardien on the eastern side of the Montmorency River and French positions. Troops succeeded in landing and establishing a camp by 10 July, and Wolfe moved his headquarters from the island to this new position, while the British base and hospital remained on the island. Two companies of the Royal American Regiment were sent against French reconnaissance positions on the eastern bank of the river,³¹⁵ and skirmishing between the two sides continued for the next several days. However, Montcalm did not attack the British positions, although Wolfe attempted to draw him into battle. Montcalm may have realized his forces were better suited to defensive positions and wearing down the British forces than fighting in the open. On 21 July Wolfe ordered the 3rd Battalion, as well as the grenadier companies of the 15th and 48th, to attack the Indian camps located to the north, in an attempt to force a move by Montcalm. While the troops were successful in destroying the camps, Montcalm still refused battle.³¹⁶ The French-allied Indians began to complain to Montcalm of the impact of the good fighting abilities of the British troops, both in the open and in the woods. This was a far cry from the comments made about Braddock's expedition.³¹⁷


Wolfe had been frustrated by his numerous unsuccessful attempts to coerce Montcalm to commit his troops to battle, and he decided to deploy part of his force to swing around and attack the French trenches by amphibious attack. This deployment would consist of thirteen companies of grenadiers and two hundred men from the 2nd Battalion, Royal American Regiment, in the first wave; Moncton would follow with the

³¹⁴Major General James Wolfe, *Instructions to Young Officers* (London: J. Millan, 1768), pp. 79-81; also Parkman, pp. 426-29.

³¹⁵Murray, p. 6.

³¹⁶Wolfe, p. 81; also Murray, pp. 8-9.

³¹⁷Butler, p. 77; also Murray, p. 8.



Wolfe's attack near the Montmorency Falls. A Portion of Thomas Jefferys's "Plan of the . . . Siege of Quebec, 1759." (Public Archives of Canada, Division of Maps.)

remainder of his brigade in support of the first wave.³¹⁸ The date of the attack was set for 31 July, with the grenadiers and Royal American Regiment earmarked to seize the first two major redoubts along the river. The attack was preceded by bombardment from Royal Navy ships, which unfortunately alerted the French to the ensuing attack, so that the area of the intended landing was reinforced with French Regulars. The grenadiers and two hundred men of the Royal American Regiment were sent in flat-bottomed boats towards the shore. Upon reaching the shore, the grenadiers and Royal American Regiment men ran in disorder to capture the first redoubt, which they seized without much opposition. As the troops readied themselves for the second redoubt, a thunderous hail of fire crashed in amongst them; the French still occupied the high ground behind the redoubt, and kept up a continuous fire upon the British troops.³¹⁹

An interesting note on the battle is anecdote concerning one Lieutenant Peyton, of the Royal American Regiment. Lieutenant Peyton was with a detachment of the Royal American Regiment which was attempting to scale the hill to the second redoubt, and was attacked by a unit of Indians. A short and violent struggle ensued, and Peyton was wounded and initially left for dead. However, both Knox and Murray describe how Peyton raised himself up and killed his Indian attackers with a two-barreled gun. It would appear that the weapon in question might have been a private purchase, as the fusils given to certain men, as well as the standard-issue Brown Bess, were single-barreled.³²⁰

The 78th and 15th Foot were landed after the taking of the first redoubt. Grenadiers and Royal American Regiment troops attempted to push up the hill, but were continuously repelled by French fire. Wolfe gave the order for a final attack against the Great redoubt by the Royal American Regiment, but this too was beaten off,³²¹ and the order to retreat was finally given. The grenadiers and elements of the Royal American

³¹⁸Moncton Papers, p. 136; also Wolfe, p. 90.

³¹⁹Parkman, pp. 438-40; also Fortescue, pp. 365-66; and Brian Connell, *Plain of Abraham* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1959), pp. 87-96.

³²⁰Murray p. 10; also Knox, p. 157.

³²¹Wolfe, p. 91.

Regiment were to row across to the island of Orléans, the 15th towards Point Levis, and the 78th and Wolfe were to proceed towards the eastern bank of the Montmorency.³²² The retreat was in good order and all surviving members reached their respective positions.

The battle, while short, had cost the grenadiers and Royal American Regiment heavily. Overall, the number of killed and wounded was more than five hundred; the Royal American Regiment, in particular, lost over a hundred men and officers killed and wounded.³²³ Wolfe was angry at the apparent disorderly attack of his grenadiers. He criticized them for their apparent lack of discipline, while praising the Royal American Regiment for their swift action and performance. A possible reason for the grenadiers' unusual behavior can be found in a story told by Murray in his history: he quotes a specific Captain David Ochterloney³²⁴ of the 2nd Battalion, Royal American Regiment, as egging on the grenadiers in a dare. The Louisbourg Grenadiers, and grenadiers in general, were regarded as the elite of the army, and Ochterloney is quoted as saying upon the approach to the beach that "thou his men were not grenadiers that they would be the first to storm the redoubt."³²⁵ This dare may have had dire consequences for the entire day, if indeed it was what prompted the grenadiers and Royal American Regiment to attack in such a disorderly fashion.

Wolfe decided to lay waste to all surrounding areas in order to draw Montcalm into open battle once and for all. The French, meanwhile, were elated by their victory, and felt that the initiative was now on their side as summer came to a close. Wolfe ordered certain companies of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, light infantry, and the 78th to burn the surrounding areas, while Montcalm moved some troops from the river trenches down towards the city in anticipation of a western attack.³²⁶ The grenadiers of the Royal

³²²Parkman, p. 440; also Hibbert, pp. 73-74.

³²³Butler, Vol. I, p. 79; also Knox, pp. 197-98.

³²⁴Ochterloney was himself captured during the attack, and was wounded alongside Lieutenant Peyton by a shot to the lungs. Ochterloney died from his wounds on 23 August. The episode involving the Indians' treatment of both Ochterloney and Peyton sparked a number of letters between Wolfe and Montcalm regarding the treatment of wounded. See Moncton Papers, p. 137.

³²⁵Murray, p. 10.

³²⁶Moncton Papers, pp. 149-50.

American Regiment were also employed during this period as escorts for high ranking officers; an order for 9 August gives instructions to escort Wolfe to St. Joachim.³²⁷ Other companies were used to protect supply trains in the woods and to act as marines for supply boats.³²⁸

Wolfe decided to pull the remaining troops from the eastern bank of the Montmorency on 3 September.³²⁹ While this maneuver was being undertaken, Montcalm moved troops in an attempt to cut off the retreating British. Moncton, however, sent two battalions in a feigned assault to scare off Montcalm from any real attack, and the British withdrew to the Isle d'Orléans and Point Levis in good order. By this time, the Royal Navy was calling for a decision to be made about future operations, and as the autumn approached Wolfe had to decide whether to attack or to withdraw and return the following spring.³³⁰

Wolfe decided to test the resolve of the French; he ordered the embarkation of five battalions, including the 3rd Battalion, Royal American Regiment, on ships sailing up the St. Lawrence from 6 September to 11 September. The French responded by marching out reinforcements to and from where the Royal Navy sailed. Wolfe had decided on a landing spot to the south of the city; how he received the actual intelligence regarding this spot is a somewhat clouded issue. Some sources list French deserters as the informers; others cite Captain Stobo, who was a hostage at Québec but had escaped and rejoined the British; and still others refer to Wolfe finding the spot himself one day while sailing up and down the river looking for likely sites. The fleet drifted down on the night of 12 September,³³¹ undetected until a French sentry called out. The British responded with the correct password, and were able to pass unchecked.³³² Feeling in the French camp was that the

³²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 155.

³²⁸Wolfe, pp. 92-100.

³²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 100; also Butler, Vol. I, p. 80.

³³⁰The Royal American Regiment embarked in the boats at 8:00 P.M.; see Moncton Papers, pp. 140-41; also Hibbert, pp. 130-40.

³³¹"Brigadier Townshend's Report on the Battle of the Plains of Abraham," *The Northcliffe Collection*, p. 419.

³³²For a more detailed account of the exchange with the French sentry, refer to Parkman, p. 472.

British were close to withdrawing from the siege, as it was unusual that a British fleet would be downstream from the city with forty-five hundred men embarked.³³³

At the spot which Wolfe had chosen, the boats³³⁴ carrying the Royal American Regiment laid up to dislodge their cargo. Twenty-four men of the light infantry corps were sent ahead up the cliff to scout a possible route for the remaining troops, and the leading elements of the force approached the summit of the cliff as dawn broke. Wolfe decided to go east one mile and form up his men in the open Plain of Abraham to await any French counterattack. The grenadiers of the 22nd, 40th, 45th and 2nd Battalion, Royal American Regiment, were first to arrive at the Plains. The 15th, 58th, 78th, 47th, 43rd, 28th, 35th, 48th and 2nd Battalion, Royal American Regiment, soon followed in ranks of three and fell into line. The light infantry corps was used on the left flank to cover the advance, and the 3rd Battalion, Royal American Regiment, was left at the summit and at the landing area to protect the stores and defend against any counterattack from behind.³³⁵ The British units had two days' worth of supplies; Wolfe was hoping for a quick and decisive battle once and for all.

Montcalm had awoken to reports of the British troop movements. He had continued to suppose that the major attack would fall along the river trenches, and had to rush to move the available units opposite the British lines. On his two flanks he positioned Canadian militia units, with the *La Sarre*, *Languedoc*, *Bearn*, *La Guienne*, and *Royal Roussillon* regiments at his center. On his furthest flanks he placed Indians and colonial sharpshooters.³³⁶

The British lines had also been formed, with the light infantry corps on the northern flank, comprised of the 15th Foot, 58th, 78th, 47th, 43rd, 28th, Grenadiers, and 35th Foot. The 2nd Battalion, Royal American Regiment, was placed in reserve in the north, with the

³³³Parkman, pp. 468-74.

³³⁴The *Medway*, *Captain*, and *Sutherland* (flatboats), as well as the *Lawrell* (possibly *Laurel*) transport; see Moncton Papers, pp. 142 and 164.

³³⁵Butler, Vol. I, pp. 90-91; also Parkman, pp. 475-78; and Hibbert, pp. 140-41.

³³⁶Parkman, p. 478; also Hibbert, p. 141; and Knox, pp. 190-95.

48th Foot in reserve in the south. The 3rd Battalion, Royal American Regiment, was placed in the rear guarding the landing area and summit approach.³³⁷

By 9:00 AM the French units had been assembled. The 2nd Battalion was moved into line in the north as the Canadians and Indians moved in on the northern flank. The French infantry was supported by three artillery pieces, while the British managed three six-pound³³⁸ artillery pieces. The French had formed up within six hundred yards of the British, and as the skirmishing increased, the 2nd Battalion, Royal American Regiment, was tasked with the removal of sharpshooters from a series of houses on the St. Foy Road.³³⁹ This was easily done with the help of the corps of light infantry, and as the 2nd Battalion cleared the houses the hellish fire from the Canadians died down.³⁴⁰ The French then brought up their three pieces of artillery and fired on the British lines. The British responded with their artillery, with British lines crouched down to avoid the fire of the cannon.

Around 10:00 AM, Montcalm gave the order for the French to advance. The French fired one volley, which because of its distance was not effective. As the French approached, a second volley was fired, but again it lacked the needed distance. When the French were within two hundred yards their lines were losing cohesion; Canadians blocked the path of the Regulars, and troops began to fire without orders. The British marched two rods and stood still, maintaining discipline and formation. Finally, within forty yards of the French lines, the order for the British to open fire was given. The simultaneous shot from the British lines smashed through the French troops; French officers later reported that the volley sounded like one cannon shot and smashed the French line into pieces. Montcalm, realizing the effect of the volley, attempted to regain order in his lines, but the British were now advancing, firing at will, and using the bayonet.

³³⁷Knox, p. 191; also Murray p. 10; and Townshend, p. 420.

³³⁸There is some debate about the actual number of artillery pieces fielded by the British. Both Murray's and Knox's accounts mention only one six-pounder, while the Moncton Papers mentions three.

³³⁹Townshend, p. 420.

³⁴⁰Murray p. 11; also Knox, pp. 200-204.

The flanks were carried as well, and the Highlanders and Royal American Regiment pushed forward; within moments, the French broke and ran towards the city. Montcalm was wounded (and would later die during the final stages of the battle), and so was Wolfe, as he led his victorious army in pursuit the fleeing French. As the British advanced, the French attempted to attack them from the rear, but this force too was rapidly undone by the firing of the British.³⁴¹

Townshend took command of the British troops on the Plain; he set the men to digging trenches and called up reinforcements from the landing zone. The British were still outnumbered by the French, but Townshend continued to push towards the city as the French commanders discussed their options. French civilians retreated thirty miles north to await the final decision, and the city stood in isolation. Townshend received the surrender of the city on 17 September, just in time, as it appears, as French troops from north of the city were approaching its outskirts. Victory accomplished, the British set out at once to improve the defenses of the city; a French counterattack was still a real possibility.³⁴²

The 2nd Battalion was the only battalion of the Royal American Regiment which was directly involved in the battle on the Plains of Abraham. Six men were killed, and five officers and eighty-three men were wounded.³⁴³ The 3rd Battalion, in its rearguard position, had two men wounded.³⁴⁴ The rest of the British troops lost nine officers and forty-eight men killed, and thirty-six officers and five hundred and thirty-five men

³⁴¹Townshend, pp. 420-21; also Butler, Vol. I, pp. 90-95.

³⁴²Townshend, p. 420; also Parkman, pp. 480-89.

³⁴³In his journal, Colonel Guy Carleton differs. He lists five privates killed, not six; six officers wounded, not five (Captain Holland, Lieutenants Calder, Jeffries and Straw, and Ensigns Cameron and Stool); and only lists fifty privates and two sergeants wounded. See "Journal of Colonel Guy Carleton, Quarter Master General to General James Wolfe," *Manuscripts Relating to the Early History of Canada*, 4th Series (Quebec: Dawson & Co., Shaw's Buildings, 1875); also Knox, p. 210; and Murray, p. 11.

³⁴⁴Carleton, pp. 20-21; also Murray, p. 11; and Knox, p. 210.

wounded.³⁴⁵ The numbers for the French are not as exact; they are listed as fifteen hundred men killed, wounded, or taken prisoner.³⁴⁶

As a result of the fall of Québec, three prisoners of war from the 60th were liberated. Returns listed in the *Amherst Papers* indicate three officers of the 60th as returned for duty. Lt. Jacob Dugan, an officer of the 3rd Battalion, was captured around Fort Edward in May 1757. Captain John McCormick, of the 4th Battalion, was taken prisoner in January 1759. Lt. Thomas Middleton, of the 2nd, was taken prisoner earlier, at Montmorency Falls. These three men, having been recovered, were placed in vacant positions of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions.³⁴⁷

The Battle of Québec showed, once again, the ability of the Royal American Regiment to fight using three different styles of warfare and still perform uniformly well. They were used in the role of amphibious troops landing at both Montmorency Falls and later at the foot of the Plains of Abraham, a task they performed well at both sites. While the attack at Montmorency provoked criticism of the grenadiers for their disorder, Wolfe noted that the rapid attack of the Royal American Regiment should be commended, praise which was later enshrined in their motto, 'swift and bold.' The regiment filled a less central role in the amphibious attack below the Plains of Abraham, but there is no mention of problems with the regiment in Wolfe's orders or from eyewitnesses to the battle, such as Knox, Moncton, or Townshend.

The regimental troops also performed duty in the irregular style of warfare for which they were originally recruited--that of the skirmisher. They were ordered to lay waste to the Indian and French communities surrounding the city, and also took part in general skirmishing on the eastern side of the Montmorency River. During the battle of the Plains of Abraham the 2nd Battalion was stationed in reserve, but was called forward

³⁴⁵Butler, Vol. I, p. 93; also Harper p. 97; and Jean Claude Herbert, *Siege of Quebec: Three Eyewitness Accounts* (Quebec: Ministre Des Culturelles, 1974), p. 43.

³⁴⁶Butler, p. 93; Hibbert, pp. 155-60; and Fortescue, Vol. II, p. 377.

³⁴⁷"List of Officers Returned from Being Prisoners in Canada, 15th November, 1759", J. Amherst Papers 34/8-9, reel 7, War Office Papers, Public Records Office, London.

before long to engage French and Indian skirmishing parties on the British northern flank. The 2nd performed these tasks well before being placed back in line to await the approaching main French Army.

It was in the last phase of the battle that the training and discipline of the Royal American Regiment was most clearly demonstrated. The regiment held its place in line as the French Regulars advanced in a Continental-style offensive; the British line stood and awaited the coming attack, holding their ground and their fire until ordered to shoot with the French lines less than forty yards away. Strict discipline was maintained among all the units on the field, even under the withering fire of the French attack. The Royal American Regiment troops had fulfilled the full range of their duties, from the skirmishing tactics of the forest fighter to the rigid discipline of the Regular soldier in a typical Continental attack, and had not only survived the day but performed admirably in every situation to which they were assigned.

DEFENSE OF QUEBEC CITY AND THE FALL OF NEW FRANCE

In spite of their victories in battle, the winter of 1759 was a trying one for the 2nd and 3rd Battalions. The two battalions were left in garrison of the Québec fort with other regiments,³⁴⁸ with the French army still strong outside the city walls.³⁴⁹ As the British regiments inside the city settled into their new home, the severe winter closed in. It was difficult for many of the men to find proper housing since the recent siege had wrought so much damage to the city. What little shelter there was often overcrowded. Burnt-out houses were scoured for heating timber, and foraging parties were sent out into the interior to cut timber for heat and hunt for food. These parties often had to fight their way back to

³⁴⁸Other regiments were the 15th, 28th, 35th, 43rd, 47th, 48th, 58th, and 78th

³⁴⁹A large number of the French Army troops positioned to the northeast of the city had not been present at the Plains of Abraham, as they had fallen back somewhat from the city. In essence Quebec was surrounded by a superior enemy force during the winter months following the battle; the Plains of Abraham did not seal the fate of Canada, as is often portrayed.

the city through ambushes of Indian and French troops. A full series of outposts outside the city walls was established by the British to act as a buffer and forward position for the foraging parties, as well as to reconnoiter the French troops. These outposts were frequently attacked by French and Indian war parties; the British retaliated by mounting counterattacks on French positions, successfully seizing a number of positions, taking whatever bounty they could find and retreating with it back to their own outposts.³⁵⁰

The British garrison was in poor condition.³⁵¹ With the freezing of the St. Lawrence River, they were shut off from any re-supply, and they were surrounded on three sides by French and Indian forces of superior size in the midst of preparations for the retaking of the city.³⁵² The defensive positions within the city were maintained, but at the expense of the ill-supplied British troops. The lack of adequate clothing and food took a heavy toll. By April 1760, six hundred and seventy-two men had died from scurvy, hypothermia and other causes. The total number of the garrison stood at five thousand six hundred fifty-three men, of whom two thousand three hundred and twelve were sick. Only three thousand three hundred and forty-one were fit for duty; the 2nd Battalion, Royal American Regiment, had two hundred and thirty-seven, with one hundred and sixty-three men listed as sick and sixty-one lost since occupying Québec.³⁵³ The 3rd Battalion had two hundred and fifty-three men fit; two hundred and fifteen men were listed as sick, and fifty-eight men lost. The garrison was in critical condition--the French troops had weathered the winter in far better condition--and reinforcement from the river was desperately needed.

Throughout the winter and early spring, there were constant reports of an impending French attack upon the city. The French had been able to gather supplies by sled from the Montréal and the surrounding regions, and they knew that they would have

³⁵⁰"Journal of the Siege of Quebec, 1760 by General Murray," *Manuscript Relating to the Early History of Canada* (Quebec: Middleton & Dawson, 1871), pp. 13-26; also Knox, pp. 230-45.

³⁵¹J. Desbroyeres, "Account of the Life in Quebec During the Winter of 1759-1760," *Northcliffe Collection*, pp. 426-28.

³⁵²The majority of the French troops were regulars and Indians, as the Canadians were sent home until the spring campaigning season. See Parkman, pp. 500-504.

³⁵³"State of His Majesty's Forces in Garrison at Quebec, 24 April 1760", Manuscript, National Army Museum Library, London.

to attack in the early spring, before the ice on the river broke and relief for the British troops was able to move upriver. A local militia call up was instituted, to summon reinforcements from Montréal and the regions between the two cities. By these methods, the French were able to muster around eight to nine thousand men; of this number, there were eight battalions of Regulars, and two battalions of (regular-colonial) marines; the remaining troops were made up of Canadian militia and Indians.³⁵⁴

The French decided to attack by early April. General Murray, commander of the British garrison, decided to occupy positions further upstream to try to prevent the French advance.³⁵⁵ The French easily pushed back the forward British posts, but Murray still had a few options available. He could fall back to the city and wait out a siege, although the city walls were in such disrepair that prolonged resistance might not be possible. He could march out his army, as Montcalm had done, and attack. Finally, he could build a series of trenches and redoubts in front of the city walls, and use these to try and hold back any attack, although the ground was not sufficiently thawed to allow the trenches to be dug to the necessary depths. Murray decided to march out of the city and confront the French advance, much as Montcalm had done half a year earlier.³⁵⁶

British troops marched out in two columns towards the woods at the edge of the Plains on the morning of 28 April.³⁵⁷ Each battalion had two guns attached. Battalions formed up in two ranks, with the two guns placed on the left of each battalion, marking the divisions between battalions.³⁵⁸ Murray also had the artillery of the city as support. As the British formed their lines, the 2nd Battalion, Royal American Regiment, was in the northern right side; the 3rd was held in reserve at first, but later came in as support on the right flank

³⁵⁴Parkman, pp. 504-505.

³⁵⁵23 April 1760, Murray ordered the 15th, 28th, 47th, and 58th regiments and the 2nd Bn. Royal American Regiment to proceed to Ste. Foy and occupy positions. See Murray, "Siege of Quebec", p. 29.

³⁵⁶Murray, "Siege of Quebec", pp. 29-30; also Gipson, Vol. VII pp. 420-27.

³⁵⁷The troops sent to Ste. Foy on 23 April had fallen back to the edge of the woods and the Plain. See Murray, "Siege of Quebec", pp. 30-31.

³⁵⁸Right Brigade, commanded by Colonel Burton: the 15th Regiment, 2nd Bn. Royal American Regiment, 48th Regiment. Left Brigade, commanded by Colonel Fraser: the 43rd, 47th, and 28th regiments. In Reserve: the 35th Regiment and 3rd Bn Royal American Regiment. See Murray "Siege of Quebec", pp. 31-32.



John Turner's map of the Battle of Sillery Woods, showing Murray's advance from the high ground to the west of Sillery Woods, 1760

of the line. Murray watched as the French drew up for battle on the outside edge of the woods forward of his position. He immediately opened fire with his artillery, taking an immediate toll on the French.³⁵⁹

The French began to withdraw some units in order to move them out of the line of fire of the British artillery; Murray saw this as a retreat and continued to advance with his artillery. This was a major mistake. He was outnumbered three to one, and it was only a matter of time before the French came around and attempted to outflank the British. The left side of the British line was the first to feel the effects, as Canadians and Indians attacked the 47th Regiment's flank. The 2nd Battalion, Royal American Regiment, was able to hold two French redoubts despite continuous attacks, and after sustaining many casualties, upon hearing the command of general retreat, they withdrew.³⁶⁰ There was very sharp skirmishing in the northern part of the line as British light infantry were pushed back from their advance. The French attempted to sweep to the south of the British line, come up from behind, and surround the British completely. The 3rd Battalion, which was stationed in the southern area of the line, vigorously attempted to hold the French at bay, and Murray, realizing his mistake, began a speedy withdrawal to the city. The 2nd Battalion also withdrew, keeping the French advance at bay, while the 3rd Battalion kept the line of retreat free of any French attacks. The British, while retreating, did not retreat from the field in disorder, as the French had done the previous September. The British retreat was an orderly one, and was supported by artillery from within the city.³⁶¹

The battle had lasted two hours. The British had lost the artillery that they had brought onto the field, as the ground was too slushy to pull the guns back to the city. The losses for the British are listed at around a thousand killed, wounded, or missing, but the two battalions of the Royal American Regiment did not suffer as much as other regiments. The 2nd Battalion reported two men killed, with two officers and nine men wounded. The

³⁵⁹Knox, pp. 247-49; also Bird, pp. 323-25.

³⁶⁰Knox, pp. 248-50.

³⁶¹Murray, "Siege of Quebec", p. 32; also Knox, pp. 250-51; and Parkman, pp. 508-11.

3rd Battalion suffered ten men killed, with eleven officers and thirty-two men wounded. The French losses are estimated at around eight hundred men.³⁶²

Upon returning to the city, the British immediately began to prepare for a siege. The French moved up and began to dig trenches and build artillery positions; they maintained a continuous bombardment of the city until relief arrived. The garrison did not know if it could hold out until relief. A possible expression of this uncertainty was the desertion of a soldier of the 60th to the French on 5 May.³⁶³ However, by 16 May, H. M. S. *Vanguard* and H. M. S. *Diana* arrived, immediately opening fire on the French supply sloops and thus deciding the fate of Québec. The French lifted the siege and retreated towards Montréal.³⁶⁴

The 60th at Ste. Foy had once again proven its worth in the face of overwhelming difficulties. Troops had withstood the French attacks upon their sectors, often while heavily outnumbered, in a battle that was once again fought in Continental style. The regiment had consistently performed well when asked to skirmish and harass enemy outposts during the previous months, and had mostly suffered from the effects of the harsh winter, which had claimed more casualties than the skirmishes and battle combined.

The next move by the garrison at Québec was the advance upon Montréal as one pincer of the attack that was the final thrust against French Canada. Before dealing with the advance from Québec, however, we should turn our attention to the 4th Battalion, stationed in the New York area of operations and forming part of the other pincer movement traveling up the St. Lawrence River from Lake Ontario under the command of Amherst.

The 4th Battalion, Royal American Regiment, had spent the winter months of 1759-60 as garrison troops at both Niagara and Oswego. While its brother battalions suffered from inadequate clothing and housing at Québec, the 4th appeared to weather the winter well.

³⁶²Butler, Vol. I, p. 110.

³⁶³Murray, "Siege of Quebec", p. 36.

³⁶⁴Murray, "Siege of Quebec", pp. 33-45.

Of a total number of six hundred and twenty-eight men, only forty-one fell ill due to weather-related causes.³⁶⁵ Orders arrived on 29 April that the 4th Battalion was to make itself ready for operations against Montréal. As part of the pincer commanded by Amherst, it faced the longest and most difficult campaign of the converging columns which made up the British operation. Amherst's command was also considered the most important, since Amherst wished to prevent any French retreat from Montréal into the west.³⁶⁶

Actual movement of the three lines took time. The first movement of the 4th Battalion did not occur until 7 August, when the 4th, with other units, was sent up from Fort Ontario (Oswego) towards the St. Lawrence River. The army, ten thousand strong (four thousand Regulars) pushed up through the Thousand Islands, with occasional skirmishes along the way. At the top of the island chain stood Fort Levis. Some sources criticize Amherst for not pushing on beyond Levis immediately, but William Amherst, brother of Jeffrey, indicates that his brother wished to acquire pilots for the last segment of the journey, through the rapids south of Montréal. The siege lasted from 23 to 26 August, and the fort was established as a staging position before the advance resumed.³⁶⁷

The 2nd and 3rd Battalions were stationed in the northern pincer, under the command of Murray, in a group of around three thousand men. While some men had recovered from illness with the onset of summer, the ranks of the Royal American Regiment were still diminished, and the 2nd Battalion formed a composite battalion with the 43rd, while the 3rd Battalion formed a composite with the 35th. The grenadier companies were respectively formed into composite grenadier battalions numbered 1st and 2nd Battalion of Grenadiers.³⁶⁸

³⁶⁵Return of 4th Bn., 14/2/60, Haldimand Papers, British Library Add. Mss. 21687.

³⁶⁶Amherst to Moncton, 29/4/60, British Library Add. Mss. 21678.

³⁶⁷W. Amherst, pp. 61-65; also Parkman, pp. 517-19.

³⁶⁸Murray, pp. 12-13.

The fleet carrying Murray and the Royal American Regiment reached Trois-Rivières (Three Rivers) by 4 August, but bypassed the town, which had a garrison of two thousand men. It was decided to proceed on to Montréal and force its surrender, thus sealing the fate of Trois-Rivières. By late August Murray had landed near Sorel, just north of Montréal, and blockaded both sides of the river. He sent his men out into the surrounding countryside with a proclamation stating that any Canadian male who returned home and stayed out of the coming fight would maintain his property, but that those who stayed with the French army in and around Montréal would have their houses burnt and property confiscated. This proclamation seems to have worked, as many Canadians deserted the French Army.³⁶⁹ By 3 September, units of Murray's force had made contact with DeHaviland's troops,³⁷⁰ who had marched from Crown Point up Lake Champlain. The ships of Amherst's army reached La Chine on 6 September, and the island of Montréal was thus surrounded on three sides. The three armies began the process of trench building outside the city, and on 8 September the French in Montréal surrendered, ending the land war in North America.

The 4th Battalion served as a garrison force for the next two years in both Montréal and Trois-Rivières, while the 2nd Battalion served as a garrison force in Québec. The 3rd Battalion initially also served as a garrison force in Québec, but in 1761 it was assigned to form part of an invasion force used in the Caribbean against the Spanish in Cuba and Hispaniola.³⁷¹ While it fought well in this theater of operations, discussion of this incident is somewhat beyond the scope of the paper, which deals with the performance of the regiment in the Seven Years' War and the Pontiac Rebellion campaign, and so is dealt with only in passing. The Parliament of Great Britain on 3 November 1761, possibly as a gesture

³⁶⁹Parkman, p. 519.

³⁷⁰DeHaviland's force comprised 3,400 regulars, provincials, and allied Indians. See Parkman, pp. 519-20.

³⁷¹Murray, p. 13; also National Army Museum List.

of thanks to the regiment, passed an Act of Parliament stating that any foreign-born men within the regiment would automatically become subjects of the British Crown.³⁷²

Following the cessation of hostilities between England and her enemies, the customary procedure of decreasing the size of the armed forces was implemented in 1763. The orders for reorganization of the Royal American Regiment were received at its depot in Lancaster, Pennsylvania on 18 May. The general orders stood as follows: the 3rd and 4th Battalions were to be disbanded, the 3rd where it was stationed in Florida, and the 4th in England upon arrival there. The 1st and 2nd Battalions would remain extant, but at reduced size. Each battalion would have nine companies, with smaller numbers of men. Regular companies would have the following: one captain, one lieutenant, one ensign, two sergeants, two corporals, one drummer, and forty-even men. The grenadier company of each battalion would comprise one captain, two lieutenants, two sergeants, two corporals, one drummer and forty-seven privates. The rest of officers for the regiment were as follows: one colonel-in-chief, two colonel commandants, two lieutenant colonels, and two majors, as well as two adjutants, two quartermasters, and two surgeons. Each battalion would compile a complete list of men who wished to remain, and places would be found for them in the two new battalions. (There is no evidence that there were actually enough places for the numbers of men who wished to remain.) All others would be paid off, except officers, who would go on half-pay. All weapons would be returned to the Stores of Ordinance. Clothing, knapsacks, and other equipment and webbing could be taken by the men, and fourteen-day subsistence would be given to men who wished to remain in North America. Cheap transport would be provided for men and officers who wished to return to Great Britain. The regiment would now stand as the 1st and 2nd Battalions, Royal American Regiment, with around five hundred five men to each battalion, in eight Regular and one grenadier companies.³⁷³ An interesting question is what became of the formal

³⁷²*Parliamentary paper*, 2 George III, Cap. 25, 3/11/61 (McGill University Library).

³⁷³Orders given to Royal American Regiment, 18/5/63, British Library Add. Mss. 21657.

light company of each battalion. As we will see later, the Royal American Regiment did not revert back to only a Regular unit in the forest.

CHAPTER IV

SERVICE OF THE ROYAL AMERICAN REGIMENT IN THE WEST, 1760-1765

The 1st Battalion spent the winter of 1759-60 in western Pennsylvania and New York, and some members were sent to Niagara after the 4th Battalion was sent to Oswego in the spring,³⁷⁴ but the major deployment of the 1st Battalion over the next few years would be in the west.

The performance of the 1st Battalion during the campaign against Pontiac illustrated how far the British Army had come from the Braddock debacle of 1755. The 60th had been formed to pioneer a new system of training for service in North America. After performing well during the Seven Years' War, it embarked on a campaign that consisted primarily of forest fighting against Indians, and proved once again its ability to wage war on the same level as the Indians, while maintaining discipline amongst its own troops.

After the surrender of the French in Montréal, the British sent troops to the French western forts, among them members of Rogers' Rangers and the 1st Battalion, 60th. They were sent to accept the surrender of any French troops still stationed in the forts and to inform the Indian tribes of the new status quo: British dominance of the area and the end of the French presence. Sir William Johnson was also sent out to meet with the various Indian tribes, a process which was very difficult and culminated in an Indian uprising in the west, led by a chief named Pontiac.³⁷⁵

The members of the 1st Battalion were given strict orders that during their deployment to the west they were under no circumstances to give any offense to any Indian or French peoples. The orders stated that peace must be kept at all costs, as the Indians and French far outnumbered the British presence in the area. The 1st was also

³⁷⁴Orders given to 1st Bn., 13/5/60, British Library Add. Mss. 21657; also W. Amherst, p. 60.

³⁷⁵Gipson, Vol. IX, pp. 95-100; also Fortescue, Vol. IV, pp. 12-14.

responsible for preventing any British settlers from going farther into the west of the Allegheny mountains, as such movement could spark a war with the Indians in the area. The forts along the frontier and in the west, when taken over, would be used primarily to stop the flow of any British settlers into the area, and any settler arrested for such violation would be subject to charges by a military court of law, not a civilian one. Any white settler in the area would be asked to show papers stating his purpose.³⁷⁶ However with the amount of land area now controlled the British and the small number of soldiers deployed to enforce these rules, there were obvious breakdowns in control as settlers disobeyed and moved into the new territories, angering the Indian tribes. Other orders from this period highlight the new policies initiated by Amherst: for example, he declared that there would be no more trade with the Indians in rum. Any trader caught with rum would have it confiscated, and would be subjected to military justice.³⁷⁷

Fort Detroit was intended to be the principal western fort for the British Army, and elements of the Rogers' Rangers and the 1st Battalion were instructed to move west and "show the flag" as soon as possible.³⁷⁸ Once again, problems arose with supply and provisioning. As the war came to an end, many civilians and government officials did not see the need of further outfitting the military in the west, and the supply columns found themselves without adequate numbers of oxen and horses. The orders given at this time are indicative of the hostility that the army encountered on all sides; they specify that the forts at Pitt, Ligonier and Bedford have ten months supply of wheat on hand in case of siege, but do not specifically mention who the besiegers would be.³⁷⁹

One letter found in Bouquet's papers provides some insight into the rigors of marching from Fort Pitt to Fort Detroit. The column on this march consisted of one corporal and eleven privates. They had two Indians as guides, and they were expected to

³⁷⁶Instructions to Bouquet, 25/9/60, British Library Add. Mss. 21657.

³⁷⁷Instructions for men at Fort Pitt, 8/10/60, British Library Add. Mss. 21657.

³⁷⁸Proclamation by Bouquet, 13/10/60, British Library Add. Mss. 21657.

³⁷⁹Instructions by Bouquet, 14/10/60, British Library Add. Mss. 21657.

march fifteen miles a day. They had twenty-five oxen, and when the column came upon a grazing area, they were supposed to rest for one day. They were supplied with seven-day rations; if they were on the march any longer, the men would have to hunt for themselves. One interesting note is that the men were specifically advised not to offend the Indian guides, which indicates that the fear of the Indians turning against the British was still very prevalent.³⁸⁰

1st Battalion troops still stationed at Fort Pitt were ordered to drive any nearby white settlers out of the Monongahela River area. Here, too, the risks of offending the Indians were obviously still very great.³⁸¹ The British decided to reward Indians with gifts for bringing in white settlers to the 60th, a practice which must certainly have caused problems between the civilians and military. The civilians would undoubtedly be outraged by this decision, viewing favor shown to the Indians over themselves by their own soldiers as a great offense.³⁸²

By the summer of 1761, relations with the Indians in the west were deteriorating. It appears that even Indians of the British-allied Six Nations were behaving poorly; attacks upon traders in the west had been attributed to their members. Captain Campbell fortified Fort Detroit and called for reinforcements from Fort Pitt.³⁸³ Bouquet confirmed Campbell's intelligence and ordered reinforcements for Fort Detroit; he agreed that the Six Nations could become a problem, even though at the moment they were restricting themselves to attacking traders and blaming the attacks on former French-allied western Indians.³⁸⁴ Bouquet also called upon Amherst for reinforcements for the west, evidently fearing the possibility of an Indian uprising. Bouquet had a limited supply of men to fortify the outposts, but he sent reinforcements to the areas he felt would be most threatened. The British Army presence in North America had significantly decreased,

³⁸⁰Orders, 16/3/61, British Library Add. Mss. 21657.

³⁸¹Orders, 19/4/61, British Library Add. Mss. 21653.

³⁸²Bouquet to Campbell, 10/6/61, British Library Add. Mss. 21653.

³⁸³Campbell to Bouquet, 30/6/61, British Library Add. Mss. 21653.

³⁸⁴Bouquet to Campbell, 9/7/61, British Library Add. Mss. 21653.

between expeditions to the Caribbean and general decommissioning and departure of troops.³⁸⁵ In spite of these warnings, however, Amherst would not fully appreciate the problems in the west until it was too late and the forts were under siege by hostile Indians.

An order had already been issued that commanded the troops at the forts to enforce the law of no white settlers in the region, in an anxious attempt to stem a tide that was sure to outrage the Indians.³⁸⁶ To assist in this endeavor, the 60th was ordered to build a new fort on Lake Erie, later called Fort Sandusky. This fort was to be a major jumping-off point for the reinforcement of any of the forts in the far west, and was also strategically located to offer support to both the larger forts of Detroit and Pitt. It was to be garrisoned by forty men of the 1st Battalion, commanded by a lieutenant. Two interesting notes found in the written order are the reiteration that no liquor is to be sold to the Indians, and that the drummers of the regiment are now to be armed and paid the same wages as Regular infantrymen. This last especially points to the need for more men.³⁸⁷

Tensions remained high between the 60th and the Indians in the west throughout 1762. It appears that the 60th was caught in the middle, attempting to keep peace between white settlers who wanted land and the Indians who wanted to keep them out. Orders traveled frequently between Fort Pitt and the western forts, all repeating the same theme: keep settlers out and stop any alcohol trade with the Indians.³⁸⁸ Men of the 60th stationed at the forts of Venango, Niagara and Presque Isle were scheduled to be relieved by companies stationed at Fort Pitt, as keeping morale up was apparently a problem; the replacements sent out to the three forts were ordered to fortify them and prepare them for possible sieges.³⁸⁹ Fortifying of the posts would have to be done carefully in order not to

³⁸⁵Bouquet to Amherst, 1/8/61, British Library Add. Mss. 21655.

³⁸⁶Bouquet to Campbell, 31/10/61, British Library Add. Mss. 21653.

³⁸⁷Orders, 7/12/61, British Library Add. Mss. 21653.

³⁸⁸Various orders, Bouquet to commanders in west, 27/1/62-1/3/62, British Library Add. Mss. 21653.

³⁸⁹Bouquet to the three outposts on the lakes, 8/4/62, British Library Add. Mss. 21653.

arouse the anger of the Indians. The felling of trees was to take place only at certain times and under certain conditions, although the letter does not state what these are.³⁹⁰

By November, with the possibility of war on the frontier looming, a number of desertions from the 60th had been reported at Fort Pitt. Bouquet gave James Magill (*sic*) the power of Justice of the Peace and orders to find five men who had deserted, stating that it was imperative to do so in order to avoid further problems. He also commented that desertion had been uncommon in the 60th, and that he wished it to remain so in the future.³⁹¹ By the end of December, four of the five deserters had been apprehended and sent to Philadelphia to await court-martial.³⁹² Posts in the west were given news of the peace treaty with France, which formally ceded to the British Crown all the lands already occupied by British troops.³⁹³

The Pontiac Rebellion has often been referred to as a unified Indian rebellion against British rule in the west. This statement is not entirely true, as not all of the Indian tribes in the west revolted. The rebellion as a whole is too large a topic to address within the scope of this paper. However, the major points were as follows: the former French-allied Indian tribes in the west were upset with the state of affairs following the end of the Seven Years' War. It appeared to them that France had abandoned them and that the British had assumed that they were now their "fathers." Steps taken by Amherst to limit distribution of liquor and gift-giving practices also caused friction. The major issue, however, for all Indian tribes, both former French-allied and English, was the encroachment of white settlers on their lands. Following the end of the war, colonists from the thirteen colonies began to infiltrate into the west. While the British government made attempts to stop the progression, there were too few troops to enforce the ban on settlement. A final cause for revolt was a rumor spread by French settlers that the French were on their way back to the

³⁹⁰Orders, 6/5/62, British Library Add. Mss. 21657

³⁹¹Bouquet to James Magill (*sic*), 23/11/62, British Library Add. Mss. 21653.

³⁹²Magill to Bouquet, 28/12/62, British Library Add. Mss. 21653.

³⁹³Bouquet to Captain Ecuyer at Fort Pitt, 22/1/63, British Library Add. Mss. 21653

Americas to win back the lands. Many of the Indian tribes saw life with the French as more tolerable than with the English. The French settler encroachment in the west previous to 1759 had been minimal compared to that of the English.³⁹⁴ There had been meetings among the various Indian tribes since 1761, but it was not until the spring of 1763 that the tribes were ready to take action to push out the English presence in the west. A chief of the Detroit River Ottawa named Pontiac was seen as the leader of the revolt, but the tribal uprising was not in reality entirely unified behind him. Indians attacked all the posts along the western frontier at around the same time, but not all members of the Huron, Delaware or other tribes involved participated in the revolt.

On the eve of the rebellion, the 1st Battalion, Royal American Regiment, was stationed as follows: five companies at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and one company (as well as one company of the 80th Foot) at Fort Detroit. The remaining three companies were split up among Forts Bedford, Ligonier, Pitt, Venango, Niagara, Presque Isle, Le Boeuf, Sandusky, Miami, Ouatennon, La Haye, St. Joseph and Michilimackinac.³⁹⁵ As the spring approached, Bouquet had sent out orders for the men to be on their guard against hostile Indians. Members of the 60th stationed in the west wrote to the headquarters at Lancaster of the mounting tension with some of the Indian tribes. Bouquet relayed these comments in letters written to Amherst warning of an impending Indian attack, and calling for reinforcements for the frontier. However, as mentioned previously, fewer reinforcements were available; with the end of the Seven Years' War many regiments had either been disbanded or sent home. The Royal American Regiment had suffered from this fate, losing two battalions and having the remaining two cut in strength. Amherst also believed that the Indians would not rebel and that the regiments stationed in the west, primarily the 60th and the 80th, were sufficient to guard the frontier.³⁹⁶

³⁹⁴Gipson, Vol. IX, pp. 89-97.

³⁹⁵The commanders of the soldiers of the 60th at these posts were: Captain Ouvry, Ensign Blane, Captain Ecuyer, Lieutenant Gordon, Major Walters, Ensign Christie, Ensign Price, Ensign Pauli, Ensign Holmes, Lieutenant Jenkins, Ensign Gorrell, Ensign Schlösser and Captain Etherington. At Fort Detroit, Captain Campbell; at Lancaster, Colonel Bouquet. *See* Orders, 13/3/63, British Library Add. Mss. 21657.

³⁹⁶Bouquet to Amherst, three letters, early 1763, British Library Add. Mss. 21652.

There was suspicion that the former French-allied Indians would rebel at any moment, and the Six Nations, British allies in the past, were sought as allies once again. The 60th was to help provision them as they marched into the west, and they were to be treated as allies in every respect.³⁹⁷ Unfortunately, however, the Senecas were not entirely reliable. They had felt slighted since the end of the French war, when powder and guns were denied them by Amherst, which they felt they deserved to receive as tokens of appreciation for their services. They also had been prevented from attacking French-allied Indian lands after the fall of Montréal.³⁹⁸

The Indians opened hostilities by attempting to seize Fort Detroit in a surprise attack on 9 May, but the British commander, Major Gladwin, had suspected such a trick and thus avoided being taken unawares. The British garrison was laid siege by the Indians; Major Gladwin had determined that they had enough provisions to last the garrison three months. A reinforcement column of ninety-five soldiers that had been headed towards Fort Detroit before hostilities broke out was surrounded and defeated *en route* on 29 May.³⁹⁹

Fort Sandusky was overtaken by Hurons on 16 May, and only Ensign Pauli was spared in the attack; all others stationed at the fort were slaughtered, and all stores were seized. Fort St. Joseph was taken on either 25 May or 10 June; sources differ, although actual testimony from Ensign Schlosser recorded in the *Johnson Papers* place the attack on 25 May. The ensign and three other soldiers were spared in this attack, while all others perished.⁴⁰⁰ A mixed force of Indians and French traders marched onto Fort Miami on 5 June. This time, only Ensign Holmes was killed, while the remaining fifteen men of his fort were taken prisoner.⁴⁰¹ The Indians then moved onto Fort Ouiatenon; here again, the

³⁹⁷Bouquet to Officers at Fort Pitt, 8/3/63, British Library Add. Mss. 21653.

³⁹⁸Gipson, Vol. IX, pp. 92-93.

³⁹⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 98-99; also Murray, p. 16; and Butler, Vol. I, pp. 128-33.

⁴⁰⁰Johnson Papers, Vol. X, p. 731; also Gipson, Vol. IX, p. 100.

⁴⁰¹Johnson Papers, Vol. X, pp. 731-732; also Gipson, Vol. IX, pp. 100-101.

sources differ as to the actual date of surrender, but testimony taken and recorded in the *Johnson Papers* lists the fall as 1 June (not the 12th, as recorded in Butler).⁴⁰²

Chippewa Indians attacked the fort at Michilimackinac on 2 June. As with Fort Detroit, this was a surprise attack. Indians rushed the gates after a game of lacrosse and quickly overcame the garrison of thirty-five men. Captain Etherinton and fifteen of his men survived the quick but vicious battle that occurred. An interesting incident occurred here which indicates the somewhat dubious support the conspiracy generated: after the surrender of the Michilimackinac fort, a tribe of Ottawas demanded the prisoners as booty from the Chippewas. The demand was granted, and the Ottawa promptly took the prisoners to Montréal and turned them over to General Gage in exchange for a reward.⁴⁰³

The posts between Fort Pitt and Fort Detroit were the next to be attacked. Fort Venango was attacked by a war party of Senecas, who, because they were Six Nations members, were received as allies and then turned and massacred all those stationed at the fort. Lieutenant Gordon, commander of the post, was put to death after listing Indian grievances.⁴⁰⁴ The post at Le Boeuf was better prepared than most; Ensign Price had readied himself for defense. On 18 June he was attacked at night, but he and his force were able to hold out and then escape, after realizing that reinforcements would be long in coming. After going through the burned-out ruins of Fort Venango, they reached Fort Pitt on 25 June.⁴⁰⁵ Fort Presque Isle was attacked by Ottawa and Chippewa tribes on 19 June; by 21 June the garrison surrendered, on the condition that they would be allowed to proceed to Fort Pitt. This permission was given, then rescinded following the surrender, and the prisoners were carted away further west.⁴⁰⁶

All the British posts in the west with the exceptions of Forts Pitt, Detroit and Niagara were in Indian hands by the end of June. The Indians then turned their attention still

⁴⁰²Johnson Papers, Vol. X, pp. 690-91; also Gipson, Vol. IX, p. 100.

⁴⁰³Gage to Bouquet, 23/8/63, British Library Add. Mss. 21653.

⁴⁰⁴Gipson, Vol. IX, p. 101; also Butler, Vol. I, pp. 146-47.

⁴⁰⁵Butler, Vol. I, pp. 147-48.

⁴⁰⁶Gipson, Vol. IX, p. 102.

further east. Fort Bedford was attacked, but the small garrison of the 60th was able to hold on, even after the Pennsylvania militia had abandoned their positions and they were surrounded. Fort Pitt was surrounded by 22 June, although the Indians did not attack until 26 July, possibly because of the size of the garrison. (There were around three hundred men at Fort Pitt, a sizable force compared to the small numbers at other posts in the west.) The importance of holding on at Fort Pitt had been highlighted in an earlier letter sent by Bouquet. Fort Pitt had to hold on, because it had to be used as a staging point for the retaking of the western forts. The garrison was prepared to hold it until Bouquet arrived, marching along the Forbes road with a relief column.⁴⁰⁷ When the attack finally came, it lasted only five days, until the Indians withdrew to intercept Bouquet.

Bouquet and the 60th depot in Philadelphia did not receive news of the Indian attacks until 31 May.⁴⁰⁸ By early June, more detailed reports began coming into the depot describing the attacks against other posts and against Fort Bedford. Bouquet informed Amherst in New York of the uprising in the west, and Amherst dispatched orders for available troops to be sent to Philadelphia. Perhaps because of his knowledge of the area and the past performance of the 60th, Bouquet was chosen to head the expedition to relieve Forts Pitt and Detroit, and along the way to re-establish all the posts lost during the previous two months. Bouquet's force was comprised of the 42nd and 77th Highlanders, five companies of the 60th,⁴⁰⁹ and a few companies of rangers. The two Highland companies were far under strength, and the total number of men for the whole force was between 450 and 500.⁴¹⁰ As had been the case in previous campaigns, the Pennsylvania Assembly was not very helpful in preparing for this expedition. Militia units were raised, but were not to be used in the relief column, only as garrison troops in the settled regions. As the populace of these regions was on high alert, many settlers had sought shelter within


⁴⁰⁷Bouquet to Commander at Pitt, 23/6/63, British Library Add. Mss. 21653.

⁴⁰⁸Escuyer to Bouquet, 20/5/63, British Library Add. Mss. 21657.

⁴⁰⁹Drafts from the 2nd Battalion, as well as other recruits, were used to fill the gaps in the five companies.

⁴¹⁰Bouquet to Escuyer, 26/7/63, British Library Add. Mss. 21657.

*Gained by Colonel Bouquet, over the
Delawares, Shawanese, Mingoes, Wyandots, Mohikons, Miamies, & Ottawas;
on the 5th and 6th of August 1763.
Surveyed by Tho^s Hutchins, Assistant Engineer.*



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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Grenadiers 2. Light Infantry 3. Battalion Men 4. Rangers 5. Cattle 6. Horses | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 7. Entrenchment of Bags for the Wounded x. The Enemy 8. First Position of the Troops □ □ Graves |
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“Plan of the Battle near Bushy-Run . . . on the 5th and 6th of August 1763.” By Thomas Hutchins.

(From Jefferys's *A General Topography of North America*, 1768)

garrisoned areas, and the necessary supplies for both the expedition and the garrisons were very hard to come by.

Bouquet had begun the long march by early July, and his force reached Carlisle by mid-month. The main force began its march toward Fort Pitt in late July. As noted earlier, the Indians in the region lifted the siege of the fort in order to attack the relief column when it arrived in the area.⁴¹¹ They chose an area of the road that lay through a series of dominating hills. The region was called Bushy Run. As the relief column approached, the Indians opened sniping attacks, withdrawing as soon as light infantry were sent out to attack. As the column came closer to the Indian positions, the attack became more concentrated; Bouquet deployed his troops in the circular manner he had devised in 1757, and had altered over the years in consequence of actual experiences.⁴¹² The Indians attacked around one o'clock on the afternoon of 4 August and continued to attack until nightfall. Bouquet suffered from losses and the disadvantage of his low position. Over the course of the afternoon, he had been able to move his formation to higher ground, but his men, horses, and cattle were still suffering from lack of water. By the night of the 4th-5th, Bouquet felt his situation was perilous, and sent a messenger off towards Carlisle to inform the higher command of the state of affairs. In the early morning of 5 August, the Indians attacked again. This time the attacks were coordinated, coming from all sides at once. British losses rose, and Bouquet realized that he would have to shorten his lines. Two light infantry companies were ordered to fall back into the circle; seeing this, the Indians assumed that the British were retreating. However, four other companies had moved, unobserved, into new positions. As the light infantry retreated the Indians rushed forward in a disorganized mass. The newly-situated right flank of the British lines opened a barrage of fire into the flank of the Indians, then rushed in with bayonets. The left flank then rushed into position and struck the opposite side of the Indian attack. The Indians

⁴¹¹Gipson, Vol. IX, p. 110; also Butler, Vol. I pp. 150-62.

⁴¹²See Appendix for a diagram of formation.

were cut down in large numbers, and confusion ensued; the Indians tried to retreat but the Regulars pushed forward. The Indian reserves, realizing the disaster, took flight, ending the Battle of Bushy Run.⁴¹³ The engagement had cost the column three officers and forty-seven men killed and five officers and fifty-four men wounded.⁴¹⁴

It has been debated whether the movement of the British troops in this situation was a feigned retreat or a consolidation of the lines. It is my opinion that the maneuver was begun as a strengthening technique that was used to tactical advantage when the undisciplined Indian attack began to surge forward. Bouquet and his officers, seasoned in the recent warfare of the Seven Years' War, were able to take quick advantage of their opponents' miscalculation. The difference between this engagement and Braddock's Defeat can be found in Bouquet's system of marching and deployment of his column during an Indian attack.

After the battle, the column continued on towards Fort Pitt, which was relieved by 10 August. Bouquet, suffering after the losses at Bushy Run, decided to stay at Fort Pitt and reorganize. Small detachments were sent out to relieve Fort Bedford and Fort Ligonier.⁴¹⁵ As the columns arrived, they found that the sieges of the forts had been lifted after the Indian defeat at Bushy Run. Stores at both posts were to be replenished and a small detachment of Regulars ordered to remain at both posts, although this was rescinded in September following the arrival of provincial troops. Regulars were ordered to proceed to Fort Pitt and gear up for the further advance into the Ohio Valley.⁴¹⁶ Intelligence reports received regarding the situation at Fort Detroit indicated that there were four thousand Indians besieging the area. Bouquet ordered a detachment of the 60th, under the command of Captain Phillips, to proceed and retake Presque Isle. Presque Isle was retaken as ordered, and the way was opened towards Fort Detroit.⁴¹⁷

⁴¹³Bouquet to Lord Amherst, 7/8/63, British Library Add. Mss. 21653; also Butler, Vol. I, pp. 163-66.

⁴¹⁴Bouquet to Amherst, 12/8/63, British Library Add. Mss. 21653.

⁴¹⁵Bouquet to Major Campbell, 42nd Reg., 12/8/63, British Library Add. Mss. 21653.

⁴¹⁶Bouquet to Campbell, 26/8/63 and 15/9/63, British Library Add. Mss. 21653.

⁴¹⁷Bouquet to Captain Phillips, 30/9/63, British Library Add. Mss. 21653.

The Indians outside Fort Detroit had been growing restless as the siege proceeded. After the defeat at Bushy Run, many tribes were anxious to seek peace with the English. News arrived at Pontiac's camp that expected French reinforcements were not on their way, having asked instead for the Indians to accept peace and withdraw. Pontiac vowed to fight again in the spring of 1764, and by November the Indians had withdrawn from Fort Detroit. The onset of winter also meant that communications between Fort Pitt and Fort Detroit were cut off until spring.

Indian morale had been destroyed by Bushy Run. Bouquet had wanted to press his advantage and descend immediately upon the Indian villages to the west of Fort Pitt, but the onset of cold weather forced him to wait until the spring of 1764 to punish the guilty parties. During the winter, the major objective for Bouquet and the troops of the 60th stationed at Fort Pitt was to keep communication between Fort Pitt and Fort Bedford open. Contingents of the 60th stationed at both Fort Pitt and Fort Detroit were on high alert for any Indian resumption of hostilities. Orders were sent to Bouquet that any Indians who approached Fort Pitt to surrender should be sent to Philadelphia; officers present at Fort Pitt, or at any of the other garrison locations, were not to engage in negotiations. Indians who had surrendered would be escorted to Military Headquarters in New York to negotiate with General Gage and Sir William Johnson.⁴¹⁸ On 13 November 1763, Lord Amherst had been replaced as Commander-in-Chief of Forces in America by Major General Thomas Gage. A letter sent by Gage dated 5 January 1764 praised Bouquet's performance, and all those who had served under him, during the Battle of Bushy Run. He specifically praised the fine performance of the 60th as a continuation of past achievements.⁴¹⁹

The winter months were spent readying the troops for the coming campaign into the west. Reinforcements were sent from Philadelphia for both the 60th and 42nd. A total of

⁴¹⁸Bouquet to Major Grant of the 42nd, 19/1/64, British Library Add. Mss. 21653.

⁴¹⁹Gage to Bouquet, 5/1/64, British Library Add. Mss. 21657.

two hundred men were sent out in March to fill holes in both regiments that had been depleted due to battle and disease;⁴²⁰ there was no possibility of reinforcements on a larger scale. Colonel Bradstreet (formerly of the 60th) was also preparing a force of Regulars and provincials to operate on the Great Lakes by boat. Provincial support was promised to Bouquet once again before the campaign season began, but provincial support proved once again to be lacking. Of the four thousand troops promised to Bradstreet, only a third eventually showed. Bouquet had much the same problem, as troops from Pennsylvania and Virginia deserted long before they reached Fort Pitt. This was compounded by the ever-growing problem of men arriving at Fort Pitt or Carlisle and then deserting.⁴²¹ New orders were issued for new officers, sent as replacements from England, to recruit for the 60th in both England and America.⁴²²

All new recruits for troops under Bouquet's command were ordered, upon arrival at Fort Pitt, to replace their bayonet with a hatchet. The men were armed with the hatchet, as earlier units of the 60th had been, because of its superiority as a weapon in close fighting in wooded areas.⁴²³ By the time both armies headed out, many of the Indian tribes had laid down their hatchets and had negotiated for peace with Sir William Johnson at Fort Niagara. Bradstreet quickly headed out to meet with various Indian tribes along the Great Lakes, but Bouquet was delayed as his column was now to go into the west overland. Bouquet did not actually proceed into the interior until the fall of 1764; his troops were headed into the area of the Delawares, Shawnee and Mingos. Bouquet's army was either to wage war with Indian tribes that would not submit, or to occupy Indian villages as necessary until their members submitted. Any Indians who wished to submit were to be sent on to Sir William Johnson at Fort Niagara, and all white hostages were to be returned to Bouquet. The Indians in this large area, along with other Indian tribes along the Great Lakes,

⁴²⁰Bouquet to Captain Sloane, 8/3/64, British Library Add. Mss. 21653.

⁴²¹Bouquet to Board Commissioners in Philadelphia, 2/4/64 and 16/5/64, British Library Add. Mss. 21657; also Gipson, Vol. IX, pp. 116-17.

⁴²²Gage to Bouquet, 14/6/64, British Library Add. Mss. 21657.

⁴²³Bouquet orders, 1/6/64, British Library Add. Mss. 21657.

submitted to the new English king without incident. Bouquet and his force returned to Fort Pitt on 28 November and reported that all lands south of the Great Lakes and north of the Ohio had been subdued.⁴²⁴ Peace was thus reestablished in the west.

The 60th, as well as the other regiments serving under Bouquet's command, had performed beyond all that could be expected from such a small force of men. The battle at Bushy Run can be seen as the final culmination of the lessons and corrections of the British Army during the Seven Years' War. The British army that left Carlisle in 1763 was a seasoned body of soldiers who had been trained in the new style of warfare typical of North America. Unlike their brother soldiers of Braddock's expedition, they were able to use these tactics to meet the enemy and destroy his will to fight. While outnumbered and surrounded, the men at Bushy Run had held their ground and performed as was expected of them. Their withdrawal, either feigned or not, was carried out with discipline and order and avoided any panic and rout. While the 60th had performed well during the previous conflict, the situation at Bushy Run was similar to Braddock's column in both the terrain and style of warfare. The 60th was born from the defeat of Braddock, but at Bushy Run, one could argue that it avenged that defeat by its performance. The men of Bouquet's column proved to all in this engagement that the British Army was the equal of the Indians on their own terrain, and in doing so broke the back of the whole rebellion in the west.

CONCLUSION

In reading many elementary school books of today, one finds that numerous misconceptions of the 18th-century British army still persist, most notably the image that soldiers walked in rows into certain death, dressed in red with white webbing which provided targets for the minutemen of Concord and Lexington. Their performance is generally not presented any more positively in accounts of the Seven Years' War, where

⁴²⁴Bouquet to Gage, 29/11/64, British Library Add. Mss. 21657.

Braddock is depicted as marching his men into certain ambush in the forest. This is not surprising, since most literature dealing with this period is based upon myths of the American War of Independence. The performance of the British Army in the American War of Independence is outside the scope of this paper, but two contradictory developments should be mentioned briefly. First, the celebrated 'free style' minuteman of the early American militias was replaced in 1775 by a Continental Army, trained in Continental tactics by a man who has been mythologized as the one person who attempted to correct Braddock's tactical mistakes during the advance to Fort Duquesne, and eventually single-handedly saved the expedition from utter disaster. George Washington was a colonial adjutant; if he was opposed to Continental tactics, as he is generally believed to be, why was the American Army of 1775 structured in the Continental style? Second, when the British Army, with their Indian allies, waged an irregular war against the American patriots in the frontier regions, they were criticized as savages. If they were incapable of any style of battle other than the rigid line, how could this have happened?

The myths of history and popular fiction are discriminatory in their nature in considering both the Seven Years' War and the American War of Independence. Writers of historical fiction, namely James Fenimore Cooper, have clearly perpetrated this image of the hapless British soldier. While these portrayals have some validity when dealing with some of the earlier battles, the later performance of the British Army in general and of the 60th in particular demonstrates their ability to learn new techniques and use them to win against the French and their allied Indians. Contrary to the popular image of incompetence, the 60th and for that matter the whole British Army had by 1764 proven that they could adapt to the *petit guerre* tactics of North America and carry victory.

After Braddock's defeat in 1755, the British Army embarked on a campaign to win the Seven Years' War. Contrary to the popular perception of the British High Command as being too conservative, high-ranking generals such as Loudon, Abercromby and Amherst, all to different degrees, implemented reforms to remold the army for an eventual victory.

One major omission in most North American historical fiction is that as the war progressed, the French Army tactics became more and more Continental, prompted by Montcalm's desire to wage war in traditional European style, while the British Army continued along a path of melding the two forms of warfare, in order to be able to engage any enemy before them. This divergence in tactics was highlighted by the major battles at Louisbourg and Québec.

The 60th was one product of the new trend in British thinking; one could also describe them as the guinea pig for army reform. While the 'ranger' formations already existed, more radical retraining was needed. The 60th accomplished this by combining the instincts of a forest fighter with the discipline of a Regular Continental-style soldier. The 60th was always listed as a Regular line regiment, but because of its special qualities it is often mistakenly referred to as a "light infantry" regiment. It was, however, distinct from the later "light" regiments, a Regular unit trained in both styles of warfare. This idea was reinforced with the order of the raising of the light company for each battalion. The 60th spent the early years filling its ranks with many different forms of men: frontiersmen of the colonies who were skilled in forest fighting tactics; foreign soldiers of fortune with various military experience; and British men from both North America and Great Britain. While it had its problems with discipline (Fort William Henry) and desertion early on, it was able to overcome these issues for the duration of the war. As illustrated throughout this paper, the performance of the regiment improved steadily, from its first baptism of fire in the New York theater of operations in 1757, to Bushy Run. Its foreign specialists, such as Bouquet, set out to train the regiment and rest of the army in forest fighting tactics. While it can not be conclusively proved, it appears that many of Bouquet's innovations, such as hatchets, two-man filing, flankers, and orders of march in the forests were adopted by other regiments that were present in the forest.

The 60th was later to prove once again that it was adept at adjusting to requirements of the British Army. In 1797, a 5th Battalion of the Royal American Regiment was raised; its

specific role was to be a Special Corps of Riflemen. Troops were armed with the Baker rifle and were dressed in a green uniform, marking the beginning of the regiment's transformation to the King's Royal Rifle Corps and present-day Royal Green Jackets. Just as had occurred in 1755, foreigners (in this case Germans) were recruited for their knowledge of irregular warfare. The 5th became the main proving ground for the rifle and went on to serve with distinction in the Peninsular War with another famous corps of riflemen, the 95th, that had been created using the lessons learned from the training of the 5th. Just as, previously, the Royal American Regiment in its original, experimental form had led the way for the raising and training of forest fighting corps in the Seven Years' War.

"Celer et audax"--swift and bold--was the motto General James Wolfe used to describe the courageous and disciplined action of the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 60th Royal American Regiment on 31 July 1759 at Montmorency Falls below Québec City.⁴²⁵ This engagement marked the culmination of four years of recruiting and training for the four battalions of the Royal American Regiment, which had been born out of the aftermath of General Braddock's disastrous expedition to take the French Fort Duquesne in 1755. The plan to train frontiersmen to fight in the Indian manner of skirmish and ambush, and to supplement them with experienced foreign officers had, as J. F. C. Fuller states, molded the regiment into soldiers capable of "combining the qualities of a scout with the discipline of a trained soldier."⁴²⁶

⁴²⁵A *Brief History of the Kings Royal Rifle Corps* , p. 5.

⁴²⁶J. F. C. Fuller, *British Light Infantry in the Eighteenth Century*, p. 98.

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- c) Periodicals

A. Introduction

The key manuscript sources for this study were the Bouquet and Haldimand papers. At the time of the Seven Years' War, the chronicling of regimental activities of later years was not practiced, so no regimental papers *per se* for the Royal American Regiment exist. Most of the material that has survived comes from the commanders of specific regiments, and these do include some weekly records, but nothing consistent, so the Bouquet and Haldimand papers provide the best overview of operations, primarily those of the 1st and 4th battalions, as well as parts of the 2nd.

Other officers' logs or journals were needed to complete the picture of the operations of the regiment. The *Annals of the King's Royal Rifle Corps* provided very useful background information, but does not give any source material for its research. It also draws some incorrect conclusions, as in the example of the Louisbourg Grenadiers cited in the body of the paper. Major Murray's account is another useful source for a general summary of activities, but it too lacks citation of sources from which the narrative was drawn. It is also unclear whether Murray's materials are a contemporary account or a history written after the fact. Knox's *A Historical Journal of the Campaigns in North America, 1757-1760* provides a very detailed contemporary account of most of the campaigns, drawn from his experiences in service with the Army.

To assemble accurate accounts of some of the more significant campaigns, other journals, diaries, or memoirs were needed. *The Northcliffe Collection* was an important resource in this respect. This collection includes the papers of Moncton and Townshend, commanders in the 60th, among them their account of the siege of Louisbourg. Material for this campaign was lacking in the Bouquet and Haldimand papers, for the obvious reason that neither was present. Both Moncton and Townshend give overviews and weekly accounts of the campaign, which clarified some inconsistencies in later regimental histories. Unfortunately, however, errors by the modern printer or illegible handwriting in the original accounts created other mistakes in this history, as noted above, such as

notations referring to the 61st Regiment. General Sir Jeffrey Amherst's journals provide more information, as well as records of orders for the Louisbourg campaign, and the journal written by his brother William is also informative. The journal of Lieutenant Augustine provides insight into the day-to-day experiences of a junior officer, as does the *Impartial Account of Lieutenant Colonel Bradstreet's Expedition to Fort Frontenac*. Bradstreet was still a Captain in the Army List for the 60th for this engagement, and he describes the difficulties of marching through the woods and of engaging in nautical warfare on the rivers and lakes of New York.

In researching the battle of Québec, *The Northcliffe Collection* again proved useful, along with several other sources. General James Wolfe's *Instructions to Young Officers* and "General Orders in Wolfe's Army" (from *Manuscripts Relating to the Early History of Canada*) give records of daily orders for the various units. These provided data on every aspect of operations, from orders for men and officers to storm the Montmorency Falls, to directions for laying waste to specific farms in the area. Supply issues and orders for the regiments present during the Québec campaign are detailed in the "Journal of Colonel Guy Carleton, Quarter Master General to General James Wolfe," also found in the *Manuscripts Relating to the Early History of Canada*. The journal of Colonel Malcolm Fraser provides firsthand insight on the siege and subsequent battle on the Plains of Abraham, and *The Siege of Québec*, by Jean Claude Herbert, includes three eyewitness accounts, from a British soldier, a French soldier, and a civilian. The two French perspectives are especially noteworthy in their descriptions of the bombardments. All sources were useful in resolving questions on the position of the Royal American Regiment during the siege and at Montmorency Falls and the Plains of Abraham. The Amherst Papers, from the War Office collection, contained one very interesting letter concerning the "liberation" of three officers of the 60th after the fall of Québec. The "Journal of the Siege of Québec, 1760," by General Murray (also in the *Manuscripts Relating to the Early History of Canada*) describes the problems of the winter of

1759-60 and siege. His account of the Battle of Ste. Foy is notable for its emotionless description, as if the author had no involvement in the action.

Operations in the New York state region are well documented in printed sources. The *Papers of Sir William Johnson* provide accurate numbers for the presence of the 4th Battalion at the attack on Fort Niagara, and the journals of both Jeffrey and William Amherst help fill in some of the blanks in the list of locations and actions of the 60th. *The Journals of Major Roberts* detail some of the important tactical maneuvers employed in New York, especially the joint reconnaissance missions of the Rangers and the 60th around Fort Carillon in 1758. The commanders of the Royal American Regiment also provided extensive manuscript on the Pennsylvania theater.

The Forbes campaign and Pontiac Rebellion were the two engagements most thoroughly chronicled by members of the 60th. The correspondence of Bouquet is the most informative source on the regiment's daily routine during these two engagements, and the *Calendar of the HQ Papers of Brigadier General John Forbes: Relating to the Expedition against Fort Duquesne* is helpful in documenting communications between Forbes and Amherst during this campaign. Forbes' papers are notable for their focus on the larger strategic importance of the seizure of Fort Duquesne. In both cases, these contemporary materials clearly indicate the particular hardships of marching through and waging war in the forest of North America.

The principal sources used to identify where the 60th was stationed at specific periods were the *National Army Museum Lists of Locations of Regiments in North America, 1755-1763* and *Service of British Regiments in Canada and North America*. The first reference may be found at the National Army Museum, London, and the second at the National Archives in Ottawa. Training methods of the British Army and the innovations of the 60th are best described in *Fit For Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715-1795*, by J. A. Houlding; "The Army of the Georges," *Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army*, by Alan Guy; "The Adaptation of the British Army to Wilderness Warfare, 1755-1763," *Adapting to*

Conditions: War and Society in the Eighteenth Century, by Daniel Beattie; and Bouquet's papers that deal specifically with tactics in the forest. The Military Manuals of the period also describe the setup of battalion formations, platoon firing, etc. Initially, some of the manuals may be a bit difficult to understand, and it is best to first read a book as *Red Coat and Brown Bess*, for a simpler outline of tactics and formations.

Several books provide a useful general background to the military history of the conflict. *A History of the British Army* (Volumes II and III), by the Hon. J. W. Fortescue gives a straightforward account of the performance of the British regiments in the years concerned. However, some feel that Fortescue is somewhat dated, and prefer Lawrence Gipson's *The British Empire Before the American Revolution* (Volumes V-IX), which provides histories of the battles that are well written, if not as militarily focused as Fortescue. The most recent scholarship dealing with the British military during this period is Douglas Leach's *Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 1607-1763*.

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- (b) Haldimand Papers Add. Mss. 21661-21892

2. Public Record Office, London, England

- (a) War Office Papers: Amherst Papers, 34/8-9, 34/40 and 34/41

3. National Army Museum, Library, London, England

- (a) Lieutenant Gordon Augustine: Journal
- (b) General Charles Lee: Letters
- (c) Colonel Malcolm Fraser: Journal
- (d) Memoirs of the Royal American Regiment as authenticated by Major Murray
- (e) His Majesty's Forces in Garrison at Quebec, April 24, 1760

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29 George II, Cap. 5
2 George III, Cap. 25

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APPENDICES

- A. FRONT OF THE BATTALION
- B. BOUQUET'S SYSTEM OF MARCH
- C. 1760 ARMY LIST

11. G. $\frac{2}{3}$ Grenad^{rs}

CG	$\frac{1}{3}$	Grenad ^{rs}	2 LG
Platt ^{ns}	S ^d	D ^{ns}	G ^d
2 C	$\frac{1}{1}$		
5 L	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	
4 E	$\frac{3}{1}$	2	Major
4 C	$\frac{3}{2}$		
7 L	$\frac{3}{3}$	3	
3 L	$\frac{5}{1}$	2	
6 E	$\frac{5}{2}$	4	
11 Co	$\frac{6}{3}$	2 E	
7 E	$\frac{6}{5}$		
4 L	$\frac{5}{1}$	6	
5 C	$\frac{4}{3}$		
5 E	$\frac{4}{2}$		
2 L	$\frac{4}{1}$	4	Adjut ^r
6 L	$\frac{2}{2}$	8	
3 C	$\frac{2}{1}$		

REAR OF THE BATTALION

The 30 Sergeants
 For the Charge
 1 The Serjeant Major in the Rear chiefly in the Center
 16 Rear Rank to cover the Officers that command Platoons
 2 Complete the L^{ts} Colonels
 3 With the Grenadiers

In the Col^s absence the L^{ts} Col^o takes his Post
 The Eldest Cap^t comes into the Front Rank &
 The Seco. Cap^t in his, in the Rear of the Reserve

Officers

B The Grand & Sub Div^{ns} are numb^d from Rth to Lth of the Battalⁿ

Colonel
 L^{ts} Col^o
 Major
 Adjut^r

1st
 2^d
 3^d
 4th
 5th
 6th
 Cap^t
 1st
 2^d
 3^d
 4th
 5th
 6th
 7th
 8th
 9th
 10th
 11th
 12th
 13th
 14th
 15th
 16th
 17th
 18th
 19th
 20th
 21st
 22^d
 23^d
 24th
 25th
 26th
 27th

Platoons

Sub Division

Grand Division

advanced before

Front Rank of

Rear of the

Rear behind the Reserve

of the


In the Rth behind the Interval of the

of the

With the Colours in the Rank separated
 by the Serj^t who covers the L^{ts} Colonel

In y^e 2^d Rear behind y^e Center of y^e 3^d Gr^d Division

The Officers of the Grenadiers w^{ch} y^e own men as usual
 The Adjut^rs here suppos'd to be a L^{ts} if he should be an Ensign there
 will be one Platoon more command^d by a Lieut^t & one set by an Ensign



TACTICAL FORMATIONS FOR INDIAN WARFARE

112 Sixtieth or Royal American Regt. of Foot, America.

Rank.	Name.	Rank in the	
		Regiment.	Army.
Colonel in Chief	Jessy Amherst	30 Sept. 1758	M. Gen. 25 June 57
Colonel Commandant	John Stanwix	1 Jan. 1756	M. Gen. 25 June 57
	James Prevost	4 do.	
	Charles Lawrence	28 Sept. 1757	
	Hon. James Murray	24 Oct. 1759	
Lieut. Colonel	Henry Bouquet	3 Jan. 1756	
	Frederick Haldimand	4 do.	
	Sir John St. Clair, Et.	6 do.	
	John Young	25 Apr. 1757	
Major - - - -	James Robertson	26 Dec. 1755	Lt. Col. 8 July 53
	Augustine Prevost	9 Jan. 1756	
	John Tullikens	26 Apr. 1757	
	Herbert Munter	20 July 1758	
Captain - - -	Thomas Oswall	26 Dec. 1755	5 Sept. 1745
	Rodolp Faich	27 do.	
	Frederick Porter	28 do.	
	Walter Rutherford	30 do.	
	Jeremiah Stanton	4 Jan. 1756	
	Gnielling	5 do.	
	Richard Mather	6 do.	
	Gustav. Wettinkroom	7 do.	
	Harry Charteris	8 do.	
	Lewis Stenar	10 do.	
	John Innis	15 do.	
	Dennis Ger. Burmand	14 do.	
	Gavin Cochran	15 do.	
	Marcus Prevost	17 do.	
	Abrah. Bosomworth	20 do.	
	John Bradstreet	8 Mar. 1757	
	Samuel Willynos	do.	
	George Du Pen.	do.	
	Stephen Gaulty	21 May	
	Schlöffer	20 July 1758	
Edward Comberbach	23 Aug.		
John Parker	12 Feb. 1759		
David Ouchterlony	15 Apr.		
Henry Gordon	16 do.		
George Etherington	17 do.		
Robert Bayard	18 do.		
Thomas Barclay	20 May		
Donald Campbell	29 Aug.		
			+ Jan. 1758

Captain.

				<i>Rank in the Army.</i>
Captain Lieut.	{	Sam. Jan. Hollandt	21 May 1757	16 Feb. 1747-8
		Alexander M ^c Bean	23 July 1758	
		Peter Von Ingen	23 Aug.	
		Lewis Ourry	29 Aug. 1759	
Lieutenant -	{	Robert Brigstock	1 Jan. 1756	16 Feb. 1747-8
		Le Noble	6 do.	
		Baziel Dunbar	12 do.	
		James Allaz	17 do.	
		William Baillie	19 do.	
		Chriff. Spielmacher	21 do.	
		Elias Meyer	23 do.	
		Simeon Ecuwier	25 do.	
		Charles Willington	26 do.	
		Charles Gallot	27 do.	
		Grandidier	29 do.	
		James Campbell	30 do.	
		George Fullerton	1 Feb.	
		Alexander Campbell	3 do.	
		George Turnbull	5 do.	
		William Abercromby	6 do.	
		John Brown	9 do.	
		Daniel M ^c Alpin	10 do.	
		Donald Forbes	11 do.	
		Thomas Bassiet	14 do.	
		George Fælich	15 do.	
		Rodolphus Bentinck	18 do.	
		Jacob Muller	19 do.	
		Bernard Ratzler	20 do.	
		Brehm. Districh	21 do.	
		Fred. Von Weiffenfels	22 do.	
		Jof. Fred. Waller des Barres	do.	
		Conrard Guky	24 do.	
Desnoilles	26 do.			
L. F. Fufer	27 do.			
A. T. F. Winter	28 do.			
Von Ingen	29 do.			
Maier	12 May			
Thomas Lindsay	28 do.			
John Evans	29 do.			
Alex. Stephens	13 Apr. 1759			
Arthur St. Clair	17 do.			
William Leslye	30 May			

Lieutenant

			<i>Rank in the Army.</i>
	Brereton Poynton	30 Nov. 1756	
	James Allen	1 Dec.	
	George M ^c Intosh	3 do.	
	Ralph Phillips	5 do.	
	Samuel Mackay	6 do.	
	Francis Mackay	7 do.	
	George Archbold	8 do.	
	James Monro	9 do.	
	William Ridge	10 do.	
	Alexander Shaw	12 do.	
	Beamsley Glazier	8 Mar. 1757	
	John Rodolph Rhan	do.	
	Peter Penier	do.	
	John Polfon	5 May	
	James Calder	6 do.	
	Stair Campbell Carre	7 do.	
	Walter Kennedy	8 do.	
	William Potts	10 do.	
	William Jones	11 do.	
	John Bell	12 do.	
	William Ryder	14 do.	
	James Ralfe	25 do.	
Lieutenant - -	Robert Campbell	23 Mar. 1758	
	Townshend Guy	24 do.	
	James Jeffries	25 do.	
	John Wilfon	26 do.	
	John Dowe	24 May	
	James Herring	24 July	
	George Otter	25 do.	
	William Ramfay	26 do.	
	Alexander Baillie	27 do.	
	Allan Grant	28 do.	
	John Nerdberg	do.	
	Harry Howarth	29 do.	
	Francis Hutchinon	23 Aug.	
	Alexander Grant	do.	
	John Netterville	do.	
	Robert Stewart	15 Sept.	
	Edward Jenkins	22 Oct.	
	John Martin	25 Feb. 1759	
	Alexander Stephens	13 Apr.	
	Lauchlan Forbes	14 do.	
	Isaac Motte	15 do.	
	Arthur St. Clair	17 do.	
	James Samuel Engel	11 May	
	William Leslie	30 do.	
	George M ^c Dougal	do.	
	Ranslaer Schuyter	1 June	
	Francis Gordon	29 Aug.	

Ensign

		<i>Rank in the Army.</i>
	Archibald Blane	4 Dec. 1756
	Donald Campbell	6 do.
	Thomas Pinckney	12 do.
	William Brown	13 do.
	John Mackie	14 do.
	Peter De Witt	1 May 1757
	William M'Lure	11 do.
	Henry Peyton	25 do.
	James Welder	16 Jan. 1758
	J. Haldimand	28 Mar.
	George Demler	29 do.
	John Jamet	30 do.
	Richard Fahie	31 do.
	Louis Victor Du Plessis	1 Apr.
	John Hay	2 do.
	William Hay	24 May
	Augustine Prevost	24 July
	Charles Rivez	25 do.
Ensign - -	Monin	26 do.
	Ulrick W. Riesberg	27 do.
	Samuel Johnson	28 do.
	Christie	do.
	James Hill	23 Aug.
	Alexander Graydon	do.
	Samuel Sears	do.
	Conrad Stockhausen	do.
	Francis Pfister	15 Sept
	Archibald Dow	6 Apr. 1759
	David Stewart	13 do.
	Philip Duperon	14 do.
	St. John Broderick	19 do.
	James Gorrell	30 May
	James M'Donald	do.
	John Britman	1 June
	George Mackay	2 do.
	Francis Schlicfer	29 Aug.

Chaplain

Chaplain - - -	{	Thomas Gawton	25 Dec. 1755
		W. Nicholson Jackson	4 Feb. 1756
		John Ogilvie	1 Sept. 1756
		Michael Schlaetler	25 Mar. 1757

Adjutant - - -	{	James Allen	18 Aug. 1756
		Thomas Barnsley	do.
		James Herring	13 June 1757
		Daniel Forbes	23 Aug. 1758







Quarter-Master	{	Donald Campbell	6 June 1757
		John Dowe	22 Oct. 1758
		William Baillie	14 Apr. 1759
		Lewis de Luz	11 May

Surgeon - - -	{	James M ^c Kenzie	2 Feb. 1756
		Stevenfon	4 do.
		Samuel Collier	6 Feb. 1759
		William Mitchell	20 Apr. 1759

Agent, Mr. Calcraff, Channel-Row, Westminster.

Sixty-

IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3)



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